



OCA FILE
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Washington, D.C. 20505

14 December 1992

OCA 0982-92/1

Mr. J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Codinha:

Your letter of 20 October 1992 inquired about information relevant to the POW issue which the Committee thought available in the files and archives of the National Warning Staff.

It will not be appropriate or useful to make the entire files and archives available to the Committee. To assist the work of the Committee, however, the National Intelligence Officer for Warning ensured that a thorough review was undertaken to locate any files or reports touching on issues before the Committee. No file specifically devoted to POW/MIA issues exists in current holdings or in archives. Other files were hand-searched, particular attention being paid to those on Vietnam and Korea.

The National Warning Staff files contained several documents, both classified intelligence reports and open press articles, which related to the POW/MIA issue. Two classified reports were originated by CIA: a December 1982 assessment of the Lao resistance; and an October 1991 report relating a Vietnamese official's views on normalizing relations with the United States. We believe both reports have already been made available to the Committee but have appended copies to this letter for ease of reference.

Sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]

John L. Breckenridge
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs


Enclosures

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SUBJECT: Response to Codinha, POW/MIA Affairs Cmte,
re Information Available in National Warning
Staff Files



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TO DIRNSA
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DEPT OF COMMERCE

DEPT OF STATE/INR
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PERCEPTION OF THE DERAILING OF VIETNAMESE-SOVIET RELATIONS AS THE
USSR LEADERSHIP LOOKED INCREASINGLY TOWARD THE WEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN
STABILIZATION OF ITS DYNAMIC DOMESTIC EVENTS AND DISTANCED ITSELF
FROM THE PROMINENT REMAINING SOCIALIST REGIMES VIETNAM AND CUBA

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CITE CIA 914109

SERIAL: TD-00-B-321/07089-91
PASS: NSA FOR ZKZK OO DLS DE (FOR NSOC).

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~
DIST: 03 OCTOBER 1991

COUNTRY: VIETNAM

SUBJ: VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL'S VIEWS ON NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS
WITH THE U.S. AND CHINA

DOI: LATE AUGUST 1991

SOURCE:

6. AS THE CONVERSATION PROGRESSED [REDACTED] DID MENTION THAT HE HAD BEEN ASKED BY AIR VIETNAM TO APPROACH A MAJOR U.S. COMMERCIAL CARRIER REGARDING THE PROSPECTS FOR POSSIBLE SALE/LEASING OF AIRCRAFT IMMEDIATELY UPON EXPIRATION OF THE TRADE EMBARGO. THE VIETNAMESE AIRLINE ALSO WAS INTERESTED IN A FLIGHT TRAINING PROGRAM BEING ESTABLISHED FOR ITS CREW MEMBERS. HOWEVER, ALL PARTIES READILY AGREED THAT COMPENSATION FOR EITHER AIRCRAFT OR TRAINING WOULD HAVE TO BE "IMAGINATIVELY ARRANGED" AS VIETNAM SIMPLY DID NOT CURRENTLY HAVE HARD CURRENCY FOR SUCH ACTIVITIES.

7. FINALLY, [REDACTED] THE MAJORITY OF VIETNAM'S NEW LEADERSHIP TEAM APPEARS CONFIDENT THAT THE TRADE EMBARGO WITH THE U.S. WOULD BE LIFTED BEFORE YEAR'S END. [REDACTED] BELIEVED THAT VIETNAM WAS NOW ACTING IN GOOD FAITH CONCERNING THE PREVIOUSLY CONTENTIOUS ISSUE OF THE POW'S AND MIA'S AND THAT U.S. BUSINESS WOULD SOON BE LOBBYING HARD FOR ENTREE INTO THE VIETNAMESE MARKETPLACE, PARTICULARLY IN THE AGRICOMMODITY SECTOR.

ACQ: (EARLY SEPTEMBER 1991)

DISSEM:

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DECL: OADR DRV [REDACTED] BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT. END OF MESSAGE
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2. [REDACTED] AT THE SEVENTH PARTY CONGRESS HELD EARLIER THIS YEAR, THE COUNTRY'S NEWLY EMERGING LEADERSHIP DECIDED THAT IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH CHINA WAS THE LINCHPIN TO ENSURE THAT VIETNAM WAS NOT ISOLATED IN FUTURE ASIAN POLITICAL AFFAIRS. TOWARD THAT END, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS NGUYEN CO ((THACH)) WAS PRESSURED INTO STEPPING ASIDE. HE HAD REPEATEDLY BEEN IDENTIFIED AS THE PRINCIPAL SPOKESMAN IN THE ANTI-CHINESE ELEMENTS OF THE "OLD LEADERSHIP" AND HIS OUSTER HAD BEEN A KEY STIPULATION BY THE CHINESE IN ANY MOVEMENT TOWARD IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

PROF. [REDACTED] AND BELIEVED THAT THE NEW MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WAS DISTINCTLY MORE POSITIVELY INCLINED TOWARD CHINA.

3. IN WHAT [REDACTED] ACKNOWLEDGED AS AN APPARENT CONTRADICTION, THE NEW MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IS PRIVATELY LESS FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. THAN WAS THACH BUT THE NEW LEADERSHIP AS A WHOLE HAS BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY DISPLAYED A NEAR OBSESSION WITH RECTIFYING THE POW/MIA MATTER AND REALIZING AN END TO THE U.S.-IMPOSED TRADE EMBARGO. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] THE PARTY CONGRESS CONCLUDED THAT REINITIATION OF TRADE WITH THE U.S. WAS CRITICAL TO VIETNAM EMERGING FROM THE SUSTAINED ECONOMIC MALAISE, PARTICULARLY AS SOVIET AID DRAMATICALLY DIMINISHED. THROUGHOUT THE CONGRESS VARIOUS PROPOSALS WERE TABLED REGARDING THE FORMULATION OF JOINT U.S.-VIETNAMESE TEAMS TO EXPEDITE THE SEARCH FOR MISSING U.S. SERVICEMEN OR THEIR REMAINS.

4. [REDACTED] TALKED OF THE APPOINTMENT OF MANY HIGH LEVEL OFFICIALS AT THE PARTY CONGRESS AS CLEAR EVIDENCE OF THE "YOUTH MOVEMENT" SWEEPING THROUGH VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP RANKS. IN FACT, HE CHARACTERIZED HIMSELF AS A "TRANSITIONAL FIGURE" DUE TO HIS AGE [REDACTED]

ACTION-DIA(1) (U,6,7)
INFO ASD:PA&E/EPF(1) GASD:C3I-INT(1) CAO(1) DI-1(1)
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+CNC WASHINGTON DC

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MCN=91276/07684

TOR=91276/2131Z

TAD=91276/2132Z

CDSN=MIA582

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6 DEC 1982

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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AND SOCIAL DISLOCATION AND WIDESPREAD UNCERTAINTY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. WHEN THOUSANDS OF SENIOR AND MIDDLE LEVEL BUREAUCRATS AND MILITARY OFFICERS WERE PRESSED INTO REEDUCATION CAMPS, THE RESULTING SEPARATION OF FAMILIES SPARKED FEAR AND TRIGGERED THE FLIGHT OF MOST OF THE COUNTRY'S INTELLECTUALS, BUREAUCRATS, AND TECHNOCRATS. AN ESTIMATED 500,000 LAO HAVE FLED THE LPDR IN THE PAST SIX YEARS. MANY OF THESE REFUGEES CARRIED THEIR RESENTMENT FOR THE LPDR REGIME AND ITS MENTOR, THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SRV), INTO REFUGEE CAMPS ALONG THE THAILAND-LPDR BORDER. THE CAMPS QUICKLY BECAME CENTERS OF AGITATION AGAINST THE LPDR AND FERTILE BREEDING GROUND FOR SELF-STYLED RESISTANCE LEADERS. ORCON WHINTEL

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ENCOURAGED BY AMBIGUOUS OFFERS OF THAI SUPPORT AND NURTURED BY PROMISES OF AID FROM PROMINENT LAO EMIGRES ABROAD, MAKE-SHIFT TEAMS OF INSURGENTS SPANG UP IN CAMPS ALONG THE BORDER. THESE RESISTANCE TEAMS WERE POORLY TRAINED AND EQUIPPED. THEY OFTEN WERE LED BY INEXPERIENCED LEADERS. THESE RESISTANCE TEAMS NEVERTHELESS HARASSED LAO PEOPLE'S ARMY (LPA) AND PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM (PAVN) INSTALLATIONS AND CONVOYS ALONG ROUTE 13 AND THE MEKONG RIVER FROM CHAMPASSAX TO VIENTIANE PROVINCE.

ORCON WHINTEL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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EXCLUSIVE DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED AT END OF REPORT

DIST: 6 DECEMBER 1982

COUNTRY: LAOS/THAILAND/VIETNAM/CHINA

SUBJ: APPRAISAL OF SITUATION: THE LAO RESISTANCE

DOI: 30 NOVEMBER 1982

SOURCE: THIS IS A FIELD APPRAISAL. [REDACTED] IT IS AN INTERPRETATION BASED ON PREVIOUSLY REPORTED INFORMATION.

ORCON WHINTEL

PREPARED PRIMARILY FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE, IT IS DISSEMINATED IN THE BELIEF THAT IT MAY BE USEFUL TO OTHERS IN THEIR OWN ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION.

SUMMARY: ARMED RESISTANCE AGAINST THE LPDR GOVERNMENT HAS CONTINUED ERRATICALLY SINCE EARLY 1976 WITH LITTLE OR NO SIGNIFICANT GAINS. THE ABSENCE OF UNITY, OVERT SUPPORT, AND CAPABLE LEADERSHIP HAS KEPT THE LAO RESISTANCE FRAGMENTED AND WEAK. LPA AND PAVN FORCES, WHILE SUPERIOR TO THE RESISTANCE, ARE STRETCHED TOO THINLY TO ELIMINATE THE RESISTANCE FORCES COMPLETELY. THE RTG HAS PROVIDED LIMITED AMOUNTS OF COVERT SUPPORT TO RESISTANCE FORCES, BUT THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE RTG WOULD WANT TO RISK CONFRONTATION WITH THE SRV BY EXPANDING SUCH AID. CHINA'S MOTIVES FOR BECOMING INVOLVED ARE NOT CLEAR, BUT IT IS LIKELY THAT THE CHINESE REGARD LIMITED COVERT SUPPORT TO THE MOVEMENT AS ANOTHER POINT OF PRESSURE ON THE SRV AND AS A CONVENIENT MEANS OF INFLUENCING THE LPDR. THE LPDR AND SRV VIEW THE RESISTANCE ACTIVITY WITH SOME CONCERN BUT NOT AS A MAJOR THREAT. IN THE ABSENCE OF A CHANGE IN THAI OR CHINESE POLICY TOWARD SUPPORTING THE RESISTANCE, THE MOVEMENT IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE ON ITS PRESENT LOW-LEVEL COURSE. ORCON WHINTEL

TEXT: INTRODUCTION

1. OPPOSITION TO THE PATHET LAO REGIME BEGAN SHORTLY AFTER THE COMMUNISTS TOOK OVER THE COUNTRY IN DECEMBER 1975. THE OPPOSITION RESULTED FROM A SERIES OF INEPT MOVES INSTITUTED BY THE LEADERSHIP OF THE NEWLY FORMED LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (LPDR) WHICH LED TO POLITICAL UPHEAVAL, SEVERE ECONOMIC

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2. FOLLOWING THE PAVN INVASION OF KAMPUCHEA AND THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN CHINA AND THE SRV IN LATE 1978 AND EARLY 1979, ETHNIC MINORITY TRIBESMEN IN REMOTE MOUNTAINOUS STRETCHES OF LPDR MILITARY REGION-1 (MR-1) WERE PROVIDED SOME AID AND WEAPONS TRAINING BY THE CHINESE. SMALL POCKETS OF RESISTANCE ACTIVITY SUBSEQUENTLY APPEARED IN THE HIGHLANDS OF LUANG NAMTHA, OUDCHSAI, AND SAYABOURY PROVINCES IN 1981 FOLLOWING THE RETURN OF THESE TRIBESMEN FROM TRAINING SITES IN CHINA. EXCEPT FOR PARTS OF MR-1 AND CLASHES INVOLVING THE HMONG ETHNIC MINORITY GROUP DEEP IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS OF LPDR MR-11, WHICH ENDED IN 1980 WITH THE DEFEATED HMONG SCATTERED TO ADJOINING PROVINCES AND REFUGEE CAMPS ORCON WHINTEL
IN THAILAND, MOST OF THE RESISTANCE ACTIVITY HAS BEEN CONFINED TO BORDER AREAS FROM SAYABOURY IN THE NORTHWEST TO CHAMPASSAX IN THE LPDR PANHANDLE. REPORTS OF RESISTANCE ACTIVITY IN OTHER PARTS OF THE LPDR SUCH AS HOUAPHAN, XIENG KHOUANG, AND AREAS CONTIGUOUS TO THE SRV, FOR THE MOST PART, INVOLVED CLASHES WITH NOMADIC HILL TRIBESMEN, OUTLAW BANDS, OR "SOCIAL UNDESIRABLES" WANDERING ABOUT WITHOUT OFFICIAL PERMISSION AND ATTEMPTING TO LIVE OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT CONTROL. THE LPA NORMALLY DOES NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THESE PEOPLE AND THE MORE OR LESS LOOSELY ORGANIZED RESISTANCE ELEMENTS OPERATING FROM BASES IN THAILAND.

STATUS OF RESISTANCE

3. AS OF NOVEMBER 1982, THERE WERE AN ESTIMATED 9,000 INSURGENTS INVOLVED IN THE OVERALL ANTI-LPDR RESISTANCE MOVEMENT. APART FROM TOKEN AID PROVIDED BY THE CHINESE AND LIMITED COVERT SUPPORT FROM THAILAND, LITTLE SUPPORT FOR THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT HAS MATERIALIZED OVER THE PAST SIX YEARS. THE THAI PERMIT RESISTANCE TEAMS TO REGISTER IN REFUGEE CAMPS AND DRAW UNITED NATIONS ORCON WHINTEL
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR) RATIONS FOR THEMSELVES AND THEIR FAMILIES. THESE TEAMS ARE BIVOUACED IN SECRET SITES ALONG THE BORDER TO KEEP THE THAI INVOLVEMENT COVERT. MORE THAN ANY OTHER FACTOR, THE ABSENCE OF SOLID OVERT BACKING BY THAILAND HAS HOBBLLED THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AND KEPT IT FRAGMENTED. THERE IS NO UNITY AMONG THE VARIOUS FACTIONS INVOLVED IN THE RESISTANCE, AND THERE IS NO COORDINATION AMONG THAI COVERT SUPPORT UNITS SPONSORING THE RESISTANCE TEAMS. THIS IS A DELIBERATE ASPECT OF THAI POLICY WHICH VIEWS THE POSSIBILITY OF A UNIFIED RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AS PROBABLY UNCONTROLLABLE AND POTENTIALLY DETRIMENTAL TO THAI INTERESTS. ACTIVITIES OF RESISTANCE TEAMS, WHETHER INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OR SABOTAGE, USUALLY REFLECT THE IDIOSYCRASIES OF LOCAL THAI COMMANDERS. THE MOVEMENT ALSO HAS BEEN SUFFETED BY COMPETING DEMANDS FOR ALLEGIANCE FROM DIFFERING FACTIONS SUCH AS ((PHUMI)) NOSAVAN'S UNITED LAO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (ULNLF); ((KONG LE)); NEUTRALISTS IN CHINA; PROMINENT FORMER LAO LEADERS LIVING IN EXILE ABROAD; AND OPPORTUNISTS SUCH AS ((BOUNLEUT)); SAYCOOCIE IN THAILAND; ((PHUMI)) BOUNLEUT WAS PHUMI NOSAVAN'S SAIDE-DE-CAMP IN VIENTIANE IN THE EARLY 1960'S.)) BICKERING LACK OF SUPPORT AND THE CONTINUOUS DRAIN ON MANPOWER AS INSURGENTS FILTER OUT OF THE
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SOVIET INSTALLATIONS ALTHOUGH THE ACTIONS OF THESE INSURGENTS ARE LARGELY INEFFECTUAL, THEY HAVE SERVED TO KEEP LPDR SECURITY UNITS IN THE AREA TENSE AND ALERT.

STATUS OF RESISTANCE IN LPDR MR-III

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12. MR-III IS STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT REGION TO THE LPDR BECAUSE OF ITS COMMUNICATIONS LINK TO THE SRV. THE AREA IS ALSO SIGNIFICANT BECAUSE IT HAS A SIZABLE POPULATION SYMPATHETIC TO THE RESISTANCE AND IS AN IMPORTANT FOOD GROWING AREA. RESISTANCE ACTIVITY IN THE REGION HAS VARIED IN INTENSITY OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS WITH MUCH OF IT DIRECTED TOWARD LIGHTLY GUARDED PAVN ORCON WMINTEL

ORCON WMINTEL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. IN EARLY 1982 WAS LED BY ((PHOU)) (LNU), A FORMER FAR CAPTAIN. PHOU HAD ABOUT 130 TROOPS BASED ON THA LI (QV 5750), LOEI PROVINCE, THAILAND, AND WAS ACTIVE IN SOUTHERN SAYABOURY PROVINCE. HE WORKED CLOSELY WITH THAI COVERT SUPPORT TEAMS AGAINST LPA UNITS IN BOTENE (QV 3187), KENTHAO (QV 3461), AND PAKLAY DISTRICTS AND HARASSED CIVILIAN AND MILITARY TRAFFIC ALONG ROADS IN THE THREE DISTRICTS. HIS ACTIONS HAVE FORCED THE LPA TO STRENGTHEN ITS FORCES IN SOUTHERN SAYABOURY.

CONVOYS ON ROUTE 13 AND BARGE TRAFFIC ON THE MEXONG. AS OF NOVEMBER, THERE WERE ABOUT 2,800 INSURGENTS, CONSISTING OF MORE THAN 30 SMALL GROUPS OF 20-50 TROOPS EACH, OPERATING AGAINST TARGETS IN KHAMMOUAN AND SAVANNAKHET PROVINCES. THESE GROUPS OPERATED WITH LIMITED THAI COVERT SUPPORT FROM BASES ALONG THE MEXONG FROM UBON TO NAKHON PHANOM PROVINCE. ON 20 MAY, TO EXERT BETTER THAI CONTROL, THAI COVERT SUPPORT TEAMS ORGANIZED THESE GROUPS INTO THE 415TH REGIMENT UNDER THE COMMAND OF ((BOUNMA)) VORACHAK AND ((BOUNLEUT)) SOULIGNAMA. THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 415TH REGIMENT WAS IN NAKHON PHANOM PROVINCE. THE TEAMS, HOWEVER, CONTINUED TO OPERATE AS SEPARATE ENTITIES. DESPITE THAI ATTEMPTS TO ORGANIZE THE DISPARATE GROUPS OF MR-II; AND MR-IV INSURGENTS, THE MOVEMENT REMAINS SPLIT INTO SEVERAL COMPETING FACTIONS. SOME INSURGENTS ARE ALIGNED WITH PHOUMI NOSAVAN (RIGHTISTS); SOME SUPPORT KONG LE (NEUTRALISTS); AND OTHERS INCLUDING A FEW FORMER PATHET LAO LEADERS (NATIONALISTS) OPERATE INDEPENDENTLY OF EITHER GROUP. INSURGENT TEAMS OPERATING IN THEIR NATIVE AREAS IN KHAMMOUAN PROVINCE HAVE THE SUPPORT OF FAMILY AND FRIENDS IN THE REGION AND GOOD AREA KNOWLEDGE. FEWER THAN TEN PERCENT OF THE INSURGENTS HAVE HAD ANY PRIOR MILITARY EXPERIENCE, HOWEVER. WEAPONS ARE CLOSELY CONTROLLED BY THAI COVERT SUPPORT TEAMS, AND THERE ARE INADEQUATE MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT. THE SINGLE THREAD HOLDING THESE RESISTANCE TEAMS TOGETHER IS THE HOPE THAT THE RTG MIGHT EXPAND ITS SUPPORT FOR THE MOVEMENT. THE GROUPS USUALLY OPERATE ABOUT 10-20 KILOMETERS INLAND FROM THE MEXONG OSTENSIBLY BECAUSE OF A LACK OF FOOD BUT MORE LIKELY BECAUSE THEY FEEL SECURE CLOSE TO THE BORDER. THEIR PRIMARY MISSIONS ARE TO HARASS LPA AND PAVN UNITS AND TO GATHER INTELLIGENCE. THEIR ACTIVITIES ARE TIGHTLY CIRCUMSCRIBED BY THE THAI.

STATUS OF RESISTANCE IN LPDR MR-II

10. MOST RESISTANCE ACTIVITY IN MR-II HAS BEEN CARRIED OUT BY HMONG FROM BAN VINAY, A HMONG REFUGEE CAMP IN LOEI PROVINCE, THAILAND, AND FROM TEAMS OF LOWLAND LAO OPERATING WITH THAI COVERT SUPPORT FROM NONG KHAI PROVINCE. FROM 1976 TO 1980, THE HMONG STUBBORNLY RESISTED LPA AND PAVN ATTACKS AGAINST THEIR MOUNTAIN VILLAGES IN PHOU BIA (UF 0798) AND LONG TIENG (TG 8313) UNTIL THEY WERE PUSHED OUT. THE FOUR-YEAR STRUGGLE EXHAUSTED THEIR STORES OF AMMUNITION AND WEAPONS AND RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF HUNDREDS OF YOUNG HMONG. THERE WERE STRONG INDICATIONS THAT PAVN FORCES HAD EMPLOYED CHEMICAL WARFARE AGAINST THE HMONG IN AND AROUND PHOU BIA. MANY OF THOSE WHO WERE NOT KILLED FLED TO ADJACENT PROVINCES AND TO THAILAND. AS A RESULT OF THE LONG STRUGGLE, HMONG RANKS HAVE BEEN DECIMATED TO THE POINT WHERE THERE ARE FEWER THAN 2,000 MEN WHO ARE EITHER WILLING OR CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING INSURGENT ACTIVITY IN MR-II. THESE INSURGENTS OPERATE PRIMARILY IN PCKETS NORTHWEST OF HUANG MOC (UF 9592), IN THE REGION WEST OF VANG VIENG (TF 3295), AND IN THE HIGHLANDS FROM BAN DONE (SF 6898) TO PAK CHOM (RV 0592). THE LEADER OF THE HMONG IN BAN VINAY IS ((VANG)) NENG WHO IS CLOSE TO HMONG LEADER FORMER GENERAL ((VANG)) PAO. AT ANY GIVEN TIME, FROM 100 TO 300 HMONG TROOPS OPERATE INSIDE VIENTIANE PROVINCE ON BEHALF OF THE THAI COVERT TEAM IN LOEI COLLECTING INTELLIGENCE OR CARRYING OUT SMALL-SCALE HARASSMENT ATTACKS. ALTHOUGH STILL CAPABLE OF POSING A MINOR THREAT TO PARTS OF VIENTIANE PROVINCE, INCLUDING THE CAPITAL, THE SPIRIT OF THESE HMONG HAS BEEN BROKEN, AND MOST OF THE HMONG HAVE LITTLE HOPE OF EVER RETURNING TO THEIR HOMES IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS.

13. ON 10 JUNE, THAI COVERT SUPPORT TEAMS ORGANIZED THE 31ST RESISTANCE REGIMENT IN MUKDAHAN PROVINCE. THE NEW REGIMENT WAS HEADED BY ((SING)) INTHISAN. OTHER LEADERS WERE ((CHAMPHENG)) CHANTHAPHON, POLITICAL AFFAIRS; ((BOUNSOUAN)) SOUMPHONPHAKDI, RESISTANCE FORCES; ((SIMUANG)) CHANTHALANGSI, INTELLIGENCE; AND ((KOH)) SOUMPHONPHAKDI, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PROPAGANDA AFFAIRS. THE 31ST REGIMENT'S AREA OF OPERATIONS IS SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE. LIKE THE 415TH REGIMENT, THE 31ST IS A REGIMENT IN NAME ONLY AND ITS DISPARATE PARTS OPERATE AUTONOMOUSLY. THE THAI COVERT TEAM MADE ARRANGEMENTS TO PROVIDE LIMITED SUPPORT AND ALSO ARRANGED WITH THE MUKDAHAN DISTRICT HOSPITAL TO PROVIDE FREE MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR ANTI-LPDR

RESISTANCE TROOPS IN EXCHANGE FOR DONATIONS OF BLOOD FROM THE INSURGENTS. MANY OF THE INSURGENTS HAVE FRIENDS OR FAMILY STILL RESIDING IN SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE, AND THERE SEEMS TO BE SOME SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT FOR THEM THERE. HOWEVER, THEY ARE NO MATCH FOR THE SUPERIOR PAVN, LPA, AND VILLAGE MILITIA FORCES IN THE REGION.

STATUS OF RESISTANCE IN LPDR MR-IV

11. GROUPS OF LOWLAND LAO NUMBERING ABOUT 500 INSURGENTS OPERATE FROM COVERT BASES IN NONG KHAI, THAILAND, ACROSS THE MEXONG IN VIENTIANE CITY AND PROVINCE. DURING 1982, THEY APPARENTLY WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR FIVE GRENADE ATTACKS, INCLUDING INCIDENTS AT THE SOVIET CULTURAL CENTER AND POLISH EMBASSY. FOLLOWING THESE INCIDENTS, HOWEVER, THEY WERE ORDERED BY THE THAI NOT TO ATTACK.

14. IN SEPTEMBER 1982, THAI COVERT TEAMS IN UBON RATCHATHANI PROVINCE CONSOLIDATED SEVERAL RESISTANCE SPLINTER GROUPS NUMBERING ABOUT 2,500 TROOPS INTO THE FOURTH ANTI-LPDR RESISTANCE DIVISION. AS OF NOVEMBER 1982, THE DIVISION WAS LED BY ((SAN)) AKKASA AND HAD ONLY ABOUT 1,485 TROOPS. MANY OF THE TROOPS HAD LEFT FOR RESETTLEMENT IN THIRTEEN COUNTRIES, DEFECTED TO THE LPA, OR LAID DOWN THEIR ARMS AND RETURNED TO REFUGEE CAMPS. ONE OF THE FOURTH DIVISION'S REGIMENTS OBTAINED SOME AID FOR SYMPATHETIC DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA FORCES FOR A TIME UNTIL THAI COVERT TEAMS, ALARMED AT THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH COLLABORATION, PUT A STOP TO IT. THE FOURTH DIVISION FOUND LITTLE

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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TO: DIA
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AND THE 968TH DIVISION IN SEND TO PROVIDE SUPPORT AND TRAINING FOR THE PAVN. HOWEVER, MOST OF THE PAVN FORCES ARE IN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS AROUND URBAN CENTERS, MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS ROUTES. LARGE PARTS OF THE BORDER AND INTERIOR ARE LEFT RELATIVELY UNGUARDED AND PROVIDE EASY ACCESS FOR THE ANTI-LPDR RESISTANCE FORCES OPERATING FROM THAILAND. THE PAVN UNITS ALTHOUGH FAR SUPERIOR TO THE RESISTANCE TROOPS, ARE TOO THINLY STRETCHED TO CONTAIN THE ELUSIVE INSURGENTS. MOREOVER, THERE IS LITTLE OR NO SYMPATHY FOR THE VIETNAMESE AMONG INHABITANTS OF AREAS THEY CONTROL. CONSEQUENTLY, THEY RECEIVE LITTLE COOPERATION FROM THE PEOPLE. PAVN TROOPS ALIENATE THE LAO BY CONFISCATING FOOD, MISTREATING LAO WOMEN, AND GENERALLY TREATING THE LAO AS INFERIORS. LARGE PARTS OF ATTOPEU PROVINCE HAVE BEEN POPULATED BY ETHNIC VIETNAMESE WHO ARE EXPLOITING THE REGION'S TIMBER RESOURCES. OTHER

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. SYMPATHY OR SUPPORT FROM LAO VILLAGERS IN CHAMPASSAK AND SARAVANE PROVINCES BECAUSE FEW OF THE DIVISION'S MEMBERS WERE NATIVES OF THE AREA. THE DIVISION WAS NOT EFFECTIVE IN HARASSING LPA AND PAVN INSTALLATIONS IN THE REGION. IT DISPLAYED LITTLE REGARD FOR THE LAO RESIDENTS OF MR-IV, ROBBING AND PLUNDERING THE VILLAGERS AND CREATING ANTI-PATHY TOWARD THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN GENERAL. THE POOR SHOWING OF THE RESISTANCE IN MR-IV PROVIDES A FAIRLY ACCURATE PICTURE OF THE PLIGHT OF THE RESISTANCE OVERALL AND UNDERSCORES ITS THREE GLARING WEAKNESSES--LACK OF SUPPORT, UNITY, AND CAPABLE LEADERSHIP.

STATUS OF LPA FORCES

15. THE LPA NUMBERS ABOUT 60,000 TROOPS ORGANIZED INTO TWO DIVISIONS AND TWO BRIGADES. THE LPA IS DEPLOYED THINLY IN ALL PARTS OF THE COUNTRY WHICH SEVERELY HAMPERS ITS EFFECTIVENESS. THE LPA LEADERSHIP IS COMPRISED OF LONG-TIME PATHET LAO FIGHTERS WHO SERVED EXTENSIVELY WITH PAVN FORCES. HOWEVER, THE OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LPA ITSELF IS QUESTIONABLE. DISCIPLINE IS LAX; TRAINING IS MINIMAL; AND BECAUSE OF POOR AND IRREGULAR PAY, MOTIVATION IS LOW. A NUMBER OF SOVIET AND SRV ADVISORS ARE WORKING TO IMPROVE THE LPA. MANY LPA UNITS ARE FORCED TO BE SELF-SUFFICIENT AND OFTEN ENGAGE IN OPIUM TRADING TO OBTAIN MONEY TO PURCHASE FOOD. THERE HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS REPORTS OF INDIVIDUAL LPA SOLDIERS SELLING THEIR WEAPONS TO OBTAIN MONEY TO BUY FOOD OR CLOTHING FOR THEMSELVES OR THEIR FAMILIES. THE AVERAGE LPA SOLDIER DISPLAYS NONE OF THE AGGRESSIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF HIS PAVN COMRADES. MANY LPA SOLDIERS HAVE FRIENDS OR FAMILY MEMBERS IN THE RESISTANCE AND OFTEN AVOID ENCOUNTERS WITH THE INSURGENTS TO AVOID INFLECTING CASUALTIES. THE LPA, HOWEVER, IS A RELATIVELY ORGANIZED MILITARY FORCE WITH VASTLY SUPERIOR FIRE AND MANPOWER AND IS MORE THAN AN EQUAL MATCH FOR THE RESISTANCE, ESPECIALLY WHEN BOLSTERED BY THE PRESENCE OF PAVN. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: THE LPA "BRIGADES" SHOULD BE CONSIDERED DIVISIONS, GIVING THE LPA A TOTAL OF FOUR.)

SRV PRESENCE IN THE LPDR

16. THE SRV VIEWS THE LPDR AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF ITS INDOCHINA FEDERATION AND AS A STRATEGIC BUFFER ON ITS WESTERN FLANK. IT MAINTAINS AN ESTIMATED 40,000 PAVN COMBAT TROOPS IN THE COUNTRY AND ABOUT 12,000 CONSTRUCTION WORKERS, MILITARY AND POLITICAL ADVISORS. IT HAS THREE PAVN COMBAT DIVISIONS IN THE LPDR, I.E., THE 379TH DIVISION IN LUANG PRABANG, THE 324 (324B) DIVISION IN VANG VIENG.

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PARTS OF THE LPDR-PANHANDLE PROVINCES ADJACENT TO THE SRV HAVE BEEN FLOODED WITH ETHNIC VIETNAMESE WHO ARE ENGAGED IN TIMBER AND MINING OPERATIONS. THIS ACTIVITY HAS THE TACIT APPROVAL OF THE LPDR AS ONE OF THE FEW MEANS AVAILABLE TO IT TO REPAY THE SRV FOR ITS LARGE INVESTMENTS OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL SUPPORT. THE SRV DOES NOT VIEW THE RESISTANCE IN ITS PERSENT STATE AS CONSTITUTING ANY SERIOUS THREAT TO THE LPDR REGIME ALTHOUGH INCREASED CHINESE OR THAI SUPPORT WOULD BE WORRISOME TO HANOI. THE RESISTANCE PROVIDES SOME JUSTIFICATION FOR MAINTAINING PAVN TROOPS IN THE LPDR, KEEPS THE ((KAYSONE)) PHOUOMVIHAN REGIME DEPENDENT ON THE SRV, AND PROVIDES A BARRIER TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF LPDR RELATIONS WITH THAILAND.

RTG VIEWS OF THE ANTI-LPDR RESISTANCE

17. THE UNDERLYING FACTORS OF THE THAI APPROACH TO RELATIONS WITH THE LPDR AND, BY EXTENSION, THE RESISTANCE, ARE THE OVERSHADOWING THREAT POSED BY THE SRV AND THE IMPACT ON THAILAND OF LAO REFUGEES. RELATIONS BETWEEN THAILAND AND THE LPDR HAVE OFTEN BEEN STRAINED OVER THE PAST SEVEN YEARS, BUT BOTH SIDES ENDEAVORED TO MAINTAIN THE APPEARANCE OF CORRECTNESS AS BEING IN THEIR BEST INTERESTS. THE LANDLOCKED LPDR IS PARTIALLY DEPENDENT ON OVERLAND IMPORTS AND EXPORT THROUGH THAI PORTS, WHILE THAILAND SEEKS TO MINIMIZE THE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER OPENLY HOSTILE NEIGHBOR WHILE PREOCCUPIED WITH THE MORE THREATENING PROBLEM OF KAMPUCHEA. THAILAND WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY LIKE TO SEE A FRIENDLIER GOVERNMENT INSTALLED IN VIENTIANE THAT COULD RID THAILAND OF ITS REFUGEE PROBLEM. IT WOULD ALSO WELCOME THE APPEARANCE OF A REGIME MORE POLITICALLY DISTANT FROM HANOI IF THAT COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT ANTAGONIZING THE LATTER. IN REALITY, HOWEVER, THE THAI ARE FACED WITH THE PROBLEM OF HAVING TO DEAL WITH A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT WHICH PURSUES POLICIES THE THAI FIND REPUGNANT AND THREATENING. THE RTG HAS, THEREFORE, EVOLVED AN APPROACH THAT PUBLICLY DISAVOWS ANY INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ANTI-LPDR RESISTANCE WHILE COVERTLY PROVIDING LIMITED ENCOURAGEMENT AND SUPPORT WHICH IT HOPES WILL LEAD TO SPONTANEOUS INTERNAL CHANGE IN THE LPDR. CRITICS OF THAI POLICY -- PEOPLE WHO ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THE LAO RESISTANCE, WHO VIEW THE LAO STRUGGLE AS AN EXTENSION OF THE KAMPUCHEAN CONFLICT AND, THEREFORE, DESERVING OF EQUAL THAI SUPPORT -- HAVE DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING THE THAI POSITION. THE THAI SEE LITTLE SIMILARITY IN THE TWO STRUGGLES. TO THEM, KAMPUCHEA REPRESENTS A CLEAR CASE OF FOREIGN AGGRESSION -- A POSITION THAT IS SHARED BY MOST NATIONS AND IS REINFORCED BY THE WEIGHT OF FREE WORLD OPINION. THE ANTI-LPDR RESISTANCE, ON THE OTHER HAND, DESPITE SOME PAVN PRESENCE, IS VIEWED AS PURELY AN INTERNAL LPDR MATTER. THE RTG IS RELUCTANT TO SUPPORT A HIGHLY VISIBLE UNITED RESISTANCE ON THAI SOIL THAT WOULD BE UNCONTROLABLE AND COULD LEAD TO A CONFRONTATION WITH THE SRV. IN THE MEANTIME, THAILAND IS FACED WITH THE DILEMMA OF WHAT TO DO WITH THE LARGE NUMBERS OF LAO REFUGEES INSIDE ITS BORDERS. THERE HAVE BEEN RECENT INDICATIONS THAT THE RTG HAS BEEN CONSIDERING A PROPOSAL TO RESETTLE SIZABLE NUMBERS OF ETHNIC HMONG TO SITES IN NAN PROVINCE ADJACENT TO THE LPDR BORDER. THAI SUPPORTERS OF THE PLAN THEORIZE THAT THE HMONG WOULD EVENTUALLY TRICKLE BACK INTO THE LPDR AND THEREBY PARTLY SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF WHAT TO DO WITH HMONG WHO ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THIRD COUNTRIES. WHILE THERE IS A PRECEDENT FOR SUCH A PLAN ON A LIMITED SCALE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EIGHT RESISTANCE VILLAGES OF HILL TRIBES IN THE NORTHERN CHANG RAI PROVINCE IN 1981, ANY EXPERIMENT OF A SIZABLE NATURE COULD CREATE PROBLEMS WITH WHICH

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. CONTINUED RESISTANCE TO THE LPDR. THE PROSPECT OF LIVING LEGALLY IN PEACEFUL, FAMILIAR SETTINGS WITH INTERNATIONAL AID WOULD EXERT AN ENORMOUS APPEAL TO LARGE NUMBERS OF HONG AND OTHER LAO ALREADY RESETTLED ILLEGALLY IN THAILAND OUTSIDE THE REFUGEE CAMPS. THERE ARE AN ESTIMATED 15,000 LAO RESIDING ILLEGALLY IN PROVINCES ALONG THE THAI BORDER. THE SETTLEMENT ALMOST CERTAINLY WOULD DRAW LARGE NUMBER OF LPA AND POSSIBLY PAVN SECURITY FORCES TO THE SAYABOURY SIDE OF THE BORDER TO COUNTER A PERCEIVED THREAT TO AN AREA RICH IN TIMBER RESOURCES AND ECONOMICALLY IMPORTANT TO THE LPDR. ENSUING TENSION WOULD INCREASE THE CHANCES FOR CLASHES AMID CHARGES OF THAI PROVOCATION.

LPDR PERCEPTIONS OF THE RESISTANCE

18. THE LPDR REGARDS THE RESISTANCE WITH SOME CONCERN BUT NOT AS A MAJOR THREAT. THE SPORADIC ATTACKS ON THE LPDR GENERATE CONTINUING TENSION IN BORDER AREAS FORCING THE GOVERNMENT TO ALLOCATE INCREASINGLY SCARCE NUMBERS OF SECURITY FORCES TO URBAN AREAS, INSTALLATIONS, AND COMMUNICATIONS ROUTES IN THE AFFECTED REGIONS. ATTACKS ALSO HAVE COST LIVES AND SOME LOSSES IN FOODSTUFFS, BUILDING SUPPLIES, AND EQUIPMENT. CONVOYS ON ROUTE 13 AND BARGE TRAFFIC PLYING BETWEEN MR-II AND MR-IV ARE FAVORITE TARGETS OF INSURGENTS. WHILE CONCERNED ABOUT THE DRAIN ON RESOURCES DEVOTED TO COUNTERING THE RESISTANCE, THE LPDR PROBABLY SEES CERTAIN BENEFITS IN A NONTHREATENING INSURGENCY. IT DEFLECTS ATTENTION FROM THE BASIC UNPOPULARITY OF THE REGIME IN THE FACE OF STAGGERING ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND PROVIDES THE GOVERNMENT WITH AN EXCUSE TO PROLONG TOUGH CONTROL MEASURES IN THE NAME OF SECURITY. THE INSURGENCY ALSO PROVIDES A HANDY EXPLANATION FOR DEFAULTING ON DEVELOPMENT GOALS SUPPORTED BY WESTERN AND INTERNATIONAL AID DONORS WHICH ARE IN FACT CAUSED BY LAO INCOMPETENCE AND MISMANAGEMENT. IT ALSO PROVIDES JUSTIFICATION FOR SEEKING CONTINUED SOVIET MILITARY AID AND SUPPORT.

CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN THE ANTI-LPDR RESISTANCE

19. CHINA BEGAN PROVIDING WEAPONS AND TRAINING TO SMALL NUMBERS OF ETHNIC MINORITY TRIBESMEN IN THE NORTHWESTERN LPDR IN EARLY 1980 FOLLOWING ITS CLASH WITH THE SRV OVER HANOI'S CUSTER OF THE PRO-CHINESE DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA REGIME IN PHNOM PENH. CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH HANOI AND VIENTIANE COOLED SIMULTANEOUSLY FOLLOWING THAT INCIDENT. IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT CHINA DECIDED TO PROVIDE LOW-LEVEL SUPPORT TO SOME INSURGENT GROUPS AS A MEANS OF MAINTAINING PRESSURE

ON THE SRV AND POSSIBLY AS LEVERAGE TO PULL THE LPDR INTO ADOPTING A MORE FAVORABLE STANCE TOWARD CHINA. CHINA HAS FEW AVAILABLE OPTIONS TO PROMPTLY TAKE INTO LINE WITH BEIJING. CHINA DOES NOT HAVE THE ECONOMIC RESOURCES TO LURE THE LPDR AWAY FROM THE SOVIET-SRV CAMP AND TO ADOPT A BELLIGERENT STANCE TOWARD THE TINY NATION AS CHINA IS DOING ALONG ITS BORDER WITH THE SRV. WOULD BE COSTLY AND WOULD NOT ENHANCE CHINA'S IMAGE AMONG THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. CHINA IS BELIEVED TO HAVE TRAINED ABOUT 2,000 LAO INSURGENTS IN THE PAST TWO YEARS. IT HAS ALSO BEEN HOST TO SEVERAL LAO EXILES, THE MOST PROMINENT BEING FORMER FAR GENERAL KONG LE. DESPITE RECENT INDICATIONS THAT CHINA MIGHT BE CONSIDERING INCREASING ITS SUPPORT FOR THE RESISTANCE, THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT CHINA WISHES TO OVERTHROW THE KAYSONE REGIME OR DO ANYTHING TO SEND IT SPIRALING MORE DEEPLY INTO SOVIET AND SRV ARMS. ADDITIONALLY, CHINA ALMOST CERTAINLY WOULD NOT WELCOME THE INSTALLATION OF A PRO-WESTERN GOVERNMENT IN VIENTIANE, WHICH IS FAVORED BY MOST OF THE THAILAND-BASED RESISTANCE GROUPS. IT APPEARS PROBABLE THAT CHINA HAS CHARTED A MODEST COURSE OF SUPPORT TO FOSTER AN IMAGE OF THE INSURGENCY AS A POTENTIAL THREAT TO VIENTIANE WHICH IT CAN READILY MANIPULATE TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE LPDR AND THE SRV.

CONCLUSIONS

20. THE ANTI-LPDR RESISTANCE IN ITS PRESENT FRAGMENTED FORM POSES LITTLE MORE THAN AN IRRITANT TO THE LPDR. IT HAS LITTLE HOPE OF DESTABILIZING THE KAYSONE GOVERNMENT AND VIRTUALLY NONE OF REPLACING IT. ITS PROSPECTS FOR ACHIEVING A VIABLE THREAT REST ALMOST ENTIRELY ON EXPANDED THAI OR CHINESE SUPPORT AND ON A COLLECTIVE WILL TO PERSIST, NEITHER OF WHICH APPEARS IMMINENT. MOREOVER, DEVELOPMENT

ELSEWHERE IN INDOCHINA, E.G., KAMPUCHEA, WHICH WOULD FREE LARGE NUMBERS OF PAVN FORCES FOR DEPLOYMENT TO THE LPDR WOULD BE A SERIOUS SETBACK FOR THE INSURGENTS. IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT THE ANTI-LPDR RESISTANCE MOVEMENT WILL CONTINUE AT ITS PRESENT INEFFECTUAL PACE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

21. [REDACTED] THE AMBASSADOR HAS SEEN THIS APPRAISAL AND POSES NO OBJECTION TO ITS DISSEMINATION.)

