



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 1, 2017

Case No.: F-2014-03625

Segment: M/PRI-0006

John H. Clarke, Esq.  
1629 K Street, N.W., Suite 300  
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. Clarke,

I refer you to our letter dated August 11, 2017, regarding the release of certain Department of State material under the Freedom of Information Act (the "FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552.

The additional search of the files of the Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation is now complete and has resulted in the retrieval of eight records responsive to your request. After reviewing these documents we have determined that six may be released to you in part and two originated in another U.S. Government agency. As stated previously, we have referred the latter two documents to the relevant agency with a request to respond to you directly. All released material is enclosed.

Where documents are released to you in part, all non-exempt material that is reasonably segregable from the exempt material has been released. Where we have made excisions, the applicable exemptions are marked on each document. An enclosure provides information on FOIA exemptions and other grounds for withholding material.

The Department has now completed its processing of your request. If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Trial Attorney Tamra Moore at (202) 305-8628 or at [Tamra.Moore@usdoj.gov](mailto:Tamra.Moore@usdoj.gov).

Sincerely,

Eric F. Stein, Director

Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosures: As stated

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**The Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552)**

**FOIA Exemptions**

- (b)(1) Information specifically authorized by an executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. Executive Order 13526 includes the following classification categories:
- 1.4(a) Military plans, systems, or operations
  - 1.4(b) Foreign government information
  - 1.4(c) Intelligence activities, sources or methods, or cryptology
  - 1.4(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the US, including confidential sources
  - 1.4(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
  - 1.4(f) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities
  - 1.4(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to US national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
  - 1.4(h) Weapons of mass destruction
- (b)(2) Related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than 5 USC 552), for example:
- |                |   |
|----------------|---|
| ARMSEXP        | Arms Export Control Act, 50a USC 2411(c)                    |
| CIA PERS/ORG   | Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC 403(g)      |
| EXPORT CONTROL | Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 USC App. Sec. 2411(c) |
| FS ACT         | Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 USC 4004                    |
| INA            | Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1202(f), Sec. 222(f) |
| IRAN           | Iran Claims Settlement Act, Public Law 99-99, Sec. 505      |
- (b)(4) Trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial information
- (b)(5) Interagency or intra-agency communications forming part of the deliberative process, attorney-client privilege, or attorney work product
- (b)(6) Personal privacy information
- (b)(7) Law enforcement information whose disclosure would:
- (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings
  - (B) deprive a person of a fair trial
  - (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
  - (D) disclose confidential sources
  - (E) disclose investigation techniques
  - (F) endanger life or physical safety of an individual
- (b)(8) Prepared by or for a government agency regulating or supervising financial institutions
- (b)(9) Geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells

**Other Grounds for Withholding**

- NR Material not responsive to a FOIA request excised with the agreement of the requester

27 Sep 2011

CODEL McCain  
Valletta, Malta; Tripoli, Libya **RELEASE IN PART B6**  
27-30 Sep 2011  
SASC  
Version 7

**Purpose:** To meet and discuss issues of defense and national security with officials in Malta and Libya.

**Mode of Travel:** **MILAIR**; DoS Charter

**Manifest:**

- Senator John McCain (R-AZ)
- Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC)
- Senator Mark Kirk (R-IL)
- Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL)
- Mr. Christian Brose, Foreign Policy Advisor, Senate Armed Services Committee

[Redacted]

Navy Escort.

B6

**Itinerary**

*(All times local)*

**Tuesday, 27 Sep – Washington, DC**

*Attire: Travel Casual*

1815 Depart Russell Bldg 1<sup>st</sup> & C

1900 Depart Andrews (KADW) [GMT:-4] en route Valletta, Malta (LMML)  
[GMT +2] via MILAIR  
8hr 48min flight time  
Set clocks ahead 6 hours

**Wednesday, 28 Sep – Valletta, Malta**

*Attire: Business*

0948 Arrive Malta International Airport (MLA) – transfer to Ministerial Lounge to complete customs and baggage clearance

1010 Depart Airport

1045 Arrive at Xara Palace Hotel, Mdina  
[CHANGE into 'Business' attire]

- 1200 Depart hotel enroute Auberge d'Castille, Valletta, Office of the Prime Minister
- 1220 Arrive at Castille
- 1230 Meeting with Prime Minister at Castille (photo spray at top)
- 1240 Lunch hosted by Prime Minister Gonzi at Castille
- 1345 Walk from Castille to St. John's Co-Cathedral
- 1350 Private Tour of St. John's Co-Cathedral – entrance from Cathedral Square  
(Tour provided by Co-Cathedral Executive Director Cynthia De Giorgio)
- 1450 Depart Cathedral enroute Fort Saint Angelo
- 1510 Private Tour of Fort Saint Angelo  
(Tour provided by Chief Curator Fr John Critien)
- 1610 Depart Fort enroute hotel
- 1645 Arrive at Xara Palace hotel
- 1700 Guided walking tour of Mdina with Deputy Mayor
- 1800 Return to Xara Palace hotel
- 1900 Depart hotel enroute Barracuda Restaurant, St. Julian's
- 1930 Dinner at Barracuda Restaurant, St. Julian's
- 2030 Depart restaurant enroute hotel
- RON Valetta, Malta  
Xara Palace Hotel, Mdina  
(tel.: +356-2145-0560)

**Thursday, 29 September (Valletta, Malta/Tripoli, Libya)**

*Attire: Business*

- 0500 (Optional) Coffee Service and breakfast for CODEL at Xara Palace
- 0530 Depart hotel enroute Malta International Airport (MLA)
- 0600 Arrive at Malta International Airport (MLA)

