



Intelligence Information Report

2-1877

[REDACTED]

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

[REDACTED]

REPORT NO. CS-311/04439-71

(C.I.A. Report #)

DATE OF [REDACTED]

COUNTRY

NORTH VIETNAM

DOI

1965-JUNE 1967

SUBJECT

PRELIMINARY DEBRIEFING SITE FOR CAPTURED U.S. PILOTS IN VINH PHU PROVINCE AND PRESENCE OF SOVIET AND COMMUNIST CHINESE PERSONNEL AT THE SITE

ACQ

SOURCE

VIETNAM, SAIGON, 23 APRIL 1971 [REDACTED]

(over)

[REDACTED]

02-05

[REDACTED]

(2)  
✓

possibly Vinh Yen + Phu Tho Prov

1. A PRELIMINARY DEBRIEFING POINT FOR U.S. PILOTS SHOT DOWN OVER VINH PHU PROVINCE, NORTH VIETNAM /NVN/, WAS LOCATED AT THE LAM THAO SUPERPHOSPHATE PLANT /WJ381589/ NEAR THACH SON VILLAGE, LAM THAO DISTRICT, VINH PHU PROVINCE. TWO U.S. PILOTS WERE TAKEN TO THE DEBRIEFING POINT ON ONE OCCASION IN 1965; EIGHT, IN 1966; AND AN UNKNOWN NUMBER, IN 1967. THE PRISONERS WERE ESCORTED TO THE SITE BY PERSONNEL OF THE ARMED PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES /APSF/, AND STUDENTS FROM A NEARBY SCHOOL SERVED AS PERIMETER GUARDS. EACH TIME PRISONERS WERE BROUGHT TO THE SITE THEY RODE IN AN OPEN CAR OF CHINESE ORIGIN RESEMBLING AN AMERICAN JEEP. SOME OF THE ESCORT GUARDS RODE IN A LEAD CAR AND OTHERS RODE IN TWO CARS FOLLOWING THE PRISONERS. UPON THEIR ARRIVAL AT THE PLANT, THE GUARDS LINED UP, FORMING A CORRIDOR THROUGH WHICH THE PILOTS ENTERED THE BUILDING. AT THIS POINT A SOVIET, A CHINESE AND A VIETNAMESE GREETED THE PILOTS AND LED THEM INTO THE BUILDING. THE PILOTS USUALLY REMAINED IN THE BUILDING FOR SEVERAL HOURS. WHEN THEY EMERGED THEY HAD CHANGED FROM UNIFORMS INTO CIVILIAN CLOTHING.

[REDACTED] SAID [REDACTED] [REDACTED] HAD TOLD HIM THE FOREIGNERS WERE SOVIET AND COMMUNIST CHINESE. SOVIET PERSONNEL HAD BEEN STATIONED AT THE PLANT SINCE ITS CONSTRUCTION IN 1963, BUT IN 1965 THE NUMBER OF SOVIETS WAS REDUCED TO THREE OR FOUR, AND IT REMAINED AT THAT LEVEL AS OF JUNE 1967. ABOUT 20 COMMUNIST CHINESE PERSONNEL ARRIVED AT THE PLANT IN 1966 AND THERE WERE STILL ABOUT 20 THERE AS OF JUNE 1967 AS FAR AS [REDACTED] KNEW, THE SOVIET AND COMMUNIST CHINESE PERSONNEL GOT ALONG WELL.

(For Trans)

(over)

Memo for the Record  
September 3, 2007


Subject: Roger Hall

I have known Roger Hall for over fifteen years. We met and discussed issues on many occasions and I had the opportunity to review his work, with which I have always been impressed.

Roger is a determined, careful, and objective researcher. Over the years he has become one of the few continuing experts on the subject of American's missing POW/MIAs and related information.

I have the highest regard for his abilities, research, and accomplishments in this area. Because of the political sensitivities associated with this issue and efforts from many quarters to hide relevant information and subvert research and investigative efforts such as Roger's, he has not "given up" as most have done but has continued to dig, uncover leads, and seek to bring the facts and documentation to light.

Roger is to be congratulated for his continuing efforts, undertaken at the cost of great personal sacrifice. I recommend that he be listened to with care and attention.



Joseph D. Douglass, Jr, PhD

Defense Analyst and author of numerable highly classified studies, many published articles, and over 12 books on various national security issues, including the POW/MIA problem, with thousands of hours experience in the analysis and interpretation of all source intelligence and personal debriefing of the highest ranking defectors ever to seek political asylum in the United States, as well as former consultant to the USG and adjunct professor at the Naval Post Graduate School and Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies.

1           Members of Congress Present: Representative Dornan.

2

3           Department of Defense Personnel Present: Al Graham,  
4           Commander William Beck, Hon. James Wold, Norm Kass, Chuck  
5           Henley, Boyd Sponaugle, Bob Corrie, and Fran O'Brien.

