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Stenographic Transcript of
HEARINGS
Before the

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

DEPOSITION OF JAN SEJNA

Thursday, November 19, 1992

Washington, D.C.

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COMMITTEE CONFIDENTIAL
DEPOSITION OF JAN SEJNA

Thursday, November 19, 1992

U.S. Senate
Select Committee on POW/MIA
Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Deposition of JAN SEJNA, the witness herein, called for examination by counsel for the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, pursuant to notice, in Room S-407, The Capitol, commencing at 10:05 a.m., on Thursday, November 19, 1992, the witness having been duly sworn by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER, CVR-CM, a Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia, and the proceedings being taken down by Stenomask by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER, CVR-CM, and transcribed under her direction.

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1 APPEARANCES:

2

3 On behalf of the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs:

4 JOHN ERICKSON, ESQ.

5 Investigative Counsel

6

7 On behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency:

8 DOUGLAS O. BOWMAN, ESQ.

9 Office of Congressional Affairs

10

11 On behalf of the Defense Intelligence Agency:

12 FRED GREEN, ESQ.

13 Department of Defense

14 Special Counsel for POW/MIA Affairs

15

16 On behalf of the Witness:

17 BARRY G. STIEN, ESQ.

18 Benson, Stien and Braunstein

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THE WITNESS	EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR
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PROCEEDINGS

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Whereupon,

JAN SEJNA,

the witness herein, was called for examination by counsel for the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs and, having been duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE

BY MR. ERICKSON:

Q. Would you please state your full name for the record?

A. Jan Sejna.

Q. Your address? Your residence, where you live?

A. 1717 Sunrise Drive, Rockville.

Q. Your date of birth?

A. 5/12/27.

Q. And your Social Security number?

A. 579-72-6598.

Q. First of all, general, I'd like to thank you on behalf of the committee for coming in for this deposition. I expect this to be an unclassified deposition. I have no documents that I plan on showing you. As I stated earlier, when we take a break I'm going to review some documents, but as of this point, I don't think we will get into any classified information. If we do, I would expect the

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1 attorneys from CIA or DIA to so signal, and I will steer away
2 from it.

3 I have been informed by the Department of Defense
4 that you do not hold a security clearance. Is that correct?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. I am going to mark as an exhibit our authority and
7 rules.

8 (The document referred to was
9 marked Sejna Exhibit No. 1 for
10 identification.)

11 BY MR. ERICKSON:

12 Q. Did you receive a copy of this?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Do you have any questions that I can help you with?

15 A. No.

16 Q. I see that you brought counsel with you. Would you
17 identify yourself?

18 MR. STIEN: Counsel is Barry G. Stien, 1333 H
19 Street, Northwest, West Tower, Ninth Floor, Washington, D.C.
20 20005.

21 MR. ERICKSON: I see that the Defense Intelligence
22 Agency is represented. Would you identify yourself for the
23 record?

24 MR. GREEN: Yes, I am Fred Green. I'm a DOD special
25 counsel for POW/MIA affairs. And I am representing the Agency

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1 today.

2 MR. ERICKSON: And the Central Intelligence Agency
3 is represented.

4 MR. BOWMAN: I'm Doug Bowman, from the Office of
5 Congressional Affairs, representing the CIA.

6 BY MR. ERICKSON:

7 Q. Next I'm going to mark the notice of the Senate
8 deposition.

9 (The document referred to was
10 marked Sejna Exhibit No. 2 for
11 identification.)

12 BY MR. ERICKSON:

13 Q. Did you receive a copy of this?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And Exhibit No. 3 is the deposition authorization
16 signed by Chairman Kerry and Vice Chairman Smith. Did you
17 receive a copy of this?

18 (The document referred to was
19 marked Sejna Exhibit No. 3 for
20 identification.)

21 THE WITNESS: Yes.

22 BY MR. ERICKSON:

23 Q. We have received a copy of what purports to be a
24 summary of your resume. It's my understanding it was prepared
25 by your employer. Do you want to take a look at it? Is there

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1 any correction or anything that you have an objection to in
2 that summary?

3 A. No, I looked at it yesterday.

4 Q. I just want to go over a few ground rules with you.
5 I have several questions that I am going to ask you. If at
6 any time you don't understand my question, please ask me to
7 repeat. You have a right to review your transcript. You can
8 notify me, or you can call me. We will make arrangements for
9 you to come in. It takes about a week for the transcript to
10 be typed and come back to the committee. Or you don't need to
11 review it. That's strictly up to you.

12 MR. STIEN: For the record, we will review.

13 MR. ERICKSON: I will call you when it gets in, and
14 make arrangements for you to come up and review it.

15 BY MR. ERICKSON:

16 Q. I want to remind you that the deposition is under
17 oath. If at any time you want to take a break for the
18 restroom, or for smoking or for whatever else, just signal.
19 My plan is to go about an hour, and then take a break.

20 At any time if you want to consult with your
21 counsel, I expect you to do that. I think this will take
22 maybe 2 hours, maybe 2-1/2. So please don't feel rushed, and
23 try to understand the questions and give us as much
24 information as you can.

25 Do you have any questions on anything I've gone

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1 over, or what we are going to do today?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Have you been instructed by any Government agency on
4 what to say, or what not to say here today?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Have you been threatened directly or indirectly on
7 your testimony today?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Would you describe for the record a little about
10 your personal background, where you grew up, where you went to
11 school, and your military career?

12 A. I was born in Radhostice. I joined elementary
13 school, and after that gymnasium. And then the Germans closed
14 the schools, and I must go work like worker. And after World
15 War II, I joined the Communist Party in 1946, which my father
16 opposed because he was a member of the Catholic Party.

17 And because my background, some brothers of my
18 father were Communist, I was selected to grow in the party as
19 high as possible. So I was called to military service when I
20 was 20. And sent to the school for political commissars. I
21 finished the school in 1951, and was appointed the deputy
22 commander and political commissar for the regiment. I was a
23 lieutenant.

24 And 2 years later, I was appointed the deputy
25 commander of the brigade, and political commissar. And in

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1 1954 I was elected to Kologium, which is like Senate, and to
2 central committee of the Communist Party. I was the youngest
3 member of the parliament, and of the central committee of the
4 Communist Party.

5 And the same year I was appointed deputy commander
6 of the all engineer troops in Czechoslovakia. And in 1956 I
7 was appointed chief of staff of minister of defense. From
8 that position, I have in my hands everything that goes to the
9 minister from the Soviet Union Politburo government; and out
10 of the minister. I prepare for him all the comments,
11 everything.

12 And I was still a member of the parliament. In the
13 last 4 years, I was a member of the presidium of the
14 parliament, the leadership of the parliament. And in 1964 I
15 was appointed first secretary of the Communist Party, and the
16 minister of defense. Which means, from a party point of view,
17 I controlled the ministry of defense. I was in charge of it.

18 Since 1954 -- I mean '56 -- I was secretary of the
19 defense council of the Communist Party, which was the highest
20 body which controlled military forces, intelligence services,
21 and security forces. And I was secretary of collegium of
22 ministers of defense, who are the top military leaders. They
23 meet every week and discuss the major things for military.
24 And I was member of the bureau of the main political
25 administration.

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1 So I don't know if it is enough, but it was crazy
2 every day, some meetings and decisions. And I was also
3 chairman of the agriculture subcommittee in the party. So I
4 think that's it.

5 Q. What military schools did you attend?

6 A. I was, first I was in the school of political
7 commissars. That was 60 percent military training, and 40
8 percent Marxism. And after that, I guess in 1956, I studied,
9 how do you call it, the military college. You study at home,
10 and you give them the paperwork, and I don't know --

11 MR. STIEN: Home-study course?

12 BY MR. ERICKSON:

13 Q. Correspondence course?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. What year did you join the military forces of
16 Czechoslovakia?

17 A. 1950.

18 Q. And how many years did you serve in the --

19 A. Until I defected.

20 Q. And what year did you defect?

21 A. '68.

22 Q. So you were in the --

23 A. 18 years.

24 Q. 18 years. And what was the highest rank or grade
25 that you obtained?

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1 A. I was promoted major general in October of 1967. I
2 was colonel when I was 27, and general when I was 40.

3 Q. How would you describe your access to military
4 information in Czechoslovakia? By that, good? I saw
5 everything?

6 A. I saw everything.

7 Q. You saw everything. During your time in the
8 military in Czechoslovakia, were you ever stationed in another
9 country? Or were all your assignments in Czechoslovakia?

10 A. No, just Czechoslovakia. I mean, trips, yes, to the
11 Soviet Union, and Egypt, all Warsaw Pact countries, but I was
12 never stationed like military attache.

13 Q. What foreign language ability do you have outside of
14 Czech and English?

15 A. Russian, and a little bit of German.

16 Q. Did you learn your Russian in grade school and high
17 school?

18 A. No, I learned it when I was in the military service,
19 because we must take courses. And when I corresponded with
20 the military, the political military college, you have also
21 Russian. And of course I was every day with Russian officers
22 and generals. So they never learned to speak Czech, everybody
23 was learning to talk to them in Russian.

24 Q. Were most of your 18 years in the capital city of
25 Prague?

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1 A. Right. No, no, no, sorry. Since 1951, as I said
2 before, I was the deputy commander of the regiment in the city
3 of Terezin. And since 1952 I was the political commissar and
4 deputy commander of the brigade in the city of Litomerice.
5 And there I was until 1954. Since 1954 I was in Prague.

6 Q. Are you married?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Do you have any children?

9 A. Yes, two.

10 Q. How old are your children?

11 A. One is 40, and one is 4.

12 Q. 40 and 4?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Congratulations.

15 A. Born on same day and same month, different years.

16 Q. Do you currently have any relatives in
17 Czechoslovakia?

18 A. Yes, I have father, my sister, and her family.

19 Q. When is the last time you were in Czechoslovakia?

20 A. Pardon me?

21 Q. When was the last year that you were in
22 Czechoslovakia?

23 A. '68.

24 Q. '68. When did you arrive in the United States?

25 A. February of '68.

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1 Q. And what city did you first come to?

2 A. Washington.

3 Q. Are you a U.S. citizen?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And when did you gain your citizenship?

6 A. I got -- it was special bill by Senate, because I
7 travel a lot. And I had all these problems. So President
8 Ford signed a special bill, I think it was in '73, I believe.

9 Q. Did you bring any family members with you to the
10 United States?

11 A. My son, older son.

12 Q. The one who is 40?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Are you currently employed?

15 A. Yes, by DIA.

16 Q. When did you become employed by DIA?

17 A. '81.

18 Q. 1981?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. What are your current duties at DIA?

21 A. I am an associate researcher.

22 Q. Have your duties changed in the last 11 years, or
23 have you always been doing roughly the same things?

24 A. Roughly the same things.

25 Q. What do you research?

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1 A. Soviet Union and East European countries.

2 Q. And you prepare memos and position papers?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Have you ever held a security clearance by the
5 United States Government?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. You have held one, but you do not have one now, is
8 that correct?

9 A. Yes. I have to say one thing -- I was 2 years out
10 of Government, and at that time I worked for System Planning
11 Corporation in Arlington. And there I had so-called
12 industrial clearance.

13 Q. Since you came to the United States in 1968, have
14 you always lived in the Washington, D.C. area?

15 A. Yes, all the time.

16 MR. ERICKSON: Let's go off the record.

17 (Discussion off the record.)

18 MR. ERICKSON: Let's go back on the record.

19 BY MR. ERICKSON:

20 Q. Do you know what a polygraph is?

21 A. Sure.

22 Q. During your time in Czechoslovakia, were you ever
23 polygraphed?

24 A. They don't have the system.

25 Q. They do not have the system. Have you ever been

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1 polygraphed in your life?

2 A. Here in the United States.

3 Q. And how many times?

4 A. Two times.

5 Q. Do you recall what years?

6 A. When I came here, and 4 or 5 weeks ago by DIA.

7 (Discussion off the record.)

8 MR. ERICKSON: Let's go back on the record.

9 BY MR. ERICKSON:

10 Q. You had a conversation with two investigators from
11 the U.S. Senate Select Committee, is that correct?

12 A. Right.

13 Q. The polygraph that you just mentioned, was that
14 before or after your discussion with Mr. LeGro and Mr.
15 McCreary?

16 A. Before.

17 Q. Were you ever polygraphed after you talked to
18 investigators from our committee?

19 A. No.

20 Q. When did you obtain your job with DIA? You said --

21 A. 1981.

22 Q. 1981. How did you obtain your job? Did you see an
23 advertisement, or did a friend tell you about it, or what were
24 the circumstances?

25 A. No. I exactly don't know how it happened, but I

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1 think some agencies of Government helped me to get the job.

2 Because I was called for an interview, and I got the job.

3 Q. I am now going to focus on some questions about your
4 service in the CSSR, when you were in the armed services of
5 Czechoslovakia.

6 A. Right.

7 Q. You stated earlier that you joined the armed
8 services when you were 20 years old?

9 A. Let's see --

10 Q. I thought that's what you said.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. When did you join the --

13 A. 1950.

14 Q. 1950.

15 A. Yes, I was probably a little older than 20.

16 Q. Were you drafted?

17 A. Yes, I was drafted.

18 Q. Did you join as an officer or an enlisted man?

19 A. No, I was drafted an enlisted man.

20 Q. And then you rose to the rank of major general?

21 A. Right.

22 Q. During your 18 years, did you ever see any combat
23 action?

24 A. No.

25 Q. You said that you were never stationed outside of

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1 Czechoslovakia. You did take some trips. Obviously, you
2 weren't in World War II. Did you ever visit Korea, or did you
3 participate in any way in the Korean War?

