


0993

MEMORANDUM

6



TO : Assistant for Personnel via MGDR  
FROM : Director of Personnel via President   
SUBJECT : Applicants

DATE: 26 January 1968

REF. No. PND-DP-68/413

REC'D WAS JAN 31 1968

The Vice President-Traffic and Sales advises he has no current interest in the following applicants due no vacancies:

[Redacted]

WH-68-0402  
RE

17 January 1968

[Redacted]

WH-68-0389  
RE  
RE

16 January 1968

[Redacted]

WH-68-0388

16 January 1968

WEISSENBACK, Edward J.

WH-68-0404

17 January 1968

We have placed their correspondence in our Active Files.

[Redacted]

FA:dlj  
cc: R/File  
P/File  
File

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

## MEMORANDUM

TO : CAED

DATE: 25 January 1968

FROM : DTD

REF. No. DTD-230/68/203

SUBJECT : AFS Candidates - E. J. Weissenback, [REDACTED]

Reference: Memorandum WH-68-0404, Subject: Air Freight Specialist Candidates dated 17 January 1968

Subject applications have been reviewed.

Neither [REDACTED] nor [REDACTED] meet the basic requirements for Air Freight Specialists as set forth by this Division. It is recommended that their applications be placed in your inactive file.

However, Mr. Weissenback does possess the necessary training and experience to qualify him for a position as an Air Freight Specialist and it is recommended that his application be retained in your active file.

Their Personal Review records are returned herewith.

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

Encl. a/s

cc: File - S/C

AKR/SJH/ll

RECEIVED

25 JAN 1968

PERSONNEL DIVISION



MEMORANDUM

TO: *[Handwritten initials]*  
DP (via Pres)

DATE: 17 January 1968

FROM: *[Handwritten initials]*  
Assistant for Personnel (via MGDR)

REF. NO.: WH-68-0404

SUBJECT: Air Freight Specialist Candidates

Attached for your review are the applications submitted by the following AFS candidates:

○ WEISSENBACK, Edward James

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

*WB*  
HHD:WHB:acs

Attachments

cc: VPT&S (via MGDR, Pres) with copies of applications

APPROVED  
FOR  
RELEASE  
DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

RECEIVED  
22 JAN 1968  
PERSONNEL DIVISION  
TAIPEI

REF-1

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

PERSONAL DATA	1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME <b>WEISSERACK, EDWARD JAMES</b>		2. SERVICE NUMBER <b>ME 51 551 1921</b>		3. GRADE, RATE OR RANK <b>SPL E-4 (GT)</b>		4. DATE OF RANK (Day, Month, Year) <b>24 SEP 66</b>					
	5. DEPARTMENT, COMPONENT AND BRANCH OR CLASS <b>ARMY AVS HQASRD</b>		6. PLACE OF BIRTH (City and State or Country) <b>RICHMOND HILL, NEW YORK</b>		7. DATE OF BIRTH <b>7 SEP 42</b>							
TRANSFER OR DISCHARGE DATA	8. TYPE OF TRANSFER OR DISCHARGE <b>TRFD TO USAR SEE ITEM # 18</b>		9. STATION OR INSTALLATION AT WHICH EFFECTED <b>US ARMY PERSONNEL CENTER OAKLAND CALIF.</b>									
	10. REASON AND AUTHORITY <b>CHAP 5 SEC VIII AR 635-200 SER 411 O/S RETIRE (RAD)</b>		11. EFFECTIVE DATE <b>19 OCT 66</b>		12. LAST DUTY ASSIGNMENT AND TAVOR COMMAND <b>SUP GO APO SF 96490 USARV 1ST CAV DIV</b>		13. CHARACTER OF SERVICE <b>HONORABLE</b>		14. TYPE OF CERTIFICATE <b>NONE</b>			
SELECTIVE SERVICE DATA	15. SELECTIVE SERVICE NUMBER <b>50 62 42 555</b>		16. SELECTIVE SERVICE LOCAL BOARD NUMBER, CITY, COUNTY AND STATE <b>LB # 62 JAMAICA, NEW YORK</b>				17. DATE INDUCTED <b>15 JAN 65</b>					
	18. DISTRICT OR AREA COMMAND TO WHICH RESERVIST TRANSFERRED <b>USAR CONTROL GROUP / ANNUAL / US ARMY ADMIN CENTER, ST LOUIS, MO.</b>											
SERVICE DATA	19. TERMINAL DATE OF RESERVE OBLIGATION <b>12 JAN 71</b>		20. CURRENT ACTIVE SERVICE OTHER THAN BY INDUCTION (SOURCE OF ENTRY) <input type="checkbox"/> ENLISTED (Army Enlistment) <input type="checkbox"/> ENLISTED (Army Draft) <input type="checkbox"/> RECALLED <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER <b>NA</b>			21. TERM OF SERVICE (ACT) <b>NA</b>		22. DATE OF ENTRY <b>NA</b>				
	23. PRIOR REGULAR ENLISTMENTS <b>NONE</b>		24. GRADE, RATE OR RANK AT TIME OF ENTRY INTO CURRENT ACTIVE SERVICE <b>Pvt E 1 (P)</b>		25. PLACE OF ENTRY INTO CURRENT ACTIVE SERVICE (City and State) <b>NEW YORK, NEW YORK</b>							
	26. HOME OF RECORD AT TIME OF ENTRY INTO ACTIVE SERVICE (Street, RFD, City, County and State) <b>RICHMOND HILL (JAMAICA) NEW YORK 11419</b>		27. STATEMENT OF SERVICE		YEARS		MONTHS		DAYS			
	28. SPECIALTY NUMBER AND TITLE <b>76M20 AMMO RECORDS CLERK</b>		29. RELATED CIVILIAN OCCUPATION AND D. O. I. NUMBER <b>NA</b>		30. CREDITABLE FOR BASIC PAY PURPOSES		31. NET SERVICE TIME PERIOD		32. OTHER SERVICE		33. TOTAL (Line 31 + line 32)	
	34. DECORATIONS, MEDALS, BADGES, COMMENDATIONS, CITATIONS AND CAMPAIGN RIBBONS AWARDED OR AUTHORIZED <b>NATIONAL DEFENSE SERVICE MEDAL VIETNAM SERVICE MEDAL VIETNAM CAMPAIGN MEDAL PARACHUTE BADGE VIETNAM PARACHUTE BADGE MARKSMAN (R) FILE M-14</b>		35. TOTAL ACTIVE SERVICE		36. FOREIGN AND/OR SEA USARPAC		37. TOTAL (Line 35 + line 36)		38. TOTAL (Line 33 + line 37)			
	39. WOUNDS RECEIVED AS A RESULT OF ACTION WITH ENEMY FORCES (Place and date if known) <b>NONE</b>		40. SERVICE SCHOOLS OR COLLEGES, COLLEGE, TRAINING, COURSES AND/OR POSTGRADUATE COURSES SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED		41. OTHER SERVICE TRAINING COURSES SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED		42. MONTHS		43. DAYS			
	44. SCHOOL OR COURSE <b>USAOCBS</b>		45. DATES (From-To) <b>7 WEEKS 1965</b>		46. COURSE <b>AMMO RECORDS</b>		47. MONTHS		48. DAYS		49. NONE	
VA DATA	50. GOVERNMENT LIFE INSURANCE IN FORCE <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO		51. AMOUNT OF ALIQUOT <b>NA</b>		52. MONTH ALIQUOT REQUIRED <b>NA</b>		53. VA BENEFIT PREVIOUSLY APPLIED FOR (Specify type) <b>NONE</b>		54. VETERAN NUMBER <b>NA</b>			
	55. REWARDS <b>BLOOD GROUP - [REDACTED] SSAN - [REDACTED] LUMP SUM PAYMENT MADE FOR 46 DAYS ACCRUED LEAVE SGLI - \$10,000 ITEM 3A - REC E-3 (P) APTD: 15 SEP 65</b>											
AUTHENTICATION	56. PERMANENT ADDRESS FOR MAILING PURPOSES AFTER TRANSFER OR DISCHARGE (Street, RFD, City, County and State) <b>SEE ITEM # 23</b>				57. SIGNATURE OF PERSON BEING TRANSFERRED OR DISCHARGED <i>Edward James Weisserack</i>							
	58. GRADE, RATE AND TITLE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICER <b>1LT, AGC, ASST ADJ</b>				59. SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICER <i>[Signature]</i>							

DD FORM 214

AGE LIMIT OF 1 JUL 62 UNLESS

ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES REPORT ON TRANSFER OR DISCHARGE

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 09 Dec 2013

4-16

DATE 21 JUNE 68

FHT

EMPLOY: EDWARD J. WEISSENBACK ✓

RSE: 2140 ✓

POSITION: Air Freight Specialist ✓

SALARY: 652.00 G4 S3 D ✓

DEPART: Redmond  
~~Astoria~~, OREGON

DATE: July 17, 1968

*amp*

	YES	NO
CONDUCT CREDIT CHECK	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
NEEDS PASSPORT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(or) TRANSIT VISA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
PERMANENT VISA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

HOME PHONE

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

AIR AMERICA, INC.  
815 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N. W.  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

GEORGE A. DOOLE, JR  
MANAGING DIRECTOR

November 16, 1967

TELEPHONE 298-7843

CABLE ADDRESS  
AIRAMERICA

REC'D WAS NOV 24 1967 *WJB*



RE: MR. EDWARD J. WEISSENBACK.

Dear

We are considering the above named person for the position of Air Freight Specialist with our company. This person has given your name as a personal reference on his employment application form.

We would very much appreciate your filling in the information requested below, and forwarding it to the undersigned in the enclosed envelope. All information will be handled in a very confidential manner.

Cordially,



FOR Assistant for Personnel

HHD:tms

How long have you known the applicant?.....*7 YEARS*.....  
Have you had business contact with the applicant?.....*No*.....  
How would you rate his:

CHECK ONE

	Excellent	Good	Average	Below Average	Poor
1. Ability ( )	✓				
2. Resourcefulness	✓				
3. Production	✓				
4. Conduct		✓			
5. Relations with other people	✓				

Remarks: (Please use reverse side if additional space is required) *ED. WEISSENBACK*  
*...IS A CREDIT TO HIS COUNTRY, HIMSELF, AND FOR WHATEVER*  
*ORGANIZATION HE WORKS.*

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013



Signature and Title  
*ASS'T FORESTER*  
*N. J. DEPT. OF CONSERVATION*

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
11-Dec-2013

**AIR AMERICA, INC.**  
815 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N. W.  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

GEORGE A. DOOLE, JR  
MANAGING DIRECTOR

November 16, 1967

TELEPHONE 298-7843

CABLE ADDRESS  
AIRAMERICA

REC'D WAS NOV 24 1967 WMB

[Redacted]  
Archbishop Malloy High School  
Briarwood, New York

RE: MR. EDWARD J. WEISSENBACK.

Dear [Redacted]

We are considering the above named person for the position of Air Freight Specialist with our company. This person has given your name as a personal reference on his employment application form.

We would very much appreciate your filling in the information requested below, and forwarding it to the undersigned in the enclosed envelope. All information will be handled in a very confidential manner.

Cordially,

[Redacted Signature]

FOR Assistant for Personnel

HHD: tms

How long have you known the applicant? *... I met Ed. Edward for (3) years ...*  
Have you had business contact with the applicant? *... no ...*  
How would you rate his: *... close to ... (6) years*

CHECK ONE

	Excellent	Good	Average	Below Average	Poor
1. Ability ( )	✓				
2. Resourcefulness	✓				
3. Production	✓				
4. Conduct	✓				
5. Relations with other people	✓				

Remarks: (Please use reverse side if additional space is required) *... as very ... loyal person ... and no ... afraid to ... dirty his hands ...*

[Redacted Signature]

Signature and Title

(over)

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

**AIR AMERICA, INC.**

815 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N. W.  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

November 16, 1967

TELEPHONE 298-7843

GEORGE A. DOOLE, JR  
MANAGING DIRECTOR

CABLE ADDRESS  
AIRAMERICA

REC'D WAS NOV 24 1967 WIA

[Redacted]

RE: MR EDWARD J. WEISSENBACK

Dear [Redacted]

We are considering the above named person for the position of Air Freight Specialist with our company. This person has given your name as a personal reference on his employment application form.

We would very much appreciate your filling in the information requested below, and forwarding it to the undersigned in the enclosed envelope. All information will be handled in a very confidential manner.

Cordially,

[Redacted]

FOR

[Redacted]

Assistant for Personnel

HHD: tms

How long have you known the applicant?... 2 years .....

Have you had business contact with the applicant?... No .....

How would you rate his:

CHECK ONE

1. Ability ( )

2. Resourcefulness

3. Production

4. Conduct

5. Relations with other people

	Excellent	Good	Average	Below Average	Poor
1. Ability ( )	✓				
2. Resourcefulness	✓				
3. Production	✓				
4. Conduct	✓				
5. Relations with other people	✓				

Remarks: (Please use reverse side if additional space is required).....  
.....

[Redacted Signature Box]

Signature and Title

*Handwritten Signature*

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

AIR AMERICA, INC.  
815 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N. W.  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

REC'D WAS DEC 11 1967  
WAB

GEORGE A. DOOLE, JR  
MANAGING DIRECTOR

November 16, 1967

TELEPHONE 298-7843

CABLE ADDRESS  
AIRAMERICA

[Redacted]

RE: MR. EDWARD J. WEISSENBACK

Dear [Redacted]

We are considering the above named person for the position of Air Freight Specialist with our company. This person has given your name as a personal reference on his employment application form.

We would very much appreciate your filling in the information requested below, and forwarding it to the undersigned in the enclosed envelope. All information will be handled in a very confidential manner.

Cordially,

[Redacted Signature]

EOR [Redacted]  
Assistant for Personnel

HHD:tms

How long have you known the applicant? *Intermittently since 1964*  
Have you had business contact with the applicant?  
How would you rate his:

CHECK ONE

	Excellent	Good	Average	Below Average	Poor
1. Ability ( )	✓	to ✓			
2. Resourcefulness	✓	to ✓			
3. Production	✓	to ✓			
4. Conduct		✓			
5. Relations with other people	✓	to ✓			

Remarks: (Please use reverse side if additional space is required).....

[Redacted Signature]

Signature and Title

*Supervisory Inspector*

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

□----- (b)(6)

**AIR AMERICA, INC.**  
815 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N. W.  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

**GEORGE A. DOOLE, JR**  
MANAGING DIRECTOR

November 16, 1967

TELEPHONE 298-7843

CABLE ADDRESS  
AIRAMERICA

[Redacted]  
Cardinal Hayes High School *2nd floor*  
New York, New York

RE: . MR.. EDWARD J.. WEISSENBACK

Dear [Redacted]

We are considering the above named person for the position of Air Freight Specialist with our company. This person has given your name as a personal reference on his employment application form.

We would very much appreciate your filling in the information requested below, and forwarding it to the undersigned in the enclosed envelope. All information will be handled in a very confidential manner.

Cordially,

[Redacted Signature]  
[Redacted Name]  
FOR Assistant for Personnel

HHD: tms

How long have you known the applicant?.....  
Have you had business contact with the applicant?.....  
How would you rate his:

CHECK ONE

	Excellent	Good	Average	Below Average	Poor
1. Ability ( )					
2. Resourcefulness					
3. Production					
4. Conduct					
5. Relations with other people					

Remarks: (Please use reverse side if additional space is required).....  
.....

.....  
Signature and Title



APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

*Meissenback* (b)(6)

# REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: SEE ATTACHMENT DEPT. RPA No. VPOCANAS-74-009  
(IN ENGLISH) (IN CHINESE)  
EMPLOYEE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ PND REF. No. PND-WA-  
EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED 1 October 1974  
(FOR SEPARATION, EFFECTIVE DATE IS LAST WORKING DAY "COB".)  
ACTUAL EFFECTIVE DATE 1 October 1974  
(TO BE FILLED BY PERSONNEL DIVISION)

PROPOSED ACTION:  NEW APPOINTMENT  CHANGE IN POSITION/SALARY  SEPARATION  (OTHER) Administrative transfer

	PRESENT STATUS.	PROPOSED STATUS
TITLE & ACCOUNTING CODE NO.	The purpose of this RPA is to administratively transfer	
SALARY - GRADE, STEP & PAY STANDARD	American missing employees, shown on the attached list,	
EMPLOYMENT STATUS - PERMANENT, TEMPORARY OR FIXED TERM	from an unassigned status BKK to an unassigned status WAS,	
DEPARTMENT/DIVISION/OFFICE	Pay records, leave and travel records are to be retained	
LOCATION	in Hong Kong by MAAL HKG.	
*CLASSIFICATION - STAFF EMPLOYEE OR WORKER		
POSITION NUMBER		
REMARKS		

\* AS STIPULATED UNDER JOB CLASSIFICATIONS IN PERSONNEL MANUAL.

BASIS FOR RECOMMENDATION: (1) FOR SEPARATION, INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT REPLACEMENT IS REQUIRED.  
(2) FOR PROMOTIONS AND SALARY INCREASES, COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING: (REQUEST ASSISTANCE FROM PND FOR DATA IF NECESSARY).

DATE OF EMPLOYMENT:	ORIGINAL TITLE:	ORIGINAL GRADE & STEP:
RECORD OF LAST 6 SALARY INCREASES: DATE:	PERCENTAGE INCREASE: (1) _____ (2) _____ (3) _____ (4) _____ (5) _____ (6) _____	
DATE OF CHANGE TO PRESENT TITLE:	PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF THIS INCREASE:	

(USE REVERSE SIDE IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED)

REQUESTED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
(DEPARTMENT HEAD) (DIVISION DIRECTOR OR OFFICER)

CONCURRED BY: STATION/AREA MANAGER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
BASE MANAGER/REGIONAL DIRECTOR \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

\*\*HEAD OF DEPARTMENT DIVISION OR OFFICE \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
OFFICER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

APPROVED BY: OFFICER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE 22 October 1974  
PRESIDENT \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

DIRA ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ \_\_\_\_\_ DATE 22 October 1974

(\*\*CONCURRENCE IS REQUIRED FOR INTER DEPARTMENTAL OR DIVISIONAL TRANSFERS ONLY.)

DISTRIBUTION BY PERSONNEL DIVISION AFTER FINAL APPROVAL:  
COPY 1: FOR PERSONNEL DIVISION. COPY 4: TO \_\_\_\_\_ VIA \_\_\_\_\_ FOR INFORMATION.  
COPY 2: FOR PAYROLL ACTION. (ORIGINATOR OF RPA) VIA \_\_\_\_\_ FOR NOTIFICATION OF APPROVAL.  
COPY 3: TO DDPD HKG

(FOR PERSONNEL DIVISION USE ONLY)

POSITION AUTHORIZED:	
POSITION NO.:	P/S:
EMPLOYMENT STATUS:	SLOT NO.:
PROPOSED SALARY:	<input type="checkbox"/> IN ORDER
REMARKS:	<input type="checkbox"/> SUBJECT TO DP'S CONCURRENCE

SICK LEAVE RECORD SINCE:										
TOTAL NUMBER OF DAYS TAKEN:										
FREQUENCY: CHECKED BY:										
ROUTING ORDER	R/S	E/S	W/A	P/V	CPL	CAEA	CEC	ADP	DP	P/F
INITIALS										
DATE										

006116804  
 APPROVED FOR  
 RELEASE DATE:  
 09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

# REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: E.J. Weissenback D. C. RPA No. DTD-RPA-016/H70  
 (IN ENGLISH) (IN CHINESE) **SEP 26 1970**  
 EMPLOYEE NO. 19337 PND REF. No. PND-WA-879-10-116/51  
 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED \_\_\_\_\_  
 (FOR SEPARATION, EFFECTIVE DATE IS LAST WORKING DAY)  
 ACTUAL EFFECTIVE DATE (1) 15 Sep. 1970 **SEP 25 1970**  
 (TO BE FILLED BY PERSONNEL DIVISION)

PROPOSED ACTION:  (1) NEW APPOINTMENT  CHANGE IN POSITION/SALARY  SEPARATION  (OTHER) (2) Arrived dat

	PRESENT STATUS	PROPOSED STATUS
TITLE & ACCOUNTING CODE NO.	Applicant	Air Freight Specialist
SALARY - GRADE, STEP & PAY STANDARD		FP/PS-D (NCC) Code X
EMPLOYMENT STATUS - PERMANENT, TEMPORARY OR FIXED TERM		Permanent
DEPARTMENT/DIVISION/OFFICE		Traffic
LOCATION		Vientiane
*CLASSIFICATION - STAFF EMPLOYEE OR WORKER	Approved Disapproved by Samuel H. Johnson DBY	Staff Employee
POSITION NUMBER		04900
REMARKS	5/8/70	

\* AS STIPULATED UNDER JOB CLASSIFICATIONS IN PERSONNEL MANUAL.

BASIS FOR RECOMMENDATION: (1) FOR SEPARATION, INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT REPLACEMENT IS REQUIRED.  
 (2) FOR PROMOTIONS AND SALARY INCREASES, COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING: (REQUEST ASSISTANCE FROM PND FOR DATA IF NECESSARY).

DATE OF EMPLOYMENT:	ORIGINAL TITLE:	ORIGINAL GRADE & STEP:
RECORD OF LAST 6 SALARY INCREASES:	PERCENTAGE INCREASE: (1) _____ (2) _____ (3) _____ (4) _____ (5) _____ (6) _____	DATE:
DATE OF CHANGE TO PRESENT TITLE:	PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF THIS INCREASE:	

Mr. Weissenback is being rehired as an Air Freight Specialist to meet operational requirements. Ref: Memorandum PND-CAEA-70/1847, 18 August 1970.

(USE REVERSE SIDE IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED)

REQUESTED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ DTD DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 (DEPARTMENT HEAD) (DIVISION DIRECTOR OR OFFICER)

CONCURRED BY: STATION/AREA MANAGER DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 BASE MANAGER/REGIONAL DIRECTOR DATE \_\_\_\_\_

\*\*HEAD OF DEPARTMENT/DIVISION OR OFFICE \_\_\_\_\_ DTD DATE 22 AUG 1970  
 OFFICER \_\_\_\_\_ VPT&S DATE 1970 9 2

APPROVED BY: OFFICER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 PRESIDENT \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL \_\_\_\_\_ DATE 18 Sep. 70

DISTRIBUTION BY PERSONNEL DIVISION AFTER FINAL APPROVAL:  
 COPY 1: FOR PERSONNEL DIVISION. COPY 4: TO POVTE VIA BWVTE FOR INFORMATION.  
 COPY 2: FOR PAYROLL ACTION.  
 COPY 3: TO DTD (ORIGINATOR OF RPA) VIA VPT&S FOR NOTIFICATION OF APPROVAL.

(FOR PERSONNEL DIVISION USE ONLY)

POSITION AUTHORIZED: Mgr. Air Freight Section  
 POSITION NO.: 04900 P/S: FP/PS  
 EMPLOYMENT STATUS: Permanent SLOT NO.: \_\_\_\_\_  
 PROPOSED SALARY:  IN ORDER  SUBJECT TO DP'S CONCURRENCE  
 REMARKS:

SICK LEAVE RECORD SINCE:									
TOTAL NUMBER OF DAYS TAKEN:									
FREQUENCY:									
ROUTING ORDER	R/S	E/S	W/A	P/V	CPL	CAE	ADP	DP	P/I
INITIALS	<u>17</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>3/6</u>						<u>8</u>
DATE	<u>11/24</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>1970</u>						

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

P-GOODMAN, JULIAN (b)(6)

Executive Registry

76-6941/A

P. HANGEN, Welles

6 MAY 1976

CIAA. of Bush George

Soc 4. of 3 NBC

(originals Goodman)

Mr. Julian Goodman  
Chairman of the Board  
National Broadcasting Co., Inc.  
30 Rockefeller Plaza  
New York City, New York 10020

Dear Julian,

When we met in your office on April 13, you gave me a memo dated April 12, 1976, from [redacted] to [redacted], summarizing information gathered by NBC on Mr. Welles Hangen.

At my request thorough checks were made in the files of Department of State, Department of Defense, and National Security Agency, as well as CIA. No significant information was turned up which was not referred to in the NBC summary. No confirmed, definite information was found as to the fate of Mr. Hangen. The same leads and disappointing efforts at follow-up are mentioned in U.S. Government files as in the NBC summary.

One of the senior American officials in Cambodia during 1970 was interviewed in connection with this review of available information. He confirmed from his own memory that no information was found which indicated Mr. Hangen's fate. As your summary states, Welles Hangen was riding in an NBC car driven by a Cambodian named Chay You Leng. Leng was captured with the three NBC newsmen and subsequently escaped. Leng stated that Welles Hangen was captured alive and was last seen alive on Monday, June 1, the day after capture. No source was able to say positively that Mr. Hangen was seen alive after that date.

13 August 87

[redacted]  
[redacted] of DIA sent  
these photos over. He would  
like to have them analyzed  
as to if all three photos are of  
the same man: specifically  
Rowley, Chas. A.; listed as MIA.

Thanks.

[redacted]

29 SEPT., 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/ICOG  
FROM: OTS/GAD/DIS/OPS  
SUBJECT: PHOTO COMPARISON

1. PER YOUR REQUEST, A COMPARISON OF VISIBLE FEATURES AND EXTRAPOLATIONS WAS CONDUCTED ON PHOTOGRAPHS OF MAJOR CHARLES S. ROWLEY, AN UNIDENTIFIED STANDING MALE AND AN UNIDENTIFIED MALE CROUCHING ON A MAT. THE EXAMINATION AND EVALUATION WERE CONDUCTED BY OFFICERS EXPERIENCED IN THE ALTERATION OF PHYSICAL APPEARANCE AND QUALIFIED IDENTI-KIT OPERATORS. THE FOLLOWING ARE OUR FINDINGS BASED ON YOUR REQUEST:

FOR PURPOSES OF COMPARISON, THE UNIDENTIFIED PHOTOGRAPHS WERE LABELLED A-1 AND A-2 AND THE IDENTIFIED PHOTO OF MAJOR ROWLEY LABELLED B. PHOTOGRAPH C DID NOT PROVIDE ANY USEFUL INFORMATION AND THEREFORE WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE COMPARISON..

2. PHOTOGRAPH A-1 SHOWS AN UNIDENTIFIED MALE, STANDING ERECT, APPROXIMATE AGE 25-45, EMACIATED CONDITION. COMPARED WITH PHOTOGRAPH B THE FOLLOWING SIMILARITIES WERE NOTED:

- EARS APPEAR TO STICK OUT FROM THE HEAD.
- GENERALLY LONG FACE SHAPE.
- PATTERN OF HAIR RECESSION AT TEMPLES.

THE FOLLOWING DISSIMILARITIES WERE NOTED:

- A-1 EVIDENCES A LOWER HAIRLINE AT FOREHEAD EVEN COMPENSATING FOR HAIR GROWTH.
- THE NOSES HAVE DISTINCTLY DIFFERENT SHAPES, ALTHOUGH THE NOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN A-1 MAY HAVE BEEN BROKEN, ALTERING THE SHAPE.
- EARS ARE SET HIGHER ON THE HEAD ON A-1, COMPENSATING FOR THE HEAD TILT.
- EYEBROWS APPEAR TO BE SHAPED DIFFERENTLY.
- EYES ON A-1 ARE SPACED CLOSER TOGETHER.
- SLOPE OF SHOULDERS IS MORE PROMINENT ON B.
- A-1 APPEARS TO BE YOUNGER THAN B WOULD BE NOW, ASSUMING THAT A-1 IS A RECENT PHOTOGRAPH.

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3. GIVEN THE NUMBER OF DISSIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE TWO PHOTOGRAPHS, IT IS OUR CONCLUSION THAT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE PHOTOGRAPHS ARE OF THE SAME INDIVIDUAL.

4. PHOTOGRAPH A-2 SHOWS AN UNIDENTIFIED MALE APPROXIMATE AGE 20-45, IN EMACIATED CONDITION, WITH SWOLLEN FEET. COMPARED WITH PHOTOGRAPH B, THE FOLLOWING SIMILARITIES WERE NOTED:

- TEXTURE AND STYLE OF THE HAIR ARE SIMILAR.
- SIMILAR INDICATION OF TEMPLE HOLLOW, ALTHOUGH IT IS SIGNIFICANTLY MORE PRONOUNCED ON A-2.

THE FOLLOWING DISSIMILARITIES WERE NOTED:

- THE STRONG OCCIPITAL FOLD ON B IS NOT APPARANT ON A-2.
- THE NOSE OF A-2 APPEARS TO BE LONGER AND SHARPER.
- EARS ON A-2 ARE MUCH MORE ROUND AT THE TOP.
- THE ADAM'S APPLE IS NOT IN THE SAME PLACE IN BOTH PHOTOS, AND IS MORE PRONOUNCED ON B.
- B EVIDENCES A GREATER DISTANCE BETWEEN MOUTH AND NOSE THAN A-2.
- EYES ON A-2 ARE SMALLER THAN THOSE ON B.
- ASSUMING A-2 TO BE RECENT, THE APPARANT AGES DO NOT APPEAR TO MATCH.

5. IN CONSIDERING THE ABOVE INFORMATION, IT IS OUR CONCLUSION THAT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT A-2 AND B ARE REPRESENTATIONS OF THE SAME INDIVIDUAL.

6. WE FURTHER CONCLUDE THAT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT PHOTOGRAPHS A-1 AND A-2 ARE OF THE SAME INDIVIDUAL.

7. IF THERE ARE ANY QUESTIONS REGARDING OUR FINDINGS, PLEASE CONTACT THE UNDERSIGNED ON SECURE 41313. RETURNED HERewith ARE THE PHOTOGRAPHS PROVIDED FOR OUR ANALYSIS AND A PHOTOCOPY OF AN ENHANCEMENT OF A-2.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

OTS/GAD/DIS/OPS

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RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

The nose has a close resemblance, but the relationship in distance between mouth and nose are not the same. The Major has more distance between mouth and nose, and the chin is shorter and more square on the Major. The ears of the side profile are large, but are too round at the top. The pictures are too grainy to distinguish the gristle shape in the ears. The shape of the nose on both photos doesn't match the Major's. One is too pointy, and the other is not shaped the same. The eye brow on the front view photo doesn't match the Major's (too dark to tell on the side view). The eyes are also further apart on the Major; the eyes on the side profile are too small, the front view is too dark to tell. The major also has a more distinct Adam's apple.

Not knowing how old the photos are and, from the photo of the Major, I also question the age factors. I also have doubt that the two photos are the same. I have no doubt in saying the two photos are not the Major.

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RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

SECRET


MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, OTS/OG/Disguise Operations  
FROM: ACEA/Indo China Operations Group  
SUBJECT: Photos from DIA

1. EA/ICOG requests your office examine the enclosed photos sent by [redacted] of D.I.A. to determine if they are of the same man, specifically Charles S. Rowley, listed as MIA.
2. For further details please contact [redacted] of EA/ICOG on secure [redacted] Your assistance is appreciated.





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RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013



APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013



APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE  
09-Dec-2013





APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013



Rowley, Charles S.

ROWLEY, CHARLES S., MAJ FR26230  
SSN: 042-32-1821 21 AUG 68

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013



LT

AIRASIA WASHINGTONDC

TF346 TP344 H38 HIT ON RIGHT SIDE BEHIND PIC BY 57MM RECOILLESS RIFLE ROUND SHORTLY AFTER LANDING FRIENDLY PAD TH2867 ABOUT 24 MILES NE LUANG PRABANG AT H031045Z PIC [ ] AND COPILOT [ ] EXITED THRU COPILOT WINDOW SECONDS LATER AIRCRAFT HIT AGAIN CAUGHT FIRE RIG TROOPS IN FOXHOLES AROUND PAD REPORTED FREQH LZPIKLE NOT [ ] REPORTED TP344<sup>4</sup> FELL BACK INTO CABIN UPON FIRST HIT AND DIDNT EXIT AIRCRAFT WHICH THEN DESTROYED BY FIRE ONE LAO PASSENGER IN CABIN FAILED EXIT ALSO PRESUMED DEAD PILOT AND COPILOT WALKED OUT WITH RIG TROOPS TOWARDS LS131 WERE PICKED UP BY WH34 AT H040555Z NOW UDORN WEITZ ONE PIECE METAL REMOVED FROM LEFT ELBOW ASTA FOUR PIECES METAL STILL IN LEFT ANKLE STOP PAD PRESUMED OVERUN BY UNFRIENDLY FORCES AND RECOVERY REMAINS NOT PRESENTLY POSSIBLE PIKLE WIFE AND MOTHER NOW UDORN ALREADY INFORMED WILADV REPATRIATION ARRANGEMENTS AND WHETHER WEITZ ASTA DESIRE RELATIVES NOTIFIED BY WAS

[ ] August 5, 1967

CC: Washington confirmation copy  
AVP  
DP (2)  
Pres.



APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

2 OCT 1970  
**REQUEST FOR  
PERSONNEL ACTION**

NAME: E.J. Weissenback (IN ENGLISH) (IN CHINESE) DEPT. RPA No. DTD-RPA-016/H70  
SEP 26 1970

TO: PAYROLL  TPE  SEL  HKG  BKK  SGN

EMPLOYEE No. 18337 PND REF. No. PND-WA-174-70-1161 S1

TNN  BKA  MNL  UDN  
 TYO  KAD  CLF  VTE

EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED \_\_\_\_\_  
(FOR SEPARATION, EFFECTIVE DATE IS LAST WORKING DATE)

VIA  MGAD  MBAD  METAT

ACTUAL EFFECTIVE DATE (1) 15 Sep. 1970 SEP 25 1970  
(TO BE FILLED BY PERSONNEL DIVISION)

PAYROLL-TPE (1)

PROPOSED ACTION:  NEW APPOINTMENT  CHANGE IN POSITION/SALARY  SEPARATION  OTHER (2) Arrived date

	PRESENT STATUS	PROPOSED STATUS
TITLE & ACCOUNTING CODE NO.	Applicant	Air Freight Specialist
SALARY - GRADE, STEP & PAY STANDARD		FP/PS-D (NCC) Code X
EMPLOYMENT STATUS - PERMANENT, TEMPORARY OR FIXED TERM		Permanent
DEPARTMENT/DIVISION/OFFICE		Traffic
LOCATION		Vientiane
*CLASSIFICATION - STAFF EMPLOYEE OR WORKER		Staff Employee
POSITION NUMBER		04900
REMARKS		

SEP 29 1970  
JH

\* AS STIPULATED UNDER JOB CLASSIFICATIONS IN PERSONNEL MANUAL.

APPROVED BY

[Redacted Signature Box]

18/9/70  
DATE

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

AIRASIA WASHINGTON

TP349 H057A OUR TP346 CONFIRMED RE-PATCHED BY CGRA H052430L changed  
TP346 REPORTED 136 [ ] FROM [ ] TO LAFIRKLE AND ADVISED  
PIRKELE WAS SEEN BY FRIENDLY FORCES SURROUNDING HELIPAD TO FALL BACK  
INTO CABIN WHEN 57MM RIFLE HIT RIGHT SIDE BEHIND PIC AND PIRKELE AND  
ONE UNIDENTIFIED LAC PASSENGER INHENT GET OF AIRCRAFT WHICH BURNED  
STOP PILOT AND COPILOT AND FRIENDLY TROOP. EVACUATED AREA AFOOT  
AND WERE RESCUED HELIPAD PRESUMED OVERTUN BY HOSTILE FORCES AND  
RECOVERY PIRKELE REMAINS NOT PRESENTLY POSSIBLE STOP PIRKELE  
WIFE AND MOTHER AT UDORN AND WERE NOTIFIED ACCORDINGLY STOP ADVISE  
WHETHER TP346 RECEIVED

[ ]

JIC - SHOULD BE  
7, OCT. 1967  
AVG

AIRASIA TAIPEI

WASHINGTON CONFIRMATION

AVP

DP (2) ✓

PIES .

MESSAGE CENTER  
74001  
H 20



# REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: E.J. Weissenback DEPT. RPA No. DTD-RPA-016/H70  
(IN ENGLISH) (IN CHINESE) SEP 26 1970  
EMPLOYEE NO. 18337 PND REF. No. PND-WA-444 70-116/81  
EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED \_\_\_\_\_  
(FOR SEPARATION, EFFECTIVE DATE IS (2) ARRIVAL DATE)  
ACTUAL EFFECTIVE DATE (1) 15 Sept 1970 SEP 25 1970  
(TO BE FILLED BY PERSONNEL DIVISION) (2) Arrived date

PROPOSED ACTION:  (1) NEW APPOINTMENT  CHANGE IN POSITION/SALARY  SEPARATION  (OTHER) (2) Arrived date

	PRESENT STATUS	PROPOSED STATUS
TITLE & ACCOUNTING CODE NO.	<b>Applicant</b>	<b>Air Freight Specialist</b>
SALARY - GRADE, STEP & PAY STANDARD		FP/PS-D (NCC) Code X
EMPLOYMENT STATUS - PERMANENT, TEMPORARY OR FIXED TERM		<b>Permanent</b>
DEPARTMENT/DIVISION/OFFICE		<b>Traffic</b>
LOCATION		<b>Vientiane</b>
*CLASSIFICATION - STAFF EMPLOYEE OR WORKER		<b>Staff Employee</b>
POSITION NUMBER		<b>04900</b>
REMARKS		

\* AS STIPULATED UNDER JOB CLASSIFICATIONS IN PERSONNEL MANUAL.

BASIS FOR RECOMMENDATION: (1) FOR SEPARATION, INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT REPLACEMENT IS REQUIRED.  
(2) FOR PROMOTIONS AND SALARY INCREASES, COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING: (REQUEST ASSISTANCE FROM PND FOR DATA IF NECESSARY).

DATE OF EMPLOYMENT:	ORIGINAL TITLE:	ORIGINAL GRADE & STEP:
RECORD OF LAST 6 SALARY INCREASES:	PERCENTAGE INCREASE: (1) _____ (2) _____ (3) _____ (4) _____ (5) _____ (6) _____	
DATE:		
DATE OF CHANGE TO PRESENT TITLE:	PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF THIS INCREASE:	

Mr. Weissenback is being rehired as an Air Freight Specialist to meet operational requirements. Ref: Memorandum PND-CAEA-70/1847, 18 August 1970.

(USE REVERSE SIDE IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED)

REQUESTED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ DTD DATE 22 Aug 1970  
(DEPARTMENT HEAD) (DIVISION DIRECTOR OR OFFICER)  
CONCURRED BY: STATION/AREA MANAGER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
BASE MANAGER/REGIONAL DIRECTOR \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
\*\*HEAD OF DEPARTMENT/  
DIVISION OR OFFICE \_\_\_\_\_ DTD DATE 22 Aug 1970  
OFFICER \_\_\_\_\_ Original Signed by: \_\_\_\_\_ VPT&S DATE 1970 8. 22  
APPROVED BY: OFFICER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
PRESIDENT \_\_\_\_\_ FOR \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL \_\_\_\_\_ DATE 18 Sept 70  
(\*\*CONCURRENCE IS REQUIRED FOR INTER DEPARTMENTAL OR DIVISIONAL TRANSFERS ONLY.)

DISTRIBUTION BY PERSONNEL DIVISION AFTER FINAL APPROVAL: POVTE POVTE 770 82 (Htan SEC/1970)  
COPY 1: FOR PERSONNEL DIVISION. COPY 4: TO \_\_\_\_\_ VIA \_\_\_\_\_ FOR INFORMATION.  
COPY 2: FOR PAYROLL ACTION. DTD (ORIGINATOR OF RPA) VIA VPT&S FOR NOTIFICATION OF APPROVAL.  
COPY 3: TO \_\_\_\_\_

(FOR PERSONNEL DIVISION USE ONLY)

POSITION AUTHORIZED: None  
POSITION NO.: 04900 P/S: 116  
EMPLOYMENT STATUS: Permanent SLOT NO.: \_\_\_\_\_  
PROPOSED:  IN ORDER  
SALARY:  SUBJECT TO DP'S CONCURRENCE  
REMARKS:

SICK LEAVE RECORD SINCE:  
TOTAL NUMBER OF DAYS TAKEN: \_\_\_\_\_  
FREQUENCY: \_\_\_\_\_ CHECKED BY: \_\_\_\_\_

ROUTING ORDER	R/S	E/S	W/A	P/V	CPL	CAE	ADP	DP	P/F
INITIALS									
DATE									

# REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: WEISSENBACK, E.J. DEPT. RPA No. TFC-69-072  
 (IN ENGLISH) (IN CHINESE) **ADD - 1 1969**  
 EMPLOYEE NO. 16153 PND REF. No. PND-WA-~~8869-0388~~  
 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED COB 31 March 1969  
 (FOR SEPARATION, EFFECTIVE DATE IS LAST WORKING DAY "COB")  
 ACTUAL EFFECTIVE DATE 31 March 1969 CAS (CA)  
 (TO BE FILLED BY PERSONNEL DIVISION)

PROPOSED ACTION:  NEW APPOINTMENT.  CHANGE IN POSITION/SALARY  SEPARATION  (OTHER) \_\_\_\_\_

	PRESENT STATUS	PROPOSED STATUS
TITLE & ACCOUNTING CODE NO.	AFS	Termination
SALARY - GRADE, STEP & PAY STANDARD	FP/PS R17 Code "X" + PA/A	Company Convenience
EMPLOYMENT STATUS - PERMANENT, TEMPORARY OR FIXED TERM	Permanent	
DEPARTMENT/DIVISION/OFFICE	TFC	Stop PA/A 31 March 69 CAS
LOCATION	VTE	Date includes advance notation
CLASSIFICATION - STAFF EMPLOYEE OR WORKER	Staff Employee	
POSITION NUMBER	PO4692	
REMARKS <u>CBM 959</u>	<u>C31</u>	Approved Disapproved <u>3/21/69</u> by Samuel H. Johnson DSY

ENTITLED TO PAYMENT OF UNPAID ACCRUALS:  
 A/I. 21.16 days  
 B/I. \_\_\_\_\_ days  
 C/I. \_\_\_\_\_ days

\* AS STIPULATED UNDER JOB CLASSIFICATIONS IN PERSONNEL MANUAL.

BASIS FOR RECOMMENDATION: (1) FOR SEPARATION, INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT REPLACEMENT IS REQUIRED.  
 (2) FOR PROMOTIONS AND SALARY INCREASES, COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING: (REQUEST ASSISTANCE FROM PND FOR DATA IF NECESSARY).

DATE OF EMPLOYMENT:	ORIGINAL TITLE:	ORIGINAL GRADE & STEP:
RECORD OF LAST 6 SALARY INCREASES:	PERCENTAGE INCREASE: (1) _____ (2) _____ (3) _____ (4) _____ (5) _____ (6) _____	
DATE OF CHANGE TO PRESENT TITLE:	PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF THIS INCREASE: _____	

An analysis of the need for a balanced staffing pattern in the Air Freight Department dictates the separation of AFS Weissenback for the convenience of the Company. No replacement required.

(USE REVERSE SIDE IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED)

REQUESTED BY: _____	DATE: <u>14 March 1969</u>
(DEPARTMENT _____)	
CONCURRED BY: _____	DATE: <u>9 MAR 1969</u>
STATION/AREA _____	
BASE MANAGER/REGIONAL DIRECTOR _____	DATE: <u>17 MAR 1969</u>
**HEAD OF DEPARTMENT/DIVISION OR OFFICE _____	DATE: <u>17 MAR 1969</u>
OFFICER _____	DATE: <u>1969 3. 18</u>
APPROVED BY: OFFICER _____	DATE: <u>21 Mar 69</u>
PRESIDENT _____	DATE: _____
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL _____	DATE: <u>3/21/69</u>

DISTRIBUTION BY PERSONNEL DIVISION AFTER FINAL APPROVAL: FM VIA BMVTE FOR INFORMATION.  
 COPY 1: FOR PERSONNEL DIVISION. COPY 4: TO \_\_\_\_\_ FOR INFORMATION.  
 COPY 2: FOR PAYROLL ACTION. COPY 5 to: DFDC Attention SEC (DFD)  
 COPY 3: TO TMVTE ORIGINATOR OF RPA) VIA \_\_\_\_\_ FOR NOTIFICATION OF APPROVAL.

(FOR PERSONNEL DIVISION USE ONLY)

POSITION AUTHORIZED: <u>Air Freight Specialist</u>	
POSITION NO.: <u>PO4692</u> P/S: <u>Code X</u>	
EMPLOYMENT STATUS: <u>Permanent</u> SLOT NO.: _____	
PROPOSED: <input type="checkbox"/> IN ORDER	
SALARY: <input type="checkbox"/> SUBJECT TO DP'S CONCURRENCE	
REMARKS:	

SICK LEAVE RECORD SINCE:																			
TOTAL NUMBER OF DAYS TAKEN:																			
FREQUENCY:	CHECKED BY: _____																		
ROUTING ORDER	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>R/S</td> <td>E/S</td> <td>WA</td> <td>P/V</td> <td>CPL</td> <td>CAF</td> <td>PA</td> <td>ADP</td> <td>DP</td> </tr> <tr> <td><u>4K</u></td> <td><u>21</u></td> <td><u>20</u></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td><u>31</u></td> <td><u>C31</u></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	R/S	E/S	WA	P/V	CPL	CAF	PA	ADP	DP	<u>4K</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>20</u>			<u>31</u>	<u>C31</u>		
R/S	E/S	WA	P/V	CPL	CAF	PA	ADP	DP											
<u>4K</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>20</u>			<u>31</u>	<u>C31</u>													
INITIALS																			
DATE	<u>3/21/69</u>																		

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: 09-Dec-2013

CONFIDENTIAL

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(6)



March 17, 1994


No. 93

### Remains of CIA Employee Killed in '75 Plane Crash in Vietnam Confirmed *Logistics Officer's Name To Be Placed in Book of Honor*

The glass-encased Book of Honor on the north wall of the CIA Headquarters foyer — a reminder to those who pass by of the ultimate risks of intelligence work — has a single memorial star entered for the year 1976, a star that does not have a name beside it.

But that will change soon.

Plans are being made to place the name of James A. Rawlings, an



*The late James A. Rawlings, an Agency logistics officer, pictured in the early 1970s.*


Agency logistics officer who died in a plane crash in South Vietnam, in the Book of Honor. Last month, the Armed Forces Identification Review Board officially confirmed Rawlings's remains, and earlier this month the Agency lifted his cover.

Rawlings, a 20-year Agency veteran who was assigned to the Nha Trang Base, Saigon Station, was aboard a C-123 cargo plane which crashed on *(continued on p. 2)*

NR

NR

CONFIDENTIAL



James Rawlings...(from p. 1)

January 3, 1975, while en route from Dalat to  
Nha Trang, South Vietnam. [redacted]

The Agency logistics officer and four Vietnamese, along with three Chinese crew members and a Filipino technician, were aboard the aircraft at the time of the crash. A crash site was located several days later, and strong evidence developed that the plane went down about 15 miles from Nha Trang without survivors. Search and recovery efforts were hampered and delayed by the weather, jungle terrain, and hostile military activity. When plans were finally completed to put a recovery team in at the crash site, the general military situation deteriorated and plans had to be canceled.

Rawlings, who was 38-years-old at the time of the crash, was placed in a missing status for a year, and a presumptive determination of death was made in January 1976 (which is why he is listed in the Book of Honor for that year).

[redacted]

[redacted] who was 16-years-old at the time of the crash, said he received official word in early February 1994, that the U.S. Government had confirmed his father's remains, which had been repatriated in August 1993, as a result of joint American-Vietnamese search efforts.

"After I got that phone call, I got in touch with my mother [Linda P. Rawlings], and she and I went down to an office in Alexandria, where we sat down with a gentleman who had the entire file," [redacted] said. "He showed us the pictures of what they had, and he ex-

plained to us why they felt it was a match [between the remains and Rawlings' dental and other records]. It was at that time that they said, 'Yes, we have enough evidence to confirm that we do have the remains.'"

"Then it was a matter of us deciding how we wanted to handle the burial and when we wanted to do it," he said. The family decided on a small, private ceremony at George Washington Cemetery in Adelphi, Maryland, on Friday, February 25.

Former Deputy Director of Logistics [redacted] who was a colleague of James Rawlings and attended the gravesite ceremony, said he was a "fine, dedicated officer" who "delivered, day in and day out, a performance of excellence."

Noting his good humor, [redacted] said, "He took his job seriously, but he took himself less seriously. He was a fun person to be around, and he was fun to work with."

In addition to working as a logistics officer in South Vietnam, Rawlings served in [redacted] during his career. "He just did whatever was necessary," son [redacted] said. "He took assignments that he didn't necessarily want, and he didn't do it in search of promotions, because they didn't come quickly then." [At the time of the crash, Rawlings was a GS-10; during the year that he was in missing status, he was promoted to GS-11, on the basis of his performance up to January 1975.]

Rawlings's final performance appraisal, signed in November 1974, detailed his work as a logistics and general support officer in South Vietnam. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Rawlings's supervisor wrote. "His dedication to the job is exemplary."

The supervisor added: "Perhaps one of the strongest points that he brings, not just to the job but to the base as a whole, is his outstandingly fine attitude and exuberance. He has an unflappable manner along with his 'can do' attitude."

In addition to being a fine logistics officer, James Rawlings was an outstanding bowler, and he spent several nights a week competing in various leagues when the family was overseas. "He carried over a 200 average, and if he had the seed money to start, he probably could have joined the PBA [Professional Bowlers Association] tour," son [redacted] said.

[redacted] "no one will ever know" if the C-123 cargo plane his father boarded in January 1975, went down accidentally or was shot down.

"I have my doubts on the question of whether it was shot down," he said. "The problem is that it had made its fourth pass over enemy-occupied territory. [redacted]"

[redacted] It took them four or five days to even find the crash site. And even though they got the remains back, it was because someone had been to the site and took the remains back to a village. To date, no [U.S. personnel] have been at that crash site."


Asked if he harbored hopes over the years that his father might still be alive, [redacted] said, "Sure....you always wonder. I had seen photos of the crash site, and I defy anyone who is not an aviation expert to tell me there was a plane there. But you never know."

He added: "It was very disturbing when I first got the phone call [confirming the remains]. It took me awhile to regain some com-


posure, because it was kind of finalized. I always knew, but I always had a little bit of hope."

James Rawlings is survived by his wife Linda; his son [redacted] and daughter [redacted] his mother, [redacted] a sister, [redacted] and two grandchildren, [redacted]


[redacted] a casualty assistance officer with the Office of Personnel, said the Agency respected the Rawlings family's expressed wishes that the ceremony remain private. (This article is classified ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)



NR



APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 09-08-2011 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~




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
APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 09-Dec-2018 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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


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APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 09-Dec-2013 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



NR



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COPY

WASHINGTONDC

1967 AUG 6 AM 5 43

TAIPEI

RECEIVED SEVERAL PHONE CALLS RELATIVES LOWELL PIRKLE REPORTING MRS. PIRKLE  
CALLED FROM UDORN STATING QUOTE LOWELL WAS KILLED IN LAOS AND THEY CANNOT  
RECOVER HIS REMAINS I INTEND REMAIN UDORN WITH CHILDREN UNTIL BODY RETURNED  
UNQUOTE ADVISE HO57A

Recopied Aug. 8 for: AVP  
DP (2) ✓

*PIRKLE FILE*

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

RECEIVED  
8 AUG 1967  
PERSONNEL DIVISION  
TAIPEI



**OVERSEAS CITIZENS SERVICES  
OFFICE OF CITIZENS CONSULAR SERVICES  
FAX TRANSMISSION**

**TO:**

[Redacted]

Work Family Center

**FROM:**

[Redacted]

CA/OCS/CCS/EAP

(202) 647-3675 fax (202) 647-2867

**PHONE:**

**CONTENTS:**


Formal Identification of the  
Remains of James A Rawlings

**DATE:**

2-7-94

**NUMBER OF PAGES:** 4 (WITHOUT COVER SHEET)

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
 U.S. TOTAL ARMY PERSONNEL COMMAND  
 ATTN: TAPC-PED-F  
 2461 EISENHOWER AVENUE  
 ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22331-0482

FROM: JOHN MANNING

TELEPHONE NUMBERS:

COMM: (703) 325-0944

FAX: (703) 325-5315

TO:

TELEPHONE NUMBERS:

COMM: (202) 647-3675

FAX: (202) 647-2867

UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED FOR  
 RELEASE DATE:  
 09-Dec-2013

UNCLASSIFIED

01 03 071505Z FEB 94 00 RR UUUU

CJMAO ALEXANDRIA VA  
 CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//  
 INFO DEPT OF STATE WASHINGTON DC//D-HA//  
 JCS WASHINGTON DC  
 SEC DEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-RSA/POW-MIA//  
 OSD WASHINGTON DC//PA/PA-DPL//  
 CSA WASHINGTON DC  
 CSAF WASHINGTON DC  
 CNO WASHINGTON DC  
 HQ AFMURSA RANDOLPH AFB TX//MWD//  
 AFMPC RANDOLPH AFB TX//MPCCA//  
 60MWRSS TRAVIS AFB CA//MWD//  
 HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//MWX//  
 60MAW TRAVIS AFB CA//CVX//  
 BUMED WASHINGTON DC//EE//  
 BUPERS WASHINGTON DC//PERS-663B//  
 CHINFO WASHINGTON DC  
 CINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J-3//  
 CDRJTF-FA HONOLULU HI  
 CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APOF//

J-F-MANNING, ASST CH, MACSD, 5-0944

~~SPINELLO, COL, DCHMN, CJMAO~~  
 SPINELLO, COL, DCHMN, CJMAO

UNCLASSIFIED

071505Z FEB 94

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 RELEASE DATE:  
 09-Dec-2013

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02 03

00 RR UUUU

DIA WASHINGTON DC//DI-7C/V0-PW//

CMC WASHINGTON DC//MHP-10//

COMNAVBASE SAN FRANCISCO CA

UNCLAS FOUO

SUBJ: IDENTIFICATION OF REMAINS

A. MEMOS, TAPC-PED-H, 25 OCT AND 21 DEC 93, SUBJ: PROPOSED IDENTIFICATION OF REMAINS.

1. ON 7 FEB 94, THE ARMED FORCES IDENTIFICATION REVIEW BOARD (AFIRB) APPROVED THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE FOLLOWING REMAINS:

PROC NUMBER	NAME	RANK	SERVICE	REF NO.
-------------	------	------	---------	---------

CILHI 0189-93	RAWLINGS, JAMES A-		U.S. CIVILIAN	2050 D 01
---------------	--------------------	--	---------------	-----------

2. THE AFIRB ALSO APPROVED THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE FOLLOWING REMAINS:

CILHI GROUP REMAINS 6-93

NAMES	RANK	SERVICE	REF NO.
-------	------	---------	---------

3. UPON RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE, COORDINATE SHIPMENT OF REMAINS TO

UNCLASSIFIED

071505Z FEB 94

SA

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 09-Dec-2013
--

C06116919

FEB-91-1994 10:50 FROM

TO

92025472867 P.04

UNCLASSIFIED

03 03

00 RR UUUU

USAF MORTUARY TRAVIS AFB, CA.

4. DO NOT MAKE PUBLIC RELEASE OF THE INFORMATION IN THIS MESSAGE  
UNTIL DIRECTED BY OASD-PA BY SEPARATE MESSAGE.

PROTECTIVE MARKING AUTO REMOVED IAW SEC 4-500, AR 340-17.

UNCLASSIFIED

071505Z FEB 94

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

900/9007

STATE-CA/OCS

TOTAL P.04  
02/07/94 11:57



(b)(3)  
(b)(6)



OVERSEAS CITIZENS SERVICES  
OFFICE OF CITIZENS CONSULAR SERVICES  
FAX TRANSMISSION

TO:

[Redacted]

Work Family Center

FROM:

[Redacted]

CA/OCS/CCS/EAP

PHONE:

(202) 647-3675 fax (202) 647-2867

CONTENTS:

Re. James Rawlings

Here is DoD/PA's Proposed  
Press Release

DATE:

Our press contact is [Redacted] in Consular Affairs  
and I plan to give his name to DoD/PA  
2-4-94 unless you have other ideas

NUMBER OF PAGES:

87 (WITHOUT COVER SHEET)

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RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

# *Fax-Memo Fax-Memo Fax-Memo*

Date: 14 Feb 94  
PAGE ONE OF SEVEN

**Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs**

[Redacted]

Specializing in PACOM, POW/MIA Affairs  
& The DoD National Media Pool--Comm 703-693-1075, DSN 223-  
1075, FAX 703-693-6853

TO: [Redacted]

Attached is a copy of the public affairs guidance and proposed statement for tomorrow's DoD press briefing as we discussed. The only question I have is who will speak for the civilian if we receive questions?

Thanks.,

[Redacted]

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

SUBJ: PUBLIC AFFAIRS -- POW/MIA -- PRESS GUIDANCE FOR IDENTIFICATION OF REMAINS -- SRV -- FEB 94

1. THE REMAINS OF THREE AMERICAN SERVICEMEN AND ONE CIVILIAN, PREVIOUSLY MISSING IN INDOCHINA, HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AND WILL BE RETURNED TO USAF MORTUARY TRAVIS AFB, CA.

2. THE FOLLOWING MEMORANDUM FOR CORRESPONDENTS WILL BE RELEASED IN WASHINGTON AT 1300 (EST), TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1994: (QUOTE) THE REMAINS OF THREE AMERICAN SERVICEMEN AND ONE CIVILIAN, PREVIOUSLY LISTED AS MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS FIRST LIEUTENANT BYRON K. KULLAND, USAR, AND SPECIALIST FIVE RONALD P. PASCHALL, USA. THE NAMES OF THE THIRD SERVICEMAN AND CIVILIAN ARE BEING WITHHELD IN DEFERENCE TO THE WISHES OF THEIR FAMILIES.

(PARA) THE REMAINS OF THE THREE SERVICEMEN WERE REPATRIATED IN FEBRUARY 1993. THE REMAINS OF THE CIVILIAN WERE REPATRIATED IN AUGUST 1993. ALL REMAINS WERE REPATRIATED AS A RESULT OF JOINT AMERICAN-VIETNAMESE SEARCH EFFORTS. THE THREE SERVICEMEN WERE ENROUTE TO ASSIST IN A SEARCH AND RESCUE EFFORT IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE WHEN THEIR UH-1H HELICOPTER WAS STRUCK BY HEAVY ENEMY THIRTY- AND FIFTY-CALIBER GROUND FIRE. AN AH-1G COBRA GUNSHIP FLYING SUPPORT ATTEMPTED TO SILENCE THE ENEMY GROUND FIRE BUT WAS FORCED TO BREAK OFF ITS ATTACK AFTER SUSTAINING DAMAGE TO ITS CANOPY. THE GUNSHIP REPORTED THAT THE UH-1H HELICOPTER WAS TRAILING SMOKE AND APPEARED TO BE IN A CONTROLLED DESCENT. DUE TO HOSTILE FIRE NEAR THE CRASH SITE AREA, DETERIORATING WEATHER CONDITIONS, AND INCREASING DARKNESS, THE SEARCH AND RESCUE MISSION WAS DISCONTINUED. NO RADIO TRANSMISSIONS WERE RECEIVED FROM THE UH-1H AND SUBSEQUENT RADIO AND ELECTRONIC SEARCHES WERE UNSUCCESSFUL.

(PARA) THE CIVILIAN, [REDACTED] WAS A PASSENGER ABOARD A C-123 AIRCRAFT ON A FLIGHT FROM DA LAT TO NHA TRANG WHEN IT CRASHED IN KHANH HOA PROVINCE ON JANUARY 3, 1975. THERE WAS NO SIGN OF SURVIVORS AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS WERE NOT ATTEMPTED DUE TO THE HOSTILE THREAT IN THE AREA.

(PARA) FIRST LIEUTENANT KULLAND WAS BORN ON NOVEMBER 9, 1947, AND HIS HOME OF RECORD IS NEW TOWN, NORTH DAKOTA. SPECIALIST FIVE PASCHALL WAS BORN ON NOVEMBER 1, 1950, AND HIS HOME OF RECORD IS ALDERWOOD MANOR, WASHINGTON.

(PARA) THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WELCOMES AND APPRECIATES THE COOPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM THAT RESULTED IN ACCOUNTING FOR THESE AMERICANS. WE HOPE THAT SUCH COOPERATION WILL BRING INCREASED RESULTS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

(PARA) ACHIEVING THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING FOR MISSING AMERICANS FROM THE VIETNAM WAR IS OF THE HIGHEST NATIONAL PRIORITY. (END QUOTE).

3. MEDIA INTEREST IN THE IDENTITY AND HOMETOWN OF THE IDENTIFIED SERVICEMAN IS ANTICIPATED.

4. DISCUSSION WITH THE MEDIA AND THE PUBLIC SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING KEY POINTS:

A. ACCOUNTING FOR MISSING AMERICANS IS A HUMANITARIAN ISSUE AND IS OF THE HIGHEST NATIONAL PRIORITY TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

B. ADDRESS THE POSSIBILITY OF LIVING AMERICANS BEING HELD IN INDOCHINA AGAINST THEIR WILL USING THE OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT POSITION STATED IN PARA 5, A4.

C. EMPHASIZE THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS DEEPLY COMMITTED TO ACHIEVING THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING FOR ALL MISSING AMERICANS.

D. AVOID SPECULATION ON THE MOTIVATION OR INTENTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM REGARDING THE POW/MIA ISSUE NOW THAT THE ECONOMIC AND TRADE EMBARGO HAS BEEN LIFTED.

5. THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS MAY BE USED IN RESPONSE TO QUERY:

Q1: HOW MANY AMERICANS PREVIOUSLY MISSING FROM THE VIETNAM WAR HAVE BEEN ACCOUNTED FOR?

A1: REMAINS THAT REPRESENT 349 AMERICANS (285 FROM VIETNAM, 59 FROM LAOS, TWO FROM THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, AND THREE FROM CAMBODIA) HAVE BEEN RETURNED FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA.

Q2: HOW MANY AMERICANS ARE STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR FROM THE VIETNAM WAR?

