

Stenographic Transcript of
HEARINGS
Before the

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

DEPOSITION OF BOBBY RAY INMAN

Wednesday, September 9, 1992

Washington, D.C.

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P 39
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P Inman

P 58

1 DEPOSITION OF BOBBY RAY INMAN

2
3 Wednesday, September 9, 19924
5 U.S. Senate6 Select Committee on POW/MIA
7 Affairs

8 Washington, D. C.

9 Deposition of BOBBY RAY INMAN, the witness
10 herein, called for examination by counsel for the Senate
11 Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, convened, pursuant to
12 notice, at 9:47 a.m. in S-407, The Capitol, the witness
13 having been duly sworn by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER, CVR, a Notary
14 Public in and for the District of Columbia, and the
15 proceedings being taken down by Stenomask by MICHAL ANN
16 SCHAFER, CVR, and transcribed by her.
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1 APPEARANCES:

2 On behalf of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA
3 Affairs:

4 JOHN McCREARY, ESQ.,
5 Investigative Counsel

6 ROBERT TAYLOR
7 Investigator

8 On behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency:

9 DOUGLAS O. BOWMAN, ESQ.
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C O N T E N T S

WITNESS

EXAMINATION

Bobby Ray Inman

By Mr. McCreary

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E X H I B I T S

INMAN EXHIBIT NO.

FOR IDENTIFICATION

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P R O C E E D I N G S

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2 Whereupon,

3 BOBBY RAY INMAN,

4 the witness herein, called for examination by counsel for
5 the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs and having
6 been duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and
7 testified as follows:

8 EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE

9 BY MR. McCREARY:

10 Q. This is the deposition of Admiral Bobby Ray
11 Inman. The time is 9:50, and it's at the Office of Senate
12 Security, S-407. Would you state for the record your
13 complete name and your address?

14 A. Bobby Ray Inman, DATA
15 Social Security Number DATA That's
16 my residence address.

17 Q. In terms of housekeeping, have you had a chance
18 to see the rules?

19 A. I did see the rules and reviewed them.

20 Q. And the most important thing -- do you have any
21 questions about them?

22 A. No.

23 Q. The most important thing I draw your attention to
24 is that you have a right to an attorney. This is an
25 informational presentation, and we're trying to have the

1 benefit of your vast and extensive experience.

2 This is Exhibit 1.

3 [The document referred to
4 was marked Inman Exhibit
5 No. 1 for identification.]

6 Exhibit 2 is the authorization for the
7 deposition. You have seen that.

8 [The document referred to
9 was marked Inman Exhibit
10 No. 2 for identification.]

11 A. I had not seen that. Fine.

12 Q. Exhibit 3 is the notice of deposition. You have
13 a copy of that?

14 [The document referred to
15 was marked Inman Exhibit
16 No. 3 for identification.]

17 A. I have a copy of that.

18 Q. You didn't bring a copy of your curriculum vitae.

19 A. I did not, but we will send one to you.

20 Q. That will be Exhibit 4.

21 [The document referred to
22 is to be marked Inman
23 Exhibit No. 4 for
24 identification upon
25 receipt.]

1 I have to ask you about your clearances. You
2 presently have DATA clearances; is that correct?

3 A. That is correct, plus a series of DATA in
4 my role as a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence
5 Advisory Board.

6 Q. Those were not sent to us, were they? Were they
7 passed to us?

8 A. I did not ask them to pass them to you. I'm sure
9 just by a telephone call you could have that done.

10 Q. I think, in light of your role, I personally am
11 aware of your role on the President's Foreign Intelligence
12 Advisory Board.

13 A. Exactly.

14 Q. I'm John McCreary. I'm a Committee investigator
15 and an analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency for 25
16 years. I will do the lead in the questioning. Mr. Taylor,
17 whom you talked with briefly, is also a Committee
18 investigator, and from time to time he will pass me notes
19 on paper about questions I should ask for the sake of an
20 orderly presentation.

21 But at the end of each hour, or the end of each
22 hour or each segment, coherent segment, of this
23 presentation, I will ask him if he has specific questions
24 to follow up in case I've missed something. He's
25 authorized also to ask questions under our rules.

1 Our Chief Counsel, J. William Codinha, may stop
2 in to listen in on the deposition, if he has time, and I
3 think to make your acquaintance as well.

4 A. Okay.

5 Q. I must urge you that you not answer a question if
6 you do not understand it clear, and please don't hesitate
7 to ask for clarification. We all get too close to this
8 material sometimes, and I understand that you are waiving
9 the right to an attorney; is that correct?

10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. I will break on the hour and as you require
12 breaks. That's clear?

13 A. That's fine.

14 Q. I will rely on the court reporter to remind me of
15 the hourly breaks.

16 A. Hopefully we will be through somewhere close to
17 12:00 or not long thereafter because I have a 12:30
18 commitment.

19 Q. We can suspend. We will go as long as we can.

20 A. We ought, given the number of years and the rest
21 of it, we ought to be able to exhaust my knowledge in that
22 amount of time.

23 Q. At the outset, the clearance level of this
24 deposition will be DATA , but as we ask questions
25 about your tenure at NSA we may have to raise that

1 classification level to DATA and solicit your advice on
2 matters that require handling via

3 Everything will be on the record unless I agree
4 that it's not. As I say, this is informational.

5 The path of the deposition is, since your career
6 spans basically the total time frame of this deposition --

7 You are?

8 MR. BOWMAN: Doug Bowman from OCA.

9 MR. McCREARY: Would you spell your last name,
10 please?

11 MR. BOWMAN: B-o-w-m-a-n.

12 MR. McCREARY: And OCA is?

13 MR. BOWMAN: Office of Congressional Affairs,
14 CIA.

15 MR. McCREARY: And you are representing the
16 Central Intelligence Agency; is that correct?

17 MR. BOWMAN: Yes.

18 MR. McCREARY: You're not representing Admiral
19 Inman?

20 MR. BOWMAN: That correct.

21 THE WITNESS: I invited that if they wanted to
22 have someone present here with us, they were welcome. I
23 did not need counsel.

24 BY MR. McCREARY:

25 Q. As I was about to explain, the path of the

1 deposition, I've divided this up into about five sections
2 that basically correspond to your career as a professional
3 intelligence officer, and that includes your, I guess it
4 is, your time as Assistant for Intelligence at PACOM,
5 Pacific Command, on the staff there --

6 A. Chief of Current Intelligence, Pacific Fleet,
7 from July '67 to May 7, '69; as Seventh Fleet Intelligence
8 Officer from 12 May 69 to July '71; in a very cursory way
9 as Executive Assistant to the Vice Chief from June '72 to
10 December '73; Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
11 Pacific Fleet from 30 December '83 --

12 Q. '73?

13 A. -- '73, thank you, until 16 September '74;
14 Director of Naval Intelligence, 19 September '74 to 20 July
15 '76; Vice Director, DIA, 20 July '76 to 5 July '77;
16 Director, NSA, 5 July '77 to 30 March '81. You'll see
17 there's an overlap coming here. Deputy Director of Central
18 Intelligence from 13 February '81 to 11 June '82. And I
19 retired 1 July '82.

20 Q. Since we're going over this, would you tell us
21 about when you joined the PFIAB, the President's Foreign
22 Intelligence Advisory Board?

23 A. Yes. I became a member of the President's
24 Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. I was sworn in on '29
25 July '90. I was designated as the Vice Chairman, and then

1 I became the Acting Chairman when John Tower was killed, on
2 the 5th of April of '81, and I remain the Acting Chairman.

3 Q. You remain Acting Chairman still?

4 A. Yes. May I make some general statements before
5 you begin actual questions on the process?

6 Q. I'm not quite finished with some introductions.
7 I was just going to give you an intro for that.

8 A. Good.

9 Q. What I want to say is we are interested in what
10 you remember and what you know, and our questions are going
11 to be designed to refresh your memory and so on, and
12 there's going to be some repetition because of your
13 continuous engagement in the intelligence business during
14 this period.

15 We're going to show you some documents to help
16 refresh your memory. Some of them will be admitted as
17 Exhibits and some of them will not.

18 And you have some things that you would like to
19 get on the record, and I welcome you to do that, invite you
20 to do that at this time.

21 A. Thank you. Three points that I would like to
22 make. The first is that I had no access to ongoing
23 activity at any of the intelligence agencies from my
24 departure on 11 June '82 until I took up my seat on the
25 President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board on the 29th

1 of July, 1990.

2 I would, on rare occasions, get telephone calls
3 asking me about advice on how to deal with problems, but I
4 had no discussions related to anything with regard to
5 POW/MIA with anyone in the intelligence community during
6 that time span.

7 The second point. There was an intensity toward
8 my interest and knowledge generated in 1970, when the then-
9 commander of the carrier task force, Vice Admiral Maurice
10 F. Weisner, had a son, an Army captain, who was reported
11 missing in action -- the time was May or June of '70 -- on
12 a mission to pick up, exfiltrate some people from South
13 Vietnam very near the Laos border, and Lee Weisner was lost
14 in a helicopter crash.

15 The team went in. The seat belts had been cut.
16 No sign of bodies. I worked for Admiral Weisner then. He
17 came to be the Seventh Fleet Commander. He was my boss as
18 the Vice Chief. He was my boss back at Pacific Fleet when
19 I went back to be the Assistant Chief of Staff for
20 Intelligence. He was on the President's selection board
21 when I was selected for Rear Admiral, remains a very close
22 personal friend.

23 Therefore, much of my knowledge of events in the
24 years come not officially but from trying to find out any-
25 evidence that might have impacted on whether Lee had

1 survived or not. So it is from that insight, not from
2 duties, that I had exposure to events or pursued them at
3 various periods of time, as we'll come back to in the
4 questions.

5 The third point I would make has to do with my
6 service as the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
7 When I reported, Mr. Casey made it very clear that he
8 intended to personally run the Deputy Director for
9 Operations and the analytical efforts, and that it was my
10 job to deal with the outside world -- the Congress, the
11 resource allocation process -- and to stay out of the other
12 areas unless he needed me.

13 I was never exposed to any of the operational
14 plans -- how they were put together, how they were executed
15 -- but I did have knowledge,

16
17 and that knowledge came about because members of the House
18 had asked me to look at evidence of the status to pin down
19 whether or not there were any surviving POWs still in
20 captivity.

