

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

21 July 2016

John H. Clarke
1629 K Street, NW
Suite 300
Washington, DC 20006

Re: F-2016-01940; DIA Case # LIT-0005-2014; 14-cv-01589

Dear Mr. Clarke:

In the course of processing the 7 April 2014 and 28 May 2014 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests that you submitted on behalf of your client, Accuracy in Media, Inc., the Defense Intelligence Agency located CIA material among the responsive documents. The Defense Intelligence Agency referred the material to CIA on 10 June 2016 for review and direct response to you. The 7 April 2014 request was for production of:

1. **Maps.** Maps depicting all assets within fifteen hundred miles of Benghazi, Libya, on September 11th, on September 11th and 12th, 2012, regardless of such maps were created before or after September 11, 2012.
2. **Military assets pre-positioned in October 2011.** Records of all Defense Department assets that were pre-positioned off the coast of Tripoli on October 18, 2011, when Secretary Clinton visited Libya.
3. **Terrorist threat in 2012.** For the calendar year 2012, records of the threat to U.S. personnel because of al-Qaida or Ansar al-Shariah or other belligerent build-up in Benghazi, including photographs.”

Secondly, the 28 May 2014 request was for production of:

1. **Op Rep 3's.** The OPREP-3 PINNACLE report(s) used to provide any Department of Defense division (or office or entity) with notification of, or information about the September 11th and 12th 2012 attacks on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya.
2. **Orders re readiness status.** For the period of July 1, 2012, through September 30, 2012, records of all directives, orders, and other communications regarding the readiness status of United States armed forces on the anniversary of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade center, to or from:

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USEUCOM (U.S. European Command);
CENTCOM (United States Central Command);
AFRICOM (U.S. African Command)
USSOCOM (Special Operations Command);
OSD/JS (Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff);
Naval Air Station Sigonella, Sicily;
Spanish naval base Naval Station Rota, Spain;
Aviano Air Base in northeastern Italy; and
Special Operations Forces in the United States.”

We reviewed the referred CIA material in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the Section 701 of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 3141.

We have determined that six (6) documents can be released in segregable form with redactions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(a), (b)(7)(c), and (b)(7)(e). The remaining material must be denied in its entirety on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(a), (b)(7)(c), and (b)(7)(e). Exemption (b)(3) pertains to Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 3507, noted as exemption “(b)(3)CIAAct” on the enclosed documents, and/or Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C § 3024(i)(1), noted as exemption “(b)(3)NatSecAct” on the enclosed documents. Portions of the enclosed documents not responsive to the request are marked “NR”.

This completes our response to the above referenced referral request.

Sincerely,



Michael Lavergne
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

000002

~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct



WIRE

Published online on 11 October 2012

(b)(3) NatSecAct Libya: Update on the Benghazi Attacks

OFFICE OF TERRORISM ANALYSIS

(b)(1) (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct Newly acquired details (b)(3) NatSecAct

reinforce our assessment that members of several terrorist and militia groups—including Ansar al-Sharia (AAS), al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Egypt-based Muhammad Jamal network—participated in the attacks in Benghazi.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct We continue to assess that the assault was deliberate and organized, but also continue to assess that its lethality and efficacy are not necessarily indications of extensive planning, given the capabilities of terrorist and militia members in eastern Libya.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

WIRe [redacted] Libya: Update on the Benghazi Attacks...

Continued

(b)(1) [redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

We cannot yet explain contemporaneous reporting—
including [redacted] press.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

In addition, [redacted] claimed that extremists took advantage of a planned demonstration as an opportunity to carry out the attack. However, a US official in Benghazi reported that a protest was not underway when the assault began.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] Government Investigation Hamstrung By Disorganization, Mistrust

(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] Tripoli's investigation into the attacks in Benghazi has been disorganized and has not yet produced tangible results despite Libyan senior leaders' vow in September to show progress.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] We assess the dismissal of Prime Minister-elect Bushagur this past weekend will preoccupy political leaders during the coming weeks and contribute to additional delays.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct



(b)(3) NatSecAct

WIRe [redacted] Libya: Update on the Benghazi Attacks...

Continued

(b)(3) NatSecAct _____ (b)(1) _____
[redacted] For additional information, please see the WIRes. (b)(3) NatSecAct _____


[redacted] "Libya: Updated Assessment of Benghazi Attacks," 25 September 2012; and [redacted] "Libya: Government Poorly Positioned to Address Attacks," 13 September 2012.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct This WIRe was produced jointly with the National Counterterrorism Center, with contributions from the Office of Middle East and North Africa Analysis.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct



23 September 2012

In response to questions on the number of people involved in the Benghazi attacks, who organized the attack, and whether the groups involved have a history of working together:

The IC continues to lack sufficient information to determine with confidence the number of individuals who participated in the attacks. The most specific numbers come from CIA and State officers present, who as of 2225 local time on 11 September less than an hour after the attack began, observed that at least 20 attackers had breached the Consulate compound and as of 0030 the next day said a crowd of approximately 100 people had gathered outside a separate US facility.

