

DIA CONFIRMS KNOWLEDGE OF LOCATION OF PRISONERS: I was somewhat shocked to receive a copy of Ann Griffiths' reply to a request release live sighting reports received by DIA after 1 August, 1979. The shock is not from the denial of DIA, but from the content of the letter. It was forwarded to the Board members and Regional Coordinators after the League newsletter was printed. It is not marked confidential and I feel it is of great importance to you; therefore, I submit it to you in its entirety. The underlining is mine.



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

APR 14 1982

9 APR 1982

60  
4/16/82

U-1,113/RTS-1B

Ms. Ann Mills Griffiths  
Executive Director  
National League of Families of American  
Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia  
1608 K Street, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Ms. Griffiths:

This is in response to your letter of 22 March 1982, in which you appeal DIA's decision not to release live sighting reports of U.S. personnel in Southeast Asia received after 1 August 1979.

It is the policy of this Agency that all live sighting reports of U.S. personnel in Southeast Asia received after 1 August 1979 are properly classified in their entirety and are exempt from release under provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552 (b) (1), Freedom of Information Act.

Release of the information in the form you requested would enable the Vietnamese and Lao Governments to equate this released information to that which may exist. Obviously, these governments know the location of any American prisoners they might hold. By comparing this information to the released documents, even though they may be sanitized, would confirm to them the fact that we know the location of these prisoners and show the extent and capability of our collection efforts. Thus release of the information in the form you requested would be counterproductive to our intelligence efforts in this vital area. Your appeal for release of these documents is therefore denied.

Sincerely,

E. A. BUNKHALTER, JR.  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Acting Director

EXHIBIT 11

000026





## DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-



27 FEB 1990

U-0218/PW-MIA

TO: Headquarters,  
Air Force Military Personnel Center  
DPMCB, ATTN: Mr. George Atkinson  
Randolph AFB, TX 78150-6001

SUBJECT: Reporting in the Case of Colonel David Hrdlicka, USAF

1. Late last year an analyst in this office received a telephone call from an American citizen who described himself as a carrier for the U.S. Postal Service. He said he was in frequent contact with a "Frenchman" in Bangkok who allegedly has a source (not identified) who claims that American pilot David Hrdlicka recently escaped, only to be recaptured. He also reported that Col Hrdlicka had been seen in a PW camp in the tri-border area of Vietnam/Laos/Cambodia. No further information was offered, but the postal carrier indicated he would be in further contact with the Frenchman and would keep us informed. We have not heard from him since.
2. Several weeks later we received a call from another American who said he knew someone with information on Col Hrdlicka. During the conversation the analyst determined that the Frenchman, who normally resides in the U.S., was the source.
3. Also, we have been investigating a story furnished by an American in Thailand who provided the driver's license data on Col Hrdlicka. He claimed to have obtained the information from another American who received it from a Pathet Lao soldier while travelling near Luang Prabang. We were finally able to locate and interview the second American while he was visiting in Beijing. He was cooperative and provided us with other information, but he knew nothing about Col Hrdlicka and had not met and received information from a Lao soldier as claimed by the American in Thailand. When we reinterviewed the American in Thailand and told him that his alleged source knew nothing about the information attributed to him, he then indicated that maybe he got it from someone else, then changed his mind, then changed the subject, alluding to knowledge of a group of PW hunters who are allegedly working on rescuing an unidentified American in Laos. In short, the source of the data on Col Hrdlicka is unknown, but it was not obtained in the manner described by the American in Thailand in Joint Casualty Resolution Center report T89-354.
4. It is worth noting that those involved in this reporting are U.S. residents with "business interests" in Thailand. There is a reasonable possibility that these sources are connected and they may decide to expand on their story to gain attention or raise funds for a private foray. In this instance the Frenchman has a track record of involvement with U.S. "PW

EXHIBIT 13


000030



hunters," who have repeatedly failed to find a PW or evidence to support their claims. Further, experience has shown that when names of missing men and identification data start making the rounds of the refugee camps and the so-called "Lao resistance" groups in Thailand, stories claiming the man is alive soon follow.

5. We are continuing to follow up on this reporting and will keep you advised of any new information we are able to develop.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Joseph A. Schlatter". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

JOSEPH A. SCHLATTER

Colonel, USA

Chief, Special Office for Prisoners  
of War and Missing in Action



~~SECRET~~  
EXCISE

LAOS Doody  
P

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPO/CDR *the* Date: *5/24/66*

RECEIVED LOCAL TIME

03 03

*POW's*

( ) RELEASE  
(X) EXCISE  
( ) DENY  
( ) DELETE Non-Responsive Info  
FOIA Exemptions *B1 B3*  
PA Exemptions

(X) DECLASSIFY  
(X) DECLASSIFY  
IN PART

MR Cases Only:  
EO Citations

TS authority to  
( ) CLASSIFY as ( ) S or ( ) O OADR  
( ) DOWNGRADE TS to ( ) S or ( ) C OADR

PASS TO

GEN CARROLL  
GEN FITCH  
GEN TAYLOR  
GEN MAPLES  
ADM HARLINGER  
COL GILLIS  
COL WYNN

NMCC CWO

24 MAY 66 09 22

NMC393

IE RUMJFS 173A 1440635

ZNY SSSSS

OPH260620Z ZFF1 MAY 66

IN AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

TO RUEKDA/DOD IMMEDIATE

RUEHC/YECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1240

INFO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 349

RUFHGV/US MISSION GENEVA PRIORITY EIGHT

RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY 600

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC PRIORITY 744

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV PRIORITY

RUECV/CNO PRIORITY

RUEACS/CSAF PRIORITY

STATE GRNC

H

SECRET MAY 24

## 2. EXPLOITATION OF U.S. PILOT

1. FBIS SAIGON MAY 23 MONITORED BROADCAST WHICH PROVIDES PASSAGES FROM LETTZR ALLEGEDLY WRITTEN BY DOWNED U.S. PILOT TO NLHS CHIEF SOUPHANOU NAME USED ALMOST CERTAINLY THAT OF DAVID LOUIS HRDLICKA, U.S. PILOT WHOSE F-105 SHOT DOWN SOUTHEAST OF SAM NEUA ON MAY 18, 1965. NAMES, DATES, AND SERIAL NUMBERS USED IN LETTER CORRESPOND VERY CLOSELY TO THOSE WE CARRY HERE FOR CAPT. HRDLICKA.

2. BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE PATHET LAO HANDLING OF U.S. PRISONERS, BELIEVE WE CAN BE REASONABLY CERTAIN PUBLICATION OF LETTER CONFIRMS

SECRET

EXHIBIT 14

EXHIBIT 14

000032



**SECRET**PAGE TWO RUMJFS 173A **SECRET**

HRDLICKA ALIVE. [REDACTED] REPORTING OVER PAST YEAR HAS OFTEN REFERRED TO QUOTE TWO U.S. PILOTS UNQUOTE HELD IN CAVE SE OF SAM NEUA (SEE [REDACTED] AND PREVIOUS), THPS MAY MEAN THAT CAPT. CHARLES E. SHELTON WHO SHOT DOWN APRIL 29, 1965, IN ROUGHLY SAME AREA IS ALSO ALIVE. 81

WE CAN ANTICIPATE QUERIES FROM PRESS RE HRDLICKA AND IF ASKED, WISH PROPOSE FOLLOWING LINE TO ALL AGENCIES CONCERNED: QUOTE PILOT NAMED CAPT. DAVID LOUIS HRDLICKA HAS BEEN MISSING SINCE HIS PLANE SHOT DOWN MAY 18, 1965, WHILE ON RECONNAISSANCE MISSION OVER LAOS. HIS NAME HAS BEEN FURNISHED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, WHICH HAS ATTEMPTED TO DETERMINE HIS WHEREABOUTS AND HIS STATUS. THE SLIGHTLY GARBLED VERSION OF CAPTAIN HRDLICKA'S NAME AND OF HIS SERIAL NUMBER BROADCAST RECENTLY BY RADIO PATHET LAO GIVE GROUNDS FOR HOPE THAT THE CAPTAIN MAY BE ALIVE AND A CAPTIVE OF THE PATHET LAO. UNQUOTE WE WILL NOT COMMENT FURTHER OTHER THAN TO SAY LETTER CLEARLY INTENDED BY PL FOR PROPAGANDA EXPLOITATION. PLEASE CONFIRM SOONEST.

4. RELEASE OF LETTER AND USE OF HRDLICKA'S NAME BY PL UNDOUBTEDLY INTENDED TO BE PEGGED ON RECENT PUBLICATION OF LAOS MILITARY AIR CASUALTIES. THIS UNFORTUNATE EXAMPLE OF COMPLICATIONS WE CAN GET INTO BY ONE SIMPLE SLIP IN PUBLIC HANDLING OF AIR OPERATIONS AND CASUALTIES IN LAOS: IN THIS CASE, DESPATCH OF ROUTINE UNCLASSIFIED NEXT

PAGE THREE RUMJFS 173A **SECRET**

OF KIN NOTICE (SEC DEF DTG 262221Z APRIL). THIS SHOULD REMIND US OF NEED TO TIGHTEN UP ALL OUR PROCEDURES TO KEEP QUOT WAR REALLY QUIET.

GP-3. SULLIVAN

E

**SECRET**

KINN

000033



SECRET

-2- 4, JULY 1, FROM VIENTIANE

AS FOR CIVILIAN PRISONERS, BAER SAID THAT HE SAW SOT PHETRASI JUN 18 AND RAISED NAMES OF BOTH DEBRUIN (AIR AMERICA) AND BRACE (BIRD & SONS). SOT DISCLAIMED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF BRACE BUT AGREED TO MAKE INQUIRIES. ON JUN 22 HE STILL HAD NO WORD. (LATEST [REDACTED] INFO LOCATED BRACE AT TJ 3237 UNDER ESCORT PL PRESUMABLY BOUND FOR MOUNG KHOUA, TJ 4234). ON CEBRUIN HE AGAIN REPORTED THAT HE ALIVE AND WELL BUT SOT UNABLE PROVIDE ANY ADDI-

B1

PAGE THREE RUMJFS 450A S E C R E T  
TIONAL DETAILS.

BAER PRESSED SOT FOR OPPORTUNITY VISIT KHANG KHAY ON BEHALF PRISONERS (AND TO ARRANGE FOR DELIVERY MEDICAL SUPPLIES) BUT WAS TOLD PRESENT WHEREABOUTS LEADING NLHX FIGURES UNKNOWN. BAER THEN REQUESTED SOT TO FIX APPOINTMENT WITH SOUPHANOUVONG OR PHOUMI VONGVICHIT FOR JUL 11, 12, OR 13 IN KHANG KHAY SINCE BAER EXPECTS LEAVE FE FOR GENEVA SHORTLY THEREAFTER. SOT AGREED MAKE AN ATTEMPT AND WILL INFORM BAER WHEN LATTER RETURNS TO VIENTIANE FROM SAIGON ON OR ABOUT JUL 7.

GP-3. SULLIVAN

SECRET

000034





DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-



27 FEB 1990

U-0218/PW-MIA

TO: Headquarters,  
Air Force Military Personnel Center  
DPMCB, ATTN: Mr. George Atkinson  
Randolph AFB, TX 78150-6001

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EXHIBIT 15


000035



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5. We are continuing to follow up on this reporting and will keep you advised of any new information we are able to develop.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Joseph A. Schlatter". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Joseph" and last name "Schlatter" clearly distinguishable.

JOSEPH A. SCHLATTER

Colonel, USA

Chief, Special Office for Prisoners  
of War and Missing in Action



#### BLOOD CHIT

In the Victorian sense, Blood means friendship, and in military terms, a Chit is a voucher. Hence, the term blood chit or "Friendship Voucher." Our aircrew members carried a blood chit on their person while flying missions during the Southeast Asian conflict. The request for assistance, in the event they were shot down, is written in English and various languages common to the area. The blood chit is credited with saving many lives.

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EXHIBIT 16

000037



FM-611  
SOUTHEAST ASIA - WEST CENTRAL PACIFIC

000038





BRING our "LIVE"  
POW's Home from  
Southeast Asia!



7-2-92  
Dear Mr. Shetty:

I am enclosing two reports that I would like to have you check and get the answers to! Also I would like to know what David's Code # or name is just in case it gets lost! Also would like to know who the satellite photo relates to if it isn't David? I would also like to see any reports in the last five years that could correlate to David as it seems even though I filed a FOIA I haven't received everything. I will be awaiting an answer soon.

I have ~~also~~ circled Thanks  
in red the questions Carol Hradick  
I would like answers  
to.





EXHIBIT 18

000040





BRING our "LIVE"  
POW's Home from  
Southeast Asia!

July 27, 1992

Gentlemen;

This is a request under the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act. I am requesting all documents that have recently been declassified concerning MIA/POW's in Laos. I am specifically looking for all the documents pertaining to rescue attempts made to gain the freedom of Col. David L. Hrdlicka USAF and Col. Charles Shelton USAF. I believe the first rescue attempt may be code named "Duck Soup". I believe there were several attempts and request documents on all such missions.



As you know, the amended Act permits you to reduce or waive fees. I need these materials to protect the constitutional rights of my husband and the Department of Defense has already decided that it is appropriate to waive all charges for materials and information furnished at the request of members of the families of POW's and MIA's. Therefore, I request that you waive fees and charges with respect to this FOIPA request. In the event that you decide not to waive such fees and charges, please let me know, as quickly as you can, how much you want me to pay for the requested items.

If you determine that some portions of the requested items are exempt from disclosure under the amended Act, please furnish me with the remainder and identify the exemptions which you maintain justify the non-disclosures. I, of course, reserve the right to appeal any such decisions.