4 A. No. Oh, I mean not in Korea, but -- no, no.

5 Q. Okay. What about the Vietnam War? Did you ever go
6 to Vietnam? Or did you in any way participate in the Vietnam
7 War?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Do you have a college degree?

10 A. Well I guess the military college is the same level,
11 no? But not civilian, no.

12 Q. All of your training was in Czechoslovakia, or did
13 you go to school in Russia and other countries?

14 A. Never.

15 Q. What would you classify as your major course of
16 studies?

17 A. Military political college.

18 Q. Do you hold any other postgraduate degrees, outside
19 of those that you obtained from the military colleges in
20 Czechoslovakia?

21 A. No.

22 Q. What was your military specialty?

23 A. I was brought to engineer corps.

24 Q. The engineer corps?

25 A. Yes. And after then, just military-political

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1 career. Except then I was chief of staff for minister of
2 defense. It was not political position, it was not political
3 commissar. I was simply in charge of all his staff.

4 Q. When were you first elected or appointed to the
5 parliament?

6 A. '54.

7 Q. And how many years did you serve in the parliament?

8 A. Until I defected, '68. Until '68.

9 Q. And you said you were chairman of the agriculture
10 committee?

11 A. I was chairman of the agriculture subcommittee, that
12 was in charge about technology, agricultural technology I
13 think, because of my background, probably, my father was
14 farmer. And I was the last 4 years a member of the presidium.

15 Q. Were you ever in the Czech military intelligence
16 service? Something similar to the GRU of the Soviet Union?

17 A. Never.

18 Q. Were you ever in what would be similar to the KGB in
19 Czechoslovakia?

20 A. Never.

21 Q. What were your major assignments in Czechoslovakia,
22 if you could kind of detail the dates when you were at various
23 commands, to the best of your ability?

24 A. You mean the most important posts?

25 Q. Yes. Yes, please.

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1 A. I would say the most important position was the
2 chief of staff of minister of defense, and after then first
3 secretary, because the chief of staff of minister of defense,
4 as I said before, everything would go to minister from foreign
5 countries, especially Soviet Union, would go through my hand.
6 Everything what goes through government, politburo, defense
7 council, I prepare.

8 I had special office which was Secretariat of the
9 defense council, which has all the documentation in their
10 hands. And, of course, I had those section which take care
11 about guests of minister, visitors, mostly Soviets, but any
12 visitors from any country. So I think there I had most
13 information which anybody could have.

14 Q. And your resume indicates you were chief of staff to
15 the minister of defense --

16 A. Right.

17 Q. -- in 1956.

18 A. Right.

19 Q. How long did you serve in that position?

20 A. Until 1964 -- 8 years. And after then I was the
21 First Secretary of the Communist Party.

22 And from there -- I want to finish this -- from that
23 position, chief of staff of minister of defense, I was
24 secretary of the defense council, which again I have to
25 repeat, not because I was secretary but because the power of

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1 the committee, the collegium of ministry, had meeting every
2 week, the defense council approximately every 2 weeks.

3 The members of the defense council were seven
4 members: First secretary and president of Czechoslovakia was
5 chairman; prime minister was member; minister of defense,
6 minister of Interior, which is like Soviet KGB; the chief of
7 state planning commission was member; and deputy to first
8 secretary, second secretary of the party.

9 Are they seven already or I forgot somebody? But
10 they were seven of the most important members in the
11 hierarchy.

12 Q. In the hierarchy of the Communist Party, where is
13 first secretary?

14 A. Well, the first secretary is the most powerful man,
15 or was, in the country, because without him nobody can do
16 anything, especially military. He was also chairman of the
17 defense council, of course, and without him you cannot do
18 anything, you know? Minister was in his office every Monday.
19 I report that was going on, he give me order what to do. So
20 he was the most important person.

21 Q. Did you have access to sensitive information in all
22 of these positions that you've detailed?

23 A. Absolutely. The highest secrecy.

24 Q. Did you have access to information on
25 Czechoslovakian military activities outside of Czechoslovakia?

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1 A. Yes, because most of these things must go through
2 the defense council. It was not just some individual activity
3 of some agent. But if it means every important activity,
4 like, let's say in Korea or other places in whole world,
5 trained couriers and all these things, of course it goes to
6 defense council.

7 Q. And your access to this material was by reviewing
8 messages and papers and discussions?

9 A. Sure. Plus I was sitting there, and when they
10 discuss it I make notes. After then I must type it. It must
11 go back to the minister, he sign it, go with that to
12 president, like chairman of the council. He signed it, and I
13 delivered it to members of the defense council or anybody who
14 got order from defense council to do something -- foreign
15 minister, anybody who was involved.

16 Q. Okay. You said your highest rank was major general?

17 A. Right.

18 Q. Is that a two-star general?

19 A. One.

20 Q. One.

21 A. One.

22 Q. So the U.S. equivalent would be a brigadier general?

23 A. I think correct.

24 Q. Next, I want to ask you some questions about your
25 position as the defense secretary. How did you become the

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1 secretary of the defense council?

2 A. Because -- I have to explain it. Officially, who
3 was secretary was minister of defense. I was the -- I don't
4 know how to say that in English -- I was the guy who did
5 everything, who prepared everything, sitting in defense
6 council, make notes, and they changed something because to
7 defense council goes the -- everybody must, for anything,
8 mobilization or whatever, for an activity, present it to
9 defense council some documents.

10 So when they go through, usually we have like 12,
11 maybe 15 documents which defense council must approve, and the
12 session was always afternoon. And if they changed anything, I
13 make notes. After then, I had a special staff for defense
14 council which was in the secretariat of ministry of defense,
15 special guard. And when it was done, I must go through again
16 and sign it and deliver it to everyone who was concerned.
17 That is why I say I think it was many times Russians were
18 present and they delivered some orders.

19 Q. And you were in this position from 1956 to 1964?

20 A. Right.

21 Q. For 8 years.

22 A. Right.

23 Q. Okay. Was membership in the Communist Party
24 required for this position?

25 A. Oh, absolutely. Absolutely.

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1 Q. Is this a government position or a party position?

2 A. It was the party government, because if you can go
3 to Czechoslovakia, you see the documents which the defense
4 council passed, the defense council said to minister of
5 health, to minister of foreign affairs. They give them order.
6 Same like politburo is party, but they give order to
7 everybody. You know, nobody can move without them.

8 Later on, when I was already here, they changed the
9 name and make it the highest council of the -- of the defense
10 of the country, or something like that. They tried to make it
11 legal, because people complained it was actually illegal under
12 party. It was not under constitution, it was -- but who can
13 complain at that time?

14 Q. I'd like to focus on when you were there. In the
15 relationship between the Government and the party, which was
16 the most important?

17 A. To me? The party. The party was power.

18 Q. The party, in essence, controlled the Government?

19 A. Absolutely. Absolutely.

20 Q. During these 8 years that you were in this position,
21 would you describe the main individuals or the main
22 departments that you worked with, be they the Communist Party
23 or the military? Who did you have the most contact with
24 during these --

25 A. Well, the most important was, as they call it,

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1 administrative department. But they changed name many times
2 because it was cover name. They were department A, after then
3 department 11, after then department 14, and finally the name
4 was Administrative Organs Department. So if you hear it you
5 would think they take care of some administration or work.
6 But it was the department which controlled military forces,
7 everything that was related to defense, intelligence, and
8 contracting. Generally, they controlled ministry of defense
9 and ministry of the interior.

10 And I forgot to say before, last 4 years, I was also
11 member of that department. I was first secretary of the party
12 at the ministry of defense, and member of the department.

13 Q. So this would have been from 1960 to 1964?

14 A. No, from '64 to '68.

15 Q. Oh, okay.

16 A. I mean, from '84 -- '64 to '68. Sorry. '84, I was
17 already here. It was the most important because these people
18 are so powerful they even discuss if minister should be fired
19 or not. What can I tell you?

20 Q. You indicated that you attended meetings. Who did
21 you write reports for, or who did you report to?

22 A. Well, when I was chief of staff of minister to
23 minister or defense council or this department. Those were
24 the three major.

25 Q. Are you familiar with the term, insider? Would you

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1 classify yourself as an insider in the Government and in the
2 party during this time in Czechoslovakia?

3 A. Yes, I do. It means you are in.

4 MR. STIEN: Off the record.

5 (Discussion off the record.)

6 THE WITNESS: Yes.

7 BY MR. ERICKSON:

8 Q. Next, I'm going to go to information on POW's. In
9 your interview with our investigators, you stated that you had
10 knowledge about POW treatment during the Korean and Vietnam
11 Wars, is that correct?

12 A. Right.

13 Q. And you met with two investigators from our
14 committee approximately a month ago?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Would you describe -- did you contact them, or did
17 they contact you?

18 A. They contact me through DIA.

19 Q. In the interview, and in your book Red Cocaine, you
20 describe Czechoslovakian medical support to the North Koreans.

21 A. Right.

22 Q. I apologize for having you repeat a lot of
23 information that you've written about and given, but that's
24 the nature of a deposition, so would you describe for the
25 record what type of medical support Czechoslovakia gave to the

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1 North Koreans, the dates, and other information of that
2 nature?

3 Q. Czechoslovakia had hospital in Korea -- North
4 Korea -- which the activity of the hospital was actually to
5 train the military personnel for the war, the Czech personnel,
6 and test some drugs. That was the major activity of that
7 hospital.

8 Q. There was one hospital, or more than one hospital?

9 A. To my best recollection, one, but I'm not sure
10 because we -- at that time, I was not chief of staff of
11 minister of defense. This is for the -- the knowledge is for
12 the -- for the discussion, from the documents which go to
13 defense council about test the drugs. And they always said
14 hospital, so I don't know if it was two or one.

15 Q. Do you know the date or dates the hospital was
16 built, when it was constructed, when it was manned by
17 Czechoslovakian doctors, and when did they turn it back to the
18 Koreans?

19 A. I don't know when it was built, but I think it
20 operated there 4 years, until end of the war. So exactly what
21 year or month it was built, I don't know.

22 Q. How many Czechoslovakian doctors or nurses or
23 medical specialists were at the hospital, if you know,
24 approximately?

25 A. You mean through that 4 years or just at the time?

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1 Q. What would be the normal staff of the hospital?

2 A. I would say up to 10 doctors?

3 Q. And the purpose --

4 A. They changed them, I think, 6 months, you know, they
5 trained them.

6 Q. And what was the purpose of the hospital?

7 A. The purpose was train the Czech medical personnel,
8 military, for the next war, prepare them, because it is
9 different if you are in the peacetime, different if you are in
10 the war time, and test the drugs.

11 Q. What kind of drugs, if you know?

12 A. To my best recollection, I have to say -- I have to
13 think about the names, if you need it, because I have notes
14 which I wrote when I came here that I cannot find at this
15 time. But drugs control the mind, for example, of the
16 military people in the wartime.

17 Q. Okay. Now what -- I want to go back -- you told me
18 that you entered the -- you were drafted in 1950. What was
19 your -- what was your job in the Army between 1950 and 1953?

20 A. 1950, 1953, I was deputy commander of brigade.

21 Q. In Czechoslovakia?

22 A. Sure. In Czechoslovakia.

23 Q. Since you stated you didn't have any -- you weren't
24 in Korea, how did you happen to learn about this information,
25 and when did you learn about it?

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1 A. Well, first of all, I know about it since '54 -- I
2 mean, direct knowledge from the discussion of the defense
3 council, discussion in collegium. Because, for example, we
4 invited to the collegium doctors which were involved in war in
5 Korea. They reported to collegium to test the results of the
6 test of the drugs.

7 Q. Did you ever, in the college, hear a lecture by one
8 of the doctors that was in this hospital in Korea, or did you
9 read about it?

10 A. No, no. I heard it in the collegium of minister,
11 where they go directly and report it to the top military
12 people, the results from the tests.

13 Q. But my question is, you read their reports or did
14 you listen to them, or orally give their reports?

15 A. Both, because if they wrote the reports, 100 pages,
16 not many people have time to read it, so we always invited
17 them to collegium and they talked to the members of collegium.

18 Also, I must say the Soviet top military people,
19 they lectures us every -- I would say twice a year, and they
20 used some statements about the results of the test of the
21 drugs.

22 Q. So you first learned this information in 1954 when
23 you were attending courses or reading other material, is that
24 your statement?

25 A. I'm just thinking.

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1 Q. Please take your time.

2 A. I must say I learned before that also, but mostly
3 from friends, not official documents or official statement
4 from Russian general or whatever. This official-unofficial; I
5 tell you for example, when they build the hospital in Korea, I
6 think 1952, the -- because the engineer troops, they were --
7 they had also the construction units or whatever.

8 And also, the people who take care about the mines
9 and these things -- I don't know how to say -- so we were
10 asked, our brigade, to select some people for the purpose go
11 to Korea one day. So it was, I think, '52 when the military
12 looked for these professionals to send them to Korea.

13 But officially, the papers, the lectures, and
14 documents since 1954.

15 Q. Where do you think these documents that you saw
16 would be stored today? Or would these documents have been
17 destroyed?

18 A. If they were destroyed, I don't know. I was not
19 there. But it must be most of them in party archives.

20 Q. In the Communist Party archives?

21 A. Right, I think. Plus, of course, if the defense
22 council give order to, I don't know -- let's say, example, --
23 appoint General Rudolph Babaka ambassador or charge d'affairs
24 to Korea, these documents should also be in the ministry of
25 defense. I'm just thinking where could even be small pieces

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1 if they destroyed the documents from the defense council,
2 which I don't know.