— [Redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

— During the incident, several probable extremist groups cordoned off and patrolled streets that ran along the opposite sides and back of the Consulate [Redacted] indicating additional individuals may have provided a supporting role to the attackers. [Redacted]

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[Large Redacted Block]

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This item was written by NCTC, CIA.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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— AAS initially claimed responsibility for the attacks but subsequently released a video denying involvement, according to press reporting. (b)(1) press allegations that AAS's leader in Darnah, former Guantanamo Bay detainee Abu Sufiyan bin Qumu, directed the attacks. (b)(3) NatSecAct Abu Sufiyan did not direct, coordinate, or plan the assault but acknowledges intelligence gaps persist regarding AAS's role. (b)(1)

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

Extremists operating in Libya are organized into loosely affiliated groups often with multiple overlapping allegiances making their leadership structures difficult to define. (b)(1)

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

— Loosely affiliated AAS groups in Benghazi and Darnah may have additional ties to other extremist groups operating in the region. (b)(1)

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CIA Operations Center
Morning Intelligence Update
12 September 2012

(b)(3) CIAAct


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(b)(1) **Libya: US Official Killed as Protestors Attack Consulate in Benghazi;** [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

A State Department official yesterday was killed when an armed mob protesting a film deemed to be offensive to Islam attacked the US Consulate in Benghazi, according to press reporting. [redacted]

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) A separate US facility also fell under attack this morning by mortar fire and rocket-propelled grenades

(b)(3) NatSecAct

All US officials from the facility were able to evacuate. (AFP OW81316703, U; [redacted])

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

Morning and Afternoon Intelligence Reports and [redacted] can be viewed in the CIA Operations Center (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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
Published online on 23 October 2012

(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] **Libya: Extremists Reportedly Associated With the Benghazi Attack**

OFFICE OF TERRORISM ANALYSIS

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Summary: Many of the extremists who appear to have been involved in the attack on the US Temporary Mission Facility (TMF) Benghazi on 11-12 September



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- (b)(7)(c)
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The ongoing FBI investigation and continued IC collection should continue to fill key gaps in our understanding of the attackers and their group affiliations.

[redacted] This is a stand-alone graphic.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] For additional information, please see the WIRes, "[redacted] Libya: Update on the Benghazi Attacks," 11 October 2012; and "[redacted] Libya: [redacted] 29 September 2012.

FBI

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- (b)(7)(a)
- (b)(7)(c)
- (b)(7)(e)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] This WIRE was produced jointly with the National Counterterrorism Center and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted]

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WIRE

Published online on 24 September 2012

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Libya: Updated Assessment of Benghazi Attacks

OFFICE OF TERRORISM ANALYSIS

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Our assessment of the circumstances surrounding the 11-12 September attacks against US facilities in Benghazi and the motivations for the operation have gradually evolved from what we first assessed as a result of a number of new intelligence reports. In contrast to our previous assessment that the attacks grew spontaneously out of local protests inspired by developments on 11 September in Cairo, we now assess they were a deliberate assault by extremists. We will continue to factor new reporting into our assessment as it becomes available.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Timing

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The timing of the attacks still appears to have been influenced by the events in Cairo. It is also possible that some participants were galvanized by Ayman al-Zawahiri's call the previous day for Libyans to avenge the death of one of their countrymen, senior al-Qa'ida leader Abu Yahya al-Libi.

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Planning

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We now assess, based on new reporting, that the assault was deliberate and organized. Our most credible information indicates that there was not a protest ongoing at the time of the attack as first reported. Nonetheless, the lethality and efficacy of the operation are not necessarily indications of extensive planning. We assess the attackers could have quickly organized the operation based on the skills and experience acquired during the uprising against the Qadhafi regime and from extremist training.

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WIRe [redacted] Libya: Updated Assessment of Benghazi Attacks... Continued

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] The attackers used fixed firing positions, capture or kill teams, and blockades to impede the escape of US personnel and prevent help from reaching the Consulate [redacted]

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] a former Libyan security official was warned late in the afternoon on the day of the attack of an unspecified imminent action possibly to take place against the Consulate. This suggests the attack was put together at least several hours ahead of time.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] Attackers also employed effective mortar fire against the Embassy annex later in the night after US return fire repulsed their initial ground assault. [redacted] However, the fact that mortars were not used until hours after the initial attack suggests that elements of the operation were put together on the fly.

