

Notes
DEPOSITION OF THOMAS E. MUERER

<u>Subject</u>		<u>Page</u>
Jim Murphy	*	38
briefing 4/70		73
Larry Devlin	*	76
Godley was procouncil		76
Devlin		79 - 88
27 POWs, Form of intel		- 88
Map	*	87
Perot's data bank		87
Soth Pethrasi		89
Sam Nuea		91
Pethrasi & POW list		91
POW list in fact		92
27 POWs in caves		94, 101, 119, 120
Ron Dodge, captured but not on list		102, 129
Jigs Weldon [US AID DR.]		121, 124, 126
Devlin - POW sightings	*	122
Monica Schwinn two blacks		125
Pop Bule		126
Roger Shields		129
Chappy James, Frank Sieverts		131
Murphy		137
Bull Simon [of Son Tay Raid]		137
Pat Landry		137
Vang Pao/CIA employee		139 - 14
Perot		149
Vice Pres. Bush intel files		150
Perot to Hanoi 87		151
seeing stuff I can't tell about		152, 160
letter for Perot to be Vietnam's business agent		153

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
DEPOSITION OF THOMAS E. MEURER

Wednesday, June 24, 1992

U.S. Senate
Select Committee on POW/MIA
Affairs
Dallas, Texas

Deposition of THOMAS E. MEURER, the witness herein,
called for examination by counsel for the Select Committee on
POW/MIA Affairs, pursuant to notice, Room 757, Federal Office
Building, 525 Griffin Street, Dallas, Texas, commencing at
3:10 p.m., on Wednesday, June 24, 1992, before Betty Morgan, a
Notary Public and Certified Shorthand Reporter in and for the
State of Texas, and the proceedings being taken down by
Stenomask by her and transcribed by her or under her
direction.

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W.
SUITE 400
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005
(202) 289-2260
(800) FOR DEPO

1 APPEARANCES:

2

3 On behalf of the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs:

4 NEAL KRAVITZ, ESQ.,

5 Investigative Attorney for the Committee

6 BARRY VALENTINE,

7 Investigator on the Committee

8

9 On behalf of the witness, THOMAS E. MEURER:

10 DAVID BRYANT, ESQ.

11 5001 Spring Valley Road

12 Suite 1075 West

13 Dallas, Texas 75244

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W.
SUITE 400
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005
(202) 289-2260
(800) FOR DEPO

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

C O N T E N T S

THE WITNESS	EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR
THOMAS E. MEURER	SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
By Mr. Kravitz	4

E X H I B I T S

MEURER EXHIBIT NO.	PAGE
1	7
2	7
3	8

P R O C E E D I N G S

1
2 Whereupon,

3 THOMAS E. MEURER,

4 the witness herein, was called for examination by counsel for
5 the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs and, having been duly
6 sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified as
7 follows:

8 EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE

9 BY MR. KRAVITZ:

10 Q. Mr. Meurer.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. My name is Neal Kravitz. I'm a lawyer working for
13 the U.S. Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs.

14 I want to start by thanking you for agreeing to be
15 here voluntarily this afternoon and on behalf of the Senators
16 we very much appreciate your taking the time to speak with us
17 and provide the information that we're trying to find.

18 I want to start by just giving you some brief
19 instructions on how the deposition will proceed.

20 A. Okay.

21 Q. Please, if you have any questions about the
22 instructions, just let me know.

23 As you know, you've just been sworn to tell the
24 truth. The deposition will proceed in question and answer
25 form.

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W.
SUITE 400
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005
(202) 289-2260
(800) FOR DEPO

1 If at any time you don't understand one of my
2 questions or feel that any clarification is appropriate, just
3 let me know that and I will try to rephrase the question or
4 provide additional details so that the question is perfectly
5 clear for you.

6 Our interest is in getting the best, most accurate,
7 reliable information we can. It doesn't do us any good if you
8 are answering questions that are poorly phrased or are unclear
9 in any way. Okay?

10 A. Okay.

11 Q. Under our rules you have a right to a lawyer at the
12 deposition. For the record, I just want to note that Mr.
13 David Bryant is here, I assume representing you.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Are you comfortable with Mr. Bryant's
16 representation?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Are you aware of the fact that Mr. Bryant is also
19 representing at least one other witness before this Committee?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. In your mind does that raise any difficulties in
22 terms of his representation of you?

23 A. No.

24 Q. As you know, the deposition is being recorded and
25 will be transcribed after it is completed. A verbatim

1 transcript of everything I say and everything you say will be
2 made.

3 Under our rules you have a right to review that
4 transcript. You're not required to but you have that right,
5 and then to prepare an errata sheet if you deem it
6 appropriate.

7 A. Yes, I would like that right because I would like to
8 see what was dictated.

9 Q. Okay. I will make it a point to inform you or Mr.
10 Bryant as soon as the transcript is prepared. I'm not sure
11 how long that takes but as soon as we receive it -- The court
12 reporter will send the transcript to the Senate Select
13 Committee and then we will inform you.

14 Certainly well in advance of any live testimony that
15 you would be asked to provide to the Committee, you'd have an
16 opportunity to review the transcript.

17 I want to introduce in evidence a few basic exhibits
18 that I believe you've had a chance to see, but I just want to
19 show them to you and make sure.

20 Exhibit No. 1 is a copy of the Authority and Rules
21 of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. Have you
22 had an opportunity to review that rulebook?

23 (The document referred to was
24 marked Exhibit No. 1 for
25 identification.)

1 THE WITNESS: No, I didn't. I'm sorry.

2 BY MR. KRAVITZ:

3 Q. Did you receive it?

4 A. I did receive it, yeah. I just haven't had an
5 opportunity to review it; but I haven't got any questions
6 about it.

7 Q. As long as you feel comfortable going forward
8 without it, then I think we're okay, unless your counsel
9 believes otherwise.

10 MR. BRYANT: I have no problem with going forward.

11 BY MR. KRAVITZ:

12 Q. Exhibit No. 2 is a copy of the authorization form
13 for this deposition signed by Senator Kerry, the Chairman of
14 the Senate Select Committee. Does that appear to be a copy of
15 one of the documents that you've received from the Committee?

16 (The document referred to was
17 marked Exhibit No. 2 for
18 identification.)

19 THE WITNESS: Not in this form, but yes. I received
20 it in the form of a letter.

21 BY MR. KRAVITZ:

22 Q. Okay.

23 MR. BRYANT: It probably has a little problem here
24 in that it says, "As Chairman and Vice Chairman...we hereby
25 agree," but it's not signed by the Vice Chairman.

1 MR. KRAVITZ: The Vice Chairman was unavailable when
2 this went out. I think it went out kind of at the last
3 minute.

4 BY MR. KRAVITZ:

5 Q. Exhibit No. 3 is the Notice of Senate Deposition,
6 also signed by Sen. Kerry.

7 (The document referred to was
8 marked Exhibit No. 3 for
9 identification.)

10 THE WITNESS: Yes, I had that attached to the
11 letter.

12 MR. KRAVITZ: Let me just say, my understanding of
13 the rules is that the deposition authorization is supposed to
14 be made by both the Chairman and the Vice Chairman. Let me
15 just ask you if you have any objection to proceeding with the
16 deposition, even though the Vice Chairman, Sen. Smith, has not
17 signed this Exhibit No. 2?

18 MR. BRYANT: I don't believe so. I don't know
19 whether this has any significance at all. If you tell me it
20 doesn't, then let's proceed.

21 MR. KRAVITZ: I think it really only has formal
22 significance.

23 BY MR. KRAVITZ:

24 Q. In terms of our schedule, we tend to go for an hour,
25 hour and a half at a time and take about a 5 or 10-minute

1 break. You should know, however, that if at any other time
2 during the deposition you feel as if you need to walk around,
3 make a phone call, go to the men's room, just take a breather,
4 there's no reason why we have to stick to a rigid schedule.
5 So just let me know and we can break at any time.

6 A. All right.

7 Q. Before we get into the substance, let me ask you if
8 you have any questions for me or in private for your counsel
9 about how the deposition would proceed?

10 A. No.

11 MR. BRYANT: The only question I have, Neal, is how
12 soon we'll be able to get through today. I really need to be
13 somewhere about 6:00.

14 MR. VALENTINE: So do we.

15 MR. BRYANT: So do you think we can get going on
16 that?

17 MR. KRAVITZ: Yes, we'll certainly go as fast as we
18 can.

19 BY MR. KRAVITZ:

20 Q. Why don't you start by telling us your full name and
21 spelling your last name for us?

22 A. It's Thomas E. Meurer, M-e-u-r-e-r.

23 Q. Where do you live, Mr. Meurer?

24 A. 

25 Q. What is your date of birth?

1 A. August 10th, 1941.

2 Q. Where are you employed now?

3 A. I'm employed by Hunt Oil Company, Dallas. Do you
4 want their address?

5 Q. Sure.

6 A. [REDACTED]

7 Q. What's your position with Hunt Oil Company?

8 A. I'm a senior vice president and director of the
9 company.

10 Q. How long have you worked for Hunt?

11 A. Since October 1975.

12 Q. Have you been a vice president for all that time?

13 A. Basically, yeah, for one company or another. But
14 yeah, basically yes.

15 Q. If you could just generally describe your areas of
16 responsibility for Hunt Oil Company?

17 MR. BRYANT: Today? His responsibilities today?

18 MR. KRAVITZ: Right.

19 THE WITNESS: I am senior vice president of Hunt Oil
20 Company, which basically is the chief administrative officer
21 of the company. Responsibilities include government
22 activities with foreign governments related to oil and gas
23 activities; and then responsible for those administrative
24 departments: security, aviation, public affairs, corporate
25 services, these type of activities that are non-financial to

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W.

SUITE 400

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005

(202) 289-2260

(800) FOR DEPO

1 the company. Those departments report to me.

2 I'm president of Hunt Realty Corporation, which is
3 our real estate operation. We have a couple hundred million
4 dollars worth of real estate assets in the Dallas area. It's
5 basically an asset management company.

6 I'm chairman of Sherryland and the Hunt Agribusiness
7 area, which we have about 300,000 acres of farms and ranches
8 throughout the country and I have P&L responsibilities for
9 that.

10 And I'm president of Palette Corporation, an
11 investment corporation, which is a family company. Hunt Oil
12 Company is a private company and essentially those private
13 activities by the family that are not within Hunt Oil Company,
14 those people report to me.

15 So it's just kind of a potpourri, kind of factotum.

16 BY MR. KRAVITZ:

17 Q. You sound busy.

18 A. Yeah, very busy.

19 Q. Could you give us a description of your educational
20 background?

21 A. I got a BA from the University of Washington in
22 Seattle in 1963. I went into the Air Force, had an assortment
23 of Air Force Schools, training personnel. These were courses
24 that the Air Force provided.

25 Q. What years were you in the Air Force?

1 A. 1963 until January of 1968. June '63 till January
2 of '68.

3 Q. Go ahead.

4 A. My last tour of duty was at the Officer Training
5 School at Lackland where I was a lecturer on current affairs,
6 and I was going to graduate school at night there at St.
7 Mary's University in international economics.

8 I did not finish that. I got out of the service and
9 went to EDS instead.

10 Q. Where is St. Mary's University located?

11 A. It's in San Antonio.

12 Q. What was your major in college at the University of
13 Washington?

14 A. It was geography, foreign studies, basically
15 geography and economics but primarily geography.

16 Q. You went to work for EDS in 1968?

17 A. 1968, yes. I'm also a graduate of the EDS Systems
18 Engineering Development Program.

19 Q. What's that?

20 A. It's a training program that EDS has that they train
21 trainees to become systems engineers.

22 Q. When you arrived at EDS in 1968, what was your
23 position there?

24 A. Trainee. I went into the training program.

25 Q. As a trainee?

1 A. As a trainee, yes.

2 Q. How long did you stay in the training program?

3 A. I think I was graduated in like September of '69, I
4 think.

5 Q. So the training program is about a year long?

6 A. In my particular case, about a year, year and a
7 half, yes.

8 Q. What did you do after you graduated from the
9 training program?

10 A. Basically, I guess, I went on Ross' staff, Mr.
11 Perot's staff, and was active in the POW activities that he
12 had instigated in 1969.

13 Subsequently, as on the staff, I handled a lot of
14 activities that were related to the chairman of the board
15 versus the corporate activity.

16 Q. How many people were on Mr. Perot's staff as of the
17 fall of 1969? When you say you were on his staff, what does
18 that mean?

19 A. Well, we didn't have titles but he had a couple of
20 secretaries; there were two of us kind of staff assistants;
21 and a bookkeeper I recall.

22 Q. So you worked on matters other than the prisoner of
23 war issue?

24 A. And prisoner of war issue, both.

25 Q. How much of your time -- Well, strike that.

1 How long did you stay in that position, being on Mr.
2 Perot's staff?

3 A. Until I left EDS in 1975.

4 Q. During that time period between the fall of 1969 and
5 1975 when you left EDS, how much of your time did you spend
6 working on prisoner of war related issues?

7 A. I would say 70 percent. It's hard to quantify that,
8 because Mr. Perot was a pretty active person and was involved
9 in a lot of things, and I would go in and out of a lot of
10 things.

11 In 1969 and 1970 it was probably 95 percent. By '71
12 and '72 it dropped back; by '73 it dropped back a lot more; in
13 '74 it went off the scope.

14 Q. When you first assumed that position on Mr. Perot's
15 staff, that was in September of 1969 after you graduated?

16 A. No. It was really, I want to say, probably
17 somewhere in the late -- probably summer of '69. I can't give
18 you the exact date. I mean, I was in the training program and
19 I did a lot of activities in the training program. I got
20 involved in some political activities.

21 Then we had a special project on a talking computer.
22 Actually, it was a terminal that one of our engineers had
23 designed and Ross financed him to go ahead and see if we could
24 manufacture a piece of hardware. EDS was in the software
25 business.

1 So I was assigned to him as basically a marketing
2 representative for this thing for about 4 or 5 months to see
3 if it worked while I was still in the training program.

4 The training program wasn't just a classroom but in
5 essence, the EDS training program was you'd have a certain
6 block of stuff you were to do and then you were thrown in OJT,
7 so to speak.

8 So that's why it's hard to quantify. You just got
9 out and went with this.

10 Q. What was Mr. Perot's involvement, if there was any,
11 with POW issues, POW matters, when you joined his staff,
12 either in late summer or early fall 1969, that you were aware
13 of?

14 A. I don't recall Ross getting involved or even
15 probably becoming aware of the POW's until the fall of '69.
16 It was with Murphy Martin and his TV program, I think, was
17 where that was initiated.

18 Q. So when you were tapped for that position on Mr.
19 Perot's staff after graduating from the training program, did
20 you know that you were going to be involved in POW-related
21 issues?

22 A. No. No.

23 Q. What was your understanding as to what you were
24 going to be doing?

25 A. Well, I had done so many other things. You know,

1 the training program was basically a program sales. 9 months
2 or a year and you're out of here and you're on into a customer
3 account. You'd probably say my mouth was better than my mind,
4 so I gravitated a little bit different direction and got into
5 a lot of different programs that were, say, more liberal arts
6 oriented than technical oriented, for want of a better word.

7 So when I say I was pulled up, it was basically more
8 by default, if you want to put it that way. Here was somebody
9 available.

10 EDS was growing very fast in those days and we were
11 looking for people all over the world. Basically there was a
12 vacuum there. Perot had a need; I was the person that was
13 available and went into it. That's kind of basically how it
14 was.

15 Q. So as far as you were aware, when you joined Mr.
16 Perot's staff in 1969, there were no ongoing --

17 A. No.

18 Q. -- projects that he was involved in relating to
19 POW's?

20 A. No.

21 Q. Describe for us, if you could, how Mr. Perot did
22 become involved in the POW issue that year.

23 A. I remember Murphy's program. I didn't go with Ross
24 but he was down at Channel 8 and he had met a young boy and
25 one of the wives I think Murphy had on a TV program. Ross

1 encountered this young lad right afterwards. He didn't have a
2 father and that touched him.

3 The way we first got into this issue, though, was it
4 was sometime in October of '69, the next month and Ross was
5 forming United We Stand. This was an organization that in
6 essence was designed to try to pull the American people behind
7 the President.

8 The President was coming out with a new speech and a
9 new program on Vietnam. What Ross wanted to do was basically
10 get the American people behind the office of the President.

11 It wasn't an issue of whether you're supporting
12 Nixon or whoever, but let's get out of Vietnam. Let's put
13 this war behind us, basically, and do it with honor and do it
14 with the American people behind him.

15 So that was the thrust that he wanted to start
16 sometime in late -- I'll say sometime in October. So it was
17 to coincide a lot of ads and some TV work -- were going to
18 coincide with the President's speech on November 3rd.

19 Q. What was United We Stand?

20 A. Well, just what I described. It was basically an
21 organization whose purpose was to try to unite the American
22 people behind the issue.

23 Q. Was it a nonprofit corporation?

24 A. Nonprofit corporation, yes.

25 Q. Funded by what or whom?

1 A. By Ross and I think there were some outside
2 contributions. I don't recall exactly.

3 Q. Was it funded by Mr. Perot personally and
4 individually or by EDS?

5 A. I'm sure it was Ross. I'm sure it was Ross.

6 Q. Did you have a position with United We Stand?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. What was your position?

9 A. At some point in time I became vice president of
10 United We Stand. It might have been in 1970; I don't recall
11 the date.

12 Q. Was that under Mr. Martin?

13 A. Yes, when Murphy was there. Yes.

14 Q. Mr. Perot was chairman of the board of directors?

15 A. Uh-huh, and Murphy was president.

16 Q. Do you remember --

17 A. And I later became president after Murphy left.

18 Q. That was in the fall of 1972?

19 A. Something like that, yes.

20 Q. How long did United We Stand stay in existence?

21 A. I don't know. I don't know. I left in '75 and
22 there was no activity at that time. I'm assuming probably,
23 say, sometime in '74. I just don't know the answer to that.

24 Q. You remained president until you left United We
25 Stand?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Who else was on the board of directors along with
3 Mr. Perot?

4 A. I don't remember. Tom Marquez might have been. I
5 don't remember.

6 Q. Tom Martins?

7 A. Marquez.

8 Q. Marquez?

9 A. Yeah, but I just don't remember if he was or not.
10 It might have been just Ross, Murphy and I. Murphy and I were
11 kind of the full-time people.

12 Q. But neither you nor Murphy Martin was on the board
13 of directors?

14 A. No, not to my -- I wasn't.

15 Q. You were the officers?

16 A. Yeah, officers.

17 Q. How long had you known Mr. Perot before you went to
18 EDS, if at all?

19 A. Never knew him, never heard of him until November of
20 1967. Actually, I was getting out of the Air Force and I was
21 going on to Thunderbird school. I wanted to get a degree in
22 international banking, another degree, an advanced degree in
23 international banking.

24 I enrolled out there. EDS in those days had a
25 lot of recruiters, which they still do, and they would recruit

1 -- At that particular time military officers coming out of
2 the service were a good source of people, because you were in
3 the height of Vietnam, you had the draft, and you either went
4 on to graduate school or you were drafted or you had some type
5 of deferment.

6 So there weren't a lot of people coming out of
7 college in '67/'68 that you could get, so EDS went after
8 military officers. Somebody got my name and came over to the
9 house and said, "We've heard about you. We'd like to talk to
10 you."

11 You know, you're kind of flattered, so you listen.
12 And another interview; take some tests; another interview and
13 they meet your wife; and then they want to fly you to Dallas.
14 So I figured well, it's a lark. I might as well go up and see
15 what's going on this weekend.

16 I met Ross that weekend on the visit up there and I
17 was so impressed that I just thought to myself that here I can
18 get into a -- I know nothing about computers but I can get
19 into a burgeoning industry that is going to take off and
20 here's the man who's got the vision and can really see it.

21 He and Mitch Hart, the president, both of them just
22 excited me and I went back to San Antonio and talked to my
23 wife. She was 3-months pregnant and we wouldn't have got any
24 benefit from a corporate standpoint but we reasoned that the
25 opportunity to get into this industry was a great opportunity.

1 So we did 180 degrees and went to Dallas.

2 Q. When you were in the Air Force, had you done any
3 tours in Vietnam?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Where had you been in the Air Force?

6 A. San Antonio was my last tour at the Officers
7 Training School. My first couple of years was at Loring Air
8 Force Base in Maine, a SAC base.

9 You must know about it.

10 MR. VALENTINE: I'm from Maine.

11 BY MR. KRAVITZ:

12 Q. Did you know anything about POW's when you joined
13 Mr. Perot's staff in 1969?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Do you know how it was that you were chosen for the
16 POW role that Mr. Perot chose you for?

17 A. Yeah, I think so. I think my background was foreign
18 affairs. I was teaching about Vietnam and American foreign
19 policy at the Officers Training School. I was a lecturer
20 teaching the officer trainees, the doctors and lawyers that
21 were being commissioned.

22 So I had had nearly a couple of years of pretty
23 active involvement in that type of activity and when I
24 interviewed with Ross, he always kind of thought of me as kind
25 of a guy who knew politics, because I talked about foreign

1 affairs.

2 So I think there was probably a connection there but
3 I never really talked to Ross about why. But understanding of
4 Asia, I had a pretty good understanding of Asia at the time.
5 As an undergraduate, I took a lot of courses in it.

6 I mean, that was the reason I was at the Officers
7 Training School, too, because there weren't a lot of people
8 that knew much about Asia. They don't very often take
9 bachelors and get them to teach.

10 Q. So you've told us that in 1969 there was this
11 television program that Mr. Perot was involved in with Murphy
12 Martin and that that really was the spark for Mr. Perot's
13 involvement in the POW issue.

