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31 August 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR:	OCA/Senate (Mr. Robert Magner)
VIA:	C/EA/ICOG
INFO:	DC/EA
FROM:	C/EA/ICOGPOW
SUBJECT:	Efforts to Determine Whether Ross Perot Was Briefed by COS, Vientiane in Vientiane in April 1970
records to an Agency Perot's early April the following record	en unable to find any reference in Agency y briefing of Mr. Ross Perot during Mr. 1970 visit to Vientiane, Laos. I searched ds: Ly Highlights for the period surrounding the
visit;	ry highlights for the period suffounding the
	oles from Vientiane Station to Chief, FE

2. At my request, the State Department has searched their Vientiane Embassy cable files for us. They have found four cables which mention the Perot visit, but none mentions any Embassy or CAS briefing. However, a State Department officer pointed out that such briefings are not always mentioned in embassy reporting back to the Department. The State Department is now new searching for four other Vientiane embassy cables, which were referred to in the first four, and have promised to Fax copies of all of the cables to us, once they have collected them.

--Logs of Congressional visits to Vientiane Station for

- 3. None of the Agency documents I reviewed mentions Mr. Perot or his visit. I confirmed via the library microfilms of the New York Times that Mr. Perot and party did in fact visit Vientiane on 5 and 6 April 1970. There are articles about it in the Times datelined Vientiane on both those dates.
- 4. We have also tried to obtain all the Vientiane Station cables for April 1970, but unfortunately Agency archives have

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collections of Vientiane cables datin are continuing that search, but as ye	
5. Another possibility would be other Station officers in Vientiane a attended a meeting with Mr. Perot, hathen ask those officers for their recond and other could be queried.	t that time might have d such occurred. We might

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Central Intelligence Agency

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Washington, D. C. 20505

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The Honorable John F. Kerry Chairman Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs United States Senate Washington, D.C.: 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your letter of December 20, 1991 which requested copies of CIA Intelligence Reports on "live sightings" in Laos after January 27, 1973. We are providing those reports we have identified in this category and are continuing to review our archives to ensure we fully satisfy your request.

Tabs A and B are two different forms of CIA reports which were disseminated to Intelligence Community members concerned with POW/MIA affairs. We have declassified these reports for the use of the Committee.

Tab C contains intelligence reports which were sent exclusively to the Defense Intelligence Agency for intelligence and operational purposes. Although we have redacted certain source information, these documents remain classified.

Tab D contains the documents requested by

These documents have been redacted but remain

classified. One of the documents requested by

April,87, was found to be a fabrication. As a
result, a Fabrication Notice was issued on July 9, 1987 stating
that the source of the report deliberately provided false and
misleading information. A copy of the notice is included as
part of Tab D.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 2-Dec-2013 1000

The Honorable John F. Kerry

In the event you need any of the original unredacted documents for review, please inform us, and we will make them available to you.

A copy of this letter is also being provided to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

Ks/ Stanley M. Moskowitz

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosures

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 2-Dec-2013

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Central Intelligence Agency



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The Honorable Bob Smith
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

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Sincerely,

Zs/ Stanley M. Moskowitz

Stanley M. Moskowitz Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosures

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•	DOI:	18 JUNE 1968	8 – January I	1987			
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GROUP OF 20 RESISTANCE SOLDIERS ASSOCIATED WITH ACCOMPANIED FOUR UNIDENTIFIED U.S. CITIZENS FROM THAILAND TO LAOS FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONTACTING A U.S. PRISONER OF WAR (POW) WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN DETAINED IN THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SRV). THE GROUP, LEAD BY DEPARTED THAILAND FROM KHEMARAT DISTRICT, UBON RACHATHANI PROVINCE, CROSSED THE MEKONG RIVER AND ENTERED LAOS THROUGH SOUTHERN SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE.

- 2. THE GROUP LEAD BY WAS REPORTEDLY TO LINK UP WITH AN ELEMENT OF THE RESISTANCE FORCES ALREADY IN LAOS. THE FOUR UNIDENTIFIED U.S. CITIZENS WERE EXPECTING TO RENDEZVOUS WITH THE U.S. POW WHO WAS BEING BROUGHT TO LAOS FROM THE SRV. THE RENDEZVOUS POINT IS ALLEGEDLY SOMEWHERE IN THE VICINITY OF BAN TANGVAY (WD 7014), SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE. (SOURCE COMMENT: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE IDENTITY OF THE POW, WHERE HE WAS DETAINED IN THE SRV OR HOW HE ALLEGEDLY MADE HIS WAY TO LAOS WAS NOT PROVIDED.)
- THERE WERE THREE UNIDENTIFIED PERSONS BELIEVED TO BE U.S. CITIZENS WHO WERE TEMPORARILY STAYING IN A HOUSE RENTED BY IN MUKDAHAN CITY, MUKDAHAN PROVINCE.

 ONE OF THE UNIDENTIFIED PERSONS TELEPHONED AN ASSOCIATE IN JUNE TO DISCUSS MATTERS RELATED TO "PRISONERS." (SOURCE COMMENT: THERE WAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE DISCUSSION OR THE PERSONS INVOLVED.)

DIST: 27 AUGUST 1987 EXCLUSIVE DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED AT END OF REPORT COUNTRY: LAOS SUBJ: POW/MIA: ALLEGED SIGHTING OF A LIVE CAUCASIAN AMERICAN PRISONER AT KRAM KEUT TOWN, KHOULING KHAMMOUAM, LAOS, IN JUNE 1975 DOI: JUNE 1975		150 E) 	
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KHAMMOUAM, LAOS, IN JUNE 1975	•	COUNTRY: LAOS	·	. ,	
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	SAPPER BATTALION TWO THAILAND BY SWIMMING MARCHED FOR TWO DAYS KEUT, LOCATED ON ROUT PUBLIC SECURITY BORDE	HE WAS N NOT MENTIONED, BY DAYS BEFORE. A COM THE MEKONG RIVER. AND NIGHTS FROM WHE E EIGHT ABOUT 120 K R CONTROL STATION T TRUCK AFTER LUNCH	CAPTURED AT THE LAO-TH TROOPS OF THE PAVN 31 PANION OF HIS ESCAPED THE PRISONER HAD BEEN RE HE WAS CAPTURED TO ILOMETERS FROM THE VIE O THE EAST. THE CAUCA AND TAKEN TO AN UNKNOW	ST TO FORCE- KHAM TNAMESE SIAN
	2. CAPTURED CAUCASIAN IN SOME 15 MINUTES AND H	THE HOUSE FROM A D	CLAIMED HE WATCHED THE ISTANCE OF FIVE METERS DCAST.)	•

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FROM AN UNIDENTIFIED LAW RESIDENT.

KNOWS THE IDENTIFY OF THE PROTECTION OF THE PROT FROM LAOS WHIGH GONTAINED A PHOTO OF AN ALLEGED LIVE AMERICAN KNOWS THE IDENTITY OF THE LAO BUT WAS NOT WILLING TO REVEAL THE. IN. ADDITION TO THE FILM, ... ALSO RECEIVED, FROM THE SAME SOURCE, A LETTER ALLEGEDLY WRITTEN BY THE POW TO HIS MOTHER. THE SIGNATURE ON THE LETTER WAS ((PHENSEN)) (SIC). THE PHOTO OF THE POW WAS TAKEN ON AN UNKNOWN DATE AT A LOCATION ABOUT 40 KILOMETERS SOUTH OF LAKO (XD 5857) IN SAMANNAKHET PROVINCE. THE POW WAS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM'S 576TH BRIGADE. UNIDENTIFIED LAO WAS ASKING 50,000 BAHT FOR INFORMATION ON THE AMERICAN POW. THE PHOTO OF THE ALLEGED AMERICAN POW IS BLACK AND WHITE AND SHOWS WHAT APPEARS TO BE AN EMACIATED CAUCASIAN SITTING ON THE GROUND ON A MAT. HE IS WEARING ONLY A PAIR OF DARK TROUSERS. HIS FEET APPEAR TO BE SWOLLEN. THE AGE OF THE PERSON IN THE PHOTO IS CIRCA EARLY FORTIES. THE PHOTO SHOWS INDICATIONS OF BEING A PHOTOGRAPH OF A PHOTOGRAPH. HOWEVER, THE NEGATIVE WAS OBTAINED FROM: AND DEVELOPED. THE PRINT FROM THE NEGATIVE PHOTO, BUT IS MUCH BETTER QUALITY AND DOES NOT SHOW THE INDICATIONS OF BEING A PHOTO OF A PHOTO. THE NEGATIVE FILM WAS THE BRAND "ORWO" WHICH IS NOT NORMALLY FOUND IN THAILAND BUT IS AVAILABLE IN LAOS. THE LETTER FROM PHENSEN TO HIS MOTHER TO HELP GET HIM OUT OF JAIL, CONTAINS MANY ERRORS WHICH WOULD NOT NORMALLY BE MADE BY A NATIVE ENGLISH SPEAKER.) COMMENT: THE

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EXISTENCE OF A PAVN 576TH BRIGADE IS UNCONFIRMED.)

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	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY		

	DIST: 30 APRIL 1987 EXCLUSIVE DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED AT END OF REPORT		
	COUNTRY: LAOS		
	SUBJ: POW-MIA: ALLEGED AMERICAN POWS SEEN IN 1979 AND 1981 BEING MOVED THROUGH BAN LONG KAT, OUDOMSAI PROVINCE		
	DOI: 1979 -1981		
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PRISONERS TO THE LAGE.

AND THE PRISONERS ATE A MEAL AT S HOUSE.

LEARNED FROM KHAM THAT THE FOUR AMERICANS HAD BEEN CAPTURED AT MAUNG HOUN (QC 5829), OUDOMSAI PROVINCE IN A PLANE CRASH (NFI). THE PRISCNERS WERE BEING MOVED FROM PRISON AT PHON PARAI, WHICH IS TWO KILOMETERS WEST OF BAN THIN (RC 0892), OUDOMSAI PROVINCE, ON ORDERS OF HIGHER AUTHORITIES WHO WANTED THE PRISONERS HIDDEN AND PUT INTO A RE-EDUCATION PROGRAM.

SAID THAT IN 1981 A VILLAGER OF BAN THAM (UTM UNK) WHO CAME TO S VILLAGE TO BUY FOOD THAT TWO OF THE AMERICANS HAD DIED FROM SICKNESS AND STARVATION AND TWO WERE STILL ALIVE. THE AMERICANS WERE RAISING CHICKENS AND MAKING HANDICRAFT ITEMS AT A COVERT SITE (NFI).

2. ACCORDING TO

IN OR ABOUT MARCH 1979 WHEN HE VISITED HIS HOME AT BAN LONG KAT HE SAW FOUR AMERICANS IN THE VILLAGE WHO WERE BEING GUARDED BY OUDOMSAI PROVINCIAL POLICE. THEY HAD A MEAL AT BAN LONG KAT AND LEFT IN A SOUTHEAST DIRECTION. THREE DAYS LATER THE POLICE CAME THROUGH THE VILLAGE AGAIN BUT WITHOUT THE AMERICANS.

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	-		ADDENDUM					
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	ABOVE HEA	14 APRIL REVEAL	LED THAT ON 5	AND 6 APRI	(L 1987,	• •	•	
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EURTHER INFORMATION ON THE AMERICAN WHO WAS ALLEGEDLY STAYING NEAR THE VIETNAM BORDER. SALEO VILLAGE CONSISTED OF SIX HOUSES AND APPROXIMATELY 30-40 INHABITANTS.

ACCOMPAINED ON THE TRIP. CLAIMED
TO HAVE PERSONALLY SIGHTED TWO LIVE AMERICANS BEING HELD BY
LOCAL HILLTRIBES, BUT SAID THAT HE WAS NOT ALLOWED CLOSER THAN
100 METERS FROM THE AMERICANS. SAID THAT THE HILLTRIBE
CARETAKER DEMANDED A PAYMENT OF 500 OF THE "OLD FRENCH SILVER COINS"

BEFORE HE (WOULD BE ALLOWED TO APPROACH THE AMERICANS.

THE FRENCH COINS ARE VALUED AT 2,800 KIP EACH AND ARE HIGHLY SOUGHT AFTER BECAUSE OF THEIR HIGH SILVER CONTENT. THE COINS ARE AVAILABLE FROM PRIVATE SHOPS IN LAOS.

U.S.\$1.00 EQUALS 35 KIP AT THE OFFICIAL RATE OF EXCHANGE AND MORE THAN 400 KIP AT THE CURRENT BLACK MARKET RATE.)

SAID THAT THE TWO AMERICANS WERE DRESSED IN

LOCAL VILLAGE COSTUMES. ALSO CLAIMED TO HAVE LEARNED THAT ONE OF THE AMERICANS HAD MARRIED A LOCAL VILLAGER AND HAD TWO SONS, A FIVE-YEAR-OLD AND A THREE-YEAR-OLD. THE AMERICAN HAD REPORTEDLY BEEN KEPT SINCE THE "LAM SON 917 OPERATIONS."

IN THE LAM SON 917 OPERATIONS WERE SUPPRESSION OPERATIONS DESIGNED TO CLOSE THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL DURING THE VIETNAM WAR.)

IN HAND DRAWN SKETCHES OF THE AREA MADE BY. ... SALEO VILLAGE APPEARS TO BE IN THE VICINITY OF XD 5570, LOCATED NEAR THE TIGER CAVE (THAM SUA) AND THE HOUAI NAMSE STREAM. THE VILLAGE IS LOCATED ON THE WEST BANK OF THE STREAM AND THE LOCATION WHERE THE AMERICANS WERE ALLEGEDLY BEING KEPT WAS ON THE EAST BANK. IN THE SKETCH MAP INDICATED THAT IT IS ABOUT ONE DAYS WALK FROM SALEO VILLAGE TO SAMOI DISTRICT TOWN AND ANOTHER ONE-HALF DAYS WALK (BASED ON APPARENT DISTANCE ONLY) TO TA-OY, THE LOCATION OF OTHER REPORTED STORIES OF AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR. DONG VILLAGE (XD 5138) IS LOCATED ON THE OTHER SIDE OF TA-OY VILLAGE FROM SAMOI TOWN. DONG VILLAGE WAS THE SITE OF AN LPDR REEDUCATION CAMP; HOWEVER, NO RUMORS OF AMERICAN PRISONERS WERE ASSOCIATED WITH THE CAMP.)

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TEXT: 1. ON 26 DECEMBER 1986, CROSSED FROM VEUN PRABAT VILLAGE, THA UTHEN DISTRICT, NAKHON PHANOM PROVINCE, THAILAND INTO LAOS TO ATTEMPT TO VERIFY THE EXISTENCE OF ALLEGED LIVE AMERICAN MISSING-IN-ACTION (MIA) HOWARD D. ((STEPHENSON)), REPORTEDLY BEING HIDDEN FROM THE LAO AUTHORITIES IN KHAMMOUAN PROVINCE. TRAVELED BY BUS TO MAHAXAI (WE 2125) DISTRICT TOWN. TWO DAYS LATER HE TRAVELED THROUGH PHAKEO (WE 6512) VILLAGE TO PAK PHANANG (WE 7723) VILLAGE WHERE HE ALSO REMAINED FOR TWO DAYS. WHILE AT PHAKEO VILLAGE, WAS TOLD BY

WHERE STEPHENSON WAS REPORTEDLY BEING HIDDEN, THAT THE LAO PEOPLE'S ARMY (LPA) HAD RAIDED THE VILLAGE AND RECAPTURED STEPHENSON ON 20 DECEMBER. CAUTIONED AGAINST TRAVELING TO NAPANG VILLAGE WHICH WAS STILL QUITE "HOT", PERSUADED. TO ACCOMPANY HIM TO NAPANG VILLAGE BECAUSE WOULD PROVIDE A REASON FOR TRAVELING THERE. WAS NOT AWARE OF THE PURPOSE OF TRIP TO ATTEMPT TO VERIFY THE STORY OF STEPHENSON'S EXISTENCE. HOWEVER, THE REPORTED LPA RAID ON NAPANG VILLAGE HAS NOT BEEN INDEPENDENTLY VERIFIED.)

- __ 2... AT NAPANG VILLAGE ON 31 DECEMBER. SAID THAT LPA HAD RAIDED THE VILLAGE WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OR INVOLVEMENT OF THE MILITIA AND THAT THE VILLAGER WHO HAD HIDDEN STEPHENSON, HAD BEEN ARRESTED ALONG WITH STEPHENSON AND THE TWO OF THEM HAD BEEN TAKEN_TO AN UNDISCLOSED LOCATION IN BOUALAPHA (WE 8075) DISTRICT. SAID THAT ADMITTED TO CARING FOR THE PRISONER TO THE LPA BUT HAD NOT YET INFORMED THEM THAT ANY OTHER NAPANG VILLAGERS WERE INVOLVED. PROMISED TO FOLLOW THE MATTER AND SAID THAT IF HAD CONFIDED STEPHENSON'S EXACT LOCATION TO HIM, HE WOULD HAVE PERSONALLY HELPED STEPHENSON TO ESCAPE TO THAILAND WHEN SAID THAT AS FAR AS HE KNEW, STEPHENSON HAD BEEN A "SPECTRE" AIRCRAFT PILOT WHO HAD BEEN CAPTURED IN THE AREA OF SEPONE (XD 3244) AT AN UNKNOWN DATE AND WAS LATER TRANSFERRED TO BOUALAPHA DISTRICT. BOUALAPHA DISTRICT HAD BEEN ATTACKED BY THE RESISTANCE AND OVERRUN. STEPHENSON HAD ESCAPED AND MET WHO HAD CARED FOR HIM
 HAD BEEN SINCE. (SOURCE COMMENT: ACCORDING TO _____ ATTACKED BY THE RESISTANCE IN 1980. THOUGHT THAT THE ATTACK WAS BEEN ALERTED TO STEPHENSON'S PRESENCE IN THE NAPANG AREA BECAUSE OF WHO HAD OPENLY TRAVELED TO THAKHEK TOWN TO PURCHASE MEDICINES FOR THE MIA AND HAD USED BAHT THAI CURRENCY. MAY HAVE BEEN UNDER SURVEILLANCE FOR SOME TIME.)
 - SAID THAT ANY VILLAGER FROM NAPANG COULD HAVE REPORTED

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-C06001242-

EXCLUSIVE DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED AT END OF REPORT

COUNTRY: LAOS

SUBJ: POW-MIA: ALLEGED SIGHTING OF TWO AMERICAN PRISONERS-

OF-WAR BEING HELD IN THE DAKCHUNG AREA OF SARAVAN,

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PROVINCE, LAOS

DOI: 12 NOVEMBER 1986 - 3 JANUARY 1987

CORRECTION

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JAN 87	
ON 24 DECEMBER 1986 A WITH THE	ABOVE
HEADING WAS ISSUED. FOLLOW-UP DEBRIEFING ON 2 AND 3 JANUARY	1987, OF
and the second of the second o	
IN JUNE 1985, INDICATED THAT TO HAVE SEEN A CAUCASI N WHO WAS IDENTIFIED TO HIM AS A PRICE	. CLAIMED
AND w	HO WAS A
THROUGH XAKHE (YB 0352) AND KENGSAI (YB 0363) VILLAGES TO CHA	APON (NCA)
AREA NAMED HOUA PHOU SOUT TO VISIT WITH	TNC THE
HOUSING THE GUARDS AND THEIR FAMILIES. SAID HE ORSERVE	THE OF
SAID THAT THE CAUCASIAN WAS ABOUT 1.6 METERS IN HEIGHT	T AND WAS .
CLAIMED TO HAVE ASKED SHOW THE MAN GAR AND IN	EPEATED
IN THE LAVEN DIALECT.	
MANY OF THE DETAILS CONCERNING SPOTTING THE PRISONER RECAUSE	MBER AT THE TIME
HE HAD NO INTEREST IN HIM.	AT THE THE
IN JUNE 1985, INDICATED THAT CLAIMED TO HAVE SEEN A CAUCASI N WHO WAS IDENTIFIED TO HIM AS A PRISONER. AND CLOSE ACQUAINTANCE, TRAVELED ON FOOT FROM POUI (XB 8329) VILLAGE THROUGH XAKHE (YB 0352) AND KENGSAI (YB 0363) VILLAGES TO CHAPON (NCA) VILLAGE, FROM CHAPON VILLAGE, THEY TRAVELED NORTHEAST TO AN UNIOCATED	
	IN JUNE 1985, INDICATED THAT CLAIMED A CAUCASI N WHO WAS IDENTIFIED TO HIM AS A PRISONER. WHO WAS A NTANCE, TRAVELED ON FOOT FROM POUI (XB 8329) VILLAGE E (YB 0352) AND KENGSAI (YB 0363) VILLAGES TO CHAPON (NCA) M CHAPON VILLAGE, THEY TRAVELED NORTHEAST TO AN UNLOCATED OUA PHOU SOUT TO VISIT WITH DURING THE SIT IN THE AREA, WHICH CONTAINED APPROXIMATELY TEN HUTS FOR GUARDS AND THEIR FAMILIES, SAID HE OBSERVED THE LKING AT A DISTANCE ESTIMATED TO BE ABOUT 200 METERS. THAT THE CAUCASIAN WAS ABOUT 1.6 METERS IN HEIGHT AND WAS NIZED BECAUSE HE HAD NOT BEEN WEARING A SHIRT. AVE ASKED WHO THE MAN WAS AND REPEATED IN THE LAVEN DIALECT. TOLD THROUGH WAS A PRISONER SAID THAT HE DID NOT REMEMBER DETAILS CONCERNING SPOTTING THE PRISONER BECAUSE AT THE TIME

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m handan agas pagaman hana m	TRAVELED TO THAKHEK (VE 8023) DISTRICT TOWN, KHAMMOUAN PROVINCE, TAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (LPDR), TO VISIT A RELATIVE. WHILE IN THAKHEK TOWN: WAS REUNITED WITH HIS FATHER	
	THAKHEK TOWN, WAS REUNITED WITH HIS FATHER, A FORMER ROYAL LAO GOVERNMENT SERGEANT, AFTER TEN YEARS. A RESIDENT OF SA PHAI (WB 7779) VILLAGE, PAKSE DISTRICT, CHAMPASSAK PROVINCE, TOLD THAT HE HAD TRAVELED TO THE DAKCHUNG (YC. 4211) AREA, NEAR THE SARAVAN AND ATTOPEU PROVINCIAL BORDER AS A	•
•	SMALL SCALE TRADER WHERE HE HET AND SPOKE WITH TWO U.S. PRISONERSOF-WAR (POWS). DAKCHUNG IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 12 KILOMETERS EAST OF ATTOPEU PROVINCE. ACCORDING TO SAID THAT ONE OF THE POWS WAS LEAN AND TALL AND THE OTHER WAS RATHER FAT AND NOT TOO TALL.	
	CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SPEAK WITH THE POWS THROUGH THE UNNAMED SON OF A FRIEND WHO WAS A GUARD AT THE PRISON. TOLD . THAT HE SPOKE WITH THE POWS IN ENGLISH AND WAS TOLD BY THEM THAT THEY WERE "CRYING" TO GO HOME.	
	2. RETURNED TO THAILAND ON 15 NOVEMBER, AFTER MAKING PLANS TO RECONTACT ON 19 NOVEMBER TO PURSUE THE MATTER. MISSED THE RETURN DATE AND ON 22 NOVEMBER, YOUNGER BROTHER, TRAVELED FROM THAKHEK TO NAKHON PHANOM TO FOLLOW UP. PLANS WERE AGAIN MADE FOR TO TRAVEL TO	
	THAKHEK ON 1 JANUARY 1987, IF ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE. PLANNED TO ATTEMPT TO HAVE HIS FATHER TRAVEL TO MEET HIM IN THAKHEK	
· ,	IF POSSIBLE. (SOURCE COMMENT: INITIALLY REQUESTED 10,000 BAHT TO MAKE THE TRIP TO PAKSE TO MEET HIS FATHER.) 26 BAHT FOULLS U.S.S. 00) WAS TO HAVE HIS FATHER OF TAIN	•
	IF POSSIBLE. (SOURCE COMMENT: INITIALLY REQUESTED 10,000 BAHT TO MAKE THE TRIP TO PAKSE TO MEET HIS FATHER.) ABOUT 26 BAHT EQUALS U.S.\$1.00.) WAS TO HAVE HIS FATHER OBTAIN DETAILS ABOUT THE POWS INCLUDING NAMES, DATES AND A SKETCH MAP OF THE PRISON AND SAID THAT IT WOULD TAKE ABOUT TEN DAYS UNTIL MID-JANUARY TO OBTAIN THE INFORMATION. ALSO SAID THAT IF THE SOURCE WERE NOT HIS FATHER, HE WOULD NOT BELIEVE THE STORY.	٠
	TO MAKE THE TRIP TO PAKSE TO MEET HIS FATHER.) 26 BAHT EQUALS U.S.\$1.00.) WAS TO HAVE HIS FATHER OBTAIN DETAILS ABOUT THE POWS INCLUDING NAMES, DATES AND A SKETCH MAP OF THE PRISON AND SAID THAT IT WOULD TAKE ABOUT TEN DAYS UNTIL MID-JANUARY TO OBTAIN THE INFORMATION. ALSO SAID THAT IF THE SOURCE WERE	
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	ADDENDUM		
v she blood a medicana lana anamana utang sebesah dalah dalah sebesah dalah dalah dalah dalah dalah dalah dalah	TEXT: 1. ON 30 OCTOBER 1986, A	JEDODT WITH THE	
	ABOVE HEADING WAS ISSUED. IN A FOLLOW-UP OF "MISSING-IN-ACTION" (MIA) (POW) IN KHAMMOUAN	THIS REPORT OF A LIVE	
•••			
		REVEALED THAT)	
	LIVE AMERICAN MIA. CLAIMED THAT TO	AATION CONCERNING THE	
	STAYED AT PHOU LOUANG (NCA) CAVE, LOCATED ABOU	JT THREE KILOMETERS EAST	
. ·.	OF NAPANG VILLAGE. THE EARLING "NAPENG" VILLAGE AT WE 7115. THE COORDINATES IN	ER REPORT PLACED	
	7916 AND THE LOCATION OF THE CAVE MAY BE IN TH	HE VICINITY OF WE 7920.)	
	2. THE MIA, WHO WAS A JET PILOT, HAD BEE	EN SHOT DOWN BY 12.7-	
	MILLIMETER (MM) ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY FIRE.	CLAIMED THAT	
	SAID THAT IF IT WAS POSSIBLE TO CONTACT THE U. QUICKLY BECAUSE HE FEARED THAT THE EXISTANCE OF	S. GOVERNMENT, TO DO SO	
	THE AUTHORITIES WHICH WAS EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.	COMMENT:	
	PROBABLY HAD NOT PERSONALLY SEEN THE MIA BECAU CHARGE OF HIDING HIM, IDENTIFIED ONLY AS	SE THE VILLAGER IN.	
	CLOSELY GUARDED ACCESS TO THE MIA FOR SECURITY	REASONS: HAD SAID	
	THAT THE MIA WAS ASKING ABOUT THE RESISTANCE.	THEIR GENUINE INTENT	
	AND THEIR TRUSTWORTHINESS, AND AFTER BEING REATHAT THE RESISTANCE PASS WORD OF HIS EXISTENCE	SSURED, HAD REQUESTED	
	GOVERNMENT.)		
	. 3. COMMENT: WHILE OPERATING IN	THE MADANC UTILACE ARCA	
	FOR ABOUT EIGHT DAYS DURING 1983-1984, NO MENT	ION OF A MIA HAD BEEN	
	MADE BY LOCAL VILLAGERS, FOR FEAR OF LEAKING T LATE 1969 - EARLY 1970 TIME FRAME,	HE SECRET. DURING THE	,
	- LAIL 1909 - EARLY 1970 TIME FRAME,	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	
	RECEIVED O	RDERS TO PROCEED TO A	
	PLANE CRASH SITE BUT WAS UNABLE TO REACH THE S FIRE.)	ITE DUE TO HEAVY ENEMY	
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	4. TOLD THAT LAO PEOPLE'S ARM KILLED A VILLAGER FROM NAPANG VILLAGE, (DATE U	Y SOLDIERS HAD SHOT AND	
	ASKED ABOUT AN AMERICAN PRISONER AND THE VILLA	GER REPLIED THAT HE DID	
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	COUNTRY:	LAOS/THAILAND			
	SUBJ:	POW-MIA: ALLEGED LIVE MISSING-IN-ACTION AMERICAN IN KHAMMOUAN PROVINCE, LAOS; REMAINS OF TWO AIRMEN IN SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE, LAOS			
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TEXT. 1. IN LATE JUNE 1986, (

TOLD A LAO REFUGEE THAT A FELLOW VILLAGER TOLD HIM OF A LIVE AMERICAN "PRISONER OF WAR" (POW) WHO WAS LIVING IN A CAVE AND WAS BEING HIDDEN FROM THE LPDR GOVERNMENT BY NAPENG VILLAGERS. THE VILLAGERS PROVIDED PROTECTION AND GUARDED THE POW. THE POW HAD SUFFERED A BROKEN LEG IN 1972 WHEN HIS AIRCRAFT CRASHED, AND HAD BEEN TREATED BY A VILLAGER WHO STILL CONTINUED TO LOOK AFTER HIM. NAPENG VILLAGE CONSISTED OF APPROXIMATELY 80 HOUSES AND WAS COMPRISED OF INHABITANTS WHO DID NOT CLOSELY COOPERATE WITH LPDR AUTHORITIES. ACCORDING TO THE POW HAD SAID THAT IF ANY OF THE VILLAGERS COULD CARRY A MESSAGE TO THAILAND AND ARRANGE TO EFFECT HIS RESCUE, THE POW WOULD "TAKE CARE OF THE ENTIRE VILLAGE."

2. T.__

SAID THAT THE REMAINS OF TWO U.S. AIRMEN WERE LOCATED IN THE VICINITY OF CHOMAT AND VIANG VILLAGES (POSSIBLY WD 5068) HAT CANTON, PHIN DISTRICT, SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE. TOLD THE REFUGEE THAT THE REMAINS COULD BE RECOVERED BUT THAT IT WOULD COST MONEY TO EXCAVATE THE SITE AND TO HOLD A CEREMONY FOR THE "SPIRITS" (PHI) BY THE VILLAGERS WHO OWNED THE SITE. SAID THAT IT WOULD COST APPROXIMATELY 25,000 KIP PER SET OF REMAINS. 35 KIP EQUALS U.S. \$1.00 AT THE OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE.) CLAIMED TO HAVE VISITED THE SITE.

3. IN SEPTEMBER, THE REFUGEE SAID THAT HE HAD PROVIDED WITH 3,000 THAI BAHT TO GO AND GET THE REMAINS.
ABOUT 26 BAHT EQUALS U.S. \$1.00 AT THE CURRENT EXCHANGE RATE.) THE REFUGEE CLAIMED THAT HIS BROTHER TOLD HIM THAT ONE SET OF REMAINS HAD BEEN DELIVERED TO PAKSEBANGFAI (VD 7373) VILLAGE ON 12 OCTOBER. THE REFUGEE SAID THAT HIS BROTHERS WERE THE VILLAGE CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF OF MILITIA. THE REFUGEE SAID THAT HE PLANNED TO CROSS BACK INTO LAOS TO RETRIEVE THE REMAINS.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 2-Dec-2013

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	COUNTRY:	LAOS/VIETNAM					
	SUBJ:	ALLEGED LOCATION OF PRABANG PROVINCE, LA		N POWS IN	LUANG		•
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	TEXT: 1.	ACCORDING TO A LAO	RESIDENT WHO	DROVE A S	SUPPLY TRU	CK AND	
	REPORTEDL	Y SAW THE POWS, THERE G DETAINED AT A CAMP	E WERE SEVEN A	AMERICAN E	OW'S AS O	F MİD-	•
	DISTRICT,	LUANG PRABAN(PROVI	NCE, LAO PEOPI	LE'S DEMOC	CRATIC REP	UBLIC	-
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(LP.DR). THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN POWS IN THIS

FORMER REEDUCATION CAMP INMATES FROM LUANG PRABANG PROVINCE, WHO FLED TO THAILAND IN 1986, HAVE REPORTED A REEDUCATION CAMP AT NAM BAC. THE CAMP WAS EMPTIED OF REEDUCATION INMATES ABOUT 1980 AND THE CAMP WAS OJCUPIED BY PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM (PAVN) TROOPS.) SIX OF THE AMERICANS WERE HISPANICS AND ONE WAS A CAUCASIAN AMERICAN NAMED ((LINGER)) (PHONETIC). THERE HAD BEEN 12 AMERICAN POWS AT THE SITE BUT IN 1985 FIVE OF THE AMERICANS POWS WERE MOVED TO THE SOVIET UNION. ALL OF THE AMERICAN POWS HAD BEEN CAPTURED IN 1968 WHILE WORKING AT THE NAM BAC CAMP.

SITE OF AN AIRFIELD DURING THE INDOCHINA WAR. NO AMERICANS WERE STATIONED THERE, BUT SOME AMERICAN PERSONNEL VISITED THERE OCCASIONALLY. NONE OF THEM WERE LOST.) THE CAMP WAS OVERRUN BY THE ENEMY AND THE AMERICANS WERE CAPTURED. IN ADDITION TO THE AMERICANS, THERE WERE 30 FORMER SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRISONERS AT THE CAMP.

- 2. THE PRISON CAMP WAS SURROUNDED BY A DOUBLE FENCE. THE INTERNAL AREA WAS FENCED WITH BAMBOO WHILE THE EXTERNAL AREA WAS FENCED WITH NINE WALLS OF BARBED WIRE, EACH ABOUT 170 CENTIMETERS IN HEIGHT. THERE WERE ABOUT SIX TO EIGHT BUILDINGS FOR PRISONERS IN THE INTERNAL AREA. EACH PRISONER BUILDING WAS ABOUT 50X10 METERS IN SIZE, BUILT OF CEMENT WITH CORRUGATED-SHEET METAL ROOFING. THE TOTAL INTERNAL AREA WAS ABOUT 3 RAI IN SIZE.

 [2.5 RAI]
- 3. THE AMERICAN POWS WERE GUARDED BY LAO PEOPLE'S ARMY (LPA) SOLDIERS AND HAD BEEN WORKING AS CONSTRUCTION FOREMEN FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A DISPENSARY AND LIVING QUARTERS BUILDING LOCATED ACROSS ROUTE SIX FROM THE CAMP WHICH WAS LOCATED ON THE NORTH SIDE OF ROUTE SIX. A PAVN SECURITY UNIT WAS LOCATED NEAR THE DISPENSARY/LIVING QUARTERS AREA AND A PAVN CHECKPOINT WAS LOCATED AT MUANG NGOY (TH 5891). THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE POWS HAD BEEN SERVING AS CONSTRUCTION WORKERS FOR THE PROJECT. THESE TWO BUILDINGS WERE COMPLETED IN 1985. THE PRISONERS WERE GUARDED BY LPA SOLDIERS WHEN THEY WORKED OUTSIDE THE CAMP, BUT WERE ALLOWED TO SPEAK WITH LOCAL VILLAGERS.
- 4. THE LIVING CONDITIONS OF THE POWS WERE TERRIBLE. THEY WERE GIVEN MILLED BUT UNPOLISHED RICE TO EAT WHICH WAS SOMETIMES SUPPLIMENTED BY WHEAT OR BARLEY FROM CUBA. THE POWS WERE IN BAD HEALTH DUE TO MALNUTRITION.

