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SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION [REDACTED]

1. ON 20 JULY 1982, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE MIA ISSUE CAME UP WITHIN THE
 LARGE CONTEXT OF U.S./VIETNAMESE RELATIONS. [REDACTED] REPLIED THAT
 IN HIS VIEW TWO IMPORTANT ISSUES MUST BE RESOLVED BEFORE THERE
 COULD BE ANY HOPE OF NORMALIZATION. FIRST WAS THE QUESTION OF THE
 VIETNAM'S OCCUPATION OF KAM-UCHEN AND, SECOND, WAS THE MIA ISSUE.
 [REDACTED] ADDED THAT THE U.S. DID NOT BELIEVE THE VIETNAMESE WERE
 BEING FORTHCOMING IN RESOLVING THE MIA MATTER. [REDACTED] RES ONDED
 THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS WILLING TO BE "VERY COOPERATIVE" IN THIS
 AREA. HOWEVER, THERE WERE CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES. FOR EXAMPLE,
 SOME U.S.-SUPPLIED DATA REGARDING CRASH SITES (OF U.S. AIRCRAFT
 DURING THE WAR) WERE FAULTY IN THAT THE COORDINATES SUPPLIED WERE
 INACCURATE AND THIS HAD LED TO FUTILE SEARCHES. A SECOND
 DIFFICULTY WAS THAT VIETNAMESE VILLAGERS WERE "INCREASINGLY"
 UNWILLING TO COOPERATE WITH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES, COMPLAINING IN
 EFFECT, "WHY ALL THIS BOTHER ABOUT DEAD AMERICANS WHEN WE LIVING
 VIETNAMESE ARE IN SUCH NEED OF ASSISTANCE?" AS A THIRD EXAMPLE OF
 VIETNAM'S DIFFICULTIES IN RESOLVING THE MIA ISSUE, [REDACTED] STATED
 THAT DUE TO THE FRAGMENTED CONDITIONS OF WARTIME VIETNAM, RECORDS
 RELATING TO DISPOSITION OF AMERICAN REMAINS WERE OFTEN
 NON-EXISTENT OR INCOMPLETE. [REDACTED] REITERATED THAT DESPITE THESE
 DIFFICULTIES, THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM WAS WILLING TO DO ITS
 BEST. HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD KEEP [REDACTED] INFORMED OF
 DEVELOPMENTS.

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1. ON THE SUBJECT OF THE VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION OF KAMPUCHEA, [] FOCUSED ON WHAT HE PERCEIVED TO BE INDICATIONS OF SOME FLEXIBILITY IN [] POSITION. ACCORDING TO [] DID NOT DWELL ON TRYING TO EXPLAIN WHY THE VIETNAMESE HAD ENTERED KAMPUCHEA; INSTEAD, [] FOCUSED ON WHY THE VIETNAMESE COULD NOT YET LEAVE, ALTHOUGH HIS PUTATIVE REASON WAS "THE CHINESE THREAT." [] SAID HE REPLIED THAT ALL OF THE ASEAN NATIONS HAD THEIR OWN THREATS OF CHINESE SUBVERSION TO DEAL WITH, BUT THEY WERE SUCCESSFULLY COPING WITH THE PROBLEM. THE SOLUTION WHICH ASEAN COULD OFFER VIETNAM IN THIS REGARD WAS SIHANOUK. IF SIHANOUK COULD ULTIMATELY ACHIEVE A DOMINANT POSITION IN THE COALITION, THEN THE VIETNAMESE WOULD NO LONGER HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT THE RETURN OF POL POT AND THEY WOULD NO LONGER HAVE A DEFENSIVE RATIONALE FOR OCCUPYING KAMPUCHEA. [] WENT ON TO SAY TO [] "SURELY YOU MUST HAVE LEARNED SUFFICIENT LESSON FROM THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN VIETNAM--YOU SUCCEEDED THERE BECAUSE OF THE FOREIGN OCCUPATION." TO THIS, [] REPLIED, "IT IS AN ILLUSION TO THINK THAT SIHANOUK CAN SERVE THE PURPOSE YOU HAVE IN MIND." [] REJOINDER WAS: "ONE DAY YOU WILL SEE THAT IT IS NOT AN ILLUSION, AND YOU WILL THEN BE UTTERLY IRRESPONSIBLE IF YOU DON'T SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY." FURTHER ON THE SUBJECT OF SIHANOUK, [] SAID [] POINTED OUT, "FOR [] ONLY," THAT "WE HAVE NEVER ATTACKED SIHANOUK; THE PROBLEM IS THAT NOW THAT SIHANOUK HAS JOINED HANDS WITH POL POT, HENG SAMRIN WILL NEVER DEAL WITH HIM. HE WOULD FEAR THAT HIS HEAD WOULD BE CUT OFF." IN RESPONSE TO A DIRECT QUESTION FROM [], HOWEVER, [] CONCEDED THAT "IF AND WHEN SIHANOUK BECOMES STRONGER THAN POL POT, WE WILL DEAL WITH HENG SAMRIN TO DEAL WITH SIHANOUK." [] SAID HE INTERPRETED THIS AS MEANING THAT THE VIETNAMESE WOULD PERSUADE HENG SAMRIN TO DEAL WITH SIHANOUK.) THE VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION OF KAMPUCHEA, ACCORDING TO [] WAS NOT "IRREVERSIBLE;" IN FACT, [] ADDED, "WE CANNOT STOP THE REVIVAL OF THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE." "THAT IS IRREVERSIBLE," [] CONCLUDED, "WAS POL POT'S END AS THE RULER OF CAMBODIA; HE MUST NEVER AGAIN BE PERMITTED TO RUN THE COUNTRY."