- 0630 Depart Valletta, Malta(LMML)(GMT+2) en route Tripoli, Libya(HLLT)(GMT+2) via DoS Charter  
*1 hr 30 min flight time, No time change*
- 0830 Arrive Tripoli, Libya
- 0800 CODEL arrives in Tripoli
- 0815-0845 Transit to Damaged U.S. Embassy*
- 0845-0900 Tour of Damaged U.S. Embassy
- 0900-0910 Transit to Temporary Offices*
- 0910-1000 Briefing with Ambassador, Country Team and RAO
- 1000-1030: Transit to TNC Offices (WICS)*
- 1030-1300 TNC Meetings:  
Chairman Abd al-Jalil  
PM Mahmoud Jibril  
Supreme Security Council
- 1300-1315 Transit to Tripoli Medical Center*
- 1315-1345 Tour of Tripoli Medical Center
- 1345-1415 Transit to al-Jdeida Prison (Box lunches in the Car)*
- 1415-1500 Tour of al-Jdeida Prison
- 1500-1520 Transit to Martyr's Square*
- 1520-1535 Walkthrough Martyr's Square
- 1535-1540 Transit to Corinthia Hotel*
- 1545-1630 Press Conference
- 1630-1700 Transit to Airport*
- 1715 Depart Tripoli, Libya(HLLT)(GMT+2) en route Valletta, Malta(LMML)(GMT+2) via DoS Charter  
*1 hr 30 min flight time, No time change*
- 1845 Arrive Malta International Airport (MLA) via DOS Charter

1855 Depart hotel enroute Xara Palace hotel  
1930 Arrive hotel  
2030 Depart hotel enroute Pintonino Restaurant, Waterfront, Valletta  
2050 Dinner at Pintonino Restaurant  
2150 Depart restaurant enroute hotel  
RON Valetta, Malta  
Xara Palace Hotel, Mdina  
(tel.: +356-2145-0560)

**Friday, 30 September (Valletta, Malta/Washington, DC)**

*Attire: Travel Casual*

0530 (Optional) Coffee Service and breakfast for CODEL at Xara Palace  
0630 Reverse Accommodation Exchange (EUR to USD) available  
0645 Depart Hotel enroute Malta International Airport (MLA)  
0715 Arrive at Malta International Airport (MLA) - transfer to Ministerial Lounge pending departure, clear baggage, photo op with Embassy staff

0800 Depart Valletta, Malta(LMML)(GMT +2) en route Rota, Spain(LERT)  
(GMT+2) via MILAIR  
*2h:54 min flight time; No time change*

1054 Arrive Rota, Spain (Refuel)

1155 Depart Rota, Spain(GMT+2) en route Andrews AFB(KADW)(GMT+2)  
4) via MILAIR  
*8hr 00 min flight time; Retard clocks 6hrs*

1355 Arrive Washington DC (Andrews AFB)

\*\*\* Mission Complete\*\*\*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**From:** Soler, Richard P <SolerRP@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Thursday, September 29, 2011 4:02 PM  
**To:** Lamb, Charlene R. <LambCR@state.gov>  
**Cc:** Eustace, John M <EustaceJM@state.gov>  
**Subject:** FW: Tripoli Situation Report - September 29, 2011

**RELEASE IN PART**  
1.4(B),B1,1.4(D),B6

Apparently the initial report from CJ was incorrect. McCain did go to the prison.

Rich

SBU  
This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

Classified by Director IPS, DoS on  
7.28.2017 ~ Class: CONFIDENTIAL ~  
Reason: 1.4(b)&(d) ~ Declassify on:  
7.28.2027

**From:** Moretti, John S  
**Sent:** Thursday, September 29, 2011 3:08 PM  
**To:** DS-IP-NEA  
**Subject:** FW: Tripoli Situation Report - September 29, 2011

Rich, fysa

**From:** Polaschik, Joan A  
**Sent:** Thu 9/29/2011 2:05 PM  
**To:** SES-O; Maxwell, Raymond D; NEA-MAG-DL; Lohman, Lee; Hanson, Kathleen D  
**Cc:** Cretz, Gene A; Tillou, Patrick A; Reynolds, John Luke; Caplan, Jared S; Harden, Dave; Moretti, John S; Nordstrom, Eric A; Hill, G. Kathleen; Stevens, John C; Tek, Nathaniel  
**Subject:** Tripoli Situation Report - September 29, 2011

**Tripoli Situation Report - September 29, 2011**

(SBU) CODEL McCain: CODEL McCain discussed U.S. assistance in caring for the war-wounded, the release of frozen US assets, the NATO-enforced no-fly zone, human rights, and the security situation in meetings with TNC Chairman Mustafa Abduljalil, TNC Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril, TNC Deputy Prime Minister Ali Tarhouni and a dozen other TNC members. All TNC interlocutors thanked the CODEL for U.S. political and military support and appealed for assistance in treating injured fighters and citizens. The CODEL visited al-Jedeida prison with Human Rights Watch observers and spoke with several detainees, commenting afterward that the TNC exhibited unprecedented transparency in allowing the visting and noting concern about the treatment of some prisoners. The CODEL also visited Tripoli Medical Center, where they were warmly received by staff and patients.

(SBU) TNC Chairman Mustafa Abduljalil told the Ambassador and CODEL McCain that the TNC's top priority is to find Qadhafi and his sons and stamp out pockets of Qadhafi loyalists, reiterating that the TNC will not form a new government or fully move the TNC seat from Benghazi to Tripoli until fighting has ceased. He appealed to the U.S. for assistance in

treating its war-wounded, and proposed the use of frozen assets to fund the evacuation of critically wounded fighters and citizens to US hospitals for care. Abduljalil said national police nominally resumed work but that many police are frightened to return to their positions and the security situation remains challenging. In response to Senator Graham's questions about human rights protections, Abduljalil said there were very few reports of revenge-taking in the country and that the TNC is providing assistance to citizens of Tuaraga, where pro-Qadhafi fighters staged attacks on Misurata, adding that the TNC is considering a general amnesty for some categories of crime committed during the fighting.