21 I don't remember all the Members of Congress who
22 sought my advice. One of them was Bob
23 Dornan. But I met with, I spent an extended period of time
24 looking at the evidence of the mission, pursued follow-up
25 activities, which we'll come to in your normal questioning,

1 and reported that to the Hill. That was the extent of my
2 exposure while I was at CIA to any actual operational
3 details.

4 And those were the only points. Oh, there's a
5 follow-on -- why there was no contact in the intervening
6 years.

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8 The only two
9 employees at CIA who ever thereafter called me, after I had
10 left, were Bob Gates and Clair George, who occasionally
11 would call to seek advice in dealing with a problem.

12 A final note. I was never involved with or
13 exposed directly to any of the negotiations that took place
14 with regard to POW/MIA matters.

15 Q. Did you receive from the Defense Department or
16 from the CIA or anyone else any materials in preparation
17 for this deposition?

18 A. None.

19 Q. Did you ask for any?

20 A. No, I did not, deliberately. I made no effort to
21 try to refresh at all, so that we'd deal with untainted
22 knowledge or memory. Unfortunately, you're going to find
23 that it's a faltering one. There are a great many myths
24 about my memory, but you're going to discover what myths
25 they are today. I'm ready for your questions.

1 Q. With respect to the loss of life or the missing
2 in action of Lee Weisner, how do you spell that last name?

3 A. W-e-i-s-n-e-r.

4 Q. What did you ascertain?

5 A. We were never able to account. You know, we had
6 the sight of the crash, like so many other instances along
7 the way, site of the crash, a team in. There were no
8 bodies in the helicopter. It appeared that the seatbelts
9 had actually been severed by a knife.

10 You know, you make all kinds of assumptions in
11 that process about Pathet Lao and/or South Vietnamese
12 taking the bodies, whether they were dead or alive. No
13 evidence. The helicopter had come down sort of on a ledge
14 and then had gone into the water in a stream. And there
15 was a fair amount of running water.

16 It was clear from the cut of the seatbelts that
17 the bodies were not just washed away in the process, but
18 there was insufficient evidence to determine whether they'd
19 been injured in the landing or not.

20 Q. What kind of operation was this?

21 A. They were -- as I recall it, they had been sent
22 in to pick up a reconnaissance team.

23 Q. This wasn't a rescue operation for prisoners?

24 A. No, no. They'd been sent in to exfiltrate.

25 Q. Do you know what the status was?

1 A. He was carried as missing in action for many,
2 many years, and finally declared killed in action about
3 four or five years ago. But I have watched the anguish for
4 the family on this issue every time it's reopened, every
5 time there's a glimmer of hope that's raised over the years
6 in the process.

7 Q. And what's your reaction to that?

8 A. Well, let's move to my ultimate judgments on the
9 process. We're just about to escalate the classification
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18 We were never able, to the best of my
19 recollection or exposure, ever to track any assembly of
20 those prisoners. We knew they searched for them, but we
21 never found any communications that indicated movement of
22 prisoners or holding of prisoners
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24 We then had an incredible number of reports of
25 sightings of people that would flow, often months or years

1 after the time of the alleged sightings. There were very
2 substantial ongoing efforts to look
3 for any sign of potential camps.

4 My ultimate conclusion, and one I have been very
5 reluctant to say in public because of the anguish to the
6 families is that in Laos there was never an effort to abide
7 by the Geneva Convention and that when they landed they
8 killed them, and that they didn't make any effort to
9 account for them or retain them.

10 I can come to no other logical conclusion for the
11 very significant number of people that we know made it to
12 the ground, for which there's never been any kind of
13 evidence subsequent to that for incarceration or holding.

14 And so my ultimate conclusion here is that Lee is
15 probably one of those.

16 Q. When you left PACFLT, did you think Lee was dead
17 or alive?

18 A. Dead.

19 Q. And on what did you base that conclusion?

20 A. On the absence of any indication of any prisoners
21 being held in Laos that I considered credible.

22 Q. Okay. Let's come back to that. Your third point
23 was that the House had asked you to investigate this.
24 Would you explain?

25 A. Yes. For reasons we could speculate on for a

1 long time, because I had appeared frequently before the
2 Committees on the Hill, a number of them who were otherwise
3 skeptical of the general relationships with the Executive
4 branch would from time to time ask me for my view on
5 topics.

6 It turned out there was a -- I don't know the
7 background of conversation briefings between DIA and the
8 Committees, but I received a call asking me would I look at
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Q. Did your investigation go beyond this?

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A. It did not.

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Q. It did not expand into --

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A. Did not ask for it and did not expand. I was specifically asked to give my own judgments about that.

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Q. We're going to come back to that in a little while. I want to work up to that, though, and I want to

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1 ask you some questions during the period you were at
2 Pacific Fleet.

3 Do you remember the terms

4 report, referring to downed American pilots?

5 A. I remember that there were flags or code words
6 used to flag anything that told you you thought there was a
7 pilot down, but whether was used, I'm sorry,
8 it's too many code words over time.

9 Q. During your time in the Naval intelligence
10 structure or the national intelligence structure, do you
11 remember the term

12 A. Yes, I do remember. Again, that was one that was
13 used, and wasn't it related to teams or efforts to go
14 search for?

15 Q. Did you see any reports on downed pilots?
16 Does that sound familiar?

17 A. It sounds familiar.

18 Q. When you were at Pacific Fleet, did you have
19 access to POW information?

20 A. There was daily reporting that flowed in with
21 regard to planes that had been lost, information on crews.
22 That information was pursued, briefed on a regular basis.

23 Q. Did your staff provide those briefings?

24 A. Yes, current intelligence staff.

25 Q. Did you review those briefings?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And they were briefed to the commander-in-chief?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Did anyone in your command at PACFLT keep track
5 of naval losses, for example, MIAs?

6 A. Not in the group that worked for me. There was a
7 -- we were divided into -- there was a current intelligence
8 division, a collection division, a targeting division. And
9 my recollection is that all of the files that related to
10 both targeting and downed aircraft were maintained by the
11 targeting division.

12 Q. They would have maintained a list of losses?

13 A. Not only a list of losses, but I believe they
14 would have maintained files. What I can't recall is what
15 the division of effort was between three different
16 organizations -- the Fleet Intelligence Center, Pacific,
17 which was located only a block away; the Pacific Fleet
18 Headquarters staff; and what we call FICPACFAC. That was
19 the photointerpretation center forward, an element of
20 FICPAC that was located at Subic Bay in the Philippines.

21 And what I simply don't recall is the division of
22 effort. My guess would be that the detailed files would
23 have been done at either the FIC or FICPACFAC, because the
24 Headquarters staff primarily was engaged, the CINC's
25 interest was engaged in what are you going to target, and

1 the general view that matters with regard to pursuing the
2 status of people would actually be done by the carrier task
3 force commander, CTF-77.

4 Q. Is it your testimony, though, that the Navy, the
5 Pacific Command, would have maintained its own?

6 A. I don't know that the Pacific Command, the
7 Unified command, I don't know what they would have kept,
8 because I never was exposed to that. But the Pacific Fleet
9 Command would indeed have tracked.

10 Q. Excuse me. I have to apologize. I'm confusing
11 the two, Pac Fleet and Pac Command. You were at PACFLT?

12 A. That's right.

13 Q. I have that on my notes.

14 A. And I don't recall ever seeing any of the files,
15 but, simply knowing the way in which they worked, almost
16 certainly there were files, not only on individual planes
17 that were lost, and pilots, but also on looking for POW
18 facilities.

19 Q. There were about 11 Navy personnel lost in 1973,
20 in the early months of '73. Would those losses have come
21 across your desk?

22 A. No. By the time I came back in '73 -- when we're
23 discussing the extent of losses, I'm going back to the
24 ROLLING THUNDER operations in the '67 to '69 time frame, in
25 all of our discussions to this point and the following,

1 when I was Chief of Current Intelligence.

2 I cannot pull out any instance in the spring of
3 '63 which comes to mind about specific aircraft or losses.
4 I thought the air war had been substantially cut off by
5 that point in time.

6 Q. We had losses through early March '73. One of
7 the most notorious ones, at least in POW folklore, is the
8 loss of what's known as the Baron 52, an EC-47 aircraft
9 flown by Air Force officers in which eight personnel were
10 lost on the 25th of February of '73. And MT
11 indicated that four had been captured alive.

12 Does that at all sound familiar?

13 A. The dates and the times run together. My opening
14 comment, I meant there was repeated information over the
15 years that indicated that there were people they were at
16 least searching for. It's hard for me to pull out ones
17 where they positively said they had captured them.

18 Q. In this instance, they did capture them, and they
19 were taken north. And in fact the MT traced
20 the route whereby they were taken north.

21 A. I don't remember where they actually were able to
22 track them going north, because, as I had indicated to you
23 earlier, I couldn't recall any where we actually had
24 movement once they had completed a search.

25 Q. If I can get organized here, there's a lot of

1 materials that we want to present to you. Have you ever
2 seen -- this was a list we have obtained from the Air
3 Force. This is just to refresh your memory of the kinds of
4 losses -- I'm sorry, men missing in action as of 2 April
5 1973. Had you ever seen anything like that before?

6 A. Not in this specific form or format, but the
7 general sense of the numbers and the rest I had seen in
8 various reports over time. So the extent of people lost
9 and unaccounted for I was very much conscious of.

10 Q. Did PACFLT have a list, do you think, of people
11 who were prisoners of war? You know, General Tighe, by way
12 of background, said that he had a list of people who he
13 expected to come out and who he thought were prisoners, and
14 it was about twice the number that actually came out.

15 A. I'm sure there was a list, because there were a
16 number of people who were organized. Now this helps zero
17 back in a little bit on the answer to the other question.
18 The organization to actually deal with Homecoming for the
19 Navy part was done from FICPAC, and specifically people
20 from both there and FICPACFAC were a substantial part of
21 the debriefing team.

22 And my recollection -- again, I was not there in
23 those years; I was away -- that they actually were
24 organized and ready with folders about individuals that
25 they expected to come. and I think had already been

1 preassigned debriefing targets of whom they were going to
2 do. That's folklore, long distance.