If you have any questions regarding this request, please contact me. I will expect to receive a reply within ten (10) days.

Thank you for your attention,

Carol Hrdlicka  
Rt. 1, Box 24  
Conway Springs, Ks. 67031  
316-450-2439

EXHIBIT 19

000041



PAGE:0002

[REDACTED] 5USC 552 (b) (2)

FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC  
INFO RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC  
RUEACHC/CMC WASHINGTON DC  
RUEDADA/AFIS AMHS BOLLING AFB DC  
RUETIAQ/MPCFTGEORGE G MEADE MD  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC  
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC  
RUQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL  
RUEALGX/SAFE

[REDACTED] 5USC 552 (b) (2)

FM CDRUSAOPSGP FT GEORGE G MEADE MD //IAGPC-L//  
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC //DAM-1B/PW-MIA//  
INFO ZEN/CDRUSAOPSGP FT GEORGE G. MEADE MD //IAGPC-CH//  
RUDHAAA/CDRINSCOM FT BELVOIR VA //IAOPS-H-C//  
RUEADWD/DA WASHDC //DAMI-POH/DAMI-FII//  
RUEHBK/JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH  
RUHQBP/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI  
RUHVMPC/HQ AFMPC RANDOLPH AFB TX //DPHCB//

BT

CONTROLS

PASS: DIA/PW-MIA FOR J. TRAVIS

QQQQ

SECTION 01 OF 02

SERIAL:

IIR [REDACTED]

5USC 552 (b) (2)

/\*\*\*\*\* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE \*\*\*\*\*/

BODY

COUNTRY:

LAOS (LA); VIETNAM (VM).

-

SUBJ:

2 240 8010 90 5USC 552 (b) (2)

IIR [REDACTED]

HEARSAY, RE U.S. MIA ALLEGEDLY

ALIVE IN LAOS

-

EXHIBIT 20

DOI:

891212.

REQS:

[REDACTED] 5USC 552 (b) (2)

000042



PAGE:0003

SOURCE:

SUSC552 (b) (1)  
SUSC 552 (b) (1) (7) (C)

SUMMARY:

TEXT:

1. SYNOPSIS.

SUSC552 (b) (1)

2. BACKGROUND.

3. CORRESPONDENCE IN REFERENCE TO U.S. MIA.

-----TEAR LINE-----

A. EXCERPT NAMING POSSIBLE MIA. THE FOLLOWING WAS TAKEN FROM A LETTER FROM SUBJECT 1 TO SUBJECT 2 DATED 27 JUN 1989, BANGKOK. "I AM TALKING TO COL CHAENG (BRIG GEN) PL COMMANDER OF THE 11TH REGIMENT AT KHAM KEUT, KHAM MOUNG PROVINCE. SUSPECTING OF HOLDING D. HERLICKA AND FRIENDS. THE OUTCOME OF MY CONVERSATION WILL BE RELAYED TO YOU SOON."

-----TEAR LINE-----

B.

C.

SUSC552 (b) (1)

*I want the Report  
to be returned to this!*

000043



BUSC 552 (b) (1)

PAGE:0004

D

## SPECIAL COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS

1 SEARCH OF MIA RECORDS. DIA PERSONNEL MISSING IN ACTION COLLECTION SUPPORT DATA BASE LISTS AS MISSING IN ACTION -

NAME	SERNO	SERVICE	DOB	DATE/PLACE OF LOSS
HRDLICKA, DAVID LOUIS	72541FR	USAF	DATA	650518 LA

2. RELEASE OF INFORMATION TO NEXT OF KIN. DUE TO THE POSSIBLE CORRELATION OF THE NAME PROVIDED IN THIS REPORT WITH THE EVENT RECORDED IN DIA MISSING IN ACTION RECORDS, THIS REPORT IS FORWARDED TO DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE PERSONNEL FOR POSSIBLE RELEASE OF PERTINENT INFORMATION ELEMENTS IN PARAGRAPH 3, A TO NEXT OF KIN AS DEEMED APPROPRIATE.

COMMENTS: THIS IS THE SECOND OF TWO REPORTS FROM SOURCE. THE FIRST WAS IIR [REDACTED] HEARSAY, RE U.S. MIA/C47 CREW ALLEGEDLY ALIVE IN LAOS. SOURCE PROVIDED THE INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT WILLINGLY AND WITHOUT EVASION. ANY EVALUATIONS, IN RESPONSE TO THIS IIR SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO: CDRUSAOPSGP FT GEORGE G. MEADE MD//IAGPC-L/IAGPC-CM//.

//IPSP: PC 2430//.

//COMSOBJ: 521//.

ADMIN

PROJ: [REDACTED]

COLL: VK.

INSTR: US: NO.

ENCL: FOUR ENCL TO FOLLOW -

1. HANDWRITTEN LETTER , 1 CY, 890627, 3PG , ENGLISH.

2. LETTER , 1 CY, 891128, 1P , ENGLISH.

3. FAX , 1 CY, 891202, 1P, , ENGLISH.

4. FAX , 1 CY, 891202, 1P, , ENGLISH.

PREP: 2-10321.

ACQ: FT GEORGE G. MEADE, MD (900426).

DISSEM: FIELD: NONE; SENT TO: DIA//RTS-2B/PW-MIA//

BUSC 552 (b) (2)

#0347

NNN:

000044





## DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-



0218/PW-MIA

27 FEB 1990

TO: Headquarters,  
Air Force Military Personnel Center  
DPMCB, ATTN: Mr. George Atkinson  
Randolph AFB, TX 78150-6001

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*I want the report this analysis  
was made from!*

000045



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## memorandum

21 SEP 1992

DATE:

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: PW

1099/PW

SUBJECT: Response to FOIA Request, Case 0670-92

TO: DSP-1 (FOIA)

Ref: DSP-1 memo 2,450), 10 Aug 92 (enclosure 1).

1. Reference requested that DIA (PW) conduct a file search in response to a request from Mrs. Carol Hrdlicka, wife of Colonel David Hrdlicka, USAF, missing in Laos. Mrs. Hrdlicka is requesting "all documents that have recently been declassified concerning MIA/POW's in Laos." Specifically, she is requesting "all the documents pertaining to rescue attempts made to gain the freedom of Col David L. Hrdlicka USAF and Col Charles Shelton USAF." Mrs. Hrdlicka believes the first rescue attempt was code named "Duck Soup."

2. Regarding her broad general request, please inform Mrs. Hrdlicka that all declassified documents pertaining to missing in action from the war in Southeast Asia have been placed in the public domain and will be available through the Library of Congress. In answer to her specific request, please inform Mrs. Hrdlicka that we have no records that the U.S. Government has ever mounted a rescue attempt for either Colonel Hrdlicka or Colonel Shelton. Based upon numerous inquiries due to articles in the public media, DIA undertook a records search, with the help of other government offices, to determine whether any operation by the name of "Duck Soup" ever actually occurred. The results of our inquiries revealed that, in 1949, a limited U.S. Government operation code named "Duck Soup" did occur. The nature of the operation remains classified. However, the operation was completely unconnected with the POW/MIA issue and was completely unconnected with the area of Southeast Asia.