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	DIST:	20 SEPTEMBE	R 1986					
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	DOI:	JUNE 1986						
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COUNTRY: LAOS/VIETNAM

SUBJ:

ALLEGED DETENTION OF SIX PRISONERS OF WAR IN

XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCE, LAOS

DOI:

MARCH 1986

SOURCE:

TEXT: 1. AS OF EARLY MARCH 1986.

, TOLD A MEMBER OF THE LAO RESISTANCE AND FORMER DETENTION CAMP INMATE THAT A GROUP OF SIX AMERICAN PRISONERS-OF-WAR (POWS) WERE STILL INCARCERATED AT A CAMP LOCATED AT THAM PHA LEUNG (NCA) CAVE NEAR PHOU SAO (UG 3918) VILLAGE, XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCE. THERE WERE SEVEN LPA SOLDIERS SERVING AS GUARDS AT THE CAVE AND ONE NURSE WAS ALSO ASSIGNED TO THE CAVE. ONE COMBINED BATTALION-SIZED LPA AND PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM FORCE WAS DEPLOYED ALONG ROUTE 5 THROUGH LAT HOUANG (NCA) TO LAT SEN (NCA), CONTROLLING ACCESS TO THE AREA. ANOTHER LPA "SPECIAL FORCE" COMPANY COMPRISING 60 SOLDIERS COMMANDED

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	COUNTRY:	LAOS		
	SUBJ:	INFORMATION ON MUANG NGOY, LAOS, LOCATION OF AN AMERICAN POW SIGHTING	ALLEGED	
	DOI:	AUGUST 1986		٠
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	SUBJ:	ALLEGED SIGHTII KHOUANG PROVING	NG OF FOUR AME	RICAN POWS	IN XIENG			
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DIST:

16 SEPTEMBER 1986

EXCLUSIVE DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED AT END OF REPORT

COUNTRY: LAOS/VIETNAM

SUBJ:

ALLEGED DETENTION OF SIX PRISONERS OF WAR IN

XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCE, LAOS

DOI:

MARCH 1986

SOURCE:

TFYT: AS OF EARLY MARCH 1986,

TOLD A MEMBER OF THE LAO RESISTANCE AND FORMER DETENTION CAMP INMATE THAT A GROUP OF SIX AMERICAN PRISONERS-OF-WAR (POWS) WERE STILL INCARCERATED AT A CAMP LOCATED AT THAM PHA LEUNG (NCA) CAVE NEAR PHOU SAO (UG 3918) VILLAGE, XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCE. THERE WERE SEVEN LPA SOLDIERS SERVING AS GUARDS AT THE CAVE AND ONE NURSE WAS ALSO ASSIGNED TO THE CAVE. ONE COMBINED BATTALION-SIZED LPA AND PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM FORCE WAS DEPLOYED ALONG ROUTE 5 THROUGH LAT HOUANG (NCA) TO LAT SEN (NCA), CONTROLLING ACCESS TO THE AREA.

ANOTHER LPA "SPECIAL FORCE" COMPANY COMPRISING 60 SOLDIERS COMMANDED BY CAPTAIN ((THIEP)) SOUTHIDET, WAS DEPLOYED ABOUT TEN KILOMETERS DISTANT FROM THE CAVE. THE GENERAL AREA WHERE THE CAVE WAS LOCATED, NEAR THE JOINT SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SRV) AND LPDR BORDER, WAS A VACATION AREA FOR LEADERS OF THE THREE "INDOCHINESE" COUNTRIES, ACMELL AS AN INFORMATION CENTER FOR THE INDOCHINESE COUNTRIES. ...

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	KHOUANG PROVINCE TO INVESTIGATE THE POW CASE AT THAM PHA LEUNG CAVE. ACCORDING TO THE SIX AMERICAN POWS AND TWO ROYAL LAO ARMY (FAR) T-28 PILOTS HAD BEEN ARRESTED AND DETAINED AT THE CAVE. AFTER THE PATHET LAO, HAD SUCCEEDED IN "LIBERATING" LAOS AND THE PEACE AGREEMENTS SIGNED, THE POW GROUP WAS TRANSFERRED TO LONG (UG 3512) VILLAGE, HOUA GNON CANTON, PEK (UG 1251) DISTRICT, XIENG KHOUANG	
	PROVINCE. THE POWS WERE USED AS LABORERS TO PLANT CROPS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE SEVEN LPA SOLDIERS AND THE NURSE. ACQ: (10 SEPTEMBER 1986).	
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TAB E

RELEASE DATE:

SUBJECT

Reported Detention of 16 Americans in Laos-Addendum 15 AUC 1989

1. The attached additional information is from the source of in response to follow-up requirements levied

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Deputy Director for Operations

CC: DCI
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NIO/EA
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__ Page 1 of 3

Attachment: Report as Stated

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Page 2 of 3

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		Hall and the second
SUBJECT : Reported Dete	ention of 16 Americans i	n Laos
TEXT: 1. On 22 July 1985, a above heading and numbered reported the following further discussion with 2. The American POW dete known as Tham Mae Mai (Widow' Muang Ngoy (TH 585915). Ther Tasseng Phra That to Tasseng road built by the Vietnamese kilometers. The road circles and merges with the main road (sic) Tassengs: Ngoy, Nam Lawhich is where the POW camp in	additional information in early August in early August ntion camp is at Doi Nars Cave), which is in the e is a road linking Oudo Don Lao of Muang Ngoy in 1984 with a length o around Muang Ngoy District Muang Na Mo. Muang t, Ban Mo. Nong Sing, and s located.	based on 1986. Ing Lio, also area of omsai via This is a new f 36 area of office Ngoy has six and Don Lao,
3. above locations.	No coordinates were g	iven for the

Page 3 of 3

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Assistant Vice Director for Collection Management
Defense Intelligence Agency Principal Advisor for Prisoner of War Missing in Action Affairs

(International Security Affairs)

Department of Defense

Director, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia

Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Department of State Office of the Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs

National Security Council

Director, National Security Agency

SUBJÉCT

Reported Detention of 16 Americans in Laos

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Deputy Director for Operations

cc: DCI DDCI EXEC DIF. NIO/EA DDI . - DDO:

Attachment: Report as Stated

Page 2 of 3.

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SUBJECT

Reported Detention of 16 Americans in Laos

who claimed TEXT: According to to have visited the site, as of April 1986, there was a detention camp containing 12 male and four female American prisoners located at Ban Don Lae (near TH 5085), Ngoy District, Luang Prabang said the prisoners were being Province, Laos. held in a cave that was used by the Pathet Lao and Vietnamese during the Indochina War years. Eight Vietnamese and 14 Lao ran the detention camp. There were three trucks assigned to the camp which were used to take the prisoners outside the camp to work said eight of the prisoners worked everyday. repairing engines and four taught engine repair to the Lao. The four females worked as nurses. The workday was 0800 hours to 1800 hours daily. The LPA soldier claimed that the Americans had been in Laos since before the communists took over the country. The LPA soldier said the Americans were confined in harsh conditions even though they had worked hard while in captivity.

Page 3 of 3

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Vice Director for Collection Management

Defense Intelligence Agency

Principal Advisor for Prisoner of War

Missing in Action Affairs

(International Security Affairs)

Department of Defense

Director, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia

Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Department of State

Office of the Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs National Security Council

Director, National Security Agency

SUBJECT

...... danie com Reported Sighting of American Prisoners in Laos

Deputy Director for Operations

CC: DCI

DDCI

EXEC DIR NIO/EA....

Attachment: Report as Stated

Page 2 of 3

SUBJECT

: Reported Sighting of American Prisoners in Laos

TEXT: In a private conversation with friends and relatives in stated that in mid March mid-April 1986, she had seen seven People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) guards she had seen seven People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) guards controlling three caucasians eight kilomaters east of Muang Ngoy (TH 5891) along the main road. said at first she thought they were Soviet advisors but then noticed that two of the three were Soviet advisors but then noticed that two of the three prisoners were wearing leg irons. Local residents later told her prisoners were wearing leg irons. Local residents later told her the men were American prisoners captured prior to 1972. The men the men were about 150 meters from the road. At the time as traveling from Son La, Vietnam.

Page 2 of 3

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Vice Director For Collection

Management

Department of Defense Principal Advisor For Prisoner of War

Missing In Action Affairs (International Security Affairs) Director, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Department of State

SUBJECT:

Identification of Possible U.S. Prisoners of War Camp in Saravane Province, Lao People's

Democratic Republic

1. Attached as of possible interest to you is a report obtained

refugee observed an apparent detention camp in Saravane Province, Laos, which a local village militia chief told him contained 23 American Prisoners of War.

2. This very sensitive information is for your background use only. There will be no further distribution of this report and additional dissemination or extraction of this information requires prior approval from this Agency. DIA is authorized to pass this information to the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCR)

Deputy Director For Operations

CC: DCI
DDCI
EXEC DIR
STATE/EAP
DIA
NIO/EAP
NSA
NSC

Attachment: Report as stated

SUBJECT:

Identification of Possible U.S. Prisoner of War Camp in Saravane Province, Lao People's

Democratic Republic

TEXT: 1. Circa March 1983,

a militia chief

claimed that there is a Prisoner claimed that there is a Prisoner war (POW) Camp located at the foot of Ngoua Mountain (NCA), approximately 25 kilometers south of Kadon Village. According to there were 23 American prisoners of war (POW's) to there were 23 American prisoners of war (POW's) detained in the camp. Prior to 1975 the came contained 25 detained in the camp. Prior to 1975 the came contained 25 detained in the camp. Said that Kadon American POW's, but two had since died. Said that Kadon Village is responsible for growing food for the camp and Village is responsible for growing food for the camp. Occasions while escorting food convoys to the camp. Occasions while escorting food convoys to the camp. added that the militia forces of Chavan Village (YB 2197) were added that the militia forces of Chavan Village (YB 2197) were

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 2-Dec-2013

escorted him to the top of Ngoua Mountain and pointed out the camp to him. According to the camp consisted of four buildings and was surrounded by a fence and a canal. buildings and was surrounded by a fence and a canal did not claim to see any of the POW's. Both Chavan and Kadon Villages have been under the influence/control of the Communist Pathet Lao since circa 1954.)

account is the first believable story on the possibility of live American POW's in the LPDR that has been heard since 1975.)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON D.C. 20505

3 NOV1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Vice Director for Collection Management.

Department of Defense

Director, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Department of State

Sightings of Six Alleged U.S. Prisoners-of-War in a Detention Camp Near Than La Hamlet in SUBJECT:

Northern Laos

Attached as of possible interest to you is a report about the similarings of a total of six alleged U.S. prisoners-of-war at a deterition camp in a small valley of Thao La Hamlet, Houa Phan Province, in northern Laos.

Deputy Director for Operations

DCI cc:

DDCI

EXEC DIR STATE/EAP

NIO/EAP

NSA

Report as stated Attachment:

SUBJECT: Sightings of Six Alleged U.S. Prisoners-of-War in a Detention Camp Near Thao La Hamlet in Northern Laos

TEXT: 1. In late April 1982, saw a total of six alleged U.S. prisoners-of-war (POW's) at a detention camp in a small valley of Thao La Hamlet, Houa Phan Province, in northern Laos (grid coordinates 20 degrees north latitude, 104 degrees east meridian). On 26 April , saw four tall Caucasians who were said to be U.S. POW's being escorted by two small Asian guards from the prisoners' house of detention to the camp office. saw two blacks who were also said to be U.S. POW's carrying bamboo baskets on their back being escorted up a hill by a guard to carry out their labor duties. made the observations from a steep hill at the edge of the Thao La Valley where the dotention camp was the men they had seen were U.S. POW's. He said the camp held about 50 such POW's who had recently been transferred to the camp Presumably the guards were Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) personnel.)

2. The camp was located across the valley to the southeast of Thao La Hamlet. The house of detention was a long, thatched house with a small front yard. It stood between two smaller houses with walls made of timber; apparently the camp office and a houses with walls made of timber; apparently the camp office and a fence guards' quarters. The camp was surrounded by a trench and a fence of closely posted, pointed wood poles. Thao La Hamlet had about 50 small houses located next to a creek.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Wishington, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Vice Director for Collection

Managerent of Defense

Principal Advisor for Prisoner of War

and Missing in Action Affairs

(International Security Affairs)

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Director, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea

Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Department of State

SUBJECT : Alleged Sighting of Live U.S. Prisoners of War in the Lao People's Democratic Republic

1. Attached as of possible interest to you is a report obtained from

Deputy Director for Operations

cc:

DCI DDCI

Exec Dir

D/DDI

STATE/EAP

NIO/FAP

NSA

Attachment: Report as stated

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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT,

-SUBJECT: Alleged Sightings of Live U.S. Prisoners of War in the Lao People's Democratic Republic .

1. On 24 February 1983.

was in the area of Ran (village) Song where several numbers of the were attending a propaganda session. According to who was present an ethnic Lao in that village, two Caucasians and six People's Army of Vietnam in that village, two Caucasians and six People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) soldiers were at that session. One of the Caucasians was (PAVN) soldiers were at that session. One of the Caucasians was did not explain why he believed that the two Caucasians were U.S. Prisoners of War (POW's).)

On 25 February 1983,

informed that there were four U.S. POW's being

held at the Nadeng Prison in the LPDR.

Member Stated that the prison was divided into two sections. One member stated that the prison was divided into two sections. One part of the prison was used to confine former Royal Lao army (FAR) officers. Government (RLG) officials and Royal Lao Army (FAR) officers. One The other part of the facility was for the four U.S. POW's. One of the Americans was ill with "sciatic disease." Another U.S. of the Americans was ill with "sciatic disease." Another U.S. POW's were POW was allowed to look after him. The two other U.S. POW's were allowed to accompany PAVN soldiers who conducted propaganda allowed to accompany PAVN soldiers who conducted propaganda operations.

Guarding the prison.

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	until neg	o attempt to r their efforts otiations for ask	escue the fo , and would a reward wer ed how much	e completed.	orated U.S.	was vance POU's	 _
	might get	for each U.S.	,	•		+ h	

claimed to have met with two U.S. POW's during his one and one-half year detention from said that the two alleged mid-1981 to January 1983.

U.S. POW's were not incarcerated within the prison facility but were held in a nearby cave.

Was not able to identify either of the two alleged U.S. POW's by name. He stated that one of their "serial number plates" was available at Ban Nondeng (WE2507). The available at Ban Nondeng (WE2507). The cited in Paragraph 2 of this report stated that he would attempt to recover the plate by 1 April 1983.)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

8 JUL 1982

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOE:

Assistant Vice Director for Collection Management Department of Defense

Principal Advisor for Prisoner of War and Missing in Action Affairs (International Security Affairs) Office of the Secretary of Defense

Director, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs Department of State

FROM:

Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT .

: Claimed Sightings of U.S. Personnel Missing in Action in Laos in the Period 1969-79

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NO HARD COPY FOLLOWS

Attached as of possible interest to you is a report obtained

cc: D/DDI State/EAP DOD NSA DDI/EAA State/INR DIA

Attachment: Report as stated

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CLAIMED SIGHTINGS OF U.S. PERSONNEL POSSIBLY MISSING IN ACTION IN LAOS IN THE PERIOD 1969-79 SUBJECT:

Appropriate Control of the Control o

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON U.S. PERSONNEL POSSIBLY MISSING IN ACTION (MIA) IN LAOS IN THE PERIOD 1969-79

2. IN A CONVERSATION IN THE LAG PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (LPDR) WITH IN FEBRUARY 1981, AN UNIDENTIFIED LPLA OFFICER SAID THAT HE HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN ASSIGNED TO GUARD U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR (POW'S) WHO WERE IMPRISONED IN A CAVE IN HOUA PHAN (SAM NEUA) PROVINCE. THIS LPLA OFFICER SAID THAT ALL OF THESE POW'S WERE SENT TO THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SRV) "IN 1979." THE LPLA OFFICER GAVE NO FURTHER DETAILS. WAS PILOTING AN H-34

3. ABOUT DECEMBER 1971, WHILE

HELICOPTER

HE SET HIS AIRCRAFT DOWN BESIDE AN AIR AMERICA UH-1 HELICOPTER THAT HAD VIRTUALLY BEEN DEMOLISHED. THE COCKPIT OF THE HELICOPTER, WHICH WAS ON A LANDING ZONE REING FIRED UPON BY HOSTILE FORCES, CONTAINED THE BODY OF AN AMERICAN PILOT, AND IT WAS APPARENT THAT HE WAS DEAD. ENERY WHO HAD ALREADY OVERRUN LATSEN, PREVENTED HIM FROM

RECOVERING THE BODY. WITNESSED THIS INCIDENT.)

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	5. ABOUT 1726) ABOUT 50 DISTRESS CALL C SIGNAL,	AUGUST 1969 KILOMETERS NO F A DOWNED U.S	MHILE RTHEAST OF L S. A-7 AIRCF S. PILOT, PI	FLYING TO F JUANG PRABANC RAFT. FOLLOW CCKED HIM UP,	HATHUNG (THE, HEARD THE ING THE AND TURNED	
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		ა ექქე 1978
	MEMORANDUM FOR:	DIRECTOR, VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF STATE
		DEPUTY COORDINATOR FOR PRISONER OF WAR AND MISSING IN ACTION MATTERS DEPARTMENT OF STATE
		CHIEF, PRISONER OF WAR/MISSING IN ACTION BRANCH RESOURCES AND INSTALLATIONS DIVISION DIRECTORATE FOR INTELLIGENCE (RESEARCH CENTER)
		PRINCIPAL ADVISOR FOR PRISONER OF WAR AND MISSING IN ACTION AFFAIRS (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS) OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
	FROM :	DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS
·· ·	SUBJECT :	REPORTED SIGHTING OF AMERICAN PRISONERS IN CENTRAL LAOS
	ATTACHED / RESULTIN	AS OF POSSIBLE INTEREST TO YOU IS A SOURCE IN SOURCE IN ARE GIVING THIS REPORT NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION.
	ĆC: NFAC/NIO NFAC/ORPA NFAC/OSR	
	ATTACHMENT: REPORT AS ST	ATED
APPROVE RELEASE 2-Dec-201	DATE:	

%EYC\%IO

NFAC/ORPA NFAC/OSR

CC:

SUBJECT: REPORTED SIGHTING OF AMERICAN PRISONERS IN-

1. THE INFORMATION IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH WAS

OBTAINED ON 30 MAY 1978

2. FOLLOWING THE COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF LAOS IN

1975, THE LPDR ESTABLISHED INDOCTRINATION CAMPS FOR

FORMER ROYAL LAO GOVERNMENT MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS

AT XEPON AND SARAVAN, WHICH WERE LITTLE MORE THAN FORCED

LABOR CAMPS. THE PRIMARY TASK OF THE PRISONERS AT THESE

CAMPS WAS THE CONSTRUCTION OF A ROAD LINKING THE TWO

TOWNS. DURING A ROUTINE ROAD SURVEY IN EARLY OCTOBER 1976,

CLAIMED TO HAVE SEEN A GROUP OF AMERICAN PRISONERS

BEING HELD IN A SPECIAL PRISON COMPOUND LOCATED IN A MOUNTAIN

CAVE ABOUT 60 KILOMETERS NORTH-NORTHWEST OF SARAVAN. (SOURCE

COMMENT: PROVIDED NO FURTHER INFORMATION ON THIS

SUBJECT.)

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	S-E-C-R-E-I		
	SUBJECT: POW-MIA: COMMENTS OF A LAD OFFICIAL ON TENSIONS BETWEEN LAD AND U.S. SIDES CONCERNI'G EFFORTS TO VERIFY CLAIMED SIGHTING OF MISSING U.S. SERVICEMAN		
•	1. THE FOLLOWING REPORT WAS OBTAINED IN LATE SEPTEMBER 1991 FROM	•	,
	The state of the s		
	SAID IN		
	LATE SEPTEMBER 1991 THA: TENSIONS HAVE INCREASED BETWEEN THE LAO AND U.S. SIDES FOLLOWING UNJUCCESSFUL EFFORTS IN SEPTEMBER TO VERIFY THE CLAIMED SIGHTING OF A MISSING U.S. SERVICEMAN. ACCORDING TO LAO SEARCHERS FIRST WERE DISPATCHED FROM VIENTIANE TO		
	ATTOPEU PROVINCE IN EARLY SEPTEMBER, AFTER THE LAD PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE RECEIVED A REPORT FROM A LAD RESIDENT OF THE PROVINCE WHO CLAIMED TO HAVE SEEN AN "AMERICAN SOLDIER" LIVING IN A REMOTE VILLAGE. WHEN THE LAD SEARCH TEAM LOCATED THE INFORMANT, DESCRIBED ONLY AS AN "OLD MAN," HE REFUSED TO CONSIDER ESCORTING THE TEAM ON	,	
	FOOT OVER WHAT HE INDICATED WOULD BE A SIX-DAY ROUNDERED FROM THE VILLAGE WHERE THE CLAIMED SIGHTING HAD BEEN MADE. AFTER DEMANDING AND RECEIVING PAYMENT OF TWO BAHT-WEIGHT (3C.4 GRAMS) IN		
	TRUE, THE INFORMANT AGREED TO CARRY A CAMERA INTO THE REMOTE VILLAGE AND ATTEMPT TO PHOTOGRAPH THE PERSON WHOM HE CLAIMED TO HAVE SEEN.		
	3. THE INFORMANT RETURNED WITH EXPOSED FILM, BUT WHEN IT WAS DEVELOPED. THE ONLY RECOGNIZABLE PHOTOGRAPHS SHOWED JUST THE LEGS OF AN UNIDENTIFIED PERSON. THE LAD SEARCH TEAM NONETHELESS DECIDED TO BRING IN U.S. AUTHORITIES AFTER FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF VILLAGES IN AREAS MENTIONED BY THE INFORMANT TURNED UP THE EXISTENCE OF A PERSON WITH CAUCASIAN FEATURES LIVING IN ONE OF THEM. WHEN IT SUBSEQUENTLY WAS DETERMINED THAT THE APPARENT CAUCASIAN WAS A METIS OF FRENCH-		
. "	WAS DETERMINED THAN THE APPRICATE AND ASIAN EXTRACTION, THE APPORMANT ATTEMPTED TO DENY THAT THIS WAS THE PERSON WHOM HE HAD SIGNTED. THE LAD SIDE TOLD THE INFORMANT TO KEEP CUIET AFTER HE CLAIMED THAT THE VILLAGE WHERE THE SIGHTING HAD TAKEN PLACE WAS NOT THE ONE WHERE THE METIS WAS FOUND BUT WAS IN A MUCH MORE REMOTE AREA.		
	THE U.S. TEAM SECAME UPSET WHEN		•
)	THOSE ALREADY COVERED. ATTRIBUTED LAW PESTIMATED THE U.S. TEAM OVER REGARD TO CONCERN THAT SUCH SEARCHES WOULD TAKE THE U.S. TEAM OVER WHAT THE OFFICIAL DESCRIBED AS THE "FREE ZONE" "ALONG THE XEKONG THE VETNAM DESCRIBED THIS ZONE AS		
continues in contraction and the second contraction of the second cont	BEING INHABITED BY VAR. OUS ETHNIC GROUPS, SOME OF WHOM DO NOT SPEAK		
APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:	MAINTAINS A MILITARY DESENCE IN THIS AREA, AS WELL AS INTERMENT CAMPS FOR ANTI-GOVERNY NT RESISTANCE ELEMENTS. AS SUCH, SAID THAT LAOS HAS NO CONTROL OVER THE ZONE, AND THE LAO SIDE IN THE	The state of the s	,
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	SEARCH HAD NO AUTHORITY FROM THE AREA WITH OR WITHOUT U.S.		FICE TO ENTER	٠	
	5. (STONY BEACH COMMENT PARTICIPATED IN THE SEPTEMBER	: A STONY BEACH OFFICER WH			
	-SELIEVE-THE-LAC-DELIBERATELY- IN HIS OPINION, THE LAO DISPL	MAHT MOTTAREGOOD BROM CBYA.	USUAL. THE	Annual Water Military Agency Special S	
•	OFFICER SAID. THE TEAM WAS NOT OF FLOODING AND IMPASSABLE RORETURN WHEN THE ROADS WERE OR	MADS. BUT THE LAD INVITED TH MY. THE PERSON THE TEAM WANT	E TEAM TO ED TO		
	INTERVIEW WAS NOT LOCATED SIX	OAYS AWAY. AS SUGGESTED IN THE HOURS AWAY. THE TEAM SAW	THE REPORT. PHOTOGRAPHS		
	OF THIS PERSON, WHO WAS NOT I CLAIM THAT THE TEAM WAS UPSET	SY NOT SEING ABLE TO VISIT	ANOTHER		
	AREA. THE TEAM ASKED TO VISI DID NOT EXPECT TO RECEIVE APP THIS. THE OFFICER SAID HE CO	ROVAL AND DID NOT DISPLAY A	NNOYANCE AT		
	PARAGRAPH FOUR REASONS FOR NO AREAS FOR INVESTIGATION ARE O	T ALLOWING THE TEAM TO GO.	HE SAID THAT	,	
	ARRIVAL IN LADS. IN PART TO A	LLOW TIME TO GET APPROVAL F	ROM BOTH THE		
	CENTRAL COVERNMENT AND DROWEN	UCIAL LEADEDS DEGARDING PA	RAGRAPH TWO.		
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	MSO PAGE 0001 AUC 91	
	SECRET	
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٠	SECRET	
	SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON PHOTO OF ALLEGED POW'S AND ON LIVE POW'S IN INDOCHINA	
	REF:	
	1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM THE SAME SOURCE AS THE SOURCE OF REF, WHICH REPORTED ON THE EXISTENCE OF VIET CONG (VC) PRISON CAMP BETWEEN SAIGON AND CAMBODIA. THIS REPORT IS BEING PASSED FOR YOUR ACTION.	
	2.	
	AS OF EARLY AUGUST 1991 HE REGARDED THE WELL-PUBLICIZED PHOTOGRAPH OF THREE	
	ALLEGED U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR AS A HOAX. HE SAID THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HANDLED THE SAD SITUATION WELL, WITHOUT RAISING THE HOPES OF THE FAMILIES OF THE MIA'S WHO WERE CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN IN THE PHOTOGRAPH.	·
	3. STATED THAT HE IS ABSOLUTELY CONVINCED THAT THERE ARE NO LIVE POW'S IN VIETNAM. HE MADE THIS STATEMENT BASED ON	
	HIS PAST PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT ON THIS ISSUE WITH THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. HE COULD NOT DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THERE COULD BE U.S. SERVICEMEN ALIVE IN LAOS, BUT REGARDED THIS AS ONLY A	
	SLIGHT POSSIBILITY, GIVEN THE PASSAGE OF TIME AND PRIMITIVE LIVING CONDITIONS THERE. HE SAID HE WOULD BE HAPPY IF SOME LIVING U.S. PERSONNEL TURNED UP IN LAOS, BUT HE HAD LIITLE BASIS FOR SUCH	
•	OPTIMISM.	
	4. SAID THAT HE MET A POW NAMED "JOHN" (LNU), WHO LATER DIED IN CAPTIVITY.	
	** TEMPORARY WORKING COPY DESTROY AFTER USE. **	

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	MSO PAGE 0002
	SAID HE HAD JOHN'S DOG TAG AT HIS HOME IN HO CHI MINH CITY AND WOULD LOOK FOR IT WHEN HE RETURNED THERE. IN REF REPORT SAID THAT JOHN'S LAST NAME WAS DAVIS OR DAVIES.)
•	6. CLASSIFIED BY SIGNER. SECRET
[END OF MESSAGE ——SECRET
	END OF MESSAGE ** TEMPORARY WORKING COPY DESTROY AFTER USE **

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	////PER OR IGUNATOR	OUTGOING
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	MSR PAGE 001	
	-SECRET	
	SUBJECT: INFORMATION CN AS OF 1971	
	CONTAINING A PICTURE OF A U.S. PERSON MISSING IN ACTION (MIA), THE CARD WAS INSCRIBED WITH A REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON HIS FATE. THE CARD WAS SHOWN TO CONTACTS IN PATHE LAD (PL) COMMUNIST CONTROLLED AREAS NEAR MUONG PHINE (XDO928), LA THE RESPONSES WERE COLLATED IN ONE REPORT WHICH WAS SENT TO OUR THEN EXISTING OFFICE IN VIENTIANE. THE REPORT WAS NOT DISSEMINATE POSSIBLY BECAUSE SOME STATEMENTS APPEARED DOUBTFUL, SUCH AS THE F HOLDING U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR (POW) NEAR MUONG PHINE. IN FEBRUAR 1991 REVIEWED THE FILE AND RECONSTRUCTED HIS ORIGINAL REPORT TO THE BEST OF HIS ABILITY. HE NOTES THAT THE DATES ARE	OS. D. PL
	APPROXIMATE BECAUSE THEY ARE BASED ON CONTACTS' RECOLLECTION OF EVENTS OCCURRING AROUND THAT TIME, SUCH AS THE END OF THE RAINY SEASON. 2. THE PL CAPTORS TOOK	CH
	SUFFERED VERY MUCH. WHILE THE PAVN GUARDS DID NOT TORTURE HE WAS HELD IN PRISON AND SUBJECTED TO PROPAGANDA LECTURES. PL GENERAL KHAMKONG (SIC) AND PAVN GENERAL TAO (SIC), WHO SPOKE ENGLISH, WERE THE ONLY HIGH RANKING OFFICERS TO INTERROGATE THE PAVN GUARDS OFTEN WERE ANGRY WITH THE POW'S BECAUSE OF U.S. BOMBING IN THE AREA. WAS ALLOWED TO EAT AND TALK WITH TH OTHER POW'S. BUT WHETHER HE EVER RECEIVED LETTERS OR PACKAGES IS UNKNOWN. BECAUSE HE WAS STRICTLY GUARDED, WEVER ESCAPED FROM EITHER PRISON. ON 2 JANUARY 1968 A PAVN GUARD NAMED "ONG (M LUI" AND SIX OTHER GUARDS TOOK AND EIGHT OTHER POW'S AWAY THE VILLAGERS WERE TOLD ONLY THAT THE POW'S WERE BEING TAKEN AWAY	R.)
	FOR "TRAINING." 3	
· ¨ ;	4. CLASSIFIED BY SIGNER. SECRET	<u>-</u>

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Aller Control			nghang sa lahin fisikali kalikakin njagaki sa mata pangan pelapinan ang da maganasa da sa manasa kalika sa man Manasa pangan pangan kalika sa manasa kali Manasa kalika sa manasa k
	CTA/DDO		
TO:	(ATTN: COL. MIKE F	Property of the second	
SECRET			
		7	
SUBJECT: REMAINS, DOG TA	GS-AND-LIVE-STGHTING IN	LAOS	
REFS:			
1. THE FOLLOWING PRI	SONER OF WAR (POW)/MISSIN	NG IN ACTION	
(MIA) INFORMATION WAS OBTA	AINED IN MID-SUMMER 1990		
			,
-	•		
•			
2. AT AN UNKNOWN LOC	CATION ON AN UNKNOWN DATE	A GROUP OF	
SEVEN POW/MIA'S WERE SHOT			
UNIFORM. ONE WITNESS OF T			
REBURIED THE BODIES. THE			•
BURIAL SITE. ANOTHER MIA			
GUARD, BUT IS AFRAID TO TR			•
WOULD LIKE TO GO HOME, HE I			
WOULD NEED HELP TO DO SO.	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
HAS TWO CHILDREN.	The same of the sa	10 k LAO) AND	
3. PARTIAL DOG TAG IN	NFORMATION ON THESE INDIV	IDHALS IS AS	
FOLLOWS.	ON THOOS INDIY	IDUALS IS AS	• .
A. SAUL JEFFERY	L		
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B'.	STONEBR R (SIC) KENNETH A
	BAPTIST
C.	TR D (SIC) LEATS A
_	PROTESANT
	BOBS LANNY D
3.	BAPTIST
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	MSK .		AGE CO APR	89	
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SECRE	T				
					,
SUBJECT:	MISČELLANEOU	JS INFORMATION	ON POW/MIA	LIVE	SIGHTINGS.

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS DETAINED VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE BORDER SMUGGLERS AND CASUAL SOURCES ON POW/MIA LIVE SIGHTINGS. DOG TAGS AND REMAINS. INFORMATION WAS PASSED AS NOTED TO UCRC AND/OR STONY BEACH. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO USE THIS INFORMATION WITH JCRC AND STONY BEACH.

2. WE ARE FORWARDING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON 15
VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE SOURCES AND FOUR BORDER SMUGGLERS WHO
HAVE PROVIDED VARIOUS TYPES OF LIVE SIGHTING, DOG TAG/REMAINS
REPORTING ON THE MIA/POW ISSUE. ALL INTERVIEWS WERE CONDUCTED
BY _______ WHICH PASSED THE LEADS TO JCRC AND
STONY BEACH FOR FOLLOWUP ACTION ON THE DATES NOTED BELOW WITH
NO FURTHER FORMAL DISSEMINATION.

A. VIFTNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE

DOG TAGS AND REMAINS

.) CLAIMED HE SAW AN AMERICAN LIVING WITH ETHNIC IRIBESMEN IN OCTOBER 1983 NEAR DAC TO VILLAGE, BAN ME THUOT PROVINCE. THE AMERICAN WAS DESCRIBED AS A CAUCASIAN WITH LIEUTENANT COLONEL RANK WHO WAS SHOT DOWN IN 1972. THERE HAVE BEEN MANY STORIES ABOUT AMERICANS LIVING WITH ETHNIC TRIBESMEN IN THIS AREA. THEY ARE OFTEN ATTPIRUTED TO AN INDIAN SUPPOSEDLY LIVING IN THE AREA. ALSO REPORTED THAT IN OCTOBER 1984 HE SAW THREE AMERICANS IN SA HUYNH DISTRICT, QUANG NGAI PROVINCE. THE THREE AMERICANS WERE WORKING ON AN OIL PROJECT ON "HAI NAM" (PROBABLY HAINAN) ISLAND WHEN A STORM SENT THEM ADRIFT. ONE OF THE AMERICANS WAS JOHN PIERRE, THE SON OF A TEXAS JUDGE. AS OF EARLY 1985, THE THREE AMERICANS WERE MOVED TO HANDI. PROVIDED THE NAMES: RONNAL C. LUCSK. RA MOVED TO HANOI. BAPTIST: JOHN BOY: JAMNE CARTE: RONIE HARIS. DOG TAGS FOR THE ABOVE NAMED INDIVIDUALS WERE TURNED OVER TO MR. LE VAN PHU OF THE INTERIOR MINISTRY IN HO CHI MINH CITY (HCMC). (LE VAN PHU HAD PREVIOUS Y BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A CHIEF INSPECTOR OF THE MOI IN HOME.) WAS MOVED TO PHANAT NIKHOM ON 20 JANUARY 1988. INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO JCRC AND STONY BEACH ON 9 MARCH 1988.

E. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE

CLAIMED HEARSAY FROM
SINKING OF AN AMERICAN SHIP CFF THE COAST OF AMERICAN HIEN
DISTRICT, MINH HAI PROVINCE. ACCORDING TO NUMBER OF
AMERICAN BODIES WERE NOT RECOVERED FROM THAT VESSEL. WAS
MOVED TO PHANAT NIKHOM ON 20 JANUARY 1988. INFORMATION WAS
PASSED TO JCRC AND STONY BEACH ON 9 MARCH 1988.

C. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE

AMERICAN. SAID THE ACQUAINTANCE HELD THE REMAINS OF ONE

AMERICAN. SAID THE ACQUAINTANCE COULD BE CONTACTED

THROUGH HIS FAMILY AT A2/41 HOANG DIEU. 14TH QUARTER, 4TH

DISTRICT. SAIGON. HWAS MOVED TO PHANAT NIKHOM ON 20

UANUARY 1988. INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO UCRC AND STONY BEACH.

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regis and Fair (a) Principles provides an investment of the control of the contro	eren produkting district den district and in production party production of the control of the c	tigt of the first state of the complete transfer of the first state of the state of the state of the state of t The state of the state
	- MSR - PAGE :: 002 - APR: 89]
•	ON 9 MARCH 1988.	<u> </u>
	O. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE .), A FORMER ARVN CAPTAIN, CLAIMED HIS SISTER J HAD INFORMATION ABOUT THE REMAINS OF ONE	
	AMERICAN.	
	STONY BEACH ON 9 MARCH 1988.	•
	CLAIMED A NEIGHBOR, HELD THE REMAINS OF ONE AMERICAN AT HIS HOME IN SAIGON. REPORTEDLY TURNED THE REMAINS OVER TO GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIFS AND HOPED TO BE RESETTLED VIA THE ODP PROGRAM. WAS MOVED TO PHANAT NIKHOM ON 20 JANUARY 1988. INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO JCRC AND STONY BEACH ON 9 MARCH 1988.	
	F. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE CLAIMED THAT WHILE IN REEDUCATION CAMPS IN YEN BAI AND HOANG LIEN SON HE CAME ACROSS A WHITE AMERICAN USING THE NAME "TRAN VAN NAM." AT THE HEADCUARTERS OF THE 776TH UNIT WHICH WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTROLLING THE CAMP. SAW NAM AND A ELACK MAN. ACCORDING TO GUARDS. THESE TWO AMERICANS VOLUNTEERED TO REMAIN AFTER THE WAR. IN EARLY 1980. WHILE IN HOA LO PRISON. CLAIMED HE SAW TWO AMERICANS (ONE	
	YOUNG AND ONE OLD). STATED THAT HE CONTACTED THEM BY MORSE CODE AND THE TWO AMERICANS WERE VICTIMS OF A SHIPWRECK IN 1975 POSSIBLY NEAR CON SON. VAS INVOLVED IN SEARCHING FOR AMERICAN REMAINS AND CLAIMED INFORMATION ON NEARLY 40 SETS OF REMAINS, MOST OF WHICH WERE TURNED OVER TO VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES. ALSO MENTIONED A HELICOPTER CRASH SITE ALONG THE BANK OF A RIVER NEAP THE BIEN HOA-PHUOC LONG-SONG BINH PROVINCIAL BOUNDARIES. PRODUCED ONE NAME BUT WAS NOT SURE IT WAS CORRECT: RUSSEL COCK. NO PREF. WAS MOVED TO PHANAT NIKHOM ON 20 JANUARY 1988. INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO JCRC AND STONY BEACH ON 9 MARCH	
	1988 .	
	C. VIFTNAMESE POAT REFUGEE CLAIMED TO HAVE INFORMATION SOUT TWO SETS OF AMERICAN REMAINS EURIED IN HOC MON. 41.50 CLAIMED THAT HIS RELATIVES HELD ONE AMERICAN DOG TAG. WAS MOVED TO PHANAT NIKHOM ON 20 JANUARY 1988. INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO JCRC AND STONY BEACH ON 9 MARCH 1988.	
	H. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE CLAIMED TO HAVE SEEN AN AMERICAN BETWEEN SEPTEMBER 1976 AND FEBRUARY 1978 AT THE CATHEDRAL IN BAIGON. THE AMERICAN WAS NAMED PAUL. BORN ABOUT 1953. AND WAS FROM PENNSYLVANIA. PAUL WAS REPORTEDLY AN "INTERNATIONAL VOLUNTARY STUDENT" WHO WAS ALLOWED TO REMAIN AFTER THE WAR. PAUL REPORTEDLY LIVED AT THE FAUCAULD MONASTERY ON CUONG DE STREECT.	
	HCMC. WAS MOVED TO PHANAT NIKHOM ON 20 JANUARY 1989. INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO JCRC AND STONY BEACH ON 3 MARCH 1989.	
	I. VIETNAMFSE EDAT REFUGEE) CLAIMED HIS AUNT HAD HAD	
en andere de l'état de la collège de la coll	INFORMATION ON AMERICAN REMAINS: VAS : NOVED TO PHANAT NIKHOM ON CO JANUAR: 1988. (NEGRMATION VAS PASSED TO JORGJANDESLONY DEACH ON) WERCH	
Committee of the Commit	INFORMALIUM.VAS. PASSED TO JONGSANORSION. 72-0.	
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STATED THAT HE HAD. THE FIRST HAND SOURCE.

PASSED INFORMATION AND . ALLEGEDLY OF A FORMER AMERICAN SOLDIER HELD IN QUANG NGAI, DA NANG. THERE ARE THREE IDENTICAL BLACK AND WHITE PHOTOS OF AN APPARENT MALE CAUCASIAN. THE FILM WAS DEVELOPED BY BUT THE NEGATIVES WERE RETAINED BY A XEROXED COPY OF A LETTER, PURPORTEDLY FROM THE AMERICAN. ACCOMPANIED THE PHOTOS AND READ AS FOLLOWS: "7408-04327 =CO 120916 RDS VICHTA 15-01-74 I MET VERY HARD, AND I WANT TO HELP ME, RI (CROSSED OUT) AND I AM LIVING AT QUANG - NGAI DANANG CITY. " UNKNOWN REASONS, PRINTED A NEAR DUPLICATE OF THE LETTER. IS ONLY AN INTERMEDIARY IN THE AFFAIR AND SEEMED UNAWARE OF THE CONTENTS OF THE LETTER. STATED THAT HE HAD NEVER MET ANY AMERICAN IN VIETNAM AND WAS SURPRISED THAT THE LETTER

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	IF IMMEDIATE CONTACT IS DESIRED BY STONY BEACH.	-	
•	SOMEONE NEED BE ON STANDBY DURING THAT PERIOD. THE MATERIAL WILL BE TURNED OVER TO STONY BEACH ON WEDNESDAY, 11 JANUARY.	·• •	
•	AND A MEETING WITH HAS BEEN TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR		•
		ets. Subun resum herné désobració dificio de celebra de celebra de celebra de contracto de contracto de celebra de celebr	••••
	P. PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION. JOHN KANALY, NEW TIMES PRESSE AGENCY, 1102 SOUTH		
	RD. APT C. COLUMBUO. OHIO 43207 USA, WAS REPORTEDLY CAPTURED IN GIA LAI-CON TUM PROVINCE (NO TIME FRAME GIVEN), AND IS STILL		
	BEING HELD AT AN UNKNOWN LOCATION IN VIETNAM. THESE DETAILS		
	MEKE SKOATOED BA		
	DETAILS ON KANALY. THE NOTE WITH NAME AND ADDRESS WILL BE		
	TURNED OVER TO YOUR OFFICE ASAP. THE NOTE INCLUDES A LINE IN THE THAT LANGUAGE CLAIMING THAT THE ADDRESS IS IN KANALY'S		
	HANDWRITING. THE ABOVE WAS PASSED TO JCRC AND STONY BEACH CIRCA 23 MARCH 1989.		
	3. DURING MARCH 1988. STONY BEACH WAS PASSED FOUR OTHER LEAD. ONE LEAD WAS PASSED TO STONY BEACH IN BANGKOK AND THREE		
	OTHER CEAUS WERE PASSED TO THE STONY BEACH! IN HOME		
!	KONG. WE HAVE NO RECORDS OF WHETHER ANY OF THESE LEADS WERE FOLLOWED UP BY STONY BEACH. THE LEADS ARE AS FOLLOWS.		•
	4. ON 5 AND 22 MARCH 1988. STONY BEACH WAS PASSED HEARSAY		
	LIVE SIGHTING AND DOG TAG INFORMATION WHICH WAS DETAINED BY		
	ON 22 MARCH, STONY BEACH SAID IT WOULD THRN OVER THE REPORTING		
	TO ITS OVERT DEBRIEFING TEAM IN FOR FOLLOWUP ACTION WITH		
	INFORMATION: ROVIDED THE FOLLOWING		
•	A. ON 4 MARCH, RELATED THAT HE HAD JUST	1	
	RETURNED FROM A VISIT TO BAN TAN VILLAGE, SAKHON NAKHON PROVINCE, THAILAND. HE HAD ACCOMPANIED HIS THAI FIANCEE AND		
	HER ERUTHER WHO WAS CONDUCTING SOME BUSINESS CONNECTED WITH HIS		•
	SEMI-PRECIOUS STONE TRADING. WHILE IN THE VILLAGE. WAS APPROACHED BY THE VILLAGE HEADMAN (NFI) WHO RELATED THAT HE		
	KNEW AN ETHNIC LAO (NFI) WHO HAD SOME INFORMATION ON POW'S	•	
•	THE HEADSMAN STATED THAT THE LAO WAS WHO FORMERLY WORKED IN A PRISON IN LAOS IN AN AREA CALLED HAI HIN.		
	(PHONETIC/NFI). REPORTEDLY SAW SOME CAUGASTAN		
	PRISONERS. THE EMACT NUMBER WAS NOT CLEAR, ALTHOUGH CHE OF THEM ALLEGEDLY RECENTLY DIED FROM UNKNOWN CAUSES. ACCORDING TO		
	'S STORY, THE DECEASED PRISONER HAD THE INITIALS "KS" TATOGED ON HIS FACE. THE HEADSMAN SAID	•	
	ALLEGEDLY HAD DOG TAG(S) AND THE ASHES OR REMAINS OF A PILOT		
	WHO WAS KILLED IN AN AIRPLANE CRASH (NFI). THE HEACEMAN STATED THAT THE LAO RESIDED IN THAILAND, PRESUMABLY IN THE	•	
	SAKHON NAKHON OR NAKHON PHANOM AREA. AND WAS WILLING TO PROVIDE THE DOG TAG(S) AND OTHER POW INFORMATION FOR A PRICE		
•	 SAID HE, HIS FIANCEE AND HER SROTHER WERE WILLING TO 		
	HELP IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE TO PLACE THE PROPER AUTHORITIES IN CONTACT WITH THE HEADSMAN TO FURTHER INVESTIGATE THE		
	INFORMATION. WAS ADVISED THAT THE INFORMATION WOULD	•	•
•	SE PASSED TO BANGKOK FOR FOLLOWUP AND THAT HE WOULD SE CONTACTED IF HIS ASSISTANCE WAS REQUIRED.		
	THAT IT COULD NOT DETERMINE IF THE ABOVE APPROACH WAS LINKED TO		
	UNSCRUPULOUS LAD RESISTANCE SCAM ARTISTS ASSOCIATED WITH PRIVATE AMERICAN RESOVERY EFFORTS, AND/OR WITH SRVIS-DIRECTED	•	
	MPDR-INTELLIGENCE AND TECURITY SERVICES DISINFORMATION EFFORTS ON THE ISSUE.	* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *	
		manus anno na companyamente per contra pel manus per estado de 100 y estados	
Carlos Campas (Carlos Habita in September 1997) in the september 1997 in the september 1	RESUNTAGTED OUR BASE TO PASS ON ADDITIONAL		
APPROVED FO	THEORMATION ON THE DOLLE PROVIDED WHICH WAS PASSED		•
Furnoved 1	ON TO YOUR OFFICE STATED THAT THE BROTHER		

INCLUDING ONE ALLEGED B-52, BOMBED SEVERAL PLACES IN HAI CLAIMED HE SAW THREE AIRCRAFT BOME A PLACE ABOUT ONE KILOMETER FROM HIS VILLAGE OF PHA LE (XJ 815115) IN THE MORNING. ONE AIRCRAFT CRASHED IN THE DIRECTION OF THUY DUONG. ABOUT SEVEN KILOMETERS WEST OF PHA LA. ON THE SAME AFTERNOON. WENT TO THE HA SAN HOSPITAL TO VISIT HIS MOTHER WHO WAS HOSPITALIZED THERE, AND SAW THE TWO CAUCASIAN AIRMEN FROM THE DOOR OF THE EMERGENCY ROOM. FROM PEOPLE AT THE HOSPITAL.[LEARNED THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE AIRMEN'S CAPTURE AND THE ALLEGATION OF A B-52 BEING AMONG THE AIRCRAFT. HE COULD NOT DESCRIBE THE AIRMEN IN ANY MORE DETAIL.

B. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED IN EARLY FEBRUARY 1988 FROM '

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The state of the s	ر الموادية br>الموادية الموادية الم	en e	essente (Leaning training the Committee of the Committee	
The state of the s	MSR	PAGE 006	P	American Service (Control of Service) and are 1 from the control of Service (Control of Service)
	1	APR 89		A P C AND INCIDENCE OF COMMUNICATION AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AN
	7			, . .
	IN KIM MON DISTRICT, HAI HUNG I AIRMAN BAILED OUT VERY HIGH UP OF TIME HE LANDED AT QUANG TRUE 575215) SOUTH-SOUTHWEST OF THE DISTRICT. HE WAS IN GOOD PHYS CRASHED AT HIEP THUONG VILLAGE PASS (XJ 565 230). THE AIRMAN BEFORE A CHINESE VEHICLE FROM PROVINCE MILITARY PROVICE CAME HEADQUARTERS. CLAIMED HE CORPORATION IN THE AREA OF THE WORKERS WENT TO "SEE" THE CAPTUDIGGING UP OF THE AIRCRAFT. HIS THE WHERE THE AIRMAN LANDED AIR SAID HE COULD NOT GET CLOSE TO DETAILED PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION THE PROVINCIAL MILITARY UNIT WORTH TO THE PROVINCIAL MILITARY UNIT WORKERS WENT WAS ALLED TO BETAILED PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE PROVINCIAL MILITARY UNIT WAS ALLED THE PROVINCIAL MILITARY UNIT WAS ALLED TO BETAILED PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE PROVINCIAL MILITARY UNIT WAS ALLED THE PROVINCIAL MILITARY UNIT	DOWNED BY A MISSILE UNIT LOCATED PROVINCE. ONE CAUCASION U.S. IN THE SKY. AFTER A LONG PERIONG VILLAGE (APPROXIAMTE XJYEN PHU MOUNTAINS. KIM MON ICAL CONDITION. THE AIRCRAFT AT THE NORTHERN FOOT OF THE NEOWAS BEATEN BY THE LOCAL PEOPLETHE HAI DUONG (NOW HAI HUNG) AND DROVE HIM TO THE UNIT'S WAS WORKING FOR AN INDUSTRIAL INCIDENT. LATER, HE AND OTHER URED AIRMAN AND THE MILITIA E DESCRIBED THE DIRECTION OF THE NOTHE CRASH SITE IN OETAIL. HE THE SCENE. SO HE DID NOT HAVE ADOFTHE AIRMAN. THE COMMANDER OF		
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			
	UUNE 1968, TWO ALLEGED U.S. AI AT CHO HUONG OR LANG HUONG. SE PHUC HAI ROAD JUNCTION IMH TOO CITY. ONE CAUCASIAN AIRMAN HA LIGHTLY CURLED IVORY-WHITE HAI EUT HIS FLESH WAS SOFT. HE WA WALKED BARE FOOTED CLUMSILY. BY A PUBLIC SECURITY VEHICLE. LANDED. HIS BODY WAS COVERED KNOWN. HE WAS TAKEN BY AMBULA HOSPITAL, HAI PHONG. ACCORDIN BY GROUND FIRE WHILE HIS PARIO SAID HIS PARACHUTE WAS RED AND WAS BLUE GREEN. THEIR AIRCRAF THE SOUTH IN KIEN THUY DISTRIC EVACUATED ABOUT HALF AN HOUR SE CLAIMED HE WAS ABIF TO GET CLT THE LIVE ONE. WAS ABOUT ONLY REACHED THE LIVE AIRMAN'S 5. THE INFORMATION BELL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100	O. SO HIS PHYSICAL TRAITS WERE NO INCE TO KIEN AN TOWN (XU 6902) A TO LOCAL MILITIA. HE WAS KILLICHUTE WAS DESCENDING. THEY ALSO OTHAT THE LIVE AIRMAN'S PARACHUTE CRASHED SOME NINE KILOMETERS IT. HAIPHONG. THE DEAD AIRMAN WISFORE THE LIVE AIRMAN. PHUC HAI (KU 7300), AN THUY. THE ARRIVED AT THE SCENE. HOWEN HE ARRIVED AT THE SCENE. HOWEN HE ARRIVED AT THE SCENE. HOWEN THE AIRMEN AND HAD TOUCHEST. SOME THE AIRMEN AND HAD TOUCHEST. SOME THE AIRMEN AND HIS HEAD AIRMENT.	NG D T E D T E T O A S H E E	
	A :)N 11 AUGUST 1988.	***	ASE ME	

EROUGHT HIM A SILVER EADGE (DOG TAG?) MEASURING TWO INCHES BY TWO INCHES WHICH HAD BEEN TAKEN FROM THE BODY OF AN AMERICAN PILOT FOUND AT THE GOORE OF AN AIR CRASH....THE SILVER TAG WAS INSCRIBED:R. O.

ndra – nie sie Carne P Lesiente Libri Hillia finn och haden diete med presenningsbetell Siere i nie sie Carne P Lesiente Libri Hillia finn och haden diete med presentingsbetelle	en ursandar-ventraditanjishishini-binaring-ventra-ventribishinaring-ventra-ventribishinaring-ventra-ventribishi	iki ji mai ilikkon ki aspat dikimma bahisha sa ka makani membadi ili ila pagtabahi a hamili ili paga da gamang Malakan sa katalah sa katalah sa mangangan sa katalah sa katalah sa katalah sa katalah sa katalah sa katalah s
alikan kanada da arab kepangan kebangan manada a sebah da berangan di kebangan berangan di kebangan berangan d	nger a dagar e bandibibby ekkin jerungan a pakin a marakatar ng bankup kabbagan marakan a maka pang a papar Pi Marakatar ng marakatibibby ekkin jerungan a pakin a marakatar ng bankup kabbagan marakatar na maka pang papar P	gelega jakontegelen resempja 11. augumente aktual gegüngegi lagus kalada etti. 19 mast bala
	MSP PAGE 007	
	[APP 87]	
	CORONA, USMC, M. CATH. STATED	
TO THESE PROPERTY AND THE PROPERTY AND AND ADDRESS OF THE PARTY.	THAT THE BAUGE HAD BEEN FOUND NEAR THE AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE AND THAT- "THEY"-WERE-BRINGING-THE-UPPER PART-OF-THE-SKELETON".	
·	INCLUDING THE SKULE. FROM THE LAO SIDE TO HIM SOON. "THEY" INFORMED HIM THAT "THEY" HAD FOUND THE REMAINS OF TEN MORE AMERICAN "SOLDIERS" IN LADS AND VIETNAM. "THEY" WANTED TO KNOW	
lendend basen had lifer som be seen resembles a substanting sugar species par sugar	ABOUT REWARDS FOR SUCH REMAINS. THE REPORT WAS PASSED TO THE STONY BEACH TEAM IN BANGKOK, WHICH WAS REQUESTED TO TAKE CHARGE OF FOLLOWING UP ON THE FOREGOING INFORMATION.	,
	F AS DE 4 FEBRUARY 1989.	
	REPORTED THAT A FRIEND, "A FORMER LPA SOLDIER," HAD LOCATED THE BODY OF A U.S. MARINE IN LAOS; DOG TAG IS WITH THE REMAINS. DOG TAG READS: MARSHALL, USMC. BAPTIST S. THIS INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO STONY BEACH TEAM.	
	7. IN EARLY SEPTEMBER 1985,	
	RECEIVED A LETTER WHICH REPORTED ON THE PRESENCE OF A LARGE NUMBER OF LIVE U.S. POW'S ALONG THE LAD/VIETNAMESE BORDER. TWO NAMES WERE PROVIDED GORDON D.C.A USMCM NOPREF, AND, MARSHALL, USAC BATIT. THIS INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO THE U.S. EMBASSY DAO DFFICE IN BANGKOK.	
	8. ON 22 SEPTEMEER 1988, OUR OFFICE WAS APPROACHED BY A FORMER CONTACT, AN ETHNIC LAO NAMED WITH POW/MIA RELATED INFORMATION. WAS BORN KHAMMOUAN PROVINCE: CURRENT ADDRESS:	
	SAKHON NAKHON PROVINCE. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO STONY BEACH. HAS AN ALLEGED JAW BONE FRAGMENT OF A PURPORTED UNIDENTIFIED U.S. POW. HE CLAIMS HE RECEIVED THE BONE FRAGMENT FROM UNSPECIFIED PERSONS IN NAKHON PHANOM PROVINCE WHO ALSO CLAIMED TO HAVE A DOG TAG WHICH APPARENTLY WAS FOUND AT THE SAME SITE AS THE BONE FRAGMENT. HAS A	1
•	LIST OF 25 ALLEGED LIVE POWS IN LADS-VIETNAM WHICH PURPORTEDLY WAS GIVEN TO A THAI DISTRICT OFFICIAL IN UBON PROVINCE IN MAY 1988 BY A DRIVER (NFI) OF LAO DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NOUHAK PHOUMSAVAN. ALSO HAS A LETTER FROM AN ETHNIC LAD RESIDENT OF THE U.S. NAMED CLAIMS TO CLAIMS TO HAVE CONTACT WITH UNIDENTIFIED U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHO HAVE OFFERED A REWARD OF ONE MILLION U.S. DOLLARS AND U.S. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT TO THE LAO RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN EXCHANGE FOR THE RETURN OF A LIFE POW.	
	STATIONERY OF THE "NATIONAL MORREPLAN ORGANIZATION." A. RESIDES AT FILE INFORMATION DATED MAY 1985 INDICATES WAS A FORMER ROYAL LAD OFFICER ATTACHED TO U.S. SPECIAL FORCES BETWEEN 1970 AND 1975 WHO HAD PREVIOUS DEALINGS WITH "INSCM" ON POW/MIA MATTERS. ADDITIONAL FILE INFORMATION DATED MAY 1985 INDICATES A PERSON NAMED TRAVELED IN THAILAND WITH BO GRITZ.	
	5. RETURNED TO HIS RESIDENCE IN SAKHON NAKHON ON 23 SEPTEMBER 1988. DUR OFFICE WAS PREPARED TO ASSIST IN ARRANGING A MEETING BETWEEN AND A STONY BEACH REPRESENTATIVE IF DESIRED. IN THE PAST. HAD PROVIDED POW/MIA RELATED INFORMATION WHICH WAS NOT ACCURATE. HE ALSO PROVIDED INTRODUCTIONS TO OTHER PERSONS WHOSE CLAIMED ACCESS TO POW INFORMATION WAS NOT ESTABLISHED. HAS PREVIOUSLY WORKED WITH AS A COPY OF S CORRESPONDENCE WITH	
en en en de de en	IS AVAILABLE. BELOW IS A LIST OF 25 NAMES OF THE ALLEGED POW'S PROVIDED BY SOME OF THE NAMES ARE ILLEGIBLE	eran manamatikantal kahala dan terminak dalah manamatan menembanan kanamatan kahan dalah melalah dalah dalah d Manamatan dalah
	AND THE SPELLINGS ARE PRESENTED AS LISTED A CORY OF THE LIST	
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APR 99 IS NESS AVAILABLE. THE WHATS INCLUDE: MARE PATERS SALES! VINILIAM JUST (LLEGIBLE "POSSIBLY KNOTCH, PEARGE EDWIN T; MODION SPETSON DOWNLE, MERCEN JACOB E; POSSITIAT I ATHAL C.M. SIMON'S RESERVE WARCE HAUTH MODIN: LINEADS YOUN ROW; VINESSP—BRANN-LINNOOD: "N-Y SARIONS HEN, NY, SAMAN, TEN, JATZOB; TOT ADOS METHOLIST; TODO YILLIAM JAD, SAV PRAN 1910. 9. ON JO DECENSES 1988. STONY BEACH AND JORD USE PASSED THE FOLDIUM'NG INFORMATION FORM A STAIRCE WERM WE CONSIDER RELIABLE. ON J DECENSER, C' SAID THEY REPRET JO HAVE TWO POYS IN HAND FROM LOS IN 1 FCC THAN DIE WEEK. 10. 11. 11. 11.	pelleta, primara dendrica de descripto		SECRET	Societis established (1995) (1995)		
IS ALSO AVAILABLE. THE WARE INCLUDE: UNEX PYER SHEW. ILLEGIBLE POSSIBLE LAST NAME IS ROSS: UNIO, SOMET: SOUTER VIMILAN JOE: ILLEGIBLE POSSIBLE LAST NAME IS ROSS: UNIO, SOMET: SOUTER VIMILAN JOE: ILLEGIBLE POSSIBLE LAST NAME IS ROSS ET FORSITATI ATHAI C.M. MORGAN SEPFERSON DOWNING MCDOT BOOK ROOSE IN THE THAN CO.M. VISH SEBRAN: SOUMNING MCDOT BOOK ROOSE IN DEFENDE THOMS CI. VISH SEBRAN: SOUMNING MCDOT BOOK ROOSE IN THE SEMILAR FOR SHAPE POSSIBLE TOO VILLIAM TOO VILLIAM TOO VILLIAM TOO VILLIAM TOO VILLIAM TOO VILLIAM ROOSE IN THE FOLIOWING INFORMSTON FORM A CHIEFT WORM WE CONSIDER RELIABLE. ON 3 DECEMBER, C. SAID THEY APPECT TO HAVE TWO POWS IN HAND FROM LAGS IN 1 FES. THAN ONE WEEK. TO DE MESSAGE. THE THAN ONE WEEK. **DO DE MESSAGE** **DECEMBER** **DO DE MESSAGE** **DECEMBER** **DECEMBER** **DO DE MESSAGE** **DECEMBER** **DECEMBER** **DECEMBER** **DECEMBER** **DO DE MESSAGE** **DECEMBER** **DO DECEMBER** **DECEMBER**					The second second	mineralbane des test band
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ILLEGIBLE POSSIBLE LAST MANE IS ROSE; GUAG SONNET; POTTER VINILLAN UJR; LLEGIBLE POSSIBLE LAVOOGE; EVANTIAL ATHAL; C.M. MORGAN SEPPERSON DOWNAME; MERCER JACOB E; FORSITATIA ATHAL; C.M. VISH BOOM: BOUNKIN GUE, BOINE ROQUIT JR; DEFRONE TOWNS: VINESEP; BRANN-CYNODE: N.W.—SARIONE; N.W.—SAMAN; F.V. JRIVES TGI ADOS METODIST; TODO VILLIAM PRAN 197L. Q. ON 30 DECEMBER 1988. STOM BEACH AND UCRC WERE PASSED THE FOLICHING INFORMATION FORM A GRIERF MADM WE CONSIDER RELIABLE. ON 3 DECEMBER, C SAID THEY EXPECT TO HAVE TWO POWS IN HAND FROM LAGS IN 1555 THAN ONE WEEK.	A CONTRACTOR OF THE PROPERTY O	MSR		24 15 24 15 16 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17	\$3,4.543 E.152 E.457 S.457 S.4	All the said to be specially beautiful the said to be
VINLIAN J JR; LILEGIBLE POSSIBLY KYNOTOH; PEARCE EDWIN 1: MORGAN SEPERSON DOCAME: MALTE MACH HOON! LINENCO MOUN ROW: VINLES BEOUGHT MAKE RESERVE; WALL'E HACH HOON! LINENCO MOUN ROW: VINLES BRANNY-CHOODED-N-W-SARONE; WALL'E HACH HOON! LINENCO MOUN ROW: VINLES BRANNY-CHOODED-N-W-SARONE; WALL'E HACH HOON! LINENCO MOUN ROW: VINLES BRANNY-CHOODED-N-W-SARONE; WALL'E HACH HOON J 317200; TGI ADOS METHODIST; TODO VILLIAM W-SARONE; WALL BRAND J WALL BRA		IS ALSO AVAILABLE. THE N	AMES INCLUDE: JUNE PETER SA EN:			
VINESEP-BRANY-LYMOGO: N-W. SARIOTHE, N-W. SAMAN T. J. 317205: TOI ADDS METHODIST; TOOV UILLIAM PRAN 197L. 9, ON 30 DECEMBER 1988, STONY BEACH AND UCRC WERE PASSED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FORM A CRIRCE WHOM WE CONSIDER RELIABLE. ON 3 DECEMBER. C SAID THEY EXPECT TO HAVE TWO POWS IN HAND FROM LACS IN 1FSS THAN ONE WEEK. 10. 11. END OF MESSAGE SECRET—		VIMLIAM U JR: ILLEGIBLE A MORGAN SEPFERSON DONAHUE: SIMMONE ROBENT VISH BROWN: BOUNKINA JEUD	OSSIBLY KYMOTOH; PEARGE EDWIN T: MERCER JACOB E: FORSITATI ATHNA E: WALTE HUGTH MOON: LINENCO WOG ; BADINE ROGOUT UR: DEFFRONE THO	; C.M. N ROW:		
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FORM A SOURCE WHOM WE CONSIDER RELIABLE. ON 3 DECEMBER. C SAID THEY EXPECT TO HAVE TWO POWS IN HAND FROM LADS IN 1FRS THAN ONE WEEK. 10. 11. END OF MESSAGE SECRET	e de la companie de l		N-W-SARIDINE:-N-W-SAMAN:-F-V-			
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4	CONTROLS SECRET	
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	SECRET	
	BODY	
	SUBJECT: AMERICAN POW/MLA LIVING IN LAOS	
	CORRECTION	
	- THIS IS A REISSUE OF WHICH WAS INADVERTENTLY SENT UNDER THIS NUMBER. THE CORRECT NUMBER SHOULD BE	
	CHANGE PLEASE CORRECT ALL FILES. THE TEXT DOES NOT	
	1.	
	THIS INFORMATION WAS TO BE PASSED TO STONY BEACH AND JCRC.	
	2. ACCORDING TO	
	25 JANUARY 1990, THERE ARE NO	•
	AMERICAN POW/MIA'S LEFT IN LAOS, EXCEPT FOR ONE AMERICAN WHO MARRIED	
	A LAO WOMAN AND RESIDES IN HOUAPHAN PROVINCE. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE LPDR (GOL) TURNED OVER ALL ITS AMERICAN POW/MIA'S TO VIETNAM IN	,
	1982/1983 (SIC) BECAUSE THERE WAS NO PLACE IN LAOS TO DETAIN THEM. SAID HE DOES NOT KNOW THE NUMBER OF AMERICANS THE GOL TURNED	
	OVER TO VIETNAM, BUT HE KNOWS THAT THEY ARE BEING DETAINED AT A PLACE THAT IS 420 KILOMETERS AWAY FROM HANOI, ALTHOUGH DOES	
Į	NOT KNOW IN WHICH DIRECTION. (COMMENT: IF THE PLACE IS INDEED 420 KILOMETERS FROM HANO1, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE SOMEWHERE IN WHAT WAS	•
•••	FORMERLY SOUTH VIETNAM. THE LPDR WAS FORMALLY ESTABLISHED IN 1975.)	
		about the Polymer Share on the con-
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OF LAOS	IN HOUAPHAN PROVINC	E, WHICH INCLUDE:		
	A. SOMEWHERE IN X	AM NEUA DISTRICT (VH	0.158)	
VIENGXAI	B. THE PHA DENG C DISTRICT (VH 1957)	AVE PRISON, TWO KILON	ETERS EAST OF	
	C. SOMEWHERE IN X	AM TAI DISTRICT (VH 6	210)	
. –		IENG KHO DISTRICT (VH		
4.		METIME IN SEPTEMBER OF		
PAPER TO ANYTHING	WITH HIS NAME AND SHER AMERICAN HUSBAN DOWN AND TOLD HER 1	PROACHED THE LAO WIFE HER A PIECE OF PAPER SERIAL NUMBER. THE LAD, BUT BOTH TIMES HE TO TELL THE INTELLIGEN	FOR THE AMERICAN TO O WIFE TOOK THE	
5.	ANT TO MEET OR SPEA	K WITH ANYONE.		
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	S E C R E T		
	SECRET		
	DOW AT MINE IN LAOS		
	SUBJECT: CLAIMED SIGHTING OF U.S. POW AT MINE IN LAOS		
	THE CASHAL CONVERSATION IN TAIWAN ON 21 DECEMBER 1989. A		
•	CLAIMED TO HAVE SEEN A U.S. PRISONER OF WAR (POW) DURING A TRIP TO LAOS IN NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1989. DURING THAT PERIOD DURING A TRIP TO LAOS IN NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1989. HE WAS		•
•	WHEN . WAS IN VIENTING		
•	TAKEN ON A TWO OR THREE DATE THE TAKEN ON A TWO OR THREE DATE THE TAKEN ON A TWO OR THREE DATE THE TAKEN OF THE DID NOT		
	BITNDEDIDED DUKING PORTIONS OF THEME WERE / SOUT SIX GUARDS		
	A DEADDED MALE CAUCASIANT		
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	BEARD, WAS GAUNT BUT NCT SICKLY, AND HAD GONE NATIVE BEARD. WAS GAUNT BUT NCT SICKLY, AND HAD GONE NATIVE BEARD HE MIGHT GO A LOCAL WIFE. SAID THAT IF CONDITIONS WERE RIGHT HE MIGHT GO A LOCAL WIFE. SAID THAT HE WOULD RETURN TO TAIWAN BACK TO THE MINING AREA IN LAOS, BUT THAT HE WOULD RETURN TO TAIWAN BACK TO THE MINING AREA IN LAOS, BUT THAT HE WOULD RETURN TO TAIWAN		
	BACK TO THE MINING AREA IN LADS, SON THE CHINESE LUNAR NEW YEAR (27 JANUARY		
	1990). PROVIDED A		
•	2. IN NOVEMBER 1989 ON A VISIT TO BANGKOK. PROVIDED A SIMILAR ACCOUNT ABOUT THIS U.S. POW, WITH THE EXCEPTION THAT HE DID		
	NOT CLAIM TO		
	SIGHTING WAS CLAIMED TO HAVE INFORMATION ON U.S. AIR FORCE CRASH SITES, WHICH HE CLAIMED TO HAVE INFORMATION ON OTHER UPCOUNTRY CONTACTS. BECAUSE		
	BOTATNED EDDM (RIBEDMEN OF THE TON DO AR REWARD		
•	AND HIS CONTACTO FOR THE THIE THEODING TON		•
	THE U. C. COVERNMENT WITCHOUT GOATS OF ATTA TO HAVE		
	TAMEDOMATION ON U.S. FUW 2 AND TO THE CONTROL EDOM FILMER AN		
	I A SHEET WITH INFORMATION COPIED FROM THE, DOB IDENTIFICATION CARD OR DOG TAGS AS FOLLOWS: JAMES BLAIR WHITE, DOB IDENTIFICATION CARD OR DOG TAGS AS FOLLOWS: JAMES BLAIR WHITE, DOB RANK-CAPTAIN; AIRMAN RALPH W. MAGET: AND AIRMAN		
	CLEAN MATTESON		
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		•
. •	BANGKOK, AND IF THE LATTER WELL STILL HAS THE SHEFT DESCRIBED ABOVE.		
	COULD BE MADE. STILL HAS THE S		
	4.		
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	•	SUBJECT: POW'S ON LAD-VIETNAMESE BORDER AND MIA REMAINS IN	
		CAMBODIA	
	•	1. DN 19 OCTOBER 1989.	•
	•	-	
•		THE THREE CLAIMED THEY WERE FROM HO CHI MINH CITY, VIETNAM, AND HAD MADE THEIR WAY TO SAVANNAKHET AS PART OF A TOUR GROUP, IS CURRENTLY BEING DETAINED AT THE PHANOM DISTRICT POLICE STATION.	
		2. THREE YEARS AGO (I.E. IN 1986) THERE WERE THREE U.S. POW'S LOCATED AT THE LAD BAD NORTH DETENTION CAMP (XD7036) ON THE LAO-VIETNAMESE BORDER. ONE OF THE POW'S (NFI) HAD DIED. ANOTHER POW WAS FLIGHT LIEUTENANT THOMAS GRIFFIN. ACCORDING TO ALL THREE POW'S WERE BEING USED AS MECHANICS. NO FURTHER DETAILS WERE AVAILABLE.	
		3. ON 27 SEPTEMBER 1989 CONTACT REPORTED THE INFORMATION IN PARAGRAPH 4, WHICH HE SAID HE LEARNED FROM UNIDENTIFIED SOURCES IN UBON.	
		4. CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS (NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED) EITHER KNEW OF OR'DISCOVERED THE REMAINS OF THREE U.S. MIA'S NEAR KIANAK (UNLOCATED), STUNG TRENG PROVINCE, CAMBODIA. THE DOG TAG FROM ONE OF THE MIA'S WAS AS FOLLOWS:	
		YORK, DANIEL	
		SSN: (BLOOD TYPE)	•
		PROT(ESTANT)	
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	S E C R E T	
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	SUBJECT: DOG TAG AND LIVE SIGHTING IN LADS	
	THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS	~ ·r
	OBTAINED THE INFORMATION FROM ONE OF 40 RECENTLY ARRIVED VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEES WHO ARE NOW INCARCERATED AT THE THA LUX POLICE COMPOUND. THE INFORMATION HAS BEEN PASSED TO UCRC AND STREACH AND NOW IS BEING SENT FOR YOUR INFORMATION.	N ONY
	2. A VIETNAMESE BJAT REFUGEE IN TRAT PROVINCE PASSED A COP A DOG TAG RUBBING TO A THAI OFFICIAL. THE DOG TAG IS THAT OF: L. SMITH JR, AF	FRED IN
	3. ON 03 OCTOBER 1989, A LETTER WAS RECEIVED FROM A SOURCE UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY WHICH CONTAINED THE POW RELATED INFORMA DESCRIBED BELOW. THE LETTER CONTAINED INFORMATION FROM A FORMER PEOPLE'S ARMY FIRST LIEUTENANT KHAMPHOU DOUANGMANYCHAN, WHO RESII IN XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCE. THE DATE AND PLACE OF THE SOURCE'S MEETING WITH KHAMPHOU WAS NOT INDICATED IN THE LETTER. A GIST OF THE LETTER WAS TO BE PASSED TO STONY BEACH.	TION LAO DES
	4. ON O3 OCTOBER 1989, OUR OFFICE RECEIVED THE FOLLOW POW/MIA RELATED INFORMATION FROM A SOURCE OF UNDERTERMINED RELIABILITY. THE SOURCE CLAIMS HE OBTAINED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION	/ING
	TOLD THE SOURCE THAT THERE ARE 14 AMERICAN POW'S BEING HAT THAM LUANG, NACHIK CANTON IN THE VIENGXAI DISTRICT (V-12949) OF HOUAPHAN PROVINCE. "THAM LUANG" IS THE ENDMED DECIDENCE OF PRINC SOUPHANDUVONG, ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE. SAID THAT THAM LUANG IS LOCATED ONE KILOMETER EAST OF BANCHIK, MAICH 15 17 KILOMETERS EAST OF THE VIENGXAI MUNICIPALITY. SAID THAT THE 14 AMERICAN POW'S ARE GUARDED BY A 26-MAN POLICE COMPANY	Ε
	COMMANDED BY A POLICE LIEUTENANT SITHA. SAID THE POW'S GROW RICE AND VEGETABLES FOR A LIVING PUT THEY ARE NOT ALLOWED T WEAR SHOES. ALSO ACCORDING TO THERE ARE THREE ADDITION POW'S BEING HELD AT AN AIR BASE IN MAUNG HAM (UH9647). THESE THREE ADDITION OF ARE REPORTEDLY BRING USED TO TRACH ENGLISH TO DAME COLORED	AL
	AND HOW THE LATTER ARE TO USE AN AIR SIGNAL SYSTEM. JAIN THERE ARE FOUR MIG-21'S LOCATED AT THE SAME AIRBASE. NO FURTHER INFORMATION WAS AVAILABLE.	
	5.	
	6. CLASSIFIED BY SIGNER. SECRET	
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	SUBJECT: POW/MIA INFORMATION FROM LAG INFORMANT		L .
	1. THE FOLLOWING PRISONER OF WAR (POW)/MISSING IN ACTION (MIA) INFORMATION ON LAGS WAS OBTAINED IN LATE SEPTEMBER AND EARLY OCTOBER		
	1989 HE ALSD PROVIDED NOTES AND A SKETCH MAP OF THE AREA OF LADS DESCRIBED IN HIS NOTES, WHICH WILL BE PASSED TO YOU SEPARATELY. HIS STATEMENTS AND NOTES ARE BEING PASSED		C
	PASSED TO YOU SEPARATELY. HIS STATEMENTS AND NOTES ARE BELLIA FASSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.		L i
	THE POW/MIA INFORMATION WHICH FOLLOWS WAS OBTAINED FROM		C.
•	HE SERVED IN THE ROYAL LAD ARMY. HE RETURNED FROM A TRIP		I
·	TO LAGS TO VISIT RELATIVES CIRCA AUGUST 1989. HE SAID THAT HE KNOWS BEODLE IN LAGS AND COULD PROVIDE SOME HELP ON THE POW/MIA ISSUE		ľ,
	SHOULD HE RETURN THERE, PROVIDED PROPER ARRANGEMENTS ARE MADE TO PROTECT HIM AND HIS FAMILY.		W
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	4. SUBSEQUENTLY PROVIDED THREE PAGES OF NOTES ON THE POW/MIA SUBJECT. ONE PAGE REPEATS SOME INFORMATION GIVEN IN PARA.		_
•	3 ABOVE. IT ALSO ADDS THAT AN UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN SAID THAT SHE SAW		0 U
	UNIDENTIFIED PERSON SAW ONE OP MODE POW/MIA'S AT BAN "HOAISAN" (SIC) A SECOND PAGE, WHICH OBTAINED FROM AN UNIDENTIFIED LAD	•	T G
	WHO HAD RETURNED FROM A TRIP TO LAOS, REPORTS THAT PRISON CAMPS EVICT NEAD "DINEDING" (SIC) AND BAN DONG (UNLOCATED). ALSO IN THIS		. 0
	NOTE IS A STATEMENT THAT A CRASH SITE WITH REMAINS EXISTS AT "BAN HOLASANE" (SIC). THE THIRD PAGE CONSISTS OF A SKETCH MAP OF THAT AREA OF LADS DESCRIBED ABOVE AND SHOWS THE LOCATION OF A HEAVILY		I N
	GUARDED CAMP AND OF "BAN HOIASANE" (SIC), WHERE AN ATTEMPT TO RELEASE A POW FAILED FOR LACK OF ENOUGH MONEY.		G
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	SUBJECT: REPORT OF POW'S IN LAOS 1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WHICH HAS REEN PASSED TO STONY BEACH, HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM		
	2. ACCORDING TO TWO AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR (POW'S) ARE NOW BEING HELD CAPTIVE IN A LEU VILLAGE IN XIANG KHOANG PROVINCE NEAR THE VIETNAMESE BORDER. THEY ARE BEING HELD AND GUARDED BY A LOCAL VILLAGE MILITIA GROUP; THE LAO AUTHORITIES AND THE LAO ARMY APPARENTLY DO NOT WARM OF THEIR PRESENCE. THE POW'S HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED BY 3. ONE OF THE TWO AMERICANS IS MARRIED TO A LEU WOMAN AND THEY NOW HAVE THREE CHILDREN. ONE WAS INJURED WHEN HIS PLANE CRASHED DURING THE WAR AND HE SUBSEQUENTLY LOST AN ARM. BOTH ARE LIVING MISERABLY AND WANT TO ESCAPE. THE VILLAGE IN WHICH THEY ARE HELD IS ENTIRELY FILMIC FEY, LOCATED IN A REMOTE AREA. 4. IS AWARE OF THE AMERICANS' PRESENCE DUE TO THE FACT THAT FRIENDS OF HIS HAVE VISITED THE VILLAGE. SINCE WORD OF A TWO MILLION DO' AD DEMAND FOR RETURN OF U.S. POW'S HAS SPREAD. THE VILLAGERS AND ALL WANT A PIECE OF THE ACTION. SAYS THAT HE CAN BRING THE TWO POW'S TO THE THAI BORDER IF HE CAN REACH AN AGDEFMENT WITH RESPONSIBLE U.S. REPRESENTATIVES. 5. STATED THAT IN ADDITION TO THE TWO LIVE POW'S. THIS VILLAGE ALSO HAS THE REMAINS OF 17 AMERICAN MISSING IN ACTION		
	(MIA). THE VILLAGERS WANT TO TURN OVER THE REMAINS FOR A REWARD AS WELL. PROVIDED A SOMEWHAT LEGIBLE LIST OF SOME OF THOSE 17 AMERICANS. FOLLOWING ARE THOSE ON THE LIST WHOSE NAMES ARE LEGIBLE ENOUGH FOR US TO REPRINT HERE: - SHELL, L. USMC S BAPTIST - MARSHALL, T., III		
	USMC BAPTIST - GILBERT, FRANCIS G SIMS USMC M METHODIST		
	- SHIRLEY, MARSHALL J. CATHOLIC - POLSTON, H.D. USMC BAPTIST - MACIEJEWSKI', R.C.	····	