6

7           Central Intelligence Agency Personnel Present: Mike  
8           Grivsky and Mike Andricos.

9

10          Staff Present: Michael Higgins, Al Santoli, and Ed  
11          Timperlake.

12

13          Also Present: John Quirk, CIA contractor; and Joe  
14          Douglass, Defense analyst and author.

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

*Dornan closed hearings '96*

1 RPTS STEIN

2 DCMN MAYER

3

4

5 HEARING ON POW/MIA ISSUES

6

7 Tuesday, October 1, 1996

8

9 House of Representatives,

10 Subcommittee on

11 Military Personnel,

12 Committee on National Security,

13 Washington, D.C.

14

15 The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:25 a.m. in  
16 Room H-405, The Capitol, Hon. Robert K. Dornan [chairman of  
17 the subcommittee] presiding.

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Strong political pressures to bury intelligence that was inconsistent with policy objectives; for example, developments that would have indicated that arms control agreements were failures such as in the case of CBW, initially suppressed by direction of the White House in 1969.

Attached are some *preliminary and evolving* think pieces that you might find of some use. They strictly represent some of the thoughts I have had over the past month. The general thrust of my concern is 1. The marshaling of past talents (former USSR intelligence types) in support of new programs for new reasons and 2. the integration and interplay of problems that were previously viewed as independent and addressed by different departments and often different agencies.

The essences of these concerns are as follows:

*CBW Terrorism: The Problems and How to Proceed*

We still grossly underestimate the nature of the CBW problem. CBW developed for intelligence, political, sabotage (both overt and covert), and specialized military and the linkages between CBW and proliferation and terrorism need to be included.

*New Dimensions in Terrorism, Proliferation, Organized Crime, and Drug Trafficking.*

The interconnections need to be brought out along with their common origins (all were developed as sensitive strategic intelligence operations managed out of the same department).

*Narcotics Trafficking, Organized Crime, and Terrorism*


These have merged and become the most dire threat we face. The underlying problem is the almost unlimited money, use of terrorism in support of "business," and the emergence of organized crime as a politically protected phenomena.

*Missing American Servicemen*

This paper uses a 2x4 in an attempt to get the mule's attention. I only include it because there are two points that I suspect may be of considerable relevance to your activities. First, the paper presents a problem of a nature that should be of interest to those at work correcting problems surfaced by the Ames' case. Second, this material surfaces Soviet weapons developments whose magnitude is, to my knowledge, totally unappreciated within the intelligence and policy communities and whose potential impact, in my judgement, is far more important than the nuclear threat ever was. You will have to read with great care to pull this aspect out because it is one of the things I, for the most part, omitted because of its importance.

Did not mean to inundate you with this stuff, but I reasoned that if there is one idea in the whole mess that is useful to you, then it was worth it.

Sincerely,



Joseph D. Douglass Jr.  
203 Garden Court  
Falls Church, VA 22046  
(703) 533-9452

July 30, 1996

Mr. Chris Holmes  
Director, Weapons, Technology and Proliferation  
CIA  
Washington DC 20505

Dear Mr. Holmes:

Over the past few months I have been rethinking a number of the threats that pose serious problems to the United States, problems that are growing. In most cases, I have become increasingly concerned as my own perception has broadened and become more serious.

I have also noted what are, in my judgement, serious deficiencies in the perception of these threats as portrayed in the open literature.

My suspicion is that there are also deficiencies in intelligence assessments of these threats because of several problems in the intelligence process in prior years and because these threats are in a sense more a product of the past than the present because it is people whose experience and training was gained in the past that are driving the problems of today.

Examples of the past problems of the intelligence process whose legacy remains include the following:

A counter intelligence process that was more agency internal security than counter intelligence (i.e. Angleton's operation was mis-named).

Counter intelligence hamstrung by the domestic/foreign split between FBI and CIA (on its way to being corrected?).

A tremendous concentration on nuclear and Warsaw Pact threats which left certain threats unattended; namely those of a *strategic intelligence* nature (using Soviet terms) such as narcotics trafficking (which CIA(OGI) did not want to know about), organized crime (whose existence Hoover denied), sponsorship and use of terrorism to create revolutionary situations (which CIA argued against for internal reasons), penetration and sabotage (that went ignored because of the political sensitivities), compromise, non-military dimensions of CBW development (the most important aspect of CBW and still unappreciated in the West), and deception (whose process and lead agencies were unrecognized by the NIO(Deception)). While some of these oversights have partially corrected, I suspect there are still major problems because of the cut-back in Soviet/Russian directed intelligence. The background knowledge deficiencies that remain are very important today because they seem to reside at the heart of many of the threats that have emerged over the past five years (not by accident coincident with the dissolution of the Soviet Union), I suspect because most of the people that have been key in the development of these "threats" today have their own training and experience rooted in the past.

## Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

Inspector General  
703-874-2555

March 9, 1995

Joseph D. Douglass Jr., Ph.D.  
203 Garden Court  
Falls Church, Virginia 22046

Dear Dr. Douglass:

This Office has received your letter of February 9, 1995. The concerns you have raised relate to events, including the 1968 defection of General Jan Sejna, that occurred more than two decades ago. This being the case, I have referred your letter and its attachments to the appropriate offices in the Central Intelligence Agency for further review and consideration.

.. Thank you for your continuing interest in matters of national policy importance.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "A. R. Cinquigrana".

A. R. Cinquigrana  
Deputy Inspector General  
for Investigations



the extent of his knowledge and retention of details. I have never known him to have been misleading or to have deliberately withheld important information. I have compared my notes of, say 1992, with notes ten or more years earlier, and found them to be totally consistent and critical statements identical. Debriefing him is not easy because of language problems and because of the manner in which his brain catalogues the information. I have discussed Sejna and his knowledge with everyone in intelligence I could find who had worked closely with Sejna and have never found any such person who did not have the highest respect for his knowledge, memory, and willingness to help.

What ever forces in the CIA that have been trying to do him in have done a great disservice to the CIA, the country, and all our efforts to safeguard our country.

As I said before, I truly believe, and not without considerable justification, that these efforts to discredit Sejna and stop his knowledge from coming out and being used have been far more deleterious to our nation than all the Ames of the past twenty years put together.

Let me conclude by asking you a question. Does it not strike you odd, that the CIA has in its hands the highest level defector we ever had, the only one who was actually a part of the decision-making process, the only one who met regularly with top level communist officials around the world, the only one who participated in the annual reviews of defense and intelligence plans, the only one who actually participated in the review and formulation of deception plans -- and then never debriefs him on any of these subjects, even after being informed of his knowledge, and on top of that takes actions designed to discredit what he has to say even before he has a chance to open his mouth? And, ignorance is no defense. I have a copy of the manuscript he put together in the early 1970s, prepared with the help of British intelligence, and with marginal notes in the handwriting of the CIA official who was in charge of him between 1970 and 1975. The document is living proof of his strategic knowledge and his importance, and it only represents the tip of the iceberg. There is no way anyone who is interested in U.S. security and who has ever had a serious lengthy discussion with him could fail to understand the depth of his knowledge and its strategic importance. Why then has he been repeatedly slandered by CIA mid-level officials?

I do hope you will take this letter in the spirit with which it is intended, which is constructive, and as an alert to a very serious and continuing internal CIA problem. If I am wrong, I would certain welcome your corrective guidance and would recommend a meeting in which Sejna is included so that all views are adequately addressed. That is, let both sides of the story be heard.

Very respectfully yours,



I personally took this memo to two native Czechs, now Americans, with superb command of English, one of whom was an official translator for conversations at the highest level and the other of whom is a professional linguist. Both told me the text was not normal, conversational Czech, that it was more an archaic diplomatic Czech that has not been used for years. I suggest you find out what is really on the tapes and whether this is a bungled attempt to falsify the record.

A Select Committee staff memo (written by John McCreary, who is a lawyer himself and a good intelligence analyst) that also mentions the CIA effort to discredit Sejna is attached (Item B). This memo also confirms my understanding that the CIA took the preliminary information to the Czechs to check it out. It evidently did not indicate the items in the Czech response that did confirm facts provided by Sejna. No effort was extended to learn from Sejna how to check out his data, and who would know better than he?

On April 30, 1992, I wrote to Bob Gates and proposed doing some additional debriefings of Sejna in special areas where I knew he had not been debriefed. Gates' response (May 27) was very positive and he passed my memo on to some staff with his "suggestion to pursue." I heard nothing for several months, and wrote Bob a second letter (August 27) asking what happened. A copy of his reply is attached (Item C). His reply, obviously prepared by the CIA staff, is revealing.

First, the information I was proposing going after was not overtaken by the Berlin Wall. It was all relevant to current problems; for example, what happened to the POW/MIAs.

Second, note the last sentence: "I am *assured* that the information to which General Sejna might have access has already been *fully* exploited." (Emphasis added.)

Clearly someone was lying to director Gates or deliberately misleading him because Sejna had not been debriefed in any detail on any of the subjects I had proposed, one of which was explicitly identified as the POW issue. I offer a direct challenge to who ever wrote that letter to produce the information I wanted to extract. Obviously, there is no way it could have been exploited, let alone fully exploited, if they did not have it in the first place, so let them produce it in my presence. I doubt that they can do this because to my knowledge no one has debriefed Sejna on the subjects I had in mind, except myself enough to know there was an unexploited gold mine there, which was why I wrote Gates in the first place.