A2: THERE ARE 2,234 AMERICANS STILL MISSING OR OTHERWISE UNACCOUNTED FOR IN INDOCHINA. OF THAT TOTAL, 1,643 WERE LOST IN VIETNAM, AND THE MAJORITY OF THE 505 STILL MISSING IN LAOS AND THE 78 UNACCOUNTED FOR IN CAMBODIA WERE LOST IN AREAS WHERE VIETNAMESE FORCES WERE OPERATING AT THE TIME OF THE LOSS. EIGHT WERE LOST IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TERRITORY.

Q3: WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME AMERICANS WERE ACCOUNTED FOR AS A RESULT OF U.S. POW/MIA ACTIVITIES?

A3: ON JANUARY 6, 1994, THE REMAINS OF LIEUTENANT JUNIOR GRADE BARRY E. KARGER, USNR, WERE RETURNED TO TRAVIS AFB, CA.

Q4: WHAT IS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT POSITION ON THE POSSIBILITY THAT AMERICANS ARE STILL ALIVE AND BEING DETAINED AGAINST THEIR WILLS IN INDOCHINA?

A4: U.S. INVESTIGATORS HAVE CONDUCTED MORE THAN 80 FIELD INVESTIGATIONS OF REPORTED LIVE SIGHTINGS OF AMERICANS IN CAPTIVE SITUATIONS IN VIETNAM, INCLUDING SOME IN PRISONS AND MILITARY FACILITIES. TO DATE, NONE OF THESE INVESTIGATIONS HAS RESULTED IN EVIDENCE THAT AMERICAN POWS ARE BEING DETAINED AGAINST THEIR WILLS. THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US PRECLUDES RULING OUT THAT POSSIBILITY. ACTIONS TO INVESTIGATE LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS RECEIVE, AND WILL CONTINUE TO RECEIVE, PRIORITY AND RESOURCES. SHOULD ANY REPORT PROVE TO BE TRUE, WE WILL TAKE DECISIVE ACTION TO ENSURE THE RETURN OF THOSE INVOLVED.

Q5: WHAT ABOUT THE INFORMATION FROM REFUGEES WHO REPORT THEY HAVE SEEN AMERICANS?

A5: WE PURSUE LEADS FROM ALL SOURCES ABOUT UNACCOUNTED-FOR AMERICANS. SINCE THE FALL OF SAIGON IN 1975 AND AS OF JUNE 1993, THE U.S. HAS RECEIVED ~~NEARLY~~ <sup>1,718</sup> 17,000 REPORTS RELATED TO THE POW/MIA ISSUE, MOST OF THEM FROM INDOCHINESE REFUGEES. OF THE TOTAL REPORTED, ~~1,692~~ <sup>OVER</sup> ARE FIRSTHAND, LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS. APPROXIMATELY 70 PERCENT OF THESE WERE VALID AND WERE RESOLVED THROUGH CORRELATION WITH AMERICANS WHO WERE IN INDOCHINA BUT WHO HAVE SINCE RETURNED TO THE UNITED STATES. TWENTY-SIX PERCENT WERE DETERMINED TO BE FABRICATIONS BY THE SOURCE. THREE PERCENT OF THE REPORTS WERE CORRELATED TO WARTIME SIGHTINGS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL OR PRE-1975 SIGHTINGS OF CIVILIANS WHO REMAIN UNACCOUNTED FOR. THE REMAINING UNRESOLVED REPORTS (LESS THAN ONE PERCENT) CONSIST OF REPORTS OF INDIVIDUALS EITHER IN CAPTIVITY OR WHO APPEAR TO BE LIVING FREELY IN ONE OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES. THESE FIRSTHAND REPORTS CONTINUE TO RECEIVE THE HIGHEST PRIORITY OF INVESTIGATIVE EFFORT.

Q6: WHAT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE RECENTLY IN POW/MIA EFFORTS?

A6: ON FEBRUARY 7, 1994, TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA AND THE UNITED STATES BEGAN JOINT INVESTIGATIONS AND REMAINS RECOVERY OPERATIONS IN SEARCH OF AMERICANS UNACCOUNTED-FOR IN CAMBODIA. CONDUCTED UNDER OPERATIONAL COMMAND OF THE JOINT TASK FORCE-FULL ACCOUNTING (JTF-FA), THIS IS THE 11TH JOINT FIELD ACTIVITY CONDUCTED BY U.S. AND CAMBODIAN REPRESENTATIVES SINCE OCTOBER 1991 AND IS EXPECTED TO LAST UNTIL MARCH 11, 1994. JTF-FA IS CHARGED WITH THE MISSION OF ACCOUNTING AS FULLY AS POSSIBLE FOR AMERICANS STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR AS A RESULT OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM. WITH ASSISTANCE FROM U.S. ARMY CENTRAL IDENTIFICATION LABORATORY, HAWAII (CILHI), JTF-FA CONDUCTS INVESTIGATIONS OF INCIDENTS OF LOSS LOCATIONS, GRAVE AND CRASH SITE EXCAVATIONS AND REMAINS RECOVERY OPERATIONS.

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JTF-FA IS HEADQUARTERED AT CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII, WITH DETACHMENTS LOCATED IN BANGKOK, HANOI, VIENTIANE, AND PHNOM PENH. JTF-FA INVESTIGATIVE SPECIALISTS AND FORENSIC EXPERTS FROM CILHI WORK WITH COUNTERPART OFFICIALS IN VIETNAM, LAOS, AND CAMBODIA IN AN EFFORT TO ACCOUNT FOR MISSING AMERICANS. THE LEVEL OF VIETNAMESE COOPERATION HAS IMPROVED SIGNIFICANTLY IN THE PAST MONTHS. TO ADVANCE THE OBJECTIVE OF ACHIEVING THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING, PRESIDENT CLINTON IN JULY SET FORTH AREAS UPON WHICH FURTHER STEPS IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND VIETNAM DEPEND: RECOVERING AND REPATRIATING ADDITIONAL REMAINS, RESOLVING DISCREPANCY CASES, COOPERATING WITH TRILATERAL INVESTIGATIONS WITH THE LAOTIANS, AND GRANTING ACCESS TO POW/MIA-RELATED DOCUMENTS. RECENT INCREASED EFFORTS TO RESOLVE DISCREPANCY CASES HAVE RESULTED IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE FATES OF 12 INDIVIDUALS, REDUCING THE NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS ON THE PRIORITY LAST-KNOWN-ALIVE DISCREPANCY LIST TO 73. SUCH CASES ORIGINALLY NUMBERED 196. ON SEPTEMBER 1, THE VIETNAMESE GRANTED THE USG ACCESS TO POTENTIALLY VALUABLE DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE DOWNING OF AIRCRAFT ALONG THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL, AND LONG-REQUESTED MILITARY-POLITICAL UNIT DOCUMENTS ON WARTIME POWS. THESE DOCUMENTS ARE BEING ANALYZED TO DETERMINE WHAT ADDITIONAL LIGHT THEY MAY SHED ON THE FATES OF AND/OR THE LOCATIONS OF THE REMAINS OF UNACCOUNTED-FOR AMERICANS. DISCUSSIONS WITH VIETNAMESE AND LAO AUTHORITIES HAVE LED TO A TRILATERAL AGREEMENT TO COLLABORATE ON INVESTIGATIONS ALONG THE BORDER WHERE THERE ARE SCORES OF AIRCRAFT CRASH SITES AND OTHER LOCATIONS WHERE REMAINS ARE LIKELY TO BE FOUND.

Q7: HAVE THE NEXT-OF-KIN OF THE IDENTIFIED AMERICAN SERVICEMEN AND CIVILIAN BEEN NOTIFIED?

A7: YES.

Q8: DO YOU ALLOW PHOTOGRAPHERS TO TAKE PHOTOS OF ANY REMAINS THAT HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED?

A8: WE PLACE A HIGH DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE ON ENSURING THAT REMAINS ARE HANDLED WITH DIGNITY AND RESPECT. WE ALSO CONSIDER THE EMOTIONAL STRESS ENDURED BY THE FAMILIES OF THESE MISSING AMERICANS. FOR THESE REASONS, WE REFRAIN FROM DISPLAYING RECOVERED REMAINS AND DISCOURAGE PUBLIC AND MEDIA PHOTOGRAPHY.

Q9: WHAT IS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S POSITION REGARDING ATTEMPTS BY PRIVATE CITIZENS TO RESCUE POW/MIA'S OR OTHER SUCH PRIVATE INITIATIVES RELATED TO THE LIVE PRISONER ISSUE?

A9: THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS NOT OPPOSED TO PRIVATE EFFORTS BY AMERICAN CITIZENS TO SEEK INFORMATION ABOUT POWS/MIAS, AS LONG AS THOSE PRIVATE EFFORTS DO NOT VIOLATE THE LAWS OF THE U.S. OR OTHER COUNTRIES, DO NOT INTERFERE WITH OFFICIAL POW/MIA ACCOUNTING EFFORTS CONDUCTED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT,

6

AND DO NOT INVADE THE PRIVACY OF THE FAMILIES OF THE MISSING. GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT COOPERATION REMAINS THE ONLY OFFICIAL CHANNEL FOR POW/MIA ACCOUNTING.

Q10: DOES THE U.S. GOVERNMENT PAY FOR THE REMAINS OF MISSING SERVICEMEN?

A10: NO. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY IS TO ACTIVELY PURSUE AND WILLINGLY ACCEPT POW/MIA INFORMATION FROM ANY SOURCE. WE DO NOT VIEW DIRECT PAYMENT TO INDIVIDUALS FOR REMAINS OR INFORMATION AS HELPFUL TO PROMOTING GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT COOPERATION TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE. IN ADDITION, PAYMENT FOR REMAINS OR INFORMATION ENCOURAGES SCAVENGING AT CRASH AND GRAVE SITES BY PEOPLE LACKING THE TECHNICAL RECOVERY ABILITY TO ACCOUNT FOR THE MISSING. SIMILARLY, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DOES NOT PROVIDE REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT AS A REWARD FOR INFORMATION OR REMAINS.

Q11: DO YOU EXPECT TO ACCOUNT FOR EVERY MISSING AMERICAN?

A11: THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF THE USG POW/MIA EFFORT IS TO ACHIEVE THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING FOR ALL AMERICANS UNACCOUNTED FOR AS A RESULT OF THE VIETNAM WAR. ACCOUNTABILITY IS DETERMINED BY THE RETURN OF A LIVE AMERICAN, THE RECOVERY OF HIS REMAINS, OR CONVINCING INFORMATION AS TO WHY NEITHER IS POSSIBLE. WE RECOGNIZE IN MANY CASES IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO RECOVER REMAINS OF AN INDIVIDUAL. IN THOSE CASES WE SEEK TO CONFIRM THE FATE OF THE INDIVIDUAL.

Q12: HOW DOES THE LIFTING OF THE ECONOMIC AND TRADE EMBARGO ON VIETNAM AFFECT THE ON-GOING POW/MIA EFFORTS?

A12: ON FEBRUARY 3, 1994 PRESIDENT CLINTON STATED THAT THE BEST WAY TO ENSURE COOPERATION FROM VIETNAM AND TO CONTINUE GETTING THE INFORMATION AMERICANS WANT ON OUR MISSING IS TO END THE TRADE EMBARGO. THE KEY, THE PRESIDENT SAID, TO CONTINUED PROGRESS LIES IN EXPANDING OUR CONTACTS WITH VIETNAM. LIFTING THE TRADE EMBARGO DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE WILL LESSEN OUR EFFORTS TO OBTAIN AN ACCOUNTING FOR OUR MISSING SERVICE PERSONNEL. ON THE CONTRARY, WE ARE DEVOTING MORE RESOURCES THAN EVER TO FIELD WORK, AND WE ARE CONDUCTING CLOSE AND CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS WITH VIETNAM'S POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS TO INSURE THAT WE LEAVE NO STONE UNTURNED, AND NO QUESTION UNASKED IN OUR PURSUIT OF AN ACCOUNTING FOR OUR MISSING. THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO ON VIETNAM WILL AID RATHER THAN DIMINISH THE EFFORTS OF THE USG TO ENSURE THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING FOR ALL MISSING AMERICANS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

6. QUESTIONS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THIS GUIDANCE SHOULD BE REFERRED TO OATSD(PA). POC FOR PLANS IS [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] DSN 223-1075, COMM (703) 693-1075. POC FOR MEDIA

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

7

QUERIES IS  
697-5131.



DSN 227-5131, COMM (703)

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013





United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

March 4, 1991

[Redacted]

Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear [Redacted]

Because you have been working closely with the family of James Rawlings, I am enclosing for your action a memo about him from the Defense Intelligence Agency.

At the same time I would like to request copies of all available health records, including dental, dental x-ray, and medical x-rays for Mr. Rawlings. These records could be useful in the identification of remains that have recently been repatriated from Vietnam. Even when health records do not pertain directly to the remains under examination, the records for one person can sometimes help identify the remains of another person through the process of elimination.

Thank you very much for your assistance. I will of course keep you informed should any new information develop regarding Mr. Rawlings.

Sincerely,

[Redacted]

[Redacted]



Office of Vietnam, Laos,  
and Cambodia Affairs

Enclosure:

As stated.

[Redacted]


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RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

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TW EA  
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APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE  
09/10/2013



(b)(6)

MEMORANDUM

TO : GEGD/TPE

DATE: 15 September 1967

FROM : BM UDN

REF. No. BMUDN-M67-320

SUBJECT : [redacted] Pirkle death certificates

REF : a. RP TOS 140120  
b. PH COL 130855

Transmitted herewith are two copies of each of the following:

[redacted]

PIRKLE, Lowell Zann = Consul certification of assumed death, memorandum PC-UDN-67/1041, regarding circumstances of death

[redacted]

Atch a/s  
cc: DP/TPE  
PC/UDN  
File

RECEIVED  
21 SEP 1967  
PERSONNEL DIVISION  
FBI

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

!Text Message  
April 17, 1989 !

!Subject: 03:41 P.M. CASUALTY PROBLEM RE James Rawlings

*out for 2nd  
beginning 20 Apr*

!From: [redacted]

!Reply By: Wednesday 4/19/89

!From [redacted] (received Monday 4/17/89 at 03:00 P.M.)


! [redacted] for EA Pers on [redacted] called re fact refugees out of VN claim to have t!

! he remains of an Agency employee, James Rawlings. D IA is looking for info.

! Please contact a DO IC by name of [redacted] on [redacted] [redacted] from Indo China Ops Gr!

! to discuss and assist. Would like a briefing on wh at is really all about.

*Cleared CIA contact*



*7IA office POW & MIA ID + tech. CIA to state disclaim & come to US. Next of kin*

*Photo of ID  
lost in plane crash & no photos recovered*

- !Select Action \* Send Reply
- ! - Forward Message
- ! - Delete Message
- ! 1 of 1. !

**AERONAUTICAL  
MESSAGE DRAFT**

PRIORITY: DD  FF  GG  JJ  KK  LL

ADDRESS PA COL CY RM T08

TEXT : H67 YT 110211 AND RM 110820 X DISCUSSED WITH VTE EMBASSY OFFICIAL  
MR T/CATES X HE DESIRES TO DISCUSS MATTER WITH UDN CONSUL AND  
THEN WILL ADV X EXPECT TO HV REPLY THIS WEEK IF THEY WILL ISSUE  
REPORT OF DLATH X

RP T08 130000

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

ORIGINATOR :

DTG :

CKT NO.

TOT

OPR. SIG.

OPS-407 R3

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

PER/FCA  
Room 2129 NS  
Department of State  
Washington, DC 20520  
ATTENTION:



(b)(6)

28 August 1985

Army Central Identification Laboratory  
Attention: Sgt. First Class   
Fort Shafter, Hawaii 96858

Dear Sgt.

The enclosed identifying information is for Mr. James A. Rawlings, a U.S. government employee who has been missing since January 3, 1975, when a plane on which he was a passenger crashed while on a flight over Vietnam.

The enclosed records consist of dental x-rays, a dental chart and two pages of medical history.

Please let this office know if Mr. Rawlings remains are recovered. Thank you for your cooperation and support.



Administrative Officer

*Received permission from  
to sign for him*  
   
*28 Aug 85*

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted], Special Assistant  
to the Deputy Secretary of State for  
POW/MIA Affairs

VIA : State Department Bureau of Intelligence  
and Research

SUBJECT : Recovery of Remains--Mr. James A. Rawlings

REFERENCE : Memo to you fm [redacted]  
dtd 31 Jul 75, Subject: Background on  
Messrs. James F. Lewis and James A. Rawlings


This Agency would like to take the opportunity to once again request that the State Department intercede through established lines of communication with appropriate contacts in Vietnam to ascertain the definite fate of Mr. James A. Rawlings. Mr. Rawlings, who has been in a missing status since 3 January 1975, is presumed to have perished in the aircraft accident which was detailed in paragraph 4 of the reference. Inasmuch as events precluded a successful conclusion of our recovery operations, we want to pursue all possibilities to locate, identify, and recover Mr. Rawlings' remains. Hopefully, the Vietnamese will be cooperative in such efforts, and the U. S. Government will be able to fulfill its moral obligation to Mr. Rawlings' family of having done everything within its power to get a final resolution of the matter.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS:

[redacted signature box]

CLASSIFIED BY [redacted]  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:  
§ 55(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON  
impossible to determine  
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

[redacted signature box]



~~SECRET~~



DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Missing Person Status - James A.  
Rawlings

REFERENCE :

1. Mr. James A. Rawlings, ~~is~~ a Logistics Officer assigned to the Nha Trang Base, Saigon Station, ~~As you know, he was a~~ passenger on a C-123 cargo plane which disappeared on 3 January 1975 while enroute from Dalat to Nha Trang, South Vietnam. Based upon a computation of flight time with fuel on board, the aircraft was technically considered down at 1900 hours, local time, 3 January 1975.


2. An intensive search and rescue effort followed the disappearance of this aircraft. Bad weather and clouds were a constant problem in the search, however, a recent crash site in the area was identified on 8 January 1975. This area was studied and photographed from the air and the following is extracted from Saigon , dated 14 January 1975:

"Interviews with the pilots, co-pilots and observers on the two Air America helicopters that hovered over the crash site plus examination ----- of photographs by a trained P1 indicate that the crash is a recent one ----- and that it is a C-123 aircraft.

While it is not possible to positively identify the downed aircraft as the missing C-123/ST-1, there have been no reports of any recent plane crashes in the area. The crash site is approximately two KMS south of the expected flight path of the missing C-123."

Although there has not been a positive identification of the plane to date, most observers are convinced that this crash site is the location of the C-123 on which Mr. Rawlings was a passenger. There appears to be no chance that anyone could have survived the crash. A joint recovery mission has been planned but arrangements require considerable coordination, and numerous delays have been encountered. It is hoped that the mission can be carried through in the near future.

3. In view of the information outlined above, it is requested that Mr. James A. Rawlings be officially designated a missing person effective 1900 hours, Nha Trang local time, 3 January 1975. It is further requested that all pay, allowances, and allotments of Mr. Rawlings be continued for the duration of his missing status.

  
Chief, East Asia Division

APPROVED: 

Director of Personnel

Date

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

AB NR 175 QSM  
 STA 316 QSM  
 OXO  
 H67 NT 031320  
 JJJ NO ATTEMPT TO PICK UP TONITE X WILL LAUNCH H57  
 AND PCE AT FIRST LIGHT HQ4  
 RM NT T08 031405

*No memo for EOP this one*

X O X O

RECEIVED  
 4 AUG 1957  
 PERSONNEL DIVISION  
 TAIPEI

NNNN167  
 STA 315 ZFA ZIA  
 XOXO  
 H67  
 AAA TEN TWO  
 BBB UH34D H38  
 CCC T93168  
 DDD APPROX 1145Z  
 EEE P073 M609 T926 X T926 REPORTED BURIED CMA EXTENT UNKNOWN X  
 FFF UNKNOQ N ONE PAX KNOWN INJURED CMA EXTENT UNKNOWN  
 GGG UNKNOWN  
 HHH HOSTILE ACTION  
 LLL UNKNOWN  
 JJJ AWAITING INFO ON EXTENT OF INJURIES AND FEASIBILITY OF NIGHT EVAC X CREW NOW IN CAMP OF FRIENDLY FORCES X CONTRACT  
 KKK P078  
 RM/NT T08 031320

*994*

X O X O

RECEIVED  
 4 AUG 1957  
 PERSONNEL DIVISION  
 TAIPEI

FEABNR 203  
169 1430 LC 155  
FR RCTPFAQQ  
111255 VTBDEAOK  
PA AV C01 CY AA RH C01

H67 MT XOXO 111220 X IN VIEW CREW H43 MISSING AND PROBABLE RESULT OF  
RECOVERY EFFORTS IN H43 ACCIDENT AND REPORTED INTENTIONS WIFE OF  
[REDACTED] TO RTN FROM TRIP CONUS ON OR ABOUT H17 CMA SUGGEST  
RELATIVES BE NOTIFIED AND REQUESTED TO HAVE HER DEPARTURE FROM HOME  
STOPPED X HER TRIP CONUS PARTLY DUE HEART CONDITION AND TREATMENT  
CMA THEREFORE IN U-AGREE THIS PROCEDURE FURTHER SUGGEST APPROPRIATE  
MEDICAL SUPERVISION BE AVAIL WHEN INFO IS GIVEN TO HER X ADDRESS

[REDACTED]

RM/RP/NT T08 1111230

RECEIVED  
12 AUG 1967  
PERSONNEL DIVISION  
TAIPEI

AB NR175  
CTA129 1115 LC 111  
LL RCTRFAPA  
111031 VTBDEAOK  
PA C01 CPY RP T08

H67 YT 110211 RE PIRKLE STATUS X MRS PIRKLE INFORMED BY RM T08 THAT  
PAPA 073 AND MAMA 629 WERE TOLD BY LAO MAJOR THAT HE HAD SEEN PIRKLE  
HIT BY UNFRIENDLY FIRE AND FALL BACK INTO HELICOPTER H38 WHICH IMMEDIATELY  
BURST INTO FLAME AND WAS TOTALLY CONSUMED X AAM CREW DID NOT OBSERVE  
SINCE THEY WERE ON OPPOSITE SIDE FROM THE HELICOPTER DOOR X THE CREW  
AND FRIENDLIES REMAINED IN VICINITY OF REMAINS OF H38 FOR OVER 3  
HOURS AND NO OTHER SURVIVORS WERE LOCATED X HELICOPTER REMAINS  
COULD NOT BE EXAMINED DUE CONTINUING UNFRIENDLY ACTIVITY AND  
HURRIED EVACUATION OF AREA BY CREW AND FRIENDLIES X THE LOCATION IS  
STILL INACCESSIBLE AND MAY REMAIN SO FOR SOMETIME X CONSENSUS OF  
OPINION REPEAT OPINION HERE IS THAT PIRKLE PERISHED IN THE AIRCRAFT  
WHICH WAS DESTROYED BY FIRE X

RM T08 110820

RECEIVED  
12 AUG 1967  
PERSONNEL DIVISION  
TAIPEI

COR..... TEXT THIRD LINE... H38 WHICH IMMEDIATELY BURST INTO FLAME... ETC

PK  
[Signature]

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

**AERONAUTICAL  
MESSAGE DRAFT**

PRIORITY:

DD

FF

GG

JJ

KK

LL

ADDRESS : PA C01 CPY RF T08

TEXT : H67 YT 110211 RE PIRKLE STATUS X MRS PIRKLE INFORMED BY  
RM T08 THAT PAPA 073 AND MAMA 609 WERE TOLD BY LAO MAJOR  
THAT HE HAD SEEN PIRKLE HIT BY UNFRIENDLY FIRE AND FALL  
BACK INTO HELICOPTER H-38 WHICH IMMEDIATELY BURST INTO  
FLAME AND WAS TOTALLY CONSUMED X AAM CREW DID NOT OBSERVE  
SINCE THEY WERE ON OPPOSITE SIDE FROM THE HELICOPTER DOOR X  
THE CREW AND FRIENDLIES REMAINED IN VICINITY OF REMAINS OF  
H-38 FOR OVER 3 HOURS AND NO OTHER SURVIVORS WERE LOCATED X  
HELICOPTER REMAINS COULD NOT BE EXAMINED DUE CONTINUING  
UNFRIENDLY ACTIVITY AND HURRIED EVACUATION OF AREA BY  
CREW AND FRIENDLIES X THE LOCATION IS STILL INACCESSIBLE  
AND MAY REMAIN SO FOR SOMETIME X CONSENSUS OF OPINION  
REPEAT OPINION HERE IS THAT PIRKLE PERISHED IN THE AIRCRAFT  
WHICH WAS DESTROYED BY FIRE X

ORIGINATOR :

RM T08 110820

DTG :

CKT No.

TOT

OPR. SIG.

OPS 407 R3

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

Here are the completed forms  
as you requested.

I am going to prepare a "Report  
of ~~Death~~ Presumed Death of an  
American Citizen" on <sup>Pirkle</sup> ~~Pirkle~~ (A.). Please  
complete the attached blank form  
FS-192 as you did for  and  
 and return to me. It  
would help if you could get a  
certified statement from the two  
Americans who survived stating he  
was dead.

Best regards,

C06116959

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

□(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

<b>TRANSMITTAL SLIP</b>		DATE
		1/16/76
TO:		
ROOM NO.	DOOR NO.	
REMARKS:		
<p>There are some copies of two memo's to D/Pres, D/ Finance, &amp; one memo for record Please retain in this file per CIBSO</p>		
FROM:		
ROOM NO.		SION

FORM NO. 241  
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 35-8  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

~~SECRET~~

14 Jan 76

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : RAWLINGS, James A. - Review and  
Recommendations Regarding Missing  
Person Status

1. Mr. James A. Rawlings was a passenger on a C-123 cargo plane which disappeared on 3 January 1975 while enroute from Dalat to Nha Trang, South Vietnam. As a result of your review of the circumstances, he was placed in a missing status under the provisions of the Missing Persons Act.

2. In accordance with HR 20-34 a review is required to determine if Mr. Rawlings' should be continued in a missing status beyond the initial 12-month period. On 17 December 1975 I met with [redacted] of EA Division to discuss the current status of this case and further action that would be required. It was agreed that EA Division would prepare a summary of all significant information and that their recommendations would be considered by the Ad Hoc Committee on Missing Persons at a meeting in early January 1976.

3. Our Committee met on 7 January 1976. Attached are the minutes of the Committee meeting (Tab A) and the EA request for formal determination of presumptive death (Tab B). It is the unanimous recommendation of our Committee that Mr. James A. Rawlings be declared presumptively dead as of 3 January 1976.

4. Attached for your signature is a memorandum to the Director of Finance (Tab C) which will be required to terminate pay and allowances for Mr. Rawlings in the event that you make a determination of presumptive death.

[redacted]  
Deputy Director of Personnel

Atts

Distribution:

- 0 - Addressee
- 1 - DD/Pers
- 2 - C/BSD

OP/BSD/[redacted]:jp (13 Jan 76)

~~SECRET~~



APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

14 JAN 76

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

SUBJECT : Termination of Pay and Allowances -  
Mr. James A. Rawlings

REFERENCE : Memo fr D/Pers to D/Fin, dtd 12 Mar  
75, Subject: Missing Person -  
James A. Rawlings

1. Reference memorandum authorized the continuation of pay and allowances for Mr. James A. Rawlings based on my determination that he qualified for the benefits of the Missing Persons Act.

2. After review of all the circumstances in this case and pursuant to paragraph e(4), [redacted], I have now determined that a reasonable presumption exists that Mr. James A. Rawlings is no longer alive. For the purpose of this presumptive determination of death, it is presumed that death occurred on 3 January 1976 and Mr. Rawlings' pay and allowances should be terminated as of that date.

[redacted]

Director of Personnel

Distribution:

- |                    |                           |            |
|--------------------|---------------------------|------------|
| 0 & 1 - Addressee  | 1 - OF                    | [redacted] |
| 1 - D/Pers         | 1 - OGC                   | [redacted] |
| 1 - C/EA Pers      | 1 - OMS                   | [redacted] |
| 1 - C&CS           | 1 - LOG                   | [redacted] |
| 1 - CI [redacted]  | 1 - OPF (Personal File)   | [redacted] |
| 1 - SEC [redacted] | 2 - C/BSD(1 w/held) - PAS | [redacted] |

OP/BSD/[redacted]:jp (13 Jan 76)

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

9 January 1976

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Missing Persons Committee Meeting  
 Regarding Mr. James A. Rawlings

1. The Committee met on 7 January 1976 to review the status of Mr. Rawlings and to recommend appropriate action. Attending this meeting were:

Personnel - [REDACTED]

EA - [REDACTED] Robert Chin, [REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CI - John O'Reilly

Security - [REDACTED]

OGC - [REDACTED]

Medical - [REDACTED]

Logistics - [REDACTED]

Finance - [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] opened the meeting by indicating that the purpose was to bring together all available information on the missing status of Mr. James A. Rawlings and to obtain the recommendations of concerned Agency components for consideration by the Director of Personnel. An excellent summary of information is contained in a 20 December 1975 memorandum from Chief, EA which [REDACTED] read to the Committee. [REDACTED] then invited office representatives to present any additional information or reservations about a determination of presumptive death in this case.

3. Mr. Chin was the Chief of Base, Nha Trang and [REDACTED] was his Support Officer in January 1975. Both officers were of the opinion that Mr. Rawlings was in fact a passenger on the

[REDACTED]

cargo plane designated ST-1, that it crashed about 15 miles from Nha Trang on 3 January 1975 and that there were no survivors. In response to questions, Mr. Chin said that he did not believe there were parachutes aboard ST-1, and [ ] said that there was no question in his mind that Mr. Rawlings was aboard ST-1 even though a specific manifest did not exist. Based upon his knowledge of the situation, Mr. Chin had no reservations with regard to a finding of presumptive death.

4. Pictures of the crash site were made available by EA for the review of Committee members. [ ] asked that the pictures and operational reports be established by EA as permanent records and that they be retained in such a manner that they could be used for reference in the future.

5. When the discussion was completed, [ ] asked if there was any additional input. There was none and he indicated that he would advise the Director of Personnel that it was the unanimous recommendation of the Committee that Mr. James A. Rawlings be declared presumptively dead as of 3 January 1976. If this finding is made, the following action will be necessary:

EA - Prepare personnel action reflecting Death and document T&A's accordingly. Request Exceptional Service Medallion

CCS - Determine whether CCS or OP will obtain Foreign Service report of death of an American citizen abroad.

LOG/EA - Consider possibility of honor award.

BSD - Arrange to brief wife along with EA representative and to assist with death benefits.

Discuss with OWCP the best approach to a case which may involve a claim against an airline.

Prepare FECA claim.

Finance - Be prepared to issue lump-sum final check to Mrs. Rawlings on an expeditious basis. Computation to be made at overseas payrate.

6. [ ] indicated, in response to a question from Mr. Chin, that we have a continuing obligation to Mrs. Rawlings to keep this matter before the Department of State. We will make every effort to use the influence and resources of the Agency toward the location and return of the remains of Mr. Rawlings to the United States. The regular members of the

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

DATE  
TIME

Missing Persons Committee will be convened as necessary to  
monitor and direct these efforts. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Chief, Benefits and Services Division

DATE  
TIME

Aircraft Accident Review

15 September 1967

ACCIDENT

LOCATION : TH-2867, Laos

A/C : UH-34D, H-38

DATE : 3 August 1967

CREW : 

TYPE ACCIDENT : Unfriendly action

DAMAGE : Aircraft destroyed

Comments by Safety:

The flight departed IS131 on a routine mission to evacuate wounded personnel from an up-country landing zone (TH-2867).

Upon arriving over the landing zone, the captain noted that an incorrect signal was being displayed; therefore, he elected not to land at the site. The pilot then returned to his point of departure and through radio contact with personnel at TH-2867 he gave them instruction as to display of the correct signal. After returning to TH-2867 a normal landing was made; however, within 30 seconds the aircraft was hit by projectiles fired by hostile forces and the aircraft was totally destroyed by fire.

The pilot and first officer evacuated the aircraft safely receiving minor injuries; however, the flight mechanic and one indigenous passenger did not evacuate and were fatally injured by fire or projectiles or both.

After the initial attack ceased, the two crew members joined the local troop commander for the purposes of security and possible assistance. Shortly thereafter the area came under mortar attack.

Later in the evening the surviving crew members, along with the local troops, departed TH-2867 by foot and they were picked up the following day by an Air Force rescue aircraft and returned to Udorn.

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

## MEMORANDUM

(b)(6)

TO [REDACTED], U.S. Embassy, VTE DATE: 24 August 1967  
FROM : Personnel Manager, Air America, Inc., UDN REF. No. FO-UDN-67/1041  
SUBJECT: L. Z. Pirkle

Encl: Rough draft of Report of the Death of an American Citizen

The rough draft of Report of Death of an American Citizen of L. Z. Pirkle is forwarded herewith.

The circumstances surrounding the death of Mr. Pirkle are as follows:

H-38 landed on the pad and was hit by unfriendly fire on the right side behind the pilot. They tried lift off with no results and the pilot and co-pilot exits through the co-pilot window on the left side of the aircraft. Seconds later the aircraft was hit again and fire started. Local Laos in foxhole on the right side of the aircraft reported that Pirkle fell back into the cabin on the first hit and did not exit the aircraft which then was destroyed by fire.

The aircraft was hot, and unfriendly action for over three hours, prevented the pilot from returning to the aircraft to search for remains. Due to continuing unfriendly activity, the crew and friendlies evacuated the area.

The location is still inaccessible and may remain so for sometime.

It is the consensus of opinion that Pirkle perished in the aircraft which was destroyed by fire.

I hope this is sufficient information for the issuance of Report of Death of an American Citizen.

The pad  
was encircled  
by friendly forces  
in foxholes, and  
any one exiting  
the helicopter  
would almost  
certainly be observed.

cc: BM UDN  
file

[REDACTED]

## MEMORANDUM

(b)(6)

TO [REDACTED], U.S. Embassy, VTE DATE: 24 August 1967  
FROM Personnel Manager, Air America, Inc., UDN REF. No. PO-UDN-67/1041  
SUBJECT L. Z. Pirkle

Encl: Rough draft of Report of the Death of an American Citizen

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The aircraft was hot, and unfriendly action for over three hours, prevented the pilot from returning to the aircraft to search for remains. The pad was encircled by friendly forces in foxholes, and any one exiting the helicopter would almost certainly been observed. Due to continuing unfriendly activity, the crew and friendlies evacuated the area.

The location is still inaccessible and may remain so for sometime.

It is the consensus of opinion that Pirkle perished in the aircraft which was destroyed by fire.

I hope this is sufficient information for the issuance of Report of Death of an American Citizen.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

cc : BM UDN  
file

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

Field Executive Office  
APO: San Francisco 96239

DLC-67-219

August 12, 1967

REC'D WAS AUG 21 1967

[Redacted]  
Assistant Deputy Commissioner  
U.S. Department of Labor  
Bureau of Employees' Compensation  
1833 Kalakaua Avenue, Room 610  
Honolulu, Hawaii 96815

Dear [Redacted]:

Enclosed please find BEC Forms 202 and 261 for Mr. Lowell Z. Pirkle.

The pilot and copilot of the aircraft involved in this incident escaped from the copilot window on the opposite side of the helicopter from the cabin door and therefore neither is able to confirm the verbal statements of friendly Laotian troops, who were in foxholes on the same side of the aircraft as the cabin door. These Lao witnesses stated that they saw Mr. Pirkle fall back into the aircraft from the cabin door immediately after the aircraft was struck by the first round and that shortly thereafter the second round struck and the aircraft was consumed by fire. They stated that Mr. Pirkle was not seen to exit. The pilot and copilot remained in the area with friendly troops for three hours before walking out with them. During this time there was no sign of Mr. Pirkle having escaped the aircraft.

The area where the incident occurred has been overrun by unfriendly troops and when it will again become accessible is indeterminate at present. No death certificate has yet been issued. We will appreciate your advising what payments we can make to Mrs. Pirkle under the circumstances and any advice you may have to further handling of this case.

At the time of the accident Mr. Pirkle was performing under the provisions of AF62(531)-1841.

Very truly yours,

Original signed by  
[Redacted]

[Redacted]  
Deputy Legal Counsel

Encl.

bcc: ✓ Counsel-WAS via MGDR, President  
T-C  
SLC - (2)  
DP (2) - BEC File  
P/File



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR			BUREAU OF EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION		
<b>EMPLOYER'S FIRST REPORT OF ACCIDENT OR OCCUPATIONAL ILLNESS</b>			1. BEC CASE NUMBER <span style="float: right;">A</span>		
SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE			2. CARRIER'S NUMBER		
7. NAME OF INJURED EMPLOYEE (TYPE OR PRINT) →			4. DATE OF INJURY (Month, day, year)		
FIRST NAME	MIDDLE INITIAL	LAST NAME	August 3, 1967		
Lowell	Z.	Pirkle			
5. EMPLOYEE'S ADDRESS (Number, street, city, State, zip code)			6. ACCIDENT IS BEING REPORTED UNDER THE FOLLOWING ACT (Check one, see instructions on reverse)		
Albuquerque, New Mexico (permanent)			<input type="checkbox"/> LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DEFENSE BASE ACT <input type="checkbox"/> NONAPPROPRIATED FUND INSTRUMENTALITIES ACT <input type="checkbox"/> OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS ACT <input type="checkbox"/> DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT		
7. SEX	8. AGE OR DATE OF BIRTH	9. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MALE <input type="checkbox"/> FEMALE	March 29, 1931				
10. ON DATE OF INJURY, GIVE	a. HOUR BEGAN WORK	b. HOUR OF ACCIDENT	c. DID EMPLOYEE STOP WORK IMMEDIATELY?		
→	0700L	M 1745L	M <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	N/A	
11. DID INJURY CAUSE LOSS OF TIME BEYOND DAY OR SHIFT OF ACCIDENT?	12. DATE AND HOUR EMPLOYEE FIRST DID NOT RETURN TO WORK	13. DATE AND HOUR PAY STOPPED.			
<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	N/A	August 3, 1967			
14. DATE AND HOUR EMPLOYEE RETURNED TO WORK	15. OCCUPATION (Job title, longshoreman, welder, etc.)	16. NUMBER OF YEARS IN THIS OCCUPATION			
N/A	Helicopter Flight Mechanic				
17. INJURED WHILE DOING SUCH WORK?	18. YEARS IN YOUR EMPLOY	19. NUMBER OF DAYS USUALLY WORKED PER WEEK	20. IF INJURED ON A VESSEL, WHAT WAS BEING DONE TO, ON, OR FROM THE VESSEL? (Check one)		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO (If "no" explain in item 25.)	2 years 2 months	70 hours/month	<input type="checkbox"/> LOADING OR UNLOADING <input type="checkbox"/> REPAIR OR CONVERSION <input type="checkbox"/> NEW SHIP CONSTRUCTION <input type="checkbox"/> SHIPBREAKING (Demolition) <input type="checkbox"/> DREDGING <input type="checkbox"/> MARINE CONSTRUCTION* <input type="checkbox"/> MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES*		
21. WAGES OR EARNINGS (Include overtime, allowances, etc.) →	a. HOURLY RATE	b. DAILY RATE	c. WEEKLY	d. YEARLY	*See instructions on reverse
Earnings exceeded those requiring maximum compensation.					
22. EXACT PLACE WHERE ACCIDENT OCCURRED (See instructions on reverse)			23. NAME OF FOREMAN OR SUPERVISOR AT TIME OF ACCIDENT		
24 miles NE of Luang Prabang Laos					
			24. EARLIEST DATE FOREMAN OR EMPLOYER KNEW OF ACCIDENT		
			August 3, 1967		
25. DESCRIBE IN FULL HOW THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED (Relate the events which resulted in the injury or occupational disease. Tell what the injured was doing at the time of the accident. Tell how it happened and how it happened. Name any objects or substances involved and tell how they were involved. Give full details on all factors which led or contributed to the accident.)					
Shortly after landing at a friendly helipad, the aircraft of which subject was a crew member was struck twice by 57mm recoilless rifle rounds. Local friendly troops stated they saw subject fall back into aircraft from the cabin door after the first round struck the aircraft above and to the right of the door. Aircraft was destroyed by fire after the second round struck. Subject was not seen to exit. As the area was overrun by unfriendly elements no examination or recovery of remains has been possible.					
26. NATURE OF INJURY (Name part of body affected—fractured left leg, bruised right thumb, etc. If there was a loss of part of the body, describe.) →	See 25 above.				
27. IF YOU PROVIDED OR AUTHORIZED MEDICAL ATTENTION, GIVE DATE. IF NOT, EXPLAIN WHY			28. DATE INSURANCE CARRIER NOTIFIED		
N/A					
29. NAME OF PHYSICIAN			30. ADDRESS (Number, street, city, State, zip code)		
N/A			N/A		
31. NAME OF HOSPITAL			32. ADDRESS (Number, street, city, State, zip code)		
N/A			N/A		
33. NAME OF INSURANCE CARRIER			34. ADDRESS (Number, street, city, State, zip code)		
Self-insured			See item 36 below		
35. NAME OF EMPLOYER (Individual or firm name)			36. ADDRESS OF REPORTING OFFICE (Number, street, city, State, zip code)		
Air America, Inc.			APC San Francisco 96239		
37. NATURE OF EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS		38. SIGNATURE	FOR EMPLOYER		
General Aviation					
39. OFFICIAL TITLE OF PERSON SIGNING THIS REPORT			40. DATE OF THIS REPORT		

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

Case No. \_\_\_\_\_

Insurance  
Carrier's No. \_\_\_\_\_

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR-Bureau of Employees' Compensation

Office of Deputy Commissioner  
Administering Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act

PRESUMED

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF EMPLOYER IN DEATH CASE

This notice, in duplicate, to be filed promptly with the Deputy Commissioner in every fatal case in addition to Form US-202, "Employer's First Report of Injury."

If this form is sent to the insurance carrier by the employer, the insurance carrier should immediately forward the same, in duplicate, to the Deputy Commissioner.

All questions should be answered fully, adding under heading of "Remarks" any further information not otherwise called for

1. Name of employer Air America, Inc.
2. Office address: Street and No. APO San Francisco 96239 City or town \_\_\_\_\_
3. Name of deceased Lowell Zinn Pirkle
4. Address: Street and No.  City or town
5. Date of accident ~~September 10, 1966~~ August 3, 1967 Date of death August 3, 1967
6. Place of death 24 miles NE of Luang Prabang Laos
7. Last physician N/A  
(Name) (Address)
8. Last hospital N/A  
(Name) (Address)
9. Married  single \_\_\_\_\_ age \_\_\_\_\_
10. Name and address of widow or nearest relative (if relative state relationship)  
Mrs. Deborah L. Pirkle (widow)   
(Name) Albuquerque New Mexico  
(Address)
11. Name of Insurance Carrier (not broker) Self-insured

REMARKS: (State fully any other facts.)

No Death Certificate or Report of Death of American Citizen has yet been issued. The area where the incident occurred has been overrun by unfriendly troops and the amount of time before it will again be accessible is indeterminate at present. See details under item 25 of BEC Form 202 submitted for Mr. Pirkle and the comments on our cover letter attached.

Firm name Air America, Inc.

Signed \_\_\_\_\_

Dated 13 August, 1967 Official title \_\_\_\_\_

FORM BEC-261, March 1963. Replaces US-261 which may be used

GPO 165-444

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE  
09 Dec 2013



(b)(6)

MEMORANDUM

TO: [redacted] U.S. Embassy, VTE      DATE: 24 August 1967  
FROM: Personnel Manager, Air America, Inc., UDN      REF. No. PO-UDN-67/1041  
SUBJECT: L. Z. Pirkle

Encl: Rough draft of Report of the Death of an American Citizen

The rough draft of Report of Death of an American Citizen of L. Z. Pirkle is forwarded herewith.

The circumstances surrounding the death of Mr. Pirkle are as follows:


H-38 landed on the pad and was hit by unfriendly fire on the right side behind the pilot. They tried lift off with no results and the pilot and co-pilot exited through the co-pilot window on the left side of the aircraft. Seconds later the aircraft was hit again and fire started. Local Lao in foxhole on the right side of the aircraft reported that Pirkle fell back into the cabin on the first hit and did not exit the aircraft which then was destroyed by fire.

The aircraft was hot, and unfriendly action for over three hours, prevented the pilot from returning to the aircraft to search for remains. The pad was encircled by friendly forces in foxholes, and any one exiting the helicopter would almost certainly be observed. Due to continuing unfriendly activity, the crew and friendlies evacuated the area.

The location is still inaccessible and may remain so for sometime.

It is the consensus of opinion that Pirkle perished in the aircraft which was destroyed by fire.

I hope this is sufficient information for the issuance of Report of Death of an American Citizens.



cc : BM UDN  
file

ASSUMED  
REPORT OF THE DEATH OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
01-Dec-2013

Vientiane, Laos September 12, 1967

(Place and date)

Name in full Lowell Zinn Firkle Occupation Flight Mechanic

Native or naturalized Native Last known address

in the United States [Redacted] Albuquerque, New Mexico

Date of death August 3 1967 Age 36  
(Month) (Day) (Hour) (Minute) (Year) (As nearly as can be ascertained)

Place of death TR2267 Laos  
(Number and street) or (Hospital or hotel) (City) (Country)

Cause of death Aircraft Accident - See attached memorandum  
(Include authority for statement)

Disposition of the remains N/A

Local law as to disinterring remains N/A

Disposition of the effects Stored at Air America Udorn pending receipt of shipping / instructions

Person or official responsible for custody of effects and accounting therefor Air America

Informed by Base Manager, Udorn.

NAME	ADDRESS	RELATIONSHIP	DATE SENT
Deborah L. Firkle	[Redacted]	- Wife	

Copy of this report sent to:

NAME	ADDRESS	RELATIONSHIP	DATE SENT
Secretary of State	Washington, D.C.		Sept. 15, 1967
Mrs. Deborah Firkle	[Redacted]	Wife	Sept. 15, 1967
Air Consulate	Udorn, Thailand		Sept. 15, 1967
Air America, Inc.	Udorn, Thailand		Sept. 15, 1967

Traveling or residing abroad with relatives or friends as follows:

NAME	ADDRESS	RELATIONSHIP
Deborah L. Firkle	[Redacted]	Wife
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]

Other known relatives (not given above):

NAME	ADDRESS	RELATIONSHIP
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]

This information and data concerning an inventory of the effects, accounts, etc., have been placed under File 234 in the correspondence of this office.

Remarks: Passport to be turned over to the U.S. Consul, Udorn for cancellation.

To date the site of the aircraft is still inaccessible.

Certified to be a true copy:

[Redacted Signature] (Continue reverse if necessary.)  
Asst Base Manager, AAM, UDORN

[SEAL]

No fee prescribed.

(Signature on all copies)

[Redacted Signature] Consul of the United States of America.

C06116969  
APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL

EMPLOYEE ACCIDENT REPORT

(b)(6)

Department Ref. No. EAR-67-029

Name L. Z. Pirkle Ref. No. 08862 Department RMD  
Job Title Flight Mechanic Permanent Station Udorn

- 1. Date and Time of Accident 3 August 1967 - 1745L
- 3. Exact Place Accident Occurred TH2867
- 4. Equipment Involved Hotel-38
- 5. Description in full of how accident occurred (Relate the events which resulted in the injury. Tell what the injured was doing at the time of the accident. Tell what happened and how it happened. Name any objects or substances involved and tell how they were involved. Give full details on all factors which led or contributed to the accident.)

is presumed to have been  
Employee was/fatally injured in Hotel-38 which was totally destroyed by  
Unfriendly forces.

The area of the accident is inaccessible at this time.

- 6. Apparent Nature and Extent of Injury (Name part of body affected - fractured left leg, bruised right thumb, etc. If there was a loss of part of the body, describe.)  
is presumed to have been  
Employee was/fatally injured.

- 7. a. Time and place of first medical treatment N/A
- b. Name and address of physician N/A
- c. Name and address of hospital N/A
- d. Cost of first treatment N/A
- e. Estimated cost of additional treatment that may be required N/A
- f. Estimated period of hospitalization required N/A
- g. Time/date employee left job N/A
- h. Time/date employee returned to duty N/A
- or-
- i. Estimated time/date employee will return to duty N/A

8. What duties were assigned at the time of the accident and by whom (provide specific instructions given, time duties began and estimated time of completion), and what contract were the duties in connection with, if any

Employee was assigned flight mechanic's duties on Hotel-38

9. a. Did the injured employee follow prescribed safe work practices?

Yes  No

b. Was the employee given instructions regarding safe work practices? N/A for this type of incident  
By whom and in what manner? \_\_\_\_\_

In what publications are the applicable safe work practices prescribed? \_\_\_\_\_

c. If the prescribed safe work practices were not followed what is reason given by employee for not doing so? N/A

10. Names and addresses of other persons involved

--

11. Names and addresses of eye witnesses

N/A

12. Corrective action taken to prevent recurrences of this type of accident

N/A

TO BE DETERMINED BY DP	
<input type="checkbox"/>	NOT IN LINE OF DUTY.
<input type="checkbox"/>	IN LINE OF DUTY. (FOLLOWING APPLICABLE TO REGULAR LABORERS AND WORKERS ON TAIWAN ONLY)
<input type="checkbox"/>	TO RECEIVE PAY PRESCRIBED BY LAW.
<input type="checkbox"/>	TO RECEIVE FULL PAY PRESCRIBED UNDER "PAYMENT DURING ABSENCE DUE LINE OF DUTY INJURY" IN PERSONNEL MANUAL PART ONE A OR PART TWO, AS APPLICABLE.
_____ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL	

FOR PERSONNEL DIVISION USE ONLY						
ROUTING	DP	CPL	W/A	R/S		P/F
INITIALS						
DATE						
DEPARTMENT HEAD NOTIFIED PER PND-RS						
DATED						

\_\_\_\_\_  
Original (NAME) Signed  
By: \_\_\_\_\_  
(SIGNATURE)

CFM/UDN  
(TITLE)  
5 August 1967  
(DATE)

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MTS/UDN  
AAM Clinic, T08  
CFM/UDN  
File  
Dm luan

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

BASE/STATION CLEARANCE SLIP - SEA

Name Pirkle, L. Z. Title F/Mechanic Ref. 08862 Clearance

Forwarding Address [Redacted] Albuquerque, NMEX. Initiated  
by: PO-UDN

Passport No. G-374556 22 Aug '67  
Date

Department/Division/Office RMD Location Udorn

Reason for Clearance (Check): Separation LWOP (over 30 days)  
Home Leave PCS Transfer to

X 1. Immediate Supervisor (Specify Title: CFM MTS) [Redacted] Signature [Redacted] Date 3 AUG 1967

2. Base/Station Operations Manager (For Operations Personnel)

(Clear for Flight Equipment Office  
Crew Scheduling Office  
and Flight Information Service [Redacted])

X 3. Base/Station Personnel Office (The Personnel Office will direct employee to:

X APO [Redacted] X Commissary [Redacted] [Redacted] AUG 23 1967

Hostel N/A X Mail Clerk [Redacted] [Redacted] Co. ID Card #1743 not returned

X Mess Hall [Redacted] Other N/A  
Where applicable and will ensure that employee clears these agencies. Personnel Office Signature will confirm clearance).

X 4. Base/station Supply Office [Redacted] Signature [Redacted] Date AUG 22 1967  
(Clear and note arrangement for shipment of personal effects: [Redacted])

X 5. Base/Station Security Office

RECEIVED  
29 AUG 1967  
PERSONNEL DIVISION  
TAIPEI

X 6. Base/Station Accounting Office

[Redacted] H22  
[Redacted] Aug 22, 1967

X 7. Base/Station Manager (in case of Non-indigenous employees, notify DP of ATD)

[Redacted] 23 AUG 1967

8. Supply Office-BKK (for personnel at VTE, UDN and BKK only; add comments to No. 4 above; must be presented in person when personal effects shipment for personnel at VTE, UDN and BKK is involved)

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(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

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STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

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CITE

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

[Redacted]

CONF: [Redacted]

INFO: FILE [Redacted]

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TO: [Redacted] SAIGON, NHA TRANG. Y

- REFS: A. NHA TRANG [Redacted]
- B. SAIGON [Redacted]
- C. NHA TRANG [Redacted]
- D. NHA TRANG [Redacted]
- E. NHA TRANG [Redacted]

1. HQS WISHES ALERT [Redacted] TO POSSIBILITY CINCPAC MAY BE CONSULTED BY [Redacted] REGARDING PROPOSED JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER (JCRC) OPERATION RECOVER REMAINS MR. JAMES A. RAWLINGS, JR. WHO ABOARD CHINA AIRLINES C-123 WHICH CRASHED INTO MOUNTAIN NEAR NHA TRANG ON 3 JAN 75. REFERENCES REPORT PRESENT STALEMATE THIS OPERATION. Y

2. MR. RAWLINGS WAS A GS-10, STAFF EMPLOYEE AND SUPPLY OFFICER, NHA TRANG BASE. C-123 ENROUTE FROM DALAT TO NHA TRANG WITH ONE FILIPINO EMPLOYEE AND FOUR VIETNAMESE EMPLOYEES NHA TRANG BASE AND THREE CHINA AIRLINES CREW. [Redacted]

EM

DATE:  
ORIG:  
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EXT:

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CL BY: [Redacted]



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[Redacted]

3. CRASH SITE LOCATED VIC COORDINATE BP 761421 IN STEEP TERRAIN WITH TRIPLE CANOPY GROWTH AND DENSE UNDERBRUSH. (NEAR POSITIVE SITE IDENTIFICATION BUT REMOTE POSSIBILITY STILL EXISTS THAT DEBRIS FROM OTHER THAN AIRCRAFT WE SEEKING.) DEBRIS SCATTERED IN AT LEAST FOUR VISIBLE SITES OVER APPROX 600 YARD AREA. OVERLAND FOOT MARCHES BY VIETNAMESE TROOPS EXPECTED REQUIRE .5 KPH. PRINCIPLE ENEMY THREAT IS SQUAD-SIZED UNIT EQUIPPED WITH SMALL ARMS; SECONDARY THREAT IS BOOBY TRAPS/MINES AT CRASH SITE. SITE AREA FOG SHROUDED FROM ABOUT 1600 UNTIL 0830 RESTRICTING VISUAL FLYING CONDITIONS TO MAX 7.5 HOURS. BELIEVE AT LEAST TWO HELICOPTER LANDING ZONES HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED FOR INSERTION PART SECURITY TROOPS.4.

4. REF A SUMMARIZES POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION AS OF 4 MAR HQS TIME:4

A. WAIT TO SEE WHAT ACTION [Redacted] DECIDED<sup>S</sup> TO

TAKE.4

B. [Redacted]

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C. REQUEST THE VIETNAMESE FORCES ALREADY ASSEMBLED  
 MR II TO COMPLETE RECOVERY OP INDEPENDENTLY OF JCRC  
 PARTICIPATION. US PERSONNEL TO REMAIN NHA TRANG AND NOT  
 INSERT AT CRASH SITE.4

5. EVERYONE CONCERNED THAT ADDITIONAL HUMAN LIFE NOT BE  
 JEOPARDIZED UNDULY OR LOST DURING RECOVERY EFFORTS. THERE NO  
 CHANCE ~~OF~~ FINDING SURVIVORS. EXAMINATION WRECKAGE

*NB*

PHOTOGRAPHS AND PATH PLANE ~~TOOK~~ TOOK THROUGH TREES CLEARLY INDICATED  
*LITTLE CHANCE ANYONE*  
~~COULD~~ *PROBABLY* COULD HAVE SURVIVED. ~~UNDER~~ UNDER OPTIMUM CIRCUM-

STANCES ONLY BONES WILL BE FOUND. SECURITY DIFFICULTIES AND  
 PHYSICAL PROBLEMS OF RECOVERY OPERATIONS LOOM ~~LARGE~~ LARGE. PATTERN  
 ENEMY ACTIVITY IN GENERAL AREA INCLUDE <sup>ING THE</sup> CONTIGUOUS PROVINCES  
 MR II, THE WEATHER, OVERRIDING PRIORITIES FOR USE OF AIRCRAFT,  
 USSAG CONCERN FOR DEVELOPMENTS IN CAMBODIA, AND THE FACT THAT  
 VIETNAMESE TROOPS ARE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE FOR THE INSERT OPERA-  
 TIONS 6 MARCH AND MAY OR MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE AGAIN IN THE NEAR

*Ear*

DATE:  
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FUTURE ARE THE MAJOR FACTORS INVOLVED.4

6. AGENCY WANTS VERY MUCH TO DETERMINE IF MR. RAWLINGS IS DEAD OR IF HIS REMAINS CANNOT BE LOCATED. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IF WE DON'T MOVE SOON, ODDS INCREASE THAT WE MAY NEVER FIND EVIDENCE MR. RAWLINGS WAS KILLED IN THIS CRASH.4

7. REF A REPORTS IN CONFIDENCE THAT [REDACTED] AGONIZING ON WHETHER OR NOT RECOVERY MISSION WAS WITHIN THE JCRC CHARTER. IF COS, VIETNAM DOES NOT OBJECT, REQUEST [REDACTED] CONTACT CINCPAC, EXPLAIN OUR INTEREST, AND ASK IF THEY AGREE THAT THIS RECOVERY MISSION OF A USG EMPLOYEE'S REMAINS IS CLEARLY WITHIN THE JCRC CHARTER. IF THEY AGREE, REQUEST THEY SO ADVISE [REDACTED]

IF NOT, ADVISE US.

[REDACTED] AGENCY DEFERS TO CINCPAC AND CG/USSAG REGARDING FEASIBILITY AND CONDUCT RECOVERY MISSION. LATEST SECURITY ASSESSMENT CRASH SITE CONTAINED REF D PARA 3. PLEASE ADVISE. E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 4 MAR 75

COORD: [REDACTED]

ORIG: [REDACTED]  
 UNIT: [REDACTED]  
 EXT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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CONF: [REDACTED]

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TO: PRIORITY SAIGON, INFO PRIORITY NHA TRANG.Y

[REDACTED]

REF: SAIGON [REDACTED] IN 455730[Y

1. RECOGNIZE DIFFICULTIES STATION FACING IN SAR EFFORTS DUE WIDE SEARCH AREA, ADVERSE WEATHER, TERRAIN, AND AREA SECURITY. NEED HOWEVER, /ALL DATA POSSIBLE TO KEEP ABREAST HERE AND REASSURE MRS. RAWLINGS OF MAX EFFORTS LOCATE CRASH SITE AND CONDUCT RESCUE MISSION. REQUEST SAIGON PROVIDE SITUATION UPDATE AND RECAP TO INCLUDE SUCH AS:Y
  - A. WEATHER IN AREA SINCE ACCIDENT.Y
  - B. USE OF SEARCH AIRCRAFT INVOLVED SO FAR BY TYPES AND FLIGHT HOURS EXPENDED.Y
  - C. TIME/EFFORTS LOST TO WEATHER, DETERMINING AREA SECURITY, FALSE LEADS SUCH AS DOWNED VNAF AIRCRAFT AND BEEPER SIGNAL, ETC.Y
  - D. PREPARATIONS FOR LAUNCHING A RESCUE MISSION.Y
  - E. [REDACTED]
  - F. COORDINATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES.Y

DATE:  
ORIG:  
UNIT:  
EXT:

*[Handwritten signature]*

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CL BY: [REDACTED]

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(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

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642.639

2. ALSO PLS CONTINUE REPORTING UNDER ZRPARKA-54. E2

IMPDET.H

EA/YNO ✓

EA/SUP

DATE: 13 JAN 1975

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

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APPROVED FOR  
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09-Dec-2013

DATA CHECK SHEET  
for  
BOARD OF REVIEW  
RE: EMPLOYEE INJURY/ILLNESS/DEATH

1. Employee: Lowell Z. Pirkle No.: 08862
2. Age: 36 Nationality: USA Passport No.: G374556
3. Permanent/~~Temporary~~
4. Date of Employment: 23 May 1966  
Presumed
5. Date of ~~Injury/Illness~~/Death: \_\_\_\_\_  
Presumed
6. On Date of ~~Injury/Illness~~/Death:
  - a. Job Assignment: Flight Mechanic Duties on H-38
  - b. Contract No.: 1841
  - c. Station of Permanent Assignment: N/A
  - d. Station of Temporary or Provisional Assignment: Udon
  - e. Title: Flight Mechanic
  - f. Salary: FPS Code "CC" + PAA  
Presumed
7. Nature of ~~Injury/Illness~~/Death: Laos witnesses stated subject wounded,  
fell back into aircraft which then consumed by fire due rocket hits while  
on ground.
  - a. Death Certificate: Yes/No
    - (1) Issued by: \_\_\_\_\_
    - (2) At: \_\_\_\_\_ (3) On: \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. Other Documents Obtained: Report of presumed death of American citizen  
issued and enroute.
  - c. Cause of ~~Injury/Illness~~/Death: As reported - due to ~~comp~~ <sup>FATHER LAO</sup> action.  
Presumed
  - d. Period of Last Illness in the Event of Death: N/A
  - e. Hospitalized at N/A  
from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_
  - f. Injury/Illness/Death Occurred at:
    - (1) ~~Site~~: "Friendly" Helipad 24 nautical miles NE of Luang Prabang, Laos.

(1) Date: 3 August 1967

(3) Time: 1745L

g. Accident Reports Submitted: Yes

8. Company Medical Doctor's Report (s):

a. Issued by: N/A

b. On: \_\_\_\_\_

c. Summary: \_\_\_\_\_

9. Any History of Illness/Cause of Death Reflected in Company Records:

a. Yes/No

(1) If so, summarize: N/A

10. Any Medical Waivers in "P" File:

a. Yes/No

b. If so, summarize: N/A

11. Participation in any Company Retirement Plan:

a. Yes/No File No. 1170

b. If so, identify: Air America retirement plan

c. Beneficiary: Deborah Lou Pirkle - Wife

12. Next of Kin Notified:

a. Yes/No

b. If so, when: Day after incident

how: Personally by EM Udorn at Udorn

whom notified Wife, Children & Mother

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

13. Relatives:

a. Spouse: **Deborah Lou Pirkle**

(1) Address: [redacted]

b. Children (Name, age, address)

[redacted]

c. Other: [redacted]

d. Summarize Repatriation Arrangements

**Wife, mother, and [redacted] children all travelled Bangkok-Albuquerque via PAA and TWA HO7 1967 - tickets Company provided**

14. Remains:

a. Disposition: How: **No remains yet**

Where:

When:

15. Washington Office Notified:

a. Yes

How: **TP346**

When: **5 August 1967**

16. Disposition and Beneficiary Form:

a. Yes

b. Name of Beneficiary: **Wife - Deborah Lou Pirkle**

17. Personal Effects:

a. Nature:

b. Location:

c. Disposition, if any:

**Understood carried by family as excess baggage as main shipment was still in [redacted]; main shipment returned to Mrs. Pirkle at Company expense [redacted]**

d. Other: [redacted]



18. Additional Remarks:

FOR DECISION BY THE BOARD OF REVIEW:

1. Injury/Illness/Death -- In Line of Duty/Not in Line of Duty

2. If LOD:

a. Hazardous/Non-Hazardous

b. Basis for Determination:

3. If not LOD:

a. Was cause through employee's misconduct:

b. If so, summarize:

4. Benefits to be Determined:

a. Amount:

b. Basis:

c. To whom to be paid:

d. How payment to be effectuated:

5. Who to bear the following costs:

a. Cost of last illness:

b. Preparation of remains for burial:

c. Repatriation of:

(1) Remains

(2) Rental of containers, etc.

