

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

21 July 2016

John H. Clarke  
1629 K Street, NW  
Suite 300  
Washington, DC 20006

Re: F-2016-01211; State Case # F-2014-03625; 14-cv-01589

Dear Mr. Clarke:

In the course of processing your 21 February 2014 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request that you submitted on behalf of your client, Accuracy in Media, Inc., the Department of State located CIA material among the responsive documents. The Department of State referred the material to CIA on 4 February 2016 for review and direct response to you. The request, as amended, was for production of:

- “2. Any and all videos depicting the United States Consulate in Benghazi, Libya (including the Special Mission Compound and the Annex) between September 10, 2012 and September 12, 2012. This request includes, but is not limited to (1) all videos and photographs obtained, transmitted, or recorded via any unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and (2) video of closed-circuit television monitor at the Benghazi Mission facility's Tactical Operations Center on September 11th and 12th, 2013.
3. All records generated between September 11, 2012 and the present, by survivors of the September 11th and 12th attacks on the Benghazi mission and the Benghazi CIA Annex, or by any person regarding the survivors' accounts of the attack.
4. All records of radio communications emanating from the Compound's Tactical Operations Center (TOC), on September 11th and 12th, 2012, whether made by Regional Security Officer (RSO) Alec Henderson or any other person.
6. All records of Secretary Clinton's actions and communications for the 24-hour period beginning when first notified that the Benghazi Consulate was under attack. Responsive records include:
  1. All records generated by Secretary Clinton, including all emails, memoranda, or notes; and
  2. Telephone logs or bills or other statements of all of her telephone calls placed or received.

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11. All notes, memoranda, and correspondence generated between January of 2007 and September 11, 2012, regarding meetings between Christopher Stevens or any other Tripoli Embassy official, and one or more of the following individuals:

- Ahmed Abu Khattala, a commander of the Libyan Ansar al-Shariah militia group
- Mustafa Abdul Jalil, Chairman of the Libyan National Transitional Council from 5 March 2011-8 August 2012
- Mahmoud Jibril, Interim Prime Minister of Libya and Chair of the Executive Board of the National Transitional Council from 5 March-23 October 2011
- Wissam bin Hamid, a Libya Shield Brigade commander, supporter of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood Justice & Construction Party, and veteran jihad fighter of Iraq & Afghanistan, who provided security for US representatives in Benghazi and was tentatively identified by the Library of Congress as the head of al-Qa'eda in Libya
- Abdelhakim Belhadj (aka Abdallah al Sadeq), veteran jihad fighter of Iraq & Afghanistan, commander of the AQ franchise militia, Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) (aka Libyan Islamic Movement for Change), post-revolution military commander of Tripoli, and Libyan delegation leader to the Syrian Free Army in late 2011
- Ismael al-Sallabi (brother of Ali), commander of the Al-Qa'eda-linked al-Sahati Brigade during the revolution, and Benghazi Military Council commander afterwards, close ally of Abdelhakim Belhadj and Mustafa Jalil
- Ali al-Sallabi (brother of Ismael), called the 'spiritual leader' of the Libyan revolution, Muslim Brotherhood links, led effort with Seif al-Qaddafi and US Embassy Tripoli to gain release of jihadi detainees from Libyan jails
- Mohammad al-Sallabi, father of Ali and Ismael, among the founders of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood in the 1960s
- Abu Sufian bin Qumu, veteran jihad fighter in Afghanistan from Derna, Libya, captured in 2001, detained at GITMO, sent back to Libyan jail, released in 2010, led jihad vs Qaddafi in 2011, and [said to have] led Benghazi Mission attack in Sep 2012."

We reviewed the referred CIA material in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the Section 701 of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 3141.

We have determined that one (1) document can be released in segregable form with redactions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). The remaining material must be denied in its entirety on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). Exemption (b)(3) pertains to Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 3507, noted as exemption "(b)(3)CIAAct" on the enclosed documents, and/or Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C § 3024(i)(1), noted as exemption "(b)(3)NatSecAct" on the enclosed documents.

This completes our response to the above referenced referral request.