14 How was that spark manifested? What started
15 happening after Mr. Perot appeared on that TV program?

16 A. Oh, I think the next --

17 MR. BRYANT: I don't believe there's been any
18 testimony that he appeared on the television program.

19 MR. KRAVITZ: Okay. I'm sorry.

20 BY MR. KRAVITZ:

21 Q. I thought you were referring to an interview of Mr.
22 Perot.

23 A. Not that program. He was being interviewed on a
24 different program but it wasn't with the POW wife.

25 Q. The program was with --

1 A. He was in the studio at the same time.

2 Q. As the four wives?

3 A. Exactly. I don't recall the number but I remember
4 there was a little boy.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. The first, when we got into the POW thing, was when
7 we formed United We Stand. There were several issues. This
8 bringing together the people behind the office of the
9 President, and I stress the "office of the President," because
10 that's what it was, one of them was the POW issue.

11 If I recall, up till about 1969 or maybe even
12 earlier than that, when Johnson was President, there was an
13 official policy that the POW's were secret. You saw nothing
14 about them; you heard really nothing about them.

15 And when the new administration came in and I think
16 maybe even when Ho Chi Minh died in August or September of
17 1969, I think it was the government policy to start saying
18 yeah, we do have POW's over there. They are being tortured.
19 They are being kept in chains. They are isolated. They are
20 violating every act of the Geneva Convention.

21 And Ross became aware of that. Whether he knew it
22 before, I don't know, but I know about October this was an
23 issue, along with getting the people united behind the office
24 of the President and let's show the world that we're
25 supporting our government and let's get full support behind

1 A. No, I don't know if he was consulted.

2 Q. When you were working for United We Stand,
3 were you physically in your EDS office or were you at a
4 separate -- I mean, was there a separate set of offices for
5 United --

6 A. Yes. We eventually moved to a separate set of
7 offices. We were paid by United We Stand. It was moved out
8 of -- I mean, it was just a floor below or something like
9 that, but there was a separate set of offices that were down
10 there that I would office out of there and then sometimes up
11 above later on.

12 Q. So you were specifically paid by United We Stand?

13 A. Yeah.

14 Q. So you were really detailed almost there from EDS?

15 A. Yes. For a period of time, yes.

16 Q. What do you remember being the first project that
17 United We Stand ran related to POW's?

18 A. It was the ads and the television programs. We did
19 a simultaneous distribution of ads to the major newspapers in
20 the United States and to the major TV stations in the United
21 States whereby -- I recall we had Frank Borman.

22 Anyway, it was about a 30-minute film clip that
23 talked about the issues, and one of those was the POW issue.
24 I think there was an ex-POW in one of them, if I recall.

25 Q. What were the other issues that United We

1 Stand --

2 A. Getting the American people behind the office of the
3 President. That was the main thrust. That thrust became more
4 of a POW thing as time when on.

5 Q. When you say getting the American people behind the
6 President, you mean trying to gain support for the
7 Vietnamization program?

8 A. Yes, and support for the government's decision on
9 how to get out of Vietnam. I mean, that's as simple as I can
10 put it but that was the basic thrust.

11 It evolved more into POW. It didn't really start
12 that way but it evolved more into the POW thing later, because
13 that was one issue, I think, Ross felt, well, here's a case
14 right here where these people are languishing.

15 We had some evidence from I think just probably
16 readings or maybe some -- I forget where the information was
17 from but these guys, some of them were at camps and they were
18 going through some horrendous problems.

19 I think Ross felt that we needed to do something
20 about it. So literally, the thrust of United We Stand kind of
21 changed. It probably was in December or January when it
22 really started to emphasize POW's and the others were just
23 kind of de-emphasized.

24 Here the thrust at that time was that these guys are
25 suffering and they need to stop suffering. How do you do

1 that? How can we bring relief for the men and the basic way
2 to do it was to try the North Vietnamese in the court of world
3 opinion.

4 So that really became the thing of United We Stand.
5 Let's show the world what the North Vietnamese are doing to
6 American pilots and soldiers and let's demand that they follow
7 the Accords of Geneva.

8 That subsequently led to sending wives all over the
9 world. That subsequently led to a Christmas trip in 1969.
10 That subsequently led to more wives and children to Paris and
11 North Vietnamese embassies.

12 That subsequently led to in 1970 the press, a
13 hundred-and-some-odd press going into camps of South
14 Vietnamese and Lao camps showing Pathet Lao, Viet Cong and
15 North Vietnamese prisoners and demonstrating to the world
16 press and thus the world that these guys were being treated
17 okay by the South Vietnamese. The South Vietnamese just
18 opened those camps up and the press saw it and there's a lot
19 of documentation in the Reader's Guide where you can pick this
20 stuff up.

21 Q. What was the budget of United We Stand back in
22 1969/1970?

23 A. I don't recall. I don't recall.

24 Q. Do you remember just --

25 A. No.

1 Q. -- an approximate number?

2 A. No.

3 Q. You said that the first real project was ads in
4 national newspapers and TV stations. What were those ads?
5 Those, I take it, were not specifically aimed at POW issues
6 but were at the larger issues of getting behind the President?

7 A. Yes, and POW. There was an ad on POW issue, too,
8 and there might have been another one, a third one, but I
9 don't recall them. But if you get your staffs to just go
10 through the Reader's Guide between '69 and '70, and
11 newspapers, you'll find those ads in there, because they are
12 public record.

13 Q. What was your sense as to the reaction to those ads
14 when they came out?

15 A. You mean my sense or the public sense?

16 Q. What was the public reaction, as you recall it?

17 A. We just got tons of mail, tons and tons of mail.
18 The Post Office was going bananas because they were bringing
19 in giant mailbags. You know, I forget the numbers but we just
20 had one -- I mean, it was just stacked and stacked and
21 stacked.

22 It snowballed again, because after that particular
23 ad then there were other activities that would get in the
24 press. Again, Ross I think saw that the way that he could
25 bring relief here is if he somehow drug the press into the

1 issue.

2 The Christmas trip -- A couple of wives going to
3 Laos, I took them to Laos in early December, and the Christmas
4 trip again, as that thing developed, it brought in a lot more
5 letters and support. The press followed that for 12 days and
6 that plane went around the world.

7 Then we had a whole series of TV programs. There
8 was a big request for Ross to go on television in early 1970.
9 So he was hitting these programs and, again, talking about the
10 issue. That would bring in a lot of support.

11 We had a system set up. We had a lot of volunteers
12 at that time, too, I recall now. And we had some system set
13 up where we would have a packet that we would mail back when
14 these people would send in a letter or coupon of some kind.

15 In essence, there was not a -- We would say this is
16 how you can do it. Here's what you need to do. Write your
17 Congressman, write Sam McDonald, et cetera, et cetera, et
18 cetera. Here's how you set up an organization. Get this
19 issue over. And here's a packet.

20 We just sent it off. We didn't keep a close direct
21 feedback, span of control type of organization. It was more
22 of here it is. If you've got a problem, let us know.

23 Q. As United We Stand got underway in the fall of 1969
24 and it, I'm sure, became clear to everyone that it was an
25 organization very much supportive of the Nixon Administration,

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W.
SUITE 400
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005
(202) 289-2260
(800) FOR DEPO

1 did there ever come a time that there was a relationship
2 between the organization and the Nixon Administration.

3 MR. BRYANT: I don't believe that he said that it
4 had anything to do with the Nixon Administration, as opposed
5 to the office of the President.

6 THE WITNESS: Yeah.

7 MR. KRAVITZ: That's a fair comment but I think he
8 understands what I mean.

9 THE WITNESS: I don't quite understand the question.

10 BY MR. KRAVITZ:

11 Q. Well, I mean --

12 A. Did Nixon tell us what to do?

13 Q. Well, not did he tell you what to do but were there
14 ever conversations between Mr. Nixon or any members of his
15 administration and any members of the United We Stand
16 organization as to what the Nixon Administration policies were
17 so that you would know what you were trying to get people
18 behind?

19 A. Yes, I think there was.

20 Q. Can you tell us about that?

21 A. Well, part of it was Ambassador Godley in Laos,
22 Ambassador Bunker in Saigon, you know, when we were in there
23 talking to the ambassadors. There were some cases -- You
24 know, I had worked in politics in the campaign and so I had
25 contacts there.

1 Q. You're referring to the 1968 --

2 A. '68 campaign.

3 Q. -- presidential campaign?

4 A. Yeah. But there was no linkage there. I mean, that
5 was not the purpose of that. I was just an advance man,
6 organizing during that period.

7 But to say that we had direct -- The ads
8 themselves, we had consulted the White House on those ads.
9 There was a connection there.

10 Q. You consulted the White House on the substance of
11 the ads?

12 A. Substance of the ads, yeah. I mean, Ross let them
13 know what he was doing and they wanted -- You know, it was
14 basically an effort that was worked together. It wasn't Ross
15 over here doing it by himself.

16 MR. BRYANT: So the question is basically whether
17 there was communication between United We Stand and the Nixon
18 White House.

19 THE WITNESS: Nixon White House, yes, there was.

20 BY MR. KRAVITZ:

21 Q. I think you were in the middle of your answer.

22 A. Well, in essence, that's probably the extent of it.
23 There was a period, I think, on the Christmas trip when Gen.
24 Haig sent a fax or a telex to Ross telling to stop the trip
25 and come on home and Ross didn't do it. He went on trying to

1 deliver those gifts in Hanoi.

2 I guess what I'm saying, yes, there was a linkage
3 but it wasn't one that was a directive linkage. It was
4 basically, you know, here's what we're doing and here's what
5 we plan to do; kind of a courtesy thing.

6 Q. Did United We Stand receive any information from
7 administration officials related to POW's or --

8 MR. BRYANT: You're talking about the entire period
9 of United We Stand or are you trying to focus it more?

10 MR. KRAVITZ: I want to start talking about the
11 entire period that Mr. Meurer was involved.

12 THE WITNESS: To say the White House -- To my
13 recall, not really. What we did and this was a concerted
14 effort by more Murphy and myself, rather than Ross, was that
15 what we needed was data.

16 Once we broke on this thing, the people that knew
17 about POW's initially was the government, was the military.
18 So it was really trying to get information and specifically
19 the pictures.

20 You know, there were some captured photographs --
21 not captured, but photographs taken by eastern European and
22 some Dutch photographers in '64/'65. We wanted to get those
23 and the military had them.

24 We had some contacts in DOD. I'd call and say, "Can
25 we get the pictures and make some copies?" It was that type

1 of thing.

2 BY MR. KRAVITZ:

3 Q. Who were your contacts within DOD?

4 A. I don't even remember the names any more. There was
5 a guy, later on, a guy at Randolph Air Force Base, Col.
6 Gratch, and he was responsible for all the POW's and the wives
7 and that linkage there.

8 As this thing expanded and we'd get in more things,
9 we would come across these people. They would contact us
10 after a while because they would want to know what was
11 happening or something like this, or maybe a question about
12 something. I can't recall specifically.

13 That was the case there. I think Frank Sieverts in
14 the State Department was specifically assigned to that, but in
15 essence it was those departments who were POW-oriented. So it
16 only makes sense.

17 Q. Did you have contacts with a man named Roger Shields
18 in the Pentagon?

19 A. Later on Roger, yeah. He wasn't in the initial
20 phases but he was towards the end, if I recall.

21 Q. So you don't remember meeting with Shields or
22 receiving information from him before the time, say, of the
23 1969 Christmas trip or the --

24 A. No.

25 Q. -- April 1970 trip?

1 A. Definitely not.

2 Q. How about Sieverts?

3 A. I forget when I first met Frank. I don't know. It
4 might have been -- It definitely wasn't before the Christmas
5 trip. There was really no connection before the Christmas
6 trip. I mean, the Christmas trip was a very quick thing.

7 Q. How was the Christmas trip conceived, as you recall
8 it?

9 A. I wasn't there. I was on my way to Laos and didn't
10 know about it until I got to Laos.

11 Q. What were you doing --

12 A. I was taking two wives to pound on the North
13 Vietnamese Embassy to try to -- "Pound" is not the right
14 word. Literally, one of Ross' thrusts was let's take --
15 Again, you've got to recall what the objective here is. That
16 is to try the North Vietnamese in the court of world opinion.
17 To put pressure on them to take the pressure off these men and
18 treat them better. That was the objective.

19 If we can get information and if we can get the men
20 out, definitely that's something that would be a nice
21 byproduct; but realistically, that was where we put the big
22 horse and heavy times.

23 The first thrust was sending wives. I think in the
24 fall Ross might have sent some wives to Paris in the fall and
25 then he decided to send -- We'd check around. Where do the

1 North Vietnamese have an embassy. Let's put a couple of wives
2 and an escort and send them over there.

3 So that was kind of the initial thing we did. The
4 basic idea was to send a press person with them, get a lot of
5 ink on it and just tighten the North Vietnamese jaw, saying
6 you guys are butchers. Ta dah ta dah ta dah.

7 They were riding high on the hog and getting lots of
8 good publicity, especially after that Tet Offensive, and I
9 think it was just one of those things that really was to put
10 pressure on them to really get some....

11 Q. So when you left to go to Laos, that was in December
12 of 1969?

13 A. December 1969.

14 Q. At that time there was no Christmas trip planned?

15 A. No Christmas trip planned, until I got there and I
16 got a telex saying there was going to be a trip.

17 Q. Do you remember what dates your trip was planned
18 for?

19 A. I can't recall. It had to be somewhere mid-
20 December. I just can't recall.

21 Q. Who went on that trip other than you? Who are the
22 two wives?

23 A. Dottie Hughes and Midge Jones and Bill Ceveraha, who
24 was a TV reporter, anchorman here in Dallas.

25 Q. So you were the only United We Stand employee who

1 was on that trip?

2 A. That's right and the trip was sponsored by United We
3 Stand.

4 Q. What happened on that trip, in addition to getting
5 news that the Christmas trip was scheduled?

6 A. Well, the objective of the trip was literally just
7 to talk to the North Vietnamese. See if, (a), the wives could
8 go in there and see their husbands; (b), see if they could
9 deliver packages to their husbands; (c) was to just put in the
10 North Vietnam conscience here are a couple more wives coming
11 in wanting to know information. Literally, just kind of a
12 water bucket of pressure.

13 Typically, the way we would do that is we would stop
14 along the way and have press conferences, saying, we're on our
15 way to see the North Vietnamese.

16 I didn't say anything. I would stay in the
17 background and the wives would control the whole thing. But
18 we would advise them on what to do and how to do it.

19 Q. Did you have a meeting with the North Vietnamese on
20 that trip?

21 A. Yes, several meetings. Yes.

22 Q. How was that arranged?

23 A. I called and it wasn't that difficult to get the
24 meetings. They didn't know what it was at first. It was
25 rather confusing.

1 Then they had heard about the -- This is a long
2 time ago, guys, so the memory clouds.

3 MR. BRYANT: All you can do is just tell them what
4 you remember. If you don't, you don't.

5 THE WITNESS: Okay.

6 In essence, there were a couple of meetings that I
7 recall. One of them was -- I think they wanted to ask --
8 They were shocked about that airplane trip and they called me
9 back to say what about this airplane coming over, or three
10 airplanes coming over.

11 But anyway, we had a series of meetings and the
12 meetings were basically, you know, we'd like to see our
13 husbands.

14 BY MR. KRAVITZ:

15 Q. To your knowledge, was your visit to Laos in
16 December 1969 with the two wives the first United We Stand
17 sponsored trip to Laos to meet with North Vietnamese?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. What did you learn in Laos from back in the States
20 regarding the Christmas trip?

21 A. I got some form of communique -- I don't recall what
22 it was -- that a plane was coming and they wanted me to
23 organize it on the ground there. Basically, to set up a
24 meeting with the Vietnamese for Ross; work out the details for
25 the airplane to come in on the strip. This is a relatively

1 small strip and this was a 707 Charlie, a very large 707, and
2 there was a real question whether that plane could even land
3 there or not.

4 And then we had -- I don't know, I forget what the
5 number was, 40 or 50 people on the airplane, or whatever; make
6 sure you've got rooms and accommodations for them. That type
7 of detail stuff.

8 Q. What did you do in order to make all the necessary
9 arrangements? Did you meet again with North Vietnamese?

10 A. Yes. Met with North Vietnamese.

11 Q. Were they receptive to setting up a meeting with Mr.
12 Perot?

13 A. Not initially, they weren't, but they eventually
14 did, yes.

15 Q. Did you meet with anyone else in anticipation of the
16 arrival of the plane with the 40 or 50 people?

17 A. Some embassy people.

18 Q. U.S. Embassy?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Do you remember who you met with from the U.S.
21 Embassy?

22 A. Over the course of that first trip was Mack Godley,
23 who was the ambassador. Jim Murphy, who was either an
24 economic or a political officer; I don't know what his title
25 was. Those are two names I recall. There were others but I

1 just don't recall the names.

2 Q. Did you meet with Ambassador Godley at the embassy?

3 A. At the embassy? Yes, at the embassy.

4 Q. Again, just to be clear, this is in December 1969 in
5 anticipation for the arrival of Mr. Perot and the larger
6 party?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. What was Ambassador Godley's position or interest in
9 regard to the upcoming trip of Mr. Perot and the rest of his
10 party? Was Ambassador Godley in favor of it? Was he
11 facilitating the trip?

12 A. I think he could probably be described as very
13 concerned. I had just got the information not too long before
14 that, so I was a little confused on it exactly, other than
15 when it was going to happen. Don't forget now, this was
16 planned while I was in the airplane.

17 If I recall, we were having dinner. I was over at
18 his house that night and he said, "I'd like to show you my
19 study."

20 Q. This is Godley?

21 A. This was Godley, yeah. The wives and I were over
22 for dinner. He invited us over there with a bunch of embassy
23 people and some around. It was kind of an honor-the-wives
24 type dinner.

25 He says, "I'd like to show you something in my

1 study." So I walk back in there and he had a couple of
2 security people there. He said, "All right, blankety-blank.
3 What in the hell is going on with this airplane?"

4 Q. He said that to you?

5 A. Yeah. So I would probably phrase that as concern.
6 And I just told him that, you know, I'm assuming that probably
7 the White House told him about it. I didn't know that; it was
8 my first comment, which I guess might have been a checkmate
9 statement, because he couldn't really respond to that too
10 much.

11 But I just told him what I knew and I said, "This is
12 what I know, Mr. Ambassador."

13 And he says, "Well, you realize bringing this number
14 of people in..." dah ta dah ta dah. We talked through it and
15 once I gave him all the information I had, I think he came
16 around and was very cordial.

17 And he said, "Here are some things I think you
18 should do," and in fact he helped plan some schedules, one of
19 which he wanted us to fly over the new dam that was being
20 built just north of Vientiane so people could see what the
21 United States was doing in the way of bringing some prosperity
22 to Laos.

23 So as I say, I think he was kind of like me. All of
24 a sudden he found out through some source and it might have
25 been the news. I don't know how he found out but I think he

1 thought I was in there with wives and all of a sudden I was
2 going to bring in this airplane with goods and press and
3 nobody had consulted him.

4 I think he accepted it and he wasn't a problem, as I
5 say, once he found out.

6 Q. Did you set up meetings between Mr. Perot and
7 Ambassador Godley during that time period when you were making
8 arrangements?

9 A. Yes, I'm sure we did. I don't recall.

10 Q. Any other meetings that you arranged?

11 A. North Vietnamese.

12 Q. That was it? For the Christmas trip there were
13 meetings that you arranged with Ambassador Godley and perhaps
14 others at the U.S. Embassy and meetings with the North
15 Vietnamese?

16 A. And I think probably in a POW camp outside
17 Vientiane, too. I think I did that.

18 Q. So this would be a Royal Lao?

19 A. This is where North Vietnamese POW's were kept, yes.

20 Q. Any meetings set up with Pathet Lao officials?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. For the Christmas trip?

23 A. Yes, I think there was, Soth Pethrasi at that time.

24 Q. And that was a meeting that was set up for after the
25 time period that Mr. Perot and the rest of his party or group

1 arrived? In other words --

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. -- it was not a meeting that -- before Mr. Perot
4 arrived?

5 A. Well, I don't recall. I met with him before with
6 the wives, too. That was the Pathet Lao representative in
7 Vientiane. So that was kind of the Laotian counterpart to the
8 Viet Cong.

9 Q. Tell us about the meeting that you had with Soth
10 Pethrasi with the two wives before the time that Mr. Perot and
11 the rest of the Christmas party people arrived in Vientiane.

12 A. I really don't recall any specifics. I don't recall
13 any specifics in it. I remember I got some orange pop that
14 tasted very good at that meeting, but to say what was on the -
15 - It was basically the wives were telling their problem.
16 That's really all I remember about it.

17 Q. What about the meeting that you and the wives had
18 with the North Vietnamese?

19 A. Basically the same thing.

20 Q. Did these two wives have information as to which
21 country their husbands had been lost in?

22 A. I don't recall. I don't recall. I'm sure they did
23 but I just don't recall.

24 Q. You've described Soth Pethrasi as the Pathet Lao's
25 lead person in Vientiane. What did you mean by that? What

1 was your understanding really as to who Soth Pethrasi was?

2 A. He was their ambassador in Vientiane, just like any
3 government would have a representation. Both the Viet Cong
4 and the Pathet Lao felt they were legitimate governments and
5 they wanted representation, and the Laotian society was such
6 that they accepted that.

7 Q. What was your perception of the level of authority
8 that Soth Pethrasi enjoyed, based on your dealings with him?

9 A. I don't know. I really don't know what his level
10 was. You're talking about totalitarian society, so I just
11 don't know.

12 Q. I guess I'm not asking you so much as to comment on
13 how much authority he may in fact have had or not have had,
14 but really just how he presented himself?

15 A. Well, he was very cordial. He was a typical profile
16 of an ambassador, I would say, and that's what I recall.

17 Q. Did Ambassador Godley have anything to do with your
18 meeting with Soth Pethrasi? Did he facilitate that in any way
19 or suggest that you meet with Soth Pethrasi?

20 A. No. We had to go through the Lao Foreign Ministry,
21 if I recall, before we could set up the meeting.

22 Q. What happened when Mr. Perot and the rest of the
23 people with him arrived in Vientiane?

24 MR. BRYANT: At the Christmastime trip?

25 MR. KRAVITZ: Right.

1 THE WITNESS: Well, it was an event. You had the
2 biggest airplane probably that was ever in Laos land at a time
3 when you had a runway that was not designed for that big an
4 airplane.