3. A DD Form 2086 is provided as enclosure 2.

4. POC for this action is John Horn, (703) 908-2761.

2 Enclosures

1. DSP-1 memo 2,450),  
10 Aug 92

2. DD Form 2086



CHARLES F. TROWBRIDGE, JR.

Deputy Chief

Special Office for Prisoners  
of War and Missing in Action



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* NSC 134

6

Action

55

Info

OO RUEHCR RUEKDA  
 DE RUMJFS 064A 15/0615Z  
 O 150600Z ZEA  
 FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE  
 TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1872  
 RUEKDA/DOD WASHDC  
 INFO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 1398  
 RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON 923  
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
 RUMHQA/CINCPAC 1499  
 STATE GRNC  
 BT

~~SECRET~~ MAY 15

LINDIS

EMBTTEL 1865

CONTRARY PRELIMINARY REPORT (SEE REFTEL) ONLY ONE  
 MEMBER MEO TEAM WITHDRAWN MAY 14 AND REMAINDER WILL STAY  
 ON TO EXPLORE FEASIBILITY CONDUCTING RESCUE ATTEMPT FOR  
 DOWNED RF-101 PILOT WHO BELIEVED BE HELD IN CAVE AT VH  
 1257 UNDER GUARD OF PLATOON PL SOLDIERS. AFTER  
 APPROXIMATELY TEN DAYS, OR ABOUT MAY 24, CHOPPERS WILL  
 RETURN TO PICK UP TEAM.

PAGE TWO RUMJFS 064A ~~SECRET~~

MEO TEAM MEMBER REPORTED THAT PILOT CAPTURED MAY 1 ON  
 SECOND MORNING AFTER BAILING OUT. CLOUD COVER HAD INTERFERED  
 WITH HIS ATTEMPTS ESTABLISH VISUAL CONTACT WITH SAR AND  
 SIGNAL FLARES COMPROMISED HIS POSITION. HE WAS TAKEN ON FOOT  
 FIRST TO XIENG SU (VH 1953) AND LATER TO NONG KOU (VH 1958).  
 ACCORDING TO MEO, PILOT WAS TO BE INTERVIEWED BY HIGHLY-PLACED  
 PL LEADERS IN NEAR FUTURE.

SEPTTEL IN AIRA CHANNEL WILL REQUEST SAR COVER FOR MAY 24  
 RENDEZVOUS.

GP-3. SULLIVAN

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 3:30 AM MAY 15  
 PASSED WHITE HOUSE 3:45 AM MAY 15

~~SECRET~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS CO  
PROHIBITED UNLESS UNCLASS

000047



SENT  
NCA

D284  
O RUEPWW  
E RUEHCR 1109/3333EEEEEE

1035 JUN 2 05 28

ID284  
O RUEPWW  
E RUEHCR 1109 02/0520Z  
I 020404Z ZEA  
M SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR BUNDY  
I 020335Z ZEA ZFF-3  
M AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE  
O RUHKA/CINCPAC IMMEDIATE 1508  
INFO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1930  
RUEHJS/JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV IMMEDIATE  
RUHLKM/CINCPACAF IMMEDIATE  
RUHPB/CINCPACFLT IMMEDIATE  
RUMSALA/SECOND AIR DIV IMMEDIATE  
RUMALB/13TH AIR FORCE IMMEDIATE  
STATE GRNC

BT  
~~TOP SECRET~~ JUNE 2

.IMDIS

RE CINCPAC 310700Z

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 92-280

By NAKA Date 2-11-90

✓  
Bundy

~~TOP SECRET~~

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

BOUVANNA HAS AUTHORIZED US EFFORT INTERCEPT AND DESTROY  
DRV TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT FLYING MISSIONS IN SAM NEUA REPEAT  
SAM NEUA AREA. MOST OF THESE MISSIONS HAVE BEEN OBSERVED IN VICINITY  
HUA MUONG AND CAN BE SEEN BY FRIENDLY GROUND OBSERVERS (INCLUDING  
AMERICAN) FROM SITE 36 (UH 4113) AND SITE 27 (UH 5312).

IT MUST BE EMPHASIZED THAT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT APPLY AND, THEREFORE,  
THAT AIRCRAFT MUST BE INVOLVED IN SUPPLY MISSION WHEN TAKEN UNDER ATTACK.

000048



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

NSC

46-42

Action

SS

Info

NNNNVV MJA106SPA931JFA439

PP RUEHCR RUEHJS 10/11

DE RUMJFS 119A 18/1195Z

P. R. 18.1125Z. ZEA

FM (AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE)

TO RUMSALA/2D AIRDIV. PRIORITY CITE 181125Z

INFO RUMSALH/DEP CDR. IAD-THAI UDORN THAI

RUMKA/CINCPAC 1566

RUMSALB/KORAT AD THAI

RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 2047

RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 1565

RUEHJS/DOD WASHDC

RUMBAJ/DEPCHJUSMAG THAI 2462

RUMEC/DET CDR. IAD-THAI BANGKOK

RUMHLM/PACAF

RUMSAMA/COMUSMACV

RUMALB/13AF CG CLARK AB PHIL

STATE GRNC

BT

T O P S E C R E T JUNE 18.

JOINT EMBASSY/AIRA MESSAGE.

DUCK SOUP.

1. WE HAVE COME TO CONCLUSION THAT OUR AIRLIFT OPERATIONS IN NORTHEAST LAOS CANNOT BE CONFINED ONLY TO MORNING HOURS IF ADEQUATE SUPPLY TO AREA IS TO BE MAINTAINED. IF DUCK SOUP IS TO BE RESUMED, IT WOULD THEREFORE HAVE TO BE ON BASIS THAT FRIEND AIRCRAFT WOULD HAVE UNRESTRICTED ACCESS TO NORTHEAST LAOS FROM AM TO FIVE PM DAILY (LOCAL TIME). IN OTHER WORDS, DUCK SOUP OPERATIONS COULD NOT BE CONDUCTED DURING THIS PERIOD.

2. WE ARE STILL CONCERNED WITH PROBLEM OF POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF HOSTILE AIRCRAFT. IT IS POSSIBLE, FOR EXAMPLE, TO DISTINGUISH DRV AIRCRAFT ON PASSENGER RUN FROM AIRCRAFT ON DROP MISSION?

3. IN EVENT SATISFACTORY PROCEDURES CAN BE WORKED OUT FOR RESUMPTION DUCK SOUP UNDER CONDITIONS SET FORTH IN PARA ONE ABOVE WE WOULD NEED TO BE NOTIFIED A MINIMUM OF 48 HOURS IN ADVANCE ORDER ALERT FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT. IT WILL THEREFORE NOT BE FEASIBLE TO RESUME DUCK SOUP AS EARLY AS JUNE 21.