ACQ:

DISSEM: [REDACTED] EMBASSY (AMBASSADOR, DCM, POLITICAL COUNSELOR ONLY), DEFENSE ATTACHE (COL. CRIST ONLY) AT BANGKOK. SENT TO [REDACTED] (AMBASSADORS ONLY), HONG KONG (CONSUL GENERAL ONLY), CINCPAC (EXCLUSIVE FOR CINCPAC, COMIPAC, AND POLAD).

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SECTIONAL (1)


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D/OCA			X
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DD/SENATE		X	
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DD/CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT			X
DD/INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ISSUES			X
CONSTITUENT INQUIRIES OFFICER			
FOIA/PA OFFICER			
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OCA/COMPT/ISC			X
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ACTION OFFICER:			
REMARKS: <u>PW</u>			
CONTROL NUMBER: <u>CA 0982-90</u>			
FILE:			

FORM 4422
Nov 91



SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

SUBJECT: Briefing of Senate Select Committee Staffers on Three Individuals

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)

FROM: <input type="text"/> C/EA/ICOG	EXTENSION: <input type="text"/>	DATE SENT: 3 Nov 92	REQUEST NUMBER: DDO 0025/277-92
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	TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1.	DCEA/SEA		3/11		
2.	DCEA Chief, EA				
3.	C/ORMS <input type="text"/>		11/04/92		
4.	DC/ORMS		3 NOV 1992		
5.	C/ORMS		5 NOV 1992		
6.	SA/DDO <input type="text"/>		9/11		
7.	ADDO		11.9		
8.	DDO				
9.	O/OCA <input type="text"/>		11/2		
10.					
11.	<i>OCA RECORD</i>				
12.					

SUSPENSE DATE:



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Priority Handling

Congressional Action

~~SECRET~~

3 November 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Breckenridge
Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: [Redacted]
Chief, Indochina Operations Group

SUBJECT: Briefing of Senate Select Committee
Staffers on Three Individuals

REFERENCE: Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs
letter to you of 30 October 1992

1. In response to the attached Reference request, we plan to brief the Select Committee staffers orally, providing the information contained in the attached traces on the two Vietnamese and one American about whom the Committee inquired. We will not pass the written traces to the staffers, nor will we declassify our traces, although we can expect to be asked to do so.

2. We received the Reference request late on 30 October, and prepared the attached traces on 2 November. Despite the 4 November deadline imposed by Mr. Codinha, please do not schedule the briefing until this memorandum has been routed through [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]


Attachments: Traces

[Redacted]

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
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2 November 1992



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Priority Handling

Cong. Action

SUBJECT: Declassified Copy of Intelligence Report for Senator Smith

FROM: [Redacted] [Redacted] C/EA/ICOG [Redacted]	EXTENSION [Redacted]	DATE SENT 9 Nov 92	REQUEST NUMBER 0025/099-92
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	TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1.	DCEA/SEA		11/9		OCA FILE: <u>SSP</u> 'S' SECRET # _____
2.	Chief, EA	9	NOV 1992		
3.	C/ORMS [Redacted]				
4.	DC/ORMS		9 NOV 1992		
5.	C/ORMS [Redacted]		9 NOV 1992		
6.	SA/DDO [Redacted]				
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FORM 4283

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Congressional Action


0625/29992

~~S E C R E T~~

6 November 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Breckenridge
Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: 
Chief, Indochina Operations Group

SUBJECT: Declassified Copy of Intelligence Report,
For Senator Smith

REFERENCE: Senator Smith's request, per his memorandum and
your 5 November memorandum, attached


1. OCA: Please send the following text to the Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs on 9 November, per Senator Smith's request.

2. Attached is the unclassified copy of the 1982 intelligence report which Senator Smith requested be delivered to him by 9 November 1992.



Attachment: As stated





DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

REPORT CLASS

COUNTRY	USSR	DATE DISTR.	12 March 1982
SUBJECT	Alleged Soviet Incarceration of U.S. Vietnam Prisoners of War (DOI: 1970)	REFERENCES	

SOURCE

SUMMARY: According to KGB Lieutenant General Petr Ivanovich Grigoriyev, specially selected U.S. prisoners of war were being received into the Soviet Union circa 1970 for long term or lifetime incarceration and "ideological retraining." He implied the number involved to be about 2,000. The goal of the program was indefinite, but involved intensive psychological investigation of the prisoners and retraining to make them available as required to serve the needs of the Soviet Union. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

END SUMMARY.

1. [REDACTED] Comment: This report should be read with caution. CIA records contain no confirmation of the alleged intelligence affiliation of the subsource cited below, despite the source's assertion that Grigoriyev held a leading position in the KGB. Several other persons named in the text likewise cannot be identified. We have never before encountered even vague rumors among Soviet dissidents or other informants that any U.S. POW's from Vietnam are incarcerated in

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the USSR, much less that 2,000 such individuals are leading "reasonably normal lives" in the same region where numerous Soviet political prisoners have resided in exile. In short, [redacted]

[redacted] we strongly believe that this report merits little if any credence from analysts. However, in light of continuing high interest in the question of U.S. personnel still listed as missing in action in Southeast Asia, this report is being disseminated with appropriate caveats to concerned members of the U.S. Intelligence Community.)

2. [redacted] circa 1970, KGB Lieutenant General Petr Ivanovich ((Grigoriyev)) stated that many specially selected U.S. prisoners of war were being received from North Vietnam for long term or lifetime custody and "ideological re-training" in the Soviet Union. [redacted] Comment: Grigoriyev did not state specifically the number of prisoners involved. The term he used was "v poryadke neskol'kikh tysyach v nas tozhe yest'" which translates as "on the order of several thousand," implying the number to be about 2,000). The prisoners were destined for confinement at a facility near Perm. Grigoriyev, who learned of the program from an unnamed high level KGB colleague, understood that Soviets rather than North Vietnamese were involved in the initial selection process and that participants were to be continually assessed for suitability. He implied that individuals determined to be unsuitable would be eliminated and replaced with other candidates. (Comment: Grigoriyev made his comment while serving as a political ideologist and personnel officer at the All-Union Scientific-Technical Information Center of the State Committee for Science and Technology in Moscow. He had previously served as Chief of the KGB's Personnel Directorate and in that capacity would have very likely made contacts among KGB officials subsequently responsible for organizing any such prisoner program.)

3. According to Grigoriyev, the goals of the U.S. prisoner program were indefinite but involved intensive psychological studies of the individuals and utilization of them as required to serve the needs of the Soviet Union. Grigoriyev understood that the detention facility was not a standard prison, but rather one in which inmates could lead reasonably normal lives. During the conversation Grigoriyev recalled that precedents existed for such a program in the Soviet Union and cited similar previous efforts with Spanish, Japanese, and Chinese nationals. He stated that in past programs, participants were encouraged to marry Soviet women.

4. (Comment: [redacted] described Grigoriyev as a very professional and security-conscious person

. Grigoriyev, in his capacity as an institute personnel officer, [redacted]

[redacted] acknowledged being acquainted with several individuals [redacted] particularly

General Feodor Petrovich ((Skrynnik)), who had a GRU officer serve as Deputy Chief of Intelligence for the Far Eastern Military District in the early 1950's. Skrynnik and Grigoriyev owned dachas near each other and while not close friends, held each other in high respect. In addition to Skrynnik, Grigoriyev was acquainted with (FNU) ((Prudnikov)) who was active in Western Europe and Germany for the KGB, (FNU) ((Gradoselskiy)) who had served as a KGB official in Poland and Germany, and (FNU) ((Gridniyev)) who served as KGB Deputy Chief for Administration and Supply. A sense of trust had therefore been developed over many years of mutual association with top level KGB and GRU officers.) [redacted] Comment: Prudnikov may be identical with Mikhail Sidorovich Prudnikov, dob circa 1912, a senior Soviet intelligence official whose memoirs of operations during and after World War Two have been published in the USSR. CIA records do not identify any individual named Grodoselskiy or Gridniyev as having served in Soviet intelligence.)

5. Grigoriyev volunteered the information regarding the Vietnam prisoners [redacted] during the late 1960's and early 1970's. His duties were not particularly demanding after his years as an administrator in the KGB. He was often finished with his work in the early afternoon and, rather than go home or engaged in outside interests, held informal discussions in his office. [redacted]

[redacted] Topics primarily involved Grigoriyev's personal affairs and health, but also included political topics. During one of these sessions the subject of prison camps arose, in particular those which furnished labor for Siberian economic development. The conversation then shifted to Vietnam and the apparent increase in strength of South Vietnam at the time and the apparent instability in the North. Grigoriyev agreed, citing the massive U.S. commitment to the South, but added that the Soviets were also making gains. He then described the program involving U.S. prisoners.

6. Grigoriyev was trained as a professional military officer and served in the tank troops during World War II. After the war he was assigned to the Party Central Committee as an army representative. In the period 1953-1954 he became KGB Deputy Chief for Personnel. He subsequently became critical of the recruitment policies of KGB head Vladimir Yefimovich ((Semichastnyy)) and was transferred from his position to that of KGB Security Chief for Soviet Bloc nations. Soon thereafter he developed a heart ailment and retired. In the late 1960's he accepted the position at the Information Center.

7. General Skrynnik joined the Russian cavalry in 1917 and subsequently entered the Odessa artillery school. Upon graduation he was assigned to the Zhitomir military district. In 1931 he entered the Frunze Military Academy. He advanced rapidly and in the 1933-1934 period was sent to China as Deputy Military Attache. He joined Mao's long march and began to establish intelligence agent networks for the Soviet Union. He remained in China until 1942 except for a brief return in 1939 to establish an intelligence school in Moscow for China operations. In the spring of 1942 he was recalled from China to become chief of intelligence on the northwestern front, where he remained for the duration of the war. After the war he was assigned as Soviet representative to the Berlin Joint Commission for Repatriation. After serving in Berlin from 1945 to 1949 he returned to Moscow as either chief or deputy chief for intelligence at the Frunze Academy. He then served as Deputy Intelligence Chief of the Far Eastern Military District. He retired from the military in 1953. Skrynnik was subsequently recalled to duty to re-establish agent networks in China after the China-USSR split but refused to leave retirement.
Comment: CIA records contain no independent confirmation of the details of Skrynnik's career provided here.)

J

- be sure copy gets to ORMAS
- check with Mike
- draft reply referring Jaylor to Orson Welles?

J

OUR RESPONSE,
~~FOR BOB TAYLOR~~

... Rosebud Yellow
Robe Frantz, 85, a Lakota
Sioux who was a great-
grandniece of Sitting Bull,
died of cancer Oct. 5 in
New York City. Movie
buffs have speculated that
Frantz, who worked with
Orson Welles on radio dra-
mas in the 1930s, inspired
that enigmatic *Citizen*
Kane line, "Rosebud."...

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 3394-92
9 December 1992

Robert E. McDaniel, Esq.
Devine Millimet & Branch
111 Amherst St.
Manchester, N.H. 03105

Dear Mr. McDaniel:

I have been informed that the Senate Select Committee for POW/MIA Affairs proposes to depose your client, former Deputy Director for Operations Max Hugel, on Thursday, December 10, in New York City. You asked us to advise you in writing of our position on this proposal.

The Central Intelligence Agency has been fully cooperative with all Committee depositions of current and former Agency employees. Whether Mr. Hugel agrees to be deposed is, of course, a matter within his sole discretion. Should he be deposed, he may discuss classified information relevant to the Committee's inquiry, within the limits of the security clearances of those present. This authority to discuss classified information does not extend to the identification of any Agency source. Any question concerning sources should be directed by the Committee to this office.


Should Mr. Hugel agree to be deposed, [redacted] from this office will attend on behalf of the Agency.

Sincerely,

[redacted]
Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Mr. Robert McDaniel

OCA/LEG (8 December 1992) OCA 3394-92



TO : D/OCA via DD/OCA **CONTROL #** OCA **DATE OF REQUEST** 9 December 1992
3394-92

FROM : [Redacted] DD/LEG/OCA **SUSPENSE DATE**

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Affairs

NOTES

[Large empty box for notes with a large scribble on the left side]

COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices)

NAME	OFFICE	DATE
	OFFICE	DATE
	OFFICE	DATE
	OFFICE	DATE
	OFFICE	DATE

ACTION REQUIRED BY D/OCA

For signature.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

□----- (b)(1)
(b)(3)

09 October 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]
Office of Congressional Affairs

FROM: Acting Chief, EA/Security

SUBJECT: SSCI Information Request - [redacted]

1. Based on the limited data provided in your request, the Office of Security could not verify that a [redacted] reportedly an employee of [redacted] was affiliated with or worked for the CIA in Laos between 1963 and mid-1970. (C)

2. Should you develop additional biographic or other information on [redacted] [redacted] please feel free to contact this office, through [redacted] in EA/ICOG, for further research. (C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

----- (b)(3)
(b)(6)

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505


2 December 1992

Ms. Frances Zwenig
Staff Director
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Ms. Zwenig:

In response to a telephone query by of your staff, two former Air America employees provided the following information on procedures used by Air America crew in distress in Southeast Asia:

Crew members of Air America, Continental Air Services and Bird Air who flew in Vietnam and Laos under contract to the US Government were not issued any system of distress signals (e.g., letters or numbers) to mark on the ground in the event their aircraft went down. They were issued a standard survival kit, and also had survival radios for signaling if they went down. If downed, they would wave something noticeable, like a white shirt, or perhaps try to signal with a mirror, but they did not mark any symbols on the ground.



Please let me know if I can be of further assistance to the Committee.

Sincerely,




John L. Breckenridge
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

OCA 3359-92

SUBJECT: Letter to Frances Zwenig, POW/MIA Affairs,
re Air America Crew Procedures

OCA/Senate/JLBreckenridge:jah (1 Dec 92)



~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action (b)(1)
 (b)(3)
 (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Information on Whether Civilian Pilots in Indochina Use Distress Symbols

FROM: <input type="text"/> C/EA/ICOG <input type="text"/>		EXTENSION	DATE SENT 23 Nov 92	REQUEST NUMBER DD/O92-0025/306
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. DCEA/SEA		11/23		
2. DCEA/SEA Chief, EA				
3. C/ORMS/CCA <input type="text"/>		11/24/92		
4. DC/ORMS				
5. C/ORMS				
6. SA/DDO <input type="text"/>	27/11	27/11		
7. ADDO		11-30		
8. DDO				
9. O/OCA/ <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>				
10.				
11. <i>OCA RECORD</i>		10 2 DEC 1992		
12.				
RETURN TO:				

SUSPENSE DATE:

~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

~~SECRET~~

20 November 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Breckenridge
Chief, Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director of Operations

FROM: [REDACTED]
Chief, Indochina Operations Group

SUBJECT: Information on Whether Civilian Pilots
in Indochina Used Distress Symbols

REFERENCE: Verbal request from Senate Select Committee
for POW/MIA Affairs Investigator Robert
Taylor to C/EA/ICOGPOW on 20 November 1992

1. The following information is in response to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] telephonic request. The information was obtained from
two former Air America employees.

2. Crew members of Air America, Continental Air Services
and Bird Air who flew in Vietnam and Laos under contract to the
U.S. Government were not issued any system of distress signals
(e.g., letters or numbers) to mark on the ground in the event
their aircraft went down. They were issued a standard survival
kit, and also had survival radios for signalling if they went
down. If downed, they would wave something noticeable, like a
white shirt, or perhaps try to signal with a mirror, but they
did not mark any symbols on the ground.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS
AND
COMPTROLLER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

TRANSMISSION DATE: 04 DEC 1992

CONTROL NO. U-1790

PAGES: 3

TRANSMITTED TO:
NAME:

FAX NO:

ORGANIZATION: SSCI

BLDG, ROOM:

TELE/EXT:

SUBJECT:

TRANSMITTED FROM: FAX NO:

NAME: John BRECKENRIDGE, OCA/SENATE

BLDG, ROOM:

TELE/EXT:

NOTE:

THIS COPIER IS DESIGNATED AS "UNATTENDED" AND WILL RECEIVE DOCUMENTS FROM 0700-1900. YOU MUST LET THE RECEIVING PARTY KNOW YOU ARE SENDING A FAX.

DECLASSIFIED 13/12/92

4 November 1992

SUBJECT: Jan Sejna

1. General Jan Sejna defected to the U.S. Government in February 1968. At the time of his defection, he was a military officer attached to the Czechoslovak General Staff and a member of the Czech National Assembly. Sejna was a political officer whose specialty was communist party matters. [REDACTED]

2. During his post-defection debriefings in the Washington area, Sejna showed himself well-informed on Czechoslovak political and military subjects. He admitted from the beginning, however, that he had no hard information on intelligence matters.

3. [REDACTED]

5. A recent, comprehensive review of CIA files pertaining to Sejna revealed that, at no time [REDACTED] did Sejna tell the CIA about U.S. POWs, a hospital in Korea, medical experiments on U.S. POWs, or about U.S. POWs having been moved from Indochina to the USSR in any timeframe.

6. A number of documents derived from Sejna's debriefings by the CIA, however, do refer to Rudolf Babka, the Central Military Hospital in Prague, and the Czechoslovak Air Force Health Institute:

a. Rudolf Babka - Records of Sejna's debriefings by the CIA include 13 documents that mention Babka. References to Babka describe him personally and in various positions in the [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED 13/12/92

NOV 05 '92 14:20 R2110 T2

P.3

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Jan Sejna

Czech military and government. None, however, links Babka to Czech activities in Korea or Southeast Asia.


b. Central Military Hospital in Prague and the Air Force Health Institute - Records from the debriefings also include several references to the Central Military Hospital in Prague and one reference to the Air Force Health Institute. No where in the debriefings is there mention of POWs or U.S. persons associated with either medical facility; neither is there mention of a Czech hospital in Korea or Viet Nam.

7. Sejna was asked specifically during his post-defection debriefing about POWs in Viet Nam. The following is excerpted from a tape recorded portion of Sejna's debriefing, dated 23 March 1968:

DEBRIEFER: Have you heard about our prisoners who are there in North Viet Nam? How many are there and where are they?

SEJNA: No. No, I have not heard anyone talking about it.
(Ja jsem neslysel nikoho o tom hovorit.)

Classification: ~~Secret~~



United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

To: John Breckenridge, CIA/OCA

From: SSCI

SSCI#

Comments:

Please sign and date this cover sheet and retransmit to acknowledge receipt of material.

Name: _____

Date: _____

Releasing Official: _____

Page 1 of 3

Classification: ~~Secret~~

~~SECRET~~


SSCI# [redacted]

4 November 1992

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~~SECRET~~

NOV 05 '92 14:20 R2110 12

P.3

~~SECRET~~**SUBJECT: Jan Sejna**

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(Ja jsem neslysel nikoho o tom hovorit.)

~~CIA - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

OCA 3393-92
8 December 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Phone Conversation with Frances Zwenig,
POW/MIA Committee

1. After being briefed by DD/OCA on the DCI's phone conversation with Senator Kerry, I phoned the Staff Director of the POW/MIA Committee Frances Zwenig to follow up on reviewing the depositions for declassification and on the detailing of [] to review POW files in EA/ICOG.

2. Ms. Zwenig said the Committee staffer who worked on depositions was out of the office today. She said she would have him call me tomorrow, 9 December. I told her that we had none of the depositions in their final form (only in the first run editions), and lacked one of them [] entirely. She was pleased that we were willing to move so quickly to review them for declassification and agreed to make the official versions of the depositions available to us. (That may slip; we'll see what her staffer says when he calls.)

3. On the detailing of [], Ms. Zwenig said that the agreement was no longer acceptable. She explained that Bob Taylor claimed to have seen a memorandum for the record which "someone" did (she did not know who; I assume it was my MemCon of October which first reported the compromise idea), which alleged in the version given her by Taylor that she (Zwenig) had "cooked the books" by naming [] [] is not acceptable, she said, to the (expletive deleted) wing of the Committee. Zwenig asked me to make another suggestion.

I told her that the memo in question, if it were mine, was an internal note to my boss and could not have been seen by Taylor. (I would guess Taylor was bluffing--and carried it off. The line that Zwenig had "sold out" is one the zealot wing of the Committee staff used so effectively on Zwenig and on Kerry himself when they were out of the country, as it happens in Hanoi on Committee business.) In any case, again if it were my memo, there was nothing therein about "cooking books."

More to the point: I said anyone of CIA's nomination would be as suspect to the zealots as [] and that I had trouble with the allegation as it amounts to the denigration of a staff officer of another Committee (SSCI) with which we have worked closely and well. I said the DCI's agreement was to [] and no one else, just as it was for [] alone and no one in addition. It was now up to the Committee to make a decision on whether to go through with the request made by Senator Kerry to the DCI.

~~CIA - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

~~CIA - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

SUBJECT: Phone Conversation with Frances Zwenig,
POW/MIA Committee

Ms. Zwenig said she would be delighted if someone finally stood up to those (expletive deleted again). With that she had to ring off as she had another call to take, I think from Kerry.

4. The bottom line is:

We await a call from the Committee staffer on the depositions; and

We await a decision on whether the Committee is to go ahead with the naming of [redacted] as their designee to review EA's files, as proposed to the DCI by Senator Kerry.

*

[redacted]

John L. Breckenridge
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

OCA/Senate/JLBreckenridge:jah [redacted] (8 Dec 92)

[redacted]

* In a later call to DD/OCA, Sen. Kerry
proposed [redacted]

~~CIA - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~



(b)(1)
(b)(3)

3



SENATOR BOB SMITH

New Hampshire

To:

From:

 Chief of Staff

Date:

8/31/00

Notes:

As a follow-up to our meeting today, please ~~also~~ review & share with Jack & Don. I would hope the precedent on fulfilling Member requests like this has already been set.

Number of Pages (including cover sheet): 22

*Look forward to seeing you next week.
Thanks again for today.*

AUG. -31' 00 (THU) 14:42

P. 002

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

26 July 1993

The Honorable Bob Smith
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Smith:

Your letter of May 17, 1993 asked that the Agency provide declassified copies of three intelligence reports and that you be afforded an opportunity to review any other documents relating to these original reports.

I instructed that the reports you requested be reviewed for declassification, and am happy to enclose declassified copies for you. I understand that declassified copies of the same reports were made available earlier to the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs in lightly redacted form.

To meet your need for detailed background on the three reports cited in your letter, CIA compiled summaries of the relevant operational histories of the several sources involved, and made those summaries available to you in October 1992. I also instructed that those summaries be reviewed for declassification, and enclose them with this letter.

The [redacted] (numbered [redacted]) [redacted] about which you inquired is accompanied by a copy of the recall notice issued when the report was found to be a fabrication. You requested copies of the "original reported information" as acquired from the source in 1977. There is nothing in our files further to the report as prepared [redacted] format, which is the form in which you saw the information.

In an effort to reconstruct the circumstances of acquisition, we queried the officer who acquired the original report. He could not recall the details behind that specific report but remembered that the source reported orally information purportedly [redacted]

[redacted]

AUG. -31' 00 (THU) 14:42

P. 003

The Honorable Bob Smith

You will appreciate that your broader request for "any documentation concerning the original reported information" is more problematic. As former DCI Bob Gates wrote you last October, CIA has done its utmost, within the obligation to protect intelligence sources and methods, to support the work of the POW/MIA Committee in making the fullest possible accounting to the American people.

To that end, CIA has made available to members of the POW/MIA Committee staff files of relevant classified operational correspondence on issues under review by the Committee. Further, CIA has made many of its [redacted] officers directly available to the Committee for depositions on the record, and many of these depositions have been declassified at the Committee's request. As the Committee was completing its work, CIA gave Mr. Art Grant of the Senate Intelligence Committee unrestricted access to all operational files on these matters, so that the Committee could confirm for itself that no material relevant to its work was being withheld by the Agency and that our replies to Committee requests were faithful to the classified originals.

I renew my predecessor's pledge to make the fullest possible accounting to the American people on the POW/MIA issue. CIA supports completely the pledge made by President Clinton that all relevant documentation will be released consistent with Executive Order 12812 of July 22, 1992. I can assure you that Agency officers will spare no effort to ensure that their reporting which responds to the President's call is made available to the public.

Please advise me if I can be of any further assistance.

Sincerely,



R. James Woolsey
Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

cc: The Honorable John F. Kerry
United States Senate

C05999547

AUG. -31' 00 (THU) 14:43

P. 004

UNCLASSIFIED SOURCE SUMMARIES

AUG. -31' 00 (THU) 14:43

P. 005

[redacted]

The source of this report claimed to enjoy excellent access to [redacted] and his reporting improved continuously through the 1970's. The source allegedly acquired this report in January 1977 from [redacted] to whom the source claimed access.

When the source was [redacted] in 1979, however, and [redacted] again in 1980, he admitted that he had been controlled from the outset by an eastern European intelligence service. He further admitted that he had had relationships with the Soviets and with the intelligence services of several other countries; that he had lied about his claimed access to various [redacted] and that he had fabricated or forged many reports. As a result of these revelations, contact with the source was terminated in October 1980.

This report (which has come to be known as [redacted]) had been considered highly suspect by our Headquarters for some time. In September 1983 a former Congressman claimed to U.S. media that the U.S. Government was covering up knowledge of the existence of American POW's. He based his charges, at least in part, on the claims made in this disseminated report. Since the report now had no credence in view of the more recent discoveries about the source, our Headquarters decided to investigate this report anew. (Contrary to the former Congressman's insistent claim, this report did not originate from an audio operation.)

In September 1983 two officers [redacted] had occasion to talk with [redacted] who had been [redacted] and was allegedly the original source of the 1977 report from the now discredited source. In conversation, [redacted] said very explicitly that while he was [redacted] no Vietnamese official had ever mentioned any remaining American prisoners to him.

As a result of the revelations about the source, combined with [redacted] very specific statement to the American diplomats, Headquarters concluded that this report was a fabrication, and a fabrication notice was duly published on 26 September 1983.

When Senator Smith inquired about this report (and two others) in September 1992, we researched the history of the report as thoroughly as possible. We spoke with the officer who had been the former source's case officer in 1977, when this report was acquired. Although the officer did not recall this specific report, when told that its alleged source was [redacted]

[redacted]

The officer said that when the

AUG. -31' 00 (THU) 14:43.

P. 006

source later admitted to large-scale fabrication of his intelligence reporting, all his reports were considered to be highly suspect, including this one.

AUG. -31' 00 (THU) 14:43

P. 007

[REDACTED]

The source of this report was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] While there he talked with members of the Vietnamese delegation. He had never reported on Vietnamese topics before, and did not do so again.

The source and the Vietnamese discussed the general situation in Vietnam, and the head of the Vietnamese delegation provided his views on the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States, including Vietnam's preconditions for it.

The source also obtained some additional comments from other members of the Vietnamese delegation. Before he left [REDACTED] the head of the delegation invited the source to visit Hanoi to observe firsthand the progress being made by the SRV. The source did not follow up on that offer, however. In 1978 the Agency's relationship with the source was terminated.

AUG. -31' 00 (THU) 14:43

P. 008

[redacted]

The source of this report was [redacted]

[redacted] He was considered politically reliable by the SRV, which invited him to various embassy functions and activities. The source got along well with the lower-ranking functionaries [redacted] and sometimes had an opportunity to speak with the few (higher-ranking) officials of the embassy as well.

In [redacted] 1977 the source attended a representational dinner given by the SRV Embassy. During the course of the evening an embassy functionary told the source privately that the U.S. planned to send a delegation to Hanoi in mid-March. The source commented that the delegation would undoubtedly be interested in the question of the American MIA's. The functionary said, "Naturally Hanoi knows where U.S. pilots shot down over North Vietnam are buried." When the source said that "of course" there were no longer any living Americans still imprisoned in Vietnam, the functionary replied, "No, I wouldn't say that." The functionary went on to say that Hanoi did not intend to release American prisoners until the U.S. government provided substantial financial aid for Vietnam's reconstruction.

The functionary acted rather nervous during this private conversation, as if he did not want other embassy employees to overhear their conversation. He told the source that he should not repeat what they had talked about. The functionary did not identify the source of his information, nor did he provide any specifics about the Americans allegedly still held by the SRV.

Since the functionary was a low-level embassy employee, it was impossible to determine whether he was simply expressing his own views, repeating rumors, or reciting statements he had heard in an official embassy briefing. The functionary tended to be quite open with the source, whom he trusted.

The source was considered a reliable reporter, who reported accurately what he had heard. He did not exaggerate or fabricate his reports.

[redacted]

In March 1977 the source had an opportunity to engage one of the embassy officials privately on the topic of American POW's. The official said the SRV had lists of U.S. MIA's, and that for Vietnam, the American MIA's fell into several categories:

American pilots who were shot down over Vietnam and killed;

American prisoners of war who died from illness during their imprisonment;

A few "good" American prisoners who had seen the light, and were now living and working in the SRV;

AUG. -31' 00 (THU) 14:44

P. 009

and "those POW's who proved to be so stubborn (that) we had to execute them in prison."

The official sounded quite authoritative when he made these statements, as if he had read the information or received it in some official fashion. The official then made additional statements which he said were based on his personal opinion. He said he "believed" there were still some living American POW's in Vietnam. He said that in his opinion, Hanoi would have to use a slow, piecemeal approach to its negotiations with the U.S. Government.

Because of this official's relatively low-level position, we were reluctant to attach too much weight to his personal views.

The source was unable to acquire any additional information on the POW-MIA issue from SRV embassy officials, and in 1979 his relationship with us was terminated.

C05999547

AUG. -31' 00 (THU) 14:44

P.010

CLEARED, DECLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

AUG. -31' 00 (THU) 14:44

P. 011

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Vice Director for Collection
Management
Department of Defense
Principal Advisor for Prisoner of War
Missing in Action Affairs
(International Security Affairs)
Director, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Department of State

① **SUBJECT** : Comments of [REDACTED] ON
American Prisoners of War Remaining in Vietnam

NO HARD COPY FOLLOWS

Attached is a notice to recall the report bearing this title
and number.

Deputy Director for Operations

[REDACTED] (CORRECT)

AUG. -31' 00 (THU) 14:44

SUBJECT: Comments of [redacted] on American Prisoners of War Remaining in Vietnam.

On 16 March 1977 a memorandum report bearing the above subject and the number [redacted] was disseminated. It has been subsequently learned that the source, who was described as [redacted] has provided fabricated information, and the [redacted] has said that he never received any information [redacted] that five U.S. prisoners of war were being held by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Government. Therefore, the information in the memorandum should be disregarded and all references to the report should be removed from computer listings and file holdings.

[redacted] (CORRECT)

AUG -31 00 (THU) 14:44

P. 013

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

10 MAR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

**Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Department of State**

Department of State

[Redacted] **Commander, USN (R)**
**Chief, Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Branch
Resources and Installations Division
Directorate for Intelligence (Research Center**

[Redacted] **Captain, USN**
**Principal Advisor for Prisoner of War and
Missing in Action Affairs
(International Security Affairs)
Office of the Secretary of Defense**

FROM :

SUBJECT : Comments of [Redacted]
**on American Prisoners of War Remaining in
Vietnam**

Attached as of possible interest to you is a report resul
from information obtained from an agent source in late January
1977. We are giving this report no further dissemination.

Attachment: [Redacted]

AUG. -31' 00 (THU) 14:44

P. 014

[REDACTED]
COUNTRY: Vietnam

DOI : January 1977

SUBJECT: Comments of [REDACTED] on
American Prisoners of War Remaining in Vietnam

ACQ : [REDACTED] (Late January 1977)

SOURCE : [REDACTED]

1. Upon his return to [REDACTED] in January 1977, [REDACTED] reported to [REDACTED] that, according to Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) [REDACTED] and other SRV officials with whom [REDACTED] was in contact, there were American prisoners of war (POW's) still remaining in Vietnam and that these POW's posed a problem to the opening of diplomatic relations between the SRV and the United States (U.S.). [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that these POW's included some who did not want to return to the U.S. [REDACTED] No reason was given as to why [REDACTED] would make such a statement on POW's especially to an [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] Other than one American civilian who was arrested in Saigon after its fall in 1975, the SRV is not known to have any live American military or civilian prisoners. Nevertheless, several unconfirmed reports have appeared since May 1975 on the possibility of some U.S. prisoners still remaining in Vietnam.)

AUG. -31' 00 (THU) 14:45

P. 015

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

11 MAR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Department of State

Department of State

[redacted] Commander, USM (R)
Chief, Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Search
Resources and Installations Division
Directorate for Intelligence (Research Center),
Defense Intelligence Agency

FROM:

[redacted]
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

Comments of a Socialist Republic of Vietnam
(SRV) Ministry of Foreign Affairs Official on
Relations with the United States and the
Presence of Americans in the SRV

The attached report, which is of possible interest to you,
was obtained from an agent source on 9 March 1977. We are
giving this information no further dissemination.

Attachment:

[redacted]

AUG. -31' 00 (THU) 14:45

P. 016

[REDACTED]

COUNTRY: VIETNAM

DOI: EARLY MARCH 1977

SUBJECT: COMMENTS OF A SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SRV) MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICIAL ON RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND THE PRESENCE OF AMERICANS IN THE SRV.

ACQ: (9 MARCH 1977)

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

1. IN EARLY MARCH 1977 WHILE ON A VISIT TO TUNISIA TO

[REDACTED]

MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS REGARDING SRV RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES (U.S.) AND PRESENCE OF U.S. PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM.


2. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SRV WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HE SAID THAT THE MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCK IN THE PAST HAD BEEN THE U.S. VETO OF VIETNAM'S ENTRY INTO THE UNITED NATIONS BUT THAT NOW HIS COUNTRY FEELS THE U.S. WILL DROP THESE EFFORTS.

3. REGARDING U.S. INSISTENCE THAT THERE ARE STILL SOME AMERICANS IN VIETNAM WHO HAVE NOT BEEN ACCOUNTED FOR, [REDACTED] SAID THAT THE ONLY AMERICANS REMAINING IN VIETNAM ARE THOSE WHO MARRIED VIETNAMESE WOMEN AND HAVE GIVEN UP THEIR U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND HAVE BECOME

AUG. -31' 00 (THU) 14:45

P. 017

A SMALL NUMBER OF AMERICANS WHO WERE IN VIETNAM AT THE TIME OF LIBERATION AND WHO WERE JUDGED TO HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. THESE AMERICANS RENOUNCED THEIR CITIZENSHIP (SIC) AND WERE PLACED IN REEDUCATION CAMPS FOR A PERIOD OF THREE YEARS. AT THE END OF THIS THREE-YEAR PERIOD THEY WILL BE EXPECTED TO ADMIT TO THEIR CRIMES AND MAKE A "SELF-CRITICISM," AT WHICH TIME THEY WILL BE JUDGED AND EITHER SET FREE AND PERMITTED TO REMAIN IN VIETNAM AS FULL CITIZENS, OR, IN THE CASE OF A LACK OF ADMISSION OF GUILT AND REFUSAL OF SELF-CRITICISM, THEY WILL BE "SENTENCED."



AUG. -31' 00 (THU) 14:45

P. 018

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

8 MAR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[Redacted]
Director, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Department of State

[Redacted]
Deputy Coordinator for Prisoner of War and
Missing in Action Matters
Department of State

[Redacted]
Commander, USN (R)
Chief, Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Branch
Resources and Installations Division
Directorate for Intelligence (Research Center)
Defense Intelligence Agency

FROM :

[Redacted]
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT :

Comment by Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV)
Embassy Employee [Redacted] on Possibility of U.
Prisoners Being Held by the SRV for Use in
Negotiations on Aid from the U.S. for the SRV

Attached as of possible interest to you is a report
resulting from information obtained from an agent source in
early March 1977. We are giving this report no further
dissemination.

Attachment:
Report as Stated
[Redacted]

AUG. -31' 00 (THU) 14:46

[REDACTED]

COUNTRY: Vietnam

DOI : Late February 1977

SUBJECT: Comment by Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) Embassy Employee [REDACTED] on Possibility of U.S. Prisoners Being Held by the SRV for Use in Negotiations on Aid from the U.S. for the SRV

ACQ : (4 March 1977)

SOURCE : [REDACTED]

1. In a private conversation at a diplomatic function in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) Embassy [REDACTED] in late February 1977, a lower echelon SRV Embassy employee commented on the visit of a U.S. delegation to Hanoi in mid-March 1977. In response to a statement on the U.S. interest in the U.S. personnel missing in action (MIA's) in Vietnam, the Embassy employee said that Hanoi naturally knows where U.S. pilots shot down over North Vietnam are buried. In response to a statement that the SRV no longer has any Americans still under detention, the Embassy employee demurred and said that there are American prisoners of war (POW's), some of whom are members of wealthy families, still in the SRV and they would not be released until U.S. financial aid for the SRV was forthcoming. [REDACTED] Comment: Other than one American civilian who was arrested in Saigon after its fall in 1975, the SRV is not known to have any live American prisoners.)

2. The Embassy employee indicated that the information on MIA's was one trump card the SRV held in the forthcoming negotiations with the U.S. and explained that the SRV, as the victor in the Vietnam war, would take advantage of this situation in negotiating with the U.S. for aid in economic reconstruction. He said that some wealthy prominent American families had been in direct contact with Hanoi in an effort to acquire information about family members who were MIA's.

AUG. -31' 00 (THU) 14:46

P. 020

However, the SRV had not released such information on the assumption that more could be gained by the SRV economically... by awaiting the opening of formal negotiations with the U.S. Government. [redacted] Comment: The SRV Embassy employee appeared nervous in making these comments on U.S. POW's and MIA's, as if it gradually dawned upon him that he was talking about a matter which he had no right to discuss.) [redacted] Comment: The SRV Embassy employee did not indicate the basis for the information he provided on U.S. POW's and MIA's; thus it cannot be determined whether his statements reflect reliable information or unsubstantiated hearsay.)

4

AUG. -31' 00 (THU) 14:46

P. 021

BOB SMITH
NEW HAMPSHIRE
IN NEW HAMPSHIRE
1-800-922-2230

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-2903

COMMITTEES:
ARMED SERVICES
ENVIRONMENT AND
PUBLIC WORKS
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
ETHICS
COMMISSION ON SECURITY
AND COOPERATION
IN EUROPE

May 17, 1993

The Honorable R. James Woolsey
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Director Woolsey:

I am writing to further pursue two related matters I raised with your predecessor, Director Gates, during my tenure as Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs.

First, on September 10, 1992, I wrote to request that three reports, in addition to all files and actions relating to these reports, be provided to my office in declassified form. These reports and materials date back to 1977 and are referenced in item #1 in the attached copy of my earlier letter.

During the course of the Committee's investigation, similar reports and materials were routinely declassified upon specific request from the Committee in accordance with President Bush's July 22, 1992 Executive Order and General Scowcroft's July 23, 1992 memorandum to executive departments and agencies (copies attached). On occasion, this was done within a few days of the request being made. I hope, therefore, that these reports, and all files and actions relating to these reports, can be forwarded to my office in declassified form in a few days, especially since this is the second request I have made.

Second, I would like to review any documentation you may have, recorded or otherwise, concerning the original reported information and the original source of information pertaining to the above-mentioned report(s) which concerned an account(s) of a

To date, I have reviewed only a summary of information on these matters in prior meetings last fall with Agency representatives. In addition, a subsequent report sent to me in classified form did not contain the original information as reported to the Agency, or a complete description of the original source of information which your agency has previously referred to as

DIRETOR BUILDING
SUITE 332
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-2903
(202) 334-2861

THE GATEWAY BUILDING
50 PHILIPPE COTE ST.
MANCHESTER, NH 03107
(603) 634-6000

48 S. MAIN STREET
CONCORD, NH 03301
(603) 228-0453

ONE HARBOUR PLACE
SUITE 435
PORTSMOUTH, NH 03801
(603) 422-1887

130 PLEASANT STREET
BRUNN, NH 03670
(603) 762-2800

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
P. 022

The Honorable R. James Woolsey
May 17, 1993
page 2

I am grateful for the previous efforts made by the Central Intelligence Agency to comply with requests from the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. Moreover, I believe that the spirit of cooperation which existed between the Senate and your Agency last year enabled our Committee to make progress in its inquiry prior to its termination in January, 1993.

I ask that this spirit of cooperation continue to the present matter at hand.

Sincerely,



BOB SMITH
United States Senator

enclosures

Viewing an archived action


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Action

**RESPONSE TO ART GRANT'S VERBAL REQUEST
RE 141 POW/MIA DOCUMENTS**

Document Number
OCA-005986-CNV

Date Received
01/07/1993



Recipients

- SEN. GRANT

Viewing an archived action

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 1000-93
7 JAN 1993

[redacted]
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear [redacted]

During your review of the internal correspondence of this Agency which related to the POW/MIA issue, you asked that copies of certain documents be made available to you through the Office of Senate Security. An earlier request asked that we provide a list of finished analytic products published by the Agency during the years 1970-1975.

The 141 documents which we are sending through Senate Security are those you flagged for copying from CIA operational files. This count is slightly more than the 139 you requested because some proved to be multiple documents filed as a package. Moreover, two of the documents you requested were originated by other US Government agencies and were therefore not copied for you.

We are forwarding copies of these documents for your further review and for discussion as you deem useful with the leadership of the POW/MIA Committee and with senior Committee staff. Because these documents relate directly to matters of sources and methods which the Director of Central Intelligence is charged by law to protect, we cannot permit these documents to be included in the POW/MIA Committee's final report. They are not to be copied or otherwise reproduced, and we ask that they be returned as soon as possible but no later than 1 March 1993.

Enclosed for your retention is a declassified version of the subject list of CIA finished intelligence products.

As in the past, we remain committed to supporting the work of the Select Committee.

Sincerely,


/s/ Stanley M. Moskowitz

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

OCA 1000-93

SUBJECT: Response to Verbal Request
re 141 POW/MIA Documents



Viewing an archived action from Class

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Action

**TRANSMITTAL OF CIA RESPONSE TO SEN.
SMITH'S REQUEST FOR DECLASSIFICATION OF
SEVERAL CIA DOCUMENTS RELATING TO
POW/MIAs IN VIETNAM**

Document Number
OCA-020060-GNV

Date Received
06/20/1997

Task Instructions:

no value

Recipients

- SEN. SMITH

Request Documents:

Additional Document Metadata

- OPI
- Secondary OPI
- From
- Other Document Number
- Comments
- File Code
- Media Type
- Codewords
- Attachments
- Keywords
- Copies

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Viewing an archived action from Class

OCA 1497

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

Reg: OCA 97-1360
ER 97-2056

OCA 97-1497

20 June 1997

The Honorable Bob Smith
United States Senate /
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Smith:

This letter forwards documents in response to your letter of 31 March 1997, which requested information relating to American POWs and MIAs from the Vietnam War. As I indicated in my interim response of 2 May 1997, appropriate Agency offices have searched their records for information relevant to the eight specific requests you made. Enclosed with this letter--as detailed below--are four documents that bear on five of those requests. We are continuing to search for any other responsive information and will forward you any additional information we find. We have also asked the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) for assistance with your request for particular imagery, and will notify you when NIMA completes its search.

- Enclosure 1 is a declassified copy of the CIA report requested in items 1 and 2 of your letter.
- Enclosure 2 is a copy of the declassified CIA report requested in item 3 of your letter.
- Enclosure 3 is a copy of the declassified CIA report requested in item 4 of your letter.
- Enclosure 4 is a copy of a declassified CIA report as requested in item 6 of your letter.

We believe the above enclosures complete our response to the indicated items in your letter. We have redacted the enclosures as necessary to protect intelligence sources and methods.