5 In fact, they had to download fuel, so they just had
6 about 30 or 40 minutes worth of fuel to get in there.

7 As I recall, we probably went to the hotel, checked
8 in. I don't even remember what time of day we came in. It's
9 been a long time ago.

10 But there were events we did and meetings and
11 dinners and sundry items like that over the course of that
12 period.

13 BY MR. KRAVITZ:

14 Q. How long was the whole group in Vientiane?

15 A. It wasn't more than a couple of days. When we left,
16 it was an interesting story, because this airplane was one
17 that hung over the edge of the tarmac a little bit. There was
18 an awful lot of talk around town that that plane wasn't going
19 to be able to take off. It was too big.

20 The day we took off, I forget what time of day it
21 was, but the North Vietnamese VC had their representation up
22 there, the Russians, the Chinese, the Americans, the French,
23 all were out there. The families with chicken, rice,
24 whatever, were on that runway or sitting on the grass to watch
25 that airplane take off. I mean, it was an event in Vientiane.

1 I was on the plane at that time because we were
2 heading on trying to get to Russia. I always remember calling
3 back after we took off and talking to Jim Murphy. He says,
4 "This is the best thing that happened to U.S. foreign policy
5 since 1945."

6 Apparently when that thing took off, the grass was
7 very dry and dusty, and when it took off it just created a
8 cloud that was almost like a mushroom cloud behind it in
9 thrust.

10 And Jim said it was amazing. He said you had the
11 Viet Cong, the Japanese and the Chinese and the Russians and
12 everybody clapping when the thing got airborne.

13 I didn't mean to get off on something here but I do
14 recall that particular thing, because I thought it was kind of
15 interesting.

16 Q. What meetings were held in Vientiane during this
17 Christmas trip after Mr. Perot and the rest of his group
18 arrived there that month?

19 A. A meeting with the North Vietnamese, with Soth
20 Pethrasi, with the U.S. Embassy.

21 Q. Was there a visit to the Lao prison camp?

22 A. I believe there was. I believe there was. I know I
23 went and I thought I took them in on a very brief tour at that
24 time.

25 And I want to say a meeting with Souvanna Phouma,

1 who was the Premier of Laos. Ross met with the top leaders of
2 the country.

3 Q. After Mr. Perot's arrival in Vientiane --

4 A. I might point out that this wasn't just crashing
5 into a country. I mean, there was protocol that Ross went
6 through.

7 Q. Sure.

8 A. This was not an American country. This was Laos and
9 Souvanna Phouma at that time, Prince Souvanna Phouma, was the
10 Premier at that time.

11 Q. After Mr. Perot and his group arrived in Vientiane,
12 were you brought up to date or up to speed as to what the
13 plans were?

14 A. Yes, but they were pretty fluid.

15 Q. What do you mean by that?

16 A. Well, we didn't know if we were going to Hanoi or
17 not.

18 Q. Were you provided with a sense of how much
19 information about POW's Mr. Perot and the rest of the people
20 in the group had in their possession? In other words, what
21 did you all know about POW's at that time in terms of numbers,
22 names, locations?

23 A. I just don't recall at that time. I don't recall at
24 that time. Whether there was a list, I don't know.

25 Q. Do you know, for example, whether any information

1 had been provided by Frank Sieverts to Mr. Perot or any other
2 people with the group?

3 A. I don't know. I don't know.

4 Q. Because you were in Laos, you weren't involved in
5 any of the Stateside preparations?

6 A. Right.

7 Q. Who went to the meeting with the North Vietnamese in
8 Vientiane during the Christmas trip?

9 A. Ross. I want to say Karen Freitag, who was an
10 interpreter. She spoke French and French was the language of
11 choice. Murphy might have been.

12 I did not go. I did not go. There was one meeting
13 I sat in later on but I don't think -- I don't recall if I was
14 in those meetings or not.

15 Q. Who else was on this trip? You've already mentioned
16 Mr. Perot, Murphy Martin, Karen Freitag.

17 A. We had Chuck McKinley, who was the 1963 Wimbledon
18 champion.

19 Q. I was going to ask you if he was the tennis player.
20 What was his relationship with it?

21 A. Chuck was one of our investment bankers out of New
22 York. He volunteered and wanted to be a part of it. So he
23 asked Ross if he could go and help on this trip.

24 Q. He was an EDS investment --

25 A. Well, he was an investment banker for Pressbich and

1 they took EDS public. But Wall Street really opened up their
2 doors and he was the one that helped organize. You know, they
3 had to get all these goods.

4 This thing was really thrown together on a massive -
5 - This was a massive program. You had 150 wives going almost
6 simultaneously; 150 wives going to Paris. You had an airplane
7 with 30 tons worth of goods going to Laos and hopefully to
8 Hanoi; another airplane with 30 tons sitting on the runway
9 waiting for instructions where it should go.

10 Then on board were the Red Cross. There was a
11 priest, a rabbi, a minister. We had Braniff staff because it
12 was a Braniff airplane. We had pilots. I think we had some
13 press.

14 Q. Was Mr. McKillop there from Braniff?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. So the people who went to the meeting -- As you
17 remember, the people who went to the meeting with the North
18 Vietnamese in Vientiane were Mr. Perot --

19 A. I really don't remember. I just don't picture it.
20 Ross went to a meeting. There were a few people that went
21 with him.

22 Q. You know you were not one of those?

23 A. I know I was not one of them.

24 Q. Were you told about what happened during that
25 meeting?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. What were you told and who told you about it?

3 A. Probably Ross, because when he'd come back we'd go
4 back up into his suite and talk and strategize what to do
5 next. Basically, it was a series of meetings.

6 If I recall, kind of the final meeting was Ross
7 wanted to deliver these goods and the North Vietnamese said
8 you can deliver them if you get them to Moscow before the 31st
9 of December and you've got to repackage those babies into 6.6-
10 pound boxes, which was 3 kilograms.

11 We had like 24 hours to get to Moscow and we hurried
12 up and went back to Bangkok, overnighted in Bangkok and were
13 preparing to hook it the next day. He had set up, I believe,
14 a meeting with the Pope. Ross was going to meet the Pope and
15 go on to Copenhagen and then on to Moscow.

16 Somehow, somebody -- I went over to the Russian
17 Embassy in Bangkok when we got back to Bangkok to brief the
18 Russians on our manifest and what we needed and what the North
19 Vietnamese told us. We did that in Vientiane also and they
20 said see the Russians in Bangkok, and so I did that.

21 The next morning somebody, we don't know who, said
22 you can't fly over Burma and India, even though before that,
23 that night, we had permission to do it. So somebody squelched
24 the trip.

25 One of the newsmen, Bernie Kalb -- We were in a

1 conference meeting in Bangkok by this time. Just looking at
2 some sort of pamphlet on a world map, he said why don't we go
3 -- Our objective was to get to Copenhagen and on into Moscow.

4 Since we didn't have any flyover rights, the only
5 way we could go was over water. So we hooked it around the
6 South China Sea. He said why don't you go this way. We all
7 looked at this very simple pamphlet and Bernie said, "You can
8 go this way."

9 And we looked at it and Ross said, "Yeah, that's a
10 great idea." So we went to Harry, can we do it, and Harry
11 says, "We've got take-off rights." So we took off.

12 We hooked it on to Tokyo and from Tokyo we refueled
13 and then into Anchorage. I called on the sideband radio the
14 radio station in Anchorage -- by this time the world press had
15 been following us -- and asked if we could have some
16 assistance and some volunteers because we needed to repackage
17 all these boxes.

18 When we landed we had the Anchorage Moratorium
19 Committee Against the War; we had military; Boy Scouts and
20 Girl Scouts; vast number of people this radio station had
21 organized.

22 Western Airlines had given us their hangar. So I
23 got our staff and we set up an assembly line and got people
24 cutting boxes and taping boxes, packing stuff, weighing stuff,
25 putting cards in, addressing things; and within 6 hours we had

1 all 30 tons into little 6-pound, 6-ounce boxes of the specs
2 that the North Vietnamese needed and we were hooking on across
3 the pole to Copenhagen.

4 Q. What happened after you got to Copenhagen?

5 A. We tried to meet with the Russians and the Russians
6 would not meet with us. Karen Freitag, again who was our
7 interpreter, was calling some various embassies on the
8 sideband radio trying to get permission.

9 Called Rome and called Copenhagen; we didn't get
10 anything there. She called France, Paris. We called Rome.
11 It might have been Madrid, I don't know where, but was talking
12 to Russian embassies saying that we needed to get clearance to
13 go into the Soviet Union.

14 She would talk that particular -- She was talking
15 in French. She spoke about seven languages. When Perot's
16 name and the mission came up, the Russian on the other end
17 would sink back into Russian and didn't understand it and she
18 didn't talk Russian.

19 We got to Copenhagen and went to the Royal Hotel.
20 The Russians wouldn't meet us. So it was kind of checkmate
21 again.

22 Ross said, "Who is the head of the Soviet Union?"

23 I said, "Well, you've got Brezhnev and Kosygin."

24 He says, "Let's get Kosygin on the line."

25 So Murphy and I went to the room and Murphy made a

1 call to the Kremlin. It was midnight in Copenhagen and about
2 2:00 o'clock in Moscow.

3 As I recall, Murphy asked in English -- There was a
4 woman, I think, on the other end of the line responded in
5 Russian. I answered in Russian, he English and then she
6 English.

7 Basically he told her what we wanted and what we
8 were trying to do is get a hold of the president or premier.
9 She said he was in a dacha outside Moscow somewhere and she
10 would pipe him on through.

11 On the line came a male. Again, Russian, English,
12 English. Murphy explained the problem and he said, "Col.
13 Kosygin is asleep. When he awakes, I will tell him this."

14 We sat in our room there for a little bit and all of
15 a sudden got a phone call. We were using that as our
16 headquarters in the hotel. It wasn't 15, 20 minutes maybe max
17 we get this phone call from the Russian Embassy in Copenhagen
18 and said, "We will meet with you at 8:00 o'clock in the
19 morning. Please don't call Kosygin again." So we got our
20 meeting.

21 The next morning we went over and met with them.

22 Q. Who went to that meeting?

23 A. Murphy and myself and Ross. In essence, the
24 Russians wanted to have a lot of details about the various
25 paints on the airplane and all this stuff.

1 It was obviously some sort of stalling tactic, I
2 think.

3 But the Braniff people pulled all this stuff
4 together. It took a while. Called Dallas, you know, we need
5 this, we need this, we need this. In essence, we got a call,
6 I think, from the Ambassador that said that we can't come in.

7 Q. This is from the Soviet ambassador in Copenhagen?

8 A. No, the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow called Ross and
9 said permission was denied. I think we were calling the
10 embassy in Moscow, too, at that time, if I recall.

11 Q. For facilitation?

12 A. Exactly. Get with the Foreign Minister. We've done
13 it from this end; can you get it from that end, ta dah ta dah
14 ta dah.

15 Q. You mentioned something a little bit earlier about
16 Gen. Haig sending a message. At what point in the story does
17 that happen?

18 A. When we returned from Vientiane and went back to
19 Bangkok, that night, there was a telex from Gen. Haig that in
20 essence said, you know, come on back. Don't go any further.
21 The point has been made, ta dah ta dah ta dah.

22 Q. What was Gen. Haig's position at that time? Was he
23 Kissinger's deputy at the National Security Council?

24 A. I believe he was.

25 Q. And the message was, the point has been made for

1 your purpose of world opinion?

2 A. Yeah, just turn around and come back. And Ross
3 felt, no, we've got a run here. Let's keep going. Let's play
4 the hand out.

5 Q. So was there a --

6 A. The North Vietnamese didn't think Perot would take
7 this -- The thing that really blew the North Vietnamese about
8 Perot is, you know, here's a capitalist coming in trying to do
9 something for these POW's.

10 They had been schooled in the thought that
11 capitalists are supposed to be short, bald, exploit the
12 laborers and smoke cigars. Ross was short but none of that
13 other stuff.

14 So I think basically he was a confusing thing to
15 them. I think really what happened was that they said let's
16 just let him run it out. Let him go to Moscow. They'll never
17 get in there anyway. And Ross felt, well, let's play this one
18 out and see what happens.

19 I think at the beginning of the trip I think I can
20 say I don't think any of us felt that there was a hundred
21 percent chance those goods were going to go in there. Again,
22 the idea was to show the American people and the world that
23 the North Vietnamese were not abiding by the Geneva
24 Convention.

25 Q. Was there any more pressure from the White House to

1 stop the trip than that one telex from Haig?

2 A. To my knowledge, no.

3 Q. I want to go back just for a moment to the time that
4 you were in Vientiane during this Christmas 1969 trip. You
5 told us about, at least what you know about, the meeting with
6 the North Vietnamese that you were not present at.

7 Was there a meeting between Mr. Perot and Soth
8 Pethrasi during that visit?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Were you present --

11 A. I'm pretty sure there was.

12 Q. Were you present at that meeting?

13 A. I just don't recall. I don't recall. I set the
14 meetings up. I might have gone in. If I went in, I would sit
15 on the side back against the wall somewhere. So I just don't
16 recall.

17 Q. Did Mr. Perot do all the talking at all of these
18 meetings for your group's side?

19 A. Yes, the ones I was in, through an interpreter.

20 Q. I take it that since you don't recall any real
21 detail about the meeting that may or may not have taken place
22 with Mr. Pethrasi and Mr. Perot during the Christmas trip
23 1969, you don't remember Mr. Pethrasi making any statements
24 relating to U.S. prisoners of war who might have been held in
25 Laos at that time?

1 A. At a later meeting, I think in April; I was in that
2 meeting. He made it at that time.

3 Q. We're going to talk in more detail about the April
4 trip.

5 A. Okay.

6 Q. But in the meeting with Soth Pethrasi --

7 A. I don't recall that.

8 Q. -- over the Christmas --

9 A. I don't recall that at that time.

10 Q. Just so the record is clear.

11 A. Okay, and let me just kind of make it correct, too.
12 I can't pinpoint down that meeting. I think it was the April
13 trip but I just can't say that. It might have been that week.
14 I just don't recall. It's a long time ago.

15 Q. Just so the record is clear, because we've been
16 interrupting each other a little bit, if there was a meeting
17 between Mr. Perot and Soth Pethrasi during the Christmas trip
18 1969 -- and again, you've told us that you think there was but
19 you're not sure -- you don't recall Soth Pethrasi making any
20 statements during that meeting which provided information
21 about U.S. POW's held in Laos at that time; is that right?

22 A. No, I don't recall it. Not at Christmastime, I
23 don't recall it. I vaguely recall it at the April time.

24 Q. Again, in Vientiane during the Christmas trip 1969,
25 was there a meeting, as far as you were aware, between Mr.

1 Perot and Ambassador Godley or any other U.S. Embassy
2 officials?

3 A. In Christmas?

4 Q. Right, during the Christmas trip and your stop in
5 Vientiane, Laos.

6 A. Well, with Mack Godley, yes, because there was
7 protocol to say hello. I think there might even have been a
8 briefing at that time on maybe what was going on. I just
9 don't recall. I'm not sure.

10 Ambassador Godley knew why Ross was there and
11 therefore was going to be very cordial to a very important
12 businessman.

13 Q. Was the meeting in the embassy or was it somewhere
14 else?

15 A. I just don't recall. I don't recall.

16 Q. You say that there may have been a briefing. Do you
17 mean --

18 A. Well, I mean Ambassador Godley might have just said,
19 well, here are some things, you know, from that standpoint.

20 Q. So in other words, when you say "briefing," you mean
21 the embassy providing information to Mr. Perot, rather than
22 the other way around?

23 A. We had a briefing in April of 1970. That's when we
24 had a briefing.

25 Q. I'm planning on asking you more questions about

1 that.

2 A. Yeah, I've already talked to you about that.

3 Q. Right. But you don't recall any similar briefing
4 in the Christmas --

5 A. I don't recall at Christmas. There very well could
6 have been, but I just don't recall it.

7 MR. KRAVITZ: Why don't we take 5 minutes.

8 (Recess.)

9 MR. KRAVITZ: Back on the record.

10 BY MR. KRAVITZ:

11 Q. Mr. Meurer, one thing that I try to remember to ask
12 every witness after a recess in the deposition is whether
13 there's anything that you've said up to this point in the
14 deposition that you'd like to add to or change in any way.

15 A. I can't think of anything.

16 Q. If at any time during the deposition, you do think
17 back on an earlier answer and decide that you want to add
18 something, just feel free to let me know.

19 A. Okay.

20 Q. I know that there was a second trip -- maybe
21 "second" is the wrong word. There was another trip to
22 Southeast Asia in April 1970.

23 A. That's right.

24 Q. But if you could just briefly give us a sense of
25 what United We Stand was doing between the Christmas trip and

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W.

SUITE 400

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005

(202) 289-2260

(800) FOR DEPO

1 the April 1970 trip on behalf of POW's. What was the focus
2 during that time?

3 A. The big thrust was Ross was going on television,
4 talk shows, news shows, and discussing the issue of POW's, the
5 plight of POW's. This was drawing a response from viewers who
6 wanted -- On those shows he would say, "If you want to help,
7 here's what you can do. Call such-and-such a number or such-
8 and-such address."

9 We would get a lot of responses. We had some
10 volunteers in there that were putting together these packets
11 we made up. They would be sent out to these individuals, and
12 people would literally organize their local communities with a
13 letter writing campaign. It was primarily a letter writing
14 campaign, to write letters to the North Vietnamese, to write
15 letters to their Congressmen and Senators. There were
16 responses to some of Perot's activities from far around the
17 world.

18 We would go into some of the morgues trying to find
19 pictures. When I say morgues, newspaper morgues. We felt
20 that this might be a source of additional pictures. By that
21 time I think -- maybe at that time or a little later, but
22 somewhere in that period we also reasoned that -- there was X
23 number of names that the military had now. Whatever that
24 number was, I forget.

25 But we knew of known prisoners, there was X. I

1 think by that time we knew that probably most of those names
2 came out via one of the prisoners who had memorized them. I
3 think Bob Frishman -- Hegdahl, Doug Hegdahl.

4 Q. How did you obtain the information, the list of
5 known prisoners?

6 A. Well, we might have got it from the Government. We
7 had Hegdahl down, Bob Frishman down, ex-POW's. Nick Roe.
8 They were all very supportive. I mean, they saw us -- what we
9 were doing as something they wanted to do. They came down and
10 basically volunteered their services.

11 Hegdahl came down and he just kind of told us
12 everything, what it was like in the camps. Bob Frishman did.
13 Nick Roe, who was captured and held in the south.

14 You've got to look at this thing as a way that
15 you're just kind of... You're building information, so every
16 little piece of information kind of fits in and you're
17 building a nice big bedrock. Everything you get becomes a
18 little bit more recognizable later on, and you get a little
19 more knowledgeable. So we were on the learning curve at that
20 time would probably be a good way to put it, following through
21 on tips and leads, get on an airplane, go check it out.

22 Again, the key was to try to publicize the issue.
23 One of the events, I think was we had all these goods we
24 brought back; what do we do with them because we still had
25 them. We had to take them back to Dallas.

1 It was somebody's idea -- I forget who it was -- is
2 why don't we take them to the POW camps in South Vietnam and
3 Laos and deliver them to those prisoners.

4 Ross said, "That's a pretty good idea." We'll go
5 back, bring the press in there, show the world what those
6 camps are like. In that way we could again put pressure on
7 the North Vietnamese.

8 So that was kind of the genesis of that April trip,
9 too.

10 Q. In other words, in April not only was the plan to go
11 film the South Vietnamese prison camps, but also to deliver
12 the goods to the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese prisoners that
13 the North Vietnamese would not allow us to deliver to our own
14 prisoners?

15 A. Exactly. In essence, we wanted to show the world
16 that the South Vietnamese were taking care of the prisoners -
17 - the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong prisoners in accordance
18 with Geneva Conventions. They were doing everything they were
19 supposed to; let's show the world that. The North Vietnamese
20 were not; let's show the world that.

21 We have these goods. Why don't we go ahead and
22 deliver them to them.

23 Now, as I recall, what we ended up doing, we
24 eventually, I think, donated the goods to World Vision because
25 the South Vietnamese at the last moment did not want the goods

1 to go in there because they felt that would show them as not
2 being able to take care of those prisoners.

3 As I recall, the Minister of Defense or one of the
4 top officials said, "You can do it, but you can't deliver the
5 goods." So I think we gave them to a charity later on, as I
6 recall.

7 Q. What were the goods? What did they consist of?

8 A. There was vitamin pills, canned foods, candies,
9 things that people would need that would supplement the
10 basics, you know, people who were incarcerated for 5 years. A
11 lot of vitamin pills. There were Bibles, playing cards,
12 canned foods that were different and even candies I think that
13 they wouldn't get, some things like that. They were all
14 donated by various sources around the country.

15 Q. During this period in the first few months of 1970,
16 was the relationship between United We Stand and the Nixon
17 Administration still positive, notwithstanding the fact that
18 General Haig's cable had not been followed?

19 A. I don't recall. I just don't recall. I don't
20 recall one way or the other.

21 Q. You don't recall any negative effect on the
22 relationship --

23 A. No.

24 Q. -- based on the fact that --

25 A. We had a good relationship working with Frank.

1 Sieverts. We had a good relationship working probably with
2 Archie Gratch by that time, who were the key people in DOD and
3 State. And that's really where you want.

4 The White House really didn't know anything. We had
5 reached a stage where we wanted to talk to people who knew the
6 facts, I think.

7 Q. What type of information did you or others in your
8 group receive from Frank Sieverts before the April 1970 trip?

9 A. I don't recall. I don't recall.

10 Q. Do you recall whether or not you or anyone else from
11 your team, your organization, met with Mr. Sieverts before the
12 April 1970 trip?

13 A. I don't recall. I don't recall.

14 Q. Was it viewed by you and others in Mr. Perot's group
15 as important to have as much intelligence information or just
16 as much information as possible about U.S. POW's?