3 Q. Well, understanding you've not been in
4 Czechoslovakia since 1968 --

5 A. Right.

6 Q. But based on your knowledge of the operation of the
7 government and the people, do you think these documents would
8 still be available today, in the archives somewhere?

9 A. If Russia didn't take it, the Soviet Union, I would
10 say yes.

11 Q. Do you think the present Czechoslovakian Government
12 would make these documents available to a U.S. Government
13 committee?

14 A. This is what I want to tell you, because when I
15 talked to your staff and people from DIA, they asked me some
16 names, for example, to give them some names.

17 I would like to tell you, for example, that General
18 Babaka, who was in Korea like charge d'affairs, but he
19 controlled everything, he was military intelligence officer,
20 this guy is sort of Stalinist. I cannot imagine this guy
21 would tell somebody anything. But there are people who must
22 have knowledge, you know. About this guy like him, I'm even
23 afraid he can make even personal revenge how much he hate
24 United States and so.

25 But on the other hand, there are guys like my best

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1 friend, and you can believe he was best friend, was Dr.
2 Bednar, to whom I told I will defect to the United States,
3 because he visited United States and so on. He was not even
4 member of the Communist Party. He works at central military
5 hospital in the psychiatric department where they test the
6 drugs, and so on. This guy would be very happy to help.

7 And I'm trying to contact them personally for my
8 reason to prove I am right.

9 MR. ERICKSON: Why don't we take about a 5 or 10
10 minute break.

11 (Recess.)

12 MR. ERICKSON: Let's go back on the record.

13 BY MR. ERICKSON:

14 Q. General, is there anything that you want to change
15 or modify in anything that you've told me so far, bearing in
16 mind that you're going to have an opportunity to review the
17 entire transcript. But I always give witnesses a chance to
18 change something or if you've had a chance to think about
19 something that you said that you want to correct, we can do
20 that now if you'd like to.

21 A. No. I just want to say one thing for the record.
22 The gentleman who talked to me from your committee.

23 A. Mr. LeGro and Mr. McCreary?

24 A. Yes. In that memo they wrote, they said I'm willing
25 to go back to Czechoslovakia with them and help them talk to

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1 some people. I think Mr. Green agrees he was there.

2 I said absolutely the opposite from this. I said I
3 would never go to Czechoslovakia because of the death penalty.
4 I was still not rehabilitated. The country is full of KGB...

5 What I will do there, I told them, if they invite
6 their people, let's say to Germany or United States, I'm going
7 to help and talk, but never go back to Czechoslovakia. I'm
8 not in a hurry, I hope. Maybe I one day I will take my son
9 and we'll older, but not now. So it was wrong in that
10 statement.

11 Q. What memorandum are you talking about?

12 A. What they wrote after the meeting. It was published
13 in newspaper. It leaked to the press.

14 MR. STIEN: That's what came out in the LA Times,
15 something to that effect.

16 THE WITNESS: I think it was the Los Angeles Times
17 that published.

18 BY MR. ERICKSON:

19 Q. But you're not talking about a committee memo that
20 you saw, you're talking about a newspaper article?

21 A. Yes. And I saw also the memo, I'm sorry.

22 MR. GREEN: Could we go off the record for a minute?

23 (Discussion off the record.)

24 BY MR. ERICKSON:

25 Q. When was Red Cocaine first published?

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1 A. I would say it's probably already 2 or 3 years.
2 Actually, it was not very much published, you know.

3 Q. Would you summarize what you saw in the documents
4 that you read or heard about concerning any American POW's in
5 Korea and their treatment at this hospital?

6 A. Well, as I told you, for was the practice and the
7 analysis of the health, physical health and mental problems of
8 the soldiers, Korean and American soldiers.

9 I would like to tell you big sample. When they make
10 autopsy of the bodies, they came to conclusion -- and you can
11 probably find it in documents -- that 22 percent -- I remember
12 like today the young American soldiers already passed as; they
13 called many heart attack. Koreans, I don't know, 2 or 4
14 percent.

15 So from these things, this analysis, they make
16 conclusion for the next war why Americans, what to do, maybe
17 make more heart attacks. I'm just telling you example. These
18 were things which were not related to test of the drugs,
19 Soviets or Czechs. These were related to the different live,
20 different country.

21 And second thing was the test of the drugs which
22 Czech participate with the Soviets on the program.

23 Q. So am I to understand this hospital was staffed by
24 both Czechs and Soviets?

25 A. Officially, just Czechs, but Soviets were there

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1 also, because they advise everything.

2 Q. And you say the tests were done on both
3 Americans --

4 A. And Koreans.

5 Q. And South Koreans or North Koreans?

6 A. I'm sorry, but I don't know.

7 Q. Were any numbers of tests revealed, like for example
8 we tested 100 soldiers or 25 or do you remember?

9 A. This I have to explain. For example when we discuss
10 it with DIA, if they said in the report which goes to the
11 Defense Counsel even later on because the program continued,
12 the program which they started in Korea continued through
13 Vietnam War, test the drugs. Not autopsies by Czechs in these
14 things, but the drugs.

15 If I say, let's say, to DIA and to repeat it if they
16 said, we test 120 soldiers on the brain damage by the drugs
17 and we test 60 soldiers about heart problem, I don't know if
18 these were separate soldiers. I just don't know. I don't
19 somebody to take me wrong, because maybe one group of doctors
20 they test the brain from same body and the other maybe livers
21 and the heart.

22 So, I must say like in -- well, we are talking about
23 Korea now.

24 Q. I'd like to stay focused just on the Korean War for
25 now if we could.

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1 A. I understand.

2 Q. My purpose of my question, General, is to try to
3 find out the contents of the documents, how detailed they were
4 or was it more written as a medical report or do you remember?

5 A. Talking about the hospital, it was the medical
6 problems, the interrogation of the soldiers from intelligence
7 point of view. It was strictly conducted by Soviets and
8 Koreans. We got results from that, but I don't know how many
9 soldiers they interrogate, how many they were officers or
10 whatever.

11 I'm talking right now about the hospital.

12 Q. Well, the Korean War, as you know, was a UN conflict
13 and there were soldiers from many different countries. Did
14 they specifically name United States or American or were they
15 Caucasian prisoners of war?

16 A. They were most interested about Americans and
17 Koreans, because different ethnic group, you know, the drugs
18 work different on Koreans or let's say on black Americans and
19 white Americans than the drugs affected Americans. So they
20 will not worry if they will find Australia or let's say,
21 whatever troops were there, but they were most worried --
22 worried, more interested -- about United States troops.

23 Q. But in hearing these lectures or reading the
24 reports, they made a differential between the black Americans
25 and the white Americans?

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1 A. Yes, absolutely.

2 Q. To the best of your knowledge, how many pages or how
3 many documents are there that you saw that discussed this
4 particular testing in Korea?

5 A. Well, first of all, at least twice a year. How it
6 works, the Defense Counsel, as was everything in Communist
7 country, everything is planning. So I must present to Defense
8 Counsel plan for one year, which all the government officials
9 and everybody give me request what they want to send to
10 Defense Counsel.

11 And after them, if it was the most important
12 security things, you must send report to Defense Counsel about
13 any issue -- let's say industrial espionage -- you must send
14 them if the order was to steal from French and British
15 technology. If you have there 3 months, the intelligence
16 services are for this and this, so maybe they send every 3
17 months. But if not, every 6 months we must present to Defense
18 Counsel a report how the plan -- how the different agencies
19 achieved the goals which Defense Counsel gives them.

20 So at least twice a year, if nothing goes awry, we
21 must present this report to Defense Counsel, because end of
22 the year you've asked for the budget. Okay, comrades, you
23 give us such an order, Ministry of Defense and Interior, we
24 did this, this, this for the next year. We need such a
25 million for other operation.

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1 Q. Well, directing your attention to this medical
2 experiment which you said took place roughly from 1949 to
3 1953, the end of the war, were the Czech doctors doing any
4 experiments in 1956 or 1957? Or were they still relying on
5 the records from the Korean War?

6 A. When Vietnam War started, it was other source of the
7 information. But after the Korean War, I think they just go
8 ahead what they had because they test something on the
9 prisoners.

10 Q. So what you're saying is, this issue was constantly
11 being reviewed and updated every 6 months?

12 A. After the Korean War, I would say yes.

13 Q. I'm asking because your statement is a very general
14 one that every 6 months all issues were being reviewed.

15 So my question is, do you remember this as being a
16 standing issue or policy that you reviewed especially when you
17 were in the Minister of Defense for 8 years?

18 A. At least once a year, absolutely. When we sent
19 report what was done over last year and what for we need money
20 for next year. You cannot do anything without decision of
21 Defense Counsel.

22 Q. But what type of things, if you remember, were being
23 discussed about the testing of drugs on American service
24 members?

25 MR. STIEN: What time?

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1 BY MR. ERICKSON:

2 Q. Anything that you can remember. I'm trying to
3 narrow down the type of report. Basically, what you've told
4 me so far or what I've heard is that there was this hospital
5 setup in Korea from roughly '49 to '53. And do you remember
6 seeing reports and do you remember early in your military
7 career hearing some lectures about certain tests that were
8 done on Koreans and Americans at that time?

9 You have further told me that at least once a year
10 and maybe twice, this policy or the study of drugs and the
11 effect on American service members was being reviewed. So I'm
12 trying to get a little more detail of what was being said in
13 these reports.

14 And I understand that, with your impressive
15 credentials, there was a lot of paper that went through your
16 desk. But I'm merely asking if you remember anything specific
17 about this at any time that you were in Czechoslovakia on this
18 narrow issue. And if you don't, I understand.

19 A. What I want to tell you is this issue, chemical
20 weapons, biological weapons, drug, different drugs, it was not
21 just mentioned like special issue. It was special, but also
22 if you discuss the future war, which you discuss almost all
23 the time from different angles, you have there the effect of
24 this, because otherwise of course we have to win the war and
25 beat NATO and all these things.

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Q Do you have, even if these reports - let's say you
had a operation plan in the general staff, which is a top
secret document. The member of the Defense Counsel, they go
to the general staff. The document can never be taken out
of general staff. There we were sitting 2 days with the chief
of general staff and Russians explain the next war and they
mention, say, NATO has this, we have this. And they mention
again this problem, the drugs, biological weapons, et cetera.
A It was not one occasion when you mention these
things, no one document. It was, I would say, not 100, but
few other documents. When they mention this problem, like
very important weapons against NATO.

Q Do you ever recall hearing any lectures or reviewing
any documents of any other East European bloc country having a
similar hospital in Korea during the Korean War?

A No. I never heard about it.

Q Bearing in mind that there were troops from some
Western European countries, do you ever recall any tests being
done on French soldiers or British soldiers or any other
nationalities outside of Koreans and Americans?

A To my best recollection, when they summarize it,
what effect on the white in this thing, of course, Europe was
included. But I never saw a report which said special tests on
Koreans. I didn't see all reports because at that time I was
not in Defense Counsel. But what I saw or what I heard when

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1 Soviet lectures us, if they mention Europe, it was like global
2 effect.

3 Q. This Czech hospital in the Korean War, you said
4 earlier that it was built by Czech engineers?

5 A. Yeah. We had --

6 Q. Do you remember any detail on the size of the
7 hospital or as, I believe in the hospital language, how many
8 beds, how large was it?

9 A. That I have to think about. I don't want to give
10 you a wrong --

11 Q. Do you know if there was any Czech intelligence
12 people assigned to the staff of the hospital?

13 A. Of course they were. As I told you, General Babaka,
14 he was the chief of the GRU and he was charge d'affaires or
15 ambassador, we called him, who was in charge about all
16 operation in Korea. It is why they send General there.

17 Q. In the Czechoslovakian Army, do you have medical
18 doctors that are in military uniforms?

19 A. Absolutely everyone.

20 Q. And the doctors assigned to the hospital in Korea,
21 were they Czech military doctors or were they Czech civilian
22 doctors?

23 A. Military.

24 Q. Do you know if there were any nurses assigned to
25 this hospital?

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1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. Do you recall how large the staff was at any one
3 time?

4 A. No. I have to think of it, because I was more
5 concentrated on how many nurses or people who work for the
6 laboratory. I don't know.

7 Q. Was this hospital strictly for research or were they
8 actually treating other medical emergencies?

9 A. It was strictly research and a training.

10 Q. Do you remember hearing or seeing any documents
11 where the Czech intelligence personnel would interrogate any
12 of the prisoners of war/patients at this hospital?

13 A. Well, who did everything and controlled were
14 Russians. Czech help. Because, you know, if they treated a
15 patient, somehow you have opportunity to talk to him. Maybe
16 he is willing to talk better than if somebody take in special
17 room and interrogate. In this case, the Czech participate.
18 But originally was completely in charge by Russians.

19 Q. Do you know or do you remember -- again, I'm always
20 referring to what you read or heard on this issue -- where the
21 patients or prisoners drugged prior to interrogation or was
22 there any information about that?

23 A. Regular drugs, like marijuana or whatever, I don't
24 know. This is what you mean?

25 Q. No, I'm wondering, was there any information that

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1 you read or heard about when they interrogated the prisoners,
2 were the prisoners brought in under some type of influence of
3 drugs or not? Or did they even address that?

4 A. Drugs which they got from the Americans?

5 Q. No, drugs that they got from the hospital, that the
6 hospital --

7 A. Oh, before they interrogated them? Oh, yes, yes,
8 sure. Because they also test these drugs, what is the memory
9 and everything, sure.