(SBU) Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril told the CODEL that the TNC's perceived inability to form a new Cabinet has jeopardized the nascent government's legitimacy and led to a "a widening gap" between the TNC and events "on the ground," where Qatar-funded militias are exploiting the opportunity to gain popularity and leverage. To counter this trend, Jibril said he is urging Abduljalil to call for early elections on the municipal level to demonstrate transparency and progress toward an electoral system. "Without early elections now, there will be real trouble," Jibril said. Jibril explained that many regions that have formed brigades will be reluctant to disarm until they are sure that they have sufficient representation in any new government. As a result, he said, recent talks to form the new Cabinet "ran into the risk of armed conflict," leading to a TNC decision earlier this week to delay Cabinet appointments until fighting concludes in Bani Walid, Sirte and other Qadhafi strongholds. He added that he agreed with the decision as "there is no point in forming a government without real power behind it."

(SBU) Jibril said he received reports that Qadhafi had fled to Algeria, and that the Qataris and Algerians held a high-level meeting there on September 28. He speculated that the Qataris and Algerians might work to stage Qadhafi's handover to Qatar's client militias in Libya, thereby giving them domestic legitimacy and influence. He noted that al-Jazeera coverage of the TNC has been slanted towards Islamists and the militia commander Abdulhakim Belhaj. These groups are not popular among the general population but "have a continuous supply of money and arms," he said.

(SBU) Highlighting the tenuous security situation in Tripoli, Jibril said the TNC must begin disarming militias and forming a national army "immediately." There are 28 militias operating in the capital alone, he said, and about ten of those are Islamist-leaning. Across Libya, individuals have stockpiled weapons to sell later for profit, he said, and with its current access to unfrozen assets abroad the TNC should initiate a weapons buy-back program as soon as possible.

(SBU) Deputy FM Ali Tarhouni told the Ambassador and CODEL that the TNC needs US assistance in building a national army and setting up a security apparatus in the near-term, and establishing a set of laws and justice system in the mid- to long-term. He said militias are increasingly worrisome and although the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups represent a minority, they are far better organized than any other political party in the country. He said there must be progress toward building a party that more accurately represents the population's predominantly moderate views. He said he had obtained minutes of secret meetings in which MB officials plotted to maneuver into positions of power before general elections, for fear they would fare badly in a popular vote.

[Redacted box] B6  
B1  
1.4(D)  
1.4(B)



[Redacted]

He tempered his concerns by noting that Islamist groups do not seek a radical state and "are more moderate than you think." Tarhouni said basic services in Tripoli and elsewhere were running surprisingly well, despite the fact that the TNC has no training, experience or management skills.

B6  
1.4(B)  
1.4(D)  
B1

(SBU) In response to the CODEL's questions about releasing unfrozen assets, Abduljalil said the TNC does not need all the funds at once and will need no more than \$10 billion in this immediate reconstruction phase. Jibril told CODEL he had proposed a UN auditor to monitor funds transfers for TNC expenses as it forms the framework for an elected government.

(SBU) OPCW: According to Deputy FM Bishari, noted Libyan chemical weapons expert Dr. Adnan Hesnawy has been working with the TNC to help secure the chemical weapons stocks at Waddan. The MFA is making arrangements to send Hesnawy to the OPCW's October 4-7 Executive Council meeting in the Hague. (Hesnawy has previously represented Libya in all Executive Council meetings and is key to Libya's CW destruction programs.) The Deputy FM also said that the TNC had confirmed with the OPCW that the current Libyan delegation to the Hague is indeed authorized to represent the TNC.

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RELEASE IN PART  
1.4(B),B1,1.4(D),B6

**From:** Soler, Richard P <SolerRP@state.gov>  
**Sent:** Sunday, September 11, 2011 5:43 PM  
**To:** NewTripolicmo@sharepoint.state.gov  
**Subject:** Fw: Tripoli Sitrep 1 - September 11, 2011

Classified by Director IPS, DoS on  
7.28.2017 ~ Class: CONFIDENTIAL ~  
Reason: 1.4(b)&(d) ~ Declassify on:  
7.28.2027

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**From:** Papanu, Brian  
**Sent:** Sunday, September 11, 2011 04:25 PM  
**To:** DS Command Center; Sincavage, Justine M; Rice, Kurt R; Allison, Douglas A; Ashbery, Wayne B; Ross, Michael H; Eustace, John M  
**Cc:** Latham, Diana E; Hartung, Robert A; Benvie, Paul; Perlman, Matthew J; Nordstrom, Eric A; DS-IP-NEA  
**Subject:** FW: Tripoli Sitrep 1 - September 11, 2011

FYI

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**From:** Tillou, Patrick A  
**Sent:** Sunday, September 11, 2011 4:19 PM  
**To:** Lamb, Charlene R.; DS-IP-NEA; LibyaMG; SWO; NEA-Staff-Assistants-DL; Djerassi, Alexander M  
**Cc:** Cretz, Gene A; Stevens, John C; Tek, Nathaniel; NEA-MAG-DL; Polaschik, Joan A; Moretti, John S  
**Subject:** Tripoli Sitrep 1 - September 11, 2011

All,

Attached Tripoli Sitrep #1 for your review. SWO- could you please distribute as appropriate?