17 A. Yes, definitely.

18 Q. In light of the purpose or purposes of your trip in
19 April 1970, why did you need as much intelligence information
20 about U.S. POW's as possible? In other words, how was that
21 information to be used?

22 A. It would probably be used, one -- is the condition
23 of them, what kind of condition they were in, where were they
24 kept, how were they being treated.

25 Probably more important is have they listed them

1 all. That was one thing they didn't do.

2 Murphy found -- As I say, when we were going
3 through morgues we found pictures in the morgues that were not
4 public. We found some in Japan that basically showed some
5 people that the Government didn't have. So we were picking up
6 some new stuff.

7 Ron Dodge was one of the POW's who was never on a
8 list. Murphy had a picture of him captured that he got. He
9 got it out of Paris Match, I believe, in Paris. It was things
10 like that.

11 We were trying to find information that could go on
12 the list so when the thing was finally settled, they could
13 say, "Hey, this guy is on the list. Where is he?" We were
14 working along that line, too.

15 Q. Did anyone on your team have a security clearance so
16 that he or she could be briefed as to classified information
17 by anyone in the U.S. Government?

18 A. Not to my knowledge. Nobody ran a security
19 clearance on us for that purpose. We didn't wear a badge that
20 said I've got a top secret. I'm sure mine wouldn't carry over
21 from the Air Force. At least I don't think it would.

22 Q. At least nowadays it wouldn't. I don't know if it
23 was any different at that time.

24 A. I just don't know the answer to that question.

25 Q. So you just don't remember many specifics about the

1 type or quantity of information about POW's that you or your
2 group received from the Government before the April 1970 trip?

3 A. I don't recall. Again, this was one of those things
4 where I was over organizing that end while everybody was
5 organizing this end. My part of the elephant was over there
6 convincing the Vietnamese that they should allow us to go in
7 those camps.

8 At that point in time, I finally got permission to
9 go in the camps, but they would only allow 20 reporters in.
10 There were a lot of complexities that we were working. We
11 were hitting POW camps all over the country. It was a massive
12 movement.

13 Q. When you say the country, you're referring to South
14 Vietnam?

15 A. South Vietnam, during the war.

16 Q. So you were an avunceman on this trip?

17 A. Also.

18 Q. -- also, although this time before you left for
19 Southeast Asia, you knew --

20 A. I knew what was going on.

21 Q. -- that you were an avunceman?

22 A. Yes. In fact, Tom Marquez and I went to Vietnam
23 probably sometime in January or February of 1970.

24 Q. South Vietnam?

25 A. South Vietnam. To consult with the government to

1 see if we could do it. To sell the government on we would
2 like to do it.

3 Q. Did you meet with President Thieu?

4 A. Not Thieu. We met with a Mr. Duc -- D-u-c -- who
5 was kind of Henry Kissinger's counterpart, a national security
6 type.

7 I remember specifically meeting with General Trung,
8 who was the head of the political warfare department.

9 I remember specifically having a beer with him and
10 convincing him that it would be in South Vietnam's best
11 interest to allow all these reporters to come into camps
12 because they were doing everything right and to show the world
13 they were doing it right.

14 Q. Did you actually go to visit any of the POW camps in
15 South Vietnam?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. During that advance trip?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. So you knew that --

20 A. We visited all of them before they went in.

21 Q. I see.

22 A. Chuck McKinley and Marquez and I, we went to all of
23 them.

24 Q. So you knew that the South Vietnam were in fact
25 doing it right?

1 A. Definitely, yes.

2 Q. As far as you could tell, were the South Vietnam in
3 fact running those camps, or were they simply following orders
4 of Americans?

5 A. They were running the camps.

6 Q. What was the level of American involvement, in terms
7 of running the POW camps in South Vietnam as far as you could
8 tell?

9 A. I don't recall. There might have been American
10 advisors around when we were going through them. I didn't
11 work with the Americans at all. I worked with the Vietnamese
12 military in setting all this stuff up. The Vietnamese
13 military -- we were using gooneybirds to fly to the various -
14 - or DC-3's. It was all done with the South Vietnamese.

15 Q. In terms of your advance work for the April trip,
16 did you go to any other countries than South Vietnam?

17 A. Laos.

18 Q. What was the purpose of your trip to Laos?

19 A. The same thing. We were going to go to Laos and
20 visit the camp there with the press, too.

21 Q. In other words, you went ahead of time to try to
22 meet with Royal Lao officials?

23 A. Yes. But it was basically the same purpose. That
24 swing would take us through both Vietnam and Laos. The
25 purpose was to show the condition of the camps to the press,

1 and then on to Paris for the Paris Peace Talks where the North
2 Vietnamese were and to basically tell the North Vietnamese
3 here's what's happening, the film and everything. Here are
4 film and information on your people in the camps. You can
5 have it; take it home and show their loved ones.

6 Q. As far as you're aware, to what extent if any was
7 the April 1970 trip coordinated with the U.S. Government? In
8 other words, did the U.S. delegation to the Paris talks know
9 that your plan was to come to Paris and do what you've just
10 been saying?

11 A. I don't know the answer to that question. I don't
12 know the answer to the question.

13 We, of course, coordinated it with the embassy when
14 we got in those countries. Ambassador Bunker was the
15 ambassador at that time. Godley was still the ambassador. I
16 had gotten to know him by that time.

17 Q. I actually just met him last week.

18 A. Is that right? He's a great man, too, I think.

19 But I think -- If there were other countries, I
20 don't recall. We might have stopped in them, but I can't
21 recall any mission. It might have been Hong Kong or
22 Singapore, but I just don't recall offhand on that particular
23 trip.

24 Q. Where were you when the main group arrived for the
25 April 1970 trip?

1 A. Saigon.

2 Q. Was that the first stop of the main group?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. What did the main group consist of, how many people,
5 who were they?

6 A. Probably a hundred and some-odd reporters, maybe
7 150, whatever we could put in a Charlie, 707 Charlie. It was
8 configured for passengers.

9 I don't remember the number, but it exceeded a
10 hundred, and maybe closer to 150.

11 Then we had our United We Stand staff.

12 Q. Who was on the April 1970 trip from United We Stand?

13 A. Well, Ross, Murphy.

14 Q. Murphy Martin?

15 A. Yes. Tom Marquez. I think Harry McKillop.

16 Q. Was Mr. McKillop a member of the United We Stand
17 staff?

18 A. No, he was a vice president of Braniff. We would
19 rent the planes from Braniff.

20 Q. Was Mr. McKillop in any way detailed to United We
21 Stand in the same way that you were from EDS?

22 A. No, not to my knowledge. At that time Harry was
23 only on those two trips that I recall. He was very
24 instrumental because he knew how to get airplanes in and out
25 of countries in a very quick manner.

1 Q. Was Braniff a supporter of United We Stand, or were
2 they simply hired by the organization?

3 A. Hired. Had to pay for it. It wasn't cheap.

4 Q. I'm sure it wasn't.

5 Okay. So there were 100 to 150 reporters. There
6 were those members of the United We Stand staff --

7 A. Then we had reporters from Asia, too, who were on
8 the ground there. They weren't on the plane, but they were
9 part of it also.

10 Q. Were there any family members on the April 1970
11 trip?

12 A. Yes, we had some wives. Beverly Mims was one.
13 There were four or five wives on there, six wives. I think
14 Carla Peterson was one. But anyway there were four or five
15 wives on there.

16 Q. How did the visit to South Vietnam go? Was that a
17 success?

18 A. Great. I mean, I felt it was. Professionally, I
19 felt it went perfect. You've got to look at what we did. We
20 had planes going all over the country during a war. It was
21 organized. We basically told the South Vietnamese how we
22 wanted to do it, and the South Vietnamese did a crackup job on
23 it. I mean, you could hear the circuits close behind us the
24 way the thing ran. There were no complaints as far as
25 organization.

1 Q. So y'all broke into groups and went to the various
2 prisons?

3 A. Yes. What we did is we sent various groups to
4 various prisons. Perot hit the key ones, if I recall the way
5 it was.

6 Q. Were there any meetings in South Vietnam during this
7 trip between Mr. Perot and the members of your group and any
8 high-level South Vietnamese government officials?

9 A. Yes. I believe he met President Thieu at this time.
10 We had a dinner one night. There were some top military
11 people there, including a Vietnamese admiral I remember,
12 because it was rather rare that we'd meet an admiral.

13 He might have met with Duc. I just don't recall.

14 Q. Were you present at the meeting that Mr. Perot had
15 with President Thieu?

16 A. No. In fact I didn't attend any of those meetings.
17 I had too many other things going every which way at that
18 time.

19 Q. Do you have any idea who else might have been
20 present at the meeting with President Thieu?

21 A. Murphy or Tom might have been. I don't know.

22 Q. When you say Tom, you're referring to Mr. Marquez?

23 A. Tom Marquez, yes.

24 Q. Were there meetings with U.S. Government officials
25 in Saigon?

1 A. I'm sure there were, but most of the meetings --
2 This was one that was pretty well set up. We were organized
3 and ready to go by the time Ross came in. The basic problem
4 was that we didn't have permission for more than 20 reporters
5 to go in these camps, which I remember specifically being
6 quite concerned about because here you had 100 to 150
7 reporters coming in, all thinking they're going to do this.

8 We had received some letters from the Minister of
9 Defense saying that you could only have 20 in there. We just
10 gambled with Ross and said keep coming, we'll get it, no
11 problem.

12 When we got everybody there, I think that's what we
13 did. In order to meet the requirement, we broke up into some
14 various groups so everybody couldn't go to every one. If I
15 recall, we maybe got 40 in a camp or something.

16 We exceeded the number, but it was one of those
17 face-saving things where they agreed and we agreed and we got
18 it done.

19 If I recall, it was basically you're going to have
20 the whole world mad at you if you don't type thing.

21 Q. Was this part of the trip publicized? Were there
22 news reports?

23 A. Yes. It's those same staff; let them go back and
24 look in the reader's guide and track that stuff down. You'll
25 see clippings on it.

1 Q. In other words, even before you all made it to Paris
2 and offered to turn over the film tapes to the North
3 Vietnamese, the stuff had been made public?

4 A. They were telexing home, yes, you bet.

5 Q. Where did the group go from North Vietnam?

6 A. Vientiane, Laos.

7 Q. Again the reason for going to Laos was primarily to
8 film conditions in Royal Lao prison camps?

9 A. Let the press see the condition that the Viet Cong -
10 - or in that case the Pathet Lao and specifically the North
11 Vietnamese were kept in.

12 Q. Were there meetings that were held in Vientiane
13 during the April 1970 trip in addition to visits to the prison
14 camps?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. With whom were meetings held?

17 A. Well, there was another meeting with Soth Pethrasi.
18 There might have been another meeting with Souvanna Phouma, I
19 don't recall. There was probably -- and I don't recall
20 specifically, but I'm sure we had other meetings with the
21 North Vietnamese because we said, "Look, we've got information
22 for you from the south if you want it."

23 We met with the embassy, and this is where we had
24 the meeting with Larry Devlin.

25 Q. Okay. I want to go through all four of those

1 meetings in some more detail, but why don't we start -- Well,
2 let me ask you this. Do you have any recollection as to the
3 order of those meetings?

4 A. No, I don't. I don't.

5 Q. Well, then let's just pick one of them. If at any
6 time while we're talking about these meetings, something
7 refreshes your memory as to the order of them, if you'd just
8 interrupt me and let me know, that might be helpful.

9 A. Okay.

10 Q. Why don't we talk about the meeting with the U.S.
11 Embassy personnel. Now we're talking about in Vientiane in
12 April 1970.

13 A. Okay.

14 Q. Were you present during that meeting?

15 A. You're talking which one? With Devlin?

16 Q. Was there more than one meeting between members of
17 your group and U.S. Embassy personnel in Vientiane, Laos?

18 A. I'm sure there were. I'm sure there was a protocol
19 meeting with Godley. Jim Murphy, definitely I'm sure I had
20 some meetings with him. But I think the specific meeting
21 you're talking about is the night meeting with Devlin.

22 Q. Let's talk about the night meeting. Who was present
23 during that meeting?

24 A. I was. Ross. We might have had some wives in
25 there. I don't know who they would have been, but we might

1 have had some -- because we had the POW wives on this trip
2 with us. I'm sure -- I think that was some of the reason for
3 the meeting is let them have some information on what was
4 going on. But I don't recall who...

5 Q. Do you remember if Murphy Martin was there?

6 A. I don't remember. Murphy might have been. I just
7 don't remember. He might have been in there.

8 Q. How about Mr. McKillop?

9 A. No, I don't think Harry would have been in there.
10 Harry was not a part of the group. Harry was handling the
11 logistics of the airplane. He would have been out making sure
12 that airplane was going to be ready to take off the next
13 morning.

14 Q. Okay. So it was you and Mr. Perot for sure?

15 A. Uh-huh.

16 Q. Maybe Murphy Martin, but you don't remember?

17 A. Uh-huh.

18 Q. And maybe one or more of the POW wives, but you
19 don't remember?

20 A. Yes, I don't recall.

21 Q. Was there anyone else from your group who could have
22 been there?

23 A. Marquez might have been, but I don't recall if he
24 was there or not.

25 Q. Is he more likely to have been there than Mr.

1 McKillop, just in terms of the general role that he was
2 playing?

3 A. Probably, yes. McKillop I know wasn't there. I say
4 that through deduction. His role was such that there would
5 have been no reason for him to be there.

6 Q. Who from the U.S. Embassy in Laos was at this late
7 night meeting?

8 A. Well, I remember Larry Devlin as the embassy
9 official. Jim Murphy might have been there. Again, I don't
10 recall. It was a late night meeting.

11 Q. What was your understanding as Mr. Devlin's
12 position?

13 A. I think he was chief of station there. I mean, you
14 can check that out. I don't know what his position was, and
15 at that time I probably didn't know what his title was.

16 Q. Did you understand that Mr. Devlin was involved in
17 intelligence?

18 A. Yes, I assumed that's what he was involved in, yes.
19 The whole embassy was involved in intelligence in Laos.

20 Q. A little CIA outpost.

21 A. Godley was proconsul. He was more than ambassador.
22 He ran everything from there. I mean, this is where the
23 action in Laos was. Everybody around that place was -- that
24 was their mission.

25 Q. Were you and Mr. Perot aware that Mr. Devlin was the

1 CIA station chief?

2 A. I don't think so. That might have come years later
3 because I probably didn't know what a station chief was at
4 that time. Since I've been in international business for 20
5 years now, going into a lot of these crazy countries that we
6 go into, I understand a little bit more what that is.

7 I can't tell you what time that I came to that
8 realization. That time is foggy. To be real candid, I don't
9 think I could go to a lineup and pick out this Larry Devlin
10 from a lineup. So to say I could pick him out of a crowd...
11 I remember the name. I have a pretty good memory for names.

12 I think I... I just remember the specifics of the
13 meeting, and that's about it.

14 Q. You think that Jim Murphy might have been there, but
15 again you don't recall for sure?

16 A. He might have. I just don't know.

17 Q. Was Ambassador Godley at this meeting?

18 A. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know.

19 Q. You just don't remember?

20 A. I just don't remember. That's right.

21 Q. How did this meeting come about?

22 A. I don't recall that. I don't recall why it
23 happened.

24 Q. Do you remember about what time? You said it was at
25 night?

1 A. I remember it was late at night, and I remember --
2 it was after midnight. We had a party that night, so that's
3 probably the reason why. That night there was a big party for
4 Perot. Vientiane is ... at the drop of the hat they want to
5 have a party at the hotel. So when everybody came in, they
6 put a party on for the reporters.

7 Q. So the party was not at the embassy?

8 A. No.

9 Q. It was at the hotel at which you were staying?

10 A. The Lane Xang Hotel, yeah.

11 Q. Then somehow after that the people you've described
12 were over in the embassy for this meeting?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. Where in the embassy was the meeting held?

15 A. I remember it was a conference room. I don't recall
16 specifically how we got there, but it was a conference room.

17 Q. As you understood it, what was the purpose of this
18 late night meeting?

19 A. It was basically to just brief us on the -- just
20 kind of an update briefing on POW's. I think that was the
21 purpose.

22 Q. Was it limited to Laos, in terms of the information
23 that was provided?

24 A. I don't recall that.

25 Q. Who did the talking for the embassy? Was it Mr.

1 Devlin?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. What type of information did Mr. Devlin tell you
4 about during the meeting?

5 A. Well, here's what I remember specifically today
6 about that meeting. It's relatively little.

7 I remember the number of 27 men. I remember that
8 they were discovered through some form of intelligence in the
9 caves of Sam Nuea, which is an area northeast of Vientiane,
10 big, limestone, Carson-formated caves up near the Vietnamese
11 border, and that they were being held in there.

12 Whatever reason they were being held, I don't
13 remember. But what struck me about that particular meeting
14 was that here was a case where intelligence said here are some
15 men that we know are there, and there was no list on these
16 men.

17 I think that's probably what I came away from that
18 meeting with.

19 Q. You mean, in other words, that this was in direct
20 violation of the Geneva Accords?

21 A. Well, not so much that, but here are some men up
22 there. Maybe they're some MIA's we don't know about. Who are
23 they?

24 Yes, and probably the Geneva Accords, too. But I
25 wasn't thinking in those terms.

1 Q. You mentioned that Mr. Devlin told you all that
2 based on some kind of intelligence these 27 men in the caves
3 had been discovered. Did Mr. Devlin tell you what the source
4 of this information was, in other words, what type of
5 intelligence information it was?

6 A. I don't recall. I don't recall what the source was.
7 He may have. I don't remember. The meeting -- I don't
8 remember how long it went. But we just didn't come in and he
9 said, "There's 27 men," and we walked out. I mean, there was
10 an explanation and we had questions, but I just don't recall.

11 Q. You don't remember whether Mr. Devlin told you that
12 some human being had seen these 27 men or whether someone had
13 intercepted radio broadcasts?

14 A. I don't recall. I don't recall the source of it.

15 Q. Or whether there had been photographic imagery or
16 anything like that?

17 A. I don't recall.

18 Q. How much detail about these 27 people did Mr. Devlin
19 provide? Did he give you names? Did he give you dates of
20 capture, locations of loss?

21 A. I don't recall that. I don't recall that. I don't
22 recall that.

23 Q. Is it that you don't think he gave you that
24 information or you just don't remember if he did or not?

25 A. I just don't remember. It has been a long time ago,

1 and like I say, what I do remember is I remember the number.
2 I remember who he was, and that's -- you know, the only reason
3 I probably remember it is because it has always been in my
4 mind ever since, we know that our government said there were
5 27 people who were captured.

6 And probably the only reason I even think about it
7 after that was that when everybody was out, I think Ernie
8 Brace was the only one who was held in Laos that came out with
9 the group.

10 If that's the case, and there were 27 people in
11 there, then what happened to them? That's the reference which
12 I'm really focusing on.

13 As far as the details of the meetings, I just don't
14 recall.

15 Q. Do you remember whether you or any other members of
16 your group asked Mr. Devlin the types of questions that I'm
17 asking you now to see whether you could probe -- really, in an
18 attempt to find out whether this information was reliable?
19 Did you all ask for details to see how strong the basis for
20 his conclusion was?

21 A. I'm sure we probably did. I'm sure there were some
22 questions asked.

23 Q. Was this a situation again where Mr. Perot was
24 asking the questions and doing the talking for your group?

25 A. Probably, yes.

1 MR. BRYANT: Mr. Meurer, you really ought to give
2 every recollection that you have, but don't just speculate
3 about what might have happened.

4 THE WITNESS: I don't recall. I don't recall is the
5 answer to that.

6 BY MR. KRAVITZ:

7 Q. What was your opinion as of the end of this late
8 night meeting of the reliability or the believability of this
9 information? In other words, did you come away from that
10 meeting believing in your heart that there were 27 men in that
11 cave, or was something different the case?

12 A. Yes. I came away believing that there were 25 white
13 men in that cave, as expressed.

14 Q. Was it 25 or 27?

15 A. 27 I mean. Yeah, 27 white men. That's basically
16 the number and the thought that I went away with.

17 Again, I guess I go back and reference it again
18 later on, just ... you know, that's a number that we were
19 thinking about, knowing about, and what happened to them.

20 Q. You've said the information was that there were 27
21 white men in those caves.

22 A. Uh-huh.

23 Q. Did Mr. Devlin indicate to you, first of all, if he
24 believed that those white men were American POW's; and,
25 second, if he did believe that, what he based that belief on?

1 A. Again, I just don't recall the essence of the
2 conversation. I just don't recall. I'm sorry I can't just
3 give you the specifics and say, "We went in here, did this,
4 did this, did this."

5 Q. We understand. It's a long time ago.

6 Is it fair to say, though, that while you don't
7 recall the specifics of what I'm asking you about, that your
8 understanding when you left that late night meeting was that
9 these were not simply 27 white prisoners, but they were 27
10 American prisoners; or is that not true?

11 A. I vaguely think we concluded they were Americans for
12 some reason. That's what I kept in my mind somehow. I can't
13 tell you why.

14 Q. Was it your understanding, based on what Mr. Devlin
15 told you during that late night meeting that these 27 white
16 prisoners, most likely Americans, were being held by Pathet
17 Lao or by the North Vietnamese army?

18 A. I don't know. I would assume -- I'm dangerously
19 assuming here -- but I'm assuming the Pathet Lao because
20 subsequently I found that Sam Nuea was an important area for
21 the Pathet Lao. That was their whole headquarters up there.

22 Q. So you're assuming they were held by the Pathet Lao,
23 but today you can't remember specifically what Mr. Devlin told
24 you?

25 A. Yeah.

1 Q. During that late night meeting, did Mr. Devlin or
2 anyone else from the U.S. Embassy provide your group with
3 additional information about other American prisoners of war
4 in Laos?

5 A. Not to my -- Do you mean did he say there were
6 other areas that had POW's?

7 Q. Right. Did Mr. Devlin provide any information known
8 to the U.S. Government in Laos about U.S. prisoners in
9 addition to the 27 he told you about in the Sam Nuea caves?