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7,

-TERRENCE L. TAYLOR

SECRET

-WOODROW W. KEMP. JR.

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•	METHODIST CATHOLIC PROTESTANT		
		and department of the control of the COV frequency to the spirit features are included that	
	E THE CARLY DESCRIPTED AND AN ETHNIZO CUTNICES WHICH		
	5. IN EARLY DECEMBER 1988 AN ETHNIC CHINESE-KHMER TURNED OVER THE FOLLOWING NAMES AND		
	ACCOMPANYING BONE FRAGMENTS TO		
	A. THREE DOG TAG RUBBINGS, ONE HANDWRITTEN PAPER PLUS BONE FRAGMENT		
	ON RANDY R. SIMPSON, FR. DIFFICULT TO READ), NONE		
•			
	B. DOG TAG RUBBINGS AND BONE FRAGMENTS ON GEORGE VARGAS, RA CATHOLIC	•	
	C. DOG TAG RUBBING, HANDWRITTEN PAPER PLUS BONE FRAGMENT ON ROBERT	•	
	SUMMERSON JR. US PRESBYTERIAN		
•	D. DOG TAG RUBBINGS PLUS BONE FRAGMENT ON MARVIN FUGATE, US		
	NO PREF		
	E. DOG TAG RUBBING ON TON V HUONG, "7 TRAN T REP, CSF B18, MED AUTH 29TH, NOTIFY 5FSG LLDB"		
	A IN EARLY DECEMBER, AN ETHNIC CHINESE-KHMER		
٠	TURNED OVER THE FOLLOWING NAMES AND ACCOMPANYING BONE FRAGMENTS		
		•	
	A. DOG TAG RUBBING PLUS BONE FRAGMENT ON ROBERT L. TROTTER, RA CHRISTIAN		
	B. DUPLICATE OF ABOVE		
	C. DOG TAG RUBBING PLUS BONE FRAGMENT ON GEORGE VARGAS, RA		
	CATHOLIC		
•	NOTE THAT ANOTHER SOURCE TURNED OVER INFORMATION ON 'ROBERT L.		
	TROTTER" WHICH WAS PASSED TO JORG IN EARLY DECEMBER 1988.		
	' 7. WHO PROBABLY OBTAINED THEM FROM A REFUGEE IN SITE B. PASSED TWO PHOTOGRAPHS OF SKELETONS WITH		
•	IDENTIFYING INFORMATION LOCATED IN THE PICTURE (TOO SMALL TO READ); A COPY OF A DOG TAG OF: GEORGE T. MURRAY, RA CATHOLIC,	•	1
	AND A MAP SUPPOSEDLY IDENTIFYING MURRAY'S BURIAL PLACE. THE		,
	PHOTOGRAPHS LOOK VERY FAMILIAR AND POSSIBLY THEY HAVE PREVIOUSLY BEEN TURNED OVER TO JCRC. THE NAME GEORGE T. MURRAY HAS ALSO BEEN		
•	REPORTED IN THE PAST.		
	8. ON 9 JANUARY 1989, J		
	AND A DOGTAG. ACCORDING TO A CRUDELY WRITTEN NOTE WHICH ACCOMPANIED		
	THE PHOTOS, THE INFORMATION ON THE DOGTAG READS AS FOLLOWS: GOMEZ, ROBERT A. CHRIST, SCI. (COMMENT: THE ALPHA		
	ROSTER SHOWS ROBERT ARTHUR GOMEZ WITH SSAN 15TED AS DEAD - BODY NOT RECOVERED 1		
• • •	HAD BEEN- APPROAGHED IN		
•••	HIS VILLAGE OF BAN THAN IN SWAENG DAEN DIN DISTRICT. SAKHON NAKHON PROVINCE O/A 7 JAN 89 BY AN ETHNIC LAO (NFI) WHO IS CURRENTY		bases to the large and assembly a sec-
	RESTOUNG IN NAKHON PHANOM PROVINCE. THE LAO REQUESTED TO DETERMINE IF THE BONES IN THE PHOTOGRAPH WERE AUTHENTIC.	The transfer of the state of th	
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	CURIECT. LAO MIA (BOU REPORTING	C NET LINVEN UITU DDIV	ATE DECOUEDY	
	SUBJECT: LAO MIA/POW REPORTING EFFORTS	G NEI FINNED MIIU LKIA	ALE RECOVER!	
	1. PER DISCUSSIONS WITH	DIA NG THE FOLLOWING INFOR	MATION ON WHAT	
	APPEARS TO BE A FIVE-MAN NET IN HEARSAY LIVE SIGHTING REPORTING	NVOLVED IN PROVIDING F	IRST HAND AND	
	THE CENTRAL FIGURE IN THIS NET			
·	NOTED IN BASE REPORTING (ON THE MIA/POW ISSUE	SINCE MARCH	
	2.		CAME TO	
	BASE ATTENTION ON 26 MARCH 198	AMERICAN REPORTEDLY BE	ING CARED FOR BY	
	IN EARLY 1987 AT SALEO V 8 APRIL TWO INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT	1987). REPORT	ED THE PARAGRAPH	
		-	· · ·	
-	ATTEMPTED TO GIVE THE P	NTIFIED PERSON (PARAGR IECE OF PAPER MAY HAVE	BEEN	•
	DEBRIEFED ON 26 MARCH 1987 AT	IEFED ON 19 MARCH 1987	ANNOT DETERMINE	•
	WHO WAS INTRODUCED TO WHOM FIRE DEBRIEFED AGAIN ON 14 APRIL 198	ST FOR DEBRIEFINGS. 87. THIS DEBRIEFING W DUM) OF 28 APRIL 1987.	AS_DISSEMINATED	•
U.	DEBRIEFED AGAIN ON 18 MAY 1987	WHICH RESULTED IN THE Y 1987) ON THE PURCHAS	DISSEMINATION E OF NARCOTICS	
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	COMPANY (MADC) FOR SHIPMENT CO VLEI	NAM CITATOMENTHE HAID.	
	TRAVELED TO KHAM KEUT TOWN ON 3-4 M	AY 1987 AS A RESULT OF AN MADC	
	RESIDENT OF VANGPON VILLAGE, KHAM K	EUT DISTRICT, BOLIKHAMSAI	
	FROM 1967 TO 1975, AND HAD RECEIVED VIETNAM.	UNSPECIFIED TRAINING IN NORTH	
	3. IN EARLY JUNE 1987, DEBRIEFINGS ON HIS LIVE SIGHTING RE HIM ON 3 JUNE 1987		IER
	SUPPORT _ STATEMENTS ABOUT A U.S. POW, ABOUT HIS GOING TO SALE HIS HAVING SEEN A WHITE U.S. POW AT	relling Him About O VILLAGE IN APRIL 1987, OR ABOU	IT
	AFTER WHICH, CHANGED HIS INF THE DESCRIPTION OF THE WHITE U.S. P VILLAGE, AND WHAT HE SAW THE TWO U.	ORMATION SEVERAL TIMES REGARDING OW, HOW HE TRAVELED TO SALEO S. POW'S DOING WHEN HE SAW THEM.	
	FINALLY STATED THAT HE THOUGH IN HIM INTO DELIVERING A STORY OF A PO	SALEO VILLAGE COULD HAVE TRICKE	ED
	MONEY. WAS TOLD TO OBTAIN A AGREED TO DO SO.	ND RETURN WITH PROOF. OR ABOU	IT
	HIS NARCOTICS INFORMATION. OUR DEB ACCEPT ANY FURTHER INFORMATION FROM PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF LIVE U.S.	UNLESS RE COULD PROVIDE	RE
	THEN ISSUED ON ALL THREE OF HIS REP		
•	4. NEXT SURFACED IN SINTRODUCTION TO A LAO MALE NAMED INFORMATION ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF U	EPTEMBER 1987 WHEN HE BROKERED A WHO CLAIMED TO HAVE	
	(UH 4254) OF HOUAMUANG DISTRICT, HO CLAIMED HE WAS A	UA PHAN PRCVINCE, LAOS.	:
	WHO TRAVELED REGULARLY BETWEEN VIEN CLAIMED HE OBTAINED INFORMATION	TIANE AND HOUA PHAN PROVINCE.	
		ID TOLD HIM ABOUT HIS	
	IN POW INFORMATION. ASKED	CONTACT WITH A PERSON INTERESTED FOR HELP IN CONTACTING THIS	
	PERSON (OUR DEBRIEFER) THROUGH HIS TO HIS BROTHER WHO BROKERED THE OUR DEBRIEFER. DEBRIEFING ON	SEPTEMBER 1987 INTRODUCTION TO	
	AMERICAN POW'S IN HOUA PHAN PROVINC	E WAS DISSEMINATED AS 1987. OUR DEBRIEFER LATER	
	DEBRIEFED ' ON 24 OCTOB KHAI PROVINCE, THAILAND. DE	ER 1987 AT BAN LAOMAKFANG, NONG BRIEFING RESULTED IN THE	
•	DISSEMINATION OF A REPORT ON THE CO	NVICTION OF FORMER LPDR CENTRAL	
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	COMMITTEE MEMBER ON CORRUPTION CHARGES NOVEMBER 1987). CLAIMED HE LEARNED HIS INFORMA MALE		
	division in the second		
	5. ON 30 JANUARY 1988, WAS DEBR PASSED ON INFORMATION PERTAINING TO AN AMERICAN HARLAND, PREVIOUSLY REPORTED IN PARAGRAPH FOUR ABOVE	POW NAMED (FNO)	
·	2 NOVEMBER 1987). THE NAME OF CORRECTED AND WAS IDENTIFIED AS HENRY L. ALLEN; ALLED DECEASED IN AVAILABLE MIA/POW LISTING. PRESENT ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF ALLEN THAT HE HAD RECEIVED	N IS CARRIED AS ED INFORMATION	
	:	1	
	· ·		
	ALLEN WAS TRANSFERRED FROM THE AREA OF BAN BOUAK VIL HOUAMUANG DISTRICT, HOUA PHAN PROVINCE, IN EARLY DEC BAN PHIENG KAO HOI (NCA), ABOUT TWELVE KILOMTERS NOR TA KHOAY CANTON (NCA), SAM TAI DISTRICT (VH 6210), H PROVINCE, NEAR THE LPDK/SRV BORDER. ALLEN WAS REPOR BECAUSE STRANGERS IN THE AREA WERE REPORTEDLY SEEKIN HIS WHEREABOUTS. ALLEN WAS REPORTEDLY UNDER THE GUA	THEAST OF BOUM OUA PHAN TEDLY MOVED G INFORMATION ON	·
	CANTON SECURITY FORCE COMMANDED BY AN OFFICER NAMED (LNU). ACCORDING TO ALLEN WAS MARRIED TO A LO THONGPLIEN SOPHAMISAI, AND WAS THE FATHER OF A FIVE NAMED KHAMDNG AND A TWO-YEAR-OLD DAUGHTER NAMED KHAM	PHOUNSAVAT CAL WOMAN NAMED -YEAR-OLD SON	
	6. ON 5 FEBRUARY 1988, DEBRIEFED CLAIMED ALLEN WAS MOVED BACK TO AREA IN MID-DECEMBER 1987, AND THAT HE HAD OBTAINED ALLEN'S SERVICE ID CARD FROM	WAS THE BAN BOUAK A PHOTOCOPY OF PORTEDLY HAS A	
	BRIEFCASE CONTAINING ITEMS (NFI) APPARENTLY PERTAINI INCLUDING THE ORIGINAL ID CARD, AND REPORTEDLY CLAIM SHOT DOWN ON 26 JANUARY 1970 IN THE VICINITY OF TG 9	ING TO ALLEN, IS THAT ALLEN WAS 107. RLY JANUARY 1988	
	WITH THE PHOTOCOPY AND CONTACTED A PERSON NAMED KON DETERMINE IF THE PHOTOCOPY COULD BE SOLD TO SOMEONE IN POW/MIA MATTERS. CLAIMED THAT RECEIVE 30,000 BAHT FOR PROVIDING THE PHOTOCOPY OF SUBSEQUENTLY INTRODUCED HIM	WITH AN INTEREST EXPECTED TO THE ID CARD.	
•	NAKHON PHANOM CITY WHO IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS	MED SHINKLE PAID	·
	HIM 4,000 BAHT FOR THE ID CARD. HOWEVER,	LLEGED HE HAD ON OFF THE	
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ABOUT IN SA RELAT LISTI IN TH	TO DELIVER EST FOR ASSISTANOTE TO OUR DEBI 7. TO TELIVER ALLEN HENRY L. DATE OF BIRTH: WEIGHT: 200 (FILLE OF TELE OF	AVE HTM A S TO NCE, PRESUM RIEFER, AND PASSED THE ROM THE PHO POSS LBS AND OWN UE	HORT NOTE W WHICH ABLY ON POW THE NOTE IS FOLLOWING IN	REEB 88% RETEEN EN F AMOUNTS TO MATTERS. S BEING HELI NFORMATION N	AN OPEN ENDED GAVE D BY OUR WHICH HE		
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- - TNŤP O	ANOTHER AMERICANT TAIL DISTRICT, TED TO NO TING INDICATES A TE VICINITY OF U	CAN POW NAMI , HOUA PHAN ,N 27 DECEN OTHER DETAI PATRICK MAR UG013331.	ED PATRICK F PROVINCE. MBER 1987 DU ILS WERE REF RTIN FALLON FALLON IS LI	THIS INFORMUTING A CONVERTED. AV	AATION WAS VERSATION WITH VAILABLE POW/N ON 4 JULY 196	H A	
BEACH WITHO	9. AS OF 12 F HAD RETUR DUCTION TO THEM WAS PASSED INF OUT SOURCING INF OF ITS INTEREST	RNED TO LAOS 1 FOR STONY FORMATION IN FORMATION.	S. BA BEACH FOLLO N PARAGRAPHS STONY BEACH	WUP INTERVI FIVE THROU HAS SINCE	GH EIGHT ABOV ADVISED		
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	1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED	FROM AN	
	ARE NOT FORMALLY DISSEMINATING THIS INFORMATION,	WHICH IS BEIN	iG
	PASSED FOR YOUR INFORMATION. 2. IN LATE SEPTEMEBER AND EARLY OCTOBER 1	1987 A	•
	REMARKED ON THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF PRIV	ATE U.S.	
	EFFORTS TO LOCATE PERSONS KILLED, CAPTURED, OR MISSING-IN-ACTION DURING THE VIETNAM WAR, SAYING	THAT "THERE	
	ARE LESS THAN 1,200 PRISONERS OF WAR" (POW'S). T LATER REMARKED IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION THAT "T	THE FUNCTIONAR	RY
	NUMBER OF POW'S IN THE SRV IS SMALL COMPARED WITH	THOSE IN LAC	PS
	AND CAMBODIA, BOTH IN KNOWN AND UNKNOWN LOCATIONS CONTINUED THAT U.S. POLICY TOWARD LAOS AND CAMBOD	IA MAKES IT	•
·	IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE AMERICANS TO PURSUE THE MATTER EFFECTIVELY AND THAT "THE NUMBER OF POW'S AS ESTI		
	AMERICANS, 1,270, IS HIGHER THAN THE ACTUAL FIGUR	E." HE	
	CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE HAD NO IDEA HOW MANY BEING HELD IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA. (HEADQUARTERS C	OMMENT: IT IS	
	UNCLEAR WHETHER THE 1,270 FIGURE CITED IS FOR ALL OR MERELY THE SRV.)	OF INDOCHINA	
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	NOT WES CONSIDE APPEARS HAS REM GAINED REFERRI IS "PRI	N, HIS NORMAL HABIT W H TO ANSWER IS TO IGN RS THE SUBJECT OF POW HOWEVER, TO BE INTE ARKED THAT HE WOULD P ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NG TO THE POW'S WAS TO SONER OF WAR." WHETH AGES OR PRISONERS UND	ORE THE QUESTION TO BE SENSITIVE RESTED IN DISCUSSION OF THE CONTROL OF THE CONTROL OF THE CONTROL OF THE CONTROL OF THE MEANT TO INC.	HE ALSO HE ALSO NG THE TOPTO S WHEN AND FFICIAL USES "TU BINH," LUDE OTHER	R HE C AND IF HE D IN THAT	PAGE TO A STATE OF THE PAGE OF	20.C
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	REPORTED THAT DURING TH AMERICAN PRISONERS WERE OUDOMSAI (RC 0291) BY C TO FIX FOUR OFFICIAL VE REPAIR THE ENGINE OF A WORK THEY WENT BACK TO	BROUGHT TO MUANG AR. THEY WERE BR HICLES THAT WERE LOCAL RICE MILL.	TO 11 JULY 1986, PAKBENG (QC 230 ROUGHT TO MUANG POUT OF ORDER AND AFTER COMPLETIN	THREE 1) FROM AKBENG TO GIRETR
	REPORT BOTH DESCRIBE TH MECHANICS. REF REPORT SUBSOURCE. OUR BASE NO VEHICLE MAINTENANCE PRO	E "AMERICANS" AS WAS FROM THE SAME TED THAT THE SOVI GRAM IN NORTH LAC WE SOVIET MILITARY	BEING USED AS SOURCE BUT A DI ETS HAVE AN ACTI OS AND THAT PER MISSION IN VIEN	FFERENT VE TIANE
	3RD DIVISION IN LUANG N REPORTED THAT A SOVIET PRABANG FROM 28 JUNE TO SIX NORTHERN LAO PROVIN MECHANICS MIGHT BE VALI	AMTHA ON 11 JULY. INSTRUCTOR GAVE A 30 JULY FOR CIVI CES. THUS THE SI D. BUT THEY MIGHT	ANOTHER BASE S COURSE IN LUANG LIAN MECHANICS F GHTING OF "AMERI ALSO BE CAUCASI	OURCE ROM THE CAN" AN
*	3. OUR BASE WILL THE SOU 22 SEPTEMBER. REQUEST DEBRIEFING BY 18 SEPTEM	HAVE THE OPPORTURCE OF PARALONS A DIA FORWARD ANY. R	ABOVE CIRCA THE W REQUIREMENTS FOR	THIS
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		SUBJECT:	ADDITIONAL	L POW/MIA ·	INFO ON L	AOS			
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		WHO IS A I				986, SOURCE ANG (QD 933		E,	
		KHOANG HAS	ABOUT 35	FAMILIES	OF ETHNIC	LUE PEOLE.	WHILE IN	BAN	
		OBSTENSIVE	LY TO SEE	THE GOLD	EN BUDDHA	TUANG NGOY (AND THE MAG	IC METAL,		
		WAS TOLD T	HAT HE CO	ULD NOT G	O THERE BE	NVULNERABLE CAUSE THERE	WERE MANY	E	
•		OUTSIDERS. HE WAS TOL	WHEN SU	BSOURCE A	SKED WHY T	A DO NOT AL HE AREA WAS MERICANS BE	RESTRICTED	•	
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		OF THAM PH	A YONG WHI	ERE A GOL RE ABSOLU	DEN BUDDHA TELY FORBI	IS ON DISPI CDEN TO ENT	LAY. LAY. ER THE AREA	 BY	
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alide enter for the first transport for the first transport transport to the first transport transport transport to the first transport	SOLD SUGAR CANE AND FOOD TO THE PAYN WHO GUARDED THE CAVE. ONE	
The standard standard by the standard standard by the standard sta	AMERICAN IS TALLER THAN THE OTHERS WITH BROWN HAIR AND WALKS LUKE HE HAS AN INJURED RIGHT DEG. THE SECOND AMERICAN IS OF	
erre pe e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e	MEDIUM HEIGHT WITH SIDEBURNS AND A BLACK SPOT ON HIS RIGHT	and the second provided and the second second decided and the second
	CHEEK THAT MIGHT BE A BIRTHMARK OR A SCAR GAUSED BY BEING HIT	
•	OR BURNED. COULD THINK OF NO DISTINGUISHING FEATURES	:
• • • • •	FOR THE THIRD AMERICAN.	
	5. (S ON 3 JUNE 1986, THE PAVN HAD REPORTEDLY	
•	MOVED THE POWS FROM SOP KHAN NOI TO THAM MUANG NGOY CAVE. THE	
IN SECTION OF THE PROPERTY OF	PAVN-SAID-THAT-ANY-VILLAGER-ENTERING THE NEW AREA WOULD BE	
	SHOT HAD NOT BEEN TO THE THAM MUANG NGOY	
	CAVE SINCE THE AMERICANS WERE MOVED THERE BUT USED TO HUNT IN	
	THE AREA AND PROVIDED A SKETCH MAP.	
	6. (S SUBSOURCE MEMORIZED THE MAP AND REDREW	
	IT FOR SOURCE. OUR BASE REPORTS THAT THE SKETCH MAP IS CLEAR	
	ON MANY POINTS BUT HAS ONE GLARING ERROR. ACCORDING TO THE MAP,	
•	MUANG NGOY MAI (NEW MUANG NGOY) AND MUANG NGOY KAO (OLD MUANG	
	NGOY) ARE ON THE WEST BANK OF THE NAM OU RIVER. UNLESS THESE ARE TWO SUB-VILLAGES OF MUANG NGOY THEY ARE ON THE WRONG BANK.	
	HOWEVER, THE SKETCH MAP DOES SHOW THE AIRFIELD WHICH OUR BASE	
	BELIEVES MUST BE THE ONE AT TH 573894. FROM THE MAP OUR	
•	OFFICER GUESSED THAT THE CAVE WHERE THE REPORTED AMERICANS ARE	
:	NOW IS AT TH 573984 OR JUST TO THE SOUTH IN THE IRREGULAR HILL	•
	THAT HAS ITS PEAK AT TH 563888. THE OLD CAVE IS LOCATED ABOUT	
	TWO KILOMETERS NORTH OF THE NEW SITE AND ON THE EAST BANK OF	
	THE RIVER. OUR BASE PUTS THIS AT THE HILL WITH ITS PEAK AT TH	
	588899. OUR BASE CAUTIONED THAT THEY ARE BASING LOCATIONS ON	
	THE SUPPOSITION THAT SUBSOURCE GOT THE AIRFIELD SITE ABOUT	•
	RIGHT. IF SO THEN THE OLD CAVE, NEW CAVE AND A PAVN AAA SITE	
,	SUBSOURCE MARKED, THAT WE PUT ON THE HILL AT TH 583881 WOULD BE	
	ABOUT RIGHT.	•
	7. HAS NOT AS YET RECEIVED THE MAP FROM OUR BASE.	
	HOPE THIS WILL BE OF ASSISTANCE. 8.	
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	NUMBER 102 POZATO	NCUBER 196 LOCATED AT NANCHOXUNG (NCA) AND	And the second s	and the Company of th
	THE JUNCTION OF TU	T VILLE NAM EAK RIVER NEAR		
	STATED THAT THEY H.	E M-3 BAK AND HOUET NOTH BEVERS: BOTH MEN AD NOT HEARD ABOUT OR SEEN ANY AMERICAN PORS		
THE PARTY OF THE P	AREA THE STATE AREA			
********	3. TS	IN ADDITION, WE HAVE AGAIN REMINDED OUR		·
•	ISSUE. WE HAD TWO	BESSONERS THE THE SULANCE OF THE POW		•
•	ACCORDING TO A SOUR	RCE VITU GOOD THE EULATELY FROM NEW SOURCES.	·	ī
	NOT BEEN ESTABLISHE	D, AN OFFICIAL ABROAD SAID THAT THERE		٠ ,
	FISEWHERE	IS STILL ALIVE IN VIETNAMESE PRISON CAMPS OR	••	
	SERVICEMEN WHO MICH	TTED THAT THERE WERE PERHAPS FORMER U.S.		
	PCWS BEING HELD AT	THE LOCAL LEVEL WEEK ARE NO		
	SENIOR SRV OFFICIALS	S. THE KNOWLEDGE OF		
	4. ACCORDING	G TO A SOURCE WHOSE PAST REPORTING HAS BEEN		
•1	LIVE OR CAPTURE BOVE	ABLISH A DEGREE OF RELIABILITY, THERE ARE NO		
	OPINION, REPORTS OF	CAPTIUE BOUR WITH THE INAM. IN SOURCE'S	•	
	SIGHTINGS OF DOWNED	CAPTIVE POWS/MIAS ARE NOTHING MORE THAN OLD CREWS LOST IN THE JUNGLES. SOURCE BELIEVES		
	ANYONE LOST IN THE J	UNGLES WOULD CERTAINLY BE DEAD, AND EVEN IF	,	
	OR CAMBODIA, NOT VIE	G POWS/MIAS THEY WOULD PROBABLY BE IN LAOS	1	
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	SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP ON POW REPORTING
	REF: DATED 3 JULY 86
	1. THIS MESSAGE IS A PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO YOUR LETTER OF 31 JULY 1986 CONTAINING FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS CONCERNING OUR TWO REPORTS ON U.S. POW SIGHTINGS IN LAOS WHICH HAS BEEN SENT TO OUR BANGKOK STATION. THE IS UNDERTAKING A NUMBER OF ACTIONS IN DIRECT RESPONSE. SOME UNILATERAL ASSETS WHO ARE FROM THAT AREA OR ARE FAMILIAR WITH IT, OR WHO KNOW PERSONS FAMILIAR WITH IT, ARE BEING CONTACTED AND A FEW SELECT ASSETS ARE BEING SENT INTO THE AREA. REFUGEES FROM THE AREA WILL BE DEBRIEFED FOR THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF
•	THAT LOCALE. THE HAS RAISED THE ISSUE WITH THE THAI MILITARY,
	WHICH HAVE PROMISED TO HELP THROUGH THEIR CONTACTS IN LAOS. THE SUBSOURCE OF ONE OF THE ORIGINAL REPORTS, HAS ALREADY BEEN DISPATCHED BACK INTO THE AREA FOR FOLLOW-UP. THE SUBSOURCE OF THE OTHER REPORT,, HAS REPORTED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WHICH IS BEING REPORTED IN (ADDENDUM). IN EACH INSTANCE, THE SUBSOURCE IS TRYING TO RECONTACT THE ORIGINAL SOURCE OF THE INFORMATION FOR CONFIRMATION AND FURTHER DETAILS. OTHER INDIVIDUALS FAMILIAR WITH THE AREA, INCLUDING SOME CAUCASIANS KNOWN TO WORK IN RURAL LAOS, MAY BE APPROACHED FOR ANY INFORMATION THEY HAVE. WE ARE MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO CONFIRM THAT THE SOURCES ACTUALLY WENT TO THE AREA AND BRING BACK PHOTOGRAPHIC OR OTHER EVIDENCE OF WHAT THEY SAW.
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(FNU) ((MORGAN)) WAS ALLEGEDLY STAYING NEAR THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM BORDER IN THE VICINITY OF SALEO (NCA) VILLAGE, SALEO CANTON, SAMOT DISTRICT (XD 9416) SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE, LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (LPDR). MORGAN, WHO REPORTEDLY PARACHUTED FROM AN AIRCRAFT IN 1973, WAS BEING CARED FOR BY ETHNIC HRONG INHABITANTS OF THE AREA, ONE UNIDENTIFIED PERSON HAD AITCHPTED TO GIVE A PIECE OF PAPER TO MORGAN WHICH CONTAINED QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED AND CALLED FOR A SIGNATURE, BUT MORGAN REVESED TO COMPLETE OR SIGN THE PAPER WITHOUT THE PRIOR PERMISSI(N OF ((THOM)) (LNU), HIS CARETAKER. THE VILLAGERS SAID THAT THEY WANTED 150 BAHT-WEIGHT OF SILVER AND MORGAN TAKEN AWAY IN EXCHANGE FOR CARING FOR HID DRING THE PREVIOUS DECADE. (FIELD COMMENT: ONE SILVER BAHT-WEIGHT IS VALUED AT APPROXIMATELY 200 BAHT, OR A TOTAL OF 30,000 BAHT, ABOUT 26 BAHT EQUALS U.S.\$1.00 AT THE CURRENT EXCHANGE RAYE.) APPARENTLY IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONING, THE VILLAGERS SAID THAT THEY KEPT AND RAISED ANIMALS, AND THEY SAW NO REASON WHY THEY SHOULD NOT CARE FOR A HUMAN BEING. MORGAN HAD ATTEMPTED TO WRITE A LETTER HOME, BUT THE VILLAGERS REFUSED TO ALLOW IT. 2. THE STORY OF MORGAN CAME TO THE ATTENTION OF A SAVANNAKHET TOWN VILLAGER WHO CLAIMED ACCESS TO THE AREA THROUGH HIS SPOUSE'S FAMILY CONNECTIONS. THE SPOUSES'S COUSIN WAS REPORTEDLY ACQUAINTED WITH THOM. THE SAVANNAKHET VILLAGER SENT HIS NEPHEY, ANTO THAILAND TO TELL THE STORY CLAIMED TO HAVE FIRST TRAVELED TO THE SALEO VILLAGE AREA TO ATTEMPT TO GAIN PIRST HAND INFORMATION ABOUT MORGAN SAID THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO SEE MORGAN, BUT THAT VILLAGE CHILDREN KNEW OF HIM. ACQ:	to a few months of the control of th
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	SECRET	
	SUBJECT: ALLEGED FIRST HAND LIVE SIGHTING REPORTING FROM KHAMTAN NOUMALA IN CANADA	
•		
	1. PER DISCUSIONS WITH DIA/VO-PW ANALYSIS BRANCH CHIEF	
	ON 11 FEBRUARY 1988, WE ARE FORWARDING INFORMATION OUR HAS OBTAINED THROUGH	·
•	FROM THE DEBRIEFING OF IMMIGRANT	
	ON ALLEGED FIRST HAND ' LIVE SIGHTINGS IN LAOS. REQUESTS THAT ITS	
•	INFORMATION NOT BE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE OF THIS AGENCY AND DIA	
	PERMISSION. WE HAVE SENT A MESSAGE TO	
	AS REQUESTED BY FOR CONFIRMATION ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR TRAVEL HERE FOR VO-PW DEBRIEFINGS ON	
	THE MIA/POW ISSUE CIRCA 15 APRIL 1988. THE TEXT OF THE	
•	NOTE ON IS AS FOLLOWS.	
	2. SOURCE: FORMER LAOTION, NOW	
	IMMIGRANT. SOURCE REPORTED THREE SIGHTINGS OF U.S. POW/MIA PERSONNEL IN LAOS IN 1984. DEBRIEFING WAS	
	BUT SOURCE MADE REFERENCE TO NOTES HE HAD PREPARED IN	
	LAOTION. WE OBTAINED THESE NOTES AND THEY ARE ENCLOSED. YOU WILL BE ABLE TO DISCERN IMPRESSIONS OF PREVIOUSLY WRITTEN NOTES	•
	ON THE PAPER, POSSIBLE WRITTEN ON 31 AUGUST 1987. THESE APPEAR	
	TO BE IN A DIFFERENT HAND AND MAY OR MAY NOT BE RELEVANT.	
	3. SOURCE WAS UNABLE TO SPECIFY WHAT MONTH SIGHTS	
	OCCURRED. SOURCE WAS ON THE ROAD FOR TWELVE MONTHS AS PART OF	
	A GROUP DELIVERING MEDICAL SUPPLIES CSOVIET QUININE AND VITAMINS J TO SEVERAL POPULATED PLACES.	
	YIIMIINGU TO GEYERAL TOTULATED FLACES.	·
	4. THE FIRST SIGHTING OCCURRED 30 KILOMTERS NORTH OF	
	SECRET -	
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Face or a survey and the same	MSR PAGE 0002	The state of the s	The state of the s
ar character delicate	EEB 88		
	EPONE. HE SPENT TWO TO THREE WEEKS HERE. SEVENTEEN U.S.		
	ERSONNEL WERE HELD IN A MONTAGNARD ENGAMPMENT ON A SMALL	A State of the sta	
	THEY APPEARED TO BE IN GOOD HEALTH AND WERE FED TWICE A	,	
	NAY, AT NOON AND 1700 HOURS: THEY WERE TREATED AS PRISONERS		
	NTO THE LOCAL POPULATION.		
	5. THE SECOND SIGHTING WAS AT KHAM KER, NEAR NAPE IN		
k	HAKEM PROVINCE. HERE HE MET "MOKEN DOMAHO" (DONAHUE?) WHOM HE		
	ESCRIBED AS A FORMER USAF BOMBER PILOT AND SON OF "A GENERAL"		•
	N THE SEVENTH FLEET. DOMAHO WAS MARRIED TO A MONTAGNARD WOMAN		
	TITH WHOM HE HAD TWO CHILDREN. HE WAS INTEGRATED INTO THE OMMUNITY AND HAD COMPLETE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT. AT THIS SAME		
	OCATION WAS A BLACK AMERICAN, ALSO FREE. HE WAS UNMARRIED.		
	UR SOURCE SPENT FOUR WEEKS HERE.		
	6. THE THIRD SIGHTING WAS AT A CAMP 20 KILOMETERS OFF THE		
Н	O CHI MINH TRAIL (SEE SKETCHES). TWENTY-SEVEN U.S. SERVICEMEN		
	ERE INCARCERATED HERE WITHIN A COMPOUND SURROUNDED BY FOUR	٠	
	OWS OF BAMBOO FENCING. THE PRISONERS WORKED AT CUTTING		
	IREWOOD. THEY WERE TAKEN OUT EACH DAY BY GUARDS WHO WERE OF HE KHA SENG ETHNIC GROUP. ABOUT 200 METERS OUTSIDE THE		
	OMPOUND WERE THREE GRAVES OF U.S. SERVICEMEN WHO HAD DIED IN	•	
	HIS PRISON. IN A THREE WEEK PERIOD, SOURCE ENTERED THE		
С	OMPOUND FOUR TIMES, TAKING IN QUININE AND VITAMINS.		
	7. AT THIS POINT HAVING GATHERED THE HIGHLIGHTS, WE		
P	ERSUADED OUR SOURCE TO SPEAK DIRECTLY WITH		
	OF YOUR OFFICE. AS AGREED WITH YOUR OFFICIALS,		
	LEASE FEEL FREE TO CONTINUE TELEPHONE CONTACT WITH THE OURCE. SHOULD YOU WISH TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO		
	EET FACE-TO-FACE WITH HIM, I WOULD BE HAPPY TO COORDINATE THE		
	EETING. THIS EXERCISE DEALT WITH A SUBJECT MATTER AND A		
	EGION THAT WE ARE NOT COMPLETELY FAMILIAR WITH, SO OUR		•
	POLOGIES FOR ANY ERRORS IN THE SPELLING OF LAOTIAN NAMES. I DULD APPRECIATE FROM YOU AN ASSESSMENT OF THE VALUE OF THIS		
	NFORMATION IN DUE COURSE.		
	8.		•
	12.		
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TO	: D/OCA	CONTROL #	11 Feb 92
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FORM 4118 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

