



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION DIVISION  
1155 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155

MAY 11 2016

Ref: 16-LR-0019  
F-2014-03625  
Segment: EAN-0011

Mr. John H. Clarke  
1629 K Street, NW  
Suite 300  
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Mr. Clarke:

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), Freedom of Information Division, Office of Litigation Support, is responding to your February 21, 2014, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for records to the U.S. Department of State on behalf of your clients, Accuracy in Media, Inc., a non-profit corporation, as well as the following seven individuals, all of whom serve as members of the "Citizens' Commission on Benghazi," an unincorporated, informal association of individuals, all working with Accuracy in Media. Your clients are identified as (1) Roger Aronoff, (2) Larry Bailey, (3) Kenneth Benway, (4) Dick Brauer, (4) Clare Lopez, (5) James A. Lyons, Jr., (5) Kevin Shipp, and (7) Wayne Simmons.

The Department of State referred twelve (12) documents consisting of forty-three (43) pages of documents for a direct response to you. The appropriate Department of Defense components reviewed the enclosed twelve responsive documents and recommended information be withheld from release citing the 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(1), in accordance with Executive Order 13526, as amended, Sections 1.4(b), 1.4(c) and 1.4(d); (b)(3) as it relates to 10 U.S.C. § 424 protecting organizational and personnel information for the Defense Intelligence Agency and 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i) which protects intelligence sources and methods; (b)(6) which pertains to personal information affecting an individual's privacy; (b)(7)(C) which protects records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information could be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy and (b)(7)(E) which allows agencies to withhold information compiled for law enforcement purposes if disclosure would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.

000001

MAY 11 2016

Appellate rights are moot as your request is currently in litigation.

Sincerely,



for

Paul J. Jacobsmeyer  
Chief

Attachments  
As Stated

000002

From: svcsmartmf  
Sent: 9/27/2012 12:39:26 PM  
To: SMART Core  
Subject:

[Redacted] (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c),Sec. 1.4(d)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
Sensitive

MRN: 12 HOTR WASHINGTON DC//NAVCRIMINVSERVFO EUR NAPLES IT// 927760  
Date/DTG: Sep 27, 2012 / 271301Z SEP 12  
From: HOTR WASHINGTON DC//NAVCRIMINVSERVFO EUR NAPLES IT//  
Action: DIA WASHINGTON DC.ROUTINE  
Captions: ~~Sensitive, NOFORN~~  
Subject:

[Redacted] (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c),Sec. 1.4(d)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

QQQQ  
SERIAL: (U) IIR 5 398 1236 12.  
DATE OF PUBLICATION: 271301Z SEP 12.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

COUNTRY OR NONSTATE ENTITY: (U) LIBYA (LBY).


[Redacted] (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c),Sec. 1.4(d)

DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 18 Sep 2012 - 26 Sep 2012.  
CUTOFF: (U) 26 Sep 2012.  
SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.  
SOURCE NUMBER A: (U//FOUO) [Redacted] (b)(7)(E)

[Redacted] (b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c),Sec. 1.4(d)

COMMENTS: (Field Comments) 1. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Source has previously reported on the aforementioned Libyan Defense Committee. For additional information reference IIR 5 398 1227 12/Libyan Interior Ministry Reorganization After 11 September 2012 attacks  
2. (U) Source A is available for recontact.


TOPIC: (U) TERR.  
FUNCTIONAL CODE: (U) IFC2400; IFC2410; IFC2430.  
REQUIREMENT: (U) TMP2007A.1.1.3.2; TMP2007A.1.5.2.1;  
LBY2008A.1.1.1.1; LBY2008A.1.1.1.7; LBY2008A.1.1.1.8; D4J22410004712;  
DIAC1516027711; DINT2300001410; AFRICOM PIR 3.9 (20 Apr 2011).  
MGT CODE: (U) ZD; ZC. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)  
INSTR: (U) U.S. NO. [redacted]  
PREP: (U) [redacted]  
JOINT REP: (U) NONE.  
DATE OF ACQUISITION: (U) Malta (20120926)




~~CLASSIFICATION~~  
CLASSIFIED BY: NCIS.  
DERIVED FROM: OPNAVINST 5513.4E, SCG ID #04-17.2.  
DECLASSIFY ON: 20220927.  
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Derived From: OPNAVINST 5513  
Declassify On: 20220927  
Info:





Action Post:  
Dissemination Rule:      Archive Copy

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
Sensitive

From: svcsmartmf  
Sent: 9/26/2012 12:13:08 PM  
To: SMART Core  
Subject: (b)(3):10 U.S.C. § 424 LIBYAN CHIEF OF Staff Views on Attack on US Facility in Benghazi, Libya DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 23 Sep 2012. CUTOFF: (U) 23 Sep 2012. SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
Sensitive

MRN: (b)(3):10 U.S.C. § 424, (b)(3) 50 USC § 3024(i)  
Date/DTG: Sep 26 2012 12:14:20Z SEP 12  
From: (b)(3):10 U.S.C. § 424, (b)(3) 50 USC § 3024(i)  
Action: DIA WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE  
Captions: Sensitive, NOFORN  
Subject: (b)(3):10 U.S.C. § 424 2/LIBYAN CHIEF OF Staff Views on Attack on US Facility in Benghazi, Libya DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 23 Sep 2012. CUTOFF: (U) 23 Sep 2012. SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

QQQQ  
SERIAL: (U) (b)(3):10 U.S.C. § 424  
DATE OF PUBLICATION: 261420Z SEP 12.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

COUNTRY OR NONSTATE ENTITY: (U) LIBYA (LBY)  
SUBJECT: (b)(3):10 U.S.C. § 424 LIBYAN CHIEF OF Staff Views on Attack on US Facility in Benghazi, Libya  
DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 23 Sep 2012.  
CUTOFF: (U) 23 Sep 2012.  
SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1 BELOW.