10 A. Not to my knowledge. I don't recall.

11 Q. Let me see if this refreshes your recollection.
12 Another witness has told us that Mr. Devlin informed your
13 group about some isolated sightings of other American
14 prisoners throughout Laos, in addition to the 27 in the cave.
15 Does that sound familiar?

16 A. I don't recall it. It could have happened. I don't
17 recall it. I just can't recall anything.

18 Q. During that late night meeting did Mr. Devlin tell
19 you anything or say anything to your group about the CIA -- or
20 even if he was not identifying his organization as to CIA, but
21 did he say anything about the U.S. Government's ability to
22 track American pilots after the time that they've been shot
23 down and they've ejected from their planes? And if so, did
24 Mr. Devlin give you any idea of the number of pilots who had
25 been tracked by the U.S. Government over the course of the

1 war?

2 A. I don't recall that. I don't recall anything.

3 Q. Do you recall Mr. Devlin saying anything to you or
4 other members of the group about the U.S. Government having
5 tracked in the hundreds -- hundreds of U.S. pilots from the
6 time that they had ejected from planes that were shot down?

7 A. No. I don't recall that.

8 Q. Is that another thing that he could have said and
9 you just don't remember it --

10 A. He could have said it. I just --

11 Q. -- or are you saying he didn't say that?

12 A. No, I just don't remember the meeting that clearly,
13 you know, every item of conversation.

14 Q. Okay. I just want to make sure, it's not your
15 testimony that what I'm talking about was not said. It's
16 simply you don't remember it?

17 A. I just don't recall whether it was or was not.

18 Q. Let me ask you this, and again I understand this is
19 a long time ago. When you left that late night meeting, based
20 on the information that you had received from Mr. Devlin, was
21 it your understanding that the U.S. Government knew about 27
22 live American POW's in Laos, or was it your understanding that
23 the U.S. Government knew about a larger number of U.S. POW's
24 in Laos, a larger number including the 27 in Sam Nuea?

25 A. My understanding was 27. I mean, that's what I came

1 away with was the 27.

2 Q. And that's what the number we knew about was limited
3 to?

4 A. That's what I remember. I remember the number. And
5 why I remember the number, I don't know. I just remember the
6 number. I've probably repeated the story a lot of times in
7 later years, and, you know, it grew that way.

8 I think -- Let me condition the meeting. I'm
9 saying I'm not remembering a lot of things. As well as
10 sitting in this meeting, you know, we were ready to take off
11 the next day going to Paris. I had a lot of organizational
12 things still to do.

13 My mind was probably racing to other things every
14 now and then, too, so that could be a reason. I don't say
15 that it is, but I'm just trying to put things in perspective a
16 little bit, too.

17 Q. Is it possible that you might not even have been in
18 the room for the whole meeting?

19 A. No, no, I'm sure I was in for the whole meeting.

20 Q. There were no 3:00 a.m. calls to the Soviet Union
21 that night?

22 A. No, there were no calls. If I recall, we had to -
23 - I don't remember the schedule now, whether we were going to
24 the camps the next day or we were hooking it back somewhere
25 the next day.

1 Q. Do you recall whether there was a map of Laos in the
2 room that this late night meeting was held in?

3 A. I don't recall.

4 Q. Is it true then that you have no recollection of Mr.
5 Devlin pointing out locations on a map of Laos during his
6 presentation?

7 A. I don't recall that, no. I don't recall that.

8 Q. How if at all did you and your group use the
9 information you had learned from Mr. Devlin during the rest of
10 your trip in April 1970?

11 A. I don't know if we used it for anything. It went
12 into a data bank. Again, we were trying to determine if there
13 were men -- in this whole phase of 1970 were there men who
14 were not known -- I mean, not identified, not on lists. That
15 was one of those -- okay, it's over here in a ledger. These
16 are some people that had been seen, but there's no names to
17 them. There's no North Vietnamese list that says we have
18 these guys.

19 Q. Did you know whether there was an American list
20 which included up to 27 American POW's in Laos at the time?

21 A. No, I didn't know of that.

22 Q. When y'all got back to the U.S. -- and I know I'm
23 skipping a few steps here -- but when you got back to the
24 U.S., was the information learned from Mr. Devlin in this late
25 night meeting related to any U.S. Government officials either

1 at the State Department or at the Defense Department?

2 A. I don't recall. I don't recall.

3 Q. Do you recall whether that information was relayed
4 to anyone in the U.S. Government, either in the United States
5 or in Southeast Asia or anywhere?

6 A. No, I just don't recall.

7 Q. Would there have been any reason not to provide that
8 information?

9 A. I don't think so. On the other hand, I'm sure it
10 was government knowledge.

11 Q. That may or may not be true. The more we look at
12 this, the more we realize that not everybody knew the same
13 things.

14 A. Well, you're talking 22 years ago, too. How you
15 remember...

16 Q. Right. I want to ask you some questions about your
17 meetings with Soth Pethrasi.

18 A. Okay.

19 Q. How many meetings during the April 1970 visit to
20 Vientiane were held with Soth Pethrasi and members of your
21 group?

22 A. I remember one offhand. Again, it's a vague
23 meeting. It was in his villa which was right near the Morning
24 Market. Some wives were in the meeting. I remember that. I
25 think I got some more orange soda, too. He was always good

1 for orange soda.

2 Q. Were you present at this one meeting with Soth
3 Pethrasi in April 1970?

4 A. Yes. Again, I think I was standing against the wall
5 somewhere, but I was there.

6 Q. Was Mr. Perot present?

7 A. Mr. Perot was present.

8 Q. Was Murphy Martin present?

9 A. I think Murphy was there.

10 Q. And you think a few wives?

11 A. I think so.

12 Q. Anyone else from your group?

13 A. We probably had an interpreter. I don't know who it
14 was. It might have been Karen.

15 Q. How about Mr. Marquez?

16 A. Marquez could have been there.

17 MR. BRYANT: Just state what you recall.

18 BY MR. KRAVITZ:

19 Q. In other words, Marquez could have been there, but
20 you're not sure?

21 A. I don't know. Really, to say I'm sure about every
22 one of these, I'm not sure about every one. I just don't know
23 who went in there specifically.

24 Q. Just as long as you tell us what you are certain
25 about and what you're not certain about, so we're all on the

1 same wave length.

2 A. Okay.

3 Q. Who, if anyone, was there in addition to Soth
4 Pethrasi from the Pathet Lao?

5 A. I don't recall.

6 Q. It may have been Soth by himself, plus an
7 interpreter?

8 A. It could have been, yeah.

9 Q. What was the purpose of that meeting, as you
10 understood it?

11 A. Well, I'm sure it was another protocol meeting. It
12 was probably to express a desire to get information on
13 Americans that were held in Laos.

14 Q. Do you know whether the Soth Pethrasi meeting you're
15 describing occurred after your late night meeting at the U.S.
16 Embassy?

17 A. I don't recall the sequence.

18 Q. Maybe it would refresh your memory if you tried to
19 remember whether or not you asked -- "you" meaning you and Mr.
20 Perot and the rest of your group -- asked Soth Pethrasi if you
21 could visit the caves in Sam Nuea. Do you remember if that
22 was discussed?

23 A. I just don't recall. I vaguely recall that
24 conversation coming up with Soth at some point in time, but I
25 don't recall when. It might have been a later trip when I was

1 over there. I don't recall.

2 Q. I'm understanding that you're not sure which trip
3 that conversation came up, but --

4 A. What I say is I vaguely remember we requested to go
5 to Sam Nuea if we could. I had never thought about that until
6 you just mentioned it, quite frankly. But something comes
7 back that we had asked to go up there.

8 Q. What happened when you asked to go to Sam Nuea?

9 A. We were turned down. We didn't go.

10 Q. So there was never any trip to the caves at Sam
11 Nuea?

12 A. No, we didn't go there.

13 Q. What was discussed in addition to just a protocol
14 visit? Did Mr. Pethrasi say anything about U.S. POW's during
15 this meeting in April 1970?

16 A. Well, I recall he was going -- We had asked to get
17 a list in one of those meetings -- asked to get a list. He
18 acquiesced that he was going to get us a list. When we went
19 back to get the list, he reneged on it.

20 Q. What was the list that you were requesting?

21 A. I think it was a list of POW's.

22 Q. U.S. POW's?

23 A. Yes, in Laos.

24 Q. In Laos specifically?

25 A. In Laos, yes.

1 Q. Do you recall whether that was limited to U.S. POW's
2 in Laos held by the Pathet Lao, or was it all U.S. POW's in
3 Laos regardless of who was holding them?

4 A. I just don't know. I don't know the specifics on
5 that.

6 Q. Okay. During any of your conversations with Soth
7 Pethrasi in April 1970, did Mr. Pethrasi give any indication
8 as to the number of U.S. prisoners of war held in Laos?

9 A. Not to my knowledge. I think I would have
10 remembered that. To my knowledge, no.

11 Q. Is it fair to assume from the fact that Mr. Pethrasi
12 promised to provide a list of U.S. POW's, that Mr. Pethrasi
13 conceded that there were in fact U.S. POW's in Laos?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. During any of your conversations or meetings with
16 Soth Pethrasi in April 1970, did Soth Pethrasi ever deny that
17 there were U.S. prisoners of war being held in Laos?

18 A. I don't recall him ever saying.

19 Q. At any time have you ever had a conversation with
20 Soth Pethrasi in which Soth Pethrasi denied that the Pathet
21 Lao held U.S. prisoners of war? Again, I mean to include even
22 the post Operation Homecoming period, if you ever talked to
23 him at that point.

24 A. I just don't recall. I don't recall at all. You're
25 getting to some real specific questions that I just -- you

1 know, my mind just doesn't pull it out.

2 Q. That's okay. If you can help us, you can help us.
3 If you can't --

4 A. Well, I'm sorry, I'm not trying to be evasive.
5 There are some points that I just don't remember.

6 Q. The reason I'm asking those questions is -- you may
7 not be aware of it, but Soth Pethrasi has made a tremendous
8 number of inconsistent statements on this subject over the
9 course of time. His statements before Operation Homecoming
10 were vastly different than his statements after Operation
11 Homecoming.

12 A. Is he still alive?

13 Q. I don't know the answer to that. I should know the
14 answer.

15 I just thought that he had made additional
16 statements to you or others in your group.

17 A. I just don't recall. There was a period we had a
18 lot of meetings with him over 12 months, 18 months, 2 years,
19 whatever it was, in and out. But I just don't recall anything
20 like that.

21 MR. KRAVITZ: Can we go off the record for one
22 second.

23 (Discussion off the record.)

24 MR. KRAVITZ: Back on the record.

25 BY MR. KRAVITZ:

1 Q. During any of the meetings in Vientiane, Laos, in
2 April 1970 that you had with Soth Pethraṣi, the North
3 Vietnamese or any additional meetings with the U.S. Embassy,
4 did you learn any information about U.S. POW's in Laos, in
5 addition to the information that you learned during the late
6 night meeting in the U.S. Embassy?

7 A. No, not to my knowledge.

8 Q. You mentioned that at some point after you received
9 the information about the 27 men in the Sam Nuea caves, there
10 was a request made to Soth Pethrasi for members of your team
11 to go to the caves, and that that request was denied.

12 Do you remember if your group took any other action
13 or attempted to take any other action regarding those 27 men?

14 A. No. To say that we were going to storm up there,
15 no, directly related to those 27 men, no. I just can't recall
16 anything.

17 Q. I understand your answer to mean that you're not
18 saying nothing was done, you just don't recall?

19 A. I don't recall anything, right.

20 Q. Where did you go from Vientiane in April 1970?

21 A. We went on to Paris.

22 Q. And what happened in Paris?

23 A. If I recall, we had a meeting with the ambassador
24 there. He just died here the other day.

25 Q. Habib?

1 A. Philip Habib.

2 He kind of briefed us on things. We tried, I think,
3 to meet with the North Vietnamese. I don't remember if we did
4 or not.

5 We, I think, held a press conference out there that
6 we had tapes and stuff we wanted to present to them. If I
7 recall, they just didn't accept them; and we turned around and
8 came back to Dallas.

9 Q. Was the quality of the treatment of the prisoners in
10 the Royal Lao prisoner camps as good as the quality of the
11 treatment in the South Vietnamese prisoner camps?

12 A. It wasn't as disciplined, but the quality was good.
13 They looked like they had adequate food. I had gone to those
14 camps several times and in fact at one point even brought some
15 soccer balls and stuff in for them. The guards said, "Fine.
16 Let them play with them."

17 That particular camp was basically almost a prison.
18 They had some other people in there, as well as the North
19 Vietnamese prisoners.

20 Q. You went back to Dallas after that?

21 A. Uh-huh.

22 Q. If you could just describe briefly what United We
23 Stand did on behalf of POW's, what were the focuses, what were
24 the thrusts in terms of POW issues.

25 A. I think it was the one that really got the issue

1 rolling to the point where I think the American people became
2 incensed -- in some degree, people of the world became
3 incensed about the treatment of the men over there.

4 Q. You're referring to the April trip?

5 A. I'm talking about what United We Stand -- Your
6 question was what United We Stand felt we did. These
7 components, like those trips, were just little portions of an
8 overall grandiose scheme.

9 The scheme itself was to try the North Vietnamese in
10 the court of world opinion. You had just a rolling mass of
11 movement that began in the fall of '69 and moved on through
12 1972.

13 So it was a giant movement. It was a starter and
14 then a catalyst to keep it going. Then you had a lot of
15 groups doing this, and you had a lot of activities. When the
16 men got out -- just to give you an idea -- I think it was
17 successful.

18 The senior officers came down to see Ross from -- I
19 think they were up at Sheppard, if I recall, when some of them
20 were being cleared through -- came down to Dallas to see Ross
21 and basically personally wanted to thank him for his
22 activities.

23 Q. Were there any additional trips to Southeast Asia or
24 France or anywhere related to this issue between April 1970
25 and Operation Homecoming in January/February/March of 1973?

1 A. Yes. We were following up on things. We were going
2 to the morgues and trying to find pictures. Basically we'd
3 get a tip on something and try to see if we could follow
4 through on it. It was that type of thing.

5 Q. Were there any additional trips to Laos or Vietnam?

6 A. I don't think there were any more to Vietnam. Laos
7 there was. I don't recall any trips after '70 to Vietnam. I
8 don't think we had any in '70, '71.

9 Q. During any of the subsequent trips to Laos, were
10 there any more meetings with embassy personnel, such as Mr.
11 Devlin or perhaps any of his successors?

12 A. No, I didn't meet with him again.

13 Q. In any of your work for United We Stand between the
14 time of the trip in April 1970 and Operation Homecoming in the
15 spring of 1973, did you or your group, as far as you're aware,
16 learn any additional information regarding the existence of
17 live U.S. POW's in Laos?

18 A. By names, no. Ron Dodge was a thing. We had some
19 information on Garwood; I forget how we got it. But that was
20 known by the government.

21 We had information -- and I'm sure it was debriefed
22 -- two Germans that came out, Monica -- I forget the names
23 right now. But they had walked up from South Vietnam into
24 North Vietnam. I recall that it took them several months
25 before they got them up to North Vietnam.

1 I remember them telling me that they had -- one of
2 the VC camps, one night there were two blacks who were in
3 pajamas and spoke with an American accent who were running
4 with the VC. I don't know if those guys ever came out or
5 they're still over there, if they turned or what.

6 But those are -- We didn't have any names, but it
7 was just sightings by these two people.

8 On one of the trips I went up on the Plain of Jars
9 to interview refugees with a priest and Pop Bugle who was an
10 organizer over there for the government. When the people were
11 coming off the trail, they were flooding into that part of the
12 Plain of Jars, and there was a refugee camp set up. We were
13 interviewing some of these refugees to see if they saw
14 Americans.

15 We were doing stuff like that. But, you know,
16 you're a blonde, you're a blonde, you're a blonde, I'm a
17 blonde. It was just difficult -- you know, we got no
18 substance out of that.

19 We talked to a lot of people. They said yes, we saw
20 people such-and-such, but there was no way you could
21 coordinate that or anything.

22 Q. What about after Operation Homecoming in the spring
23 of 1973? What POW-related activities did United We Stand get
24 involved in? You told me you were with the organization until
25 1974 or '5.

1 A. Yeah, but --

2 Q. And you were the president at that point?

3 A. Yes, but by that time it had really phased down.
4 The real hundred percent stuff was '69 and '70. '71 I think
5 there were some activities. People were doing things and we
6 were supporting them.

7 One group wanted to take all this mail and take it
8 to Paris and was a brother of one of the POW's. We helped
9 them do that. There were things like that that were going on.

10 There were no more trips, massive publicity trips
11 because they weren't needed.

12 In April '73 Ross put on a giant party for the POW's
13 in San Francisco. I organized it. It was a world class
14 event. It had John Wayne there and Clint Eastwood.

15 When the senior officers came back, one of them
16 asked -- when they were talking to Ross, they said, "One thing
17 we would like to do is personally shake the hands of every one
18 of those Son Tay Raiders that went into the camps."

19 Ross said, "Well, I'll do you one better than that.
20 Why don't you have a party and you can meet them all. You
21 decide where you want it and let us know."

22 They talked together and called us back about a week
23 later and said, "How about San Francisco?"

24 Ross said fine. He said, "Go out and organize it."

25 Clements was the Deputy Secretary of Defense at the

1 time. Ross called him and said, "Can we get the names of
2 where these Rangers and Green Berets are? I'll pay for
3 everything, hotel suites, everything for them. I'd also like
4 to know where the POW's are who were in the Son Tay camp." He
5 identified all of those, and the senior officers, maybe 150
6 people, wives and everybody. 300 maybe with wives. I forget
7 what the number was.

8 It was an interesting event because they all
9 converged on San Francisco. Ross called Tack Schreiber who
10 was the head of Universal Studios and said, "Can you get me
11 some movie stars for it."

12 So he sends up John Wayne, Clint Eastwood and the
13 Andrews Sisters and Red Skelton. We had lunches and dinners
14 and had an assortment of activities for them.

15 Ross was very insistent that the lower the rank the
16 better the room. So the lowest ranks got the suites, and the
17 highest ranks got the one rooms. Half of these guys were on
18 single tour, and they were up on the trail in Laos, even in
19 '73. We pulled a lot of those guys out of Laos, got them back
20 to Bangkok, put them on airplanes, got them to San Francisco,
21 they spent a long week in San Francisco, went right back to
22 Laos, and their wives were in Fayetteville, North Carolina and
23 they came out to meet them in San Francisco. Of course, we
24 never saw them. They stayed in their suite the whole time.

25 But I think they really, really enjoyed it. I

1 remember John Wayne was a real hit. This was what a great guy
2 Wayne was. He did his thing at lunch. Then that night -- he
3 could have gone back to LA, but he wanted to be with these
4 guys and he went to the party that night and then took a bunch
5 of them out on the town drinking that night.

6 The next morning I came down -- We were at the
7 Fairmont in San Francisco. I went down to the restaurant; it
8 was a Mexican restaurant at that time. They were all sitting
9 in there, just three sheets to the wind.

10 Wayne just basically drunk them under the table.
11 They were talking about how they had gone out and hit the bars
12 with him. I always think about those guys going back to Laos
13 and Bangkok the next day. When they're asked what they did on
14 the weekend, "Oh, I got drunk with John Wayne."

15 Q. In light of the information that you had received
16 from Mr. Devlin about the 27 white POW's in the caves near Sam
17 Nuea, and in light of your realization that Mr. Brace was the
18 only POW held in Laos --

19 A. That's what I recall. I hadn't focused on it, but I
20 just remember that Ernie Brace is one that I recall.

21 Q. In light of those two possibly contradictory pieces
22 of information, what was your -- and perhaps in light of other
23 information that you had, what was your opinion as to the
24 completeness of the repatriation of U.S. prisoners of war
25 during Operation Homecoming?

1 A. I had no real reason to hang something that said
2 there was somebody alive when everybody got out. I had no
3 reason to hang something that said everybody was dead when
4 they got out, other than there were sightings that were not
5 accounted for.

6 There was Ron Dodge who was not accounted for.
7 There were some other people who were not accounted for. So
8 the question was, what happened to them. Were they summarily
9 executed? Were they held in some deep dark cave somewhere? I
10 don't know.

11 Actuarially if you take a look -- I remember this is a
12 figure Shields used. I'm quoting Shields. It was basically
13 actuarially if you take all the number of men that flew
14 airplanes and then applied a certain formula to the number of
15 people that jumped out.

16 Then you've got to go through the canopies and if
17 you get out of there, you hit the bamboo at the bottom. Then
18 you've got to get down the trail before somebody gets you.

19 If you work all those numbers out, the number that
20 came out was pretty close actuarially. That's what Shields was
21 saying.

22 I don't know. I always recall a meeting I had with
23 a guy in Hong Kong, though. That meeting was with a man named
24 John Teonmu. He was head of security for C. Y. Tong who was a
25 shipbuilder out of Hong Kong.

1 But prior to that, before his retirement he was one
2 of Chiang Kai-Shek's top security people. I think his job was
3 to run over, grab some soldiers and try to bring them back and
4 get information.

5 But I was in Hong Kong with him and I just sat down
6 and talked to him about the American POW experience. I said,
7 "What do you think of this?" This was in '73.

8 I said, "What do you think of this?"

9 He said, "Mr. Meurer, I know nothing about the
10 American experience of POW's in Vietnam, but I do know the
11 Asian Marxist mind. I can tell you that they will hold some
12 back, and they will keep them as an asset. You will never
13 know they have them. When they cease becoming an asset, they
14 will kill them and you'll never know they killed them."

15 Those words have always stuck in my mind. To say
16 that I say there's somebody there because of that reason, I
17 have no information on that at all. But I always think about
18 that statement that John Teonmu told me.

19 Q. Along those same lines, it sounds as if as of the
20 spring of 1973 you really did not have a strong opinion one
21 way or the other as to whether all of our live POW's in
22 Southeast Asia had been returned; is that accurate?