Thanks,  
Patrick

**Tripoli Sitrep #1**

Charge, RSO and Poloff met with the TNC's Deputy Foreign Minister Saleh Bishari on September 11 to discuss the upcoming visit of NEA A/S Feltman and issues relating to restarting the US Embassy in Tripoli. Key highlights follow:

**NEA A/S Feltman's Visit:** Bishari agreed to assist in setting up meetings with TNC Chairman Mustafa Abd al-Jalil and PM Mahmoud Jibril, who Bishari said would both be in Tripoli during Feltman's September 14 visit. Bishari said that a meeting with Deputy PM Tarhouni will depend on whether Tarhouni has returned from Benghazi, where he is tending to family matters. Bishari also strongly suggested that A/S Feltman meet with Justice Minister Allaghi to discuss transitional justice, reconciliation and where the United States and Libya can work together in this area. Bishari seemed pessimistic about a possible meeting with Interior Minister Darat, with regard to both Darat's availability as well as the utility of the meeting. Instead, he suggested that A/S Feltman discuss matters of security with PM Jibril, noting that a new government would be announced next week and hinting strongly that Darat would be replaced at that time.

**Other Diplomatic Engagement:** The Qatari Chief of Staff is in Tripoli today, and Bishari said the TNC would deliver a tough message regarding the need to rein in the Islamist militias. Bishari also

confirmed that French President Sarkozy, British PM Cameron and Turkish PM Erdogan are all planning trips to Tripoli for September 15-16.

**Embassy Security Requests:** RSO raised several requests related to standing up the embassy, including the issuance of diplomatic plates and the provision of armed TNC guards around our current offices. Bishari agreed to raise these with the Ministry of the Interior. Raising the issue of bringing in Department of Defense forces to guard the Embassy, Bishari stressed the sensitivities regarding armed troops in the capital and said it would be possible only if the forces remained low-profile and without uniforms.

**UNGA Visas:** Bishari requested expedited help with securing visas for the TNC's 4 person UNGA team. The team will consist of PM Jibril, his assistant and two TNC members, all of whom will be travelling to UNGA on September 17. Bishari said that Jibril applied for his visa online and agreed to send us the necessary information for all of the applicants, which we will forward when we receive. We ask that NEA work with CA to expedite this processing if possible.

**New Faces and Old:** According to Bishari, approximately 80% of the TNC ministers have migrated to Tripoli, including all of the key ones (e.g., Finance, Justice, Interior). Bishari reiterated that Jibril and Jalil will not permanently relocate to Tripoli until all of Libya has been "liberated" and the TNC's transition plan has kicked in. While Bishari is now clearly managing the MFA, we noted that many of the former MFA bureaucrats are still in place, including Abdurahman Al-Gannas, the director of the Americas Desk under the regime. (Note: In a private side conversation with Bishari, Charge explained that Gannas had been a regular stumbling block in our previous interactions with the MFA and that our new relationship would be better served with a different interlocutor.)

[Redacted] B6  
[Redacted] B1  
[Redacted] 1.4(B)  
[Redacted] 1.4(D)

End Note.)

Separately, Charge and team also toured several prospective interim embassy sites and inspected the Ambassador's residence. Full details submitted in NEA/EX conference call earlier today.

Subject: Benghazi Weekly Report - September 10, 2012  
 Drafted by: David McFarland  
 Cleared by: DCM Hicks, Ambassador Stevens  
 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, KISL, LY

1. (SBU) Summary. This is Benghazi's weekly round-up of political, economic, and social issues not included in previous reporting.
2. (SBU) **Ambassador Stevens in Benghazi September 10-14:** The Ambassador will conduct meetings in Benghazi from September 10-14. He will meet with local government officials, other political and commercial contacts, non-governmental and local civil society organizations funded through USAID and MEPI, and members of the international and diplomatic community. He will officially launch the PAS-supported American Space, a platform for USG public and cultural affairs programs, and conduct a press briefing in the final days of his visit.
3. (SBU) **Benghazi Local Council Welcomes the Ambassador:** Members of Benghazi's Local Council told the Ambassador about their frustrations with the slow pace of reforms instituted by the Transitional National Council (TNC) and its successor, the General National Congress (GNC). Members said they welcomed USG assistance across a broad range of political and economic issues, including specific programs and training from USAID and MEPI to improve the effectiveness of the Council, its communications with constituents, and its administrative processes. They pleaded for a regional balance to other USG programs to ensure participants from the east and west were equally represented in programming, noting the long-standing feeling in the east that the TNC and GNC had focused development efforts on Tripoli to the detriment of the rest of the country. Despite the challenges, members asserted that the security situation was improving and told the Ambassador that the USG should "pressure" American companies to invest in Benghazi. Twenty of the 41 council members, including President Jumaa al-Sahli, participated. The Benghazi Local Council oversees the work of approximately 600 employees.
4. (SBU) [redacted] discusses security situation, dissolution of the SSC, extra-judicial killings of former regime security officers, political aspirations of militia leaders, reintegration of revolutionaries, and welfare of Iranian Red Crescent detainees: In a September 2 meeting with Acting Principal Officer Benghazi, [redacted] told us that senior Interior Ministry authorities had unceremoniously ended the "state of maximum alert" announced in Benghazi on August 29. The alert came amid fears of potential strikes by ex-regime supporters to mark the 1st September 1969 revolution and Gadhafi's rise to power, [redacted] said. During the meeting, [redacted] said reintegrating revolutionaries remained a priority [redacted] [redacted] his expectation that the SSC and militias would gradually dissolve (but not until a legitimate alternative for maintaining security emerged), growing frustration with police and security forces (who were too weak to keep the country secure), the status of the Iranian Red Crescent detainees (still held by "unknown" kidnappers but in good accommodations), the possible motivations for the ongoing extra-judicial killings of interior ministry officials (personal vendettas, criminality, tribal conflicts, purge of pro-Qadhafi officials) and, indications of the growing political and economic aspirations of a few key brigade commanders, who seek government positions in security ministries. (More details septel.)