(b)(1), (b)(3):10 U.S.C. § 424, 1.4 (c)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

TEXT: 1- (b)(3):10 U.S.C. § EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. The Libyan Chief of Staff characterized the attack on the U.S. Consulate Benghazi during condoleances.  
2. (b)(3):10 U.S.C. § In an expression of his condolences for the death of the U.S. Ambassador to Libya and the attack on the consulate, Chief of Staff Major General ((Mangush)) said he hoped the incident would not be a black stain in the Libyan-U.S. relationship. He also confirmed the Libyan authority will exert a tremendous effort to bring the perpetrators to justice.  
3. (b)(3):10 U.S.C. § In answering who he believed conducted the attack against the facility, MG Mangush drew a distinct separation between the two attacks that occurred on the evening of 11-12 September 2012. He stated the initial attack on the U.S. Consulate first started with a protest related to the "innocence of Muslims" film. According to Mangush, there was a peaceful demonstration which some elements exploited to attack the U.S. consulate. Mangush identified three groups that were involved in the attack from initial

information.

-The first was extremists who were small in number.

-The second group was a criminal element.

-The third group was former regime agitators who he referred to as

fifth

4. (S) (b)(3):10 U.S.C. § Mangush characterized the second attack at 0400 local Libya time on 12 September 2012, as distinctly different from the first incident. The group that executed the second attack were well trained experts. The attackers used stand off weapons, hit the U.S. facility hard for a limited amount of time and then quickly disappeared.

5. (S) (b)(3):10 U.S.C. § 424 Mangush explained the investigation has learned a lot of information and a lead investigator has been appointed. He emphasized the perpetrators of the attacks were enemies of the U.S. and the Government of Libya.

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 U.S.C. § 424,(b)(3) 50 USC § 3024(i), 1.4 (c)

(b)(3):10 U.S.C. § 424,(b)(3) 50 USC § 3024(i)

Derived From:  
Declassify On:  
Info:

(b)(3):10 U.S.C. § 424,(b)(3) 50 USC § 3024(i)



UTAIS RAMSTEIN AB GE ROUTINE

Action Post:  
Dissemination Rule:      Archive Copy

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Sensitive



From: svcsmartmf  
Sent: 9/16/2012 4:40:14 PM  
To: SMART  
Subject: (S//NF) (b)(3):10 U.S.C. § 424 (b) BRIGADES OF THE CAPTIVE OMAR ABDUL Rahman Claim Responsibility for Attack on Benghazi, Libya DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 16 Sep 2012. CUTOFF: (U) 12 Sep 2012. SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
Sensitive

MRN: 12 H0TR WASHINGTON DC//USDAO TRIPOLI LY// 9165459  
Date/DTG: Sep 16, 2012 / 162032Z SEP 12  
From: H0TR WASHINGTON DC//USDAO TRIPOLI LY//  
Action: DIA WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE  
Captions: Sensitive NOFORN  
Subject: (S//NF) (b)(3):10 U.S.C. § 424 (b) BRIGADES OF THE CAPTIVE OMAR ABDUL Rahman Claim Responsibility for Attack on Benghazi, Libya DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 16 Sep 2012. CUTOFF: (U) 12 Sep 2012. SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Q000 (b)(3):10 U.S.C. § 424  
SERIAL: (U) 424  
DATE OF PUBLICATION: 162032Z SEP 12.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

COUNTRY OR NONSTATE ENTITY: (U) LIBYA (LBY).  
SUBJECT: (S//NF) (b)(3):10 U.S.C. § 424 (b) BRIGADES OF THE CAPTIVE OMAR ABDUL Rahman Claim Responsibility for Attack on Benghazi, Libya  
DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 16 Sep 2012.  
CUTOFF: (U) 12 Sep 2012.  
SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.  
SOURCE NUMBER A: (S//NF) OES 6-215-0035-12

(b)(1), 1.4 (c), 1.4 (d), 1.4 (b)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~.  
TEXT: 1. (S//NF) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. Brigades of the Captive Omar Abdul Rahman claim ultimate responsibility for the attacks on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya. The group has training locations around Libya and subscribe to AQ ideologies.  
2. (S//NF) The attack on the American consulate in Benghazi was planned and executed by The Brigades of the Captive Omar Abdul Rahman (BCOAR). BCOAR is also responsible for past attacks on the Red Cross

in Benghazi and the attack on the British ambassador, they have approximately 120 members. The BCOAR are connected to Ansar al Sharia katiba, commanded by Sofian AL ((GUMMA)), they are based in Derna but have a branch in Benghazi. Ansar al Sharia share the same ideology as BCOAR, but it is not thought that they were involved in the attack on the U.S. American Consulate on 11 September 2012.

3. ~~(S//NF)~~ The attack was planned ten or more days prior on approximately 01 September 2012. The intention was to attack the consulate and to kill as many Americans as possible to seek revenge for U.S. killing of Aboyahiyeh ((ALALIBY)) in Pakistan and in memorial of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center buildings.

(b)(1), 1.4 (c), 1.4 (d), 1.4 (b)

4. ~~(S//NF)~~ The leader of BCOAR is Abdul Baset ((AZUZ)), AZUZ was sent by ((ZAWARI)) to set up Al Qaeda (AQ) bases in Libya. It was stated that AZUZ was not a charismatic leader but rather just a violent radical. He is also a member of the Abu Slim Martyrs Katiba, run by Fati ((AGIB)).

5. ~~(S//NF)~~ Within the last year AZUZ established the Al-Tawheed (Oneness of God) college in Derna, the establishment of this college was authorized by the Ministry of Education with the approval of the Under Secretary of the Ministry of Education, Fathi ((AL-KA'AHY)), a member of the Muslim brother hood movement and currently one of the eight presidential candidates. Al-Tawheed College is the headquarters of BCOAR and is located next to the main Derna hospital.