23 A. I think that's accurate, yes.

24 Q. Based on statements or conversations that you may
25 have had with Mr. Perot, are you aware of what Mr. Perot's

1 opinion was as of the spring of 1973 over the completeness of
2 the U.S. prisoner return?

3 A. I don't recall sitting down and talking with Ross
4 about it. To say that I didn't have an opinion one way or the
5 other, I don't think that's an accurate way to phrase it, if I
6 can go back to that earlier statement.

7 Q. Please.

8 A. I just think -- I formulated some ideas as the year
9 went on. I think I felt they might have some, but I don't
10 know it. I think that was my opinion at that time.

11 Then I started to play the little game of politics,
12 why would they keep them. I always go back and say, why does
13 somebody do something. People have interests, not friends.
14 You go to what the interest is, and it unlocks the secret.

15 Then you start reading that maybe Nixon had a deal
16 where he was going to give some aid if we had that thing.
17 Maybe the Vietnamese held some back, you know. You can build
18 stories like that.

19 I think that's where my mind was racing probably '73
20 and '74. Then by '74 -- In '75 I was doing other things.

21 Q. When you left your position as president of United
22 We Stand, that was late '74 you say?

23 A. Well, I think United We Stand was still engaged; it
24 just wasn't active. I think I carried the title because
25 somebody had to have the title and sign papers each year.

1 Q. Were you back at EDS most of the time?

2 A. Yes, I was back in Ross's shop at that time.

3 Q. In other words, from approximately Operation
4 Homecoming on you were back most of the time?

5 A. Well, I would say that from the office of United We
6 Stand, we probably physically -- when Murphy left, I think we
7 pretty well closed that office down as far as the space.

8 Q. That was the fall of '72?

9 A. Yeah. Then I was just kind of a titular head
10 because somebody needed to -- you know, we would do these
11 little things over here, and then we would flare up on
12 something and then back down again.

13 Q. Then in 1975 you left EDS to go to Hunt Oil Company?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. Since the time that you left EDS in 1975, have you
16 had any direct involvement with POW issue?

17 A. No, not in any way where -- you know, hunting for
18 them or anything like that. I've had involvement because I
19 have POW's who are friends. I've gone to some parties. I've
20 attended some of the conventions, you know, the annual
21 conventions in Las Vegas and Austin, stuff like that.

22 Q. Have you made any kind of relationship with Mr.
23 Perot since 1975?

24 A. Yes.

25 MR. KRAVITZ: Let's go off the record.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

(Whereupon, at 5:40 p.m. the taking of the instant deposition was suspended.)

THOMAS E. MEURER

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _____ day
of _____, 19____.

NOTARY PUBLIC


My Commission expires: _____.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

C E R T I F I C A T E

I hereby certify that the transcript contained herein is a full and accurate transcript of the notes taken by me at the deposition of MURPHY MARTIN conducted by the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, on June 24, 1992, in Dallas, Texas, to the best of my knowledge and belief.

DATED this 26th day of June 1992.



Betty Morgan

Betty Morgan, Reporter

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

COMMITTEE SENSITIVE
DEPOSITION OF THOMAS E. MEURER

Tuesday, June 30, 1992

U.S. Senate
Select Committee on POW/MIA
Affairs
Dallas, Texas

Continued deposition of THOMAS E. MEURER, the witness herein, called for examination by counsel for the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, pursuant to notice, Suite 1700, Lakeside Square Building, 12377 Merit, Dallas, Texas, commencing at 9:25 a.m., on Tuesday, June 30, 1992, before Betty Morgan, a Notary Public and Certified Shorthand Reporter in and for the State of Texas, and the proceedings being taken down by Stenomask by her and transcribed by her or under her direction.

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W.
SUITE 400
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005
(202) 289-2260
(800) FOR DEPO

1 APPEARANCES:

2

3 On behalf of the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs:

4 J. WILLIAM CODINHA, ESQ.

5 Chief Counsel for the Committee

6 NEAL KRAVITZ, ESQ.

7 Investigative Attorney for the Committee

8

9 On behalf of the witness, THOMAS E. MEURER:

10 DAVID BRYANT, ESQ.

11 5001 Spring Valley Road

12 Suite 1075 West

13 Dallas, Texas 75244

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W.
SUITE 400
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005
(202) 289-2260
(800) FOR DEPO

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

C O N T E N T S

THE WITNESS	EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR	
THOMAS E. MEURER	SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS	
By Mr. Kravitz		110

E X H I B I T S

MEURER EXHIBIT NO.	PAGE
(None)	

1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2 Whereupon,

3

THOMAS E. MEURER,

4

the witness herein, was called for examination by counsel for
5 the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs and, having been
6 previously duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and
7 testified as follows:

8

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR

9

THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

10

BY MR. KRAVITZ:

11

Q. Mr. Meurer, thank you for coming back again today.

12

Again, we apologize for being late.

13

Let me just start by asking you if there's anything,
14 now that there has been a week or so since the last time we
15 were together, if there's anything you said at the last
16 deposition that you'd like to add to or change in any way?

17

A. I can't think of anything.

18

MR. BRYANT: Of course, Mr. Meurer has not yet had a
19 chance to look at the transcript, but he can answer that based
20 on what he recalls.

21

BY MR. KRAVITZ:

22

Q. Obviously, when the entire transcript is prepared,
23 we understand that you've already recorded your right to
24 review the transcript.

25

When we finished last week, you had just been

1 telling us about the trip to Southeast Asia in April 1970. We
2 had gone into some detail in particular about the meetings
3 that were held in Vientiane, Laos, during that trip.

4 I want to ask you about the period of time following
5 that trip. I think you told us last week that you remained as
6 an officer with United We Stand until 1974 or 1975?

7 A. Yes. I don't remember exactly when, but it was
8 beyond the period of 1972.

9 Q. You remained vice president of United We Stand until
10 sometime in 1972 --

11 A. Until Murphy left.

12 Q. -- and then you became president?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. What types of activities were you involved in as the
15 vice president and then as the president of United We Stand
16 between the end of April 1970 and 1974 or 1975, whenever it
17 was that you left that organization?

18 A. A lot of it was organizing activities. There were a
19 couple of other events that happened either after that trip or
20 before the trip. The time factor is kind of milky.

21 One of them, Ross spoke before Congress sometime in
22 the first or second quarter of 1970 and in essence had --this
23 was a subcommittee, I think on POW affairs at the time --
24 Blanky, I think, was the chairman if I recall -- and in
25 essence had listed some things that he thought the Congress

1 should do. Two of those I remember specifically.

2 One was to sign a resolution and send it to the
3 North Vietnamese, basically trying to get them to improve the
4 treatment of the American POW's and account for POW's and
5 MIA's.

6 I remember that Senator Bob Dole and Birch Bayh took
7 the lead on that. I went out and worked with them trying to
8 pull that all together and get a resolution put through the
9 House and the Senate.

10 Another program was Senator Dole had a program that
11 he put on that I helped him organize. It was basically a
12 rally that he put on, again in Washington, trying to bring the
13 issue forth.

14 A third thing was putting some cages and cells in
15 the rotunda of the Congress, which was one of the things Ross
16 asked for and then really put a lot of -- I think we all tried
17 to put a lot of pressure or appealed to a lot of people to get
18 that in there.

19 Speaker McCormick was receptive and was very
20 helpful. We had a decorator here in Dallas by the name of
21 Peter Wolf design these. We used Bob Frishman and I think
22 Nick Roe -- one escapee and one former POW -- and I think Doug
23 Hegdahl, to help design these things, replicas of the cells
24 that they were in.

25 Those cells were put in the rotunda. In that summer

1 you had thousands of people going through the Congress. I
2 think it really brought a lot of attention to the plight of
3 the men.

4 It was things like that that would really bring out
5 what the problem was.

6 Q. Were there additional trips to Southeast Asia or to
7 Paris?

8 A. Yes. We sent additional wives over to Paris. If I
9 recall, we sponsored some individuals going over. I think Bob
10 Frishman's brother was one -- No, wait, I'm sorry. It might
11 have been John McCain's brother, Senator McCain's brother, if
12 I recall.

13 He pulled together -- We might have had a lot of
14 letters that were sent to Paris. It might have been John
15 McCain's brother that spearheaded that. I don't recall.

16 But I remember we had his brother doing some things.
17 His brother was kind of a different ilk than the Senator at
18 that time and really, I think, was very supportive. Of
19 course, his father was CINCPAC at that time.

20 But there were wives that were sent to Paris. Again
21 at that time, as I mentioned the other day, there were points
22 where we went overseas to look in the morgues for information.
23 Murphy has spent quite a bit of time in Paris.

24 MR. BRYANT: Photo morgues?

25 THE WITNESS: Photo morgues, those type of morgues.

1 Newspaper morgues.

2 BY MR. KRAVITZ:

3 Q. Did you make additional trips to Southeast Asia?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. How many trips did you make between April 1970 and
6 the time that the peace agreement was signed in January of
7 1973?

8 MR. BRYANT: Neal, the question is about Mr. Meurer
9 personally?

10 MR. KRAVITZ: Yes, at this point.

11 THE WITNESS: I don't recall the number, but it was
12 several trips.

13 BY MR. KRAVITZ:

14 Q. Can you give your best approximation?

15 A. Oh, probably two or three, maybe four.

16 Q. Did Mr. Perot go on any of those trips?

17 A. To Vietnam or Laos?

18 Q. Any of those trips to Southeast Asia between April
19 1970 and January of 1973.

20 A. We took one in July of '71, but it was a very brief
21 trip. Actually we went around the world. Ross, Jr., Nancy,
22 Margo, Ross and myself. What Ross really wanted to do was
23 just basically see the great civilizations. It was a
24 vacation; it wasn't anything other than that.

25 But in the process of that, we went into Vientiane

1 so that he could show Margo and Ross and Nancy what it looked
2 like in there. We were in Bangkok, but I think it was a day
3 in and a day out, so it was a very quick trip

4 Q. That was in July of 1971?

5 A. I believe it was July of '71.

6 Q. During your stay in Vientiane in July of 1971, did
7 you or Mr. Perot have any meetings with any government
8 officials of any nation?

9 A. I don't recall. I honestly don't recall, Neal. If
10 we did, it was a courtesy call and it was very brief. In
11 fact, I don't think we even stayed overnight. I think we went
12 in that morning and went back out that afternoon, if I recall.

13 Q. So is it accurate to say that during the July 1971
14 visit to Vientiane, Laos, neither you nor Mr. Perot obtained
15 any additional information about POW's?

16 A. Yes, I think it would be accurate to say that.

17 Q. Do you know whether Mr. Perot went on any other
18 trips to Southeast Asia between April 1970 and January 1973,
19 in addition to the trip you've just been talking about in July
20 1971?

21 A. Yes, but again it wasn't -- it was Hong Kong. It
22 was 1973.

23 Q. Do you know when in 1973?

24 A. I was with him, my wife and I with he and Margo. It
25 was probably June or July of '73. Maybe August. But it was

1 in the summer.

2 Q. So that was after the peace agreement was signed?

3 A. After the peace agreement was signed.

4 Q. And after Operation Homecoming was completed?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. What was the purpose of the trip in the summer of
7 1973 to Hong Kong?

8 A. C. Y. Tung, who was the largest shipbuilder in Hong
9 Kong, was looking for financing for some deals. At a party in
10 New York I recall he had told Margo the next VLCC that we
11 build, I will invite you to launch it. 5 months later the
12 invitation came to launch the -- I think it was --Energy
13 Transmission I think was the name of the boat and it was a
14 VLCC.

15 So we went to Osaka and launched the thing there.
16 We were guests of C. T. Tung and then on to Hong Kong for
17 about a week as his guests. Then Ross and Margo and Sharon
18 went on to London.

19 Did I tell you the other day the story about reading
20 THE WINDS OF WAR?

21 Q. No.

22 A. This was the trip where I told Ross it was going to
23 be an 8-hour trip. I was wrong, it was a 17-hour trip. For
24 some reason I thought it was an 8-hour trip.

25 Well, Ross is pretty organized and he generally has

1 his work ready to go for 8 hours. For 9 hours of the trip,
2 there was nothing to do. There was still another 8 hours to
3 go.

4 Sharon said it was the funniest thing she had ever
5 seen because Margo had been reading THE WINDS OF WAR. She had
6 brought the book, and she had about that much (indicating)
7 read.

8 So Ross decided, well, I guess the only thing I've
9 got is WINDS OF WAR. So he started reading. She ripped off
10 that corner of THE WINDS OF WAR, and he started reading that.
11 He's a faster reader than Margo.

12 Sharon said toward the end of the trip, it was,
13 "Hurry up. Finish the page, Margo." She'd finish the page,
14 hand it to Ross to read.

15 But, anyway, the purpose of that trip was basically
16 one to do the ship.

17 This is the one where I had mentioned John Teonumu.
18 That's where I met him in Hong Kong on the trip.

19 Q. Were any POW or MIA matters addressed in any way
20 during that trip during the summer of 1973?

21 MR. BRYANT: Are you asking about Ross or both of
22 them?

23 MR. KRAVITZ: By anyone on the trip?

24 MR. BRYANT: Do you mean meetings or discussions?

25 BY MR. KRAVITZ:

1 that I had met in there sometime back.

2 Q. This was in July of 1973?

3 A. The summer of 1973.

4 Q. During your trip to Laos in the summer of 1973, did
5 you meet with any U.S. Embassy officials?

6 A. I might have. It might have been Jim Murphy who was
7 still there; I just don't recall specifically. But generally
8 -- I knew Jim pretty well, and if he was still there, I
9 probably met with him. I might have met with Godley, too; I
10 just don't recall.

11 Q. You testified last week that during a meeting that
12 you had in the U.S. Embassy in April of 1970, you were told by
13 U.S. Embassy officials that there were American prisoners of
14 war in Laos; is that right?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Indeed, the number that you were told about was, I
17 think you said 27 --

18 A. 27.

19 Q. -- which you certainly understood by the summer of
20 1973 to be a larger number than the number that returned from
21 Laos during Operation Homecoming; is that right?

22 A. That's right.

23 Q. Wouldn't it have made sense to go check with the
24 same sources in the U.S. Embassy to find out what they
25 thought?

1 A. It probably would have, but I didn't.

2 Q. Why not?

3 A. I don't know. Maybe he wasn't there at the time.
4 This is Devlin. Maybe he was not there. I don't know why,
5 but I did not go back to that source.

6 Q. Do you recall whether you went back and spoke with
7 Ambassador Godley?

8 A. I could have because generally any time I was in
9 town I did go over and see the ambassador. It was more of a
10 courtesy call, or if we were coming in to organize something,
11 like those two plane trips, then it was basically to let him
12 know what numbers we had and what our schedule was, and
13 basically from a courtesy standpoint to let him know what we
14 were doing or get permission of the Lao.

15 Q. You also testified last week that you had had
16 several meetings with Soth Pethrasi in 1970.

17 A. Uh-huh.

18 Q. Did you make any attempt to contact Mr. Pethrasi
19 during your trip to Laos in the summer of 1973?

20 A. I might have. Again, I just don't recall. I might
21 have tried the North Vietnamese, but I just don't recall
22 specifically. There were a lot of people that I knew in there
23 at that time. Literally, it was just going around and asking
24 people.

25 I think I probably relied more on the AID people as

1 Q. Were there meetings? Were there statements made?

2 A. Yes. I went to Laos after that Hong Kong trip and
3 was in there ... oh, probably maybe 5 days, 6 days, something
4 like that.

5 Q. Who did you go with?

6 A. By myself.

7 Q. What was the purpose of that trip?

8 A. In essence to see if there was anybody left in
9 there, just to talk to a few people around and say, "Is there
10 any evidence that people may still be there?"

11 Q. Who did you meet with?

12 A. Oh, probably somebody at the embassy to ask them.

13 There were some priests in there that --

14 Q. In where, in the U.S. Embassy?

15 A. In Vientiane. One was a Father Buchard. Another
16 was a Father Minger. Both had parishes there.

17 I think Jigs Weldon who was an AID doctor with USAID
18 -- it might have been Pop Bugle at that time who was an
19 organizer of a lot of the people coming out of the trail area
20 up into the Plain of Jars.

21 It was basically going through those people and
22 saying, "What do you think? Do you think there are people
23 left?" It might even have been some Laotian people. I don't
24 recall specifically.

25 But it literally was basically checking with people

1 much as anything because those people were up country.
2 Probably a lot more on the Continental Air Service and the Air
3 America people, those are the people that were up country.

4 And Larry Joseph. There were several others there
5 in the pilots.

6 Q. To the best of your recollection, please tell us
7 what each person you spoke with about the subject of whether
8 there were U.S. POW's remaining in Laos told you in response
9 to your questions; and to the best of your recollection,
10 please tell us what the basis of each person's answer was
11 relayed to you as.

12 MR. BRYANT: This is all in this one visit in the
13 summer of '73?

14 MR. KRAVITZ: Yes, sir.

15 THE WITNESS: Well, I think I came away with the
16 general consensus that there was no hard evidence of living
17 Americans there. I think when I say that -- Because had I
18 had any other thing, we would have pursued it probably a lot
19 more if I had had it right there.

20 Now, that's not to say that these people who I
21 talked to didn't believe that there was still some people. I
22 think Jigs Weldon -- this is the USAID doctor -- I think
23 probably felt that there were people. But there was no real
24 evidence to say they had it.

25 Basically, I think the evidence we had was that

1 there were sightings up in those caves. I mean, that was
2 pretty substantial when the Government tells you they're
3 there.

4 BY MR. KRAVITZ:

5 Q. You're referring to the information you received in
6 1970?

7 A. From Devlin, yeah.

8 Q. Didn't you tell us last week that you didn't know
9 what the source of that information was?

10 A. No, I don't know what the source was.

11 Q. So you don't know that there were sightings?

12 A. Well, basically he said they were there, so I'm
13 assuming that's sightings. I mean, he gave a number that I
14 specifically remember. I'm assuming that's a sighting of some
15 kind.

16 Q. But you don't recall whether Mr. Devlin told you
17 that his information about 27 POW's in the caves was based on
18 human sightings of people --

19 A. I don't recall.

20 Q. -- or whether it was on interceptions --

21 A. No, again, I don't recall.

22 Q. -- of broadcast information?

23 A. No.

24 Q. So to a certain extent it's speculation on your part
25 that there were sightings even in the caves in Xam Nuea back

1 in 1970?

2 A. Well, I don't consider it speculation when he says
3 the number 27 people have been seen in these caves.

4 Q. Your recollection now is you were told in April 1970
5 that 27 U.S. POW's were actually seen in these caves?

6 A. Seen in these caves, yeah. That's what I recall of
7 the conversation. Now again, I want to caveat this by saying
8 that's what I recall. It's a long time ago, (a).

9 And, (b), I had a lot of other things going on at
10 that same time, so I was thinking about a lot of other things
11 in my mind. We had to hook it on to Paris the next day and do
12 a bunch of other things.

13 That's as clear as I can come through. The thing
14 that hit me was the number in the caves.

15 Q. So although you don't recall precisely what Mr.
16 Devlin stated as the basis or the source of this information
17 back in April 1970, you would agree that if he in fact said
18 that 27 U.S. POW's had been seen in the caves, that would
19 certainly indicate that it was more likely that it was a live
20 sighting rather than a radio broadcast intercept or something
21 of that nature?

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. Going back to the trip in 1973, you said that there
24 no hard evidence -- or at least your sense was that there was
25 no hard evidence of whether any live U.S. POW's were remaining

1 in Laos.

2 A. And I qualify that by saying that I did not talk to
3 anybody who said, "We saw somebody up here at X."

4 Q. But several people you spoke with told you that they
5 believed that there were live POW's?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Who were all those people who told you that that was
8 their belief?

9 A. Well, I think it wasn't so much that they were
10 alive, as they basically said they didn't think they all came
11 out. I think Jigs probably mentioned that. I can't remember
12 specifics of the conversation, but to the point where I think
13 he felt that there was still possibly some people up in the
14 villages somewhere.

15 Again, in talking to people -- and this was not
16 particular -- You know, that was one point in time -- and I
17 really kind of take all of this in a broader sense -- but I
18 think that was one individual that we had talked to who felt
19 that a lot of people were probably summarily executed, a lot
20 of Americans.

21 Q. Who was that?

22 A. This was a guy by the name of Jean Kadu. Jean was
23 an Eurasian that I met over there. I just recall that his
24 basic opinion was that there probably were a lot of them that
25 were captured up there. The villagers didn't particularly

1 want the North Vietnamese to come in -- the patrols to come in
2 and harass them, so they would just get rid of the prisoners.

3 That's not to say they got rid of all of them, but
4 there was evidence that people were picked up, in the
5 panhandle at some point in time.

6 I go back to the point I made the other day on
7 Monica Schwinn -- I remembered her name this weekend, Schwinn
8 -- who was the nurse and her comment about the two blacks when
9 she was in the camp. When they came through, they spoke
10 American English. They were wearing VC pajamas. That's a
11 pretty good sighting right there of people that haven't come
12 out.

13 We had some information on Garwood -- I can't recall
14 how -- but somebody had said there was somebody still in
15 there. I recall the name was Garwood. He came out 4 years
16 later or something like that.

17 The John Teonomu thing, you know, that's not saying
18 there's somebody there, but here's a guy who thinks in that
19 mold. His basic comment was one that really stuck with me,
20 the one I told you the other day. That is, they're going to
21 hold some back as an asset; and they're going to keep them as
22 an asset until they cease having value. They'll get rid of
23 them, and you'll never know they even had them or got rid of
24 them.

25 That thing has always stuck in my mind. But to say

1 there was somebody up in Point A or Point B, I can't say that.

2 Q. Did you make any attempts to go to Xam Nuea and try
3 to visit the caves?

4 A. No. That was still under Pathet Lao control. One
5 trip we went into Pakxe and talked to refugees. I went up on
6 the Plain of Jars one or two times, again talking to refugees,
7 interviewing refugees. I mean, that was one thing I was doing
8 over there, trying to determine if they had seen anybody. I
9 spent some time with Pop Bugle, and this is where I met Jigs
10 Weldon, going through systematically.