10 Q. Was there any information on the length of stay at
11 the hospital by some of these patients, if you recall?

12 A. No. I don't know.

13 Q. Was there any information whether Soviets were
14 present during any of these interrogations?

15 A. They orchestrated everything. You can not do
16 anything without them. Because it was Soviet order for
17 Czechoslovakia to build the hospital.

18 Q. Do you recall the names of some of the drugs that
19 were used at this hospital?

20 A. That I have to take a look at my notes, because I
21 make some notes after I defected. I'm not a doctor, you know.

22 Q. I understand. Do you know if there were any guards
23 at this hospital?

24 A. Absolutely.

25 Q. Were they Soviet, Czech or North Korean guards?

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1 A. What Czechs have there were not regular military,
2 but they were military contract agents which is under Ministry
3 of Interior.

4 Q. Was there ever a mention of any North Korean guards
5 at the hospital?

6 A. Yeah. They were there mainly for deception to show
7 them outside it is Korean.

8 Q. Was there any evidence -- you mentioned that this is
9 a research hospital? Do you know if any North Korean troops
10 were ever treated at this hospital or was this mentioned?

11 A. I don't know that, because if they mentioned it,
12 they say Korean soldiers. If they were both sides, I don't
13 know.

14 Q. And again, you don't remember the size of the Czech
15 medical team?

16 A. The medical team? I said before I think it was
17 around 10 doctors.

18 Q. And how many nurses?

19 A. It was changed.

20 Q. I understand. They would be transferred in and out.

21 A. Right.

22 Q. Was there a Soviet medical team there also?

23 A. Sure.

24 Q. Do you remember any names of any people that were
25 ever stated at this research hospital?

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1 I realize, General, we're going back many, many
2 years, but perhaps a name or some of the reports you might
3 recall, some doctor that gave the lecture. Maybe he or she
4 was present in Korea or anything along that line.

5 We're just trying to get as much information on this
6 subject that you can remember.

7 A. I would like to ask if it will be maybe possible to
8 come back, look all my notes.

9 Q. Well, my suggestion would be this. If it's
10 agreeable to your counsel, when you come to review your
11 transcript, you might, please feel free to bring your notes
12 with you. And in the transcript you're going to see where
13 I've asked the size of the hospital and the drugs and that.
14 And when you come to that in your transcript, then you can
15 fill in the answer. I think that would be easier for
16 everybody.

17 A. Okay.

18 Q. If there was a commander at this hospital, who would
19 that commander report to back in Czechoslovakia? What
20 department of agency would the hospital have been under?

21 A. Everything goes through intelligence service, GRU.
22 I mean, the channel, the communication. General Babaka was
23 again in charge, because everything was based on the military
24 operation. The civilians didn't have anything to do with
25 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and so on.

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1 So all this information go through GRU and from the
2 GRU, it goes to the medical team or researchers in
3 Czechoslovakia.

4 Q. You mentioned earlier he was in charge of
5 intelligence, but also the ambassador to North Korea.

6 A. Well, because, at that time, any foreign policy
7 didn't have any reason. The main thing was military operation
8 and it is why they officially appointed me charge d'affaires
9 or ambassador, but he was GRU because everything was under
10 control of GRU.

11 Q. To your knowledge, is he still alive?

12 A. I don't know. I didn't have 24 years contact with
13 anybody, because I didn't want to put people to dangerous
14 situation. If he is alive, he will live in probably, in
15 Moravska Ostrava because it was his home town. And what I
16 heard when I was already here, he was appointed military
17 commander of that region or something like that. If he is
18 alive, I don't know. Probably when Communism collapsed, he
19 gave up.

20 Q. To the best of your knowledge, were there any other
21 Czechoslovakian soldiers or civilians anywhere else in Korea
22 during the Korean War or was it just this one location?

23 A. No, they were more Czechoslovakian to help with
24 construction, especially when the war moved back from North
25 Korea. They were much more people.

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1 Q. Do you have any idea of their location or was it
2 basically just moving throughout North Korea?

3 A. I don't have idea about location, but you know, it
4 was in the papers. But it's not easy to remember the official
5 names. I just remember, I think, one document in 1952 or
6 something I saw.

7 There was fight about budget because the Minister of
8 Defense and Interior request more money in foreign currency
9 than the Minister of Finance can give them. And it was not
10 for military operation. It was for the others. So there were
11 other people and other operations in Korea.

12 Also, military equipment and --

13 Q. Was it the general policy of the Soviet Union when
14 they task Czechoslovakia to go and do these projects in Korea
15 to reimburse or to increase the aid to offset some of these
16 expenses?

17 A. Oh, yeah, absolutely.

18 Q. Do you know or did you ever read about any of these
19 other Czech advisers, construction or ordinance people, even
20 having any contact with any American POW's? Or was it just at
21 this hospital?

22 A. Well, if they have the contact with the other POW's,
23 I can just guess, I would say I don't think so. But I never
24 saw anything.

25 Q. Switching to the tests, could you give us some

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1 examples of what kind of tests were actually performed in
2 Korea?

3 A. As I said before, there were different drugs which
4 they would test. All reason was war, prepare for the war, how
5 such drugs can affect troops, for example, affect the mind,
6 affect the decision process, again, related to the war. Or
7 drugs which could be effective for a heart attack and this
8 type of drugs. Everything not drugs which will improve not
9 health or something. Everything related to the war, how it
10 will affect NATO troops, operations.

11 Q. From the tests, who would receive the results? This
12 would go, you said, to the intelligence agency in
13 Czechoslovakia? Was this then disseminated throughout the
14 Warsaw Pact or to the Soviet Union?

15 A. To the Soviet Union and Soviets decide where to send
16 it, if they give Bulgarians or Germans. I don't know. I just
17 can say when we have joint meeting of the Warsaw Pact, like
18 Marshal Grechko and his people, they mention it in front of
19 all ministers of the general staff. But how much they give,
20 they decide, the Soviets, not Czechoslovakia.

21 Also, if let's say, Czechoslovakia cooperated with
22 Germany because they were a very effective, especially Vietnam
23 War, the Soviets said, you will cooperate with these German
24 scientists. Because it was so top secret they control who has
25 clearance to participate.

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1 Q. Do you have any idea who devised the tests, who came
2 up with the idea, maybe we should test this drug? Did this
3 come out of Czechoslovakia or Russia or who made up the method
4 of testing?

5 A. The method of this testing, how to use it, I think
6 it was some joint -- I must say the Soviets didn't control
7 every day if you give the soldier shot. But generally they
8 give the instruction, what to do, how to do it. Of course,
9 the Czechs have rights to say we recommend this or this,
10 because of the scientist work.

11 But again, major decisions and approve the test was
12 in Soviet hands.

13 Q. So the actual approval came from the Soviet Union
14 rather than Czechoslovakia?

15 A. Yes. Soviets. Czechs can say what they think, but
16 Soviets make decision because they have own research.

17 Q. And I believe you stated earlier that the reason for
18 Czechoslovakia going to Korea was based on request from the
19 Soviet Union to do that.

20 A. Absolutely. Soviet coordinate everybody, this
21 project, how many each of satellites, put technology and all
22 these things was coordinated.

23 Q. Were there any other Warsaw Pact doctors at this
24 hospital or were they strictly Czechoslovakian?

25 A. No, it was Czech, Soviet.

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(Recess.)

BY MR. ERICKSON:

Q Let's go back on the record. Once again, General, is there any statement that you've made that you'd like to change or modify in any way?

A No.

Q Do you have any information on how the Korean or American patients were obtained for the hospital?

A No.

Q Was there any information in the lectures or documents that you saw on what happened to the patients after the experiment was over?

A They have to die. They don't have choice, because many of these people were mentally destroyed.

Q Did the method of death, was that ever explained? Were they shot or did they treat them with some drug that caused instant death? Or was that ever explained?

A I just -- it was not even in the document, in the report of Defense Counsel, the Chief of General Staff explain that order of Soviet Union, any soldier or any person who die under this program, nobody can never find anything, body, bones or something, you know. So whether they cremated them, I don't know. But it was order from Soviet Union and they strictly control it.

Q And those would have taken place at the hospital of

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1 did it say?

2 A. Didn't say.

3 Q. I want to focus in now on the chain of command, the
4 organization of the hospital. Do you know who was in charge
5 of the hospital in Korea? Was there a commanding officer or a
6 chief administrator or how was the hospital organized?

7 A. About that, I don't know too much.

8 Q. And what organization or organizations in Prague
9 would the hospital report its findings or any information that
10 they wanted to relay to Czechoslovakia?

11 A. I can tell you who was involved in this program,
12 which was the health administration, military health
13 administration, which was under the rear service, chief of
14 rear service. The chief of rear service was General Chlad.
15 He was former Soviet citizen.

16 Q. He was a former Soviet citizen?

17 A. Right.

18 Q. Do you know if he is still alive?

19 A. I don't know. Before I left he hadn't died. Who
20 was involved was, is they call it, Scientific Institution of
21 Air Force and Central Military Hospital and of course, GRU,
22 Czech GRU and Ministry of Interior, the Czech KGB.

23 Q. On the construction of the hospital, once again, who
24 constructed the hospital?

25 A. Was who in charge was the construction

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1 administration, military construction administration.

2 Q. Do you know who planned the construction and the
3 layout of the hospital? Was it done by Czechs or by Soviets?

4 A. Czechs. Architecture Institute, military again.

5 Q. So the Soviets were not involved in the planning of
6 the construction?

7 A. Well, they were involved because they have their
8 advisers, so called. Without them, you cannot write one page.

9 Q. Who paid for the construction of the hospital?

10 A. Czechoslovakia. Was gift to Korean people.

11 Q. What was Czechoslovakia's interest in the Korean
12 War?

13 A. You mean generally?

14 Q. Generally, yes.

15 A. Well, the major interest was always help our
16 countries to win the war, to prove to United States they
17 cannot win the war. It was the major interest.

18 The second interest was when the Chinese must step
19 in to do everything possible, push them out, because the
20 Russians didn't want Chinese to expand power. And there was
21 this research and experiments for the war.

22 Q. Where would the documents for the planning and the
23 construction, the actual plans, where could they be found
24 today? In what agency would they have been kept?

25 A. The health administration. I don't know if it's

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1 correct translation. Architecture Institute, officially, in
2 Czechoslovakia they call it Vojenski Projektovy Ustav,
3 Institute of Projects. Does that make sense in English?

4 Q. Various reports were coming back from this hospital
5 periodically. Did the Czechoslovakian Army or Security
6 Service ever use the results of any of these tests, either
7 quote, on enemies of Czechoslovakia?

8 A. Sure, all the time.

9 Q. Am I correct, you said this was part of a large
10 scheme to quote, fight the next war. And this was updated and
11 was part of basically an annual review?

12 A. Exactly.

13 Q. Were any of the US prisoners of war from Korea ever
14 taken to Czechoslovakia?

15 A. To Soviet Union. To Soviet Union. You mean from
16 Korea?

17 Q. Yes. We have this hospital in Korea that, according
18 to your testimony the way I understand it, was doing
19 experimental drugs on American POW's.

20 So my question was, was all of the testing done in
21 Korea or were some of these prisoners transported to
22 Czechoslovakia?

23 A. For test, to Czechoslovakia, no. To Soviet Union,
24 because from the reports -- I don't know how many -- from the
25 reports they still continue after war, continue test.

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1 Q. In the Soviet Union?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. So you have seen some documents whereby some
4 American prisoners from Korea were taken to the Soviet Union?

5 A. No. At that time I was already in the Defense
6 Counsel. And the reports from the joint teams -- because they
7 were joint teams between Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and
8 other Warsaw Pact country, I don't know what other Warsaw Pact
9 country participate. But the tests continued in the Soviet
10 Union and they give the Czech researchers and scientists
11 results of some of these tests.

12 Q. To your knowledge, did any of the Czech doctors or
13 medical staff from this hospital in Korea go with the
14 prisoners to the Soviet Union?

15 A. Well, if they go with prisoners, I don't know. But
16 they were many times in Soviet Union after, when the tests
17 continued, when the program continued.

18 Q. Do you have any idea of the number of US POW's from
19 Korea that would have been transferred to the Soviet Union?

20 A. No.

21 Q. Do you have idea how the prisoners that were
22 transferred were selected? Was it because of their technical
23 knowledge, their age? Was there ever any criteria for the
24 selection of these?

25 A. Two different things. One, regular espionage what

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1 is the technology what is normal for any war. I'm talking
2 more about continuity of the tests of the drugs. And I think
3 if you see from the result what Soviets did, they took some
4 prisoners who were already on that program to continue,
5 because the program was not finished.

6 And when they start to test something on one soldier
7 or officer, they want to finish it. Do you know what I mean?
8 So this was it.

9 Q. Who would have made the decision to transfer the
10 prisoners from Korea to the Soviet Union?

11 A. The Soviet Defense Counsel.

12 Q. Did you ever see any information or hear anything
13 that U.S. POW's from Korea were transferred to any other
14 country besides the Soviet Union?

15 A. No.

16 Q. Have you ever visited any of these test sites in the
17 Soviet Union?

18 A. No.

19 Q. You did tell me earlier that you have visited the
20 Soviet Union on numerous occasions?

21 A. Many times.

22 Q. But during your visits, this particular area was not
23 discussed by you?

24 A. With the Soviets?

25 Q. Yes.

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1 A. If I was with minister many times, in Soviet Union
2 or in Czechoslovakia, when let's say Marshal Grechkov came,
3 the supreme commander, it was many times discussed between
4 minister.