People at the CIA have, from my perspective, gone out of their way to discredit and slander General Sejna in a variety of ways, and going as far back as March 1968.

This is nothing short of criminal, in my judgment, because it has prevented the extraction and utilization of extremely important information from a national security perspective.

I have known and worked with Sejna since roughly 1976. I am constantly amazed by

2. The statement that he said he had no "hard information on intelligence matters" is, I believe, grossly misleading if not a deliberate lie. My understanding is that he said that he did not have tactical details of intelligence operations, especially those in the United States, and that his knowledge was basically limited to the discussions on intelligence that took place in the Defense Council. That is, he had extensive knowledge at the strategic and planning and decision level but not the tactical details of operations as he understood the question.

You might ask whoever wrote the memo just what was meant by "no hard information."

You also might also ask why there has never been any effort to debrief him on intelligence items of strategic importance, even after people like myself had alerted appropriate people in the CIA about instances of importance where debriefings were lacking.

3. Regarding Sejna's failure to tell the CIA about POWs, he did not tell them anything because they never asked. Sejna has responded to questions as best he could whenever asked. The problem is in knowing how to ask the question to bring forth the desired information. Believe me, I know, because of the work I have done with him. Releasing his memory is not easy, and it is not because of his reluctance, but rather because of the way his mind works, because the information stored there is so massive, and because it has been some twenty-five to thirty years since many of the events of importance took place.

As an aside, he did tell his handlers, or whatever they are called, in 1968 that in his judgment the most important information he brought with him was that related to the long range strategic plan, but that he would not discuss that information until the decision to grant him political asylum was made. After that decision was made, no one asked him about the plan. Why?

Why were his formal debriefings suddenly stopped before he was asked any questions of strategic importance. Why was there next to zero efforts from 1970 to 1975 when he was on the CIA payroll to carefully debrief him and exploit his knowledge of Soviet intelligence operations directed against the United States?

4. When told of his debriefing tapes where he is supposed to have denied knowing anything about POWs in North Vietnam, he denied the conversation ever took place. He then asked to listen to the tape, in an effort to clear up the obvious confusion. He was first told the tape was destroyed, and later told he would be giving a copy to listen to -- this has never happened. More importantly, when showed the written translation (Ja jsem neslysel etc.) he said that could not have been him because he did not talk that way.

I am very knowledgeable about General Sejna's information and over the years have become painfully aware of the CIA efforts to discredit him. In my professional judgment, these efforts have been far more damaging to our nation than those of Ames, Pollard, and so forth combined. His knowledge is still valuable, which is a second reason I have decided to write to you and ask you to investigate this matter and either bring a stop to these efforts and begin to uncover and exploit his knowledge that has not been used (I am personally aware of many such opportunities.) or, if I am in error, to explain to me where I am wrong so that I can direct my energies in more productive directions.

With this brief introduction, let me detail just a few of my concerns as regards CIA efforts to kill Sejna's information on what happened to American POW/MIAs who never returned.

While conducting research into international narcotics trafficking (see my book *Red Cocaine*), I learned about Sejna's knowledge of experiments performed on American servicemen. I brought that knowledge to the attention of people in both CIA and DIA in 1989 and 1990. Neither expressed any interest and I dropped the matter.

In July, 1992, a Senate staff person urged me to alert the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs to the nature of Sejna's information. I re-questioned Sejna to double check my previous notes and to gain a better sense of the extent of his knowledge on the POW issue. My conclusion was that his knowledge was, indeed, extensive, shocking, and, most important, of potentially great value in an effort to track down POWs that might still be alive.

Accordingly, I wrote the Select Committee about this information and also told at least two members of the Select Committee staff about the information and what I thought should be done. I later learned that the CIA was told about Sejna's information as contained in my memo and, as an evident response, *went to Czech foreign intelligence and asked them about some of the information attributed to Sejna*. This action, taken without first debriefing Sejna in detail and tracking down relevant leads was inexcusable because it, in effect, alerted the Czech and Russian intelligence services, thus enabling them to destroy material and silence potential corroborating sources.

Subsequently, several memoranda were prepared in the CIA and provided to the Select Committee with the evident intent of discrediting Sejna. A copy of one such memo is attached (Item A). There are several points to be made regarding this memo:

1. Sejna was much more than a mere "political officer" and to describe him as such is to deliberately downgrade his importance. Sejna had been acting secretary of the Defense Council (which was more important than the Politburo in the areas of national security, defense, intelligence, counter intelligence, foreign policy, and the economy), first secretary at the Ministry of Defense, chief of staff to the Minister of Defense, a member of the party group of the Presidium, and so forth.

copy

Joseph D. Douglass Jr., Ph.D.  
203 Garden Court  
Falls Church, VA 22046  
(703) 533-9452

February 9, 1995

Inspector General  
CIA  
Washington DC 20505

Dear Sir:

I am writing this letter in the hopes that it will lead to constructive internal housekeeping.