. July 9, 1992

BY HAND AND BY PACSIMILE

Steve Rademaker Deputy Legal Adviser

Special Assistant to the President Ginny Lampley for National Security Affairs Senior Director for Legislative Affairs Room 375

National Security Council Washington, DC 20506

Dear Mr. Rademaker and Ms. Lampley:

Consistent with our meeting yesterday, the Senate Select Committee requests the following items be declassified in a form that will allow the items to be disseminated to the public:

Items to be declassified on or before July 23, 1992:

- (1) Live Sighting and Hearsay Reports The live sighting and hearsay reports listed on attachment "A" to this document along with all case file data accompanying these reports should be declassified by this date.
- (2) Current DIA POW/MIA Policy Files All policy memoranda, documents, materials, reviews, and internal assessments pertaining to the POW/MIA issue created by DIA since 1980, including the Gainer Report, the Brooks Report, the Tighe Report, and any addends or comments attached thereto should be declassified by this date.
- (3) National Security Agency Product Reports Those designated published (serialized) and raw intelligence reports and memoranda listed on Attachment "B" from wartime product reports and post-war product reports. This would include all third party reports pertaining to the FOW/MIA include all third party reports pertaining to the powers date.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 2-Dec-2013

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- (4) Photography and Imagery All designated imagery listed.

 (5) Photography and Imagery All designated imagery listed.

 (6) Photography and Imagery All designated imagery listed by the collected by Neutonal Technical Means in Actachment "C" collected by Neutonal Technical Pows In Indicating the Dossible presence of American Pows In Indicating Southeast Asia after 1973 should be declarating southeast Asia after 1973 should be declarating the control of the companies of symbols and include all photography revealing date. This should include all photography revealing southeast Asia after 1973 should be compromised by such a release, line possible distress signals or symbols are release, line capabilities would be compromised by such a release, line drawings would suffice.
 - (5) Specific Memoranda and Documents 1 cable from Admiral Thomas Moorer to CINCPAC dated March 22, 1973, a memo from Assistant Secretary Eagleburger to them-Secretary of Defense Elliot Richardson dated March 27, 1973, and a letter from Mr. Richardson to Dr. Kissinger dated March 28, 1973, should be declassified by July 23. Additionally, the Committee be declassified by July 23. Additionally the Committee requests declassification of 1988 satellite imagery of the Hon symbol near Sam Neua, the 1975 satellite imagery of the above Gai prison building, written interpretations of the Above imagery, and finally JSOC materials on the Nhom Marrott.
 - (6) National Security Council Documents All previously designated National Security Council memoranda, minutes of meetings, national security decision directives, and other documents related to the POW/MIA issue should be declassified by this date.
 - (7) WSAG Documents All previously designated WSAG memoranda, minutes of meetings, and other documents or supporting documents relating to the POW/MIA issue should be declassified by this date.
 - (8) <u>Kissinger Papers</u> The Committee must have access for six named individuals to review the unreducted files of Dr. Henry Kissinger which do, or may, portain to POW/MIA matters as they are kept at the Library of Congress. The access the should begin on or before July 13, 1992 and continue for the should begin on or before July 13, 1992 and continue for the life of the Committee. As documents which pertain to life of the Committee. As documents which pertain to POW/MIA matters are identified by the designated Senate Select Committee staff, they should be declassified
 - (9) Nixon Papers The Committee must have access for six named individuals to review the unredacted files of Richard Nixon which do, or may, pertain to POW/MIA matters as they are kept at the National Archives. The access should begin on or before July 13, 1992 and continue for the life of the Committee. As documents which pertain to POW/MIA matters committee. As documents which pertain to POW/MIA matters are identified by the designated Senate Select Committee are identified by the declassified immediately.

(1) Last known alive/in captivity files - The 130 files (1) Last known alive/in captivity files - The 130 files relating to servicemen last known to be alive and in captivity should be declassified by this date.

Documents to be declassified by August 15, 1992:

- Casualty files All DIA and service casualty files, pending permission being granted by the next of kin should be declassified by this date.
- (2) Files of Dr. Roger Shields, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Internal Economic Affairs with Responsibility for POW/MTA Affair 1971 - 1976 - All documents from 1971 to 1976 relating to POW/MIA matters should be declassified by this date.
- (3) Files of Former Deputy Defense Secretary William Clements - All documents relating to the POW/MIA issue should be declassified by this date.
- (4) Files of Former Defense Secretaries Caspar Weinberger and Frank Carlucci related to the FOW/MIA issue including all memuranda, background papers, talking papers, meeting minutes, personal cables, breakfast meeting papers prepared for or by wither Sceretary Weinberger or Carlucci pertaining to POW/MIA issue should be declassified by this date. Additionally, all similar material from Assistant Secretary Richard Armitage's files should be declassified by this date.
- (5) Joint Chiefs of Staff Documents All POW/MIA related policy as well as operational documents issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the war until the fall of Saigon should be declassified by this data.
- (6) Central Intelligence Agency documents All POW/MIA related documents that CIA has transferred to the Director of the National League of Families over a period of years in the 1980s and all other POW/MIA related documents held by CIA should be declassified by this date.
 - (7) CIA Documents sent to the Select Committee The 120 CIA documents related to Laco and Vietnam that have been sent to the Select Committee should be declassified by this date.
- (8) Four Party Joint Military Commission All materials related to FOW/MIA matters should be declassified by this date.

The following documents should be declassified by September 15

- (1) Ford Papers All files of former Fresident Gerald Ford which relate to the POW/MIA issue should be declassified by this date.
 - (2) Carter Papers All files of former President Jimmy Carter which relate to the POW/MIA issue should be declassified by this date.
 - (3) Readan Papers All files of former President Ronald Reagan which relate to the FOW/MIA issue should be declassified by this date.
 - (4) <u>sush Fapers</u> All files of President George Bush which relate to the POW/MIA issue should be declassified by this date.
 - (5) State Department Cable Traffic All cable traffic related to POW/MIA issues should be declassified by this date.
 - (5) DIA Intelligence Files The approximately 1100 DIA intelligence files which correspond to MIAs who are not KIA/BNR status should be declassified by this date.
 - (7) <u>Service Intelligence Files</u> All service intelligence archives relating to POW/MIA issues from 1971 to 1975 should be declassified by this date.
- (8) Photography and Imagery All imagery collected by National Technical Means indicating possible presence of American POWs in Southeast Asia after 1973 and not previously designated for declassification should be declassified by this date.

The following documents should be declassified by October 31, 1992:

- (1) Live Sighting and Hearsay Reports All remaining reports should be declassified by this date.
- (2) Other reports The nearly 12,000 reports pertaining to dog tags, bones and crash and grave site information from the war years should be declassified by this date.
- (3) Casualty Files All casualty files not heretofore designated should be declassified by this date.
- (4) <u>Kissinger Papers</u> All remaining papers not previously designated which relate to POW/MIA issues should be declassified by this date.

- (6) Frank Sieverts Filoc All files of former Special Assistant for POW/MIA matters to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Frank Sieverts should be declassified by this date. Additionally, the Committee requests the declassification of all remaining State Department memoranda, policy documents, and diplomatic cables relating to the negotiation of the Paris Feace Accords in 1973.
- ..(7) <u>PIA Wistorical Filos</u> Tho POW/MIA related archival information from 1966 to 1980 previously retired to the National Archives in 1984 should be declassified by this date.

I believe that if the NSC can meet the proposed schedule enumerated above, the Senate Select Committee will be able to avoid initiating action under S. Res. 400 in order to release documents to the public. I believe we are in agreement that your cooperation would be in the best interest of all parties.

The items which we have requested declassified by July 23, 1992, are those items which we believe will indicate that the NSC and other agencies are making a "good faith effort" to comply with the Senate's document declassification request. It would be helpful to the Senators if you respond on or before July 17 to the substance and schedule set forth in this letter.

Please contact me if there is any question about this letter or my request.

Sincerely,

J. William Codinha Chiaf Counsel

JWC/kb

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ATTACHMENT "C"

ITEMS TO BE OFCLASSIFIED BY JULY 23, 1992

This would include, but not be limited to, the following:

- May 1973 photograph depicting a "TH" symbol and possible pilot authenticator number in Lacs.
- December 1980 photograph depicting a possible "52" "K" in a prison camp in central Taos.
- July 1975 photograph of Hon Gai prison in Vietnam showing possible Morse symbols of a "K" on a roof.
- January 1988 photograph of rice paddy in northern Laos, near sam Noua, depicting a "USA" and possible "K" symbol.
- January 1988 photograph of rice paddies approximately 140 km southwest of Sam Neua, depicting numerous symbols.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9830300

REFERRAL

DATE: 22 JAN 99

MEMORANDUM FOR: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CIA

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: SMITH, ROBERT C

SOURCE: BERGER

DATE: 19 JAN 99

SUBJ: REPLY TO SENATOR SMITH RE VIETNAM POW / MIA NIE

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR YOUR INFORMATION

DUEDATE:		
COMMENT: PLEASE PASS COPY TO	(CHAIRMAN NIC) &	A/NIO
EAST ASIA		
٠.	FOR	



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-



U-14019

27 January 1999

Honorable Robert C. Smith United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Smith:

Thank you for your letter of 25 November and the accompanying critique of the National Intelligence Estimate that assessed Victnam's cooperation on the POW/MIA issue. I have personally reviewed the issues you raised and discussed them with various other interested parties. I also recently chaired a meeting of the Military Intelligence Board (MIB) that, at your request, reviewed this matter in some detail, and subsequently represented MIB views at a National Foreign Intelligence Board meeting that considered your requests. Since the issues you raised centered on the contents of a National Intelligence Council product, NFIB principals agreed that the appropriate venue for responding to your concerns would be the DCI, speaking on behalf of the full Intelligence Community. I understand that a formal response from the DCI will be provided to you in the near future. I fully support his response.

I want to take this opportunity to assure you of my continuing heartfelt and personal commitment to the Defense Intelligence Agency's role in assuring the fullest possible accounting of our POW/MIA personnel.

Sincerely,

Licutenant General, USA

Director

bcc: SECDEF/DEPSECDEF

USDP/DPMO/ASD(C3I)/ASD(LA)

CJCS/VCJCS/DJS/J2

DCI/DDCI/OCA MIB Members

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DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

----RICHARD J. KERR

APPEARANCE BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE

25 NOVEMBER 1991 ·



21 November 1991 OCA 4837-91

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

Robert W. Magner

Deputy Director for Senate Affairs Office of Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT:

POW/MIA Closed Briefing 25 November 1991

- 1. You will be making a brief opening statement to the Committee. This will go a long way toward convincing the Committee of the Intelligence Community's commitment to support its work. We have included reference to sources and methods in your remarks because this will be one of the key issues as the Committee presses for full declassification of all materials related to POW/MIA matters.
- 2. Our understanding is that the Committee is interested primarily in an informal exchange of information with only limited structure. We do not anticipate that you will be asked any particular questions. Essentially the Committee wants a brief update on what the various agencies are doing in this area and then turn to questions. DIA's prepared talking points reflect that understanding as does the short statement prepared for ADDO Price. Both are in your briefing book. We anticipate having NSA's statement shortly.
- 3. There are likely to be several areas the Senators will want to explore. One is the whole issue of sources and methods and why sources of considerable vintage and not of central value must be protected. We have taken the position that while we are redacting all reporting to be shown to the Committee staff we will, upon request, show unredacted information to members or cleared staff on a case by case basis. This is an even more liberal policy than is our practice with the Oversight Committees. CIA and DIA have worked out agreed guidelines in this area, a copy of which is in the background material. These guidelines have been shown to Committee staff but not accepted by them.
- 4. A second issue concerns Laos. The Senators are likely to focus on the large number of unresolved cases in Laos. DIA and CIA will be prepared to respond in detail. There is also keen interest in the status of civilian intelligence operatives

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 2-Dec-2013

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Closed Briefing 20 November 1991

missing	in	Laos.	Again	CIA	and	DIA	will	be	prepared	to	
address.											_

CIA will address these activities in detail.

- 5. There is also the issue of POW/MIA family members having access to classified materials. DOD is seeking to develop a policy in this area in response to Congressional pressure. DIA and CIA have some concerns but will be supportive so long as sources and methods are protected.
- 6. Overall we anticipate most of this meeting being an information gathering session with the Senators asking questions that they could not get answers to in the open session. Hopefully in this process two points will be made. One that there are strong reasons for keeping some of the materials relating to POW/MIA in classified form. Secondly, there is a need for the Committee to address classified issues in a closed forum. On the latter point, both Senator's Kerry and Smith pressed DIA to discuss code breaking in Laos in open session. NSA will address this issue in the closed session and other speakers will be supportive.
- 7. There is general agreement that there must be a positive and forthcoming attitude toward responding to the Committee's interests. Yet all agencies want to avoid carte blanche access to all information that includes data revealing sources and the methods of acquisition. Even more, they want to uphold the overall principal of such protections because of the larger equities involved.

Robert W. Magner

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 2-Dec-2013

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DDCI Opening Remarks

ADDO Statement

NSA Statement

DIA Statement

Qs & As

Background Information

- --19 Sep 91 Letter from ADCI to Richard B. Cheney, The Secretary of Defense
- --04 Oct 91 Categories for Review/Redaction with Release of Classified POW/MIA Documents to Appropriately SCI Cleared Staff of Temporary Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
- --18 Nov 91 Memorandum for the Record re POW/MIA Committee Hearing on 15 November
- --12 Nov 85 Memorandum for National Foreign Intelligence Board re Interagency Committee on Vietnam MIA's/POW's
- --1986 Memorandum of Understanding between the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, I AM PLEASED TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU THIS AFTERNOON TO UNDERSCORE THE IMPORTANCE THAT I AND THE WHOLE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ATTACH TO YOUR EFFORTS TO WORK TOWARD A FINAL RESOLUTION OF LONGSTANDING CONCERNS ABOUT POWS AND MIAS FROM THE INDOCHINA WAR. I REGRET THAT MY SCHEDULE ALLOWS ONLY A BRIEF APPEARANCE TODAY. I HAVE, HOWEVER, BROUGHT WITH ME SENIOR MEMBERS FROM THE CONCERNED AGENCIES—AND THEIR RESPECTIVE EXPERTS—WHO ARE PREPARED TO BRIEF YOU ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THEIR AGENCIES AND RESPOND TO YOUR QUESTIONS. FROM THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY—THE LEAD AGENCY FOR THE COMMUNITY ON THIS ISSUE—IS ITS NEW DIRECTOR, GENERAL CLAPPER. FROM THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY IS ITS CHIEF OF STAFF, DONALD PARSONS, AND FROM CIA IS ASSOCIATE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS TED PRICE.

LET ME SAY EMPHATICALLY AT THE OUTSET THAT THE WORK OF YOUR NEW COMMITTEE HAS MY FULL SUPPORT AND THAT OF THE DCI. THE SUBJECT OF POW/MIAS IS A DIFFICULT AND HIGHLY EMOTIONAL ONE. I AM AWARE OF THE INTENSE INTEREST IN IT, AND OF THE IMPORTANT ROLE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS PLAYED AND CONTINUES TO PLAY IN DEVELOPING AND DISSEMINATING INFORMATION ON IT. I ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE STRONG VIEWS ABOUT

INTELLIGENCE REPORTING AND ITS AVAILABILITY TO THOSE DEEPLY
CONCERNED ABOUT THE FATE OF INDIVIDUALS STILL MISSING IN
INDOCHINA. I HOPE THAT THROUGH THIS PROCESS THOSE CONCERNS CAN
BE PUT TO REST.

THE DCI HAS THE STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROTECTING INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS. I WANT TO ASSURE YOU, HOWEVER, THAT THE INTERAGENCY TEAM THAT HAS BEEN ASSEMBLED WILL BE AS RESPONSIVE AS POSSIBLE IN SETTING ITS GUIDELINES AND IN DEALING WITH THE COMMITTEE'S INTERESTS. ONLY WHEN IT IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR THE PROTECTION OF THOSE SOURCES AND METHODS WILL THERE BE ANY LIMITATIONS ON THE MATERIALS TO BE REVIEWED, AND ANY SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION WILL BE PROVIDED TO YOU.

THROUGHOUT THIS PROCESS I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE MAY WELL BE AREAS OF DIFFICULTY OR DISAGREEMENT, BUT I ASSURE YOU THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS COMMITTED TO WORKING WITH YOU TO REACH ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FULL SHARING OF INFORMATION. I ALSO CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THE COMMUNITY WILL CONTINUE TO ATTACH THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO COLLECTING AND DISSEMINATING INFORMATION ON THE POW/MIA ISSUE AND WILL DEVOTE SUBSTANTIAL RESOURCES WORLDWIDE TO THAT EFFORT. WE WANT TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE.

LET ME NOW TURN TO THE AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES, EACH OF WHOM HAS PREPARED REMARKS ADDRESSING THE ACTIVITIES OF THEIR INDIVIDUAL AGENCIES.

THANK YOU.

Mr. Chairman, members of Committee, I welcome this opportunity to discuss CIA's role in resolving the status of prisoners-of-war (POW) and missing-in-action (MIA) from the war in Indochina.

- -- This issue has remained an important collection requirement since the beginning of U.S. involvement in the war in Indochina.
- -- CIA is committed to continue its intelligence collection program and provide whatever resources are necessary to resolve the status of Indochina War POW's and MIA's.
- -- As the DCI stated earlier, we are determined to cooperate with the lead Agency, DIA, in every way possible consistent with our statutory requirement to protect sources and methods, in making available to your Committee and to other appropriate recipients, materials bearing on this issue.

-- Let me emphasize that in almost every instance, we believe we will be able to satisfy your legitimate informational needs on this matter.

		10	unue	rscore our committment, I want to assure you that
th	ne fir	st qu	esti	on our officers in the field ask
			w	hom they believe might have access to information
on	ı this	subj	ect	is what do they know about American POW's or
MI	[A's.			
				We ask about the fate of MIA's, details on crash
				sites, grave locations, live sightings,
	•			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	•	}		
***************************************	encourage of the 6.70 to 100 t	Principal distribution (all China) distributions (all China) distribut	niide eliseensed is mirella meeta. Is	
				This is an important requirement for our
	•			stations worldwide; last year, in East
	•			Asia, Europe, and the U.S. forwarded reports on
				Asia, Europe, and the U.S. forwarded reports on this issue.

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Once collected, we disseminate intelligence expeditiously to authorized customers for action.

- -- Between 1973 and the present, we have disseminated approximately on subjects such as the downing of U. S. aircraft, possible grave sites, sightings of U. S. servicemen, alleged discovery of remains and Hanoi's position on U. S. MIA's.
- -- Some 6.5 linear feet of material covering reporting between 1964 and 1979 has been declassified in response to FOIA requests.


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Mr. Chairman, we in CIA are committed to resolving the POW-MIA matter, and our resources are turned to this purpose.

This concludes my statement.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 2-Dec-2013



TALKING POINTS FOR GEN CLAPPER

DIA'S PRIMARY MISSION IS LIVE PRISONER ISSUE -- COLLECTING (STONY BEACH), ANALYZING AND REPORTING ON ANY AMERICANS STILL HELD IN CAPITVITY.

SECONDARY MISSIONS INVOLVE SUPPORT TO DC AREA POLICY OFFICIALS AND ANALYTIC SUPPORT TO CINCPAC/JCRC FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING EFFORTS.

BOTH MISSIONS INVOLVE HIGHLY SPECIALIZED ANALYSIS THAT USUALLY MUST RELY ON SKETCHY DETAIL. THIS ANALYSIS IN AN ARTFORM REQUIRING CONSIDERABLE OUT.

DIA POW-MIA OFFICE CONTINUOUSLY IN EXISTENCE SINCE VIETNAM WAR. REVIEW POW-MIA AND STONY BEACH RESOURCE NUMBERS ON REVERSE.

TIMELY RESOLUTION OF PHOTO CASES AND OTHER HIGH VISIBILITY DISCREPANCY CASES HAS UNDERSCORED THE VALUE OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED BY OVERT FIELD INVESTIGATION. EFFORTS IN-COUNTRY ARE A MAJOR NEW THRUST OF DIA'S EFFORTS (TALK THRU
WHAT IS NOW CRITICAL IS GEITING VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIAN GOV'T APPROVAL OF A LIVE SIGHTING INVESTIGATION REGIME SIMILAR TO ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS HAMMERED OUT WITH THE SOVIETS NAMELY, NO NOTICE VISITATIONS TO SITES OF FIRST HAND SIGHTING REPORTS AND CERTAIN OTHER CAMPS AND PRISONS THAT COULD POTENTIALLY BE INVOLVED IN HOLDING AMERICAN PRISONERS.
DIA IS NOW WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE JOINT STAFF AND CINCPAC TO INTEGRATE OUR ANALYTIC AND COLLECTION EFFORTS WITH CINCPAC'S PROPOSED POW-MIA JOINT TASK FORCE.
DIA'S BOTTOM LINE:
O ISSUE RECEIVING APPROPRIATE PRIORITY WITHIN DIA OFFICE REPORTS TO COMMAND ELEMENT NECESSARY BILLETS TAKEN OUT OF HIDE BEFORE ACTIVE CONG INTEREST AGCRESSIVE, MOTIVATED AND KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONNEL ASSIGNED
O OTHER INTEL AGENCIES PROVIDING STRONG SUPPORT
0
o DOD POLICY OFFICIALS NO LONGER RELYING ON DIA TO "CARRY THE WEIGHT"
O DEA TO DEADY WITH TAIC AND ARIE TO BRILLY SUDDOOP THE COMMITTED AND THE

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2 OR 3 YEARS.

SECRET

WHAT HAS BECOME KNOWN AS THE COVERNMENTS "FULL COURT PRESS" OVER THE NEXT

% %

D

QUESTION: Please explain why certain information in reports on POW-MIA's still remains protected.

ANSWER: The documents were initially classified to protect national security interests which includes the protection of the source of the information, the place and manner in which it was acquired, any foreign intelligence service involvement, references to other operational activity and administrative details

Source	information	cont	tinue	s to	be	Cla	assified	despi	te t	he
passage of	time because	of	the	conti	inui	ing	ramifica	ations	of	
protecting	sources.									


APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 2-Dec-2013

QUESTION: What information has been declassified and released to the public via the FOIA?

ANSWER: Ann Mills Griffiths, Executive Director of the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia, filed an FOIA case in May 1979 requesting all documents and intelligence reports, not previously released, which originated or were held by CIA elements operating in Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia from May 1964-present (May 79) which relate to American POWs.

Six and one-half linear feet have been released to the public and DIA in response to this request. The information is compiled chronologically and it is contained in some twenty-two volumes representing periodic releases over a ten year period ending in 1989. A complete set is on file in Information Services Division, DDA in Ames Building.

These reports are in sanitized form, having details about sources and methods deleted from them. They may be passed, as is, in a body to a centrally controlled DIA reading room for access by the public. Privacy concerns of multiple American names in many reports have not been addressed and we defer to the DIA on this issue.



QUESTION: Is there any intelligence reporting to indicate the possible presence of POW-MIA's from the Indochina War being transferred to the Soviet Union or China?