5 Q. But you never toured, physically toured---

6 A. Especially for this?

7 Q. Yes.

8 A. No.

9 Q. So you never saw any American POW's being tested in
10 the Soviet Union?

11 A. No, no.

12 Q. Were any American POW's from the Korean War taken to
13 Czechoslovakia for further testing?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Do you know what parts of the Soviet Union they were
16 taken to?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Do you know how they got from Korea to the Soviet
19 Union?

20 A. No. I just can guess, but I don't know.

21 Q. Again, I'm trying to find out what you read from the
22 reports, or heard in the lectures.

23 A. I understand.

24 Q. I don't want to be detailed, but these are just
25 questions that may have been in the reports that we are trying

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1 to find out.

2 A. Right.

3 Q. Do you know what agency of the Soviet Union would
4 have been in charge of this continued testing?

5 A. I just can say, from the communication point of view
6 with the Soviets -- it was similar, like in Czechoslovakia,
7 except in Soviet Union was also more involved, Academy of
8 Science, where the Soviets have special military programs.
9 Selected scientists in Czechoslovakia, some of them were, but
10 not many because they didn't have clearance like in the Soviet
11 Union.

12 Q. Do you know whether these prisoners were taken to
13 one location or to several locations?

14 A. I don't know.

15 Q. Do you have any knowledge what would have happened
16 to them after the testing was over?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Do you have any knowledge whether any of these
19 prisoners were ever released or repatriated to the United
20 States?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Do you have any knowledge whether any of these
23 prisoners that were taken to Russia were ever resettled in any
24 Eastern Bloc country, including Czechoslovakia?

25 A. Not in Czechoslovakia, not the people who were

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1 selected for the test. But they have also some people, and
2 care with Vietnam, who were selected for intelligence
3 purposes. They interrogate them and they find out they are
4 anti-imperialists, or whatever, how they call it.

5 So I think these people were settled down in the
6 Soviet Union, because they have the propaganda and some other
7 things. And I don't think these people were killed. I don't
8 know. I was not there, I'm sorry. But I know there were some
9 people who settled.

10 Q Now, you stated earlier that those who were tested
11 at this Czechoslovakian hospital in Korea, after the tests
12 they were killed, and there was no evidence of anything. Did
13 you ever see or read anything, or hear anything about what
14 would have happened to them, the continued testing in Russia?

15 A No.

16 Q And how did you learn about the American POW's being
17 transferred to Russia?

18 A Because from the reports, the tests continued. They
19 were there.

20 Q You saw this in documents, then?

21 A Yes.

22 Q Did you ever see any of the American prisoners?

23 A No.

24 Q Did you ever see any photographs of the American

25 prisoners?

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1 A. No.

2 Q. In any of the documents that you saw in
3 Czechoslovakia, were there any photographs attached to the
4 reports?

5 A. I saw some photographs, but not when, I don't know
6 if it was when they were already in the Soviet Union or it was
7 still in Korea. Some photographs, a bunch of soldiers. How
8 they looked after, I think they say 2 years of tests of the
9 drugs, which affected your brain.

10 Q. Did you ever see any photographs of the hospital
11 itself?

12 A. No. I saw the plan.

13 Q. The plans of the construction of the hospital?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Did any of these reports show, or were there ever
16 any photographs of American dogtags or uniforms or anything,
17 that would identify these prisoners as United States service
18 personnel?

19 A. No.

20 Q. They were just identified in the reports or in the
21 lectures that you heard?

22 A. Um-hum.

23 Q. Now I'm going to focus on what's called the Cold
24 War. From your resume, and from what you've told me today,
25 you were in a position of authority up until 1968 in

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1 Czechoslovakia. Would that be a fair statement?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. How many countries did you visit prior to leaving in
4 1968? Where did you travel?

5 A. Except Warsaw Pact countries, nothing else.

6 Q. Did you visit all of the Warsaw Pact countries?

7 A. Except Romania. Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, East
8 Germany, Soviet Union.

9 Q. Which country did you visit the most? . . .

10 A. Soviet Union.

11 Q. And approximately how many times have you been to
12 the Soviet Union?

13 A. Probably 4 or 5 times a year, every month, maybe, or
14 6 weeks.

15 Q. And approximately how long would your visits last
16 when you went?

17 A. The longest one was, I think, in 1963. In 1963 I
18 think was the longest visit, 1 week. In 1967, also a 1-week
19 visit.

20 Q. But most of your visits were just for a day or two?

21 A. 2, 3 days.

22 Q. When did you leave Czechoslovakia for good, you said
23 February of '68?

24 A. '68.

25 Q. And where did you go?

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1 A. To Yugoslavia. From Yugoslavia to Italy. And from
2 Italy to the United States.

3 Q. And how did you go from Czechoslovakia to
4 Yugoslavia? Fly? Drive? Train?

5 A. Drive. I drove my car. And I drove to Rome, and
6 from Rome I flew to the United States.

7 Q. What was the major purpose of your visits to the
8 Soviet Union? Military?

9 A. Just military.

10 Q. And what would be --

11 A. Military, or international policy. I would say it
12 was meeting of the political consultative committee, which was
13 the highest body there. You discuss, I don't know, global
14 policy in Europe or against the United States. Do you know
15 what I mean.

16 But on the other hand, on the military defense
17 council, it was just military things, so it was different
18 meetings, but if it was not this official meetings, everything
19 else, when I go there with some other people, it was for
20 military and intelligence, and counterintelligence.

21 Q. Were your meetings generally just with Soviets, or
22 were other members of the Warsaw Pact there?

23 A. Well, if it was meetings of Warsaw Pact, all of them
24 were there. Sometimes Romania was not there. But if it was
25 individual meetings, you deal just with Soviets.

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1 Q. During your travels to Russia or other Warsaw Pact
2 countries, did you ever talk about U.S. POW's from the Korean
3 War?

4 A. Just from the point of view of the tests.

5 Q. I want to come to Vietnam, probably after our break.
6 But did you, during your travels up to '68, ever talk about
7 any U.S. prisoners of war from Vietnam during your visits to
8 Russia or the Eastern Bloc countries?

9 A. Not Eastern Bloc countries, but Russia, yes --
10 Soviet Union.

11 Q. Did you ever meet Francis Gary Powers, who was shot
12 down over the Soviet Union?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Would the Soviets have ever debriefed you on any of
15 the results of their interrogation of Powers, that you recall?

16 A. They debriefed him.

17 MR. STIEN: They would debrief him, he would not be
18 debriefed.

19 BY MR. ERICKSON:

20 Q. I said, did the Soviets ever share any of their
21 debriefing of Powers with you?

22 A. Not with me. But the chief of general staff, and
23 the chief of Czech GRU, they were called to Soviet Union and
24 they debriefed them.

25 Q. Do you remember any cases in which U.S. military

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1 personnel were captured during the Hungarian uprising in 1956?

2 A. By Soviets?

3 Q. By any Eastern Bloc country.

4 A. 1956, Hungary. Not by Czechs, but I also don't know
5 of the others. But I don't know numbers or how many. But
6 when the Soviets tried to justify the Soviet operation in
7 Hungary, when they sent -- it's not report, but information to
8 defense counsel, because Czechoslovakia participated very
9 much. They said they have proof from American citizens. Of
10 course, they believe all of them are CIA, which they took from
11 Hungary. They have proof.

12 It was the Russian language, imperialistic plot to
13 destroy Hungary. And after that, they should have evidence
14 they should go back to Czechoslovakia, which they tried to
15 make scared the Czech leadership. But how many and, or names,
16 I'm sorry I don't know.

17 Q. Did you ever remember any instances or cases where
18 U.S. military personnel were captured during the Cuban missile
19 crisis in 1962?

20 The reason we're asking these questions is, the
21 broad scope of any American service people ever being
22 captured, and in your position in Czechoslovakia, perhaps you
23 saw some message traffic that related to this. I'm not
24 suggesting they were.

25 A. Right, I know, I know. No, I just, they were just

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1 some reports which they said that some soldiers crossed the
2 border to Czechoslovakia, some American soldiers from Germany.

3 Q. You are suggesting that they defected from the U.S.
4 Army?

5 A. It was official. They were some, taken from
6 Austria, Czechoslovakia. But the Cuban crisis, I don't know.

7 Q. You left Czechoslovakia prior to the Soviet --

8 A. Invasion.

9 Q. -- invasion in '68?

10 A. Right.

11 Q. Do you have any knowledge of any U.S. military
12 personnel ever being put on trial for acts of criminal, for
13 any criminal acts, spying or espionage in any of the Eastern
14 Bloc countries during -- prior to you leaving Czechoslovakia?

15 A. I have to think about that. Trial. There were
16 trials of spies, but, well, some were captured like, I think
17 you remember the case of somebody who was former citizen of
18 the United States, but before he was citing Czech citizen who
19 has travel agency somewhere in Chicago, or I don't know, and
20 they invited him to Soviet Union for business deal. Travel
21 agent.

22 And when he flew back, our plane has some
23 difficulty, and must land in Prague, because he is supposed to
24 travel with the Soviets to Vienna, I think. And planned on
25 that, and the KGB stepped in to get him out, and the plane was

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1 fixed again, and he was, I don't know how many years in that
2 jail. He was, I think Kennedy was president. And he sent a
3 letter to Czech president. And so finally they release him.

4 There was another one who was captured in Vienna.
5 That one I don't remember the name. And he was tried in
6 Czechoslovakia. But some others I have to remember, because
7 these were the most publicized cases.

8 Q. Well, perhaps when you come to read your transcript,
9 you can add some others. I think we are at a good place to
10 take a break. Let's go off the record.

11 (Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the deposition in the
12 above-entitled matter was recessed, to reconvene at 1:00 p.m.,
13 this same day.)

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AFTERNOON SESSION

(1:00 p.m.)

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Whereupon,

JAN SEJNA,

the witness on the stand at the time of recess, having been previously duly sworn, was further examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE (RESUMED)

BY MR. ERICKSON:

Q. General, once again is there any testimony that you have given previously that you would like to change or modify in any way?

A. No.

Q. I'm going to shift to the Vietnam War POW issue now. In your interview with two of our committee investigators, you stated that you recall two to three groups of 25 each, U.S. POW's taken from Vietnam to Czechoslovakia, and then on to the Soviet Union. Do you recall making such a statement?

A. Yes. I think I said 20 to 25. Not exactly 25, because I'm not sure if it was 25 or 24.

Q. What years did these trips take place?

A. I think first one was end of '65, or beginning '66. And other one '66. And the last one which I saw was the spring of '67.

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1 Q. And each one of these groups would have been roughly
2 20 to 25 American POW's?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Did you see the American POW's yourself?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. What was your duty at the time? And did it change
7 from '65 to '67, or were you in the same position?

8 A. I was in the same position.

9 Q. Which was?

10 A. First secretary of the Communist Party to minister
11 of defense.

12 Q. And how were these American POW's transported from
13 Vietnam to Prague?

14 A. Soviet airplanes, they escorted them, Soviets and
15 Czechs together. Counterintelligence took them to the
16 facility, and that's it. And three guys, or four guys I'm not
17 sure, they wait in Prague. They were the guys who were
18 actually the interrogators, because they already worked with
19 them when they stay in Prague.

20 Q. Approximately how many days or how many hours did
21 they stay in Prague?

22 A. 5 to 7 days, no more.

23 Q. And what was the reason or rationale to bring them
24 from Vietnam to Prague, rather than straight to the Soviet
25 Union?

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1 A. I think this is how Soviets operated. They try to
2 cut the throat. Nobody knows they go to Soviet Union. It is
3 how they use courier, transport couriers from Latin America,
4 the same, they use Czechoslovakia. Not just this time. And
5 since they were there, they gave them the physical
6 examination.

7 Q. Did you see each of the three groups personally?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And where did you see them? What location, and what
10 was the occasion that you would go out to see them?

11 A. They were -- I saw them on three occasions. One is
12 at a military barracks, which belongs to military
13 counterintelligence in Prague. And a small group, they
14 separate I think three guys in the last group, and they put
15 into one other house, other villa. I don't know if they
16 separate them because they were officers, or they had special
17 interest with them.

18 And I saw they was in the villa, the safe house.

19 Q. What was the reason, if you know, that the Soviets
20 were taking them to Russia?

21 A. Some, the Soviet general in Czechoslovakia, General
22 Kushev, Alexander Kushev, told me some of them they used. I
23 don't know if they were the guys they separated from some
24 others, to have them for propaganda, and have them analyze the
25 operation of the Vietnam War from the American side.

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1 And the others, it was to continue the drug test.

2 Q. Was there some message traffic or information that
3 you knew they were coming, or were you notified after they had
4 already landed in Prague?

5 A. No, no, we knew they were coming. I was waiting in
6 the barracks.

7 Q. Could you describe the physical condition, and how
8 were the prisoners dressed?

9 A. They have some badge or uniforms like field
10 uniforms, and physically they were not chubby, but I don't
11 think they were -- they didn't look to me sick, I would have
12 to say.

13 Q. Do you know any of their names, or any of their
14 ranks?

15 A. I never saw the names, because it was Soviet
16 operation. I never saw the names.

17 Q. Did you personally talk to any of them?

18 A. Oh, God, if I talk to them I would be not here,
19 because it was the main thing prohibited. Nobody can contact
20 them. They even said, you don't smile to them. They
21 interrogate the chef who was formerly in jail because he tried
22 to be too friendly. First of all, I didn't speak English, and
23 secondly, I wouldn't even try.