4. [] SAID THAT ON THE SUBJECT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KAMPUCHEA, [] DEMONSTRATED SOME FLEXIBILITY. POINTING TO THE VIETNAMESE ROLE IN GENEVA AND PARIS TO BRING ABOUT THE CONCLUSION OF PAST WARS IN INDOCHINA, [] SAID, "NEVER MIND, WE CAN NEGOTIATE SUCH THINGS AS THE TIMING, THE SITE OF THE CONFERENCE, ITS COMPOSITION AND THE CHAIRMANSHIP. THERE ARE NO HARD AND FAST RULES." AS FOR WHAT SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AT SUCH A CONFERENCE, IN [] VIEW THERE SHOULD BE TWO MAIN SUBJECTS:

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A ZONE OF PEACE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA WHICH WOULD INCLUDE ALL COUNTRIES, INDOCHINESE AND ALL ASIAN, AND VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL FROM KAMPUCHEA.

TO "THINK ABOUT" THESE MATTERS. [] RESPONDED THAT HE HAD BEEN THINKING ABOUT THEM, BUT HOW WAS HE TO COMMUNICATE IN THE FUTURE WITH [] [] REPLIED THAT THERE SHOULD BE "TWO TRACKS," ONE, "QUIET (I.E., SECRET) DIPLOMACY"; THE OTHER, THE CONTINUATION OF THE OPEN DIALOGUE (WHICH [] INDICATED WOULD NOT BE NEARLY AS FLEXIBLE AS THE "QUIET" ONE).

[] (IN RESPONSE TO THE RECENTLY TENDERED INVITATION OF [] MIGHT BE ONE CHANNEL FOR CONTINUING THE "QUIET DIPLOMACY." [] REPLIED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT WOULD BE BETTER USED TO UNVEIL SOME NEW INITIATIVE, SUCH AS, FOR EXAMPLE, AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KAMPUCHEA.

5. [] RELATED THAT AT HIS LAST SESSION WITH [] ON THE MORNING OF 28 JULY, [] REPEATED HIS REQUEST FOR [] "GOOD OFFICES" IN WORKING FOR NORMALIZATION OF U.S./VIETNAM RELATIONS. [] ALSO ASKED [] FOR HIS GOOD OFFICE "IN GETTING THE THAI TO BE LESS HOSTILE" AND IN ORCHESTRATING THE [] SAID, "PLEASE FIND SOME WORDS THAT WILL BRING ABOUT, IN TALKING TO THE PRESS, A BETTER ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES." [] THEN INDICATED THAT THERE WERE PEOPLE IN HIS GOVERNMENT WHO SOUGHT TO MAKE TROUBLE FOR HIM BY EXPLOITING STATEMENTS MADE IN THE PRESS. IN RESPONSE TO THIS, [] QUERIED, "PEOPLE OR GROUPS?" [] REPLIED, "PEOPLE." [] COMMENT: LOCAL PRESS COVERAGE DURING THE FIRST TWO DAYS OF [] VISIT WAS NEGATIVE AND MINIMAL BUT COVERAGE OF THE THIRD AND FINAL DAY OF THE VISIT WAS PROMINENT AND POSITIVE. WHAT CAME THROUGH CLEARLY IN THE MEDIA COVERAGE WAS [] OPTIMISM REGARDING THE VISIT, ALTHOUGH THE GROUNDS FOR HIS OPTIMISM WERE LEFT VAGUE. [] WAS QUOTED AS SAYING, "MY OPTIMISM IS GUARDED. I ENJOY THE ROSE, BUT I TAKE CARE OF THE THORNS AS WELL. IF THERE IS NOW A DIFFERENT NUANCE TO THE MEANING OF 'IRREVERSIBLE,' THEN I THINK THERE IS PROGRESS. BUT DON'T EXPECT THE DURIANS TO FALL TOMORROW. IT TAKES TIME.")

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AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONVERSATION

"VIETNAM'S MAXIMUM POSITION IS TO RETAIN CONTROL OVER KAMPUCHEA. IF THIS CAN BE DONE WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF ITS TROOPS, IT MIGHT GRAB THE OPPORTUNITY."

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DECL: OADR DRV BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL
PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

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