The majority of its members are under the age of 28 with a large number between the ages of 17-21 years of age. AZUZ has managed to establish a headquarters and training facility in Derna, they train in the mountains surrounding Derna where they have large caches of weapons. Some of these caches are disguised by feeding troughs for livestock. They have SA-7 and SA-23/4 MANPADS as well as unidentified missiles over two meters in length. They train almost every day focusing on religious lessons and scripture including three lessons a day of jihadist ideology.

6. ~~(S//NF)~~ Approximately 120 men of the BCOAR train in this area and sometimes they are joined by other radical groups such as Abu Slim Martyrs Katiba, Ansar al Sharia Katiba. One of BCOARs main planning locations is Hamza Mosque (b)(3):10 U.S.C. § 424 nobody with the exception of their group is allowed to pray there, everyone in Derna is aware of this.

7. ~~(S//NF)~~ The most important location is Al-Sadaqa Mosque, (b)(3):10 U.S.C. § 424 There is a small rectangular room, approximately 12 meters by 6 meters in the vicinity of the mosque that contains a large number of written documents. The majority of their documentation is written as the group very rarely uses e-mail, these documents contain information on all of the AQ activity in Libya.

(b)(1), (b)(3):10 U.S.C. § 424, (b)(3) 50 USC § 3024(i), 1.4 (c), 1.4 (d)

(b)(3):10 U.S.C. § 424,(b)(3) 50 USC § 3024(i)

(b)(3):10 U.S.C. § 424

Action Post:  
Dissemination Rule:      Archive Copy

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Sensitive

From: svcsmartmf  
Sent: 9/17/2012 10:39:17 AM  
To: SMART  
Subject: (S//NF) (b)(3):10 U.S.C. § 424 12/DT NO. 928131A DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 14 Sep 2012.  
CUTOFF: (U) 14 Sep 2012. SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.  
SOURCE NUMBER A: (S//NF) EUML-0060

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
Sensitive

MRN: 12 DIA (b)(3):10 WASHINGTON DC 9174952  
Date/DTG: Sep 17 2012 171107Z SEP 12  
From: DIA (b)(3):10 WASHINGTON DC  
Action: 547IS NELLIS AFB NV ROUTINE ; ACC AFTC LANGLEY AFB VA ROUTINE ;  
AFIAA AMHS BOLLING AFB DC ROUTINE ; AFNORTH A2 TYNDALL AFB FL ROUTINE ;  
APL JHU LAUREL MD ROUTINE ; CDR3DSFGA FT BRAGG NC ROUTINE ;  
CIA WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE ; COGARD MIFC LANT DAM NECK VA ROUTINE ;  
COMLANTAREA COGARD PORTSMOUTH VA ROUTINE ; COMMARFORCOM ROUTINE ;  
COMNAVSEASYS COM WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE ;  
COMSOCCENT INTEL MACDILL AFB FL ROUTINE ; COMUSFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA  
ROUTINE ; CTF 69 ROUTINE ; DA AMHS WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE ;  
DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE ;  
DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE ;  
DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE ; DIRJIATF SOUTH J2 ROUTINE ;  
(b)(3):10 U.S.C. § 424 DIRNAVCRIMINVSERV QUANTICO VA  
ROUTINE ; DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN HQ WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE ;  
FORSCOM ACE FT MCPHERSON GA ROUTINE ;  
HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE ;  
HQ AFTAC PATRICK AFB FL ROUTINE ;  
HQ NORAD USNORTHCOM INTEL PETERSON AFB CO ROUTINE ;  
HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL ROUTINE ;  
INTEL FACILITY SOUTHEAST SECTOR TYNDALL AFB FL ROUTINE ;  
JAC MOLESWORTH JCDX RAF MOLESWORTH UK ROUTINE ;  
JIATF SOUTH INTEL KEY WEST FL ROUTINE ; JIATF WEST ROUTINE ;  
JIOWC SAN ANTONIO TX ROUTINE ; JWAC DAHLGREN VA ROUTINE ;  
NASIC WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB OH ROUTINE ; NAVEODTECHDIV INDIAN HEAD MD  
ROUTINE ; NAVOCEANO STENNIS SPACE CENTER MS ROUTINE ;  
NAVSTKAIRWARCEN FALLON NV ROUTINE ; NGA WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE ;  
PACOM JIOC HONOLULU HI ROUTINE ; WASHDC, SECSTATE ROUTINE ;  
UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE ROUTINE ;  
US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE ;  
US SECRET SERVICE WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE ; US SURVEY DIV SHAPE BE ROUTINE ;  
USAREUR ACE DARMSTADT GE ROUTINE ; USCENTCOM (b)(3):10 CEN MACDILL AFB FL  
ROUTINE ; USS BONHOMME RICHARD ROUTINE ; USSOCOM INTEL MACDILL AFB FL  
ROUTINE ; USSS CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE ;  
USSTRATCOM INTEL DIRECTORATE OFFUTT AFB NE ROUTINE  
Captions: Sensitive (b)(3):10 U.S.C. § 424  
Subject: (S//NF) (b)(3):10 U.S.C. § 424 NO. 928131A DATE OF  
INFORMATION: (U) 14 Sep 2012. CUTOFF: (U) 14 Sep 2012. SUMMARY: (U) SEE  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW. SOURCE NUMBER A: (S//NF)  
EUML-0060

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

QQQQ

SERIAL: (U) IIR 5 398 1203 12.

DATE OF PUBLICATION: 141948Z SEP 12.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

COUNTRY OR NONSTATE ENTITY: (U) LIBYA (LBY); UNITED STATES (USA).