With respect to the other items you requested, we are continuing to search for information responsive to item 5, but have not yet located relevant documents. We will forward any such documents we find as quickly as possible. We have asked NIMA to search its files for the imagery you requested in item 7; again, we will forward any releasable imagery that is found.


(+1 Smith) I-102D

The Honorable Bob Smith

Finally, we have discussed with the Defense Intelligence Agency the source noted in item 8 of your letter. We have not located any CIA reports concerning this source that respond to your request.

We appreciate your patience while we conducted this search and declassification effort, and we thank you for your continued interest in POW/MIA issues. Please let me know if we may be of any other assistance.


Sincerely,



John H. Moseman
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosures

The Honorable Bob Smith



FOLLOWING NEW INFORMATION RECEIVED 16 MARCH ¹⁹⁷³ PARALLELS
EARLIER REPORT THAT THERE ARE MORE U.S. POWS THAN
COMMUNISTS HAVE OFFICIALLY ADMITTED.
WHO OBTAINED INFO FROM DURING MEETING
WITH VC MILITARY PERSONNEL MARCH 1973.

SAID ON 12 MARCH 1973 THAT THE FIGURE OF 585
UNITED STATES PRISONERS OF WAR (POWS) RELEASED OFFICIALLY TO
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IN ITS NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE POWS, WAS
DEVELOPED AS A "BARGAINING FIGURE" BY THE VC (SIC) FOR NEGOTIATING
PURPOSES WITH THE UNITED STATES. HE SAID THAT SINCE THE 1954
INVOLVEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM MANY ADDITIONAL
POWS HAVE BEEN CAPTURED, AND THE PRISONERS NOT YET LISTED
BY THE COMMUNISTS WILL BE A SUBJECT OF DIRECT SECRET NEGOTIATIONS
BETWEEN HANOI AND THE UNITED STATES. HE SAID HANOI WILL USE THESE
POWS AS A "BARGAINING TOOL" TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL "CONCESSIONS"
FROM THE UNITED STATES.

FILE 102

3

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: HANOI'S POSITION ON AND ACTIVITIES REGARDING THE ISSUE OF U.S. PERSONNEL MISSING-IN-ACTION IN INDOCHINA.

SUMMARY: AS OF EARLY JUNE 1981, NEITHER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SRV) GOVERNMENT NOR THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PARTY HAD ORDERED A NATIONAL-LEVEL SEARCH IN INDOCHINA FOR U.S. PERSONNEL MISSING-IN-ACTION (MIA) IN THE INDOCHINA WAR ENDING IN 1975. WITHIN THE SRV MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (BNV) NO MENTION WAS EVER MADE OF AN SRV OFFICE TO HANDLE MIA MATTERS. FOR NORTH VIETNAM THE SRV MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE HAS RECORDS OF U.S. AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN IN THE PERIOD 1964-1972. ALTHOUGH HANOI GAINED CONTROL OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND LAOS IN 1975 AND KAMPUCHEA IN 1979, ITS CAPABILITY TO ACCOUNT FOR PRISONERS OF WAR (POW'S) AND MIA'S HAS NOT BEEN SYSTEMATICALLY ORGANIZED. SOME SRV PERSONNEL HAVE COMMENTED ON HANOI'S MANIPULATION OF THE MIA ISSUE AS A BARGAINING CHIP TO SEEK CONCESSIONS FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. IF THE SRV STILL HOLDS U.S. PERSONNEL, THEY COULD POSSIBLY BE LOCATED AT FOUR SITES IN NORTH VIETNAM. END SUMMARY.

1. AS OF EARLY JUNE 1981, NEITHER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SRV) NOR ITS RULING VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PARTY (VNCP) POLITBURO HAD ORDERED ANY NATIONAL-LEVEL SEARCH FOR THE REMAINS OF U.S. MISSING-IN-ACTION (MIA) PERSONNEL IN THE SRV, LAOS OR IN KAMPUCHEA. POLITBURO POLICY ON THE U.S. PRISONER OF WAR (POW)/MIA ISSUE WAS CLASSIFIED AS A STATE SECRET AND WAS NOT PUBLICIZED IN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY STATE AND VNCP AGENCIES, OR TO THE VIETNAMESE POPULACE. HANOI APPEARED PROUD OF THE FACT THAT SOME (NUMBER UNKNOWN) U.S. POW'S AND U.S. MIA REMAINS HAD NOT BEEN RETURNED TO THE U.S. COMMENT: THE U.S. POW/MIA ISSUE WAS BEING KEPT ALIVE AS "BARGAINING CHIPS" TO PRESSURE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO CARRY OUT PROVISIONS OF THE 1973 PARIS AGREEMENT.)

2. AS OF EARLY JUNE 1981, THERE WAS NO ORGANIZED PUBLIC SEARCH FOR THE REMAINS OF U.S. PERSONNEL IN THE SRV, LAOS, OR KAMPUCHEA. NO INSTRUCTIONS WERE ISSUED BY THE SRV GOVERNMENT OFFICES, INCLUDING THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (BO NOI VU-BNV), TO SUBORDINATE ECHELONS TO LOOK FOR U.S. REMAINS. WITHIN BNV CIRCLES, NO MENTION WAS EVER MADE OF AN OFFICE CREATED BY THE SRV TO SEARCH FOR U.S. REMAINS.

3. FOR THE NORTHERN PART OF THE SRV, THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (MND) HAS COMPLETE RECORDS OF ALL U.S. AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN BY TIME, DATE AND PLACE, AS WELL AS DATA ON CAPTURED AND DEAD AIR CREW MEMBERS BETWEEN 1964 AND 1972. THE BNV KEPT COMPLETE RECORDS ON ALL U.S. POW'S, WHO HAD BEEN TRANSFERRED TO PRISON FACILITIES WHICH WERE ADMINISTERED BY THE BNV AND WHERE INTERROGATIONS WERE CONDUCTED. FOR EXAMPLE, THE CENTRAL HOA LO PRISON IN HANOI WAS AND HAS ALWAYS BEEN ADMINISTERED BY THE BNV PRISONS MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT (KH-6). THE HOA LO PRISON WAS THE ONLY KNOWN PRISON FACILITY WHICH WAS PHYSICALLY GUARDED BY THE BNV. AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF PRISON FACILITIES FOR U.S. PERSONNEL WERE GUARDED BY MND GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT MILITARY JUSTICE DEPARTMENT (CUC QUAN PHAP/CQP) PERSONNEL IN JOINT ACTION WITH THE BNV. THE SON TAY PRISON WAS THE ONLY KNOWN FACILITY GUARDED BY THE COP.

4. AS FAR AS THE SOUTHERN SRV AND LAOS SINCE 1975 AND KAMPUCHEA SINCE 1979 ARE CONCERNED, HANOI'S CAPABILITY TO ACCOUNT FOR U.S. POW'S AND MIA REMAINS WAS NOT AS SYSTEMATICALLY ORGANIZED AS IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY. NEVERTHELESS, HANOI THROUGH ITS BNV AND THE MND COULD TASK ITS SUBORDINATE COMMANDS IN THE SOUTHERN SRV TO SEARCH FOR U.S. REMAINS IF IT DESIRED. NO ORDER TO DO SO WAS ISSUED THROUGH BNV CHANNELS AS OF EARLY JUNE

1981. ALTHOUGH THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (LPDR) HAD SOME DEGREE OF AUTONOMY FROM THE SRV, HANOI HAD THE POWER TO DISCLOSE INFORMATION ON U.S. PERSONNEL WHO WERE EITHER CAPTURED ALIVE OR DIED DURING THE INDOCHINA WAR YEARS IN AREAS UNDER PATHET LAO CONTROL. IF THE PATHET LAO HAD CAPTURED U.S. PERSONNEL, HANOI WOULD KNOW OF IT. IN THE CASE OF KAMPUCHEA, SINCE 1979 HANOI COMPLETELY CONTROLS ALL FACETS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA (PRK) GOVERNMENT AND, IF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA (DK) RECORDS ON AMERICAN PERSONNEL HAD FALLEN INTACT INTO SRV HANDS, HANOI WOULD HAVE THEM.

5. AFTER HANOI'S TAKEOVER OF SOUTH VIETNAM IN APRIL 1975, SEVERAL FOREIGNERS WERE CAPTURED AND/OR ARRESTED IN THE SOUTHERN SRV. KG-3 AUDIO OPERATIONS OFFICE 1 HAD INSTALLED A NUMBER OF AUDIO IMPLANT DEVICES INSIDE THE CHI HOA PRISON IN HO CHI MINH CITY (HCMC) AND IN THE BIEN HOA PRISON. THESE TWO PRISONS WERE ADMINISTERED BY THE BNV PRISONS MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT (KB-6). THE BNV FOREIGN COUNTERESPIONAGE DEPARTMENT (KD-3) WAS ALSO INVOLVED IN UNSPECIFIED ACTIVITIES AT BOTH PRISONS.

6. SOME SRV PERSONNEL HAVE MADE COMMENTS ON HANOI'S POSITION ON THE MIA ISSUE SINCE THE COMMUNIST VICTORY IN 1975. IN MID-1976. SENIOR COLONEL

COMMENTED ON THE STRATEGIC TACTICS (DUONG LOI CHIEN LUOC) OF THE SRV TOWARDS THE U.S., WHICH SUPPORTED THE OBJECTIVE OF NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND WOULD BREAK THE U.S. "ENCIRCLEMENT" EFFORTS OF THE SRV. THE SRV STRATEGY WAS TO USE THE U.S. MIA ISSUE TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC AID FOR THE SRV. THE SRV MEANS WERE TO CONDUCT DIALOGUES ON THE U.S. MIA ISSUE WITH PRIVATE U.S. RELIGIOUS, CHARITABLE AND OTHER GROUPS. HANOI HOPED

THAT THESE GROUPS WOULD GENERATE PRESSURE ON THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THAT THESE GROUPS WOULD IN TURN PROVIDE SOME ECONOMIC OR MEDICAL AID TO THE SRV. THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS WAS TO CULTIVATE SYMPATHY FOR THE SRV AND TO DEMONSTRATE THE HUMANENESS OF THE SRV TOWARDS THE AMERICAN POPULACE, WHICH WOULD HELP HANOI ACHIEVE ITS GOAL OF ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

8. (COMMENT: THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS LARGELY SPECULATION IF U.S. PERSONNEL WERE AND ARE BEING DETAINED IN THE SRV AFTER 1973, HANOI MIGHT BE KEEPING THEM IN ONE OF FOUR PROBABLE AREAS IN THE NORTHERN SRV: THE DA PHUC AIR BASE AREA, THE CENTRAL HOA LO PRISON IN HANOI, HA SON BINH PROVINCE, AND HA NAM NINH PROVINCE. THE DA PHUC AIRBASE AREA WHICH SERVED AS ONE OF THE MOST SENSITIVE MILITARY BASES IN THE SRV, WAS BUILT WITH SOVIET ASSISTANCE AND WAS FREQUENTED BY SOVIET PERSONNEL. IT WAS LARGELY MADE UP OF CAVES TO CONCEAL VARIOUS TYPES OF MIG AIRCRAFT AND COULD CONCEIVABLY BE USED TO KEEP PRISONERS. THE HOA LO PRISON IN HANOI COULD STILL BE USED TO HOUSE U.S. PRISONERS, BASED ON THE FACT THAT HANOI'S PROPAGANDA MACHINERY HAS MADE A FILM RECORD OF PRISON CONDITIONS THERE AFTER 1973. THE PROVINCES OF HA SON BINH AND HA NAM NINH (PARTICULARLY THE AREA OF FORMER NINH BINH PROVINCE) WERE OTHER LIKELY AREAS WHERE U.S. PRISONERS MIGHT BE HELD, BECAUSE COLLECTIVIZED AREAS THERE COULD BE CAMOUFLAGED TO LOOK LIKE REGULAR VILLAGES. OTHER FACTORS WHICH MIGHT FAVOR THE POSSIBILITY OF THESE TWO PROVINCES HAVING U.S. POW'S WERE THAT THEY WERE LOCATED FAR FROM THE CHINA-SRV BORDER; WERE SPARSELY POPULATED, MOUNTAINOUS AND HEAVILY FORESTED; AND PRISONER FACILITIES COULD BE EASILY CONCEALED FROM THE KNOWLEDGE OF LOCAL INHABITANTS.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Vice Director For Collection
Management
Department Of Defense
Principal Advisor For Prisoner Of War
Missing In Action Affairs
(International Security Affairs)
Director, Vietnam, Laos And Kampuchea
Bureau Of East Asian And Pacific Affairs
Department Of State**

**SUBJECT : The Transfer of Caucasian Prisoners By Truck
From Thanh Hoa to Quang Ninh Province, Socialist
Republic of Vietnam, in Early March 1982**

14-00000

SUBJECT: The Transfer of Caucasian Prisoners By Truck From Thanh Hoa To Quang Ninh Province, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, in Early March 1982.

TEXT: 1. In early March 1982 a cargo truck driver casually told a friend in Hai Phong, Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), that he had just returned from transporting Caucasian prisoners, whom he presumed were Americans. The driver was hired to transport goods and was sent from Hai Phong to Reeducation Camp 90A/TD63, in Cam Tuy, Thanh Hoa Province. He arrived at the camp at night and was told to stay in the driver's cabin while people were loaded into the rear of the truck. The truck was covered and remained covered during the trip to the Dong Vai Reeducation Camp in Quang Ninh Province. The driver arrived at the Dong Vai Camp at night and was again instructed to remain in the truck cabin. When the people were taken from the truck, the driver saw that they were handcuffed in pairs. There were three or four dozen of these prisoners, most of whom were a head taller than the guards. The driver said that when he cleaned the back of the truck after the trip, there were many empty food cans. The driver stated that other prisoners, such as former officers of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, were usually just given bread.

2. According to a Hai Phong resident, Camp 90A/TD63 was located on top of a hill in Cam Tuy, about ten kilometers from Thanh Hoa Town via Route 15, and approximately 20 kilometers west of the Cam Tuy train station. Before 1975 the camp held northerners who had committed grave civil offenses. After 1975, the camp held former officers of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam in compartmented areas. The Dong Vai Camp is a national prison camp under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior (Bo Noi Vu/BNV). To reach Dong Vai Camp, one must travel from Hon Gai Town to Bai Chay and then to Dong Dang Town. In Dong Dang Town one turns at the Cho Troi market to Hoang Bo and Vu Streets where the

Local people can give directions to the nearby Dong Vai Camp. The Dong Vai Camp held prisoners who had committed grave civil offenses and were sentenced to ten or more years of hard labor. (Source Comment: The Dong Vai Camp should not be confused with the Dong Muoi Camp, under BNV supervision, also located near Hon Gai. From Hon Gai, one reaches the Dong Muoi Camp via Long Tonc and Nui Xe villages.)

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Item 6

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11. ~~Source~~ NEVER SAW OR HEARD ANYTHING ABOUT U.S.
POW'S WHILE IN SAM NEUA. EXCEPT ON ONE OCCASION WHICH OCCURED
MUCH EARLIER. IN 1969 . . . ATTENDED THE FIRST MEDICAL CONGRESS

SENSIND:

PAGE: 5

IN SAM NEUA AND MPT

WHILE VISITING IN
THE SAM NEUA AREA, ... POINTED OUT A CERTAIN CAVE TO
AND SAID THIS WAS WHERE THE U.S. POW'S HAD BEEN HELD. HE
SAID HE HAD VISITED THE CAVE IN ORDER TO ADMINISTER MEDICAL
ATTENTION PRIOR TO THEIR EVACUATION TO NORTH VIETNAM. THIS IS
ALL. ... COULD RECALL ABOUT THE CONVERSATION WITH .
GAVE NO FURTHER INFORMATION REGARDING THE PRISONNERS
OR WHEN THEY HAD BEEN EVACUATED, WHICH HAD TO BE SOME TIME PRIOR
TO THE MEDICAL CONGRESS IN 1969. ... WAS LED TO BELIEVE THAT
NO U.S. POW'S REMAINED IN THIS AREA AND ALL HAD BEEN EVACUATED
TO NORTH VIETNAM FOR MORE SECURE SAFEGUARDING.

~~SECRET~~(b)(1)
(b)(3)OCA 1039-93
8 January 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Report - Telecon with Frances Zwenig

1. Frances Zwenig called late on the 7th on a few issues left from the POW/MIA Committee; she is working from a temporary location in Senator Kerry's office. I talked to her again this morning to hammer out some details.

A. [redacted] As now drafted the report takes up this [redacted] by approaching the topic through a discussion of [redacted]. After laying out this matter, including disagreements in interpretation, it goes on according to Ms. Zwenig in a statement along these lines: *That CIA received from a sensitive source information indicating that U.S. POWs had been sent to this location; that CIA did not disseminate this report outside its own channels and was unable to explain this lapse in responding to the Committee's investigation.*

Ms. Zwenig asked approval to draw from classified testimony [redacted]

[redacted] She felt something additional is needed in the report to put the above in proper context. Note that it is not clear just what report the drafters have in mind: If the report [redacted]

(as I think likely), then the further context is needed as Ms. Zwenig argues--unless we simply stand behind our barricades of classification and take our in-coming unfairly.

I checked with [redacted]. We agreed to ask the Committee to take out [redacted]

[redacted] that which needs to be protected by classification. What we worked out was a sentence stating that CIA's investigation of this report in 1981 (i.e., timely follow-up) failed to find evidence to corroborate that report or to confirm the presence of POWs in the location.

ALL PORTIONS CLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Report - Telecon with Frances Zwenig

I checked this with Ms. Zwenig on Friday morning. She felt it did not go far enough [redacted]

[redacted] After a second round of discussion with her, we settled on a statement along the following lines to add to the report just after that portion quoted above which charges that we had a report on a sighting and buried it.

Investigation by CIA of this report in 1981, which was recounted in detail in closed session to the Committee, failed to corroborate this report or to find other evidence of the presence of POWs in that location; further, a key Lao member of the investigating group reported in closed session that he had been asked by members of the Lao Resistance to report the presence of a Caucasian but had replied that doing so would be wrong because their report would not be true.

B. Security Review of the Committee Report: Ms. Zwenig also wanted us to know that the Committee had agreed to submit the final draft to a security review, at the urging of several (most particularly NSA). The report will be in Senate Security on Monday from 0900 to 1700 for review. (I had been told separately by Art Grant of the SSCI the previous day that the POW/MIA Committee had agreed to allow only one member of the Intelligence Community review the document, but Ms. Zwenig said that the Committee was concerned only that there not be a large group--that it is more important that those reviewing the document do so within the hours given at Senate Security and complete the process on Monday, 11 January. She specifically said that two people might be able to do the work quicker by splitting the report between them. (She doesn't know that this isn't the way things work but her comment does admit more than one reviewer.) I passed this word to [redacted] who will plan on looking the report over for CIA purposes.

[redacted]

John L. Breckenridge
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

OCA/Senate/JLBreckenridge:/jah (13 Jan 93)

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 0041-93/1

11 MAR 1993

The Honorable Bob Smith
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Smith:

In response to your letter of February 12, 1993, we have prepared the following unclassified explanation of the refugee reporting to which you referred and its relationship to the Nhommarath camp.

On June 5, 1981, CIA disseminated to DIA and CINCPAC a report from the debriefing of a refugee from Laos who had been detained at a prison camp from February through May 1980, allegedly for resistance activities in Laos; he described the camp as being in Ban Naden, Khammouan Province, Laos.

The Lao refugee said that he had been held in a building in the inner compound of the camp, that this building had been a maximum security barracks where prisoners were shackled; he said prisoners were permitted outside this building only once every two weeks to bathe. He categorically denied that there were any Caucasians among the prisoners held there.

Our investigation of Nhommarath was unable to determine what the camp's inner building contained. Because the refugee's description of the Ban Naden camp corresponded to a remarkable degree to that of the detention camp at Nhommarath, we believed the two were in fact the same camps but were never able to prove or disprove this thesis.

CIA did not interview any other Lao refugees who were known to be imprisoned at the camp we know as Nhommarath.

Sincerely,

7a/ Stanley M. Moskowitz

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Office of General Counsel

6 June 1994

John C. Mattes
Brickell Concours - Suite 800
1401 Brickell Avenue
Miami, Florida 33131

Dear Mr. Mattes:

Thank you for your correspondence of 9 May 1994. As you suggested, our office obtained a copy of the declassified study, commissioned by the the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1970, to which you referred in your letter.

Upon careful review of that study and other government records, we are unable to identify any information that evidences an obligation on the part of this agency to provide compensation for your clients.

If you have specific documentation pertaining to the issues you have raised in your correspondence that you wish to share with this office, we will review that information and respond to you in a timely fashion.

Thank you for contacting us with your concerns.

Sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]

[Redacted Title]
Attorney-Advisor

JOHN C. MATTES, Esq.

June 17, 1994

1401 BRICKELL AVENUE
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33131

Senator John Kerry
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and
International Operations
421 Russell Senate Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

TEL: (305) 374-5590
FAX: (305) 358-8565

Attn: Jonathan Winer

RE: COMMANDO POW's

Dear Senator Kerry:

I'm writing to you concerning the plight of my clients, who were Vietnamese POW's. Between 1959 and 1969, a number of my clients, were recruited by the United States to participate in covert operations inside North Vietnam. While on their missions, a number of them were captured, tried, and imprisoned. As POW's, they suffered for many years.

For a number of months, I've been attempting to assist these individuals in a variety of ways. Besides trying to help them in leaving Vietnam, I'm also trying to get them their back pay from United States agencies.

Recently, I've been in touch with the CIA regarding the back pay owed the commandos by the agency. Unfortunately, the CIA has claimed they have no legal obligation to provide for their own agents (see enclosure).

I would strongly suggest that the CIA be questioned on what grounds they feel they can abdicate responsibility for their own. It is sad enough to think that these POW's were abandoned for all those years, however, it is far more troubling that they are being ignored now.


I appreciate your attention to this.

Cordially,

John C. Mattes

JCM/jm

cc: - Admiral James Woolsey,
CIA Director
- Dorothy S. Kim, General Counsel
CIA





CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY -
OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS
AND
COMPTROLLER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

CONTROL NO. 4-0019

TRANSMISSION DATE: January 8, 1993 PAGES: 7

TRANSMITTED TO: FAX NO: 202-224-135

NAME: BOB TAYLOR

ORGANIZATION: % SEN. SMITH

BLDG, ROOM: _____

TELE/EXT: ~~224-2317~~ 224-2317

SUBJECT: POW/MIA COMMITTEE

TRANSMITTED FROM: FAX NO:

NAME: OCA

BLDG, ROOM: _____

TELE/EXT: _____

NOTE: THIS COPIER IS DESIGNATED AS "UNATTENDED" AND WILL RECEIVE DOCUMENTS FROM 0700-1900. YOU MUST LET THE RECEIVING PARTY KNOW YOU ARE SENDING A FAX.

6 July 1976.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

ATTENTION [REDACTED]

THROUGH [REDACTED]

SUBJECT : Dong Mang Prison Camp, NVN

REFERENCES : (a) Requirement No. [REDACTED]
(b) IAS Project No. [REDACTED]

1. This memorandum is in response to your requirement for [REDACTED] analysis of a prison camp located in the vicinity of Cam Pha, North Vietnam. [REDACTED]

Prison Location

NF 48-12

2. The prison is located at 21-04-00N 107-07-15E, approximately 26 kilometers west-northwest of the port of Cam Pha. It is located in a secluded area at the base of the foothills about 1 kilometer north of Dong Mang and 2 kilometers north of Route 183.

Discussion

3. Although we were unable to find any conclusive evidence that this prison might contain American POWs, we did notice several unique features in this prison that differ from other known Vietnamese prisons. It is secluded in a relatively remote area and has an access control point on the road leading to the camp. Walls within the compound physically and visually segregate the prisoners. The visual segregation of prisoners indicates it is not a forced labor camp. The only other known prison that used internally walled compounds to segregate the prisoners was the former POW camp at Dan Hoi.

4. Roof repair work was [REDACTED] on one of the confinement buildings/living quarters [REDACTED]. A close study of the roof repair work revealed a unique alternating light and dark pattern on the roof. This pattern, in the form of squares, was repeated [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Dong Mang Prison Camp, NVN

three times at different locations on the roof. Because of the seemingly unusual manner in which the roof was being repaired we attempted to discern if this pattern was coincidental or purposeful. We were unable to make this distinction and realize that the prospect of it being purposeful is remote. It is not known if prisoners would be used or allowed to make these repairs. However, we did investigate this possibility. An attempt was made to transpose this pattern into Morse code. The white squares, being larger than the dark ones, were considered as dashes and the dark squares as dots. A dash-dot-dash in Morse code transposes as the letter "K".

Two other less conspicuous possibilities exist. These are the letters "NI" and "TA" that are variations of the same dash-dot-dash pattern. We contacted an individual in the Office of Naval Intelligence who has extensive knowledge of the POW situation. According to this source, the letter "K" was the permanently designated signal letter assigned to air crews should they be downed and unable to recall the monthly and/or daily assigned signal letters. This information has been confirmed through discussions with former POWs.

Construction Details

5. The prison was [redacted] in the early stages of construction adjacent to a small possible detention camp in [redacted] July 1972. The possible detention camp consisted of a secured compound containing approximately ten small, semipermanent buildings. As work on the present prison progressed, the semipermanent facility was dismantled.

6. The currently existing prison consists of a walled compound containing eight confinement buildings/living quarters, one probable messhall, two support buildings, at least four latrines, ten unidentified buildings and two probable guard houses/towers. The interior of the compound is divided into 14 separately secured areas. Each area is secured by a solid wall with a single access. The only buildings in the compound that are not separately secured are the probable messhall and two support buildings. Studies of prisons in North Vietnam known to contain POWs during the war have shown efforts to segregate the prisoners by using walls or other materials to obscure visibility. However, none were as extensively segregated as at this compound. A small building, possibly used for solitary confinement, is located outside of the walled

SUBJECT: Dong Mang Prison Camp, NVN

compound. The building is secured on three sides by fencing and on one side by the east wall of the compound. Two possible guard houses/towers are at the two outer corners of the fenced area. Another guard tower is located on a hillside outside of the compound near the southeast corner and it affords good visibility of the entire prison.

7. During the construction of one of the confinement buildings/living quarters, we [determined] the building would contain eight rooms or cells. Assuming the other confinement buildings also contain eight rooms and if two to four prisoners were in each room the compound could contain between 130 to 260 prisoners.

8. A large area behind the east (rear) wall of the compound has been cleared and leveled. Portions of an outer wall have been constructed around the compound with one segment of this outer wall extending into the cleared area. The height of this outer wall is about three times higher than the existing wall securing the prison. If this cleared area is for enlarging the compound, it could increase the current capacity by approximately 50 percent.

9. The administration and support facility for the prison is located just outside of the prison compound. This facility consists of one administration building, three barracks, one probable messhall and 11 support buildings:

10. A possible satellite/auxiliary detention camp is located 1,100 meters northwest of the main compound. This camp began to develop as construction of the main compound progressed. It may have been constructed to hold personnel from the possible detention camp that was dismantled to make room for the main compound. If, as it appears, this satellite area is a detention facility, it indicates an effort to separate the prisoners being kept there from those being confined at the main compound. Otherwise the main compound would have originally been constructed of sufficient size to accommodate these prisoners.

11. This possible satellite compound is triangular shaped and contains four to five possible confinement buildings/living quarters and seven or eight support buildings. These buildings are much smaller than those at the main compound. Two walls of the compound were in the open, but vegetation obscures the area where the third wall should be located. A

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Dong Mang Prison Camp, NVN

large opening can be seen where the two visible walls should meet.. This large opening raises questions about the security of the compound. Nine administration/support buildings are located outside of the compound.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]





[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]





K= .-. -

NT= -. -

TA= - .-



AA= .- .-

AR= .- .-



02 JUN 1993

CLASSIFIED VERSION OF UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS
HAND DELIVERED TO HILL ON 26 MAY 93 BY
SENATE LIAISON OFFICER.

DELIVERED TO: HPSCI, SSCI, SEN SMITH, AND
TO WOODWARD, SEN KERRY'S OFFICE.

DD/SA

SECRET [redacted]

The [redacted] Reports

J POW

Seven intelligence reports on treatment of US prisoners in Hanoi--disseminated during 1970--found by CIA in routine review for the Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs. Not released until February 1993 (after Select Committee went out of business), due to massive volume of information reviewed.

Political sensitivity: The reports tend to corroborate both the numbers and some other facts contained in the recently-released Russian document (purporting to be a report to the Vietnamese Politburo, it claimed Hanoi held 1205 POWs in 1972). [redacted]

On [redacted] A "rallier" (*chieu hoi*) in 1969, formerly a North Vietnamese army doctor. Claimed a lot of knowledge on the POW system, but his reporting was portrayed at the time as second or third hand. [redacted] was "surfaced" in Saigon in 1971 for the press, probably because his information on Russian, Chinese and Czech involvement in interrogating POWs (subsequently proven inaccurate) was useful. CIA decided his numbers of POWs were not verifiable and could only mislead families, and deleted that section from his press conference. [redacted]

Additional Questions of Concern

Assessment of his reporting -- Not formally done yet. Initial reviews indicate a lot of errors in his information on how POWs were handled. Enough to make all his reporting, including numbers, suspect. Because CIA knew so little about the system at the time, his reports were disseminated. Subsequent debriefs of actual POWs prove his information erroneous.

[redacted] No longer in possession of current information, was evidently not very useful in consultant position (no disseminable info). Seems to have wanted to pursue other employment options, as a medical doctor, perhaps in US.

Where is he now? -- We don't know. INS has no record of him as an immigrant, refugee, or applicant for asylum. [redacted]

SECRET [redacted]



Senator Bob Smith
Washington, DC 20510

(202) 224-2841

Memorandum

*CIA 1982 Report
Subject: Transfer of U.S. POWs
to Perm, Russia during
the Vietnam conflict.*

*Information cited from KGB
Lt. General Grigoryev.*

*Shown to Select Committee in
February, 1992 on eve of
Committee trip to Moscow.*

*Declassification requested by
Monday, November 9, 1992*

before Tuesday/Wed. hearings.

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

(b)(1)
(b)(3)OCA 1000-93
JAN 1993

[Redacted]
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear [Redacted]:

During your review of the internal correspondence of this Agency which related to the POW/MIA issue, you asked that copies of certain documents be made available to you through the Office of Senate Security. An earlier request asked that we provide a list of finished analytic products published by the Agency during the years 1970-1975.

The 141 documents which we are sending through Senate Security are those you flagged for copying from CIA operational files. This count is slightly more than the 139 you requested because some proved to be multiple documents filed as a package. Moreover, two of the documents you requested were originated by other US Government agencies and were therefore not copied for you.

We are forwarding copies of these documents for your further review and for discussion as you deem useful with the leadership of the POW/MIA Committee and with senior Committee staff. Because these documents relate directly to matters of sources and methods which the Director of Central Intelligence is charged by law to protect, we cannot permit these documents to be included in the POW/MIA Committee's final report. They are not to be copied or otherwise reproduced, and we ask that they be returned as soon as possible but no later than 1 March 1993.

Enclosed for your retention is a declassified version of the subject list of CIA finished intelligence products.

As in the past, we remain committed to supporting the work of the Select Committee.


Sincerely,

/s/ Stanley M. Moskowitz

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

SUBJECT: Response to Verbal Request
re 141 POW/MIA Documents



01

VIETNAM/LAOS: POWS OR MIAS

T I T L E O F R E P O R T	PUB DATE
VIETNAM: FALLOUT FROM SON TAY (POW , GUERRILLA TACTICS)	70 12
VIETNAM: FALLOUT FROM SON TAY (POW , GUERRILLA TACTICS)	70 12
WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS WEEK ENDING 26 DECEMBER 1970 (MILITARY SITUATION ; CASUALTIES ; INFILTRATION ; STUDENT ; NVA ACTIVITY ; DISSIDENCE ; VCI ; POWS ; BAN BAN)	70 12
HANOI AND US PRISONERS OF WAR	71 06
DRV CONTINUES CRITICISM OF U.S. REACTION TO RELEASE OF POWS	72 10
THE COMMUNISTS CLAIM US B-52 BOMBERS HAVE STRUCK A COMMUNIST PRISONER OF WAR CAMP IN KONTUM PROVINCE , KILLING OVER 200 SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRISONERS	72 07
PEKING HAS HANDLED HANOI'S RELEASE OF THREE AMERICAN AIRMEN GINGERLY. THERE WAS NO OFFICIAL RECEPTION WHEN THEIR PLANE LANDED IN PEKING, AND THE CHINESE PRESS HAS NOT MENTIONED THE STOPOVER (POW)	72 09
NORTH VIETNAM: TROOPS MOVING SOUTH ; POWS MOVING SOUTH	73 03
LAOS: POWS IN LAOS	73 03
LAOS: PATHET LAO TO RELEASE US POWS	73 03
LAOS: THE US POW	73 05
LAOS: FATE OF US POW (NEED MORE INFORMATION)	73 05
LAOS COMMUNISTS ACKNOWLEDGE HOLDING AMERICAN PRISONER (POW)	73 06
SOUTH VIETNAM: A SPECIAL STUDY BY STUDENTS OF SAIGON'S NATIONAL DEFENSE COLLEGE ON COMMUNIST PRISONERS OF WAR HAS BEEN FORWARDED TO PRESIDENT THIEU	73 01
NORTH VIETNAM: HANOI IS MOVING MORE COMBAT TROOPS SOUTH. SOME SOUTH VIETNAMESE POWS ARE ALSO BEING MOVED SOUTH THROUGH THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES OF NORTH VIETNAM	73 03

01

VIETNAM/LAOS: POWS OR MIAS

T I T L E O F R E P O R T	P U B D A T E
INDOCHINA-SUGGESTED CHANGES IN 3/8/73 DRAFT MEMO FOR DR. KISSINGER; FURTHER STUDIES FOR WSAG; OPTIONS TO INHIBIT NVA MILITARY BUILDUP IN S. VIETNAM (INFILTRATION; AGREEMENT VIOLATION POWS ; INTERDICTION OPERATIONS ; SUPPLY LIMITATION)	73 03
HANOI NOTES RETURN OF DEAD U.S. POWS BRIEFLY, FACTUALLY	74 03
N VIETNAM HANOI---CHARGES US PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN ON MISSING PERSONNEL (MIA , POW)	74 12
LAOS: COMMUNISTS APPARENTLY TO USE ALLIED PRISONERS TO EXERT PRESSURE ON WASHINGTON AND BANGKOK (POWS)	74 05
LAOS: THE SECOND PHASE OF THE PRISONER EXCHANGE AGREEMENT CALLED FOR BY THE 1973 LAO ACCORDS TOOK PLACE AS SCHEDULED ON SEPTEMBER 29. (POW)	74 10
LAOS: THE COMMUNISTS RELEASED 38 ADDITIONAL CAPTIVES ON NOV 7, THUS COMPLETING THE FIFTH AND FINAL PHASE OF THE PRISONER EXCHANGE AGREEMENT CALLED FOR BY THE LAO ACCORDS OF 1973 (POW)	74 11
THE NEW COALITION IN LAOS: RECONCILIATION ON CAPITULATION (ROLE OF PL , JCCIA , JPF , JPMF , POW RETURN)	74 06
SAIGON, VIET CONG AGREE ON EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS (POW EXCHANGES IN SOUTH VIETNAM)	74 02
LAOS: LAO COMMUNIST FRANK, AFFABLE WITH US ENVOY (FOREIGN RELATIONS OUTLOOK, POW , REFUGEE , PATHET LAO ISSUES)	74 04
COMMUNIST TROOP DEPARTURES UNLIKELY TO MEET LAOS DEADLINE (US, THAILAND TROOP WITHDRAWALS ON SCHEDULE BUT N. VIETNAM AND PRC FORCES INTACT; ROAD CONSTRUCTION CONTINUES; POW STATUS)	74 05
ALLIED PRISONERS MAY BECOME PAWN IN LAOS BARGAINING (US, THAILAND POW PROBLEM, NEGOTIATIONS STATUS OVER US RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS)	74 05
LAOS: SEPTEMBER PRISONER EXCHANGE AGREED BY TWO SIDES IN LAOS (POW ;NORTH VIETNAMESE, THAIS; US; PROPAGANDA FOR CESSATION OF US RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS)	74 08

C06010928

01

VIETNAM/LAOS: POWS OR MIAS

T I T L E O F R E P O R T	PUB DATE
LAOS: PATHET LAO DECIDE TO FREE US PILOT (POW RELEASE)	74 08
LAOS: PATHET LAO LEADER COOPERATIVE DURING SOUVANNA'S RECUPERATION (POLITICAL STABILITY UNDER DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS ,US FOREIGN RELATIOHS , POW RELEASE)	74 09
LAOS: LAO COMMUNISTS FREE US PILOT (POW RELEASED BY PATHET LAO ; N VIETNAM, THAILAND RELEASES BEGINNING)	74 09
LAOS: POWS AS POLITICAL HOSTAGES (THAI AND AMERICANS STILL HELD)	74 06
LAOS: FREEDOM AT LAST (POW EXCHANGE)	74 09
LAOS: COMMUNIST'S RELEASE MORE POWS (N. VIETNAMESE, THAI, AMERICAN, LAO)	74 10
LAOS: PATHET LAO RELEASE MORE POWS (ALL LAO)	74 10
LAOS: PRISONER EXCHANGES COMPLETED (FIFTH & FINAL PHASE OF LAO ACCORDS OF A73, POW STATUS)	74 11
LAOS: PATHET LAO STILL NEGATIVE ON POW MATTERS	74 06
LAOS--PATHET LAO POLICY ON PRISONER EXCHANGE (POWS)	74 05
LAOS-PHOUMIS LETTER TO PRESIDENT FORD (MIA POW)	74 11
VIETNAM DRV RELEASES AMERICAN BODIES ; PHAM VAN DONG SEES CONGRESSMEN (MIA , AIO , RELATIONS)	75 12
COMMUNIST FORCES ARE STILL RESISTED IN SOUTH VIETNAM (MILITARY SITUATION RESISTANCE POW)	75 05

C06010928

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

SUBJECT: Documents From CIA POW/MIA Operational Files per Request by [redacted] - For Review by Senate Select Committee

FROM: [redacted] C/EA/ICOG [redacted]	EXTENSION [redacted]	DATE SENT [redacted]	REQUEST NUMBER DDIO 0025/331-92
---	--------------------------------	--------------------------------	---

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. DCEA/SEA		12/29		
2. Chief, EA				
3. C/ORMS [redacted]		12/30/92		
4. DC/ORMS				
5. C/ORMS				
6. SA/DDO [redacted]		12/30		
7. ADDO			✓	
8. DDO			✓	
9. O/OCA/S [redacted]			✓	
10.				
11.				
12. OCA RECORD - LAST!				

SUSPENSE DATE: [redacted]

RETURN TO: [redacted]

FORM 4283 8-87

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

~~SECRET~~

DDIO 0025/331-92

22 December 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Breckenridge
Chief, Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: [REDACTED]
Chief, Indochina Operations Group

SUBJECT: Copies of Documents Requested by Investigator
for Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs

REFERENCE: [REDACTED] verbal request

1. Attached are copies of 141 documents from our POW-MIA operational files which were requested by Committee investigator [REDACTED] based on his review of the files at Headquarters on 17 and 18 December. We have removed [REDACTED] [REDACTED] but the documents remain classified SECRET, and must be handled as such. The count of documents is somewhat more than the 136 documents [REDACTED] had requested, because some which he selected were multiple documents stapled together. Two of the documents which [REDACTED] requested were originated by other U.S. government agencies; consequently we were obliged to remove them.


2. We are providing these documents to the Committee with the stipulation that no copies be made of them, and that the documents be returned to this Agency once the Committee has finished reviewing them.

Attachments:
As stated

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

TO : D/OCA	CONTROL # OCA 1000-93	DATE OF REQUEST 4 Jan 93
FROM : DD/Senate Via DD/OCA		SUSPENSE DATE
SUBJECT: Response to [redacted] SSCI re Verbal Request for 141 POW/MIA Documents		
NOTES Changes made 05 Jan per DD/OCA's request. 		
COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices)		
NAME See attached listing	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
ACTION REQUIRED BY D/OCA Signature Please		

Viewing an archived action from

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(b)(3)
(b)(6)

Action

**REQUEST FOR DECLASSIFICATION OF THE CIA
INFORMATION RELATING TO AMERICAN POWS
OR MIA FROM THE VIETNAM WAR**

Document Number
OCA-002416-CNV

Date Received
03/31/1997

Task Instructions:

no value

Recipients

- ADCI TENET

Request Documents:

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	<input type="text"/>	
Secondary OPI		
From		
Other Document Number		
Comments		
File Code		
Media Type		
Codewords		
Attachments		
Keywords		
Copies		

U

Viewing an archived action from

BOB SMITH
NEW HAMPSHIRE
1-800-922-2230
IN NEW HAMPSHIRE
opinion@smith.senate.gov

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-2903

ER 97-2056
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
ETHICS
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE ON
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS

March 31, 1997

The Honorable George Tenet
Acting Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear George:

I am writing to request information from the Central Intelligence Agency which relates or may relate to the subject of American POWs or MIAs from the Vietnam War. Most of this information has been or should have been declassified under Executive Order 12812, dated July 22, 1992, and Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-8, dated June 10, 1993. As the Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs (1991-1993), and the current U.S. Chairman of the Vietnam War Working Group of the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, I am asking you to ensure that this information is retrieved and provided to me as soon as possible in declassified form. I further request that the information be provided as it is located, as opposed to delaying your response until all items have been located.

The requested information is as follows:

(1) The CIA report, referenced in paragraph 1 of the CIA memorandum dated March 20, 1973 (copy of memorandum attached), which was disseminated on February 2, 1973, to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, then-National Security Advisor to President Nixon. According to the March 20, 1973 CIA memorandum, the above-referenced CIA report, "indicated that the list of U.S. POWs given the United States was not a complete one and that the communists in fact held over a thousand prisoners."

(2) The CIA report referenced in paragraph 2 and 3 of the CIA memorandum dated March 20, 1973 (copy of memorandum, also referenced in (1) above, is attached). According to the CIA memorandum, "VC Lieutenant Colonel Nam Lam, a member of the Military Intelligence Staff of VC MR 4, said on 12 March 1973 that the figure of 585 U.S. POWs, which was released officially to the U.S. Government in its negotiations over the POWs, was developed as a bargaining chip by the VC for negotiating purposes with the United States..., and that many additional POWs have been captured..., (and that) Hanoi will use these POWs as a bargaining tool to obtain additional concessions from the United States."

(3) A complete copy of the attached CIA report from the 1980's which was disseminated by Deputy Director of Operations to USG policy and intelligence-level officials, "Subject: Hanoi's Position on and



DIRKSEN BUILDING
SUITE 307
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-2903
(202) 224-2841

1750 ELM STREET
SUITE 100
MANCHESTER, NH 03104
(603) 834-5000

ONE HARBOUR PLACE
SUITE 435
PORTSMOUTH, NH 03801
(603) 433-1667

3 GLEN AVENUE
FIRST FLOOR
BERLIN, NH 03570
(603) 752-2600

The Honorable George Tenet

March 31, 1997

page 2

Activities Regarding the Issue of U.S. Personnel Missing in Action in Indochina." The report, based on a source debriefing, states that (NVN) "Politburo policy on the U.S. prisoner of war (POW)/MIA issue was classified as a state secret and...(that) Hanoi appeared proud of the fact that some (number unknown) U.S. POWs and U.S. MIA remains had not been returned to the U.S." The report further indicates that "if the SRV still holds U.S. personnel, they could possibly be located at four sites in North Vietnam," and that "the U.S. POW/MIA issue was being kept alive as bargaining chips to pressure the U.S. Government to carry out provisions of the 1973 Paris agreement."