ANSWER: We have neither substantive intelligence or fragmentary reporting which indicates that American POW's were transferred to the Soviet Union or China during the war. We are in the the process of querying the KGB on this issue.

Because of the previous hostile environment in Moscow, collection on POW-MIA's was not a requirement

Considering the changes in recent months, we will reemphasize this requirement

in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

QUESTION: Are you familiar with the case of the mortician who claimed there were over 400 sets of remains of Americans from the Indochina War being warehoused in Hanoi?

ANSWER: a Vietnamese refugee residing in a
refugee camp was interviewed by
in November 1979. During this interview,
asserted that he personally inspected the remains of
over 400 U.S. military personnel which were in secret storage
in Hanoi. The equested
in an attempt to verify claim. The results
did not support claims on either the 400
sets of remains or that he personally saw three alive American
soldiers in Hanoi. A
soldiers in Hanoi. A
soldiers in Hanoi. Ain
in
the United States with results that was telling the
the United States with results that was telling the truth with regard to the remains and the live Americans. At
the United States with results that was telling the truth with regard to the remains and the live Americans. At the time, conclusion was that

QUESTION: What can you tell us about the possible existence of POW-MIA's in Laos?

ANSWER: Over the years there have been continuing stories

about the possible existence of POW's still being held in
Laos. I spoke earlier of
as well as the attempts to locate POW-MIA's via
imagery. There were reports of alleged POW working in gold
mines or held being held in caves. A report regarding a
caucasian spotted bathing in a stream in north Laos was
investigated and to the best of our knowledge was a Czech
geologist working in the area. Our capabilities in Laos are
somewhat limited but we do attempt to followup and verify
substantive reporting on POW-MIA's. We have no reporting to
support the claim that there may still be POW's or MIA's being
held in Laos. In fact, in spite of all our efforts over a
number of years, we have received no credible evidence that
there are in fact American prisoners being held in Vietnam,
Laos, or Cambodia.

With regard to pilots or crew members of Air America or Continental Air Service, there were nine individuals unaccounted as of mid-1973. All of these cases were turned over to the Department of Labor for resolution as the individuals were contract employees of the U.S. government.

. . / . . .

QUESTION: Why was source information given away to the Vietnamese and Cambodian authorities in July 91 while at the same time we continue to protect refugee sources?

BACKGROUND: In July 1991 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Ken Quinn, passed a list of names of individuals to Cambodian and Vietnamese authorities requesting access to talk with these individuals on POW-MIA matters. He did this while visiting Hanoi and Phnom Penh on POW-MIA matters.

	ANSWER: The individuals in question were not source	es of
	intelligence but were individuals thought by State of	or the
	families of POW-MIA's to have possible information.	
. [We do not
	know what, if any followup there has been on this is	sue as we
	were not involved in this	

QUESTION: Is it possible to provide the families of POW/MIA's access to a broader range of classified information?

ANSWER: We are willing to work in concert with DIA on this issue as they maintain the files on the individual POW or MIA's. Our concern is that sources and methods continue to be protected and we are hopeful that we can come up with a mutually beneficial solution. The files currently under review for this committee could possibly be made available to the families if properly controlled in a secure facility to which the families could be given access.

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QUESTION: Are your familiar with the events surrounding the fall of Lima Site 85 in March 1968?

ANSWER: Lima Site 85 r located 25
kilometers from the North Vietnamese/Laotian border atop Phou
Pha Thi mountain. The site was used to direct and control
attacking jet fighters and bombers to their targets and to
provide them with percise bomb release points, under radar
control.
On 10
March 1968, the site began to receive heavy incoming mortar and
artillery fire, and in the early morning hours that followed,
20 heavily armed infiltartors launched a surprise attack on the
Of the Americans at the site, only five
technicans were extracted.
our officers was wounded, five of the six technicans were
wounded, one of them being hit by fire while in the helicopter
and he died in route. Theremaining Americans were presumed
dead.

An enemy buildup had been underway for several months in the area prior to the attack and intelligence reporting indicated that the safety of the site was questionable after 10 March.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 2-Dec-2013

Central Intelligence Agency



1 9 SEP 1991

The Honorable Richard B. Cheney The Secretary of Defense Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Agency has been contacted by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence Duane P. Andrews concerning Senate Resolution 82 which creates a temporary Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. It is my understanding that this Committee will request access to Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) files, some of which contain CIA-generated classified information. Assistant Secretary Andrews has asked that the Agency work with the Department of Defense (DoD) to develop guidelines concerning Committee access to these files.

In response to Secretary Andrews' request for assistance, Agency officers are working with the newly-created POW/MIA Data Release Office to review DIA files. Once these officers have determined the scope and sensitivity of the CIA-originated information in the files, we will be able to develop appropriate guidelines for use with the Committee. In addition, I have designated a senior attorney in the Office of General Counsel to work with DoD attorneys to negotiate with the Select Committee concerning access to classified information in the files. I want to assure you that the Agency will cooperate fully with the Committee, and I am confident that guidelines can be developed that will ensure full compliance with the spirit of Senate Resolution 82 while at the same time meeting our statutory duty to protect intelligence sources and methods.

I have designated Chief, Policy and Coordination Staff as the Agency's point or concact on this matter.

Sincerely,

Richard J. Kerr

Acting Director of Central Intelligence

BECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL

4 OCT 91

CATEGORIES FOR REVIEW/REDACTION WITH RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED POW/MIA DOCUMENTS TO APPROPRIATELY SCI CLEARED STAFF OF TEMPORARY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS.

REPORT ORIGINATOR

REDACT

DOD HUMINT

STONY BEACH team members names

Detailed source data/biographic reports/source numbers

Ongoing clandestine operational data

NSA

Not applicable

RATIONALE

Compromise the safety and mission of US collection personnel

Jeopardize safety of sources

Reveal extent and involvement of US intelligence operations; cause extreme embarrassment to the Thai or other foreign governments

when SIGINT reporting related to is received, it will reviewed to ensure would not be jeopardized or collection methods compromised. Content that would reveal or other intelligence sources will be protected.

Historical SIGINT can be released at the Secret SCI level

SECRET/NOPORN/WHINTEL

SECRET/NOTORN/WNINTEL

STATE

U.S. Government policies under negotiation

ASD/ISA

Not applicable

OVERHEAD IMAGERY

DEBRIEFS

Not releasable

Would compromise ongoing US foreign policy positions and interests

Classified cables can be released

Images can be released at the SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL level

Executive Order 11652 dated 8 Mar 72; ASD/ISA memo I-86/19832, dated 3 Jan 87; release of this information would violate confidentiality agreements with returned POWS.

CIA

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SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL

BECRET/NOFORN/WNINTE

NOTES:

- 1. Although material has been redacted based on guidelines established above, all the documents retain their original classification.
- 2. Material extracted from the file will be noted on the file index (e.g., "source biographic sheet is not included").
- 3. Information that has been extracted or redacted from original file can be reviewed by committee members. Staff will be allowed to review the original files on a case-by-case basis.
- 4. All classified material requires handling and protection in accordance with Senate Resolution 400 as adopted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 2-Dec-2013

BECRET/NOFORN/WHINTEL

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 2-Dec-2013

SECKET

OCA 4821-91 18 November 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Committee Hearing on 15 November

- 1. I attended a portion of the above-mentioned open Hearing (list of members attached). This was an opportunity for the Administration in the persons of Bob Sheetz of DIA, Ken Quinn from State and Carl Ford from DOD/ISA to address some of the charges made by other witnesses before the Committee the previous week. Ford's Statement is attached.
- 2. During the questions period, several areas of inquiry developed which could bear on the closed briefing now scheduled for 1430 on 20 November in S407. Agency participants at that briefing should be prepared to deal with some if not all of these issues.
- 3. Although unrelated to the actual focus of the investigation, there was considerable interest in the possible presence of POW/MIAs in the Soviet Union given the recent press article on that possibility. The Senators asked specifically if there had been contact with the KGB to inquire about this. State noted the diplomatic efforts. The Agency rep could be asked about contact with the KGB.
- 4. Ken Quinn was asked repeatedly about a list of individuals in Indochina who allegedly had information about POW/MIAs which he had given to the Vietnamese and Cambodian authorities in July 1991. Senators Smith and Grassley in particular asked if, in effect, he was not passing source information. They went on to ask why the Administration would give away one type of source information while vigorously guarding the refugee reporting sources. Quinn explained the difference between people who are in fact intelligence sources and those we believe have information and with whom we wanted to be in contact. Smith and/or Grassley can be counted on to raise the same issue at the closed briefing.
- 5. Carl Ford raised the issue of providing POW/MIA family members access to a broader range of classified information, saying that he is wrestling with how to arrange such access.

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I	2-Dec-2013	

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Committee Hearing on 15 November

(In an earlier conversation Keith Hall told me that this is something that Defense is pushing and will eventually need an Agency input relative to the inclusion of CIA material in the DOD holdings.) The Agency rep should be prepared with some form of response if this issue comes up. Senator Robb was particularly interested in this aspect of the discussion.

- 6. Senator Kerry wanted information on those unaccounted for in the "secret war" in Laos. He wanted to know if they were in the overall 2,000 plus figure carried as POW/MIA. Ford said that it was only in the late 70's that those clandestine operatives were included in the overall count. Up to that time, there had been a secret list of such POW/MIAs. This bothered Kerry a great deal, and he can be certain to ask the Agency representative for more information.
- 7. Kerry asked about code breaking in Laos in 1968-1973. Witnesses declined to respond in open testimony and pointed to the absence of an NSA representative. This issue is certain to arise in the closed briefing. Senator Smith also asked specifically if there had been any operations into Laos in the period after 1973. Ford said he didn't know, and Smith was incredulous. Quinn said that he had recently learned from another witness—

 None of the witness had any personal knowledge of such operations. The Agency representative should be prepared to address this issue in detail.
- 8. Overall there was a very heavy emphasis on the Laotian situation throughout the Q and A period reflecting an apparent belief on the part of some Committee members that there is far less accountability for POW/MIAs in Laos and more evidence of there possible presence there after Operation Homecoming in 1973. Agency representatives should be prepared to deal especially with reporting on Laos and operational activity there related to POW/MIA matters.

Robert W. Magner
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs
Office of Congressional Affairs

Attachment

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 2-Dec-2013

SECRET

SUBJECT:	POW/MIA Committee	Hearing on	15 November
	e/RWMagner	(18 Nov	
			·
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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE OF POW-MIA

Offices: 705 Senate Hart Office Building

Main Office Number: (202) 224-2038

Majority Staff Director Frances Zwenig: 202-224-2038

Minority Staff Director Al Ptak: 202-224-2306

MAJORITY:

Chairman John Kerry, Mass.

Thomas Daschle, S.D. Harry Reid, Nev. Charles Robb, Va. Robert Kerry, Neb. Herb Kohl, Wisc.

MINORITY:

Vice Chairman Robert
Smith, N.H.
John McCain, Ariz.
Jesse Helms, N.C.
Nancy Kassebaum, Kan.
Charles Grassley, Iowa
Hank Brown, Colo.

TESTIMONY AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY

BY

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CARL W. FORD, JR.

BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

NOVEMBER 15, 1991

TESTIMONY AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

Carl W. Ford, Jr.

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

November 15, 1991

Mr. Chairman, Senator Smith, members of the Committee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to return to comment on issues that have arisen during the three days of historic hearings that you convened last week on the POW/MIA issue.

First, I would like to clarify a point that came up in last Thursday's testimony concerning the "last known alive" discrepancy cases. The definition of a discrepancy case is:

A case about which the USG has convincing evidence that the Governments of Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia should have specific knowledge.

The term "discrepancy case" includes not only individuals who were "last known alive, but also individuals who were known dead, but for whom the Indochinese Governments should be able to provide information or remains. As you can see, the definition is broad. Within this broad definition, we have identified three subcategories of cases. We did this because over the years a great deal of confusion has developed over what

precisely we were talking about—the terms "discrepancy case," "compelling case," "last known alive case," "Vessey case," all meant different things to different people.

The three subcategories of discrepancy cases are:

LAST KNOWN ALIVE: Those cases in which the US has information that the individual survived the loss incident and fell into enemy hands. In the case of air incidents, this includes cases in which the crew members are believed to have successfully exited their aircraft and to have been alive on the ground. In the case of ground incidents, this includes cases in which the individuals were last known alive, were not gravely wounded, and were in proximity to enemy forces who should have specific knowledge of the incident.

POW AT HOMECOMING: A specific group of individuals who, during the Vietnam War, were classified by their commanding officers and Service Secretaries as POWs but did not return during Operation Homecoming. These cases are also known to many families as "last known alive" due to their POW status. There were 97 individuals so listed. Subsequently, 42 "listed POWs" have been accounted for through unilateral SRV repatriation. The remainder are still unaccounted for.

KNOWLEDGE OF THE INCIDENT:

Circumstances of loss or subsequent information is convincing that Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia should have knowledge of the incident. In some of these cases, there is convincing evidence that the individual did not survive the incident of loss. In many cases, there is convincing evidence that Vietnam also has remains.

With this background, now I will shift to the 119 individuals who have been discussed in the testimony here, called variously "Vessey cases" and the "Vessey discrepancy cases." The first point to make is that, from the beginning, the list was not meant to be all-encompassing. In 1988, DIA, JCRC, General Vessey and the Office of the Secretary of Defense worked together to develop a list of most compelling last known alive cases, as well as other discrepancy cases, i.e., cases of individuals for whom the Vietnamese should have knowledge of the fate of the individual and remains if the individual is dead. The list was not exhaustive, merely illustrative. The primary purpose was to shed light on the live prisoner issue by asking the Vietnamese to help us solve cases in which there was either hard evidence or a strong possibility that the individual survived the incident of loss, but did not return at Operation Homecoming, and for whom, as of 1987, there had been no accounting. So far, despite our investigative efforts, we have not returned any live Americans or uncovered proof that unaccounted for Americans are alive in Vietnam.

There are additional cases, beyond the 119 individuals, which fit into the discrepancy case definition. Again, not all of the "Vessey" discrepancy



cases involve individuals who were last known alive. Some of them involve individuals who are known dead—but the Vietnamese should be able to provide information or remains.

In addition to the 119 individuals whose cases were presented to the Vietnamese by General Vessey, we determined that there are 64 other individuals who meet the "last known alive" definition as well as 13 individuals who were classified by their respective Service Secretary as a POW at Operation Homecoming in 1973, and who are not included in the "Vessey" cases who are otherwise not accounted for. This group of cases will be the focus of the full time efforts of the Hanoi Office under the USCINCPAC Joint Task Force earlier described to this committee by General Christmas. They will all be investigated within Phase I of the USCINCPAC plan.

DIA as Family Outreach Organization

Next, I would like to address an issue that has been implicit in the testimony you have heard from many family members regarding DIA. The issue of family members and DIA analysts meeting directly to discuss individual cases has proved problematic. DIA is an intelligence collection and analysis agency. Their personnel are not trained for family outreach and the function of family outreach is not an appropriate one for that agency. The families' primary point of contact for discussion of their cases is the designated Service Casualty Affairs Office. Those offices are staffed with personnel trained to perform the family outreach role. In the case where a

family is dissatisfied with the service received from the Service Casualty Affairs Office, the proper place to redress that problem is with my office.

The problems experienced within DIA that resulted in the changes made by the Secretary's Management Inquiry related to functions assumed by the PW-MIA Office that were not within their mission. Those functions have been removed and placed within my office.

Allegations by				
We certain	nly understand (the grief felt by		over her
family's loss. W	Ve have reviewe	d the	case file and v	we believe that
	amily has been p	properly served	l by our casua	ılty affairs
process. The	case is or	ne in which we	believe that the	he family has
been promptly	and accurately n	otified about in	nvestigative ac	ctivity and
information rela	ating to the case	2.		· .
	sweeping a	allegations of (Government n	onfeasance,
malfeasance and	d misfeasance a	re without fact	ual basis. For	example,
states	that her family	was advised fro	om the time th	nat her father
became missing	that he was dea	d. That statem	ent is quite si	mply wrong.
From immediate	ely after his inci	dent of loss, the	e Air Force bel	ieved there
was a good poss	sibility he surviv	ved. He was se	en to eject fro	m his aircraft.
He was seen wi	th a good paracl	nute, and his ch	iute was seen	on the ground,
but he was not i	n it. All indicati	ons were that l	ne survived his	s ejection.
PROVED FOR				

was carried in a missing in action status until 1977 who	en
his status was reviewed, at the express request of his wife, and his status	3
changed to deceased and a Presumptive Finding of Death was entered in	1
his case.	
A second, most serious allegation was made by which	l
requires discussion. She alleged in her testimony that "identifications we	2 r 6
made with teeth and teeth fragments but when independent forensic	
anthropologists were consulted, there were no dental records to be	
compared to. Again, this is absolutely false. There has never been a dent	tal
identification rendered by the U.S. Army Central Identification	
Laboratory without benefit of dental records. In every case, either a ante	e-
mortem dental X-ray or a dental chart was available to provide the factu	ıa.
predicate for the dental identification. No other forensic laboratory in the	ıe
world has as many independent procedural safeguards as has the Centra	al
Identification Laboratory. Should you have any further questions on this	}
point, I have the Commander, U.S. Army Central Identification	
Laboratory available to respond.	
There a detailed weither management to the other disease we do by	
I have a detailed written response to the other allegations made by	
in her testimony that I would like to submit for the record.	
	•

As dissatisfied with the Department's performance as the families clearly are, the Department of Defense has vigorously pursued the

investigation of the photo. I have personally made myself available to the families to answer their questions and respond to their concerns, as has my staff and the Director of the DIA Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs. We have been unable to either confirm or disprove the identifications of the subjects of the photo made by the family members. We are continuing to investigate the photograph. Any intimation by the families that there has been less than an honest effort to investigate and locate the source of the photo is disingenuous. The facts establish otherwise. We have requested assistance from the Vietnamese at the highest levels of Government. We have sent three separate investigative teams to Cambodia to follow-up information and attempt to locate the source of the photograph. We have requested all of our world-wide to search for the photo in Eastern-bloc magazines. We have tasked national technical means to obtain information on reports associated with the photographs and have established all-source collection requirements to obtain additional information about the photo, the individuals or the associated reporting. We are continuing to investigate vigorously, however, without some new leads, we may not be able to solve the mystery of this photo.

Finally, and this is an important point,	case is
not closed. It is still under active investigation and any preli-	minary
judgements made have been set aside pending further inves	tigative
activity and information.	

I would like to submit a brief written response to the specific allegations contained within the testimony of the families for the record.

	Allegatio	ns		
		stated in	previous testimo	ony that he has information
abou	it his brother,			lost in Laos on 13 December
1968	, and relates th	e fact that	t the presence in	intelligence reporting of his
fath	er's zip code is	proof that	his brother is sti	ll alive in Laos, because only
his b	prother could k	now the p	ostal zip code of	his father. In fact, the postal
zip code of father was contained within a widely				
circulated flyer that the family prepared and distributed throughout				
Southeast Asia. It is not unsusual that information contained in such flyers				
later shows up in intelligence reports about American POWs.				

Lost Records

There have been allegations made that fingerprint and other records have "mysteriously" disappeared from DoD files. There is no conspiracy to purge records. The Department of Defense does not maintain fingerprint records. The FBI is the sole agency with that responsibility. I request that this letter, from FBI Director Sessions to Congressman Solarz explaining "lost" or purged fingerprint records be entered in the record.

To prevent a recurrence of this problem in the future, I have tasked the Service Secretaries to examine possible alternatives to establish a redundant, independent source for military fingerprints separate from the FBI records. I will report to the Committee and to the families when we have implemented a solution to this problem.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Minority Staff Report

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Tracy Usry of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Minority staff came before this Committee to defend the minority staff report, <u>An Examination of U. S. Policy Toward POW/MIAs</u>, authored in large measure by himself. That report is replete with factual errors. I would like to take just a moment to discuss a few of the most glaring examples of poor research and error.

On page 5-8 of the Report, the staff states:

"In fact, only 591 U.S. POWs were repatriated by the North Vietnamese during Operation HOMECOMING, which is 12% of the figure of 5,000 U.S. POWs held by the North Vietnamese reported by the *New York Times*.

The original New York Times article, the primary source material, appeared on the front page of the 6 March 1973 issue. The number "5,000" appeared only once in the entire article—quoting an American source who stated at a meeting of the Joint Military Commission the previous day, North Vietnam had demanded the release of 5,000 Communist prisoners held by Saigon.

This 5,000 number cited incorrectly in the report has been oftquoted by POW activists and is used within the report to lend



credence to the allegation that 85 % of American prisoners of war were withheld by Hanoi after Operation Homecoming.

A second glaring inaccuracy is found in the Prologue to Part II, page *i*. The report states:

"In spite of 1,400 unresolved reports of first hand livesightings, the Department of Defense, remarkably, still believes it has "no credible evidence." How does it dismiss these reports?

In fact, there are numerous inaccuracies in just that simple statement. First, while there have been cumulatively over 1,400 first-hand live sighting reports, only approximately 100 are unresolved. Second, live-sighting reports have not been dismissed. In over 75 percent of the first-hand live sightings received, DIA have been able to establish that the report is true. These reports involve POWs who returned at Operation Homecoming, or have been correlated to other Americans or Westerners, such as missionaries or individuals stranded in South Vietnam when the Communists took control. Almost three hundred relate to Private Garwood, who returned from Vietnam in 1979.

There are numerous other factual inaccuracies throughout the report. To catalogue the inaccuracies would require a document of equal length and would be beyond the scope of my testimony here today. Further, to do so would require diverting manpower from

more important tasks related to the function of investigating POW/MIA cases.

A more	impo	rtant issue that this Committee should address of	f
Mr. Usry is why he and other staff members of the Senate Foreign			
Relations Co	mmitte	ee staff have withheld from the Department of	
Defense info	rmatio	on relevant to the investigation of the	
case and the	·	case. Not only has Mr. Usry withheld	
information that would have assisted the Department of Defense in			1
more expeditiously investigating these cases, but he has stood by			
while Senate staff members directed sources not to provide their			
information to members of my staff, the DIA, or others within the			
Department of Defense investigating these cases.			

I am personally outraged by the obstruction that Mr. Usry has presented to the DoD investigations of these cases. That any American would withhold relevant information or otherwise not cooperate with an on-going DoD POW/MIA investigation is shocking and should not be tolerated by you—his employers—the Members of the United States Senate. The families of the two individuals deserve better treatment than that.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that you will question Mr. Usry about how long he had the information before July 1991. When the Department of Defense <u>finally</u> received the information, <u>we</u> resolved the case in less than 2 months.

Response to	Allegations		
The	milies have been the losers as a result of the		
	er of individuals before this Committee.		
•	•		
•	overnment has been further eroded by the		
· · ·	s claims of Government conspiracy. Mr.		
Sheetz will later discuss the	case in detail, however, I would like to		
spend a moment on the	case and the allegations made by Judge		
before this Committ	ee.		
Judge allegation th	at the Department of Defense would		
knowingly provide to the fan	nily, the Congress and the American people		
altered photographs of the m	neeting between our investigator,		
and the individual	is ludicrous. Even more disturbing is the fact		
that Judge Gayden, an officer	r of a court, would allege that he had obtained		
a photo analysis of the photo	s of the meeting and then assert that the DoD		
photos are frauds. This Com	mittee can not stand by and let these gross		
distortions of fact go unnotice	ed. If Judge photo experts believe		
the DoD photos are a fraud, he should produce their reports, or their			
testimony, or an affidavit or			
•			
Our investigators, with the he	elp of the Lao, found the individual		
photographed in Laos and ide	entified as The individual		
is not	family has been convinced by Judge		
bailiff, Khambang S	Sibounheuang, that the individual is		
and Kham	bang has accompanied the two sons to		
Laos. Khambang's blood rela	ative in Laos passed the roll of film containing		
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the photos	to Khambang in	n the United States. Khambang has a
long history of pr	oviding POW re	elated materials, from as early as 1985;
and none-not or	ne— of his leads l	has ever proven valid.
	•	
I have a fact	sheet on Khaml	bang that I would request be entered into
the record. The	/KI	hambang connection needs to be
thoroughly invest	igated. I hope t	that this Committee will undertake that
task.	•	· ´
•		
Cooperation	on .	
Finally, I would li	ke to clarify a po	oint raised by
in his testimony.		suggested that the Secretary
of Defense may ha	ıve misspoken ir	n his testimony before this Committee.
	suggest	ted that the Secretary was mistaken in
his recitation of w	hat agree	ed to provide to the Department of
Defense in Thailar	nd and that he w	was further mistaken in attributing to
a comment	that the	photograph "may have been" taken in
Thailand or Burma	a. I would like t	to make clear for the record that the
Secretary of Defen	ıse did not missj	peak nor was he mistaken in any of the
testimony he prov	ided to this com	nmittee relative to
		•
promises	of cooperation v	were made to the Secretary of Defense in
the presence of my	self, and Congre	ressmen McCloskey and Visclosky in the
Secretary's office.	The Secretary's	s testimony correctly reflected who and
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what	stated he would make available to our investigators. It also				
corre	correctly reflected what told our investigators in Bangkok about				
wher	where the photograph may have been taken. We have a chronology of our				
conve	ersations with	which I would like to make a part of the record.			
I have with me the individuals who were involved in the					
inves	tigation with	and who will provide you the facts about			
their investigation. Mr. Bob Sheetz, the Chief of the Special Office for					
POW/MIA Affairs will address the specifics of the conduct of the					
inves	tigation of which	was a part.			
	•				

Thank you Mr. Chairman and Senator Smith. I am prepared now to respond to your questions.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board

SUBJECT:

Interagency Committee on Vietnam MIA's/POW's

- 1. I hereby establish an Interagency Committee on Vietnam MIA's/POW's under the chairmanship of Brigadier General James Shufelt (DIA). The purpose of the Committee is to exhaust all intelligence within the Community regarding the location and identification of Americans who might be held or interned in Southeast Asia.
- 2. I request that the appropriate NFIB agencies nominate representatives to serve on the Committee under Brigadier General Shufelt's chairmanship. Representatives will also be responsible for ensuring that any intelligence information presently held within the Intelligence Community is proferred to the Committee.
- 3. I am asking Lieutenant General Leonard Perroots, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, to oversee this activity on my behalf.

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William J. Casey

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P. 100

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

between the

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA)

and the

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SERVICE INTELLIGENCE REPRESENTATIVES

on

PARTICIPATION AT INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INDOCHINA PW/MIAS MEETINGS

A. PURPOSE

This memorandum of understanding clarifies the roles and responsibilities of each organization during participation in Interagency Committee on Indochina PW/MIAs meetings on the collection, oversight and coordination of intelligence relating to American servicemen and civilians who remain unaccounted for as a result of the war in Indochina (1961-1975).

B. BACKGROUND

Resolution of the PW/MIA issue is a matter of personal interest to the President of the United States, who has pledged that it is a matter of the highest national priority within his Administration. In implementation of this priority the purpose of the committee will be to formulate, coordinate, and manage new collection initiatives to ensure that all intelligence disciplines are sensitized to the issue. It will provide a clearing house for the exchange of PW intelligence and a forum for the discussion and resolution of related collection problems and requirements. The committee will make aggressive use of appropriate resources of specialized components of the intelligence community to identify, augment or supplement, confirm, or otherwise qualify intelligence information relating to U.S. PW/MIAs.

C. ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT

- 1. DIA shall provide the chairmanship and staff and administrative support for the committee.
- 2. The committee shall be comprised of one principal general-flag officer or equivalent civilian leveT representative of the following U.S. Government components: Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and Service Intelligence representatives. The DIA representative at the committee meetings will also be the principal Joint Chiefs of Staff representative. All members and other attendees shall have TOP SECRET and SI/TK clearances.

- 3. Responsibilities of member representatives pertaining to the collection of PW/MIA related intelligence shall be consistent with the charter of the parent Department, Agency or Bureau.
- 4. The committee shall meet at the call of the Chairman but not less than quarterly.

D. IMPLEMENTATION AND TERMINATION

This memorandum of understanding shall become binding and enter into force upon signature by all parties. It shall remain in effect until revised or terminated and will be reviewed annually.

JAMES W. SHIJEPITY RG IJSA Defense Intelligence Agency Date: 28 Her &C	Deputy Chief, Policy and Coordination Staff Central Intelligence Agency Date: 3/28/86
Chief, Operations Directorate B5 National Security Agency Date: 237 March 156	James H. GEER Assistant Director, Intelligence Division Federal Bureau of investigation Date: 4/15/86

JOHN J. TAYLOR Deputy Assistant Secretary for Coordination Bureau of Intelligence & Research Department of State	
Date: April 17/988	Date: 2 APR 1986
RICHARD J. POWERS, JR., COL, USA Director, Intelligence Systems Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff Army Intelligence Department of the Army	
Date: 28 March 1986	Date: <u>24 April</u> 86
DONALD W. MCFADYEN, Colone I, USAF Director, Joint Services Support Directorate Department of the Air Force Date: 28 MAL &	F. J. BREIH, Brig Gen, USMC Director of Intelligence Headquarters United States Marine Corps Date: 3 April 86

3

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE OF POW-MIA

Offices: 705 Senate Hart Office Building

Main Office Number: (202) 224-2038

Majority Staff Director Frances Zwenig: 202-224-2038 Minority Staff Director Al Ptak: 202-224-2306

MAJORITY:

Chairman John Kerry (D-MA)

Thomas Daschle (D-SD) Harry Reid (D-NV) Charles Robb (D-VA) Robert Kerry (D-NB) Herb Kohl (D-WS)

MINORITY:

Vice Chairman Robert Smith (R-NH)

John McCain (R-AZ) Jesse Helms (R-NC) Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS) Charles Grassley (R-IA) Hank Brown (R-CO)



- 1. Senator Kerry, Senator Smith, it is a priviledge for me to appear here today. We all recognize the importance of your endeavor and I am here to emphasize the commitment of NSA to support your efforts. For years, NSA has been actively involved on this issue primarily with the Defense Intelligence Agency, but also with individual Congressman and Congressional Committees. As we have done with these organizations in the past, we will make available to you all the data that can assist you in your investigation.
- 2. To ensure we would be prepared to be responsive to the committee we have again conducted a comprehensive review of SIGINT holdings for the period 1965 to the present. This review included:
- a. manually scanning all SIGINT material which might contain any reference to POW/MIAs during or after the war.
- b. interviewing selected analysts and managers who served at NSA Headquarters or in the field,
- c. reconstructing and evaluating the SIGINT process used during the war.

Additionally, we attempted to uncover any material which might be related to recent allegations and to review any new information that has come to light since our last complete review in 1987.


3. I would like to take a few minutes and explain how NSA has conducted its business in regard to the POW/MIA task. During the Vietnam War, our ability to access the communications of Southeast Asian

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Communist Forces was very good. Over seventy (70) ground-based collection sites, no fewer than twelve (12) types of airborne collection platforms, and numerous shipborne collectors worked 24-hours a day against the full range of target communications. Thousands of people, primarily uniformed military personnel, were involved in this massive signals intelligence effort. The SIGINT system had an excellent capability to collect information on aircraft shootdowns and on downed fliers. We intercepted information that some crew members did not survive the shootdown. In other cases, we were able to detect initial capture and subsequent movement of prisoners by the capturing unit to either a holding location or to a place designated as a camp. We were aware of the existence of more permanent prison camps from non-SIGINT sources, but in spite of our vast collection resources, we never heard any communications emanating from these camps.

- 4. The enormous amount of data collection during the war had to be processed manually. Because of this we did not always process everything, but we did process everything related to downed fliers or captured Americans. This was our highest priority mission. Intercept operators were trained to recognize critical information, and were instructed to notify supervisors immediately when information on downed fliers or captured servicemen was intercepted. This information was processed immediately and reported in the most expeditious manner to tactical units to aid in search and rescue operations.
- 5. Our information can be divided into two categories. We have a total of 1530 "incident" reports which are based on military





communications and relate to specific losses. We have approximately 500 "non-incident" reports which are associated with the general topic of POW/MIAs. We reported both tactical and strategic information. Tactical reporting included information on such subjects as shootdowns of aircraft and locations of enemy forces. A special reporting series, called SONGBIRD Reports, was established for information pertaining to prisoners, prisoner locations, movement of prisoners, shootdown of aircraft, or any other information relating to the fate of U.S. servicemen. Strategic reporting included such activities as North Vietnamese infiltration and resupply. This information came from communications serving the network of roads, transportation units, and rest stops known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail and from communications serving military elements in Northern Vietnam.

- 6. We understand that the committee is especially concerned about the fate of American MIAs captured in Laos. Logitian codes were broken during the war and the communications of Pathet Lao Headquarters were intercepted. Regretably, while we had voluminous intercept of Laotian communications, they do not provide any new information on the fate of our men lost in Laos.
- 7. Also, no SIGINT evidence is available to either confirm or deny allegations of involvement with Americar POWs. NSA has completed a review of pertinent material. As with our study of Vietnamese communications, there is no evidence to involved POWs. Our search of indicate that communications that may be related to the POW/MIA issue continues, but

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as with our efforts in researching	rid arcandmeno commentantorento un titat
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yet to find any SIGINT evidence	
8. NSA currently holds appro	oximately 2000 SIGINT reports, dating
from 1965 to the present, relating	ng to the loss, capture, and status o
U.S. personnel in Southeast Asia	. To illustrate the challenge of
following individual POWs, of all	l the POW/MIA related incidents repor
in SIGINT during the war, less th	nan 100 names of captured Americans a
contained in our reporting. The	majority of these people were
subsequently accounted for. All	of this information was reported in
normal system and made available	during previous investigations. Let
emphasize however, that none of c	our data contains evidence that Ameri
service personnel remain in Vietr	nam today or were left behind after
Operation HOMECOMING.	
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9. We spent many years after that could reveal evidence that the ware not successful. The only control of the question of releasing reasons why even after 20-25 year	J.S. personnel were held in Vietnam bollection, reflecting POW/MIA matters general intelligence data, there are good es, some intelligence information
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We recognize the concerns of POW/MIA families, and we want to explore methods for them to gain access to data associated with their kin while at the same time protecting our sources and methods. I would like to caution everyone, however, that what we hold as described above only applies to a very few families and even that involves not more than one or two SIGINT reports per family.

On the other hand, for you and/or your cleared staff, we stand ready to show our entire SIGINT POW/MIA-related reports and to help interpret them as necessary for you and respond to any of your questions.

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QUESTION: Please explain why it is necessary to protect the sources of information on POW's and MIA's.

ANSWER: In the intelligence collection process, whether it be on POW's and MIA's or other requirements, we have a statutory responsibility under the National Security Act of 1947 and E.O. 12356 to protect the source of the information, the place and manner in which it was acquired, any foreign intelligence service involvement, references to other operational activity and administrative details such as cryptonyms, field report numbers, source and field comments.