11 I went into the POW camps talking to those North
12 Vietnamese prisoners to see if they had seen anything. This
13 was a lot of the stuff we were trying to do.

14 Q. Did you report back to Mr. Perot when you returned
15 to the United States after your trip to Laos?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Did you tell Mr. Perot the finding of your trip was,
18 at least the sense that you had, was that there was no hard
19 evidence of live U.S. prisoners remaining in Laos?

20 A. Yes. To the point that there was -- you know, there
21 was no evidence that there were some people still in caves
22 somewhere or in camps somewhere or, you know, in prison
23 somewhere.

24 That's not to say they weren't. You've got to look
25 at this in two sides. (a), you've got to assume that there

1 were some people there at one time. (b), when the thing is
2 all over, not all these people are out.

3 Therefore, you can say there's no evidence that
4 they're there, but you can conclude that maybe they were there
5 at some point in time, what happened to them. I think that's
6 the logic and the deduction that I was using.

7 Q. Between the time of your trip to Laos in the summer
8 of 1973 and the time that you left your position as president
9 of United We Stand, either in late 1974 or early 1975, did you
10 obtain any information from any source indicating that there
11 was hard evidence of live prisoners of war remaining in
12 captivity in Laos or anywhere else in Indochina?

13 MR. BRYANT: Neal, is your question whether he found
14 hard evidence or whether he heard any information that there
15 might be hard evidence? I know there was a bunch of
16 information that did not itself rise to the level of hard
17 evidence.

18 BY MR. KRAVITZ:

19 Q. Let me ask a direct question. Did you ever see any
20 hard evidence or anything that you viewed as hard evidence by
21 the time that you left your position as president of United We
22 Stand in late 1974 or early 1975, that there were live U.S.
23 prisoners of war remaining in captivity anywhere in Southeast
24 Asia?

25 A. No, I can't say that I came across anything that

1 said there were people left. I can still say there were
2 people who were there who didn't come out. But to say that
3 there were people left, there's nothing that I came across
4 that I can recall.

5 Q. Based on your conversations with Mr. Perot during
6 that time period, do you know whether there was any evidence
7 or information that Mr. Perot viewed as hard evidence of live
8 American POW's being left behind in Indochina during that time
9 period?

10 MR. BRYANT: Mr. Meurer, you can't really speculate
11 about what Mr. Perot may have thought. But if he said
12 anything that could let you answer the question, provide that
13 information.

14 THE WITNESS: Okay. Ask the question again.

15 BY MR. KRAVITZ:

16 Q. Okay, I'll try. Based on conversations that you had
17 with Mr. Perot between the summer of 1973 and early 1975, and
18 based on anything that Mr. Perot may have said to others that
19 you were made privy to, do you know whether Mr. Perot viewed
20 the situation the same way you did; that is, that there was no
21 hard evidence of live POW's being left behind in captivity in
22 Southeast Asia?

23 A. I don't know. I don't really recall him saying I
24 know they're there or not there. I just don't recall any
25 conversations to that effect. I just don't recall any.

1 At that point I think we were really -- you know, in
2 1973 we were really curious. They had just been released.

3 As I mentioned the other day, the Government had
4 come out with actuarial figures -- Roger Shields -- that
5 actuarially they should all be out, because so many drop out,
6 so many come through the canopies, so many are killed when
7 they hit the ground, so many are captured, so many are killed;
8 and that number coming out is approximately the number, within
9 a hundred or so, or whatever his figure was. It's in the
10 records somewhere, the newspapers.

11 But I think what we were doing is just trying to
12 find out if they were. Again, we had evidence. I mean, some
13 of the pictures, the Ron Dodge picture. That's a classic
14 example. There's a guy whose picture was taken being
15 captured. He was not on a list, didn't come out; ergo, where
16 was he? That's what we were concerned with right there.

17 I'm sure Ross felt that was one. So did I, that
18 that was somebody captured at that time.

19 Q. The question was, was there hard evidence that he
20 was still alive.

21 A. That's right.

22 Q. And the answer, in your opinion, was no, at least up
23 until 1975?

24 A. Not hard evidence, but I still go back to Teonomu's
25 comment.

1 Q. You've talked a little bit about your trip to Laos
2 in 1973 to try to find out whether there were any live POW's
3 remaining in that country. Were there similar trips made to
4 Vietnam and Cambodia?

5 A. No, just Laos.

6 Q. Was there a reason for that? I mean, was Laos
7 suspected of being a place that there was more likely to be
8 prisoners, or was it just a more hospitable place to go? What
9 was the reason for choosing Laos and not choosing Vietnam or
10 Cambodia?

11 A. One is that we had a lot of contacts in Laos. We
12 had them in Saigon, too.

13 But, too, I think probably was nobody came out of
14 Laos to my knowledge except Brace. There were a lot of
15 sightings of people at points in time, Gene DeBroom and people
16 like this, you know, what happened to them.

17 So I think that's what the concern was. Probably
18 Laos was a little more remote region than Vietnam as far as
19 where the targets were. So when these guys were shot down, it
20 was an area -- especially in the panhandle -- you know, it's a
21 pretty hostile area just from the standpoint of topography.

22 People might not know they're there. Conceivably,
23 they could be in a village.

24 Q. Before your trip to Laos in the summer of 1973, did
25 you have access to any intelligence information from the

1 United States Government regarding possible POW's in Laos?

2 MR. BRYANT: You mean immediately before the trip,
3 or are you going back to April 1970?

4 BY MR. KRAVITZ:

5 Q. Let me rephrase the question.

6 Between the time of Operation Homecoming, February
7 through March of 1973, and the time of your trip to Laos in
8 the summer of 1973, did you have any meetings or discussions
9 with any U.S. Government officials who provided you
10 information about POW's in Laos?

11 A. I can't give you a specific on meetings. But I did
12 have meetings with -- Periodically we talked to Frank
13 Sieverts; Chappy James at that time was pretty active in the
14 stuff. As I said, Archie Gratch down at Randolph, and there
15 were a lot of others, too: Luther...

16 There were people we were pretty well talking to
17 during the whole United We Stand period. If there was a piece
18 of information that I was curious about or came across, I
19 would sometimes call Frank and say, "Do you know this or
20 that?"

21 But to say that we had some grandiose intelligence
22 briefing, no.

23 Q. On April 12, 1973, Roger Shields made a public
24 statement at the Pentagon announcing the Government's position
25 that there was no indication that any live prisoners of war

1 remained held against their will anywhere in Indochina.

2 Let me first ask you: Do you recall that press
3 conference or reading about it?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Do you recall whether there was any reaction among
6 the people at United We Stand to that announcement?

7 A. I don't recall. I don't recall. Was that the one
8 where he gave the actuarial figures?

9 Q. I don't know if he did or not.

10 So you don't recall, I take it then, really any
11 split in approach to the POW issue between the United We Stand
12 people and the Nixon Administration after Operation
13 Homecoming?

14 A. No, I don't. Again, I think we were in a search
15 mode at that time. We were talking to a lot of the people
16 when they came out. I think, if I recall, there were mixed
17 emotions about the men.

18 We had a lot of them come to Dallas. Robby Reisner
19 was down, Stockdale, a lot of the senior officers, a lot of
20 the junior officers would come through.

21 Some of them we got to look at their debriefing
22 papers, so we were picking up more information. There were
23 questions raised in some of those.

24 There were a lot of questions that were not
25 answered, let me put it that way. Things would come up, and

1 there wasn't just a clearcut answer to it.

2 So you kind of went over here and said, you know,
3 "What happened to them?" Definitely, by virtue of our action,
4 I would say we didn't really think that probably everybody was
5 out, but did not have evidence that said they're over there at
6 Point A.

7 Q. Do you know how it was that you had access to the
8 debriefing reports of the returnees? My understanding is that
9 they were classified and also --

10 A. If they were classified, maybe we didn't have those.
11 I think in some cases they might have sent us some, but I
12 don't think these were classified.

13 Q. Do you recall during your review of debriefing
14 reports of the returning POW's whether you learned any
15 information about live prisoners who were seen or heard about
16 by returnees who did not return during Operation Homecoming?

17 A. I think there were probably a couple. I can't name
18 them right now. I remember some that they thought were
19 killed. I think Ron Storch was one of those.

20 I recall some of the conversations we had where they
21 had the Cuban interrogator that was basically designed to
22 interrogate our men and torture them pretty good.

23 But to give you some specific names, I think the
24 inference was there in some cases that there were people they
25 just didn't know what happened to them.

1 Q. So you specifically remember reading reports in the
2 returnee debriefs --

3 A. Either reading or talking to them. As I say, they
4 came down and we talked to them. By 1973 we had compiled a
5 lot of information on POW's and so were quite curious about
6 things.

7 I think relatively small conversations could -- you
8 could build a lot of information because you had built a
9 pretty good bedrock in 2 or 3 years.

10 I would ask questions, and then it might like click
11 on something that maybe I knew or maybe could find out
12 information. But there was no grandiose debriefing where
13 they'd come down and give us a lot of secret stuff.

14 It was more -- I think they were very appreciative
15 of what Ross had done in the United We Stand movement.
16 Several of them came down to visit and basically to thank him
17 for his efforts. I think they were doing this with a lot of
18 other groups, too, quite frankly.

19 Q. Are there any other additional trips during the
20 1973-1975 period that you took on POW-related matters that you
21 haven't told us about?

22 A. Yes. I think it was about September of '73 I went
23 back again to Laos.

24 Q. What was the purpose of that trip?

25 A. Again to go back in and just talk with some more

1 people to see if there were any activities going on. I think
2 on the July trip I had more or less set up some of that stuff
3 and then went back in again in September.

4 Q. Did you go by yourself again in September of 1973?

5 A. No, I had Bull Simon with me.

6 Q. Bull Simon?

7 A. Yeah. He was a retired Army officer at the time.

8 Q. What happened on that trip to Laos?

9 A. We basically just talked to a lot of people about
10 the activities over there. Bull had known some other people,
11 because he had been in there in the early 60's organizing the
12 CAW. He had a lot more contacts that he could talk to, too.
13 So together we went over there and basically hit these people
14 asking questions.

15 Q. Did you have any meetings during your September 1973
16 trip with any U.S. Embassy officials?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Who did you meet with from the U.S. Embassy?

19 A. It might have been Godley again. We met with Pat
20 Landry who was down in Udorn at the time.

21 I just don't recall the names. We met with Vang
22 Pao. That was not an embassy official. He's the Meo --

23 Q. Right. I know who he is.

24 Let me ask you about your meeting with Ambassador
25 Godley. I wasn't sure whether you were certain that you met

1 with Godley during this trip or not.

2 A. Again, I'm not certain. Most of my meetings with
3 the Ambassador were more courtesy calls than exchanging of
4 information. I just don't recall the substance of any of the
5 meetings, other than I had great respect for Godley. I think
6 we were probably a thorn in his side a little bit in some
7 cases. In other cases, we brought up issues that he liked,
8 so...

9 Q. Why do you say that you were a thorn in Godley's
10 side?

11 A. Well, I would say that when you bring in an airplane
12 with 150 press into a country, that could be a thorn; when you
13 bring another airplane with goods and people from all over the
14 world and the press following, you know, I think anybody is a
15 little concerned when you've got that number of press coming
16 in. I would be.

17 Q. Okay. Is it accurate to say then that you have no
18 recollection of receiving any additional POW-related
19 intelligence information from Ambassador Godley during the
20 September 1973 trip?

21 A. Nothing that I can recall; nothing that I can
22 recall.

23 Q. Did you meet with Mr. Devlin or Mr. Murphy during
24 the September 1973 trip?

25 A. Not Devlin, possibly Murphy. I just don't recall.

1 Q. Is it also accurate to say then that if you did meet
2 with Mr. Murphy during the September 1973 trip, you don't
3 recall learning any additional intelligence information from
4 him relating to POW's in Laos?

5 A. No.

6 Q. That is accurate to say?

7 A. Yeah. I can say that I don't recall. I don't
8 recall.

9 Q. What about Pat Landry? Did you meet with him up at
10 Udorn?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. What was that meeting about?

13 A. Well, one of them was private where Bull went in and
14 met with Pat by himself. I think Pat was probably a little
15 concerned that there was a civilian there. Bull said, "Well,
16 I'll meet with him by myself." So he went in and met with
17 him.

18 Then I came in at a different point in time. As I
19 recall, the general scope of the meeting was, is there anybody
20 left behind. I think Pat really didn't know, as I recall
21 basically the gist of the meeting.

22 There was nothing that came out that he said
23 specifically there were people there, let me put it that way.

24 Q. I understand that Bull Simon was one of the people
25 who planned the Son Tay raid.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Was your choice of Mr. Simon to go along with you in
3 1973 on your trip to Laos, was that part of any short term or
4 long term plan to plan a raid in Laos for prisoners?

5 A. No, not at all. After the Son Tay raid, Bull
6 retired from the Army. He was, I think, a little upset by
7 virtue of getting a form letter that said your 30 years are
8 up, about 2 or 3 months right after the raid. It was
9 something that slipped through, and he was not very happy with
10 it.

11 I think he finally decided, "I've got my 30; I'll
12 get out."

13 He bought himself a hog farm in north Florida and
14 decided that's where he wanted to retire.

15 When we had the '73 party in San Francisco, where
16 Ross put on this party for the POW's, the Son Tay raiders were
17 invited. Of course, Bull, being the head of that raid, was
18 invited. He and his wife Lou came out. We got to know Bull
19 pretty well at that time, and I spent quite a bit of time with
20 him.

21 He said -- He told Ross, he said, "If there's
22 anything I can do to help you, you just let me know."

23 Well, I think Ross -- It probably came to Ross's
24 mind, probably by the summer of 1973, if there's anybody else
25 left around, let's just go back and try to find out. Bull had

1 spent a lot of time in that area of the world; he knew a lot
2 of people. It made sense to send Bull over there. So Bull
3 and I went in in September.

4 There was nothing about any raids; there was nothing
5 about anything like that. It was basically here was a guy who
6 had spent probably a third of his military career in Southeast
7 Asia and knew everybody over there.

8 Here's a guy who could go into an office and
9 probably get a pretty correct answer. I mean, when we went in
10 to see Vang Pao -- all of his wives were there and we just
11 walked in and Vang Pao remembered Bull and they talked about
12 old times. It's that type of rapport. I think this is where
13 Ross saw the advantage to using somebody who knew things.
14 Definitely not any raid was planned.

15 Q. Where did you meet with Vang Pao?

16 A. His house in Vientiane.

17 Q. What did you learn from Vang Pao?

18 A. We didn't really learn -- He knew of no camps or
19 any places where people were held. He indicated that he would
20 keep his eyes peeled. He had hunters going out hunting for
21 gores, which is a type of animal that they hunt in the forests
22 and jungles of Southeast Asia. If they come across any, they
23 were to let him know. But that's what he said he would do.

24 Q. Did you or Mr. Perot have any kind of relationship
25 with Vang Pao before the time that you met him in September of

1 1973?

2 A. No relationship other than at one point in time Ross
3 sent over a pistol as a gift to Vang Pao, a silver pistol. In
4 essence, it was just to say, "You're doing a great job. This
5 is just a symbol of Texas," a little bit of PR.

6 As I recall, Vang Pao sent him a Meo gun. So it was
7 kind of an exchange of guns. But there was no relationship
8 other than that.

9 Q. What was your understanding as to who Vang Pao was
10 back in September of 1973?

11 A. Well, Vang Pao was a Meo general. Basically, he was
12 running the war for the Meo, more or less a guerrilla activity
13 against the North Vietnamese regulars in Laos.

14 Q. Did you understand Vang Pao to be a CIA employee?

15 A. Whether he was an employee or not, I think that
16 basically the CIA and the U.S. Government were providing the
17 hard and soft rice for the Meo to fight the North Vietnamese,
18 yes. To say he was an employee, I don't know how you'd define
19 that. But certainly our Government was supporting Meo.

20 Q. I'm not sure any of us is supposed to know how to
21 define a CIA employee.

22 Any other meetings of note during the September 1973
23 trip to Laos?

24 A. Yeah. There was a lady who ran a restaurant, a bar
25 of questionable character. Bull had known her -- She was

1 Miss Hanoi, I think, of 1952 or something like this.

2 Anyway, he had asked her if she could keep her eyes
3 peeled for people. It was basically just trying to get
4 information like that. "Can you help us? Here's what we're
5 looking for. If you hear of people coming back through, if
6 you come across anything, would you let me know?"

7 Usually an old relationship, trying to establish a
8 rapport so they might be of assistance.

9 Q. With regard to Vang Pao, you mentioned a minute ago
10 that your understanding was that the U.S. Government was
11 providing hard and soft rice for him and his troops. What did
12 you mean by hard and soft rice?

13 A. Well, that was kind of the comment over there. Hard
14 rice was ammunition; soft rice was food for the Meo. The Meo
15 were being forced out of the Ho Chi Minh Trail area up into
16 the highlands of north central Laos and the Plain of Jars. It
17 was actually USAID's job to pull them all together into
18 refugee camps.

19 They were pulled into various villages. Continental
20 Air Services and Air America were contracted to drop food and
21 ammunition to them. So the hard rice was ammunition, and the
22 soft rice was food.

23 Q. Did you have any indication at that time that Vang
24 Pao and his forces had any drug involvement with the U.S.
25 Government or CIA?

1 A. No, I had no idea of that. I mean... No.

2 Q. Were there any additional trips after the September
3 1973 trip related to POW's while you were still working at
4 United We Stand?

5 MR. BRYANT: That Mr. Meurer made?

6 THE WITNESS: I think that was the last trip I made
7 was in the fall of 1973.

8 BY MR. KRAVITZ:

9 Q. Are you aware of any trips that Mr. Perot made
10 during that time period related to POW matters?

11 A. You're talking to Southeast Asia?

12 Q. Well, to Southeast Asia or anywhere else. For
13 example, Paris or any of the other places that you had gone
14 to.

15 A. No, not specifically. He was still giving speeches.
16 So if that's within the purview of the question. He might go
17 to New York and be on television, still talking about things.

18 Now, by '73 I don't recall if he was doing that.
19 The men were out. He was doing it prior to them coming out.
20 I don't recall offhand any trips that he made to Southeast
21 Asia or Europe strictly on behalf of POW's.

22 Q. Okay. Now, when you left United We Stand either in
23 late 1974 or early 1975, did you go back to EDS?

24 A. No.

25 Q. That was when you went straight to Hunt Oil?

1 A. To Hunt Oil Company, yeah.

2 Q. Why was it that you didn't go back to EDS?

3 A. Well, I enjoyed what I was doing for Ross, number
4 one. It was a very exciting job; I was traveling all over and
5 I was learning things beyond my years.

6 H. L. Hunt was a very wealthy oilman in Texas. In
7 1974 he died. Prior to his death there was probably about 10
8 years of employee theft at Hunt Oil Company, maybe a hundred
9 million dollars in either imputed or actual losses in the
10 company.

11 When he died, his youngest son Ray became the
12 executor of the will. He and his mother inherited about 82
13 percent of Hunt Oil Company and other assets.

14 When Ray took over, he really didn't know what he
15 had in the way of management in 1975. He and I had been close
16 personal friends for about 5 years.

17 He basically called and said, "I need you. I know
18 your strengths; I know your weaknesses. I can give you a shot
19 at a line position right at the top of the company." It was a
20 well-heeled company.

21 It was one of those opportunities that come along
22 once in a lifetime as far as a business career, where you can
23 move into a shot. I felt -- My family and I felt that it was
24 an opportunity for us, and so I took it.

25 But there was never any dissatisfaction with

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W.
SUITE 400
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005
(202) 289-2260
(800) FOR DEPO

1 anything at EDS. I concluded my career was -- As an
2 assistant, you know, you're in a role and you've got a hell of
3 a lot of responsibility and not a hell of a lot of authority.

4 Q. I know.

5 A. It's very exciting, but at some point in time I
6 realized that I needed to get back into the mainstream of EDS
7 if I was going to move up into the role of senior executive.

8 So I just weighed the alternatives and said, well,
9 really Hunt offers a better short-term opportunity.

10 Q. After you left United We Stand and went to Hunt Oil,
11 did you have any continuing involvement in the POW issue?

12 A. No, not directly. There were a couple of cases
13 where I helped Ross organize some things that were related to
14 POW's, but not the issue itself.

15 Q. What exactly are you saying --

16 A. Well, one was Robby Reisner. There was a trophy
17 that Ross had set up for the top fighter pilot in the Air
18 Force each year. It was called the Reisner Trophy.

19 They were going to announce it at the Smithsonian
20 and have all this activity in Washington with a big dinner,
21 and I helped organize that.

22 Q. Anything else?

23 A. I can't recall anything.

24 Q. What has been your continuing relationship, if any,
25 with Mr. Perot since the time that you left United We Stand?

1 A. Well, he's a very good friend, a mentor and a man I
2 admire very much.

3 I became a trustee several years ago of his
4 children's trusts. I maybe have lunch with him once every 6
5 weeks or 2 months or so, where I come out and chew the fat
6 with him.

7 I'll call him on things or he'll call me on things.
8 So it's a friendship relationship, an old, old friendship
9 relationship.

10 Q. I want to go back briefly to the time period 1969 to
11 1975, really the whole time period that we've been talking
12 about. The best way you can, how would you describe the
13 quantity and quality of access that Mr. Perot had to President
14 Nixon during that time period?

15 A. The quality and the quantity?

16 Q. I mean how often did Mr. Perot get to speak with
17 President Nixon about POW-related issues or other issues?
18 Were they personal contacts or were they always through
19 intermediaries?

20 MR. BRYANT: So this question is not even limited to
21 POW-related matters?

22 MR. KRAVITZ: Well, I think initially I'm interested
23 in POW-related matters, but I'm also interested in other
24 issues.

25 THE WITNESS: Well, I can't give you specific

1 meetings, but there were cases where Ross did meet with the
2 President or through intermediaries.

3 There were cases where I would bring messages or
4 pass messages on in some cases. But it wasn't what you would
5 say very frequent or went on a lot.