(3) Personal Effects

(4) Disbursements

6. Other Items for Inclusion:

006116975  
APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

PERSONNEL DIVISION  
CLEARANCE SLIP

RECEIVED (b)(6)  
9 AUG 1967  
PERSONNEL DIVISION  
TAIPEI  
Clearance Initiated by:

Name L. Z. Pirkle Title F/Mech Ref. No. 08862

Department/Division/Office RMD Location UDN

Reason for Clearance (Check Below) Effective Date 3 Aug 67 COB Date \_\_\_\_\_


Separation  LWOP  Home Leave  Transfer  Other (Describe)  
Deceased

The above named employee is to clear with the respective Departments/  
Divisions/Offices as indicated hereunder:-


	SIGNATURE	DATE	NOTE
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Supply Division	[Signature]	17/8/67	<p>1. It is the responsibility of the department head concerned to initiate this slip and see that it is completed prior to the effective date of the employee's separation or departure on leave. If final payment is involved, the department head shall see that the Final Payment Instruction form on the reverse side of this slip is properly completed by the employee, before routing this slip. For Main Base Personnel, submit this slip in duplicate. For all others, only one copy is required.</p> <p>2. Before signing the Clearance Slip the responsible person of each office so checked must ensure that there is nothing outstanding or unsettled between the employee and the respective office involved.</p> <p>3. Department/Division/Office head, before affixing his signature, should determine that Company property has been returned and all accounts settled for those matters which are his concern.</p> <p>4. *Tax Manager's clearance is required of all Taiwan-Based employees.</p> <p>5. **To be completed by all persons who are either bank signatories or in a position in which they handle Company accounts and where an audit is necessary prior to assumption of position by successor.</p> <p>6. Paymaster will arrange for settlement of final payment in accordance with the Final Payment Instruction of the employee only after he receives a properly executed Clearance Slip signed by all indicated in the check column as having no outstanding matter.</p> <p>7. Station Manager must ensure that the employee being cleared has no outstanding accounts with the station concerned before he signs the Clearance Slip.</p>
<input type="checkbox"/> Time Keeping Office	_____	_____	
<input type="checkbox"/> Library	_____	_____	
<input type="checkbox"/> Tool Crib	_____	_____	
<input type="checkbox"/> Flight Equipment Office	_____	_____	
<input type="checkbox"/> Office Manager	_____	_____	
<input type="checkbox"/> Station Manager	_____	_____	
<input type="checkbox"/> Regional Director	_____	_____	
<input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Manager	_____	_____	
<input type="checkbox"/> Department Chief	_____	_____	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Division Director	[Signature]	AUG 18 1967	
<input type="checkbox"/> Officer ( )	_____	_____	
<input type="checkbox"/> Other ( )	_____	_____	
<input type="checkbox"/> Airport Security Representative, TPE	_____	_____	
<input type="checkbox"/> Director of Security	[Signature]	21 Aug 67	
<input type="checkbox"/> Passport/Visa Section	[Signature]	31/8/67	
<input type="checkbox"/> Records Section	[Signature]	H/12/67	
<input type="checkbox"/> Wage Admin. Section	[Signature]	H/21/67	
<input type="checkbox"/> Employment Section	[Signature]	H/21/67	
<input type="checkbox"/> Director of Personnel	[Signature]	JP 1/67	
<input type="checkbox"/> Accounts Receivable Department MB (MB employees only)	_____	_____	
<input type="checkbox"/> Accounts Receivable Department-TPE (All employees except Chinese employees at MB)	_____	_____	
<input type="checkbox"/> *Tax Manager	_____	_____	
<input type="checkbox"/> **Treasurer-Controller	_____	_____	
<input type="checkbox"/> Paymaster	_____	_____	

C06116976

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013



~~E C R E T~~ 031035Z JAN 75 STAFF


TE SAIGON 



(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

1: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

ACT



0123K 54-0825 (ST-1) CHINA AIRLINES

MISSING

02/0825Z

UNKNOWN

A40B CUSTOMER, CARGO AIRLIFT FROM DALAT (V-08)  
TO NY

TRANG (V-07)

PIC S.S. LIN JS F/O C.N. JEN

F/M Y. C. SUNG

PASSENGERS: JAMES RAWLINGS ASSIGNED NHA TRANG AS LOGISTICS  
OFFICER FOR NHA TRANG BASE. ONE NHA TRANG FILIPINO EMPLOYEE AND  
UNDISCLOSED NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE.

UNKNOWN

WEATHER AT DALAT UNKNOWN, NHA TRANG WEATHER REPORTED AS 3/8  
T 2000 FT, 4/8 AT 3000 FT, 6/8 AT 7000 FT, LIGHT RAIN VISIBILITY 4  
TO 5 MILES. AT 0925Z AN AIR AMERICA CHOPPER PICKED UP AN EMERGENCY  
BEEPER BETWEEN NHA TRANG (V-08) AND PHAM THIET (V-11). VNAF AND  
AIR AMERICA AIRBORNE ON SEARCH FROM NHA TRANG AT 0930Z. GENERAL  
CARGO ON BOARD, NO CLASSIFIED CARGO. AIRCRAFT RECORDS DO NOT  
INDICATE THAT AIRCRAFT HAS EMERGENCY BEEPER INSTALLED. ROUTE OF  
LIGHT REPORTED AS SECURE AREA. E2 IMPDET

~~E C R E T~~


APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

*056*

REC'D WAS SEP 14 1963

CATAIR WASHINGTONDC

TP220 TP219 AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE SPOTTED IN SEARCH ZONE AT WD 9336  
JUST BEFORE DARK JO7 BUT DARKNESS PREVENTED POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION  
OR OTHER DETERMINATIONS NO REPORTS YET FROM DAWN JO8 SEARCH AIRCRAFT



CC: Washington confirmation copy  
AVP  
DP

CATAIR TAIPEI , SEPT. 8, 1963

MESSAGE CENTER TAIPEI HEAD OFFICE
- 8 SEP 1963
REG NO. <i>831</i>

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PAGE ~~01~~ <sup>7</sup>

N 4648<sup>90</sup>~~77~~

TOR:141528Z JAN 75

~~SECRET~~ 140737Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE SAIGON [ ] (FINAL SECTION OF 2)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY NHA TRANG.

F. SAR PROBLEMS:

SEARCH AND RESCUE EFFORTS HAVE SERIOUSLY BEEN HAMPERED BY WEATHER. ORIGINAL SEARCH AND RESCUE EFFORTS WERE LAUNCHED AT DAYLIGHT ON 4 JANUARY. BEEPER SIGNALS WERE PICKED UP ON 4 JAN SOUTH OF NHA TRANG AND APPROXIMATELY 4 HOURS OF HELICOPTER TIME WAS EXPENDED WITHOUT LOCATING THE BEEPER. ON 4 JANUARY LOCAL VIETNAMESE SOURCES PASSED INFO TO NHA TRANG THAT MILITARY AIRCRAFT WAS DOWN IN THE VICINITY OF SONG MAO. WRECKAGE WAS NEVER LOCATED. ESTIMATE 3 HOURS OF HELICOPTER AND VOLPAR TIME EXPENDED IN THIS ACTION. DURING THIS TIME ADDITIONAL SEARCH ACTIVITIES CONTINUED ON ROUTE OF FLIGHT OF C-123 (ST/1); SECURITY OF AREA MBEEN A DELAYING FACTOR. WRECKAGE OF VNAF C-123 LOCATED AT BP 9745 SLOWED DOWN SEARCH SINCE IT BELIEVED C-123 ST/1 HAD BEEN FOUND. UPON FURTHER EXAMINATION THIS WAS FOUND TO BE IN ERROR.

G. COORDINATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES: ALL REPORTING AND SAR EFFORTS HAVE BEEN CLOSELY COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY AND NHA TRANG

~~SECRET~~

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19-Dec-2013

C06116978

FORM 3020D  
7-71 MFG. 3/74

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
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PAGE ~~02~~ <sup>8</sup>

TOR:141528Z JAN 75

CON-GEN,



2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF NHA TRANG CON-GEN MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR  
DATED 13 JAN 75:

"I BELIEVE WE SHOULD APPLY THE SAME CRITERIA TO THIS RECOVERY  
OPERATION THAT WE DO TO JCRC ACTIVITIES, I.E. THAT WE WILL NOT TAKE  
UNNECESSARY RISKS THAT LIVES (EITHER AMERICAN OR VIETNAMESE) WILL BE  
LOST TO RECOVER BODIES.

ARGUING AGAINST A RECOVERY OPERATION ARE THE FOLLOWING FACTORS.  
THE CRASH SITE IS IN AN AREA IN WHICH THERE ARE KNOWN SMALL VC ARMED  
FORCES AND IT IS POSSIBLE THEY MIGHT SEEK TO SET AN AMBUSH FOR THE

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE <sup>9</sup>~~83~~

IN 4648<sup>70</sup>~~77~~

TOR:141528Z JAN 75

SAIG

RECOVERY PARTY. THE PRESENCE OF HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS AND/OR AN RF SECURITY FORCE WOULD PROBABLY DETER THIS, BUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A FIRE-FIGHT CANNOT BE FULLY RULED OUT. THE PRESENCE OF SEARCH AIRCRAFT AROUND THE SITE MAY HAVE ALERTED THE VC, BUT FINDING IT FROM THE GROUND WILL BE DIFFICULT THROUGH THE HEAVY JUNGLE. BECAUSE THE WRECKAGE IS OFF THE BEATEN TRACK, GVN FORCES WOULD POSE NO THREAT TO VC OPERATING AREAS. HAVING SAID ALL THIS, THE ELEMENT OF RISK IS PRESENT.

IN FAVOR OF CARRYING OUT A RECOVERY EFFORT THROUGH HELICOPTER INSERTION (INVOLVING A JCRC JOLLY GREEN CHOPPER AND POSSIBLY U.S. JCRC EXPERTS) GUARDED BY GUNSHIPS ARE THE FOLLOWING POINTS. THIS TYPE OF OPERATION WOULD HAVE AN ELEMENT OF SURPRISE THAT COULD REDUCE THE CHANCE OF HOSTILE ACTION AND CAREFUL PLANNING MIGHT REDUCE IT FURTHER. THE NATURE OF THE SITE IS SUCH AS TO PREVENT ANYTHING BUT SMALL ARMS FIRE FROM DIRECTLY AT THE SITE. THE GUNSHIPS WOULD DETER THIS. ONE ARGUMENT THAT WEIGHS HEAVILY IN MY JUDGMENT IS THAT THIS IS A RECENT LOSS WHICH HAS HIT THIS SMALL STAFF HARD. THEIR DEDICATION IN MANNING SEARCH FLIGHTS IN BAD WEATHER IS EVIDENCE OF THE STRENGTH OF THEIR FEELINGS ABOUT THIS LOSS. I THEREFORE FEEL WE SHOULD DO EVERYTHING WE PRUDENTLY CAN TO

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE <sup>10</sup> 84

IN 464877

TOR:141528Z JAN 75

TRY TO EFFECT A RECOVERY. (I WOULD NOTE THAT IT IS A DISCIPLINED STAFF WHICH WILL ACCEPT A NEGATIVE DECISION IF THE REAYONS ARE EXPLAINED TO THEM).

I HAVE CONSIDERED WHETHER DELAY MIGHT BE ADVISABLE, SINCE IT IS VIRTUALLY CERTAIN THAT THERE ARE NO SURVIVORS AND THE AREA MIGHT BE MORE SECURE AT SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE. I DO NOT BELIEVE THIS IS A LIKELY POSSIBILITY IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

ONE MORE FACTOR YOU SHOULD CONSIDER IS THAT IF WE GO AHEAD ON THIS OPERATION IN THE FACE OF THE RISKS INVOLVED, IT COULD INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON YOU TO APPROVE MORE RISKY JCRC CASES.

HAVING WEIGHED ALL THE CONSIDERATIONS DISCUSSED ABOVE, I BELIEVE THAT THE RISKS INVOLVED ARE SUFFICIENTLY SMALL AND THE REASONS FOR ACCEPTING THEM SUFFICIENHLY COMPELLING THAT I RECOMMEND THAT YOU APPROVE A RECOVERY EFFORT. I WILL REVIEW THE RECOVERY PLAN IN DETAIL AND AM PREPARED TO RESUBMIT IT TO YOU IF OTHER ELEMENTS OF RISK EMERGE FROM THIS REVIEW."

[Redacted]

3. AMBASSADOR HAS APPROVED NHA TRANG CONGEN RECOMMENDATION FOR USE OF JCRC IN RECOVERY OF REMAINS OF CRASH VICTIMS. ACTION NOW IN PROGRESS ON PLANNING TO IMPLEMENT AMBASSADOR'S DECISION. WE WILL

~~SECRET~~

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C06116978

FORM 3020b  
7-71 MFG. 3/74

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PAGE ~~25-05~~ <sup>11-11</sup>

IN 464877 <sup>90</sup>

TOR:141528Z JAN 75

SAIG

CONTINUE TO REPORT AS SITUATION DEVELOPS. E2, IMPDET.

~~SECRET~~

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RELEASE DATE:  
19-Dec-2013

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013



GWS  
SEPT 14

REC'D WAS SEP 10 1963

CATAIR WASHINGTONDC

TP218 TP217 FURTHER DETAILS STILL UNKNOWN EXCEPT

ONBOARD WITH THREE AFD INSTEAD FOUR AFD OTHER NAMES REMAIN SAME



cc: Washington Confirmation Copy  
President (2)  
AVP  
DP (2)

MESSAGE CENTER  
TAIPEI HEAD  
-6 SEP 1963  
REG NO. *g24*

September 6, 1963

AIRASIA TAIPEI

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PAGE 02

IN 456834

TOR:060437Z JAN 75

SAIG

OPERATED IN SUPPORT OF AIR AMERICA'S CONTRACT WITH THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY HAS BEEN REPORTED MISSING ON A FLIGHT FROM DALAT TO NHA TRANG ON 3 JANUARY. BAD WEATHER HAS PREVAILED IN THE AREA SINCE THE PLANE WAS FIRST REPORTED OVERDUE AND HAS SIGNIFICANTLY HAMPERED SEARCH OPERATIONS. ONE AMERICAN CITIZEN, MR. JAMES A. RAWLINGS, A SUPPLY OFFICER

[REDACTED] IN NHA TRANG WAS ABOARD, ALONG WITH A THREE-MAN CHINESE CREW, ONE FILLIPINO CONTRACTOR AND FOUR VIETNAMESE LOCAL EMPLOYEES OF THE CONSULATE GENERAL IN NHA TRANG. END QUOTE.

2. STATEMENTS WERE CLEARED WITH APPROPRIATE EMBASSY ELEMENTS AND APPROVED BY AMBASSADOR.

3. FYI, UPI ALREADY HAS SOME ELEMENTS OF TUY HOA INCIDENT BUT DID NOT KNOW OF DEATH OF [REDACTED] ASSOCIATED PRESS HAS FILED STORY ON MISSING C-123. E-2 IMPDET.

~~SECRET~~

C06116981

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013 NY 8 RS-AC

(b)(6)

American Cable & Radio System  
"All America" Via Commercial "V" Jackay Radio



AN IRT & ASSOCIATE

0605/RS1796/TH15

TAIPEI 71/70 5 2153

REC'D WAS SEP 5 1963

CATAIR WASHINGTONDC  
TP217 STATION MANAGER WTE ADVISES B150 REPORTED HEAVY GROUND  
FIRE 050832Z NIGHT ENGINE FEATHERED 0855 RESULT FIRE STOP  
RADIO CONTACT LOST STOP COMPUTED OR ASSUMED POSITION  
FIFTY MILES EAST SEND STOP TWO C123 CONDUCTED SEARCH WITH  
NEGATIVE RESULTS SO FAR WILL RESUME FIRST LIGHT JOG STOP  
PIC JOSEPH C CHENEY SIC CHARLES C HERRICK ONE RADIO OPERATOR  
FOUR AFD ONBOARD STOP WILL ADVISE WHEN FURTHER DETAILS KNOWN

[Redacted]

4 - 9/5/63

A C & R FACSIMILE RECEIVING BLANK

8 DUPONT CIRCLE N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. DUPONT 7-5100  
0 0

NY 8 RS-ACR

American Cable & Radio System  
"All America" Via Commercial "V" Jackay Radio



AN IRT & ASSOCIATE

KVNN

ZCZC AV1103/RS2387/TH157

REC'D WAS SEP 7 1963

TAIPEI 54/52 7 1234

1963 SEP 7 AM 3 33 8

CATAIR WASHINGTONDC

TP219 TP218 TP217 CHENEY'S WIFE NOTIFIED AIRCRAFT OVERDUE  
AND PRESUMED MISSING SEARCH RESULTS NEGATIVE TO DATE F  
SUGGEST SIMILAR NOTIFICATION TO HERRICKS WIFE MRS CHARLES HERRICK

[Redacted] SAN ANTONIO TEXAS [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

4 - 9/7/63

A C & R FACSIMILE RECEIVING BLANK

Wireless Radio Cables and Cables  
DUPONT 7-5100  
8 DUPONT CIRCLE N.W. WASHINGTON, D. C.

06116983  
APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

NY 8 RE-ACR

# American Cable & Radio System

Via All America Via Commercial Via Mackay Radio



TRIPET 50 8 428P

1953 SEP 8 AM 4 54 000  
1953 SEP 8 AM 4 54 000

GWG

REC'D WAS SEP 9 1963

CATAIR WASHINGTONDC

TP221 TP220 UH34 AND GROUND PARTY AT WRECKAGE MORNING JOB  
REPORT WRECKAGE LARGELY BURIED BY IMPACT POSITIVE AIRCRAFT  
IDENTIFICATION NOT YET MADE NO APPARENT SURVIVORS BUT ONLY ONE  
UNIDENTIFIED REMAINS SO FAR FOUND STOP SZVTE REPORTS USEMBL  
JOB ORDERED RECOVERY EFFORTS CEASE UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE DETAILS  
YET UNKNOWN

[Redacted box]

4 - 9/10/63

A C & R FACSIMILE RECEIVING BLANK

WASHINGTON, D. C. DUPOINT 73180

8 DUPOINT CIRCLE N.W. WASHINGTON, D. C.

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PAGE 01 IN 462482  
TOR:110805Z JAN 75 NH TR \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~ 110727Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE NHA TRANG \_\_\_\_\_  
TO: IMMEDIATE SAIGON INFO DIRECTOR.  
NIACT SAIGON

- REFS: A. SAIGON \_\_\_\_\_
- B. NHA TRANG \_\_\_\_\_ (NOT SENT DIRECTOR)
- C. NHA TRANG \_\_\_\_\_ (NOT SENT DIRECTOR)

1. CONCUR PARA 1 REF A PROPOSAL CANCEL FURTHER PLANS FOR \_\_\_\_\_ COVERAGE OF CRASH SITE.

2. CONGEN HAS SUGGESTED, AND BASE AGREES, THAT COURSE OF ACTION WITH BEST CHANCE OF SUCCESS NOW IS TO HAVE <sup>H</sup> THE JCRC MOUNT AND INSERTION/EXTRACTION MISSION AT THE CRASH SITE. ACCORDINGLY ON 11 JAN THE CONGEN SENT TWO MESSAGES TO AMBASSADOR MARTIN IN SAIGON (SEE REF B). THE FIRST (PREPARED WITH OUR HELP) DESCRIBES THE CRASH SCENE AND GIVES AN ANALYSIS OF THE TERRAIN AND AN ESTIMATE OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES IN THE AREA AS WELL AS AN ANALYSIS OF THE PHOTOS TAKEN FROM THE CHOPPERS. THE SECOND MESSAGE (PREPARED BY THE CONGEN) GOES OVER THE PROS AND CONS OF MOUNTING A JCRC MISSION CONCLUDING WITH A RECOMMENDATION

~~SECRET~~

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C06116984

JRM 3020b  
1 MFG. 3/74

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PAGE 02-02

IN 462482

TOR: 110805Z JAN 75

NHTR

TO THE AMBASSADOR THAT SUCH A MISSION BE UNDERTAKEN.

3. BASE AND CONGEN PREPARED SUPPORT JCRC IN CONDUCT OF  
MISSION. PLS ADVISE IF ANY OTHER INFO IS NEEDED FROM BASE  
TO GIVE ADDITIONAL SUPPORT TO THE CONGEN'S RECOMMENDATION.

4. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

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PAGE 01

IN 456782

TOR:060052Z JAN 75

NHTR

~~SECRET~~ 060042Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE NHA TRANG

TO: IMMEDIATE SAIGON INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

REF: SAIGON

1. WITH WEATHER BREAKING AND SEARCH FOCUSING CONE DALAT EAST TO NHA TRANG, WISH PLAN FOR CONTINGENCY RESCUE AND EXTRACTION FROM POSSIBLY DIFFICULT AND HOSTILE TERRAIN. BASE HAS OFFER OF ASSISTANCE FROM VIETNAMESE AGENCIES AND JRCS MAN HERE, \_\_\_\_\_ WHO HAS HAD SOME MILITARY EXPERIENCE IN THIS CONNECTION, HAS INDICATED IN HIS PLANNING POSSIBLE NEED FOR SPECIAL EXPERTISE AND EQUIPMENT. CAN SAIGON PROVIDE EXPERIENCED OFFICER WHO COULD DIRECT AND COORDINATE RESCUE AND EXTRACTION.

2. WISH REPORT THAT RESPONSE FROM BASE AND CONGEN PERSONNEL (INCLUDING PHAN THIET) PAST SEVERAL DAYS AS VOLUNTEERS FOR SEARCH AND SPOTTER MISSIONS IN ROUGH WEATHER WAS MOST GRATIFYING. E2 IMPDET.

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~~SECRET~~



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IN 464890

TOR:141552Z JAN 75

SAIG [redacted]

~~SECRET~~ 140737Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE SAIGON [redacted] (SECTION 1 OF 2)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY NHA TRANG.

REF: DIRECTOR [redacted]

1. PER REF, FOLLOWING IS DETAILED STATUS REPORT ON CRASH OF C-123(ST/1). INFO IN THIS REPORT CURRENT TO 1500(L) 14 JANUARY 1975.

A. CRASH SITE: COORDINATES BP755440.

THE CRASH SCENE IS APPROXIMATELY 15 NAUTICAL MILES FROM NHA TRANG. THE PLANE WAS ON A HEADING OF 050 DEGREES AT AN ALTITUDE OF APPROXIMATELY 3,650 FEET WHEN IT IMPACTED INTO TREES ON A FINGER (DESCENDING TERRAIN WHICH TRAVELS FROM A RIDGE TO THE GROUND BELOW THE MOUNTAINS IN THE AREA) RUNNING NNW BY SSE; AT APPROXIMATELY BP 7641 IT CUT THROUGH ABOUT 15 FEET OF TREETOP LEAVING A SWATH THROUGH THE TREETOPS ROUGHLY 15 WIDE AND 150 FEET LONG. THE PLANE THEN CARRIED ACROSS A DEPRESSION OF SOME 500 VI QHIPP<sup>\*</sup> FEET BEFORE IMPACTING AGAIN INTO THE BASE OF A PARALLEL FINGER AT AN ALTITUDE OF APPROXIMATELY 3,500 FEET. DEBRIS IS SCATTERED FROM THE FIRST ENTRY INTO THE TREES TO THE FINAL IMPACT ZONE AND MAKES IT VIRTUALLY CERTAIN THAT THERE ARE NO SURVIVORS.

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 02

IN 464890

TOR:141552Z JAN 75

SAIG

THE FINAL IMPACT ZONE, THE BASE OF A FINGER WHICH RISES TO AN APPROXIMATE ALTITUDE OF 3,750 FEET, COMPRISES A SMALL CIRCULAR AREA ABOUT 40 FEET IN DIAMETER. THERE IS A LARGE ROCK NEARLY IN THE MIDDLE OF THE IMPACT ZONE. THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE IMPACT ZONE ALSO HAS SEVERAL TREES WHICH HAVE BEEN BROKEN OFF, LEAVING TRUNKS OF SOME 20 FEET IN HEIGHT REMAINING. (A PENETRATION ENTRY FROM THE AIR WOULD HAVE TO BE ON THE LOWEST PART ((SOUTHWEST)) OF THE IMPACT ZONE SINCE THAT WOULD LEAVE MORE ROOM FOR A HELICOPTER TO MANEUVER AND HELP ENSURE THAT ANYONE BEING LOWERED INTO THE AREA WOULD NOT HIT THE LARGE ROCKS IN THE ZONE OR THE BROKEN TREES.)

TERRAIN ANALYSIS OF SITE AREA: THE AREA SURROUNDING THE CRASH SITE IS THICKLY WOODED, TRIPLE-CANOPIED JUNGLE. THE PRIMARY GROWTH CONSISTS OF 100-150 FOOT TREES WHILE THE SECONDARY GROWTH IS 50-100 FOOT TREES, WITH THICK UNDERBRUSH COVERING THE GROUND. THE DOMINANT TERRAIN FEATURE IS HON BA MOUNTAIN LOCATED AT BP 768388, APPROXIMATELY 4.5 KILOMETERS (CMS) SOUTH OF THE REPORTED CRASH SITE. THE CRASH SITE IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY ONE KM NORTH OF HILL 1084 IN A DEPRESSION FLANKED BY TWO FINGERS. THESE FINGERS SHARPLY DROP TO A RIVER VALLEY BELOW, THE AREA IS CATEGORIZED BY EXTREMELY STEEP SLOPES, NUMEROUS WATERFALL AND NARROW MOUNTAIN VALLEYS. WATER IS

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IN 464890

TOR:141552Z JAN 75

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PLENTIFUL BECAUSE <sup>E</sup>DMJDD H NAL MONSOONS, WHICH ALSO ACCOUNTS FOR LOW CEILINGS AND DAILY RAINFALL. MOVEMENT IN THE AREA IS DIFFICULT EXCEPT ON ESTABLISHED TRAILS (NONE WERE OBSERVED) AND ALONG THE RIVER VALLEYS. THE LIKELY AVENUES OF APPROACH TO THE CRASH SITE WOULD BE FROM AN ESTABLISHED TRAIL NETWORK ALONG RIDGELINES (AGAIN, NONE NOTED) OR ALONG MORE GRADUALLY DECLINING FINGERS. THE NEAREST THE VALLEY OF THE SONG CAU RIVER COMES TO THE CRASH SITE IS THREE KMS (WITH THE SITE BEING DUE EASTWARD), WHERE THE RIVER SWINGS IN A WESTWARD ARC BEFORE CONTINUING ITS EASTWARD DIRECTION ABOUT 12 KMS SOUTH OF THE SITE.

B. SECURITY ASSESSMENT:

ENEMY UNITS IN THE AREA INCLUDE THE VC KHAN SON DISTRICT UNIT WITH A REPORTED STRENGTH OF 23 MEN. SECTOR ESTIMATES A FORCE OF 250 LOCAL VILLAGE GUERRILLAS IN CAM LAN DISTRICT, HOWEVER, ONLY 50 OF THEM ARE BELIEVED TO BE ARMED. THE ONLY PROVINCE MAIN FORCE UNIT IN THE AREA IS THE 407TH SAPPER BATTALION WITH 305 MEN. THE 407TH'S BASE AREA IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 12 KMS SE OF THE CRASH SITE (BP 8132) AND THEIR AREA OF OPERATION IS THE CAM RANH BAY AREA. THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE SITE AND THEIR BASE AREA WOULD PRECLUDE ANY IMMEDIATE REACTION TO AN INCURSION INTO THE SITE.

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TOR:141552Z JAN 75

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C. IDENTIFICATION OF AIRCRAFT:

INTERVIEWS WITH THE PILOTS, CO-PILOTS AND OBSERVERS ON THE TWO AIR AMERICA HELICOPTERS THAT HOVERED OVER THE CRASH SITE, PLUS EXAMINATION OF OVER 75 PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE SITE AND WRECKAGE BY A TRAINED PHOTO INTERPRETER, INDICATE THAT THE CRASH IS A RECENT ONE (THE BROKEN BOUGHS OF THE TREES STILL HAD WILTED LEAVES ON THEM) AND THAT IT IS A C-123 AIRCRAFT. THOSE PIECES LARGE ENOUGH TO BE SEEN WERE OF THE PROPER DIMENSIONS FOR A C-123 AIRCRAFT AND ONE PIECE HAS BEEN TENTATIVELY IDENTIFIED AS THAT OF A C-123 JET POD. WHILE IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE DOWNED AIRCRAFT AS THE MISSING C-123/ST-1, THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTS OF ANY RECENT PLANE CRASHES IN THE AREA OF THE CRASH SITE. THE CRASH SITE IS APPROXIMATELY TWO KMS SOUTH OF THE EXPECTED FLIGHT PATH OF THE MISSING C-123.

D. WEATHER:

WEATHER IN CRASH SITE HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE BROKEN, VARIABLE 3000 TO 9000 FEET WITH SCATTERED TO BROKEN CLOUDS AT 4000 TO 7000 FEET. WEATHER AS OF 0800 (L) 14 JANUARY REPORTED TO BE SCATTERED AT 2500 AND 4000 FEET; OVER CAST AT 9000 FEET. MOUNTAIN TOPS CONTINUE TO BE CLOUD COVERED. WEATHER FORECAST UNTIL 1600 (L) 14 JANUARY IS 4000 FEET SCATTERED, OVERCAST AT 10000 FEET WITH RAIN.

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IN 464890

TOR:141552Z JAN 75

SAIG

E. AIRCRAFT USED TO DATE IN SAR:

(1) AIR AMERICA

DATE	AIRCRAFT	HOURS
3 JAN	HELICOPTER	1 PLUS 00
4 JAN	HELICOPTER	13 PLUS 15
4 JAN	VOLPAR	9 PLUS 40
5 JAN	HELICOPTER	6 PLUS 30
6 JAN	HELICOPTER	4 PLUS 20
6 JAN	VOLPAR	2 PLUS 55
7 JAN	HELICOPTER	5 PLUS 50
7 JAN	VOLPAR	2 PLUS 10
8 JAN	HELICOPTER	13 PLUS 15
8 JAN	VOLPAR	5 PLUS 10
9 JAN	VOLPAR	PLUS 30
		ESTIMATED TIME OVER AREA)
9 JAN	VOLPAR	2 PLUS 30 (POSITION AT NHA TRANG)
10 JAN	VOLPAR	2 PLUS 30 (POSITION AT NHA TRANG)
	TOTAL	69 PLUS 35

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FORM 3020b  
7-71 MFG. 3/74

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PAGE 06-08

IN 464890

TOR:141552Z JAN 75

SAIG

(2) VNAF

DATE

AIRCRAFT

HOURS

4-6 JAN

HELICOPTER

9 PLUS 30

L-19

6 PLUS 00

TOTAL GVV

15 PLUS 30

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IN 462770

TOR:120410Z JAN 75

SAIG

~~SECRET~~ 120404Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE SAIGON

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY NHA TRANG;

REF: SAIGON

ZRPARKA (PART II)

TIME OF REPORT 1200(L) 12 JANUARY 1975

SEARCH AND RESCUE:

NO ADDITIONAL INFO AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME.

E2 IMPDET

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7-71 MFG. 3/74

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IN 464301

TOR:140937Z JAN 75

NHTR

~~SECRET~~ 140927Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE NHA TRANG [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAIGON.

REF: DIRECTOR [REDACTED]

1. DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION, [REDACTED]

NOTIFIED CONGEN [REDACTED] ON 14 JAN THAT CONGEN HAD "GREEN

LIGHT" FOR RECOVERY OPERATION. CONGEN SUBSEQUENTLY

TALKED WITH [REDACTED] CHIEF OF JOINT CASUALTY

RESOLUTION CENTER LIAISON OFFICE, (JCRC), AND [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] OF JCRC IN SAIGON. LATTER HAS READ TRAFFIC FROM

CONGEN NHA TRANG ON CRASH AND LOOKED AT PHOTOS OF CRASH

SITE AVAILABLE IN SAIGON. [REDACTED] WILL TRAVEL TO

NHA TRANG MORNING OF 15 JAN TO MEET WITH BASE, CONGEN

AND LOCAL JCRC REPS TO MAP OUT PLANS FOR RECOVERY OPERATION.

WILL ADVISE RESULTS.

2. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

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7-71 MFG. 3/74

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IN 456952

TOR: 060844Z JAN 75

SAIG

SECRET 060825Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE SAIGON

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY NHA TRANG.

REF: SAIGON

ZRPARKA (PART II)

TIME OR REPORT 1200(L) 6 JANUARY 1975

SEARCH AND RESCUE:

A. WX CONTINUES TO HAMPER SAR EFFORT. SAR SUSPENDED DUE TO BAD WX IN BOTH NHA TRANG AND DALAT AREAS AT 1100(L).

B. AIR AMERICA CHOPPER (12F) ON SEARCH MISSION REPORTED TAKING SMALL ARMS FIRE AT 1000(L) 6 JANUARY AT COORDINATES BP 5944, AIRCRAFT NOT HIT. E2 IMPDET

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IN 45573Z

TOR: 031057Z JAN 75

SAIG

~~SECRET~~ 031236Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE SAIGON

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

ZRPARKA (PART 1)

1. C123K 54-0625 (ST-1) CHINA AIRLINES
2. MISSING
3. <sup>3</sup> 02/0825Z
4. UNKNOWN
5. A408 CUSTOMER, CARGO AIRLIFT FROM DALAT (V-08)  
TO NY TRANG (V-07)

PASSENGERS: JAMES RAWLINGS ASSIGNED NHA TRANG AS LOGISTICS OFFICER FOR NHA TRANG BASE. ONE NHA TRANG FILIPINO EMPLOYEE AND UNDISCLOSED NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE.

7. UNKNOWN
8. WEATHER AT DALAT UNKNOWN, NHA TRANG WEATHER REPORTED AS 3/8 AT 2000 FT, 4/8 AT 3000 FT, 6/8 AT 7000 FT, LIGHT RAIN VISIBILITY 4

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IN 455730

TOR:031057Z JAN 75

SAIG

TO 5 MILES. AT 0925Z AN AIR AMERICA CHOPPER PICKED UP AN EMERGENCY BEEPER BETWEEN NHA TRANG (V-08) AND PHAN THIET (V-11). VNAF AND AIR AMERICA AIRBORNE ON SEARCH FROM NHA TRANG AT 0930Z. GENERAL CARGO ON BOARD, NO CLASSIFIED CARGO. AIRCRAFT RECORDS DO NOT INDICATE THAT AIRCRAFT HAS EMERGENCY BEEPER INSTALLED. ROUTE OF FLIGHT REPORTED AS SECURE AREA. E2 IMPDET

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FORM 30206  
7-71 MFG. 3/74



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IN 485557

TOR:151039Z JAN 75

NHTR

~~SECRET~~ 151000Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE NHA TRANG

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAIGON,

REF: SAIGON

ZRPARAKA (PART II)

TIME OF REPORT 1800 (L) 15 JANUARY 1975

RECOVERY

1. BASE, CONGEN AND LOCAL JCRC REP HELD LENGTHY DISCUSSION WITH OPS OFFICER SAIGON, ON MORNING OF 15 JAN. TALKS WERE GOOD FIRST PLANKING SESSION IN THAT ALL CONCERNED ARE NOW MORE FAMILIAR WITH WHAT IS WANTED AND NEEDED TO COMPLETE MISSION.

2. FIRST OF TWO AREAS OF JCRC CONCERN IS CURRENT THREAT ASSESSMENT. BEFORE JCRC WILL LAUNCH A MISSION THERE MUST BE AGREEMENT BY ALL PARTIES THAT THREAT IS LOW TO MODERATE. WHILE ACTUAL MILITARY SITUATION AS SPELLED OUT IN PARA 1B OF SAIGON PUTS ASSESSMENT IN THAT RANGE, DAO SAIGON SAYS THAT FACT OF INTENSE SEARCH ACTIVITY IN VICINITY OF CRASH SITE RAISES THE THREAT

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7-71 MFG. 3/74

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IN 465557

TOR:151039Z JAN 75

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ASSESSMENT TO MODERATE TO HIGH. AS RESULT THERE WILL HAVE TO BE A SUFFICIENT COOLING OFF PERIOD IN AREA OF CRASH SITE TO BRING THE ASSESSMENT BACK INTO THE ACCEPTABLE RANGE, NO DEFINITE TIME <sup>A</sup> MENTIONED BUT [ ] SAID IT COULD BE AS LONG AS 15 DAYS. THE BASE AND CONGEN ARE PREPARING AN UPDATED SECURITY REVIEW DESIGNED TO ADDRESS THIS SPECIFIC REQUIREMENT AND WILL FORWARD IT TO THE EMBASSY VIA THE CONGEN SOONEST.

3, THE SECOND REQUIREMENT BEFORE JCRC WILL UNDERTAKE MISSION IS THAT THE LANDING ZONE AT THE CRASH SITE MUST BE SECURE. THERE MUST BE POSITIVE COMM# FROM THE LANDING ZONE TO THE JCRC TEAM INDICATING SECURE LZ BEFORE THE TEAM WILL GO IN. THIS INVOLVES QUESTIONS OF WHAT SECURITY FORCES TO USE, HOW TO PUT THEM IN THE AREA, WHERE TO PUT THEM AND HOW MANY MEN AND CHOPPERS WILL BE NEEDED? ON THIS POINT CAPT WOOD TALKED TO HIS SAIGON HQS BY PHONE AND RECOMMENDED THAT THE JCRC OFFICER WHO WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE MISSION COME TO NHA TRANG AND MAKE A RECON OF THE CRASH SITE IN AN AA CHOPPER. HE WILL THEN BE ABLE TO MAKE SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR SUPPORT THAT BASE

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7-71 MFG. 3/74

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TOR:151039Z JAN 75			NHTR		

AND CONGEN CAN FOLLOW UP ON WITH GVN AS APPROPRIATE.

[ ] SAID IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE THE OFFICER IN QUESTION IN COUNTRY FROM HIS BASE IN THAILAND BY FRIDAY 17 JAN. ONCE THIS RECON FLIGHT IS ACCOMPLISHED WE CAN BEGIN THE COOLING OFF PERIOD MENTIONED ABOVE.

4, PLAN RUN [ ] ON 16 JAN. IN ADDITION TO MORE INFO ON CRASH SITE AND DOWNED AIRCRAFT, THIS WILL PROVIDE INFO ON THE SURROUNDING TERRAIN TO ASSIST JCRC TEAM TO MAKE DECISION ON HOW BEST TO APPROACH THE SITE AND CONDUCT THE MISSION.

5, BASE AND LOCAB JCRC REP HAVE BEGUN PULLING TOGETHER MEDICAL RECORDS OF VIETNAMESE ON BOARD FOR IDENTIFICATION USE. REQUEST SAIGON PASS TO [ ] MEDICAL RECORDS OF MR, RAWLINGS AND THAT HQS TRY AND GET AND FORWARD TO SAIGON A COPY OF MR, RAWLINGS DENTAL RECORD. ALSO REQUEST SAIGON ASK ECCI TO PROVIDE SIMILAR RECORDS ON [ ] [ ] WILL REQUEST FROM AA SAIGON INFO ON SERIAL NUMBERS OF ST/1 AND ALL RELATED EQUIPMENT ON BOARD SO THAT TEAM WILL HAVE INFO TO WORK FROM FOR POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF AIRCRAFT.

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7-71 MFG. 3/74

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IN 465557

TOR:151039Z JAN 75

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SEARCH AND RESCUE

1. WHILE MOST OBSERVERS CONVINCED CRASH SITE IN QUESTION IS ST/1, THERE NO POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION TO DATE AND PROBABLY WILL NOT BE ANY UNTIL ACTUAL RECOVERY MISSION COMPLETED, WHICH COULD BE SEVERAL WEEKS OFF. AS RESULT AND TO BE SURE WE HAVE COVERED AS MUCH OF THE SEARCH AREA AS POSSIBLE, AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE PLAN LAUNCH ADDITIONAL SEARCH MISSION ON 16 JAN TO COVER THOSE SPECIFIC AREAS NOT PREVIOUSLY COVERED WHERE A CRASH COULD HAVE TAKEN PLACE. THIS WILL ALSO DIVERT VC ATTENTION AWAY FROM CURRENT CRASH SITE.

2. WEATHER IN NHA TRANG AREA WAS CLEAR TODAY FOR FIRST TIME SINCE CRASH. WE HOPING FOR MORE OF SAME TOMORROW.

OTHER

1.  AND LOCAL JCRC REP WENT SAIGON AFTERNOON OF 15 JAN.

2. CONGEN SENDING PARALLEL MESSAGE, NUMBER 0033.

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IN 462946

TOR:130438Z JAN 75

SAIG

~~SECRET~~ 130425Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE SAIGON

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY NHA TRANG.

REFS: A. SAIGON

B. SAIGON

C. SAIGON

ZRPARKA (PART 11)

TIME OF REPORT 1200(L) 13 JANUARY 1975

SEARCH AND RESCUE:

PLANS CANCELED PER REF C. NO ADDITIONAL INFO

AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME.

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FORM 30700  
11 JAN. 5/74



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IN 455993

TOR 031556Z JAN 75

SAIG [REDACTED]

~~S E C R E T~~ 031535Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE SAIGON [REDACTED]

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY TAIPEI, NHA TRANG.

NIACT DIRECTOR

REFS: A, DIRECTOR [REDACTED]

B, SAIGON SERVICE [REDACTED]

1. REF B SERVICE MESSAGE GAVE CORRECTED DATE TIME

GROUP.

2. COMPUTATION OF FLIGHT TIME WITH FUEL ON BOARD

AIRCRAFT INDICATES TECHNICALLY ACFT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED  
DOWN AT 1900 (L) 3 JANUARY. PRIOR TO DARKNESS CHOPPERS  
CHECKED C123 FLIGHT ROUTE NEAREST NHA TRANG (V07) WITH  
NIL RESULTS.

3. AT 2000 (L) 3 JANUARY VNAF REPORTED COMPLETING  
INVENTORY OF ALL AIRFIELDS UNDER THEIR CONTROL AND  
C-123 (ST-1) WAS NOT REPORTED AT ANY OF THESE.

4. VTB/77Z SCHEDULED DEPART V01 (SAIGON) 0630 (L)  
4 JANUARY TO ACT AS CONTROL AIRCRAFT FOR SAR EFFORT.

WILL PROVIDE STATUS REPORT OF SAR EFFORT AT 1200 (L) 4 JANUARY.

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~~S E C R E T~~

C06116994

FORM 71 MFG. 3/74

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IN 462415

TOR:110554Z JAN 75

SAIG

~~SECRET~~ 110514Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE SAIGON

TO: IMMEDIATE NHA TRANG INFO DIRECTOR.

NIACT NHA TRANG

1. FOLLOWING REVIEW OF CHOPPER PHOTOS OF SUSPECTED C-123  
(ST-1) CRASH SITE AND DISCUSSIONS WITH PI SPECIALIST   
 STATION OF THE OPINION WILL NOT ADD  
TO FURTHER IDENTIFICATION OF AIRCRAFT. ACCORDINGLY WE PROPOSE  
CANCELING FURTHER PLANS FOR OF CRASH SITE.

2. WOULD LIKE BASE, IN CONCERT WITH CONGEN, PROVIDE RECOMMENDATIONS  
FOR NEXT COURSE OF ACTION, E2 IMPDET.

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 01

IN 469379

TOR:191057Z JAN 75

NHTR

~~SECRET~~ 190942Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE NHA TRANG \_\_\_\_\_

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAIGON.

REF: NHA TRANG \_\_\_\_\_

ZRPARKA \_\_\_\_\_ (PART II)

TIME OF REPORT 1800 (L) 19 JANUARY 1975

RECOVER

1. \_\_\_\_\_, JCRC FIELD TEAM LEADER, MADE SUCCESSFUL RECON OF CRASH SITE MORNING OF 19 JAN. WAS OVER SITE APPROX ONE HOUR AND SAYS HE HAS ALL THE INFO HE NEEDS TO PLAN MISSION.

2. \_\_\_\_\_ IS CONFIDENT CRASH IS RECENT ONE AND PROBABLY A C-123 AIRCRAFT, FROM DEBRIS HE ABLE OBSERVE THINKS BOTTOM OF PLANE TORN OPEN AT POINT OF FIRST IMPACT AND THAT IT THEN BEGAN TO DISINTEGRATE, SPREADING PARTS ALONG WAY TO FINAL IMPACT AREA, APPROX 600 FT AWAY. SINCE ONLY AREA HE WOULD FIND TO LAND JCRC TEAM IS A FINAL IMPACT POINT HE WILL HAVE TO WORK HIS WAY BACK ALONG CRASH PATH TO RECOVER IDENTIFIABLE OBJECTS. GIVEN DIFFICULT TERRAIN AND DISTANCE INVOLVED HE ESTIMATES THIS AS ALL DAY JOB.

~~SECRET~~

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FORM 3020b  
7-71 MFG. 3/74

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PAGE 02

IN 469379

TOR:191057Z JAN 75

NHTR \_\_\_\_\_

3. \_\_\_\_\_ HAS PREPARED COMPLETE REPORT AND WILL HAND CARRY TO JCRC HQS IN THAILAND ON TUESDAY, 22 JAN. HE WILL ALSO HAVE WITH HIM ADDITIONAL PHOTOS OF CRASH SITE HE TOOK AND COLOR SLIDES TAKEN BY CHOPPER CREW.

4. AT THIS POINT \_\_\_\_\_ ESTIMATES WE WILL NEED GVN SUPPORT OF THREE/FOUR CHOPPERS TO LIFT IN ONE COMPANY OF MEN TO SECURE THE AREA, PLUS TWO GUNSHIPS FOR FIRE SUPPORT.

\_\_\_\_\_ AND BASE WILL BRIEF CONGEN SPEAR ON THESE NEEDS ALONG WITH FULL REPORT, WHEN LATTER RETURNS TO NHA TRANG TOMORROW, 20 JAN.

5. \_\_\_\_\_ RUN WAS ATTEMPTED MORNING OF 19 JAN WITH POSSIBLE PARTIAL RESULTS. AIRCRAFT WAS IN THE AREA OF THE CRASH SITE FROM SAIGON BY ABOUT 1100 HOURS AND BEGAN ITS RUN, BUT HAD ELECTRONIC DIFFICULTIES AND RETURNED DIRECTLY TO SAIGON. CREW THINKS IT MAY HAVE GOTTEN SOME FOOTAGE BEFORE PROBLEMS DEVELOPED. IN VIEW OF SUCCESSFUL RECON AND ADDITIONAL PHOTOS TAKEN BY \_\_\_\_\_ AND CHOPPER CREW DO NOT THINK \_\_\_\_\_ COVERAGE IS NOW AS SIGNIFICANT AS BEFORE. INTEND THEREFORE TO STAND DOWN ANY FURTHER \_\_\_\_\_ ATTEMPTS UNTIL WE DETERMINE THAT IT IS NECESSARY FOR COMPLETION OF RECOVERY MISSION.

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 03

IN 469379

TOR:191057Z JAN 75

NHTR

\_\_\_\_\_

SEARCH AND RESCUE

1. WERE ABLE CONDUCT SUCCESSFUL SEARCH MISSION AFTERNOON OF 19 JAN, COVERED ALL HIGH GROUND, RIDGES, AND MT TOPS ALONG PROBABLE FLIGHT PATH OF ST/1 WHICH NOT COVERED IN PREVIOUS SEARCH MISSIONS.

2. GIVEN TERRAIN WE SEARCHING COULD NEVER SAY HAVE COVERED EVERY POSSIBILITY, BUT SINCE WE HAVE COVERED ALL OBVIOUS AREAS AND DO HAVE A PROBABLE CRASH SITE TO INVESTIGATE PLAN CALL OFF ANY FURTHER SEARCH MISSIONS. HAVE THEREFORE RELEASED STANDBY CHOPPER FOR TOMORROW, 20 JAN,

OTHER

AIRCRAFT USED IN RECOVERY AND SAR:

VOLPAR \_\_\_\_\_ 3 HOURS (POSITION AT NHA TRANG AND RETURN SAIGON)

VOLPAR \_\_\_\_\_ PLUS 45 (ESTIMATE TIME OVER AREA)

HELICOPTER (RECOVERY) 2 HOURS

HELICOPTER (SEARCH) 2 HOURS PLUS 45

TOTAL 8 HOURS PLUS 30

E2 IMPDET

~~SECRET~~

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IN 458042

TOR:071024Z JAN 75

NHTR

~~SECRET~~ 071010Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE NHA TRANG

TO: IMMEDIATE SAIGON INFO DIRECTOR.

REF: SAIGON

1. ATTEMPT THIRD SIGHTING AT 1405 (L) 7 JAN ABORTED

\* AT 14 -8/)) DUE CLOUD COVER AT SITE. ACCORDINGLY STILL UNABLE  
CONFIRM IF C-123/ST-1, BUT PROCEEDING ON BASIS THAT IT IS.

2. KHANH HOA PROVINCE CHIEF WITH APPROVAL MR-2  
COMMAND WILL AIRLIFT VIA VNAF CHOPPER ARMED UNIT TO LZ  
APPROX 0700 (L) 8 JAN. ONCE GROUND SECURE, PLAN IS FOR  
AAM TEAM BE LIFTED BY AAM CHOPPER TO LZ WHICH MAY BE TWO  
TO FOUR HOUR CLIMB TO WRECK. THIS PLAN UNDER DISCUSSION  
WITH AAM TEAM WHICH ARRIVED FROM SAIGON 1700 (L) 7 JAN.  
BASE NOW ACTING AS COORDINATOR BETWEEN AAM TEAM AND GVN  
AGENCIES. E2 IMPDET,

\* PORTION GARBLED - BEING SERVICED.

~~SECRET~~

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IN 465369

TORI 150606Z JAN 75

SAIG

~~SECRET~~ 150417Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE SAIGON [REDACTED]

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, IMMEDIATE NHA TRANG,  
[REDACTED]

REF: SAIGON [REDACTED]

ZRPARKA <sup>R</sup> [REDACTED] (PART II)

TIME OF REP <sup>ORT</sup> 1200 (L) 15 JANUARY 1975

RECOVERY

1, AS SCENE OF ACTIVITY HAS SHIFTED FROM SAIGON <sup>To</sup> NHA TRANG, NHA TRANG BASE WILL ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY, EFFECTIVE 15 JAN 1975, FOR DUPLX <sup>E</sup> ZRPARKA [REDACTED] (PART I) REPORTING UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

2, FIRST NHA TRANG ZRPARKA [REDACTED] (PART II) REPORT SHOULD BE FILED CIRCA 1800 (L) 15 JAN 75 AND SHOULD INCLUDE RESULTS OF TODAY'S PLANNING SESSIONS WITH JCRC. E2 IMPDET.

~~SECRET~~

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IN 456702

TOR:050438Z JAN 75

SAIG

~~SECRET~~ 050415Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE SAIGON

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO NHA TRANG

ZRPARKA (PART II)

TIME OF REPORT 1200 (L) 5 JANUARY

SEARCH AND RESCUE:

- (1) WX IN CG 2 AREA CONTINUES TO HAMPER SAR EFFORT.
- (2) NO WRECKAGE SIGHTED AS OF TIME OF REPORT. LEAD REPORTED IN SAIGON HAS BEEN NEGATED. E-2 IMPDET

~~SECRET~~



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JRM 3070b  
7-71 MFG. 3/74

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PAGE 01

IN 455732

TOR:031057Z JAN 75

SAIG

SECRET 031236Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE SAIGON

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

NI ACT

ZRPARKA (PART 1)

1. C123K 54-0625 (ST-1) CHINA AIRLINES
2. MISSING
3. 02/0825Z
4. UNKNOWN
5. A400 CUSTOMER, CARGO AIRLIFT FROM DALAT (V-08)  
TO NY TRANG (V-07)

PASSENGERS: JAMES RAWLINGS ASSIGNED NHA TRANG AS LOGISTICS  
OFFICER FOR NHA TRANG BASE. ONE NHA TRANG FILIPINO EMPLOYEE AND  
UNDISCLOSED NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE.

7. UNKNOWN

8. WEATHER AT DALAT UNKNOWN, NHA TRANG WEATHER REPORTED AS 3/8  
AT 2000 FT, 4/8 AT 3000 FT, 6/8 AT 7000 FT, LIGHT RAIN VISIBILITY 4

~~SECRET~~

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~~PAGE 02-02~~

IN 455730

TOR:031057Z JAN 75

SAIG 85063

TO 5 MILES. AT 0925Z AN AIR AMERICA CHOPPER PICKED UP AN EMERGENCY  
 BEEPER BETWEEN NHA TRANG (V-08) AND PHAN THIET (V-11). VNAF AND  
 AIR AMERICA AIRBORNE ON SEARCH FROM NHA TRANG AT 0930Z. GENERAL  
 CARGO ON BOARD. NO CLASSIFIED CARGO. AIRCRAFT RECORDS DO NOT  
 INDICATE THAT AIRCRAFT HAS EMERGENCY BEEPER INSTALLED. ROUTE OF  
 FLIGHT REPORTED AS SECURE AREA. E2 IMPDET

~~SECRET~~

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IN 469126

TOR:180947Z JAN 75

NHTR \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~ 180930Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE NHA TRANG \_\_\_\_\_

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAIGON.

REF: NHA TRANG \_\_\_\_\_

ZRPARKA \_\_\_\_\_ (PART II)

TIME OF REPORT 1800 (L) 18 JANUARY 1975

RECOVERY

1. REGRET BAD WEATHER PREVENTED ANY MISSION IN AREA OF  
CRASH SITE. CLOUD COVER NEVER REACHED ABOVE APPROX 2,000 FT  
LEVEL, WITH CRASH SITE AT APPROX 3,500 FT.

2. \_\_\_\_\_ AIRCRAFT IS ON STANDBY IN SAIGON. FORECAST  
FOR TOMORROW IS FOR 2,000 TO 4,000 FT CEILING WITH MARGINAL  
CONDITIONS OF BROKEN CLOUDS UNDER THE CEILING.

SEARCH AND RESCUE

1. NO SEARCH MISSIONS POSSIBLE DUE BAD WEATHER.  
2. VOLPAR AND ONE CHOPPER AND CREW ON STANDBY IN NHA  
TRANG IF WE GET BREAK IN WEATHER. E2 IMPDET

~~SECRET~~

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IN 456644

TOR:041311Z JAN 75

SAIG [redacted]

SECRET 041245Z JAN 75 STAFF

ITE SAIGON [redacted]

O: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

[redacted]

1. RE MISSING C-123 AIRCRAFT WHICH CARRIED STATION OFFICER MR. JAMES RAWLINGS.
2. LATE AFTERNOON (LOCAL) 4 JAN INFO RECEIVED THROUGH VIETNAMESE POLICE CHANNELS THAT WRECKAGE SIGHTED NEAR SONG MAU, BINH THUAN PROVINCE, NEAR VIETNAM AIR STRIP 18. COORDINATES BN 309470, IN GVN CONTROLLED AREA.
3. AIR AMERICA VOLPAR REACHED SCENE AS DARKNESS DESCENDED. PILOT REPORTS INDICATIONS THERE MAY BE WRECK BUT DECLINES TO STATE DEFINITELY IN VIEW EXTREME POOR VISIBILITY.
4. ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR BINH TUAN PROVINCE CHIEF AND STATION OFFICER TO ARRIVE AT LOCATION SHORTLY AFTER 0700 HOURS LOCAL.
- 5 JAN,
5. WILL ADVISE FURTHER ASAP. E2 IMPDET.

~~SECRET~~

C06117002

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RCA COMMUNICATIONS, INC.  
A SERVICE OF RADIO CORPORATION OF AMERICA  
1812 M STREET, N.W.

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RCA COMMUNICATIONS, INC.  
A SERVICE OF RADIO CORPORATION OF AMERICA  
1812 M STREET, N.W. TEL. FE. 8-7500



CATAIR WASHINGTONDC

REC'D WAS SEP 9 1963



RADIO CORPORATION OF AMERICA  
1812 M STREET, N.W. TEL. FE. 8-7500


TP224 TP221 SZVTE LATEST REPORT WRECKAGE POSITIVELY  
IDENTIFIED B150 BUT ENTRY NOT YET EFFECTED

TO DETERMINE WHETHER REMAINS INSIDE ACCURACY PRIOR  
REPORT ONE REMAINS NOW QUESTIONABLE DUE LOAD INCLUDED

300 KILOS FRESH MEAT



4-9/10/63



NY 6 RE-ACR



American Cable & Radio System  
"Via America" "Via Commercial" "Via Maritime Radio"



REC'D WAS OCT 19 1963

GUY

2:55 pm

AN IT & T ASSOCIATE

Cables Wireless Radio Cables Wireless Radio Cables Wireless Radio

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
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TP249 TP224 SZVTE REPORTS AMEMB RECEIVED ADVICE FROM PL  
SOURCE THAT CHENEY HERRICK DECEASED ALL OTHER CREW MEMBERS CAPTIVE  
AND ALL RIGHT STOP WE ADVISING NOK RESIDENT FE OF REPORT BUT  
THAT WE UNABLE CONFIRM ACCURACY AND AGAINST REACHING HASTY  
CONCLUSIONS IN ABSENCE MORE SUBSTANTIAL INFORMATION ASSUME YOU  
WILL WISH ADVISE NOK THERE SIMILARLY PRESS AWARE SOMETHING NEW  
AND SZVTE ANTICIPATES PRESSURE FOR STATEMENT WHICH ALREADY CLEARED  
WITH AMEMB HOWEVER BE RELUCTANT MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT UNTIL MORE  
POSITIVE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE



COL TP249 TP

DE W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20540-7510  
A REPORT CIRCLE 114, WASHINGTON, D.C.

A C & R FACSIMILE RECEIVING BLANK

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*Cheney*

MGDR

15 October 1963

AMGDR

B-150 Accident

□ of Department of State, Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, called at approximately 3:30 P.M. today to advise that he has heard through State Department channels and through both AP and UP the following information:

The ICC went up into Laos on October 14 and at the request of the Soviet and Polish Ambassadors the Communist Pathet Lao Ministers addressed a letter to the ICC advising that the families of the Air America crew members could write to the crew members if they wished and that the Communists would deliver this mail. The Pathet Lao Ministers did or could not say how many survived or what their names are.

Simultaneously, another Communist Minister called in Ambassador Unger and stated that the Pathet Lao would permit the families to write to the prisoners, that they were being treated humanely, but that he could not say how many had survived, or who they were.

□ was concerned that the press might publish a garbled version of this which would raise the hopes of the families unnecessarily, and he suggested that we call them first to caution them against premature hopes.

Should any of the families wish to write on the chance that their relative has survived, the accident, he suggested that letters be addressed as follows:

□  
Office of Southeast Asian Affairs  
Department of State  
Washington 25, D. C.

This information was read to you in essence and with your concurrence the information was then passed by telephone to Mrs. Herrick, □ and Mrs. DeBruin. Copies of the information thus transmitted are included in the files of Mr. Cheney, Mr. Herrick and Mr. DeBruin.

dm

□

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RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

MEMORANDUM

*File Memorandum M.A.S.D.*

(b)(6)  
*Y. S. Chen*

OFFICE OF  
PRESIDENT

17 SEP 1963

DATE: September 16, 1963

TO : See Distribution *[Handwritten initials]*

FROM : DP

SUBJECT: Board of Review Meeting - B-150

REF. No. PND-DP-63/1996

REC'D WAS SEP 20 1963

Pursuant to the provisions of the Personnel Manual, Chapter: Termination; Section: Benefits due to Death, Capture or Internment, the Board of Review shall meet in the Conference Room of the Head Office, Taipei, at 1100L, Tuesday, September 17, 1963. If any of the Board members of those requested to attend are unable to be present, please notify this office at your earliest convenience so that a new time and date satisfactory to all may be arranged.

Individuals on board B-150 at the time of its disappearance:

- |                               |                           |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Reserve Captain               | - Joseph Curtis Cheney II |
| Senior First Officer          | - Charles Grant Herrick   |
| Flight Radio Operator         | - [Redacted]              |
| Air Freight Specialist        | - [Redacted]              |
| Three Air Freight Dispatchers | - [Redacted]              |
- The other two Air Freight Dispatchers' names unknown

Information is incomplete at this time as to whether the individuals survived the accident and, if so, their whereabouts. However, the Board of Review should consider the present situation in accordance with B.1. and 2. of Section: Benefits due to Death, Capture or Internment, Chapter: Termination of the Personnel Manual.

*[Handwritten signature]*

cc: President, Chairman and Member  
VPSLC, Secretary and Member - Copies of Disposition & Beneficiary Forms attached

- T-C, Member
- DP, Member
- AVP, Requested to attend
- File
- R/File

DET/aw

*MGR*



C06117006

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09-Dec-2013

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**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR**  
BUREAU OF EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION  
680 ALA MOANA, ROOM 302  
HONOLULU, HAWAII 96813

May 20, 1964

REFER TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

**REC'D WAS MAY 22 1964**

Air America, Inc.  
808 Seventeenth Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C., 20006

Attention:

Gentlemen:

Please refer to our letter of March 24, 1964 regarding the death of two American pilots employed by you in Laos. It will be appreciated if you will let us have a prompt reply to our letter.