B6

5. (SBU) **Militia commanders discuss the Muslim Brotherhood, Jibril, their political aspirations, the economy, and security:** In a September 9 meeting, local area militia commanders [redacted] [redacted] discussed the very fluid relationships and blurry lines that define membership in Benghazi-based brigades under the February 17, Libya Shield, and SSC umbrellas. [redacted] They debated – hotly and without resolution – about which brigades supported or opposed specific causes. They claimed to exercise “control” over Libyan Armed Forces Chief of Staff Yousef Mangoush, who “depends” on them to secure eastern Libya. In times of crisis, Mangoush has no other choice than to turn to their brigades for help, they said, as he did recently with unrest in Kufra. As part of this arrangement, Mangoush often provides the brigades direct stocks of weapons and ammunition, they said. [redacted] and [redacted] support the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood's Justice and Construction Party backed candidate Minister of Electricity Awad Al Barasi for Prime Minister and said that, if elected, al-Barasi would appoint Fawzi Bukatif, Commander of the February 17 Brigade, as Minister of Defense. Bukatif's appointment would open the MOD and other security ministries and offices to plum-appointments of his most favored brigade commanders – giving February 17 and Libya Shield tacit control of the armed forces. They criticized the USG for “supporting” National Forces Alliance (NFA) leader and Prime Minister candidate Mahmoud Jibril. If Jibril won, they said, they would not continue to guarantee security in Benghazi, a critical function they asserted they were currently providing. Growing problems with security would discourage foreign investment and led to persistent economic stagnation in eastern Libya, but the USG could play a role by “pressuring” American businesses to invest in Benghazi.
6. (SBU) **Salafists reported killed in clashes with locals defending Sufi shrines:** The Ministry of Interior confirmed press reports that a September 8 gun battle about 35 kilometers outside Benghazi resulted in three killed and seven injured during an attempt to destroy a Sufi shrine in Rajma. Press reports credit local residents and the late-responding Libya Shield brigade with defending the Sidi Al-Lafi mausoleum. Some contacts here, however, assert that Salafists within the Libya Shield were fighting against the local residents in support of efforts to destroy the shrine.
7. (SBU) **Expanding Islamist influence in Derna:** A growing number of anecdotal reports from residents, NGOs, and USG contractors link the Abu Salim Brigade with a troubling increase in violence and Islamist influence in Derna. Complaints against the Abu Salim Brigade range from their efforts to close radio and other media outlets, enforce strict rules against comingling of men and women at the local university, and increased criminality, including carjacking, thefts, and murders. One e-mail to the Ambassador asserts Abu Salim Brigade members have undercut police presence by accusing the police of being loyal to the former regime. The e-mail ends by pleading to the U.S. Embassy to “Please send someone to see the truth for yourselves.”
8. (SBU) **Car Bomb Kills One, Injures Another:** A September 1 car bomb on Benghazi's largest and busiest street, Gamal-Abdel-Nasser, killed Abdul Baset Hufaitha and injured Col. Jumaa Kadeki, both former Interior Ministry security officers under the Gadhafi regime. The bombing occurred during the “state of maximum alert” announced by Interior Ministry officials on August 29, and fueled rampant speculation in the press and among our contacts that unknown actors continue to work down a list of former Gadhafi regime officials who had been targeted for extra-judicial killings. Security contacts at United Nations Benghazi who were on the scene within minutes and questioned eye-witnesses, tell us that it is just as likely that the driver of the car, Abdul Baset Hufaitha, may

have been in possession of the explosive device and detonated it accidentally.

9. (SBU) **Great Manmade River Authority (GMRA):** Press reported a September 9 explosion that targeted power lines in the Wadi Mansour area between Tarhouna and Bani Walid and cut the major source of electrical power to parts of the Great Manmade River. On September 10, GMRA Acting Chairman Nasser Bubteina told us that auxiliary power lines had kept the GMMR running, but confirmed press reports that "huge 400 kilowatt" lines and towers, including their foundations, had been completely destroyed by the explosion. Bubteina told us that repairs would take a minimum of two weeks, but quite possibly longer because he first had to secure permission from local militias and mobilize security forces to insert workers from the Ministry of Energy and the General Electric Company into the area. With about USD 10 billion invested since its inception in the 1980s, the Great Manmade River (GMMR) Project links wholesale water supplies from underground aquifers in southern and eastern Libya to municipal, agricultural, and industrial end users in Benghazi and points west toward Tripoli. The GMMR Authority manages the system, a structure of about 2500 miles of pipes, about one hundred operational wells, multiple reservoirs, and multiple supply, pump, and delivery stations that supply water to more than two-thirds of Libya's population. Details to follow septel.
10. (SBU) **Ambassador to Open American Space Benghazi:** The Ambassador will launch American Space Benghazi, a public platform for cultural and educational outreach by U.S. Mission Libya. The American Space will contain a small library, computer lab, and open space for programming. Embassy Tripoli will support the center with regular programs and speakers. We have already used the space to engaged in dialogue with 15 young adults about U.S. foreign policy in the country and Libya's political transition.
11. (SBU) **MEPI Projects:** In our ongoing effort to assist and monitor USG implementers, we visited with some of the two dozen civil society organizations that operate in Benghazi with MEPI assistance, including: the *Libyan Society for Industrial Engineering*, which has created eastern Libya's first mobile public library; *My Environment Society*, which conducts environmental education campaigns with school-age children; *Rayhan Elshohadaa Association*, which works to empower disadvantaged youth with employable skills, including computer literacy and English education; and *the Cure Foundation*, which has conducted education campaigns about cancer and hemophilia to patients and their families. Additionally, the Embassy-supported ACCESS program in Benghazi, offers evening English-language instruction to disadvantaged teenagers.
12. (SBU) **UK Presence:** British Charge d'Affairs Gill Frasier visited U.S. Mission Benghazi during a September 5 trip to determine whether conditions were appropriate for the re-opening of the British Consulate in the wake of the widely reported June 11 RPG attack against the British Ambassador's motorcade. According to Frasier, London will make its decision about reopening the consulate sometime in October.