I believe people within the CIA have acted to unjustly discredit one of the most important sources America has ever had, to slander him and impune his reputation, and in so doing to deprive the United States of much valuable information.

The individual I am referring to is Jan Sejna. General Major Sejna defected from Czechoslovakia in February 1968. He is now an American citizen. To my knowledge he remains the highest ranking communist ever to defect, and the only one who was actually a member of the decision-making hierarchy. His only crimes, from my perspective, seem to be his desire to help defend America against the communists he knew so well and his refusal to change his story so that it conforms to the "conventional wisdom."

I am writing to you now because a book has just been published that uses a CIA memo, described below, that is part of this effort to discredit him, and in the process will operate to his detriment.

This is not an isolated event, or simply a tragic mistake. For many years now there has been a deliberate effort by people within the CIA to discredit him. One of the most blatant efforts was during the debate over the sponsorship of international terrorism, circa 1980, when, according to a DIA analyst who was present, the CIA tried to discredit many of their own sources in an effort to discredit Sejna and the information he had provided on the Soviet sponsorship of international terrorism. (The CIA people involved did not want to find evidence of Soviet sponsorship.)

Most recently, it has taken place during efforts to learn what happened to those Americans -- POWs and MIAs -- who remain missing from the Korean and Vietnam Wars. I have witnessed a number of these more recent activities first hand and this is the subject of this letter.

Dr. Robert Gates, October 28, 1992, page 2

concerns the shipment of selected (hundreds) U.S. POWs to the Soviet Union, both directly and through assorted East European countries such as Czechoslovakia. I recently brought the existence of this information to the attention of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs and the OSD POW/MIA office and have not run into anyone who was aware of either the information or the availability of considerably more information that details numbers, disposition, people in charge, documentation, and so forth. I have provided a sampling of the data from my files on earlier debriefings to the Committee and to OSD and have just begun further debriefings. If you like, I would be more than happy to pass on to you a summary of important results that emerge. Unfortunately, my memo to the Select Committee was leaked to the press. It is my understanding that the consequent news article was the first the CIA was aware of this information and that they have not evidenced any serious interest in the "rest of the story."

Would anyone dare claim that specific, first-hand information on what actually happened to hundreds of U.S. POWs, including disposition, has been overtaken by "developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe"? I believe that these "developments" are what make the information more, not less, important because follow-up is now possible.

Was the person who drafted your letter aware of such data?

Even more to the point, how can the drafter make any judgement on the relevance of the data or the extent of its exploitation when the subject has not even been debriefed on the data? Moreover, the drafter obviously does not know what else I have in mind since I was never asked!

It is clear that I was wrong in bothering you with this issue in the first place. The system, for a number of reasons, simply does not want to know what Sejna knows, and this goes back to almost the instant he defected in 1968. On numerous occasions over the past ten years, I have tried to alert people to the existence of unexploited information of importance (in my judgement) and have without exception run into a sequence of brick walls, of which the attached letter is a good example. Unfortunately, hardly a month goes by that there is not an issue of current importance to which Sejna's knowledge is not still relevant, useful, and unexploited -- the POW/MIA issue being the best current example. This explains the frustration implicit in the above discussion.

Obviously, my proposal is dead. But, I would like you to know -- if it is not inappropriate -- that your letter of September 22 does not reflect the true state of affairs.

Warm regards,



Joseph D. Douglass Jr.  
7021 Churchill Road  
McLean Va 22101

October 28, 1992

Dr. Robert Gates  
Director, CIA  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington D.C. 20505

Dear Bob:

I have given your letter of September 22 (copy attached) considerable thought. The question in my mind is, is it proper for me to tell you when you are being sandbagged by your own people? If the answer is "no," please disregard this letter. Alternatively, what follows is intended to be constructive and for your personal use.

The issue goes back to my previous offer to conduct further debriefings of General Sejna on subjects he was not debriefed on to obtain information that remains relevant today and that has not been even partially, let alone "fully exploited." I brought this proposal to you directly because I knew full well that the "system" below you has not wanted Sejna debriefed in areas of strategic importance since his defection in 1966. I do not deny that there may be many "details," as your letter implies, of which I am unaware. However, anyone who even thinks Sejna's information has been extracted, let alone exploited, is either naive, misinformed, or lying.