Sincerely,



Michael Lavergne  
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosure

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**CLASSIFICATION: SECRET**  
Page 1 of 5

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**From:** svcsmartmfi  
**Sent:** 9/14/2012 6:35:29 PM  
**To:** SMART Core  
**Subject:** ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Observations from the 11 and 12 September 2012 Attacks Against the U.S. Consulate and Separate U.S. Facility in Benghazi, Libya

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Sensitive



(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

**Subject:** ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Observations from the 11 and 12 September 2012 Attacks Against the U.S. Consulate and Separate U.S. Facility in Benghazi, Libya

**SECRET STATE 094087**

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

**SUBJECT:** ~~(S//OC/NF)~~ Observations from the 11 and 12 September 2012 Attacks Against the U.S. Consulate and Separate U.S. Facility in Benghazi, Libya

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**CLASSIFICATION: SECRET**  
Page 1 of 5

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~  
Page 2 of 5

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) CIAAct  
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CITE CIA WASHINGTON DC 358771

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SERIAL: (b)(3) CIAAct

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

WARNING: Any transmission or revelation of this information in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited. Violators may be subject to criminal prosecution, including under the espionage laws of the United States.

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

DIST: 14 September 2012

COUNTRY: (U//FOUO) Libya

(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJ: ~~(S//ORNF)~~ Observations from the 11 and 12 September 2012 Attacks Against the U.S. Consulate and Separate U.S. Facility in Benghazi, Libya

DOI: (U//FOUO) Mid-September 2012

SOURCE: ~~(S//NF)~~ A CIA Officer.

(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~  
Page 2 of 5

**CLASSIFICATION: SECRET**  
**Page 3 of 5**

(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

**SUMMARY:** (U//FOUO) None.

**TEXT:** 1. (Context Statement: The source of the following information was a CIA officer with direct access to the below events.)

2. On 11 September 2012 at approximately 2200 (local), during an attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, a commander of an unidentified militia in the proximity of the facility stated that the attackers belonged to the Ansar al-Shari'a militia. The militia commander stated that he preferred to negotiate with the attackers rather than move toward the Consulate and engage in armed confrontation with them. At this time, there was no sign of a large gathering or protest; the only individuals observed in front of the Consulate were militia members who were neither participating in the attack nor providing assistance to the Consulate.

3. The attackers breached the Consulate compound using explosives and immediately attacked the guard building and lit it on fire. Following this, they moved through the compound and attacked the various buildings, also lighting them on fire using fuel from the compound's generators. In addition to small arms, the attackers employed large-caliber weapons (NFI) and rocket propelled grenades

**CLASSIFICATION: SECRET**  
**Page 3 of 5**

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~  
Page 4 of 5

(RPGs) against the vehicles carrying U.S. personnel as they evacuated from the U.S. Consulate.

4. On 12 September 2012 at approximately 0100 (local), following the attack on the U.S. Consulate, groups of individuals approached a separate U.S. facility in Benghazi and used small arms and an RPG against the facility. Following an exchange of fire between the attackers and U.S. personnel at the facility, the attackers retreated. (CIA Officer Comment: The attackers likely were aware of the general area in which the U.S. facility was located, but it appeared they were uncertain as to its exact location. They were likely unaware of the facility's defensive posture and were surprised by the ability of the facility's personnel to effectively locate and engage them.) At approximately 0500 on 12 September, the attackers returned and engaged the same U.S. facility in Benghazi with mortar fire. The first and second rounds landed to the south and north of the compound, respectively, and subsequent rounds impacted within the compound, including three to four direct hits on the compound's main building. (CIA Officer Comment: The mortar fire was highly accurate and was assessed to have originated from a racetrack approximately 800 meters south of the facility. The first and second shots likely "bracketed" the main building and allowed the assailants to accurately deliver follow-on rounds.)

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

ACQ: (U//FOUO) Mid-September 2012

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~  
Page 4 of 5

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~  
Page 5 of 5

(b)(3) CIAAct  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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ORIGINATOR -NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

[Redacted]

ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION

AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.  
END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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Sensitive

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Page 5 of 5