24 Q. Who in the Soviet Union would approve this program
25 or transfer?

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1 A. Oh, it must be Defense Council or Politburo. No
2 other way.

3 Q. Would anyone in Czechoslovakia have to approve it?

4 A. Not approve it. They just informed the First
5 Secretary this will happen, and that was it. There was not
6 too much discussion.

7 Q. On each of these three trips, did they take the
8 prisoners to the same location at Prague each time, or were
9 there different locations?

10 A. The major group, same location, yeah. If they
11 separate two, three guys, they have -- that time when I was
12 there, they have a few at safe houses, and I never saw them in
13 same safe house every time.

14 Q. Were you invited to go out to see them, or did you
15 go out of your own curiosity?

16 A. No, no, no. It was my duty to see how it is
17 prepared.

18 Q. How did you learn about each of these trips? How
19 did you find out about them?

20 A. Because the Administrative Organs Department, his
21 name is Mamula, he just called me and say, you are in charge
22 to control the security and how it is prepared.

23 Q. In your discussions with some of the Soviet guards
24 or people that were accompanying these flights, or your
25 exchange with other Soviets, were there other flights to any

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1 other Eastern European countries that were discussed?

2 A. I never heard.

3 Q. Could you be more specific as to where they were
4 held in Prague, or could you pinpoint exactly where you were?

5 A. If we have Prague map, I can show directly. The
6 name of the part of Prague is Bohorelec, and this barracks,
7 when they were to military counterintelligence they have their
8 special battalion where they train terrorists and other people
9 for war, so it was the most secret place.

10 I don't want to waste time how I find out about such
11 places, but it was the most secret place guarded by military
12 counterintelligence, and of course in that case the Soviets
13 guards were around POW's, so it is one thing.

14 The one villa, the guys who were separated, the name
15 or the street is Roseveltova, for President Roosevelt, number
16 1, and the other one is, street name is Corejska, but I don't
17 remember the number -- 3, or -- I'm not sure about. I have to
18 look in the map which I have at home.

19 Q. During the time you saw the prisoners, were any
20 pictures taken of them?

21 A. Not by us, no.

22 Q. Were there any documents outside of the Soviet
23 aircraft was going to land at a certain time, are there any
24 documents that would verify that a certain number of American
25 prisoners were going to be on these aircraft?

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1 A. I don't know. I just got order from the head of the
2 Ministry of Organs Department, no paper, no nothing.

3 Q. It was a verbal command.

4 A. Right.

5 Q. Did you just see them one time, or did you go see
6 them every day, or what was your responsibility during their
7 visits?

8 A. The main group I saw just one time. The second
9 group, I was there two times, I think. The smaller-group, I
10 was in that villa probably three times a week.

11 Q. You just referred to the main group and a smaller
12 group. Could you be more specific? What was the main group?

13 A. They were the people who -- they put them to the
14 barracks, let's say, 19, 20 people.

15 Q. Of each of these three flights, then.

16 A. Right.

17 Q. I'm with you.

18 A. From one flight, you know, when they went in the
19 closed vans to the barracks, this group which they separated
20 didn't go even out to the barracks, they took them immediately
21 to separate place, and from one group. I don't know whether
22 it was second or third. The Ministry of Interior took one
23 specially separate. I don't know why.

24 Q. What was done to the prisoners during their stay in
25 Czechoslovakia?

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1 A. They just took them to the main military hospital
2 for a physical check-up, and the Soviets interrogated with
3 them.

4 Q. Were they guarded by Soviet or Czech soldiers?

5 A. Well, generally both. The Soviets were in that part
6 of the barracks, and all barracks were guarded by the Czech
7 counterintelligence.

8 Q. These barracks that you talk about, were they
9 strictly for the Soviet troops?

10 A. No, no. There was a battalion of Czech military
11 counterintelligence which prepared generally Czech citizen for
12 terrorism, assassinate people, and so and so, if the war will
13 start in the west.

14 Q. Realizing it's a long time ago, but the group that
15 came in in 1965, do you remember, perhaps, what time of year
16 or what month it was?

17 A. As I said, it was late '65 or beginning '66, but I
18 don't know exactly if it was December or February.

19 Q. The second group that came in --

20 A. It was later on. It was August.

21 Q. Of '66.

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. And the '67 group.

24 A. It was, I think, late spring '67. It was last time
25 when I saw.

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1 Q. May, perhaps.

2 A. May, June.

3 Q. Were these American prisoners mistreated in any way
4 that you observed?

5 A. I don't think so, not in Czechoslovakia. I think
6 coming from Vietnam it was heaven for them -- food and clean
7 beds and everything.

8 Q. Can you tell us the names of anyone else that you
9 saw observing the U.S. prisoners when they were in
10 Czechoslovakia?

11 A. You mean Czech citizen, or Russians?

12 Q. Well, either.

13 A. Well, the Russians who escorted them, I don't --
14 there were three guys who were with them. I talked to the
15 colonel many times, but I'm not sure about the man's name, but
16 who was in charge was General Kushev, who was president or
17 the supreme commander of Warsaw Pact forces in Czechoslovakia,
18 Alexander Kushev.

19 Q. He's Russian.

20 A. Russian, a 3-star general.

21 Q. What about any officials that were in charge of the
22 Czech counterintelligence at the barracks where they stayed?
23 Do you have any names of people that would have known about
24 these trips?

25 A. Who knows for sure was the chief of

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1 counterintelligence. His name was Joseph Stavinoha. Of
2 course, minister, First Secretary, the head of the
3 Administrative Organ Department, Miroslav Mamula.

4 Q. What was the individual's name that told you to go?

5 A. Miroslav Mamula, the head of the Administrative
6 Organs Department of Central Committee.

7 Q. Was he the one that told you on all three occasions
8 to go there?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Can you think of anyone else?

11 A. First of all, I don't remember the name of the
12 commander of the battalion, but in the military
13 counterintelligence, probably for sure some other people were
14 involved, because just the chief cannot do everything. But I
15 just don't want to tell you names of his deputies, because I
16 don't know which one was exactly involved. I think one of
17 them was his deputy. His name was -- who was generally in
18 charge of the guards for everything. His name was Franticek
19 Pitra, P-i-t-r-a.

20 Q. Did any of the Soviets tell you the reason they were
21 taking these POW's to Russia?

22 A. Well, what we know was for sure, for the continuity
23 of the drug program, but not officially. When I was once
24 fishing with General Kushev we discussed the Vietnam War, how
25 it is analyzed. He told me what they think is wrong with

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1 American troops, and so on, and he told me some of the
2 prisoners, American prisoners are very helpful to analyze the
3 operation of the United States forces, so that means -- the
4 minister also mentioned it a few times, but I never saw any
5 document about that.

6 Q. That was going to be my next question. Do you know
7 of any documents that might be in the archives in
8 Czechoslovakia about these three occasions?

9 A. It could be -- exist, you know. There was a system.
10 These things were usually discussed between Minister of
11 Defense, Minister of Interior, the Czech KGB, and First
12 Secretary. In my practice, I think even whole Politburo
13 didn't know these things, and First Secretary or any secretary
14 of the Communist Party, they wrote notes.

15 They call it order of First Secretary, I think,
16 because they were more and more careful what decision they
17 make. I think this order must go to Minister of Interior, and
18 if you have -- and have possibility to go to archives of
19 Minister of Interior or Central Committee. It must be there.

20 Q. When you were in Czechoslovakia, was it common
21 practice to archive all of these records?

22 A. In Ministry of Defense, yes. Central Committee, I
23 don't know.

24 Q. Are you aware that the Czech Government does not
25 confirm your story on these three visits by Soviet?

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1 A. No.

2 Q. Is there anyone that you know of that can verify
3 these three visits, outside of the names that you've already
4 given us? Is there anyone that we could contact in the United
5 States that perhaps used to live in Czechoslovakia or Russia
6 that would know about these?

7 A. Well, unfortunately, I don't know who lives in the
8 United States.

9 Q. From the time the first flight in '65 or early '65
10 was there, during any of your visits to the Soviet Union when
11 you were updating, as you said earlier, this drug-testing
12 program, was there ever a reference to these new American
13 POW's that were arriving in the Soviet Union?

14 A. It was referenced all the time when they analyzed
15 the testing, but I'm thinking if it was ever in the documents
16 from the Soviet Union to Czechoslovakia.

17 Q. What I'm suggesting, general, is perhaps in one of
18 the debriefings at a Warsaw Pact meeting or information coming
19 out of the Soviet Union -- please don't let me put words in
20 your mouth -- but recently arrived Americans from Vietnam have
21 been tested and the results are as follows, or upon testing
22 Americans from Vietnam we find different results than what we
23 did from Korea?

24 A. No.

25 Q. I'm not suggesting perhaps that would have been

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1 done, but okay, why was Czechoslovakia picked out rather than
2 Poland or Romania or Hungary, if you know?

3 A. Because the Soviets always repeat they trust
4 Czechoslovakia more than anybody else in Warsaw Pact, and we
5 can document that on many, many things which I mentioned
6 earlier to DIA.

7 For example, they give Czechoslovakia a permit
8 organize own front, which is military structure, regiment,
9 division, army front. The commander of front has rights to
10 use nuclear weapons, and it was checked out, they never gave
11 this permit to Poland or East German or Bulgaria, and I can
12 tell you many other things.

13 The Soviets pay even Czechoslovak operation abroad,
14 intelligence operation, because Czechoslovakia was more
15 educated people, but not enough money, so it was not first
16 case when Soviets use Czechoslovakia for such things.

17 Q. You stated, I believe, earlier, it was or is common
18 Soviet practice to take people not directly to their country
19 but to a third country first.

20 A. Yeah. We used North Korea, for example, for people
21 from Latin America, and if somebody complains, Americans,
22 somebody, they say, I'm sorry, this is Czech business. We
23 don't control them.

24 Q. To your knowledge, prior to your leaving
25 Czechoslovakia in '68, were there any Czech advisors or Czech

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1 hospitals in Vietnam?

2 A. No. I don't know.

3 Q. Not that you're aware of.

4 A. No.

5 Q. What kind of assistance, if any, did Czechoslovakia
6 give Vietnam, North Vietnam during the Vietnam conflict that
7 you're aware of?

8 A. All kind of assistance. Most, of course,
9 technology. It was very high budget for that, for the
10 technology. Some specialists, of course, spare parts,
11 political assistance to work with other countries against
12 United States -- what else. Medical equipment, but I never
13 heard, I never saw that we built a hospital like in Korea.

14 Q. I'm curious, if you know, judging on this constant
15 experiment, the Soviets test Czechoslovakia with going to
16 Korea during a conflict in '49 through '53 to set up a
17 hospital to do drug testing. What would be the reason -- once
18 again, we had another conflict in Vietnam. To me, there would
19 have been another opportunity for first-hand information.

20 A. They did it in cooperation with Vietnamese, but with
21 Vietnam it was not so easy like with Korea, I can tell you.
22 They didn't accept easy some proposals.

23 Q. The Vietnamese.

24 A. The Vietnamese they always repeat everything is
25 international duty of Czechoslovakia and others. We want to

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1 send there, for example, pilots, say it was voluntary, but it
2 was not voluntary because they thought the Americans have
3 privilege to train specially Air Force in the war, and Soviet
4 generally they don't have this, so we pushed them to take a
5 regiment, and again change them. They never accepted. They
6 say, if we take it, if it was excused or not, we have to take
7 Chinese troops, and we don't want Chinese. If we take them,
8 they will never go back.

9 Always, we have there in 1967 I believe the highest
10 delegation premier minister, chief of main political
11 administration, General Prchlik. They were there to force
12 Vietnamese, even tell them we will not supply with more
13 military technology if they wouldn't do this, this, this. It
14 was not easy.

15 I met first Vietnamese delegation before they
16 attacked the south with the generals that was the head, and
17 Soviets and Czechs they even laugh about it, and I remember
18 when Pham Van Dong, prime minister was in Czechoslovakia, he
19 said they will destroy American Imperialists. They don't care
20 if the war take 10 more years, but economically they will
21 destroy the United States, and the Soviets and Czechs there
22 laugh about it. They thought they are stupid, but did they
23 hurt American economy, the war? Sure, of course it did.

24 Q. Did you ever personally visit Vietnam?

25 A. No.

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1 Q. Do you know if there were any hospitals set up in
2 Vietnam by any other --

3 A. No.

4 Q. Did you ever hear of any drug testing going on by
5 the Vietnamese on U.S. POW's?

6 A. Yeah, because they give us the results. I don't
7 know what other ones were, the countries. I'm sure the
8 Soviets, but Czechoslovakia, you give them -- you know, you
9 ask them, what do you want if they test, give them some drugs
10 which they want.

11 Q. Do you remember the name of what drugs they were
12 using?

13 A. No. It is what I told you. I have to look at the
14 notes.

15 Q. Do you know of any other Warsaw Pact countries that
16 might have received U.S. prisoners on their way to the Soviet
17 Union?

18 A. I don't know.

19 A. I think, but I didn't see. I think East German
20 participate on the test, but I don't know if they have any
21 prisoner.

22 Q. Would you guess that this program of taking 20 to 25
23 prisoners, perhaps yearly from Vietnam to the Soviet Union
24 would have continued after you departed Czechoslovakia?

25 A. The program continued. There's no question about

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1 that. If they some others, I don't know. But program
2 continued.

3 Q. Were the Vietnamese, if you know, cooperative with
4 the Soviets to release these prisoners of war from Vietnam to
5 the Soviet authorities?