Subject: Benghazi Weekly Report - September 10, 2012

RELEASE IN PART B6

Drafted by: David McFarland

Cleared by: DCM Hicks, Ambassador Stevens

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, KISL, LY

1. (SBU) Summary. This is Benghazi's weekly round-up of political, economic, and social issues not included in previous reporting.

2. (SBU) [redacted] on Security Situation and "High Alert," dissolution of the SSC, extra-judicial killings of former regime security officers, political aspirations of militia leaders, reintegration of revolutionaries, and welfare of Iranian Red Crescent detainees: In a September 2 meeting with Acting Principal Officer Benghazi, [redacted] told us that senior Interior Ministry authorities had unceremoniously ended the "state of maximum alert" announced in Benghazi on August 29. The alert came amid fears of potential strikes by ex-regime supporters to mark the 1st September 1969 revolution and Gadhafi's rise to power, [redacted] said. During the meeting, [redacted] also discussed thuwar integration efforts (lots of hopes but not many plans), his expectation that the SSC and militias would gradually dissolve (but not until a legitimate alternative emerged), growing frustration with police and security forces (who were too weak and unorganized to keep the country secure), the status of the Iranian Red Crescent detainees (still held by "unknown" kidnappers but in good accommodations), the possible motivations for the ongoing extra-judicial killings of interior ministry officials (personal vendettas, criminality, tribal conflicts, purge of pro-Qadhafi officials) and, indications of the growing political and economic aspirations of a few key brigade commanders. (More details to follow septel.)

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3. (SBU) Militia Commanders on security, political aspirations, the economy, and support and funding. In a September 9 meeting, local area militia commanders and their deputies, [redacted]

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[redacted] discussed the very fluid relationships and blurry lines that define membership in Benghazi-based brigades under the February 17, Libya Shield, and SSC umbrellas. The commanders told us that [redacted] and, during the meeting, debated – hotly and without resolution – about which brigades supported or opposed their own causes. They claimed to have gained "control" over Libyan Armed Forces Chief of Staff Yousef Mangoush, who "depends" on them to secure the East. In times of crisis, Mangoush provides them with weapons and ammunition, they said. They said they support the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood's Justice and Construction Party backed candidate Minister of Electricity Awad Al Barasi for Prime Minister and said that, if elected, al-Barasi would appoint Fawzi Bukatif, Commander of the February 17 Brigade, as Minister of Defense. They criticized the USG for "supporting" National Forces Alliance (NFA) leader and candidate for Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril. If Jibril won, they said, they would not continue to guarantee security in Benghazi. Instability under the NTC and GNC justified their continued role in the eastern security apparatus, and had contributed to the absence of foreign investment and economic stagnation in the East.

4. (SBU) A September 8 gun battle in Rajma, about 35 kilometers outside Benghazi, Three people killed in the latest attempt by militant Salafists to destroy a Sufi shrine, the interior minister has said. The incident took place yesterday in the town of Rajma, some 35 kilometres from Benghazi, when local residents sought to defend the Sidi Al-Lafi mausoleum from the extremists.

Sources have told the Libya Herald that all three of the dead men were Salafists and that a further seven were injured. Three of those are said to be in a critical condition and are receiving treatment in hospital

in Benghazi. Whereas the security forces did nothing to stop the desecration of three Sufi shrines in Tripoli, Zliten and Misrata, a battalion of the army's Libya Shield brigade is said to have intervened to stop the fighting, albeit belatedly. Two of the battalion's vehicles were reported to have sustained damage, and the house of a local resident was burned down. This is the first time that Salafists have been challenged and killed in their campaign to eradicate Sufism in Libya.

5. (SBU) Expanding Islamist influence in Derna We did have a local staff come back recently from [redacted] [redacted] He described the situation there as a "Ghost town". Many people have left because of the Abu Salim Brigade controlling the town and their repressive policies. He also said that the space for radio and other media has reduced in the town (and was surprised about how much of what has been happening there is not making it into national media). He also noted that recently members of the Brigade went to the University and tried to stop male and female students from sitting together in areas such as the cafeteria. He said that the students fought back with knives and sticks and ran the Brigade members out of the university. He described the situation as serious with a high likelihood for continued clashes between the students and Brigade.

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I want to deliver this message to the U.S. envoy in Libya personally. I am one of the residents of the city of Derna. We have a problem with the security situation in the city. There is no one willing to complain or calls competent authority to ask for help and of course because of this problem, the security situation got out of control in the city of Derna, including shop thefts at night and forcing citizens out of their cars "carjacking", people get killed too, and nobody really know, for sure, whose behind it all. There is a battalion called Abu Salim policing the city and later we found out that the battalion is behind the crimes in the city too, and were responsible for false accusing good policemen in the city, "accusing police of being Gaddafi loyalist". The Battalion are not now active on the scene of policing the city.

The reason why I wrote this letter is because the Abu Salim battalion have closed the local radio station and jammed-off all other radio stations because they broadcast songs and anyone who stands in their way they liquidate him.

I ask your Excellency, the Envoy, to alert the Libyan government to this subject because it is a very important issue and also because they threaten to shut down the university if student are not separated "males & females students are in different class rooms" of course, this problem only in the city of Derna.

Please send someone to see the truth for your selves.