6 BY MR. KRAVITZ:

7 Q. Did you ever meet with Mr. Nixon on behalf of Mr.
8 Perot during that time period?

9 A. Not on behalf of Mr. Perot.

10 Q. Did you ever meet with Mr. Nixon during that time
11 period?

12 A. Yes. As I think I told you the other day, I was an
13 advanceman for him in 1968 and periodically for the next 2 or
14 3 years just on a part-time basis. There were cases where he
15 would thank me in advance, or "Please tell Ross that I
16 appreciate the opportunity that you could help us out here,"
17 things like this. It was never to advise me on Vietnam.

18 Q. In other words, that was in terms of the 1968
19 presidential campaign?

20 A. Or advancing, yeah.

21 Q. Were you or Mr. Perot involved in Mr. Nixon's
22 reelection campaign in any way in 1972?

23 A. In '72, no, no. Well, by '71 I just felt that the
24 people were getting pretty paranoid out there. I, in essence,
25 told Ross that continuing to do advancing was not gaining

1 anything. It had reached the stage where I would have some
2 third-rate aide call me and want me to be in South America or
3 Morristown, New Jersey, or someplace. The staff had got so
4 ballooned by that time that it ceased being fun.

5 I, in essence, told him, "I don't have time to do
6 this anymore."

7 Q. You told us last week that really the overriding
8 purpose or corporate purpose of United We Stand was to gain
9 support for the office of president?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And that certainly one of the main parts of that
12 goal or purpose was to bring a lot of public attention to the
13 plight of American POW's in Indochina. Over time did the
14 emphasis of United We Stand shift really more toward POW
15 issues specifically rather than the more general purpose of
16 supporting President Nixon?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Can you talk about that, how that happened and,
19 really, in your opinion why that happened?

20 A. Well, I think it's one of those issues within that
21 overall scope of things that people really grappled onto. It
22 was something that was very tangible, very emotional, and
23 something that you could really put your teeth into.

24 As a result of that, I think being a very tangible
25 thing, it became an issue that we really locked onto. We did

1 the ads on the other things, too. But at some point in time
2 it was, you know, let's try to get better treatment for these
3 men.

4 Q. I think I asked you real briefly last week whether
5 you knew what had happened to United We Stand after you left
6 in late 1974/early 1975. I may be wrong, but my recollection
7 was that you said you weren't sure.

8 A. Yeah.

9 Q. Have you heard anything in the last week that --

10 A. No.

11 Q. So you don't know whether the company went out of
12 existence or whether --

13 A. I don't know.

14 Q. As far as you know, does it exist today?

15 A. I don't know.

16 Q. You've told us that you personally had no direct
17 involvement with the POW issue except for the few incidents
18 that you've talked about after the time that you left United
19 We Stand.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Is it accurate to say then that since early 1975 or
22 late 1974 when you left that organization, you've obtained
23 personally no information that would change your view that
24 there was no hard evidence of live Americans remaining in
25 captivity in Southeast Asia?

1 A. Yes, I would say that would be accurate because I
2 just really wasn't exposed to anything. I just got out of the
3 mainstream on it. I followed it; I read things in the
4 newspapers and read the various books: KISS THE BOYS GOODBYE
5 and stuff like this, a lot of POW books.

6 Q. As a result of your continuing friendship with Mr.
7 Perot, have you been kept up to date as to Mr. Perot's
8 continuing activities relating to POW matters?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Does that mean across the board? I mean, you've
11 never discussed with Mr. Perot since January 1975 what Mr.
12 Perot was doing relating to POW's?

13 A. No, it's not that. It's just that I knew he was
14 working on the committee or whatever it was. A couple of
15 times he called and said, "I'm finding some interesting
16 stuff," but he was never specific. It was always in another
17 conversation that would come up, so there was nothing that he
18 told me that made me change my mind or come up with ideas that
19 I didn't have before.

20 But those weren't specific things he was saying
21 either.

22 Q. What committee are you referring to?

23 A. Well, he was heading something up where he was
24 looking at files at some point in time in the early 80's, as I
25 recall.

1 Q. Let me ask you about that. My understanding is that
2 at some point Vice President Bush made available to Mr. Perot
3 intelligence files on live sightings and other POW/MIA-related
4 intelligence information. What did Mr. Perot tell you about
5 that?

6 A. Virtually nothing other than he had seen stuff in
7 files. That was basically it. I think he was probably under
8 some order not to talk about it; and he honored that.

9 Q. Did Mr. Perot indicate to you what his supposed
10 mission was or what instructions Mr. Bush had given him?

11 A. No.

12 Q. At any point did Mr. Perot say anything to you about
13 any dissatisfaction with the way Vice President Bush was
14 handling the POW/MIA issue?

15 A. No. Where he said something, no, nothing that I
16 recall where he said to me, you know, "He's doing this or
17 that, and I don't like it." I really didn't talk to him about
18 POW activity. When we'd have meetings, it was always on some
19 other subjects basically.

20 One incident, when he came back from Hanoi, he
21 called and said, "Let's have lunch." We sat down and had
22 lunch out at Luther's or the barbecue place over here. He
23 puts down a bottle of Hanoi beer. He didn't tell me he had
24 gone into Hanoi.

25 He said, "Meurer, I want you to know where I've

1 been," and he gave me this bottle of beer from Hanoi. I
2 couldn't believe he had gone in there.

3 Q. When was this?

4 A. Oh, this was probably '87, something like that. He
5 just wanted to let me know he had gone in there.

6 For a while I thought he was kidding me until he
7 finally convinced me he had. That was probably as close to,
8 you know, saying, "Well, I've gone back to Vietnam," but we
9 didn't really talk -- I just didn't feel -- My relationship
10 with Ross is if he wants to tell me something, fine. If he
11 doesn't, then I'm not going to probe and ask questions.

12 I mean, I probably wanted to ask a lot of questions,
13 but I wasn't going to ask him. I didn't want to put him in a
14 position where he probably was going to have to divulge maybe
15 secret information that he wasn't supposed to.

16 My policy has basically been -- you know, I'm not
17 going to ask him questions that will embarrass him; and I'm
18 definitely not going to ask him for things.

19 I get a thousand people a year asking me to talk to
20 Ross Perot about this business deal or that business deal.
21 I've made it a policy that I will not ask anything from him
22 ever, and I tell people that and that pretty well shuts it
23 off.

24 Q. But this isn't a business deal --

25 A. No.

1 Q. I mean, this is something that you spent 5 years of
2 your life working with Mr. Perot on, and obviously it was a
3 very emotional -- But you really just never asked any
4 details?

5 A. I never asked any details. And for the reason I
6 gave you.

7 Q. What about contacts that Mr. Perot may or may not
8 have had with President Reagan relating to the POW/MIA issue?
9 Were you aware of any assignment or any mission that Mr. Perot
10 was asked to perform by President Reagan?

11 A. Only from what I read, and that was the committee
12 that I referred to. There was nothing where he told me he had
13 a mandate or anything like this.

14 Q. At any time has Mr. Perot said anything to you about
15 POW/MIA-related work that he was doing on behalf of President
16 Reagan?

17 A. No, nothing where he has specifically told me what
18 he was doing, no.

19 Q. Are there any general statements that Mr. Perot has
20 made to you?

21 A. Well, one particular conversation was, "Tom, I'm
22 seeing stuff in here I can't believe, but I can't tell you
23 about it." That was about the extent of it.

24 Q. And you understood Mr. Perot to be referring to
25 intelligence information?

1 A. That's when he was working on that particular
2 committee or whatever that activity was.

3 Q. At any point did Mr. Perot say anything to you about
4 any meeting or meetings that he had with Mr. Reagan relating
5 to POW matters?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Were you aware of a report or a letter relating to
8 Mr. Perot's findings on the POW project that Mr. Perot
9 submitted to Ronald Reagan in 1987?

10 A. No. This was a letter from his committee activity?

11 Q. That's our understanding.

12 A. No, I don't know anything about it.

13 Q. As I'm sure you've read in the press and seen on TV,
14 Mr. Perot is alleged to have received a letter, or perhaps
15 through Mr. McKillop, a letter from Vietnamese government
16 officials in 1990 asking Mr. Perot to be their business agent
17 here in the United States. Were you aware of that letter --

18 A. No.

19 Q. -- at or near the time that it was received?

20 A. Not at all, no.

21 Q. When did you first become aware of the existence of
22 that letter?

23 A. Probably when I read it in the Washington Post or
24 New York Times the last couple of weeks.

25 Q. Have you had any conversations with Mr. Perot

1 relating to that 1990 letter from the Vietnamese?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Have you had any conversations with Mr. McKillop
4 relating to that 1990 letter?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Do you know anything about Mr. Perot's reaction to
7 that letter, in addition to what you've read in the press or
8 heard in the press?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Do you know anything about the genesis of that 1990
11 letter to Mr. Perot, other than what you've read or heard in
12 the press?

13 A. No. But if you'll permit me an editorial --

14 Q. Sure.

15 A. I would say that anybody that thinks that Ross was
16 going to do business over there, wanted to do business,
17 understands business, would -- that it would be folly to try
18 to do what somebody says he has done.

19 I mean, first of all, he's not one that would
20 approach things like that. Secondly, probably Vietnam would
21 be one of the last places he'd invest money.

22 So whatever the reason for that letter I read about
23 is or how it started, I don't know. I can assure you from
24 what I know of Ross Perot that he did not generate or in any
25 way encourage them to write that letter.

1 Q. What do you mean when you said that Ross Perot would
2 not be the type of person to approach the situation like that?

3 A. Well, first of all, that wouldn't be his reason for
4 going there, to do business. Secondly, if you look at the
5 risk of doing business in Vietnam right now, it's pretty
6 doggoned high.

7 About the only thing you'd really want to get into
8 maybe is oil and gas, and Ross is not into that. There's just
9 a lot of better places in the world to invest, especially in
10 his business.

11 I mean, the Vietnamese don't have any hard currency.
12 How are they going to pay for software services or something
13 like this? A software company -- One of the last places that
14 you want to put money into is a country that has no hard
15 currency and can't pay you.

16 Q. Wasn't the Vietnamese request for him to be a
17 business agent for all types of businesses as opposed to
18 simply being a seller of computer software?

19 A. That's not what Ross Perot does; he's not an agent.
20 He doesn't do that kind of thing. He doesn't even deal with
21 it.

22 Q. You told us last week that in your work you actually
23 have a lot of dealings with one of the Indochinese countries.
24 I can't remember which --

25 A. Laos.

1 Q. How often do you go to Laos? What do you do there?

2 A. I've been twice this year. We're in oil and gas
3 exploration. I explained our businesses. We're in three:
4 agribusiness, real estate, but the predominant thing is oil
5 and gas exploration with some refining and pipelines. We
6 operate in nine countries overseas. They're generally high
7 risk countries: Yemen, Ghana, Ethiopia, Laos; we're in
8 Argentina, Chile and probably the highest risk is the United
9 States.

10 But in 1986 when the oil prices took a real dive, we
11 had just had a big discovery in the Middle East and were about
12 ready to put this thing on stream, which was going to allow us
13 some cash flow to go out and explore.

14 When everybody was pulling away from the world, we
15 decided to go out and tackle the world as far as getting new
16 concessions, or what we call a production sharing agreement, a
17 license to explore for oil.

18 We were dealing with the Burmese at the time. I
19 spent quite a bit of time in Burma. The exploration manager
20 who I was traveling with, I told him, I said, "I have been to
21 Laos many years ago. I don't know if you're interested or not
22 from a geological standpoint, but I really like the country
23 and there is some basin areas along the Mekong, and maybe we
24 ought to try to talk to them. Nobody else has talked to them.
25 It's a Marxist country."

1 We went back and did a little study of some of the
2 geology, and he felt that maybe it was worth the risk.

3 I tried to set up an appointment to go see the Lao.
4 It was pretty strange at that time because they really had no
5 communications to speak of.

6 In 1986 they were still -- and this was before
7 Perestroika. I had first called the charge in Washington and
8 told him who I was and told him I'd like to talk about oil
9 exploration of Laos.

10 His first comment was, "There's no oil here."

11 I said, "Well, I don't know. I would like to talk
12 to you about the potential of looking for it."

13 Well, this led to one thing and another. And over
14 the course of probably 4 years, we eventually signed an
15 agreement for the southern portion of the country, what they
16 call the Pakxe area, the southern provinces that borders along
17 Cambodia. It doesn't go up to the Vietnamese border, but it
18 covers part of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and comes down between
19 Savannakhet and Pakxe.

20 In 1990 -- we have to work in off seasons, what I
21 call dry seasons because you have a wet season when you can't
22 operate. So in 1990 -- 1991, the dry season of '92, we did
23 what we call an aeromatic survey, gravity, where we fly
24 airplanes back and forth over the area to measure to see if
25 indeed there is even a basin there.

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W.
SUITE 400
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005
(202) 289-2260
(800) FOR DEPO

1 We concluded from our aeromatic surveys that there
2 is a basin there. Nobody knew there was.

3 Incidentally, we were the first American company to
4 be not only in Laos, but Indochina. Basically there's an
5 embargo on Vietnam and was on Cambodia, so we could not do
6 business there.

7 But Laos is what we call a rank wildcat. We have
8 just concluded this dry season a seismic survey. We have a
9 lot of ordnance, quite frankly.

10 I was over there 2 months ago walking back into the
11 bush. The blooies and the old cluster bombs are all over the
12 place. We've hired six EOD type, former Brits, who are going
13 through clearing out mines and bombs so we can drag our
14 seismic lines to shoot seismic. Seismic is a way that we
15 measure the sediment in the earth. We shoot sound down into
16 the earth. And by its speed we can determine what type of
17 rock is down there. The program that we have, we maybe will
18 drill next year or the year after.

19 There is absolutely zero connection between what I'm
20 doing in Laos now and POW's. I have not been over there to
21 look for POW's. I've not been over there to talk to anybody
22 about POW's.

23 Quite frankly, I'm concerned in these hearings that
24 that could come out. That could, quite frankly, I think
25 affect our business over there.

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W.
SUITE 400
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005
(202) 289-2260
(800) FOR DEPO

1 Q. During any of your trips to Laos in the past several
2 years, has anyone in Laos, either a government official or
3 non-government official, indicated to you anything that makes
4 you believe that live American prisoners are still in Laos?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Has anyone implied or said anything to you that
7 there might be any way to negotiate for prisoners or buy them
8 back?

9 A. No. We had one incident where somebody brought us
10 some dog tags.

11 Let me preface this by saying, we have been allowed
12 to move virtually anywhere we want around the Pakxe area and
13 in the Ho Chi Minh Trail area by virtue of what our plan is.
14 The Lao have been a hundred percent supportive of it.

15 I've been back in walking along the trail area. I
16 even had my wife over there on vacation in January. We were
17 down in that area and went up to Luang Prabang and up to the
18 northern part of the country, strictly on vacation, to see
19 something before it really starts to change.

20 The Lao have been very helpful as far as us getting
21 where we want to go, because it's very important to them for
22 us to find oil if we can, if it's there -- or gas, because
23 they need the hard currency very much. It's a very poor
24 country.

25 There are cases, though, where we have had some

1 people bring -- a case where we've had people bring a couple
2 of dog tags to us. Our instructions to our people over there
3 is to turn it over to Charles Sammon, who is the charge; and
4 we stay out of it. I mean, we just turn any information we
5 have over to him, to the joint committee or the joint command
6 or whatever it is over there for MIA's.

7 So that's probably as close as we've got to it. I
8 have not personally been in any of those meetings.

9 Quite frankly, I called John McCain here several
10 months ago and told him that I'd be very happy to brief him on
11 all our activities in Laos. I know John from POW days.

12 Q. You mentioned a few minutes ago that at some point
13 in the 1980's when you were talking generally with Mr. Perot
14 about the committee or -- I think you described it as a
15 committee, but his work with the administration relating to
16 POW's, that Mr. Perot said something to the effect of, "I'm
17 seeing stuff in here I can't believe, but I can't tell you
18 about it." I think you said that happened in 1987?

19 A. No, I didn't say when because I don't remember when
20 it happened.

21 Q. What's your best recollection as to when that
22 happened?

23 A. I just don't recall. Sometime in the 80's. Again,
24 you've got to look at it -- you know, you take that and it
25 sounds like he has got a revelation over here and he's trying

1 to tell me something without telling me something. That's not
2 the way I interpret that.

3 In essence, I think he knew that I knew that he was
4 going through records. The way Ross will sometimes do things,
5 saying, "You know, there's some neat stuff here, Meurer. Too
6 bad you aren't here!" It's kind of kidding me a little bit,
7 too.

8 I took it more as the latter than the former. So to
9 just put it in that perspective, rather than saying that he
10 uncovered all kinds of things and was very excited about it.

11 I don't know if he did; I don't know if he didn't.
12 I just know that a lot of times our relationship is -- he'll
13 joke around a lot.

14 Q. Did Mr. Perot appear to be excited about the
15 information that he had reviewed?

16 A. Not any more excited than anything else I've ever
17 seen him in. He's always very optimistic.

18 No. To say he was excited and there was a eureka,
19 no, that didn't come across to me.

20 Q. Was there ever any follow-up to that discussion in
21 terms of Mr. Perot's providing any more details than that
22 statement?

23 A. No, none.

24 Q. Mr. Meurer, that's all the questions that I have for
25 you. I want to thank you again for coming back a second day.

1 Let me ask you two wrap-up questions. One is, first
2 of all, whether there's anything you said, either today or
3 last week, that you'd like to add to, or change or take away
4 from in any way?

5 A. No.

6 Q. The other is whether there's anything you'd like to
7 say in conclusion. You don't have to, but if you'd like to
8 say something or if you think there is any question that I
9 should have asked you in the areas that we've been talking
10 about that you have information that you think might be
11 helpful to the Committee, we'd like to hear about it.

12 Before you answer that, let me just ask you one more
13 specific question. When Mr. Perot said to you, "I'm seeing
14 stuff in here that I can't believe," or something to that
15 effect, did you interpret that statement to refer specifically
16 to reports of live prisoners of war in Indochina?

17 A. I didn't interpret it as anything. It was kind of a
18 phone call; he was doing some other things. He just made a
19 comment about that. Like I say, I think he was -- you know,
20 he was seeing some stuff that I didn't see, and I had an
21 academic interest in it obviously. He was saying, "Too bad,
22 Meurer!" That's the kind of relationship we have.

23 So I don't put any significance to the statement.
24 If I did, I'd tell you so, but I don't.

25 Q. Okay. Is there anything that you want to say in

1 conclusion?

2 A. No. I can't think of anything else other than the
3 fact that I think what Ross Perot did with the United We Stand
4 program -- and I think I've tried to explain that to you --
5 was I think a remarkable effort. I think it was quite
6 successful.

7 I think by the effort that he did and his people
8 did, I think you could argue that it did improve the treatment
9 of the prisoners. They brought them together after the Son
10 Tay raid.

11 I think you could argue that had it not been for
12 Perot's activities, you might not have had the Son Tay raid.
13 Now, that was not a success from the standpoint of
14 operationally, but I think it was a success in getting the men
15 back together and allowed them to talk and exchange
16 information. Maybe subsequently we got more information on
17 people than we would have.

18 I think all of the subsequent activities that he did
19 fosters a lot of other activities by other groups. I just
20 want to make that point, because I kind of got the
21 interpretation -- or the feeling, I should say, when we
22 started this thing that this was a feeling that this was just
23 kind of an organization that was just flitting around. It
24 really wasn't. I mean, it had a goal and activities; and I
25 think it accomplished what it was trying to do.

1 MR. KRAVITZ: Thank you. Mr. Bryant, do you have
2 any questions you wanted to ask?

3 MR. BRYANT: Just a couple of minor points. I think
4 a couple of things you said were said in a joking manner.

5 THE WITNESS: Uh-huh.

6 MR. BRYANT: I'd like to be sure that the record
7 reflects that. First of all, you made some remark with
8 respect to the United States being a high-risk country for oil
9 and gas exploration. Was that said in a joking manner or a
10 serious manner?

11 THE WITNESS: It was said in both a joking and a
12 serious manner. People ask me, why would you go to a country
13 like Ghana or Ethiopia where there's revolution right now, or
14 Yemen, with high political risk. I say, "Well, if you take a
15 look at the history of our business, the highest political
16 risk -- where things have been taken from you is the United
17 States with the windfall profit tax and the taking away of
18 offshore properties -- California, that were awarded and then
19 taken back, where companies make a lot of investment." So the
20 United States has probably been a higher risk than a lot of
21 countries.

22 I said that in jest, really, but it is somewhat of a
23 fact. That's why you have an awful lot -- although the
24 windfall profit tax doesn't exist anymore because of lower oil
25 prices, that's why you have a lot of companies leaving the

1 United States right now.

2 MR. BRYANT: The second point was the remark by Mr.
3 Perot that we discussed relating to his having seen some
4 material. Did you understand Mr. Perot to make that remark in
5 a joking manner?

6 THE WITNESS: Yes, a joking manner and not a serious
7 manner, definitely.

8 MR. BRYANT: Has Mr. Perot ever expressed to you an
9 interest in making a personal investment or engaging in
10 personal business activity in Vietnamese?

11 THE WITNESS: Absolutely not.

12 MR. BRYANT: That's all I have.

13 MR. KRAVITZ: Thank you.

14 (Whereupon, at 10:45 a.m. the taking of the instant
15 deposition was suspended.)

16 _____
17 THOMAS E. MEURER

18 SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _____ day
19 of _____, 19____.

20
21 _____
22 NOTARY PUBLIC

23 My Commission expires: _____.

24
25

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W.
SUITE 400
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005
(202) 289-2260
(800) FOR DEPO

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

C E R T I F I C A T E

I hereby certify that the transcript contained herein is a full and accurate transcript of the notes taken by me at the deposition of THOMAS E. MEURER conducted by the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, on June 30, 1992, in Dallas, Texas, to the best of my knowledge and belief.

DATED this 1st day of July 1992.

Betty Morgan, Reporter

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W.
SUITE 400
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005
(202) 289-2260
(800) FOR DEPO