4. YOUR MESSAGE 121140Z (NOTAL) INDICATED OPERATIONAL USEFULNESS OF DUCK SOUP UNDER STUDY YOUR HQ. WILL APPRECIATE RECEIVING RESULTS THIS STUDY AS WELL AS COMMENTS ON PARAS ONE AND TWO ABOVE.

GP-3. SULLIVAN

BT *Handwritten signature* 174 175~~TOP SECRET~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY  
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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*105  
00282  
ActionSS  
Info

NNNNVV HJ2470JT 0375

.....ZZ RUEHCR RUEHDA

DE RUHJFS 150A 21/0222Z

Z O 210230Z 21A 200-0

FM AMEMBASSY WASHINGTON

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 2051

INFO RUHJFS/AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE 1015

RUHJFS/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 1507

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC IMMEDIATE 1569

RUEKDA/JCS IMMEDIATE

RUALC/10AF CAB PI IMMEDIATE

RUMSALA/2ND AIR DIV TSN

STATE GRNC

BT

S E C R E T JUNE 21

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3A

NY 91-278

BY ~~100~~ NARA Date 1-28-93

L I M D I S

OUR MIGHTY MEO REPORT FROM ONE OF THEIR OUTPOSTS IN SAM NEUA THAT THEY HAVE SUCCEEDED IN RECAPTURING ONE OF U.S. PILOTS CAPTURED DURING PAST FEW WEEKS BY PATHET LAO AND HAVE WALKED HIM OUT TO FRIENDLY TERRITORY. WE ARE SENDING A CHOPPER TO THEIR COMMAND POST TO PICK HIM UP.

IT IS NOT REPEAT NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THIS IS WRDLCKA OR SHELL BUT WE ASSUME IT IS ONE OR THE OTHER. WE WILL FLY HIM DIRECT TO UDORN AND PRESUME OTHER WORD WILL COME THROUGH AIR FORCE CHANNEL

PAGE TWO RUHJFS 150A ~~SECRET~~

I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS OVERWHELMING IMPORTANCE THAT THIS RESCUE NOT REPEAT NOT BE GIVEN PUBLICITY. I HAVE ALREADY PASSED THIS WORD TO UDORN AND TRUST IT CAN BE PUNCTUATED BY INSTRUCTIONS TO ALL ECHELONS, PARTICULARLY PENTAGON PRESS SERVICES. SAME INJUNCTION SHOULD BE PASSED TO NEXT OF KIN.

THIS OFFICER IS ONLY ONE OF THREE FOR WHICH WE CURRENTLY HAVE MEO RESCUE OPERATIONS IN PROGRESS. THOSE OPERATIONS, AS WELL AS LIVES OF U.S. OFFICERS AND OUR MEO AND LAO FRIENDS, COULD BE COMPROMISED AND JEOPARDIZED BY PUBLIC HULLABALOO ABOUT THIS RESCUE.

WHEN WE HAVE MORE FACTS IN HAND, WE WILL BE IN TOUCH RE BEST METHOD HANDLING THIS MATTER WITH ICRC AND OTHER ENTITIES WHICH NEED TO KNOW ABOUT PILOT'S RECOVERY. PLEASE ADVISE ACTION TAKEN.

GP-3 SULLIVAN.

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO SS/O, 6/20/65, 11:08 p.m.

PASSED WHITEHOUSE 6/20/65, 11:20 p.m.

CIA, 6/20/65, 11:35 p.m.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**Bundy S Nsc*43  
ActionSS  
Info

.NNNNVV MJA463JFA914  
 RR RUEHCR  
 DE RUMJFS 453A 1821159  
 ZNY TTTT  
 R 011145Z ZEA  
 FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE  
 TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC THREE  
 INFO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK TWO  
 RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON TWO  
 RUMSALA/SECOND AIR DIVISION  
 RUHKA/CINCPAC THREE  
 RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
 STATE GRNC  
 BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ JULY 01

LIMDIS

REDEPTTEL 1121.

REGRET WASHINGTON UNWILLING RISK USE AIR AMERICA PILOTS IN T-2  
 FOR DUCK SOUP OPERATIONS. ALTERNATE PROPOSAL FOR USE LAO OR TH  
 PILOTS INFEASIBLE. NONE REPEAT NONE HAS ADEQUATE TECHNICAL  
 PROFICIENCY TO LAND AND TAKE OFF FROM SITE 98 IN T-28 TYPE AIR  
 MOREOVER, BECAUSE OF COMMUNICATIONS/LANGUAGE AND OTHER PROBLEM  
 INTERCEPT ATTEMPTS BY THAI/LAO PILOTS WOULD POSE UNACCEPTABLE  
 RISKS TO FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT IN GENERAL VICINITY.

GP-3 SULLIVAN  
 BT

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E.O. 12336, Sec. 3.4

DATE 91-2-28

By *yu*, NARA, Date 6-24-93~~TOP SECRET~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

B. J. N. JSC

3  
Adlon

SS

Info

NNNNVV MJA143JFA367  
RR RUEHCR RUEHJS  
DE RUMJFS 521A 1870820  
ZNY TTTT  
R 050743Z 7FA  
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE  
TO RUHKA/CINCPAC 12  
INFO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 18  
RUEHJS/JCS WASHDC  
RUHLKM/CINCPACAF  
RUHPB/CINCPACFLT  
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

03073

1965 JUL 6

AM 4 31

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12336, Sec 1.4

NY 91-278

By NARA, Date 2-9-92

T-075000001 JULY 06.

REUR 032217Z.

(1) AIR ATTACHE HAS DISCUSSED **DUOK SOUP** WITH COLONEL MURPHY AT UDORN AND THEY BELIEVE THEY MAY HAVE ALTERNATE PROPOSAL WHICH COULD ACCOMPLISH DESIRED OBJECTIVE.

(2) THIS PROPOSAL WOULD UTILIZE FAC AIRCRAFT BASED OUT OF UDORN IN MANNER WHICH WE ORIGINALLY ENVISAGED FOR T-28'S, I.E.

(A) F40'S WOULD GO ON GROUND ALERT DAILY AT 1700 HOURS LOCAL. THIS WOULD PERMIT US TO COMPLETE OUR DAILY AIR SUPPLY MISSIONS IN NORTHEAST LAOS BEFORE WE HAVE TO CLEAR THE CORRIDOR.

(B) IN ABSENCE SCRAMBLE CALL FROM FAC UNIT AT SITE 36, F40'S WOULD LAUNCH ABOUT DUSK FOR AIR ALERT STATION IN GENERAL VICINITY SITE 36.

(C) IF ENEMY AIRCRAFT SHOW UP IN VICINITY, FAC COULD THEN CALL IN F40'S FOR INTERCEPT ON ASSUMPTION THAT ENOUGH LIGHT WILL REMAIN TO PERMIT POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION VISUALLY BEFORE MAKING FIRING PASS.