6 A. Well, as I told you they were not very cooperative,
7 but I think Soviet has much stronger weapons than
8 Czechoslovakia to force Vietnamese to do something. Not just
9 the supplies, but international negotiation. And these things
10 the Soviets, where Czechoslovakia doesn't mean too much.

11 Q. After you left Czechoslovakia in '68, did you ever
12 learn of any other groups of U.S. POW's being taken out of
13 Vietnam to any other country?

14 A. No.

15 Q. But it would be your guess that the program
16 continued?

17 A. Well, the program is not a guess, because I left
18 February '68. In November or December of '67 was already
19 approved the budget for that, and the approval of the defense
20 council. So, if they cancel it later, which I believe it is
21 impossible, I cannot say. But before I left, the program as
22 on.

23 Q. I'm now going to talk a little bit about you leaving
24 Czechoslovakia and your arrival. And if I get into classified
25 information, I ask you gentlemen to please warn me.

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1 When did you leave Czechoslovakia and why?

2 A. I left February 25th. I crossed the border. I was
3 28th in United States.

4 I prepared defection a few years before. I supposed
5 to go the Czechoslovak soccer team military plane to Belgium,
6 and they decide to send a few busses of fans of the Czech
7 team.

8 Of course, all the busses were just military
9 intelligence officers, and there is supposed to be one
10 political leader of that trip, of the group, and it was up to
11 me to select someone who will go there.

12 I want to go there and never come back, forget to go
13 back. But, first of all, I will go out of my son, and they
14 didn't agree. Nobody can take member of family. Then,
15 secondly, they say I know too much and CIA have methods which
16 they grab you, give you some shot, and 2 hours you tell them
17 everything.

18 And then they give you other shot and you are okay.
19 They send you back. So, I cannot go. Who was going was my
20 deputy at that time. So, I didn't have opportunity to do that
21 and, of course, I look for other opportunity which always it
22 was problem with my son, because without him I cannot go.

23 Finally in 1967, when was the fight in the party for
24 power I got order from the General Jepisev, chief of main
25 political administration, Soviet minister of defense, to use

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1 all power which I have to protect the first secretary and
2 president in power before they want to fire him.

3 After then they realize it is too late, and the
4 liberals go more and more to power. They want to save him,
5 liquidate the liberals, and then after that, liquidate him. A
6 typical Soviet way which I didn't, because his son was my best
7 friend. He was in military service.

8 And I know from that family and from everybody else,
9 because it was hot situation in Czechoslovakia, the man is
10 finished. To somebody protecting him, he must be absolutely
11 crazy.

12 So I didn't anything to help him stay in the power,
13 nothing. They said, I want to use troops, and I didn't have
14 any power to troops. I just control ministry of defense who
15 control troops or some other people.

16 So I can -- except pick up some five my friends and
17 tell them take machine gun and kill central committee. But it
18 is not banana republic to do this way, so I didn't anything.

19 Jepisev called me and told me, you didn't what I
20 told you. I said, I know, comrade general. He said, you know
21 what it means. I said, yes, I know. It was like Monday or
22 Tuesday.

23 Saturday, and that time I always prepared, my much
24 stronger defection than before. I must go a little bit back.
25 In February, we and the Soviet party celebrated the Red Army

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1 and I -- '67. And I came home and I told my son, John, I
2 cannot go anymore to these parties. They pick up drink after
3 drink, and you go to poor people, and have lectures and tell
4 them how socialism is super, and they don't have bread, you
5 know.

6 And my son told me, well, how about that we will
7 defect. I said, well, why would you never like to defect. I
8 never think -- thought he would think about it. He listened
9 Radio Free Europe all the time, and he said, because I want to
10 race the car, and I cannot do that in a communist country, but
11 I can do that in Great Britain or the United States. So, I
12 was thinking, if your son want to race the car, there is some
13 reason for General to defect.

14 Q. A good reason?

15 A. Yeah. So I said, John, let's do and prepare. And
16 when I saw the fight in October, how it start again, you
17 cannot imagine these guys in the Politbureau, how they call
18 each other bastards and prostitutes and all these things.
19 Again, you must go and lie to people. Unity of the party.
20 These angels, great leaders.

21 So, I go to my son and his girlfriend, who is today
22 his wife who, by the way, they said was my mistress when I
23 defected. They have daughter. I told him, okay, let's go and
24 prepare it. She did the best job. I contact American Embassy
25 two or three times.

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1 Q. In Prague?

2 A. In Prague through this girl and her friends. They
3 told the press attache or cultural attache it one general,
4 they didn't say name, who would like to defect if they can
5 help somehow. They said no because the Czechs would take it
6 like provocation. They thought they used me to contact the
7 embassy.

8 But when he cross the border, we will help him. At
9 that time, I don't need help, honestly. So, I was on my own,
10 and when the general official told me you know what it means,
11 I know what it means.

12 Q. What does it mean?

13 A. For me? To liquidate me. So, it was like Monday,
14 Tuesday, and Saturday was published article which you can pick
15 up in library of this great building. They said, one Czech
16 general, his name was Pepich, who was long-time KGB agent
17 because his wife works for Hungarian -- her father was
18 prominent Hungarian fascist.

19 He publish article and said, what I did in my
20 position in the ministry of defense was actually sabotage of
21 military readiness. If somebody say so, you don't have to
22 wait too long. Communist death penalty because it is never
23 cracked.

24 So, I told my son John, tomorrow we are leaving.
25 So, he pick up his girlfriend, and left Sunday morning, 6:00

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1 because I thought the secret police, after the Saturday
2 parties, they would be more close eyes. And I used the
3 simplest way, which I think is the best, because, I'm sorry,
4 the intelligence services they think everything too
5 complicate.

6 So, we left 6:00 Prague in front of the office,
7 ministry of defense -- my office. And we want to take also
8 another girl who helped contact American Embassy, but she said
9 she cannot go. So, she stayed.

10 So, we left. What I did, I ask for passports for my
11 son and me to go skiing to Poland in the weekend. It was just
12 one mistake, because they give me diplomatic passport. The
13 girlfriend of my son, she just asked tourist permit, visit
14 Bulgaria, and it was just two small pages, no picture in
15 Bulgarian and Russian language. She never had any problem.

16 And we play game finally. First, then I ask
17 passport. I want to go to Poland. Once we were on the road,
18 we play game. We are going to Bulgaria. At that time, you
19 have permit to go to Bulgaria through Yugoslavia, and you have
20 three days to cross to Yugoslavia. Once I defected, they
21 cancel it, this permit.

22 So, we didn't have problem in Hungary. Cross border
23 to Yugoslavia. We wait. We were there 6:00 Monday morning.
24 From friend of mine, who was my best friend, a doctor, he told
25 me how to handle it in the village corporal. He was ready go

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1 with me, because he was originally born in Yugoslavia. If I
2 cannot do that legally, take me secretly across the border to
3 Italy. I refused because he wanted to go back, and they will
4 kill him.

5 So, we were at 6:00 morning in that village. We
6 wait in the forest. After then, 9:00, we go to Italian
7 consulate and ask for visa, visiter for one day, Trieste, the
8 harbor. They give the visa to girlfriend of my son the time,
9 which I can show you all these papers Monday. So my passport
10 and my son, diplomatic passport, they said we cannot give it
11 to you because you have such a position. There was Parliament
12 and so on. When you come back, they will kill you.

13 I said, look, in Czechoslovakia it's changed. We
14 have Dubchek and all these things. Plus, I know they want to
15 copy Czechoslovakia. Maybe you will be interested later on.
16 And so don't worry. And the guy said, no, no, no, come back
17 1:00, which was not pleasant because I supposed to be in
18 parliament. I'm sure they look for me. I was covered by
19 INTERPOL.

20 So, what can I do? Wait again in the forest. Come
21 back 1:00, and the counsel talked to me. And if you know in
22 Italy, 5 million people what were communist, you see everyone
23 communist and Russian agent. So, again he talked to me. I
24 said, look, it is not your business. You cannot go back, he
25 repeated. I cannot tell him I don't want to go back. So,

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1 finally he give me for one day.

2 So, I took the car, go to the cross-border station
3 where Yugoslavians go with busses to work in Italy. Then they
4 saw my car. They said, get out of line. I thought, that's
5 it. One call from Czech Embassy and so on.

6 And the policeman was unusually smart. He said, you
7 don't have Czech permit to go to the West. I said, are you
8 Italian or Czech policeman, or Yugoslavian? I don't have a
9 problem with your country, tell me what you want. He said,
10 don't give me this baloney. I know the regulations.

11 They took me to the station, let me wait in the
12 hallway 30 minutes -- longest 30 minutes in my life, I can
13 tell you, and they talked behind the closed door with
14 telephones. And finally he came out, and the boss came out of
15 the station and said, let him go. I don't know if they
16 already have message, because of the -- I think in this case I
17 can mention CIA. They told me, they said we contact American
18 Embassy. They send message everywhere I was Czechoslovak.
19 Get me out. So, I was in Trieste, look for American consular.
20 And generally I look. I was lost. And finally one guy told
21 me where it is. I went to the consulate, and the next day I
22 was in Washington.

23 Q. You first arrived in U.S. custody by going to the
24 U.S. consulate in Trieste?

25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. And then the next day you were flown to Washington,
2 D.C.?

3 A. No, second day. Next day I drove the car from
4 Trieste to Rome, and day after I flew to New York.

5 Q. It's my understanding that when people defect to the
6 United States, you're normally debriefed?

7 A. Right.

8 Q. Where did your first debrief take place? In Italy
9 or in the United States?

10 A. Here. Here in the United States. Well, I'm sorry.
11 Small in Italy, where the guys asked me who I am, what I did.
12 I showed them ID.

13 Q. Did the debrief that you went through in the United
14 States touch on any POW/MIA issues?

15 A. You mean, if I said so?

16 Q. Yes. Did you talk about the Czech hospital in
17 Korea? Did you talk about the three flights?

18 A. I think so. Not three flights, no.

19 Q. You talked about the Korean experience but not the
20 Vietnamese, or do you remember?

21 A. I think about Korea, we were talking about more
22 details. We were talking a lot about Vietnam, but what I want
23 to say is I don't think that time anybody has interest in POW.
24 Most discussions were about general policy, orientation.
25 There were already the talks in France between Vietnamese and

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1 Americans, so their interest was, what are the Russians orders
2 as most distinct.

3 (Discussion off the record.)

4 BY MR. ERICKSON:

5 Q. It's my understanding, when you came to Washington,
6 D.C., as is common practice, you were debriefed?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. In this debrief, did anyone ask you about any POW
9 issues, or did you volunteer any, if you can remember?

10 A. I think it was -- it was both ways, but most these
11 discussions were about Korea. Discussion about Vietnam, it
12 was not major issue.

13 Q. When you mentioned the situation in Korea, what was
14 the reaction, if any, of the people that were debriefing you,
15 or were they just taking notes?

16 A. They have a question and they take notes. They took
17 notes, yeah.

18 Q. Did you ever see any report from your debriefing?

19 A. Never.

20 Q. Do you recall whether you were considered a good
21 source? That is, a person with access to provide reliable
22 information?

23 A. Can I tell you something? Everybody repeat to you,
24 it is super, this information. What can I say? Nobody never
25 told me -- nobody never questioned me if things which I said

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1 are wrong or right, never.

2 Q. Were you able to speak English at this time, or did
3 you have an interpreter?

4 A. Interpreter.

5 Q. Were you given a polygraph at this time?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Was there ever any correspondence written to
8 discredit you as a source of information?

9 A. I don't know.

10 Q. Then I trust you don't have any copy of any
11 correspondence that you're aware of?

12 A. No, no.

13 Q. I believe you indicated that DIA hired you in 1981.
14 Is that correct?

15 A. I think on April 7.

16 Q. Of 1981?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. How did you come to work for DIA?

19 A. I was recruited.

20 Q. Do you know who was responsible for hiring you and
21 why?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Do you believe that DIA trusted your information?

24 A. Well, they say yes, if it is true.

25 Q. Did any DIA officer ever talk to you about your

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1 knowledge of POW's either from Korea or Vietnam?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Was this interview recorded?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Was it under oath?

6 A. Not all of them. I think one or two, when they
7 talked to me individuals. It was when the book was published
8 1 year ago or 2 years ago.

9 Q. What book are you referring to?

10 A. Red Cocaine. At that time, I don't think it was
11 recorded, but when they talked to me recently, everything was
12 recorded.

13 Q. Well, how many times have DIA officers talked to you
14 about POW's approximately?

15 A. Including last week or the week before, I think five
16 times. Three individuals, and after then a group of people.

17 Q. You started working for DIA in 1981?

18 A. Right.

19 Q. When was the first time, if you remember, that
20 anybody in DIA talked to you about POW's?

21 A. After the book was published. I think 2 years ago.

22 Q. The book was published in 1990 is my understanding.

23 A. Okay. In that case, it is 2 years ago.

24 Q. What did you tell the DIA officers when they
25 interviewed you about your knowledge of POW's?

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1 A. I think generally what we discussed today. Same
2 things.

3 Q. About North Korea and Vietnam?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Are you in a position to know what DIA did with the
6 information that you told them?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Do you believe, based on your knowledge and
9 experience, that the United States Government has the
10 capability to check out or verify your story?

11 A. Sure.

12 Q. How would we do this?

13 A. How you will do that?

14 Q. Yes?

15 A. I guess go to Czechoslovakia, look at the archives,
16 and find people who are in the life and talk to them.

17 Q. In summing up, very briefly, I want to make sure
18 that I've understood your testimony. And please don't let me
19 put words in your mouth. If for some reason you've changed
20 your mind, or maybe I misunderstood your answers, please
21 correct me.