6. (SBU) Car Bomb Kills One, Injures Another: A September 1 car bomb on Benghazi's largest and busiest street, Gamal-Abdel-Nasser, killed Abdul Baset Hufaitha and injured Col. Jumaa Kadeki, both former Interior Ministry security officers under the Gadhafi regime. The bombing occurred during the "state of maximum alert" announced by Interior Ministry officials on August 29, and fueled rampant speculation in the press and among our contacts that unknown actors continue to work down a list of former Gadhafi regime officials who had been targeted for extra-judicial killings. Security contacts at United Nations Benghazi who were on the scene within minutes and questioned eye-witnesses, tell us that it is just as likely that the driver of the car, Abdul Baset Hufaitha, may have been in possession of



the explosive device and detonated it accidentally.

7. (SBU) **Great Manmade River Authority (GMRA):** Press reported a September 9 explosion that targeted power lines in the Wadi Mansour area between Tarhouna and Bani Walid and cut the major source of electrical power to parts of the Great Manmade River. On September 10, GMRA Acting Chairman Nasser Bubteina told us that auxiliary power lines had kept the GMMR running, but confirmed press reports that "huge 400 kilowatt" lines and towers, including their foundations, had been completely destroyed by the explosion. Bubteina told us that repairs would take a minimum of two weeks, but quite possibly longer because he first had to secure permission from local militias and mobilize security forces to insert workers from the Ministry of Energy and the General Electric Company into the area. With about USD 10 billion invested since its inception in the 1980s, the Great Manmade River (GMMR) Project links wholesale water supplies from underground aquifers in southern and eastern Libya to municipal, agricultural, and industrial end users in Benghazi and points west toward Tripoli. The GMMR Authority manages the system, a structure of about 2500 miles of pipes, about one hundred operational wells, multiple reservoirs, and multiple supply, pump, and delivery stations that supply water to more than two-thirds of Libya's population. Details to follow septel.

8. (U) A sampling of the two dozen civil society organizations supported by MEPI grants in Benghazi told us about successes and difficulties they face: . These included: the Libyan Society for Industrial Engineering, which has created eastern Libya's first mobile public library; My Environment Society, which conducts environmental education campaigns with school-age children; Rayhan Elshohadaa Association, which works to empower disadvantaged youth with employable skills, including computer literacy and English education; and the Cure Foundation, which has conducted education campaigns about cancer and hemophilia to patients and their families. Mike listened to the successes and difficulties faced by each organization, and he offered three PAS resources to assist them: 1) Spotighting their work on our Facebook page; 2) Potentially sending a representative from the Embassy to an event of theirs to draw media attention; and 3) Networking, especially with American organizations which may be valuable resources for them.

In addition, Mike and A/PO David McFarland visited the Embassy-supported ACCESS program in Benghazi, which offers evening English-language instruction to disadvantaged teenagers. They also visited our American Space in Benghazi, the Embassy's first permanent educational and cultural outreach center in Libya, which will hold its opening ceremony later this week. David engaged in dialogue with 15 young adults there about U.S. foreign policy in the country and Libya's political transition.

5. (SBU) **UK Presence:** A planned visit by the UK Embassy's DCM was cancelled due to transportation problems, but we understand they are on track to reopen their local office on September 1.

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RELEASE IN PART B6

From: Pickens, Amber R  
Sent: 9/11/2012 9:43:43 AM  
To: svcSMARTBTSP03  
Subject: BENGHAZI WEEKLY REPORT- SEPTEMBER 11, 2012

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MRN: 12 TRIPOLI 1098  
Date/DTG: Sep 11, 2012 / 111351Z SEP 12  
From: AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI  
Action: WASHDC, SECSTATE ROUTINE  
E.O.: 13526  
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, SENV, ENRG, KOEM, KISL, LY  
Captions: SENSITIVE, SIPDIS  
Subject: BENGHAZI WEEKLY REPORT- SEPTEMBER 11, 2012

1. (SBU) Summary: This is Benghazi's weekly round-up of political, economic, and social issues not included in previous reporting.

2. (SBU) Benghazi Local Council Welcomes the Ambassador: Members of Benghazi's Local Council told the Ambassador about their frustrations with the slow pace of reforms instituted by the Transitional National Council (TNC) and its successor, the General National Congress (GNC). Members said they welcomed USG assistance across a broad range of political and economic issues, including specific programs and training from USAID and MEPI to improve the effectiveness of the Council, its communications with constituents, and its administrative processes. They pleaded for a regional balance to other USG programs to ensure participants from the east and west were equally represented in programming, noting the long-standing feeling in the east that the TNC and GNC had focused development efforts on Tripoli to the detriment of the rest of the country. Despite the challenges, members asserted that the security situation was improving and told the Ambassador that the USG should "pressure" American companies to invest in Benghazi. Twenty of the 41 council members, including President Jumaa al-Sahli, participated. The Benghazi Local Council oversees the work of approximately 600 employees.

3. (SBU) [redacted] discusses security situation, dissolution of the SSC, extra-judicial killings of former regime security officers, political aspirations of militia leaders, reintegration of revolutionaries, and welfare of Iranian Red Crescent detainees: In a September 2 meeting with Acting Principal Officer Benghazi, [redacted] told us that senior Interior Ministry authorities had unceremoniously ended the "state of maximum alert" announced in Benghazi on August 29. The alert came amid fears of potential strikes by ex-regime supporters to mark the September 1, 1969, revolution and Qadhafi's rise to power, [redacted] said. He continued that reintegrating revolutionaries remained a priority [redacted] and he expects that the SSC and militias would gradually dissolve (but not until a legitimate alternative for maintaining security emerged). [redacted] expressed growing frustration with police and security forces (who were too weak to keep the country secure) and commented that the Iranian Red Crescent detainees are still held by "unknown" kidnappers but in good accommodations). He speculated about possible motivations for the ongoing extra-judicial killings of interior ministry officials (personal vendettas, criminality, tribal conflicts, purge of pro-Qadhafi officials), and he noted indications that a

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few key brigade commanders, who have been seeking government positions in security ministries, may be developing higher political and economic aspirations. (More details septel.)