\*\*\*\*\* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE \*\*\*\*\*

SUBJECT: ~~(S//NF)~~ IIR 5 398 1203 12/S-AFR-2400-0291-12/DT NO. 928131A

DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 14 Sep 2012.

CUTOFF: (U) 14 Sep 2012.

SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.

SOURCE NUMBER A: ~~(S//NF)~~ EUML-0060

SOURCE A: ~~(S//NF)~~ Source is a civilian Libyan national.

CONTEXT A: ~~(S//NF)~~ Source has indirect access with longtime contacts in the Libyan cities of Tripoli and Benghazi. Source has reported multiple times in the past with high reliability. Reliability of sub-sources is unknown at this time.

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

TEXT: 1. ~~(S//NF)~~ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. This IIR provides additional information which satisfies inquiries posed under SDR

~~S~~-AFR-400-0291-12/DT No. 928131A

2. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO)~~ QUESTION from SDR S-AFR-2400-0291-12. Were any license plate numbers or identifying marks of vehicles involved in the attacks recorded?

2A. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO)~~ ANSWER. Source did not have any specific info on the vehicles involved or tag numbers. The perpetrators fled to DERNA immediately after this attack. There is speculation that anyone who was seen on video is now in disguise and most likely fled over the border into Egypt.

3. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO)~~ QUESTION from SDR S-AFR-2400-0291-12. Were attackers firing from within an unarmed crowd or openly?

3A. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO)~~ ANSWER. There was no firing from the crowd, but there was firing towards the crowd from the embassy at some point, which further incited the violence.

4. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO)~~ QUESTION from SDR S-AFR-2400-0291-12. Were Libyan security services observed detaining any attackers?

4A. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO)~~ ANSWER. No one was detained immediately.

5. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO)~~ QUESTION from SDR S-AFR-2400-0291-12. Were members of local militias or security complacent during the attack?

5A. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO)~~ ANSWER. The Libyan Security, 17 February Brigade, withdrew at the first sign of armed aggression and fled the scene.

6. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO)~~ QUESTION from SDR S-AFR-2400-0291-12. Did the attack seem coordinated and controlled or did it appear the result of mob mentality?

6A. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO)~~ ANSWER. Attack was coordinated and controlled. Attackers conducted two separate attacks (NFI).

7. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO)~~ QUESTION from SDR S-AFR-2400-0291-12. How long did it take for security services to arrive?

7A. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO)~~ ANSWER. Initial rescue/recovery of the bodies was conducted by local civilians after the attackers departed. Looting of the compound followed and office equipment was stolen.

8. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO)~~ QUESTION from SDR S-AFR-2400-0291-12. Were the attackers chanting any specific phrases?

8A. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO)~~ ANSWER. The attackers did not chant anything specific.

9. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO)~~ QUESTION from SDR S-AFR-2400-0291-12. Who

- did the first responders blame for the attack?
- 9A. (U) ANSWER. Site not visited
10. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO)~~ QUESTION from SDR S-AFR-2400-0291-12. Was this attack related to the killing of al-Shahri's (AQAP Deputy Leader)?
- 10A. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO)~~ ANSWER. The first reaction was that this attack was retaliatory for the death of Abu Yahya Al Libi and the protest over the video created the opportunity.
11. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO)~~ QUESTION from SDR S-AFR-2400-0291-12. Was this attack unique to Libya or part of the larger global agenda?
- 11A. (U) ANSWER. Source has no input
12. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO)~~ QUESTION from SDR S-AFR-2400-0291-12. Was there any financial gain for the attackers?
- 12A. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO)~~ ANSWER. Attack was very well planned.
- \*\*\*\*\* START OF SECTION 2 \*\*\*\*\*
- There did not appear to be any financial gain for the attackers as they were not involved in the looting that followed.
13. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO)~~ QUESTION from SDR S-AFR-2400-0291-12. Where did the weapons for the attack come from?
- 13A. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO)~~ ANSWER. It is unknown where the weapons came from, but weapons are readily available throughout Libya and are held by the various splinter groups.
14. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO)~~ QUESTION from SDR S-AFR-2400-0291-12. Was the attack a result of 9-11, what was their intent?
- 14A. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO)~~ ANSWER. Attack could have occurred any day; it was a coincidence that it occurred on 11 September 2012.
15. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO)~~ QUESTION from SDR S-AFR-2400-0291-12. Who conducted the attack and was the attack coordinated with others?
- 15A. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO)~~ ANSWER. A Salafi group (NFI) from DERMA, Libya was responsible.
16. ~~(S//REL TO USA, NATO)~~ QUESTION from SDR S-AFR-2400-0291-12. How is Ansar al-Sharia associated to the AQ organization?
- 16A. (U) ANSWER. Source has no input
- COMMENTS: (Field Comments) 1. (S//NF) See previous reporting about the attack on US Consulate Benghazi IIR 5 398 1185 12 DTG 130917Z SEP 12.
2. (U) Source A is available for recontact.

TOPIC: (U) TERR; DEPS; LEAD; FPOL.

FUNCTIONAL CODE: (U) IFC2210; IFC1500; IFC2400; IFC1570; IFC1590; IFC2390.

REQUIREMENT: (U) LBY2008A.1.1.4.7; LBY2008A.1.1.1.2; LBY2008A.1.1.1.11; LBY2008A.1.1.3.3; LBY2008A.1.1.1.8; LBY2008A.1.1.3.2; LBY2008A.1.1.2.8; UAFR2410005311; SAFR2400029112.

MGT CODE: (U) ZA; ZD; ZC.

INSTR: (U) U.S. NO.

PREP: (U) 5N0555; 5N0649; 5N2671.

JOINT REP: (U) NONE.

DATE OF ACQUISITION: (U) MALTA (20120914).