Very truly yours,

Deputy Commissioner

Copied for VPSLC & DP (via Pres) - 6/12/64

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR**  
BUREAU OF EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION  
15TH AND PACIFIC COMPENSATION DISTRICTS  
680 ALA MOANA, ROOM 302  
HONOLULU 13, HAWAII

March 24, 1964

ADDRESS REPLIES TO:  
THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER

REFER TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

REC'D WAS MAR 26 1964

Air America, Inc.  
808 Seventeenth Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C., 20006

Attention:

Gentlemen:

Our attention has been directed to a September 1963 incident involving the apparent death of two American pilots and the imprisonment of five members of the crew of a plane that was shot down in southeast Laos. These men or their survivors may be entitled to benefits under the War Hazards Compensation Act which can be found on pages 47 - 59 of the enclosed pamphlet. In cases involving disabling or fatal injuries, the matter is usually adjudicated and payments made under the Defense Base Act if applicable with subsequent reimbursements to the self-insured employer by the Secretary of Labor.

Our office in Washington has expressed an interest in this matter, and it will be appreciated if you submit forms US-202 covering the detentions and deaths, forms US-261 in the death cases, and any other explanatory or clarifying data concerning the circumstances. Please advise if you have made any payments to the decedents' next of kin and as an incidental matter what your policy is with respect to the detained employees. Are wages accruing in their behalf?

We understand your work in Laos is being taken over by Seaboard World Services, an affiliate of Seaboard World Airlines. Since we have no record concerning this company, we would appreciate your providing their address.

Very truly yours,

Deputy Commissioner

Enclosure

Copied for VPSLC & DP (via Pres) - 6/12/64

*Cheney*

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

MEMORANDUM

REC'D WAS DEC 23 1963

TO : Counsel-WAS via MDR-WAS  
FROM : DP-TPE via President-TPE  
SUBJECT: Death Certificate for Messrs. Cheney and Herrick  
Reference: WC-63-3898

DATE: December 14, 1963  
REF. No. PWD-DP-63/3725

We enclose five copies each of the revised presumptive "Report of Death of An American Citizen" for Cheney and Herrick per referenced memo.



Encls.


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CO 6117008  
APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(1) Herrick  
V(2) Cheney

(b)(6)



REC'D WAS OCT 24 1963

CATAIR WASHINGTON DC  
TP249 TP224 SZVTE REPORTS AMEMB RECEIVED ADVICE FROM PL SOURCE  
THAT CHENEY HERRICK DECEASED ALL OTHER CREW MEMBERS CAPTIVE  
AND ALL RIGHT STOP WE ADVISING NOK RESIDENT FE OF REPORT BUT  
THAT WE UNABLE CONFIRM ACCURACY AND AGAINST REACHING HASTY  
CONCLUSIONS IN ABSENCE MORE SUBSTANTIAL INFORMATION ASSUME  
YOU WILL WISH ADVISE NOK THERE SIMILARLY PRESS AWARE SOMETHING  
NEW AND SZVTE ANTICIPATES PRESSURE FOR STATEMENT WHICH ALREADY  
CLEARED WITH AMEMB HOWEVER WE RELUCTANT MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT  
UNTIL MORE POSITIVE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE

WASHINGTON CONFIRMATION  
PRESIDENT  
AVP  
DP

CATAIR TAIPEI OCT. 19

MESSAGE CENTER  
TAIPEI HEAD OFFICE  
19 OCT 1963  
REG NO. 104

DP-TPE (Via Pres.-TPE)

22 November 1963

Counsel-WAS (Via MGRD-WAS)

WC-63-3898

Death Certificate for Messrs. Cheney and Herrick

The survivors of Messrs. Cheney and Herrick are having difficulty obtaining recognition by certain agencies and individuals of the Presumptive Report of the Death of an American Citizen which was issued by the American Vice-Consul in Vientiane, Laos. One of the principal items which has been causing trouble and on which the Vice-Consul could elaborate is the cause of death, which is now stated as "Official communique of Pathet Lao's spokesman". This obviously is not the cause of death, but the source of information concerning the death.

There is no information contained in the report that the individuals were killed in an airplane crash nor the location of the crash. It would seem appropriate that a revised Report of Death be issued and that this information be inserted as the cause of death. We would appreciate your attempting to obtain a revised "Report of Death of an American Citizen" from the Vice-Consul for both Messrs. Cheney and Herrick. We would also appreciate about five copies of each report in order that the survivors will have adequate official copies to give to the interested parties. The Department of State will not issue certified copies but claims that additional copies must be secured from the Embassy in Laos.

JHB:ns



APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR  
BUREAU OF EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION  
880 Ala Moana, Room 302  
HONOLULU 13, HAWAII  
OFFICE OF DEPUTY COMMISSIONER  
Administering Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act

Form approved,  
Budget Bureau No. 44-R887.2.  
**LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK**  
Case No. \_\_\_\_\_  
Insurance \_\_\_\_\_  
Carrier's No. \_\_\_\_\_

### Employer's First Report To Deputy Commissioner of Accident or Occupational Disease

(To be submitted direct to Deputy Commissioner within ten (10) days)

1. Employer's name Air America, Inc. (Individual or firm name)
2. Office address 808 17th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. (Street and number) (City or town) (State)
3. Nature of business General Aviation (Goods produced, work done, or kind of trade or transportation)
4. Insurance carrier Self-insured 5. Was carrier notified? \_\_\_\_\_ When \_\_\_\_\_
6. Full name of injured employee Joseph C. Cheney II His check No. \_\_\_\_\_
7. Address: Street and No. Plermchitt Road City or town Bangkok State Thailand
8. Sex Male Age 43 Social Security No. \_\_\_\_\_
9. Injured employee's regular occupation Pilot
10. Was he injured in regular occupation? Yes If not, occupation when injured \_\_\_\_\_
11. Wages or average earnings per day, \$1,050 month; per week, \$ (excluding overtime, bonuses, etc.)
12. Working days per ~~week~~ month 70 hours month Any other advantage? \_\_\_\_\_
13. Length of service in your employ 13 months Were full wages paid for day of injury? Yes
14. Place where accident occurred Approximately 5 miles northwest of Muong Phine, Laos (Give place and name of vessel)
15. Name of foreman N/A
16. Date of accident or first illness September 5, 1963 Last day worked September 5, 1963 (Month, day, year) (Month, day, year)
17. When did you or your foreman first have knowledge of injury or illness? September 5, 1963
18. Describe in full how alleged accident occurred, or how employee was exposed to alleged hazard causing illness:  
Aircraft crashed after being hit by pro-Communist Pathet Lao ground fire while on a  
food supply mission to refugees (Immediate cause of alleged accident or disease)
19. What (machine, tool, object, vapor, liquid, or other substance) inflicted or produced the injury or disease? Aircraft crash (If machine, indicate part)
20. Nature of injury or occupational disease N/A (State exactly the part of the person affected and the character of injury or disease)
21. Was member or part of member lost? N/A
22. Did injury cause loss of time? N/A If "yes," on what date? \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_ (Yes or No)
23. Has injured person returned to work? N/A If "yes," on what date? \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_ (Yes or No)
24. Did injured person require medical attention? N/A (Yes or No)
25. Did you provide or authorize medical attention? N/A When \_\_\_\_\_ (Yes or No)
26. Physician N/A (Name) (Address)
27. Hospital N/A (Name) (Address)

Firm name Air America, Inc.

Dated June 12, \_\_\_\_\_, 1964

(Signed) \_\_\_\_\_  
Managing Director

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

Approved  
Budget Bureau No. 44-8902.2

Form US-261

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR—Bureau of Employees' Compensation  
680 Ala Moana, Room 302  
Office of Deputy Commissioner Honolulu 13, Hawaii  
Administering Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK  
CASE No. \_\_\_\_\_  
INSURANCE  
CARRIER'S No. \_\_\_\_\_

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF EMPLOYER IN DEATH CASE

This notice, in duplicate, to be filed promptly with the Deputy Commissioner in every fatal case in addition to Form US-202, "Employer's First Report of Injury."

If this form is sent to the insurance carrier by the employer, the insurance carrier should immediately forward the same, in duplicate, to the Deputy Commissioner.

All questions should be answered fully, adding under heading of "Remarks" any further information not otherwise called for.

- 1. Name of employer Air America, Inc.
- 2. Office address: Street and No. 808 17th Street, N.W. City or town Washington, D.C.
- 3. Name of deceased Joseph C. Cheney II
- 4. Address: Street and No. Plernchitt Road City or town Bangkok, Thailand
- 5. Date of accident or first illness September 5, 1963 Date of death September 5, 1963
- 6. Place of death Laos
- 7. Last physician None  
(Name) (Address)
- 8. Last hospital None  
(Name) (Address)
- 9. Married Yes single \_\_\_\_\_ age \_\_\_\_\_
- 10. Name and address of widow or nearest relative (if relative state relationship) \_\_\_\_\_  
Mrs. Bertha L. Cheney, \_\_\_\_\_  
(Name) (Address)
- 11. Name of Insurance Carrier (not broker) Self-Insurance

REMARKS: (State fully any other facts.)

Mr. Cheney is presumed dead on the basis of a report received by the U.S. Embassy at Vientiane, Laos from a Pathet Lao spokesman. The aircraft crashed in an area under control of the pro-Communist Pathet Lao forces and the body was not recovered.

Firm name Air America, Inc.

Signed \_\_\_\_\_

Dated June 12, 1964 Official title Managing Director

006117011  
APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

Form US-202

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR  
BUREAU OF EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION

OFFICE OF DEPUTY COMMISSIONER ..... 880 Ala Moana, Room 392 .....  
Administering Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act

Form approved.  
Budget Bureau No. 44-R887.2.  
**LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK**  
Case No. ....  
Insurance  
Carrier's No. ....

(b)(6)

**Employer's First Report To Deputy Commissioner of Accident or Occupational Disease**

(To be submitted direct to Deputy Commissioner within ten (10) days)

1. Employer's name Air America, Inc. (Individual or firm name)
2. Office address 808 17th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. (Street and number) (City or town) (State)
3. Nature of business General Aviation (Goods produced, work done, or kind of trade or transportation)
4. Insurance carrier Self-insured 5. Was carrier notified? ..... When .....
6. Full name of injured employee Charles Grant Herrick His check No. ....
7. Address: Street and No. .... City or town Vientiane State Laos
8. Sex Male Age 44 Social Security No. [ ]
9. Injured employee's regular occupation Pilot
10. Was he injured in regular occupation? Yes If not, occupation when injured .....
11. Wages or average earnings per day, \$ .685 monthly; per week, \$ (Include overtime, bonuses, etc.)
12. Working days per week 70 hours monthly Any other advantage? .....
13. Length of service in your employ 12 months Were full wages paid for day of injury? Yes
14. Place where accident occurred Approximately 5 miles northwest of Muong Phine, Laos (Give place and name of vessel)
15. Name of foreman N/A
16. Date of accident or first illness September 5, 1963 Last day worked September 5, 1963 (Month, day, year) (Month, day, year)
17. When did you or your foreman first have knowledge of injury or illness? September 5, 1963
18. Describe in full how alleged accident occurred, or how employee was exposed to alleged hazard causing illness:  
Aircraft crashed after being hit by pro-Communist Pathet Lao ground fire while on  
a food supply mission to refugees. (Immediate cause of alleged accident or disease)
19. What (machine, tool, object, vapor, liquid, or other substance) inflicted or produced the injury or disease?  
Aircraft crash (If machine, indicate part)
20. Nature of injury or occupational disease N/A (State exactly the part of the person affected and the character of injury or disease)
21. Was member or part of member lost? N/A
22. Did injury cause loss of time? N/A (Yes or No) If "yes," on what date? ....., 19.....
23. Has injured person returned to work? N/A (Yes or No) If "yes," on what date? ....., 19.....
24. Did injured person require medical attention? N/A (Yes or No)
25. Did you provide or authorize medical attention? N/A (Yes or No) When .....
26. Physician N/A (Name) (Address)
27. Hospital N/A (Name) (Address)

Firm name Air America, Inc.

Dated June 12, 19 64 (Signed) .....



APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

m Approved  
Budget Bureau No. 44-R902.2

Form US-261

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR—Bureau of Employees' Compensation  
620 Ala Moana, Room 302  
Office of Deputy Commissioner \_\_\_\_\_ Honolulu 13, Hawaii  
Administering Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK  
CASE No. \_\_\_\_\_  
INSURANCE CARRIER'S No. \_\_\_\_\_

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF EMPLOYER IN DEATH CASE

This notice, in duplicate, to be filed promptly with the Deputy Commissioner in every fatal case in addition to Form US-202, "Employer's First Report of Injury."

If this form is sent to the insurance carrier by the employer, the insurance carrier should immediately forward the same, in duplicate, to the Deputy Commissioner.

All questions should be answered fully, adding under heading of "Remarks" any further information not otherwise called for.

- 1. Name of employer Air America, Inc.
- 2. Office address: Street and No. 808 17th Street, N.W. City or town Washington, D.C.
- 3. Name of deceased Charles Grant Herrick
- 4. Address: Street and No. \_\_\_\_\_ City or town Vientiane, Laos
- 5. Date of accident or first illness September 5, 1963 Date of death September 5, 1963
- 6. Place of death Laos
- 7. Last physician None  
(Name) (Address)
- 8. Last hospital None  
(Name) (Address)
- 9. Married Yes single \_\_\_\_\_ age 44
- 10. Name and address of widow or nearest relative (if relative state relationship) \_\_\_\_\_  
Mrs. Margaret L. Herrick, \_\_\_\_\_  
(Name) (Address)
- 11. Name of Insurance Carrier (not broker) Self-Insurer

REMARKS: (State fully any other facts.)

Mr. Herrick is presumed dead on the basis of a report received by the U.S. Embassy at Vientiane, Laos from a Pathet Lao spokesman. The aircraft crashed in an area under control of the pro-Communist Pathet Lao forces and the body was not recovered.

Firm name Air America, Inc.

Signed \_\_\_\_\_

Dated June 12, 1964 Official title Managing Director

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

FORM 7-71 MFG. 3/72

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PAGE 01

IN 457825

TOR: 070455Z JAN 75

SAIG

~~SECRET~~ 070440Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE SAIGON

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE NHA TRANG.

REF: SAIGON

ZRPARKA  (PART II)

TIME OF REPORT 1200(L) 7 JANUARY 1975

SEARCH AND RESCUE:

- A. WX CONTINUES TO HAMPER SAR EFFORT WITH CLOUDS COVERING HIGHER PEAKS. BOTH AAM ACFT AND VNAF CHOPPERS BEING UTILIZED IN SEARCH TODAY.
- B. REPORTS OF DOWNED ACFT IN VICINITY SONG MAO (V18) FULLY INVESTIGATED WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.
- C. AAM CHOPPER (05X) REPORTS SIGHTING WRECKAGE OF C-123 AT COORDINATES BP 9745. TIME OF SIGHTING 1155(L) 7 JANUARY 1975. UNABLE TO CONFIRM IT C-123/ST-1 AT THIS TIME DUE TO CLOUDS IN AREA. SECOND SIGHTING OF WRECKAGE CONFIRMED 1220(L). FURTHER INFO FOLLOWS FROM NHA TRANG. E2 IMPDET.

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 01

IN 458060

TOR:071045Z JAN 75

SAIG

~~SECRET~~ 071030Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE SAIGON

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE NHA TRANG.

REF: SAIGON

ZRPARKA (PART II)

TIME OF REPORT 1800(L) 7 JANUARY 1975

RECOVERY:

- A. INVESTIGATION TEAM INCLUDING MEMBERS FROM AIR AMERICA, CHINA AIRLINES AND SVN DCA (DIRECTOR OF CIVILIAN AVIATION) ENROUTE NHA TRANG ON BOARD VTB/70B TO INVESTIGATE C-123 WRECKAGE, ETA NHA TRANG 1705(L) 7 JANUARY.
- B. UNABLE TO ACCOMPLISH AIRBORNE PHOTOGRAPHY IN THE AFTERNOON DUE TO DETERIORATING WEATHER CONDITIONS AROUND REF PARA C LOCATION. E2 IMPDET

~~SECRET~~

C06117016

FORM 3020b  
7-71 MFG. 3/74

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PAGE 01

IN 458892

TOR: 080433Z JAN 75

SAIG

~~SECRET~~ 080417Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE SAIGON

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY NHA TRANG.

REF: SAIGON

ZRPARKA (PART II)

TIME OF REPORT 1200 (L) 8 JANUARY 1975

SEARCH AND RESCUE:

- A. C-123 WRECKAGE AT BP 9745 CONFIRMED AS VNAF C-123 WRECKAGE, PHOTOGRAPHS WERE TAKEN AND WILL BE PROCESSED.
- B. WEATHER IMPROVING AND SAR CONTINUING. EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO SEARCH PEAKS THAT HAVE PREVIOUSLY BEEN INACCESSABLE.
- C. INVESTIGATION TEAM RETURNING TO SAIGON AFTERNOON OF 8 JANUARY. E2 IMPDET.

~~SECRET~~

C06117017

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

FORM 3020b  
7-71 MFG. 3/74

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\_\_\_\_\_ PAGE 01 IN 456430  
 TORI040451Z JAN 75 SAIG \_\_\_\_\_

~~S E C R E T~~ 040412Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE SAIGON \_\_\_\_\_

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY NHA TRANG, \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
 REF: A. SAIGON \_\_\_\_\_  
 B. SAIGON \_\_\_\_\_

ZRPARKA \_\_\_\_\_ (PART 11)

TIME OF REPORT 1200(L) 04 JANUARY 1975

(1) SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS:

(A) SAR BEING CONDUCTED BY CHOPPERS ALONG 0123 FLIGHT ROUTE BETWEEN V-07 (NHA TRANG) AND V-08 (DALAT)

(B) SAR BEING CONDUCTED BY VTB'S ALONG FLIGHT ROUTE BETWEEN V-08 AND V-07,

(C) AT TIME OF REPORT NO WRECKAGE HAS BEEN SIGHTED.

(2) NAMES OF ADDITIONAL PASSENGERS:

(A) FILIPINO: \_\_\_\_\_

(B) VIETNAMESE EMPLOYEES OF NHA TRANG BASE:

- (1) \_\_\_\_\_
- (2) \_\_\_\_\_
- (3) \_\_\_\_\_

~~S E C R E T~~

C06117017

FORM 3020b  
7-71 MFG. 3/74

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PAGE 02-02

IN 456430

TOR: 040451Z JAN 75

SAIG \_\_\_\_\_

(4) \_\_\_\_\_

(3) SECURITY:

AREA ALONG FLIGHT PATH BETWEEN DALAT (V-08) AND NHA TRANG (V-07)  
CONSIDERED SECURE FOR AIR OPERATIONS.

(4) WEATHER:

WEATHER ALONG FLIGHT ROUTE CONTINUES TO HAMPER SAR EFFORTS,  
PARTICULARLY IN SEARCHING HIGHER PEAKS WHICH CONTINUE TO BE CLOUD  
COVERED. E2 IMPDET

~~SECRET~~

C06117018

7-71 MFG. 3/74

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PAGE 01

IN 459104

TOR:081027Z JAN 75

~~SECRET~~ 081010Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE SAIGON [ ]

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY NHA TRANG.

REF: SAIGON [ ] [ ]

ZRPARKA [ ] (PART I)

TIME OF REPORT 1800 (L) 8 JANUARY 1975

SEARCH AND RESCUE:

A. WRECKAGE LOCATED AT 1505 (L) BY AAM CHOPPER (12F) AT BP 765415. SITE IS ON 5,100 FT. MOUNTAIN WITH CRASH AT THE 3,700 FT. LEVEL. A JET POD HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AND SITE IS NEW WITH A BURNED OUT AREA. WRECKAGE HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED AS C-123/ST-1. NO EVIDENCE OF SURVIVORS, AAM INVESTIGATOR ON BOARD TOOK PICTURES OF NEW SITE AND THESE WILL BE PROCESSED AND ANALYZED.

B. INVESTIGATION TEAM BOOKED ON FLT 2N AND WILL PROCEED NHA TRANG 9 JANUARY IF NEW SITE CONFIRMED, AS CRASH LOCATION C-123/ST-1. E2 IMPDET.

~~SECRET~~

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09-Dec-2013

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ACTION #

PAGE 01

IN 461209

TOR: 100441Z JAN 75

SAIG

~~SECRET~~ 100433Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE SAIGON

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY NHA TRANG.

REF: SAIGON

ZRPARKA (PART II)

TIME OF REPORT 1200 (L) 10 JANUARY 1975

SEARCH AND RESCUE:

A. WEATHER STILL SUCH THAT PHOTO MISSION  
CANNOT BE LAUNCHED. WEATHER APPEARS TO BE  
CLEARING. WILL LAUNCH MISSION AFTERNOON 10  
JANUARY, WEATHER PERMITTING.

B. SAR AIRCRAFT AND INVESTIGATION TEAM STILL ON  
STANDBY AT NHA TRANG.

E2 IMPDET.

~~SECRET~~



APPROVED FOR  
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09-Dec-2013

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CLASSIFICATION #

PAGE 01-01

IN 462408

TOR:110539Z JAN 75

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~ 110402Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE SAIGON [Redacted]

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY NHA TRANG.

REF: SAIGON [Redacted]

ZRPARKA [Redacted] (PART I)

TIME OF REPORT 1200(L) 11 JANUARY 1975

SEARCH AND RESCUE:

[Redacted] AIRCRAFT STILL ON STANDBY SAIGON DUE TO WEATHER. NO ADDITIONAL INFO AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME. E2 IMPDET.

~~SECRET~~

C06117022

FORM 3020b  
1 MFG. 3/74

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

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SECTION UNIT INFORMATION RE. FILE VR

PAGE 01-01

IN 464212

TOR:140738Z JAN 75

SAIG

~~SECRET~~ 140655Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE SAIGON

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY NHA TRANG.

- REFS: A. DIRECTOR
- B. SAIGON
- C. NHA TRANG

ZRPARKA (PART 11)

TIME OF REPORT 1200(L) 14 JANUARY 1975

SEARCH AND RESCUE:

RESPONSE TO REF A, INCLUDING AMBASSADOR'S DECISION (SEE REF. C),  
IN PREPARATION AND WILL FOLLOW VIA SEPARATE MESSAGE. E2, IMPDET.

~~SECRET~~

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

PROFICIENCY TRAINING  
(REF. CHAP IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

(b)(6)

NAME <b>DRIVER, CLARENCE</b>		CREW POSITION <b>T/F.O.</b>		BASE <b>L-03</b>	FLT. TIME <b>4:17</b>	DATE <b>8 DEC 1967</b>
AIRCRAFT TYPE <b>PORTER</b>	AIRCRAFT NUMBER <b>N-195-X</b>	LOCATION <b>L-03</b>	HOOD/INST <b>-</b>	NIGHT <b>-</b>	BLOCK TIME <b>4:55</b>	GRADING LEGEND: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete

	I	S		I	S
1. DOCUMENTATION		X	21. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS		X
2. FLIGHT PLANNING	X		22. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES		
3. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)		X	23. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK		X
(EXTERIOR)		X	24. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION		X
4. KNOWLEDGE OF A/C AND EQUIPMENT		X	25. INTERCEPTION AND TRACKING		X
5. ENGINE STARTING	X		26. HOLDING		X
6. TAXYING		X	27. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF- )		X
USE OF BRAKES		X	(VOR- )		X
ENGINE RUN-UP		X	(ILS- )		X
USE OF CHECK LIST		X	(GCA- )		X
10. CREW BRIEFING AND TAKE-OFF DATA		X	28. MISSED APPROACH		X
11. TAKE-OFFS (NORMAL- 3 )	X		29. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES		X
(CROSSWIND- )	X		30. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDINGS)		X
(STOL- 3 )	X		31. LANDINGS (CIRCLING MINIMUMS- )		X
(REJECTED- )	X		(NORMAL- 2 )		X
(ENGINE FAILURE- )	X		(CROSSWIND- 1 )		X
12. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES	X		(ZERO FLAP- 0 )		X
13. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS	X		(ACCURACY/SPOT- 0 )		X
14. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)	X		(STOL- 2 )		X
15. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS	X		(NIGHT- 0 )		X
16. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED	X		(ENGINE(S) OUT- 0 )		X
RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP	X				
ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING	X				
PROPELLER UNFEATHERING	X		32. LOW AND HIGH RECONNAISSANCE		X
20. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:	X		ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES AND MANEUVERS		
FIRES- HEATER, CARGO, CABIN	X		33.		
SMOKE REMOVAL	X		34.		
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES	X		35.		
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)	X		GENERAL COMPETENCY		
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE	X		36. CREW COODINATION		X
FUEL DUMPING	X		37. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP		X
BRAKE FIR	X		38. JUDGEMENT		X
EMERGENCY EVACUATION	X		39. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION		X
BRAKE FAILURE	X		40. ADHERENCE TO SOP		X
USE OF AIRBRAKES		NA	A. Time trainee manipulated flight controls for purpose of training		2+00
			B. Training time, this trainee, logged to company as non-revenue time		00+00

COMMENTS: 1. FAVORS EXTREME LEFT SIDE OF RUNWAY FOR LANDINGS  
2. NOSE OF AIRCRAFT NOT ALIGNED STRAIGHT DOWN THE RUNWAY FOR T/O + LANDINGS. LEFT CRAB.

INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN

C06117024

7-71 MFG. 3/74

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

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3	6

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RF. FILE. VF

PAGE 01-01

IN 466810

TOR:161026Z JAN 75

~~SECRET~~ 160955Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE SAIGON [redacted]

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO NHA TRANG.

REF: NHA TRANG [redacted] [redacted]

1. RE PARA 5 REF, STATION MEDICAL FILE HOLDINGS ON MR. RAWLINGS ARE SO SPARSE THAT THEY WOULD BE USELESS FOR IDENTIFICATION PURPOSES. REQUEST HQTRS POUCH ASAP ANY MEDICAL AND DENTAL RECORDS THAT MIGHT AID IN IDENTIFICATION.

2. NHA TRANG: SAIGON [redacted] REP CONTACTED RE MEDICAL AND DENTAL RECORDS ON [redacted] THAT MIGHT HELP IN IDENTIFICATION. NONE AVAILABLE BUT [redacted] SENDING PRIORITY MESSAGE TO MANILA IN ATTEMPT TO GET MEDICAL AND DENTAL RECORDS, E2 IMPDET.

~~SECRET~~

C0611702

7-71 MFG. 3/74

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STAFF **PRECEDENCE**

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RF. FILE . VR . \_\_\_\_\_

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3	6

PAGE 01

IN 466776

TOR:161007Z JAN 75

NHTR

~~SECRET~~ 160945Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE NHA TRANG \_\_\_\_\_

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAIGON.

REF NHA TRANG \_\_\_\_\_

ZRPARKA \_\_\_\_\_ (PART II)

TIME OF REPORT 1800 (L) 16 JANUARY 1975

RECOVERY

1. MADE TWO UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO RUN \_\_\_\_\_ MISSION. BOTH STYMIED BY BAD WEATHER. FIRST ATTEMPT MADE IN MORNING ON FLIGHT UP TO NHA TRANG. SECOND MADE AT 1300 HOURS. 1

2. AT 1400 HOURS CHECKED WEATHER FORECAST \_\_\_\_\_ AND WERE TOLD BEST CHANCE FOR ACCEPTABLE WEATHER WAS AFTERNOON OF 16 JAN AND 17 JAN. FORECAST FOR 18 JAN AND BEYOND IS FOR DETERIORATING WEATHER IN AREA OF CRASH SITE. \_\_\_\_\_ AIRCRAFT AND CREW WERE ON STANDBY ALL AFTERNOON 16 JAN AND PLAN HAVE THEM RON TO BE READY FOR ANY BREAK IN WEATHER TOMORROW, 17 JAN.

3. BASE MET WITH \_\_\_\_\_ JCRC FIELD TEAM

~~SECRET~~

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ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF

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ACTION #				3	6

PAGE 02

IN 466776

TOR:161007Z JAN 75

NHTR

LEADER ASSIGNED NHA TRANG, [ ] HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS COMMANDER OF TEAM THAT WILL CARRY OUT RECOVERY MISSION AND MADE RECON OF CRASH SITE, [ ] [ ] WAS ON STANDBY ALL AFTERNOON AND WILL BE READY TO MAKE RECON 17 JAN. IF WEATHER PERMITS, CONGEN BRIEFED ON ABOVE.

4, [ ] AND [ ] DISCUSSED PHOTO NEEDS TO MAXIMIZE VALUE OF [ ] MISSION, SEARCH AND RESCUE

1. WERE ABLE CONDUCT LIMITED SEARCH DURING MORNING HOURS; COVERED FLIGHT PATH OF ST/1 CLOSER TO DALAT AND A RIDGE THAT RUNS NORTH OF AND PARALLEL TO FLIGHT PATH THAT NOT COVERED BEFORE. NEGATIVE RESULTS. WEATHER CLOSED IN ABOUT 1045 HOURS AND SEARCH DISCONTINUED.

2. FURTHER SEARCH IN AFTERNOON CANCELED DUE TO POOR WEATHER,

OTHER

AIRCRAFT USED IN RECOVERY AND SAR:

HELICOPTER

2 HOURS PLUS 45

VOLPAR [ ]

2 HOURS PLUS 30 (POSITION AT

~~SECRET~~

C06117025

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ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT

STAFF

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RF. FILE VR

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2		5
3		6

ACTION #

PAGE 03-03

IN 466776

TOR:161007Z JAN 75

NHTR

NHA TRANG)

VOLPAR

PLUS 45 (ESTIMATED

TIME OVER AREA)

TOTAL

6 HOURS

E2 IMPDET

~~SECRET~~

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BY AT X

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ACTION #	F			
	O			

PAGE 01

IN 469683

TO: 200950Z JAN 75

NHTR

~~SECRET~~ 200935Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE NHA TRANG

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAIGON.

REF NHA TRANG

ZRPARKA  (PART II)

TIME OF REPORT 1800 (L) 20 JANUARY 1975

RECOVERY

1. BASE AND  BRIEFED CONGEN   
ON AFTERNOON OF 20 JAN ON RECON, PHOTO AND SEARCH MIS-  
SIONS CARRIED OUT YESTERDAY. CONGEN PLANS TO PREPARE  
 THREAT ASSESSMENT REPORT (SEE PARA 3  
OF NHA TRANG 27609) FOR HAND CARRY BY  TO  
JCRC HQS WITH THE CAPT'S RECON REPORT ON WEDNESDAY 22 JAN.
2.  MISSION OF 19 JAN GOT SOME TAKE OF AREA  
BUT NONE OF CRASH SITE ITSELF.  WILL STOP  
OFF IN SAIGON TOMORROW, 21 JAN, ON HIS WAY TO THAILAND  
TO LOOK AT THE PICTURES AND DISCUSS WITH   
WHETHER OR NOT WE NEED ANOTHER  MISSION. E2 IMPDET

~~SECRET~~



C06117027

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

PROFICIENCY TRAINING  
(REF. CHAP IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

(b)(6)

NAME		CREW POSITION		BASE	FLT. TIME	DATE	
DRIVER, C.N.		T/FO		VTE	3:48	13 Dec 1967	
AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NUMBER	LOCATION	HOOD/INST	NIGHT	BLOCK TIME	GRADING LEGEND:	
PC6c	193X	L-08	:	:	4:01	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete	
			I	S		I	S
1. DOCUMENTATION				✓	21. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS		-
2. FLIGHT PLANNING				✓	22. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES		-
3. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)				✓	23. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK		-
(EXTERIOR)				✓	24. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION		-
4. KNOWLEDGE OF A/C AND EQUIPMENT				✓	25. INTERCEPTION AND TRACKING		-
5. ENGINE STARTING				✓	26. HOLDING		-
6. TAXYING				✓	27. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF- )		-
USE OF BRAKES				✓	(VOR- )		-
ENGINE RUN-UP				✓	(ILS- )		-
USE OF CHECK LIST				✓	(GCA- )		-
10. CREW BRIEFING AND TAKE-OFF DATA				✓	28. MISSED APPROACH		-
11. TAKE-OFFS (NORMAL- 1 )				✓	29. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES		-
(CROSSWIND- 8 )				✓	30. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDINGS)		-
(STOL- )				-	31. LANDINGS (CIRCLING MINIMUMS- )		-
(REJECTED- )				-	(NORMAL- )		-
(ENGINE FAILURE- )				-	(CROSSWIND- 2 )		✓
12. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES				-	(ZERO FLAP- )		-
13. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS				✓	(ACCURACY/SPOT- )		-
14. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)				-	(STOL- 7 )		✓
15. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS				-	(NIGHT- )		-
16. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED				-	(ENGINE(S) OUT- )		-
RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP				-			-
ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING				-			-
PROPELLER UNFEATHERING				-	32. LOW AND HIGH RECONNAISSANCE		-
20. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:				-	ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES AND MANEUVERS		-
FIRES- HEATER, CARGO, CABIN				-	33.		-
SMOKE REMOVAL				-	34.		-
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES				-	35.		-
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)				-	GENERAL COMPETENCY		-
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE				-	36. CREW COODINATION		-
FUEL DUMPING				-	37. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP		✓
BRAKE FIRE				-	38. JUDGEMENT		✓
EMERGENCY EVACUATION				-	39. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION		✓
BRAKE FAILURE				-	40. ADHERENCE TO SOP		✓
USE OF AIRBRAKES				-	A. Time trainee manipulated flight controls for purpose of training	100%	
					B. Training time, this trainee, logged to company as non-revenue time	0	

COMMENTS: TRAINEE slow but positive on procedures  
ALL T.O'S AND LANDINGS L-35/LS-28.

INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

PROFICIENCY TRAINING  
(REF. CHAP IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

NAME		CREW POSITION		BASE	FLT. TIME	DATE	
DRIVER, C.		T/PIC		VTE	:	8 AUGUST 1970	
AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NUMBER	LOCATION	HOOD/INST	NIGHT	BLOCK TIME	GRADING LEGEND:	
C-123K	56-4374	VTE	:10	---	1:59	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete	
		I	S			I	S
1. DOCUMENTATION			X	21. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS			X
2. FLIGHT PLANNING			X	22. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES			
3. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)			X	23. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK			X
(EXTERIOR)			X	24. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION		X	
4. KNOWLEDGE OF A/C AND EQUIPMENT			X	25. INTERCEPTION AND TRACKING			X
5. ENGINE STARTING			X	26. HOLDING			X
6. TAXYING			X	27. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF- 1 )			X
7. USE OF BRAKES			X	(VOR- )			
8. ENGINE RUN-UP			X	(ILS- )			
USE OF CHECK LIST			X	(GCA- )			
10. CREW BRIEFING AND TAKE-OFF DATA			X	28. MISSED APPROACH			X
11. TAKE-OFFS (NORMAL- 1 )			X	29. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES			X
(CROSSWIND- )				30. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDINGS) S.E		X	
(STOL- )				31. LANDINGS (CIRCLING MINIMUMS- 1 )			X
(REJECTED- 1 )			X	(NORMAL- )			
(ENGINE FAILURE- )				(CROSSWIND- )			
12. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES		X		(ZERO FLAP- )			
13. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS			X	(ACCURACY/SPOT- )			
14. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)			X	(STOL- )			
15. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS			X	(NIGHT- )			
16. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED			X	(ENGINE(S) OUT- 1 )		X	
17. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP							
18. ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING			X				
1 PROPELLER UNFEATHERING			X	32. LOW AND HIGH RECONNAISSANCE			
20. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:			X	ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES AND MANEUVERS			
FIRES- HEATER, CARGO, CABIN			X	33.			
SMOKE REMOVAL			X	34.			
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES			X	35.			
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)			X	GENERAL COMPETENCY			
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE			X	36. CREW COODINATION		X	
FUEL DUMPING JETTISON			X	37. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP			X
BRAKE FIRE			X	38. JUDGEMENT			X
EMERGENCY EVACUATION			X	39. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION			X
BRAKE FAILURE			X	40. ADHERENCE TO SOP		X	
USE OF AIRBRAKES			X				
				A. TIME TRAINEE MANIPULATED FLIGHT CONTROLS FOR PURPOSE OF TRAINING		1	59
				B. TRAINING TIME THIS TRAINEE LOGGED TO COMPANY AS NON-REVENUE		1	59

COMMENTS: FLIGHT TERMINATED EARLY DUE R. ENGINE OIL LEAK. FLIGHT ADMINISTERED BY S/1P WYCHE, SUPERVISED BY MFSD.

ITEM 12. DID NOT ADHER TO CLEARANCE

24. ACTUAL 13 MINUTES TO STATION VS. ESTIMATE OF 5 1/2 MINUTES.

31. 100 KIAS LANDING FLARE VS. 87 KIAS CHARTER.

36, 40. RANDOM COMMANDS WITH NON ADHERANCE TO COMMAND/RESPONSE PHRASEOLOGY

INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN

EAUG 70

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

PROFICIENCY TRAINING  
(REF. CHAP IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

*10*

NAME		CREW POSITION		BASE	FLT. TIME	DATE	
DRIVER, CN		PIC		VTE	:	3 AUG 1980	
AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NUMBER	LOCATION	HOOD/TINST	NIGHT	BLOCK TIME	GRADING LEGEND:	
C123K	554545	VTE	50	—	2:16	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete	
			I	S		I	S
1. DOCUMENTATION				X	21. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS		X
2. FLIGHT PLANNING				X	22. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES		—
3. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)				X	23. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK		X
(EXTERIOR)				X	24. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION		X
4. KNOWLEDGE OF A/C AND EQUIPMENT				X	25. INTERCEPTION AND TRACKING		X
5. ENGINE STARTING				X	26. HOLDING		X
6. TAXYING				X	27. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF— 2)		X
7. USE OF BRAKES				X	(VOR— )		—
8. ENGINE RUN-UP				X	(ILS— )		—
USE OF CHECK LIST				X	(GCA— )		—
10. CREW BRIEFING AND TAKE-OFF DATA				X	28. MISSED APPROACH		—
11. TAKE-OFFS (NORMAL— 1)				X	29. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES		X
(CROSSWIND— 3)				X	30. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDINGS)		—
(STOL— 1)				X	31. LANDINGS (CIRCLING MINIMUMS— 1)		X
(REJECTED— 1)				X	(NORMAL— 1)		X
(ENGINE FAILURE— 1)				X	(CROSSWIND— 3)		—
12. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES				X	(ZERO FLAP— )		—
13. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS				X	(ACCURACY/SPOT— 1)		X
14. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)				X	(STOL— 1)		X
15. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS				X	(NIGHT— )		—
16. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED				X	(ENGINE(S) OUT— 1)		X
17. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP				—			
18. ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING				X			
PROPELLER UNFEATHERING				X	32. LOW AND HIGH RECONNAISSANCE		
20. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:				—	ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES AND MANEUVERS		
FIRES- HEATER, CARGO, CABIN				X	33.		
SMOKE REMOVAL				X	34.		
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES				X	35.		
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)				—	GENERAL COMPETENCY		
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE				X	36. CREW COODINATION		X
FUEL DUMPING				—	37. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP		X
BRAKE FIR				X	38. JUDGEMENT		X
EMERGENCY EVACUATION				X	39. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION		X
BRAKE FAILURE				X	40. ADHERENCE TO SOP		X
USE OF AIRBRAKES				X			
					A. Time trainee manipulated flight controls for purpose of training		2:16
					B. Training time, this trainee, logged to company as non-revenue time		2:16

COMMENTS: TRAINING FOR EVALUATION.

*J*

INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN

[Signature Box]

CO 6117030

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

PROFICIENCY TRAINING  
(REF. CHAP IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

(b)(6)

NAME		CREW POSITION		BASE	FLT. TIME	DATE	
DRIVER CN		CAPT		VTE	6:55	21 SEPT 1969	
AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NUMBER	LOCATION	HOOD/INST	NIGHT	BLOCK TIME	GRADING LEGEND:	
C-123K	545		:	:	7:44	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete	
		I	S			I	S
1. DOCUMENTATION			✓	21. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS		✓	
2. FLIGHT PLANNING		✓		22. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES			
3. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)			✓	23. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK			L
(EXTERIOR)			✓	24. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION		✓	
4. KNOWLEDGE OF A/C AND EQUIPMENT			✓	25. INTERCEPTION AND TRACKING			L
5. ENGINE STARTING			✓	26. HOLDING			
6. TAXYING			✓	27. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF- )		✓	
7. USE OF BRAKES			✓	(VOR- )			
8. ENGINE RUN-UP			✓	(ILS- )			
9. USE OF CHECK LIST			✓	(GCA- )			
10. CREW BRIEFING AND TAKE-OFF DATA		✓		28. MISSED APPROACH			
11. TAKE-OFFS (NORMAL- 4 )			✓	29. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES			
(CROSSWIND- )				30. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDINGS)			
(STOL- )				31. LANDINGS (CIRCLING MINIMUMS- )			
(REJECTED- )				(NORMAL- 2 )			2
(ENGINE FAILURE- )				(CROSSWIND- )			
12. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES		L		(ZERO FLAP- )			
13. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS				(ACCURACY/SPOT- )			
14. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)				(STOL- 2 )		✓	
15. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS				(NIGHT- )			
16. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED				(ENGINE(S) OUT- )			
17. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP							
18. ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING							
19. PROPELLER UNFEATHERING				32. LOW AND HIGH RECONNAISSANCE			
20. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:				ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES AND MANEUVERS			
FIRES- HEATER, CARGO, CABIN				33.			
SMOKE REMOVAL				34.			
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES				35.			
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)				GENERAL COMPETENCY			
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE				36. CREW COODINATION			✓
FUEL DUMPING				37. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP			✓
BRAKE FIRF				38. JUDGEMENT			✓
EMERGENCY EVACUATION				39. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION			L
BRAKE FAILURE				40. ADHERENCE TO SOP			✓
USE OF AIRBRAKES				A. Time trainee manipulated flight controls for purpose of training		7	4
				B. Training time, this trainee, logged to company as non-revenue time			

COMMENTS:

INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN

DISTRIBUTION: 1 INDIV TNG FILE, VIA, MFD; 2 MFT RECORDS; 3 DFD, VIA MFT

OP-374 17 JUN 66

C06117031

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

PROFICIENCY TRAINING  
(REF. CHAP IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

(b)(6)

NAME <i>DRIVER C.N.</i>		CREW POSITION <i>T/PIC</i>		BASE <i>VTE</i>	FLT. TIME <i>2:33</i>	DATE <i>10 SEPT 1969</i>
AIRCRAFT TYPE <i>C-123K</i>	AIRCRAFT NUMBER <i>374</i>	LOCATION <i>VTE</i>	HOOD/INST <i>:</i>	NIGHT <i>:</i>	BLOCK TIME <i>2:54</i>	GRADING LEGEND: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete

	I	S		I	S
1. DOCUMENTATION		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	21. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
2. FLIGHT PLANNING		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	22. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
3. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	23. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
(EXTERIOR)		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	24. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
4. KNOWLEDGE OF A/C AND EQUIPMENT		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	25. INTERCEPTION AND TRACKING		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
5. ENGINE STARTING		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	26. HOLDING		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
6. TAXYING		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	27. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF- 1 )		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
7. USE OF BRAKES		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(VOR- )		
8. ENGINE RUN-UP		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(ILS- )		
USE OF CHECK LIST		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(GCA- 1 )		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
10. CREW BRIEFING AND TAKE-OFF DATA		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	28. MISSED APPROACH		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
11. TAKE-OFFS (NORMAL- 3 )		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	29. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
(CROSSWIND- )			30. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDINGS)		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
(STOL- 1 )		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	31. LANDINGS (CIRCLING MINIMUMS- 1 )		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
(REJECTED- 1 )		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(NORMAL- 3 )		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
(ENGINE FAILURE- 1 )		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(CROSSWIND- )		
12. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(ZERO FLAP- 1 )		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
13. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(ACCURACY/SPOT- 1 )		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
14. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(STOL- 2 )		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
15. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(NIGHT- )		
16. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(ENGINE(S) OUT- 1 )		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
17. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
18. ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
PROPELLER UNFEATHERING		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	32. LOW AND HIGH RECONNAISSANCE		
20. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES AND MANEUVERS		
FIRES- HEATER, CARGO, CABIN		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	33.		
SMOKE REMOVAL		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	34.		
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	35.		
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	GENERAL COMPETENCY		
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	36. CREW COODINATION		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FUEL DUMPING		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	37. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BRAKE FIRF		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	38. JUDGEMENT		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
EMERGENCY EVACUATION		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	39. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BRAKE FAILURE		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	40. ADHERENCE TO SOP		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
USE OF AIRBRAKES		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
			A. Time trainee manipulated flight controls for purpose of training		<i>1:54</i>
			B. Training time, this trainee, logged to company as non-revenue time		<i>2:54</i>

COMMENTS:

INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMA

DISTRIBUTION: 1 INDIV TNG FILE, VIA, MFD; 2 MFT RECORDS; 3 DFD, VIA MFT

*REP*

OP-374 17 JUN 66

C06117032

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

3/74

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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BY AT Z

STAFF ~~PRECEDENCE~~

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PAGE 01

III 470814

TOR:211002Z JAN 75

NHTR

~~SECRET~~ 210935Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE NHA TRANG

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAIGON.

REF NHA TRANG

ZRPARKA (PART II)

TIME OF REPORT 1800 (L) 21 JANUARY 1975

RECOVERY

1. CONGEN THREAT ASSESSMENT MEMO COVERED THE GENERAL DISPOSITION OF COMMUNIST UNITS IN THE AREA OF THE CRASH SITE AND CLOSED BY SAYING THAT "THE THREAT IS CONSIDERED LOW TO MODERATE, AFTER SOME DELAY FOLLOWING SEARCH ACTIVITIES OVER THE SUSPECTED CRASH SITE." THE TERMS "LOW TO MODERATE" AND "AFTER SOME DELAY" ARE THE KEY PHRASES. JCRC HQS WILL ONLY APPROVE OPERATIONS IN THE LOW TO MODERATE RANGE AND THE LOCAL PROVINCE REPRESENTATIVE'S ASSESSMENT IS CONSIDERED VERY IMPORTANT SINCE IT IS THE MOST AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENT AVAILABLE ON THE CONDITIONS AT ANY CRASH SITE. AS TO THE DELAY FACTOR, WE DELIBERATELY DID NOT STATE ANY SPECIFIC PERIOD

~~SECRET~~

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09-Dec-2013

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PAGE 02

IN 708.4

TOR:211002Z JAN 75

Nr ind

OF TIME. HOPEFULLY, BY THE TIME WE GET APPROVAL FROM JCRC HQS AND THE RECOVERY TEAM IS IN NHA TRANG, PROBABLY AT LEAST A WEEK OR MORE, WE WILL BE ABLE TO SAY THAT THE DELAY HAS BEEN SUFFICIENT TO LAUNCH THE MISSION.

2. [ ] WILL BE IN THAILAND UNTIL 27 JAN. HE WILL BE IN TELEPHONIC CONTACT WITH THE BASE TO KEEP US INFORMED AND IN THE EVENT HE NEEDS ANY ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FROM HERE.

3. WITH CONGEN [ ] CONCURRENCE, BASE ALERTED MR-2 DEPUTY COMMANDER, [ ], THAT THE CONGEN WOULD PROBABLY BE GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE GVN SHORTLY TO REQUEST SUPPORT TO SECURE THE CRASH SITE PREPARATORY TO INSERTING A JCRC TEAM.

4. STATEMENT BY MANILA DENTIST ON DENTAL WORK DONE

[ ] WAS PASSED TO [ ]

OTHER

WHILE ON THE RECON MISSION [ ] SPOTTED AND PHOTOGRAPHED THE WRECKAGE OF A PROBABLY USAF CARIBOU AIRCRAFT, NUMBER WE 574. THE CRASH IS AN OLD ONE AND LOCATED ABOUT EIGHT KILOMETERS SOUTH OF THE CRASH SITE

~~SECRET~~

C06117032

FORM 302b  
7-71 MFG. 3/74

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

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ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED \_\_\_\_\_ BY \_\_\_\_\_ AT \_\_\_\_\_ Z \_\_\_\_\_

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ACTION #.

PAGE 03-03

IN #/0814

TOR:211002Z JAN 75

NHT? \_\_\_\_\_

WE ARE INVESTIGATING. THIS CRASH SITE HAD NOT BEEN CARRIED  
BY JCRC AND INFORMATION ON IT WILL BE USEFUL FOR ITS  
RECORDS. E2 IMPDET

~~SECRET~~



C06117033

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RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

PROFICIENCY TRAINING  
(REF. CHAP IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

(b)(6)

NAME		CREW POSITION		BASE	FLT. TIME	DATE	
DRIVER C.N		T/PIC		VTE	3:23	11 SEPT 1969	
AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NUMBER	LOCATION	HOOD/INST	NIGHT	BLOCK TIME	GRADING LEGEND:	
C-123K	576	VTE	:	:	3:54	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete	
		I	S			I	S
1. DOCUMENTATION			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	21. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
2. FLIGHT PLANNING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	22. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
3. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	23. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
(EXTERIOR)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	24. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
4. KNOWLEDGE OF A/C AND EQUIPMENT			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	25. INTERCEPTION AND TRACKING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
5. ENGINE STARTING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	26. HOLDING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
6. TAXYING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	27. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF- 7 )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
7. USE OF BRAKES			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(VOR- )			
8. ENGINE RUN-UP			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(ILS- )			
USE OF CHECK LIST			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(GCA- )			
10. CREW BRIEFING AND TAKE-OFF DATA			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	28. MISSED APPROACH			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
11. TAKE-OFFS (NORMAL- )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	29. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
(CROSSWIND- 7 )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	30. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDINGS)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
(STOL- 4 )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	31. LANDINGS (CIRCLING MINIMUMS- )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
(REJECTED- 1 )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(NORMAL- )			
(ENGINE FAILURE- 1 )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(CROSSWIND- 7 )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
12. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(ZERO FLAP- 1 )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
13. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(ACCURACY/SPOT- )			
14. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(STOL- 4 )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
15. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(NIGHT- )			
16. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(ENGINE(S) OUT- 1 )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
17. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				
18. ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				
PROPELLER UNFEATHERING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	32. LOW AND HIGH RECONNAISSANCE			
20. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES AND MANEUVERS			
FIRES- HEATER, CARGO, CABIN			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	33.			
SMOKE REMOVAL			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	34.			
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	35.			
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	GENERAL COMPETENCY			
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	36. CREW COODINATION			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FUEL DUMPING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	37. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BRAKE FIRF			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	38. JUDGEMENT			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
EMERGENCY EVACUATION			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	39. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BRAKE FAILURE			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	40. ADHERENCE TO SOP			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
USE OF AIRBRAKES			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	A. Time trainee manipulated flight controls for purpose of training			2:54
				B. Training time, this trainee, logged to company as non-revenue time			3:54
COMMENTS:							
INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN							

DISTRIBUTION: 1 INDIV TNG FILE, VIA, MFD; 2 MFT RECORDS; 3 DFD, VIA MFT

REP

OP-374 17 JUN 66

C06117034

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

PROFICIENCY TRAINING  
(REF. CHAP IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

(b)(6)

NAME		CREW POSITION		BASE	FLT. TIME	DATE		
Driver, C. N.		F/O		VTE	1:14	6 February, 1969 196		
AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NUMBER	LOCATION	HOOD/INST	NIGHT	BLOCK TIME	GRADING LEGEND:		
G-123	564374	VTE	0:30		1:28	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete		
		I	S				I	S
1. DOCUMENTATION			X	21. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS				X
2. FLIGHT PLANNING			X	22. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES				X
3. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)			X	23. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK				X
(EXTERIOR)			X	24. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION				X
4. KNOWLEDGE OF A/C AND EQUIPMENT			X	25. INTERCEPTION AND TRACKING				X
5. ENGINE STARTING			X	26. HOLDING				X
6. TAXIING			X	27. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF- 1 )				X
USE OF BRAKES			X	(VOR- )				X
ENGINE RUN-UP			X	(ILS- )				X
9. USE OF CHECK LIST			X	(GCA- )				X
10. CREW BRIEFING AND TAKE-OFF DATA			X	28. MISSED APPROACH				X
11. TAKE-OFFS (NORMAL- 4 )			X	29. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES				X
(CROSSWIND- 7 )			X	30. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDINGS)				X
(STOL- 3 )			X	31. LANDINGS (CIRCLING MINIMUMS- 1 )				X
(REJECTED- )			X	(NORMAL- 5 )				X
(ENGINE FAILURE- 1 )			X	(CROSSWIND- 7 )				X
12. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES			X	(ZERO FLAP- 1 )				X
13. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS			X	(ACCURACY/SPOT- 2 )				X
14. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)			X	(STOL- 2 )				X
15. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS			X	(NIGHT- )				X
16. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED			X	(ENGINE(S) OUT- 1 )				X
17. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP			X	ENGINE OUT GO AROUND				X
ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING			X	32. LOW AND HIGH RECONNAISSANCE				X
PROPELLER UNFEATHERING			X	ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES AND MANEUVERS				X
20. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:			X	33. FUEL MANAGEMENT				X
FIRES- HEATER, CARGO, CABIN			X	34. ANGLE OF ATTACK STILL WARNING				X
SMOKE REMOVAL			X	35. AIR DROP PROCEDURES				X
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES			X	GENERAL COMPETENCY				X
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)			X	36. CREW COODINATION				X
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE			X	37. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP				X
FUEL DUMPING			X	38. JUDGEMENT				X
BRAKE FIR			X	39. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION				X
EMERGENCY EVACUATION			X	40. ADHERENCE TO SOP				X
BRAKE FAILURE			X					X
USE OF AIRBRAKES			X					X
				A, Time trainee manipulated flight controls for purpose of training				1:2
				B, Training time, this trainee, logged to company as non-revenue time				1:2

COMMENTS: Excellent performance in all areas. Ready for proficiency check.

INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN

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OP-374 17 JUN 66

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

PROFICIENCY TRAINING  
(REF. CHAP IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

(b)(6)

NAME DRIVER C.N.		CREW POSITION F/O		BASE VTE	FLT. TIME 1:15	DATE 5 FEB 69
AIRCRAFT TYPE C123K	AIRCRAFT NUMBER 54636	LOCATION VTE	HOOD/INST ---	NIGHT ---	BLOCK TIME 1:25	GRADING LEGEND: S Completed to Standard I Incomplete

		I	S			I	S
1. DOCUMENTATION			✓	21. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS			✓
2. FLIGHT PLANNING			✓	22. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES			
3. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)			✓	23. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK			✓
(EXTERIOR)			✓	24. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION			✓
4. KNOWLEDGE OF A/C AND EQUIPMENT			✓	25. INTERCEPTION AND TRACKING			
5. ENGINE STARTING			✓	26. HOLDING			
6. TAXYING			✓	27. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF- 1 )			✓
7 USE OF BRAKES			✓	(VOR- )			
ENGINE RUN-UP			✓	(ILS- )			
SE OF CHECK LIST			✓	(GCA- )			
8. NEW BRIEFING AND TAKE-OFF DATA			✓	28. MISSED APPROACH			
11. TAKE-OFFS (NORMAL- 1 )			✓	29. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES			✓
(CROSSWIND- )				30. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDINGS)			
(STOL- 1 )			✓	31. LANDINGS (CIRCLING MINIMUMS- )			
(REJECTED- )				(NORMAL- 3 )			
(ENGINE FAILURE- )				(CROSSWIND- )			
12. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES			✓	(ZERO FLAP- )			
13. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS			✓	(ACCURACY/SPOT- )			
14. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)			✓	(STOL- )			
15. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS			✓	(NIGHT- )			
16. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED			✓	(ENGINE(S) OUT- )			
17 RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP				ENGINE OUT GO AROUND			
ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING			✓				
19. PROPELLER UNFEATHERING			✓	32. LOW AND HIGH RECONNAISSANCE			
2 SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:				ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES AND MANEUVERS			
FIRES-HEATER, CARGO, CABIN			✓	33. FUEL MANAGEMENT			✓
SMOKE REMOVAL			✓	34. ANGLE OF ATTACK/STALL WARNING			✓
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES			✓	35. Air Drop Procedures			✓
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)			✓	GENERAL COMPETENCY			
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE			✓	36. CREW COODINATION			✓
FUEL DUMPING				37. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP			✓
BRAKE FIRF			✓	38. JUDGEMENT			✓
EMERGENCY EVACUATION			✓	39. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION			✓
BRAKE FAILURE			✓	40. ADHERENCE TO SOP			✓
USE OF AIRBRAKES			✓				
				A. Time trainee manipulated flight controls for use of training			1:25
				B. Training time, this trainee, logged in company as non-instrument time			1:25

COMMENTS: Very Good progress on first flight. Will be ready for proficiency check after next flight.

INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN

AIM 17 5 FEB 69

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OP-374 17 JUN 66

C06117036

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)  
CLL

**PROFICIENCY TRAINING**  
(REF. CHAP IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

NAME		CREW POSITION		BASE	FLT. TIME	DATE	
DRIVER, C.N.		F/O		VTE	0:58	15 NOV 1967	
AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NUMBER	LOCATION	HOOD/INST	NIGHT	BLOCK TIME	GRADING LEGEND:	
PC-6C	N197X	VTE	:40	:39	1:13	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete	
			I	S		I	S
1. DOCUMENTATION				X	21. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS		X
2. FLIGHT PLANNING				X	22. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES		
3. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)				X	23. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK		X
(EXTERIOR)				X	24. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION		
4. KNOWLEDGE OF A/C AND EQUIPMENT				X	25. INTERCEPTION AND TRACKING		X
5. ENGINE STARTING				X	26. HOLDING		
6. TAXYING				X	27. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF- )		
USE OF BRAKES				X	(VOR- )		
ENGINE RUN-UP				X	(ILS- )		
USE OF CHECK LIST				X	(GCA- )		
10. CREW BRIEFING AND TAKE-OFF DATA				X	28. MISSED APPROACH		
11. TAKE-OFFS (NORMAL- 2) 2				X	29. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES		
(CROSSWIND- 2)				X	30. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDINGS)		
(STOL- 2)				X	31. LANDINGS (CIRCLING MINIMUMS- )		
(REJECTED- )					(NORMAL- 2)		X
(ENGINE FAILURE- )					(CROSSWIND- 2)		X
12. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES				X	(ZERO FLAP- 0)		
13. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS				X	(ACCURACY/SPOT- 0)		
14. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)					(STOL- 0)		
15. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS					(NIGHT- 1)		X
16. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED				X	(ENGINE(S) OUT- 0)		
17. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP							
ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING							
PROPELLER UNFEATHERING							
20. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:					32. LOW AND HIGH RECONNAISSANCE		
FIRES-HEATER, CARGO, CABIN					ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES AND MANEUVERS		
SMOKE REMOVAL					33.		
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES					34.		
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)					35.		
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE					GENERAL COMPETENCY		
FUEL DUMPING					36. CREW COORDINATION		X
BRAKE FIRE					37. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP		X
EMERGENCY EVACUATION					38. JUDGEMENT		X
BRAKE FAILURE					39. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION		X
USE OF AIRBRAKES					40. ADHERENCE TO SOP		X
					A. Time trainee manipulated flight controls for purpose of training		1:13
					B. Training time, this trainee, logged to company as non-revenue time		1:13
COMMENTS: WAS ROUGH ON THE CONTROLS WHEN HE FIRST PUT ON THE INSTRUMENT HOOD. ALTHOUGH ROUGH HE WAS A GOOD DEFLECT-INTERCEPTED AND TRACKING VERY GOOD. SMOOTHED OUT LATER. HANDLES THE AIRPLANE WELL. A GOOD INSTRUMENT FLYING KNOWLEDGE. HAS GOOD POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER PIC							
INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN							

DISTRIBUTION: 1 INDIV TNG FILE, VIA, MED 2 MFT RECORDS; 3 DFD, VIA MFT

OP-374 17 JUN 66

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

**PROFICIENCY TRAINING**  
(REF. CHAP IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

NAME		CREW POSITION		BASE	FLT. TIME	DATE	
DRIVER C.H.		TFO		VTA	2:10	1 NOV 1962	
AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NUMBER	LOCATION	HOOD/INST	NIGHT	BLOCK TIME	GRADING LEGEND:	
PC6C	N392R	1520A	00:00	0:00	2:21	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete	
				I	S	I	S
1. DOCUMENTATION							
2. FLIGHT PLANNING							
3. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)							
(EXTERIOR)							
4. KNOWLEDGE OF A/C AND EQUIPMENT							
5. ENGINE STARTING							
6. TAXIING							
USE OF BRAKES							
ENGINE RUN-UP							
USE OF CHECK LIST							
10. CREW BRIEFING AND TAKE-OFF DATA							
11. TAKE-OFFS (NORMAL— )							
(CROSSWIND— )							
(STOL— )							
(REJECTED— )							
(ENGINE FAILURE— )							
12. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES							
13. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS							
14. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)							
15. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS							
16. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED							
17. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP							
ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING							
PROPELLER UNFEATHERING							
20. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:							
FIRES-HEATER, CARGO, CABIN							
SMOKE REMOVAL							
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES							
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)							
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE							
FUEL DUMPING							
BRAKE FIRE							
EMERGENCY EVACUATION							
BRAKE FAILURE							
USE OF AIRBRAKES							
21. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS							
22. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES							
23. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK							
24. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION							
25. INTERCEPTION AND TRACKING							
26. HOLDING							
27. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF— )							
(VOR— )							
(ILS— )							
(GCA— )							
28. MISSED APPROACH							
29. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES							
30. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDINGS)							
31. LANDINGS (CIRCLING MINIMUMS— )							
(NORMAL— )							
(CROSSWIND— )							
(ZERO FLAP— )							
(ACCURACY/SPOT— )							
(STOL— )							
(NIGHT— )							
(ENGINE(S) OUT— )							
32. LOW AND HIGH RECONNAISSANCE							
ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES AND MANEUVERS							
33.							
34.							
35.							
GENERAL COMPETENCY							
36. CREW COORDINATION							
37. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP							
38. JUDGEMENT							
39. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION							
40. ADHERENCE TO SOP							
A. Time trainee manipulated flight controls for purpose of training							2:10
B. Training time, this trainee, logged to company as non-revenue time							

COMMENTS: *EARLY RETURN FROM up country due to RADIO FAILURE.  
PROGRESS SATISFACTORY.*

INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN

*[Signature]*

C06117038

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

□ (b)(6)  
C C C

**PROFICIENCY TRAINING**  
(REF. CHAP IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

NAME		CREW POSITION		BASE	FLT. TIME	DATE																																																																																																																																																																																																																								
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PC6C	N39ZR	LS20A	00:00	0:00	8:44	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete																																																																																																																																																																																																																								
<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>I</th> <th>S</th> <th></th> <th>I</th> <th>S</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>1. DOCUMENTATION</td> <td>/</td> <td></td> <td>21. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>2. FLIGHT PLANNING</td> <td>/</td> <td></td> <td>22. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>3. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)</td> <td>/</td> <td></td> <td>23. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>(EXTERIOR)</td> <td>/</td> <td></td> <td>24. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>4. KNOWLEDGE OF A/C AND EQUIPMENT</td> <td>/</td> <td></td> <td>25. INTERCEPTION AND TRACKING</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>5. ENGINE STARTING</td> <td>/</td> <td></td> <td>26. HOLDING</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>6. TAXYING</td> <td>/</td> <td></td> <td>27. 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COMMENTS:

FIRST DAY OF TRAINING up-country. PROGRESS SATISFACTORY.  
NORMAL TROUBLE IN CHANGING FROM big bird to Littlebird  
OPERATIONS.

INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN

DISTRIBUTION: 1 INDIV TNG FILE, VIA, MFD; 2 MFT RECORDS; 3 DFD, VIA MFT

OP-374 17 JUN 66

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

# PROFICIENCY TRAINING

(REF. CHAP IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

NAME <i>DRIVER CN</i>		CREW POSITION <i>TFO</i>		BASE <i>VTN</i>	FLT. TIME <i>2:29</i>	DATE <i>30 Oct 1962</i>	
AIRCRAFT TYPE <i>PC6C</i>	AIRCRAFT NUMBER <i>N392R</i>	LOCATION <i>UADN</i>	HOOD/INST <i>00:00</i>	NIGHT <i>0:00</i>	BLOCK TIME <i>2:40</i>	GRADING LEGEND: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> S Completed to Standard <input type="checkbox"/> I Incomplete	
			I	S			
1. DOCUMENTATION			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		21. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS		
2. FLIGHT PLANNING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		22. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES		
3. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		23. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK		
(EXTERIOR)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		24. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION		
4. KNOWLEDGE OF A/C AND EQUIPMENT			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		25. INTERCEPTION AND TRACKING		
5. ENGINE STARTING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		26. HOLDING		
6. TAXYING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		27. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF- )		
- USE OF BRAKES			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		(VOR- )		
- ENGINE RUN-UP			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		(ILS- )		
USE OF CHECK LIST			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		(GCA- )		
10. CREW BRIEFING AND TAKE-OFF DATA			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		28. MISSED APPROACH		
11. TAKE-OFFS (NORMAL- )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		29. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES		
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(STOL- )					31. LANDINGS (CIRCLING MINIMUMS- )		
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HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE					36. CREW COODINATION		
FUEL DUMPING					37. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BRAKE FIR					38. JUDGEMENT		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
EMERGENCY EVACUATION					39. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BRAKE FAILURE					40. ADHERENCE TO SOP		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
USE OF AIRBRAKES					A. Time trainee manipulated flight controls for purpose of training		<i>2:29</i>
					B. Training time, this trainee, logged to company as non-revenue time		

COMMENTS:

*Little training accomplished because of mission.*

INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMANSHIP




APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

PROFICIENCY TRAINING  
(REF. CHAP IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

NAME		CREW POSITION		BASE	FLT. TIME	DATE	
DRIVER, C		TF/O		VTE	3:34	29 OCT 1967	
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PC6E	N392R	UDN	:	00:10	3:47	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete	
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6. TAXYING				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	27. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF- 1 )	<del>27</del> L39	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
7 USE OF BRAKES				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(VOR- )		
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(REJECTED- )				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(NORMAL- )		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
(ENGINE FAILURE- )				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(CROSSWIND- )		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
12. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(ZERO FLAP- )	N/A	
13. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(ACCURACY/SPOT- )		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
14. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(STOL- )		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
15. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(NIGHT- )		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
16. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(ENGINE(S) OUT- )		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
17 RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING	ORAL			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
PROPELLER UNFEATHERING	ORAL			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	32. LOW AND HIGH RECONNAISSANCE		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
20. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:					ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES AND MANEUVERS		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FIRES- HEATER, CARGO, CABIN				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	33.		
SMOKE REMOVAL				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	34.		
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	35.		
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	GENERAL COMPETENCY		
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	36. CREW COODINATION		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FUEL DUMPING	N/A				37. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BRAKE FIR				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	38. JUDGEMENT		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
EMERGENCY EVACUATION				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	39. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BRAKE FAILURE				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	40. ADHERENCE TO SOP		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
USE OF AIRBRAKES	N/A						
						A. Time trainee manipulated flight controls for purpose of training	2:16
						B. Training time, this trainee, logged to company as non-revenue time	2:16

COMMENTS: DRIVER IS READY FOR UPCOUNTRY TRAINING.

INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMA





APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

PROFICIENCY TRAINING  
(REF. CHAP IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

CLL  
□ (b)(6)

NAME		CREW POSITION		BASE	FLT. TIME	DATE	
DRIVER, C		T F/O		VTE	2:49	27 OCT 1967	
AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NUMBER	LOCATION	HOOD/INST	NIGHT	BLOCK TIME	GRADING LEGEND:	
PC6C	N196X	UDN	:	2:18	2:58	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete	
			I	S		I	S
1. DOCUMENTATION				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		21. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
2. FLIGHT PLANNING						22. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES	
3. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		23. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK	
(EXTERIOR)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		24. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION	
4. KNOWLEDGE OF A/C AND EQUIPMENT			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			25. INTERCEPTION AND TRACKING	
5. ENGINE STARTING				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		26. HOLDING	
6. TAXYING				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		27. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF- )	
USE OF BRAKES				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		(VOR- )	
ENGINE RUN-UP			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			(ILS- )	
USE OF CHECK LIST				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		(GCA- )	
10. CREW BRIEFING AND TAKE-OFF DATA				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		28. MISSED APPROACH	
11. TAKE-OFFS (NORMAL- )	A			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		29. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES	
(CROSSWIND- )	B			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		30. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDINGS)	
(STOL- )	C		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			31. LANDINGS (CIRCLING MINIMUMS- )	
(REJECTED- )	D			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		(NORMAL- )	
(ENGINE FAILURE- )	E		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			(CROSSWIND- )	
12. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES						(ZERO FLAP- )	
13. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS						(ACCURACY/SPOT- )	
14. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			(STOL- )	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
15. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			(NIGHT- )	
16. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			(ENGINE(S) OUT- )	
17. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP							
ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING							
PROPELLER UNFEATHERING	ORAL			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		32. LOW AND HIGH RECONNAISSANCE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
20. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:						ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES AND MANEUVERS	
FIRES- HEATER, CARGO, CABIN				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		33.	
SMOKE REMOVAL				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		34.	
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		35.	
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		GENERAL COMPETENCY	
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE	BRAKES			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		36. CREW COODINATION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FUEL DUMPING						37. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BRAKE FIR				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		38. JUDGEMENT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
EMERGENCY EVACUATION				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		39. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BRAKE FAILURE				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		40. ADHERENCE TO SOP	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
USE OF AIRBRAKES							
						A. Time trainee manipulated flight controls for purpose of training	0140
						B. Training time, this trainee, logged to company as non-revenue time	0140

COMMENTS: **(11-A)** A/C KNOWLEDGE IMPROVING SPENDS A LOT OF TIME WITH MAINT PEOPLE IN THE HANGAR. **(11-B)** DOES NOT KNOW POINT CHECKS **(11-C)** DIRECTIONAL CONTROL IMPROVING **(11-D)** DOES NOT KNOW ENGINE FAILURE PROCEDURES, BUT MADE OUT WHOLE CHECK LIST.

INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN

DRIVER USES CHECK LIST ALWAYS.

C06117042

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

PROFICIENCY TRAINING  
(REF. CHAP IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

(b)(6)

NAME		CREW POSITION		BASE	FLT. TIME	DATE
DRIVER, C.		TF/O		VTE	2:47	25 OCT. 1967
AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NUMBER	LOCATION	HOOD/INST	NIGHT	BLOCK TIME	GRADING LEGEND:
PC6C	N392R	UON	:	:	2:53	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete
			I	S		
1. DOCUMENTATION			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	21. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
2. FLIGHT PLANNING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	22. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
3. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	23. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
(EXTERIOR)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	24. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
4. KNOWLEDGE OF A/C AND EQUIPMENT			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	25. INTERCEPTION AND TRACKING	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
5. ENGINE STARTING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	26. HOLDING	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
6. TAXYING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	27. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF— )	
7 USE OF BRAKES			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(VOR— )	
ENGINE RUN-UP			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(ILS— )	
USE OF CHECK LIST			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(GCA— )	
10. CREW BRIEFING AND TAKE-OFF DATA			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	28. MISSED APPROACH	
11. TAKE-OFFS (NORMAL— )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	29. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
(CROSSWIND— )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	30. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDINGS)	
(STOL— )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	31. LANDINGS (CIRCLING MINIMUMS— )	
(REJECTED— )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(NORMAL— )	
(ENGINE FAILURE— )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(CROSSWIND— )	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
12. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(ZERO FLAP— )	
13. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(ACCURACY/SPOT— )	
14. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(STOL— )	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
15. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(NIGHT— )	
16. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(ENGINE(S) OUT— )	
17 RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING	ORAL		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
PROPELLER UNFEATHERING	ORAL		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	32. LOW AND HIGH RECONNAISSANCE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
20. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:					ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES AND MANEUVERS	
FIRES- HEATER, CARGO, CABIN			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	33.	
SMOKE REMOVAL			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	34.	
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	35.	
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	GENERAL COMPETENCY	
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	36. CREW COODINATION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FUEL DUMPING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	37. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BRAKE FIR			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	38. JUDGEMENT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
EMERGENCY EVACUATION			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	39. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BRAKE FAILURE			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	40. ADHERENCE TO SOP	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
USE OF AIRBRAKES					A. Time trainee manipulated flight controls for purpose of training	1720
					B. Training time, this trainee, logged to company or non-revenue time	2753

COMMENTS: ① MADE HIS FIRST ENGINE START THIS FLIGHT UNSURE OF  
CORRECT PROCEDURES.  
② NEEDS MORE PATTERN WORK  
③ STEADY IMPROVEMENT.  
④ FLIES WITH A MORE POSITIVE FEEL

INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN

DISTRIBUTION: 1 INDIV TNG FILE, VIA, MFT RECORDS; 3 DFD, VIA MFT

OP-374 17 JUN 66

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

PROFICIENCY TRAINING  
(REF. CHAP IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

*CLL*  
 (b)(6)

NAME <b>DRIVER, C</b>		CREW POSITION <b>T/F/O</b>		BASE <b>VTE</b>	FLT. TIME <b>4:54</b>	DATE <b>21 OCT 1967</b>
AIRCRAFT TYPE <b>PCC</b>	AIRCRAFT NUMBER <b>N392R</b>	LOCATION <b>MDN</b>	HOOD/INST <b>:</b>	NIGHT <b>0724</b>	BLOCK TIME <b>5:09</b>	GRADING LEGEND: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete

		I	S			I	S
1. DOCUMENTATION			✓	21. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS			✓
2. FLIGHT PLANNING	<i>N/A</i>			22. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES			✓
3. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)		✓		23. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK			✓
(EXTERIOR)		✓		24. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION			✓
4. KNOWLEDGE OF A/C AND EQUIPMENT		✓		25. INTERCEPTION AND TRACKING			✓
5. ENGINE STARTING		✓		26. HOLDING			
6. TAXYING		✓		27. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF- )	<i>N/A</i>		
7. USE OF BRAKES		✓		(VOR- )	<i>N/A</i>		
ENGINE RUN-UP		✓		(ILS- )	<i>N/A</i>		
USE OF CHECK LIST		✓		(GCA- )	<i>N/A</i>		
10. CREW BRIEFING AND TAKE-OFF DATA		✓		28. MISSED APPROACH	<i>N/A</i>		
11. TAKE-OFFS (NORMAL- )		✓		29. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES			✓
(CROSSWIND- )		✓		30. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDINGS)			✓
(STOL- )		✓		31. LANDINGS (CIRCLING MINIMUMS- )	<i>N/A</i>		✓
(REJECTED- )		✓		(NORMAL- )			✓
(ENGINE FAILURE- )	<i>N/A</i>			(CROSSWIND- )			✓
12. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES		✓		(ZERO FLAP- )			✓
13. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS		✓		(ACCURACY/SPOT- )			✓
14. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)		✓		(STOL- )			✓
15. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS		✓		(NIGHT- )	<i>NORMAL</i>		✓
16. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED		✓		(ENGINE(S) OUT- )	<i>N/A</i>		
17. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP	<i>N/A</i>			32. LOW AND HIGH RECONNAISSANCE	<i>N/A</i>		
ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING	<i>N/A</i>			ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES AND MANEUVERS			
PROPELLER UNFEATHERING	<i>N/A</i>			33.			
20. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:				34.			
FIRES- HEATER, CARGO, CABIN		✓		35.			
SMOKE REMOVAL		✓		GENERAL COMPETENCY			
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES		✓		36. CREW COODINATION			✓
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)	<i>N/A</i>			37. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP			✓
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE	<i>N/A</i>			38. JUDGEMENT			✓
FUEL DUMPING	<i>N/A</i>			39. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION			✓
BRAKE FIR		✓		40. ADHERENCE TO SOP			✓
EMERGENCY EVACUATION		✓		A. Time trainee manipulated flight controls for purpose of training	<i>1520</i>		
BRAKE FAILURE	<i>N/A</i>			B. Training time, this trainee, logged to company as non-revenue time	<i>509</i>		
USE OF AIRBRAKES	<i>N/A</i>						

COMMENTS: ① DRIVER IS VERY ENTHUSIASTIC AND DID QUITE WELL FOR HIS FIRST TIME IN THE AIRCRAFT.  
② UNFAMILIAR WITH START PROCEDURES & STOL OPERATION

INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN

*AWW*

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

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[redacted]	F	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
ACTION #	O	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]

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3	6

PAGE 01

IN 478738

TOR:291012Z JAN 75

~~SECRET~~ 291000Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE NHA TRANG [redacted] [redacted]

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAIGON,

REF: NHA TRANG [redacted]

ZRPARKA [redacted] (PART II)

TIME OF REPORT 1800 (L) 29 JANUARY 1975

RECOVERY

1. NOW THAT WE HAVE UNANIMITY ON THE THREAT ASSESSMENT, [redacted] IN FULL AGREEMENT THAT FORMAL REQUEST FOR JCRC RECOVERY MISSION BE SUBMITTED SOONEST.

2. AT TIME THIS MESSAGE FILED HE TRYING CONTACT DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION [redacted] BY PHONE TO SEE IF EMBASSY WILL PUT IN REQUEST OR IF [redacted] WANTS [redacted] TO SEND DOWN REQUEST BY CABLE.

3. FYI ONLY: JCRC REP NHA TRANG TOLD [redacted] THAT HIS SAIGON OFFICE IS UNEASY ABOUT MISSION SINCE IT DOES NOT FALL DIRECTLY UNDER THE JCRC CHARTER. HE ADDED THAT HE THOUGH THE REQUEST MIGHT HAVE TO GO TO CINCPAC FOR FINAL APPROVAL. E2 IMPDET

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013



(b)(6)

SYNTHETIC INSTRUMENT TRAINING CERTIFICATION

TO : CP-VTE

DATE : 26 Feb. 1973

FROM : SITI-VTE

I hereby certify that Driver, C. N. received 4:00 hours  
Synthetic Instrument Training on 26 Feb. 1973.

COMMENTS OR RECOMMENDATIONS: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

cc: SCP TPE  
File



Syn/Inst. Trng. Instr.

\_\_\_\_\_

C06117046

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013



(b)(6)

SYNTHETIC INSTRUMENT TRAINING CERTIFICATION

TO : MFD-VTE

DATE : 31 May 1972

FROM : SITI-VTE

I hereby certify that Driver, C.N. received 2:00 hours

Synthetic Instrument Training on 31 May 1972.

COMMENTS OR RECOMMENDATIONS : \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

cc: SCP TPE  
File



Syn. Inst. Trng. Instr.

C06117047

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013



(b)(6)

SYNTHETIC INSTRUMENT TRAINING CERTIFICATION


TO : MFD-VTE  
FROM : SITI-VTE

DATE : 16 Dec. 1971

I hereby certify that Driver, C. N. received 2:00 hours  
Synthetic Instrument Training on 16 Dec. 1971.

COMMENTS OR RECOMMENDATIONS : \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

cc: SCP TPE  
MFOT VTE



Syn. Inst. Trng. Instr.

C06117048

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013



(b)(6)

SYNTHETIC INSTRUMENT TRAINING CERTIFICATION

*C-125*

TO : CP-VTE

DATE : 29 Sept. 1972

FROM : SITI-VTE

I hereby certify that Driver, C. N. received 4:00 hours

Synthetic Instrument Training on 29 Sept. 1972.

COMMENTS OR RECOMMENDATIONS : \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

cc: SCP TPE  
File



*Dyn. Instr. Ing. Instr.*



APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

SYNTHETIC INSTRUMENT TRAINING CERTIFICATION

TO : MFD/VTE

FROM : SITI/VTE

DATE : 26 July 71

I hereby certify that Driver, C. received 2:00 hours  
Synthetic Instrument Training on 26 July 71.

COMMENTS OR RECOMMENDATIONS : \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

cc: DFD TPE  
MFOI VTE

Syn. Inst. Trng. Instr.

C06117050

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ACTION #

PAGE 01-01

IN 482577

TOR:021008Z FEB 75

S E C R E T 020945Z FEB 75 STAFF

CITE NHA TRANG [ ] [ ]

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAIGON.

REF: NHA TRANG [ ] [ ]

ZRPARKA [ ] (PART II)

TIME OF REPORT 1800 (L) 2 FEBRUARY 1975

RECOVERY

NOTHING NEW TO REPORT. E2 IMPDET

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

~~SECRET~~

CERTIFICATION OF GROUND TRAINING

NAME	CREW POSITION	STATION	
DRIVER, C.N.	F/O	VTE	
COURSE TITLE	HOURS	DATE COMPLETED	GRADE
C-123K Recurrent	16+00	12 Nov. 1972	100%
<p>This is to certify that the individual named above has completed the Training course indicated. The training was conducted at <u>VTE</u> by <u>                    </u> Station Instructor</p>			
<p><u>DISTRIBUTION:</u></p> <p>CP <u>VTE</u></p> <p>SCP TPE</p> <p>FILE</p>		<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 40px; margin: 0 auto;"></div> <p>MFOTD/SEA-VTE</p>	

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

## CERTIFICATION OF GROUND TRAINING

NAME	CREW POSITION		STATION
DRIVER, C. N.	F/O		VTE
COURSE TITLE	HOURS	DATE COMPLETED	GRADE
SURVIVAL TRAINING	16+00	7 Nov. 1972	100%

This is to certify that the individual named above has completed the Training course indicated. The training was conducted at VTE by [redacted]  
 Station Instructor

DISTRIBUTION:  
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 SCP TPE  
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[redacted]  
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ACTION UNIT [ ] RF. FILE . VR [ ]

PAGE 01

IN 482289

TOR:011024Z FEB 75

~~SECRET~~ 010950Z FEB 75 STAFF

CITE NHA TRANG [ ] [ ]

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAIGON,

REF: A. NHA TRANG [ ] [ ]

B. NHA TRANG [ ] [ ]

ZRPARKA [ ] (PART II)

TIME OF REPORT 1800 (L) 1 FEBRUARY 1975

RECOVERY

1. [ ] RETURNED NHA TRANG, WHILE AT NKP HAD DISCUSSED PROPOSED MISSION WITH HIS SUPERIOR OFFICER, [ ] [ ] WHO WILL LEAD OVERALL RECOVERY TEAM IN NHA TRANG, IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH [ ] ASSESSMENT OF THE MISSION. HE IS WILLING UNDERTAKE MISSION AND PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE MISSION PLAN WITH JCRC COMMANDER, [ ] MISSION TEAM, WITH NECESSARY GEAR, BEING FORMED AND WILL BE READY TO DEPART NKP WITHIN 24 HOURS OF MISSION APPROVAL.

2. [ ] THOUGHT DECISION WOULD BE MADE AT USAG HQS RATHER THAN HAVE TO GO TO CINCPAC AS SUGGESTED BY JCRC-REP NHA TRANG (SEE REF B, PARA 3).

~~SECRET~~

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED \_\_\_\_\_

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PAGE 02

IN 482289

TOR:011024Z FEB 75

3.

\_\_\_\_\_ SITE IS A

LARGE TRIANGULAR/CONE SHAPED AREA WHICH IS ABOUT 170 METERS  
METERS AT ITS WIDEST POINT AND ABOUT 200 METERS FROM THE  
POINT OF INITIAL IMPACT TO THE FINAL IMPACT ZONE. THIS IS  
A LARGER AREA TO SEARCH THAN ORIGINALLY THOUGHT AND  
NOW SPECULATES THAT THE TEAM MAY HAVE TO STAY ON  
GROUND OVERNIGHT TO MAKE COMPLETE SEARCH OF AREA. HE SAID  
HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THIS AND WAS PREPARED TO  
STAY AS LONG AS NECESSARY TO DO THE JOB. PHOTOS ALSO SHOW  
AN LZ ABOUT THREE KILOMETERS FROM THE CRASH SITE WHICH IS  
SUITABLE TO INSERT THE ARVN SECURITY FORCE.

4. AS \_\_\_\_\_ PUT IT THE "DOERS" ARE READY TO GO  
AS SOON AS APPROVAL IS GRANTED.

5. \_\_\_\_\_ IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS MATTER OF GVN  
SUPPORT WITH \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ ON MONDAY,

3 FEB.

6. REALIZE WE GETTING CLOSE TO TET. WITH ALL THE MILITARY  
AND HOLIDAY RAMIFICATIONS OF THAT PERIOD, AS RESULT CONGEN

~~SECRET~~

APPROVED FOR  
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09-Dec-2013

C06117053

DRM 3020b  
71 MFG. 3/74

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PAGE 03-03

IN 482289

TOR: 011024Z FEB 75

MOVING AHEAD AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE AND WE ASKED \_\_\_\_\_

TO BRING FACTOR OF TET PERIOD TO ATTENTION OF HIS HQS AT NKP WHEN  
HE CALLS ON MONDAY TO CHECK ON STATUS OF APPROVAL ACTION.

E2 IMPDET

~~SECRET~~

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

# COMPLETION OF TRAINING RECORD

TO: See Distribution

FROM: MFOT D/SEA-VTE

The individuals named below completed the C-47 Initial training  
(aircraft) (type course)  
course on 25 July 1971 The training was conducted at VTE by   
(date) (station) (instructor)

Name	Station at	Hours Instruction	Grade
1. <input type="text"/>	SGN	40+00	98% Upgraded to 100%
2. <input type="text"/>	SGN	40+00	99% Upgraded to 100%
3. DELIVER, C. N. ✓	VTE/SGN	40+00	98% Upgraded to 100%

**Distribution**

- 1 DFOTD
- 1 DFD
- 1 DFOD (Dispatchers only)
- 1 MFOT-TAW
- 1 MFOT-VTE
- 1 Each MFD concerned ✓
- 1 File

Original signed by:

Manager, Flight Operations Training



## COMPLETION OF TRAINING RECORD

TO: See Distribution

FROM: MFOT ~~D/SEA-VTE~~

The individuals named below completed the VTE Initial training  
(aircraft) (type course)

course on 29 Aug. 1971 The training was conducted at VTE by   
(date) (station) (instructor)

Name	Station at	Hours Instruction	Grade
1. <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 100px; height: 15px;"></span>	VTE	40+00	92% Upgraded to 100%
2. <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 100px; height: 15px;"></span>	VTE	40+00	88% Upgraded to 100%
3. <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 100px; height: 15px;"></span>	VTE	40+00	87% Upgraded to 100%
4. <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 100px; height: 15px;"></span>	VTE	40+00	90% Upgraded to 100%
5. <b>DEIVER, C. H.</b> ✓	<del>VTE</del> SGN	40+00	87% Upgraded to 100%
6. <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 100px; height: 15px;"></span>	VTE	40+00	94% Upgraded to 100%
7. <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 100px; height: 15px;"></span>	VTE	40+00	93% Upgraded to 100%

**Distribution**

- 1 SCP
- 1 DFOD (Dispatchers only)
- 1 MFOT-TAW
- 1 MFOTD-SEA-VTE ✓
- 1 Each CP concerned ✓
- 1 File

Original signed by

  
 Manager, Flight Operations Training

COPY

COMPLETION OF TRAINING RECORD

TO : See Distribution

FROM: LFO BKK

The individuals named below completed the PC-6C Initial training  
(aircraft) (type course)

course on 12 June 1968. The training was conducted at VTE by [redacted]  
(date) (station) (instructor)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Station at</u>	<u>Hours</u> <u>Instruction</u>	<u>Grade</u>
✓ 1. Driver, C.N.	VTE	32+00	92%
2. [redacted]	VTE	32+00	88%
3. [redacted]	VTE	32+00	84%

Distribution

- 1 DFID
- 1 DFD
- 1 DFOD (Dispatchers only)
- 1 LFO BKK
- 1 Each LFO concerned
- 1 File

s/s [redacted]  
Manager, Flight Operations Training

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(1)  
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PAGE 01

IN 482947

TOR:031021Z FEB 75

SECRET 031000Z FEB 75 STAFF

CITE NHA TRANG [ ] [ ]

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAIGON.

REF A. NHA TRANG [ ] [ ]

B. NHA TRANG [ ] [ ]

ZRPARKA [ ] (PART II)

TIME OF REPORT 1800 (L) 3 FEBRUARY 1975

RECOVERY

1. [ ] HAS APPOINTMENT TO SEE [ ]

[ ] KHANH HOA PROVINCE CHIEF, AT 0830 HOURS, 4 FEB.

[ ] AND [ ] WILL ACCOMPANY.

2. [ ] LEARNED BY PHONE FROM [ ]

THAT [ ] WILLING TO GO AHEAD WITH THE MISSION  
AND HAD REQUESTED APPROVAL FROM [ ], CHIEF USSAG.

IN PROCESS OF MAKING REQUEST JCRC HQS LEARNED THAT DAO  
(PRESUMABLY DAO SAIGON) HAD REVISED ITS THREAT ASSESS-  
MENT FROM LOW/MODERATE BACK TO MODERATE/HIGH (SEE PARA

1 REF B). AS RESULT JCRC STANDING DOWN UNTIL THREAT  
ASSESSMENT RESOLVED. SAIGON STATION ATTEMPTING TO TRACK

~~SECRET~~

FORM J020b  
7-71 MFG. 3/74

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PAGE 02-02

IN 482947

TOR:031021Z FEB 75

DOWN THIS DEVELOPMENT. [ ] BRIEFED. HE CALLED

[ ], DEP POLMIL SECTION, EMBASSY SAIGON,  
AND ASKED HIM ALSO TO LOOK INTO MATTER.

3. MEDICAL RECORDS OF MR. RAWLINGS TURNED OVER TO

[ ] E2 IMPDET

~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

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*EYES ONLY* ←

PAGE 01

IN 487692

TOR:061735Z FEB 75

SAIG

SECRET 061035Z FEB 75 STAFF

CITE SAIGON

TO: DIRECTOR INFO NHA TRANG.

REF: DIRECTOR (BEING RELAYED NHA TRANG)

1. ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF REF AND WISH TO ASSURE YOU THAT ALL HANDS HERE UNDERSTAND HUMANITARIAN AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IN THIS MATTER. INDEED ONE COULD SAY THAT ENTIRE <sup>AMERICAN</sup> 13481- ESTABLISHMENT HERE IS SENSITIZED TO THE PROBLEMS OF THOSE FAMILIES WHO HAVE RELATIVES MISSING IN ACTION.

2. THE FACT IS THAT THERE IS NO CHANCE WHATSOEVER OF FINDING SURVIVORS FROM THIS TRAGIC ACCIDENT. THE EXAMINATION OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE WRECKAGE AND THE PATH THE PLANE TOOK THROUGH THE TREES SHOULD CLEARLY INDICATE THAT NO ONE COULD HAVE SURVIVED. WHILE THE TERM "MISSING" IS TECHNICALLY CORRECT, IT IS NOT REALISTIC TO ASSUME THAT ANYTHING OTHER THAN BONES WILL BE FOUND.

3. AGAINST THE CERTAINTY THAT UNDER OPTIMUM CIRCUMSTANCES ONLY BONES WILL BE FOUND, THE SECURITY DIFFICULTIES AND THE PHYSICAL PROBLEMS OF THE RECOVERY OPERATION LOOM VERY LARGE. IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THERE WILL BE RECOVERY OPERATION BEFORE TET AND HOW SOON

~~SECRET~~ PORTION GARBLED- BEING SERVICED

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

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TABLE SEC DISSEM BY \_\_\_\_\_ PER \_\_\_\_\_ TOTAL COPIES \_\_\_\_\_ RUN BY \_\_\_\_\_

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PAGE 02-02

IN 487692

TOR:061735Z FEB 75

IT WILL COMMENCE AFTER TET DEPENDS ON A NUMBER OF FACTORS OVER WHICH WE HAVE NO CONTROL, THE PATTERN OF ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THE GENERAL AREA INCLUDING IN CONTIGUOUS PROVINCES OF MILITARY REGION TWO, THE WEATHER, OVERRIDING PRIORITIES FOR THE USE OF AIRCRAFT, USSAG CONCERN OVER DEVELOPMENTS ~~IN CAMBODIA~~ <sup>IN CAMBODIA</sup> ~~PROVINCE A~~, THE WILLINGNESS OF THE GVN AUTHORITIES TO SPARE THE NECESSARY TROOPS FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME ARE SOME, NOT NECESSARILY ALL, OF THE FACTORS INVOLVED,

4. VERY BRIEFLY, THE TERRAIN IS AS DIFFICULT AS IT COMES. TRIPLE CANOPY FOREST, STEEP MOUNTAIN SIDE, NO IMMEDIATE OR EVEN NEARBY LANDING ZONE, NO ROADS AND FREQUENTLY CHANGING LOW CLOUD FORMATIONS BY THEMSELVES SUGGEST CONSIDERABLE RISK TO PARTICIPATING PERSONNEL, TO WHICH THE POSSIBILITY OF ENEMY THREAT MUST BE ADDED.

5. WE DO NOT WISH TO SOUND DISCOURAGING BUT IT IS IN FACT A DISCOURAGING SITUATION WHICH MUST BE FACED SQUARELY. E2 IMPDET

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 01

IN 484367

TOR 040954Z FEB 75

SECRET 040935Z FEB 75 STAFF

CITE NHA TRANG

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAIGON.

REF NHA TRANG

ZRPARKA (PART II)

TIME OF REPORT 1800 (L) 4 FEBRUARY 1975

RECOVERY

1. STATION AND EMBASSY CHIEF OF DAO SAIGON REVEALED

THAT DAO HAS NOT REPEAT NOT REVISED ITS THREAT ASSESSMENT BACK UP TO MODERATE/HIGH AND WE UNABLE TO DETERMINE HOW THIS MISINFORMATION REACHED JCRC HQS, ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] WILL BE IN SAIGON TOMORROW

AND DCM [REDACTED] WILL DISCUSS ENTIRE MATTER OF RECOVERY MISSION WITH HIM, AT WHICH TIME [REDACTED] WILL CLARIFY THE SAIGON POSITION ON THE THREAT ASSESSMENT AND REITERATE THE EMBASSY'S DESIRE TO MOVE AHEAD WITH THE MISSION.

2. AT MEETING TODAY WITH [REDACTED] HOA PROVINCE CHIEF,

[REDACTED] IT AGREED THAT HIS STAFF WILL GET TOGETHER WITH OFFICERS FROM THE [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

APPROVED FOR  
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09-Dec-2013

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PAGE 02-02

IN 484367

TOR:040954Z FEB 75

HOA PROVINCE REP [ ] AND BASE OFFICER [ ]

[ ] TO WORK OUT DETAILS OF ARVN SUPPORT.

FIRST MEETING SCHEDULED FOR TOMORROW 5 FEB.

3. [ ] IN MAKING REQUEST FOR SUPPORT INDICATED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO UNDERTAKE THE MISSION BEFORE TET. WHILE [ ] DID NOT REPLY DIRECTLY HE DID INDICATE THAT THE UNIT HE PROBABLY WOULD USE IS CURRENTLY IN TRAINING IN PLEIKU AND IS EXPECTED BACK IN THE AREA AFTER TET.

4. [ ] SAID HE WOULD REQUEST AIR SUPPORT FOR HIS TROOPS DIRECTLY FROM CORPS. E2 IMPDET.

~~SECRET~~

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013



COMPLETION OF TRAINING REPORT

TO: See Distribution

FROM: MOT BKK

The individuals named below completed the Survival Initial training  
 (aircraft) (type course)  
 course on 30 May 1968. The training was conducted at VTE by [redacted]  
 (date) (station) (instructor)

Name	Stationed at	Hours Instruction	Grade
1. <u>Driver, C.N.</u>	VTE	14+00	100%
2. <u>[redacted]</u>	VTE	14+00	100%
3. <u>[redacted]</u>	VTE	14+00	100%
4. <u>[redacted]</u>	VTE	14+00	92%
5. <u>[redacted]</u>	VTE	14+00	100%

## Distribution

- 1 DOTD
- 1 DFD
- 1 DFOD (Dispatchers only)
- 1 MFT BKK
- 1 Each MFD concerned ✓
- 1 File

Original signed by  
[redacted]  
 Manager, Operations Training

APPROVED FOR  
 RELEASE DATE:  
 09-Dec-2013

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

COMPLETION OF TRAINING REPORT

TO: See Distribution

FROM: MFOT BKK

The individuals named below completed the H-395 Initial training  
(aircraft) (type course)  
course on 10 October 1967 The training was conducted at VTE by   
(date) (station) (instructor)

Name	Station at	Hours Instruction	Grade
1. Driver, G.N. ✓	VTE	8+00	94%
2. <input type="text"/>	UDN	8+00	94%
3. <input type="text"/>	VTE	8+00	94%
4. <input type="text"/>	VTE	8+00	94%
5. <input type="text"/>	VTE	8+00	92%
6. <input type="text"/>	UDN	8+00	96%
7. <input type="text"/>	VTE	8+00	96%
8. <input type="text"/>	VTE	8+00	90%

- Distribution
- 1 DFOTD
  - 1 DFD
  - 1 DFOD (Dispatchers only)
  - 1 MFT BKK
  - 1 Each MFD concerned ✓
  - 1 File

Original signed by   
Manager, Flight Operations Training

C06117062

7-71 MFG. 3/74

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PAGE 01

IN 500616

TOR:210944Z FEB 75

NHTR

~~SECRET~~ 210935Z FEB 75 STAFF

CITE NHA TRANG

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAIGON.

REF NHA TRANG

ZRPARKA  (PART II)

TIME OF REPORT 1800 (L) 21 FEBRUARY 1975

RECOVERY

1. AERIAL RECON OF IMMEDIATE AREA OF CRASH SITE  
FAILED DISCLOSE ANY SUITABLE LANDING ZONES. WILL MAKE  
ADDITIONAL RECONS OF ADJACENT AREAS FOR SUITABLE LAND-  
ING FIRST OF NEXT WEEK. THIS SHOULD NOT UPSET TIME-  
TABLE SUBMITTED PARA 3 REF.

2. UNLESS WE HAVE SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT DO NOT  
PLAN FILE REPORT SATURDAY OR SUNDAY, 22-23 FEBRUARY.

E2 IMPDET

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 01

IN 493641

TOR:130954Z FEB 75

NHTR \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~ 130945Z FEB 75 STAFF

CITE NHA TRANG \_\_\_\_\_

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAIGON.

REF: NHA TRANG \_\_\_\_\_

TIME OF REPORT 1800 (L) 13 FEBRUARY 1975

RECOVERY.

1. \_\_\_\_\_ APPROVED USE OF ARVN SECURITY FORCE, INCLUDING CHOPPER SUPPORT, FOR JCRC RECOVERY MISSION.
2. GROUP MENTIONED PARA 4 REF MET AND WENT OVER PRELIMINARY PLANS FOR OPERATION. CONGEN WILL SUBMIT PLAN TO JCRC FOR ITS CONSIDERATION WHEN DETAILS FIRMED UP.
3. CONGEN MESSAGE NOTED PARA 5 REF IS NHA TRANG \_\_\_\_\_ SENT TODAY. E2 IMPDET

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

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APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013



(b)(6)

C O P Y

## COMPLETION OF TRAINING REPORT

TO : See Distribution

FROM: MFOT BKK

The individuals named below completed the PC-6C Initial training  
(aircraft) (type course)  
course on 12 October 1967. The training was conducted at VTE by [REDACTED]  
(station) (instructor)

	<u>Name</u>	<u>Station at</u>	<u>Hours Instruction</u>	<u>Grade</u>
1.	[REDACTED]	VTE	32+00	90%
2.	[REDACTED]	VTE	32+00	98%
3.	Driver, C. N. ✓	VTE	32+00	96%
4.	[REDACTED]	VTE	32+00	94%
5.	[REDACTED]	VTE	32+00	98%
6.	[REDACTED]	UDN	32+00	92%
7.	[REDACTED]	VTE	32+00	88%
8.	[REDACTED]	UDN	32+00	94%
9.	[REDACTED]	VTE	32+00	92%
10.	[REDACTED]	VTE	32+00	98%
11.	[REDACTED]	VTE	32+00	92%

## Distribution

1 DFOTD  
1 DFD  
1 DFOD (Dispatchers only)  
1 MFT Bkk  
1 Each MFD concerned  
1 File

s/s [REDACTED]  
Manager, Flight Operations Training

C O P Y

(b)(1)  
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PAGE 01

IN 502445

TOR:241107Z FEB 75

NHTR

~~SECRET~~ 250945Z FEB 75 STAFF

CITE NHA TRANG

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAIGON.

(PART II)

TIME OF REPORT 1800 (L) 24 FEBRUARY 1975

RECOVERY

1. COORDINATION WITH JCRC CONTINUES WITH BASE'S PREPARATION OF ORDER OF BATTLE THREAT ASSESSMENT TO BE SUBMITTED VIA CONGEN TO USSAG.

2. ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS PRECLUDED ANY AERIAL RECON TODAY; HOWEVER, SEARCH FOR LANDING ZONE TO CONTINUE AS SOON AS WEATHER PERMITS. TARGET DATE OF 6 MARCH REMAINS IN EFFECT. E2 IMPDET

~~SECRET~~

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

C06117066

-71 MFG. 3/74

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013



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PAGE 01

IN 492597

TOR:121030Z FEB 75

NHTR

~~SECRET~~ 120950Z FEB 75 STAFF

CITE NHA TRANG

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAIGON.

REF: NHA TRANG

ZRPARKA (PART II)

TIME OF REPORT 1800 (L) 12 FEBRUARY 1975

RECOVERY

1. BASE AND CONGEN REP, MET WITH KHANH HOA PROVINCE CHIEF IN MORNING TO BRING HIM UP TO DATE ON JCRC PLANNING AND DETERMINE STATUS HIS PLANS TO PROVIDE SECURITY FORCE FOR RECOVERY MISSION. REPEATED HE PLANNED USE 207TH RECON COMPANY PRESENTLY IN TRAINING AT PLEIKU FOR OPERATION, AND WHILE DETAILS REMAINED TO BE WORKED OUT HE WILLING LET 207TH RON IN AREA IF NECESSARY, PERSONAL ASSESSMENT OF THREAT IN AREA IS LOW.

2. INDICATED HE WOULD NEED HELP IN GETTING CHOPPER SUPPORT FOR SECURITY FORCE. THIS MATTER DISCUSSED WITH CONGEN AND HE SUGGESTED COB VISIT

~~SECRET~~

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

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PAGE 02

IN 492597

TOR:121030Z FEB 75

NHTR

MR-2 DEPUTY COMMANDER; [ ] THIS AFTERNOON AND REQUEST THE NECESSARY CHOPPERS. [ ] SAID THAT HE WOULD MAKE THE REQUEST TO [ ], COMMANDING GENERAL MR-2, AND THAT HE WAS CERTAIN THAT AS LONG AS THE MILITARY SITUATION PERMITTED AVAILABLE AIR SUPPORT WOULD BE PROVIDED.

3. [ ] LEARNED FROM SECTOR CHIEF OF STAFF, [ ] THAT 207TH RECON COMPANY NOW DUE BACK IN NHA TRANG ABOUT 26 FEB.

4. [ ], BASE OFFICER [ ] SECTOR CHIEF OF STAFF, THE S-2, [ ] AND S-3 [ ] HAVE A PLANNING MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 1430 HOURS TOMORROW 13 FEB.

5. CONGEN [ ] IS SENDING SHORT MESSAGE TO SAIGON NOTING THAT JCRC MESSAGE COVERED IN REF STILL CARRIED THE "HIGH" THREAT ASSESSMENT AS OF 7 FEB, ALTHOUGH THE MATTER IS BEING TAKEN CARE OF AND THAT THE DETAILS OF JUST WHAT ARVN UNITS WILL ACT AS THE SECURITY FORCE HAS NOT YET BEEN DETERMINED. ON LATTER POINT, CONGEN [ ] IS CONCERNED THAT [ ] WILL THINK WE HAVE GONE BEHIND

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7-71 MFG. 3/74

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PAGE 03-03

IN 492597

TOR:121030Z FEB 75

NHTR [Redacted]

HIS BACK TO GET SUPPORT IF HE SHOULD LEARN THAT JCRC  
 PLANNING USE THE 201ST RANGERS FOR SECURITY FORCE WHEN  
 HE IS DISCUSSING WITH US THE USE OF THE 207TH RECON.  
 WHILE DIFFERENT UNIT DESIGNATIONS MAY JUST BE GARBLE,  
 HIS LOW-KEY MESSAGE IS INTENDED TO ALERT EMBASSY SAIGON  
 TO SITUATION IN ORDER AV0ID A POTENTIAL PROBLEM.  
 E2 IMPDET

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APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

Name in Full	<b>Clarence Hesbit DRIVER</b>	Date of Birth	<b>7 March 1921</b>
Date of Employment	<b>15 May 1966</b>	Total Flight Time at Employment	<b>Approx. 6000</b> Hrs.
Present Position	<b>F/O</b>	Dual Rated	

**GROUND SCHOOL COMPLETED**

Basic			Recurrent			Initial/Transition			Up-grading		
Subject	Grade	Date	Subject	Grade	Date	Subject	Grade	Date	Subject	Grade	Date
Co-Processing			Aircraft			Aircraft			Aircraft		
Meteorology						<b>C-47</b>	<b>87%</b>	<b>F06</b>			
Ops-Regs						<b>C-123B</b>	<b>88%</b>	<b>F18</b>			
Navigation											
Emergency			Emergency			Emergency			Emergency		
Total Hours:			Total Hours:			Total Hours: <b>80+00</b>			Total Hours:		
Certified By:			Certified By:			Certified By: <b>1907-BKK</b> <i>Original Signed by</i>			Certified By:		

**ADDITIONAL TRAINING**

Basic			Recurrent			Initial/Transition			Up-grading		
Subject	Grade	Date	Subject	Grade	Date	Subject	Grade	Date	Subject	Grade	Date
Total Hours:			Total Hours:			Total Hours:			Total Hours:		
Certified By:			Certified By:			Certified By:			Certified By:		

**LICENSE TRAINING**

US ATR			US Dispatcher			US-Flight Engineer			CCAA-ATR-SR.COMM.		
Subject	Grade	Date	Subject	Grade	Date	Subject	Grade	Date	Subject	Grade	Date
FAR			FAR			FAR			FAR		
WT & BAL			WT & BAL			WT & BAL			WT & BAL		
Navigation			Navigation			Aircraft			Navigation		
Meteorology			Meteorology			Meteorology			Meteorology		
Performance			Flt-Planning			Computation			Instrument		
ATC			ATC			Operation			ATC		
Total Hours:			Total Hours:			Total Hours:			Total Hours:		
Certified By:			Certified By:			Certified By:			Certified By:		

**DIRECTED STUDY WRITTEN EXAMINATIONS**

First Quarter		Second Quarter		Third Quarter		Fourth Quarter	
Date	Grade	Date	Grade	Date	Grade	Date	Grade

**REMARKS**

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APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

Name in Full <b>Clarence N. Driver</b>	Date of Birth <b>7 Mar, 1921</b>
Date of Employment <b>15 May 1966</b>	Total Flight Time at Employment <b>Hrs.</b>
Present Position <b>F/O</b>	Dual Rated

**GROUND SCHOOL COMPLETED**

Basic			Recurrent			Initial/Transition			Up-grading		
Subject	Grade	Date	Subject	Grade	Date	Subject	Grade	Date	Subject	Grade	Date
Co-Processing			Aircraft			Aircraft			Aircraft		
Meteorology	<b>80%</b>	<b>E26</b>									
Ops-Regs	<b>87.5%</b>	<b>E28</b>									
Navigation	<b>95%</b>	<b>E27</b>									
Emergency	<b>95%</b>	<b>E28</b>	Emergency			Emergency			Emergency		
Total Hours: <b>40+00</b>			Total Hours:			Total Hours:			Total Hours:		
Certified By:			Certified By:			Certified By:			Certified By:		

**ADDITIONAL TRAINING**

Basic			Recurrent			Initial/Transition			Up-grading		
Subject	Grade	Date	Subject	Grade	Date	Subject	Grade	Date	Subject	Grade	Date
Total Hours:			Total Hours:			Total Hours:			Total Hours:		
Certified By:			Certified By:			Certified By:			Certified By:		

**LICENSE TRAINING**

US ATR			US Dispatcher			US-Flight Engineer			CCAA-ATR-SR.COMM.		
Subject	Grade	Date	Subject	Grade	Date	Subject	Grade	Date	Subject	Grade	Date
FAR			FAR			FAR			FAR		
WT & BAL			WT & BAL			WT & BAL			WT & BAL		
Navigation			Navigation			Aircraft			Navigation		
Meteorology			Meteorology			Meteorology			Meteorology		
Performance			Flt-Planning			Computation			Instrument		
ATC			ATC			Operation			ATC		
Total Hours:			Total Hours:			Total Hours:			Total Hours:		
Certified By:			Certified By:			Certified By:			Certified By:		

**DIRECTED STUDY WRITTEN EXAMINATIONS**

First Quarter		Second Quarter		Third Quarter		Fourth Quarter	
Date	Grade	Date	Grade	Date	Grade	Date	Grade

**REMARKS**

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(b)(6)

# REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: SEE ATTACHMENT DEPT. RPA No. VPOCAWAS-74-009  
 (IN ENGLISH) (IN CHINESE)  
 EMPLOYEE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ PND REF. No. PND-WA-  
 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED 1 October 1974  
 (FOR SEPARATION, EFFECTIVE DATE IS LAST WORKING DAY "COB")  
 ACTUAL EFFECTIVE DATE 1 October 1974  
 (TO BE FILLED BY PERSONNEL DIVISION)

PROPOSED ACTION:  NEW APPOINTMENT  CHANGE IN POSITION/SALARY  SEPARATION  (OTHER) Administrative Transfer

	PRESENT STATUS	PROPOSED STATUS
TITLE & ACCOUNTING CODE NO.	The purpose of this RPA is to administratively transfer	
SALARY - GRADE, STEP & PAY STANDARD	American missing employees, shown on the attached list,	
EMPLOYMENT STATUS - PERMANENT, TEMPORARY OR FIXED TERM	from an unassigned status BKK to an unassigned status WAS,	
DEPARTMENT/DIVISION/OFFICE	Pay records, leave and travel records are to be retained	
LOCATION	in Hong Kong by MAAL HKG.	
*CLASSIFICATION - STAFF EMPLOYEE OR WORKER		
POSITION NUMBER		
REMARKS		

\* AS STIPULATED UNDER JOB CLASSIFICATIONS IN PERSONNEL MANUAL.

BASIS FOR RECOMMENDATION: (1) FOR SEPARATION, INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT REPLACEMENT IS REQUIRED.  
 (2) FOR PROMOTIONS AND SALARY INCREASES, COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING: (REQUEST ASSISTANCE FROM PND FOR DATA IF NECESSARY).

DATE OF EMPLOYMENT:	ORIGINAL TITLE:	ORIGINAL GRADE & STEP:
RECORD OF LAST 6 SALARY INCREASES:	PERCENTAGE INCREASE: (1) _____ (2) _____ (3) _____ (4) _____ (5) _____ (6) _____	
DATE OF CHANGE TO PRESENT TITLE:	PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF THIS INCREASE:	

(USE REVERSE SIDE IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED)

REQUESTED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 (DEPARTMENT HEAD) (DIVISION DIRECTOR OR OFFICER)  
 CONCURRED BY: STATION/AREA MANAGER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 BASE MANAGER/REGIONAL DIRECTOR \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 \*\*HEAD OF DEPARTMENT/DIVISION OFFICER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 APPROVED BY: OFFICER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE 22 October 1974  
 PRESIDENT \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 DIRA \_\_\_\_\_ DATE 22 October 1974

(\*\* CONCURRENCE IS REQUIRED FOR INTER DEPARTMENTAL OR DIVISIONAL TRANSFERS ONLY.)

DISTRIBUTION BY PERSONNEL DIVISION AFTER FINAL APPROVAL:  
 COPY 1: FOR PERSONNEL DIVISION. COPY 4: TO \_\_\_\_\_ VIA \_\_\_\_\_ FOR INFORMATION.  
 COPY 2: FOR PAYROLL ACTION.  
 COPY 3: TO DDPD HKG (ORIGINATOR OF RPA) VIA \_\_\_\_\_ FOR NOTIFICATION OF APPROVAL.

(FOR PERSONNEL DIVISION USE ONLY)

POSITION AUTHORIZED:	
POSITION NO.:	P/S:
EMPLOYMENT STATUS:	SLOT NO.:
PROPOSED SALARY:	<input type="checkbox"/> IN ORDER <input type="checkbox"/> SUBJECT TO DP'S CONCURRENCE
REMARKS:	

SICK LEAVE RECORD SINCE:											
TOTAL NUMBER OF DAYS TAKEN:											
FREQUENCY:											
ROUTING ORDER	R/S	E/S	W/A	P/V	CPL	CAEA	CEC		ADP	DP	P/F
INITIALS											
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PAGE 01

IN 509302

TOR:031010Z MAR 75

NHTR

~~SECRET~~ 030955Z MAR 75 STAFF

CITE NHA TRANG

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAIGON,

REF NHA TRANG

ZRPARKA (PART II)

TIME OF REPORT 1800 (L) 3 MARCH 1975

RECOVERY

1. [ ] TOLD BASE THIS AFTERNOON THAT HE HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED USE OF FIVE TROOP CARRYING HELICOPTERS, ONE COMMAND HELICOPTER AND TWO GUN SHIPS FOR RECOVERY OPERATION. HE PREPARED TO LAUNCH HIS SECURITY FORCES AS SCHEDULED ON 6 MARCH. HE ESTIMATED TWO TO THREE DAYS TO SECURE THE AREA.

2. COMPANY COMMANDER OF 207TH RECON PLANS MAKE AERIAL RECON OF LANDING ZONES TOMORROW OR NEXT DAY.

3; FOR SAIGON ONLY: WE LEARNED FROM LOCAL JCRC REP THAT THERE IS JCRC MESSAGE IN WORKS THAT SAYS THERE WILL BE A DELAY IN MISSION FOR TEN DAYS DUE TO OTHER NEEDS FOR ITS EQUIPMENT, PRESUMABLY FOR POSSIBLE EVACUA-

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7-71 MFG. 3 74

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PAGE 02-02

IN 509302

TOR:031010Z MAR 75

NHTR

TION FROM PHNOM PENH. SINCE NEITHER WE NOR CONGEN HAVE  
 SEEN THE MCRC MESSAGE, CAN YOU LOOK INTO MATTER AND  
 DETERMINE WHAT, IF ANY, DELAY WE CAN EXPECT? IN VIEW  
 OF THE PREPARATIONS MADE BY [ ] AND POSSIBILITY  
 THAT, IF HEAVY FIGHTING STARTS, WE MAY NOT HAVE ANOTHER  
 OPPORTUNITY TO GET THIS KIND OF GVN SUPPORT, REQUEST  
 ADVICE IF GVN SHOULD BEGIN OPERATION ON SCHEDULE (ADDING  
 ITS OWN GRAVES/RECOVERY PEOPLE IF NECESSARY) OR ASK THE  
 GVN TO STAND DOWN UNTIL THE JCRC IS READY? E2 IMPDET

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EIA704 PAGE 01 IN 510401

TOR:040535Z MAR 75 SAIG [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ 040458Z MAR 75 STAFF

CITE SAIGON [REDACTED]

TO: IMMEDIATE NHA TRANG INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

[REDACTED]

REF: NHA TRANG [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

1. FOLLOWING IS RESULT OF OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH EMBASSY POL-MIL OFFICER RE PARA 3 REF:

A. JCRC/THAILAND WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE HAD FINAL RECOVERY PROPOSAL IN HANDS OF EMBASSY LAST WEEK FOR APPROVAL AND SUBSEQUENT SUBMISSION TO USSAG. FOR UNCLEAR REASONS, JCRC PROPOSAL NOT RECEIVED BUT IS NOW EXPECTED CIRCA 7 OR 8 MARCH.

B. EMBASSY HAS LEARNED UNOFFICIALLY THAT USSAG IS UNEASY ABOUT IMPLEMENTING JCRC RECOVERY PLAN, EVEN IF APPROVED BY SAIGON EMBASSY, AND WILL PROBABLY PASS PROPOSAL TO CINCPAC FOR APPROVAL. SUCH A MOVE WOULD PROBABLY RESULT IN ADDITIONAL DELAY OF SEVERAL DAYS AT BEST.

2. RECOGNIZE IT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO KEEP [REDACTED] AND HIS ARVN FORCES ON STAND-BY UNTIL THE JCRC/USSAG/CINCPAC

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IN 510401

TOR:040535Z MAR 75

SAIG

APPROVAL HAS BEEN OBTAINED. FACT IS THAT JCRC FINAL APPROVALS AND IMPLEMENTATION WILL BE WORTHLESS WITHOUT ARVN SUPPORT.

3. IN VIEW ABOVE, REQUEST BASE TAKE FOLLOWING ACTION:

A. DETERMINE HOW LONG WE CAN REALISTICALLY ASK [ ] AND HIS FORCES TO REMAIN ON STAND-BY.

B. RAISE POSSIBILITY WITH CONGEN [ ] OF ARVN GOING AHEAD WITH RECOVERY WITHOUT JCRC.

C. IN VIEW RECOVERY RESPONSIBILITY RESTS WITH EMBASSY, URGE CONGEN [ ] TO FILE CABLE TO EMBASSY REQUESTING EMBASSY TO EXERT MAXIMUM EFFORT TO BREAK LOG JAM WITH JCRC/USSAG AND CINCPAC IF NECESSARY.

4. PLEASE ADVISE RESULTS OF YOUR EFFORTS ON ABOVE.

E2 IMPDET

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IN 512007

TOR:051026Z MAR 75

NHTR

~~SECRET~~ 050955Z MAR 75 STAFF

CITE NHA TRANG

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAIGON.

REF NHA TRANG

TIME OF REPORT 1800 (L) 5 MARCH 1975

RECOVERY

1. CONGEN AND BASE RECEIVED FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM  
 JCRC THAILAND MORNING OF 5 MARCH: "040701 MAR 75  
 SUBJ: C-123 RECOVERY OPERATION  
 REF: COORDINATION DISCUSSION KHANH PROVINCE CHIEF,  
 CONGEN II OSA REP AND  19 FEB 75 AT PROVINCE  
 HQS NHA TRANG.

1. BE ADVISED PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES THIS END HAS  
 PRECLUDED ACCOMPLISHMENT PLANNING ARRANGEMENTS/HIGHER  
 HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZATIONS NECESSARY FOR THIS COMMAND  
 TO CONDUCT C-123 RECOVERY AS PER TIME FRAME DISCUSSED  
 REF. REQUEST YOU NOTIFY GVN/US AUTHORITIES/AGENCIES  
 CONCERNED OF PLANNING STATUS. WILL ADVISE YOU SOONEST

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PAGE 02

IN 512007

TOR:051026Z MAR 75

NHTR

OF CHANGE, REGRET LATE NOTIFICATION."

2. CONGEN [ ] HAS SENT TWO MESSAGE TO EMBASSY SAIGON (NHA TRANG [ ]), THE FIRST MESSAGE REVIEWS THE PREPARATIONS MADE BY THE GVN AND THE CALL RECEIVED FROM [ ] IT GOES ON TO SAY THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE BE ABLE TO ADVISE THE PROVINCE CHIEF OF A DEFINITE DATE FOR THE RECOVERY OPERATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. CONGEN [ ] THEN COMMENTS THAT THE DELAY AND LATE NOTIFICATION PUT A STRAIN ON OUR RELATIONS WITH THE KHANH HOA AUTHORITIES AND WE WAS "BAFFLED" AT THE DELAY. HE ENDED BY REQUESTING THAT THE MATTER BE "PUSHED TO RESOLUTION PROMPTLY," THE SECOND MESSAGE IS ADDRESSED TO CHARGE [ ] AND NOTED THE CONGEN'S "DISTRIES" OVER THE LONG DELAY AND THE FACT THAT CLEARANCES WE THOUGHT WERE IN PROCESS ARE STILL LACKING. HE THEN ASKED FOR [ ] ASSISTANCE IN "PUSHING THIS MATTER ALONG," ENDING WITH A "REQUEST THAT YOU APPROVE RECOVERY OPERATION BY JCRC." E2 IMPDET

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APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

Driver E.N.

COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL (b)(6)

# REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: See Attachment (IN ENGLISH) (IN CHINESE)  
PT. RPA No. PA&IR-UTH-RPA-74/22  
EMPLOYEE No. See Attachment PND REF. No. PND-WA-  
EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED 1 July 1974  
(FOR SEPARATION, EFFECTIVE DATE IS LAST WORKING DAY "COB")  
ACTUAL EFFECTIVE DATE JUL 01 1974  
(TO BE FILLED BY PERSONNEL DIVISION)

PROPOSED ACTION:  NEW APPOINTMENT  CHANGE IN POSITION/SALARY  SEPARATION  (OTHER) Transfer (Administratively)

TITLE & ACCOUNTING CODE NO.	PRESENT STATUS	PROPOSED STATUS
See Attachment 099	See Attachment	Same
SALARY - GRADE, STEP & PAY STANDARD	See Attachment	Same
EMPLOYMENT STATUS - PERMANENT, TEMPORARY OR FIXED TERM	Permanent	Same
DEPARTMENT/DIVISION/OFFICE	Personnel Unassigned	Same
LOCATION	UTH	BKK
*CLASSIFICATION - STAFF EMPLOYEE OR WORKER	Staff Employee	Same
POSITION NUMBER	See Attachment	Same
REMARKS		

\* AS STIPULATED UNDER JOB CLASSIFICATIONS IN PERSONNEL MANUAL.  
BASIS FOR RECOMMENDATION: (1) FOR SEPARATION, INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT REPLACEMENT IS REQUIRED.  
(2) FOR PROMOTIONS AND SALARY INCREASES, COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING: (REQUEST ASSISTANCE FROM PND FOR DATA IF NECESSARY).

DATE OF EMPLOYMENT:	ORIGINAL TITLE:	ORIGINAL GRADE & STEP:
RECORD OF LAST 6 SALARY INCREASES:	PERCENTAGE INCREASE: (1) _____ (2) _____ (3) _____ (4) _____ (5) _____ (6) _____	
DATE:		
DATE OF CHANGE TO PRESENT TITLE:	PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF THIS INCREASE:	

This RPA is initiated for transfer of LWOP, Furlough personnel records UTH/BKK for Administrative purpose. In addition, missing personnel are also included on this RPA.

(USE REVERSE SIDE IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED)

REQUESTED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
(DEPARTMENT HEAD) (DIVISION DIRECTOR OR OFFICER)

CONCURRED BY: STATION/AREA MANAGER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
BASE MANAGER/REGION \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

\*\*HEAD OF DEPARTMENT/ DIVISION OR OFFICE: AVP-BKK DATE 26 June 74

OFFICER: VPIR-BKK DATE \_\_\_\_\_

APPROVED BY: OFFICER: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
PRESIDENT: IRA-BKK DATE 21 JUN 1974  
P-NTD DATE \_\_\_\_\_

DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE JUN 21 1974  
MPA&IR-UTH

(\*\*CONCURRENCE IS REQUIRED FOR INTER DEPARTMENTAL OR DIVISIONAL TRANSFERS ONLY.)

DISTRIBUTION BY PERSONNEL DIVISION AFTER FINAL APPROVAL: CC: VPIR-BKK  
COPY 1: FOR PERSONNEL DIVISION. COPY 4: TO Asst. Sy. Sidwa WAS FOR INFORMATION.  
COPY 2: FOR PAYROLL ACTION.  
COPY 3: TO MPA&IR-UTH (ORIGINATOR OF RPA) VIA VP-NTD FOR NOTIFICATION OF APPROVAL.

POSITION AUTHORIZED:		SICK LEAVE RECORD SINCE:										
POSITION NO.:	P/S:	TOTAL NUMBER OF DAYS TAKEN:										
EMPLOYMENT STATUS:	SLOT NO.:	FREQUENCY: CHECKED BY:										
PROPOSED SALARY	<input type="checkbox"/> IN ORDER	ROUTING ORDER	R/S	E/S	W/A	P/V	CPL	CAEA	CEC	ADP	DP	P/F
REMARKS:	<input type="checkbox"/> SUBJECT TO DP'S CONCURRENCE	INITIALS										
		DATE										

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PAGE 01

IN 514484

TOR:071008Z MAR 75

NHTR

~~SECRET~~ 071000Z MAR 75 STAFF

CITE NHA TRANG

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAIGON.