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Culpability

[redacted] Reporting indicates that many of the attackers were drawn from the Libyan militia group Ansar al-Sharia (AAS)—which has some members with ties to al-Qa'ida affiliates—and one or more groups associated with it.

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[redacted] We are looking into indications that members of other extremist networks in the region were also involved in the attacks.

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[redacted]
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[redacted] We continue to assess the perpetrators of the attack included a mix of individuals with ties to multiple extremist groups. Libyan authorities have [redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted] arrested several suspects, according to [redacted] (b)(1) press reports.

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WIRe [redacted] Libya: Updated Assessment of Benghazi Attacks... Continued

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] Islamic Extremists' Involvement in the Attacks

[redacted] We assess members of multiple extremist groups, some with connections to al-Qa'ida-affiliates, were involved in the attacks. Our most compelling reporting points to a nexus of members of AAS [redacted] as well as Benghazi-based individuals tied to the Jamal network.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] AAS denied directing the assaults, but praised the attacks and has not refuted public allegations suggesting its members were involved, according to press reports.

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[redacted] For additional information, please see the WIRes, [redacted] Egypt-Libya: Muhammad Jamal's Network Connected to Cairo Protests and Benghazi Attacks, 22 September 2012; [redacted] Libya: Ansar al-Sharia Preparing for Military Confrontation, 19 September 2012;

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] Libya: Government Poorly Positioned To Address Attacks, 13 September 2012; [redacted] Libya: Variety of Extremists Participated in Benghazi Attacks, 13 September 2012; and [redacted]

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/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

WARNING: ANY TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF THIS INFORMATION IN ANY
MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED. VIOLATORS
MAY BE SUBJECT TO CRIMINAL PROSECUTION, INCLUDING UNDER
THE
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REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

DIST: 14 SEPTEMBER 2012

COUNTRY: (U//~~FOUO~~) LIBYA

(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJ: (~~S//OC/NF~~) OBSERVATIONS FROM THE 11 AND 12 SEPTEMBER 2012
Attacks Against the U.S. Consulate and Separate U.S.
Facility in Benghazi, Libya

DOI: (U//~~FOUO~~) Mid-September 2012

SOURCE: (~~S//NF~~) A CIA Officer.

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SUMMARY: (U//~~FOUO~~) None.

TEXT: 1. (Context Statement: The source of the following information was a CIA officer with direct access to the below events.)

2. On 11 September 2012 at approximately 2200 (local), during an attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, a commander of an unidentified militia in the proximity of the facility stated that the attackers belonged to the Ansar al-Shari'a militia. The militia commander stated that he preferred to negotiate with the attackers rather than move toward the Consulate and engage in armed confrontation with them. At this time, there was no sign of a large gathering or protest; the only individuals observed in front of the

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Consulate were militia members who were neither participating in the attack nor providing assistance to the Consulate.

3. The attackers breached the Consulate compound using explosives and immediately attacked the guard building and lit it on fire. Following this, they moved through the compound and attacked the various buildings, also lighting them on fire using fuel from the compound's generators. In addition to small arms, the attackers employed large-caliber weapons (NFI) and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) against the vehicles carrying U.S. personnel as they evacuated from the U.S. Consulate.

4. On 12 September 2012 at approximately 0100 (local), following the attack on the U.S. Consulate, groups of individuals approached a separate U.S. facility in Benghazi and used small arms and an RPG against the facility. Following an exchange of fire between the attackers and U.S. personnel at the facility, the attackers retreated. (CIA Officer Comment: The attackers likely were aware of the general area in which the U.S. facility was located, but it appeared they were uncertain as to its exact location. They were likely unaware of the facility's defensive posture and were surprised by the ability of the facility's personnel to effectively locate and engage them.) At approximately 0500 on 12 September, the attackers returned and engaged the same U.S. facility in Benghazi with mortar fire. The first and second rounds landed to the south and north of the compound, respectively, and subsequent rounds impacted within the compound, including three to four direct hits on the compound's main building. (CIA Officer Comment: The mortar fire was highly accurate and was assessed to have originated from a racetrack approximately 800 meters south of the facility. The first and second shots likely "bracketed" the main building and allowed the assailants to accurately deliver follow-on rounds.)

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ACQ: (U//~~FOUO~~) Mid-September 2012

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3):10 USC
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WARNING: REPORT CLASS SECRET--

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION

AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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