(4) A complete copy of the attached undated excerpt from a CIA report entitled, "Subject: The Transfer of Caucasian Prisoners By Truck From Thanh Hoa To Quang Ninh Province, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, in Early March, 1982." The report indicates that three or four dozen Caucasian prisoners, "presumed to be Americans" and "most of whom were a head taller than the guards" were moved to the Dong Vai prison camp in early March, 1982.

(5) Copies of CIA reports concerning the "Lao Source with PW Information" referenced in the attached March 12, 1986 Memorandum for Record by D. Warren Gray of the former Defense Intelligence Agency Special Office for PW/MIA. This Memorandum was located in the declassified holdings of the Library of Congress established under Public Law 102-190.

(6) Copies of any CIA debriefing reports on Dr. Vanney Boupha, the daughter of Khamphai Boupha. I understand that Dr. Boupha defected from Laos in the 1982/83 time frame and reportedly had information on U.S. POW/MIAs.

(7) Postwar imagery of an escape and evasion code made with clothing (in a manner similar to what was reportedly done at Son Tay in 1970) on the roof of a detention facility in North Vietnam. I understand that this imagery may have been from the Haiphong area (see attached map from intelligence files for the mid-1970's suspected code at the Dong Vai prison -- both Haiphong and and Dong Mang (Vai) were highlighted). However, the code may also have been from Bangliet, Cu Loc, MND (Alcatraz), Hoa Lo, or at any number of other prisons in North Vietnam. I am told that this imagery was shown to two Members of Congress in 1981 by Director Casey in his office at Langley, but was not provided to the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs in 1992. I have only recently learned about this matter, and I am obviously very concerned.

The Honorable George Tenet
March 31, 1997
page 3

(8) All CIA reports pertaining to the source referenced in an October 10, 1985 DIA-originated Memorandum and in follow-up notes originated by DIA on March 6, 1986 (copy attached). The source # used for this reporting by the former DIA Special Office for PW/MIA (currently the Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office) is 2574, and it is my understanding that the source would only provide his POW-related information to CIA, as opposed to DIA.

Your prompt assistance concerning this request is sincerely appreciated. Should your staff have any questions concerning any of the requests outlined above, please have them contact [redacted] in my office at (202) 224-2841. I look forward to reviewing your final response, and would appreciate receiving an interim reply by April 8, 1997.

Sincerely yours,



BOB SMITH, U.S.S.

/dlc
enclosures (7)

Viewing an archived action from

(b)(3)
(b)(6)

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Action

**RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR INFORMATION RE
THE POW/MIS ISSUE WITH THE SOCIALIST
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM**

Document Number
OCA-016719-CNV

Date Received
04/03/1997

Task Instructions:

no value

Recipients

- SSCI DORN

Request Documents:

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	
Secondary OPI	
From	
Other Document Number	
Comments	
File Code	
Media Type	
Codewords	
Attachments	
Keywords	
Copies	

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Viewing an archived action from

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 97-1291

3 April 1997

Mr. Pete Dorn
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Dorn: *Pete*

This letter is in response to your fax of March 21, 1997, requesting a copy of the Intelligence Community's assessment that formed the basis for the President's certification in 1996 that the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was cooperating in full faith on the POW/MIA issue. Because the Defense Department's Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO) is responsible for intelligence bearing on the POW/MIA issue, other elements of the Community were not formally involved in the certification process. Therefore, please direct your inquiry to of DPMO at

Sincerely,

A rectangular box with a slanted top edge, used to redact the signature of John H. Moseman.


John H. Moseman
Director of Congressional Affairs

B-103A

UNCLASSIFIED

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Facsimile Transmission
March 21, 1997—2:59 pm

Advise #
OCA/LEG
Pete S.
3/23/97



MEMORANDUM

To: CIA-OCA/John Moseman
From: Pete Dorn
Subject: Intelligence Community's assessment of POW/MIA 1996 Presidential Certification.

Phone 202/224-1735. Fax: 224-1772

On May 29, 1996 and December 3, 1996, the President certified to Congress that, based upon information available to the U.S. Government, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was "cooperating in full faith" on the POW/MIA issue, to include accelerating efforts to provide POW/MIA related documents. These certifications were required by law in order for the President to expand

UNCLASSIFIED

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diplomatic relations with Vietnam.

Please provide the Committee a copy of the Intelligence Community's assessment that formed the basis of the 1996 Presidential certification.

UNCLASSIFIED



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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

C

Action

25 MARCH 1997 SSCI QUICK COM RE: VIETNAM

Document Number
OCA-017164-CNV

Date Received
03/25/1997

Task Instructions:

no value

Recipients

- MFR

Request Documents:



Additional Document Metadata

OPI	
Secondary OPI	
From	
Other Document Number	
Comments	
File Code	
Media Type	
Codewords	
Attachments	
Keywords	
Copies	

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Viewing an archived action from




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
From the Desk of



NOTE FOR: Richard Bush @ DCI



FROM:



DATE: 03/25/97 09:19:17 AM

SUBJECT: SSCI Request Re Viet Cooperation on POW/MIAs





We've received a FAX from SSCI staffer Pete Dorn noting that on 29 May 96 and 3 Dec 96 the President certified that the Vietnamese are "cooperating in full faith' on the POW/MIA issue, to include accelerating efforts to provide POW/MIA related documents." Dorn asks that we give the SSCI a copy of the Intelligence Community's assessment that formed the basis for the 1996 presidential certifications.

Richard: While I understand that the POW/MIA issue is largely a DoD responsibility, I'm turning to you because of your NIC work on this issue. Pls let me know who might have generated the IC assessment to which Dorn refers, and how we can go about helping him get a copy. (Note: Dorn tends to simply send any intel-related questions to the CIA with the idea that we'll take the lead for him and do whatever coordination and scrambling are necessary, thus saving him the trouble of dealing with community agencies directly.)

This request may well be related to the confirmation of Amb Pete Peterson.

DI/DO: Unless NIO  is unable to help, this msg is just fyi to you.

CC: John Moseman @ DCI



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NOTE FOR: [REDACTED]

FROM: [REDACTED]

DATE: 03/25/97 09:31:31 AM

SUBJECT: PETE DORN REQUEST

Rick --

As we discussed, Pete Dorn called this morning looking for some answers to his request for the DCI's assessment of the 1996 POW/MIA presidential certification that Vietnam was "cooperating in full faith." He implied that if the SSCI doesn't get answers soon on this issue, Ambassador-designate Pete Petersen's confirmation package would be delayed. When told you were working the issue, he asked if you knew that he was looking for a status report "in the next few days." Told him I would pass it along.

[REDACTED]

In the same phone call, Pete asked for an assessment of the intel value of the places listed in a separate fax dealing with two CODELS [REDACTED] is planning on taking this summer. (Fax is in the [REDACTED] Which places would be the most worthwhile for the Senator to visit from an intel perspective? Which places might he consider dropping? Adding? What does CIA recommend? He is looking for an answer later this week, or early next. Good opportunity to help shape this fact-finding CODEL at the start. (I've provided [REDACTED] a copy of the fax in case DI wants to weigh-in as well.)

CC: [REDACTED]

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WTC/Memorandum for the Record

KEY: C/97-05438

EVENT: QUICK COM

DATE: 03/25/97 TIME: 1030

STATUS: COMPLETE

PLACE:

FOR: SSCI

SUBJ: VIETNAM

--- (PARTICIPANTS) ---

<u>ASSOC</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>ROLE</u>
STAFF	DORN, PETER ROBERT (SSCI)	
CIA	<input type="text"/>	BRFR

--- (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY) ---

(U) On 21 Mar 97 SSCI staffer Dorn faxed OCA a request for the "intelligence assessment" on which the President had based his certifications on 29 May 1996 and 3 December 1996 that Vietnam is "cooperating in full faith" on the POW/MIA issue. For background on the POW/MIA issue, see OCA C/96-06565 and C/96-06632 of 20 November 1996. After consultation with NIO/EA Richard Bush, who told me that State/NSC/DoD had handled this matter without CIA involvement, OCA informed Dorn that the CIA had no role in the certification process, and referred him to the DoD DPMO (Defense POW/MIA Office). Dorn was reluctant to accept this information telephonically, and was told that a written response would require a formal written letter from the Committee.

--- (ADDITIONAL INFORMATION) ---

(U) No further text.

CIA Liaison Group
Office of Congressional Affairs

Attachment

DCI/OCA/LG/ dms/39940 (30 Apr 97)

--- (FOLLOW-UP ACTION ITEMS) ---

There were no Action Items on file for this event.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(3)

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Action

**REQUEST FOR THE DCI TO ATTEND A 1
OCTOBER 1996 CLOSED HEARING TO DISCUSS
INTERAGENCY EFFORTS TO ACCOUNT FOR
AMERICAN SERVICE PERSONNEL AND
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIVES WHO REMAIN
MISSING IN ACTION FROM THE KOREAN AND
VIETNAM WARS**

Document Number
OCA-014110-CNV

Date Received
09/25/1996

Task Instructions:

no value

Recipients

- DCI DEUTCH

Request Documents:

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	<input type="text"/>	
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From		
Other Document Number		
Comments		
File Code		
Media Type		
Codewords		
Attachments		
Keywords		
Copies		

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Viewing an archived action from

OCA 96-0390

BOB STUMP, ARIZONA
 PHILIP HUNTER, CALIFORNIA
 JOHN R. KASICH, OHIO
 HERBERT M. BATEMAN, VIRGINIA
 JAMES V. HANSEN, UTAH
 CURT WELDON, PENNSYLVANIA
 ROBERT K. DORNAN, CALIFORNIA
 JOEL HEFLEY, COLORADO
 JIM SAXTON, NEW JERSEY
 RANDY "DUKE" CUNNINGHAM, CALIFORNIA
 STEVE BUYER, INDIANA
 PETER G. TORKILDSEN, MASSACHUSETTS
 TILLIE K. FOWLER, FLORIDA
 JOHN M. McHUGH, NEW YORK
 JAMES TALENT, MISSOURI
 TERRY EVERETT, ALABAMA
 ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, MARYLAND
 HOWARD "BUCK" McKEON, CALIFORNIA
 RON LEWIS, KENTUCKY
 J.C. WATTS, JR., OKLAHOMA
 MAC THORNBERRY, TEXAS
 JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, INDIANA
 BAXBY CHAMBLISS, GEORGIA
 VAN HILLEARY, TENNESSEE
 JOE SCARBOROUGH, FLORIDA
 WALTER B. JONES, JR., NORTH CAROLINA
 JAMES B. LONGLEY, JR., MAINE
 TODD TIAHRT, KANSAS
 RICHARD "DOC" HASTINGS, WASHINGTON

COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-6035

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

FLOYD D. SPENCE, SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN

September 25, 1996

RONALD V. DELLUMS, CALIFORNIA
 G.V. (SONNY) MONTGOMERY, MISSISSIPPI
 PATRICIA SCHROEDER, COLORADO
 IKE SIKELTON, MISSOURI
 NORMAN BUSISKY, VIRGINIA
 JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., SOUTH CAROLINA
 SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, TEXAS
 OWEN PICKETT, VIRGINIA
 LANE EVANS, ILLINOIS
 JOHN TANNER, TENNESSEE
 GLEN BROWDER, ALABAMA
 GENE TAYLOR, MISSISSIPPI
 NEIL ABERCROMBIE, HAWAII
 CHET EDWARDS, TEXAS
 FRANK TEJEDA, TEXAS
 MARTIN T. MEEHAN, MASSACHUSETTS
 ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, GUAM
 JANE HARMAN, CALIFORNIA
 PAUL McHALE, PENNSYLVANIA
 PETE GEREN, TEXAS
 PETE PETERSON, FLORIDA
 WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON, LOUISIANA
 ROSA L. DELAUNO, CONNECTICUT
 MIKE WARD, KENTUCKY
 PATRICK J. KENNEDY, RHODE ISLAND

ANDREW K. ELLIS, STAFF DIRECTOR


Mr. John Deutch
 Director of Central Intelligence
 The Central Intelligence Agency
 Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Deutch:

As the Chairman of both the Subcommittee on Military Personnel of the House National Security Committee and the Subcommittee on Tactical and Technical Intelligence of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), I request your attendance at a closed meeting in Room H-405 of the Capitol (HPSCI hearing room) at 10:00 a.m. on Tuesday, October 1, 1996 to discuss interagency efforts to account for American service personnel and intelligence operatives who remain missing in action from the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

As you know, recent public hearings that I have conducted on POW/MIAs from the Korean War and their possible transfer to the Soviet Union have generated considerable media coverage. It is essential that all U.S. Government agencies coordinate efforts to resolve the fates of our missing heroes. I have learned that interagency rivalry has led to the derailment of recent efforts by Defense Department investigators to obtain important information. For example, an initiative to interview sources in Europe was allegedly sabotaged by a Russian defector working for your agency and a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee currently working at the Defense POW/MIA Office. I have also learned that important documents have been suppressed or remain inappropriately classified. This closed meeting will be an opportunity to candidly address the concerns of Congress regarding these issues and to expedite the accountability process.

If you cannot attend the meeting, I request that you please send a senior deputy to represent your interests. In addition, because I believe that the current coordination problems can best be overcome by sharing information between agencies in a session involving personnel from several levels of management, I would also request the attendance of the following people: Mr. Frederick P. Hitz, the Inspector General of the CIA; and CIA/ROC



Viewing an archived action from

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

S

Action

**RESPONSE TO REP. DORNAN WHO REQUESTED
INFORMATION REGARDING LT.COL ROBERT
WALLACE BROWNLEE WHO WAS REPORTED
MIA IN VIETNAM ON 25 APRIL 1972**

Document Number
OCA-014566-CNV

Date Received
09/05/1996

Task Instructions:
no value

Recipients

- REP DORNAN

Request Documents:

[Redacted]

Additional Document Metadata

OPI		
Secondary OPI		
From		
Other Document Number		
Comments		
File Code		
Media Type		
Codewords		
Attachments		
Keywords		
Copies		

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Viewing an archived action from

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

3/11/2013

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA Records

Reg: ER 96-5441

OCA 96-1659

5 September 1996

The Honorable Robert K. Dornan
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Dornan:

This is in response to your August 12, 1996 letter addressed to the Director of Central Intelligence requesting all information collected by this Agency or in possession of this Agency regarding Lieutenant Colonel Robert Wallace Brownlee, Refno 1834, who was reported missing in action in Vietnam on April 25, 1972.

Based on the information you provided, a review of Agency files was conducted. This review did not produce any records responsive to your request.

If I can be of further assistance, please let me know.


Sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]

John H. Moseman
Director of Congressional Affairs

DCI/OCA/CLG/[Redacted]:dms [Redacted] (28 Aug 96)
OCA 96-1659 (FN:wdata/house/herb828.doc)

[Large Redacted Area]



B-103F
107

Viewing an archived action from

U

Action

**POW/MIA DOCUMENT REVIEW BY SSCI
STAFFER PETE DORN, 23 JULY 1997**

Document Number
OCA-50158-99

Date Received
07/23/1997

Task Instructions:

no value

Recipients

- MFR

Request Documents:

Additional Document Metadata

- OPI
- Secondary OPI
- From
- Other Document Number
- Comments
- File Code
- Media Type
- Codewords
- Attachments
- Keywords
- Copies

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Viewing an archived action from

3/15/2013

OCA Records

PRINTED: Sunday, February 14, 1999
AT: 16:55

CODEWORDS:

CL BY:
CL REASON: (b)(3)
DECL ON:
DRV FRM:

UNCLASSIFIED

OCA 99-50158

Memorandum for the Record

KEY: C/97-06010

EVENT: DOCUMENT REVIEW **DATE:** 07/23/1997 **TIME:** 6:45 **STATUS:** COMPLETED
PLACE:
FOR: SSCI
SUBJECT: POW/MIA ISSUES

ATTENDEES:

<u>ASSOCIATION</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>ROLE</u>
DO/ORMS	<input type="text"/>	BRIEFER
DCI/OCA	<input type="text"/>	SUPPORT
SSCI	DORN, PETER (SSCI)	

Executive Summary:

1. Pete Dorn came to to review two documents relating to Viet Nam POW/MIA issues. This was a follow on to a letter from Senator Smith asking to declassify 8 different documents concerning POW's. An initial response to the original action was provided but at the time three of the eight items were not found. This action was to close out one of the three items. Additionally, during a meeting with Senator Smith and George Tenet Mr. Dorn asked to see the full version of a cable that had been previously redacted. The documents were provided to Pete in OCA spaces due to the nature of the documents. The cable is an operational document and as such should not leave the building. The other was a classified SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY for the acting DDP Colby. The restrictions for this document were imposed by Director IRO. Mr. Dorn expressed consternation over the limiting restrictions and wondered why a document that was previously provided in an unclassified form was now so highly restricted.

2/14/99

Ofcr unavailable for signature
Liaison Officer
Office of Congressional Affairs

DCI/OCA/CLG/JC mgn (14 Feb 99)

Distribution:
Original - OCA Records
Summary Text

Follow-up Action Items:
Additional Information:

UNCLASSIFIED

Viewing an archived action from

(b)(3)

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Action

**TRANSMITTAL OF THE NEW TORS FOR A NEW
POW/MIA NIE AS REQUESTED AT THE 8 MAY
1997 BRIEFING BY NIO/EA**

Document Number
OCA-020092-CNV

Date Received
07/03/1997

Task Instructions:

no value

Recipients

- SSCI LAWRENCE/STRAUB

Request Documents:

Additional Document Metadata

- OPI
- Secondary OPI
- From
- Other Document Number
- Comments
- File Code
- Media Type
- Code words
- Attachments
- Keywords
- Copies

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Viewing an archived action from

3/15/2013

~~SECRET~~
Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 97-1565

3 July 1997

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION ITEM
C/97-05698

Mr. Taylor Lawrence
Staff Director
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Taylor:

(U) Further to National Intelligence Officer for East Asia Richard Bush's May 8, 1997, meeting with Committee staff to discuss the terms of reference for a new POW/MIA National Intelligence Estimate, and a subsequent Committee letter of May 29, 1997, we are enclosing herewith a memorandum from NIO Bush along with revised terms of reference for the new NIE. We hope that you find the enclosed material helpful and look forward to discussing this matter with you shortly.

(U) An original of this letter is also being sent to Minority Staff Director Chris Straub. If we can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact this office.

Sincerely,

John H. Moseman
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

Classification is UNCLASSIFIED
When Separated From
Enclosure

~~SECRET~~

B-1038

~~SECRET~~
Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 97-1565/1
3 July 1997

Mr. Chris Straub
Minority Staff Director
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Chris:

(U) Further to National Intelligence Officer for East Asia Richard Bush's May 8, 1997, meeting with Committee staff to discuss the terms of reference for a new POW/MIA National Intelligence Estimate, and a subsequent Committee letter of May 29, 1997, we are enclosing herewith a memorandum from NIO Bush along with revised terms of reference for the new NIE. We hope that you find the enclosed material helpful and look forward to discussing this matter with you shortly.

(U) An original of this letter is also being sent to Staff Director Taylor Lawrence. If we can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact this office.

Sincerely,

A rectangular box with a diagonal line through it, used to redact the signature of John H. Moseman.

John H. Moseman
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure


Classification is UNCLASSIFIED
When Separated From
Enclosure

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Taylor Lawrence
Mr. Charles Straub

DCI/OCA/Liaison Grp/[redacted]:dms/[redacted] (01 Jul 97)
OCA 97-1565 (FN:wdata/senate/pow797.doc)



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ 

26 June 1997

TO Taylor Lawrence
Chris Straub

FROM Richard Bush

RE Draft Terms of Reference for POW/MIA New Estimate

What follows is a revised draft TOR, designed to accommodate as much as possible the suggestions in the your letter of 29 May. It has received at least silent consent from the agencies concerned.

To summarize the proposed changes (which appear in boldface on the draft):

Key estimative question

Your statement of the estimate's primary objective has two parts ("assess Vietnamese cooperation"; and, identify the unilateral and joint steps Hanoi could take "to achieve the fullest possible accounting").

To refine the first part, I have expanded my original key estimative question to include the issue of performance (in addition to intentions and capabilities).

With respect to the latter part, it is our collective judgment that it would be inappropriate for an intelligence estimate to establish a standard for "the fullest possible accounting," against which we would then identify measures that the SRV could take. Fundamentally, determining fullest possible accounting is a policy judgment.

Questions on SRV personnel, records, and artifacts

Here, I have collapsed these various questions into two secondary questions in the TOR. I am confident that, as stated, the questions will cover all the issues raised in your letter.

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I must be clear, however, that the team working on the estimate does not have the resources to do much new research on these issues, and we will have to depend on DPMO to provide the information on which to make a judgment.

Question on New Information on Live POW/MIAs

I have included a shortened version of this question in the new draft TOR. Here again, it will be necessary to depend to at least some extent on DPMO to provide the basic data.

Questions on Non-SRV Archives and Current Collection Priorities

It is our judgment that these question are outside the scope of an estimate that focuses on Vietnamese intentions, capabilities, and performance.

~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~ Terms of Reference**Title:** Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue**Requested By:** Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs**Key Estimative Question:** To what extent is the leadership of the government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) (a) **demonstrated a commitment to cooperating with the United States to achieve the fullest possible accounting of American personnel Missing in Action during the Vietnam conflict** (b) **dedicated the resources necessary to deliver on its commitment;** and (c) **performed in a manner consistent with its intentions and capabilities?****Time Frame:** 1987-1998**Key Variables:** SRV leadership intentions on and conflict over the MIA issue; priority the leadership places on the POW/MIA issue; the leadership's capacity to enforce its will on lower level units; overall relationship with the United States; pattern of past interactions with the USG; denial and deception efforts.**Secondary Questions:**

- In general:
 - under what circumstances has the Vietnamese leadership chosen to respond positively to USG accounting efforts?
 - to what extent has the Vietnamese bureaucracy demonstrated responsiveness or resistance to leadership directives concerning activities to secure MIA accounting?
- What does the record of recent accounting efforts suggest about general intentions and capabilities of the SRV government?
 - What do sensitive intelligence sources reveal about recent Vietnamese leadership intentions on the MIA issue?
 - Are there instances in which the Vietnamese authorities have absolutely refused USG requests concerning accounting for MIAs? What is the likely reason for any such refusals?
 - To the extent that obstacles to MIA accounting exist, what does previous experience and our knowledge of the Vietnamese system suggest are the best ways to remove them?
- In particular, what is the recent record of SRV responsiveness on the following:
 - recovery and repatriation of remains;
 - resolution of discrepancy cases;
 - assistance in implementing trilateral investigations with Laos;
 - provision of POW/MIA-related documents;
 - live-sighting reports?

~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~ 

- **What have been SRV policies and handling of (a) records pertaining to POW/MIA issues; and (b) personal artifacts of US personnel and US military equipment relevant to POW/MIA accounting? To what extent has the Hanoi government permitted access to those records, artifacts and equipment?**
- **Who are the key officials, current and retired, who have knowledge of the handling of POWs, POW remains, and archives, equipment, and artifacts related to US POW/MIAs, and to what extent has the Hanoi government permitted access to those officials?**
- **Has any information come to light since 1993 that would change the past judgments that no live American POWs remain in Vietnam?**
- **Has there been any change in the assessment of the so-called "735 document" and "1205 document" from Russian archives?**
- **Is the SRV government deliberately withholding evidence of a program to transfer control of US POWs to a third country?**

~~NOFORN~~  

JUN 04 '97 08:46AM SSCI

P.2

RICHARD C. SHELBY, ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN
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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6478

TRENT LOTT, MISSISSIPPI, EX OFFICIO
 THOMAS A. DASCHLE, SOUTH CAROLINA, EX OFFICIO

TAYLOR W. LAWRENCE, STAFF DIRECTOR
 CHRISTOPHER C. STRAUSS, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
 KATHLEEN P. ROSSINI, CHIEF CLERK

May 29, 1997

SSCI# 97-1899

Mr. Richard C. Bush
 National Intelligence Council
 National Intelligence Officer
 for East Asia Affairs
 Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Richard:

In accordance with Mr. Berger's April 10, 1997 letter and as agreed upon, the staff has reviewed your proposed Terms of Reference for the Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) on Vietnam POW/MIA. Our input to your Terms of Reference proposal follows:

Objective: The primary objective of the Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) should be to assess Vietnamese cooperation on the POW/MIA issue and what measures the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) can take unilaterally and in cooperation with the U.S. to achieve the fullest possible accounting.

In addition to the Terms of Reference provided to the Committee by the NIO for East Asia, the Committee asks that the SNIE address the following points:

1. Key Officials:

a. Who are the key officials, current and retired, likely to have knowledge of the circumstances of the capture, imprisonment and release of American POWs, and whether all POWs were released after Operation Homecoming in 1973?

b. Who are the key officials, current and retired, likely to have knowledge of stored remains, archived material, and equipment/artifacts related to American POWs?

Mr. Richard C. Bush
May 29, 1997
Page two

c. What access do U.S. investigators have to the officials referenced above?

2. Records and Archival Material Relevant to POW/MIA Accounting:

a. What records pertaining to POW/MIA issues did the SRV maintain, where are those records located and what level of access have U.S. investigators had to these records?

b. What records are likely in Russian Federation archives, including GRU, MND, MFA, Presidential, and Soviet-era Politburo/Central Committee holdings, and what level of access has been provided to the U.S. Chairman of the Vietnam War Working Group of the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs?

c. What records or information might be held by the PRC on Vietnamese POW/MIA policy or individual cases?

d. What records or information might be held by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on Vietnamese POW/MIA policy or individual cases?

e. What records or information might be held by the former Warsaw Pact nations on Vietnamese POW/MIA policy or individual cases?

3. Unreturned U.S. POWs in Southeast Asia: The 1987 SNIE's Key Judgment on this matter is: "To date, the analysis of information available to the U.S. Government has not produced credible evidence or convincing evidence that any live American POWs remain in Indochina. However, until the governments of Indochina are more forthcoming in resolving the POW issue, it will be difficult to conclude with absolute certainty that Americans are not being held against their will." The 1993 Report of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs reached a similar conclusion. Has any additional information come to light that would change that judgment?

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Mr. Richard C. Bush
May 29, 1997
Page three

4. Equipment/Artifacts:

a. What was Vietnamese policy on the handling of personal artifacts of U.S. personnel and U.S. military equipment, and which organizational entity is now responsible for any personnel artifacts/military equipment that might be stored and not yet made available to the United States?


b. What level of access have U.S. investigators had to these personal artifacts and captured military equipment?

5. Current Collection Priorities: What are the current collection priority and Essential Elements of Information by intelligence discipline assigned to the Vietnamese POW/MIA issue; how has the collection priority changed over time, and what changes are necessary to improve collection?

Please let us know when you are available to finalize the SNIE's Terms of Reference. In the meantime, if you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact Pete Dom or Melvin Dubee at (202) 224-1700.

Sincerely,


Taylor W. Lawrence
Staff Director


Christopher C. Straub
Minority Staff Director

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Viewing an archived action from

S

Action

**24 FEBRUARY 1998 SSCI STAFF MEETING RE:
VIETNAM**

Document Number
OCA-018595-CNV

Date Received
02/24/1998

Task Instructions:

no value

Recipients

- MFR

Request Documents:

Additional Document Metadata

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Secondary OPI		
From		
Other Document Number		
Comments		
File Code		
Media Type		
Codewords		
Attachments		
Keywords		
Copies		

S

Viewing an archived action from

~~SECRET~~

28 April 1998

Page 1

OCA Records

WTC/Memorandum for the Record

KEY: C/98-05221

EVENT: STAFF MEETING

DATE: 02/24/98 TIME: 1500

STATUS: COMPLETE

PLACE:

FOR: SSCI

SUBJ: VIETNAM

--- (PARTICIPANTS) ---


ASSOC	NAME	ROLE
STAFF	DORN, PETER ROBERT (SSCI)	
CIA	MCNAIR, BILL (DO/IMS)	BRFR
CIA	<input type="text"/>	SPRT
CIA	<input type="text"/>	BRFR
CIA	<input type="text"/>	BRFR

--- (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY) ---

(S) As part of the ongoing negotiation with SSCI on a new Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) on Vietnamese governmental cooperation on POW/MIA issues, the NIO/EA briefed Sen. Bob Smith (R-NH) and staff on 7 November 1997 per OCA C/97-06453. Subsequently, SSCI staff in a letter of 3 December 1997 (SSCI #97-3454) offered the NIO access to SSCI file holdings and in turn requested access to "574" classified CIA documents. On 30 January 1998, OCA responded with OCA 98-1030 requesting a number of SSCI documents and inviting SSCI staff to Hqs to discuss our holdings with DO/IRO McNair. Assuring staff that we want to satisfy them, McNair discussed the actual number of classified documents in our holdings, described the various reasons for maintaining them as classified, and offered either to allow staff to review the classified documents or to explain why staff could not see specific documents. When it quickly became apparent that among the categories being withheld from staff review were the 122 documents judged to be "fabrications," the meeting abruptly ended with staff determined to gain access to those specific documents. DO/IRO undertook to reconfirm that staff would be denied access to fabricated reports. Following the meeting, other staff sought confirmation from us that the drafter of the SNIE had access to all CIA holdings, including the fabricated material. Staff also asked whether "all-source analysts" outside the DO had participated in the evaluation of the suspect documents and the determination that they were fabrications. Staff suggested that we compromise and allow staff review of a sampling of all CIA holdings, including fabrications, to permit SSCI staff to confirm to possible future critics of the SNIE that SSCI had independently confirmed the thoroughness of our research.

---(ADDITIONAL INFORMATION) ---

1. (S) DO/IRO McNair explained to SSCI staffer Dorn that he was welcome to review our index of 98 volumes of CIA Vietnam-era POW/MIA documents that had been denied either entirely or in part. Some documents are source-revealing, or were denied as revealing sources and methods, violating individual privacy, or lacking relevance. Assuring Dorn that we had no interest in withholding any substantive information on POW/MIAs and wanting to satisfy him, McNair said we'd either allow him to review, but not take notes on, specific documents "or explain why not." (OCA Comment: McNair has clarified that staff can indeed take notes, which we will then review and classify before transmitting to SSCI.) Since DO/IRO said we had some 748 documents in our index, Dorn first asked the origin of the number 574, ominously suggesting that false information had been provided to SSCI in the context of the DCI's confirmation hearing. Dorn was reassured to find, however, that the 574 number originated in a 4 November 1993 letter from EXDIR Leo Hazelwood to DCI Woolsey, and was repeated in a 9 November 1993 letter from the DCI to the President. Dorn dropped further interest in the number. We clarified that our index reflects every



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9-1030

~~SECRET~~

Page 2

WTC/Memorandum for the Record

KEY: C/98-05221

remaining classified CIA document identified in an Agency-wide search instituted in response to the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIAs, and that CIA reviewed all our documents for declassification by 11 November 1993. The documents in the current index are those remaining pre-1993 documents still classified. Dorn asked about CIA documents since 1993, and DO/IRO undertook to check with DO/EA regarding what we might have developed since 1993.

2. (S) Noting McNair's assurance that we would make our substantive information available for SSCI review, Dorn affirmed that SSCI is only concerned about confirming what information is held by the USG as we "pound the Russians and Vietnamese" for POW/MIA information. CIA annuitant [] assured Dorn that he had personally reviewed every document in our index, but cautioned that we did not have access to such non-CIA material as Select POW/MIA Committee interviews or privileged post-return POW interviews conducted by DoD. [] also noted that during SSCI work, staffer [] had reviewed some 100 of the classified docs in our index. (OCA Comment: [] Dorn said he's very interested in information on numbers of POWs held by the Communists in the early 1970s, and information on Communist policy on POWs in that period. He also said that he wanted to assure that the NIC takes all CIA classified information (including the documents reflected in the index) into account, and OCA assured him that NIC SNIE drafter [] had access to the entire document collection. Dorn made reference to the fact that SSCI has 1976 allegations on the killing of POWs, and in response to McNair's comment that Smith staffer [] knew about this matter and was asking for the material, refused to say how Carluccio might have learned about the matter. (OCA Comment: According to NIC drafter [] the substance of this "185 report" was passed to DPMO in 1993 and Sen. John Kerry (D-MA) was briefed at that time. []

[] DPMO is now reluctant to share "185" info with DPMO's Joint Commission Support Directorate (JCSD) out of concern that JCSD personnel would leak the information []

3. (S) Dorn then began reviewing the index, but the first document he asked to see, an Indonesian MFA report, has been judged a fabrication, and IMS officers [] explained the "fabricator" designation to him while McNair said we do not allow access to material judged to be fabricated. Dorn insisted that he wanted access to material judged to be fabrications, arguing that SSCI could then reassure potential SNIE critics that SSCI had independently reviewed all material being reviewed by the SNIE drafter. He said he wanted to "spot check" the whole range of material, but McNair emphatically told him he would not let SSCI see fabricated material, although he could have access to any substantive material we judge to be accurate. To clarify the material at issue, of the 748 documents in the index, [] 122 are classified as "fabrications," with one being deemed "disinformation" and another characterized as "policy/fabricator." McNair said he could confirm with management his authority and judgment regarding his refusal to allow access to the fabricated information. He also invited Dorn to return at his convenience to review the entire index and look at specific documents of interest.

4. (S) Following the meeting, SSCI staffer and CIA budget referent [] called OCA to say that SSCI staff leadership had assigned him to replace former staffer [] in working with Dorn on POW/MIA. [] said he'd been briefed by Dorn on the above meeting, and requested clarification on a number of points. He sought assurance that the NIC SNIE drafter has access to all CIA documents, including the 122 fabricated reports. He also asked whether DI all-source analysts have participated in the evaluative process that had labeled the reports fabricated. OCA reminded [] that field information is evaluated through the entire reporting cycle, []

[] (OCA Comment: According to DO/EA annuitant [] all 122 reports were initially disseminated through the Intel Community and were later recalled as fabrications. Ironically, [] pointed out that SSCI's POW/MIA holdings as itemized in their 3 December 1997 letter [SSCI

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WTC/Memorandum for the Record

KEY: C/98-05221

#97-3454] include a 26 July 1993 CIA letter to Sen. Smith addressing precisely the disputed Indonesian document and our reasons for judging it a fabrication.) [redacted] reminded OCA that Dom is tenacious and prepared to escalate the issue, and suggested that much effort could be saved if we would consider allowing Dom [redacted] to review the files on some fabricator reports to satisfy them on the integrity and rigor of the fabricator evaluative process. We assured [redacted] that the issue is being addressed at senior levels.

[redacted]

DCI/OCA/LG

OC/LG/F [redacted] jab [redacted] 24 Apr 98)

[redacted]

--- (FOLLOW-UP ACTION ITEMS) ---

There were no Action Items on file for this event.

BOB SMITH
NEW HAMPSHIRE

opinion@smith.senate.gov
http://www.senate.gov/~smith/

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-2903

June 10, 1999

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE ON
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
CHAIRMAN,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ETHICS

The Honorable Richard Shelby
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Richard:

Pursuant to Section 405 of Public Law 102-88 (FY91 Intelligence Authorization Act), I respectfully ask that your Committee request the following information or documents in the possession, custody, or control of the agencies or departments referenced below. This data relates to the issue of U.S. POW/MIA personnel or the remains of such personnel.

□ Oct 96
From CIA to DoD POW/MIA Office
Subject: Vietnam - POW Information
Classification level: "SECRET"

□ Nov 96
From CIA to DoD POW/MIA Office
Ref: □ Oct. 96 message from CIA to DPMO
Classification level: "SECRET"

26 August 1998
CIA DO Memorandum, Intelligence
□
Classification level: "TOP SECRET"

□ May 99
From American Embassy Hanoi □ to SECSTATE
Subject: Remains Study Comments
Cable # □
Classification level: "UNCLASSIFIED, but sensitive, handle accordingly"


The first three reports referenced above were the subject of a request to the Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence by myself and the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Warner, on January 26, 1999. I received a subsequent briefing on this matter by the Central Intelligence Agency on March 5, 1999, but would nonetheless like these documents furnished to the Senate, in accordance with Public Law 102-88, for more detailed review. These reports pertain to matters I am attempting to investigate further as the Senate Leadership-appointed representative to the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POWs and MIAs, and the U.S. Chairman of that Commission's Vietnam War Working Group.

The Honorable Richard Shelby
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence
June 10, 1999
page 2

It is my understanding that the last cable has a direct bearing on intelligence analysis and information pertaining to Vietnamese knowledge on POW/MIA matters, and may explicitly constitute an effort by the Executive Branch to prevent disclosure of certain information to Congress that could result in added support for legislation I recently introduced which the Administration opposes. This legislation (S.J. Res. 28) is now pending before the Senate and may be considered further in the next several weeks.

I thank you for your prompt attention to this request, and would appreciate your assistance with respect to these matters prior to the July 4th recess. My staff point of contact on this matter is Dino L. Carluccio on my personal staff who may be reached at 4-3828.

With warm regards,



BOB SMITH, U.S.S.

cc: The Honorable Robert Kerrey, Vice-Chairman, SSCI
The Honorable John Warner, Chairman, SASC
The Honorable Trent Lott, Majority Leader

~~TOP SECRET~~

DOEA-215

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Deputy Director for Operations

FROM:
Chief East Asia Division

SUBJECT: Provision of Requested POW/MIA Information
to Senator Shelby, Chairman of the SSCI

REFERENCES:

- A. Letter From SSCI Chairman Shelby to DCI Tenet, dated 24 July 2000
- B. Letter From Senator Bob Smith to SSCI Chairman Shelby as an Attachment to Ref A, dated 10 June 1999
- C. Draft List of 18 Questions Faxed to CIA by Office of Senate Security and Attached to Ref A, dated 2 August 2000
- D. Congressionally Directed Action, Executive Order 12812 (unavailable to East Asia Division)

1. Action Requested: ~~(S)~~ Provide the documents listed in paragraph six below on a "read and return" basis to Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Members, Senator Bob Smith and appropriately cleared members of Senator Smith's staff.

2. Background: ~~(S)~~ Refs A-D represent a series of requests that SSCI Chairman Shelby has made, in conjunction with Senator Bob Smith, for Agency and Intelligence Community documents and information concerning POW/MIA's. Within the Agency, it was agreed that East Asia Division (EA) would respond to the following three items: 1) the request for Agency documents described in Ref C, items 2-7; 2) the request, based on Ref D, as expanded and refined by Ref C, item 16, for a listing of the Agency Vietnam conflict POW/MIA documents dated prior to 1993 which have not been declassified; and 3) the request for a listing of the Agency Vietnam conflict POW/MIA documents dated subsequent to 1993 which have not been declassified.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Provision of Requested POW/MIA Information to
Senator Shelby, Chairman of the SSCI

3. (S) Concerning the first, the six responsive documents are described in more detail in paragraph 6 below and attached. Please provide them on a "read and return" basis to Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Members, Senator Bob Smith and appropriately cleared staff members of Senator Smith's staff.

4. (S) Concerning the second, EA has completed the listing in question. It is being provided separately to your office via the Directorate of Operations Information Review Officer.

5. (S) Concerning the third, EA has completed its search for the documents and is assembling the list. EA hopes to have this work completed by 1 October 2000.

6. (TS) The following documents are being provided to the paragraph 1 Congressional recipients in response to Ref C, questions 2-7:

- o [] Oct 96
From CIA to DoD POW/MIA Office
Subject: Vietnam - POW Information
Classification: SECRET
(Responds to question 2)
- o [] Nov 96
From CIA to DoD POW/MIA Office
Reference: [] Oct 96 message from CIA to DPMO
Classification: SECRET
(Responds to question 3)
- o 26 August 1998
CIA DO Memorandum, Intelligence
[]
Classification: TOP SECRET
(Responds to question 4)
- o [] Sep 76 []
[]
Subject: Socialist Republic of Vietnam Decision to
Withhold Further Names of American MIAs until after the
United States Presidential Elections in November 1976
(Responds to question 5)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Provision of Requested POW/MIA Information to
Senator Shelby, Chairman of the SSCI

o [redacted]
Date of Report: April 19, 1973
Subject: [redacted]
[redacted]
(Responds to question 6)

o Intelligence Report referenced on page 2 of SECRET CIA
Biographic Highlight on [redacted]
forwarded to Sen. Bob Smith, via Office of Senate
Security on April 29, 1993. (CIA Biographic Highlight
states, "according to one intelligence report, [redacted]
was physically located in North Vietnam and passed
orders from Hanoi to MR-V by radio.")
(Responds to question 7)

7. (S) In response to questions 6 and 7 for CIA [redacted]
[redacted] and the Intelligence Report Biographic
Highlight, we wish to note that the two versions in question
are the same report. Neither report has the quote cited in
request description "according to one intelligence report,
[redacted] was physically located in North Vietnam and passed
orders from Hanoi to MR-V by radio." For the recipients'
information, we have included an unclassified biography of
[redacted]

CONCUR: [redacted]
[redacted]
Deputy Director for Operations
Date 06 Sep 2000

Attachments:
as stated in paragraph 6

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Viewing an archived action from Extral Case

U

Action
**AGENCY RESPONSE TO SSCI RE: CIA ACCESS
TO SSCI HOLDINGS ON SOUTHEAST ASIA
POW/MIAs**

Document Number: OCA-018115-CNV
Date Received: 01/30/1998

Task Instructions:
no value

Recipients

- SSCI STAFF DIRECTORS
LAWRENCE AND STRAUB

Request Documents:

Additional Document Metadata

- OPI
- Secondary OPI
- From
- Other Document Number
- Comments
- File Code
- Media Type
- Codewords
- Attachments
- Keywords
- Copies

U

Viewing an archived action from Extral Case

OCA Records

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 98-1030

30 January 1998

Mr. Taylor Lawrence
 Staff Director
 Select Committee on Intelligence
 United States Senate
 Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Taylor:

We appreciate your offer of December 3, 1997, (SSCI #97-3454) to give us access to SSCI holdings on Southeast Asian POW/MIAs. After reviewing your listing, we would be grateful for copies of the following documents:


B1/2/17 Letter for Senator Smith
 B1/2/18 GEN Volkogonov Comments (opening session)
 B1/2/19 GEN Volkogonov Comments (closing session)
 B1/2/21 Statement of Russian Co-chairman of the US-Russian Joint Commission
 B2/1/12 Note from Dr. Morris re North Vietnamese Politburo Meeting
 B2/1/27 Memorandum: Assessment of a Text
 B2/1/28 Report to the Politburo by Tran Van Quang
 B3/1/5 US Acquisition of the 735 Document
 B3/1/6 Vietnamese Letter Responding to Release of 735
 B3/1/7 Douglas Pike Memorandum on "Hoang Anh"
 B3/1/23 Bullets for Mr. Wold
 B3/1/30 Minutes of the Discussion on 735/1205 Documents During Technical Talks
 B3/2/5 Minutes of Meeting with Russian Secretary Baturin
 B3/2/6 Minutes of Meeting with Kokoshin
 B3/2/7 Letter to Russian Secretary Baturin
 B3/2/8 Letter to Deputy FM Mamedov
 B3/2/9 Letter to Gen-Col Korabelnikov

Regarding the 574 classified POW/MIA documents referred to in your letter, we would be pleased to invite appropriate staff to meet with our DO specialists at Headquarters at a mutually convenient time to review our document inventory and discuss those documents relevant to Committee interest.

Mr. Taylor Lawrence

An original of this letter is also being sent to
Chris Straub.

Sincerely,

A rectangular box with a black border, used to redact the signature of John H. Moseman.

