

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

21 July 2016

John H. Clarke
1629 K Street, NW
Suite 300
Washington, DC 20006

Re: F-2016-02054; DIA Case # LIT-0005-2014; 14-cv-01589

Dear Mr. Clarke:

In the course of processing the 7 April 2014 and 28 May 2014 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests that you submitted on behalf of your client, Accuracy in Media, Inc., the Defense Intelligence Agency located CIA material among the responsive documents. The Defense Intelligence Agency referred the material to CIA on 29 June 2016 for review and direct response to you. The 7 April 2014 request was for production of:

1. **Maps.** Maps depicting all assets within fifteen hundred miles of Benghazi, Libya, on September 11th, on September 11th and 12th, 2012, regardless of such maps were created before or after September 11, 2012.
2. **Military assets pre-positioned in October 2011.** Records of all Defense Department assets that were pre-positioned off the coast of Tripoli on October 18, 2011, when Secretary Clinton visited Libya.
3. **Terrorist threat in 2012.** For the calendar year 2012, records of the threat to U.S. personnel because of al-Qaida or Ansar al-Shariah or other belligerent build-up in Benghazi, including photographs.”

Secondly, the 28 May 2014 request was for production of:

1. **Op Rep 3's.** The OPREP-3 PINNACLE report(s) used to provide any Department of Defense division (or office or entity) with notification of, or information about the September 11th and 12th 2012 attacks on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya.
2. **Orders re readiness status.** For the period of July 1, 2012, through September 30, 2012, records of all directives, orders, and other communications regarding the readiness status of United States armed forces on the anniversary of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade center, to or from:

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USEUCOM (U.S. European Command);
CENTCOM (United States Central Command);
AFRICOM (U.S. African Command)
USSOCOM (Special Operations Command);
OSD/JS (Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff);
Naval Air Station Sigonella, Sicily;
Spanish naval base Naval Station Rota, Spain;
Aviano Air Base in northeastern Italy; and
Special Operations Forces in the United States.”

We reviewed the referred CIA material in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the Section 701 of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 3141.

We have determined that one (1) document can be released in segregable form with redactions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). The remaining material must be denied in its entirety on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(a), (b)(7)(c), and (b)(7)(e). Exemption (b)(3) pertains to Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 3507, noted as exemption “(b)(3)CIAAct” on the enclosed documents, and/or Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C § 3024(i)(1), noted as exemption “(b)(3)NatSecAct” on the enclosed documents. Portions of the enclosed documents not responsive to the request are marked “NR”.

This completes our response to the above referenced referral request.

Sincerely,



Michael Lavergne
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosure

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WORLDWIDE INTELLIGENCE REVIEW



Wire for November 12, 2012




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
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WIRE

Published online on 13 September 2012

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Libya: Government Poorly Positioned To Address Attacks

OFFICE OF TERRORISM ANALYSIS

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The Libyan Government's lack of cohesion and control over the militias and the inexperience of its security institutions will hamper its ability to formulate a cohesive response to the attack on the US mission in Benghazi. Although most top Libyan leaders have publicly condemned the attack,

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Maqaryaf, whose role has not been officially defined, (b)(1) has convoked meetings with senior government officials to discuss security challenges, according to press reporting.

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In the early stages of the protest, Benghazi's top Ministry of Interior official personally ordered the withdrawal of the Libyan security forces protecting the Consulate saying he believed the action would avoid violence, according to press reporting.

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Yesterday, Libya's National Congress selected former Deputy Prime Minister Mustafa Bushagur—who taught computer and electrical engineering at two US universities from 1985 to 2011—as Libya's new Prime Minister. He is scheduled to form a cabinet, which should include defense and interior ministry positions, by the end of the month.

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WIRe [redacted] Libya: Government Poorly Positioned To Address... Continued

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Extremists Capitalized on Benghazi Protests

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We assess the attacks on Tuesday against the US Consulate in Benghazi began spontaneously following the protests at the US Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a direct assault against the Consulate and a separate US facility in the city. Extremists with ties to al-Qa'ida were involved in the attacks

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Initial press reporting indicated that Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi— one of two militias operating under that name in eastern Libya—claimed responsibility for the attack. Yesterday morning, however, Ansar al-Sharia released a video claiming the event was spontaneous. While not denying that some of its members were involved in the attacks, it claimed it had not ordered the assault.

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Attacks of increasing intensity occurred in waves throughout the night as extremists took advantage of opportunities to attack US facilities. The Libyan Army arrived roughly two hours after the initial attack against the US Consulate and clashed with attackers. After US personnel evacuated to a US facility in a separate part of the city, assailants began attacking it with mortars and rocket-propelled grenades. We cannot yet confirm whether a specific group directed these secondary attacks.

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Since April, there have been at least five other attacks on foreign interests in Benghazi by unidentified assailants, including three against diplomatic targets; most have involved rudimentary tactics suggesting minimal planning. The June attack on the British Ambassador's convoy, however, involved sophisticated tactics that suggested the attack was well planned.

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This WIRe was produced jointly with the Office of Middle East and North Africa Analysis.

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Timeline of Benghazi Attack, 1-12 September 2012

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21:00-22:00
Crowds observed around the US Consulate

22:20-22:25
US State compound in Benghazi breached by more than 20 attackers; communication lost with US Ambassador, who was believed to be in a hardened room.

23:30
US personnel took fire as they and 17 February Brigade members—who probably had returned—attempted to secure perimeter. First confirmation of wounded personnel.

Attack Related

11 September

US and Libyan Action Taken

Sometime on 11 September, Benghazi Local Council met with US Ambassador on slow pace of Libyan Government reforms.

21:50
The Libyan Prime Minister and the National Congress President offered their resignation as did the Director of the Libyan Intelligence Service (LIS).

22:25
Probably by this time, Libyan security forces had withdrawn from the US Consulate.

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01:00
An RPG was fired at the separate US facility in Benghazi.

1:10
A crowd of approximately 100 people had gathered and fired at the separate US facility.

1:15
RPG launched at the separate US facility but missed. Cars amassed around the facility.

3:30-4:30
The separate US facility came under heavy fire to include the use of mortars and RPGs. Attackers reportedly had tear-gas canisters and defense systems.

3:30
Small arms fire against the separate US facility ceased and crowd dispersed. LIS and February Brigade and her militia, Supreme Security Council, deployed personnel to safeguard the facility.

3:45
US Ambassador remained unaccounted for following the initial attack on the US Consulate.

5:50
The National Congress President publicly condemned the attack on his Twitter account, saying the National Congress had launched an immediate investigation into the attack. He also had called for an emergency meeting with the Libyan Prime Minister and his cabinet.

4:10-6:30
Libyan Prime Minister's Office crossed military requirements to help defend the separate US facility. US personnel commenced evacuation. We assess the US Ambassador and three other US personnel were killed by this time.

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7:27
Libyan Facebook page posted photos of Libyan personnel evacuated from Benghazi had arrived in Tripoli.

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12:00
A senior Ministry of the Interior official claimed el-Qadhafi supporters carried out attack.

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18:10
Libyan officials reportedly were building up an army unit in Tripoli and expanding security presence at all embassies.

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