REF NHA TRANG

(PART II)

TIME OF REPORT 1800 (L) 7 MARCH 1975

RECOVERY

1. RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM JCRC THAILAND:

SUBJ: C-123 RECOVERY OPERATION

REFS: A. AMCONSUL NHA TRANG MAR 75

B. COORDINATION DISCUSSION KHANH HOA PROVINCE

CHIEF, CONGEN II OSA REP, AND 19 FEB

75 AT PROVINCE HQS NHA TRANG (NOTAL)

1. THIS HQS CONTINUES DEVELOPMENT PLANNING/COORDINATION FOR C-123 RECOVERY OPERATION ALONG LINES DISCUSSED REF B. FOR PLANNING PURPOSES THIS COMMAND, INITIATION DATE ON/ABOUT 19 MARCH APPEARS FEASIBLE; SUBJECT TO HIGHER AUTHORITY APPROVALS OF FIRM CONCEPT. REPS THIS

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COMMAND WILL MAINTAIN LIAISON YOUR REPS CONCERNED SO AS TO COMPLETE NECESSARY PLANNING/ACCOMPLISH COORDINATION GVN/ARVN AGENCIES INVOLVED."

2. UNLESS THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS, DO NOT PLAN TO FILE REPORT SATURDAY OR SUNDAY, 8-9 MARCH.  
E2 IMPDET

PORTION GARBLED - BEING SERVICED

SECRET

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

**COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL**  
FOVTE-71-RPA-068

(This is the originator's file copy. Do not...)

NAME: G. H. DRIVER DEPT. RPA No. \_\_\_\_\_

(IN ENGLISH) (IN CHINESE)

EMPLOYEE No. 07740 PND REF. No. PND-WA-

EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED 30 May 1974  
(FOR SEPARATION, EFFECTIVE DATE IS LAST WORKING DAY "COB".)

ACTUAL EFFECTIVE DATE MAY 30 1974  
(TO BE FILLED BY PERSONNEL DIVISION)

**REQUEST FOR  
PERSONNEL ACTION**  
**RECEIVED**  
MAY 1974

PROPOSED ACTION:  NEW APPOINTMENT  CHANGE IN POSITION/SALARY  SEPARATION  (OTHER) TRANSFER

	PRESENT STATUS	PROPOSED STATUS
TITLE & ACCOUNTING CODE NO.	<u>First Officer (Missing)</u>	<u>Same</u> <u>099</u>
SALARY - GRADE, STEP & PAY STANDARD	<u>VTE RPA-71-004 refer</u>	<u>Same</u>
EMPLOYMENT STATUS - PERMANENT, TEMPORARY OR FIXED TERM	<u>Permanent</u>	<u>Same</u>
DEPARTMENT/DIVISION/OFFICE	<u>Flying 672</u>	<u>Same</u>
LOCATION	<u>VTE</u>	<u>UTH</u>
* CLASSIFICATION - STAFF EMPLOYEE OR WORKER	<u>Staff Employee</u>	<u>Same</u>
POSITION NUMBER	<u>F03016</u>	<u>Same</u>
REMARKS		

\* AS STIPULATED UNDER JOB CLASSIFICATIONS IN PERSONNEL MANUAL.

**BASIS FOR RECOMMENDATION:** (1) FOR SEPARATION, INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT REPLACEMENT IS REQUIRED.  
(2) FOR PROMOTIONS AND SALARY INCREASES, COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING: (REQUEST ASSISTANCE FROM PND FOR DATA IF NECESSARY).

DATE OF EMPLOYMENT:	ORIGINAL TITLE:	ORIGINAL GRADE & STEP:
RECORD OF LAST 6 SALARY INCREASES:	PERCENTAGE INCREASE: (1) _____ (2) _____ (3) _____ (4) _____ (5) _____ (6) _____	
DATE OF CHANGE TO PRESENT TITLE:	PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF THIS INCREASE:	

The purpose of this RPA is to administratively transfer F/O Driver from VTE to UTH due to closing of VTE base.

(USE REVERSE SIDE IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED)

REQUESTED BY: NAS VTE DATE 07 May 1974  
(DEPARTMENT HEAD) (DIVISION DIRECTOR OR OFFICER)

CONCURRED BY: STATION/AREA MANAGER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE 08 MAY 1974  
BASE MANAGER/PERSONNEL DIRECTOR \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

\* HEAD OF DEPARTMENT/DIVISION OR OFFICE \_\_\_\_\_ DATE 11 MAY 1974  
OFFICER VP NTD DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
OFFICER VPIR DATE \_\_\_\_\_

APPROVED BY: OFFICER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
PRESIDENT \_\_\_\_\_ DATE 07 MAY 1974  
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL NAS VTE DATE \_\_\_\_\_

DISTRIBUTION BY PERSONNEL DIVISION AFTER FINAL APPROVAL: NPA&IR UTH VP NTD FOR INFORMATION.  
COPY 1: FOR PERSONNEL DIVISION. COPY 4: TO \_\_\_\_\_  
COPY 2: FOR PAYROLL ACTION. Copy 5: to VPIR EKK FOR NOTIFICATION OF APPROVAL.  
COPY 3: TO NAS VTE (ORIGINATOR OF RPA) VIA VP NTD

(FOR PERSONNEL DIVISION USE ONLY)

POSITION AUTHORIZED: \_\_\_\_\_  
POSITION NO.: \_\_\_\_\_ P/S: \_\_\_\_\_  
EMPLOYMENT STATUS: \_\_\_\_\_ SLOT NO.: \_\_\_\_\_

PROPOSED  IN ORDER  
SALARY  SUBJECT TO DP'S CONCURRENCE

REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_

SICK LEAVE RECORD SINCE:		TOTAL NUMBER OF DAYS TAKEN:		CHECKED BY:	
FREQUENCY:					
ROUTING ORDER	R/S	E/S	W/A	P/V	CPL CAEA CEC
INITIALS					ADP DP P
DATE					

006117077  
APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL

# REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: C. N. Driver (IN ENGLISH) (IN CHINESE)  
JEPT. RPA No. VPIR-RPA-74-004 (b)(6)  
EMPLOYEE No. 07740 PND REF. No. PND-WA-  
EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED 6 February 1974  
(FOR SEPARATION, EFFECTIVE DATE IS LAST WORKING DAY "COB".)  
ACTUAL EFFECTIVE DATE 6 February 1974 (COB)  
(TO BE FILLED BY PERSONNEL DIVISION)

PROPOSED ACTION:  NEW APPOINTMENT  CHANGE IN POSITION/SALARY  SEPARATION  (OTHER) See below

TITLE & ACCOUNTING CODE NO.	PRESENT STATUS	PROPOSED STATUS
SALARY - GRADE, STEP & PAY STANDARD	The purpose of this RPA is to record the fact that payment of missing compensation benefits will be assumed by the	
EMPLOYMENT STATUS - PERMANENT, TEMPORARY OR FIXED TERM	Division of Claim and Benefits Payments, Employment Standards	
DEPARTMENT/DIVISION/OFFICE	Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, beginning 7 Feb'74.	
LOCATION	WM-74-0151 dated 24 January 1974, ALC OCA WAS B74 111515Z	
*CLASSIFICATION - STAFF EMPLOYEE OR WORKER	and DIRA-74-082 dated 14 February 1974 refers.	
POSITION NUMBER		
REMARKS		

\* AS STIPULATED UNDER JOB CLASSIFICATIONS IN PERSONNEL MANUAL.

BASIS FOR RECOMMENDATION: (1) FOR SEPARATION; INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT REPLACEMENT IS REQUIRED.  
(2) FOR PROMOTIONS AND SALARY INCREASES, COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING: (REQUEST ASSISTANCE FROM PND FOR DATA IF NECESSARY).

DATE OF EMPLOYMENT:	ORIGINAL TITLE:	ORIGINAL GRADE & STEP:
RECORD OF LAST 6 SALARY INCREASES:	PERCENTAGE INCREASE: (1) _____ (2) _____ (3) _____ (4) _____ (5) _____ (6) _____	
DATE OF CHANGE TO PRESENT TITLE:	PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF THIS INCREASE:	

(USE REVERSE SIDE IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED)

REQUESTED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ (DEPARTMENT HEAD) \_\_\_\_\_ (DIVISION DIRECTOR OR OFFICER) DATE \_\_\_\_\_

CONCURRED BY: STATION/AREA MANAGER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 BASE MANAGER/REGIONAL DIRECTOR \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

\*\*HEAD OF DEPARTMENT/DIVISION OR OFFICE \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 OFFICER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

APPROVED BY: OFFICER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE 15 FEB 1974  
 PRESIDENT \_\_\_\_\_ DATE 15 FEB 1974

(\*\* CONCURRENCE IS REQUIRED FOR INTER-DEPARTMENTAL OR DIVISIONAL TRANSFERS ONLY.)

DISTRIBUTION BY PERSONNEL DIVISION AFTER FINAL APPROVAL: CEO WAS DDPD TFE  
 COPY 1: FOR PERSONNEL DIVISION. COPY 4: TO \_\_\_\_\_ VIA \_\_\_\_\_ FOR INFORMATION.  
 COPY 2: FOR PAYROLL ACTION. BM VTE  
 COPY 3: TO \_\_\_\_\_ (ORIGINATOR OF RPA) VIA VP NTD FOR NOTIFICATION OF APPROVAL.

(FOR PERSONNEL DIVISION USE ONLY)

POSITION AUTHORIZED: \_\_\_\_\_  
 POSITION NO.: \_\_\_\_\_ P/S: \_\_\_\_\_  
 EMPLOYMENT STATUS: \_\_\_\_\_ SLOT NO.: \_\_\_\_\_

PROPOSED:  IN ORDER  
 SALARY:  SUBJECT TO DP'S CONCURRENCE

REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_

SICK LEAVE RECORD SINCE:									
TOTAL NUMBER OF DAYS TAKEN:									
FREQUENCY:					CHECKED BY:				
ROUTING ORDER	R/S	E/S	W/A	P/V	CPL	CAE	ADP	DP	P/F
INITIALS									
DATE									

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

# REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: C.N. DRIVER (IN ENGLISH) DEPT. RPA No. FD-RPA-73-201  
 (IN CHINESE)  
 EMPLOYEE No. 07740 PND REF. No. PND-WA-AM-73-328  
 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED 7 March 1973  
 (FOR SEPARATION, EFFECTIVE DATE IS LAST WORKING DAY "COB")  
 ACTUAL EFFECTIVE DATE 7 March 1973  
 (TO BE FILLED BY PERSONNEL DIVISION)

TO: PAYROLL  TPE  SFL  BKK  VTE  
 TNY  DNA  UTH  SGN  
 HXG  CRK  CRX  OKO  
 VIA  DGAD  DMAD  DS/AT

FOR ACCOUNTING: AAL HXG  
 PROPOSED ACT:  NEW APPOINTMENT  CHANGE IN POSITION/SALARY  SEPARATION  (OTHER) Missing

MAR 22 1973  
 MAR 22 1973

	PRESENT STATUS	PROPOSED STATUS
TITLE & ACCOUNTING CODE NO.	First Officer	Missing
SALARY GRADE, STEP & PAY STANDARD	FB/PS-D (Pilots) Code "F" + PATA	RS, PND Remarks: 65 C2177
EMPLOYMENT STATUS - PERMANENT, TEMPORARY OR FIXED TERM	Permanent	Entitled to payment of unused A/V: 5.58 days A/L: 8.80 days H/L: 4.83 days T/T: 1.40 days as of 7 March 1973.
DEPARTMENT/DIVISION/OFFICE	Flying Division/Operations	
LOCATION	VTE	
* CLASSIFICATION - STAFF EMPLOYEE OR WORKER	Staff employee	
POSITION NUMBER	08016	
REMARKS		

\* AS STIPULATED UNDER JOB CLASSIFICATIONS IN PERSONNEL MANUAL.

PD-D9 R17

APPROVED BY

DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

3/19/73  
DATE



# REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: C.N. DRIVER (IN ENGLISH) (IN CHINESE) PT. RPA No. FD-RPA-73-201  
 EMPLOYEE NO. 07740 PND REF. No. PND-WA-AM-73-339  
 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED 7 March 1973  
 ACTUAL EFFECTIVE DATE 7 March 1973 (FOR SEPARATION, EFFECTIVE DATE IS LAST WORKING DAY/COB\*)  
 (TO BE FILLED BY PERSONNEL DIVISION)

PROPOSED ACTION:  NEW APPOINTMENT  CHANGE IN POSITION/SALARY  SEPARATION  (OTHER) Missing

TITLE & ACCOUNTING CODE NO.	PRESENT STATUS	PROPOSED STATUS
	First Officer	Missing
SALARY - GRADE, STEP & PAY STANDARD	FR/PS-D (Pilots) Code "F" + DATA	RS, PND Remarks: <u>41 C-21-75</u>
EMPLOYMENT STATUS - PERMANENT, TEMPORARY OR FIXED TERM	Permanent	Entitled to payment of unused A/V: 5.58 days A/L: 8.80 days H/L: 4.83 days T/T: 1.40 days
DEPARTMENT/DIVISION/OFFICE	Flying Division/Operations	
LOCATION	VTE	
*CLASSIFICATION - STAFF EMPLOYEE OR WORKER	Staff employee	as of 7 March 1973.
POSITION NUMBER	08016	
REMARKS		Date 3/20 M Samuel H. Johnson DSY

\* AS STIPULATED UNDER JOB CLASSIFICATIONS IN PERSONNEL MANUAL.

BASIS FOR RECOMMENDATION: (1) FOR SEPARATION, INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT REPLACEMENT IS REQUIRED.  
 (2) FOR PROMOTIONS AND SALARY INCREASES, COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING: (REQUEST ASSISTANCE FROM PND FOR DATA IF NECESSARY).

DATE OF EMPLOYMENT:	ORIGINAL TITLE:	ORIGINAL GRADE & STEP:
RECORD OF LAST 6 SALARY INCREASES:	PERCENTAGE INCREASE: (1) _____ (2) _____ (3) _____ (4) _____ (5) _____ (6) _____	
DATE OF CHANGE TO PRESENT TITLE:	PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF THIS INCREASE:	

Missing in the crash of C-123K 554524 on 7 March 1973.

(USE REVERSE SIDE IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED)

REQUESTED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ (DEPARTMENT HEAD) \_\_\_\_\_ (DIVISION DIRECTOR OR OFFICER) DFD DATE 16 March 1973

CONCURRED BY: STATION/AREA MANAGER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 BASE MANAGER/REGIONAL DIRECTOR \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

\*\*HEAD OF DEPARTMENT/  
 DIVISION OR OFFICE \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 OFFICER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE MAR 16 1973

APPROVED BY: OFFICER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 PRESIDENT \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL \_\_\_\_\_ DATE 3/19/73

(\*\*CONCURRENCE IS REQUIRED FOR INTER DEPARTMENTAL OR DIVISIONAL TRANSFERS ONLY.)

DISTRIBUTION BY PERSONNEL DIVISION AFTER FINAL APPROVAL:  
 COPY 1: FOR PERSONNEL DIVISION. COPY 4: TO PM VIA CP, VPVTE FOR INFORMATION.  
 COPY 2: FOR PAYROLL ACTION. COPY 3: TO DFD (ORIGINATOR OF RPA) VIA \_\_\_\_\_ FOR NOTIFICATION OF APPROVAL.

POSITION AUTHORIZED:		SICK LEAVE RECORD SINCE: _____	
POSITION NO.:	P/S:	TOTAL NUMBER OF DAYS TAKEN: _____	
EMPLOYMENT STATUS:	SLOT NO.:	FREQUENCY: _____ CHECKED BY: _____	
PROPOSED <input type="checkbox"/> IN ORDER		ROUTING ORDER	
SALARY <input type="checkbox"/> SUBJECT TO DP'S CONCURRENCE		INITIALS	
REMARKS:		DATE	

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PAGE 01-01

IN 536579

TOR:310609Z MAR 75

SAIG

~~SECRET~~ 310415Z MAR 75 STAFF

CITE SAIGON

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

ADMIN PERS LOGS

REF: DIRECTOR

PLEASE SEND COVER ORDERS FOR MR. JAMES RAWLINGS PERSONAL  
EFFECTS. E2 IMPDET.

~~SECRET~~

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

**COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL**  
FOYTB-74-RPA-068

**REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION**

NAME: C. H. DRIVER (IN ENGLISH) (IN CHINESE) DEPT. RPA No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 EMPLOYEE No. 07740 PND REF. No. PND-WA- (b)(6)  
 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED 30 May 1974  
 (FOR SEPARATION, EFFECTIVE DATE IS LAST WORKING DAY "COB")  
 ACTUAL EFFECTIVE DATE MAY 30 1974  
 (TO BE FILLED BY PERSONNEL DIVISION)

PROPOSED ACTION:  NEW APPOINTMENT  CHANGE IN POSITION/SALARY  SEPARATION  (OTHER) TRANSFER

	PRESENT STATUS	PROPOSED STATUS
TITLE & ACCOUNTING CODE NO.	<u>First Officer (Missing)</u>	<u>Same 099</u>
SALARY - GRADE, STEP & PAY STANDARD	<u>VTE-74-001 refer</u>	<u>Same</u>
EMPLOYMENT STATUS - PERMANENT, TEMPORARY OR FIXED TERM	<u>Permanent</u>	<u>Same</u>
DEPARTMENT/DIVISION/OFFICE	<u>Flying 672</u>	<u>Same</u>
LOCATION	<u>VTE</u>	<u>UTH</u>
* CLASSIFICATION - STAFF EMPLOYEE OR WORKER	<u>Staff Employee</u>	<u>Same</u>
POSITION NUMBER	<u>P08016</u>	<u>Same</u>
REMARKS		

\* AS STIPULATED UNDER JOB CLASSIFICATIONS IN PERSONNEL MANUAL.  
 BASIS FOR RECOMMENDATION: (1) FOR SEPARATION, INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT REPLACEMENT IS REQUIRED.  
 (2) FOR PROMOTIONS AND SALARY INCREASES, COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING: (REQUEST ASSISTANCE FROM PND FOR DATA IF NECESSARY).

DATE OF EMPLOYMENT:	ORIGINAL TITLE:	ORIGINAL GRADE & STEP:
RECORD OF LAST 6 SALARY INCREASES: DATE:	PERCENTAGE INCREASE: (1) _____ (2) _____ (3) _____ (4) _____ (5) _____ (6) _____	
DATE OF CHANGE TO PRESENT TITLE:	PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF THIS INCREASE:	

The purpose of this RPA is to administratively transfer P/O Driver from VTE to UTH due to closing of VTE base.

(USE REVERSE SIDE IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED)

REQUESTED BY: HAS VTE (DEPARTMENT HEAD) (DIVISION DIRECTOR OR OFFICER) DATE: 07 May 1974

CONCURRED BY: STATION/AREA MANAGER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
 BASE MANAGER/PERSONNEL DIVISION \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: 09 MAY 1974

\* HEAD OF DEPARTMENT/DIVISION OR OFFICE \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
 OFFICER \_\_\_\_\_ VP BTD DATE: 11 MAY 1974  
VPIR DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

APPROVED BY: OFFICER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
 PRESIDENT \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
 DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL \_\_\_\_\_ HAS VTE DATE: 07 MAY 1974

(\*\* CONCURRENCE IS REQUIRED FOR INTER DEPARTMENTAL OR DIVISIONAL TRANSFERS ONLY.)

DISTRIBUTION BY PERSONNEL DIVISION AFTER FINAL APPROVAL: REPAIR UTH VP BTD  
 COPY 1: FOR PERSONNEL DIVISION. COPY 4: TO \_\_\_\_\_ VIA \_\_\_\_\_ FOR INFORMATION.  
 COPY 2: FOR PAYROLL ACTION. COPY 5: to VPIR BAK  
 COPY 3: TO HAS VTE (ORIGINATOR OF RPA) VIA DI VTE FOR NOTIFICATION OF APPROVAL.

(FOR PERSONNEL DIVISION USE ONLY)

POSITION AUTHORIZED: \_\_\_\_\_  
 POSITION NO.: \_\_\_\_\_ P/S: \_\_\_\_\_  
 EMPLOYMENT STATUS: \_\_\_\_\_ SLOT NO.: \_\_\_\_\_  
 PROPOSED:  IN ORDER  
 SALARY:  SUBJECT TO DP'S CONCURRENCE  
 REMARKS:

SICK LEAVE RECORD SINCE:

TOTAL NUMBER OF DAYS TAKEN: \_\_\_\_\_

FREQUENCY: \_\_\_\_\_ CHECKED BY: \_\_\_\_\_

ROUTING ORDER	R/S	E/S	W/A	P/V	CPL	CAEA	CEC	ADP	DP	P/F
INITIALS										
DATE										

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

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PAGE 01

IN 510708

TOR:041050Z MAR 75

NHTR

~~SECRET~~ 041015Z MAR 75 STAFF

CITE NHA TRANG

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAIGON.

REFSI A. NHA TRANG

B. SAIGON

ZRPARKA (PART I)

TIME OF REPORT 1800 (L) 4 MARCH 1975

RECOVERY

1. CONGEN HAD CALL THIS AFTERNOON FROM

CHIEF JCRC THAILAND, WHO SAID THAT

CHIEF USSAG WAS:

A. AGONIZING OVER WHETHER OR NOT RECOVERY MISSION  
WAS WITHIN THE JCRC CHARTER,

B. STILL CONCERNED WITH ORIGINAL USSAG HIGH  
THREAT ASSESSMENT,

C. CONSIDERING GOING TO CINCPAC FOR APPROVAL.

INTENDS TO SEE AND DISCUSS THESE  
PROBLEMS, BUT NO MEETING POSSIBLE BEFORE LEAVES  
FOR CINCPAC LATER THIS WEEK. AS RESULT IT

~~SECRET~~

APPROVED FOR  
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PAGE 02

IN 510708

TOR1041050Z MAR 75

NHTR

OPINION THAT IT WILL BE AT LEAST 20<sup>A</sup> MARCH BEFORE JCRC WILL  
BE ABLE TO LAUNCH RECOVERY MISSION.

2. BASE HAD EARLIER INDICATED TO [ ] THAT  
THERE WOULD BE A DELAY AND ASKED HIM HOW LONG HE THOUGHT HE  
COULD KEEP HIS FORCES ON STAND-BY. HE SAID HE COULD HOLD  
OFF ABOUT A WEEK BUT IT POSSIBLE THAT 207TH RECON COMPANY  
MIGHT HAVE TO BE RECOMMITTED ELSEWHERE. [ ] THEN  
CANCELLED HIS ALREADY PUBLISHED ORDER TO START THE OPERATION

~~PAGE 2 NHA TRANG~~ [ ]

AT 0600 HOURS 6 MARCH. ALTHOUGH [ ] NOT UPSET OVER  
THIS DEVELOPMENT ACCORDING TO KHANH HOA PROVINCE REP, [ ]

[ ], THE PROVINCE CHIEF [ ] IS VERY UPSET. [ ]

[ ] AND IF NECESSARY CONGEN [ ] WILL SEE [ ]

IN ORDER TO EXPLAIN THE SITUATION AND CALM HIM DOWN.

3. AS A RESULT OF THE JCRC DELAY AND THE STAND DOWN OF  
THE GVN FORCES CONGEN [ ] IS PREPARING A TELEGRAM TO THE  
EMBASSY WHICH WILL SPELL OUT THE PREPARATIONS THE GVN HAS  
MADE AND REQUEST THE EMBASSY USE ITS INFLUENCE TO GET FROM  
MCRC A FIRM DATE WHEN ITS ASSISTANCE CAN BE EXPECTED. HE IS  
PREPARED TO ASK THE GVN TO STAND DOWN UNTIL 20 MARCH IF HE

~~SECRET~~

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

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PAGE 03-03

IN 510708

TOR:041050Z MAR 75

NHTR

HAS SOME ASSURANCE THAT IS A VALID DATE. THIS MESSAGE WILL  
BE SENT TOMORROW.

4. IN RESPONSE TO GOING IT WITHOUT THE JCRC CONGEN  
 [ ] WILLING TO CONSIDER THIS AS OUR FALL BACK POSITION  
 IF THERE ARE FURTHER JCRC DELAYS, OR THE JCRC FINALLY  
 TURNS DOWN THE OPERATION. BASE ALSO RAISED THIS POINT  
 INFORMALLY WITH [ ] AND WHILE HE PREFERS A JOINT  
 OPERATION WITH THE JCRC HE IS WILLING TO CONSIDER AN ALL GVN  
 OPERATION. [ ] CLEARLY IS CONCERNED THAT IF THE  
 ACTUAL REMOVAL OF REMAINS (HUMAN OR AIRCRAFT) IS NOT DONE  
 BY AMERICANS AND SOMETHING IS DONE WRONG HE (THE GVN) WILL  
 BE BLAMED. IN THIS CONNECTION THE LOCAL JCRC REP SAID THERE  
 ARE VIETNAMESE IN THE REGION WHO HAVE BEEN TRAINED IN RECOVERY  
 WORK BY AMERICANS AND CAN BE USED IF WE GO WITHOUT THE JCRC.  
 E2 IMPDET

~~SECRET~~

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

# REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: C. W. DRIVER DEPT. RPA No. FD-RPA-68-520  
(IN ENGLISH) (IN CHINESE)  
EMPLOYEE No. 07740 PND REF. No. PND-WA-17-62-1802 **SEP 30 1968**  
EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED 13 September 1968  
(FOR SEPARATION, EFFECTIVE DATE IS LAST WORKING DAY "COB")  
ACTUAL EFFECTIVE DATE **SEP 13 1968**  
(TO BE FILLED BY PERSONNEL DIVISION)

Attd:  Notification of  
Change in Pay/Status  
 Pay Review Sheet

PROPOSED ACTION:  NEW APPOINTMENT  CHANGE IN POSITION/SALARY  SEPARATION  (OTHER)

TITLE & ACCOUNTING CODE NO.	PRESENT STATUS	PROPOSED STATUS
	Reserve Captain	First Officer
SALARY - GRADE, STEP & PAY STANDARD	FP/PS Code "D" + PA/A	FP/PS Code "F" + PA/A
EMPLOYMENT STATUS - PERMANENT, TEMPORARY OR FIXED TERM	Permanent	Same
DEPARTMENT/DIVISION/OFFICE	Flying Division/Operations	Same
LOCATION	P/A - VTE	Same
*CLASSIFICATION - STAFF EMPLOYEE OR WORKER	Staff employee	Same
POSITION NUMBER	08016	
REMARKS		

\* AS STIPULATED UNDER JOB CLASSIFICATIONS IN PERSONNEL MANUAL.

BASIS FOR RECOMMENDATION: (1) FOR SEPARATION, INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT RE-EMPLOYMENT IS REQUIRED.  
(2) FOR PROMOTIONS AND SALARY INCREASES, COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING: (REQUEST ASSISTANCE FROM PND FOR DATA IF NECESSARY).

DATE OF EMPLOYMENT:	ORIGINAL TITLE:	ORIGINAL GRADE & STEP:
RECORD OF LAST 6 SALARY INCREASES:	PERCENTAGE INCREASE: (1) _____ (2) _____ (3) _____ (4) _____ (5) _____ (6) _____	
DATE OF CHANGE TO PRESENT TITLE:	PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF THIS INCREASE:	

As a result of PC60 aircraft N196X accident, 9 July 1968.

(USE REVERSE SIDE IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED)

REQUESTED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ (DEPARTMENT HEAD) (DIVISION DIRECTOR OR OFFICER) DATE 13 September 1968

CONCURRED BY: STATION/AREA MANAGER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
BASE MANAGER/REGIONAL DIRECTOR \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

\*\*HEAD OF DEPARTMENT/  
DIVISION OR OFFICE \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

APPROVED BY: OFFICER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE 18 Sept 1968  
PRESIDENT \_\_\_\_\_ DATE 25 Sept 68  
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL \_\_\_\_\_ DATE 26 Sept 68  
(\*\*CONCURRENCE IS REQUIRED FOR ALL TRANSFERS ONLY.)

DISTRIBUTION BY PERSONNEL DIVISION AFTER FINAL APPROVAL:  
COPY 1: FOR PERSONNEL DIVISION. COPY 4: TO PMVTE VIA (1) MFD/L (2) PMVTE FOR INFORMATION.  
COPY 2: FOR PAYROLL ACTION. COPY 3: TO DFD (ORIGINATOR OF RPA) VIA VPFO CSD FOR NOTIFICATION OF APPROVAL.

(FOR PERSONNEL DIVISION USE ONLY)

POSITION AUTHORIZED: Captain  
POSITION NO.: 08016 P/S: Code D  
EMPLOYMENT STATUS: Permanent SLOT NO.: \_\_\_\_\_

PROPOSED SALARY:  IN ORDER  SUBJECT TO DP'S CONCURRENCE

REMARKS: Extr. C py to DPD/PRL - HKG

SICK LEAVE RECORD SINCE: \_\_\_\_\_

TOTAL NUMBER OF DAYS TAKEN: \_\_\_\_\_

FREQUENCY: 1/26 1/25 3/8

ROUTING ORDER	R/S	E/S	W/A	P/V	CPL	CAE	ADP	DP	R/F
INITIALS	<u>HT</u>	<u>AR</u>	<u>AR</u>	<u>AR</u>	<u>AR</u>	<u>AR</u>	<u>AR</u>	<u>AR</u>	<u>AR</u>
DATE	<u>13/9/68</u>	<u>13/9/68</u>	<u>13/9/68</u>	<u>13/9/68</u>	<u>13/9/68</u>	<u>13/9/68</u>	<u>13/9/68</u>	<u>13/9/68</u>	<u>13/9/68</u>

# REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: C. N. DRIVER DEPT. RPA No. FD-RPA-67-826  
 (IN ENGLISH) (IN CHINESE)  
 PAYROLL No. 07740 PND REF. No. PND-WA-AM-67-2614  
 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED 19 December 1967  
 (FOR SEPARATION, EFFECTIVE DATE IS LAST WORKING DAY "COB")  
 ACTUAL EFFECTIVE DATE DEC 19 1967  
 (TO BE FILLED BY PERSONNEL DIVISION)

Attd:  Notification of Change in Pay/Status  
 Pay Review Sheet

PROPOSED ACTION:  NEW APPOINTMENT  CHANGE IN POSITION/SALARY  SEPARATION  (OTHER)

	PRESENT STATUS	PROPOSED STATUS
TITLE & ACCOUNTING CODE NO.	First Officer	Reserve Captain
SALARY - GRADE, STEP & PAY STANDARD	FP/PS Code "F" + PA/A	FP/PS Code "D" + PA/A
EMPLOYMENT STATUS - PERMANENT, TEMPORARY OR FIXED TERM	Permanent	Same
DEPARTMENT/DIVISION/OFFICE	Flying Division/Operations	Same
LOCATION	P/A - VTE	Same
*CLASSIFICATION - STAFF EMPLOYEE OR WORKER	Staff employee	Same
POSITION NUMBER	<u>008016</u>	Same
REMARKS		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Approved <input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved <u>20 Dec 67</u>

\* AS STIPULATED UNDER JOB CLASSIFICATIONS IN PERSONNEL MANUAL.

BASIS FOR RECOMMENDATION: (1) FOR SEPARATION, INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT REPLACEMENT IS REQUIRED.  
 (2) FOR PROMOTIONS AND SALARY INCREASES, COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING: (REQUEST ASSISTANCE FROM PND FOR DATA IF NECESSARY):

DATE OF EMPLOYMENT:	ORIGINAL TITLE:	ORIGINAL GRADE & STEP:
RECORD OF LAST 6 SALARY INCREASES:	PERCENTAGE INCREASE: (1) _____ (2) _____ (3) _____ (4) _____ (5) _____ (6) _____	DATE: _____
DATE OF CHANGE TO PRESENT TITLE:	PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF THIS INCREASE:	

Completed pilot in command requirement.  
 No accident record.

(USE REVERSE SIDE IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED)

REQUESTED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ DFD DATE 20 December 1967  
 (DEPARTMENT HEAD) (DIVISION DIRECTOR OR OFFICER)

CONCURRED BY: STATION MANAGER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 REGIONAL DIRECTOR \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

\*\*HEAD OF DEPARTMENT/DIVISION OR OFFICE  
 OFFICER \_\_\_\_\_ VPFO DATE DEC 21 1967

APPROVED BY: OFFICER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE 28 Dec 67  
 PRESIDENT \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL \_\_\_\_\_ DATE 29 Dec 67

(\*\* CONCURRENCE IS REQUIRED FOR INTER DEPARTMENTAL OR DIVISIONAL TRANSFERS ONLY.)

DISTRIBUTION BY PERSONNEL DIVISION AFTER FINAL APPROVAL: PMVTE (1) MFD/L  
 COPY 1: FOR PERSONNEL DIVISION. COPY 4: TO MED/L VIA (2) BMVTE FOR INFORMATION.  
 COPY 2: FOR PAYROLL ACTION. DFD (ORIGINATOR OF RPA) VIA VPFO CSD FOR NOTIFICATION OF APPROVAL.  
 COPY 3: TO \_\_\_\_\_

(FOR PERSONNEL DIVISION USE ONLY)

POSITION AUTHORIZED: Captain  
 POSITION NO.: 008016 P/S: Adh  
 EMPLOYMENT STATUS: Permanent SLOT NO.: \_\_\_\_\_  
 PROPOSED:  IN ORDER  
 SALARY:  SUBJECT TO DP'S CONCURRENCE  
 REMARKS: FD-RPA-67-826 (upgrading)

SICK LEAVE RECORD SINCE: \_\_\_\_\_  
 TOTAL NUMBER OF DAYS TAKEN: \_\_\_\_\_  
 FREQUENCY: \_\_\_\_\_ CHECKED BY: \_\_\_\_\_

ROUTING ORDER	R/S	E/S	W/A	P/V	SEC	CPL	CHK	ADP	DR	R/F
INITIALS	<u>LT</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>VP</u>			<u>2</u>	<u>12</u>			<u>92</u>
DATE	<u>20</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>67</u>				<u>1967</u>			<u>92</u>



APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

# REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: C. N. DRIVER DEPT. RPA No. FD-RPA-66-411  
 (IN ENGLISH) (IN CHINESE)  
 PAYROLL No. 09276 PND REF. No. PND-WA-AM-RPA-66-2665  
 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED To be inserted by PND  
 (FOR SEPARATION, EFFECTIVE DATE IS LAST WORKING DAY "COB")  
 ACTUAL EFFECTIVE DATE 15 May 1966 JUN 14 1966  
 (TO BE FILLED BY PERSONNEL DIVISION)  
 PROPOSED ACTION:  NEW APPOINTMENT  CHANGE IN POSITION/SALARY  SEPARATION  (OTHER) PA-A

AUG 12 1966

	PRESENT STATUS	PROPOSED STATUS
TITLE & ACCOUNTING CODE NO.	APPLICANT	First Officer
SALARY - GRADE, STEP & PAY STANDARD		FP/PS Rev. 18 Code "F" + PA/A
EMPLOYMENT STATUS - PERMANENT, TEMPORARY OR FIXED TERM		Permanent
DEPARTMENT/DIVISION/OFFICE		Flying Division/Operations
LOCATION		P/A - VTE
*CLASSIFICATION - STAFF EMPLOYEE OR WORKER		Staff employee
POSITION NUMBER		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Approved <input type="checkbox"/> Disapprove
REMARKS		5/25/66 [Signature] DSY

RECEIVED  
25 MAY 1966  
Security Division  
RECEIVED  
23 MAY 1966  
VPPO OFFICE  
TAPPEI

\* AS STIPULATED UNDER JOB CLASSIFICATIONS IN PERSONNEL MANUAL.  
 BASIS FOR RECOMMENDATION: (1) FOR SEPARATION, INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT REPLACEMENT IS REQUIRED.  
 (2) FOR PROMOTIONS AND SALARY INCREASES, COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING: (REQUEST ASSISTANCE FROM PND FOR DATA IF NECESSARY).

DATE OF EMPLOYMENT:	ORIGINAL TITLE:	ORIGINAL GRADE & STEP:
RECORD OF LAST 6 SALARY INCREASES:	PERCENTAGE INCREASE: (1) _____ (2) _____ (3) _____ (4) _____ (5) _____ (6) _____	
DATE:		
DATE OF CHANGE TO PRESENT TITLE:	PERCENTAGE INCREASE OF THIS INCREASE:	

(USE REVERSE SIDE IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED)

REQUESTED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ BFD DATE 19 May 1966  
 (DEPARTMENT HEAD) (DIVISION DIRECTOR OR OFFICER)  
 CONCURRED BY: STATION MANAGER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 REGIONAL DIRECTOR \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 \*\*HEAD OF DEPARTMENT/DIVISION OR OFFICE \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 OFFICER \_\_\_\_\_ PFO DATE 23 May 1966  
 APPROVED BY: OFFICER \_\_\_\_\_ DATE 26 May 66  
 \_\_\_\_\_ DATE 5/27/66

10193  
8183

DISTRIBUTION BY PERSONNEL DIVISION AFTER FINAL APPROVAL:  
 COPY 1: FOR PERSONNEL DIVISION. COPY 4: TO MF/VTE VIA \_\_\_\_\_ FOR INFORMATION.  
 COPY 2: FOR PAYROLL ACTION. DFD (ORIGINATOR OF RPA) VIA VPFO CSD (3) BMVIE  
 COPY 3: TO \_\_\_\_\_ FOR NOTIFICATION OF APPROVAL.

POSITION AUTHORIZED: <u>1st Officer</u>	(FOR PERSONNEL DIVISION USE ONLY)
POSITION NO.: <u>09-27-115</u> P/S:	SICK LEAVE RECORD SINCE:
EMPLOYMENT STATUS: <u>Perm</u> SLOT NO.:	TOTAL NUMBER OF DAYS TAKEN:
PROPOSED: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> IN ORDER	FREQUENCY: _____ CHECKED BY: _____
SALARY: <input type="checkbox"/> SUBJECT TO DP'S CONCURRENCE	ROUTING ORDER: R/S E/S W/A P/V SEC CPL _____ ADP DP P/F
REMARKS:	INITIALS: _____ DATE: _____

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

*Driver, C. N.* *Cancelled 3/29/66*

*3/29/66 PAA*

Via	Flight	Date	From	To	EDT ETA
<del>PA</del>	<del>845F</del>	<del>07 APR</del>	<del>LAX</del>	<del>TWO</del>	<del>1445 1940</del>
<del>CT</del>	<del>33F</del>	<del>109- APR</del>	<del>TWO</del>	<del>TRE</del>	<del>1420 1830</del>
<del>CT</del>	<del>F-OPEN</del>	<del></del>	<del>TRE</del>	<del>BKK</del>	<del>OPEN</del>

*Hotel OKURAF*

*PAA-7039*

Departure from *Los Angeles*

### REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: C. N. DRIVER DEPT. RPA No. FD-RPA-66-411  
 (IN ENGLISH) (IN CHINESE) AUG. 12. 1966  
 PAYROLL No. 0P5P6 PND REF. No. PND-WA-AM-16-NE-0015  
 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED To be inserted by PND  
 (FOR SEPARATION, EFFECTIVE DATE IS LAST WORKING DAY "COB".)  
 ACTUAL EFFECTIVE DATE 15 May 1966 JUN 14 1966  
 (TO BE FILLED BY PERSONNEL DIVISION)

- TO:  PAYROLL - TPE VIA D/GAD  
 PAYROLL - TPE VIA D/GAD & STAT  
 PAYROLL - TPE VIA D/MBAD  
 PAYROLL - TPE VIA B/GAD  
 RAS/SEA - BKK VIA D/GAD & PAYROLL - TPE

PROPOSED ACTION:  NEW APPOINTMENT  CHANGE IN POSITION/SALARY  SEPARATION  (OTHER) PAA

**CONFIDENTIAL**

	PRESENT STATUS	PROPOSED STATUS
TITLE & ACCOUNTING CODE NO.	APPLICANT	First Officer
SALARY - GRADE, STEP & PAY STANDARD		FP/FS Rev. 18 Code "F" + PA/A
EMPLOYMENT STATUS - PERMANENT, TEMPORARY OR FIXED TERM		Permanent
DEPARTMENT/DIVISION/OFFICE		Flying Division/Operations
LOCATION		P/A - VTE
CLASSIFICATION - STAFF EMPLOYEE OR WORKER		Staff employee
POSITION NUMBER		
REMARKS		

AS STIPULATED UNDER JOB CLASSIFICATIONS IN PERSONNEL MANUAL.  
 IBM ENTERED *FD* APPROVED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: 5/27/66  
 PD-09 R15 DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

## MEMORANDUM

TO : MFD/L via BMVTE.  
FROM : DFD  
SUBJECT : C. N. Driver

DATE: 6 Nov. 1969

REF. No. FD-69-517-SE28/70

A review of Mr. C. N. Driver's flying file indicates he accomplished a satisfactory upgrade flight check 19 September 1969 and received an unsatisfactory grade on two subsequent Route/Line checks.

Mr. C. N. Driver is to remain as First Officer until 28 February 1970. During this period, MFD/L is to assure that Mr. Driver receives counsel concerning his unsatisfactory performance. It is requested that he receive not only on-the-line training and documented evaluations from the Captains with whom he flies, but also synthetic instrument training in excess of that normally required.

MFD/L may recommend upgrading at any time he determines Mr. Driver meets the standard of performance required of a pilot-in-command but is required to furnish DFD with an evaluation and recommendation not later than 28 Feb. 1970.

MFD/L is to furnish evidence to DFD that Mr. Driver is aware of the general contents of this memo not later than 20 November 1969.

*Original signed by*

cc: C. N. Driver 'P' file VTE  
C. N. Driver 'P' file TPE  
File

GVC/pw

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

FORM 11-72 3013 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

35-1

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION		CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY	
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED		<b>SECRET</b> (When Filled In)		1	5
ADVANCE COPY <input type="checkbox"/> ISSUED <input type="checkbox"/> SLOTTED				2	6
BY: _____ AT: _____ Z				3	7
DISSEM BY <u>9</u> PER <u>H</u>				4	8
ACTION UNIT		REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED		069	
INFO FILE. VR.		INDEX: <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO			
ACTION NO.		CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. _____			
		X-REF TO CS FILE NO. _____			
		<input type="checkbox"/> FILE RID <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN TO _____		BRANCH	
				<b>SERVICE</b>	
SAIGON _____		14 JAN 75		464890 A	
STA & NR		DATE		IN NR	

PLEASE CORRECT THE GARBLED PORTION(S) OF THIS MESSAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

PTN PARA 1A(1ST SUBPARA) TO READ:

"ACROSS A DEPRESSION OF SOME 500 TO 600 FEET BEFORE IMPACTING AGAIN"

PARA 1A (LAST SUBPARA) TO READ:

"WATER IS PLENTIFUL BECAUSE OF SEASONAL MONSOONS, WHICH ALSO ACCOUNTS"

**SECRET**

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

COMMENTS  
DRIVER

On the leg from L08 to L22 Capt. Driver let down over Skyline from 9000 ft. to 7000 ft on a heading of 040° varying to 060° through broken clouds. This track brought us very close to a 6988 ft. peak.

The traffic pattern at L22 was normal, however, the final approach was two high and too fast. About 200 feet from the ground I had to take over the aircraft and make the landing.

*MFD was on board this flight*

*Swelwick 125*

C06117083  
APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

281

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY			
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	<del>SECRET</del> (When Filled In)		1		5	
ADVANCE COPY <input type="checkbox"/> ISSUED <input type="checkbox"/> SLOTTED	REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED		2		6	
BY: _____ AT: _____ Z	INDEX: <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		3		7	
DISSEM BY <u>M</u> PER <u>H</u>	CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. _____		4		8	
	X-REF TO CS FILE NO. _____		#143			
	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE RID <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN TO _____		BRANCH			

ACTION NO.	INFO	FILE. VR.	<u>SECRET</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>
------------	------	-----------	---------------	----------------

NHA TRANG 27546  
STA & NR

7 JANUARY 75  
DATE

458042 A  
IN NR

PLEASE CORRECT THE GARBLED PORTION(S) OF THIS MESSAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

PORTION PARA 1 READS:

"7 JAN ABORTED AT 1430 (L) DUE CLOUD COVER"

~~SECRET~~

<b>U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR</b> EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION		<b>OFFICIAL SUPERIOR'S</b> <b>REPORT OF EMPLOYEE'S DEATH</b>		
1. NAME OF DECEASED EMPLOYEE, (Last, first, middle) RAWLINGS, James A.		2. DATE OF BIRTH (Mo., day, year) 11-3-36	3. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MALE <input type="checkbox"/> FEMALE	4. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER _____
5. DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY		6. BUREAU OR OFFICE		
7. NAME AND ADDRESS OF REPORTING OFFICE			8. NAME AND OFFICE PHONE NO. OF EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL SUPERIOR	
9. DATE AND HOUR OF INJURY (Mo., day, year) AM <input type="checkbox"/> 1-3-75 MIA PM <input type="checkbox"/>	10. DATE AND HOUR OF DEATH (Mo., day, year) AM <input type="checkbox"/> Declared Legally deceased 1-3-76 PM <input type="checkbox"/>	11. DATE AND HOUR EMPLOYEE'S PAY STOPPED (Mo., day, year) AM <input type="checkbox"/> 1-3-76 PM <input type="checkbox"/>		
12. DESCRIBE HOW INJURY OCCURRED Employee was a passenger in an airplane which crashed on 1-3-75. Has been missing in action since that date. Was declared legally dead 1-3-76.		13. WAS EMPLOYEE IN PERFORMANCE OF DUTY WHEN INJURY OCCURRED? IF NO, EXPLAIN <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		
14. LOCATION WHERE INJURY OCCURRED Vietnam	15. LOCATION WHERE DEATH OCCURRED Vietnam	16. IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF DEATH (Attach medical and autopsy reports if available) Plane crash		
17. EMPLOYEE'S PAY RATE AS OF: A. DATE OF INJURY: 1/3/75 B. DATE STOPPED WORK: 1/3/76 (Pay stopped)	a. BASE PAY \$16,001 per yr \$16800 per yr	Sep. maint. b. SUBSISTENCE \$3690 per yr \$3690 per yr	c. QUARTERS \$2808 per yr \$2808 per yr	Post dif. 25% d. OTHER Pre Pay \$6400 per yr \$6920 per yr
18. DID EMPLOYEE WORK IN THE POSITION HELD AT THE TIME OF INJURY FOR A FULL ELEVEN MONTHS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE INJURY? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		19. IF ANSWER TO 18 IS NO, WOULD THE POSITION HAVE AFFORDED EMPLOYMENT FOR ELEVEN MONTHS EXCEPT FOR THE INJURY? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		
20. IF EMPLOYEE WAS ENROLLED IN A HEALTH BENEFIT PLAN FOR SELF AND FAMILY, SHOW HBS CODE NUMBER: 422	21. SHOW DATE THROUGH WHICH HBS DEDUCTIONS WERE LAST MADE. (Mo., day, year) 12/28/75-1/3/76	22. IF EMPLOYEE RECEIVED MEDICAL CARE PRIOR TO DEATH, GIVE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ATTENDING PHYSICIAN NA		
23. IF INJURY WAS CAUSED BY A THIRD PARTY, GIVE NAME AND ADDRESS OF THIRD PARTY	24. GIVE NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE ATTORNEY REPRESENTING THE SURVIVORS IF LEGAL ACTION IS INSTITUTED AGAINST THE THIRD PARTY	25. SHOW AMOUNT OF THIRD PARTY RECOVERY, IF ANY \$		
26. IF EMPLOYEE WAS A MEMBER OF THE ARMED SERVICES OF THE UNITED STATES, SHOW: BRANCH OF SERVICE: SERIAL NO. (if known) NA		27. HAS A CLAIM FOR SURVIVOR'S BENEFIT BEEN FILED WITH THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION? NA <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		
28. NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYEE'S SPOUSE OR NEXT OF KIN (Show relationship, if other than spouse)				
30. TITLE Personnel Officer		31. DATE (Mo., day, year) January 30, 1976		

APPROVED FOR  
 RELEASE DATE:  
 09-Dec-2013

~~SECRET~~

(b)(3)

95-593

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

5 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Missing Person Status--Mr, James A. Rawlings

REFERENCE :

1. Mr. James A. Rawlings, a Logistics Officer assigned to the Nha Trang Base, Vietnam Station, was a passenger on a C-123 cargo plane which disappeared on 3 January 1975 while enroute from Dalat to Nha Trang, South Vietnam. Based upon a computation of flight time with fuel on board, the aircraft was technically considered down at 1900 hours, local time, 3 January 1975.

2. An intensive search and rescue effort followed the disappearance of this aircraft. Bad weather and clouds were a constant problem in the search; however, a recent crash site in the area was identified on 8 January 1975. This area was studied and photographed from the air and the following is extracted from Saigon , dated 14 January 1975:

Interviews with the pilots, co-pilots and observers on the two Air America helicopters that hovered over the crash site plus examination . . . of photographs by a trained PI indicate that the crash is a recent one . . . and that it is a C-123 aircraft. . . . While it is not possible to positively identify the downed aircraft as the missing C-123/ST-1, there have been no reports of any recent plane crashes in the area. The crash site is approximately two kms south of the expected flight path of the missing C-123.

Although there has not been a positive identification of the plane to date, most observers are convinced that this crash site is the location of the C-123 on which Mr. Rawlings was a passenger. There appears to be no chance that anyone could have

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

survived the crash. A joint recovery mission has been planned but arrangements require considerable coordination, and numerous delays have been encountered. It is hoped that the mission can be carried through in the near future.

3. In view of the information outlined above, it is requested that Mr. James A. Rawlings be officially designated a missing person effective 1900 hours, Nha Trang local time, 3 January 1975. It is further requested that all pay, allowances, and allotments of Mr. Rawlings be continued for the duration of his missing status.

[Redacted Signature]

Chief, East Asia Division

CONCUR:

[Redacted Signature]

Acting Chief, Career  
05 MAR 1975  
Element Group

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

[Redacted Line]

Distribution:

Orig & 1  
2  
2  
2  
2

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Scheduled Work Week for Nha Trang Base  
Employees of Vietnam Station

This is to certify that all Agency employees (both staff and full-time contract) assigned to Nha Trang Base, were working a regularly scheduled 44 hour work week and receiving 15% premium pay for unscheduled overtime beyond 44 hours. The four hours (41st-44th hours) were scheduled as a half work day on Saturday each week. Those employees who were GS-11 and below had the option of receiving overtime pay or compensatory time for the four hours per week. Those employees GS-12 through GS-14 were only authorized compensatory time in keeping with [redacted].

This combination of a regularly scheduled 44 hour work week and premium pay was standard for all non-Saigon based personnel of Vietnam Station.

[redacted signature box]

Former Support Officer  
Nha Trang Base

*Rawlins file  
COPY TO  
C/BSD -*


APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

MISSING PERSONS COMMITTEE

MEETING : 7 January 1976  
5E 62, Headquarters  
3:00 p.m.

SUBJECT : JAMES A. RAWLINGS

ATTENDEES: Personnel -  
EA -  
CCS -  
CI -  
Security -  
OGC -  
OMS -  
Logistics -  
Finance -



APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

75-2021

PERMS 75-2912

20 DEC 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

VIA : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Request for Formal Determination of Presumptive  
Death - Mr. James A. Rawlings

1. Mr. James A. Rawlings, Logistics Officer assigned to Nha Trang, was directed to go to Dalat on [REDACTED] 2 January 1975 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In this connection Mr. Rawlings was a passenger aboard a C-123K (tail number ST-1) on 3 January when it made its last trip, Dalat to Nha Trang, backhauling office furniture and equipment. Radio contact was made with the aircraft upon its departure from Dalat, at 1525 local time (L); at that time the pilot confirmed there were nine persons on board. (Note: The Support Officer, Nha Trang, in telephone conversation with Mr. Rawlings at approximately 1400L was advised that a party of six--himself, a Filipino assistant and four local Vietnamese employees--would be accompanying the flight to Nha Trang. These six, plus the known crew of three China Air Lines personnel, account for the nine persons reported to be on board.) The flight was considered overdue at 1630L and a Search and Rescue (SAR) effort was launched shortly thereafter. The aircraft was technically considered down at 1900L considering fuel on board.

2. Airborne SAR continued during daylight hours from 3 to 8 January when a crash site was sighted at 1505L on 8 January. The crash site was located at 3,700 feet on the side of a 5,100 foot mountain (coordinate BP755440) approximately 15 miles from Nha Trang, some 2 km south of a straight flight-path projection between Dalat and Nha Trang. Photographs taken of the crash site, evaluated by an Agency photo interpreter in Saigon, concluded that the crash was recent and was indeed that of a C-123K aircraft. There were no C-123K's operational in Vietnam at the time of the accident other than ST-1.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. Based on experienced observers who flew over and orbited the crash site (Air America pilots and Joint Casualty Resolution Center {JCRC} personnel) as well as an evaluation of photos of the crash by Saigon Air Branch, the chances of there being survivors of the incident were considered virtually non-existent. It was considered that the force of impact would have been fatal to any passenger judging from the condition and size of individual pieces of aircraft debris. In addition to the SAR, all other efforts to ascertain the fate of the passengers failed to produce hard evidence that there were any survivors.

4. Inclement weather, the element which is considered to be a primary cause of the accident, also dominated the search and recovery efforts. A total in excess of 73 hours was spent in airborne SAR between 3 and 10 January, and again on 16 January, by Air America aircraft and 15-1/2 hours by VNAF aircraft. Recovery plans were formulated, which of necessity required coordination with several elements of the Vietnamese military, JCRC, both within country as well as its command structure in Thailand and Washington, the Consul General of MR II, Saigon Embassy and Air America. Due to the widely held opinion that there were no survivors, the recovery plans were understandably cautious. Once a coordinated plan was agreed upon and the risk element was considered sufficiently low enough to warrant putting a recovery team in at the crash site, the general military situation was in a state of drastic deterioration for the GVN. The ARVN and Regional Force elements which had been designated to secure the area around the crash site were recommitted to higher priority military objectives. By 10 March, it became apparent that it was not realistic to plan for recovery until the military emergency could be brought under an acceptable degree of control. As the military emergency was not stemmed, a recovery team was never able to get to the crash site.

5. Accordingly, based on the reporting by responsible Agency personnel from the field and the preponderance of evidence that there were no survivors, it is requested that

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

an official determination of presumptive death of Mr. James A. Rawlings be rendered to be effective 3 January 1976.

[Redacted Signature]

Chief, East Asia Division

CONCUR:

*for*

[Redacted Signature]

Deputy Director for Operations.

24 DEC 1975

Date

APPROVED:

Director of Personnel

Date

[Redacted Signature]

Distribution:

- Orig & 1
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[Redacted Distribution Box]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

□ (b)(3)

~~SECRET~~

PERS

76-098

14 JAN 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : RAWLINGS, James A. - Review and  
Recommendations Regarding Missing  
Person Status

1. Mr. James A. Rawlings was a passenger on a C-123 cargo plane which disappeared on 3 January 1975 while enroute from Dalat to Nha Trang, South Vietnam. As a result of your review of the circumstances, he was placed in a missing status under the provisions of the Missing Persons Act.

2. In accordance with [ ] a review is required to determine if Mr. Rawlings' should be continued in a missing status beyond the initial 12-month period. On 17 December 1975 I met with [ ] of EA Division to discuss the current status of this case and further action that would be required. It was agreed that EA Division would prepare a summary of all significant information and that their recommendations would be considered by the Ad Hoc Committee on Missing Persons at a meeting in early January 1976.

3. Our Committee met on 7 January 1976. Attached are the minutes of the Committee meeting (Tab A) and the EA request for formal determination of presumptive death (Tab B). It is the unanimous recommendation of our Committee that Mr. James A. Rawlings be declared presumptively dead as of 3 January 1976.

4. Attached for your signature is a memorandum to the Director of Finance (Tab C) which will be required to terminate pay and allowances for Mr. Rawlings in the event that you make a determination of presumptive death.

[ ]

[ ]

Deputy Director of Personnel

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

BSD RAWLINGS  
FILE  
EF

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
	UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
<b>OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP</b>			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	
1	DD/Pers	9 FEB 1976	
2	DD/Pers	9 FEB 1976	
3	D/Pers	76 13 FEB 1976	
4	B/Log	12 FEB 1976	
5	<del>DD/Pers</del>	2/13	
6	<del>DD/Pers</del>		
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
<b>Remarks:</b>			
<p>2- Re: <u>Retrospective</u> <u>Promotion of</u> <u>Rawlings</u></p> <p>I believe we should approve this, but you may want OGC concurrence. <u>Do what is necessary re OGC</u></p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
C/BSD			2/9/76
	UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

← OGC  
OK by

FORM NO. 237  
1-67

Use previous editions

GPO : 1974 O - 535-857

(40)

NOTE 2/13

Asked EAPers to prepare  
promotion letter.



APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

12 FEB 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Promotion of James A. Rawlings

1. Mr. James A. Rawlings was placed in a missing status on 3 January 1975 and subsequently declared presumptively dead by the Agency effective 3 January 1976. A review of the case revealed that Mr. Rawlings was not competitively evaluated for promotion by the Logistics Career Service during this period. It was believed that his missing status precluded promotion consideration.

2. Agency regulation [redacted] requires the competitive promotion evaluation of personnel in grades GS-09 through GS-14 must be accomplished at least annually. In addition, the DDA Personnel Management Handbook provides for the competitive evaluation of all professional GS careerists in grades GS-07 through GS-15 at least once a year. There is precedent in the Agency for the promotion consideration of employees who are in military service or are prisoners of war.

3. The Logistics Career Service conducted its last competitive review of GS-10 personnel during September 1975. Recognizing that the failure to evaluate Mr. Rawlings at that time was an administrative error, a review was made on 4 February 1976 to determine if he would have been promoted had he been ranked. It was the conclusion of the Head of Logistics Career Service that Mr. Rawlings would have ranked sufficiently high in September 1975 for promotion and that he would have been promoted to GS-11 effective 9 November 1975 along with other careerists selected for promotion at that time.

4. In view of the information presented above and the administrative error which took place relative to his competitive evaluation and promotion, it is agreed that the grade and salary of Mr. James A. Rawlings should be adjusted retroactively to reflect his promotion to GS-11 effective 9 November 1975.

T - [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted]

Director of Logistics

[redacted]

Director of Personnel

[redacted]

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

~~ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

4 FEB 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : James A. Rawlings

Mr. Rawlings was not competitively evaluated during Logistics' September 1975 exercise. We have now reviewed his record and have concluded that if he had been ranked, he would have been promoted from GS-10 to GS-11 effective 9 November 1975.



Director of Logistics

~~ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

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APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

~~SECRET~~

PREPARED FEB 76  
NOT USED  
EJ

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Promotion of Mr. James A. Rawlings

1. Mr. James A. Rawlings was placed in a missing status on 3 January 1975 and subsequently declared presumptively dead by the Agency effective 3 January, 1976. It has come to my attention that Mr. Rawlings was not competitively evaluated for promotion by the Logistics Career Service during this period as is required under these circumstances. He was promoted to his present grade, GS-10, in October 1974.

2. I contacted Logistics Personnel and asked that a determination be made as to whether Mr. Rawlings would have been promoted if he had been ranked. [redacted] arranged for an appropriate review and advised me that it is the conclusion of the Logistics Career Service that Mr. Rawlings should have been promoted from GS-10 to GS-11 effective 9 November 1975. This is the date that other competitive promotions to GS-11 were made by Logistics.

3. It is requested that the promotion of Mr. James A. Rawlings from GS-10 to GS-11 effective 9 November 1975 be approved.

[redacted signature box]

Chief, Benefits and Services Division

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

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~~SECRET~~

[redacted box]

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

# OUTGOING MESSAGE

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
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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF



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CITE  
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

652628

INDEX DISSEM BY: 49  
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TO: SAIGON.4

*Eyes only*

*1-Word*

REF: NHA TRANG



1. APPRECIATE COMPLEXITY AND EXTENSIVE COORDINATIONS

NECESSARY TO MOUNT THE OPERATION TO RECOVER MR. JAMES RAWLINGS AND OTHER PERSONNEL ON THE CRASHED C-123 AIRCRAFT. APPRECIATE EVERYONE'S CONCERN THAT ADDITIONAL HUMAN LIFE NOT BE JEOPARDIZED UNDULY OR LOST DURING RECOVERY EFFORTS. OUR DAILY CONTACT WITH MR. RAWLINGS' WIFE IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY DELICATE AS WE ENTER THE SECOND MONTH OF HIS BEING MISSING. SHE FEELS AN OBLIGATION TO HER HUSBAND AND HAS CONSIDERED CALLING THE DIRECTOR TO SEEK HIS ASSISTANCE IN SEEING THAT EVERYTHING POSSIBLE IS BEING DONE TO EXPEDITE RECOVERY MISSION, ~~REDACTED~~ SO FAR, SHE HAS ACCEPTED OUR COUNSEL AND IS PATIENTLY FOLLOWING RECOVERY EFFORTS. PLEASE DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO MOUNT RECOVERY MISSION PROMPTLY WITH DUE CONSIDERATION OF ALL FACTORS AND CONTINUE TO PROVIDE US WITH SUFFICIENT REPORTING SO THAT WE CAN DO OUR BEST MAINTAINING MRS. RAWLINGS' AND HER FAMILY'S MORALE.4

DATE:  
 ORIG:  
 UNIT:  
 EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

# OUTGOING MESSAGE

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CLASSIFICATION

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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

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STAFF

DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO: FILE

652628

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- IF FILES #

2. MRS. RAWLINGS IS NOW FOCUSING ON THE POSSIBILITY OF THE RECOVERY MISSION BEING COMPLETED BEFORE TET. WE WILL WANT TO LET HER DOWN EASILY IF THE MISSION IS GOING TO BE DELAYED UNTIL AFTER TET. ON THE BASIS OF YOUR REPORTING, WE WILL TRY TO PREPARE MRS. RAWLINGS IN ADVANCE FOR ANY DISAPPOINTMENTS THAT CAN BE ANTICIPATED.