POC: (U//FOUO) POC INFORMATION: Direct any further questions concerning this IIR to NCIS HQ Collection Management via NIPRNET: collections(at)ncis.navy.mil; SIP RNET:collection(at)ncis.navy.smi I.mil ; or JWICS: COLLECTIONS(AT)NCIS.IC.GOV...

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====DISSEMINATION===== ==

AGENCY: ~~(S//NF)~~ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Department of Defense; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

U.S. MISSION: (U) None.

MILITARY: ~~(S//NF)~~ DIA/Defense CI and HUMINT Center (DX); Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS); U.S. Africa Command.

STATE/LOCAL: (U) None.

=====CLASSIFICATION===== ==

CLASSIFIED BY: 5N0555.  
DERIVED FROM: OPNAVINST 5513.4E, SCG ID #04-17.2.

DECLASSIFY ON: 20220914.  
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Derived From:	OPNAVINST 5513
Declassify On:	20220914

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Action Post:  
Dissemination Rule: Archive Copy

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Sensitive



From: svcsmartmfi  
Sent: 9/13/2012 6:18:17 AM  
To: SMART Core  
Subject: (U) ADMINISTRATIVE REVISION: IIR 5 398 1185 12/INFORMATON ON attack of US Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, on 11Sep12 DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 12 Sep 2012. CUTOFF: (U) 12 Sep 2012. SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
Sensitive

MRN: 12 HOTR WASHINGTON DC//NAVCRIMINVSERVFO EUR NAPLES IT// 9132460  
Date/DTG: Sep 13, 2012 / 130913Z SEP 12  
From: HOTR WASHINGTON DC//NAVCRIMINVSERVFO EUR NAPLES IT//  
Action: DIA WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE  
Captions: ~~Sensitive, NOFORN~~  
Subject: (U) ADMINISTRATIVE REVISION: IIR 5 398 1185 12/INFORMATON ON attack of US Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, on 11Sep12 DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 12 Sep 2012. CUTOFF: (U) 12 Sep 2012. SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

QQQQ  
SERIAL: (U) IIR 5 398 1185 12.  
DATE OF PUBLICATION: 130913Z SEP 12.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

COUNTRY OR NONSTATE ENTITY: (U) LIBYA (LBY); UNITED STATES (USA).  
SUBJECT: (U) ADMINISTRATIVE REVISION: IIR 5 398 1185 12/INFORMATON ON attack of US Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, on 11Sep12  
DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 12 Sep 2012.  
CUTOFF: (U) 12 Sep 2012.  
SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.

(b)(1),(b)(7)(D),Sec. 1.4(c),Sec. 1.4(d)

WARNING: (U) ADMINISTRATIVE REVISION. THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED SECRET//NOFORN.

(b)(1),Sec. 1.4(c),Sec. 1.4(d)

1. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. A Salafi group (NFI) is believed to be responsible for the 11 September, 2012, attack on the US Consulate in Benghazi, Libya. The attack was in retaliation for the killing of an Al Qaeda operative. The Salafi group attended the initial protests and returned at night using overwhelming firepower to overtake security forces of the Consulate.  
2. (U) The general atmosphere in Benghazi and Tripoli, Libya, relevant to the attack on the US Consulate, on 11 and 12Sept12, is that of shock and disbelief. A Salafi group is reported to be behind the attack. The Salafi group responsible for the violent are believed to be the same group who defaced the Islamic shrines and old

historic monuments. Some business owners are siding against the Salafi group, believed to be the culprits, and hoping for international intervention to assure stability and justice. A majority of the local population is reported to hold anti-Salafi views.

3. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ The attack was an organized operation with specific information that the US Ambassador was present. The Salafi group attended the protest at or near the US Consulate earlier on 11 September, 2012, and then returned at 2300 firing small arms weapons and between 25 to 30 RPGs at the Consulate and other unknown targets (NFI). The local police tried to defend the Consulate but were out matched by the group's size and their superior firepower.

4. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ The attack was in carried out in retaliation for the killing of the Al Qaeda's number two man, Abu Yah Ya ((Al LIBI)).  
COMMENTS: (Source Comments) 1. (U//FOUO) Some portions of the population who believe the timing and agenda was an attempt to sabotage the 13 September, 2012, elections of the Prime Minister. However, the recently released anti-Islam film produced in America is taking the blame, as it is more popular widely accepted reason vice the actual reason of revenge.

2. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ There has been no reports of any continuation of the protests or violence, but source suspects there could be additional violence since the attack seemed well coordinated. The majority of the population is against these violent actions, but will not openly condemn them as it will align them with those who support the creation and promulgation of the anti-Muhammad/Islamic video or view. It is believed that most of the businesses and population would support this as the majority hold anti Salafi views and are against such violence.

[Redacted] (b)(1), Sec. 1.4(c), Sec. 1.4(d)

4. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ There was a plan to protest in Tripoli on 11 Sep 12, but law enforcement officials squashed the protest with roadblocks and enforcement efforts.

5. (U) One business owner was heard expressing, "I hope the building has cameras," to help catch the ones responsible.

[Redacted] (b)(7)(E)

2. (U) Source A is available for recontact.  
TOPIC: (U) DEPS; FPOL; LEAD; TERR.  
FUNCTIONAL CODE: (U) IFC1500; IFC1570; IFC1590; IFC2210; IFC2390; IFC2400.

REQUIREMENT: (U) LBY2008A.1.1.2.8; LBY2008A.1.1.1.8; LBY2008A.1.1.3.3; LBY2008A.1.1.1.2; LBY2008A.1.1.4.7; LBY2008A.1.1.3.2; LBY2008A.1.1.1.11.

MGT CODE: (U) ZC; ZD; ZJ.

QQQQ

INSTR: (U) U.S. NO.

PREP: [Redacted] (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

JOINT REP: (U) NONE.