John H. Moseman
Director of Congressional Affairs

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 98-1030/1
30 January 1998

Mr. Chris Straub
Minority Staff Director
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Chris:

We appreciate your offer of December 3, 1997, (SSCI # 97-3454) to give us access to SSCI holdings on Southeast Asian POW/MIAs. After reviewing your listing, we would be grateful for copies of the following documents:


B1/2/17 Letter for Senator Smith
 B1/2/18 GEN Volkogonov Comments (opening session)
 B1/2/19 GEN Volkogonov Comments (closing session)
 B1/2/21 Statement of Russian Co-chairman of the US-Russian Joint Commission
 B2/1/12 Note from Dr. Morris re North Vietnamese Politburo Meeting
 B2/1/27 Memorandum: Assessment of a Text
 B2/1/28 Report to the Politburo by Tran Van Quang
 B3/1/5 US Acquisition of the 735 Document
 B3/1/6 Vietnamese Letter Responding to Release of 735
 B3/1/7 Douglas Pike Memorandum on "Hoang Anh"
 B3/1/23 Bullets for Mr. Wold
 B3/1/30 Minutes of the Discussion on 735/1205 Documents During Technical Talks
 B3/2/5 Minutes of Meeting with Russian Secretary Baturin
 B3/2/6 Minutes of Meeting with Kokoshin
 B3/2/7 Letter to Russian Secretary Baturin
 B3/2/8 Letter to Deputy FM Mamedov
 B3/2/9 Letter to Gen-Col Korabelnikov

Regarding the 574 classified POW/MIA documents referred to in your letter, we would be pleased to invite appropriate staff to meet with our DO specialists at Headquarters at a mutually convenient time to review our document inventory and discuss those documents relevant to Committee interest.

Mr. Chris Straub

An original of this letter is also being sent to
Taylor Lawrence.


Sincerely,

A rectangular box with a black border, tilted slightly to the right, used to redact the signature of John H. Moseman.

John H. Moseman
Director of Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT: SSCI Holdings on Southeast Asian POW/MIAs

DCI/OCA/LG [redacted]:dms/[redacted] (27 Jan 98)
OCA 98-1030 & 1030/1 (FN:wdata/senate/mia1.doc)
(ACTION ITEM: SSCI 97-3454; A/97-05698)



Viewing an archived action from

Action
**26 JANUARY 1998 HAC/S&I STAFF BRIEFING RE:
POW/MIA ISSUES**

Document Number
OCA-018682-CNV

Date Received
01/26/1998

Task Instructions:
no value

Recipients
• MFR

Request Documents:

Additional Document Metadata

- OPI
- Secondary OPI
- From
- Other Document Number
- Comments
- File Code
- Media Type
- Codewords
- Attachments
- Keywords
- Copies

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)

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Viewing an archived action from

~~SECRET~~

8 May 1998

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
Page 1

OCA Records

WTC/Memorandum for the Record

KEY: C/98-05076

EVENT: STAFF BRIEFING

DATE: 01/26/98 TIME: 1300

STATUS: COMPLETE

PLACE: TBD

FOR: HAC/S&I

SUBJ: POW/MIA ISSUES

ASSOC	NAME	--- (PARTICIPANTS) ---	ROLE
STAFF	[REDACTED]		
STAFF	[REDACTED]		
CIA	[REDACTED]		BRFR
CIA	[REDACTED]		BRFR
CIA	[REDACTED]		SPRT
CIA	[REDACTED]		BRFR

--- (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY) ---


(S) In response to a request from HAC/S&I staffers studying Intelligence Community (IC) support on POW/MIA issues, NIC and DO/EA briefed them on CIA support to the Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO) and on the Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) on Vietnamese governmental cooperation on POW/MIA efforts currently being drafted by the NIO/EA.

---(ADDITIONAL INFORMATION) ---

1. (S) HAC/S&I staffer [REDACTED] explained that his team was working on a HUMINT study and would next address Southeast Asia. They propose to visit our stations and, aside from their larger review, are looking into the question of how HUMINT and the IC in general currently support POW/MIA efforts. They've visited DPMO, propose to meet with DIA and NSA, and also plan to visit Joint Task Force/Full Accounting in Hawaii. They're interested in identifying producers and customers of POW/MIA intelligence and in seeing how tasking is generated, but clarified that they are focused on Southeast Asia POW/MIAs and are not looking at current CIA or IC mechanisms for supporting current warfighters or POW/MIA cases (OCA Comment: such as SSCi interest in Gulf War MIA LtCmdr Speicher.)

2. (S) NIC officer [REDACTED] who is drafting the current SNIE, summarized the history and origin of the SNIE and the consultations with SSCi which defined the terms of reference for the estimate (OCA Comment: for background, see OCA C/97-05698 of 8 May 1997 and C/97-06453 of 7 Nov 97.) Emphasizing that this will be an IC rather than CIA estimate, [REDACTED] defined the major SNIE questions as determining whether the Vietnamese government is cooperating and assessing the validity of Russian POW/MIA documents. He stressed that as SNIE drafter he is reviewing all relevant IC data and that each IC agency will be represented on the committee reviewing and coordinating the estimate. He later said that all appropriate US embassies and CIA stations have been tasked for input, he's worked with DO/EA on tasking, and has been assured by US Ambassador to Hanoi Peterson of his full support. (OCA Comment: see OCA C/96-06632 and C/96-06565 of 20 November 1996 for more on Peterson.) The DCI and National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) will approve the final document. The SSCi is most interested in the estimate, with HPSCI devoting little attention to the matter.

3. (S) Later in the briefing [REDACTED] asked whether the IC knows enough about the Vietnamese government (GVN) to make judgments about their cooperation. [REDACTED] said there are plenty of indicators, including the professionalism of GVN personnel.



~~SECRET~~

WTC/Memorandum for the Record

KEY: C/98-05076

and how they interact and cooperate with us. Still later [] said that some POW/MIA material is in Russian files, and we're reviewing that information as the Russians and Eastern Europeans allow us access. [] said that at this point our most profitable sources of POW/MIA information will be archives or historical research rather than human sources or agents.

4. (S) [] told staff that under the terms of a 1986 agreement DoD bears primary action and analytic responsibility for POW/MIA issues, with the IC providing intelligence support to DIA and since 1993 to DPMO. In response to [] [] said that most POW/MIA knowledge and expertise resides in DPMO, and assured him that all IC POW/MIA information goes directly to them. He added that DPMO also performs "satisfactory" analysis. In response to [] question about current

[]

[] asked whether we're actively pursuing potential POW/MIA agents inside Vietnam, and [] said the [] primary focus is counterintelligence with POW/MIA as an "adjunct" rather than primary mission. []

[]

observed that the small, very busy DATT office is involved in remains recovery.

5. (S) [] said DPMO has assured staff that they're tightly linked to the IC, and asked how they task the IC and drive collection. EA officer [] said CIA does research for DPMO and that POW/MIA are the first matters raised with walk-ins or defectors. We pass any info to DPMO and offer them the opportunity to debrief our sources. [] assured staff that POW/MIA issues are always handled as immediate precedence. [] said that he assumes that most information collected deals with MIAs rather than live sightings, but [] said that "Stony Beach" has two active live sighting cases. []

[] The Lao government also has old Vietnamese films that DPMO hopes might help identify MIAs, but the Lao are demanding compensation for access. [] referred staff to the JTF for more detail.

[]

DCI/OCA/LG

OCA/LG/RE [] ab:x39940

[]

--- (FOLLOW-UP ACTION ITEMS) ---

There were no Action Items on file for this event.

BRUCE F. VENTO
4TH DISTRICT, MINNESOTA

2413 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-2413
(202) 225-6831

DISTRICT OFFICE:
111 EAST KELLOGG BOULEVARD
SUITE 215
ST. PAUL, MN 55101
(651) 224-4503

CAH 99-0134

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
RESOURCESHOUSE COMMITTEE ON
BANKING AND
FINANCIAL SERVICES

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-2504

May 11, 1999

John Moseman
Director of Congressional Affairs
Central Intelligence Agency
Room 7-C38 CIA
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Moseman:


Recently I was contacted by Mr. Rich Daly of Minnesota Won't Forget POW/MIA. For over six years Mr. Daly has been pursuing the declassification of all depositions and records of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs.

In my recent discussions with the National Archives and Records Administration's Center for Legislative Archives, I was informed that most of the records had been returned to the CIA for declassification in adherence to Executive Order 12958 and Executive Order 12812.

Please advise my office of the status of the declassification of these records, as well as a general timeline to completion. POW/MIA families have waited for many years for this information, I would appreciate full and fair consideration as you review this request.

Please address your response and any questions or concerns to Debra of my district office staff. Debra may be reached by phone at 651/224-4503; by fax at 651/224-0575; or by mail at 111 East Kellogg Boulevard, Suite 215; St. Paul, Minnesota, 55101.

Sincerely,


Bruce F. Vento
Member of Congress

BFV:dm

BRUCE F. VENTÓ
4TH DISTRICT, MINNESOTA

2413 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-2413
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DISTRICT OFFICE:
111 EAST KELLOGG BOULEVARD
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ST. PAUL, MN 55101
(651) 224-4503

00A99-045

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
RESOURCES

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
BANKING AND
FINANCIAL SERVICES

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-2504

June 10, 1999

John Moseman
Director of Congressional Affairs
Central Intelligence Agency
Room 7-C38 CIA
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Moseman:


On May 11 I contacted your office on behalf of my constituent, Mr. Rich Daly of Minnesota Won't Forget POW/MIA. Mr. Daly has been diligently pursuing the declassification of all depositions and records of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs.

By contacting the National Archives and Records Administration's center for Legislative Archives, I learned that several of these records had been sent to the CIA for declassification, as per Executive Orders 12958 and 12812. I contacted you in May to learn the status of these documents. Since that date I have not received a response from your office regarding this matter.

Please inform my office, as soon as possible, what the status of these documents is, and what the time table is for declassifying them. Any information you can provide would be greatly appreciated. The families of POWs and MIAs have waited a very long time for this information.

Please send the information to Debra Munding at my district office: 111 East Kellogg Boulevard, St. Paul, MN 55101. If you have any further questions please call her at (651) 224-4503.

Sincerely,



Bruce F. Vento
Member of Congress

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S

Action:

**20 JUNE 1997 DDCI MEETING WITH SEN. SMITH
RE: POW/MIA ISSUES**

Document Number
OCA-02667-00

Date Received
06/20/1997

Task Instructions:

no value

Recipients

- MFR

Request Documents:

Additional Document Metadata


- OPI
- Secondary OPI
- From
- Other Document Number
- Comments
- File Code
- Media Type
- Codewords
- Attachments
- Keywords
- Copies

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Viewing an archived action from Extra

PRINTED: Monday, September 11, 2000
AT: 17:38

CODEWORDS:



~~SECRET~~

11 September 2000

Memorandum for the Record *OCA 00-021017*

KEY: C/97-05862

EVENT: DDCI MEETING **DATE:** 06/20/1997 **TIME:** 8:30 **STATUS:** COMPLETED
PLACE:
FOR: SEN SMITH
SUBJECT: PW/MIA ISSUES

ATTENDEES:

<u>ASSOCIATION</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>ROLE</u>
A/DCI	TENET, GEORGE (A/DCI)	
D/OCA	MOSEMAN, JOHN (D/OCA)	
PERSTAFF SEN	<input type="text"/>	
SEN	SMITH, ROBERT (SEN)	
SSCI	DORN, PETER (SSCI)	

Executive Summary:
[EXECUTIVE-SUMMARY]

[SUPPORTING-TEXT]

Summary Text:

~~(C)~~ The ADCI briefly met with Sen. Bob Smith to discuss POW/MIA matters as well as a current budget issue relating to Special Navy.

~~(S)~~ With respect to POW/MIA matters, Sen. Smith and the DCI discussed whether the POW/MIA analytic activity should be maintained as it is in the Defense Department. The ADCI said he would work with Gen. Hughes and discuss the matter. The ADCI stressed that objectivity is the key to intelligence analysis and that policy should not drive analysis in any way.

~~(S)~~ Sen. Smith then discussed some specific matters, including a discussion he had with a Russian named Volganov who reportedly told Sen. Smith that the Vietnamese were holding back information on POW/MIA matters. In addition, Sen. Smith indicated that he was aware of some 300 NSA reports relating to Afghanistan and Russian POW/MIA matters.

~~(U)~~ The ADCI in general indicated to Sen. Smith that he would attempt to be helpful.

~~(C)~~ See addendum to this memorandum regarding discussion of Special Navy.



John H. Moseman
Director of Congressional Affairs

~~SECRET~~



SECRET

D/OCA/JH Moseman:jab:x



SECRET

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Action

**RESPONSE TO 26 FEBRUARY 1999 LETTER RE:
DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW OF RECORDS OF
THE U.S. SENATE - SELECT COMMITTEE ON
POW/MIA AFFAIRS**

Document Number
OCA-022364-CNV

Date Received
06/03/1999

Task Instructions:

no value

Recipients

Request Documents:

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	<input type="text"/>
Secondary OPI	<input type="text"/>
From	<input type="text"/>
Other Document Number	<input type="text"/>
Comments	<input type="text"/>
File Code	<input type="text"/>
Media Type	<input type="text"/>
Codewords	<input type="text"/>
Attachments	<input type="text"/>
Keywords	<input type="text"/>
Copies	<input type="text"/>

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Viewing an archived action from

3/11/2013

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

OIM 99-0195
3 June 1999

[Redacted]

Assistant Archivist for
Records Services
National Archives at College Park
8601 Adelphi Road
College Park, Maryland 20740-6001

Reference: EO-1999-00116

Dear [Redacted]

The following is in response to your 26 February 1999 letter regarding the declassification review of Records of the U.S. Senate - Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, your project numbers NND 982005 through 982026. The 22 boxes of approximately 4000 multi-page documents, comprising some 40,000 pages, began arriving in our offices in late April 1998. The final boxes were not received until the end of May. We have had the equivalent of one full-time employee dedicated to this project from late August 1998 to the present.

Our project continues in cooperation with the appropriate Agency components. We anticipate, given resources and competing litigation and special search demands, that all Agency originated, Senate Select Committee documents will have received a full re-review and be ready for release by the end of the calendar year. All documents that require referral to other government agencies will be tasked out shortly, with completion requested by 30 November 1999 so that those documents may be incorporated in the final delivery.

While we share with you and the Senate a strong commitment to making the maximum amount of declassified information available to the public as soon as possible, there are a record number of other large projects underway that demand our attention, and we remain subject to many other court orders. Our


[Redacted]

limited resources must be stretched to accommodate all appropriate requests. Please convey my assurance to [Redacted] that we will do all we can to speed the completion of this major project.


Sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]

JS
Lee S. Strickland
Information and Privacy Coordinator



DA/OIM/LSSD/Jmaier:tak/31287 (3 June 1999)
s/da/oim/irgfrontoffice/general/tab/[redacted] doc



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S

Action

5 MARCH 1999 SENATE MEMBER BRIEFING RE:
POW/MIA

Document Number
OCA-019866-CNV

Date Received
03/05/1999

Task Instructions:
no value

Recipients
• MFR

Request Documents:

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	<input type="text"/>	
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From		
Other Document Number		
Comments		
File Code		
Media Type		
Codewords		
Attachments		
Keywords		
Copies		

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PRINTED: Wednesday, May 12, 1999
AT: 17:14

CODEWORDS:

OCA Records
[Redacted Box]

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum for the Record

KEY: C/1999-00260

EVENT: MEMBER BRIEFING DATE: 03/05/1999 TIME: 9:00 STATUS: COMPLETED
PLACE: 407 SENATE
FOR: SEN
SUBJECT: POW/MIA

ATTENDEES:

<u>ASSOCIATION</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>ROLE</u>
	DZIATKIEWICZ, ELIZABETH ()	BRIEFER
	ELBERG, GRAEME ()	BRIEFER
	JANNOTTA, SHELLEY ()	BRIEFER
	MOORE, PATRICIA ()	BRIEFER
	SOTOS, MARY ANNE ()	BRIEFER
DCI/OCA	[Redacted Box]	SUPPORT
DCI/OCA	[Redacted Box]	SUPPORT
DOD	LAJOIE, MGEN, RONALD (DOD)	
SEN	SMITH, ROBERT (SEN)	

Executive Summary:

1) § [Redacted Box] The purpose of the briefing was to respond to the major points raised in the 26 January 1999 letter to the DCI from Senators Bob Smith and John Warner (Smith is the head of the Vietnam Working Group on the US/Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs; the commission is chaired by General Roland LaJoie) requesting the following:

- 1) Access to a September 1996 report cited in the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate on the Vietnam POW/MIA issue;
- 2) Access to an August 1998 Top Secret memorandum dissem report which dealt with the alleged transfer of U.S. POWs to the Soviet Union from Vietnam during the Vietnam War;
- 3) Justification for the discrepancy in classification levels between the 1996 and 1998 reports;
- 4) An explanation as to why nearly two years elapsed before a follow-up report was generated on this matter.

2) § [Redacted Box] A package of DO reports and [Redacted Box] were taken to the meeting for the Senator and General LaJoie to review on a read-and-return basis. The package included the following documents: 1) [Redacted Box] 10 October 1996, 2) [Redacted Box] 7 October 1996; 3) CIA [Redacted Box] 9 September 1998; and 4) DO Memorandum Intelligence Report [Redacted Box] 26 August 1998. Copies of these documents as well as the 26 January letter authored by Senators Rob Smith and John Warner are attached to this report.

3) § [Redacted Box] As background, both the 1996 and the 1998 information originated from [Redacted Box] [Redacted Box] The August 1998 report recounts stories in circulation among KGB officers over the years that, during the Vietnam War, the KGB transported US POWs clandestinely from North Vietnam to Russia, where they were interrogated and pitched. The stories allege the KGB succeeded in recruiting one American POW who was a member of an American military intelligence service [Redacted Box]

Page 1 of 4

~~SECRET~~

B-103H

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] The [redacted] source had only indirect access to the information and no past reporting record on this issue. Efforts to flesh out the source's account resulted in limited additional details. A thorough review of EA, CE, and CIC records failed to identify any new information which corroborates the stories in the report.

4) (S) [redacted] As background, both the 1996 and the 1998 information originated from [redacted] [redacted] The August 1998 report recounts stories in circulation among KGB officers over the years that, during the Vietnam War, the KGB transported US POWs clandestinely from North Vietnam to Russia, where they were interrogated and pitched. The stories allege the KGB succeeded in recruiting one American POW who was a member of an American military intelligence service who had been involved in US intelligence operations [redacted]

[redacted] The [redacted] source had only indirect access to the information and no past reporting record on this issue. Efforts to flesh out the source's account resulted in limited additional details. A thorough review of EA, CE, and CIC records failed to identify any new information which corroborates the stories in the report.

Summary Text:

5) (S) [redacted] As Senator Smith was delayed for approximately fifteen minutes, the briefers spent the time discussing a broad range of topics with General LaJoie. The General admitted he was not fully briefed on the subject of the meeting, but stated that he understood the core issue as being the transportation of US POWs captured during the Vietnam War to Russia for the purpose of being recruited as informants once they return to the United States. At this point, LaJoie is unconvinced that US POWs were sent to the Soviet Union during the Vietnam War. According to LaJoie, the Russians have admitted that a plan was drawn up between the Soviet and Vietnamese Governments to conduct such a program during the Vietnam War. To date, however, neither have the Russians provided any documentation detailing such a plan to the Commission nor has the Commission has found any evidence that would suggest such a program was carried out.

6) (S) [redacted] In the case of the Korean War, however, the General believes that it is highly likely that US POWs were transported to Russia. The General believes exploitation by the Russians of US POWs occurred during this period, largely due to Stalin and his policies. The Russians continue to deny such any such transfers took place during the Korean War and the issue has yet to be resolved. Discussions continue on this matter between US and Russian negotiators.

7) (S) [redacted] Other topics discussed with the General was his tenure with the Agency. He stated he enjoyed working with the Agency, adding that the Agency culture was very much like the military with its "can-do" spirit. He also identified himself as one the of the first pioneers in improving the working relationship between the Agency and the military. DCEA, who was directly involved in supporting the military during her assignment [redacted] [redacted] discussed the Agency's evolving relationship with the military with the General until Senator Smith finally arrived for the meeting.

8) (S) [redacted] The Senator began the meeting by announcing the Agency refused to admit staff at this session, including Roger Schmaker, who had been specifically requested to participate by Senator Smith's personal office. Roger Schmaker is a DOD employee assigned to support the Commission, who, the Senator added, had the clearance level for this briefing (Top Secret) and had even had access to the two reports identified in his 26 January 1999 letter. [redacted] responded to the Senator by stating that in an effort to be as forthcoming as possible in this briefing, we had brought along a package of documentation for review. This package not only included the two reports but DO [redacted] related to this issue which neither Mr. Schmacker nor anyone else outside the Agency would normally have access. The Senator appeared to accept this explanation and began to review the four documents.

9) (S) [redacted] Once the General and Senator had finished reviewing the documents, the briefing began with a discussion of the source information, [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] Details regarding the identities of the subsources or their access to the information provided in the 1996 and 1998 reports are not available. The briefers added that [redacted] was not personally involved in interrogating American POWs and did not have access to interrogation reports. The briefers further explained that the two reports represented two separate meetings with the source, one which took place in mid-1996 and another follow-up meeting in July 1998 to address additional tasking from DPMO generated from the original report. The Senator asked if it would be possible for the Commission to provide questions to present to the source during future meetings to which the briefers replied this would not be a problem.

10) (S) [redacted] The Senator then asked why nearly two years elapsed before a follow-up report was generated on this matter. The briefers response was that the reasons for the long intervals between reports was due to the infrequency of the meetings with the source, [redacted]

11) (S) [redacted] The Senator then asked for the rationale behind updating the classification level of the second report disseminated in 1998 to "Top Secret" when the original 1996 report was classified only as "Secret." The briefers explained that the reason the second report was classified "Top Secret" was due to source protection. [redacted]

The upgrade of the classification level was because we wanted to be able to provide as detailed an account as possible of the source chain of the information, while still allowing adequate source protection.

12) (S) [redacted] The discussion then jumped to a review of [redacted] agency career and experience as a POW during the Vietnam War as well as [redacted] connection with the Agency's [redacted] program ran in the 1950's. [redacted] agency career began in 1949. Weaver held a number of positions in the Agency, [redacted] That said, there is no information available which directly connects [redacted] to [redacted]

[redacted] In addition, after a considerable investigation [redacted] it was determined that [redacted] was never recruited or cooperated with any foreign intelligence service during the period that he was a POW during the Vietnam War.

13) (S) [redacted] CIC officer [redacted] described [redacted] incarceration by the Vietnamese as cruel and difficult. The Vietnamese were aware of [redacted] intelligence affiliation and consequently, [redacted] was often held in solitary confinement and treated very badly by the guards. In order to stay alive, [redacted] provided information to the Vietnamese on cases that he knew had been long terminated; however, when that was not possible he altered the information to make it misleading or incorrect. There is no indication in [redacted] files to show that he was ever interrogated by the Vietnamese about [redacted] [redacted] also reported just after the POW's had been notified that they were to be released, he was dressed up and taken to a building in Hanoi for a meeting. In addition to several Vietnamese officers, a European-looking man was in attendance. He was not introduced, however [redacted] deduced over the next few hours that the individual was probably a Soviet intelligence officer. [redacted] stated that the meeting could be described as a rapport building session. He was not questioned about cases and did not volunteer any such information. When the group broke for lunch, and his captors told him he would be meeting this person again in the afternoon, [redacted] refused. This one brief meeting was the only session [redacted] had with the individual he believed might be a Soviet intelligence officer. While [redacted] was on extended leave following his release, the Soviets placed a postcard in [redacted] mailbox referring to the meeting in Hanoi and stating that if he knew what was good for him, he would follow their directions for a meeting. [redacted] reported the incident to the Agency immediately. He did not follow-up on this contact.

14) (S) [redacted] [redacted] also advised that the Agency had no information on [redacted] current status as the Agency had no further contact with [redacted] once he retired from the Agency in 1976.


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15) (S) [redacted] Senator Smith specifically expressed an interest in pursuing the information provided in [redacted] paragraph 4 identifying the Khabarovsk or Vladivostok regions as sites where US POWs were reportedly taken within the Soviet Union during the Vietnam War. The Senator asked if it would be possible for him and his commission colleagues to follow-up on this information during their next trip to Russia. The briefers attempted to explain that, in order to protect the source of the information, the commission could act on this information only if it could show that it had received this collaborating information from other venues. General Lajoie, largely due to his past Agency experience, seemed to grasp this concept fairly quickly; however, the Senator appeared unconvinced.


16) (S) [redacted] The Senator also questioned the need for comments from [redacted] on the contents of the report, suggesting that such comments actually politicized DO reporting. In response, the briefers explained "comment procedures" on DO reporting, [redacted]

17) (S) [redacted] In closing, Senator Smith asked DCEA [redacted] if she had had an opportunity to review his assessment of the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Vietnamese intentions, capabilities, and performance concerning the POW/MIA issue and if so, what were her comments on his assessment. In response, DCEA advised that she understood the DCI responded to his concerns via a recent letter and she had no other comments to add to the DCI response.



Liaison Officer
Office of Congressional Affairs

DCI/OCA/CLG/NCB:broadbent:pnr/37922(12 May 99)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(b)(3)

CLASSIFICATION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING SHEET

1. CONTROL NUMBER: DAC 99-00582

2. SUSPENSE DATE:

3. SUBJECT: Letter to Senator Smith

4. ORIGATION OFFICE:
NIC, 7E62 OHB, 37322

5. DATE: 29 January 1999

6. PURPOSE:
Responds Letter to Senator Smith

7. SUMMARY:

8. COORDINATION:

9. RECOMMENDATION:

10. DATE IN	11. ROUTE TO	12. ACTION (Check a Box)	13. NONCONCUR REASON	14. DATE OUT
	TITLE	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input type="checkbox"/> FYI		
0/29/99		<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input type="checkbox"/> FYI		2/2/99
FEB 03 1999		<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input type="checkbox"/> FYI		FEB 03 1999
FEB 03 1999		<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input type="checkbox"/> FYI		2/4/99
FEB 04 1999		<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input type="checkbox"/> FYI		FEB 17 1999
Feb 17 th	SIGNATURE	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input type="checkbox"/> FYI		
	TITLE	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input type="checkbox"/> FYI	L-225	
	SIGNATURE			



File

**DCI ACTION CENTER
ROUTING SLIP**

		ACTION	INFO			ACTION	INFO
1	DCI		X	11	OPA		
2	DDCI		X	12	DDA		
3	DDC/CM			13	DDI		
4	ADC/MS		E-Copy	14	DDO		
5	EXDIR/CIA			15	DDS&T		
6	CHMN/NIC		E-Copy	16	A/NIO/EA		X
7	IG			17			
8	GC			18			
9	COMPT			19			
10	OCA		X	20			

SUSPENSE DATE: N/A

DOCUMENT NO: DAC 00390-99

Action Officer:

COORDINATION/ROUTING:

No written response necessary. FYI only.

SUMMARY:

FYI copy of letter from Samuel Berger in response to The Honorable Robert Smith's (Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Ethics) recent letter regarding the NIE on the Vietnam POW/MIA issue.

Date: 26 January 1999

Received in DAC: 26 January 1999

DA C-00390-99

CONGRESSIONAL CORRESPONDENCE ACTION PLAN

Suspense Date

Control Number

ACTION: Please forward response as indicated below to OCA for coordination and transmittal.

Prepare a response for DCI signature.

Lead Action Office:

Information Copies:

Prepare a response for D/OCA signature.

Lead Action Office:

Information Copies:

NO WRITTEN RESPONSE NECESSARY

Lead Office:

NIC, A/1070 - East Asia

Follow-Up Action:

Information Copies:

Special Counsel, Ken Levit

ADCI-MS,

OCA ACTION OFFICER:

Advance Copies Provided To:

OCA / FA
CIDE

Comments:

~~SECRET~~ (b)(3)

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

17 February 1999


The Honorable Bob Smith
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Smith:

(S) As I promised in my letter of 17 December, I convened the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB)—senior leaders of the Intelligence Community—on 19 January to discuss your extensive critique of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Vietnam's performance on the POW/MIA issue.

(S) The NFIB members, after a full discussion, voted unanimously to let this Estimate stand. They stressed that this is not a traditional estimate that attempts to get beyond current intelligence to make judgments about the future. Rather, we were tasked to review as best we could scarce information of varying reliability to make judgments about the current behavior of the Vietnamese government. NFIB principals continue to believe that the published NIE fulfills this mandate, and that it makes clear both the gaps and the methodologies used to assess what information we do have.

(S) Dealing with critical gaps in information, as you know, is a constant of the intelligence analysis business. We must be prepared to weigh the impact of new information or fresh challenges to our assumptions. NFIB members want to assure you that any new information will be provided to those responsible for dealing with the POW/MIA question. The NIE remains an accurate assessment of our current knowledge and understanding of the issue.

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
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The Honorable Bob Smith

(S) NFIB members again commended both the senior analyst who supervised the drafting of this NIE and the rigorous interagency process that made this Estimate an Intelligence Community product, not the work of a single author. NFIB members emphasized that they fully accept the testimony of the professional officers who worked on this project that, at all times, they "called it as they saw it" in developing their judgments. I accept their word, and that of NFIB members, that there was at no time any effort to distort judgments from outside or inside the Community.

(U) In closing, let me again express our deep commitment to a full accounting of those missing from the Vietnam War. I can assure you that the Intelligence Community is working hard to achieve this objective.

Sincerely,




George J. Tenet

~~SECRET~~

The Honorable Bob Smith

DCI/NIC/[]:mmc/[] (1 Feb 99)



Viewing an archived action from

S

Action
**RESPONSE TO 25 NOVEMBER 1998 LETTER RE:
NIE ON VIETNAMESE INTENTIONS,
CAPABILITIES AND PERFORMANCE
CONCERNING POW/MIA ISSUES**

Document Number Date Received
OCA-019711-CNV 12/17/1998

Task Instructions:
no value

Recipients
• SEN. BOB SMITH

Request Documents:

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	<input type="text"/>	
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From		
Other Document Number		
Comments		
File Code		
Media Type		
Codewords		
Attachments		
Keywords		
Copies		

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Viewing an archived action from

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(b)(3)

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

17 December 1998


The Honorable Bob Smith
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Smith:


(S) I appreciate the concern expressed in your letter of 25 November 1998 about the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning POW/MIA Issues. I recognize your long-standing interest in the issue, as well as your tireless efforts on behalf of military personnel and their families. I assure you that the Intelligence Community will seriously consider your criticism and suggestions. I agree that we owe the families of POWs and MIAs our best effort.

(S) As you know, Intelligence Community Principals in the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), which I chair, discussed and approved the estimate on 13 April 1998. I have directed that your evaluation of the NIE be placed on the agenda for the NFIB now scheduled for January. I will inform you of the results.

Sincerely,



George J. Tenet

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~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

DCI/OCA/CLG [redacted] pnr/ [redacted] (7 Dec 98)
OCA 98-1663
FN: WDATA/liaison [redacted] doc



~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

Viewing an archived action from Extral Close

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Action
**FYI COPY OF LETTER RE: RESPONSE OF NIE ON
THE VIETNAM POW/MIA ISSUE**

Document Number : Date Received
OCA-000095-CNV : 01/19/1999

Task Instructions:
no value

Recipients

- CHAIRMAN ROBERT SMITH

Request Documents: I97NB5FU.TIF

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	oca_cdocs_lib
Secondary OPI	no value
From	SAMUEL BERGER
Other Document Number	
Comments	MEA
File Code	L-303
Media Type	PP
Codewords	
Attachments	
Keywords	
Copies	

(b)(3)

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Viewing an archived action from Extral Close

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 19, 1999

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your recent letter on the National Intelligence Estimate published earlier this year that assessed Vietnam's commitment to accounting fully for Americans missing in action during the Vietnam conflict, and examined Russian documents that -- if accurate -- would bring into question whether all American prisoners of war were released in 1973.

First, let me say that I appreciate your careful and detailed examination of this estimate. George Tenet has indicated that he welcomes such scrutiny as essential to helping make sure our intelligence agencies maintain the highest standards of research and analysis on issues that are critical to our national security. Indeed, he has mandated that more rigorous "red teaming" be incorporated into future estimates on such issues. In this particular instance, I understand he is placing your critique on the agenda for the next meeting of the Intelligence Community body that originally approved the Vietnam POW/MIA estimate.


I believe it important to note that the estimate was drafted by experts who represent our intelligence agencies' collective wisdom on the POW/MIA issue. They worked in accord with long-standing procedures governing finished intelligence assessments. They laid out a methodology and noted problems or gaps in available information. Their product was reviewed by some of our most senior intelligence officers, and released ultimately under the authority of the DCI himself. We depend on this process to yield informed, balanced and unbiased assessments on key foreign policy matters.

For this reason, I must take exception to any suggestion that I or any member of the National Security Council staff sought to influence the judgments reached by the Intelligence Community in this estimate. Each of us at the NSC understands the importance of ensuring that our intelligence agencies conduct their work in this objective fashion, without outside interference. The best

interests of the military and the country demand that we endeavor to achieve the best analysis of the facts and then tailor our policy to these facts, rather than vice versa.

Let me take this opportunity to underscore the President's personal commitment to the fullest possible accounting of our POWs and MIAs as the cornerstone of his Vietnam policy. This Administration will continue to work with the Government of Vietnam, and dedicate our own resources, to ensure that this goal is achieved. With the help of dedicated individuals such as yourself, I am confident that we will succeed.

Sincerely,



Samuel R. Berger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

The Honorable Robert C. Smith
Chairman
Select Committee on Ethics
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Viewing an archived action from

(b)(3)

S

Action

DCI letter to Senator Smith regarding POW/MIA NIE

Document Number
DAC-00582-99

Date Received
02/17/1999

Task Instructions:

no value

Recipients

- Senator Bob Smith

Request Documents:

Additional Document Metadata

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Attachments	
Keywords	
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OCA Records

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

17 December 1998

OCA 98-1663


The Honorable Bob Smith
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Smith:


(S []) I appreciate the concern expressed in your letter of 25 November 1998 about the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning POW/MIA Issues. I recognize your long-standing interest in the issue, as well as your tireless efforts on behalf of military personnel and their families. I assure you that the Intelligence Community will seriously consider your criticism and suggestions. I agree that we owe the families of POWs and MIAs our best effort.

(S []) As you know, Intelligence Community Principals in the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), which I chair, discussed and approved the estimate on 13 April 1998. I have directed that your evaluation of the NIE be placed on the agenda for the NFIB now scheduled for January. I will inform you of the results.

Sincerely,


George J. Tenet


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309

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

DCI/OCA/CLG [redacted]: pnr [redacted] (7 Dec 98)
OCA 98-1663
FN: WDATA/liaison [redacted].doc



~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

Viewing an archived action from

U

Action
**25 NOVEMBER 1998 LETTER REQUESTING THAT
THE POW/MIA NIE BE RECALLED**

Document Number OCA-02495-00 Date Received 11/25/1998

Task Instructions:

no value

Recipients

- GEORGE TENET

Request Documents:

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	<input type="text"/>	
Secondary OPI		
From		
Other Document Number		
Comments		
File Code		
Media Type		
Codewords		
Attachmante		
Keywords		
Copies		

Viewing an archived action from

BOB SMITH
NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-2903

OCA 00-02495

H/C to FO
4:30pm

November 25, 1998

11/30/98

The Honorable George Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence
Chairman, National Foreign Intelligence Board
Room 7D56, CIA Headquarters

Dear George:

Please find enclosed a copy of *A Critical Assessment* concerning the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the Vietnam POW/MIA issue. This assessment was prepared by my office following your declassification and public release of the Key Judgments portion of the NIE this past August.

I am making four requests of you with this letter. First, I request that you convene, in the next 60 days, a meeting of the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) to consider my request that the referenced NIE be retracted for the reasons noted in my attached assessment.

Second, I urge you in the strongest possible terms to personally read the NIE, and then read my assessment of the NIE, before acting on my retraction request. I think you will agree with me that there are serious problems with the NIE. The problems can either be attributed to shoddy research or a deliberate, pre-determined strategy to discredit relevant information. In either case, it's a sad commentary on the U.S. Intelligence Community.

Third, I request that a copy of my assessment of the NIE be disseminated to those who have already received the NIE itself, and I request that I be notified as to who those people are. I would be pleased to assist you in disseminating my assessment. And fourth, I request that both my assessment and the remaining portions of the NIE be processed for declassification immediately.

I look forward to hearing from you as soon as possible, and I trust you will consider the concerns and requests I am raising with you in a thoughtful and serious manner. Finally, please know that I am available to meet with you at any time to discuss this matter further.

With warm regards,

Bob Smith
BOB SMITH, U.S.S.

Unclassified when separated from classified enclosure

L-309 (P)

(b)(3)

Viewing an archived action from

[Redacted]

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Action

**RESPONSE RE: REQUEST FOR
DECLASSIFICATION OF NIE: VIETNAMESE
INTENTIONS, CAPABILITIES, AND
PERFORMANCE CONCERNING THE POW/MIA
ISSUE**

Document Number
OCA-008541-CNV

Date Received
08/03/1998

Task Instructions:
no value

Request Documents:

[Redacted]

Recipients

- SENATORS
KERRY/KERREY/MCCAIN/GLENN/CLELAND/HA

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	[Redacted]
Secondary OPI	
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Comments	
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Attachments	
Keywords	
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Viewing an archived action from

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

August 3, 1998

The Honorable John Kerry
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Kerry:

In response to your request of 22 July 1998, I have decided to declassify, in full, the Key Judgments of NIE 98-03, Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue. In reaching this decision, I had to balance the legitimate interest of the public in this issue, including our common objective in resolving remaining uncertainties, and my obligation to protect intelligence sources and methods. These Key Judgments, which are available to the public, are reflected in the enclosure.


I believe declassification of the remaining text of the NIE would be inappropriate at this time, and perhaps harmful to efforts to recover MIA remains and resolve other open questions concerning the fates of Americans who remain unaccounted for. In my view, the release of the full text of the NIE could actually harm cooperation with Vietnamese and other officials whose work has been vital to successful remains recovery operations. For example, many of those identified as "cooperative" with US officials might be less willing or able to be so if their roles were publicized. Similarly, many American officials who cooperated in the preparation of the classified NIE did so with the expectation that their views would be kept out of the public record.

The Honorable John Kerry

This NIE was specifically requested as an intelligence product, accessing the full array of information available to the Intelligence Community. As such, there are portions which involve sources and methods that would be damaged if it were released in full. A heavily redacted document would prevent some of this damage, but of itself would then spur interest in and demands for what was not released. Furthermore, in some cases the remaining text would not support some of the key judgments.

Of course, we will make the document available and brief interested Members of Congress through established channels.


Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "George J. Tenet". The signature is stylized with a large initial "G" and a long, sweeping underline.

George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

The Honorable John Kerry



Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

August 3, 1998

The Honorable J. Robert Kerrey
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Kerrey:

In response to your request of 22 July 1998, I have decided to declassify, in full, the Key Judgments of NIE 98-03, Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue. In reaching this decision, I had to balance the legitimate interest of the public in this issue, including our common objective in resolving remaining uncertainties, and my obligation to protect intelligence sources and methods. These Key Judgments, which are available to the public, are reflected in the enclosure.


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The Honorable J. Robert Kerrey

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Of course, we will make the document available and brief interested Members of Congress through established channels.

Sincerely,

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George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence


Enclosure

Central Intelligence Agency

The Honorable J. Robert Kenney



Washington, D. C. 20505



Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

August 3, 1998

The Honorable John McCain
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator McCain:

In response to your request of 22 July 1998, I have decided to declassify, in full, the Key Judgments of NIE 98-03, Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue. In reaching this decision, I had to balance the legitimate interest of the public in this issue, including our common objective in resolving remaining uncertainties, and my obligation to protect intelligence sources and methods. These Key Judgments, which are available to the public, are reflected in the enclosure.


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The Honorable John McCain

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
Sincerely,

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George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

The Honorable John McCain



Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

August 3, 1998

The Honorable John Glenn
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Glenn:

In response to your request of 22 July 1998, I have decided to declassify, in full, the Key Judgments of NIE 98-03, Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue. In reaching this decision, I had to balance the legitimate interest of the public in this issue, including our common objective in resolving remaining uncertainties, and my obligation to protect intelligence sources and methods. These Key Judgments, which are available to the public, are reflected in the enclosure.


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The Honorable John Glenn

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
Sincerely,

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George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

The Honorable John Glenn



Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

August 3, 1998

The Honorable Max Cleland
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Cleland:

In response to your request of 22 July 1998, I have decided to declassify, in full, the Key Judgments of NIE 98-03, Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue. In reaching this decision, I had to balance the legitimate interest of the public in this issue, including our common objective in resolving remaining uncertainties, and my obligation to protect intelligence sources and methods. These Key Judgments, which are available to the public, are reflected in the enclosure.


I believe declassification of the remaining text of the NIE would be inappropriate at this time, and perhaps harmful to efforts to recover MIA remains and resolve other open questions concerning the fates of Americans who remain unaccounted for. In my view, the release of the full text of the NIE could actually harm cooperation with Vietnamese and other officials whose work has been vital to successful remains recovery operations. For example, many of those identified as "cooperative" with US officials might be less willing or able to be so if their roles were publicized. Similarly, many American officials who cooperated in the preparation of the classified NIE did so with the expectation that their views would be kept out of the public record.

The Honorable Max Cleland

This NIE was specifically requested as an intelligence product, accessing the full array of information available to the Intelligence Community. As such, there are portions which involve sources and methods that would be damaged if it were released in full. A heavily redacted document would prevent some of this damage, but of itself would then spur interest in and demands for what was not released. Furthermore, in some cases the remaining text would not support some of the key judgments.

Of course, we will make the document available and brief interested Members of Congress through established channels.


Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "George J. Tenet". The signature is stylized with a large initial "G" and a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

The Honorable Max Cleland



Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

August 3, 1998

The Honorable Chuck Hagel
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Hagel:

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
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
Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "George J. Tenet". The signature is stylized with a large initial "G" and a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

The Honorable Chuck Hagel



~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING SHEET

1. CONTROL NUMBER: DAC 99-00582 2. SUSPENSE DATE:

3. SUBJECT: Letter to Senator Smith

4. ORIGATION OFFICE: NIC, 7E62 OHB, 37322 5. DATE: 29 January 1999

6. PURPOSE: Responds Letter to Senator Smith

7. SUMMARY: (b)(3)

8. COORDINATION:

9. RECOMMENDATION:

10. DATE IN	11. ROUTE TO	12. ACTION (Check a Box)	13. NONCONCUR REASON	14. DATE OUT
		<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input type="checkbox"/> FYI		
1/29/99		<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input type="checkbox"/> FYI		2/2/99
FEB 03 1999		<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input type="checkbox"/> FYI		FEB 03 1999
FEB 03 1999		<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input type="checkbox"/> FYI		2/4/99
FEB 04 1999		<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input type="checkbox"/> FYI		FEB 17 1999
Feb 17th	SIGNATURE	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input type="checkbox"/> FYI		
	TITLE	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input type="checkbox"/> FYI	L-225	
	SIGNATURE			

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

CL BY: _____
CL REASON: _____
DECL ON: _____
DRV FROM: _____

~~SECRET~~

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

17 December 1998


The Honorable Bob Smith
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Smith:

~~S~~ I appreciate the concern expressed in your letter of 25 November 1998 about the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning POW/MIA Issues. I recognize your long-standing interest in the issue, as well as your tireless efforts on behalf of military personnel and their families. I assure you that the Intelligence Community will seriously consider your criticism and suggestions. I agree that we owe the families of POWs and MIAs our best effort.