(3) IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT SEVERAL F40 AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN MODIFIED TO PERMIT THEM ACCOMPLISH SUCH A MISSION. WE ALSO ASSUME THAT A-1-H AIRCRAFT MIGHT BE SUITABLE FOR THIS ROLE.

AMB SULLIVAN CONCURRED IN FOREGOING PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE.

GP-3. SWANK

Handled LIMDIS per S/S-O.

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~~SECRET~~

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The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia

## The War in Northern Laos

Victor B. Anthony  
Richard R. Sexton

Classified by: Multiple sources  
Declassify on: OADR

Center for Air Force History  
United States Air Force  
Washington, D.C. 1993

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## Chapter VII

See-Saw on the Plain (U)

(S) During the summer of 1965, as Vang Pao edged toward Hua Muong (Lima Site 58), Ambassador Sullivan and military authorities spent much time and effort seeking a way to halt communist aerial resupply flights into northeastern Laos. The embassy first got wind of these flights in April, when [REDACTED] reports suggested a pair of Soviet-built Il-14 aircraft might be making occasional night runs from North Vietnam, one dropping flares and the other dispensing cargo. Since the intelligence was sketchy, it was possible the flares were ground fired and the flights covert 34-Alpha (34-A) missions.<sup>1</sup> Even if they were enemy planes, the chances of catching one in the act seemed pretty slim; Pathet Lao territory was "nasty country" at night, demanding the best navigational equipment and pilot skills. There was also an outside chance the transports were engaged in innocent passage or had Souphanouvong or other Pathet Lao officials on board. If so, Sullivan believed Souvanna would rule out any attempt to down the aircraft. In fact, the very thought of American fighters blazing away at a transport loaded with Pathet Lao very important persons already had Sullivan "spinning his prayer wheel." Nonetheless, as part of the April 17 relaxation of Washington control over air operations, President Johnson approved the use of U.S. aircraft to intercept these flights. His decision was somewhat unusual, catching Sullivan and Souvanna by surprise, for neither had requested it. All in all, however, Sullivan welcomed the President's action.<sup>2</sup>

(S) Yankee Team photos later confirmed two North Vietnamese Il-14s parked at the Samneua airfield. The country team's consensus was that it was best to attack these planes on the ground, but Souvanna had banned air strikes on the town or airfield and leaned toward the RLAF T-28s flying the mission. He also had prohibited hitting the Il-14s at remote landing sites or in the air since they could be carrying passengers. The only avenue open was to catch the North Vietnamese flagrantly dropping supplies by parachute. For this reason, Souvanna soon reversed his preference for the T-28s (he concluded they might bungle the job) and wondered instead if the Air Force could undertake such "a refined type of intercept."<sup>3</sup>

(S) PACAF thought the mission could be conducted by Souvanna's ground rules but not until precise information on the flights was at hand. Thus, during most of May, the GCI radar sites at Nakhon Phanom and Udon monitored the Il-14s. They found that the North Vietnamese had now switched to day operations and occasionally flew as far south as the Plain of Jars. By May 23, two fixed routes (with offloading in two northeast areas) were pinpointed. Deeming the warning time for scrambling interceptors sufficient, the 2d Air Division suggested that Bango F-4Cs begin a ground alert at Udon for this mission on June 1. The air support operations center would launch the F-4Cs in flights of from four to ten, depending on the number of target aircraft airborne and the routes followed. (Enemy flights varied from one to six transports.) Positive identification was to be made prior to any attack, and all intercepts made within Laotian air

1. (S) 34-A operations were covert operations carried out north of the Demilitarized Zone.

2. (S) Msgs, SECSTATE/SECDEF to AmEmb Vientiane, 914, Apr 17, 1965, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 1689, Apr 19, 1965; memo, Rear Adm Francis J. Blouin, USN, Dir/FE Region, ASD/ISA, to Alvin Friedman, ASD/ISA, subj: Duck Soup, Sep 7, 1965.

3. (S) Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 1725, Apr 23, 1965, 1802, May 4, 1965.

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## The War in Northern Laos

operating conditions in northern Laos. They would be given enemy aircraft identification training before deployment. Their planes, armed only with .50-caliber machineguns, would stand daily alert until five in the evening, when they would take off from Long Tieng and be in the vicinity of the most recent sightings within twenty minutes. They would then loiter to dusk before flying back to Udom. If a North Vietnamese transport was seen, the T-28s would give chase but withhold fire until the FAG team at Lima Site 36 approved. Since Souvanna had agreed to Duck Soup, Sullivan envisioned no problem in getting him to accept this modified plan but did not foresee the State Department's opposition.<sup>10</sup>

(S) Leonard Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, put Sullivan on notice that State was not willing to run the risk of Americans flying T-28s in Laos, except during an emergency search and rescue mission in planes marked with U.S. insignia. He thought the use of Laotian  pilots for Duck Soup should be explored. With all the pilots trained by Water Pump, surely Sullivan could find two such individuals. Like Air America personnel, they should undergo intensive aircraft identification training before being sent to Long Tieng. To make sure the Laotian  pilots fully understood the instructions passed to them, Unger suggested stationing reliable interpreters in the Vientiane air operations center and with the forward air guide at Lima Site 36. Lastly, the former ambassador said there was no evidence of Soviet involvement in the airlift; but if their participation became evident, all intercepts were forbidden.<sup>11</sup>

(S) The Joint Chiefs reminded Admiral Sharp that Duck Soup had been laid on by the "highest authority," and that he and Ambassador Sullivan should come up with a solution, preferably one not using U.S. personnel. Sharp, however, sided with Sullivan; it was better for American pilots to tackle such a sensitive undertaking than the Laotians . If an American pilot was shot down, the admiral felt the chances of his falling into the wrong hands could be reduced by enlarging the search and rescue force during all Duck Soup operations.<sup>12</sup>

(S) Meanwhile, Colonel Tyrrell and General Murphy had a back-to-the-drawing-board session at Udom, trying to hammer out a plan acceptable to Washington. The air attaché and deputy commander decided to substitute Bango F-4Cs for the T-28s. The Udom jets would pull ground alert beginning at five each evening, allowing  America time to complete resupply missions in northeast Laos before having to clear the area. If the Lima Site 36 forward air controller did not call for a scramble, the F-4s would take off at dusk for an airborne alert in the general vicinity of Na Khang. If a North Vietnamese transport showed up and sufficient light remained for a positive identification before making a firing pass, the FAC would call in the F-4s. (Tyrrell and Murphy also held that the A-1Es were just as reliable for this type mission as jets.)<sup>13</sup>

(S) After consulting with Ambassador Sullivan on July 18, Admiral Sharp again stated that the best solution was to station two T-28s with  America pilots at Long Tieng and to follow the format sketched out by the ambassador, including the additional SAR forces. Tyrrell's and Murphy's F-4 proposal was acceptable, since it also included American personnel. Sharp thought it was time for the Joint Chiefs to convince the State Department to modify its objections to  America pilots flying intercept missions. The chiefs dropped the impasse into McNamara's lap in the hope he could talk Secretary of State Rusk into reconsidering.<sup>14</sup>

(S) Over the next month, Washington reviewed the intercept problem. On August 24, Undersecretary of State George W. Ball expressed strong reservations about these missions,

10. (S) Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 2079, Jun 25, 1965.