3 Q. You think those files would still exist?

4 A. I don't know, once you get through the
5 debriefing. There was a very colorful individual, a
6 commander, Nick Oakley, who had been at FICPACFAC when I
7 was 7th Fleet, and I believe he went back to be involved in
8 Homecoming. How good he was at keeping files, I don't
9 know, because he never even cashed his checks when they
10 came in. I can remember pulling open his desk and he had
11 five or six payroll checks he never bothered to deposit.

12 He was wealthy enough he didn't need the income.
13 So I don't know how good the detailed files would have
14 been, but I'm sure he's somewhere. I'm sure you could find
15 Oakley and there will be others who were involved
16 specifically.

17 There was a very able guy, Ken Robinson, who
18 later I knew. He worked for me a couple of later times. I
19 remember that he was one of the debriefers. So I'm sure
20 some of those people would have a very clear view of what
21 materials they had available and how they went about --
22 what the anticipation was at the debriefing time.

23 Q. Ken Robinson?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Is he still in the area?

1 A. I think he's probably retired now. He was at DIA
2 for one of his last tours, if not his last tour. But,
3 Christmas card exchanges, they were still here in the area.

4 Q. Do you recall Admiral Gayler's reaction to the
5 Vietnamese list? Admiral Gayler's reaction was sort of
6 public.

7 A. I do not.

8 Q. He is remembered as having expressed dismay that
9 the Vietnamese listed far fewer than they expected. Does
10 that sound familiar?

11 A. No. I don't have any recorded view of his view.
12 Even though this will be eventually public, I would simply
13 be candid to say that relationships between PACOM and
14 PACFLT were extremely strained,

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18 Q. Are you aware of any communications between
19 Gayler and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

20 A. None. Never exposed to any of them. He did not
21 keep the fleet commanders informed of his dialogues.

22 Q. What was the reaction at PACFLT when only 590
23 people came back after Homecoming on 28 March 1973?

24 A. Well, there was a great scramble as to how
25 accurate were our own counts in the process. You know,

1 I've heard many things in subsequent years about events
2 that we were not exposed to at that point in time. But it
3 was largely an issue of, again, mine was in fact very close
4 and personal. One of the issues was, was Lee Weisner going
5 to be on the list, and was he part of it.

6 And, of course, my recollection is that no one
7 who'd gone down in Laos was part of it. I do not know
8 whether that's accurate or not, but it's the impression
9 that was stuck in my mind from the time frame.

10 Q. The Pathet Lao released 10 people, one of whom
11 was a Canadian, 9 Americans, 7 of whom were military. As I
12 recall, most of them had gone down in Laos, but they had
13 been held in North Vietnam in North Vietnamese prisons, in
14 prisons where other returnees came from, but the two did
15 not know that each other were in the same prison, according
16 to subsequent debriefings.

17 So that raises the question, did you have access
18 to any of the debriefing materials? Did you see any of the
19 debriefings of the returnees?

20 A. No. My exposure -- I never saw, to the best of
21 my recollection, any of the actual debriefings of people
22 who came back. I was exposed later to a lot of stories.
23 We had a reasonable parade -- remember that I'm not at
24 PACFLT --

25 Q. In the fall of '73?

1 A. I didn't get there till December. I am at the
2 Vice Chief's office, and that was why I made the reference
3 much earlier to my exposure at the Vice Chief's office.
4 The exposure there was to senior former POWs who were
5 brought in to be interviewed by the Vice Chief.

6 I had my first exposure to Admiral Stockdale in
7 those times, to Jerry Denton, to Billy Lawrence, Johnny
8 McCain, and a number of others. I can't remember whether
9 Stratton actually came for an interview, but I saw stories
10 in the process.

11 So my exposure to the process was in that
12 interaction, which had two parts. One was to learn what
13 things were like. Most of the focus from where we were was
14 on misconduct and issues of misconduct and how to deal with
15 them, and particularly some very stressful allegations
16 about misconduct by some senior people from other services.

17 So my vagueness about detailed debrief and the
18 rest of it, if I'd been sitting at PACFLT as Assistant
19 Chief of Staff for Intelligence, I'm sure I would have been
20 fairly deeply involved and knowledgeable.

21 Q. In those interviews, did the issue of men left
22 behind ever arise?

23 A. Yes. There were lots of discussions about
24 whether they knew of anybody who'd been a prisoner who had
25 not shown up in the process. There were discussions in

1 that time frame, again partly, I am sure, sensitized
2 because of Admiral Weisner's own loss, of whether or not
3 there were people from Laos and what had happened to the
4 large number of people who were in Laos.

5 None of the people who came out that I can recall-
6 evidenced any significant knowledge of that block of
7 people. They knew of a lot of the ones who had actually
8 shown up in camps as their system had worked, but again the
9 overwhelming recollection I have from that time frame,
10 simply because it was the nature of the ongoing dialogue,
11 was assessing the mental health and physical health of the
12 senior people.

13 Could they be returned to duty? To what
14 commands? Were they ready for operational commands? And
15 issues of misconduct.

16 Q. We have had testimony by people involved in this
17 process that numbers up to 100 names had been given by
18 other returnees.

19 A. Of people that they had known?

20 Q. That they knew were alive when they left.

21 A. Entirely plausible, but I have no direct
22 knowledge.

23 Q. Let me move on. Had you ever seen this
24 memorandum? That message is a 22 March message from the
25 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Pacific

1 Commander?

2 A. No. But again it's not surprising, because
3 Admiral Gayler never shared with the fleet commander-in-
4 chief and staffs personal traffic that he exchanged with
5 the Chairman and the others.

6 And, just as a matter of practice, he might well
7 extract and issue orders, but he'd never give us the actual
8 detailed traffic.

9 Q. This message is a 220036 Zulu March '73 message
10 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I'm going to mark it as an
11 Exhibit.

12 [The document referred to
13 was marked Inman Exhibit
14 No. 5 for identification.]

15 A. The Chairman did not normally share his traffic
16 out with the services.

17 Q. And what it describes is, it's an order to not
18 commence the withdrawal of the fourth increment of
19 withdrawal until the U.S. has been provided with a complete
20 list of all U.S. POWs, including those held by the Pathet
21 Lao, and the first group of POWs had been physically
22 transferred to U.S. custody.

23 Do you remember a sort of hiccup in the
24 withdrawal process at all while you were at PACFLT?

25 A. See, I'm not at PACFLT then. I'm in the Vice

1 Chief's.

2 Q. The Vice Chief?

3 A. The Navy's Vice Chief.

4 Q. You're at Navy headquarters?

5 A. At Navy headquarters. I'm the executive
6 assistant to the Vice Chief from June of '72 to December of
7 '73. And we're out of the operational chain.

8 Q. I'm going to show you one more memorandum that I
9 know was above where you were at that time in case maybe
10 you'd heard.

11 A. Sometimes I got side exposure to some of this.

12 Q. On the off chance. This is a memorandum from the
13 Secretary of Defense, Mr. Elliot Richardson, dated 28 March
14 1973, the actual final day of Homecoming, and if you'd take
15 a moment to look at that to see if that recalls some of the
16 anguish or some of the concern about the lack of people who
17 came out of Laos and what the U.S. was prepared to do.

18 [Pause.]

19 A. I never saw this memorandum, but the sense of the
20 pressing to try to find more information on Laos I'm aware
21 of from, again, the Weisner connection. Admiral Weisner
22 had become the Vice Chief on 1 September '82, and served as
23 the Vice Chief until 1 September -- '72 until 1 September
24 '73, when he then went out to be Commander-in-Chief,
25 Pacific Fleet.

1 didn't honor the Geneva Conventions much later, after a
2 large accumulation of the inability to find any evidence
3 that would support that part.

4 Q. You were aware that prisoners in Laos were shown
5 in films made with the assistance of the Soviet Union --
6 Debruin and other people?

7 A. Every time something like that came up, it would
8 again stir.

9 Q. There was some evidence that they gathered people
10 together.

11 A. That part, that they had done it in Laos, doesn't
12 --

13 Q. Souphanouvong said they did that in March of '71.
14 He made a statement and it was backed up by defector
15 reports that said they had a policy. How well they
16 executed it is still a matter of debate between analysts.

17 I wanted to ask you a question about status
18 changes for prisoner of war. I don't have the memo here,
19 but the Committee has a memo signed by Mr. Clements in June
20 1973 in which he took upon himself the authority to make
21 status changes, and took that authority away from the
22 service secretaries.

23 Does that at all sound familiar to you? Have you
24 ever heard that before?

25 A. No. I've not heard of it, and have no

1 recollection. It would not be untypical of his approach to
2 being in charge.

3 Q. Would you comment on that a bit more, or
4 elaborate?

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11 It was simply he'd been a very effective
12 businessman by being pretty harsh and blunt about firing
13 people and taking charge, and that was his basic approach.

14 Q. When you were Director of Naval Intelligence --
15 this is moving on into '74 and '76, is that correct?

16 A. September '74 to July '76.

17 Q. Were you involved in any recommendations for
18 status changes of prisoner of war?

19 A. No. The Director of Naval Intelligence was
20 excluded from that whole process.

21 Q. Why is that, do you think?

22 A. I don't know. Remember that -- I don't know
23 whether the Air Force service intelligence chief was
24 involved or not, but the Navy intelligence chief was never
25 involved in any of the activities going on in Vietnam,

1 targeting in North Vietnam, or in the pursuit of things
2 afterwards. It was done as a personnel issue between
3 BUPERS.

4 Q. It was a personnel issue?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And the intelligence contribution was provided by
7 whom on these issues, would you say?

8 A. When there was an exchange, my recollection is
9 that it was done by dealing with DIA. I don't know the
10 history of when the special job was created for the flag
11 officer in DIA to deal with POW/MIA matters. It preceded
12 my time as DNI. It was ongoing.

13 There were a series of Navy rear admirals who
14 went through the job. My exposure to it is largely from
15 knowledge of those individuals and occasional statements,
16 and not a direct knowledge.

17 Q. How would it strike you -- I'm asking for your
18 reaction to something. We have information that Mr.
19 Clements overruled the service secretaries' recommendations
20 on status changes to POW, various services -- I don't know
21 the Navy percentage -- of 80 names while he was Deputy
22 Secretary of Defense.