~~S~~ As you know, Intelligence Community Principals in the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), which I chair, discussed and approved the estimate on 13 April 1998. I have directed that your evaluation of the NIE be placed on the agenda for the NFIB now scheduled for January. I will inform you of the results.

Sincerely,



George J. Tenet

~~SECRET~~

C06002442

~~SECRET~~ /

DCI/OCA/CLG/:pnr (7 Dec 98)
OCA 98-1663
FN: WDATA/liaison .doc



SECRET/NOFORN

UNCLASSIFIED

US Classification//Non US//SCI//Codeword//FGI//Dissem Controls//Non-farell//Declass (as appropriate)

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING SHEET

1. Origination Office ADCI/AP		2. Date 06/19/2001
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3. FROM:	Name DDCI/	Room No. and Building	Phone
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4. Subject
Final Coordination: CDA 2-11-2001: POW/MIA Analysis

5. Originating Office Control #	5a. Response to DAC # (Originating Office to Complete)	5b. DAC Control # (DAC Use Only) DAC-03004-01
---------------------------------	--	--

6. Justification Summary (required for Immediate and Priority Actions)

Routine Priority Immediate

Requesting DCI Signature.

7. Coordination
The attached memorandum has been coordinated with DIA, NSA, NIMA, CIA, DI.

NOTE: All correspondence sent to DCI, must be sent via ExDir and DDCI

DATE IN	ROUTE TO	ACTION (Check a Box)	NONCONCUR REASON	DATE OUT
JUN 21 2001	TITLE DAC SIGNATURE	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FYI		JUN 21 2001
JUN 21 2001	TITLE DDCI SIGNATURE	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input type="checkbox"/> FYI		6/22/01
JUN 26 2001 JUL 02 2001	TITLE DCI SIGNATURE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input type="checkbox"/> FYI		7301
	TITLE ADCI/AP SIGNATURE	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input type="checkbox"/> FYI		
JUN 28 2001	TITLE ADCI/MS SIGNATURE	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input type="checkbox"/> FYI	DCI ACTION CENTER	JUL 2 2001
	TITLE SIGNATURE	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input type="checkbox"/> FYI		
	TITLE SIGNATURE	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input type="checkbox"/> FYI		
	TITLE SIGNATURE	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input type="checkbox"/> FYI		
			PO APPRO 07120-P-01	

TO : D/OCA via [redacted]		CONTROL # OCA 2001-2192	DATE OF REQUEST 17 July 01
FROM: DCI/OCA/ [redacted]		SUSPENSE DATE	
SUBJECT: Letter to The Honorables Peter Goss, Nancy Pelosi, Bob Graham, Richard Shelby, Daniel Inouye, and Jerry Lewis re: POWs and MIAs since 1990			
NOTES <p><i>FUI, this was the [redacted] requested solution to the DCI's letter saying he was answering a CIA [redacted]</i></p> <p><i>[Handwritten signature]</i></p>			
COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices)			
NAME	[redacted]	OFFICE O/LEG/OCA	DATE
NAME	[redacted]	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	[redacted]	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	[redacted]	OFFICE	DATE
ACTION REQUIRED BY D/OCA			
For your Review and Signature			

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
For Community Management
Washington, D.C. 20505

19 June 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: CDA 2-11-2001: POW/MIA Analysis

Background: The attached memorandum to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), and the Executive Director of the Central Intelligence Agency responds to actions requested by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) Report to establish and maintain an analytic capability within the Intelligence Community (IC) for supporting activities related to prisoners of war (POW) and persons missing in action (MIA). This draft memo has been pre-coordinated with the above-named agencies.

Issues: The SSCI is interested in having designated points of contact within the IC for handling POW/MIA analytic issues. Director, DIA, has agreed to establish a small permanent core element charged with directing DIA and IC efforts in this area, with the support of designated points of contact within NSA, NIMA, and CIA. DIA will work with other interested non-IC players to ensure appropriate coordination of support.

Recommendation: That the DCI sign the attached memorandum to DIA, NSA, NIMA, and CIA on the Designation of Intelligence Community Leads for POW/MIA Analysis and the attached letters to the leadership of the Congressional committees with intelligence oversight responsibilities.



Attachments

UNCLASSIFIED

CDA Document

CMS Internal Tracking Number: 2-11-2001

Lead: ADCI/AP

Title: POW/MIA ANALYSIS
Number: 2-11-2001
Other Date Info: TBD
Tasking Document: SSCI Report
Page(s); Section: 36
CMS Coordinating Component(s): RMO
DDCI/CM Monitor - Component: RMO
DDCI/CM Monitor - POC:

REQUIRED ACTION: The Director of Central Intelligence is asked to designate a small number of analysts to be responsible for current POW/MIA issues with the capability to handle any surge requirements.

Actual Language

Section 304 directs the Director of Central Intelligence to establish and maintain an analytic capability within the Intelligence Community with responsibility for supporting activities related to prisoners of war and missing persons since 1990. Currently, no standing analytic capability exists. This analytical shortfall was highlighted by the case of Navy Lt. Commander Michael Speicher who was shot down over Iraq on January 17, 1991, during the Persian Gulf War. Section 943 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-85; 111 Stat. 1866; 10 U.S.C. 1501 note) requires the Director of Central Intelligence to provide intelligence analysis on matters concerning prisoners of war and missing persons to all departments and agencies of the Federal Government involved in such matters.

The Committee notes that Commander Speicher's fate remains unknown. The Navy declared Commander Speicher "killed in action" in May 1991. Federal regulations state that a finding of presumptive death is made when a survey of all available sources of information indicates, beyond doubt, that the presumption of continuance of life has been overcome. Information available to Congress does not necessarily support this conclusion.

The Committee has reviewed the support of the Intelligence Community for the decision of the United States Government to characterize Commander Speicher's status as "killed in action." The review was based upon a September 1998 report by the Director of Central Intelligence and additional information on the chronology of the disappearance of Commander Speicher. The Committee concluded that it is critical that an intelligence organization be specifically assigned responsibility for analysis of all-source information on POW/MIA matters, including information derived from sensitive intelligence sources and methods, such as the information collected with respect to Commander Speicher.

The case of Commander Speicher demonstrates that valid questions about POW/MIAs remain today, and that rigorous and timely analytic assessments and accountability are essential to resolving such questions. A POW/MIA analytic capability in the Intelligence Community is required. The Committee understands the sporadic nature of the requirement for this analytic capability and directs the DCI to designate a small number of analysts with responsibility for current POW/MIA issues and with the capability to surge their effort should the need arise.



(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Viewing an archived action from Close

S

Action

**Provision of Requested POW/MIA Document
Titles Acquired After 1993 to Senator Shelby,
Chairman of the SSCI**

Document Number
DAC-05584-00

Date Received
10/31/2000

Task Instructions:

�

Recipients

- Moseman-D/OCA

Request Documents:

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	
Secondary OPI	
From	
Other Document Number	
Comments	
File Code	
Media Type	
Codewords	
Attachments	
Keywords	
Copies	

S

Viewing an archived action from Close

SECRET

US Classification//Non US//SCI//Codeword//FGI//Dissem Controls//Non-Intell//Declass (as appropriate)

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING SHEET

1. Origination Office DO/EA <input type="text"/>		2. Date 10/30/2000	
3. FROM: Name <input type="text"/>		Room No. and Building <input type="text"/>	Phone <input type="text"/>
4. Subject Provision of Requested POW/MIA Document Titles Acquired after 1993 to Senator Shelby, Chairman of the SSCI			
5. Originating Office Control # DO/EA-00-0267.		5a. Response to DAC # (Originating Office to Complete)	5b. DAC Control # (DAC Use Only) DAC-05584-00
6. Justification / Summary (Required for Immediate and Priority Actions) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Routine <input type="checkbox"/> Priority <input type="checkbox"/> Immediate			
7. Coordination			

NOTE: All correspondence sent to DCI, must be sent via ExDir and DDCI

DATE IN	ROUTE TO	ACTION (Check a Box)	NONCONCUR REASON	DATE OUT
10/27/2000	TITLE: DDO SIGNATURE: <input type="text"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FYI		
DEC 15 2000	TITLE: DAC SIGNATURE: <input type="text"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FYI		DEC 15 2000
	TITLE: DDCI SIGNATURE: <input type="text"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FYI		
	TITLE: DCI SIGNATURE: <input type="text"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input type="checkbox"/> FYI		
	TITLE: <input type="text"/> SIGNATURE: <input type="text"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input type="checkbox"/> FYI		
	TITLE: <input type="text"/> SIGNATURE: <input type="text"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input type="checkbox"/> FYI		
	TITLE: <input type="text"/> SIGNATURE: <input type="text"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input type="checkbox"/> FYI		



SECRET

CL BY:
CL REASON:
DECL ON:
DRV FROM:

~~SECRET~~DO/EA 267-00
OCT 31 2000

MEMORANDM FOR: Director of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Deputy Director for Operations


FROM:
Chief, East Asia DivisionSUBJECT: Provision of Requested POW/MIA Document
Titles Acquired After 1993 to Senator
Shelby, Chairman of the SSCI

REFERENCES:

- A. Letter From SSCI Chairman Shelby to DCI Tenet, dated 24 July 2000
- B. Letter From Senator Bob Smith to SSCI Chairman Shelby as an Attachment to Ref A, dated 10 June 1999
- C. Draft List of 18 Questions Faxed to CIA by Office of Senate Security and Attached to Ref A, dated 2 August 2000
- D. EA-215, Provision of Requested POW/MIA Information, to Senator Shelby, Chairman of the SSCI
- E. EA-232, Provision of Requested Denied POW/MIA Document Titles to Senator Shelby, Chairman of the SSCI

1. Action Requested: ~~(S)~~ Provide the attached listing of document titles to Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Members, Senator Bob Smith and appropriately cleared members of Senator Smith's staff. This request satisfies Ref C, due August 30, 2000.


2. Background: ~~(S)~~ References A-E represent a series of requests that SSCI Chairman Shelby has made, in conjunction with Senator Bob Smith, for Agency and Intelligence Community documents and information concerning POW/MIA's. The attached document is the continuation of Ref C request, which are document titles on published intelligence acquired by this Agency after 1993 on POW/MIAs in Vietnam. Within the Agency, it was agreed that East Asia Division (EA) would provide the titles of the POW/MIA

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


Subject: ~~(S)~~ Provision of Requested POW/MIA Document Titles
Acquired After 1993 to Senator Shelby, Chairman of the SSCI

documents acquired after 1993. A search of the Agency's records indicates that there are three additional documents that fit the Ref C request. The titles of these documents are attached along with the date of acquisition, date of dissemination, classification, caveat and disposition. The three additional documents are in review for release.



Attachment:
As stated in paragraph 2


CONCUR:


Deputy Director for Operations _____ Date _____

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

SUBJECT: Provision of Requested POW/MIA Document Titles
Acquired After 1993 to Senator Shelby, Chairman of the SSCI



~~SECRET~~

1. Document Title: [REDACTED]

Document Number: [REDACTED]

Dissemination Date: 19 October 1994

Date of Acquisition: 21 September 1994

Classification: Secret

Caveat: [REDACTED]

Disposition of Document: To Be Determined

2. Document Title: Reaction of Vietnamese Officials to
Recent Release of Soviet POW/MIA
Documents

Document Number: [REDACTED]

Dissemination Date: 25 September 1993

Date of Acquisition: 16 September 1993

Classification: Secret

Caveat: [REDACTED]

Disposition of Document: To Be Determined

3. Document Title: [REDACTED] Instructions Regarding MIA
Information

Document Number: [REDACTED]

Dissemination Date: 4 June 1993

Date of Acquisition: Early June 1993

Classification: Secret

Caveat: [REDACTED]

Disposition of Document: To Be Determined

~~SECRET~~

11:58AM US SENATE SSCI

NO. 001 P. 2

J. SHILBY, ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN
 J. H. DUFFY, MONTANA, VICE CHAIRMAN
 FOR OAHAMA, FLORIDA
 JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS
 MARI BAUCUS, MONTANA
 CHARLES E. ROSS, WISCONSIN
 FRANK A. LAUTENBERG, NEW JERSEY
 CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN

United States Senate

SSCI #2000-3175-B

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475

FRANK LOTT, MISSISSIPPI, EX OFFICIO
 THOMAS A. DASCHLE, SOUTH CAROLINA, EX OFFICIO

GAIL DANHEISE, STAFF DIRECTOR
 ALFRED CLAMANN, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
 KATHLEEN P. MOORE, CHIEF CLERK

July 24, 2000

Meeting to be held
on this - (to be done)
July 2000
Have 2001 - 2000

The Honorable George Tenet
 Director of Central Intelligence
 Central Intelligence Agency
 Washington, D.C. 20505


Dear Mr. Director:

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence requests a listing of classified information or documents in the possession, custody, or control of your organization which may pertain to the subject of United States military personnel listed as prisoner, missing, or unaccounted for in military actions which have not been declassified. This request is pursuant to Public Law 102-88, Section 405 (Furnishing of Intelligence Information to the Senate and House Committees on Intelligence).

Please list in chronological order each entry by date of dissemination and include originating organization, classification with caveats of document, title/subject, and date of subject information or content (if applicable) since 1965.

We request that you provide a copy of your listing to the Committee no later than August 29, 2000. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please have your staff contact Pete Dorn at (202) 224-1700.

Sincerely,



Richard C. Shelby
Chairman

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

From the Desk of [redacted]
Assistant General Counsel - [redacted]

NOTE FOR: [redacted]
FROM: [redacted]
OFFICE: DCI/OCA/LEG
DATE: 06/16/99 04:07:05 PM
SUBJECT: Ltr. to Rep. Vento

[redacted]

Here is the letter for D/OCA's review & signature. It has been coordinated with OIM [redacted]
[redacted], and OGC/LD [redacted] Thanks for your help.

[redacted]




Vento 3.doc

CC: [redacted]

Sent on 16 June 1999 at 04:07:05 PM

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

TO : D/OCA Via DE/OCA, [redacted] EA/OCA	CONTROL # OCA 99-1624	DATE OF REQUEST 06/17/99
FROM: [redacted] via C/Legislation/OCA [redacted]		SUSPENSE DATE
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO REP. BRUCE F. VENTO FOR LETTERS D/D 11 MAY 99 AND 10 JUNE 99 FROM HIS CONSTITUENT RICH DALY RE: POW/MIA RESQUE FOR DECLASSIFICATION OF RECORDS BELONGING TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS.		
NOTES THIS LETTER RESPONDS TO OCA 99-0134 and OCA 99-0145 <div style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em; font-family: cursive;">  </div>		
COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices)		
NAME [redacted]	OFFICE GIM [redacted]	DATE
NAME [redacted]	OFFICE OGC/LD	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
ACTION REQUIRED BY D/OCA <div style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.2em;"> YOUR SIGNATURE PLEASE. </div>		

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 99-1624

21 June 1999

Subj
POW/MIA

The Honorable Bruce F. Vento
U.S. House of Representatives
111 East Kellogg Boulevard, Suite 215
St. Paul, Minnesota 55101

Attn:

Dear Mr. Vento:

I am writing in response to your letters of 11 May 1999 and 10 June 1999 regarding a request from one of your constituents, of Minnesota Won't Forget POW/MIA. is interested in the declassification of records belonging to the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs.

I have been informed that the CIA is currently reviewing for declassification 40,000 pages of POW/MIA materials that were referred to us by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). These documents are Congressional records and are the subject of a Mandatory Declassification Review ordered by the United States Senate.

At the direction of the Senate, NARA--as custodian of certain POW/MIA records--sent the CIA twenty-two boxes of documents in April and May 1998 for declassification review. These approximately 4,000 multipage documents, totaling some 40,000 pages, are records belonging to the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs.

Since receiving the 4,000 documents last year, we have been moving steadily toward completion of our mandated declassification review. The CIA shares with the Senate a strong commitment to declassifying the maximum amount of POW/MIA information as quickly as possible for release to the public, to the extent consistent with U.S. national security. However, there are a large number of other declassification projects that demand our attention, and many of the documents contain information that will require referral to other government agencies for review. The CIA has no control over the length of time these third agencies will require to complete their review of the documents.

The Honorable Bruce F. Vento

If you will provide me with [redacted] address, I will ask our Office of Information Management to contact him directly when the review of the 40,000 POW/MIA-related pages is completed. I hope this information is helpful.

Sincerely,


A redacted signature, represented by a hand-drawn irregular polygon.

John H. Moseman
Director of Congressional Affairs

The Honorable Bruce F. Vento

DCI/OCA/RS/MVega.:ls/37912 (16 June 99)
FN:wdata/oca/legislate/leglib [redacted] 4.doc

OCA 99-1624



(b)(1)
(b)(3)

System Controls//Non-Intell//Declass (as appropriate)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT (Optional) **Letter to The Honorable Robert C. Smith**

FROM
**Barry Hilton
SA/ADCI/MS**

Extension
37954

NO.
DAC 01190-01

DATE
03/21/2001

TO (Officer designation, room, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICIAL'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

FULL SIGNATURE IS REQUESTED BY OCA

1. C/CE -
RM 4E60 OHB

Handwritten: 23/23, POM

2. C/EA -
RM 5D31 OHB

Handwritten: 23/23, W

3. DO/IRO
RM 1D4106

Handwritten: 23/23, W

4. C/CIC
4T09 NHB

Handwritten: 23 Mar, 23 Mar, S.K. (Mina)

5. D/OCA
RM 7C38 OHB

Handwritten: 3/23, 3/23, 9

6.

7.

8.

9.

10. ADCI/MS
RM 7D35 OHB

11.

12. *Handwritten: O/D/OCA 7C38*

13.

14. Barry Hilton x 37954 or
Ann Shaffer x 32854 *Handwritten signature*

Please call for pick up.

SECRET

OCA 00-02974

OCA
Records
8

CONGRESSIONAL CORRESPONDENCE ACTION PLAN		
Date / Time Received	Suspense Date	Control Number
ACTION: Please forward response as indicated below to OCA for coordination and transmittal.		
<input type="checkbox"/> Prepare a response for DCI signature.		
Lead Action Office:		
Information Copies:		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Prepare a response for D/OCA signature.		
Lead Action Office: A DCI-MS		
Information Copies: DO/COS; DO/NE; DO/EUR; DO/EA		
<input type="checkbox"/> NO WRITTEN RESPONSE NECESSARY		
Lead Office:		
Follow-Up Action:		
Information Copies:		
OCA ACTION OFFICER: Jack Dempsey		
Advance Copies Provided To: OCA/AO C/Reason		
Comments:		
<input type="checkbox"/> NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION WITHOUT PRIOR OCA APPROVAL. 2000		

~~SECRET~~ / [REDACTED]

The Associate Director of Central Intelligence
for Military Support
Washington, D.C. 20505

MAR 23 2001

The Honorable Robert C. Smith
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-2903

Dear Senator Smith:

(S) [REDACTED] This letter is a further response to the request (made in a mid-2000 note from your staff to the CIA's Office of Congressional Affairs and alluded to in your 19 October 2000 letter to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence) for any POW-related information that might have been provided to the US government by GRU General-Major Dmitriy Fedorovich Polyakov.

(S) [REDACTED] The CIA has carried out a complete review of its files on General Polyakov, who disappeared in the 1980's and is presumed--though not certainly known--to have been executed by the USSR. Only one document sourced to him, a 27 September 1967 intelligence report, is relevant to the topic of US Vietnam-era POWs/MIAs. That report [REDACTED] marked SECRET/[REDACTED] [REDACTED] is enclosed.

(S) [REDACTED] US policy has been not to confirm publicly the clandestine cooperation of foreign citizens with US intelligence, even when--as in the case of General Polyakov--much time has passed and press accounts have exposed purported details of such cooperation. This is partly to avoid giving adversary governments material with which to punish assets or surviving relatives, and partly to avoid discouraging other citizens of adversary countries from volunteering their services to the US.

(U) Research continues on other queries raised in your 19 October letter; I wish to assure you of my personal interest in seeing these questions resolved as speedily as feasible.

Sincerely,

[REDACTED]
John H. Campbell
Lieutenant General, USAF

Enclosure

~~SECRET~~ / [REDACTED]


~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

SUBJECT: Letter to The Honorable Robert C. Smith

ADCI/MS/B.HILTON [redacted] ars [redacted] (21 Mar 01) DAC 01190-01
S:DCI/ADCI/MS/ANN/0103.tosmith.draft04.doc

Distribution:



Orig



TO: The Honorable Robert C. Smith
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-2903



~~SECRET~~ [redacted]



200

~~INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

COUNTRY : USSR/North Vietnam

REPORT NO.

SUBJECT : Soviet Involvement in
North Vietnam

DATE DISTR. 27 September 1967

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Up to August 1967

PLACE &
DATE ACQ.

FIELD REPORT NO.

~~THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.~~

SOURCE: Soviet Bloc source whose reliability cannot be judged, from a Soviet officer who had served in North Vietnam.

1. The USSR is having difficulty supplying North Vietnam; the situation in that country is bad.
2. The USSR has no contact with American prisoners in North Vietnam. However, some reports of interrogation of the prisoners are passed officially to the Soviet Embassy by the North Vietnamese. These are generally one-page reports which have little value.
3. U.S. military hardware which falls into North Vietnamese hands is not provided to the Soviets by either the North Vietnamese or the Chinese, but the Soviets have been able to steal an item from time to time.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

Viewing an archived action from Extral

F

Action

**RESPONSE TO LETTER OF 28 MARCH 2000 RE:
ASSISTANCE IN REVIEWING TWO POW/MIA
RELATED REPORTS**

Document Number
OCA-01050-00

Date Received
05/16/2000

Task Instructions:
no value

Recipients

• SSC: SHELBY & BRYAN

Request Documents: AAEHAJYX.TIF

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	oca_cdocs_lib
Secondary OPI	no value
From	HAYES FOR MOSEMAN
Other Document Number	
Comments	FILED IN POW/MIA FILE.
File Code	[2000]
Media Type	PP
Codewords	
Attachments	
Keywords	
Copies	

(b)(3)

F

Viewing an archived action from Extral



Central Intelligence Agency
UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2000-1237
16 May 2000

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

(U//~~FOUO~~) In your letter of March 28, 2000, you asked the DCI for assistance in reviewing two POW/MIA related reports. The first was a 1996 debriefing report controlled by DIA. The second was a 1952 CIA Information Report.

(U//~~FOUO~~) DIA has already provided your staff (on a read-and-return basis) access to the DIA debriefing report. The CIA Information Report is an enclosure to this letter.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Should you have any question, please do not hesitate to call me or have your staff call me at (703) 482-8794.

No enclosure

(U//~~FOUO~~) An original of this letter is also being sent to Vice Chairman Bryan.

Sincerely,

John H. Moseman
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Central Intelligence Agency
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2000-1237/1
16 May 2000

The Honorable Richard H. Bryan
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

(U//FOUO) In your letter of March 28, 2000, you asked the DCI for assistance in reviewing two POW/MIA related reports. The first was a 1996 debriefing report controlled by DIA. The second was a 1952 CIA Information Report.

(U//FOUO) DIA has already provided your staff (on a read-and-return basis) access to the DIA debriefing report. The CIA Information Report is an enclosure to this letter.

(U//FOUO) Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call me or have your staff call Jack Dempsey, at (703) 482-8794.

(U//FOUO) An original of this letter is also being sent to Chairman Shelby.

Sincerely,

A rectangular box with a black border, used to redact the signature of John H. Moséman.

John H. Moséman
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure


UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

OCA 00-01050

DCI/OCA/Liaison/JDempsey:blo [redacted] (12 May 2000)
fn: DCI/OCA/Liaison/Jack/POW-MIA.doc
OCA 2000-1237

Distribution
Origin



Answers: OCA 00-00449

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

POW/MIA

Viewing an archived action from Close

Action

CIA RESPONSE TO CDA REGARDING POW/MIA DOCUMENTS(NOTE-ATTACHMENTS NOT SCANNED)

Document Number
OCA-02821-00

Date Received
10/02/2000

Task Instructions:

no value

Recipients

- R. SHELBY/R. BRYAN

Request Documents:

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	
Secondary OPI	
From	
Other Document Number	
Comments	
File Code	
Media Type	
Codewords	
Attachments	
Keywords	
Copies	

Viewing an archived action from Close

Central Intelligence Agency
~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2000-1420
2 October 2000

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

(U) Enclosed is CIA's response to a Congressionally Directed Action contained in the Classified Annex of the FY2000 Intelligence Authorization Conference Report. The CDA directed the Agency to compile a list of POW/MIA documents relating to the Vietnam War that have not been made available to the public.

(U) Please note that--for ease of handling--the first 557 documents of the 561 listed have been classified as SECRET, while the last four listings are on a separate page and are classified as TOP SECRET.

(U) If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call or have your staff call [redacted] of my staff on [redacted]. A copy of this letter is also being sent to Vice Chairman Bryan.


Sincerely,



John H. Moseman
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure:
POW/MIA Document List (TS)

Classification is UNCLASSIFIED
When Separated from Enclosures




~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

OCA 00-02821

OCA 00-14202/1



~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

A-1030 (P)



Central Intelligence Agency

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2000-1420/1
2 October 2000

The Honorable Richard H. Bryan
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

(U) Enclosed is CIA's response to a Congressionally Directed Action contained in the Classified Annex of the FY2000 Intelligence Authorization Conference Report. The CDA directed the Agency to compile a list of POW/MIA documents relating to the Vietnam War that have not been made available to the public.

(U) Please note that--for ease of handling--the first 557 documents of the 561 listed have been classified as SECRET, while the last four listings are on a separate page and are classified as TOP SECRET.


(U) If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call or have your staff call [redacted] of my staff on [redacted]. A copy of this letter is also being sent to Chairman Shelby.

Sincerely,

John H. Moseman
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure:
POW/MIA Document List (TS)

Classification is UNCLASSIFIED
When Separated from Enclosures



~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

(b)(3)
(b)(6)

Viewing an archived action from Close

U

Action

**(OCA 01-00541) CLARIFYING COMMENT RE:
JOINT REPORT ON POW/MIA**

Document Number
OCA-00541-01

Date Received
09/27/2000

Task Instructions:
no value

Recipients

- SSCI: RICHARD SHELBY

Request Documents:

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	
Secondary OPI	
From	
Other Document Number	
Comments	
File Code	
Media Type	
Codewords	
Attachments	
Keywords	
Copies	

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Viewing an archived action from Close

SEP-28-2000 12:30

INTEL-REVIEW-DIRECTORATE-

D/OCA
DD/OCA
DDNSL/OCA
EA/OCA

P.02/02

Will accompany the CD Rom version which SSCI indexes to post on the internet today.

SEP 27 2000

INSPECTOR GENERAL
2000-0923

Honorable Richard C. Shelby
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-6475

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Attached is a clarifying comment that should go with the unclassified version of our Joint Report entitled, "A Review of the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate on POW/MIA Issues and the Charges Levied by a Critical Assessment of the Estimate (1999-5974-IG) (00-OIR-04)," dated February 29, 2000.

Additionally, an earlier modification, with the attached clarification, will be sent to all recipients of the classified report through appropriate Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency secure channels. Your Committee is one such recipient.

This concludes our efforts on this issue requested by you on March 8, 1999.

A similar letter has been provided to Vice Chairman Bryan.

Sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]

L. Britt Snider
Inspector General
Central Intelligence Agency

[Redacted Signature]

Donald Mancuso
Acting Inspector General
Department of Defense

Attachment

POW/MIA

SEP-28-2000 12:30

INTEL-REVIEW-DIRECTORATE-

P.01/02

SEP 27 2000

Honorable Richard H. Bryan
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-6475

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

Attached is a clarifying comment that should go with the unclassified version of our Joint Report entitled, "A Review of the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate on POW/MIA Issues and the Charges Levied by a Critical Assessment of the Estimate (1999-5974-IG) (00-OIR-04)," dated February 29, 2000.

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This concludes our efforts on this issue requested by you on March 8, 1999.

A similar letter has been provided to Chairman Shelby.

Sincerely,



L. Britt Snider
Inspector General
Central Intelligence Agency



Donald Mancuso
Acting Inspector General
Department of Defense

Attachment

Clarifying Comment

to

The *Unclassified* Version of

A JOINT REPORT

**A REVIEW OF THE 1998 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON
POW/MIA ISSUES AND THE CHARGES LEVIED BY**

A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE ESTIMATE

(1999-5974-IG)

(00-OIR-04)

29 February 2000

**THIS COMMENT PERTAINS TO THE SECTION "MEETING WITH DPMO
ANALYSTS" AT PAGE 29 OF THE JOINT REPORT:**

By way of clarification, the matter of a possible security violation was outside the scope of our review. It should be noted, however, that during the time that we were researching this report, we discovered no information that supports the perception that the Joint Commission or its support directorate within DPMO violated appropriate security regulations. Additionally, we did not consider the appropriateness of the relationship between the JCSD and the Joint Commission, created in 1992 by the United States and the Russian Federation, as it also was outside the scope of this review.

Viewing an archived action from [] Close

U

Action

ADCI/MS Response to Senator Shelby's POW/MIA Letter

Document Number
DAC-03848-00

Date Received
09/01/2000

Task Instructions:
no value

Recipients

- ADCI/MS []

Request Documents: []

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	[]
Secondary OPI	
From	
Other Document Number	
Comments	
File Code	
Media Type	
Codewords	
Attachments	
Keywords	
Copies	

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Viewing an archived action from [] Close

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2000-1381
1 September 2000

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am responding on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence to your letter of 24 July 2000 requesting a chronological listing of classified information or documents in the CIA's possession pertaining to U.S. military personnel listed as prisoner, missing, or unaccounted for since 1965. This letter will also serve as the response of the Directors of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) and the National Security Agency (NSA), in an effort to update you concisely on Intelligence Community-wide efforts relating to the Committee's request.

I must report, however, that full compliance with the Committee's request by the specified 29 August 2000 deadline proved impossible, given its massive scope. Nevertheless, CIA, NIMA, and NSA are all engaged in a variety of efforts, summarized below, that we believe will go a long way towards prompt satisfaction of what your staff has indicated are two central interests of the Committee in connection with the overall request. The summary states, in particular, that the CIA's listing of Speicher-related disseminations, and withheld Vietnam POW/MIA documents will be provided imminently. CIA and the other affected agencies will provide additional responsive material by the specified target dates. We believe this approach will get as much relevant information to the Committee as quickly as possible. I trust that this procedure and the summary that follows will assist the Committee in meeting its oversight responsibilities.

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby

Gulf War (Speicher)

- DIA has provided CIA a detailed draft assessment of intelligence relating to LCDR Speicher and is currently working with CIA to produce a coordinated Intelligence Community assessment. I will submit DIA's findings to the Committee in mid-September 2000.
- CIA is preparing a listing of disseminated classified materials relating to LCDR Michael Speicher. CIA anticipates completing this by 29 September 2000.
- NIMA has recently completed a review of imagery that may help corroborate information provided by intelligence sources concerning the status of LCDR Speicher. NIMA anticipates completing the analysis of this reviewed imagery by 1 November 2000.
- I have been informed that a joint DoD/CIA Inspector General review of Intelligence Community support to the Speicher case is currently being prepared and will be delivered to the Committee this Fall.
- NSA has completed several extensive searches for information on LCDR Speicher and has not located any information.

Vietnam

- CIA is expediting the completion of the Congressionally Directed Action (CDA) to compile a listing of those POW/MIA documents that were identified as a result of Executive Order 12812 but withheld from release. Although the deadline for the CDA is January 1st, 2001, CIA anticipates being completed by 15 September 2000.

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby

- NSA is reviewing and declassifying over 20,000 pages of NSA-originated records and approximately 3,000 pages of records which were originated by other agencies but contain NSA equities as part of the NARA declassification review. NSA anticipates completing this task by 31 December 2000.
- CIA is also engaged in a major effort to review and declassify over 900 CIA-originated documents from the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs collection held at NARA. CIA anticipates completing this task by 31 July 2001.

Please be assured that the Intelligence Community fully shares your sense of the priority and importance of all POW/MIA matters. The IC is committed to working with you and members of your staff to satisfy the Committee's request as quickly and completely as possible given the need to maintain each agency's ability to meet its core mission-related responsibilities at the appropriate operations tempo.


As the ADCI/MS, I have a strong personal interest in making sure that the POW/MIA issue receives the highest priority in the Intelligence Community and I stand ready to discuss these issues with you at your earliest convenience. Please contact me if you have any questions, or have a member of your staff contact [redacted] [redacted] from the Office of Congressional Affairs on [redacted] [redacted].

Sincerely,

[redacted]
Major Gen. John H. Campbell
Associate Director of Central Intelligence
for Military Support

C06002354

• DAC-03848-00
OCA 00-02668
OCA 00-1381



Por/MIA

Viewing an archived action from Close

F

Action

**LETTERS TO SHELBY AND BRYAN FROM DCI ON
POW/MIA ISSUES AND THE DECLASSIFYING OF
THE NIE AND THE CRITICAL ASSESSMENT,
MARCH 24, 2000**

Document Number : Date Received
DAC-01430-00 03/24/2000

Task Instructions:
no value

Recipients

- Shelby/Bryan

Request Documents:

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	<input type="text"/>	
Secondary OPI		
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Other Document Number		
Comments		
File Code		
Media Type		
Codewords		
Attachments		
Keywords		
Copies		

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UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Central Intelligence AgencyDAC
DAC-01430-00

Washington, D.C. 20505

IG 2000-0317
24 March 2000

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your 8 March 2000 letter requesting that the Inspector General prepare an unclassified version of the joint Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Report entitled "A Review of the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate on POW/MIA Issues and the Charges Levied by A Critical Assessment of the Estimate."

CIA and relevant agencies whose classified documents were used in the Report are in the process of declassifying the National Intelligence Estimate and the Critical Assessment. This process will be completed soon and will facilitate declassification of the Inspector General's Report. While this will not be accomplished by the end of the month as you requested, we will proceed as expeditiously as possible.

An identical letter is being provided to Vice Chairman Bryan.


Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "George J. Tenet". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, stylized initial "G".

George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby

OIG/IG/[redacted]tw (21 Mar 00) [redacted]
DCI/OIG/SRS/IG Staff/POWMIA/dci_shelby_bryan.doc



DAC

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~
Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

IG 2000-0318
24 March 2000

The Honorable Richard H. Bryan
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

This is in response to your 8 March 2000 letter requesting that the Inspector General prepare an unclassified version of the joint Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Report entitled "A Review of the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate on POW/MIA Issues and the Charges Levied by A Critical Assessment of the Estimate."

CIA and relevant agencies whose classified documents were used in the Report are in the process of declassifying the National Intelligence Estimate and the Critical Assessment. This process will be completed soon and will facilitate declassification of the Inspector General's Report. While this will not be accomplished by the end of the month as you requested, we will proceed as expeditiously as possible.

An identical letter is being provided to Chairman Shelby.

Sincerely,


A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "George J. Tenet". The signature is stylized and written over a vertical line.

George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

The Honorable Richard H. Bryan

OIG/IG [redacted] tw (21 Mar 00) [redacted]
DCI/OIG/SRS/IG Staff/POWMIA/dci_shelby_bryan2.doc



Viewing an archived action from

U

Action

SSCI REQUEST FOR IG TO DECLASSIFY THE POW/MIA NIE & PREPARE AN UNCLASSIFIED VERSION (NOTE: UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ATTACHED TO LETTER)

Document Number
OCA-00288-00

Date Received
03/08/2000

Task Instructions:

no value

Recipients

- DCI: TENET

Request Documents:

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	<input type="text"/>	
Secondary OPI		
From		
Other Document Number		
Comments		
File Code		
Media Type		
Codewords		
Attachments		
Keywords		
Copies		

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Viewing an archived action from

3/11/2013

RICHARD C. SHELBY, ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN	BOB GRAHAM, FLORIDA
RICHARD H. BRYAN, NEVADA, VICE CHAIRMAN	JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, INDIANA	MAX BAUCUS, MONTANA
JON KYL, ARIZONA	CHARLES S. ROBB, VIRGINIA
JAMES M. INHOFE, OKLAHOMA	FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, NEW JERSEY
ORRIN G. HATCH, UTAH	CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN
PAT ROBERTS, KANSAS	
WAYNE ALLARD, COLORADO	
CONNIE MACK, FLORIDA	

United States Senate SSCI #2000-1153-A

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8475

TRENT LOTT, MISSISSIPPI, EX OFFICIO
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, SOUTH DAKOTA, EX OFFICIO

NICHOLAS ROSTOW, STAFF DIRECTOR
ALFRED CUMMING, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, CHIEF CLERK

March 8, 2000

The Honorable George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505


Dear Mr. Director:

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence requests that you direct the Inspector General to prepare an unclassified version of the Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency Joint Report entitled, "A Review of the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate on POW/MIA Issues and the Charges Levied by A Critical Assessment of the Estimate" (1999-5974-IG)(00-OIR-04) dated February 29, 2000. The Committee believes that much information in the report can and should be declassified. We therefore request that you direct the IG to scrutinize the report to ensure that as much as possible is declassified.


A copy of this unclassified version should be provided to this Committee by March 30, 2000. Thank you for your attention to this matter.

An identical copy of this letter is being sent to Secretary of Defense William Cohen.

Sincerely,



Richard C. Shelby
Chairman



Richard H. Bryan
Vice Chairman

cc: The Honorable William S. Cohen
The Honorable L. Britt Snider, CIA Inspector General

(b)(3)

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C

Action

CIA RESPONSE TO SSCI REGARDING REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE POW/MIA ISSUE

Document Number
OCA-50208-99

Date Received
07/21/1999

Task Instructions:

no value

Recipients

- SSCI: R. SHELBY/R. KERREY

Request Documents:

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	
Secondary OPI	
From	
Other Document Number	
Comments	
File Code	
Media Type	
Codewords	
Attachments	
Keywords	
Copies	

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3/11/2013



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 99-50208

OCA 99-1357
21 July 1999

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510


Dear Mr. Chairman:

(U) On behalf of DCI Tenet, thank you for your letter of 24 June 1999 requesting CIA assistance in furnishing to the Committee four POW/MIA-related documents for review by Senator Bob Smith in support of his position as Chairman of the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on POW and MIAs Vietnam War Working Group. As discussed earlier with the Staff Director of the SSCI, the first three documents are indeed CIA material and we have assembled this material for review. Due to the sensitivity of this material; however, we request that SSCI staff review this material at CIA Headquarters at their convenience. Should Senator Smith wish to review this material at any time in the future, an Agency representative is prepared to bring this material to appropriate spaces in the Capitol building at the Senator's earliest convenience.

(U) These documents were previously provided to Senator Smith for review on two earlier occasions, the first being at the 5 March 1999 briefing which he referred to in his 10 June 1999 letter addressed to you. The second occasion took place on the afternoon of 9 March 1999 where Senator Smith reviewed this material privately in classified Senate spaces for approximately 45 minutes. The fourth document identified in your letter for review was originated by the Department of State, which is attached.

~~Let~~ We invite you to have a member of the SSCI staff come to Headquarters to read the Agency material that has been assembled in response to this request and stand ready to provide this material to Senator Smith upon his request. Please contact me if you have any questions, or have a member of your staff contact of my staff on to make appropriate arrangements.

Sincerely,


John H. Moseman
Director of Congressional Affairs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OCA

B-202

P

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 99-1357/1
21 July 1999

The Honorable J. Robert Kerrey
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

(U) On behalf of DCI Tenet, thank you for your letter of 24 June 1999 requesting CIA assistance in furnishing to the Committee four POW/MIA-related documents for review by Senator Bob Smith in support of his position as Chairman of the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on POW and MIAs Vietnam War Working Group. As discussed earlier with the Staff Director of the SSCI, the first three documents are indeed CIA material and we have assembled this material for review. Due to the sensitivity of this material; however, we request that SSCI staff review this material at CIA Headquarters at their convenience. Should Senator Smith wish to review this material at any time in the future, an Agency representative is prepared to bring this material to appropriate spaces in the Capitol building at the Senator's earliest convenience.

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(C) We invite you to have a member of the SSCI staff come to Headquarters to read the Agency material that has been assembled in response to this request and stand ready to provide this material to Senator Smith upon his request. Please contact me if you have any questions, or have a member of your staff contact [redacted] of my staff on [redacted] to make appropriate arrangements.

Sincerely,


John H. Moseman
Director of Congressional Affairs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby

DCI/OCA/Liaison [redacted] trh x34543 (21 Jul 99)
(w/data/front office/ddoca [redacted] pow mia.doc)
OCA 99-1357



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONGRESSIONAL CORRESPONDENCE ACTION PLAN		
Date / Time Received 25 JUNE 1999 1732 HRS	Suspense Date	Control Number SSCI #99-1780
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Prepare a response for DCI signature.		
Lead Action Office:		
Information Copies:		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Prepare a response for D/OCA signature.		
Lead Action Office:		
Information Copies:		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO WRITTEN RESPONSE NECESSARY		
Lead Office: DO		
Follow-Up Action: Provide requested documents to Senate Security for review & return.		
Information Copies:		
OCA ACTION OFFICER:		
Advance Copies Provided To: OCA F/O C/Oc Liaison C/Regulation		
Comments: OCA F/O to discuss with DO/Fo for approval to provide doc's.		
<input type="checkbox"/> NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION WITHOUT PRIOR OCA APPROVAL.		

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

SECURE FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL FORM

SENDING SECURE FAX TELEPHONE NUMBER [redacted]

RECEIVING SECURE FAX TELEPHONE NUMBER [redacted]

NUMBER OF PAGES (INCLUDING TRANSMITTAL SHEET) 8 pages

FROM [redacted] OCA / LG [redacted]
NAME / OFFICE / EXTENSION

SUBJECT POW / MIA

TO: (ADDRESSEE / ORGANIZATION / OFFICE / EXTENSION)

1. ATTN: [redacted]

2. _____

3. Hi [redacted] Here's the

4. information!

5. _____

6. Thanks

7. Call if you

8. have questions

9. _____

10. _____

SPECIAL INSTRUCTION _____


RELEASING OFFICIAL [redacted] [redacted]

PRINTED NAME

SIGNATURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

TO : D/OCA, DD/OCA, OCA/EA, C/Liaison, DC/Liaison		CONTROL # OCA 99 -1357	DATE OF REQUEST 7/21/99
FROM : OCA/LIAISON <input type="text"/>		SUSPENSE DATE	
SUBJECT : Letter to th Honorable Richard C. Shelby POW/MIA issue.			
NOTES 			
COORDINATED WITH (List names as well as offices)			
NAME	OFFICE	DATE	
NAME	OFFICE	DATE	
NAME	OFFICE	DATE	
NAME	OFFICE	DATE	
ACTION REQUIRED BY D/OCA			

UNCLASSIFIED

DOCUMENT
DOCNO:
PRODUCER:
AGENCY:
DOCTYPE:
DOR:
TOR:
DOCPREC:
ORIGDATE:
MHFNO:
DOCCLASS:

[Redacted]

CDS

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FRP: ,2,3, , , , ,

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

SUO

PAGE 001

TOR: [Redacted] MAY 99

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

CONTROLS
UNCLAS [Redacted]

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR EAP/BCLTV

E.O. 12958: N/A

TEXT
TAGS: MOPS, VM
COMBINE: COMPLETE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: REMAINS STUDY COMMENTS

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED (SBU) PROTECT ACCORDINGLY

1. (SBU) [] IS VERY CONCERNED AFTER READING NOTES (SEE BELOW), LOOKING AT ANNOTATIONS (FAXED TEXT SENT TO BCLTV) AND THEN READING THE ENTIRE REMAINS STUDY. HE BELIEVES THE STUDY DOESN'T CONTRIBUTE TO THE OVERALL GOAL OF "FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING" BECAUSE IT STILL FOSTERS OLD SUSPICIONS AND GENERATES NEW DOUBTS ABOUT COOPERATION. IT CREATES NEW AND UNHELPFUL NUMBERS ON REMAINS, WHICH WILL BE TAKEN AS DEFINITIVE, EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE CAVEATED AS UNVERIFIABLE BY HARD EVIDENCE. MOREOVER, THE WAY WE READ THE TEXT WE SEE IT PROVIDING MORE AMMUNITION TO CRITICS TO CHALLENGE THE PRESIDENT'S CERTIFICATION.