4. (SBU) Militia commanders discuss the Muslim Brotherhood, Jibril, their political aspirations, the economy, and security: In a September 9 meeting, local area militia commanders [redacted]

[redacted] discussed the very fluid relationships and blurry lines they say define membership in Benghazi-based brigades under the February 17, Libya Shield, and SSC umbrellas. [redacted] they said. They debated – hotly and without resolution – about which brigades supported or opposed specific causes. They claimed to exercise “control” over Libyan Armed Forces Chief of Staff Yousef Mangoush, who “depends” on them to secure eastern Libya. In times of crisis, Mangoush has no other choice than to turn to their brigades for help, they said, as he did recently with unrest in Kufra. As part of this arrangement, Mangoush often provides the brigades direct stocks of weapons and ammunition, they said. [redacted] and [redacted] support the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction Party backed candidate Minister of Electricity Awad Al Barasi for Prime Minister and said that, if elected, al-Barasi would appoint Fawzi Bukatif, Commander of the February 17 Brigade, as Minister of Defense. Bukatif’s appointment would open the MOD and other security ministries and offices to plum-appointments for his most favored brigade commanders – giving February 17 and Libya Shield tacit control of the armed forces. They criticized the USG for “supporting” National Forces Alliance (NFA) leader and Prime Minister candidate Mahmoud Jibril. If Jibril won, they said, they would not continue to guarantee security in Benghazi, a critical function they asserted they were currently providing. Growing problems with security would discourage foreign investment and led to persistent economic stagnation in eastern Libya, but the USG could play a role by “pressuring” American businesses to invest in Benghazi.

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5. (SBU) Salafists reported killed in clashes with locals defending Sufi shrines: The Ministry of Interior confirmed press reports that a September 8 gun battle about 35 kilometers outside Benghazi resulted in three killed and seven injured during an attempt to destroy a Sufi shrine in Rajma. Press reports credit local residents and the late-responding Libya Shield brigade with defending the Sidl Al-Lafi mausoleum. Some contacts here, however, assert that Salafists within the Libya Shield were actually fighting against the local residents in support of efforts to destroy the shrine.

6. (SBU) Expanding Islamist influence in Derna: A growing number of anecdotal reports from residents, NGOs, and USG contractors link the Abu Salim Brigade with a troubling increase in violence and Islamist influence in Derna. Complaints against the Abu Salim Brigade range from their efforts to close radio and other media outlets, enforce strict rules against co-mingling of men and women at the local university, and increased criminality, including carjacking, thefts, and murders. One e-mail to the Ambassador asserts Abu Salim Brigade members have undercut police presence by accusing the police of being loyal to the former regime. The e-mail ends by pleading to the U.S. Embassy to “Please send someone to see the truth for yourselves.”

7. (SBU) Car Bomb Kills One, Injures Another: A September 1 car bomb on Benghazi’s largest and busiest street, Gamal-Abdel-Nasser, killed Abdul Baset Hufaiha and injured Col. Jumaa Kadeki, both former Interior Ministry security officers under the Qadhafi regime. The bombing occurred during the “state of maximum alert” announced by Interior Ministry officials on August 29, and fueled rampant speculation in the press and among our contacts that unknown actors continue to work down a list of former Qadhafi regime officials who had been targeted for extra-judicial killings. Security contacts at United Nations Benghazi who were on the scene within minutes and questioned eye-witnesses, tell us that it is just as likely that the driver of the car, Abdul Baset Hufaiha, may have been in possession of the explosive device and detonated it accidentally.

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from underground aquifers in southern and eastern Libya to municipal, agricultural, and industrial end users in Benghazi and points west toward Tripoli. The GMMR Authority manages the system, a structure of about 2500 miles of pipes, about one hundred operational wells, multiple reservoirs, and multiple supply, pump, and delivery stations that supply water to more than two-thirds of Libya's population. Details to follow septel.

9. (SBU) Ambassador to Open American Space Benghazi: The Ambassador will launch American Space Benghazi, a public platform for cultural and educational outreach by U.S. Mission Libya. The American Space will contain a small library, computer lab, and open space for programming. Embassy Tripoli will support the center with regular programs and speakers. We have already used the space to engage in dialogue with 15 young adults about U.S. foreign policy in the country and Libya's political transition.

10. (SBU) MEPI Projects: In our ongoing effort to assist and monitor USG implementers, we visited with some of the two dozen civil society organizations that operate in Benghazi with MEPI assistance, including: the *Libyan Society for Industrial Engineering*, which has created eastern Libya's first mobile public library; *My Environment Society*, which conducts environmental education campaigns with school-age children; *Rayhan Elshohadaa Association*, which works to empower disadvantaged youth with employable skills, including computer literacy and English education; and *the Cure Foundation*, which has conducted education campaigns about cancer and hemophilia to patients and their families. Additionally, the Embassy-supported ACCESS program in Benghazi, offers evening English-language instruction to disadvantaged teenagers.

11. (SBU) UK Presence: British Charge d'Affairs Gill Frasier visited U.S. Mission Benghazi during a September 5 trip to determine whether conditions were appropriate for the re-opening of the British Consulate. According to Frasier, London will make its decision about reopening the consulate sometime in October. The British withdrew their presence from Benghazi after the widely reported June 11 RPG attack on the British Ambassador's motorcade.

Signature: STEVENS

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Drafted By: POL-ECON:McFarland, David C  
Cleared By: EXEC:Hicks, Gregory N  
Approved By: EXEC:Stevens, John C  
Released By: TRIPOLI:Pickens, Amber R  
Info: DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DCROUTINE ;  
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