3. WE DISCUSSED THE ABOVE SITUATION WITH [REDACTED] 31 JANUARY. HE HAS A COMPLETE APPRECIATION FOR THE CONSIDERATIONS ON THIS END AND INSURED US THAT HE WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE AT THAT END. E2 IMPDET.H

COORD: C/EA/VN [REDACTED]

DATE: 5 FEB 75

ORIG: [REDACTED] MEL

UNIT: CEA/SS

EXT: 1759

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] CEA

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] CEA/SS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

MEMORANDUM

RECEIVED

18 MAY 1974

DIRA

(b)(6)


*Salvage*  
*Review for*  
*files, also mentioned*  
*that for me.*

TO : MA&IR/UTH via BMVTE  
FROM : AM-A-VTE  
SUBJECT : R/Files - Missing Employees  
REFERENCE: FOVTE-74-RA-66

DATE : 15 May 1974  
REF. No. FOVTE-74-779

Enclosed are R/Files of the below named employees to be administratively transferred VTE/UTH effective 30 May 1974 per above referenced RPA's.

- |                   |       |                     |
|-------------------|-------|---------------------|
| 1. Ackley, J.H.   | 06501 | Captain             |
| 2. Boyles, H.H.   | 04317 | Captain             |
| 3. Cavill, J.W.   | 09235 | First Officer       |
| 4. Driver, C.N.   | 07740 | First Officer       |
| 5. Ritter, G.L.   | 06597 | Captain             |
| 6. Townley, R.F.  | 09246 | First Officer       |
| 7. De Bruin, E.H. | 04999 | A/F Specialist      |
| 8. [Redacted]     |       | Flt. Radio Operator |
| 9. [Redacted]     |       | A/F Dispatcher      |
| 10. [Redacted]    |       | Sr. A/F Dispatcher  |
| 11. [Redacted]    |       | A/F Dispatcher      |
| 12. [Redacted]    |       | A/F Dispatcher      |



cc: DIRA-BKK  
R/File  
File

**PERSONNEL DIVISION  
ADVANCE NOTICE OF PERSONNEL ACTION**

DATE **15 March 1973**  
REF. No. **PND-MEA/73-0771**

TO: THOSE CHECKED ON DISTRIBUTION  
PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL ACTION IS BEING PROCESSED BY THE PERSONNEL DIVISION.

NAME	TITLE AND DEPT/DIV/OFFICE	LOC.	CODE	EFFECTIVE DATE RECOMMENDED	REMARKS
✓ C. N. Driver	F/O, FD	VTE	N/A	7 March 1973	Missing
J. H. Ackley	Captain, FD	VTE	N/A	7 March 1973	Missing

CODE: A - SEPARATION      C - M/S LWOP      E - ANNUAL VACATION/HOME LEAVE      G - TRANSFER (PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION)  
B - LWOP      D - ANNUAL LEAVE      F - EXTENDED SICK LEAVE

DISTRIBUTION: (CHECK THOSE APPLICABLE PER CHECK LIST ON REVERSE SIDE)

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> T/C'S OFFICE - TPE   | <input type="checkbox"/> EMPLOYMENT MANAGER, TPE                       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> ASSISTANT TREASURER, TPE   | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, TPE          |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CHIEF ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE - TPE                       | <input type="checkbox"/> DIRECTOR COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION TPE          |
| <input type="checkbox"/> DIRECTOR, MAINTENANCE ACCOUNTING DIVISION, TNN                   | <input type="checkbox"/> SUPPLY SUPERVISOR, TPE                        |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CHIEF, PAYROLL, TPE                                   | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CHIEF, MEDICAL DEPARTMENT, TPE     |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CHIEF, PAYROLL.HKG VIA MGR ACCTG HKG                  | <input type="checkbox"/> GROUND TRANSPORTATION DIVISION, TPE/TNN       |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ACCOUNTING SUPERVISOR OF BASE/STATION ( VTE )         | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> STATION MANAGER/MANAGER AAL, HKG   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> INTERNAL AUDITOR, TPE  | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> P/FILE VIA MANAGER R/S AND W/A TPE |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SECRETARY, LEGAL COUNSEL, TPE <b>RBS via CPRL TPE</b> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OTHER <b>MESB</b>                  |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PERSONNEL MANAGER/REPRESENTATIVE ( VTE )              |  |

SIGNED \_\_\_\_\_ TITLE **MEA**

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

Ref: VIE-RA-73-032

COCKPIT CREW/UNASSIGNED: (Cont'd)

<u>Employee Nr.</u>	<u>Name</u>		<u>Position Nr.</u>	<u>Title</u>	
04317	Bovles, H.H.	A	04290	Captain	- Missing
		A	04736	Captain	- Medical
09235	Cavill, J.W.	A	07369	First Officer	- Missing
		A	08278	First Officer	- Medical
07746	Driver, G.N.	A	08016	First Officer	- Missing
		A	04709	Instructor Pilot	- LWOP
		A	04749	First Officer	- Medical
		A	00703	First Officer	- Medical
06597	Ritter, G.L.	A	08015	First Officer	- LWOP
		A	05503	Captain	- Missing
		A	04318	Instructor Pilot	- LWOP
09246	Townley, R.F.	A	07344	First Officer	- Missing
		A	05406	Instructor Pilot	- Medical
		A	04806	Captain	- LWOP

APPROVED FOR  
 RELEASE DATE:  
 09-Dec-2013



APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

- 2 -

MISSING PERSONNEL

<u>Emp. No.</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Pay Standard</u>	<u>Pos. No.</u>
06501	Ackley, J. H.	Capt.	PS-K	08019
04317	Boyles, H. H.	Capt.	PS-K	04290
09235	Cavill, J. W.	FO	PS-K	07369
15634	[REDACTED]	Sr. AFD	PS-K	
04999	De Bruin, E. H.	AFS	PS-K	04686
07740	✓ Driver; C. N.	FO	PS-K	08016
21512	[REDACTED]	AFD	PS-K	12625
04857	[REDACTED]	AFD	PS-K	12628
06597	Ritter, G. L.	Capt.	PS-K	05503
	[REDACTED]	AFD	PS-K	
05172	[REDACTED]	Flt. Radio Opr.	PS-B	04827
09246	Townley, R. F.	FO	PS-K	07344

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013


Clarence Nesbit Driver



(b)(6)

(Missing as of 8 March 1973)

General Information

Birth Date	7 March 1922
Birth Place	Phoenix, Arizona
Height : 5' 8"	Weight: 190 lbs.
Hair : Grey-Black	Eyes : Brown
Complexion	Dark
Nationality	USA
Citizenship	USA
Job Title	First Officer (AAM)
SSN	

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

APD 96237

*P. Ziles*

Ref. Nr. VPNTD-L73-2359

21 November 1973

*MMK*

Headquarters JCRC  
APO 96310

Attn:

Dear Sir:

In accordance with your telephone request of 19 November, personal information concerning missing Air America crew members is forwarded herewith.

The attached data pertains to:

Captain J. H. Ackley  
and  
First Officer C. N. Driver

Both of the above were crew members of C-123K, 55-4524, which disappeared on 7 March 1973 while on a cargo flight in Laos. The exact location of the crash site has not been confirmed; however, wreckage was sighted at coordinates QB 2398 and tentative identification was made by an airborne observer based on the reading of the figure "4" on a portion of what appeared to be an aircraft's tail at that wreckage site. No photograph of the crash site is available and there has been no ground party into the site to provide positive identification.

Sincerely,

AIR AMERICA, INC.

Original Signed by

Vice President  
Northern Thailand Division

*JH*

bcc: PRES-AAM WAS  
VPIR-OSG BKK  
EM-VTE  
MFC via DO  
MPA&IR  
File

*SVP-OCIA*

~~SECRET~~ 190942Z JAN 75  
FROM NHA TRANG  
TO: IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON SAIGON.

TIME OF REPORT 1800 (L) 19 JANUARY 1975

RECOVER

1. [REDACTED], JCRC FIELD TEAM LEADER, MADE SUCCESSFUL RECON OF CRASH SITE MORNING OF 19 JAN. WAS OVER SITE APPROX ONE HOUR AND SAYS HE HAS ALL THE INFO HE NEEDS TO PLAN MISSION.
2. [REDACTED] IS CONFIDENT CRASH IS RECENT ONE AND PROBABLY A C-123 AIRCRAFT. FROM DEBRIS HE ABLE OBSERVE THINKS BOTTOM OF PLANE TORN OPEN AT POINT OF FIRST IMPACT AND THAT IT THEN BEGAN TO DISINTEGRATE, SPREADING PARTS ALONG WAY TO FINAL IMPACT AREA, APPROX 600 FT AWAY. SINCE ONLY AREA HE WOULD FIND TO LAND JCRC TEAM IS A FINAL IMPACT POINT HE WILL HAVE TO WORK HIS WAY BACK ALONG CRASH PATH TO RECOVER IDENTIFIABLE OBJECTS. GIVEN DIFFICULT TERRAIN AND DISTANCE INVOLVED HE ESTIMATES THIS AS ALL DAY JOB.

TRY TO EFFECT A RECOVERY. (I WOULD NOTE THAT IT IS A DISCIPLINED STAFF WHICH WILL ACCEPT A NEGATIVE DECISION IF THE REAYONS ARE EXPLAINED TO THEM).

I HAVE CONSIDERED WHETHER DELAY MIGHT BE ADVISABLE, SINCE IT IS VIRTUALLY CERTAIN THAT THERE ARE NO SURVIVORS AND THE AREA MIGHT BE MORE SECURE AT SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE. I DO NOT BELIEVE THIS IS A LIKELY POSSIBILITY IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

ONE MORE FACTOR YOU SHOULD CONSIDER IS THAT IF WE GO AHEAD ON THIS OPERATION IN THE FACE OF THE RISKS INVOLVED, IT COULD INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON YOU TO APPROVE MORE RISKY JCRC CASES.

HAVING WEIGHED ALL THE CONSIDERATIONS DISCUSSED ABOVE, I BELIEVE THAT THE RISKS INVOLVED ARE SUFFICIENTLY SMALL AND THE REASONS FOR ACCEPTING THEM SUFFICIENHLY COMPELLING THAT I RECOMMEND THAT YOU APPROVE A RECOVERY EFFORT. I WILL REVIEW THE RECOVERY PLAN IN DETAIL AND AM PREPARED TO RESUBMIT IT TO YOU IF OTHER ELEMENTS OF RISK EMERGE FROM THIS REVIEW."

3. AMBASSADOR HAS APPROVED NHA TRANG CONGEN RECOMMENDATION FOR USE OF JCRC IN RECOVERY OF REMAINS OF CRASH VICTIHS. ACTION NOW IN PROGRESS ON PLANNING TO IMPLEMENT AMBASSADOR'S DECISION. WE WILL CONTINUE TO REPORT AS SITUATION DEVELOPS.

~~SECRET~~

RECOVERY PARTY. THE PRESENCE OF HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS AND/OR AN RF SECURITY FORCE WOULD PROBABLY DETER THIS, BUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A FIRE-FIGHT CANNOT BE FULLY RULED OUT. THE PRESENCE OF SEARCH AIRCRAFT AROUND THE SITE MAY HAVE ALERTED THE VC, BUT FINDING IT FROM THE GROUND WILL BE DIFFICULT THROUGH THE HEAVY JUNGLE. BECAUSE THE WRECKAGE IS OFF THE BEATEN TRACK, GVN FORCES WOULD POSE NO THREAT TO VC OPERATING AREAS. HAVING SAID ALL THIS, THE ELEMENT OF RISK IS PRESENT.

IN FAVOR OF CARRYING OUT A RECOVERY EFFORT THROUGH HELICOPTER INSERTION (INVOLVING A JCRC JOLLY GREEN CHOPPER AND POSSIBLY U.S. JCRC EXPERTS) GUARDED BY GUNSHIPS ARE THE FOLLOWING POINTS. THIS TYPE OF OPERATION WOULD HAVE AN ELEMENT OF SURPRISE THAT COULD REDUCE THE CHANCE OF HOSTILE ACTION AND CAREFUL PLANNING MIGHT REDUCE IT FURTHER. THE NATURE OF THE SITE IS SUCH AS TO PREVENT ANYTHING BUT SMALL ARMS FIRE FROM DIRECTLY AT THE SITE. THE GUNSHIPS WOULD DETER THIS. ONE ARGUMENT THAT WEIGHS HEAVILY IN MY JUDGMENT IS THAT THIS IS A RECENT LOSS WHICH HAS HIT THIS SMALL STAFF HARD. THEIR DEDICATION IN MANNING SEARCH FLIGHTS IN BAD WEATHER IS EVIDENCE OF THE STRENGTH OF THEIR FEELINGS ABOUT THIS LOSS. I THEREFORE FEEL WE SHOULD DE EVERYTHING WE PRUDENTLY CAN TO

~~SECRET~~

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF NHA TRANG CON-GEN MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR  
DATED 13 JAN 75:

"I BELIEVE WE SHOULD APPLY THE SAME CRITERIA TO THIS RECOVERY  
OPERATION THAT WE DO TO JCRC ACTIVITIES, I.E. THAT WE WILL NOT TAKE  
UNNECESSARY RISKS THAT LIVES (EITHER AMERICAN OR VIETNAMESE) WILL BE  
LOST TO RECOVER BODIES.

ARGUING AGAINST A RECOVERY OPERATION ARE THE FOLLOWING FACTORS.  
THE CRASH SITE IS IN AN AREA IN WHICH THERE ARE KNOWN SMALL VC ARMED  
FORCES AND IT IS POSSIBLE THEY MIGHT SEEK TO SET AN AMBUSH FOR THE

~~SECRET~~

(2) VNAF

DATE	AIRCRAFT	HOURS
4-6 JAN	HELICOPTER	9 PLUS 30
	L-19	6 PLUS 00
	TOTAL GUV	15 PLUS 30

## F. SAR PROBLEMS:

SEARCH AND RESCUE EFFORTS HAVE SERIOUSLY BEEN HAMPERED BY WEATHER. ORIGINAL SEARCH AND RESCUE EFFORTS WERE LAUNCHED AT DAY-LIGHT ON 4 JANUARY. BEEPER SIGNALS WERE PICKED UP ON 4 JAN SOUTH OF NHA TRANG AND APPROXIMATELY 4 HOURS OF HELICOPTER TIME WAS EXPENDED WITHOUT LOCATING THE BEEPER. ON 4 JANUARY LOCAL VIETNAMESE SOURCES PASSED INFO TO NHA TRANG THAT MILITARY AIRCRAFT WAS DOWN IN THE VICINITY OF SONG MAO. WRECKAGE WAS NEVER LOCATED. ESTIMATE 3 HOURS OF HELICOPTER AND VOLPAR TIME EXPENDED IN THIS ACTION. DURING THIS TIME ADDITIONAL SEARCH ACTIVITIES CONTINUED ON ROUTE OF FLIGHT OF C-123 (ST/1); SECURITY OF AREA MBEEN A DELAYING FACTOR. WRECKAGE OF VNAF C-123 LOCATED AT BP 9745 SLOWED DOWN SEARCH SINCE IT BELIEVED C-123 ST/1 HAD BEEN FOUND. UPON FURTHER EXAMINATION THIS WAS FOUND TO BE IN ERROR.

## G. COORDINATION

: ALL REPORTING AND SAR EFFORTS HAVE BEEN CLOSELY COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY AND NHA TRANG CONGEN.

~~SECRET~~



## E. AIRCRAFT USED TO DATE IN SAR:

## (1) AIR AMERICA

DATE	AIRCRAFT	HOURS
3 JAN	HELICOPTER	1 PLUS 00 ✓
4 JAN	HELICOPTER	13 PLUS 15 ✓
4 JAN	VOLPAR	9 PLUS 40 ✓
5 JAN	HELICOPTER	6 PLUS 30 ✓
6 JAN	HELICOPTER	4 PLUS 20 ✓
6 JAN	VOLPAR	2 PLUS 55 ✓
7 JAN	HELICOPTER	5 PLUS 50 ✓
7 JAN	VOLPAR	2 PLUS 10 ✓
8 JAN	HELICOPTER	13 PLUS 15 ✓
8 JAN	VOLPAR	5 PLUS 10 ✓
9 JAN	VOLPAR	PLUS 30
9 JAN	VOLPAR	2 PLUS 30
10 JAN	VOLPAR	2 PLUS 30
	TOTAL	69 PLUS 35

SECRET

C. IDENTIFICATION OF AIRCRAFT:

INTERVIEWS WITH THE PILOTS, CO-PILOTS AND OBSERVERS ON THE TWO AIR AMERICA HELICOPTERS THAT HOVERED OVER THE CRASH SITE, PLUS EXAMINATION OF OVER 75 PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE SITE AND WRECKAGE BY A TRAINED PHOTO INTERPRETER, INDICATE THAT THE CRASH IS A RECENT ONE (THE BROKEN BOUGHS OF THE TREES STILL HAD WILTED LEAVES ON THEM) AND THAT IT IS A C-123 AIRCRAFT. THOSE PIECES LARGE ENOUGH TO BE SEEN WERE OF THE PROPER DIMENSIONS FOR A C-123 AIRCRAFT AND ONE PIECE HAS BEEN TENTATIVELY IDENTIFIED AS THAT OF A C-123 JET POD. WHILE IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE DOWNED AIRCRAFT AS THE MISSING C-123/ST-1, THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTS OF ANY RECENT PLANE CRASHES IN THE AREA OF THE CRASH SITE. THE CRASH SITE IS APPROXIMATELY TWO KMS SOUTH OF THE EXPECTED FLIGHT PATH OF THE MISSING C-123.

D. WEATHER:

WEATHER IN CRASH SITE HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE BROKEN, VARIABLE 3000 TO 9000 FEET WITH SCATTERED TO BROKEN CLOUDS AT 4000 TO 7000 FEET. WEATHER AS OF 0800 (L) 14 JANUARY REPORTED TO BE SCATTERED AT 2500 AND 4000 FEET; OVER CAST AT 9000 FEET. MOUNTAIN TOPS CONTINUE TO BE CLOUD COVERED. WEATHER FORECAST UNTIL 1600 (L) 14 JANUARY IS 4000 FEET SCATTERED, OVERCAST AT 10000 FEET WITH RAIN.

~~SECRET~~

PLENTIFUL BECAUSE OF SEASONAL MONSOONS, WHICH ALSO ACCOUNTS FOR LOW CEILINGS AND DAILY RAINFALL. MOVEMENT IN THE AREA IS DIFFICULT EXCEPT ON ESTABLISHED TRAILS (NONE WERE OBSERVED) AND ALONG THE RIVER VALLEYS. THE LIKELY AVENUES OF APPROACH TO THE CRASH SITE WOULD BE FROM AN ESTABLISHED TRAIL NETWORK ALONG RIDGELINES (AGAIN, NONE NOTED) OR ALONG MORE GRADUALLY DECLINING FINGERS. THE NEAREST THE VALLEY OF THE SONG CAU RIVER COMES TO THE CRASH SITE IS THREE KMS (WITH THE SITE BEING DUE EASTWARD), WHERE THE RIVER SWINGS IN A WESTWARD ARC BEFORE CONTINUING ITS EASTWARD DIRECTION ABOUT 12 KMS SOUTH OF THE SITE.

B. SECURITY ASSESSMENT:

ENEMY UNITS IN THE AREA INCLUDE THE VC KHAN SON DISTRICT UNIT WITH A REPORTED STRENGTH OF 23 MEN. SECTOR ESTIMATES A FORCE OF 250 LOCAL VILLAGE GUERRILLAS IN CAM LAN DISTRICT, HOWEVER, ONLY 50 OF THEM ARE BELIEVED TO BE ARMED. THE ONLY PROVINCE MAIN FORCE UNIT IN THE AREA IS THE 407TH SAPPER BATTALION WITH 305 MEN. THE 407TH'S BASE AREA IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 12 KMS SE OF THE CRASH SITE (BP 8132) AND THEIR AREA OF OPERATION IS THE CAM RANH BAY AREA. THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE SITE AND THEIR BASE AREA WOULD PRECLUDE ANY IMMEDIATE REACTION TO AN INCURSION INTO THE SITE.

~~SECRET~~

THE FINAL IMPACT ZONE, THE BASE OF A FINGER WHICH RISES TO AN APPROXIMATE ALTITUDE OF 3,750 FEET, COMPRISES A SMALL CIRCULAR AREA ABOUT 40 FEET IN DIAMETER. THERE IS A LARGE ROCK NEARLY IN THE MIDDLE OF THE IMPACT ZONE. THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE IMPACT ZONE ALSO HAS SEVERAL TREES WHICH HAVE BEEN BROKEN OFF, LEAVING TRUNKS OF SOME 20 FEET IN HEIGHT REMAINING. (A PENETRATION ENTRY FROM THE AIR WOULD HAVE TO BE ON THE LOWEST PART ((SOUTHWEST)) OF THE IMPACT ZONE SINCE THAT WOULD LEAVE MORE ROOM FOR A HELICOPTER TO MANEUVER AND HELP ENSURE THAT ANYONE BEING LOWERED INTO THE AREA WOULD NOT HIT THE LARGE ROCKS IN THE ZONE OR THE BROKEN TREES.)

TERRAIN ANALYSIS OF SITE AREA: THE AREA SURROUNDING THE CRASH SITE IS THICKLY WOODED, TRIPLE-CANOPIED JUNGLE. THE PRIMARY GROWTH CONSISTS OF 100-150 FOOT TREES WHILE THE SECONDARY GROWTH IS 50-100 FOOT TREES, WITH THICK UNDERBRUSH COVERING THE GROUND. THE DOMINANT TERRAIN FEATURE IS HON BA MOUNTAIN LOCATED AT BP 768388, APPROXIMATELY 4.5 KILOMETERS (CMS) SOUTH OF THE REPORTED CRASH SITE. THE CRASH SITE IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY ONE KM NORTH OF HILL 1084 IN A DEPRESSION FLANKED BY TWO FINGERS. THESE FINGERS SHARPLY DROP TO A RIVER VALLEY BELOW. THE AREA IS CATEGORIZED BY EXTREMELY STEEP SLOPES, NUMEROUS WATERFALL AND NARROW MOUNTAIN VALLEYS. WATER IS

~~SECRET~~

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013



(b)(6)

~~SECRET~~ 231236Z JAN 75

FROM SAIGON

03/0825Z

TO: IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INITIAL REPORT OF MISSING AIRCRAFT

- 1. 0123K 54-0625 (ST-1) CHINA AIRLINES
- 2. MISSING
- 3. 03/0825Z TIME OF OCCURRENCE
- 4. UNKNOWN LOCATION
- 5. A408 CUSTOMER, CARGO AIRLIFT FROM DALAT (V-08) MISSION/SPONSORING UNIT TO NY TRANG (V-07)
- 6. PIC S.S. LIN JS F/O C.N. JEN CREW AND PASSENGERS  
F/M Y. C. SUNG

PASSENGERS: JAMES RAWLINGS ASSIGNED NHA TRANG AS ~~LOGISTICS~~ <sup>SOEPLX</sup> OFFICER. ONE NHA TRANG FILIPINO EMPLOYEE AND UNDISCLOSED NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE.

- 7. UNKNOWN PROBABLE CAUSE OF ACCIDENT
- 8. WEATHER AT DALAT UNKNOWN, NHA TRANG WEATHER REPORTED AS 3/8 AT 2000 FT, 4/8 AT 3000 FT, 6/8 AT 7000 FT, LIGHT RAIN VISIBILITY 4

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TO 5 MILES. AT 0925Z AN AIR AMERICA CHOPPER PICKED UP AN EMERGENCY BEEPER BETWEEN NHA TRANG (V-08) AND PHAN THIET (V-11). VNAF AND AIR AMERICA AIRBORNE ON SEARCH FROM NHA TRANG AT 0930Z. GENERAL CARGO ON BOARD, NO CLASSIFIED CARGO. AIRCRAFT RECORDS DO NOT INDICATE THAT AIRCRAFT HAS EMERGENCY BEEPER INSTALLED. ROUTE OF FLIGHT REPORTED AS SECURE AREA.

~~SECRET~~

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 09-Dec-2013
--

## 5. SEARCH AND RESCUE

1. WERE ABLE CONDUCT SUCCESSFUL SEARCH MISSION AFTERNOON OF 19 JAN. COVERED ALL HIGH GROUND, RIDGES, AND MT TOPS ALONG PROBABLE FLIGHT PATH OF ST/1 WHICH NOT COVERED IN PREVIOUS SEARCH MISSIONS.

2. GIVEN TERRAIN WE SEARCHING COULD NEVER SAY HAVE COVERED EVERY POSSIBILITY, BUT SINCE WE HAVE COVERED ALL OBVIOUS AREAS AND DO HAVE A PROBABLE CRASH SITE TO INVESTIGATE PLAN CALL OFF ANY FURTHER SEARCH MISSIONS. HAVE THEREFORE RELEASED STANDBY CHOPPER FOR TOMORROW, 20 JAN.

OTHER

AIRCRAFT USED IN RECOVERY AND SAR:

VOLPAR 3 HOURS

VOLPAR PLUS 45

HELICOPTER (RECOVERY) 2 HOURS

HELICOPTER (SEARCH) 2 HOURS PLUS 45

TOTAL 8 HOURS PLUS 30

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3. [REDACTED] HAS PREPARED COMPLETE REPORT AND WILL HAND CARRY TO JCRC HQS IN THAILAND ON TUESDAY, 22 JAN. HE WILL ALSO HAVE WITH HIM ADDITIONAL PHOTOS OF CRASH SITE HE TOOK AND COLOR SLIDES TAKEN BY CHOPPER CREW.

4. AT THIS POINT [REDACTED] ESTIMATES WE WILL NEED GVN SUPPORT OF THREE/FOUR CHOPPERS TO LIFT IN ONE COMPANY OF MEN TO SECURE THE AREA, PLUS TWO GUNSHIPS FOR FIRE SUPPORT.

[REDACTED] AND BASE WILL BRIEF CONGEN [REDACTED] ON THESE NEEDS ALONG WITH FULL REPORT, WHEN LATTER RETURNS TO NHA TRANG TOMORROW, 20 JAN.



APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

WB-73-3870

September 24, 1973

[REDACTED]  
Assistant Deputy Commissioner  
Employment Standards Administration  
U.S. Department of Labor  
1833 Kalia Ave.  
Room 610  
Honolulu, Hawaii 96815

Re: James H. Ackley - Captured: 3/7/73  
Howard H. Boyles, Jr. - Captured: 2/9/73  
Jack W. Cavill - Captured: 2/9/73  
Clarence H. Driver - Captured: 3/7/73

Dear [REDACTED]:

In response to your inquiry of August 27, 1973, we regret to inform you that there have been no new developments with regard to the missing status of the following employees:

James H. Ackley  
Howard H. Boyles, Jr.  
Jack W. Cavill  
Clarence H. Driver

We shall advise you promptly of any change in the situation.

Very truly yours,

AIR AMERICA, INC.

[REDACTED]  
Vice President - Law

cc: DIRA-OSG BKK  
File Ackley, Boyles,  
Cavill & Driver

HPB/lc

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE CENTER  
3800 YORK STREET  
DENVER, COLORADO 80205



21 AUG 1975

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF:

RPTT

SUBJECT: Employment - DRIVER, Clarence N.

[Redacted]

TO:

[Redacted]

Air America Inc.  
1725 K. St NW  
Washington DC 20006

Dear [Redacted]

Determination is required as to the exact status of Major Clarence N. Driver, USAF (Ret), SSN [Redacted] while employed by your company.

*From 73*

Please verify date Major Driver became Missing In Action, and if at that time his employment with your agency made him a civilian officer or employee of a department of the Federal Government.

Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely

[Redacted Signature]

[Redacted Title]

Deputy Director of Reserve  
and Retired Pay Operations

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013



(b)(6)

**AIR ASIA COMPANY LIMITED**

108 Chung Shan Road North  
Section 2, Taipei, Taiwan

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22 October 1969

Dear Mr. C. N. Driver

This is to advise you that Air America, Inc. has assumed the obligations of your employment with Air Asia Company Limited (and its predecessor companies) and hence forth shall be deemed for all purposes your employer. The terms of your employment remain unchanged.

Please acknowledge receipt of this letter and your approval of its terms by signing the attached copy and returning it to this office at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely yours,



Director of Personnel

Acknowledged and approved  
this 11 day of NOV, 1969:

Clarence N. Driver

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

v<sup>4</sup>

JAN. 70'

FIRST OFFICERS MONTHLY TAKE OFF AND LANDING RECORD

<u>DATE</u>	<u>A/C NO.</u>	<u>CAPTAIN</u>	<u>TAKE OFF'S</u>
2 JAN 70	556	[REDACTED]	3
3 "	556	"	4
4 "	576	"	3

<u>DATE</u>	<u>A/C NO.</u>	<u>CAPTAIN</u>	<u>LANDING'S</u>	<u>TYPE OF APPROACH</u>
5	576	SMITH W.P.	3	VFR
6	293	[REDACTED]	3	"
8	293	[REDACTED]	2	"

Signed: DRIVER, CN  
First Officer

Date: 14 JAN. 70

It is the First Officer's responsibility to complete this record and return it to his respective AMFD the last day of each month.

INTER-OFFICE ROUTING SLIP

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

REFERENCE NUMBER  
OR IDENTIFICATION  
OF THE ATTACHED

TO	

- ACTION**
- For your information
  - Initial and pass on
  - For your comments
  - Please handle
  - Take up with me
  - For your approval
  - For your decision
  - Investigate and report
  - Bring up to date
  - Draft reply
  - For your file
  - Note and destroy
  - Please return to

REMARKS

DOCUMENTATION SHEET AND  
EXAM RESULTS WILL BE AVAILABLE  
MONDAY.



From	Date
------	------

MFD

C-63

(b)(6)

File  
Driver

September 8, 1970

Mr. Clarence N. Driver  
Air America, Inc.  
Vientiane, Laos

Dear Mr Driver:

This is to sincerely thank you for the fine support you have given to the Joint Alert and Notification Office in the performance of your JANO duties.

Your excellent performance in assuming these additional duties has enabled your Sector to function as an adequate and reliable element in the JANO system. Your willingness to undertake additional responsibility outside of your normally assigned duties has been greatly appreciated by your fellow Americans and the U.S. Mission as a whole.

Thank you for a job well done.

Sincerely yours,

  
Joint Alert and Notification Officer

DIST. JANO  
MGT  
AA/PERS  
AA/Security  
✓ AA/Base Manager *AC*  
C&R-3

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

Mr Clarence Driver, Air America, Inc.  
AA Block Warden, Sector VII, Block B

August 20, 1979

The Ambassador

**Duty Assignment - Joint Alert and Notification Plan (JANO)**

Your company has nominated you to serve as a Block Warden in our JANO system. I appreciate your undertaking this assignment.

As you know, I am responsible for the safety and welfare of all United States' citizens in Laos, including, if necessary, their evacuation when circumstances dictate such action. Because of this, it is imperative that we have a workable notification system, one that assures the prompt relay of instructions to all individuals concerned. Your role is a vital one in this important system.

As soon as possible, you should contact [redacted] Assistant JANO, in USAID building 100, telephone 2107. He will brief you on your JANO duties and give you the written material you will need to carry out your Block Warden's responsibilities.

Again, thank you for undertaking this assignment.

Dist.: JANO  
MGT  
EME/Admin  
SMB  
Sector Chief  
AA/Security  
✓ AA/Pass Manager  
CAR-3

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

C06117132

PERSONAL INFORMATION

(b)(6)

REF.: \_\_\_\_\_

REC'D WAS DEC 31 1965

PIN RECENT  
PHOTO HERE

NAME Driver, Clarence N.  
 LAST FIRST MIDDLE  
 PHONE NUMBER AX 4-1901 SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER [redacted]  MALE  FEMALE  
 PRESENT ADDRESS [redacted] Los Angeles, Calif. MARITAL STATUS  
 SINGLE  MARRIED  ENGAGED  
 WIDOWED  DIVORCED  SEPARATED  
 PERMANENT ADDRESS [redacted] Los Angeles, California PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY, COUNTRY)  
March 7, 1922 Phoenix, Arizona  
 WEIGHT 190 COLOR OF HAIR Brn. COMPLEXION fair DESCRIBE ANY SPECIAL OR OUTSTANDING CHARACTERISTICS OR IDENTIFYING MARKS. none  
 HEIGHT 5'8" COLOR OF EYES Brn.  
 PASSPORT PARTICULARS: No Passport ISSUING AUTHORITY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE OF ISSUE \_\_\_\_\_  
 PLACE OF ISSUE \_\_\_\_\_ KIND OF PASSPORT \_\_\_\_\_ VALIDITY PERIOD \_\_\_\_\_  
 CITIZEN OF U.S.A. YES  NO  NATURALIZED: DATE 5/12 PLACE \_\_\_\_\_ NATIONALITY: U.S. HAS YOUR PASSPORT EVER BEEN CANCELLED?  YES  NO. IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE FULL DETAILS:

EDUCATION	NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	DATES ATTENDED	GRADUATE DEGREES	MAJOR SUBJECTS
HIGH SCHOOL	<u>David Starr Jordan, Los Angeles</u>	<u>1934-1940</u>	<u>graduated</u>	<u>college prep. course</u>
COLLEGE	<u>Los Angeles City College, Los Angeles</u>	<u>1940-1942</u>	<u>none</u>	<u>math.</u>
TRADE, BUSINESS OR CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOL, OTHER WITH DATES	<u>attended numerous military schools</u>			

SUBJECTS OF SPECIAL STUDY OR RESEARCH WORK \_\_\_\_\_  
 VOCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS LICENSE, CERTIFICATE, ETC. Air Transport Rating

WHAT FOREIGN LANGUAGES DO YOU SPEAK FLUENTLY? none READ \_\_\_\_\_ WRITE \_\_\_\_\_  
 U.S. MILITARY SERVICE (BRANCH) FROM: Sept. 1942 TYPE OF DISCHARGE: retired PRESENT MEMBERSHIP IN NATIONAL GUARD OR RESERVES: \_\_\_\_\_  
U.S.A.F. TO: Aug. 1964 RANK: Major SERIAL NUMBER (MANDATORY): AO 15210339

ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN RELIGIOUS (CIVIC, ATHLETIC, FRATERNAL, ETC.) none

PREVIOUS ADDRESSES DURING PAST TEN YEARS

DATES		STREET	CITY/STATE	COUNTRY
FROM	TO			
<u>1954</u>	<u>1960</u>	[redacted]	<u>Riverside, Calif.</u>	<u>U.S.A.</u>
<u>1960</u>	<u>1962</u>	[redacted]	<u>Tacoma, Wash.</u>	<u>U.S.A.</u>
<u>1962</u>	<u>1964</u>	[redacted]	<u>Mather A.F.B., Calif.</u>	<u>U.S.A.</u>
<u>1964</u>	<u>present</u>	[redacted]	<u>Los Angeles, Calif.</u>	<u>U.S.A.</u>

SPOUSE (INCLUDE FIANCE AND PRIOR MARRIAGES) - CHILDREN

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	PRESENT ADDRESS	OCCUPATION
<u>Allene L. Driver</u>	[redacted]	[redacted]	<u>Housewife</u>
[redacted]	[redacted]	<u>(same)</u>	<u>none</u>
[redacted]	[redacted]	<u>(same)</u>	<u>none</u>

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APPROVED FOR  
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(CONTINUED ON OTHER SIDE)



A. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR)		EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION	SALARY OR EARNINGS	
FROM:	TO PRESENT TIME	Chief Pilot	STARTING \$6,500.00	PER YR.
Aug. 1964	to present		FINAL \$10,000.00	PER YR.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT  
Ray Charles Enterprises, 2107 West Washington Bl., Los Angeles, Calif. 90018

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR	DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU
[Redacted], Executive Vice-Pres.	Fly a Martin 404 and a Cessna 310 throughout U.S.A., Canada, Mexico;
REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT	
Desire more challenging position	

B. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR)		EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION	SALARY OR EARNINGS	
FROM:	TO:	KC 135, USAF	STARTING \$	PER YR.
Sept. 1962	Aug. 1964	Instructor Pilot	FINAL \$	PER YR.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT  
(see resume for military duties over twenty year period)

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR	DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU
	-pilot
REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT	
retired	

C. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR)		EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION	SALARY OR EARNINGS	
FROM:	TO:		STARTING \$	PER YR.
			FINAL \$	PER YR.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR	DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU
REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT	

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE FULL DETAILS. NO  YES

HAVE YOU NOW OR EVER HAD ANY PHYSICAL OR MENTAL DEFECTS OR DISABILITIES WHATSOEVER? GIVE FULL DETAILS: NO  YES

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED OR DETAINED BY ANY POLICE OR MILITARY AUTHORITY? IF SO NAME THE ARRESTING AUTHORITY GIVE TIME, PLACE AND REASON FOR SUCH ARREST OR DETENTION, AND THE DISPOSITION OR COURT ACTION. NO  YES

JOB APPLIED FOR: pilot company  
MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE SALARY \$ scale PER YR.

REFERENCES. LIST FIVE PERSONS, NOT RELATED TO YOU BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE, WHO ARE PARTICULARLY QUALIFIED TO SUPPLY DEFINITE INFORMATION REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER AND ABILITY. DO NOT GIVE NAMES OF SUPERVISORS LISTED ABOVE.

NAME	ADDRESS	OCCUPATION
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	Tech. Writer
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	Chief Appraiser
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	sg C.O. S.A.C.
[Redacted]	Mayther AFB, Calif	Wg. C.O. S.A.C.
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	Pilot, Air Asia

FATHER'S NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY, COUNTRY)
William N. Driver	Sept. 24, 1896	Atlanta, Georgia
PRESENT ADDRESS	PRESENT OCCUPATION	
deceased		
NATIONALITY AT BIRTH	PRESENT NATIONALITY	
American		

MOTHER'S FULL NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY, COUNTRY)
[Redacted]	Nov. 6, 1901	Greenville, S. Carolina
	PRESENT OCCUPATION	
	none	
NATIONALITY AT BIRTH	PRESENT NATIONALITY	
American	same	

IN CASE OF EMERGENCY NOTIFY Mrs. Allene L. Driver, [Redacted], I. A. AX 4-191  
NAME ADDRESS PHONE NO.

IF THE ABOVE SPACE IS NOT SUFFICIENT USE CONTINUATION SHEET.  
I authorize investigation of all statements contained in this application. I understand that misrepresentation or omission of facts called for is cause for dismissal.  
12-15-65 DATE  
C. [Redacted] SIGNATURE

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 09-Dec-2013

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# AREA FAMILIARIZATION TRAINING RECORD

(b)(6)

NAME	CREW POSITION	BASE	AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NUMBER	DATE
DRIVER, C.N.	SIC	VOI	VTB	N9956Z	4 OCT 19 71
GRADING LEGEND: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard. <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete. <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable or not accomplished.					
1. MAPS			21. COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES		
2. WEIGHT & LOADING			22. INSTRUMENT APPROACHES ( )		
3. PIC BRIEFING			23. KNOWLEDGE OF:		
4. FLIGHT PLAN			A. ENROUTE AND AREA HAZARDS		
5. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)			B. EMERGENCY FACILITIES		
(EXTERIOR)			C. MINIMUM ENROUTE ALTITUDES		
6. ENGINE STARTING			D. SURVIVAL PROCEDURES		
7. TAXING			E. SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT		
8. USE OF BRAKES			F. LOST PROCEDURES		
9. ENGINE RUN UP			G. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES		
10. USE OF CHECK LIST			H. COMMUNICATIONS CODES		
11. CREW BRIEFING & TAKEOFF DATA			I. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE CHARTS		
12. AREA DEPARTURES			24. CREW COORDINATION		
13. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS			25. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP		
14. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK			26. JUDGEMENT		
15. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATIONS			27. SMOOTHNESS & COORDINATION		
16. RADIO NAVIGATION			28. ADHERENCE TO SOP		
17. D.R. NAVIGATION			29. CUSTOMER RELATIONS		
18. LOW & HIGH RECONNAISSANCE			30.		
19. AREA ARRIVALS			31.		
20. AIR DROPS : (FREE FALL)			32.		
(CHUTES)			33. TPE-331 START PROCEDURES (PC-6 & VTB)		

T/O's:

SITES	NORMAL		X-WIND		STOL		BALKED		E/FAIL		TOTAL
	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	

LDG's:

SITES	NORMAL		X-WIND		STOL		BALKED		E/FAIL		TOTAL
	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	

REMARKS: FLIGHT AS OBSERVER - VOT-VQ8-VOT-

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AREA TRNG. & FAM.	PREV.	TODAY	TOTAL
BLK. TIME AT CONTROLS	11:04	0:00	11:04
BLK. TIME AS OBSERVER	19:54	1:05	20:59

ACK. *[Signature]*

INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN

DATE <i>11 Oct</i> 19 <i>71</i>	MFD (REVIEW AND POSTING)	DATE APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: <i>9</i>
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FILE, VIA MFD; 2 MFSD RECORDS; 3 DFD, VIA MFSD

09 OCT 1971 131 JAN 69

# AREA FAMILY ARIZATION TRAINING RECORD

b)(6)

NAME <i>C. DRIVER</i>	CREW POSITION <i>T.P.C. AF</i>	BASE <i>V03</i>	AIRCRAFT TYPE <i>VTB</i>	AIRCRAFT NUMBER <i>746</i>	DATE <i>23 SEP. 1971</i>
--------------------------	-----------------------------------	--------------------	-----------------------------	-------------------------------	-----------------------------

GRADING LEGEND: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard. <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete.		I	S		I	S
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Not applicable or not accomplished.						
1. MAPS			X	21. COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES		X
2. WEIGHT & LOADING			X	22. INSTRUMENT APPROACHES ( )		
3. FIC BRIEFING				23. KNOWLEDGE OF:		
4. FLIGHT PLAN			X	A. ENROUTE AND AREA HAZARDS		
5. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)			X	B. EMERGENCY FACILITIES		
(EXTERIOR)			X	C. MINIMUM ENROUTE ALTITUDES		X
6. ENGINE STARTING			X	D. SURVIVAL PROCEDURES		
7. TAXING			X	E. SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT		
8. USE OF BRAKES			X	F. LOST PROCEDURES		
9. ENGINE RUN UP			X	G. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES		X
10. USE OF CHECK LIST			X	H. COMMUNICATIONS CODES		X
11. CREW BRIEFING & TAKEOFF DATA			X	I. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE CHARTS		
12. AREA DEPARTURES			X	24. CREW COORDINATION		X
13. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS			X	25. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP		
14. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK				26. JUDGEMENT		
15. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATIONS				27. SMOOTHNESS & COORDINATION		X
16. RADIO NAVIGATION			X	28. ADHERENCE TO SOP		X
17. D.R. NAVIGATION			X	29. CUSTOMER RELATIONS		X
18. LOW & HIGH RECONNAISSANCE		<i>NA</i>		30.		
19. AREA ARRIVALS			X	31.		
20. AIR DROPS: (FREE FALL)		<i>NA</i>		32.		
(CHUTES)		<i>NA</i>		33. TPE-331 START PROCEDURES (PC-6 & VTB)		X

T/O's:							LDG's:																
SITES	NORMAL		X-WIND		STOL		BALKED		E/FAIL		TOTAL	SITES	NORMAL		X-WIND		STOL		BALKED		E/FAIL		TOTAL
	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S			I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	
<i>V03</i>		X										<i>V40</i>		X									
<i>V03</i>		X										<i>V03</i>		X									
<i>V03</i>												<i>V03</i>											
<i>V03</i>				X								<i>V03</i>			X								
<i>V03</i>												<i>V40</i>				X							
<i>V40</i>				X								<i>V03</i>											
<i>V03</i>				X								<i>V03</i>											
<i>V40</i>												<i>V40</i>			X								
<i>V03</i>				X								<i>V03</i>											
<i>V78</i>				X								<i>V03</i>			X								

REMARKS:

AREA TRNG. & FAM.	PREV.	TODAY	TOTAL
BLK. TIME AT CONTROLS	<i>5:52</i>	<i>3:14</i>	<i>11:06</i>
BLK. TIME AS OBSERVER	<i>7:54</i>	<i>2:00</i>	<i>14:54</i>
TIME CHARGED TO <i>(to 17)</i>			<i>30:5</i>

Acknowledged:  
*C. Driver*

INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN

DATE <i>27 Sept 1971</i>	MFD (REVIEW AND POSTING)	APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: <i>9</i>
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DISTRIBUTION: 1 MFD, VIA MFD; 2 MFSR RECORDS; 3 DFD, VIA MFSR

09-Dec-2013 1 JAN 69

# AREA FAMILIARIZATION TRAINING RECORD (b)(6)

NAME <i>C. DRIVER</i>		CREW POSITION <i>PIC</i>	BASE <i>SEN</i>	AIRCRAFT TYPE <i>VTB</i>	AIRCRAFT NUMBER <i>295</i>	DATE <i>22 SEPT. 19 71</i>
GRADING LEGEND: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard, <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Not applicable or not accomplished.						
1. MAPS				21. COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES		
2. WEIGHT & LOADING				22. INSTRUMENT APPROACHES ( )		
3. FIC BRIEFING				23. KNOWLEDGE OF:		
4. FLIGHT PLAN				A. ENROUTE AND AREA HAZARDS		
5. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)				B. EMERGENCY FACILITIES		
(EXTERIOR)				C. MINIMUM ENROUTE ALTITUDES		
6. ENGINE STARTING				D. SURVIVAL PROCEDURES		
7. TAXING				E. SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT		
8. USE OF BRAKES				F. LOST PROCEDURES		
9. ENGINE RUN UP				G. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES		
10. USE OF CHECK LIST				H. COMMUNICATIONS CODES		
11. CREW BRIEFING & TAKEOFF DATA				I. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE CHARTS		
12. AREA DEPARTURES				24. CREW COORDINATION		
13. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS				25. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP		
14. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK				26. JUDGEMENT		
15. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATIONS				27. SMOOTHNESS & COORDINATION		
16. RADIO NAVIGATION				28. ADHERENCE TO SOP		
17. D.R. NAVIGATION				29. CUSTOMER RELATIONS		
18. LOW & HIGH RECONNAISSANCE			<i>NA</i>	30.		
19. AREA ARRIVALS			<i>A</i>	31.		
20. AIR DROPS : (FREE FALL)			<i>NA</i>	32.		
(CHUTES)			<i>NA</i>	33. TPE-331 START PROCEDURES (PC-6 & VTB)		

T/O's:							LDG's:																
SITES	NORMAL		X-WIND		STOL		BALKED		E/FAIL		TOTAL	SITES	NORMAL		X-WIND		STOL		BALKED		E/FAIL		TOTAL
	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S			I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	

REMARKS: *OBSERVED LINE OPERATION OUT OF VTB. DEMONSTRATIONS ONLY. NO LANDINGS PERFORMED AREA FAMILIAR ONLY WITH FAST TURNAROUND*

AREA TRNG. & FAM.	PREV.	TODAY	TOTAL
BLK. TIME AT CONTROLS	<i>5:50</i>	:	<i>5:50</i>
BLK. TIME AS OBSERVER	<i>19:08</i>	<i>5:46</i>	<i>17:58</i>
TIME CHARGED TO TOTAL	<i>21:58</i>	:	<i>26:48</i>

Acknowledged:

27 Sept. 1971 INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN

DATE <i>29 Sept 19 71</i>	MFD (REVIEW AND POSTING)	APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: <i>9</i>
LE, VIA MFD; 2 MFS RECORDS; 3 DFD, VIA MFS		09-Dec-20 1 JAN 69

(b)(6)

Los Angeles, Calif.  
December 23, 1965

REC'D WAS DEC 31 1965

AIR AMERICAN CO. LTD.  
815 Connecticut Ave. N.W.  
Washington D.C. 20006

Dear

I have been looking sometime for a more challenging position, that could better utilize my abilities in flying, instruction, maintenance, and operation.

I am not just looking for an ordinary job, but for a position that has a challenge; a position where I can benefit my Country, and company. I am hoping to find a position that could be, if warranted, a stepping stone towards bettering myself with the company.

After the interview, I am confident that I fulfill the requirements and pre-requisites for the position of pilot with your organization.

Attached to cover letter please find:

1. Personal Information
2. Supplementary Flight, Crew Information
3. Resume
4. Breakdown of Flying time, Aircraft, etc.

Thank you very much for considering this material.

Sincerely,

Clarence N. Driver  
CHIEF PILOT,  
RAY CHARLES ENTERPRISES

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

PERSONAL INFORMATION

REF.: 7  
REC'D WAS DEC 31 1965

PIN RECENT  
PHOTO HERE

2-2/16/66

NAME Driver Clarence N  
LAST FIRST MIDDLE

PHONE NUMBER AX 4-1901 SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER [redacted]  MALE  FEMALE

PRESENT ADDRESS [redacted] Los Angeles, Calif. CITY STATE

PERMANENT ADDRESS [redacted] Los Angeles, California PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY, COUNTRY)

DATE OF BIRTH (MONTH, DAY, YEAR) March 7, 1922 PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY, COUNTRY) Phoenix, Arizona

WEIGHT 190 COLOR OF HAIR Brn. COMPLEXION fair DESCRIBE ANY SPECIAL OR OUTSTANDING CHARACTERISTICS OR IDENTIFYING MARKS. none

HEIGHT 5'8" COLOR OF EYES Brn.

PASSPORT PARTICULARS: NO PASSPORT ISSUING AUTHORITY [redacted] DATE OF ISSUE [redacted] PLACE OF ISSUE [redacted] KIND OF PASSPORT [redacted] VALIDITY PERIOD [redacted] PASSPORT NO. [redacted]

CITIZEN OF U.S.A.  YES  NO NATURALIZED: N/A DATE [redacted] PLACE [redacted] NATIONALITY: N/A HAS YOUR PASSPORT EVER BEEN CANCELLED?  NO. IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE FULL DETAILS:

EDUCATION	NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	DATES ATTENDED	GRADUATE DEGREES	MAJOR SUBJECTS
HIGH SCHOOL	<u>David Starr Jordan, Los Angeles</u>	<u>1934-1940</u>	<u>graduated</u>	<u>college prep. course</u>
COLLEGE	<u>Los Angeles City College, Los Angeles</u>	<u>1940-1942</u>	<u>none</u>	<u>math.</u>
TRADE, BUSINESS OR CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOL, OTHER WITH DATES	<u>attended numerous military schools - SEE RESUME</u>			

SUBJECTS OF SPECIAL STUDY OR RESEARCH WORK

VOCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS LICENSE, CERTIFICATE, ETC. Air Transport Rating

WHAT FOREIGN LANGUAGES DO YOU SPEAK FLUENTLY? none READ NONE WRITE NONE

U.S. MILITARY SERVICE (BRANCH) FROM: Sept. 1942 TYPE OF DISCHARGE: retired PRESENT MEMBERSHIP IN NATIONAL GUARD OR RESERVES NO

U.S.A.F. TO: Aug. 1964 RANK: Major SERIAL NUMBER (MANDATORY): AO 15210339

ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN RELIGIOUS (CIVIC, ATHLETIC, FRATERNAL, ETC.) none

PREVIOUS ADDRESSES DURING PAST TEN YEARS

DATES		STREET	CITY/STATE	COUNTRY
FROM	TO			
<u>1954</u>	<u>1960</u>	[redacted]	<u>Riverside, Calif.</u>	<u>U.S.A.</u>
<u>1960</u>	<u>1962</u>	[redacted]	<u>Tacoma, Wash.</u>	<u>U.S.A.</u>
<u>1962</u>	<u>1964</u>	[redacted]	<u>Mather A.F.B., Calif.</u>	<u>U.S.A.</u>
<u>1964</u>	<u>present</u>	[redacted]	<u>Los Angeles, Calif.</u>	<u>U.S.A.</u>

SPOUSE (INCLUDE FIANCE AND PRIOR MARRIAGES) - CHILDREN

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	PRESENT ADDRESS	OCCUPATION
<u>Allene L. Driver</u>	[redacted]	[redacted] <u>L.A.</u>	<u>Housewife</u>
[redacted]	[redacted]	<u>(same)</u>	<u>none</u>
[redacted]	[redacted]	<u>(same)</u>	<u>none</u>

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 09-Dec-2013

(CONTINUED ON OTHER SIDE)

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

SUPPLEMENTARY PERSONAL INFORMATION  
FLIGHT CREW

Name: Clarence N. Driver

I. Narrative Description of Experience (Military Flying Experience, Airline Experience, Far East Experience.)

(see resume)

II. Equipment Types and Flying Times (Please list type by specific model of aircraft flown.)

A. MILITARY FLIGHT TIME (see resume)  
(1) Branch of Service .....  
(2) Flight Time .....

B. AIRLINE EXPERIENCE Corp.  
(1) Name of Airline(s) and Position Held  
Chief Pilot Ray Charles

Table with 4 columns: Pilot, Co-Pilot, Other, Type of Aircraft. Rows include engine types like Single Eng Prop, Twin Eng Prop, Single Eng Jet, 4 Eng Prop, Multi-Eng Jet, Turbo-prop, SEA Plane, Little H'cptr P, Med/Hvy H'cptr P, Turbin H'cptr.

Table with 4 columns: Pilot, Co-Pilot, Other, Type of Aircraft. Rows show flight times for MARTIN 404 (2:50:00 Pilot, 75:00 Co-Pilot) and CESSNA 310 (96:00 Pilot).

Total Military Flight Times  
(3) Pilot ..... Co-Pilot .....  
(4) Total Night Time .....

Total Airline Flight Times  
(3) Pilot 346:00 Co-Pilot 75:00  
(4) Total Night Time 2:10:00

III. USFAA AVIATION LICENSES & RATINGS

IV. FOREIGN AVIATION LICENSES & RATINGS

Type Number Rating  
(1) APR 477924: multi-engine land Martin 202/404  
(2) Commercial " single & Multi engine land  
(3) Instrument "

Country Type Number Ratings  
(1) NONE  
(2) land; Boeing 707/720  
(3)

V. Resume of any specialized flying experience, such as agricultural spray pilot, test pilot, etc., giving type of aircraft used, total hours, and country(s) in which flight took place.

(see resume)

VI. Selection of an applicant may well be influenced by the type and amount of ground and flight training received. To assist in evaluating your overall qualifications it is important that you endeavor to submit documentary evidence. In a thorough and detailed manner, of all training received during the past three year period. (This information may be submitted in the form of notarized statements, photostats, etc.)

VII. Are you willing to be based at any station at the discretion of the Company? Yes  No

I understand that misrepresentation or omission of facts requested is cause for dismissal.

December 16, 1965

Date

Clarence N. Driver Signature  
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C06117126  
APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

CLARENCE N. DRIVER

Home Address: [redacted] Los Angeles, Calif. Phone: AX 4-1901  
Bus. Address: 2107 W. Washington Blvd., Los Angeles, Calif.  
Phone: RE 2-0171

... Broad background and experience in all phases of Military Flying/  
Operations/Management/Maintenance/Electronics/Special Services.

... Wide experience working with foreign personnel and employees...  
Socially astute, knowledgeable in communicating on a variety of subjects  
and well traveled.

... Ability to sell a program...Good speaker and writer...Versatile on  
presentations...Wide scope of interests.

EDUCATION:

2 years Los Angeles City College...major in Mathematics. Graduated  
David Starr Jordan High School S-1940; one semester Accounting, University  
of Washington; one semester Psychology, Tulane University; one year  
Electronics, Kessler AFB, Mississippi; one semester Economics, Sacramento  
State College; Correspondence course in Real Estate; Pilot Training  
(Cadets) Class 44A, Tuskegee, Alabama; B-25 Instructor School; KC-97  
Upgrading School; KC-135 Instructor School; Jet Engine Investigator course,  
Amarillo AFB, Texas; Brooks & Budbe Aeronautical Ground School, Air  
Transport Rating course, Los Angeles, Calif; Air Transport Rating Flight  
Training, accomplished by Mr. Earl Brouse, 16 hours, Los Angeles, Calif.

PERSONAL:

Born 7 March 1921, Phoenix, Arizona. Married; a daughter (10) and a son  
(8). Health, excellent...passed annual Air Force physical, equal to a man  
of 30. Height 5'8"...Weight 189 pounds. Participate in golf, ping pong,  
handball, swimming, tennis, etc...Achieved top status in football, Track  
and boxing...Top Secret Clearance.

Permanent Address: c/o Mrs. Anna Driver, [redacted]

OBJECTIVE:

To serve as a chief pilot in a civilian environment. To further utilize  
my experience in operations, scheduling, expediting, travel and special  
services.

OTHER FACTS OF INTEREST:

Member of the 332nd Veterans Club, Los Angeles, Calif...Active in community  
affairs...Member of Calvary Baptist Church, Santa Monica, Calif... served  
as Military Liaison for fund drives...coached military football, track and  
boxing teams...flown airplanes to various parts of the world participating  
in static displays...proficient in many types of aircraft...licensed air  
pilot...learn rapidly...especially like work involving flying.

AVAILABILITY:

1 April, 1966...Earlier release possible, dependent upon employment.



EXPERIENCE: 1965 to present:

Chief Pilot, Ray Charles Enterprises. Current and qualified in Martin 404, and twin Cessna 310, owned by the company to fly the band and executives throughout USA, Canada, Mexico, Alaska and the Carribean Islands. Responsible for all maintenance, inspections, operation functions, i.e. Flight Plans, Jeppesen Charts, Maps, FAA Regs, etc., Weight and Balance, Take-off, Landing and Fuel Curve Charts.

1963 to 1965:

Responsible for administering flight and instrument checks to crews of this unit...instructor pilot, Aircraft Commander...test flight crew... responsible for inflight testing of KC-135 4 engine jet for maintenance and operational requirements, Mather AFB, Sacramento, California.

1960 to 1963:

Completed 3 months Jet School for KC-135 upgrading, Castle AFB, Calif. Reported to McCord AFB, Washington, assumed duties as first pilot and flight commander of approximately 35 to 40 persons, advising operation officer of their training, progress, effectiveness of performance, prepared schedules, checked mission planning, conducted briefings, wrote all aircraft commanders effective reports and indorsed all other crew members. Upgraded to instructor pilot and assumed duties as Director of Safety for the commanding officer. Flew test flights...special mission checking performance of aircraft in snow and ice. Ferried very important people (VIPS) to various countries.

1953 to 1960:

22nd Bomb Wing Electronic Counter Measure Officer. Co-pilot in KC-97 aircraft, upgraded to Instructor Pilot, where I was responsible for checking out new pilots as co-pilots, pilots, and instructor pilots in the KC-97. I administered pre-standboard checks, flight checks, and instrument checks to crew members in the Squadron and Wing. Recommended for standboard by Wing Commander. Officer in charge of KC-97 simulator for 15th Air Force (16 months), responsible for training crews in normal and emergency procedures...developed course syllabi, training project outlines, set up mission. Evaluated progress of students...wrote and administered examinations...instructed students by means of lectures, quizzes, discussions and demonstrations. My unit was awarded an "Outstanding" in all phases by the Inspector General Team. Maintained proficiency in the C-47 and C-45 aircraft.

1951 to 1953:

Performed duties as Electronic Counter Measures Officer and Pilot in B-50 aircraft. Flew 36 combat missions during Korean War. This was highly classified work. I was stationed in Puerto Rico, Alaska and Japan as number one Electronic Counter Measure Officer (6 on a crew). I was responsible for reviewing and accepting or refusing missions from higher headquarters, planning missions, submitting classified reports to Headquarters, Washington, D.C. Writing effective reports on the other Electronic Counter Measure Officers and assisting as operation officer. Flew General Officers to Korea, Okinawa, Guam and the Phillipines.

1950 to 1951:

Served in Okinawa, Japan and Philippines, working mainly with indigous personnel, as Special Service Officer. Duties included (naturally flying) C-46 for Air Transport Command and instructor pilot in T-6...establishing and operating Base Exchanges, Service Clubs, Base Movies, Bas Laundry, Athletic teams, auditioning and selection of entertainment for Officers and NCO Service Clubs, Hospitals, football pageants, etc. During this period (approximately 1 year) I was the first Negro Pilot integrated into the Air Force as a test case prior to total integration in 1949. It was quite an experience.

1946 to 1948:

Military Police Officer for the Seattle-Tacoma area...worked with city and state police and city officials reducing friction while maintaining law and order.

1945 to 1946:

Completed B-25 Instructor School...Instructor Pilot B-25 Training cadets for the 477th Bombardment Squadron.

1944 to 1945:

Enlisted reserve corp...Army Air Force Cadet...graduating 7 January, 1944 (Class 44A)...Fighter Training at Selfredge Field, Michigan...combat fighter pilot 332nd Fighter Wing, Africa and Italy, Test Flight maintenance officer, flight leader. Completed over 60 missions...shot down over Germany, became a prisoner of War until termination of hostility in Europe.

1940 to 1942:

Graduated from high school and attended 2 years of college...enlisted Army Air Corp, 12 September, 1942.