DATE OF ACQUISITION: (U) Sicily, Italy (20120912).

POC: ~~(U//FOUO)~~ POC Information: Direct any further questions concerning this IIR to NCIS HQ Collection Management via NIPRNETcollections@ncis.navy.mil


[Redacted] (b)(7)(E)

WARNING: (U) ADMINISTRATIVE REVISION. THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED SECRET//NOFORN.

=====DISSEMINATION===== ==  
AGENCY: (U) None.  
U.S. MISSION: (U) None.  
MILITARY: (U) None.  
STATE/LOCAL: (U) None.  
=====CLASSIFICATION===== ==  
CLASSIFIED BY: 5N2671.  
DERIVED FROM: OPNAVINST 5513.4E, SCG ID #04-17.2.  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1, 20370912.  
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Derived From: OPNAVINST 5513  
Declassify On: 25X1, 20370912  
Info:



(b)(7)(E)

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Action Post:  
Dissemination Rule: Archive Copy

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~~Sensitive~~

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From: svcsmartmfi  
Sent: 9/12/2012 12:41:18 PM  
To: SMART Core  
Subject: (U) IIR 5 398 1185 12/INFORMATON ON ATTACK OF US CONSULATE in Benghazi, Libya, on 11Sep12 DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 12 Sep 2012. CUTOFF: (U) 12 Sep 2012. SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
Sensitive

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MRN: 12 HOTR WASHINGTON DC//NAVCRIMINSERVFO EUR NAPLES IT// 9121495  
Date/DTG: Sep 12, 2012 / 121508Z SEP 12  
From: HOTR WASHINGTON DC//NAVCRIMINSERVFO EUR NAPLES IT//  
Action: DIA WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE  
Captions: Sensitive, NOFORN  
Subject: (U) IIR 5 398 1185 12/INFORMATON ON ATTACK OF US CONSULATE in Benghazi, Libya, on 11Sep12 DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 12 Sep 2012. CUTOFF: (U) 12 Sep 2012. SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

QQQQ  
SERIAL: (U) IIR 5 398 1185 12.  
DATE OF PUBLICATION: 121508Z SEP 12.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

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COUNTRY OR NONSTATE ENTITY: (U) LIBYA (LBY); UNITED STATES (USA).  
SUBJECT: (U) IIR 5 398 1185 12/INFORMATON ON ATTACK OF US CONSULATE in Benghazi, Libya, on 11Sep12  
DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 12 Sep 2012.  
CUTOFF: (U) 12 Sep 2012.  
SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.  
SOURCE NUMBER A-(S/NF) EULM-0060  
SOURCE A: (S/NF) Source is a Libyan national who operated a business in Malta and makes frequent trips to Libya.  
CONTEXT A: (S/NF) Source has indirect access with longtime contacts in the Libyan cities of Tripoli and Benghazi. Source has reported multiple times in the past with high reliability.  
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED SECRET//NOFORN.  
TEXT: 1. (U//FOUO) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. A Salafi group (NF) is believed to be responsible for the 11 September, 2012, attack on the US Consulate in Benghazi, Libya. The attack was in retaliation for the killing of an Al Qaeda operative. The Salafi group attended the initial protests and returned at night using overwhelming firepower to overtake security forces of the Consulate.  
2. (U) The general atmosphere in Benghazi and Tripoli, Libya, relevant to the attack on the US Consulate, on 11 and 12Sept12, is that of shock and disbelief. A Salafi group is reported to be behind the attack. The Salafi group responsible for the violent are believed to be the same group who defaced the Islamic shrines and old historic monuments. Some business owners are siding against the Salafi group, believed to be the culprits, and hoping for international intervention to assure stability and justice. A majority of the local population is reported to hold anti-Salafi

views.

3. (U//FOUO) The attack was an organized operation with specific information that the US Ambassador was present. The Salafi group attended the protest at or near the US Consulate earlier on 11 September, 2012, and then returned at 2300 firing small arms weapons and between 25 to 30 RPGs at the Consulate and other unknown targets (NFI). The local police tried to defend the Consulate but were out matched by the group's size and their superior firepower.

4. (U//FOUO) The attack was in carried out in retaliation for the killing of the Al Qaeda's number two man, Abu Yah Ya ((Al LIBI)).  
COMMENTS: (Source Comments) 1. (U//FOUO) Some portions of the population who believe the timing and agenda was an attempt to sabotage the 13 September, 2012, elections of the Prime Minister. However, the recently released anti-Islam film produced in America is taking the blame, as it is more popular widely accepted reason vice the actual reason of revenge.

2. (U//FOUO) There has been no reports of any continuation of the protests or violence, but source suspects there could be additional violence since the attack seemed well coordinated. The majority of the population is against these violent actions, but will not openly condemn them as it will align them with those who support the creation and promulgation of the anti-Muhammad/Islamic video or view. It is believed that most of the businesses and population would support this as the majority hold anti Salafi views and are against such violence.

3. ~~(S//NF)~~ Source has received over 50 calls condemning the Salafists in the attacks on 11 September 2012.

4. (U//FOUO) There was a plan to protest in Tripoli on 11Sep12, but law enforcement officials squashed the protest with roadblocks and enforcement efforts.

5. (U) One business owner was heard expressing, "I hope the building has cameras," to help catch the ones responsible.

(Field Comments) 1. (U//FOUO) To aid collection efforts, analysts are encouraged to send evaluations and additional source directed requirements (SDRs) via HOT-R. If HOT-R is unavailable, please send evaluations and SDRs to DIRNAVCRIMINVSERV QUANTICO VA//0025//. For foreign disclosure and release of information contained in this IIR, submit a request for information (RFI) via the NCIS Homepage at: (SIPR) <http://www.ncis.navy.smil.mil>; or (JWICS) <http://www.ncis.nmic.ic.gov>.