23 Would that strike you as irregular?

24 A. Changing the status --

25 Q. Denial of status changes. In other words, the

1 service recommended that these men were known to be alive
2 in captivity and recommended that they be changed from MIA
3 to POW. And that was denied by the Deputy Secretary of
4 Defense on 80 occasions.

5 A. I have zero knowledge or exposure to those
6 events, so I'm not sure we gain anything by my speculating.
7 In my own dealing with Mr. Clements on a lot of other
8 topics -- budgets other things over the years -- I found
9 once he formed an opinion on a topic he did not easily
10 change his mind, and if he had taken a view that these were
11 being done for other than hard clear evidence in the
12 process he was very likely to come down and say, no, you
13 can't do that.

14 Q. Did you have any knowledge of his relationship
15 with the White House or Mr. Kissinger or Mr. Schlesinger,
16 Dr. Schlesinger?

17 A. Well, I observed that his relationship with Dr.
18 Schlesinger was somewhat strained. They were just very
19 different people -- Clements a very action-oriented
20 businessman, little experience in government; Dr.
21 Schlesinger a philosopher who'd been a long-time --
22 Clements had very little patience with long meetings or
23 philosophical discussions, and in my exposure to him
24 everything was either black or white and fast decisions.

25 His general view was that he'd come to run the

1 Pentagon, and therefore was determined to assert that
2 authority and run it. I'm sure you're aware of the
3 Clements cuts in intelligence, where he just decreed one
4 day that, because we hadn't told him about the Yom Kippur
5 war, that there would be 25 percent reduction in all
6 manpower and defense intelligence activities -- the
7 services and NSA -- 5, 10, and 10.

8 CIA was lucky to escape it because they were
9 outside his reach. But once he'd made that decision, he
10 was never willing to consider an appeal, and it was made on
11 sort of that basis. That's the only kind of background on
12 which I could make any judgment.

13 But if a set of circumstances popped up on
14 POW/MIA and he'd make a decision, the likelihood of his
15 changing his mind on that was remote. His being influenced
16 -- if the inference is would he have been influenced by the
17 NSC or elsewhere to do it, I'd be surprised, because I
18 think his dialogue there was reasonably limited.

19 Dr. Schlesinger dealt with that world more than
20 Clements.

21 Q. Okay. Your impressions are valuable. You were
22 there.

23 So would you have been aware of any White House
24 attitude or atmosphere sort of the way the White House has
25 a way of sending things through the Pentagon about POWs or

1 the Paris Peace Accords?

2 A. My exposure to the NSC and its functioning and
3 the rest of it really begins with my NSA time, and prior to
4 that it was extraordinarily rare when I had any exposure to
5 what they were doing, what their views were on any topics.

6 You know well from your own years there that
7 there is a general view in the city that knowledge is
8 power, and therefore there was not a great willingness of
9 OSD to share their dialogue with the NSC, even with the
10 JCS, and neither of them had much inclination to share with
11 the services the dialogue that went on.

12 Only during -- there was a period when I was in
13 the Vice Chief's office when Admiral Zumwalt had his own
14 dialogue with the NSC and Kissinger, and they would talk
15 from time to time. And Admiral Zumwalt was a great admirer
16 until the night of the riots, demonstration off the
17 Constellation -- San Diego, the blacks, and the television
18 films of their black power salute, on strike on the pier.

19 President Nixon was in Key Biscayne. He was
20 livid, demanded everybody be fired who was related with it.
21 Zumwalt was in California on a trip. Admiral Weisner
22 summoned him back to Washington. He said he wasn't worried
23 about it. His first way to deal with it was with his good
24 friend Dr. Kissinger. He put in a call to Kissinger, who
25 did not take the call, did not return it.

1 And if you read Admiral Zumwalt's book you can
2 sort of see his view about Mr. Kissinger changing
3 dramatically from that event.

4 I never saw anything else that came about
5 discussions with the NSC related beyond that time, which
6 is, I think, the fall of '72. So I was not really exposed
7 to exchanges back and forth again until my NSA years.

8 Q. Would Admiral Zumwalt be a useful person to
9 contact with respect to this POW issue?

10 A. He might well be. Remember that he commanded
11 naval forces in Vietnam for an extended period of time. He
12 was part of the JCS during the whole Operation Homecoming
13 issues, a terrible toll on him of his own son, who served
14 out there with Agent Orange and died of cancer. He's aged
15 a lot, but I would say yes, he's certainly worth at least
16 having some discussion. And he may have an insight into
17 NSC/JCS discussions, and Deputy Secretary of Defense ones
18 that I simply was not exposed to.

19 Q. Was the Navy involved and, by extension, the
20 Director of Naval Intelligence, in reporting on violations
21 of the Four-Power Joint Military Commission agreement, do
22 you recall?

23 A. Never exposed to it. I would suspect that there
24 would be some Navy involvement from Op-06, the DCNO for
25 Operations in their JCS exchanges in the process.

1 Office of Naval Intelligence throughout all those
2 years was focused on characterization of weapons systems to
3 support the acquisition process and on location of Soviet
4 navy and its activities worldwide, and interacting with
5 that flow out with subordinate commands.

6 They would track other activities related to what
7 was going on in a crisis -- i.e., was there going to be a
8 war in the Middle East, that sort of thing -- in the way of
9 daily briefings, but they were not involved in the other
10 ongoing operational activities which ran the DIA chain and
11 out to the CINCs.

12 Q. Let's go on, then, to the DIA chain. You were
13 Deputy Director. Was it Vice Director?

14 A. Vice Director. You will recall that was the time
15 frame General Tighe had been fired by Mr. Rumsfeld. Sam
16 Wilson was brought in as the Director/DIA, and there were
17 two vice directors, Linc Faurer, who had all of the
18 positive intelligence side, and Inman, who had all of the
19 administrative. I did have the collection operations, John
20 Hughes, et al.

21 But mostly I had the great joy of working with an
22 effort to try to try to build a NMIC and deal with all of
23 those overrun problems.

24 Q. That's the National Military Intelligence Center?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Did you know Admiral Don Whitmeyer, Donald
2 Whitmeyer?

3 A. I knew him from the time when I was in the Vice
4 Chief's office briefly, but he was not at DIA when I was
5 there. At least I don't believe he was still there.

6 Q. You were there in '76, is that right?

7 A. '76 to '77. I don't think Don was still there.
8 Maybe he was. When was Jerry Tuttle in the job?

9 Q. '79 to '81.

10 A. Then he may well have been, but that individual
11 reported to Linc Faurer.

12 Q. So, just to refresh your memory, you wouldn't
13 have seen this kind of a document on prisoners of war that
14 the DIA published? The cover letter is missing. It's
15 signed by Admiral Whitmeyer and is dated April '76.

16 A. April '76 was before I got there. I got there in
17 July.

18 Q. There's a series in April, July, and September.

19 A. I was given a copy of information that was
20 published, a huge amount that flowed through, so the odds
21 are that I would have read, seen or read, the document. I
22 don't recall it specifically.

23 Q. Would your concerns as the Vice Director be more
24 management oriented rather than substantive?

25 A. I was not happy with the decision to create two

1 Vice Directors as opposed to one Deputy, but, by natural
2 inclination, my preference would have been to be in the
3 substantive intelligence side. I was excluded from it,
4 except when I was the Acting Director.

5 Q. So you say it was more management oriented?

6 A. It was almost totally management oriented.

7 Q. Would that management orientation extend to
8 quality control over analysis of any sort?

9 A. No, no. Very specifically, that was all kept
10 under the Vice Director. He did his own analysis.

11 Q. Would you have been involved in overseeing or
12 reviewing the training and other kinds of things involved
13 with analysts?

14 A. No.

15 Q. So the management was strictly physical plant?

16 A. Resource allocations, Defense Intelligence
17 College, all the non-substantive intelligence matters.

18 Q. Would you have been involved in resource
19 decisions regarding the POW shop?

20 A. I was engaged in putting together a GDIP, General
21 Defense Intelligence Program, and defending that budget in
22 the Congress. Breaking it down -- was there ever a
23 breakdown that would show across all the analysts who was
24 in the various places? The answer is yes.

25 I don't recall ever challenging General Faurer on

1 those allocations.

2 Q. How would you characterize the priority of this
3 issue, if you can remember, back in the GDIP scheme?

4 A. I don't recall it from the budget side. Let me
5 tell you, though, the one event I recall that impacted on
6 priorities with regard to all of this matter. Joe Wilson
7 was away. I was present for the Chairman's briefing as
8 well as General Faurer and the bulk of his staff.

9 And an item on North Vietnam was briefed, and
10 General George Brown, the Chairman, just exploded and said,
11 with substantial expletives, don't you understand? The war
12 is over, and we lost it. And I don't even want to hear
13 about anything in North Vietnam.

14 Q. I was outside the room when that happened. I
15 remember that.

16 A. And clearly when the Chairman takes that view,
17 that the war is over, close the door, I don't even want to
18 hear about it any more, it reverberates across the whole
19 process in allocation of effort and going forward.

20 And, as I've reflected on it ten years removed
21 and looked back to understand the level of effort, there
22 was a very substantial sense among senior military people
23 that we had lost the war and to put it behind you and get
24 on to focus on new problems.

25 Did that consciously extend to the POW/MIA

1 effort? Never that I encountered directly. But I have
2 wondered in retrospect if that basic attitude didn't
3 permeate the intensity of assignment on that problem, as in
4 everything else related to Southeast Asia, for several
5 years.

6 Q. Let's move on to your period as Director of NSA,
7 and then we'll take a break. With that background, did
8 this color your interest, your activities, at NSA?

9 A. The thing which kept the question open for me, is
10 there any new evidence on it, I would have to candidly tell
11 you, was Lee Weisner -- the occasion calls from
12 CINCPACFLT/CINCPAC to pursue, if you've got anything.

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And that specifically one of the things still
flagged to be reported was any evidence of information
regarding potential prisoners or location of Americans.

1 organization.

2 But this is 3 December 1979. Here's what the
3 original is. This would be the Exhibit, but we'll work out
4 of this notebook. This is what it actually looks like out
5 of the files of NSA. Would you just kind of take a moment
6 to look at that?

7 Here's an orientation map of where that activity
8 is going on, far northeastern Laos.

9 A. And Sam Neua and Viang Sai. Yes.

10 [Pause.]