11. (S) Msg, SECSTATE to AmEmb Vientiane, 1121, Jun 30, 1965.

12. (S) Msgs, JCS to CINCPAC, 5168, 031650Z Jul 65, CINCPAC to AmEmb Vientiane, 032317Z Jul 65.

13. (S) Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to CINCPAC, SECSTATE, 18, Jul 6, 1965.

14. (S) Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 180035Z Jul 65; memo, Blouin to Friedman, Sep 7, 1965.

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## See-Saw on the Plain

particularly when the last sighting (from a non-American source, at that) had been on June 21. Furthermore, the Pentagon was troubled over the number of aircraft that would be tied down on alert. The State Department's stance compelled Sullivan to closely reexamine Duck Soup. Although enemy transports were spotted on July 15 (several at night), July 25 (two in the late afternoon), and on August 10 (several at night), he now deemed the flights too few to justify a full-time alert. The downturn in sightings was partially attributed to poor weather, but GCI radars showed that the North Vietnamese had gone back to flying chiefly at night. Since there were no all-weather interceptors in the theater he could call on, the ambassador sought discretionary authority to trigger **Duck Soup** when sightings and conditions warranted. He did not say if he would use the T-28s or F-4s but agreed to keep Washington informed. On September 2, Admiral Sharp endorsed Sullivan's position.<sup>15</sup>

(S) Three weeks passed with no action on Sullivan's request. Finally, at the urging of the JCS, McNamara approached Rusk on September 24. He was told that Sullivan would not receive this authority because the drops had fallen off and were almost entirely at night. State further pointed out that, over the past five months, neither Souvanna nor any other RLG official had raised the resupply subject with the ambassador. The matter might logically be expected to come up if the airlift was hurting the Royal Laotian Government. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This information was furnished Sullivan on the 28th, but the State Department wanted him to understand it had not closed the door to using America pilots in T-28 intercepts. If enemy aerial resupply resumed in force, the decision would be reexamined.<sup>16</sup>

(S) Sullivan realized that State was set against Duck Soup. In early October, when Maj. Gen. Ouane Rathikone, RLA Chief of Staff, reported that IL-14s were making occasional daylight drops in Luang Prabang Province from the general area of Dien Bien Phu, Sullivan did not ask for reactivation of the intercepts. Instead, he promised Ouane he would see if U.S. strikes could be cycled against Dien Bien Phu in the hope of catching some of the transports on the ground. However, when the ambassador sent the information to COMUSMACV, it was in an almost offhand manner—if Westmoreland had a few spare aircraft he did not have targets for, he might find it profitable to schedule them against the Dien Bien Phu airfield.<sup>17</sup>

(S) Duck Soup was not considered again, and an incident in South Vietnam in mid-September may have had a bearing on this, even though the incident was not mentioned in any State Department cables to Sullivan. Two F-100s made a pass so close to an ICC C-46 that the startled commission pilot nearly lost control of his plane. The ICC sent a strong protest to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, and the 2d Air Division investigated the matter. Although the pilots were cleared, State could not understand how Air Force fighters could intercept an aircraft that had "ICC" stenciled in large letters on the wing and fuselage. If this could happen in the clear weather and broad daylight of South Vietnam, the chances for mistakes were much higher in Laos where the weather was poor and there were innumerable nonmilitary flights, including two a week between Hanoi and Vientiane. Since the intercepts were limited to the late afternoon and twilight, the odds against positive identification and for an inadvertent shootdown were far higher. The near miss in South Vietnam may well have ended any State Department endorsement of Duck Soup.

15. (S) Msgs, SECSTATE to AmEmb Vientiane, 130, Aug 24, 1965, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 220, Aug 28, 1965, CINCPAC to JCS, 020537Z Sep 65.

16. (S) Memo, SECDEF to CJCS, subj: Enemy Resupply Activity Northern Laos Duck Soup, Sep 24, 1965; msg, SECSTATE/SECDEF to AmEmb Vientiane, 192, Sep 28, 1965.

17. (S) Msg, AmEmb Vientiane to COMUSMACV, SECSTATE, 330, Oct 4, 1965.

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**SECRET****The War in Northern Laos**

(S) If Admiral Sharp thought that back in February he had satisfied Ambassador Sullivan's need for H-34s, he was too optimistic. In early June, Sullivan told the DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, Col. Jack G. Cornett, USA, that the ~~the~~ America helicopter fleet needed to be increased to twenty-six H-34s due to SAR commitments. Nevertheless, the worldwide shortage of these machines persisted, and those that could be found were costly to maintain. Even if ~~the~~ America got the helicopters, it had to find qualified flying personnel or train the pilots from scratch. Moreover, the required expansion of the airline's Udom facilities would not be cheap. Cornett concluded that if the H-34 remained the backbone of the ~~the~~ America fleet, the U.S. effort in Laos was in trouble.<sup>18</sup>

(S) Two USAF CH-3Cs arrived in Thailand on July 5, and Cornett proposed that the embassy authorize the use of those aircraft for SAR in northern Laos (CH-3Cs had already been approved for SAR over North Vietnam). Unlike the HH-43s, there was no need to pre-position these two machines at remote lima sites. If an aircraft was lost in Laos, Cornett envisioned the nearest H-34 or CH-3 flying to the rescue. It would most likely be a CH-3, since one would be on ground alert at Nakhon Phanom during all planned missions. By using the CH-3s, extra H-34s would not be needed for ~~the~~ America, which could use the sixteen it had for cargo hauling, and the Udom facilities would not require expansion. All told, a lot of Laos MAP funds could be saved.<sup>19</sup>

(S) Cornett was well aware of Sullivan's reluctance to use the Air Force and his high esteem for ~~the~~ America. He admitted that the airline pilots that had been there for some time knew the area better than their USAF counterparts, but training and orientation flights could overcome this handicap. Moreover, new ~~the~~ America pilots were no different than USAF types; both came to Laos without local experience and both had to learn the country. Admiral Sharp at once threw his weight behind Cornett. At a July 9 meeting between embassy and deputy chief personnel, Vientiane's representatives sided with the military.<sup>20</sup>

(S) Even though country team members opted for USAF SAR helicopters in Laos, Ambassador Sullivan still preferred ~~the~~ America. He realized that sooner or later he would have to accept USAF HH-43s and/or CH-3s for SAR in this area on a "first-come, first-served basis;" but before giving in on this touchy subject, the ambassador wanted Washington's guidance. In the interim, he discussed the matter at Udom with Colonel Cornett and Lt. Gen. Paul S. Emrick, PACOM Chief of Staff. They agreed that, for the time being, the final decision would be left hanging. Sullivan also accepted an interim limit of twenty-one for the H-34s.<sup>21</sup>