2. (U) Source A is available for recontact.

TOPIC: (U) DEPS; FPOL; LEAD; TERR.

FUNCTIONAL CODE: (U) IFC1500; IFC1570; IFC1590; IFC2210; IFC2390; IFC2400.

REQUIREMENT: (U) LBY2008A.1.1.1.2; LBY2008A.1.1.1.8; LBY2008A.1.1.1.11; LBY2008A.1.1.2.8; LBY2008A.1.1.3.2; LBY2008A.1.1.3.3; LBY2008A.1.1.4.7.

MGT CODE: (U) ZC; ZD; ZJ.

INSTR: (U) U.S. NO.

PREP: (U) 5N2671; 5N0649.

JOINT REP: (U) NONE.

DATE OF ACQUISITION: (U) Sicily, Italy (20120912).

POC: (U//FOUO) POC Information: Direct any further questions concerning this IIR to NCIS HQ Collection Management via NIPRNET: [collections\(at\)ncis.navy.mil](mailto:collections(at)ncis.navy.mil); SIPRNET: [collection\(at\)ncis.navy.smil.mil](mailto:collection(at)ncis.navy.smil.mil); or JWICS: [collections\(at\)ncis.ic.gov](mailto:collections(at)ncis.ic.gov) ..

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====DISSE MINATION===== ==

AGENCY: (U) None.

U.S. MISSION: (U) None.

MILITARY: (U) None.

STATE/LOCAL: (U) None.

=====~~SECRET~~=====  
=====CLASSIFICATION===== ==  
CLASSIFIED BY: 5N2671.  
DERIVED FROM: OPNAVINST 5513.4E, SCG ID #04-17.2.  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1, 20370912.  
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Derived From: OPNAVINST 5513  
Declassify On: 25X1, 20370912  
Info: AFRICOM IKD-M MOLESWORTH UKROUTINE ; AMC INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB ILROUTINE ;  
ANCHORY FT GEORGE G MEADE MDROUTINE ; CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE  
ROUTINE ; CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GEROUTINE ;  
CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FLROUTINE ;  
CDR USTRANSCOM INTEL CELL SCOTT AFB ILROUTINE ;  
CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB ILROUTINE ; CDR2NDMIBN DARMSTADT GEROUTINE ;  
CDRINSCOM FT BELVOIR VAROUTINE ; CDRUSACIDC FT BELVOIR VAROUTINE ;  
CDRUSAREUR DCSINT HEIDELBERG GEROUTINE ; CIA WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ;  
CIFA WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ; CNO WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ;  
COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ;  
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ; COMJSOC FT BRAGG NCROUTINE ;  
COMMARFORAF STUTTGART GEROUTINE ; COMMARFOREUR ROUTINE ;  
COMSC WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ; COMSIXTHFLT ROUTINE ;  
COMSOCAFRICA INTEL STUTTGART GEROUTINE ; COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
ROUTINE ; COMUSNAVEUR NAPLES ITROUTINE ; DA AMHS WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ;  
DCDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FLROUTINE ;  
DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ; DIA WASHINGTON DC  
ROUTINE ; DIRACIC FT GEORGE G MEADE MDROUTINE ;  
DIRNAVCRIMINSERV QUANTICO VAROUTINE ; DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD  
ROUTINE ; FBI WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ; HOTR WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ;  
HQ AFOSI ANDREWS AFB MDROUTINE ; HQ AMC SCOTT AFB ILROUTINE ;  
HQ BICE INTEL WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ;  
HQ NORAD USNORTHCOM INTEL PETERSON AFB COROUTINE ;  
HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GEROUTINE ; HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GEROUTINE ;  
HQ USSOCOM FP MACDILL AFB FLROUTINE ;  
JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UKROUTINE ; MARCORINTACT QUANTICO VA  
ROUTINE ; MCNOSC QUANTICO VAROUTINE ; MSCREP ROTA SPROUTINE ;  
MSCREP SOUDA BAY GRROUTINE ; NAVCRIMINSERVFO EUR NAPLES ITROUTINE ;  
NAVOCEANO STENNIS SPACE CENTER ROUTINE ;  
NAVUNSEAWARCENDIV KEYPORT WAROUTINE ; NCTC WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ;  
NGIC INTEL OPS CHARLOTTESVILLE VAROUTINE ; NRC WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ;  
ONI WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ; WASHDC, SECSTATE ROUTINE ; SR JOIC NAPLES IT  
ROUTINE ; TSA HQ WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ; USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NEROUTINE ;  
UTAIS RAMSTEIN AB GEROUTINE

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Action Post:  
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From: svcsmartmfi  
Sent: 9/14/2012 5:00:25 PM  
To: SMART Core  
Subject: (U//FOUO) IIR 5 398 1204 12/LIBYAN AUTHORITIES SEEK PERSONS responsible for attack on the US Consulate Benghazi DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 14 Sep 2012. CUTOFF: (U) 14 Sep 2012. SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
Sensitive

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MRN: 12 HOTR WASHINGTON DC//NAVCRIMINVSERVFO EUR NAPLES IT// 9144805  
Date/DTG: Sep 14, 2012 / 142033Z SEP 12  
From: HOTR WASHINGTON DC//NAVCRIMINVSERVFO EUR NAPLES IT//  
Action: DIA WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE  
Captions: ~~Sensitive, NOFORN~~  
Subject: (U//FOUO) IIR 5 398 1204 12/LIBYAN AUTHORITIES SEEK PERSONS responsible for attack on the US Consulate Benghazi DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 14 Sep 2012. CUTOFF: (U) 14 Sep 2012. SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

QQQQ  
SERIAL: (U) IIR 5 398 1204 12.  
DATE OF PUBLICATION: 142033Z SEP 12.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