2. (SBU) WE ARE AWARE THE LONG GESTATION PROCESS FOR THIS STUDY HAS ENSURED PEOPLE ON THE OUTSIDE ARE EAGERLY AWAITING ITS PUBLICATION. WE BELIEVE THE STUDY MAKES CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLICY OBJECTIVES AND HELPS IN THE PROCESS TO DEMONSTRATE EFFORTS ON "FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING." BUT, WE DON'T THINK THE PRESENT ARRANGMENT AND CONTEXT OF THE STUDY WILL RESULT IN THOSE CONTRIBUTIONS BEING ACKNOWLEDGED. IN ITS PRESENT FORM, THE STUDY SEEMS MOSTLY TO DEMONSTRATE THERE HAS BEEN A VERY DETAILED ALL SOURCE ANALYSIS OF MATERIALS RELATED TO THE ISSUE OF STORED REMAINS WHICH DEMONSTRATES DPMO HAS A BETTER HANDLE ON THIS NUMBER THAN THE FOLKS AT CILHI WHO USED ONLY FORENSIC DATA. IT DEMONSTRATES THERE WAS A LOT OF HARD WORK DONE OVER THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS TO COLLECT AND ANALYZE DATA. BUT, THAT SAID, THE REST OF THE STUDY IS SO CAVEATED ON "FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING" ISSUES IT LEADS TO THE JUDGMENT WE HAVE NO VERIFIABLE DATA TO REACH CONCLUSIONS.

3. (SBU) WE ARE AWARE DASD JONES HAS PERSONALLY SENT THIS STUDY BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARDS FOR TONE AS WELL AS CONTENT. BUT WE STILL FIND GRATUITOUS COMMENTS AND JUDGMENTAL LANGUAGE IN A NUMBER OF PLACES WHICH WILL ONLY ANTAGONIZE AND CREATE NEGATIVE REACTIONS AMONG THE VETERANS/FAMILIES GROUPS AND WITH THE VIETNAMESE. THE STUDY NEEDS TO BE LOOKED AT AGAIN IN THAT CONTEXT.

4. (SBU) WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE STUDY SHOULD BE RELEASED NOW OR IN THE COMING MONTHS WITHOUT EXTENSIVE REVIEW AND REWORKING. RELEASING IT IN THE TIMEFRAME CURRENTLY BEING CONSIDERED, AROUND TIME OF LEAGUE OF FAMILIES CONVENTION, WOULD BE A DIRECT HINDRANCE TO DISCUSSIONS ON THE JACKSON-VANIK WAIVER. WE REQUEST AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE ENTIRE STRATEGY AND SCOPE OF THE REMAINS STUDY WITH DASD JONES AND HIS ANALYSTS HERE IN HIS END-JUNE VISIT TO SEE IF WE CAN DETERMINE A DIFFERENT WAY TO PRESENT THE POLICY CONCLUSIONS WITHOUT THE NEGATIVE BAGGAGE. WE HOPE YOU CAN CONVINCED DASD JONES THIS IS THE BEST WAY TO GO DURING YOUR REVIEW NEXT WEEK.

5. (SBU) FOLLOWING IS AN ATTEMPT TO LOOK AT THE TEXT OF THE

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STUDY FROM TWO PERSPECTIVES, THE NUMERICAL CONCLUSIONS AND WHETHER THEY CLARIFY OR ENCUMBER THE "FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING" PROCESS AND SECOND, THE CHALLENGES CREATED TO THE PRESIDENT'S CERTIFICATION OF VIETNAMESE COOPERATION.

BEGIN TEXT:

THE DPMO REMAINS STUDY REACHES A NUMERICAL CONCLUSION CONCERNING THE NUMBER OF REMAINS COLLECTED AND STORED BY HANOI WHICH IS MISLEADING AND LIKELY TO CREATE GREATER CONTROVERSY IF IT IS MADE PUBLIC. ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS THROUGHOUT THE STUDY, THE REPORT RAISES SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S DECLARATION WE HAVE BEEN RECEIVING FULLEST POSSIBLE COOPERATION FROM THE VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES MANY OF THESE RELATING TO VIETNAMESE INABILITY TO PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT MISSING DOCUMENTS. (THIS IS ONE OF THE MOST CONTINUOUS ARGUMENTS MADE BY THE LEAGUE OF FAMILIES.)

THE STUDY'S INTRODUCTION POSTULATES A VERY IMPORTANT CONCLUSION CONCERNING FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING, THE VIETNAMESE DO NOT HAVE LARGE NUMBERS OF REMAINS IN THEIR CONTROL AND THEREFORE ACCOUNTING RESULTS WILL LARGELY DEPEND ON OUR OWN RECOVERY EFFORTS. THIS IS A POSITIVE CONCLUSION, BUT IN ISOLATION AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE OTHER QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE STUDY, IT LOSES ITS IMPACT.

CRITICS OF THE U.S. POLICY ON POW/MIA AND THOSE WHO ARE UNWILLING TO ACCEPT HANOI'S GOOD FAITH WILL FIND MUCH IN THIS STUDY TO SUPPORT THEIR CONTENTIONS. THE REPORT, FOR EXAMPLE, DOES A FINE JOB OF DEMONSTRATING THE RELEASE OF COLLECTED REMAINS DURING THE 1970-1990 TIME PERIOD WAS DONE FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES BY THE HANOI LEADERSHIP. CONCLUSIONS THAT THE VIETNAMESE NEVER COLLECTED REMAINS FROM LAOS, WHEN THEY DID COLLECT AT LEAST TWO FROM CAMBODIA WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED BY CRITICS. AS NOTED ABOVE, ANOMALIES IN THE PROVISION OF DOCUMENTS WILL STAND OUT AS KEY FAILURES BY THE VIETNAMESE TO COOPERATE. WHILE WE DESCRIBE THE SEARCH FOR THESE DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION AS ONGOING ACTIVITIES, CRITICS WILL SAY THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE EARLIER.

THE NUMBERS ISSUE:

-- IN ITS EFFORTS TO QUANTIFY THE NUMBER, DPMO GIVES GREATEST WEIGHT TO TWO VIETNAMESE SOURCES. THEY IDENTIFY APPROXIMATELY 300 INDIVIDUALS IN THIS CATEGORY. (SEE P. 23)

-- DPMO, FROM ITS OWN RESOURCES, CLAIMS TO BE SURE OF 263 REMAINS AND BELIEVES AN ADDITIONAL 11 WERE ALSO STORED, BRINGING ITS TOTAL TO 274. (SEE P. 31) (OF THESE 249 HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AND 25 HAVE NOT.)

-- INEXPLICABLY DPMO THEN ROUNDS ITS 274 NUMBER TO BETWEEN 270 AND 280, AS A MINIMUM ADDING AN ADDITIONAL SIX CASES/REMAINS TO THE TOTAL.

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-- THIS CREATES THE BIGGEST PROBLEM FOR US TO DEAL WITH THE VETERANS AND FAMILIES ORGANIZATIONS BECAUSE IT REACHES THE CONCLUSION HANOI STILL HAS 20-30 ADDITIONAL REMAINS WHICH IT HAS FAILED TO TURN OVER TO THE USG. (NOTE: BASED ON THE EARLIER ASSUMPTION THEY COULD ONLY COMPLETELY ACCOUNT FOR 263, THERE WOULD BE EVEN MORE LOGIC TO START THE NUMBER RANGE AT 260, GIVING US A GAP OF 20-40.)

IT IS IMPORTANT HERE TO NOTE THE STUDY THROUGHOUT INDICATES ALL OF THIS INFORMATION IS QUESTIONABLE AND IT QUALIFIES VIRTUALLY EVERY IDENTIFICATION OF NUMBERS WHICH IS MADE IN THE SECTION WHICH DEALS WITH HOW MANY REMAINS WERE COLLECTED. (SEE PP.21-24). THIS SAME CONCLUSION, UNCERTAINTY, IS REACHED WHEN IT COMES TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE VIETNAMESE GAVE US BACK ALL THEY COLLECTED. (SEE P. 33)

-- WITH NO ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSION, APPENDIX 3 INCLUDES A STATEMENT ON THE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN BY THE VIETNAMESE WHICH SUGGESTS SOME SETS OF REMAINS COLLECTED FROM THE PROVINCES COULD HAVE BEEN LOST OR MISIDENTIFIED IN THE PROCESS OF TRANSFER FROM LOCALITIES TO HANOI. THIS CONCLUSION WITHOUT FURTHER EVIDENCE SEEMS UNLIKELY TO BE ACCEPTED ESPECIALLY WHEN THE COLLECTION EFFORT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN RATHER CAREFULLY CARRIED OUT. (SEE P. 43)

-- DPMOQS ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION RELATED TO THE PRIORITY AND SPECIAL REMAINS CASES IS AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD, AND IT REACHES THE CONCLUSION SOME OF OUR ORIGINAL REASONS FOR CLASSIFYING INDIVIDUALS IN THESE CATEGORIES WAS WRONG. BUT THERE IS NOTHING IN THE PRESENTATION OF ARGUMENTATION WHICH WILL CONVINCED THE CRITICS ON THESE ISSUES, ABSENT SOME ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTATION OF SOME OF THE ASSERTIONS IN THIS SECTION. (SEE P. 40)

-- IN THIS REGARD, FOR EXAMPLE, THE STUDY CONCLUDES WE WERE WRONG TO ASSUME THE VIETNAMESE WOULD BE ABLE TO ACCOUNT FOR REMAINS OF INDIVIDUALS WHO HAD DIED IN CAPTIVITY (GRAVES REGISTRATION LISTS) BUT PROVIDES NO EVIDENCE FOR WHY WE SHOULD REACH THIS CONCLUSION. (SEE P. 41)

-- VIETNAMESE RECOVERY EFFORTS OF PAVN LOSSES IN LAOS INDICATE THE VIETNAMESE HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN MAKING ANY KIND OF IDENTIFICATION OF THE LOST PERSONNEL BUT THIS IS THEN PARALLELED WITH COMMENTS FROM VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS WHICH SAY THEY HAVE NEVER RECOVERED ANY AMERICAN REMAINS IN THE PROCESS OF THESE RECOVERIES. IF THEIR PROCESS IS SO UNSCIENTIFIC HOW CAN WE ACCEPT THE CONCLUSION NO AMERICAN REMAINS HAVE BEEN COLLECTED? (SEE PP. 19-20)

THE DOCUMENTS/COOPERATION PROBLEMS:

-- STARTING WITH THE SUMMARY, THERE ARE REFERENCES TO

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 4

UNCLASSIFIED

ONGOING REQUESTS/SEARCHES FOR DOCUMENTS WHICH CALL INTO QUESTION THE DEGREE OF COOPERATION OF THE HANOI AUTHORITIES. (SEE P. 5)

-- THE STUDY IDENTIFIES SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS DETERMINING THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF A KEY VIETNAMESE ORGANIZATION WHICH HANDLED REMAINS COLLECTIONS AND STORAGE RELATED TO THE LAST TURNOVER OF STORED REMAINS IN 1990 WHICH MAKES IT DIFFICULT TO EVALUATE IF MORE WERE SO STORED. (SEE P. 14)

-- INTERVIEWS WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS INVOLVED IN THE SEARCH FOR REMAINS ALONG THE CENTRAL COAST OF VIETNAM (MR5), INDICATE THEY PROVIDED INFORMATION IN THE FORM OF SKETCHES OF GRAVE SITES WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN OBTAINED. (SEE P. 15)

-- DPMO SAYS IT CANNOT VERIFY WHETHER THE VIETNAMESE HAVE GIVEN US BACK ALL OF THE REMAINS THEY COLLECTED BECAUSE WE LACK ACCESS TO INVENTORIES, COMPLETE RECORDS, OR OTHER INFORMATION THAT WOULD PROVIDE A DEFINITIVE ANSWER. (SEE P. 33)

-- DPMO STUDY RAISES ISSUE OF VIETNAMESE TELLING US AFTER 1990 THEY STILL HAD SOME REMAINS WHICH HAD NOT BEEN REPATRIATED BUT THEN LEAVES THE VALUE/VALIDITY OF THESE STORIES UP IN THE AIR, PARTICULARLY CONCLUDING THEY CANQT DETERMINE WHETHER THE 1990 TURNOVERS WERE THE LAST OF WHAT HANOI HAD TO RETURN OR WHETHER THEY STOPPED RETURNING REMAINS. HOWEVER, IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THIS DISCUSSION, THE STUDY SAYS THE VIETNAMESE PROBABLY HAVE RECORDS . . . THAT WOULD ANSWER THIS QUESTION AND THERE IS STRONG EVIDENCE THE VIETNAMESE MAINTAINED AN INVENTORY OF THE REMAINS THEY COLLECTED. (SEE P. 34)

-- ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE, THE STUDY THE MAKES ITS MOST DAMNING CONCLUSION ON THIS ISSUE STATING DESPITE OUR REPEATED REQUESTS, WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO ACQUIRE A COMPANION LIST OF REMAINS THAT WERE RECOVERED, WHICH EVEN OUR VIETNAMESE COUNTERPARTS AGREED WOULD HAVE BEEN CREATED AT THE SAME TIME; AND THEN, WHEN THE VIETNAMESE SAY THEY DONQT HAVE ANYTHING ELSE TO TURN OVER, DPMO CONCLUDES THESE ASSURANCES LACK CREDIBILITY. (SEE P. 35)


THE DPMO STUDY PROVIDES GOOD INFORMATION TO SHAPE OUR CONCLUSIONS ON HOW WE CAN ACHIEVE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING. IT DEMONSTRATES A THOROUGH AND RIGOROUS REVIEW OF MATERIALS WHICH VALIDATE THE EFFORTS OF DPMO ANALYSTS TO SEARCH OUT AND INVESTIGATE EACH INDIVIDUAL CASE AND, WITHOUT BLOWING ANY HORNS, SUGGESTS WITHOUT THE DPMO ANALYSIS WORK WEQD NOT HAVE RECOVERED MUCH OF WHAT WEQVE DONE THROUGH THE JOINT RECOVERY EFFORTS. IT ALSO CLARIFIES CONCERNS ABOUT NUMBERS OF STORED REMAINS, PARTICULARLY WHEN IT COMES TO EVALUATING THE DPMO CONCLUSIONS ON STORED REMAINS VERSUS THOSE OF CILHI. (HOPEFULLY, THAT WAS NOT THE MAIN REASON FOR THIS ANALYSIS.)

END TEXT

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 5

(b)(3)
(b)(6)



**U.S. Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence**

Fax Cover Sheet

To: JOHN MOSEMAN, CIA

From:

SSCI#: 44-1780

Date: 6/25/99

Time: 17:28

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Page 1 of 7

Prepared by: JW

Note to Recipient:

**If you did not receive every page of this facsimile, please call
(202) 224-1771.**

RICHARD C. SHELBY, ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN
 J. ROBERT KERREY, NEBRASKA, VICE CHAIRMAN

JOHN H. CHAFFEE, RHODE ISLAND	RICHARD M. BRYAN, NEVADA
RICHARD G. LUGAR, INDIANA	BOB GRAHAM, FLORIDA
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WAYNE ALLARD, COLORADO	

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475

TRENT LOTT, MISSISSIPPI, EX OFFICIO
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, SOUTH DAKOTA, EX OFFICIO

NICHOLAS ROSTON, STAFF DIRECTOR
CHRISTOPHER C. STRAUS, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
KATHLEEN P. McGUIRE, CHIEF CLERK

June 24, 1999

SSCI# 99-1780

The Honorable George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Director:


Pursuant to Section 405 of Public Law 102-88, Senator Bob Smith has asked this Committee to obtain POW/MIA-related documents for his review. Senator Smith is the Senate's representative to the U.S.- Russian Joint Commission on POWs and MIAs and the U.S. Chairman of that Commission's Vietnam War Working Group.

Please provide to this Committee the documents listed in the attachment. If you have any questions, please have your staff contact Pete Dorn or Al Cumming of our staff at 202-224-1700.

Sincerely,



Richard C. Shelby
Chairman



J. Robert Kerrey
Vice Chairman

CC: Senator Bob Smith

BOB SMITH
NEW HAMPSHIRE

opinion@smith.senate.gov
http://www.senate.gov/~smith/

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-2903

June 10, 1999

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE ON
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
CHAIRMAN,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ETHICS

The Honorable Richard Shelby
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Richard:

Pursuant to Section 405 of Public Law 102-88 (FY91 Intelligence Authorization Act), I respectfully ask that your Committee request the following information or documents in the possession, custody, or control of the agencies or departments referenced below. This data relates to the issue of U.S. POW/MIA personnel or the remains of such personnel.

[] Oct 96
From CIA to DoD POW/MIA Office
Subject: Vietnam - POW Information
Classification level: "SECRET"

[] Nov 96
From CIA to DoD POW/MIA Office
Ref: [] Oct. 96 message from CIA to DPMO
Classification level: "SECRET"

26 August 1998
CIA DO Memorandum, Intelligence
[]
Classification level: "TOP SECRET"

[] May 99
From American Embassy Hanoi [] to SECSTATE
Subject: Remains Study Comments
Cable []
Classification level: "UNCLASSIFIED, but sensitive, handle accordingly"

The first three reports referenced above were the subject of a request to the Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence by myself and the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Warner, on January 26, 1999. I received a subsequent briefing on this matter by the Central Intelligence Agency on March 5, 1999, but would nonetheless like these documents furnished to the Senate, in accordance with Public Law 102-88, for more detailed review. These reports pertain to matters I am attempting to investigate further as the Senate Leadership-appointed representative to the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POWs and MIAs, and the U.S. Chairman of that Commission's Vietnam War Working Group.

DIRKSEN BUILDING
SUITE 307
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-2903
(202) 224-2841
(202) 224-1353 (FAX)

1750 ELM STREET
SUITE 100
MANCHESTER, NH 03104
(603) 634-5000
(800) 922-2230


ONE HARBOUR PLACE
SUITE 435
PORTSMOUTH, NH 03801
(603) 433-1887
(800) 922-2230

The Honorable Richard Shelby
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence
June 10, 1999
page 2

It is my understanding that the last cable has a direct bearing on intelligence analysis and information pertaining to Vietnamese knowledge on POW/MIA matters, and may explicitly constitute an effort by the Executive Branch to prevent disclosure of certain information to Congress that could result in added support for legislation I recently introduced which the Administration opposes. This legislation (S.J. Res. 28) is now pending before the Senate and may be considered further in the next several weeks.

I thank you for your prompt attention to this request, and would appreciate your assistance with respect to these matters prior to the July 4th recess. My staff point of contact on this matter is Dino L. Carluccio on my personal staff who may be reached at 4-3828.

With warm regards,



BOB SMITH, U.S.S.

cc: The Honorable Robert Kerrey, Vice-Chairman, SSCI
The Honorable John Warner, Chairman, SASC
The Honorable Trent Lott, Majority Leader

106TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. J. RES. 28

Disapproving the extension of the waiver authority contained in section 402(c) of the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to Vietnam.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 7, 1999

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

JOINT RESOLUTION

Disapproving the extension of the waiver authority contained in section 402(c) of the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to Vietnam.

- 1 *Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives*
- 2 *of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*
- 3 That Congress does not approve the extension of the au-
- 4 thority contained in section 402(c) of the Trade Act of
- 5 1974 recommended by the President to Congress on June
- 6 3, 1999 with respect to Vietnam.

○

meaning as set forth in paragraph 3.4(f) of Executive Order 12333, dated December 4, 1981, or successor orders.

SEC. 405. FURNISHING OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES ON INTELLIGENCE.

(a) **FURNISHING OF SPECIFIC INFORMATION-** In accordance with title V of the National Security Act of 1947, the head of any department or agency of the United States involved in any intelligence activities which may pertain to United States military personnel listed as prisoner, missing, or unaccounted for in military actions shall furnish any information or documents in the possession, custody, or control of the department or agency, or person paid by such department or agency, whenever requested by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives or the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

(b) **ACCESS BY COMMITTEES AND MEMBERS OF CONGRESS-** In accordance with Senate Resolution 400, Ninety-Fourth Congress, and House Resolution 658, Ninety-Fifth Congress, the committees named in subsection (a) shall, upon request and under such regulations as the committees have prescribed to protect the classification of such information, make any information described in subsection (a) available to any other committee or any other Member of Congress and appropriately cleared staff.

TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PROVISIONS

SEC. 501. REIMBURSEMENT RATE FOR CERTAIN AIRLIFT SERVICES.

(a) **IN GENERAL-** Chapter 157 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

Sec. 2642. Reimbursement rate for airlift services provided to Central Intelligence Agency

(a) **AUTHORITY-** The Secretary of Defense may authorize the use of the Department of Defense reimbursement rate for military airlift services provided by a component of the Department of Defense to the Central Intelligence Agency, if the Secretary of Defense determines that those military airlift services are provided for activities related to national security objectives.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



MAR 23 1999

Honorable Robert C. Smith
Chairman, Strategic Forces
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Bob:

The classified reports you requested in your and John Warner's January 26, 1999, letter were originated by the Central Intelligence Agency. I understand that Agency personnel briefed you and General Lajoie on these reports on March 5, 1999. I hope their briefing answered your questions.

I assure you that the Department takes seriously the oversight responsibility of Congress and remains committed to full cooperation on this issue. Your continued support to all our servicemen is gratefully acknowledged.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "J. O.", written in a cursive style.



F A X M E S S A G E F R O M

BOB SMITH

UNITED STATES SENATOR FOR NEW HAMPSHIRE



To:

From: *Russ*

Date: *16 Oct 00* Page 1 of: *4*

Notes: *As discussed. Thanks for your help.*

Sent From:



WASHINGTON, DC
SD 307
Washington, DC 20510
Phone: 202-224-2841
FAX: 202-224-1353



MANCHESTER
1750 Elm Street, Suite 100
Manchester, NH 03104
Phone: 603-634-5000
FAX: 603-634-5003



PORTSMOUTH
1 Harbour Place
Portsmouth, NH 03801
Phone: 603-433-1667
FAX: 603-433-1885



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

SSCI# 2000 - 3113

w/00-0101-6

19 July 2000

The Honorable Richard H. Bryan
 Vice Chairman
 Select Committee on Intelligence
 United States Senate
 Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

(U//~~FOUO~~) In response to Section 309 of the FY 2000 Intelligence Authorization Act, attached is the declassified version of the April 1998 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) titled "Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue." Also attached is the declassified version of "A Critical Assessment", a critique of the 1998 NIE produced by the office of Senator Bob Smith.

(U//~~FOUO~~) We remain committed to providing all the support we can to resolving uncertainties regarding Americans missing during the Vietnam conflict. In declassifying this information, we have made every effort to carefully balance the legitimate interest of the public in this issue, with our obligation to protect intelligence sources and methods and our ability to continue to collect intelligence on this critical topic. We have declassified those portions of the documents in question which we felt could reasonably be released without jeopardizing options for gaining further insights into this important matter.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Office of the Inspector General (IG) has also, at the request of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, declassified the joint DOD/CIA IG review of the NIE. Enclosed is an advanced copy of that document. The printed version will follow shortly. The key judgments conclude that:

- appropriate methodology and sound analysis were used in producing the NIE
- conclusions of the NIE were balanced and well-documented
- no Administration official influenced the substance or fundamental judgments of the NIE

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

The Honorable Richard H. Bryan

(U) Originals of this letter are also being sent to Chairman Shelby, the Chairman and Ranking Democratic Member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Chairmen of the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Defense.

(U) If you have any questions on this matter please contact me or have a member of your staff contact of my staff at

Sincerely,



John H. Moseman
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

<u>THIS SEARCH</u>	<u>THIS DOCUMENT</u>	<u>GO TO</u>
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	<u>Doc Contents</u>	

H.R.1555

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Enrolled Bill (Sent to President))

SEC. 307. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.

Section 305(b)(2) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-293; 110 Stat. 3465; 8 U.S.C. 1427 note) is amended by striking 'subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) of section 243(h)(2) of such Act' and inserting 'clauses (i) through (iv) of section 241(b)(3)(B) of such Act'.

SEC. 308. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON VIETNAM-ERA PRISONERS OF WAR AND MISSING IN ACTION PERSONNEL AND CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF ESTIMATE.

(a) DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW- Subject to subsection (b), the Director of Central Intelligence shall review for declassification the following:

- (1) National Intelligence Estimate 98-03 dated April 1998 and entitled 'Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue'.
- (2) The assessment dated November 1998 and entitled 'A Critical Assessment of National Intelligence Estimate 98-03 prepared by the United States Chairman of the Vietnam War Working Group of the United States-Russia Joint Commission on POWs and MIAs'.

(b) LIMITATIONS- The Director shall not declassify any text contained in the estimate or assessment referred to in subsection (a) which would--

- (1) reveal intelligence sources and methods; or
- (2) disclose by name the identity of a living foreign individual who has cooperated with United States efforts to account for missing personnel from the Vietnam era.

(c) DEADLINE- The Director shall complete the declassification review of the estimate and assessment under subsection (a) not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 309. REPORT ON LEGAL STANDARDS APPLIED FOR ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE.

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

The Associate Director of Central Intelligence
for Military Support
Washington, D.C. 20505


MAR 23 2001

The Honorable Robert C. Smith
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-2903

Dear Senator Smith:

(S [redacted]) This letter is a further response to the request (made in a mid-2000 note from your staff to the CIA's Office of Congressional Affairs and alluded to in your 19 October 2000 letter to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence) for any POW-related information that might have been provided to the US government by GRU General-Major Dmitriy Fedorovich Polyakov.

(S [redacted]) The CIA has carried out a complete review of its files on General Polyakov, who disappeared in the 1980's and is presumed--though not certainly known--to have been executed by the USSR. Only one document sourced to him, a 27 September 1967 intelligence report, is relevant to the topic of US Vietnam-era POWs/MIAs. That report (CSDB-312/02644-67, marked SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM) is enclosed.



(U) Research continues on other queries raised in your 19 October letter; I wish to assure you of my personal interest in seeing these questions resolved as speedily as feasible.

Sincerely,

[redacted]
John H. Campbell
Lieutenant General, USAF


Enclosure

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]




~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

SUBJECT: Letter to The Honorable Robert C. Smith



TO: The Honorable Robert C. Smith
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-2903



~~SECRET~~ 2 [redacted]

2001
POW/MIA

200 ✓

~~INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

COUNTRY USSR/North Vietnam

REPORT NO.

SUBJECT Soviet Involvement in
North Vietnam

DATE DISTR. 27 September 1967

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Up to August 1967

PLACE &
DATE ACQ.

FIELD REPORT NO.

~~THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.~~

SOURCE: Soviet Bloc source whose reliability cannot be judged, from a Soviet officer who had served in North Vietnam.

1. The USSR is having difficulty supplying North Vietnam; the situation in that country is bad.
2. The USSR has no contact with American prisoners in North Vietnam. However, some reports of interrogation of the prisoners are passed officially to the Soviet Embassy by the North Vietnamese. These are generally one-page reports which have little value.
3. U.S. military hardware which falls into North Vietnamese hands is not provided to the Soviets by either the North Vietnamese or the Chinese, but the Soviets have been able to steal an item from time to time.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT (Optional) Letter to The Honorable Robert C. Smith

FROM
SA/ADC/MIS

Extension

NO. DAC 01190-01

DATE 03/21/2001

TO (Officer designation, room, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED FORWARDED

OFFICIAL'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

FULL SIGNATURE IS REQUESTED BY OCA

1. C/CF -

[Redacted]

23 Mar 01

For Coordination

Thank you.

2. C/EA -

[Redacted]

23/3

For Coordination

3. DO/IRO

[Redacted]

3/23

For Coordination

4. C/CIC

[Redacted]

23 Mar 23 Mar

For Coordination

5. D/OCA

[Redacted]

3/23 3/23

For Coordination

6.

7.

8.

9.

10. ADCI/MS

[Redacted]

For Signature

11.

12. *O/M/OCA*

[Redacted]


13.

14.

[Redacted] *or*

Please call for pick up.

SECRET



OCA
Records
8

CONGRESSIONAL CORRESPONDENCE ACTION PLAN

Date / Time Received	Suspense Date	Control Number
----------------------	---------------	----------------

ACTION: Please forward response as indicated below to OCA for coordination and transmittal.

Prepare a response for DCI signature.

Lead Action Office:

Information Copies:

Prepare a response for D/OCA signature.

Lead Action Office:
A DCI-MS

Information Copies:
DO/COS; DO/NE; DO/EUR; DO/EA

NO WRITTEN RESPONSE NECESSARY

Lead Office:

Follow-Up Action:

Information Copies:

OCA ACTION OFFICER

Advance Copies Provided To:
OCA/AO
C/DAISON

Comments:

NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION WITHOUT PRIOR OCA APPROVAL.

2000

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

(b)(3)
(b)(6)**Directors Action Center Routing Slip**

Record Number	Document Number	File Code	Date
0006051-2011	DAC-0006051-2011-Request-1	PO LIAIS 08110 1004-P	12/02/2011
Title: CONGRESS: Request from Senator Web Regarding Vietnam/POW issue			
Summary: Lotus Note from <input type="text"/> forwarding a request for all the remaining classified documents regarding the Vietnam/POW issue and an explanation of the authorities by which the document remain classified. OCA requests a response by Monday, 5 December 2011.			
Action Officer: <input type="text"/>			
Lead Office: OCA			
Task Instructions: OCA to take the lead and coordinate a response with the appropriate components. (Please provide all responses through DARTS to close action. The lead office should provide the final response to the originator of the request.)			
Suspense Date: 01/13/2012			
Action: CIO			
Information: CSPI/FO			

As of: 08 March 2013 10:57 AM

Attached Files

- o DAC-0006051-2011.rtf
- o DAC-0006051-2011b.rtf

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

.. 3/8/2013

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

From: **Janna S. Robinson**
Executive Staff
Office of Congressional Affairs,
[redacted]
Date: 12/02/2011 03:40 PM

Subject: **Taskir**
To: DIR-D
Cc: DIR-O

This r

DAC,

Please task out the following with OCA lead and IMS as the action office:

Senator Webb document request for a list of remaining classified documents regarding the Vietnam/POW issue and explanation of the authorities by which the documents remain classified. Information is requested by 5 Dec.

Note to DAC: Diane Yancey has already discussed this issue with IMS, and they have been working on it throughout the week. IMS requested that OCA have this tasked through DAC.

thanks!
Janna

Mail Type: Official

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~



UNCLASSIFIED

From: **Janna S. Robinson**
Executive Staff
Office of Congressional Affairs,
[Redacted]
Date: 12/02/2011 05:12 PM

Subject: **Fw: D**
To: **Ian G.**

This r


See below for the email from Sen. Webb's staffer, Ann. Thank you!

Have a great weekend!

Janna

----- Forwarded


From:
To:
Cc:
Date:
Subject:



Though I recognize it's a bit unusual, CIO/IMS has asked that we task this through the DAC. IMS should have the action to prepare a response. Thanks.

----- Forwarded by


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To:
Date:
Subject:




Please see request below from Senator Webb's office. I doubt we have such a listing, but defer to you to provide a definitive response. Thanks.

----- Forwarded by

From:
To:
Date:
Subject:



CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED



This email originated on the [Redacted] (U) and has been forwarded to th [Redacted]

[Redacted]. *This is only a copy of the original message.* This email has been virus scanned, but

consider the source before opening attachments. **If this E-Mail is from someone unfamiliar to you (especially if it contains an attachment) do NOT open it; instead, contact your**

if you have questions, send a lotus note to
GLIDE_HELP.

Message ID: 6716403/glide-ain-b70-ps1-a

Diane:

It was a pleasure speaking with you this afternoon. As we discussed, Senator Webb is requesting a list of what documents remain classified regarding the Vietnam POW / MIA issue and under what authority (e.g., EOs, the "McCain bill"). We would like the information by 5 Dec 2011.

Thank you in advance for your time and assistance, and please let me know if I can provide any additional information.

Thank you,
Ann

Ann Vallandingham
Office of U.S. Senator Jim Webb
Legislative Assistant
Veterans' Affairs
(202) 224-4024

Mail Type: Official

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



(b)(3)

Directors Action Center Routing Slip

Record Number	Document Number	File Code	Date
0003957-2010	DAC-0003957-2010-Request-1	PO LIAIS 08110 1004-P	08/02/2010
<p>Title: CONGRESS: Congressional Request for DNI to Declassify Vietnam POW Records - SUSPENSE 20 August 2010</p> <p>Summary: Lotus note from Jennifer L. Hudson, DNI, forwarding a request from Members of Congress to declassify all classified material under the DNI's authority dealing with POWs from the Vietnam War. External due date NLT 20 August 2010.</p> <p>Action Officer: Leslie A. Scott</p> <p>Lead Office: CIO</p> <p>Task Instructions: CIO to take lead and coordinate a response with the appropriate components. (Please respond back to the originator, also please provide all responses in DARTS to close action.)</p> <p>Suspense Date: 08/20/2010</p> <p>Action: DI-APLAA-SOUTHEAST ASIA-JAPAN ISSUE GROUP, HR, OCA</p> <p>Information: ADD/CIA, DCIA, DDCIA, CSPI/FO, DI, DI-APLAA</p>			

As of: 08 March 2013 11:43 AM

Attached Files


- o DAC-0003957-2010.rtf
- o 2010-06-23 Ltr From W. Jones, D. Kucinich, R. Paul, and J. McGovern, House of Representatives, to Acting DNI Gompert, Reques.pdf

UNCLASSIFIED

3/8/2013

UNCLASSIFIED

**Jennifer L.
Hudson-DNI-/STF/AG
ENCY**
Chief, Information
Release Branch
DNI/DIS/MSC/IMO
703-275-2210 (u)
917-2210 (s)
DNI/DIS/MSC/IM



08/02/2010 10:06 AM

Subject Congressional Request for DNI to Declassify Vietnam
POW Records - SUSPENSE 20 August 2010

Good morning,

ODNI has received the attached request from Members of Congress to declassify all classified material under the DNI's authority dealing with POWs from the Vietnam War. In order to provide the best response possible, I am asking for input from CIA regarding current declassification efforts as they relate to any responsive material.

I will also be asking for input from DOD/DPMO.

Please let me know if there are any questions.

Thank you,
Jennifer



2010-06-23 Ltr From W. Jones, D. Kucinich, R. Paul, and J. McGovern, House of Representatives, to Acting DNI Gompert, Reques.pdf

Jennifer Hudson
DNI Information Management Office
Chief, Information Review and Release Branch
917-2210 (s)
703-275-2210 (u)



Mail Type: Official

UNCLASSIFIED

WALTER B. JONES
3D DISTRICT, NORTH CAROLINA

ROOM 2333
RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
TELEPHONE: (202) 225-3415

COMMITTEES:
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES

DISTRICT OFFICE:
1105-C CORPORATE DRIVE
GREENVILLE, NC 27858
(252) 931-1003
(800) 351-1697

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-3303



RECEIVED

SL

JUL - 7 2010

June 23, 2010

Mr. David C. Gompert
Acting Director of National Intelligence
Washington, DC 20511


Dear Director Gompert:


Over the years serious questions have been raised regarding the extent of the return of American Prisoners of War (POW's) from Southeast Asia during the time after the Vietnam War. We write to ask for your help to find answers to these questions.


In years past, all of the relevant files were found in a multitude of agencies, making any reading of the pertinent information near impossible. However, when Congress created the Director of National Intelligence position, it envisioned a case just as this where your authority could help find much needed answers. Director Gompert, the American people would be most grateful if you declassify all classified material under your authority dealing with these POW's. The Paris Peace Accords were signed over thirty years ago ending the Vietnam War. Much has changed in the ensuing years: our country has normalized relations with Vietnam and the country has healed many of its divisions from the conflict, yet questions remain in the eyes of the American people regarding American POW's.


Thank you for your service to America and our intelligence community. We look forward to your help in this request for openness regarding these American heroes.

Sincerely,


Walter B. Jones
Member of Congress


Dennis Kucinich
Member of Congress


Ron Paul
Member of Congress


Jim McGovern
Member of Congress

Viewing an archived action from Extral Close

U

Action
**(OCA 01-01206) CLARIFICATION OF 3 JULY 2001
DCI LETTER REGARDING ESTABLISHING A
POW/MIA ANALYTIC CAPABILITY**

Document Number: OCA-01206-01
Date Received: 07/20/2001

Task Instructions:
no value

Recipients

• MULTIPLE



(b)(3)

Request Documents: AARGAJXT.TIF

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	oca_cdocs_lib
Secondary OPI	no value
From	STAN MOSKOWITZ
Other Document Number	
Comments	
File Code	PO-APPRO 07120 [2001]
Media Type	PP
Codewords	
Attachments	
Keywords	3 JULY 2001 ANALYTIC CAPABILITY GOSS GRAHAM INOUYE LEWIS MIA MOSKOWITZ PELOSI POW POW/MIA SHELBY TENET
Copies	

U

Viewing an archived action from Extral Close



OCA/LG/JDempsey: la (17 July 2001)

OCA 2001-2192 (F: DCI/OCA/Liaison/Jack/POW&MP 17 Jul 01.doc)

Distribu

Origin


Origin

Origin

Origin

Origin

Origin



Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2001-2192

20 July 2001

The Honorable Porter Goss
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This letter clarifies a 3 July 2001 letter to you signed by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) dealing with the establishment of an analytic capability within the Intelligence Community (IC) with responsibility for supporting activities related to prisoners of war and missing persons since 1990.

In his 3 July letter the DCI wrote that his letter was "in response to a Congressionally Directed Action from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report for Fiscal Year 2001." By way of clarification, the requirement that the DCI establish such an analytical capability was enacted into law as § 307 of the FY2001 Intelligence Authorization Act (Public Law 106-567). Accordingly, it was the Public Law that mandated the DCI's action in this matter.

If you have any questions in this area, please do not hesitate to contact me directly, or Jack Dempsey of my staff at (703) 482-8794.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Stanley M. Moskowitz".

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2001-2192/2
20 July 2001

The Honorable Bob Graham
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510


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Sincerely,


Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2001-2192/3
20 July 2001

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510


Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

This letter clarifies a 3 July 2001 letter to you signed by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) dealing with the establishment of an analytic capability within the Intelligence Community (IC) with responsibility for supporting activities related to prisoners of war and missing persons since 1990.

In his 3 July letter the DCI wrote that his letter was " in response to a Congressionally Directed Action from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report for Fiscal Year 2001." By way of clarification, the requirement that the DCI establish such an analytical capability was enacted into law as § 307 of the FY2001 Intelligence Authorization Act (Public Law 106-567). Accordingly, it was the Public Law that mandated the DCI's action in this matter.

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Sincerely,


Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2001-2192/4

20 July 2001

The Honorable Jerry Lewis
Chairman
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This letter clarifies a 3 July 2001 letter to you signed by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) dealing with the establishment of an analytic capability within the Intelligence Community (IC) with responsibility for supporting activities related to prisoners of war and missing persons since 1990.

In his 3 July letter the DCI wrote that his letter was "in response to a Congressionally Directed Action from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report for Fiscal Year 2001." By way of clarification, the requirement that the DCI establish such an analytical capability was enacted into law as § 307 of the FY2001 Intelligence Authorization Act (Public Law 106-567). Accordingly, it was the Public Law that mandated the DCI's action in this matter.

If you have any questions in this area, please do not hesitate to contact me directly, or Jack Dempsey of my staff at (703) 482-8794.

Sincerely,


Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2001-2192/5
20 July 2001

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This letter clarifies a 3 July 2001 letter to you signed by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) dealing with the establishment of an analytic capability within the Intelligence Community (IC) with responsibility for supporting activities related to prisoners of war and missing persons since 1990.

In his 3 July letter the DCI wrote that his letter was " in response to a Congressionally Directed Action from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report for Fiscal Year 2001." By way of clarification, the requirement that the DCI establish such an analytical capability was enacted into law as § 307 of the FY2001 Intelligence Authorization Act (Public Law 106-567). Accordingly, it was the Public Law that mandated the DCI's action in this matter.

If you have any questions in this area, please do not hesitate to contact me directly, or Jack Dempsey of my staff at (703) 482-8794.

Sincerely,


Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

PUBLIC LAW 106-567—DEC. 27, 2000

114 STAT. 2839

(b) **CLERICAL AMENDMENT.**—The table of contents for the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 115 the following new item:

“Sec. 116. Travel on any common carrier for certain intelligence collection personnel.”

SEC. 306. UPDATE OF REPORT ON EFFECTS OF FOREIGN ESPIONAGE ON UNITED STATES TRADE SECRETS.

Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report that updates and revises, as necessary, the report prepared by the Director pursuant to section 310 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-120; 113 Stat. 1606). Deadline.

SEC. 307. POW/MIA ANALYTIC CAPABILITY WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.), as amended by section 305(a), is further amended by adding at the end the following:

“POW/MIA ANALYTIC CAPABILITY

“SEC. 117. (a) REQUIREMENT.—(1) The Director of Central Intelligence shall, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, establish and maintain in the intelligence community an analytic capability with responsibility for intelligence in support of the activities of the United States relating to individuals who, after December 31, 1990, are unaccounted for United States personnel.

Establishment.
50 USC 404I.

“(2) The analytic capability maintained under paragraph (1) shall be known as the ‘POW/MIA analytic capability of the intelligence community’.

“(b) UNACCOUNTED FOR UNITED STATES PERSONNEL.—In this section, the term ‘unaccounted for United States personnel’ means the following:

“(1) Any missing person (as that term is defined in section 1513(1) of title 10, United States Code).

“(2) Any United States national who was killed while engaged in activities on behalf of the United States and whose remains have not been repatriated to the United States.”

(b) **CLERICAL AMENDMENT.**—The table of contents for the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 305(b), is further amended by inserting after the item relating to section 116 the following new item:

“Sec. 117. POW/MIA analytic capability.”

SEC. 308. APPLICABILITY TO LAWFUL UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF FEDERAL LAWS IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new title:

Public Law 106-567
106th Congress

An Act

To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2001 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.

Dec. 27, 2000
[H.R. 5630]

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the “Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001”.

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents of this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

- Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
- Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
- Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
- Sec. 104. Community management account.
- Sec. 105. Transfer authority of the Director of Central Intelligence.

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND
DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

TITLE III—GENERAL PROVISIONS

Subtitle A—Intelligence Community

- Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law.
- Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
- Sec. 303. Sense of the Congress on intelligence community contracting.
- Sec. 304. National Security Agency voluntary separation.
- Sec. 305. Authorization for travel on any common carrier for certain intelligence collection personnel.
- Sec. 306. Update of report on effects of foreign espionage on United States trade secrets.
- Sec. 307. POW/MIA analytic capability within the intelligence community.
- Sec. 308. Applicability to lawful United States intelligence activities of Federal laws implementing international treaties and agreements.
- Sec. 309. Limitation on handling, retention, and storage of certain classified materials by the Department of State.
- Sec. 310. Designation of Daniel Patrick Moynihan Place.

Subtitle B—Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office (DTS-PO)

- Sec. 321. Reorganization of Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office.
- Sec. 322. Personnel.
- Sec. 323. Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Oversight Board.
- Sec. 324. General provisions.

TITLE IV—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Sec. 401. Modifications to Central Intelligence Agency's central services program.

Intelligence
Authorization
Act for Fiscal
Year 2001.

Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

3 July 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director, National Security Agency
Director, National Imagery and Mapping Agency

SUBJECT: Designation of Intelligence Community Leads
for POW/MIA Analysis

In response to a request from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to establish and maintain an analytic capability within the Intelligence Community (IC) with responsibility for supporting activities related to prisoners of war and missing persons since 1990, I am taking the following actions:


- I assign primary responsibility for maintaining the IC Prisoners of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA) analytic capability to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). DIA will establish a small permanent core element charged with ensuring that DIA and the IC at large develop and maintain current collection priorities, develop applicable doctrine, focus appropriate analytic resources, and prepare to surge as necessary to ensure timely and effective support to ongoing and future POW/MIA personnel recovery cases.
- I direct the National Security Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency each to designate a senior Point of Contact who shall be responsible for ensuring all appropriate support to Department of Defense and DIA efforts with regard to POW/MIA analysis.


George J. Tenet

C05999014

SUBJECT: Designation of Intelligence Community Leads
for POW/MIA Analysis

ORIG: ADCI/AP [redacted] mjt (21May01 - AP 013/01)



Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

3 July 2001

The Honorable Bob Graham
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This letter is in response to a Congressionally Directed Action from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report of Fiscal Year 2001 that requested the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to establish and maintain an analytic capability within the Intelligence Community (IC) with responsibility for supporting activities related to prisoners of war and missing persons since 1990.

In response to the Committee Report, I have taken the following actions:


- Assigned primary responsibility for maintaining the Intelligence Community Prisoners of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA) analytic capability to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). DIA will establish a small permanent core element charged with ensuring that DIA and the IC at large develop and maintain current collection priorities, develop applicable doctrine, focus appropriate analytic resources, and prepare to surge as necessary. This element will ensure timely and effective support both to ongoing efforts to recover missing personnel (Personnel Recovery) and to such future cases as might arise.
- Directed that the National Security Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency designate senior Points of Contact who shall be responsible for ensuring all appropriate support to Department of Defense and DIA efforts in this regard.

I am confident the inherent capabilities of the IC, augmented by these steps, will position the Community to

participate and respond effectively to both current and future Personnel Recovery and other POW/MIA requirements. DIA has already undertaken actions in conjunction with its newly designated responsibilities.

Originals of this letter are also being sent to the leadership of the committees with intelligence oversight responsibilities.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "George J. Tenet", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

George J. Tenet

Enclosure

Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

3 July 2001

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

This letter is in response to a Congressionally Directed Action from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report of Fiscal Year 2001 that requested the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to establish and maintain an analytic capability within the Intelligence Community (IC) with responsibility for supporting activities related to prisoners of war and missing persons since 1990.

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
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Originals of this letter are also being sent to the leadership of the committees with intelligence oversight responsibilities.

Sincerely,


George J. Tenet

Enclosure

Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

3 July 2001

The Honorable Porter J. Goss
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This letter is in response to a Congressionally Directed Action from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report of Fiscal Year 2001 that requested the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to establish and maintain an analytic capability within the Intelligence Community (IC) with responsibility for supporting activities related to prisoners of war and missing persons since 1990.

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Originals of this letter are also being sent to the leadership of the committees with intelligence oversight responsibilities.

Sincerely,


George J. Tenet

Enclosure

Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

3 July 2001

The Honorable Nancy Pelosi
Ranking Democratic Member
Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Ms. Pelosi:

This letter is in response to a Congressionally Directed Action from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report of Fiscal Year 2001 that requested the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to establish and maintain an analytic capability within the Intelligence Community (IC) with responsibility for supporting activities related to prisoners of war and missing persons since 1990.


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Sincerely,



George J. Tenet

Enclosure

Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

3 July 2001

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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
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Sincerely,

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George J. Tenet

Enclosure

Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

3 July 2001

The Honorable Jerry Lewis
Chairman
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This letter is in response to a Congressionally Directed Action from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report of Fiscal Year 2001 that requested the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to establish and maintain an analytic capability within the Intelligence Community (IC) with responsibility for supporting activities related to prisoners of war and missing persons since 1990.


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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "George J. Tenet", is written over the typed name. The signature is stylized and somewhat illegible due to overlapping lines.

George J. Tenet

Enclosure

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

(b)(3)

SUBJECT: Documentation Concerning Possible Interrogation of U.S. POWs/MIAs by Soviet Officers.

FROM: Richard W. Coffman
C/ORMS/CCA

DATE SENT
10 Jan.
1992

REQUEST NUMBER

DD/O 0025/005-92

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)

1. Jim Anders, C/EA/ICOG

2. C/CCS

3. C/OGC

4.

5. C/CTC

6. DC/ORMS

7. C/ORMS

8. SA/DDO

9. ADDO

10. DDO

11. Robert Wagner, C/OCA/S

12.

Attachment: Weaver debriefing.
To be held by C/EA/ICOG

*Please hand carry to next office.
Thank you.*

1/10

1/10

10

1/10/92

1/13

1-13

1-13

13 Jan

SUSPENSE DATE:

RETURN TO:

~~SECRET~~

DB/O 0025/005-92

10 January 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert W. Magner
Chief, Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: Richard W. Coffman
Chief, Congressional and Covert Action Oversight
Group
Operations and Resource Management Staff

SUBJECT: Documentation Concerning Possible Interrogation
of U.S. POWs/MIAs by Soviet Officers

REFERENCE: Letter of 13 December 1991 from Senators John
Kerry and Bob Smith of the Select Committee on
POW/MIA Affairs to the DCI

1. We note a Tass news agency dispatch of 4 January 1992 quoting a spokeswoman of the Russian Interrepublic Security Service (ISS), the successor organization to the former KGB Second Chief Directorate, that the Russian authorities thoroughly searched KGB files and uncovered records of one contact with a U.S. POW in 1973. According to the Tass dispatch, the Soviets suspected the American of being an intelligence officer but the U.S. POW refused to meet with the Soviets a second time. Our Station is continuing to press the ISS on this matter and on any information of Soviet contact with U.S. POWs.

2. We have reviewed our files and have identified an incident in 1973 that may match the above Tass account. An ~~Agency officer was captured by the Vietnamese in January 1968~~ during the Tet offensive and held until his release on 16 March 1973. During his debriefing, the officer said he was interrogated in January 1973 by a man he presumed was a Soviet. We will make available a copy of the relevant transcript for review at CIA Headquarters by appropriately cleared and designated Committee personnel.

3. In a second instance, an Agency officer was captured by the North Vietnamese Army on 16 April 1975 and held by the

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
~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Documentation Concerning Possible Interrogation of U.S. POWs/MIAs by Soviet Officers

Vietnamese until 30 October of that year. During his debriefing, this officer said he believed the Soviets were in the near background relative to his interrogation. There is no further indication that this officer, now deceased, was ever interrogated by Soviet personnel.

4. In regard to an earlier Soviet press report of an American military pilot present in the village of Saryshagan, Dzhezkazgan Oblast, the ISS said it had made several initial attempts to gain access to the area but was turned back for security reasons by the military that controls the area. Recently, however, the ISS did succeed in entering Saryshagan. Its investigative checks and interviews gave no indication that Americans were ever present there.

5. Information concerning the recent debriefing of former KGB General Oleg Kalugin by the U.S. Defense Attache's Office in Moscow would have to be obtained either from DoD or the State Department. Similarly, the 1955 document labeled "Re U.S. POWs in the USSR" which National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft withheld in 1991 from public release would have to be obtained from the White House.




Richard W. Coffman

2
SECRET



~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Documentation Concerning Possible Interrogation of U.S.
POWs/MIAs by Soviet Officers

DO/ORMS/CCA/ARyan:sc



(10 January 1992)



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

27 April 1973

ATTACHMENT #6 to SR DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

SUBJECT: Interrogation of Mr. Eugene WEAVER by a Probable Soviet Intelligence Officer on 31 January 1973.

Extracted from Tape One, Side One, 23 April 1973

Mc. Alright. Do you know the date, the date of the meeting with the Soviet?

W. The date of the meeting?

Mc. The date of the meeting.

W. It was the 31st of January, 1973.

Mc. Can you give me a little bit of the chronology of it. Was it in the early morning...was there any forewarning at all that he was coming in?

W. He, on the 30th. I talked to the interrogator known as the Grand Inquisitor. We just called him "GI".

Mc. GI.

W. So I met with GI on the 30th and this had been the first meeting since probably 1970. And, along with a lot of chatter.

Mc. The first time with GI since 1970....

W. 1970....yes, and he said that "I want you to meet a member of the Socialist Camp." And I asked what nationality and he wouldn't answer it. And then, the next day, when I was taken there.....

Mc. When you were what?

W. The next day, when I returned to this house No. 30,

there was a stranger was sitting there.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Mc. And that was at what, in the morning?

W. This was in the morning, so, somewhere around, perhaps around 8 o'clock. 8 or 9 because food was served about 11. As I recall, we didn't talk much more than two hours. In the vicinity of 2 or 3.

Mc. House No. 30 was an interrogation center?

W. No, it was, I believe a government reception house because other prisoners were also taken there to this place. And simply greeted and given something to drink, tea, tangerines, it was used as a reception center, for the government. It was set up with white covered furniture and white draperies, for the Soviet photographer (sic).

Mc. Had you been to House 30 before?

W. Only on the 30th.

Mc. And that was the time that the Grand Inquisitor came to the camp to see you for the first time since 1970?

W. Since '70.

Mc. Alright fine. Let's go back to 8 or 9 o'clock. You came to House 30 and the European was there.

W. Yes.

Mc. Alright. You take it from there.

W. Alright. When I arrived he was seated, there was the Grand Inquisitor, the European, and the fellow I call "Paunchy" who was the, I am quite sure he was the DRV intelligence officer.

Mc. At the camp?

W. He had been at the camp on two other occasions and I was told by other interrogators that he was a very very important man. He could make changes at this camp.

Mc. You were told by whom?

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

W. By one of the interrogators.

Mc. Alright, fine. His relationship with GI was what?

W. Definitely a senior.

Mc. To GI?

W. Yes. GI did not strike me as an intelligence officer whereas Paunchy definitely did. So back now? In House 30?

Mc. Okay, we're in House 30 with three people and you walk in....

W. Alright. He arose when I came in and extended his hand, shook hands. He was about, somewhere in the early forties, about 5'10"-ish, -10"-11" - he was a bit shorter than I am 5'11", he was a bit shorter than I - ah, he was a big boned fellow, his wrists, and I could see his ankles and his throat were heavy. He had a bulbulous nose, not a WC Fields type but a prominent nose. Dark eyebrows, brown eyes, he had a gold tooth in the back of his jaws - you could see it when he smiled. No, actually, he left, he chuckled once, opened up his mouth. His hair struck me as being two shades of black, so I thought he had a hairpiece on. It was the first time I'd seen hair combed this way - he looked like a nut. His hair was combed forward, right down to his eyebrows and as a habit he would pick his hand up over his forehead and then bring down his little finger, and then VERY CAREFULLY scratch his forehead, so that he wouldn't disturb his locks. He wore a dark suit, white shirt, dark tie, and I remember black socks, black shoes, and little short socks. He had a watch, and I don't believe he had a ring on. He spoke very good English, the accent was not recognizable as that of Russian, but just slightly slavic.

Mc. Did he try some on you?

W. No. No Russian.

Mc. He spoke no Russian during the time you were there?

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

W. He spoke no Russian, but I threw two little gimmicks to see if he would bite, and we were talking about, when he asked about the instructors at Georgetown I mentioned BOLDREYEFF.

Mc. This was Constantin BOLDREYEFF?

W. I don't know. I didn't say Constantin. But I said BOLDREYEFF was one of the instructors of the course at Georgetown, and that he was NTS, and this Soviet-type wrote it down without asking me....what is the meaning of NTS....he wrote it right straight out....and then another thing I tried was....talked about the defector Boris OLSHANSKY....you know OLSHANSKY had been an instructor at Georgetown, and then a description of the man. He asked me if I knew where he was born. I said Osovotnovo (sic)....and he wrote it right out in English. I said it rapidly with a Russian accent so that, to see if he would take a double check, but he didn't falter, he just wrote it right out. And he took all his notes in English. He had a folder, and I could see from all his notes the shuffle of paper that there were several lines of writing on each page, leaving all the blank at the bottom, so I assume that this was interrogation material.

Mc. Did you gain any impression at all of the position of this man vis-a-vis Paunchy?

W. No, other than that they were very polite to him. The GI took notes later on, after a short conversation we picked up the reception room and walked into another section of the room which had merely been divided with a long curtain down to the floor, like two rooms out of the one big one. And there was a table, a large table.

Mc. How long were you in the first room?

W. Oh, perhaps a half an hour. He spoke almost..... In the beginning he said nothing. I was wondering when he was going to talk. He didn't open up his mouth. He just sort of smiled a little bit at the questions I was asking. I was asking GI who the man was, what does he want, and (GI said) "Oh, he just wants to talk

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to you, he is a member of the Socialist Camp". Then we had this little go-around for a little while and then, so that we were there drinking tea and eating a few tangerines we were there for perhaps about half an hour only and he was asking me questions at that time, about training....

Mc. He began to question you at that point.

W. He began to question me at that point.

Mc. Can you remember the sequence of questions that he asked?

W. Yes, the first one was about....it was about the Russian language training. He, he was not much, in other words, he wasn't a, there was no social exchange at all. He sat quietly until he was sure it was time to start asking questions. He didn't try to get into a rapport situation.

Mc. Did he let Paunchy take the, it was Paunchy who actually answered your questions about the European at first?

W. Gi was the interpreter in the case. And he said, he said "I have given him your biography", and then the question turned to if you had Russian language training. I said yes. Where at? And I said at the University of Wisconsin and then I had training at the Foreign Service Institute. And then they asked who were the other students. And I said Colonel Taylor, an Air Force Colonel, who had gone to Moscow, William McBaden, an ICSO who had also gone to Moscow in an administrative position, and a Warren Kelsey, who was an FRO. He carefully took the names down. And then, I said that after FSI I had gone to Cornell for a summer session, then to Georgetown. He asked who were the instructors and I recalled BOLDREYEFF.

Mc. Did he ask you about Cornell?

W. No. No. Boris OLSHIANSKY - and I didn't recall any others. He asked me who were the other CIA students... and I said that it had been in a very small unit with Colonel Taylor usually.

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Mc. The same one you were at FSI with?

W. Yes. And that Colonel Taylor was preparing to go to Moscow. And our courses at that time were fairly well tailored, there was, I was not in a large class, so I did not know....

Mc. Did you answer the question? About CIA students?

W. Well, I did this in an evasive way, to explain it to him that we were not bunched up as a group and went right specifically back the way you did, with the students, so I said well I vaguely remember a man called Summers, Frank Summers. So that was the one man. I mentioned that Georgetown University was also used by his outfit. And, he said what do you mean, and I said well, there was a KGB student going to school there at one time I had heard, and then he became very interested about this...what was his name, when was this, Oh, I said I didn't recall exactly the date, but it happened a number of years ago, that he was an exchange student, that some American students were going to Moscow and that this fellow as one of those exchange students, and that it was known that he was KGB -- KGB officer. He (the European) used words, he used words like "case officer", "chief of station", he used those expressions. I did not. I noticed the expression "chief of station" is used in the newspapers now.

Mc. It is now?

W. It is now. I've seen it, yes.

~~Mc. I'm not so sure it was used so far back, I don't know. As a matter of fact it wasn't so far back so it could very well be that he has read the New York Times or something like that.~~

W. I wouldn't doubt it at all. His English was excellent. His American was excellent, I should say.

Mc. Then it really was American.

W. Oh yes, yes. I'm anxious to look through some pictures ~~to find that band.~~

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- Mc. Do you have any feeling from the time that you spent with this man that he was a KGB as opposed to GRU, or GRU as opposed to KGB?
- W. You couldn't tell. Because there were no intelligence, positive intelligence questions at all, actually no direction.
- Mc. Will you continue discussion the session with him?
- W. Alright. He was very much interested in the identity of this KGB officer at Georgetown, and I left it vague. I said that I was very much interested in OLSHANSKY as an instructor as opposed to his personal habits. His personal habits were very bad, but I enjoyed learning the language from him because he spoke a modern type of Russian, as opposed to the old emigre types that there are at Georgetown. He wanted to know what other schools are used. And I said that there was nothing definite in this whatsoever, that there are no courses because of security reasons. There is no pattern of courses at this school or at that -- that they are tailored for the individual and they are used throughout the country. Then he switched to this third subject I'm trying to think of.
- Mc. The first subject being your Russian (Language) training?, then what was your second subject?
- W. The second subject....the third, the third subject was how do you identify CIA case officers abroad?
- Mc. What was the second subject?
- W. This is what I'm trying to recall.
- Mc. Ok.
- W. It, put it on the tape last week with (Bill) Johnson (CI/OPS), so I'm afraid it to be....it's lost.. I can't think of it right now. Well, let's go into the third then....the third subject was how to identify CIA case officers abroad...and case officers is what he used. And I used the criteria I used in Bangkok of

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identifying Soviet case officers. I said that the Embassy would have a, would have a room separated from others, that perhaps he would work with a select group in a room separated from others. That the (waste) basket would be clean. That cleaning women would have trouble getting into his room at the hours that they chose. That he provided the exact hours that they could come and clean. I said that the man would have an automobile and his wife would not drive it. I said that it would be a good chance there there would be a special telephone switching in his office and that if you called him directly there would be a switching on the line, you would hear clicks or noises indicating that he is being switched out. Then I said that he would be a front man to provide some of the initial interview situations for people who come into an Embassy, or questions or crackpots, or what have you. That he would be a front man to do this. That was about it.....I gave, as I recall about four points, and it was an easy subject to talk about with him because I was simply using his own service in this case. He did not make an interrogation situation out of it, he didn't try any control, but he posed his questions very clearly, and copied down in English slowly.

As for the second.....just have to skip it at this point.

Mc. That's alright, we'll go back to it. Now at what time did you leave the one room after the half an hour and go into the second room?

W. Well, as I said we were only in the first room for about half an hour. And then we went into the second room.

Mc. What was the reason for the break?

W. Oh, they said, come let us talk in the next room. And we all picked up.

Mc. Any evidence of taping?

W. No. But I could tell, I was positioned in this one particular chair at the table, I was lead directly there.

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Mc. That room No. 2?

W. In this other section, yes. I say section because it was one large room with a drape, and this looked like a banquet room, it was a large table, some chairs for about 10-12 people and a chest of drawers in the background, it looked like a buffet. The lighting was very good. We were disturbed by the driver, the young interpreter that I called "John". John came in shuffling behind the curtain. They turned their heads, I couldn't see, his back was to me, and then he went back out to the jeep, the Soviet jeep they had, and then he got up his nerve I guess, the second time he came back to the curtain and I turned around and saw him standing there. And they talked and they told me it was time to leave, time to eat lunch. And then the Soviet put his pencil down, oh, incidently, he had rimless glasses on, he wore rimless glasses, and....

Mc. Bifocles?

W. Rimless glasses....I don't know....

Mc. Yes, but were they split, do you know....

W. Yes, I don't recall if they were split. Well, I was told to pick up and that he, he said that we would talk again this afternoon.

Mc. Now, how long were you in the second room before you were interrupted a second time?

W. Well, it would be about, somewhere around 2 hours. All together I figure something between 2, between 2 and 3, but it certainly wasn't three hours. Not that much. 8 to 9, 9 to 10, and then food was put out at 10.

Mc. At the camp.

W. At the camp. It was served somewhere around 9:30 in the morning, early. And when I arrived the bowls were in my cell. And cold.

Mc. ~~When you returned from your second session back to your cell.~~

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W. Yes.

Mc. Ok. Then let's continue, in the second room. Was there a break in the subjects that were being asked you?

W. Yes, because, yes there was a change in the subject. He had finished up what he had been talking about. Oh, the third, the second topic is how an FSO, how does a man (i.e., a CIA man) become an FSO? He picked this up after we had moved to, what is called the dining room. Then he started questioning me on this, how does a man become an FSO? And what came to mind at that time was the fact that the Soviets in Mexico were trying to recruit an American student, as I recall at one time years ago, and trying to recruit an American student as a penetration into State. So what came to mind was they've got this information, and it's accurate, and now they want to check it, check me on the reliability of the stories -- that immediately came to mind. And then I proceeded to say that the applicants finds out at a government building, usually a post office when and where a test will be given in his area. He then appears and takes a comprehensive examination and if this examination is then sent to Washington, and if the Department of State is interested in him, he is then called to Washington for an interview. And then, based on the interview and his examination, background, then he would be accepted. And he said "Does CIA do this?" "Do CIA officers do this" "How do CIA officers do this"....and I said that CIA officers are....

Mc. I'm sorry.

W. Yes?

Mc. Was this question actually "How does one become a CIA officer?"

W. No. How does a CIA officer become a Foreign Service officer?

Mc. Okay.

W. "How did you?" he asked specifically. And I said that

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it was handled, in my case, by the personnel officers of both organizations. That I filled out forms, I swore an oath, and the paperwork is handled by personnel. Then he said "How does, how can a CIA officer become a Foreign Service Officer...how would he go through the normal FSO channels?" Well, this, I had no idea of, I was really, just what I told him was that I said I think, I think that the CIA officer goes to his home town area, and then makes an application and appears at his home town, at this regional examination center, he takes the examination there with other applicants, who then see -- see him and perhaps will be in the service for years as bonafide FSOs. And he takes this examination and the examination is then sent to Washington, and a personnel officer will then contact State and say we have a man in your channel and we want him to become an FSO. And so then the man is then invited to Washington from his area. He will probably be with other applicants, they will think him as bonafide as he goes through this...they'll probably vouch for him for years as having been a bonafide man, FSO applicant. This is, this was notional, completely. He took this down very carefully, step by step, with questions, detailed questions on where are these areas, what kind of questions are asked, no, no, on the examination itself he did not ask me a single question, content of the examination, but he was very much interested in the interview that takes place, - where did the interview take place.

Mc. This is the selection panel interview, the State...

W. Yes, the selection panel. But I didn't say selection panel, I said he was interviewed. Is this smoking irritating you?

Mc. No, no, not at all. Thank you.

W. So, now since this question came as the second question I don't think he was trying to establish a rapport. He could have started out with something like this; if you consider he had this information, it's overt information with the exception of this secret entry. But he put this in between. He got right down to business with the questions on my Russian training.

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Then this one. And then the last question was on the -- how to identify a CIA man abroad. And that's where we left it. When I got up and left.

Mc. For lunch.

W. Yes. And he said, I will see you this afternoon. Well, when I got in the jeep and we were halfway back to prison, No. 30 is in town, right across the street from a lake in the middle of Hanoi, I said I was not going to return. And I guess John, John was the handler there, John said "Why?" And I said "Well, now John, this is a Russian intelligence officer and I can't talk with him." And he wouldn't admit it. He said "I'll pick you up after lunch." I had a, they gave me a black suit to wear, and big black shoes, and a white shirt, no tie was handy.... "I'll pick you up this afternoon" and I said "Don't bother, I'm not going" and he sort of laughed it off. It wasn't serious. And he said "Why?", and I said "Well, now look John, this man is an intelligence officer, a Soviet and if I talk to him I'll just walk out of your prison into an American prison. It is ridiculous, I'm not going to talk to him any more." And he said "Well, I'll see you" and then he returned me to my cell and came in the afternoon, fully expecting me to be ready, and I had taken off the clothes, was back in my prison pajamas, and he said "Oh, you must go. They are waiting for you". And I said "No, I'm not going". He said "Well, I'll have to go to the camp commander and they'll force you to go." And I said "No, I'm not going. If they want to talk to me, let them come to the cell and talk to me." And he says "No -- they can't come here." And this was just, he lost a great opportunity to keep his mouth shut. And then I was firmly convinced that nothing ~~other than violence could get me to move. Well, he~~ left the cell and returned a couple of hours later. And again started this business of "you must to". And, it was this day, that night I passed this information over to the pilots, that I had been out, that I had been talking to a Soviet intelligence officer, and they were keeping me in solitary, that they were keeping all the other prisoners in groups somewhere.

Mc. You were, prior to this time, aware that you were returning to the United States?

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W. Oh yes. On the 26th of January (1973) at mountain camp, an official, an elderly official came and made the announcement that we would be returned in 60 days. So I knew this, and also there was a mechanic it seemed, an interrogator known as Mao, or Bug-Eyes, came and gave me a sheet of paper with statements from the cease-fire agreement, indicating that, that prisoners, how they were to be treated, humanely, and that they were to be released and that they were not to be punished. Could not get additional punishment which would keep them beyond 60 days. So I was sure with this, it was something to go by. And I thought if they continued to keep me in there that the Red Cross or this Four-Power Commission would come through. Well, this was a faint hope actually, because at no time, right to the day of our release, did we see any visiting officials like Red Cross or Four-Power Commission. Then, when John came again, he said that the member of the Socialist camp won't be present. He, he won't be present, so come on, let's go. I said no, I'm simply not going to. If your man wants to talk to me let him come to the prison to talk to me. So it wasn't a case of my refusal, I left this hanging business about being willing to talk to them if they wanted to talk but this had to be in prison.

Mc. When you passed the word to the pilots, what, how did you manage that?

W. Well, I was in the section of the camp known as, known by, known to the pilots as New-Guy Village. It's directly to the left side of the entrance to the camp, and then later transferred to two other sections of the prison. But I was in a solitary cell, the bloc had four cells in it. As I hung laundry I saw them before. Beyond this section were rooms I couldn't see but I could hear the men talking and from the conversation I assumed they were pilots....they were talking about being shot down. It was only at certain times during the day that I could hear them....it was at the siesta hour and then after 5 o'clock, when prisoners are going to be locked in. I heard them talk so I whistled - I whistled an Air Force song, I whistled a Marine song.....

~~END OF SOVIET INTERROGATION ATTACHMENT.~~~~SECRET~~

THE WORLD

Washington Post declined
excuse me, I didn't mean it, my
mistake," Aguilar said.

in Hong Kong yes-
Beijing had never ac-
s reported by the of-
ed during the summer

believe that a large pro-
than two years later,

Prisoners
who were jailed
1976-83 military dictator-
law for up to \$40 for

igned the measure into
dicted yesterday that as
for the settlements.

Argentina's claim to
Falkland Islands be-
tation. He said he was
eventually see its claim

American
American aid worker
six months was freed
embassy and aid officials

ed over to Gerald Feier-
war, by a guerrilla lead-
ing group. A U.S. official

said DeHart was in good shape and would be reunited
with his family soon.

Cuba Seeks Return of Defectors

■ HAVANA—State television said Cuba's Communist
government was seeking the immediate return of a
stolen helicopter and the 34 Cuban defectors who flew
it to the United States.

U.S. officials said the defectors, who flew to Florida
on Friday, had been released by immigration author-
ities and reunited with family members in Florida. They
had requested political asylum, the officials said.

Cuban television said the Air Cubana helicopter was
stolen by "a traitor," whom it named as German
Pompa Gonzalez, a reserve helicopter co-pilot.

KGB Allegations Denied

■ MOSCOW—Russian intelligence denied allegations
that agents of the former Soviet KGB had interro-
gated U.S. prisoners of war held illegally by Vietnam.

Tass news agency quoted foreign intelligence agen-
cy spokeswoman Tatyana Samolis as saying Russian
authorities had made a thorough study of KGB files.
Only one contact with a U.S. prisoner was recorded in
1973. He was suspected of being a spy but refused to
see KGB agents a second time, the spokeswoman said.

This contradicted the allegations of retired KGB
general Oleg Kalugin on Thursday that Soviet agents
had questioned at least three U.S. POWs in 1978.

From news services

Arab Delegates Delay Departure for Talks

Associated Press

AMMAN, Jordan, Jan. 4—Arab delegates to the Mid-
dle East peace talks delayed their departure for Wash-
ington today to protest Israel's decision to expel
Palestinian activists.

The Palestine Liberation Organization, meanwhile,
debated whether to urge a boycott of the next round of
talks, scheduled to resume on Tuesday. It was not clear
whether the other Arab delegations would abide by any
PLO demands.

On Friday, Palestinian delegates from the occupied
territories announced they would delay leaving for the
talks and urged Washington to press Israel not to expel
the 12 Arabs, who are accused of links to anti-Israeli
groups in the occupied territories.

Jordan, Syria and Lebanon postponed their depart-
ures today and gave no indication of when they would
leave.

The spokesman for the Israeli government, Ehud
Gol, said the nation's negotiators will be ready to re-
sume talks with Arab neighbors on Tuesday as sched-
uled.

Palestinian negotiators claim Israel is trying to sab-
otage the peace effort, and they are waiting for a de-
cision by the PLO on a proposed boycott. The PLO does
not have a direct role in the talks, but has influence
over the Palestinian delegation.

A senior PLO official said by telephone from Tunis
that a decision was expected on Sunday.

C06016455

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REMARKS

Here is an update from our previous reports. Pls feel free to send it on to Kerry, et al., if you wish.



DC NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disosals, clearances, and simliar actions

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OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-75)
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SECRET

**SUBJECT: Inquiries Concerning U.S. POW's and MIA's in the
Former Soviet Union**

In response to an inquiry made by a declared Moscow Station officer on 16 December 1991 to a senior officer of the Interrepublic Security Service (ISS - successor to the former KGB Second Chief Directorate) concerning U.S. POW's and MIA's allegedly either interrogated by Soviet officials or present on Soviet territory after 1973, we were notified on 03 January 1992 that the ISS had researched its archives and found nothing that would indicate KGB or Russian contact with U.S. POW's in Southeast Asia subsequent to 1968/69. The contact in 1968/69, said the ISS officer, would either have been by GRU officers or KGB officers attached as military advisors to the Vietnamese. As such, any substantive record of the contact would be in GRU or military archives, to which the ISS has no access.

Regarding the earlier Soviet press report of an American military pilot present in the village of Saryshagan, Dzhezkazgan Oblast, the ISS officer said his organization had made several initial attempts to gain access to the area, but was turned back for reasons of security by the military that controls the area. More recently, the ISS succeeded in entering Saryshagan; its investigative checks and interviews gave no indication that Americans were ever present there.

The ISS officer assured us that he would continue to follow up on our request, but said he was not optimistic that he could uncover anything more positive.

Note: We learned on 02 January 1992 that both of our primary contacts in the Russian Agency for Federal Security (AFB -- successor of the Russian KGB) were removed from their official positions in that organization. Furthermore, it is clear that there is much confusion within the security service bureaucracy as Yeltsin pursues his attempt to merge the ISS, AFB and MVD under a single Ministry for Security and Internal Affairs. This situation makes it uncertain exactly when our December 1991 request for POW/MIA information made to the AFB might receive attention and when, consequently, we might receive a response. Despite this situation, we will continue to work with our remaining AFB contacts and press them for any POW/MIA information to which they or their organization may have access.

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~~SUBJECT: Inquiries Concerning U.S. POWs and MIAs in
the Former USSR~~

In response to an inquiry made by a declared Moscow Station officer to a senior officer of the Interrepublic Security Service (ISS - successor to the former KGB Second Chief Directorate) on 29 November 1991 concerning U.S. POWs and MIAs in the USSR, we were notified by the ISS officer on 3 December 1991 that he had undertaken "an exhaustive search of available information and resources, and had come up with no indication of such presence in the USSR, past or present."

The same ISS officer passed a written "official" response on 6 December 1991 to our declared Moscow Station officer. The following is a translation of that response:

"At our request, an investigation was conducted in Kazakhstan concerning the supposed presence of an American military pilot in the village of Saryshagan, Dzhezkazgan Oblast, as presented in the newspaper 'Kommersant' (no. 42, dated 4 November 1991). The pilot was reportedly taken prisoner during the period of war in Indochina.

"As a result of the investigation, which included questioning long-time residents, no information was obtained about the presence in that region at any time of an American pilot.

"On our part, we also do not have any information about American military personnel located on the territory of the USSR who were missing in action during the course of military activities in Indochina."

In response to alleged statements by retired KGB General Oleg Kalugin, reported by Australian television, that he had been involved in the interrogation of Americans in Vietnam during the period 1975 to 1978, we have tasked Moscow Station with asking the ISS and the Russian Republic Federal Security Service to confirm the remarks attributed to Kalugin and provide details. The Station is also to seek instructions from those services as to how an inquiry might be put to the military intelligence service, the GRU.

~~Note: On 29 November 1991 an embassy officer and military attache both had a conversation with Kalugin in which the latter commented on KGB contacts with American POWs in Vietnam. According to the embassy officer Kalugin said he was aware of only one instance when the KGB was allowed contact with American POWs. In circa 1968 two of his KGB colleagues interviewed a senior U.S. seaman, a U.S. pilot, and a CIA~~

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employee. The military attache reported Kalugin as saying that a three or four man team had been sent to Vietnam to interview U.S. prisoners, and had interviewed a "senior" naval officer, a U.S. Air Force pilot and a "suspect CIA-related person." Kalugin is also quoted as saying "this was the only time KGB agents (sic) met with American POWs in Vietnam." Both reports state that Kalugin cited the possibility that the GRU may have at some point interviewed U.S prisoners in Vietnam, although he professed no knowledge that this was the case.

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81-1588

OLC 81-1413
25 June 1981

(b)(3)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence


FROM: Acting Legislative Counsel

SUBJECT: Meeting with Representative Robert J. Dornan (R., CA)
on POW/MIA Matters

1. Representative Dornan called personally on 16 June 1981 with a formal request to meet with you on the POW/MIA issue. He said that he has been following it for 16 years and just a few weeks ago was named Chairman of the Task Force on POW/MIA's of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. He said that Representatives Benjamin Gilman (R., NY), John LeBoutillier (R., NY), and William Hendon (R., NC) are Members of the Task Force and would like to be included in the meeting.

2. Representative Dornan expressed some frustration at not being able to get information from DIA on the results of the recent mission into Laos to collect information on a suspected POW camp. He added that he had tried to get some help from Admiral Turner when he was Director but never really got what he wanted. He said that he had talked to McMurtrie Godley in Laos some years ago and also to an Air Force Lt. Col. Shinkle about the CIA roles in Laos. He had concluded that CIA wanted everybody out of Laos including those on POW/MIA missions.

3. The Congressman was advised that DIA is indeed the action agency for POW/MIA matters, not CIA. That didn't seem to deter him at all. He was vague when asked what specifically he wanted to talk to you about. We have learned that DIA prepared a POW/MIA update briefing for the Task Force as recently as 11 June 1981 but when they got there Representative Dornan asked about the results of the recent collection operation. DIA said they know little about the results other than that there were no Caucasians sighted. DIA did not say whether they referred Representative Dornan to us. In any event, that explains why he said he ran into a dead end with DIA. It is almost certain, therefore, that Representative Dornan's first question will be: What were the results of the operation? He will also be interested in the role the Agency plays in receiving and referring information on POW/MIA's to DIA. Representative Dornan believes that he has a legitimate basis for making a request for information on the results of the operation. He is not seeking--and should not be given--details on the sources and methods involved.

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United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND
FORESTRY
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ETHICS

July 22, 1981

(b)(6)

Executive Registry

81-4790

Admiral B. R. Inman, USN
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Admiral Inman:

During the past several months a number of news accounts and unconfirmed reports have created a rekindled public interest in the issue of prisoners-of-war and missing-in-action personnel in Southeast Asia. Just this week the return of three more bodies of American servicemen, two of whom were known to be prisoners, highlights a disturbing situation and raises the desire of the American people to learn more about their missing servicemen. We are also anxious to determine the possible purpose of the Vietnamese in withholding a full account of all former POW's and MIA's.

The numbers are well-known to most of us: 2,500 unaccounted for, 96 known POW's not returned in 1973, 1,279 MIA's, 1,178 known dead not recovered. Since 1975 approximately 900 reports from Indochinese refugees concerning alleged sightings of live Americans, grave sites, aircraft crash sites, and POW encampments have filtered to American military intelligence for investigation. Congressional committees have established the fact that more knowledge is available from North Vietnam but have done little to obtain it.

I would like to think that our intelligence network has tried to bring the situation into focus and perhaps provide a method for finally resolving this problem. I also hope that the announced commando-style raid into Laos several months ago was a harbinger of renewed interest and commitment on this subject.

The purpose of my letter is to ask for your personal assistance in providing me with a full briefing on the situation in Southeast Asia as it now stands, and the efforts of our various agencies that are pursuing this issue. I am enclosing for your information a listing of eight Arkansans who, by date of their casualty, may be considered unaccounted for, except by presumptive finding of death, and ask for any information that you may have on them.


R100

Page 2

It is my intention to support any and all efforts to resolve the question of whether or not live Americans are being held in Southeast Asia, and to ensure that the Administration is aware of the support in the Congress for pursuit of this goal.

Thank you in advance for your assistance.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "David Pryor", written over a horizontal dashed line.

David Pryor

NAME	SSN	Date of Birth	Hometown
SMS Robert Thomas Elliot	<input type="text"/>	18 Dec 48	El Dorado
COL James Sheppard Morgan	<input type="text"/>	17 Aug 28	El Dorado
COL Ernest Leo DeSoto	<input type="text"/>	30 Dec 31	Manning
CMS Thomas Edward Knebel	<input type="text"/>	11 Jun 47	Midway
PFC James Rickey Maxwell	<input type="text"/>	20 Feb 57	Center Ridge
SSGT Cleveland Evans, Jr.	<input type="text"/>	22 Nov 45	Hot Springs
LT James Erlan Teague	<input type="text"/>	23 Jul 43	Harrisburg
MSGT James William Holt	<input type="text"/>	19 Sep 41	Hot Springs

C06026600

DAVID PRYOR
ARKANSAS

248 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
(202) 224-2393

ARKANSAS OFFICE:
3030 FEDERAL BUILDING
LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS 72201
(501) 378-6336

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

COMMITTEES:
AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND
FORESTRY
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ETHICS

Executive Order
81-4812

July 23, 1981


Admiral B. R. Inman, USN
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Admiral Inman:

Attached you will find an updated listing of all Arkansans unaccounted for in Southeast Asia. This list supercedes the earlier list that I forwarded to you yesterday.

The attachment on yesterday's letter reflected only those unaccounted for as of January 1973. This list represents the complete unaccounted for listing for the entire timeframe of our involvement in Southeast Asia.

Sincerely,


David Pryor


DP/djj
Enclosure

15

P-100

LIST OF CASUALTIES INCURRED BY U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL
BY HOME STATE

NAME	SERVICE #	GRADE	HOMETOWN	BIRTHDATE
John Frederick Barr		LCDR	Hope	March 31, 1934
Marvin Earl Bell		SSGT	Blytheville	July 27, 1943
Harold George Bennett		SSGT	Perryville	October 16, 1940
Chambless M. Chesnutt		MAJ	Little Rock	August 13, 1934
Charles Edward Darr		CAPT	Little Rock	February 25, 1944
Ernest Leo DeSoto		COL	Manning	December 30, 1931
Robert Thomas Elliott		MSGT	El Dorado	December 18, 1948
Cleveland Evans, Jr.		SSGT	Hot Springs	November 22, 1945
Solomon Hughey Godwin		CWO	Hot Springs	January 24, 1935
James William Holt		MSGT	Hot Springs	September 19, 1941
Paul Laverne Jenkins		MSGT	McGehee	May 11, 1930
Thomas Edward Knebel		CMS	Midway	June 11, 1947
Lawrence Scott Mailhes		LTJG	Hot Springs	December 16, 1940
William Henderson Mason		COL	Camden	October 12, 1924
James Rickey Maxwell		PFC	Center Ridge	February 20, 1957
Virgil Kersh Meroney III		CAPT	Fayetteville	May 22, 1943
Walter Hugh Mcon		MAJ	Rudy	March 31, 1923
Richard Allan Moran		LCDP	Fort Smith	January 27, 1936
James Sheppard Morgan		COL	El Dorado	August 17, 1928
Linus Labin Oakley		SGT	Carthage	October 14, 1949
Ronald L. Roehrich		LTJG	Springdale	November 16, 1941
John Daniel Shewmake, Sr.		SFC	Adona	May 15, 1933
William Ward Smith		CAPT	Searcy	January 15, 1934

NAME	SERVICE #	GRADE	HOMETOWN	BIRTHDATE
Edd David Taylor		LT	Kensett	February 22, 1939
Lynn Michael Travis		LTJG	Newport	May 25, 1941
Therman Morris Waller		CMS	Wynne	February 9, 1943
Richard Wilson, Jr.		PEC	Crawfordsville	November 8, 1952
Karl Edward Worst		CAPT	Fort Smith	October 29, 1937

~~INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

81-2460

(b)(6)

14 SEP 1981

LLB 81-1754

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Director, External Affairs

SUBJECT : Request from Senator DeConcini to Meet With You on MIA Issue

1. [redacted] a Legislative Assistant from Senator Dennis DeConcini's (D., AZ) office, telephoned this morning to inform us that Senator DeConcini would like to meet with you next week. The Senator's schedule is fairly open on Friday, 18 September, and left it to you to offer a time that is convenient. Ms. Hawkins said the subject is to be MIA/POW's.

2. [redacted] direct line is 224-2065. If she happens not to be available, she suggested any information on the meeting be passed to [redacted] at the same number.

3. FYI: Senator Barry Goldwater (R., AZ) requested the DCI to brief the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) on 16 September on what the CIA is doing in the MIA/POW area. It became known to us indirectly that Goldwater's request was driven by constituent interest. This might also be the case with Senator DeConcini.

[redacted signature box]
 J. William Doswell

✓ Note to Doswell
✓ " " Only to get background material.

~~INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

100

~~SECRET~~

RECORD COPY

EX-8710/1

(b)(3)

16 NOV 1981
EAS 81-2212/1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Director, External Affairs
SUBJECT: Request for Briefing From the House Task Force on American POW/MIAs in Southeast Asia

1. Representative Robert K. Dornan (R., CA), Chairman of the House Task Force on American POW/MIAs in Southeast Asia, has requested that you appear before that group on 8 December. Representative Dornan has asked that you address any recent information on the collection effort in Laos earlier this year and the current resources, intelligence and operational, that the Agency is devoting on behalf of POW/MIAs. There are also specific questions about inter-Agency cooperation in his letter which is attached. The staff has indicated they plan to have a DIA witness appear along with you.

2. You will recall that you met with Representative Dornan and other Members of the House Foreign Affairs Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee on 19 July 1981 to brief them on the POW/MIA situation and the collection effort into Laos. Representative Dornan also visited you to discuss the same subject on 2 July 1981. If you approve, we will advise Representative Dornan that you will appear as requested. The DDO has been alerted to Representative Dornan's request and will provide whatever background information you may need.

J. William Doswell

Attachment
As stat

App

Disapprove

Date

11/16

*(Horn, dxB,
verified that
it is a closed
session)
11/19/81*

[Redacted box]

[Redacted box]

~~SECRET~~

Briefing of
House Task Force on American Prisoners and Missing In Southeast Asia
Tuesday - 8 December 1981
10:00 a.m.
2218 Rayburn House Office Building
(POW/MIAs in Southeast Asia)

Robert K. Dornan (R., CA), Chairman

Stephen J. Solarz (D., NY)
Howard Wolpe (D., MI)
Daniel A. Mica (D., FL)
Tom Lantos (D., CA)

Benjamin A. Gilman (R., NY)
Robert J. Lagomarsino (R., CA)
John LeBoutillier (R., NY)
Henry J. Hyde (R., IL)
Bill Hendon (R., NC)

ALSO INVITED

Bob Stump (D., AZ)
G. William Whitehurst (R., VA)
C. W. Bill Young (R., FL)

Senator Pete V. Domenici (R., NM)
Senator Jeremiah Denton (R., AL)
Senator S. I. Hayakawa (R., CA)