22 A. Absolutely.

23 Q. But I've gathered today that your testimony is that
24 Czech military doctors and medics conducted experimental drug
25 and other testing on U.S. POW's during the Korean War in

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1 Korea.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. That some of these U.S. POW's were taken from Korea
4 to Czechoslovakia.

5 A. Not from Korea, from Vietnam.

6 Q. So, U.S. POW's were not taken from Korea to
7 Czechoslovakia?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Okay. That U.S. POW's were taken from Vietnam in
10 late '65, early '66, in the early fall of '66 and in the late
11 spring of '67 to Czechoslovakia and then moved on to Russia?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And that you learned this information, all of it,
14 from basic documents, from attending certain military course
15 lectures, and from personally seeing the U.S. POW's that were
16 moving from Vietnam to Russia?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Do you believe that any of these 70 to 75 POW's that
19 you saw, from '65 to '67, are still alive today in the Soviet
20 Union?

21 A. I think so. I think it's possible. They were young
22 people.

23 Q. I'd like to ask you if between now and a week or 10
24 days, when I notify your attorney that your transcript is
25 back, I hope that you can review some of your notes, and feel

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1 free to bring your notes to the review of the transcript, and
2 provide any other documentation to us for verification of your
3 story.

4 What do you think would happen if the information,
5 names, and contacts that you've given to us today were ever
6 leaked to the Czech Government security services, or the
7 Russian security services, or to the press? What do you think
8 would happen to those people?

9 A. Maybe not all of them, but many of them will be
10 really in trouble, including me and my family in
11 Czechoslovakia.

12 Q. Again, between after this deposition and when you
13 review it, if you can think of any other people or information
14 or organizations that we can go to, I'd ask that you write it
15 on the piece of paper as you review the transcript.

16 A. I will be helpful as much as possible.

17 Q. If the Czech archive files were made available to
18 this committee without restriction, which organization's files
19 should we look at first? Which would provide the most
20 information for us on this situation we're talking about?

21 A. I think the archives of defense council, archives of
22 ministry of interior, and ministry of defense.

23 Q. General, you mentioned earlier that you recalled
24 talking to DIA officials on five different occasions. I'd
25 like to go through each one and make sure whether you remember

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1 whether you talked about the Korean hospital drug experience,
2 number one, and whether you talked about American POW's from
3 Vietnam being moved through Prague to Russia.

4 When was the first time you talked to DIA officials
5 on POW matters that you can remember?

6 A. When I talked to -- first time was when the book was
7 published, and one gentleman from DIA, from the office which
8 take of POW, he talked to me generally about the book, about
9 the drugs. If it is true they test the drugs in Korea. He
10 talked to me a year later a second time.

11 Q. Let me go back. The first time he talked to you,
12 then, was in 1990, and he talked to you about the drug testing
13 at the Czech hospital in Korea?

14 A. Right.

15 Q. Did he mention or did you mention anything to him
16 about the three flights in Soviet aircraft from Vietnam to
17 Prague, and on to Russia?

18 A. No.

19 Q. The second time that you spoke to him?

20 A. It was continuing about same things. He probably
21 studied and come back. And we discussed same things.

22 Q. So, once again, during the second interview, you
23 talked only about Korea and not about Vietnam.

24 A. No, no.

25 Q. When was the third interview?

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1 A. The third interview was, I would say, 2 or 3 months
2 ago.

3 Q. And did you talk about Korea during that interview?

4 A. I think in this interview we talk most about Vietnam
5 because the gentleman -- actually, when talk to me; next week
6 he flew to Vietnam with some delegation to look at the stuff,
7 and mostly we discussed Vietnam to tell him where he can find
8 documents in Czechoslovakia. So it was discussion about it.

9 Q. Was Korea mentioned during that interview?

10 A. I don't think so.

11 Q. Then the next interview was a DIA official?

12 A. It was with a group of, I think, four or five
13 people. Mr. Green knows these people.

14 Q. Was Korea discussed during that interview?

15 A. No, it was Vietnam. They said that they are happy
16 that I told them about Korea, but we didn't discuss it.
17 Everything was Vietnam.

18 MR. GREEN: Excuse me. Was that after your
19 interview with the Senate Select Committee staffers?

20 THE WITNESS: Right.

21 BY MR. ERICKSON:

22 Q. When was your last interview?

23 A. The last one was last Tuesday, last week Tuesday.
24 And it was just about Vietnam, again. They go to more details
25 from the first interview.

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1 Q. Now, let me sum up and see if I have this correct.
2 Your five interviews with DIA -- the first one was after the
3 publication of the book Red Cocaine. And during that
4 interview with DIA, you only talked about the Korean War
5 POW's?

6 A. Yeah.

7 Q. Your second interview took place with DIA about a
8 year later, and you only talked about --

9 A. It was the same gentleman.

10 Q. But you only talked about Korea. Your third
11 interview, which took place approximately 3 months ago, which
12 would have been August --

13 A. I would say August, September.

14 Q. You talked for the first time to the DIA official
15 about Vietnam?

16 A. Right.

17 Q. And you talked a little about Korea?

18 A. Yeah.

19 Q. About 5-6 weeks ago, two Senate investigators talked
20 to you. After that time, you again talked to DIA, but you
21 only talked about Vietnam and not Korea, and about a week ago
22 you had another interview with DIA, and you only talked about
23 Vietnam and not Korea?

24 A. No. The Senate investigators -- I think they talked
25 to me more about Korea than Vietnam.

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1 Q. I'm not asking you what our investigators talked
2 about. But the fourth and fifth interview with DIA took place
3 after our investigators talked to you?

4 A. Right. It was just about Vietnam.

5 Q. I have no more questions. I want to thank you for
6 coming. If you have anything that you want to add to the
7 record, or anything you want to say, I always give the depositee
8 the opportunity to say anything that you want to. Please feel
9 there's no requirement that you say anything.

10 A. Maybe after I read.

11 Q. Well, I will notify your attorney as soon as I get
12 the transcript and make arrangements for you to come.

13 A. Okay.

14 MR. ERICKSON: Let's suspend the deposition.

15 (Whereupon, at 2:26 p.m., the taking of the instant
16 deposition was suspended.)

17

Signature of the Witness

18

19 SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _____ day of

20

_____, 19____.

21

NOTARY PUBLIC

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23 My Commission expires:

24

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
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Congress of the United States

Notice of
Senate Deposition

To Major General Jan Sejna

Defense Intelligence Agency

Department of Defense, Greeting:


Please take notice that at 10:00 o'clock a. m., on November 5, 1992,
at S-407 the Capitol, Wash., DC, of the staff of the Select committee
on POW/MIA Affairs of the Senate of the United States, will
take your deposition on oral examination concerning what you may know relative to the subject
matters under consideration by said Select committee. The deposition will be taken before a
notary public, or before some other officer authorized by local law to administer oaths; it will,
be taken pursuant to the Select committee's rules, a copy of which are attached.

Please provide the Committee with a current resume of your

educational and professional experience in advance of your

deposition

Given under my hand, by authority vested in me by
the Select committee, on November 2
1992.



John F. Kerry, Chairman

Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs



JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS,
Chairman
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, SOUTH DAKOTA
HARRY REID, NEVADA
CHARLES S. ROBE, VIRGINIA
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HERBERT H. KOHL, WISCONSIN

BOB SMITH, NEW HAMPSHIRE,
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CHUCK GRASSLEY, IOWA
NANCY LANDON KASSEBAUM, KANSAS
JESSE HELMS, NORTH CAROLINA


FRANCES A. ZWENIG, STAFF DIRECTOR
J. WILLIAM CODINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL

United States Senate


SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS DEPOSITION AUTHORIZATION

As Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs ("the Committee"), pursuant to Rule 4 and Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure of the Committee, we hereby agree and consent to the deposition of Major General Jan Sejna of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as described in the attached notice of deposition. This deposition shall be taken by Frances A. Zwenig, Staff Director for the Committee; J. William Codinha, Chief Counsel to the Committee; John Erickson, Investigative Attorney to the Committee; William LeGro, Committee Investigator; and/or any Member of the Committee.



John F. Kerry
Chairman



Bob Smith
Vice Chairman



On February 25, 1968, General Major Jan Sejna left Czechoslovakia and requested political asylum in the United States. Sejna is believed to be the only Communist Party official ever to defect to the West who had served inside the decision-making process of his country's government at the highest level.


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From 1956 until his defection in 1968, he operated at the center of power in Czechoslovakia. A listing of the various positions he held after 1954, most of them continuously until 1968, provides clear evidence of his experience in and knowledge of the internal workings of the communist decision-making process at the highest level:

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Additionally, he headed and served on numerous committees while acting in the above capacities. Of all these activities, unquestionably the most significant was that of Secretary of the Defense Council.

Defense Council is the most important decision-making body in the fields of foreign policy, intelligence, military affairs, and, in several respects, even the economy and industry.



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
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
Notice of
Senate Deposition

To Major General Jan Sejna
Defense Intelligence Agency
Department of Defense, **Greeting:**

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Please provide the Committee with a current resume of your
educational and professional experience in advance of your
deposition

Given under my hand, by authority vested in me by
the Select committee, on November 2,
1992.



John F. Kerry, Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs

On February 25, 1968, General Major Jan Sejna left Czechoslovakia and requested political asylum in the United States. Sejna is believed to be the only Communist Party official ever to defect to the West who had served inside the decision-making process of his country's government at the highest level.

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**DoD POW/MIA CENTRAL DOCUMENTATION OFFICE**3100 Clarendon Blvd.
Arlington, VA 22201

FAX (703) 908-2835

FROM: C. WELLSDATE/TIME: 4 NOVPHONE NUMBER: (703)908-2871

REMARKS:

For tomorrow's depositionTO: STEVE GEROSKI

PHONE NUMBER: _____

OFFICE: SFCFAX NUMBER: 202 224-2155NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING COVERSHEET 2

[50] From: John Erickson 11/5/92 5:23PM (446 bytes: 4 ln)
To: Bill Codinha, Nancy Cuddy, Steve Gekoski, Bill LeGro, Rich Smith
Subject: DEPO OF MG JAN SEJNA

----- Message Contents -----

STEVE- IT HAS NOW BEEN SET FOR 10:00 THURSDAY NOV.19,1992 IN
S-407. PLEASE DO THE NORMAL ARRANGEMRNTS, ROOM,
ALDERSON,ETC. HIS ATTORNEY IS MR. BARRY STIEN- 202-393-8500.
ALSO NOTIFY MR> FRED GREEN 703-908-2849 OF DOD.

[41] From: Jon McCreary 10/27/92 4:28PM (832 bytes: 15 ln)
To: Steve Gekoski, Nancy Cuddy, Rich Smith
cc: Bill Codinha, John Erickson, Bill LeGro
Subject: Deposition of Maj Gen Sejna

----- Message Contents -----

Bill has approved the deposition of Maj Gen Jan Sejna, of the DIA. McCreary cannot take this deposition, but it needs to be taken to prepare for the 10 November 1992 Hearing. Sejna has information on both the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

Briefing will be SECRET, higher if necessary.

Sejna can be reached through DoD CDO, because he is a DIA employee.

The length of the deposition will be about 3 hours.

Bill LeGro wants John Erickson to take the deposition.

Erickson says next Tuesday is good for him.

Approved for release

[49] From: Bill Codinha 11/5/92 12:16PM (1149 bytes: 15 ln)
To: John Erickson, Nancy Cuddy, Steve Gekoski, Neal Kravitz, Bill LeGro,
Jon McCreary
cc: Frances Zwenig
Subject: DEPO OF MAJ. GEN. JAN SEJNA

----- Message Contents -----

HE HAS RETAINED MR. BARRY STIEN 202-393-8500. I HAVE SPOKEN WITH MR. STIEN AND HE CAN NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR A DEPO UNTIL NOV 12 OR 13 DUE TO HIS SCHEDULE. HE REQUESTED THE GENERAL AREA OF THE QUESTIONS, WHICH I FAXED TO HIM. I WILL BE IN KANSA NOV. 12 OR 13 FOR MY FATHER'S 75TH, BUT PERHAPS NEAL COULD TAKE IT. MR> STIEN WOULD LIKE TO KNOW TODAY AS HE WILL BE OUT OF TOWN TOMORROW. HE NEEDS TO SWITCH HIS SCHEDULE IF WE ARE TAKING A DEPO ON THE 12 OR 13TH. I HAVE RELAYED THIS INFO TO FRED GREEN. PLEASE ADVISE.

John: This doesn't look like it is going to work, just based on the dates. We already have an interview with Sejna, that may have to be enough. Sejna will have to be closed session anyway. I will discuss it with FAZ.

JWC

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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
To Major General Jan Sejna
Defense Intelligence Agency
Department of Defense

Greeting:

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Please provide the Committee with a current resume of your educational and professional experience in advance of your deposition.

Given under my hand, by authority vested in me by the Select committee, on November 16, 1992


John F. Kerry, Chairman

Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs

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Jan Sejna is the only known high-ranking Communist Party official with access to the top decision-making process to have defected to the West. From 1956 until his defection from Czechoslovakia in 1968, General Major Sejna held a variety of Party and government positions, including membership in the Central Committee, the National Assembly, the Presidium of the National Assembly, the Military Section of the Administration Department, the Bureau of the Main Political Administration, and the Kolegium of the Ministry of Defense; he also served as a member of the inner decision-making councils at the Ministry of Defense, Defense Council, Main Political Administration, and National Assembly.

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