11 Q. Would something like that have been brought to
12 your attention?

13 A. The answer is probably not. Only if it was
14 assigned a high degree of validity. What would normally
15 happen with something like this is that it would flow to
16 the imagery, to the people who were doing liaison with NPIC
17 and DIA, though sometimes competition may have gotten in
18 the way of that.

19 In this case, it would appear this flowed from
20 CIA, not from NSA.

21 Q. It came from CIA to NSA to request --

22 A. Then, if it came in the process what would
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1 if you could find anything to confirm.

2 Most all of the materials that came from third
3 party were recorded. They were old when you got them.
4 They were not things which had the immediate relevance that
5 you might be able to immediately follow up and target
6 activity. Had it been on our own reporting and something
7 that you could follow up immediately, those would have been
8 flagged all the way up to the top.

9 Q. I'm just going to walk you through the sequence.
10 This is the first one, and it talks about the movement of
11 three U.S. prisoners of war from Viang Sai to southern
12 Laos. There was a second message related to this, and it
13 was to follow up, and it was issued on -- I can't see the
14 date.

15 A. It says: without compromising the source, request
16 you obtain any additional information.

17 Q. 4 December, right?

18 A. Barbara McNamara.

19 Q. Do you remember any of the other names on that?
20 Jack O'Dell?

21 A. No. Barbara, of course, I remember because she
22 was the head of the staff, and then of course Walt was
23 intensely interested and involved and pursued all these
24 things in the years he was chief of B Group.

25 Q. Pursue these things, do you mean prisoners of

REPRODUCTION

1 war?

2 A. Yes. And the more likely way, if there had been
3 anything that had been considered valid is that I probably
4 would have heard directly from Walt.

5 Okay.

6 Q. In this message there are DIA things. This is
7 another one from NSA, outgoing.

8 A. Querying the response. Did they ever get a
9 response?

10 Q. Let me move to the final message in the series.
11 Admiral Tuttle, as you know, you mentioned his name, is
12 here. This is another query on 19 January 80, this time.
13 And this is another from NSOC, and it's less formal.

14 A. These are what we call upscoms, informal
15 exchange.

16 Q. Do you recognize any of the people or parties on
17 that? Major Peterson is referred to, Jack O'Dell, Tom
18 Fogerty.

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22 Q. And then the final message. This is the final
23 message from in the whole series.

24 [Pause.]

25 Our understanding of the text of the message is

1 that the confirmation process is not complete. Is that
2 your reading of it?

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11 Why he was not ~~DATA~~-cleared, I don't understand.

12 Q. Our understanding is it looks like it's still an
13 open case at that point and there's still follow-up to be
14 done. Is that your reading of it? That's all we have on
15 this.

16 A. It just says the DATA assured me that
17 the head of the JCRC was being kept advised of any data on
18 hand and could not add any info related to the subject.

19 And then the handwritten note on the bottom
20 saying that he has asked Bill Mulligan to purge NSOC files
21 of any traffic on this subject on 13 February 80. Also
22 informed Bill Peterson of this in a.m. He will be in
23 Friday to discuss this with us.

24 Q. Would you comment on purging inside files?

25 A. If you decide that it's not a valid one to

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So what B Group still has or retained, I can't

Q. Our sense is that this was kept on for almost 90 days and that there really was no satisfactory answer. In depositions of some of the parties involved, we don't have an answer that there was ever an answer received from the

1 A. I don't remember it at all. It could well have
2 been in the process. Whenever you got anything that you
3 thought might be in those days, I read lots of sighting
4 reports, as I indicated to you much earlier, again in this
5 same time frame, where you had people come out who had seen
6 Americans somewhere along the way.

7 It turned out when you pursued them they were
8 four years earlier on the dock.

9 Q. We're concerned that maybe this was left hanging
10 because of a lack of resolution after a certain period of
11 time. Was there an automatic time period for NSOC to purge
12 its files?

13 A. I don't recall, but let's go back and deal with
14 the third party relationships here. And you really need to

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23 So you need to pursue at least enough on the
24 dialogue on this one.

25 Q. Is this in the category of the DATA has

1 primacy on this?

2 A. Yes.

3 MR. McCREARY: I'm going to let you ask some
4 questions for a few minutes and then we're going to break.

5 MR. TAYLOR: One question before we break. Why
6 would an order be issued to purge NSOC files if NSOC purged
7 its files or discarded traffic because it is a current
8 intelligence shop anyway after 30 or so days? Why would an
9 order be necessary?

10 You see this continued beyond the 30 days. As
11 you indicate, already it had gone 90 days, so it's been
12 kept open longer than the normal purge. Obviously somebody
13 then made a decision. I'm saying obviously. My conclusion
14 in looking at it is that at that point somebody said we're
15 not going to be able to get anything further out of the
16 rest of it, so NSOC's out of the loop.

17 BY MR. McCREARY:

18 Q. One of the concerns is it seems like this thing
19 just died, not just at NSOC but also the fact that NSOC
20 took primacy on this over B Group, and there are no other
21 follow-up B Group files.

22 A. NSOC picked up, to pursue -- if you go back and
23 look at the sequence of the traffic that you've got, you
24 have first B Group has gone out with a message trying to
25 follow up in the process.

1 Now what's not apparent to me from this is what
2 prompts the follow-up to shift, why B didn't continue to
3 follow it up, but why they had NSOC pursue it. I suspect
4 it's simply that they're there 24 hours a day. Let's let
5 them pursue why there's no answer.

6 You have this first query. It's still from B
7 Group. Then you shift. You still have --

8 Q. The formal messages are still from B Group --

9 A. They are still from B Group.

10 Q. -- But there are opscons from NSOC.

11 A. And it's not until you go -- what's that time
12 difference there? 19 January, and you still have no answer
13 coming back.

14 Q. Then you get to 12 February.

15 A. Then you get to 12 February, when NSOC gets in to
16 pursue why isn't there an answer.

17 Q. Is that because there had been no response?

18 A. And probably -- remember that -- I'm trying to
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1 whoever's head of NSOC and saying this guy at NCR isn't
2 answering the mail. What the hell? Over.

3 Q. That was our sense.

4 A. So O'Dell -- but it's interesting. Even the
5 opscon is still from Chief, B-5.

6 MR. McCREARY: Why don't we take a break for a
7 few moments?

8 THE WITNESS: Just one last sort of follow-on.
9 Again, the point of recollection over the four years,
10 almost four years, at NSA was that there was a morning
11 briefing highlighting activity from around the world, and
12 that there were times throughout that, if they had any sort
13 of information that they thought related to POW/MIA, it
14 would get flagged as a briefing item more or less to show
15 that they were still pursuing the topic.

16 BY MR. McCREARY:

17 Q. I'm a little surprised that something of this
18 magnitude doesn't kind of jump out at you.

19 A. You have to put it in the context of thousands of
20 messages a day and the whole range of activities and events
21 that are ongoing in that time frame, that it would not jump
22 out at all.

23 MR. McCREARY: Why don't we break?

24 [Recess.]

25 BY MR. McCREARY:

1 Q. We're back on the record.

2 This is our next Exhibit, 7.

3 [The document referred to
4 was marked Inman Exhibit
5 No. 7 for identification.]

6 Do you want to make any further comments on that
7 sequence of messages?

8 A. In responding to your question earlier about
9 being surprised that this wouldn't jump out, in my almost
10 four years at Director of NSA I don't recall a single query
11 to me from anyone at any of the other intelligence agencies
12 asking about level of effort or coverage on POW/MIA
13 matters.

14 I'm trying to set a stage and a forum for you.
15 The tasking that was there came from the SIGINT Committee,
16 and there was the constant challenge of what were the
17 priorities and how was it being spread. I was not a party
18 to the detailed dialogue, but you can go back to the people
19 who actually were. John Morrison, I suspect, still played
20 a role in many of those years at the SIGINT Committee, and
21 what the discussion was about the level of effort and
22 assignment of effort.

23 I heard informally from Jerry Tuttle in
24 conversations at the Chairman's mess on rare occasions how
25 unhappy he was about the general allocation of resources

1 and efforts broadly to resolving the problem as a general
2 impression, but to the best of my recollection never from
3 Admiral Turner or his deputy or others any questions in the
4 process.

5 Q. Any from the Director of DIA?

6 A. No. Gene Tighe, General Tighe, and I would
7 informally sometimes exchange views about the process and
8 where it was. I had not yet come down hard in my own view,
9 nor had he, on where things were at that point in time.

10 Most of the calls I got were a call that would
11 come from Pacific Fleet or PACCOM. Admiral Weisner had
12 seen some reference. Is there anything to it? So most of
13 the questions which caused me to go down inside to ask the
14 questions in fact came from that.

15 What that tells us is that the reporting going
16 out of these went out to operational commands, and then
17 they were flagged because of personal interest. But that's
18 where I got more calls and questions -- is there any
19 validity to that -- than any other way.

20 Q. I'd like to make a comment on that and share
21 something that we found, is that there seems to be
22 surprisingly little dialogue with NSA on this issue for two
23 decades, and that's reflected in NSA material, with some
24 frustration at the level of dialogue, and until very
25 recently, and Dave McManus has indicated NSA has done a lot

1 of recent work on this issue, but there's not even a lot of
2 SIGINT in the files that we have reviewed, which exceed
3 2,000 source files, or more.

4 It has struck me -- and I welcome your comment --
5 as odd, as an intelligence professional, that successive
6 Presidents, Carter and Reagan, have stated that this is
7 their top priority, intelligence priority, but there is
8 precious little NSA effort and resources allocated. In
9 fact, far more allocated to the '79 Chinese invasion of
10 North Vietnam than there were to this continuing problem,
11 despite Presidential public statements.

12 And there seems to be a great deal of
13 informality even in the CIA, which we're coming to. The
14 CIA statement of priority, we've had deputy directors of
15 operations tell us that there was no written statement of
16 priority *DATA* for POWs, but everybody knew that if
17 you came across you should report.

18 That's not quite the same as setting up
19 penetrations to try to find out who in the Vietnamese
20 ministry of interior, for example, was in control. So this
21 leaves us -- I don't know how to understand this.

22 A. John, I think the place for you to look to try to
23 understand is to in fact go to the SIGINT Committee. There
24 are files. That is the process by which priority was
25 assigned to topics. And simply look at what priority was

1 assigned by the SIGINT Committee.