To cite an example with which you are familiar, no one was even aware of his knowledge of the Soviet-Warsaw Pact international drug trafficking operation, code named *Drazhba Narodov*, until I began debriefing him on the subject -- and I challenge anyone in the CIA to prove this statement is incorrect. Incidentally, no one, other than yourself when you asked OGI to look into the data back in 1986, has evidenced any interest in the details of this highly successful Soviet intelligence operation. I can list a variety of other similarly important subjects on which Sejna is particularly knowledgeable and where his information remains totally unexploited -- and not overtaken by the events of the past three years. To my knowledge no one has yet to claim that the KGB or GRU has been disbanded, gone out of business, or abandoned its proven techniques and trade craft.

A second example that I mentioned in my prior proposal and letter and that I wanted to attack first concerns Sejna's knowledge of U.S. POW/MIAs. Would anyone in the CIA dare claim Sejna's knowledge has been either extracted or exploited? Does anyone know what this knowledge encompasses -- and if someone says "yes" I can only wonder how insofar as Sejna has not been seriously debriefed on the subject by anyone. One portion of the information I am referring to describes the Soviet and Czech use of U.S. POWs for medical experimentation in both the Korean War and Vietnam War. Another portion


Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

September 22, 1992

Mr. Joseph D. Douglass, Jr.  
7021 Churchill Road  
McLean, Virginia 22101

  
Dear Mr. Douglass:

Thanks for your follow-up note of 27 August. I appreciate your desire to assist us in obtaining further intelligence from General Sejna.

After considerable review, our people believe that the historic developments in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall have overtaken the need to pursue a program such as the one you have proposed. Please forgive me for not being able to go into detail; however, I am assured that the information to which General Sejna might have access has already been fully exploited.

Sincerely,

Handwritten signature of Robert M. Gates.

Robert M. Gates  
Director of Central Intelligence





## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

5-27-92

Dear Joe -

Sorry to be so long in acknowledging your letter of April 20th. I appreciated hearing from you, and I have sent the package along to others with a suggestion to pursue.

Thanks again for writing.

Bob Gates

Dr. Robert Gates, August 27, 1992, page 2

potentially unstable in Russia, it seems to me that we should act as quick as possible to assist him in obtaining the essential information on the various activities of the former Soviet Union such as those related to POWs, biological warfare experiments, penetrations, and so forth.

*I have gone back over my own debriefing notes of the past ten years and truly believe there is much of value relative to current concerns and security interests to pursue my proposal with utmost dispatch. I also recognize the disinclination of the normal intelligence processes to gather information from Jan Sejna, as demonstrated in the past, which together with the utility of the information is why I brought the proposed approach to your attention in the first place.*

Because of your personal awareness of this potential and of the systemic problems in realizing this potential, I thought you would like to know that as yet there has been no follow-up to your suggestion that the project be pursued.

Warm regards,



Joseph D. Douglass Jr.  
7021 Churchill Road  
McLean Va 22101

August 27, 1992

Dr. Robert Gates  
Director, CIA  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington D.C. 20505

Dear Bob:

Thank you for your return note of May 27, copy attached, referencing my letter and proposal of April 20. By way of review, the package I had sent proposed a modest effort for me to conduct further debriefings of Jan Sejna relative to activities of the East European and Soviet intelligence services that are still of major relevance to U.S. security.

What makes the project so viable now is our ability to contact former Soviet bloc officials to confirm and extend Sejna's knowledge. This should produce information that will enable U.S. intelligence to ascertain the extent to which certain operations are still active, or only temporarily quiescent and thus still a potential threat, and to obtain information on capabilities that are of great potential importance; for example, advanced chemical and biological agent development for sabotage and political intelligence operations. However, the first step has to be a serious debriefing of Sejna on operations of strategic importance.

*I am writing this follow-up letter to let you know that I have not been contacted by the people to whom you sent my package and because I believe the project may be even more valuable and timely than I had previously thought. What makes the project even more important to undertake as soon as possible, in my judgement, are the various pronouncements of President Yeltsin, who on one hand is holding out a warm hand of cooperation, while on other hand has two intelligence agencies (civilian and military) that seem to be most uninterested in cooperating. It seems clear from what Yeltsin has said that he does not know any substantial details of the past intelligence operations (why should he, especially insofar as very sensitive operations are concerned). Accordingly, he is limited in what he can do. Thus, anything we could do to help him might be of major value both to him and to us. Moreover, because the situation is so*

In addition to the narcotics and POW subjects, there are several other equally if not more important subjects where I had previously begun debriefing Sejna, but never finished, that are still highly relevant to U.S. security. Still further, I believe that some of the information could prove to be of significant value to the President in obtaining the support of various government leaders in battles in which he has expressed clear interest, such as in combatting organized crime and international narcotics trafficking.