(S) Two HH-43s and two CH-3Cs were at Nakhon Phanom, two HH-43s were at Udom, and six HH-3s were due to arrive in Thailand during September and October. As soon as the crews for the HH-3s were checked out, the HH-43s and CH-3s would be withdrawn from Thailand. Wanting to "explore all alternatives," Washington asked Sullivan to clarify if these Thai-based USAF helicopters would do SAR from bases in Thailand and land in Laos just to refuel or would they stand ground alert at various lima sites. If the latter were the case, Washington wanted to know what sites were involved, what the risks of exposure were, if it would be wiser to limit the Air Force to flying SAR only in Steel Tiger and North Vietnam, and if Souvanna had been consulted or his permission obtained for USAF rescue operations in northern Laos?<sup>22</sup>

18. (S) Msg, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI to CINCPAC, 070900Z Jul 65. In this message, Colonel Cornett repeated to Admiral Sharp a cable he had sent to Ambassador Sullivan.

19. (S) *Ibid.*

20. (S) *Ibid.*; msgs, CINCPAC (Adm Sharp) to AmEmb Vientiane (Amb Sullivan), 072228Z Jul 65, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI to CINCPAC, 091205Z Jul 65.

21. (S) Msgs, AmEmb Vientiane to SECSTATE, 21, Jul 13, 1965, AmEmb Vientiane (Amb Sullivan) to CINCPAC (Adm Sharp), 130711Z Jul 65.

22. (S) Msg, SECSTATE/SECDEF to AmEmb Vientiane, 56, Jul 21, 1965.

**SECRET**

000057



ADMINISTRATIVE MESSAGE

ROUTINE

91 JUL 10 A 100

yh

R 081842Z JUL 91 ZY3 PSN 592863P33

FM CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

TO JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

HQ AFMPC RANDOLPH AFB TX//DPMCB//

INFO JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//PN-MIA/J5//

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3//

DIA WASHINGTON DC//PN-MIA//

SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EAP/VLC//

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-ISA/PN-MIA//

WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC

CDRUSACILHI FT SHAFTER HI//DAPC-PED-H//

MSGID/SYS.RRM/CDR JCRC//

AMPN/SUBJ: ANALYSIS OF LAO MILITARY MUSEUM VISIT IN VIENTIANE, LAOS//

REF/A/RMG/JCRC LNO 3KK TH/071206ZMAY91//

RMKS/1. REF A REPORTED VARIOUS ARTICLES VIEWED BY A J.S. TEAM WHO VISITED THE LAO MILITARY MUSEUM IN VIENTIANE, LAOS DURING MAY 1991. THE FOLLOWING IS THE INITIAL ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED IN REF A. COMMENTS ON EACH ENTRY RELATE TO THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY APPEAR IN REF A.

A. BLOOD CHIT NUMBER 224568: (PARA 2, REF A) THIS BLOOD CHIT CORRELATES WITH CAPTAIN JOSEPH S. PIRRUCCELLO, REFNO 1536. CAPTAIN PIRRUCCELLO'S AIRCRAFT CRASHED ON 8 DEC 68 AFTER IT WAS HIT BY GROUND FIRE IN THE VICINITY OF GRID COORDINATES JH593727 APPROXIMATELY SIX KILOMETERS WEST OF BAN CHATHAO, HOJAPHAN PROVINCE, LAOS. CAPTAIN PIRRUCCELLO IS UNACCOUNTED FOR.

B. TAIL NUMBER 0-17746: (PARA 3, REF A) JCRC FILES INDICATE TWO AIRCRAFT LOSSES CONTAINING THE NUMBERS 17746. TAIL NUMBER 517746 RELATES TO A LAO AIR FORCE T-26, LOST ON 24 JUN 74. TAIL NUMBER 6717746 RELATES TO A UH-1 HELICOPTER LOST ON 4 DEC

68. NEITHER LOSS INVOLVED UNACCOUNTED FOR INDIVIDUALS.

C. DATA PLATE, WITH NUMBER 53-310010-11: (PARA 4, REF A) MCCONNELL DOUGLAS DETERMINED THE DATA PLATE IS FROM AN F-4 RAODME. THE RAODME WOULD HAVE BEEN USED ON AN AIRCRAFT WITH A SERIAL NUMBER BETWEEN 66-284 AND 69-2741. THIS SERIAL NUMBER

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EXHIBIT 20

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RANGE WOULD INCLUDE MOST F-4 AIRCRAFT PRODUCED BETWEEN 1966 AND 1969.

D. THE PHOTO (PARA 5, REF A) CORRELATES TO CAPTAIN DAVID L. HRDLICKA, REFNO 0084. ON 18 MAY 65, AN F-105 AIRCRAFT PILOTED BY CAPTAIN HRDLICKA WAS HIT BY GROUND FIRE WHILE OVER MUANGPHAN PROVINCE, LAOS. CAPTAIN HRDLICKA PARACHUTED FROM THE AIRCRAFT AND LANDED IN THE VICINITY OF GRID COORDINATES VH180533. HE WAS OBSERVED BEING LED AWAY BY INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA OF HIS LANDING. SEVERAL MONTHS LATER, A PORT CAPTURE PHOTOGRAPH OF CAPTAIN HRDLICKA APPEARED IN PRAVDA, A MOSCOW NEWSPAPER. IN JULY 1966, THE NEWSPAPER QUAD DZI THAN DAN FEATURED A STORY ON HIS CAPTURE. ALSO, A TAPE RECORDING MADE BY CAPTAIN HRDLICKA WAS BROADCAST THE SAME MONTH. SUBSEQUENT REPORTS ALLEGE THAT CAPTAIN HRDLICKA WAS HELD IN CAVES IN THE VICINITY OF BAN NAKAY TEU (VH198551) AND BAN NAKAY NEJA (VH197572) AND DIED OF MALNUTRITION. CAPTAIN HRDLICKA IS STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR. THE PHOTO OBSERVED IN THE MUSEUM HAS BEEN SEEN BEFORE. DURING THE 8-9 APR 91 JOINT INVESTIGATION, THE TEAM INTERVIEWED WITNESSES AND EXAMINED A CEMETERY AND CAVE ASSOCIATED WITH CAPTAIN HRDLICKA'S CONFINEMENT. ALTHOUGH THE INFORMATION OBTAINED IS GENERALLY CONSISTENT WITH PREVIOUS REPORTS CORRELATED TO THIS CASE, THE TEAM LOCATED NO EVIDENCE INDICATING CAPTAIN HRDLICKA'S FATE.

2. FOR AFMPC: THIS EVALUATION MAY BE RELEASED TO THE APPROPRIATE NOK UPON REMOVAL OF ALL OTHER NAMES. SANITIZED COPIES OF REF A WILL BE FORWARDED SEPARATELY.//  
EVAL-SLG//  
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