2
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4 And I think what you're going to find is that
5 over the years there built up on the analytical side a
6 great deal of skepticism about the validity or value of any
7 of the *MT* on a topic, and that there was an
8 overwhelming reliance on *MT*. That's what the analysts
9 were comfortable with.

10 Whenever there was a HUMINT indication, they
11 would task *MT*, but not to see if you could get any
12 *MT*. And it is to some degree cultural on
13 judgments about the value of the information provided, that
14 it was not of value. And I think you would find, if you
15 were to go back to the wartime, you would find a
16 significantly higher value assigned to the *MT*
17 and its contribution at the operational commander level
18 than you would at the intelligence agency level.

19 Q. So you're talking about sort of a cultural bias
20 or bent against *MT* generally, not just this issue?

21 A. Generally, that it was of minimal value, whereas
22 *MT* they could *MT*
23 understand, nobody in-between in the process.

24 Q. Comment, if you would, on what you consider the
25 value of *MT* for POW issues, aside from finding a camp,

1 the obvious thing.

2 A. Again, I'm dealing from limited knowledge, but
3 from my limited knowledge the mindset from the withdrawal
4 on -- I really can't talk about it before the '76 time
5 frame, but from what I saw in the '76 time frame on, it
6 wasn't pursued of individual cases. It was looking for the
7 camps, where are hostages being kept.

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Q. Let's go to that.

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A. So I think that it would be interesting as you do
your own cross-section to look at it, but as I look back
all those years what characterized the look, it would not
be pursued of individual case files, at least from the
exposure that came in tasking. It was, is there a camp.
Where is there a camp?

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Q. The analytical task, as we've observed it, is
just the opposite, that even where there's a camp, if there
wasn't an individual identified by name or personality or
whatever distinguishing characteristic, then the report is
no good, is considered no good. There's a mindset that
way, too.

1 Moving to '81, because I know your time is
2 limited and we have a ways to go yet, MT

3
4 A. Do we have the original in our notebook here?

5 Q. It should be. We'll submit the declassified one
6 as an Exhibit and let you read the original one.

7 [The document referred to
8 was marked Inman Exhibit
9 No. 8 for identification.]

10 It's part of a sequence of events that hangs
11 together, and it says that 20 prisoners of war, American
12 prisoners of war, were moved from Oudom Sai in western
13 Laos. We'll let you pause to go through that file and
14 refresh your memory.

15 [Pause.]

16 You are reading right now a ... item for the
17 Director. Is that something that was written for you at
18 NSA?

19 A. Mm-hmm.

20 [Pause.]

21 The MT of things that would come. This
22 was an actual summary. This would have been an input for
23 the 24-hour summary.

24 Q. Below it is the supporting --

25 A. Yes. MT That doesn't tell you

1 what the source of CIA's collateral was, at least at that
2 point.

3 MR. TAYLOR: That comes later.

4 THE WITNESS: What we have next is the actual
5 going out *MT* And this *MT* as I recall, is

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9 I suspect that is out to *MT* not
10 a U.S. side, or coverage. Anyway, it was placed under

11

12 Ah, yes.

13 BY MR. McCREARY:

14 Q. They describe it as collateral, I think, but I
15 believe it was a real message.

16 A. It was, again, reporting that comes because of
17 that. Most of the material was taken out and reported as
18 though there were sources. It was only when you went back
19 that you found it was *MT*

20 MR. TAYLOR: Was that very common, for CIA to
21 report SIGINT as being collateral?

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BY MR. McCREARY:

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Q. That's correct.

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A. CIA rep believes December 80 case is a fraud.

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Q. Yes.

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A. The background. The in this case

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is a message. They were put together. As I said, I went

12

after the election, I went on a trip to Thailand, Australia

13

-- the other way around. I went to New Zealand and

14

Australia, then to Thailand, then to Hong Kong over about a

15

two-week time frame, not long after the election.

16

I figured if they'd won reelection they'd all be

17

celebrating, and if they lost the election the new group

18

would be putting up, and it was a good time to go on the

19

trip. That's why the things were put together to send to

20

me from the field.

21

So that's why there's a message. So there would

22

be somewhere a whole file of things that went to tell me

23

daily what was going on.

24

Q. This is a follow-up.

25

A. I saw where they asked whether there was any

1 aircraft activity.

2 Q. So you're following the train and in fact it all
3 goes down and what happens is it results in or is spurred
4 on by -- I don't have all the source material, but in
5 December of 1980, at the time of this activity, CIA
6 received some human source reporting that ties everything

7
8 A. Again demonstrating, I guess, the faultiness of
9 the memory, in my memory bank I had somehow put together

10

11

12 Q. This memo refers to that. The *MT* shows us
13 where the prisoners of war came from in Oudom Sai province,
14 how they were moved down into southern Laos, and then wound
15 up in and then the *MT* puts prisoners in

16

MT

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Would you comment?

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19 A. *DATA* That is the part I remember. The other
20 part, obviously if it was in the , it clearly came
21 out that there was evidence considered credible for the
22 movement. But I do remember the specific *MT*

22

or what they thought were the *DATA* and

23

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Q. You were the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence at this time.

1 A. Well, I got to the new job on the 13th of
2 February.

3 Q. So slightly after this. It struck us as strange
4 that we have a memo in which CIA characterizes this as
5 probably bogus or fraud.

6 A. The actual movement. They said earlier that they
7 think that the report was bogus on movement.

8 Q. But then the subsequent events tend to suggest
9 that it's not.

10 A. That it may not have been bogus. That is the
11 reading. And you have the internal NSA comment, as you
12 saw, when they came back and asked about aircraft, why
13 hadn't they told us that they thought they were being moved
14 by aircraft, because then you've got a whole different
15 target set you look for, as opposed to what's being moved
16 on the ground

int

17 *int*

18 Q. There seems to be some fumbling around. Were you
19
20 when you were Deputy Director?

21 A. No.

22 Q. That would have talked about these issues?

23 A. I was not exposed to identity of sources across
24 the board.

25 Q. If I say to you the letters referring to a

1 product line at CIA,

2 A. It rings no bell. That doesn't mean I haven't
3 seen it, but it just rings no bell.

4 Q. My question was, would that be a sensitive source
5 category?

6 A. Nothing tells me that automatically.

7 Q. The source was reported out as
8 . 19 December 1980.

9 A. almost sounds like it's controlled
10 information report or something like that that says it's a
11 serial for one of your own sources in the process.

12 Q. So do you recall being briefed on sources in
13 Laos?

14 A. I was never briefed on any sources anywhere
15 around the world who were paid sources to provide
16 information.

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THE WITNESS: The answer is no, not only then, but I was never exposed during any of my jobs to the actual -- any of the *MT* or other things used. My only exposure to that is after the fact, and the improper discussion or revelation of some of those details after the POWs came back.

But again that's because I was never AI. I was never an air intelligence officer. That was not part of the world in which I worked.

BY MR. McCREARY:

Q. Let me just try to bring this to closure. this

1 A. No, I was not.

2 Q. So your recollections are basically the files?

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BY MR. McCREARY:

8 Q. My question that I was leading to was, were you
9 aware that there were multiple phenomenology, intelligence
10 phenomena, that were reinforcing the sense of prisoners in
11 movement and in Laos?

12 A. The answer is no.

13 Q. So your testimony is that you had never seen the
14 SIGINT?

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The time frame I would set for you. When I came
back from my Far East trip, we plunged into the hostage
negotiations in Iran, and it became an all-consuming topic
-- the calls from the President, the calls from Cutler, the
pursuit of details to support became an around-the-clock
evolution, and anything else that came along I may well

1 have been briefed but simply didn't absorb, because all the
2 focus was on the efforts to get the hostages out of Iran.

3 Q. It seems to be a fairly common problem that spans
4 several decades gets overwhelmed by the moment.

5 A. Current.

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1 THE WITNESS: Again, I'm going many years back to
2 pull this out.

3 BY MR. McCREARY:
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Q. There's some allegation to that, but there are comparable reports about other areas, Sao Pao, for example, in Sam Neua, where there are sightings of alleged Americans who also hold the worst criminals of the regime, but the Americans are always held apart.

The sighting of the so-called Americans -- let me get my syntax right -- is a secret that is somehow leaked, and the pattern is that the normal Lao prisoners don't see, are not given access to other prisoners that are special. Let's call it that.

A. Elsewhere in Southeast Asia and in Vietnam, et al., is there evidence of mingling of POWs with native criminals or people being incarcerated?

Q. Almost no evidence of that.

A. Yes, that was my recollection. I didn't remember any instance of it, and that again weighed heavily, as I recall, in the evaluation here. The idea that they would be mixed is probably a mindset, but, because they weren't,

1 that it would be highly unlikely.

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5 A. That's correct.

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12 BY MR. McCREARY:

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BY MR. McCREARY:

Q. Let's move on to two more subjects. I don't know what your time is.

A. About 12:15.

Q. That's good. We have a very curious incident occurred, also in this time frame, around the 26th of January 1981, in which some high-level, including intelligence officials, have told us about prisoners still in Vietnam, and the Vietnamese conveying an offer to sell them back to the United States.

Had you ever heard of that?

A. Never, until I saw the press queries. I had

1 never heard of or seen anything about it.

2 Q. In your relationship with Mr. Casey, would you
3 have been brought into this?

4 A. That's one that I think, if there actually had
5 been an approach or offer to sell, that's the kind of thing
6 I likely would have heard about. Can't rule it out.

7 Remember that I didn't get there until the 13th
8 of February, and the issue is, is it still judged to be
9 valid or anything viable about it.

10 Q. Did you know Mr. Max Hugel?

11 A. Oh, yes.

12 Q. Would you comment upon him at all in a
13 professional sense?

14 A. Mr. Hugel was a very successful businessman
15 working with the Brother Sewing Machine business in Asia
16 who got involved in the political campaign in '80,
17 beginning in New Hampshire, working for Mr. Casey dealing
18 with ethnic minorities.

19 Casey became very attached to him as a can-do
20 guy. He brought him to CIA as the Deputy Director for
21 Administration. When Casey arrived, that was the job he
22 had. When I arrived in February, but shortly thereafter,
23 he made him the DDO for a brief period of time -- three
24 months.