I have put my thoughts on what should be done *as a bare minimum* in the attached short proposal, which I believe warrants your personal attention because of the reasons why this work has not been done in the past, notwithstanding many suggestions and proposals. The accuracy and excellence of General Sejna's information has been repeatedly demonstrated. Nevertheless, there remains a continuing reluctance to thoroughly debrief him in both the CIA and DIA. This reluctance emerged as soon as his first debriefings began in 1968, in part I believe because people simply did not want to hear what he had to say. Such bias, as you well know, is very hard to overcome.

Should any questions arise with respect to the above, my phone number is (703) 356-5410.

Warm regards,

Joe

Joseph D. Douglass Jr.  
7021 Churchill Road  
McLean Va 22101

April 20, 1992

Dr. Robert Gates  
Director, CIA  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington D.C. 20505

Dear Bob:

As you may recall, General Schriever, Col. Sleeper, and I met with you the day before you left the CIA to go over to the White House in 1989. General Schriever had requested the meeting because of his concern over the information I had assembled in the manuscript, *Red Cocaine*, an early copy of which I had sent you a year or so before. Your reaction was quite positive and you expressed hope that the book could be as useful to director Webster as the *Terror Network* had been to director Casey.

Over the years I have tried to interest several different divisions in CIA and DIA in the narcotics trafficking information and in information on other Soviet bloc strategic intelligence activities that had direct bearing on U.S. security. In each instance I ran into brick walls. People were unaware of the information and did not seem to want to know, as best I could determine. With respect to *Red Cocaine*, I only wrote the book because I could not find anyone in the intelligence community that was interested in learning about the role of the Soviet bloc intelligence services in international narcotics trafficking.

I recently discussed some of my concerns in the narcotics trafficking (see attached article by Adams) and POW/MIA areas with some friends on the Hill. As a result, my primary source, General Sejna was polygraphed and critically questioned about information in *Red Cocaine* last week. I just learned this and was told he passed with flying colors.

My reason for bringing this up now is that the changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union provide a unique opportunity to confirm and bring up to date Sejna's knowledge of important former Soviet bloc strategic intelligence operations and sensitive military capabilities and R&D programs. This information can be used to better understand important threats where our knowledge is very deficient (for example, CBW) and to enable us to identify continuing intelligence operations. The information should also be invaluable to use in obtaining the assistance of the East European and republic leaders in combating many activities that are still operating and in obtaining critical information needed to counter important future developments that could be contrary to U.S. security interests. But, to do this, it is essential to start with further debriefings in critical areas to identify more precisely the specific strategies, organizations, and identities needed to guide specific follow-on HUMINT collection efforts.


his request for asylum would be favorably considered.

6. On 30 October, Mr. Robert Egan of Hackensack, New Jersey, who is a close friend of Mr. Le and the intermediary whereby the Committee Staff met Mr. Le, informed McCreary and LeGro that the FBI had again contacted Mr. Le. A person representing himself as an FBI person called on 30 October to set up a meeting with Le to discuss Le's working as an intelligence agent for the FBI's POW/MIA office.

7. So far informal checks indicate there is no such office. Secondly, this contact occurred three days after my return from taking Le's deposition in Hackensack on 26 October after which I wrote another MFR. This MFR was sent only to JW Codinha on 28 October. I observed a copy of the MFR with apparent routing designators written in the top margin on the desk of Frances Zwenig on 28 October.

8. The contact with Le two days after preparation of my MFR, despite the passage of a month since his public declarations, is highly suspicious and more than coincidental. The circumstances of both contacts in which persons identifying themselves as FBI without showing credentials or other evidence of authenticity or authority and also making a pitch to recruit Le are also highly suspicious.

9. An internal Department of Defense Memorandum identifies Frances Zwenig as the conduit to the Department of Defense for the acquisition of sensitive and restricted information from this Committee. Based on the above sequences of events, I must conclude that Frances Zwenig continues to leak all of my papers to the Defense Department. Her flagrant disregard of the rules of the Senate and her oath of office are now jeopardizing the livelihood, if not the safety, of Senate witnesses. In addition, the Department of Defense's continuing access to sensitive Committee Staff papers is resulting in obstructions of the investigations by the Senate Select Committee by various agencies of the Executive Branch.



October 30, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: John F. McCreary

SUBJECT: Obstruction of the Investigation

1. I am concerned that recent lines of investigation have been seriously compromised by leaks of sensitive information by the Committee Staff Director to the Department of Defense. Leaks to the Department of Defense or other agencies of the Executive Branch of my Memoranda for the Record are interfering with follow-up discussions with useful witnesses. Moreover, they are endangering the lives and livelihood of two witnesses.

*Leak of Information on Jan Sejna*

2. My MFR concerning discussions with former Czech Gen Maj Sejna have ended up in the hands of private citizen and Sejna's co-author Joseph Douglas and the LA Times. I provided copies of that memorandum to Carluccio, Codinha, and Kolesnick.