If we were unable to guarantee this protection, it would impact on our ability to collect intelligence. Other sources would be wary of cooperating with us if information were released which pinpoints its origin without consideration of the effect this information might have on the source, and his heirs, survivors or colleagues. It is important to understand that in many cases, especially with regard to information

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
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SPOT REPORT

6 DECEMBER 1991

. UPDATE ON PW-MIA ACTIVITIES

1. FILES AT DIA: A total of 496 "live-sighting" files in the Prisoner of War-Missing in Action (PW-MIA) Task Force for Intelligence Data Release have been reviewed and sanitized at
the Pentagon.
The files remised them the 1 500
The files reviewed were from the 1,500 live-sighting files of which only 496 contained Agency reporting. The agreed-upon Inter-Agency guidelines were used in deleting identification of sources, names of Agency personnel, place acquired, liaison involvement, and methods of acquisition. DIA PW-MIA appreciated our Agency's cooperation and effort is particularly noteworthy.
2. Response to the Committee's letter: During ADDO'S 4 December one-on-one with DCEA, the wording of the response letter to the Committee was raised. You should be receiving the draft of this letter in-part reads "It has been agency practice to provide all information on PW-MIA's to DIA and this information should be available in their files. In response to your request, we are undertaking a review of all files held by the Agency which bear on this issue to ensure that all pertinent data has been passed to DIA."
PW-MIA: This component is being formed with the Chief to review our files on PW-MIA's and ensure that all the reporting on this issue has been forwarded to DIA. All archived files on the subject are being retrieved and will be reviewed. We will also look at substantive issues such as programs in Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia associated with our operational and collection activities on PW-MIA's. Will be We have
discussed with the need for additional funding for
to assist with this project. the
provide administrative assistance as required and
are working on locating office
space for the group. We are receiving excellent cooperation from all concerned and has been particularly helpful with several aspects of the program.
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JOINT STAFF
INFO SERVICE CENTER
+++EXCLUSIVE+++

COPY NUMBER - PW - MIA

IMMEDIATE ZYUF RUEMMCA4410 3361958 TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES. SECONDLY, HE NOTES THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE HAVE BEEN VERY PRO-AMERICAN ALL ALONG. NOT JUST AFTER G 021958Z DEC 91 DIA WASHDO PERESTROIKA: IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO HIDE A U.S POW, UNLESS IN VERY CONFINED AREAS, BUT FOR WHAT PURPOSE?
THIRDLY, TRUTH IS BREAKING OUT ALL OVER, NO ONE CAN KEEP A
SECRET AND THERE ARE MANY THAT WOULD STOP AT NOTHING TO INFO SECSTATE WASHDC/ S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DISCREDIT THE FORMER REGIME BY GOING PUBLIC IF IN FACT AMERICAN PON WERE IN THE USSR. SECRET DID GO OUT OF HIS WAY TO STATE THAT AMERICANS COULD BE RESTOING IN THE USSR, BUT ADDED THAT THIS HAS TO BE LOOKED AT ON A CASE-TO-CASE BASIS. FOR EXAMPLE: AN AMERICAN POW COULD HAVE MET AND MARRIED A 5-1438-91 SUBJECT: POW-MIA ISSUES (U) 1. (C) COMERIDAY EVENING 29 HOVEMBER 1991 RUSSIAN WOMAN AND RETURNED WITH HER TO THE SOVIET UNION HERE HE CITED THAT THIS MIGHT BE THE CASE OF SOMEONE LIKE THE AMERICAN SUPPOSIBLY LIVING IN SARYSHAGAN, QUICKLY ADDING THAT HE PERSONALLY DOES NOT BELIEVE THE STORY. AT TO DISCUSS ONGOING POW/MIA ISSUES. FROM THE VERY START MADE IT CLEAR THAT ALTHOUGH HE WAS MENTIONED IN THIS POINT SURPRISED ALUSNA BY STATING THE PRESS, HE WAS NOT INTIMATELY FAMILIAR WITH SUBJECT AND COULD NOT PROVIDE ANYTHING MORE THAN AN OVERVIEW OF EVENTS S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 34410 AS HE REMEMBERS THEM. THAT ALTHOUGH HE UNDERSTOOD CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST.
ESPECIALLY IN AN ELECTION YEAR, HE COULD NOT QUITE
UNDERSTAND THE SUDDEN AND ALMOST INTERSE INTEREST THAT THE
U.S. WAS SHOWING ON THE POW ISSUE, STATING THAT WE HAD INVOLVEMENT IN POW INTERPOGATION WAS MINIMAL UNTIL AN AGREEMENT ON THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WAS SIGNED BY THE KGB AND ITS VIETNAMESE COUNTERPART--ABOUT 1977 OR 1978--HE WAS NOT MANY MORE POW/MIAS DURING THE KOREAN WAR WITHOUT TODAY'S SURE OF THE EXACT YEAR--CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES WAS FERVOR. RO SUMMARILY EXPLAINED THAT CIRCUMSTANCES WERE IN VIRTUALLY NON-EXISTENT. AFTER THE AGREEMENT WAS IN PLACE. THE VIETNAMESE REQUESTED KGB ASSISTANCE IN "DISMANTLING" FACT, NOT SIMILAR. THE VIETNAMESE REQUESTED KOB ASSISTANCE IN "DISMANTING"
THE U.S. EMBASSY IN SAIGON, WHICH THE KGB WAS HAPPY TO DO.
AFTER THIS EVENT, THE KGB IN A LOW KEY MANNER, REQUESTED
AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO A FEW U.S. POWS THAT MAY STILL
HAVE BEEN HELD IN VIETNAM. (NOTE: KALUGIN STATED THAT AN
UMKNOWN NUMBER OF AMERICAN POWS IN 1977-1978 WERE KEPT BY
THE VIETNAMESE, BUT DID NOT KNOW FOR WHAT PURPOSE.) REASON
FOR THE REQUEST WAS TO ASSESS SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT
EFFECTIVENESS AND IN TURN, FAMILIARIZE THEMSELVES WITH
U.S. DOCTRINE. A THREE (OR POSSIBLY) FOUR MAN TEAM WAS
DISPATCHED TO VIETNAM--LOCATION UNKNOWN--AND A LIST OF U.S
POWS WAS PROVIDED TO THE SOVIET SIDE--NUMBER OR NAMES
UNKHOWN--FROM WHICH THE KGB TEAM PICKED THREE TNDIVIDUALS:
CAE WAS A "SENIOR" NOVAL OFFICER--RANK UNKNOWN-AN AIR
FORCE PILOT, AND A SUSPECTED CIA-RELATED PERSON. AN EFFORT
TO TURN THESE INDIVIDUALS WAS MADE AT THAT TIME, KALUGIN
DID MENTION, HOWEVER, THAT AN ATTEMPT TO CONTACT THE THREE
AMERICANS IN THE UNITED STATES A FEW YEARS LATER WAS
LINSUCCESSFUL. 5. (C) IS AN INTERESTING CASE STUDY. HE IS VERY WESTERN IN HIS DRESS AND MANNERISMS--LIVED IN THE U.S. FOR FIVE YEARS, SPEAKS EXCELLENT ENGLISH (AMERICAH)--STUDIED AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN 1958, IS URBANE, POLISHED AND VERY CONGENIAL. HE IS A FORMER USSR PEOPLES' DEPUTY: HE CONTINUES TO BE ENGAGED IN GOVERNMENT BUT AS A CONSULTANT. HE APPEARS TO BE, HOWEVER, ON THE MARGINS CONCERNING THE POW/MIA QUESTION AND HAS PROBABLY EXHAUSTED HIS OWN KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT. 6.(C) BECAUSE OF THE POTENTIALLY DAMAGING INFORMATION ADDRESSED IN PARAGRAPH TWO ABOVE, EMBASSY IS TREATING THIS AS A SPECAT/EXDIS MATTER. 7.(C) EMBASSY INTER-AGENCY GROUP WOULD APPRECIATE ANALYSIS AND ANY FEEDBACK ON INFORMATION PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH TWO. BUT WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED IN LEARNING MORE ABOUT THE UNSUCCESSFUL. GRU CONNECTION AND HOW THIS COULD BE FURTHER PURSUED. 8.(C) NEXT STEP: AWAIT KALUGIN'S CALL TO SEE IF FORMER SUBORDINATE AND SCYIET TEAM CHIEF WOULD BE WILLING TO TALK TO US. DECL: DADR BT 3. (S) IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT GENERAL KALUGIN IS NOT IN THE MAINSTREAM OF POW ISSUES, NOR DOES HE BELIEVE, FROM A KGB PERSPECTIVE, THAT THE ISSUE IS BONA FIDE AND NOT A FABRICATION. FIRST HE FEELS THAT DURING THE 1970'S BREZHNEV (AND BY ASSOCIATION, ANDROPOV) WAS VERY CAREFUL ACTION: MR. SASEK/DIA ACTION (M,C) CDSN=MIA530 PAGE 1 OF 1 021958Z DEC 91 C2 SECT M3G MCN=91336/05887 TOR=91335/2044Z TAD-91336/2315Z ++++EXDIS++++



Foreign Intelligence Information Report

DIRECTORATE OF

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•	Grigoriyev received i lifetime i the number was indefi	, specially nto the Sovi nearceration involved to nite, but in e prisoners d to serve t	selected tet Union of and "ideo be about to lived internal and retraint	J.S. prison circa 1970 plogical re 2,000. Ti censive psy ining to ma	eral Petr Ivano ners of war wer for long term etraining." He he goal of the ychological invake them availa iet Union. Gri	or implied program vestige-	
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the USSR, much less that 2,000 such individuals are leading "reasonably normal lives" in the same region where numerous Soviet political prisoners have resided in exile.

However, in light of continuing high interest in the question of U.S. personnel still listed as missing in action in Southeast Asia, this report is being disseminated with appropriate caveats to concerned members of the U.S. Intelligence Community.)

- 2. which was held circa 1970, KGB Lieutenant General Petr Ivanovich ((Grigoriyev)) stated that many specially selected U.S. prisoners of war were being received from North Vietnam for long term or lifetime custody and "ideological re-training" in the Soviet Union. Grigoriyev did not state specifically the number of prisoners involved. The term he used was "v porvadke neskol'kikh tysyach v nas tozhe yest'' which translates as "on the order of several thousand," implying the number to be about 2,000). The prisoners were destined for confinement at a facility near Perm. Grigorivey, who learned of the program from an unnamed high level KGB colleague, understood that Soviets rather than North Vielnamese were involved in the initial selection process and that participants were to be continually assessed for suitability. He implied that individuals determined to be unsuitable would be eliminated and replaced with other Grigoriyev made his comment while serving as a political ideologist and personnel officer at the All-Union Scientific-Technical Information Center of the State Committee for Schence and Technology in Moscow. He had previously served as Chief of the KGB's Personnel Directorate and in that capacity would have very likely made contacts among KGB officials subsequently responsible for organizing any such prisoner program.)
- 3. According to Grigoriyev, the goals of the U.S. prisoner program were indefinite but involved intensive psychological studies of the individuals and utilization of them as required to serve the needs of the Soviet Union. Grigoriyev understood that the detention facility was not a standard prison, but rather one in which inmates could lead reasonably normal lives. Frigoriyev recalled that precedents existed for such a program in the Soviet Union and cited similar previous efforts with Spanish, Japanese, and Chinese nationals. He stated that in past programs, participants were encouraged to marry Soviet women.

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- 6. Grigoriyev was trained as a professional military officer and served in the tank troops during World War II. After the war he was assigned to the Party Central Committee as an army representative. In the period 1953-1954 he became KGB Deputy Chief for Personnel. He subsequently became critical of the recruitment policies of KGB head Vladimir Yefimovich ((Semichastnyy)) and was transferred from his position to that of KGB Security Chief for Soviet Bloc nations. Soon thereafter he developed a heart ailment and retired. In the late 1960's he accepted the position at the Information Center.
- 7. General Skrynnik joined the Russian cavalry in 1917 and subsequently entered the Odessa artillery school. Upon graduation he was assigned to the Zhitomir military district. In 1931 he entered the Frunze Military Academy. He advanced rapidly and in the 1933-1934 period was sent to China as Deputy Military Attache. He joined Mao's long march and began to establish intelligence agent networks for the Soviet Union. He remained in China until 1942 except for a brief return in 1939 to establish an intelligence school in Moscow for China operations. In the spring of 1942 he was recalled from China to become chief of intelligence on the northwestern front, where he remained for the duration of the war. After the war he was assigned as Soviet representative to the Berlin Joint Commission for Repatriation. After serving in Berlin from 1945 to 1949 he returned to Moscow as either chief or deputy chief for intelligence at the Frunze Academy. He then served as Deputy Intelligence Chief of the Far Eastern Military District. He retired from the military in 1953. Skrynnik was subsequencly redalled to duty to re-establish agent networks in China after the China-USSR split but refused to leave rather-

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA

: Deputy Director for Operations

FROM

Acting Chief, East Asia Division

SUBJECT

: Representative Dornan's Request for DDCI Testimony Concerning POW/MIA's in Southeast

Asia

Attached are East Asia Division comments on Congress-man Dornan's request for DDCI testimony concerning CIA efforts on the POW/MIA problem in Southeast Asia. Our comments are keyed to the questions asked in Congressman Dornan's letter of November 6, 1981.

Attachment:

East Asia Division Comments

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 2-Dec-2013

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## EAST ASIA DIVISION COMMENTS

| I.         | What is the priority of the POW/MIA issue at CIA?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|            | No CIA Station is tasked in its OD with action on the MIA                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| POW        | issue.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
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| 1          | this issue receives as much                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 229        | sometimes even more attention than other priority                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| ohi        | ectives                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| on<br>ass  | When any believable information when any believable information with the highest priority is in the highest priority is in the highest priority is the highest priority is in the highest priority in the highest priority is in the highest priority in the highest priority is in the highest priority in the highest priority is in the highest priority in the highest priority in the highest priority is in the highest priority in the highest priority in the highest priority in the highest priority is in the highest priority ind |
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|            | What are the resources being assigned to this problem within CIA?  At CIA Headquarters there is no DDO officer who has been cifically assigned to the POW/MIA problem.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
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| dut        | activities as required and in addition to their regular ies. devotes the most time /MIA activities.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| FOW        | /MIR decivities.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
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| inf<br>Sta | the highest priority to obtaining ormation on POW/MIA's. As mentioned above, officers at al tions are alert for any information on POW/MIA's.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
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| . III      | . What are the roadblocks to resolving this issue? How can these barriers be eliminated?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |

The primary roadblock to resolving this issue continues to be the uncooperative attitude of the governments of Vietnam and Laos. They claim they have no POW's and are searching for MIA's.

Repeated requests over the years by the U.S. Government for more information or entry into these countries of investigative teams have been stalled. Continued diplomatic efforts combined with intelligence community efforts to obtain positive information appear to be the best available course of action at this time.

Unfortunately, another and serious roadblock to obtaining positive information on the subject is the publicity given to leaks of confidential activities, and publicity given to the wild and inaccurate stories of various adventurers.

Of publicity, many Lao and Vietnamese believe that claiming to possess information on POW/MIA's is a way to ensure entry to the Unted States, various Indochinese resistance groups view it as a method of obtaining covert U.S. Government financial and military support, and professional fabricators see it as a way of obtaining funds. The continued visits to Thailand of various soldiers of fortune working on their own or on behalf of private groups serves to additionally confuse the issue. Considerable intelligence community time and effort is wasted on the stories of fabricators and soldiers of fortune. Also, the actions of adventurers and inaccurate publicity has undoubtedly caused the Vietnamese and Lao to tighten security and to become more intransigent in their attitude towards our diplomatic efforts.

IV. Has the United States intelligence community achieved smooth cooperation among its members on this issue?

We believe there is good cooperation among the members of the intelligence community both at the Headquarters level and in the field. DIA is recognized as the focal point for all POW/MIA information and CIA passes all information obtained on the subject to DIA.

We believe DIA is doing an excellent job in this difficult activity and will continue to cooperate fully.

VI. What more can the United States Government do to assist the intelligence community on this issue?

Sufficient support and cooperation is being provided at this time. We know that if additional resources are necessary that the administration will be responsive to any requests. The problem is not one of resources or even intelligence, especially in the case of alleged POW's. It has not been demonstrated, at least on the basis of the considerable available information, that additional collection resources would lead to a definitive resolution of this issue. Sufficient assets are in place and a large volume of information is continually being screened and checked. To date, information indicating locations of POW's and MIA's in Laos or Vietnam has not proved credible. We and DIA have gone to considerable lengths to check out the more promising leads.

VII. What more can the United States intelligence community do on this issue?

The intelligence community continues to be alert and receptive to any information concerning POW/MIA's. We will actively and aggressively continue to search for, and follow up on new sources of information.

SUBJECT: Missing in Action Case - Processing Statistics

#### Documents Processed or in Process

| CIA Army (Referral) Air Force (Referral) Navy (Referral) Defence Intelligence Agency (Referral) State Department POW Letters | 23,047<br>866<br>1,295<br>664<br>1,658<br>2,873<br>10,379 |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| Total                                                                                                                        | 40,782                                                    |
| No Pertinent Documents Reviewed                                                                                              | 25,600                                                    |
| Total                                                                                                                        | 66.382                                                    |

# Estimated Manhours/Cost to Date

| Computer Cost | TOTAL                 | 81,564<br>\$286,734 |
|---------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
| Copy Cost     | 406,000 sheets @ 5.0  | _                   |
| Regular Time  | 1,000 hours @ \$ 9.3  |                     |
| Overtime      | 15,600 hours @ \$11.2 |                     |

# Estimated Manhours/Cost to Completion

| Overtime<br>Regular Time   | 6,000 hours @ \$15.99<br>6,500 hours @ \$25.00* | \$ 95,940<br>\$ 162,500 |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|
|                            | TOTAL                                           | \$258,440               |
| Copy Cost<br>Computer Cost | 300,000 copies @ .05                            | 15,000<br>5,000         |
|                            | TOTAL                                           | \$278,440               |

Total Estimated Cost to Completion \$565,174

Please note that these are estimated figures in many instances. When all factors are considered, such as assistance from other offices in servicing document requests and overhead, these figures represent our minimum cost.

\* The increase in the hourly cost at this point is because of the employment of rehired annuitants to analyze the MIA reporting. In the early stages of this project, mostly clerical personnel and overtime employees were involved in the processing of documents.

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| FROM:  Acting Chief, East Asia Division  TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)  RECEIVED MORWARDED INITIALS  TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)  RECEIVED MORWARDED INITIALS  TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)  RECEIVED MORWARDED INITIALS  TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)  TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)  RECEIVED MORWARDED INITIALS  TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)  TO: (OMMENTS (Number each comment) to show from whom the show from the show | SU           | SUBJECT: (Optional)                          |        |          |       |                       |                                                                                                         |  |  |
| Acting Chief, East Asia Division  TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)  DATE  RECEIVED FORWANDED  1.  3/12 3/12  2.  Attached are East Asia Division's comments on the POW/MIA questions raised by Representative Dornan.  4.  5.  DDO Reg  6.  ADDO  8. Chief, Inderdepartmental                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |              | Congressional Testimony Concerning POW/MIA's |        |          |       |                       |                                                                                                         |  |  |
| Acting Chief, East Asia Division  TO: (Officer designolion, room number, and building)  1.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | FRO          | FROM:                                        |        |          |       |                       | NO.                                                                                                     |  |  |
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| Division's comments on the POW/MIA questions raised by Representative Dornan.  A.  Division's comments on the POW/MIA questions raised by Representative Dornan.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | TO           |                                              |        | r        |       | . 1436                | 2 DECEMBET 1301                                                                                         |  |  |
| Attached are East Asia Division's comments on the POW/MIA questions raised by Representative Dornan.  5.  DDO Reg 6.  ADDO 7.  DDO 8. Chief, Inderdepartmental                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | bvi          | lding)                                       | n, und |          | T     | OFFICER'S<br>INITIALS | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) |  |  |
| the POW/MIA questions raised by Representative Dornan.  5.  DDO Reg 6.  ADDO 7.  DDO 8. Chief, Inderdepartmental                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | 1.           |                                              |        | 3/12     | 3/12  |                       |                                                                                                         |  |  |
| a.  DDO Reg  6.  DDO  Reg  6.  DDO  Reg  7.  DDO  8. Chief, Inderdepartmental                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | 2.           |                                              |        |          | 1     |                       |                                                                                                         |  |  |
| 4.  5.  DDO Reg  6.  ADDo  7.  DDO  8. Chief, Inderdepartmental                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |              |                                              |        |          |       |                       | raised by Representative                                                                                |  |  |
| 5.  DDO Reg  6.  DDO  7.  DDO  8. Chief, Inderdepartmental                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | 3.           | •                                            |        |          |       | ./                    | Dornan.                                                                                                 |  |  |
| 5. DDO Reg 6. DDO 7. DDO 8. Chief, Inderdepartmental                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |              |                                              |        |          |       |                       |                                                                                                         |  |  |
| DDO Reg  6.  DDO  7.  DDO  8. Chief, Inderdepartmental                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | 4.           | •                                            |        |          |       |                       | ,                                                                                                       |  |  |
| DDO Reg  6.  DDO  7.  DDO  8. Chief, Inderdepartmental                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |              |                                              |        |          |       | ·                     |                                                                                                         |  |  |
| 6.  DDO  7.  DDO  8. Chief, Inderdepartmental                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | 5.           |                                              |        | 6.5.5    | 10.41 |                       |                                                                                                         |  |  |
| 7. DDO  8. Chief, Inderdepartmental                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |              |                                              |        | 71 % 22. |       |                       | '                                                                                                       |  |  |
| DDO  8. Chief, Inderdepartmental                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | 6.           |                                              |        |          |       |                       | ·                                                                                                       |  |  |
| DDO  8. Chief, Inderdepartmental                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |              |                                              |        |          |       |                       |                                                                                                         |  |  |
| 8. Chief, Inderdepartmental                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | <sup>'</sup> | passassas                                    |        |          |       |                       |                                                                                                         |  |  |
| Chief, Inderdepartmental                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | Ω            |                                              |        |          |       |                       |                                                                                                         |  |  |
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| 9.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | 9.           |                                              |        |          |       |                       |                                                                                                         |  |  |
| EXEC Reg                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | >            | EXEC Reg                                     |        |          | )     |                       |                                                                                                         |  |  |
| 10.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | 10.          |                                              |        | ,        | ,     |                       |                                                                                                         |  |  |
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| 11.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | 11.          |                                              |        |          |       |                       |                                                                                                         |  |  |
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IMAGERY ANALYSIS NOTES

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 2-Dec-2013

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| MEMORANDUM FOR:                             | Dinasten Office of Improve Callegation & Fundadastic                                                                                                                                                                                               |
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| FROM:                                       | Director, Office of Imagery Collection & Exploitation                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| ***                                         | Director, Office of SIGINT Collection                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| SUBJECT:                                    | POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| REFERENCE:                                  | DD/ICS Note, Same Subject dated 27 Nov 1981                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|                                             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| <ol> <li>In res<br/>is provided.</li> </ol> | ponse to the above reference the following information                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| a. <u>S</u><br><u>problem</u> .             | IGINT collection requirements levied against the POW/MIA                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| National SI                                 | urrently there are three active requirements in the GINT Requirements <u>List (NSRL) which request information on</u> Southeast Asia.                                                                                                              |
| •                                           |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
|                                             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
|                                             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| b. <u>E</u>                                 | valuation of SIGINT Efforts.                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| efforts to                                  | he following evaluation of the results of NSA's SIGINT date was provided by, Chief, B5 NSA. B5 l point in NSA for all actions connected with the Southeast A issue.                                                                                |
| substa<br>POW/MI/<br>availal                | To date there has been no SIGINT information either ntiating or refuting the existence of unaccounted for U.S. As in Southeast Asia. NSA, however, continues to task ble collection resources against NSRL requirements concern-W/MIA information. |
|                                             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
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| ;<br>APPROVED FOR<br>RELEASE DATE:          | TOP SECRET                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
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| SUBJECT:  | PUWS and MI  | as in Southea | ST ASIA     |                                                |                                              | بترتب    |
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| initiativ | es with rega | rd to U.S. PC | W/MIAs. N   | as DIRNSA was<br>SA B5 is not<br>n on this iss | optimistic t                                 | hat      |
| SIGIN! MI | ii be abie t | contribute    | Intormation | n on this iss                                  | ue. (SCCO)                                   |          |
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| a/s       | 165          |               |             |                                                | <u>.                                    </u> |          |
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 2-Dec-2013

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4 December 1981

MEMORANDUM TO:

Director, Office of Imagery, Collection and Exploitation

FROM:

Director, Office of HUMINT Collection

SUBJECT:

HUMINT Collection on the POW/MIA Problem in Southeast Asia /

l. National concerns and priorities regarding POW/MIAs are reflected in the National HUMINT Collection Plan #34 on Indochina, issued in March 1981. HUMINT collection responsibilities for objectives on the subject as it relates to Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos are assigned to State (advisory), the CIA's clandestine service and DIA, with supporting responsibilities for the military services, DCD and FBIS. (S)

although queried, have no knowledge of this subject. As a result, the reporting on POW/MIAs from debriefings is meager. In the case of DoD, the debriefing and reporting is done by the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, whose entre to refugee camps is on humanitarian grounds. FBIS gives the subject a very high priority; however, reporting has been limited to material from the Vietnamese media, almost all of which is general and reactive to U.S. commentary. (S)

4. In sum, HUMINT collection managers and field entities are fully aware of the importance of the POW/MIA issue and are attempting to improve collection. Collection opportunities, however, have been scarce. (C)

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| Attachment | 6 | to |  |
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| EAST ASIA DIVISION COMMENTS                                                                       |                   |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|
|                                                                                                   |                   |
|                                                                                                   |                   |
| I. What is the priority of the POH/MIA issue at CIA?                                              |                   |
| No CIA Station is tasked in its OD with action on                                                 | the MIA/          |
| POW issue.                                                                                        |                   |
|                                                                                                   |                   |
| ·                                                                                                 |                   |
| and sometimes even more attention than other priority                                             | much              |
| objectives                                                                                        |                   |
| on POW/MIA's is obtained in the field, the highest price                                          | ormation orlty is |
| assigned to its verification.                                                                     | •                 |
| <del>-</del>                                                                                      |                   |
| II. What are the resources being assigned to this probable within CIA?                            | lem               |
|                                                                                                   |                   |
| At CIA Headquarters there is no DDO officer who has specifically assigned to the POW/MIA problem. | is been           |
| hai                                                                                               | ndle POW/         |
| MIA activities as required and in addition to their requires.  devotes the most                   |                   |
| POW/MIA activities.                                                                               |                   |
|                                                                                                   |                   |
|                                                                                                   |                   |
|                                                                                                   |                   |
| the highest priority to obta                                                                      | nining "          |
| information on POW/MIA's. As mentioned above, officers                                            | at_all            |
| Stations are alert for any information on POW/MIA's.                                              | . Total Section 1 |
| III. What are the roadblocks to resolving this issue?                                             | Sav.              |
| can these barriers be eliminated?                                                                 |                   |
| The primary roadblock to resolving this issue cont                                                |                   |
| be the uncooperative attitude of the governments of Vie                                           | etnam and         |
| Laos. They claim they have no POW's and are searching                                             | for MIA's         |
|                                                                                                   | -                 |
|                                                                                                   | •                 |

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: · 2-Dec-2013 Repeated requests over the years by the U.S. Government for more information or entry into these countries of investigative teams have been stalled. Continued diplomatic efforts combined with intelligence community efforts to obtain positive information—appear to be the best available course of action at this time.

Unfortunately, another and serious roadblock to obtaining positive information on the subject is the publicity given to leaks of confidential activities, and publicity given to the wild and inaccurate stories of various adventurers.

of publicity, many Lao and Vietnamese believe that claiming to possess information on POW/MIA's is a way to ensure entry to the Unted States, various Indochinese resistance groups view it as a method of obtaining covert U.S. Government financial and military support, and professional fabricators see it as a way of obtaining funds. The continued visits to Thailand of various soldiers of fortune working on their own or on behalf of private groups serves to additionally confuse the issue. Considerable intelligence community time and effort is wasted on the stories of fabricators and soldiers of fortune: Also, the actions of adventurers and inaccurate publicity has undoubtedly caused the Vietnamese and Lao to tighten security and to become more intransigent in their attitude towards our diplomatic efforts.

IV. Has the United States intelligence community achieved smooth cooperation among its members on this issue?

We believe there is good cooperation among the members of the intelligence community both at the Headquarters level and in the field. DIA is recognized as the focal point for all POW/MIA information and CIA passes all information obtained on the subject to DIA.

We believe DIA is doing an excellent job in this dilficult activity and will continue to cooperate fully.

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V1. What more can the United States Government do to assist the intelligence community on this issue?

Sufficient support and cooperation is being provided at this time. We know that if additional resources are necessary that the administration will be responsive to any requests. The problem is not one of resources or even intelligence, especially in the case of alleged POW's. It has not been demonstrated, at least on the basis of the considerable available information, that additional collection resources would lead to a definitive resolution of this issue. Sufficient assets are in place and a large volume of information is continually being screened and checked. To date, information indicating locations of POW's and MIA's in Laos or Vietnam has not proved credible. We and DIA have gone to considerable lengths to check out the more promising leads.

'VII. What more wan the United States intelligence community many do on this issue?

The intelligence community continues to be alert and receptive to any information concerning POW/MIA's. We will actively and aggressively continue to search for, and follow up on new sources of information.

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Statement of

RADM E.A. Burkhalter, Jr., USN

Deputy Director

Defense Intelligence Agency

on

Prisoners of War and Missing in Action

Before the ...

Task Force on American Prisoners

and Missing in Southeast Asia

House Subcommittee

on

Asian and Pacific Affairs

December 8, 1981

DRAFT

CONFIDENTIAL

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 2-Dec-2013 .. CHARL WAS TAND HOME TO LE MEMBERS:

DUE TO PRIOR COMMITMENTS WHICH HAVE TAKEN HIM OUT OF TOWN, THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, LIFUTENANT GENERAL JAMES WILLIAMS, HAS ASKED HE TO APPEAR BEFORE THE TASK FORCE TODAY AND REPRESENT THE AGENCY ON THE SUBJECT OF DIA'S INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS TO DETERMINE THE FATE OF AMERICANS STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

I APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO YOUR INVITATION AND COME BEFORE YOU ON THIS MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE. THE TASK FORCE'S VIGOROUS EFFORTS DIRECTED TOWARD DETERMINING THE FATE OF THOSE AMERICANS LISTED AS PRISONER OF WAR OR MISSING IN ACTION AND WHO STILL REMAIN UNACCOUNTED FOR IS WELL RECOGNIZED BY DIA. I ALSO KNOW THAT THE TASK FORCE IS WELL AWARE OF DIA'S ROLE AND CONTRIBUTIONS.

IN THAT REGARD, I DO WANT TO REAFFIRM DIA'S FULL COOPERATION WITH YOU IN THIS MATTER. I WOULD ALSO EMPHASIZE RIGHT FROM THE START THAT THE CRITICAL NEED FOR CONTINUED INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS IS RECOGNIZED AND I ASSURE YOU THAT DIA WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT NEEDED FOR AS LONG AS AMERICANS REMAIN UNACCOUNTED FOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. RADM JERRY PAULSON, WITH WHOM YOU ARE FAMILIAR, IS THE ASSISTANT VICE DIRECTOR FOR COLLECTION MANAGEMENT AND HEADS OUR PW/MIA STAFF.

LIKE MOST MILITARY MEN, MY PERSONAL ASSOCIATION WITH MEN WHO ARE NOW AMONG THE MISSING HAS KEPT ME CLOSE TO THE ISSUE FOR MANY YEARS. AS PART OF DIA'S COMMAND ELEMENT I FOLLOW THIS AGENCY'S EVERY DAY EFFORTS ON THIS ISSUE THROUGH A DAILY REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR. I CAN SAY WITHOUT RESERVATION THAT DIA REMAINS DEDICATED IN ITS PURSUIT AND RESEARCH OF INFORMATION WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE DETERMINATION OF THE PRESENT FATE OF THESE MISSING AMERICANS.

ASSUREDLY, THE PW/MIA FUNCTION HAS AND WILL CONTINUE TO RECEIVE STRONG COMMAND ATTENTION WITHIN DIA.

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AFTER REVIEW DATE THAN ONE LESS OF COLUMNIC AND ONE WEST STORESTS

ADD, AND REGRETTABLY SO, THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE SITUATION SINCE DIA'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY OF SIX MONTHS AGO.

THERE ARE STILL 2,496 AMERICANS WHO WERE DETERMINED TO BE EITHER A PRISONER, MISSING OR KILLED (BODY NOT RECOVERED) THAT REPAIR UNACCOUNTED FOR. WE LAVE STRESSED IN THE PAST THAT DIA MAKES NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE TERMS OF AN INDIVIDUAL STATUS. OUR GOAL IS TO RECOVER ANY AMERICAN - WHETHER LIVE OR DEAD. OUR COLLECTION AND RESEARCH EFFORTS RELATIVE TO REPORTS OF AMERICANS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA REFLECT OUR DEDICATION TO THAT END.

UNDERSTANDABLY, THE REFUGEE REPORTING FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA CONTINUES TO BE OUR MAJOR SOURCE OF INFORMATION. SINCE THE COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF SOUTH VIETNAM IN 1975 WE HAVE ACQUIRED A TOTAL OF 1,303 REPORTS BEARING ON THE PW/MIA FIRST HAND PROBLEM. OF THE TOTAL REPORTING, 386ARE LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS. APPROXIMATELY 33 PERCENT OF THESE LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS HAVE BEEN EQUATED TO AMERICANS WHO HAVE SINCE BEEN ACCOUNTED FOR. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT USING A SLIGHTLY MORE LIBERAL 10 APPROACH, THAT AN ADDITIONAL PERCENT OF THE SIGHTING REPORTS WOULD EQUATE TO ACCOUNTED FOR AMERICANS. SOME OF THE REMAINING SIGHTING REPORTS ARE FABRICATIONS AND OTHERS ARE REPORTS FROM PERHAPS WELL INTENDED BUT MISGUIDED INDIVIDUALS. THERE ARE OTHER SIGHTING REPORTS WHICH WE HAVE EXTENSIVELY INVESTIGATED AND OTHERS, FOR WHICH OUR FOLLOW UP EFFORTS CONTINUE. DESPITE THE LARGE NUMBER OF SIGHTING REPORTS WHICH REMAIN UNRESOLVED AND OUR PERSISTENT EFFORTS, WE STILL CAN NOT PROVE THAT THERE ARE ANY AMERICANS BEING DETAINED AGAINST THEIR WILL.