25 Q. And he didn't succeed in that job?

1 A. Oh, it was -- well, it had been my judgment to
2 Mr. Casey and Bob Gates that he would not be successful,
3 but Casey went ahead anyway. But his departure wasn't --
4 he'd not had long enough to demonstrate competence one way
5 or the other. His departure was related to a series of
6 Washington Post stories on his business dealings in his
7 prior job, and he resigned in the middle of that.

8 Q. Did you know John Stein?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And what is your professional -- would you make a
11 professional observation about him?

12 A. A good, competent DDO. He had been John
13 McMahon's deputy for years. Dick Stoltz was brought back
14 to be interviewed, but he thought it was to become the DDO,
15 but it turned out the request from Casey was to be Stein's
16 successor. He declined and made the decision to retire
17 because he didn't get the appointment.

18 Stein stayed on as the deputy, and then Hugel was
19 fired Stein moved up and Clair George was brought in as
20 deputy.

21 Q. Do you remember any attitudes from the DDO
22 officers -- McMahon, Hugel, Stein -- regarding the prisoner
23 of war issue either as an important --

24 A. The only discussion I ever had of it was related
25 to the period of time when I was getting ready to brief the

1 Congressional side. I'm not even sure of the actual
2 individuals. But they certainly were -- at least for that
3 time frame the topic was on their agenda. So was
4 everything else around the world.

5 Q. As I mentioned earlier, there seems to have been
6 an informality about the prisoner of war issue, although
7 President Reagan had made some very strong statements about
8 it. Do you share that kind of feeling or is that your
9 recollection?

10 A. President Bush has made it a habit of actually
11 putting in place a memorandum in which he gives his
12 priorities for things to be done. I don't recall previous
13 Presidents doing that. They may have done it. It tended
14 to be more a question of their interaction with the DCI and
15 what the DCI then put into whether it's key intelligence
16 questions in the Turner years, or different kinds of
17 directives in other time frames.

18 Q. We don't have any direct evidence that
19 advancement in the DDO was in any way predicated on
20 reporting on prisoners of war, which is really the litmus
21 test of -- in other words, this reporting all goes to DOD,
22 which means there's no incentive for the DO officers to
23 report.

24 Am I missing something there?

25 A. Well, I would characterize it there are an awful

1 lot of things you do daily that aren't incentives for
2 promotion, and it does come back to sort of fundamentally
3 what's the overall priority that's been assigned and what
4 level is it in that process.

5 It is clear that the fast track for promotion was
6 finding some KGB defector, wherever you were, and that was
7 what was most likely to cause you to burst upwards in your
8 assignment. But every day these officers have a huge array
9 of requirements to work against, and particularly if you're
10 some substantial distance -- you've been out for six or
11 seven years -- the informality part isn't going to reach
12 you. It's down to what's there in the priorities, in the
13 process.

14 And that's why I dwelt a little on General Brown
15 and his comments way back. I think that general attitude
16 permeated across government, regardless of what Presidents
17 may have said in speeches. If you find evidence, pursue
18 it. Don't leave things.

19 There's also another topic we have not dealt with
20 here at all, and that's the flood of specious reports,
21 particularly coming out of Thailand by people trying to
22 sell information to the U.S. that they believe they want.
23 They will either get them a passport to the U.S. or get
24 them cash.

25 And there were Americans who were out there

1 involved. I have again just a sense that the overwhelming
2 volume of reports that flowed on any given day were from
3 out of that milieu, largely in Thailand, of people who were
4 fabricators who became ultimately documented, and it
5 produced a very substantial cynicism about the validity of
6 any of it.

7 I can remember one of the few conversations I had
8 with external people, a dialogue with Ross Perot, who had
9 initially taken the view of putting money in Bangkok to pay
10 for information, and then had reached a judgment himself
11 about the cynicism about it, that he only would pay for
12 delivery of an individual.

13 Q. About what time do you recall this?

14 A. When he was on the PFIAB, '81-'82 time frame.

15 But there is a long period of years in there in
16 which there was a very substantial flow, regular flow, of
17 HUMINT reports of people who turned over time to be
18 discredited -- actual fabricators selling information,
19 finding it was a very lucrative pastime, or soldiers of
20 fortune.

21 I had forgotten that Bo Gritz came to see to seek
22 some support from me for his ongoing wanting to go back for
23 yet another expedition, sure he could go and find. He was
24 a very engaging individual for the conversation, but as I
25 then went back to run the traps at Defense the word very

1 quickly was he is not a stable individual, and you all
2 should not get involved in any individual activities to
3 support him.

4 Q. Were you aware that he had had some official
5 relationships with the U.S. Army?

6 A. Earlier, yes.

7 Q. Can you put a time frame on when you reached
8 these conclusions?

9 A. About the large volume of fabricated information?
10 '81-'82.

11 Q. And where did you obtain this information from?
12 How did this come to your attention?

13 A. Talking to analysts, pursuing, asking questions
14 about it. Again going back to the beginning of this
15 conversation, much of my pursuit would be a story which
16 would originate somewhere in the immediate or whatever.
17 I'd get a call from Admiral Weisner. Is there any validity
18 to it?

19 So I would go to ask the questions. Almost all
20 of my dialogue over these years with analysts working on
21 this problem, . . . originate from my
22 asking them is there any validity to a report that's
23 appeared in the media or elsewhere, not from people
24 bringing to me judgments about things to convey.

25 Q. Did you read raw reports yourself?

1 A. Occasionally they'd bring them to me to show. In
2 this case, I want to say a guy named Bailey sticks in my
3 mind again as somebody who was a frequent American soldier
4 of fortune type in Bangkok who was a frequent fabricator,
5 it turned out.

6 Q. We have looked at a lot of reports here. As a
7 professional intelligence officer, every sighting over a
8 20-year period in which anyone, whether they worked for the
9 United States or not, or whether they worked for the other
10 side or not, which claims to have seen an American in
11 captivity is either a fabrication or a case of mistaken
12 identity. 100 percent of these reports are wrong, and
13 there's about 1,000 of them, or haven't been analyzed, and
14 yet 2,266 people are unaccounted for.

15 Those figures strike me as somehow distorted.
16 With that many people, white people, missing in Southeast
17 Asia, how can 1,000 people, all 1,000 people be wrong, or
18 maybe even more than 1,000?

19 A. Well, you had some sightings of people. The key
20 word here is "captivity," because a substantial number of
21 those reports of sightings were not of people in captivity.

22 Q. The 1,000 I mentioned --

23 A. Were they? The ones that I recall that were
24 brought to my attention may turn out to be people on a dock
25 in Laos alongside the river, and, of course, you have the

1 uncertainty of how many U.S. contractors stayed out with
2 families in Southeast Asia -- not a lot, but a few -- and
3 how many of those sightings correlated to those, how many
4 correlated to French expatriates who had stayed.

5 The part zeroed in for me was in captivity, and
6 that's, I guess, again, when I reached my own judgments as
7 the years passed, no camps found. A lot of people got to
8 the ground. No tracking.

9 You have now shown me a couple of reports here
10 that at least raise some prospect of some in captivity, but
11 it had led me to the judgment that they did not collect and
12 treat them as prisoners as the Geneva Conventions would
13 have required in Laos.

14 Q. You never saw any briefings on camps in Laos?

15 A. I saw lots of reports that there were camps, and
16 none that were ever confirmed over the time frame once
17 you'd go to pursue them. You'd get the reports. Gee,
18 they're keeping them in caves somewhere along the way.

19 Q. You're aware that we attempted rescue operations
20 on at least two occasions in Laos?

21 A. Without ever finding that there were in fact
22 prisoners.

23 Q. One was attempted and was canceled because the
24 attempted bribe failed, to bribe the Laotians.

25 A. Didn't they have another one where they were

1 going to do it and they concluded that there were not?

2 Q. There was one General Secord mounted DATA
3 in the '60s, late '60s, early '70s, and
4 they rescued 80 people, but the Americans had been moved
5 from the camp several days earlier. But they did a rescue
6 that included Air America employees of foreign nationality.

7 So, in other words, some of your statements
8 strike me as a little raising some sense of curiosity
9 because we have a 1972 -- I think it's a FICPACFLT document
10 listing, showing prison camps or reputed prison camps.

11 A. There were a lot of places that were put under
12 watch and were kept under watch and looked at for years as
13 prospective ones, and none of them, the best I could track,
14 ever proved to be valid.

15 Now you come to that over time, and have to say
16 then what happened. Do you really believe they're still
17 there as prisoners? Well, for what purpose? If they
18 aren't there, then you have to go back and reexamine all of
19 those conclusions that led you to that, and to say did the
20 bulk of them ever get to camps or were they in fact
21 slaughtered on the ground?

22 Q. We don't have a lot of evidence in Laos to
23 comment on that of direct slaughter. We have some evidence
24 --

25 A. Again, it's one of those things where we got no

1 evidence. It's in that great void of not knowing, and you
2 have to then make judgments of what likely happened.

3 Q. That's a curious question. The judgment seems to
4 be made that people are dead unless proven alive, yet in
5 fact our normal concourse of life is that people are alive
6 unless proven dead.

7 A. No. You accept that they were probably there
8 alive for seven, eight years, but then at the end of seven
9 or eight years you don't have anything to show any other
10 reason, then you go back and challenge your original
11 assumption. Your original assumption was that they were
12 alive, not that they were dead. But when you go that many
13 years and don't find any significant group of them, then I
14 think you have to go back and challenge the first basic
15 assumption that they were all alive.

16 But then what happened somewhere later on. Do
17 you think they took them out and killed them later? I
18 think that's a much tougher decision.

19 Q. The starting point, though, is a 29 March '73
20 statement by President Nixon that we have all our prisoners
21 alive. We have them all back. That was the President's
22 statement the day after Homecoming, and that sort of sets
23 the tone in a sense.

24 A. And doesn't that refer to Vietnam?

25 Q. That's all of our prisoners. It also included

1 the negotiations with the Lao on this. The Lao came out.
2 The guys supposedly held by the Pathet Lao came out on the
3 28th of March.

4 So there was an assumption, in-going assumption
5 in the post-war era, that there was certainly evidence to
6 the contrary.