3. Irrespective of leaks outside the government, Bill LeGro attended a meeting of the US-Russia Joint Commission group in Washington on 28 October 1992 at the Department of State. The discussion featured information provided by Sejna. LeGro stated that Ambassador Malcolm Toon called for his dismissal. DIA personnel defended Sejna as to his expertise on Central Europe, but not as to his information on other areas, particularly POW-related.

4. On 30 October 1992, I learned from Bill LeGro that he was directed to read a letter from the Central Intelligence Agency to the Select Committee that discredits Sejna's information. The letter reportedly indicates that Sejna's information has been checked and not been confirmed by his former government. At the time this letter was received, the Staff had decided to take Sejna's deposition but had not yet scheduled a deposition of Sejna. In addition, my MFR was written from memory, and did not do justice to all that Sejna stated, either in detail or in context. As of this writing, we do not know what Sejna knows or will say under oath, yet his testimony has already been written off. This anticipatory discrediting of a Select Committee potential witness is tantamount to tampering with the evidence.

*Suspected Leak of Information on Le Quang Khai*

5. The second issue of suspected misconduct concerns witness Le Quang Khai. Although Le made a public statement concerning POWs on 12 September 1992, no agency of the US government contacted him concerning his POW information. He told me on 26 October that some men who represented themselves as FBI agents contacted him to attempt to recruit him to return to Vietnam as a US intelligence agent for six months. After which

NOV 03 '92 14:28 02110 12

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

P.3

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Jan Sejna

Czech military and government. None, however, links Babka to Czech activities in Korea or Southeast Asia.

b. Central Military Hospital in Prague and the Air Force Health Institute - Records from the debriefings also include several references to the Central Military Hospital in Prague and one reference to the Air Force Health Institute. No where in the debriefings is there mention of POWs or U.S. persons associated with either medical facility; neither is there mention of a Czech hospital in Korea or Viet Nam.

7. Sejna was asked specifically during his post-defection debriefing about POWs in Viet Nam. The following is excerpted from a tape recorded portion of Sejna's debriefing, dated 23 March 1968:

DEBRIEFER: Have you heard about our prisoners who are there in North Viet Nam? How many are there and where are they?

SEJNA: No. No, I have not heard anyone talking about it. (Ja jsem neslysel nikoho o tom hovorit.)



DECLASSIFIED 13/12/92  
 REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES November 1992

SUBJECT: Jan Sejna

1. General Jan Sejna defected to the U.S. Government in February 1968. At the time of his defection, he was a military officer attached to the Czechoslovak General Staff and a member of the Czech National Assembly. Sejna was a political officer whose specialty was communist party matters. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

2. During his post-defection debriefings in the Washington area, Sejna showed himself well-informed on Czechoslovak political and military subjects. He admitted from the beginning, however, that he had no hard information on intelligence matters.

3. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
 5. A recent, comprehensive review of CIA files pertaining to Sejna revealed that, at no time ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ did Sejna tell the CIA about U.S. POWs, a hospital in Korea, medical experiments on U.S. POWs, or about U.S. POWs having been moved from Indochina to the USSR in any timeframe.

6. A number of documents derived from Sejna's debriefings by the CIA, however, do refer to Rudolf Babka, the Central Military Hospital in Prague, and the Czechoslovak Air Force Health Institute:

a. Rudolf Babka - Records of Sejna's debriefings by the CIA include 13 documents that mention Babka. References to Babka describe him personally and in various positions in the

CL BY 070152  
 DECL ORDER  
 REV HUM 4-82

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED 13/12/92



Central Intelligence Agency  
Publications Review Board  
1016 Ames  
Washington, D.C. 20505  
Telephone No. (703) 351-2053

8 September 1989

Mr. Joseph D. Douglass, Jr.  
7021 Churchill Road  
McLean, VA 22102

Dear Mr. Douglass:

This letter will confirm your telephone conversation with the Executive Secretary of the Publications Review Board on 6 September 1989. The Board has completed its review of your proposed book entitled Red Cocaine: The Drugging of America and has no security objection to its publication. You also informed her that you would be sending us a revised version of this manuscript. We look forward to receiving it.

Your cooperation in this review process is appreciated.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Anne Fischer".

Anne Fischer  
Associate Legal Adviser  
Publications Review Board

**Studies Solutions Results, Inc.  
8560 Second Ave., Suite 621  
Silver Spring, MD 20910**

August 31, 2007

**National Security Council  
The White House  
Attn: Council to the President  
1600 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.  
Washington, DC 20500**

**This is a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for copies of NSC-68, NSC-68/2 and NSC-135/3 and for directives ORE-750, NIE 2, 2/1, 2/2, 10 and 11 of the President's Truman and President Eisenhower administrations. I would also like to acquire any documentation related to the above.**

Thank you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Roger Hall". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

**Roger Hall, Director  
301/587-5055**