AS A CASE IN POINT, WE HAD HIGH HOPES FOR ONE OF OUR RECENT LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS. APPROXIMATELY 165 MANDAYS HAVE BEEN EXPENDED IN HOPEFUL PURSUIT OF THE TRUTHFULNESS OF THE SOURCE"S INFORMATION. THE INTERVIEWS, INVESTIGATIONS, POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS AND ANALYTICAL RESEARCH COVERED A PERIOD BACK TO 1954,

THE FORMAL PROBLEM OF ASSESSED AND BROKETZATIONS TO BE BUT

AFTER THIS THOROUGH EXAMINATION ARE WE NOW SATISFIED THAT THIS SOURCE HAS BEEN DECEPTIVE AND UNTRUTHFUL.

DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS DIA HAS TAKEN EVER INCREASING STEPS TO INTERSIFY ITS EFFORTS AND CAPABILITIES COMMEMBURATE WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE. DIA'S PW/MIA STAFF IS CURRENTLY AT A MANNING LEVEL OF 15 PERSONNEL. THE STAFF HAS ADDED PERSONNEL WITH LANGUAGE CAPABILITIES IN VIETNAMESE AND CHINESE, AND WITH EXTENSIVE INVESTIGATIVE BACKGROUNDS. THE EXPERIENCE LEVEL OF THE STAFF RELATIVE TO ANALYTICAL SKILLS AND SOUTHEAST ASIAN BACKGROUND INCLUDING INCOUNTRY EXPERIENCE IS EXCEPTIONAL. ADDITIONALLY, WE ARE REGULARLY ASSISTED IN OUR EFFORTS THROUGH THE DEFENSE ATTACHE SYSTEM, PHOTO INTERPRETERS. LINGUISTS, INVESTIGATORY PERSONNEL, AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS ON A WORLD WIDE BASIS. NO BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS ARE IMPOSED ON RESEARCH. INTERVIEWS AND INVESTIGATIVE FOLLOW-UP ASSOCIATED WITH DIA'S PURSUIT OF PW/MIA INFORMATION. ALTHOUGH TRAVEL ALLOCATIONS REMAIN AUSTERE FOR OTHER PURPOSES. THIS SAME POLICY OF NO CONSTRAINTS APPLIES TO TRAVEL FUNDS ASSOCIATED WITH DIA'S QUICK REACTION TEAM WHICH TRAVELS WITHIN CONUS AND OVERSEAS TO INTERVIEW SOURCES OF POTENTIAL PW/MIA INFORMATION DEEMED ESSENTIAL TO OUR EFFORTS. OUR WORKING RELATION AND SUPPORT FROM OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUE TO BE EXCELLENT. ESPECIALLY NOTEWORTHY IS THE COOPERATION AND RESPONSIVENESS OF THE JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER PERSONNEL TO OUR TASKING AND FOLLOW-UP REQUIREMENTS RELATIVE TO REFUGEE INTERVIEWS. IN ORDER TO ENSURE A COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING EXISTS ON VARIOUS ISSUES AND REQUIREMENTS. DIA RECENTLY BROUGHT THE JCRC BANGKOK LIAISON OFFICER TO WASHINGTON FOR EXTENSIVE WORKING DISCUSSIONS AND MEETINGS WITH SENIOR LEADERSHIP. ADDITIONALLY, THROUGH DIA INITIATION, THE STATE DEPARTMENT OBTAINED AUTHORIZATION FOR JCRC PERSONNEL TO CONDUCT PW/MIA INTERVIEWS WITH

DEBRIEFINGS HAS BEEN EXEMPLARY THROUGHOUT THE VARIOUS REFUGEE CAMPS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. THEIR PROFESSIONALISH GREATLY FACILITATES OUR ANALYTICAL EFFORTS.

DIA PROVIDES THE INTELLIGENCE UPON WHICH DECISIONMAKERS DEVELOP U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY. THE LEADERSHIP WITHIN THE DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENSE AND STATE MEMBERS OF THIS TASK FORCE AND OTHER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS HAVE BEEN UPDATED ON OUR CURRENT INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS THROUGH INFORMAL CLOSED SESSION BRIEFINGS. WHEN OUR RESEARCH HAS DEVELOPED INFORMATION TO A POINT THAT FURTHER PURSUIT WARRANTS ACTION BEYOND THE CAPABILITY OR CHARTER OF DIA THEN AT THAT POINT ACTION IS TRANSFERRED TO THE APPROPRIATE ORGANIZATION OR AGENCY. ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION DEVELOPED IN THIS MANNER WOULD BE PROVIDED TO DIA FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS AND DISSEMINATION. I THINK IT WORTHWHILE AT THIS POINT TO NOTE AGAIN THAT ALTHOUGH THIS IS A HUMANITARIAN ISSUE, SOME OF THE INFORMATION MUST BE CLASSIFIED AND REMAIN SO IF OUR EFFORTS ARE TO BE EFFECTIVE AND ALSO TO PRECLUDE HARM TO ANY AMERICANS WHO MIGHT STILL BE HELD IN CAPTIVITY. SINCE PFC ROBERT GARWOOD, USMC, RETURNED FROM VIETNAM IN FEBRUARY 1979, DIA HAS WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE MARINE CORPS ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES CONCERNING HIS CASE. ALTHOUGH RESTRAINED FROM DEBRIEFING GARWOOD DUE TO HIS COURT MARTIAL. DIA DID HAVE ACCESS TO PW/MIA INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED BY THE MARINE CORPS, AND BY THE FORMER CHAIRMAN AND A PRESENT MEMBER OF THIS SUBCOMMITTEE DURING 1979. THE MARINE CORPS RECENTLY ADVISED DIA THAT THE PRESENT STATUS OF GARWOOD'S COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS WERE SUCH THAT THEY HAD NO FURTHER RESERVATIONS IN REGARD TO AN INTERVIEW WITH GARWOOD. A LETTER HAS BEEN SENT FROM DIA TO GARWOOD'S COUNSEL REQUESTING HIS COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING A GARWOOD INTERVIEW DEDICATED TO THE HUMANITARIAN ISSUE OF RESOLVING THE FATE OF THOSE AMERICANS STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

PW/MIA ISSUE. DURING PREVIOUS TESTIMONY BEFORE THIS SUBCOMMITTEE. DIA PEPORTED THAT IT HAD JUDGED AS VALID A FORMER VIETRAMESE MONTHEIAN'S INFORMATION THAT THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT HAS IN ITS POSSESSION THE REMAINS OF SOME 400 U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL LOST AS A RESULT OF HOSTILITIES IN INDOCHINA. THE FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THIS SUBCOMMITTEE CONFRONTED THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WITH THIS INFORMATION IN HANOI. VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS DENIED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THESE REMAINS. IN OUR TESTIMONY IN JUNE OF THIS YEAR IT WAS NOTED THAT THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HAD RECENTLY ANNOUNCED THEY WOULD PROVIDE THE REMAINS OF THREE ADDITIONAL MISSING AMERICANS. IT WAS ALSO NOTED THAT THE RETURN OF THESE REMAINS WERE WELCOMED. AND IN A LARGER SENSE. IT WAS A CYNICAL REFLECTION ON THEIR INTRANSIGENCE ON THIS ISSUE. THESE REMAINS HAVE SINCE BEEN RETURNED AND IDENTIFIED AS BEING THREE INDIVIDUALS WHO HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF OUR NEGOTIATION FOLDER EFFORTS. IN PARTICULAR, THESE CASES WERE THREE OF FOUR INCLUDED IN MEETINGS WITH THE VIETNAMESE JUST PRIOR TO AND AT THE TIME OF THE VIETNAMESE ANNOUNCEMENT. THE EVENT OF A SIMULTANEOUS RETURN OF THESE THREE INDIVIDUALS CONSIDERING THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THEIR LOSS. VARIED YEARS OF LOSS. AND CONFIRMED KNOWLEDGE FOLLOWING THEIR LOSS. CLEARLY SIGNALS THAT THE VIETNAMESE DID NOT JUST RECOVER THESE INDIVIDUALS ON THE BASIS OF DETAILED INFORMATION PROVIDED IN OUR NEGOTIATION FOLDERS. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE VIETNAMESE ARE WITHHOLDING INFORMATION. ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN OCCASIONAL SMALL GAINS. THE OVERALL ISSUE OF AN ACCOUNTING REMAINS VIRTUALLY UNACCOMPLISHED. RECENT PROPOSALS TO THE VIETNAMESE FOR A CONTINUATION OF THE PW/MIA MEETINGS IN HANOI THIS PAST FALL AND A RECIPROCAL PW/MIA VISIT TO HAWAII. WERE DEFERRED BY THE VIETNAMESE. A VERY RECENT PROPOSAL FOR A STATE AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENT SPECIAL PW/MIA MISSION TO VISIT VIENTIANE WAS ALSO TURNED DOWN BY THE LAOTIANS. WE ARE STILL AWAITING THE

THE COURTERAST ASSIAN COMMUNICATION CONTINUES TO BE .

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11 July 15 1 . 11. 1 4 1677 WE STAIL (160 CL.

HAMOI. THE VIETNAMESE AND LAO REACTION TO THESE PROPOSALS IS TYPICAL OF THEIR ATTITUDE OVER THE YEARS. THEREIN LIES THE ROADSLOCK TO ACHIEVING AN ACCOUNTING FOR OUR MISSING.

THE EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR DIA'S EFFORTS AS PREVIOUSLY STATED BY THE TAKE FORCE AND THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS HAVE BEEN MOST ASSURING AND THAT SUPPORT WILL BE CALLED UPON SHOULD THE OCCASION ARISE. AT PRESENT IT IS FELT THAT ACTIONS OF THE TASK FORCE AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE, COUPLED WITH THOSE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA THROUGH ALL AVAILABLE DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS IS OUR BEST COURSE OF ACTION TO ACHIEVE ADDITIONAL ACCOUNTING OF OUR MISSING MEN. FURTHER RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE RESTS WITH THE INFORMATION HELD BY THOSE GOVERNMENTS AND NOT IN THE INFORMATION HELD BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. IN SPITE OF THE INTRANSIGENCE OF THESE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS ON THIS ISSUE, IT IS DIA'S INTENT AND DUTY TO COLLECT AND ANALYZE ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION AND FOR AS LONG AS NECESSARY.

DIA HAS PLACED THE HIGHEST PRIORITY ON INFORMATION RELATING TO AMERICANS WHO MIGHT STILL BE ALIVE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE A DEDICATED AND PROFESSIONAL EFFORT TOWARD A SUCCESSFUL ACCOUNTING FOR AMERICANS MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I WANT YOU TO KNOW DIA'S RESOLVE IS UNWAVERING. LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAMS, MYSELF, RADM PAULSON AND HIS STAFF WILL CONTINUE TO COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH YOUR TASK FORCE.

|    |    | <u>America</u>                                          | an POWS and                |           |            |            | <br>  |
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## 4 December 1981

| MEMORANDUM | FOR: | Deputy | Director | of | Central | Intelligence |
|------------|------|--------|----------|----|---------|--------------|
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FROM:

Chief, Interdepartmental Affairs Staff, OPP

SUBJECT:

House Task Force Hearing on American POW/MIAs in

Southeast Asia (U)

- 1. Attached is the material that has been provided by IC Staff and DDO for your Tuesday appearance before the House Task Force on American POW/MIAs in Southeast Asia. You are scheduled to appear at 1030 in closed session. Admiral Burkhalter will speak for DIA and will be accompanied by Admiral Paulson. (C)
- 2. Per your request, I asked John Koehler to provide a rundown of IC collection levied against the problem as well as an evaluation of our efforts. The bottom line appears to be that we have adequate tasking, but little success in collecting hard data. Leaks and insufficient cooperation from Vietnam and Laos are also obstacles. (S)
- 3. DDO provided additional data on HUMINT efforts as well as an accounting of resources devoted to FOIA requests on the subject. You may find the latter of particular interest. (S)
- 4. Please note that we do not have the latest version of Admiral Burkhalter's presentation. Koehler's people do not believe that it will change significantly, however. (C)

| 5. | Please | let | me | know | if | there | is | anything | else | we | can | provide you. | (U) |
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Attachment

cc: DCI (w/Talking Points)
D/OPP (w/Talking Points)
C/EAS/OPP (w/Talking Points)

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| APPROVED FOR  |
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| RELEASE DATE: |
| 2-Dec-2013    |

4 December 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

: John E. Koehler

Director, Intelligence Community Staff

SUBJECT

: American POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia (U)

Per your request the attached data relative to the above subject in support of your testimony before the House Task Force on American POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia on 8 December 1981 is provided for your information. The package consists of individual inputs from the Imagery, SIGINT and HUMINT Offices plus a compilation of talking points for your use. Also provided is a working draft of the DIA prepared testimony statement which will be presented by RADM Burkhalter. Please let me know if we can be of any further assistance in this matter.

|            |   |     |   | John I | E. Koehler |  |
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 2-Dec-2013

|   | SUBJECT: | American | PUWS | and | MIAS | 111                                     | Southeast | AS     |
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 2-Dec-2013

4 December 1981

|                                     | MEMORANDUM FOR:                                                                                                                                                            | Brigadier General Cli<br>Deputy Director, Inte                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                                                                                                                                                               |                                                                          |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                     | FROM :                                                                                                                                                                     | Director, Office of I                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | magery Collection                                                                                                                                                           | and Exploitation                                                                                                                                                                              |                                                                          |
|                                     | SUBJECT :                                                                                                                                                                  | American POWs and MIA                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | s in Southeast As                                                                                                                                                           | ia ·                                                                                                                                                                                          |                                                                          |
|                                     |                                                                                                                                                                            | llowing is provided in :<br>Force on American POWs                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                                                                                                                                                               |                                                                          |
|                                     | IMAGERY:                                                                                                                                                                   | •                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                             | , ,                                                                                                                                                                                           | ·<br>                                                                    |
|                                     | DIA is also res Director, will are generated i imagery require depending on th employed whenev camp. Surveill suspected to ho this problem. readout of any report on a sus | C, is the senior DIA of ponding to the House represent DIA testimony. In an effort to confirm/ments can be categorized specifics of the informance coverage is used to use POWs/MIAs. DIA per NPIC does not do detail significant finds relativect POW detention faci | quest and Admiral For the most part negate reports fro d as either area s rmation available ly a general locat o monitor known forms ed exploitation, t ive to this subject | Burkhalter, Deput, imagery required the HUMINT sources. Search or surveilled to the Area search is tion of a possible acilities that are not would provide to (See DIA images 3.) OIA support | y<br>ments<br>These<br>ance<br>POW<br>against<br>initial<br>ery<br>s any |
|                                     | For example, in six facilities special area se                                                                                                                             | ically, this 1981 only about nine rare presently active foarch requirements curres have standing                                                                                                                                                                      | equirements have b<br>r<br>ntly identified fo                                                                                                                               | There are no                                                                                                                                                                                  | d only<br>hough                                                          |
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| Attachments:                                                                   |                 |
| 1 - Recent Collection Reqmts. and Coverage                                     | Accomplishments |
| 2 - of Vietnam and Laos<br>3 - DIA Imagery Report                              |                 |
| 4 - OSC Input<br>5 - OHC Input                                                 |                 |
| 6 - DDO Input                                                                  |                 |
| <ul><li>7 - DIA Draft Testimony Statement</li><li>8 - Talking Points</li></ul> |                 |
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Warning Notice
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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| C           | Imagery Evaluation                             |
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| F           | DDO Response to Congressman Dornan's Questions |
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| I           | DDO FOIA Data                                  |
| J           | DDO Cable on Soldier of Fortune in Laos        |
|             |                                                |

4 December 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

: John E. Koehler

Director, Intelligence Community Staff

**SUBJECT** 

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John E. Koehler

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## 4 December 1981

| MEMORANDUM                                                                 |                                                                       | Brigadier<br>Deputy Di                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | irector, I                                                            | nteliige                                                 | ince comm                                | unicy scar                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | •                                                                     |                                                     |                                  |
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| FROM                                                                       | :                                                                     | Director,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | , Office o                                                            | T Imager                                                 | y Collec                                 | tion and E                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | Exploit                                                               | ation                                               |                                  |
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ATTACHMENT 2

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ATTACHMENT 3

IMAGERY ANALYSIS NOTES

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 2-Dec-2013

| Attachment 4 to |  |
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
| ME  | MORANDUM FOR:  Director, Office of Imagery Collection & Exploitation                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| FR. | OM: Director, Office of SIGINT Collection                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| Su  | BJECT: POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| RE  | FERENCE: DD/ICS Note, Same Subject dated 27 Nov 1981                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| is  | <ul> <li>In response to the above reference the following information provided.</li> <li>a. SIGINT collection requirements levied against the POW/MIA</li> </ul>                                                                                                              |
|     | Currently there are three active requirements in the National SIGINT Requirements List (NSRL) which request information on POW/MIAs in Southeast Asia.                                                                                                                        |
|     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
|     | b. Evaluation of SIGINT Efforts.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
|     | The following evaluation of the results of NSA's SIGINT efforts to date was provided by Chief, B5 NSA. B5 is the focal point in NSA for all actions connected with the Southeast Asia POW/MIA issue.                                                                          |
|     | (1) To date there has been no SIGINT information either substantiating or refuting the existence of unaccounted for U.S. POW/MIAs in Southeast Asia. NSA, however, continues to task available collection resources against NSRL requirements concerning POW/MIA information. |
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
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
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
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











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


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SUBJECT: HUMINT Collection on the POW/MIA Problem in Southeast Asia

Distribution:

Orig. - Addressee

1 - IC Registry

1 - D/OHC Chrono

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 2-Dec-2013

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Attachment 7 to

Statement of



RADM E.A. Burkhalter, Jr., USN

----Deputy-Director-----

Defense Intelligence Agency

on

Prisoners of War and Missing in Action

Before the

Task Force on American Prisoners

and Missing in Southeast Asia

House Subcommittee

on

Asian and Pacific Affairs

December 8, 1981

DRAFI

CONFIDENTIAL

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 2-Dec-2013 . James our rated Hiller rate Elements:

THE TO PRIOR COMMITMENTS WHICH HAVE TAKEN HIM OUT OF TOWN, THE DIRECTOR OF THE LIFERITE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, LIFUTENANT GENERAL JAMES WILLIAMS, HAS ASKED ME TO PAPEAR BEFORE THE TASK FORCE TODAY AND REPRESENT THE AGENCY ON THE SUBJECT OF DAYS INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS TO DETERMINE THE FATE OF AMERICANS STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

I APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO YOUR INVITATION AND COME BEFORE YOU ON THIS MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE. THE TASK FORCE'S VIGOROUS EFFORTS DIRECTED TOWARD DETERMINING THE FATE OF THOSE AMERICANS LISTED AS PRISONER OF WAR OR MISSING IN ACTION AND WHO STILL REMAIN UNACCOUNTED FOR IS WELL RECOGNIZED BY DIA. I ALSO KNOW THAT THE TASK FORCE IS WELL AWARE OF DIA'S ROLE AND CONTRIBUTIONS.

IN THAT REGARD, I DO WANT TO REAFFIRM DIA'S FULL COOPERATION WITH YOU IN THIS MATTER. I WOULD ALSO EMPHASIZE RIGHT FROM THE START THAT THE CRITICAL NEED FOR CONTINUED INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS IS RECOGNIZED AND I ASSURE YOU THAT DIA WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT NEEDED FOR AS LONG AS AMERICANS REMAIN UNACCOUNTED FOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. RADM JERRY PAULSON, WITH WHOM YOU ARE FAMILIAR, IS THE ASSISTANT VICE DIRECTOR FOR COLLECTION MANAGEMENT AND HEADS OUR PW/MIA STAFF.

LIKE MOST MILITARY MEN, MY PERSONAL ASSOCIATION WITH MEN WHO ARE NOW AMONG THE MISSING HAS KEPT ME CLOSE TO THE ISSUE FOR MANY YEARS. AS PART OF DIA'S COMMAND ELEMENT I FOLLOW THIS AGENCY'S EVERY DAY EFFORTS ON THIS ISSUE THROUGH A DAILY REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR. I CAN SAY WITHOUT RESERVATION THAT DIA REMAINS DEDICATED IN ITS PURSUIT AND RESEARCH OF INFORMATION WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE DETERMINATION OF THE PRESENT FATE OF THESE MISSING AMERICANS.

ASSUREDLY, THE PW/MIA FUNCTION HAS AND WILL CONTINUE TO RECEIVE STRONG COMMAND ATTENTION WITHIN DIA.

I The a William the room officially a compared for the first

SITUATION SINCE DIA'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY OF SIX MONTHS AGO.

THERE ARE STILL 2,496 AMERICANS WHO WERE DETERMINED TO BE EITHER A PRISONER,

MISSING OR KILLED (BODY NOT RECOVERED) THAT REMAIN UNACCOUNTED FOR. WE LAVE

STRESSED IN THE PAST THAT DIA MAKES NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE TERMS OF AN

INDIVIDUAL STATUS. OUR GOAL IS TO RECOVER ANY AMERICAN - WHETHER LIVE OR

DEAD: OUR COLLECTION AND RESEARCH EFFORTS RELATIVE TO REPORTS OF AMERICANS IN

SOUTHEAST ASIA REFLECT OUR DEDICATION TO THAT END.

ADD. AND REGRETTABLY SO, THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE

UNDERSTANDABLY, THE REFUGEE REPORTING FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA CONTINUES TO BE OUR MAJOR SOURCE OF INFORMATION. SINCE THE COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF SOUTH VIETNAM IN 1975 WE HAVE ACQUIRED A TOTAL OF 1,303 REPORTS BEARING ON THE PW/MIA FIRST HAND PROBLEM. OF THE TOTAL REPORTING, 386ARE LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS. APPROXIMATELY 33 PERCENT OF THESE LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS HAVE BEEN EQUATED TO AMERICANS WHO HAVE SINCE BEEN ACCOUNTED FOR. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT USING A SLIGHTLY MORE LIBERAL 10 APPROACH, THAT AN ADDITIONAL PERCENT OF THE SIGHTING REPORTS WOULD EQUATE TO ACCOUNTED FOR AMERICANS. SOME OF THE REMAINING SIGHTING REPORTS ARE FABRICATIONS AND OTHERS ARE REPORTS FROM PERHAPS WELL INTENDED BUT MISGUIDED INDIVIDUALS. THERE ARE OTHER SIGHTING REPORTS WHICH WE HAVE EXTENSIVELY INVESTIGATED AND OTHERS, FOR WHICH OUR FOLLOW UP EFFORTS CONTINUE. DESPITE THE LARGE NUMBER OF SIGHTING REPORTS WHICH REMAIN UNRESOLVED AND OUR PERSISTENT EFFORTS, WE STILL CAN NOT PROVE THAT THERE ARE ANY AMERICANS BEING DETAINED

AS A CASE IN POINT, WE HAD HIGH HOPES FOR ONE OF OUR RECENT LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS. APPROXIMATELY 165 MANDAYS HAVE BEEN EXPENDED IN HOPEFUL PURSUIT OF THE TRUTHFULNESS OF THE SOURCE"S INFORMATION. THE INTERVIEWS, INVESTIGATIONS, POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS AND ANALYTICAL RESEARCH COVERED A PERIOD BACK TO 1954.

DRAFT.

AGAINST THEIR WILL.

THE THE THEOLOGY EVANDATION OF HE HOW SATISFIED THAT THE SOUR

AFTER THIS THOROUGH EXAMINATION ARE ME NOW SATISFIED THAT THIS SOURCE HAS BEEN FEMERATIVE AND UNTRUTHFUL.

THE THE PAST TWO YEARS DIA HAS TAMEN EVER INCREASING STEPS TO INTENSIFY ITS LEGATS AND CAPABILITIES CONCENSURATE WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE.

LIA'S PW/MIA STAFF IS CURRENTLY AT A MANNING LEVEL OF 15 PERSONNEL. THE STAFF HAS ADDED PERSONNEL WITH LANGUAGE CAPABILITIES IN VIETNAMESE AND CHINESE, AND WITH EXTENSIVE INVESTIGATIVE BACKGROUNDS. THE EXPERIENCE LEVEL OF THE STAFF

RELATIVE TO ANALYTICAL SKILLS AND SOUTHEAST ASIAN BACKGROUND INCLUDING

INCOUNTRY EXPERIENCE IS EXCEPTIONAL. ADDITIONALLY, WE ARE REGULARLY ASSISTED
IN OUR EFFORTS THROUGH THE DEFENSE ATTACHE SYSTEM, PHOTO INTERPRETERS,
LINGUISTS, INVESTIGATORY PERSONNEL, AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS ON A
WORLD WIDE BASIS. NO BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS ARE IMPOSED ON RESEARCH,
INTERVIEWS AND INVESTIGATIVE FOLLOW-UP ASSOCIATED WITH DIA'S PURSUIT OF PW/MIA
INFORMATION. ALTHOUGH TRAVEL ALLOCATIONS REMAIN AUSTERE FOR OTHER PURPOSES,
THIS SAME POLICY OF NO CONSTRAINTS APPLIES TO TRAVEL FUNDS ASSOCIATED WITH
DIA'S QUICK REACTION TEAM WHICH TRAVELS WITHIN CONUS AND OVERSEAS TO INTERVIEW
SOURCES OF POTENTIAL PW/MIA INFORMATION DEEMED ESSENTIAL TO OUR EFFORTS.
CUR WORKING RELATION AND SUPPORT FROM OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUE TO BE EXCELLENT. ESPECIALLY
NOTEWORTHY IS THE COOPERATION AND RESPONSIVENESS OF THE JOINT CASUALTY

RESOLUTION CENTER PERSONNEL TO OUR TASKING AND FOLLOW-UP REQUIREMENTS RELATIVE

TO REFUGEE INTERVIEWS. IN ORDER TO ENSURE A COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING EXISTS ON

WARIOUS ISSUES AND REQUIREMENTS, DIA RECENTLY BROUGHT THE JCRC BANGKOK LIAISON

SENIOR LEADERSHIP. ADDITIONALLY, THROUGH DIA INITIATION, THE STATE DEPARTMENT

OFFICER TO WASHINGTON FOR EXTENSIVE WORKING DISCUSSIONS AND MEETINGS WITH

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OSTAINED AUTHORIZATION FOR JCRC PERSONNEL TO CONDUCT PW/MIA INTERVIEWS WITH

DEBRIEFINGS HAS BEEN EXEMPLARY THROUGHOUT THE VARIOUS REFUGEE CAMPS IN DISTRIBASY ASIA. THEIR PROFESSIONALISM (MEATLY FACILITATES OF AMALYTICAL EFFORTS.

THE PROVIDE THE INTELLIGENCE UPON WHITH DECISIONMAKERS DEVILOR U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY. THE LEADERSHIP MITHIN THE DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENSE AND STATE MEMBERS OF THIS TASK FORCE AND OTHER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS HAVE BEEN UPDATED ON <del>OUR GURRENT INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS THROUSH INFORMAL CLOSED SESSION BRIEFINGS.</del> WHEN OUR RESEARCH HAS DEVELOPED INFORMATION TO A POINT THAT FURTHER PURSUIT WARRANTS ACTION BEYOND THE CAPABILITY OR CHARTER OF DIA THEN AT THAT POINT ACTION IS TRANSFERRED TO THE APPROPRIATE ORGANIZATION OR AGENCY. ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION DEVELOPED IN THIS MANNER WOULD BE PROVIDED TO DIA FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS AND DISSEMINATION. I THINK IT WORTHWHILE AT THIS POINT TO NOTE AGAIN THAT ALTHOUGH THIS IS A HUMANITARIAN ISSUE, SOME OF THE INFORMATION MUST BE CLASSIFIED AND REMAIN SO IF OUR EFFORTS ARE TO BE EFFECTIVE AND ALSO TO PRECLUDE HARM TO ANY AMERICANS WHO MIGHT STILL BE HELD IN CAPTIVITY. SINCE PFC ROBERT GARWOOD, USMC, RETURNED FROM VIETNAM IN FEBRUARY 1979, DIA HAS WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE MARINE CORPS ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES CONCERNING HIS CASE. ALTHOUGH RESTRAINED FROM DEBRIEFING GARWOOD DUE TO HIS COURT MARTIAL, DIA DID HAVE ACCESS TO PW/MIA INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED BY THE MARINE CORPS, AND BY THE FORMER CHAIRMAN AND A PRESENT MEMBER OF THIS SUBCOMMITTEE DURING 1979. THE MARINE CORPS RECENTLY ADVISED DIA THAT THE PRESENT STATUS OF GARWOOD'S COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS WERE SUCH THAT THEY HAD NO FURTHER RESERVATIONS IN REGARD TO AN INTERVIEW WITH GARWOOD. A LETTER HAS BEEN SENT FROM DIA TO GARWOOD'S COUNSEL REQUESTING HIS COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING A GARWOOD INTERVIEW DEDICATED TO THE HUMANITARIAN ISSUE OF RESOLVING THE FATE OF THOSE AMERICANS STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

FORMIA ISSUE. DURING PREVIOUS TESTIMONY BEFORE THIS SUBCOMMITTEE, DIA CONTROL THAT IT HAD JUDGED AS VALID A FORMER VIETNAMESE MATAMANA. INTORMATION THAT THE VIETNAMESE COVERNMENT HAS IN ITS POSSESSION THE REMAINS SOME 400 U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL LOST AS A RESULT OF RECTLITTES IN INDOCHINA. THE FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THIS SUBCOMMITTEE CONFRONTED THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WITH THIS INFORMATION IN HANOI. VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS DENIED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THESE REMAINS. — IN-OUR TESTIMONY IN JUNE OF THIS YEAR IT WAS..... NOTED THAT THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HAD RECENTLY ANNOUNCED THEY WOULD PROVIDE THE REMAINS OF THREE ADDITIONAL MISSING AMERICANS. IT WAS ALSO NOTED THAT THE RETURN OF THESE REMAINS WERE WELCOMED, AND IN A LARGER SENSE, IT WAS A CYNICAL REFLECTION ON THEIR INTRANSIGENCE ON THIS ISSUE. THESE REMAINS HAVE SINCE BEEN RETURNED AND IDENTIFIED AS BEING THREE INDIVIDUALS WHO HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF OUR NEGOTIATION FOLDER EFFORTS. IN PARTICULAR, THESE CASES WERE THREE OF FOUR INCLUDED IN MEETINGS WITH THE VIETNAMESE JUST PRIOR TO AND AT THE TIME OF THE VIETNAMESE ANNOUNCEMENT. THE EVENT OF A SIMULTANEOUS RETURN OF THESE THREE INDIVIDUALS CONSIDERING THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THEIR LOSS, VARIED YEARS OF LOSS, AND CONFIRMED KNOWLEDGE FOLLOWING THEIR LOSS, CLEARLY SIGNALS THAT THE VIETNAMESE DID NOT JUST RECOVER THESE INDIVIDUALS ON THE BASIS OF DETAILED INFORMATION PROVIDED IN OUR NEGOTIATION FOLDERS. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE VIETNAMESE ARE WITHHOLDING INFORMATION. ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN OCCASIONAL SMALL GAINS, THE OVERALL ISSUE OF AN ACCOUNTING REMAINS VIRTUALLY UNACCOMPLISHED. RECENT PROPOSALS TO THE VIETNAMESE FOR A CONTINUATION OF THE PW/MIA MEETINGS IN HANOI THIS PAST FALL AND A RECIPROCAL PW/MIA VISIT TO HAWAII, WERE DEFERRED BY THE VIETNAMESE. A VERY RECENT PROPOSAL FOR A STATE AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENT SPECIAL PW/MIA MISSION TO VISIT VIENTIANE WAS ALSO TURNED DOWN BY THE LAOTIANS. WE ARE STILL AWAITING THE

FOR AS LONG AS NECESSARY.

THE VIETNAMESE AND LAO REACTION TO THESE PROPOSALS IS TYPICAL OF THEIR FOR AND LOVER THE YEARS. THEREIN LIES THE ROADBLOCK TO ACHIEVING AN ACTUALITIES FOR OUR MISSING.

I DIPPESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR DIA'S EFFORTS AS PREVIOUSLY STATED BY THE TAIN

ASSURING AND THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS HAVE BEEN MOST
ASSURING AND THAT SUPPORT WILL BE CALLED UPON SHOULD THE OCCASION ARISE. AT
PRESENT IT IS FELT THAT ACTIONS OF THE TASK FORCE AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE,
COUPLED WITH THOSE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE
COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA THROUGH ALL AVAILABLE DIPLOMATIC
CHANNELS IS OUR BEST COURSE OF ACTION TO ACHIEVE ADDITIONAL ACCOUNTING OF OUR
MISSING MEN. FURTHER RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE RESTS WITH THE INFORMATION HELD
BY THOSE GOVERNMENTS AND NOT IN THE INFORMATION HELD BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.
IN SPITE OF THE INTRANSIGENCE OF THESE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS ON THIS ISSUE, IT
IS DIA'S INTENT AND DUTY TO COLLECT AND ANALYZE ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION AND

DIA HAS PLACED THE HIGHEST PRIORITY ON INFORMATION RELATING TO AMERICANS WHO
MIGHT STILL BE ALIVE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE A

DEDICATED AND PROFESSIONAL EFFORT TOWARD A SUCCESSFUL ACCOUNTING FOR AMERICANS
MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I WANT YOU TO KNOW DIA'S RESOLVE IS UNWAVERING. LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAMS, MYSELF, RADM PAULSON AND HIS STAFF WILL CONTINUE TO COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH YOUR TASK FORCE.

TOP SECRET

Attachment 8

## American POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia

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DELKET

OGC 81-10414

8 December 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

Deputy General Counsel

SUBJECT: MIAs APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 2-Dec-2013



EAS 81-2212/2

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

Director, External Affairs

SUBJECT:

Briefing of the House Task Force on POW/NIAs, 8 December 1981

1. Chairman Robert K. Dornan's (R., CA) staff called the close of business yesterday to ask whether Ann Mills Griffith, leader of the POW families' organization could sit in on your briefing today. We reminded them that you had agreed to appear on the condition that it would be a closed briefing. This would mean that only Members and cleared staff would be present. The staffer said she would inform Mrs. Griffith. The question about her sitting in could come up again. DIA has no objection to her presence.

2. The following Members of the Task Force have indicated they will attend this morning's briefing: Chairman Dornan and Representatives Stephen Solarz (D., NY); Daniel Mica (D., FL); Tom Lantos (D., CA); Benjamin Gilman (R., NY); Robert Lagomarsino (R., CA); and John LeBoutillier (R., NY). Pepresentatives Henson Moore (R., LA); C. W. Bill Young (R., FL); William Hendon (R., NC); and Bob Stump (D., AZ) have been invited and will be present also.

Distribution:

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LLB:RJK:mm (8 December 1981)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 2-Dec-2013