COUNTRY OR NONSTATE ENTITY: (U) LIBYA (LBY); UNITED STATES (USA).  
SUBJECT: (U//FOUO) IIR 5 398 1204 12/LIBYAN AUTHORITIES SEEK PERSONS responsible for attack on the US Consulate Benghazi  
DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 14 Sep 2012.  
CUTOFF: (U) 14 Sep 2012.  
SUMMARY: (U) SEE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TEXT PARAGRAPH 1, BELOW.  
SOURCE NUMBER A: ~~(S//NF)~~ EUML-0060  
SOURCE A: ~~(S//NF)~~ Source is a civilian Libyan national.  
CONTEXT A: ~~(S//NF)~~ Source has indirect access with longtime contacts in the Libyan cities of Tripoli and Benghazi. Source has reported multiple times in the past with high reliability. Reliability of sub-sources is unknown at this time.  
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED SECRET//NOFORN.  
TEXT: 1. ~~(S//NF)~~ TO USA, NATO) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. Libyan authorities suspect the Islamist group ANSAR AL-SHARIA is responsible for the attack on the US Consulate Benghazi.  
2. ~~(S//NF)~~ TO USA, NATO) Libyan authorities have arrested multiple persons for the attack on the US Consulate Benghazi. Libyan Authorities suspect the Islamist group ANSAR AL-SHARIA, located in Derna, was responsible for the attack on the US Consulate. Libyan authorities are focusing their search for the perpetrators in Derna.  
COMMENTS: (Field Comments) 1. ~~(S//NF)~~ See IIR 5 398 1200 12 for additional reporting about the attack on US Consulate Benghazi.  
2. (U) Source A is available for recontact.  
TOPIC: (U) FMCC; TERR.  
FUNCTIONAL CODE: (U) IFC2400; IFC2420.  
REQUIREMENT: (U) LBY2008A.1.1.1.1; LBY2008A.1.1.1.7; UAFR2410005311; AFRICOM PIR 3.1 (20 Apr 2011).



MGT CODE: (U) ZA; ZC; ZD.  
INSTR: (U) U.S. NO.  
PREP: (U) 5N0649.  
JOINT REP: (U) NONE.  
DATE OF ACQUISITION: (U) MALTA (20120914).  
POC: (U//FOUO) POC INFORMATION: Direct any further questions concerning this IIR to NCIS HQ Collection Management via NIPRNET: collections(at)ncis.navy.mil; SIP RNET: collection(at)ncis.navy.smi l.mil ; or JWICS: COLLECTIONS(AT)NCIS.IC.GOV...

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====DISSE MINATION=====

AGENCY: ~~(S//NF)~~ Department of Defense; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); US Navy; US Marine Corps; National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC); Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

U.S. MISSION: (U) None.

MILITARY: ~~(S//NF)~~ DIA/Defense CI and HUMINT Center (DX); Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS).

STATE/LOCAL: (U) None.

=====CLASSIFICATION=====

CLASSIFIED BY: 5N0555.

DERIVED FROM: OPNAVINST 5513.4E, SCG ID #04 -17.2.

DECLASSIFY ON: 20220914.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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Derived From: OPNAVINST 5513  
Declassify On: 20220914  
Info: AFRICOM IKD-M MOLESWORTH UKROUTINE ; AMC INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB ILROUTINE ; ANCHORY FT GEORGE G MEADE MDROUTINE ; CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GEROUTINE ; CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GEROUTINE ; CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FLROUTINE ; CDR USTRANSCOM INTEL CELL SCOTT AFB ILROUTINE ; CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB ILROUTINE ; CDR2NDMIBN DARMSTADT GEROUTINE ; CDRINSCOM FT BELVOIR VAROUTINE ; CDRUSACIDC FT BELVOIR VAROUTINE ; CDRUSAREUR DCSINT HEIDELBERG GEROUTINE ; CIA WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ; CIFA WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ; CNO WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ; COMJSOC FT BRAGG NCROUTINE ; COMMARFORAF STUTTGART GEROUTINE ; COMMARFOREUR ROUTINE ; COMSC WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ; COMSIXTHFLT ROUTINE ; COMSOCAFRICA INTEL STUTTGART GEROUTINE ; COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GEROUTINE ; COMUSNAVEUR NAPLES ITROUTINE ; DA AMHS WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ; DCDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FLROUTINE ; DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ; DIA WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ; DIRACIC FT GEORGE G MEADE MDROUTINE ; DIRNAVCRIMINVSERV QUANTICO VAROUTINE ; DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MDROUTINE ; FBI WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ; HOTR WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ; HQ AFOSI ANDREWS AFB MDROUTINE ; HQ AMC SCOTT AFB ILROUTINE ; HQ BICE INTEL WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ; HQ NORAD USNORTHCOM INTEL PETERSON AFB COROUTINE ; HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GEROUTINE ; HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GEROUTINE ; HQ USSOCOM FP MACDILL AFB FLROUTINE ; JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UKROUTINE ; MARCORINTACT QUANTICO VAROUTINE ; MCNOSC QUANTICO VAROUTINE ; MSCREP ROTA SPROUTINE ; MSCREP SOUDA BAY GRROUTINE ; NAVCRIMINVSERVFO EUR NAPLES ITROUTINE ; NAVOCEANO STENNIS SPACE CENTER ROUTINE ; NAVUNSEAWARCENDIV KEYPORT WAROUTINE ; NCTC WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ; NGIC INTEL OPS CHARLOTTESVILLE VA . . . . .



ROUTINE : NRC WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE : ONI WASHINGTON DC ROUTINE :  
WASHDC, SECSTATE ROUTINE : SR JOIC NAPLES IT ROUTINE . TSA HQ WASHINGTON DC  
ROUTINE : USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE ROUTINE ; UTAIS RAMSTEIN AB GE ROUTINE

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Action Post:  
Dissemination Rule:       Archive Copy

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