7 A. I would just sort of conclude what I have to
8 constructively contribute on it by saying that in my own
9 mind I have separated events in Laos and Vietnam, that in
10 North Vietnam they did not always control the reaction when
11 somebody landed, but that there's a pretty solid base of
12 evidence that at least their whole approach was to gather
13 them as prisoners to move them to extract what information
14 they could and use them for those purposes.

15 There are issues of what did they do with those
16 who died while they were there, and particularly if they
17 died under torture or whatever, and whether they really
18 accounted for all of those.

19 Totally separate in my mind is the large group of
20 people who went down in Laos for whom we have no comparable
21 track of the accumulation, the extraction of information,
22 the effort to use, and that's what leads me back to the
23 same question to both of you in looking at it of did we
24 make a faulty assumption early of assuming that they took
25 the same approach in dealing with them that the Vietnamese

1 did.

2 Q. The interesting thing is that most people have
3 told us that, whatever happened in Laos was PAVN-controlled
4 anyway, because we were bombing areas where we weren't
5 bombing the Pathet Lao that much other than the CIA.

6 A. I'm less comfortable with that judgment as the
7 years have gone on.

8 Q. , but
9 my final question is about your time in PFIAB, and this is
10 not meant to be a challenging question, but it's meant to
11 be --

12 A. Our charter when we took office on the 29th of
13 July was to look forward, not to look back. And this whole
14 reconstituted board was put there to look forward.

15 Q. Into prospective intelligence issues?

16 A. Prospective issues, where investment ought to be
17 ten years out, as you start sizing down where the drawdown
18 is to be. The only time we pulled back to what happened
19 was in the very near-term warning issue.

20

21 A. Exactly.

22 Q. Past PFIAB boards have looked at analytical
23 judgments or analytical quality control type issues.

24 A. The President made it very clear that that wasn't
25 what he wanted this board to do. When he reconstituted,

1 what he wanted it to do was to go focus on where he
2 couldn't get advice elsewhere -- where ought he to invest
3 and where could he draw down as he drew down the size.

4 Q. You know of no past investigation or examination
5 of the performance of the intelligence community on the
6 prisoner of war issue?

7 A. I don't know of any. There may have been some.
8 Wasn't there something in the early '80s?

9 Q. Well, there was -- in the early '80s?.

10 A. Driven by Ross's interest in it while he was
11 serving on it?

12 Q. I don't know of anything.

13 A. I don't know, but I just had again it was a
14 question from him of looking at the issues.

15 Q. Did you know Ken deGraffenreid and people of that
16 ilk?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. What was his job, do you recall?

19 A. He was on the NSC staff as the principal
20 intelligence analyst.

21 Q. Do you know whether he may have done any
22 investigations of this?

23 A. I'm not aware of any that he did.

24 Q. Do you know of whether anybody ordered any at
25 that time?

1 A. No. No sign of any interest in it. I can't rule
2 out that there was some, but I never saw any.

3 Q. But basically during your tenure as DDCI this was
4 basically a DOD show and everyone else played a supporting
5 role?

6 A. Earlier than that. I would say this was
7 essentially a DOD show all the way through, with everybody
8 else in a supporting environment, and I suspect that's not
9 much different from how it was handled in Korea and in
10 World War II.

11 Q. Do you have any other questions?

12 MR. TAYLOR: I want to go back to the 1981 offer.
13 As I understand your testimony a few moments ago, you have
14 no knowledge?

15 THE WITNESS: Never heard of such an offer until
16 fairly recent media coverage.

17 MR. TAYLOR: Does the date January 26, 1981,
18 realizing this is before you came on board at CIA, does
19 that date have any significance to you?

20 THE WITNESS: None.

21 MR. TAYLOR: Do you recall shortly after coming
22 on at CIA any activity that Mr. Casey may have been working
23 on that may have been considered sensitive at the time?

24 THE WITNESS: Let's put it in context. An
25 incredible amount of what he did was sensitive. He arrived.

1 and his number one interest was the health of the DDO. And
2 so he began all-out, looked all across all of its
3 activities, and he had completed that assessment by the
4 time I came on the 13th of February.

5 And his basic assessment was it's a pretty good
6 crowd. They're timid. They've been so beaten down over
7 the years that they're not risktakers. But as
8 professionals in the business they're competent. It isn't
9 that there's a lot of deadheads in here.

10 Now whether he had gone into doing very specific
11 other things, I haven't a clue. But what I know was his
12 number one priority was to look as broadly as he could at
13 all their activities and assess. The transition team had
14 raised real issues of, one, competence, two,
15 trustworthiness, a whole range of issues largely flowing
16 out of the Senate Select Committee cross-cutting feuds with
17 the DDO.

18 And he had completed that, so I know certainly
19 where he put the bulk of his efforts, was on that broad
20 assessment.

21 But could there have been specific operations
22 along the way? I don't think there had been any new
23 findings. There might have been, but I don't think so.

24 MR. TAYLOR: Do you recall anything at all that
25 may have dealt with subjects pertaining to Southeast Asia

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1 that's going to take place in

2 So the crisis in all the last of January was

3 And indeed, when there was the annual
4 winter offensive it was viewed as, not from the analysts
5 reporting up, but from the political side looking down as
6 ah-ha, DeMaranche was right. Here is the challenge.

7 So Southeast Asia never got on the agenda for any
8 kind of discussion in those first weeks. If you go look at
9 all the task forces being put together at State and
10 elsewhere, it was how do :

11

12 MR. TAYLOR: I'm glad you mentioned that. Do you
13 know a Mr. Walter Raymond at NSC?

14 THE WITNESS: Yes.

15 MR. TAYLOR: Do you ever recall any meetings that
16 Mr. Casey may have attended possibly put together or
17 chaired by Mr. Raymond at the NSC dealing with strategy
18 pertaining to Latin America where one of the problems that
19 was discussed at these meetings was getting this Vietnam
20 syndrome behind us?

21 And one of the problems was this recurring POW
22 issue which keeps coming up, which slows up that process of
23 getting that Vietnam syndrome behind us?

24 THE WITNESS: Walt Raymond went to the NSC to
25 work, but he didn't go for a while. He wasn't there. He

1 was still in the DDO in the early stages. I don't know
2 exactly what job he had or how Casey encountered him, but I
3 know he became impressed with him and therefore sponsored
4 his going down to work for deGraffenreid, to work on the
5 issues of creating the foundations that were the
6 counterparts.

7 Casey had been very impressed by the German
8 institutions that were actually funded by Government, one
9 on right, one on left, that worked out in other countries
10 as non-covert action ways to do things. And my
11 recollection of his interest in Walt Raymond and his
12 function going down was to work on creating that structure.
13 I can't rule out that the get the Vietnam syndrome behind
14 us.

15 When Bill Casey talked about the Vietnam
16 syndrome, it was paralysis for acting. Never heard him
17 bring up the POWs in that process. But he would refer to
18 it as a paralysis to not be willing to act.

19 BY MR. McCREARY:

20 Q. Did he ever talk to you about POWs, ever express
21 his view?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Do you ever recall him saying we know they're
24 there, there's nothing we can do about it?

25 A. Never, no. That doesn't even sound like Bill.

1 Casey. Bill Casey's general view was, hey, if they're
2 there, there's a way to do something about it. It may not
3 be legal, may not be something you want to tell to
4 Congress. But the incongruity, to say they're there and we
5 can't do anything about it, that does not sound to me like
6 anything I ever heard him say.

7 Q. You don't recall any conversations at all?

8 A. No.

9 Q. My last question, unless you have anything more,
10 is simply is there anyone else you think, any directions
11 you can point us in in any way to plumb NSA, for example,
12 to find the DATA reports or anything, any new leads?

13 A. Sadly, Walt Dailey's death takes away the single
14 most knowledgeable individual. He ran B Group for a very
15 long time there. Have you talked to Barbara McNamara?

16 MR. TAYLOR: We've asked to talk to her, but we
17 haven't.

18 THE WITNESS: Because she's a very bright lady.
19 How much she will still recall this many years removed, but
20 she worked as a staff person supporting him.

21 Harry Daniels, who was his deputy, is now dead,
22 DATA -- DATA I think if you
23 haven't done it you ought to do the SIGINT committee and
24 look at assignment of priorities and effort.

25 BY MR. McCREARY:

1 Q. How about the files of the DCI? I know they'd
2 probably be difficult to get at.

3 A. There were files Admiral Turner had. He was a
4 methodical file keeper. I don't know where those are now,
5 whether they're still retained there, whether they were
6 transferred to storage somewhere else.

7 MR. TAYLOR: Are you talking about the Executive
8 Registry?

9 THE WITNESS: Yes. And he was a very methodical
10 file keeper, always was his whole life. So there probably
11 would have been DCI files related to POW/MIA in that time
12 frame. Casey was not oriented in that direction at all.

13 The only person who would really know would be
14 his secretary, who was very close to him, whom he brought
15 there. I don't know where she went when he died.

16 BY MR. McCREARY:

17 Q. Do you remember her name?

18 A. No, I don't. But he dictated to her hours at a
19 time, and she -- the reason I know he kept all his files,
20 those are the ones that Bob Woodward read when it came to
21 Veil time. He used to keep those himself. They didn't go
22 to the Executive Registry. But I don't know what has
23 happened to all of that.

24 MR. TAYLOR: Those are his personal notes that he
25 took with him or that were not part of the Executive

1 Registry, as you understand it?

2 THE WITNESS: Yes.

3 BY MR. McCREARY:

4 Q. This is Mr. Casey's?

5 A. Yes.

6 MR. McCREARY: Well, that's very helpful. We've
7 kept you five minutes than we promised, and I apologize for
8 that. But I can't thank you enough for the chance to share
9 your reminiscences with us and your experiences, for us to
10 profit from them. So thank you very much.

11 We suspend depositions on the chance that we
12 might have to get in touch with you again so we don't have
13 to go through the oath-taking and all of that, though I
14 don't anticipate that being necessary. It's been a
15 pleasure, sir, and we're adjourned for now.

16 [Whereupon, at 12:21 p.m., the taking of the
17 instant deposition suspended.]

18

19 _____
Signature of the Witness

20 SUBSCRIBED and SWORN TO before me this _____ day of

21 _____ . 19__.

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23 _____
Notary Public

24 My Commission Expires: _____