## Partial extract of military flying time.

Type Aircraft - 4 EngineMilitaryCivilian designationKC-135 Jet Tanker

Boeing 707

Instructor Pilot	633.05	
Pilot	227.10	
Co-Pilot	50.10	
Aircraft Commander	19.05	
Command	5.20	Total 934.30

KC-97

Boeing Statacrusier "

Instructor Pilot	245.00	
Pilot	595.00	
Co-Pilot	510.00	Total 1502.00

B-50

Boeing Superfortress

Pilot	398.00	
Co-Pilot	198.00	Total 596.00

Type Aircraft - 2 EngineC-47

DC-3

Pilot	241.00	
Co-Pilot	243.00	Total 484.00

C-46

C-46 Commando

Pilot	75.00	
Co-Pilot	33.00	Total 108.00

B-25

Mitchell Bomber

Instructor Pilot	137.00	
Pilot	87.00	
Co-Pilot	11.00	Total 235.00

C-45

Twin Beechcraft

Pilot	57.30	
Co-Pilot	47.45	Total 105.15

Type Aircraft Single Engine

P-40

P-39

P-47

P-51

T-33 (Jet)

T-6 INSTRUCTOR PILOT

B-T 13A

Steerman

Approximately 1200,00 hours

Type Aircraft Civilian

Stenson Voyager

Tripacer

Cessna 172

Approximately 95.00 hours

In the process of checking out in the following:

T-29

Convair

U-3A

Cessna 310

Total Flying Time 30 September 1963

TOTAL - 4164:45

Instructor Time - 1126:15

Actual Weather Time - 678:00

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

# AREA FAMILIARIZATION TRAINING RECORD

(b)(6)

NAME	CREW POSITION	BASE	AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NUMBER	DATE
C DRIVER	TRAP/DF	Vo7	VTB	N7770B	SEPT 19 71
GRADING LEGEND: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard, <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete, <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Not applicable or not accomplished.					
1. MAPS				21. COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES	
2. WEIGHT & LOADING				22. INSTRUMENT APPROACHES ( )	
3. FIC BRIEFING				23. KNOWLEDGE OF:	
4. FLIGHT PLAN				A. ENROUTE AND AREA HAZARDS	
5. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)				B. EMERGENCY FACILITIES	
(EXTERIOR)				C. MINIMUM ENROUTE ALTITUDES	
6. ENGINE STARTING				D. SURVIVAL PROCEDURES	
7. TAXING				E. SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT	
8. USE OF BRAKES				F. LOST PROCEDURES	
9. ENGINE RUN UP				G. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES	
10. USE OF CHECK LIST				H. COMMUNICATIONS CODES	
11. CREW BRIEFING & TAKEOFF DATA				I. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE CHARTS	
12. AREA DEPARTURES				24. CREW COORDINATION	
13. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS				25. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP	
14. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK				26. JUDGEMENT	
15. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATIONS				27. SMOOTHNESS & COORDINATION	
16. RADIO NAVIGATION				28. ADHERENCE TO SOP	
17. D.R. NAVIGATION				29. CUSTOMER RELATIONS	
18. LOW & HIGH RECONNAISSANCE	NA			30.	
19. AREA ARRIVALS	NA			31.	
20. AIR DROPS : (FREE FALL)	NA			32.	
(CHUTES)	NA			33. TPE-331 START PROCEDURES (PC-6 & VTB)	

T/O's:							LDG's:																
SITES	NORMAL		X-WIND		STOL		BALKED		E/FAIL		TOTAL	SITES	NORMAL		X-WIND		STOL		BALKED		E/FAIL		TOTAL
	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S			I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	
Vo7		X										Vo7	X										
Vo7		DEM.										Vo7	DEM.										
Vo7		DEM.										Vo7	X										
Vo7		X										Vo7	X										
VII		X										VII	X										
V28		X										V28	X										

REMARKS: AC SPEED CONTROL POOR ON LDN.  
 V28 - SHOWING IMPROVEMENTAL BASICS  
 Vo7 LDN APP TO HIGH - ROTATED SLOW  
 VII - LEVEL OFF HIGH - DID NOT COMPENSATE FOR  
 X WIND UNTIL JUST PRIOR TO TOUCHDOWN  
 V28 - DOES NOT COORDINATE RUP REDUCTION  
 WITH ROTATION ON LANDING

AREA TRNG. & FAM.	PREV.	TODAY	TOTAL
BLK. TIME AT CONTROLS	5:50	3:00	8:5
BLK. TIME AS OBSERVER	11:31	37	19:0
TIME CHARGED TO TOTAL	16:21	3:37	20:5

INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN

DATE: 19 SEP 1971

MFD (REVIEW AND POSTING) DATE: APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:

# AREA FAMILIARIZATION TRAINING RECORD

□  
(b)(6)

NAME	CREW POSITION	BASE	AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NUMBER	DATE
C. DRIVER	CAPT T/AF	VN SGN	VTB	N7770B	16 SEPT 1971
GRADING LEGEND: [S] Completed to Standard, [I] Incomplete. [+ ] Not applicable or not accomplished.					
1. MAPS		X	21. COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES		
2. WEIGHT & LOADING		X	22. INSTRUMENT APPROACHES (2) ECA (V15)		
3. FIC BRIEFING		X	23. KNOWLEDGE OF: (V07)		
4. FLIGHT PLAN			A. ENROUTE AND AREA HAZARDS		*
5. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)		X	B. EMERGENCY FACILITIES		*
(EXTERIOR)		X	C. MINIMUM ENROUTE ALTITUDES		*
6. ENGINE STARTING			D. SURVIVAL PROCEDURES		
7. TAXING		X	E. SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT		
8. USE OF BRAKES		X	F. LOST PROCEDURES		
9. ENGINE RUN UP			G. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES		*
10. USE OF CHECK LIST		X	H. COMMUNICATIONS CODES		*
11. CREW BRIEFING & TAKEOFF DATA		X	I. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE CHARTS		
12. AREA DEPARTURES		X	24. CREW COORDINATION		
13. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS		X	25. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP		
14. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK		X	26. JUDGEMENT		*
15. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATIONS		X	27. SMOOTHNESS & COORDINATION		*
16. RADIO NAVIGATION		X	28. ADHERENCE TO SOP		*
17. D.R. NAVIGATION		X	29. CUSTOMER RELATIONS		*
18. LOW & HIGH RECONNAISSANCE	NA	X	30.		
19. AREA ARRIVALS		X	31.		
20. AIR DROPS: (FREE FALL)	NA	X	32.		
(CHUTES)	NA		33. TPE-331 START PROCEDURES (PC-6 & VTB)		

T/O's:							LDG's:						
SITES	NORMAL	X-WIND	STOL	BALKED	E/FAIL	TOTAL	SITES	NORMAL	X-WIND	STOL	BALKED	E/FAIL	TOTAL
	I	S	I	S	I	S		I	S	I	S	I	S
V07		DEMONSTRATED					V15	DEMONSTRATED					
L 5		DEMONSTRATED					V07	X					1
V07	X					1	V19	X					1
V19	X					1	V07	X					1
V07	X					1	V07	X					1
V07	X					1	V15	DEMONSTRATED					
V15	X					1	V04	X					1
V04	X					1	V07	X					1
V07	X					1	V06	DEMONSTRATED					
V06	DEMONSTRATED						V07	X					
						7							6

REMARKS: SEEMS to PICK UP DE. NAV WELL IN VN. - MAPS WELL ORGANIZED NEEDS CONCENTRATED INSTRUCTION IN ALL AREAS

AREA TRNG. & FAM.	PREV.	TODAY	TOTAL
BLK. TIME AT CONTROLS	5:50	5:50	5:50
BLK. TIME AS OBSERVER	9:31	2:00	11:3
TIME CHANGED TO TOTAL	7:50	19:2	

Notes: *Ch. Driver*

INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN

DATE: 14 SEP 1971 MFD (REVIEW AND POSTING) APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 19

# AREA FAMILIARIZATION TRAINING RECORD

(b)(6)

NAME	CREW POSITION	BASE	AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NUMBER	DATE
C DRIVER	TAF	Vo7	VTB	N7770 B	15 SEPT. 1971
GRADING LEGEND: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard, <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Not applicable or not accomplished.					
1. MAPS		X	21. COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES		
2. WEIGHT & LOADING		X	22. INSTRUMENT APPROACHES ( )		
3. FIC BRIEFING		X	23. KNOWLEDGE OF:		
4. FLIGHT PLAN		X	A. ENROUTE AND AREA HAZARDS		
5. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)		X	B. EMERGENCY FACILITIES		
(EXTERIOR)		X	C. MINIMUM ENROUTE ALTITUDES		
6. ENGINE STARTING		X	D. SURVIVAL PROCEDURES		
7. TAXING		X	E. SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT		
8. USE OF BRAKES		X	F. LOST PROCEDURES		
9. ENGINE RUN UP		X	G. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES		
10. USE OF CHECK LIST		X	H. COMMUNICATIONS CODES		
17 CREW BRIEFING & TAKEOFF DATA		X	I. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE CHARTS		
12. AREA DEPARTURES			24. CREW COORDINATION		
13. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS			25. GENERAL AIRMANSHP		
14. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK			26. JUDGEMENT		
15. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATIONS			27. SMOOTHNESS & COORDINATION		
16. RADIO NAVIGATION			28. ADHERENCE TO SOP		
17. D.R. NAVIGATION			29. CUSTOMER RELATIONS		
18. LOW & HIGH RECONNAISSANCE		NA	30.		
19. AREA ARRIVALS			31.		
20. AIR DROPS : (FREE FALL)		NA	32.		
(CHUTES)		NA	33. TPE-331 START PROCEDURES (PC-6 & VTB)		

T/O's:							LDG's:																
SITES	NORMAL		X-WIND		STOL		BALKED		E/FAIL		TOTAL	SITES	NORMAL		X-WIND		STOL		BALKED		E/FAIL		TOTAL
	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S			I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	
Vo7												V13											
V3												V07											
V07												V60											
V19												V28											
V21												V17											
V25																							

REMARKS: AF OUT OF Vo7-OBSERVED throughout flight

AREA TRNG. & FAM.	PREV.	TODAY	TOTA
BLK. TIME AT CONTROLS	:	:	:
BLK. TIME AS OBSERVER	4:38	4:53	9:3
TIME CHARGED TO	TOTAL	:	:

Physical Apr. 71

INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN

DATE 19 Sep 1971 MFD (REVIEW AND POSTING) DATE APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:

*Handwritten signature*

**AIR ASIA COMPANY LIMITED**

815 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N. W.  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

TELEPHONE 298-7840

[Redacted] (b)(6)

CABLE ADDRESS  
"AIRASIA"

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February 16, 1966  
**REC'D WAS FEB 24 1966**  
Ref.: WD-66-0852

Mr. Clarence N. Driver  
[Redacted]  
Los Angeles, California

Dear Mr. Driver:

This letter constitutes an offer of employment in the position of  
First Officer at a monthly salary of \$750.00

This offer is subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. Your possessing the necessary qualifications in our opinion for the above position being offered.
2. Completion to the satisfaction of the Company of such personal history checks as it may deem necessary or desirable.
3. Your satisfactorily passing a physical examination and meeting the physical requirements as set forth by the Company for the position offered to you.
4. Reporting for Duty:
  - (a) You will report for duty at Air Asia Company Limited  
46 Chung Shan Road North, Second Section, Taipei, Taiwan  
on or before 9 April 1966 or at such other place  
as you may subsequently be notified.
  - (b) Since you will travel by air and will have to adhere to the prescribed passenger baggage weight limitations, the Company will pay for the transportation by surface shipment of up to 2,500 pounds (7½ cubic tons or 300 cubic feet, depending upon the basis of computation) of your personal effects from your bona fide home or place of employment to your station of assignment. Any duty or customs' fees collectable on the shipment to or importation into a foreign country of your personal effects must be borne by you.

Salary:

Your salary will commence the day you start travel enroute to the place stated in paragraph 4(a) above, provided no undue or voluntary delays result enroute. Salary will be paid by U.S. Dollar check once a month.

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013



6. Term of Employment:

Subject to your satisfactory completion of the probationary period, as set forth in the Company's Personnel Manual, your employment will be for an indefinite period. If you fail to meet at any time any of the conditions set forth in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above, or if your services become excess to the needs of the Company, and your services are therefor terminated by the Company, you will be given two weeks advance notice, or pay in lieu of such notice, with return passage to Los Angeles, California.

If your services are terminated by the Company for any other reason you will be given return passage to Los Angeles, California. If, however, you resign prior to completion of at least three years of service, the Company will not be responsible for return passage for you or your dependents to Los Angeles, California or for the repatriation of your personal property.

7. Location:

Your initial assignment will be at Taipei, Taiwan ; however, our operations in conjunction with those of our associated companies normally extend throughout the Far East and sometimes to other locations and you will be subject to assignment to work with an associated company and to assignment to any point of operations required by the Company.

8. Transportation for Dependents:

Transportation for your dependents will be provided by the Company upon certification by your Supervisor that you have successfully completed a probationary period of such duration as the Company deems necessary to evaluate your performance and suitability. However, if you wish to bring your dependents with you, you may do so at your own expense. You will, however, be reimbursed by the Company for dependent travel only after certification by your Supervisor, as provided above, that you have successfully completed your probationary period. In either case only travel by Company authorized route will be provided or reimbursed and reimbursement will be only at authorized Company discount fares.

9. Company Personnel Manual:

The terms, conditions, and benefits relating to employment with the Company are set forth in its Personnel Manual. Except and unless expressly provided to the contrary herein, the provisions of the Personnel Manual control, and where not expressly contrary to the Personnel Manual the matters set forth herein which are covered in the Personnel Manual are subject to the provisions of the Personnel Manual relating hereto. The following generalize some of the benefits of employment with the Company:

- (a) Annual Leave: Two weeks annual leave with pay for each full year of service. Annual leave may be accrued up to a maximum of four weeks. Payment for unused annual leave will be made upon separation from employment for the convenience of the Company (without prejudice), or upon separation for any reason provided such separation takes place after completion of a full year of service.

- (b) Sick Leave: Two weeks sick leave per year. Unused sick leave is carried forward to the following year and is cumulative up to a maximum of sixty (60) days; however, no payment is made for unused sick leave.
- (c) Home Leave: After completion of three years service with the Company you will be entitled to ninety (90) days home leave with pay and transportation for you and your dependents to your bona fide home. Payment for accrued unused home leave will be made upon separation from employment in the event of termination of employment by the Company on a non-prejudice basis or upon termination for any reason after completion of two years continuous employment.

10. Personal Conduct:



We expect that personal conduct of our employees will reflect no discredit upon themselves, upon their fellow employees, or upon the Company. Excessive or even considerable use of intoxicants will not be permitted.

An employee's dependents for purposes of Company afforded travel referred to herein are his wife and children under eighteen years of age.

This letter constitutes the only authorized offer of employment to you from or on behalf of the Company. We have attempted to cover the general terms of your employment and some of the benefits which will result from your employment. As provided above, it is understood that the Personnel Manual (as it presently exists and as amended from time to time) is the final authority on details. It is an employee's privilege and responsibility to familiarize himself with the Company's Personnel Manual and the benefits provided therein.

If this offer of employment is acceptable to you, will you please indicate your acceptance by signing the enclosed copy hereof, as provided below, and returning that copy to us at the above letterhead address. This offer of employment shall remain in effect only for a period of thirty (30) days from the above date unless extended by written notice from me.

Very truly yours,

GAD.ed

I have read, understand, agree with, and accept the above offer of employment this 18 day of FEB, 196

Clarence N. Orme

# AREA FAMILY ARIZONIAN TRAINING RECORD

(b)(6)

NAME	CREW POSITION	BASE	AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NUMBER	DATE
DRIVER, C.	F/O	SVN	VTB-18	N3674G	13 SEP. 1971
GRADING LEGEND: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard, <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete.					
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Not applicable or not accomplished.					
1. MAPS			21. COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES		
2. WEIGHT & LOADING			22. INSTRUMENT APPROACHES ( )		
3. FIC BRIEFING			23. KNOWLEDGE OF:		
4. FLIGHT PLAN			A. ENROUTE AND AREA HAZARDS		
5. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)			B. EMERGENCY FACILITIES		
(EXTERIOR)			C. MINIMUM ENROUTE ALTITUDES		
6. ENGINE STARTING			D. SURVIVAL PROCEDURES		
7. TAXIING			E. SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT		
8. USE OF BRAKES			F. LOST PROCEDURES		
9. ENGINE RUN UP			G. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES		
10. USE OF CHECK LIST			H. COMMUNICATIONS CODES		
11. CREW BRIEFING & TAKEOFF DATA			I. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE CHARTS		
12. AREA DEPARTURES			24. CREW COORDINATION		
13. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS			25. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP		
14. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK			26. JUDGEMENT		
15. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATIONS			27. SMOOTHNESS & COORDINATION		
16. RADIO NAVIGATION			28. ADHERENCE TO SOP		
17. D.R. NAVIGATION			29. CUSTOMER RELATIONS		
18. LOW & HIGH RECONNAISSANCE			30.		
19. AREA ARRIVALS			31.		
20. AIR DROPS : (FREE FALL)			32.		
(CHUTES)			33. TPE-331 START PROCEDURES (PC-6 & VTB)		

T/O's:							LDG's:												
NORMAL		X-WIND		STOL		BALKED	E/FAIL		TOTAL	NORMAL		X-WIND		STOL		BALKED	E/FAIL		TOTAL
I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S

REMARKS: FIRST FLIGHT IN IX-CORPS AREA. DUE TO ROAD CONDITIONS, UNABLE TO PRACTICE T.O. & LANDINGS.

AREA TRNG. & FAM.	PREV.	TODAY	TOTAL
BLK. TIME AT CONTROLS	:	-	:
BLK. TIME AS OBSERVER	:	4:29	4:38
TIME CHARGED TO	:	:	:

Ac knowledge: *[Signature]*  
 Date: 27 Sept 1971

INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRM

DATE: 27 Sept 1971 MFD (REVIEW AND POSTING) APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 19 09-Dec-87 1 JAN 69

C06117143

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

# PILOT LIGHT CHECK RECORD

(REF. CHAPTER IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

DATE 15 Oct 1970

NAME <u>DRIVER, C.N.</u>		CREW POSITION <u>SIC</u>		BASE <u>VTE</u>	TIME <u>2:09</u>	TYPE OF CHECK <input type="checkbox"/> Proficiency <input type="checkbox"/> Evaluation <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Upgrading <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Recurrency <input type="checkbox"/> Type Rating		
AIRCRAFT TYPE <u>C123K</u>	AIRCRAFT NO. <u>554555</u>	LOCATION <u>VTE</u>	HOOD INST <u>045</u>	NIGHT <u>---</u>	BLOCK TIME <u>1:50</u>	GRADING LEGEND: 1. Well Above Average 2. Above Average 3. Average 4. Below Average 5. Unsatisfactory		
				1	2	3	4	5
1. EQUIPMENT TEST ORAL <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> WRITTEN <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>100%</u>								
2. PRE FLIGHT INSPECTION								
3. ENGINE STARTING PROCEDURES								
4. TAXIING								
5. ENGINE RUN UP								
6. PRE TAKE OFF CHECKS								
7. TAKEOFFS (NORMAL - <u>2</u> )								
(CROSSWIND - )								
(STOL - <u>1</u> ) <u>(4)</u>								
(REJECTED - )								
(ENGINE FAILURE - <u>1</u> )								
8. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES								
9. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS								
10. STEEP TURNS (45° BANK)								
11. STALLS- APPROACH TO STALLS								
12. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED								
13. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL UP								
14. ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE- FEATHERING								
15. PROPELLER UNFEATHERING								
16. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES								
17. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:								
FIRES- HEATER, CARGO, CABIN								
SMOKE REMOVAL								
ELECTRICAL FAILURES- FIRES								
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S) <u>Disc</u>								
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE								
FUEL DUMPING								
BRAKE FIRE								
EMERGENCY EVACUATION								
USE OF AIRBRAKES								
ABOVE CHECK CERTIFIED		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SATISFACTORY <input type="checkbox"/> UNSATISFACTORY		CHECK AIRMAN				

COMMENTS: EXPLANATION OF GRADES 1 AND 5, PLUS ANY OTHER COMMENTS

ACKNOWLEDGED an. Driver 15 Oct 70  
Signature Date

DATE <u>15 Oct 1970</u>	MFSD (REVIEW AND POSTING)	DATE
----------------------------	---------------------------	------

C06117144

PIL T FLIGHT CHECK RECORD

(b)(6)

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(REF. CHAPTER IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

DATE

19 SEPT

1969

NAME <b>DRIVER C.N</b>		CREW POSITION <b>PIC</b>			BASE <b>VTE</b>	FLT TIME <b>2:42</b>	TYPE OF CHECK <input type="checkbox"/> Proficiency <input type="checkbox"/> Evaluation <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Upgrading <input type="checkbox"/> Recurrency <input type="checkbox"/> Type Rating
AIRCRAFT TYPE <b>C-123</b>	AIRCRAFT NUMBER <b>556</b>	LOCATION <b>VTE</b>	HOOD/INST :	NIGHT :	BLOCK TIME <b>3:47</b>	GRADING LEGEND: 1. Well Above Average 2. Above Average 3. Average 4. Below Average 5. Unsatisfactory	

	1	2	3	4	5		1	2	3	4	5
1. EQUIPMENT TEST-ORAL <input type="checkbox"/> WRITTEN <input type="checkbox"/>			X			18. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION					X
2. PRE FLIGHT INSPECTION			X			19. HOLDING					X
3. ENGINE STARTING PROCEDURES			X			20. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF- 2 )			X		
4. TAXYING			X			(VOR- )					
5. ENGINE RUN-UP			X			(ILS- )					
6. PRE TAKE-OFF CHECKS			X			(GCA- )					
7. TAKEOFFS (NORMAL- 3 )			X			21. MISSED APPROACH			X		
(CROSSWIND- )			X			22. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES					X
(STOL- 1 )			X			23. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDING)			X		
(REJECTED- 1 )			X			24. LANDING (CIRCLING MIN- 1 )			X		
(ENGINE FAILURE- 1 )			X			(NORMAL- 3 )					
8. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES			X			(CROSSWIND- )					
9. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS			X			(ZERO FLAP- 1 )					X
10. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)			X			(ACCURACY/SPOT- 1 )					X
11. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS			X			(STOL- 1 )					X
12. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED			X			(NIGHT- )					
13. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP			X			(ENGINE(S) OUT- 1 )			X		
14. ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING			X			( )					
15. PROPELLER UNFEATHERING			X			( )					
16. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES			X			ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES/MANEUVERS:					
17. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:						25.					
FIRES-HEATER, CARGO, CABIN			X			26.					
SMOKE REMOVAL			X			27.					
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES			X			GENERAL COMPETENCY					
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)			X			28. COMMAND ABILITY			X		
HYDAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE			X			29. JUDGEMENT			X		
FUEL DUMPING						30. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION			X		
BRAKE FIRE						31. ADHERENCE TO SOP			X		
EMERGENCY EVACUATION											
USE OF AIRBRAKES											

ABOVE CHECK CERTIFIED  SATISFACTORY  
 UNSATISFACTORY

CHECK AIRMAN

COMMENTS: EXPLANATION OF GRADES 1 AND 5, PLUS ANY OTHER COMMENTS

MFD (REVIEW)

DATE

MFT (REVIEW AND POSTING)

DATE

*RCR*

26 SEPT 1969


196

DISTRIBUTION: 1 INDIV TNG FILE, VIA MFD; 2 MFT RECORDS; 3 DFD, VIA MFT

OP-373 17 JUN 66

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)



February 22, 1966

REC'D WAS FEB 24 1966

Air Asia Company, Ltd.  
815 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D. C. 20008

Attention:

Dear

Enclosed and signed is the original copy of the letters setting forth the terms and conditions of employment.

The passport pictures and signed necessary forms will be mailed to you next Monday. Physical, X-rays, shot record, etc. will follow approximately one week later.

I am having a little trouble with my present employer about the 9 April 1966 reporting date. They want to hold me to the terms of my contract which expires 25 April 1966. I will keep you closely advised and informed on this matter. Let me know your comments on this.

What is the normal length of the probationary period?


Are crew members paid additional expenses away from home, and how much?

What are the normal usual monthly deductions?

Will Federal Income Tax have to be paid on this money?

Please address all future correspondence to:

Clarence Driver  
  
Los Angeles, California 90043  
Phone:

Yours very truly,  
  
Clarence Driver

CD:et:i

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(REF. CHAPTER IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

DATE  
September 17, 1969

NAME <b>DRIVER, C. N.</b>		CREW POSITION <b>PIC</b>			BASE <b>VTE</b>	FLT TIME <b>1:56</b>	TYPE OF CHECK <input type="checkbox"/> Proficiency <input type="checkbox"/> Evaluation		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Upgrading <input type="checkbox"/> Recurrency <input type="checkbox"/> Type Rating	
AIRCRAFT TYPE <b>C123</b>	AIRCRAFT NUMBER <b>54617</b>	LOCATION <b>VTE</b>	HOOD/INST <b>0:40</b>	NIGHT ---	BLOCK TIME <b>2:05</b>	GRADING LEGEND: 1. Well Above Average 3. Average 2. Above Average 4. Below Average 5. Unsatisfactory				

	GRADE						GRADE				
	1	2	3	4	5		1	2	3	4	5
1. EQUIPMENT TEST-ORAL <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> WRITTEN <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <b>92%</b>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				18. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
2. PRE-FLIGHT INSPECTION		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				19. HOLDING					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
3. ENGINE STARTING PROCEDURES			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			20. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF- )					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
4. TAXYING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			(VOR- )					
5. ENGINE RUN-UP			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			(ILS- )					
6. PRE TAKE-OFF CHECKS				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		(GCA- )					
7. TAKEOFFS (NORMAL- )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			21. MISSED APPROACH					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
(CROSSWIND- )						22. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
(STOL- ) <b>(2)</b>						23. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDING)					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
(REJECTED- )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			24. LANDING (CIRCLING MIN- )					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
(ENGINE FAILURE- )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			(NORMAL- )					
8. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		(CROSSWIND- )					
9. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			(ZERO FLAP- )					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
10. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			(ACCURACY/SPOT- )					
11. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		(STOL- )					
12. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			(NIGHT- )					
13. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP						(ENGINE(S) OUT- )					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
14. ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			( )					
15. PROPELLER UNFEATHERING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			( )					
16. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES/MANEUVERS:					
17. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:						25.					
FIRES-HEATER, CARGO, CABIN			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			26.					
SMOKE REMOVAL			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			27.					
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			GENERAL COMPETENCY					
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			28. COMMAND ABILITY					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
HYDAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			29. JUDGEMENT					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FUEL DUMPING						30. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BRAKE FIRE			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			31. ADHERENCE TO SOP					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
EMERGENCY EVACUATION			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			A. Time pilot manipulated flight controls for purpose of flight check					<b>2:05</b>
USE OF AIRBRAKES			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			B. Flight time, this pilot, logged to company as non-revenue					<b>2:05</b>

ABOVE CHECK CERTIFIED  SATISFACTORY  
 UNSATISFACTORY

CHECK AIRMAN

COMMENTS: EXPLANATION OF GRADES 1 AND 5, PLUS ANY OTHER COMMENTS

MFD (REVIEW)	DATE	196	MFT (REVIEW AND POSTING)	DATE	196
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C06117146


APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

ATTACHMENT TO OPS 373 - C. N. Driver

The unsatisfactory upgrading check administered to C. N. Driver was debriefed in his presence with the Acting MFD/L, Capt. Randall.

The items 18 and 19 were terminated after departure when Capt. Driver levelled at assigned altitude and at no time, approximately 15 minutes after receiving clearance and takeoff, did he ascertain or recognize that the radio compass was in the antenna position. Although I was acting as his first officer, I turned the radios on and identified the station without instructions at any time as to how to set them. Several leading comments were made to help him realize his problem to no avail. He then demonstrated his lack of knowledge of the procedure to enter a holding pattern.

I recommend Link Training and a subsequent re-check by the AMFD/C123.





APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

PILOT FLIGHT CHECK RECORD

(b)(6)

(REF. CHAPTER IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

DATE  
**February 6, 1969** 196\_\_

TYPE OF CHECK  
 Proficiency  
 Evaluation  
 Upgrading  
 Recurrency  
 Type Rating

NAME <b>DRIVER, C. N.</b>		CREW POSITION <b>First Officer</b>		BASE <b>VTE</b>	FLT TIME <b>1:21</b>
AIRCRAFT TYPE <b>C-123</b>	AIRCRAFT NUMBER <b>564374</b>	LOCATION <b>VTE</b>	HOOD/INST <b>0:35</b>	NIGHT	BLOCK TIME <b>1:40</b>

GRADING LEGEND:  
 1. Well Above Average 3. Average  
 2. Above Average 4. Below Average  
 5. Unsatisfactory

	1	2	3	4	5		1	2	3	4	5
1. EQUIPMENT TEST-ORAL <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> WRITTEN <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			X			18. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION		X			
2. PRE-FLIGHT INSPECTION			X			19. HOLDING		X			
3. ENGINE STARTING PROCEDURES			X			20. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF- 1 )		X			
4. TAXYING			X			(VOR- ) (1)					
5. ENGINE RUN-UP			X			(ILS- )					
6. PRE TAKE-OFF CHECKS			X			(GCA- )					
7 TAKEOFFS (NORMAL- 3 )			X			21. MISSED APPROACH		X			
(CROSSWIND- 5 ) (5)			X			22. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES		X			
(STOL- 2 )			X			23. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDING)		X			
(REJECTED- )			X			24. LANDING (CIRCLING MIN- 1 )		X			
(ENGINE FAILURE- 1 )			X			(NORMAL- 1 ) (5)		X			
8. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES			X			(CROSSWIND- 5 )		X			
9. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS			X			(ZERO FLAP- 1 )		X			
10. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)			X			(ACCURACY/SPOT- 3 )		X			
11. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS			X			(STOL - 2 )		X			
12. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED			X			(NIGHT- )					
13. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP			X			(ENGINE(S) OUT- 1 )		X			
14. ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING			X			<b>Engine out go-around 1 )</b>		X			
15. PROPELLER UNFEATHERING			X			ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES/MANEUVERS:					
16. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES			X			25. <b>Air Drop Procedures</b>			X		
17. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:			X			26. <b>Fuel Management</b>			X		
FIRES-HEATER, CARGO, CABIN			X			27. <b>Angle of attack/Stall warning</b>			X		
-SMOKE REMOVAL			X			GENERAL COMPETENCY					
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES			X			28. COMMAND ABILITY		X			
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)			X			29. JUDGEMENT		X			
HYDAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE			X			30. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION		X			
FUEL DUMPING			X			31. ADHERENCE TO SOP		X			
BRAKE FIRE			X			A. Time pilot manipulated flight controls for purpose of flight check					1.98
EMERGENCY EVACUATION			X			B. Flight time, this pilot, logged to company as non-revenue					1.98
USE OF AIRBRAKES			X								

ABOVE CHECK CERTIFIED  SATISFACTORY  UNSATISFACTORY

CHECK AIRMAN [Signature]

COMMENTS: EXPLANATION OF GRADES 1 AND 5, PLUS ANY OTHER COMMENTS

**Well above average flight in all phases, especially so in view of the fact that he has not been in the aircraft for over one year. Overall pilot ability and much study on the aircraft systems and procedures evident throughout.**

DATE **8 Feb** 196**9** MFT (REVIEW AND POSTING) DATE 196\_\_

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE  
09-Dec-2013

# PILOT FLIGHT CHECK RECORD

(REF. CHAPTER IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

DATE 7 Sept 1972

NAME <u>DRIVER, C.N.</u>		CREW POSITION <u>SIC</u>		BASE <u>VTE</u>	FLT. TIME <u>1:37</u>	TYPE OF CHECK <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Proficiency <input type="checkbox"/> Evaluation <input type="checkbox"/> Upgrading <input type="checkbox"/> Recurrency <input type="checkbox"/> Type Rating	
AIRCRAFT TYPE <u>C123K</u>	AIRCRAFT NO. <u>545</u>	LOCATION <u>VTE</u>	HOOD INST <u>:35</u>	NIGHT <u>—</u>	BLOCK TIME <u>2:04</u>	GRADING LEGEND: 1. Well Above Average 2. Above Average 3. Average 4. Below Average 5. Unsatisfactory	

	1	2	3	4	5		1	2	3	4	5
1. EQUIPMENT TEST ORAL <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> WRITTEN <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			X	X		18. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION				X	
2. PRE FLIGHT INSPECTION			X	X		19. HOLDING				X	
3. ENGINE STARTING PROCEDURES			X	X		20. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF- / )				X	
4. TAXIING			X	X		<u>TACAN</u> (R- / )				X	
5. ENGINE RUN UP			X	X		(ILS- )				X	
6. PRE TAKE OFF CHECKS			X	X		(GCA- )				X	
7. TAKEOFFS (NORMAL- / )			X	X		21. MISSED APPROACH			X		
(CROSSWIND- / )			X	X		22. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES			X	X	
(STOL- )			X	X		23. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDING)			X	X	
(REJECTED- )			X	X		24. LANDING (CIRCLING MIN- / )			X	X	
(ENGINE FAILURE- / )			X	X		(NORMAL- / )			X	X	
8. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES			X	X		(CROSSWIND- / )			X	X	
9. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS			X	X		(ZERO FLAP- / )			X	X	
10. STEEP TURNS (45° BANK)			X	X		(ACCURACY/SPOT- / )			X	X	
11. STALLS-APPROACH TO STALLS			X	X		(STOL- )			X	X	
12. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED			X	X		(NIGHT- )			X	X	
13. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL UP			X	X		(ENGINE(S) OUT- / )			X	X	
14. ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING			X	X		( )			X	X	
15. PROPELLER UNFEATHERING			X	X		( )			X	X	
16. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES			X	X		ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES/MANEUVERS:			X	X	
17. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:			X	X		25.			X	X	
FIRES-HEATER, CARGO, CABIN			X	X		26.			X	X	
SMOKE REMOVAL			X	X		27.			X	X	
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES			X	X		GENERAL COMPETENCY			X	X	
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)			X	X		28. COMMAND ABILITY			X	X	
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE			X	X		29. JUDGEMENT			X	X	
FUEL DUMPING			X	X		30. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION			X	X	
BRAKE FIRE			X	X		31. ADHERENCE TO SOP			X	X	
EMERGENCY EVACUATION			X	X		Time Pilot Manipulated Flt Controls for Purpose of Flt Check			X	X	
USE OF AIRBRAKES			X	X		Flight Time, This Pilot, Logged to Company as Non-revenue			X	X	

ABOVE CHECK CERTIFIED  SATISFACTORY  UNSATISFACTORY

CHECK AIRMAN

COMMENTS: EXPLANATION OF GRADES 1 AND 5, PLUS ANY OTHER C

PHY EXPIRES: 31 OCT 72

ACKNOWLEDGED C.N. Driver DATE 7 Sept. 72

MFD (REVIEW)	DATE	MFS (REVIEW AND POSTING)	DATE
	<u>7 Sept 1972</u>		<u>7 Sept 1972</u>

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

**AIR ASIA COMPANY LIMITED**

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46 Chung Shan Road, North, 2nd Section  
Taipei, Taiwan

17 May 1966

Secretary and General Manager  
United States Officers' Open Mess  
Taipei, Taiwan

Attention:

Dear Sir:

In accordance with the understanding of 15 April 1964 regarding temporary membership to the United States Officers' Open Mess, Taipei for certain employees of this Company and affiliated or subsidiary and associated companies, CLARENCE N. DRIVER has been advised of the rules and regulations of the Mess and the personal conduct expected of Mr. Driver and his dependents should they be permitted the privilege of using Mess facilities. If Mr. Driver qualifies for temporary membership according to the regulations of the Mess, this letter may be taken as our endorsement of application for such membership.

Sincerely yours,

for Director of Personnel

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE  
09-Dec-2013

# PILOT FLIGHT CHECK RECORD

(REF. CHAPTER IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

DATE 7 Sept 1972

NAME <b>DRIVER, C.N.</b>		CREW POSITION <b>SIC</b>		BASE <b>VTE</b>	FLT. TIME <b>1:37</b>	TYPE OF CHECK <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Proficiency <input type="checkbox"/> Evaluation <input type="checkbox"/> Upgrading <input type="checkbox"/> Recurrency <input type="checkbox"/> Type Rating	
AIRCRAFT TYPE <b>C123K</b>	AIRCRAFT NO. <b>545</b>	LOCATION <b>VTE</b>	HOOD INST <b>:35</b>	NIGHT <b>—</b>	BLOCK TIME <b>2:04</b>	GRADING LEGEND: 1. Well Above Average 3. Average 2. Above Average 4. Below Average 5. Unsatisfactory	

	GRADE						GRADE				
	1	2	3	4	5		1	2	3	4	5
1. EQUIPMENT TEST ORAL <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> WRITTEN <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			X			18. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION			X		
2. PRE FLIGHT INSPECTION			X			19. HOLDING			X		
3. ENGINE STARTING PROCEDURES			X			20. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF- / )			X		
4. TAXING			X			TACAN/DOR- / )			X		
5. ENGINE RUN UP			X			(ILS- )			X		
6. PRE TAKE OFF CHECKS			X			(GCA- )			X		
7. TAKEOFFS (NORMAL- / )			X			21. MISSED APPROACH			X		
(CROSSWIND- / )			X			22. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES			X		
(STOL- )			X			23. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDING)			X		
(REJECTED- )			X			24. LANDING (CIRCLING MIN- / )			X		
(ENGINE FAILURE- / )			X			(NORMAL- / )			X		
8. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES			X			(CROSSWIND- / )			X		
9. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS			X			(ZERO FLAP- / )			X		
10. STEEP TURNS (45° BANK)			X			(ACCURACY/SPOT- / )			X		
11. STALLS-APPROACH TO STALLS			X			(STOL- )			X		
12. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED			X			(NIGHT- )			X		
13. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL UP			X			(ENGINE(S) OUT- / )			X		
14. ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING			X			( )			X		
15. PROPELLER UNFEATHERING			X			( )			X		
16. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES			X			ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES/MANEUVERS:			X		
17. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:			X			25.			X		
FIRES-HEATER, CARGO & CABIN			X			26.			X		
SMOKE REMOVAL			X			27.			X		
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES			X			GENERAL COMPETENCY			X		
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)			X			28. COMMAND ABILITY			X		
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE			X			29. JUDGEMENT			X		
FUEL DUMPING			X			30. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION			X		
BRAKE FIRE			X			31. ADHERENCE TO SOP			X		
EMERGENCY EVACUATION			X			Time Pilot Manipulated Flt Controls for Purpose of Flt Check			X		
USE OF AIRBRAKES			X			Flight Time, This Pilot, Logged to Company as Non-revenue			X		

ABOVE CHECK CERTIFIED  SATISFACTORY  UNSATISFACTORY

CHECK AIRMAN \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: EXPLANATION OF GRADES 1 AND 5, PLUS ANY OTHER COMMENTS

**PHY EXPIRES: 31 OCT 72**

**ACKNOWLEDGED C.N. Driver DATE 7 Sept. 72**

MFD (REVIEW)	DATE	MFSD (REVIEW AND POSTING)	DATE
	<u>7 Sept 1972</u>		<u>7 Sept 1972</u>

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

PERSONNEL DIVISION  
ORIENTATION SLIP

NAME: DRIVER, Clarence N. TITLE: First Officer STATION: \_\_\_\_\_

The above named employee is required to report to the Officers and/or Division Directors indicated below for initial orientation:

	Signature	Date
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Passport & Visa Section	[Redacted]	May 18, 1966
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Chief, Medical Department	[Signature]	18 May 66
<input type="checkbox"/> President	_____	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Assistant Vice President	_____	_____
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Vice President - Flight Operations / E.E. PECH	[Signature]	18 May
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Operations Statistics - K. K. Wong	[Signature]	E 18
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Director of Security	[Redacted]	5/23/66
<input type="checkbox"/> Vice President - Traffic & Sales	_____	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Legal Counsel	_____	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Treasurer-Controller	_____	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Vice President - General Affairs	_____	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Vice President - Technical Services	_____	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Office - Tainan	_____	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Regional Director - Tainan	_____	_____
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Director of Personnel	[Signature]	5/10

NOTE: Upon completion of orientation this form should be returned to PND.

This is to confirm that I have completely read the chapters pertaining to any terms of employment in the Personnel Manual. I understand that the Personnel Manual is subject to periodic revisions, and I will undertake to become knowledgeable with regard to the revisions.

Signature: Clarence N. Driver  
Date: 18 May 1966

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

# PILOT FLIGHT CHECK RECORD

(REF. CHAPTER IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

DATE  
**2 DEC 1971**

NAME		CREW POSITION		BASE	FLT TIME	TYPE OF CHECK								
DRIVER, C		F/O		VTE	155	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Proficiency	<input type="checkbox"/> Evaluation	<input type="checkbox"/> Upgrading	<input type="checkbox"/> Recurrency					
AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NO.	LOCATION	HOOD INST	NIGHT	BLOCK TIME	GRADING LEGEND:								
C123K	386	VTE	0+55	—	2705	1. Well Above Average	2. Above Average	3. Average	4. Below Average					
				1	2	3	4	5						
1. EQUIPMENT TEST ORAL <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> WRITTEN <input type="checkbox"/>									18. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION					
2. PRE FLIGHT INSPECTION									19. HOLDING					
3. ENGINE STARTING PROCEDURES :									20. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF - 1 )					
4. TAXIING									(VOR - )					
5. ENGINE RUN UP									TACAN <del>415</del> ①					
6. PRE TAKE OFF CHECKS									(GCA - )					
7. TAKEOFFS (NORMAL - 1 )									21. MISSED APPROACH					
(CROSSWIND - 3 )		④							22. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES					
(STOL - 3 )									23. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDING )					
(REJECTED - )									24. LANDING (CIRCLING MIN - )					
(ENGINE FAILURE - )									(NORMAL - )					
8. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES									(CROSSWIND - 3 )					
9. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS									(ZERO FLAP - 1 )					
10. STEEP TURNS (45° BANK)									(ACCURACY/SPOT - 2 ) ④					
11. STALLS - APPROACH TO STALLS									(STOL - )					
12. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED									(NIGHT - )					
13. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL UP									(ENGINE(S) OUT - 1 )					
14. ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE - FEATHERING									( )					
15. PROPELLER UNFEATHERING									( )					
16. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES									ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES/MANEUVERS:					
17. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES :									25.					
FIRES-HEATER, CARGO, CABIN									26.					
SMOKE REMOVAL									27.					
ELECTRICAL FAILURES - FIRES									GENERAL COMPETENCY					
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)									28. COMMAND ABILITY					
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE									29. JUDGEMENT					
FUEL DUMPING									30. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION					
BRAKE FIRE									31. ADHERENCE TO SOP					
EMERGENCY EVACUATION									Time Pilot Manipulated Flt Controls for Purpose of Flt Check					
USE OF AIRBRAKES									Flight Time, This Pilot, Logged to Company as Non-revenue					
ABOVE CHECK-CERTIFIED		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SATISFACTORY <input type="checkbox"/> UNSATISFACTORY		CHECK AIRMAN										
COMMENTS: EXPLANATION OF GRADES 1 AND 5, PLUS ANY OTHER COMMENTS														
VERY SMOOTH, WELL AHEAD OF ACFT ON ALL MANUEVERS						2 DEC 71 <i>C. Driver</i> DATE								
MFD (REVIEW)	DATE			MFS (REVIEW AND POSTING)	DATE									
	4 Dec 1971							1971						

C06117154

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

# PILOT LIGHT CHECK RECORD

(b)(6)

(REF. CHAPTER IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

DATE  
**17 OCT 1971**

NAME		CREW POSITION		BASE	FLT TIME	TYPE OF CHECK						
DRIVER, C.N.		T CAPT.		VO1		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Proficiency	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Upgrading					
						<input type="checkbox"/> Evaluation	<input type="checkbox"/> Recurrency					
						<input type="checkbox"/> Type Rating						
AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NO.	LOCATION	HOOD INST	NIGHT	BLOCK TIME	GRADING LEGEND:		3	4	5		
VTB	N9518Z	SGN	0:50	-	2:17	1. Well Above Average	2. Above Average	3. Average	4. Below Average	5. Unsatisfactory		
								1	2	3	4	5
1. EQUIPMENT TEST ORAL <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> WRITTEN <input type="checkbox"/>						18. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION						
2. PRE FLIGHT INSPECTION						19. HOLDING						
3. ENGINE STARTING PROCEDURES						20. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF - 1 )						
4. TAXIING						(VOR - )						
5. ENGINE RUN UP						(Loc) (ILS - 1 )						
6. PRE TAKE OFF CHECKS						(GCA - )						
7. TAKEOFFS (NORMAL - ) 1						21. MISSED APPROACH						
(CROSSWIND - ) 2						22. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES						
(STOL - ) 1						23. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDING 2 )						
(REJECTED - ) 1						24. LANDING (CIRCLING MIN - 2 )						
(ENGINE FAILURE - ) 1						(NORMAL - 1 )						
8. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES						(CROSSWIND - 2 (8))						
9. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS						(ZERO FLAP - 1 )						
10. STEEP TURNS (45° BANK)						(ACCURACY/SPOT - )						
11. STALLS - APPROACH TO STALLS						(STOL - 1 )						
12. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED						(NIGHT - )						
13. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL UP						(ENGINE(S) OUT - 2 )						
14. ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE - FEATHERING						( )						
15. PROPELLER UNFEATHERING						( )						
16. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES						ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES/MANEUVERS:						
17. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:						25. FUEL SYSTEM MANAGEMENT						
FIRES - HEATER, CARGO, CABIN						26.						
SMOKE REMOVAL						27.						
ELECTRICAL FAILURES - FIRES						GENERAL COMPETENCY						
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S) 1						28. COMMAND ABILITY						
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE						29. JUDGEMENT						
FUEL DUMPING						30. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION						
BRAKE FIRE						31. ADHERENCE TO SOP						
EMERGENCY EVACUATION						Time Pilot Manipulated Flt Controls for Purpose of Flt Check						2:17
USE OF AIRBRAKES						Flight Time, This Pilot Logged to Company of Non-revenue						2:17
ABOVE CHECK CERTIFIED		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SATISFACTORY				CHECK AIRMAN						
		<input type="checkbox"/> UNSATISFACTORY										

COMMENTS: EXPLANATION OF GRADES 1 AND 5, PLUS ANY OTHER COMMENTS. **SHOWS SOME WEAKNESS IN FUEL SYS. MANAGEMENT. NEED TO WORK ON COMMAND ABILITY. SHOULD BE POSITIVE IN DECISIONS AND ACTIONS. C.N. DRIVER RELEASED AS PIC AND RECOMMEND AN ADDITIONAL SPOT CHECK AFTER 100 HR PIC BUT NOT TO EXCEED 90 DAYS. ALSO RECOMMEND RESTRICTING PIC FROM THE FOLLOWING FIELDS WITHOUT SUPERVISORY PILOT UNTIL COMPLETION OF 100 HR PIC.**  
 Acknowledged: C.N. Driver  
 Date: 17 OCT '71  
 V260-V202-V53

MFD (REVIEW)	DATE	MFSD (REVIEW AND POSTING)	DATE
	18 Oct 1971		1971

C06117156

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013



(b)(6)

REG J WAS <sup>AMD</sup> AUG 27 1966


TO : Mr. C. H. Driver  
First Officer, Flying Division  
via MFD, GML, VPFO, DFD

DATE : August 22, 1966

REF.NO.: PND-ES-66/7095

Dear Mr. Driver:

This is to advise that you successfully completed your Probationary Period of employment with the Company on August 14, 1966.



for Director of Personnel

cc: P/File  
✓ Assistant for Personnel via MGDR, President  
CAPD  
D/RAD  
PMBKK  
E/S

PD-165



06117159

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

# PILOT LIGHT CHECK RECORD

(b)(6)

(REF. CHAPTER IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

DATE  
10 SEPT. 1971

NAME		CREW POSITION		BASE	FLT TIME	TYPE OF CHECK						
C DRIVER		SIC		SGN	2:04	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Proficiency	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Upgrading					
						<input type="checkbox"/> Evaluation	<input type="checkbox"/> Recurrency					
						<input type="checkbox"/> Type Rating						
AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NO.	LOCATION	HOOD INST	NIGHT	BLOCK TIME	GRADING LEGEND:						
VTB	777	SGN	45		2:20	1. Well Above Average	3. Average					
						2. Above Average	4. Below Average					
							5. Unsatisfactory					
			1	2	3	4	5					
1. EQUIPMENT TEST ORAL <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> WRITTEN <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>								18. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION				
2. PRE FLIGHT INSPECTION								19. HOLDING				
3. ENGINE STARTING PROCEDURES								20. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF - 1)				
4. TAXIING								(VOR - 1)				
5. ENGINE RUN UP								(ILS - 1)				
6. PRE TAKE OFF CHECKS								(GCA - 1)				
7. TAKEOFFS (NORMAL - 1)								21. MISSED APPROACH				
(CROSSWIND - 5)								22. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES				
(STOL - )								23. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDING 1)				
(REJECTED - 1)								24. LANDING (CIRCLING MIN - 1)				
(ENGINE FAILURE - 1)								(NORMAL - 1)				
8. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES								(CROSSWIND - 1)				
9. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS								(ZERO FLAP - )				
10. STEEP TURNS (45° BANK)								(ACCURACY/SPOT - )				
11. STALLS-APPROACH TO STALLS								(STOL - )				
12. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED								(NIGHT - )				
13. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL UP								(ENGINE(S) OUT - 1)				
14. ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE - FEATHERING												
15. PROPELLER UNFEATHERING												
16. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES								ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES/MANEUVERS:				
17. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:								25. H.P. STAPLES				
FIRES-HEATER, CARGO, CABIN								26.				
SMOKE REMOVAL								27.				
ELECTRICAL FAILURES - FIRES								GENERAL COMPETENCY				
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)								28. COMMAND ABILITY				
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE								29. JUDGEMENT				
FUEL DUMPING								30. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION				
BRAKE FIRE								31. ADHERENCE TO SOP				
EMERGENCY EVACUATION								Time Pilot Manipulated Flt Controls for Purpose of Flt Check				
USE OF AIRBRAKES								Flight Time, This Pilot, Logged to Company as Non-revenue				

ABOVE CHECK CERTIFIED  SATISFACTORY  
 UNSATISFACTORY

CHECK AIRMAN

COMMENTS: EXPLANATION OF GRADES 1 AND 5, PLUS ANY OTHER COMMENTS  
SIC QUALIFIED - NEEDS ADF PRACTICE - RECOMMEND 5 HOURS LINK  
RECOMMEND SIC FLIGHTS TO LEARN COUNTRY BEFORE ILC TRAINING  
Date of last physical: RPR 1971

Acknowledged: *[Signature]*  
Date: 10 Sep 71

MED (REVIEW)	DATE	MFSD (REVIEW AND POSTING)	DATE
	11 Sep 71		1971

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

PILOT FLIGHT CHECK RECORD

(REF. CHAPTER IX, OPERATORS' MANUAL)

C(6)(8)

DATE 16 NOV 1967

NAME <u>DRIVER, C.A.</u>	CREW POSITION <u>PIC</u>	BASE <u>VTE</u>	FLT TIME <u>2:21</u>	TYPE OF CHECK <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Proficiency <input type="checkbox"/> Evaluation	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Upgrading <input type="checkbox"/> Recurrency <input type="checkbox"/> Type Rating
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AIRCRAFT TYPE <u>PC-6A</u>	AIRCRAFT NUMBER <u>N197X</u>	LOCATION <u>VTE</u>	HOOD/INST <u>1:50</u>	NIGHT <u>-</u>	BLOCK TIME <u>2:58</u>	GRADING LEGEND: 1. Well Above Average 2. Above Average 3. Average 4. Below Average 5. Unsatisfactory
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	1	2	3	4	5		1	2	3	4	5
1. EQUIPMENT TEST-ORAL <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> WRITTEN <input type="checkbox"/>			X			18. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION			X		
2. PRE-FLIGHT INSPECTION			X			19. HOLDING			X		
3. ENGINE STARTING PROCEDURES			X			20. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF- / )			X		
4. TAXYING			X			(VOR- )					
5. ENGINE RUN-UP			X			(ILS- )					
6. PRE TAKE-OFF CHECKS			X			(GCA- )					
7. TAKEOFFS (NORMAL- 1 ) 2			X			21. MISSED APPROACH			X		
(CROSSWIND- 2 )			X			22. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES			X		
(STOL- 1 )			X			23. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDING)			X		
(REJECTED- )						24. LANDING (CIRCLING MIN- / )			X		
(ENGINE FAILURE- )						(NORMAL- / ) 2			X		
8. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES			X			(CROSSWIND- 2 )			X		
9. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS			X			(ZERO FLAP- / )			X		
10. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)			X			(ACCURACY/SPOT- / )			X		
11. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS			X			(STOL- / )			X		
12. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED			X			(NIGHT- )					
13. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP			X			(ENGINE(S) OUT- )					
14. ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING			X			( )					
15. PROPELLER UNFEATHERING			X			( )					
16. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES			X			ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES/MANEUVERS:					
17. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:						25.					
FIRES-HEATER, CARGO, CABIN			X			26.					
SMOKE REMOVAL			X			27.					
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES			X			GENERAL COMPETENCY					
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)			X			28. COMMAND ABILITY			X		
HYDAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE			X			29. JUDGEMENT			X		
FUEL DUMPING						30. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION			X		
BRAKE FIRE			X			31. ADHERENCE TO SOP			X		
EMERGENCY EVACUATION			X			A. Time pilot manipulated flight controls for purpose of flight check			2	3	
USE OF AIRBRAKES						B. Flight time, this pilot, logged to company as non-revenue			2	3	

ABOVE CHECK CERTIFIED  SATISFACTORY  UNSATISFACTORY

CHECK AIRMAN \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: EXPLANATION OF GRADES 1 AND 5, PLUS ANY OTHER COMMENTS

LICENSE DATA: ATR #477924 MEL, 202,440<sup>00</sup> COMM. FUEL. SUEL, 707/320, C-123

PHYSICAL EXAM 10 JUNE 67

A GOOD AVERAGE PILOT. HAS GOOD AVIATION KNOWLEDGE AND FLYING ABILITY AND SHOULD BE ABOVE AVERAGE WITH A LITTLE MORE EXPERIENCE IN THE PC-6A.

MFD (REVIEW)	DATE	MFT (REVIEW AND POSTING)	DATE
	196		196

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

PILOT FLIGHT CHECK RECORD  
(REF. CHAPTER IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

*DUE JULY*  
DATE  
*17 AUGUST 1967*

NAME		CREW POSITION		BASE	FLT TIME	TYPE OF CHECK		GRADING LEGEND:							
<i>DRIVER, C.A.</i>		<i>SIC</i>		<i>VTE</i>	<i>1:23</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Proficiency	<input type="checkbox"/> Upgrading								
AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NUMBER	LOCATION	HOOD/INST	NIGHT	BLOCK TIME	<input type="checkbox"/> Evaluation	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Recurrency								
<i>C-123B</i>	<i>54-655</i>	<i>VTE</i>	<i>1:10</i>	<i>---</i>	<i>1:30</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Type Rating									
						1. Well Above Average		3. Average		5. Unsatisfactory					
						2. Above Average		4. Below Average							
						1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
1. EQUIPMENT TEST-ORAL <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> WRITTEN <input type="checkbox"/>							<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				18. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION				
2. PRE FLIGHT INSPECTION								<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			19. HOLDING				
3. ENGINE STARTING PROCEDURES								<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			20. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF- <i>1</i> )				
4. TAXIING								<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			(VOR- )				
5. ENGINE RUN-UP								<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			(ILS- )				
6. PRE TAKE-OFF CHECKS								<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			(GCA- )				
7. TAKEOFFS (NORMAL- <i>1</i> ) <i>2</i>								<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			21. MISSED APPROACH				
(CROSSWIND- <i>2</i> )								<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			22. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES				
(STOL- )											23. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDING)				
(REJECTED- )											24. LANDING (CIRCLING MIN- <i>1</i> ) <i>2</i>				
(ENGINE FAILURE- <i>1</i> )							<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				(NORMAL- )				
8. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES								<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			(CROSSWIND- )				
9. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS							<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				(ZERO FLAP- <i>1</i> )				
10. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)								<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			(ACCURACY/SPOT- )				
11. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS								<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			(STOL- )				
12. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED								<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			(NIGHT- )				
13. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP							<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				(ENGINE(S) OUT- <i>1</i> )				
14. ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING							<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				( )				
15. PROPELLER UNFEATHERING							<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				( )				
16. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES						<del>-----</del>					ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES/MANEUVERS:				
17. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:						<del>-----</del>					25.				
FIRES-HEATER, CARGO, CABIN								<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			26.				
SMOKE REMOVAL								<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			27.				
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES							<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				GENERAL COMPETENCY				
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)								<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			28. COMMAND ABILITY				
HYDAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE							<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				29. JUDGEMENT				
FUEL DUMPING								<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			30. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION				
BRAKE FIRE								<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			31. ADHERENCE TO SOP				
EMERGENCY EVACUATION								<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>							
USE OF AIRBRAKES								<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>							

ABOVE CHECK CERTIFIED  SATISFACTORY  UNSATISFACTORY

COMMENTS: EXPLANATION OF GRADES 1 AND 5, PLUS ANY OTHER COMMENTS FOR TIME 6490 FAR PHYS CL-1. 08-16-67. FAA RTA 477924 AMEL MARTIN 202/NUD/COMM PRIN ASMBL BOWENS 207/720/FAIRCHILD C-123 - VEGY  
Good flight. Fairchild C-123 type issued on this flight.

MFD (REVIEW) [ ] DATE *15 AUG 1967* MFT (REVIEW AND POSTING) [ ] DATE *1967*

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

PI JT FLIGHT CHECK REC RD

(REF. CHAPTER IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

(79) C 266 (b)(6)

DATE  
30 JUNE 1968

NAME DRIVER, C.N.		CREW POSITION CAPTAIN		BASE VTE	FLT TIME 1:53	TYPE OF CHECK <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Proficiency <input type="checkbox"/> Evaluation		<input type="checkbox"/> Upgrading <input type="checkbox"/> Recurrency <input type="checkbox"/> Type Rating	
AIRCRAFT TYPE PC-6	AIRCRAFT NUMBER N196X	LOCATION VTE	HOOD/INST :	NIGHT :	BLOCK TIME 2:00	GRADING LEGEND: 1. Well Above Average 3. Average 2. Above Average 4. Below Average 5. Unsatisfactory			

	1	2	3	4	5		1	2	3	4	5
1. EQUIPMENT TEST-ORAL <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> WRITTEN <input type="checkbox"/>			X			18. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION			X		
2. PRE-FLIGHT INSPECTION			X			19. HOLDING			X		
3. ENGINE STARTING PROCEDURES			X			20. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF- 2 )			X		
4. TAXYING			X			(VOR- )					
5. ENGINE RUN-UP			X			(ILS- )					
6. PRE TAKE-OFF CHECKS			X			(GCA- )					
7. TAKEOFFS (NORMAL- )						21. MISSED APPROACH 1			X		
(CROSSWIND- 7 } 8			X			22. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES			X		
(STOL- 3 } 8			X			23. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDING) 3			X		
(REJECTED- 3 } 8			X			24. LANDING (CIRCLING MIN- 1 )			X		
(ENGINE FAILURE- )		X				(NORMAL- )					
8. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES			X			(CROSSWIND- )					
9. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS			X			(ZERO FLAP- )					
10. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)			X			(ACCURACY/SPOT- 7 } 8			X		
11. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS			X			(STOL- )			X		
12. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED			X			(NIGHT- )					
13. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP			X			(ENGINE(S) OUT- 4 )			X		
14. ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING ORAL			X			( )					
15. PROPELLER UNFEATHERING ORAL			X			( )					
16. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES			X			ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES/MANEUVERS:					
17. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:						25. USE OF BETA MODE			X		
FIRES-HEATER, CARGO, CABIN			X			26.					
SMOKE REMOVAL			X			27.					
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES			X			GENERAL COMPETENCY					
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)			X			28. COMMAND ABILITY			X		
HYDAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE N/A						29. JUDGEMENT			X		
FUEL DUMPING N/A						30. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION			X		
BRAKE FIRE			X			31. ADHERENCE TO SOP			X		
EMERGENCY EVACUATION			X								
USE OF AIRBRAKES N/A											

ABOVE CHECK CERTIFIED  SATISFACTORY  UNSATISFACTORY

CHECK AIRMAN [REDACTED]

COMMENTS: EXPLANATION OF GRADES 1 AND 5, PLUS ANY OTHER COMMENTS

① CAPT. DRIVERS KNOWLEDGE OF PC-60 A/C HAS IMPROVED REMARKABLY

② BETA MODE & USE IS NO LONGER A MYSTERY TO DRIVER.

RELEASED FOR FURTHER UP-COUNTRY TRAINING

THIS WAS AN INTERIM CHECK.

DATE 4 July 1968	MFT (REVIEW AND POSTING)	DATE 1968
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DRIVER CN

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION - FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

THIS LICENSE IS VALID FOR THE HOLDER THAT

IV. CLARENCE NESBIT DRIVER  
 V. C/O AIR AMERICA, INC.  
 APO SAN FRANCISCO 96352

DATE OF BIRTH: 03-07-21    HEIGHT: 68 IN.    WEIGHT: 198    HAIR: BROWN    EYES: BROWN    SEX: M    NATIONALITY: VI. USA

IX. HAS BEEN FOUND TO BE PROPERLY QUALIFIED TO EXERCISE THE PRIVILEGES OF

II. AIRLINE TRANSPORT PILOT RATINGS AND LIMITATIONS

XII. AIRPLANE MULTIENGINE LAND: MARTIN 202-440  
 COMM PRIV. AIRPLANE SINGLE ENGINE LAND: BOEING 707-720 FAIRCHILD C-123B

III. CERT. NO. 477924

XIII. SIGNATURE OF HOLDER: *Clarence N. Driver*

X. ADMINISTRATOR: [Redacted]

DATE OF ISSUE: 08-15-67

AC FORM 1800-2 (4-67)

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

AFR 55-22  
AR 95-20  
NAVAIRINST 3710.1A  
DSAR 8210.1

8 October 1971

FORMAT FOR  
REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF CONTRACTOR FLIGHT CREWMEMBER

SUBJECT: Request for Approval of Contractor Flight Crewmember

TO: Government Flight Representative

I. I have verified the records of C.N. Driver (Crewmember's Name) and it is requested that he be approved as a (Crewmember) for ~~unapproved~~ functional (delete one not appropriate) flights in C-123K type aircraft.

[Redacted Signature Box]

(Signature of Contractor's  
Requesting Official and Date)

1 Attachment  
DD Form 1821

[Redacted Name Box]

(Typed Name of Contractor's  
Requesting Official)

II. I certify that C.N. Driver has satisfactorily flown a proficiency flight check on 2 December 1971 (Date)

[Signature]

(Signature of Instr Pilot/Flt  
Examiner)

III.  Approved

[Redacted Signature Box]

(Signature of Government Flight  
Representative)

Disapproved

(Type Name of Government Flight  
Representative)

31 Jul 72  
(Date)

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

# PILOTS FLIGHT RECORD FORM

NAME: DRIVER, C. N.  
DATE: 8 JUNE & 9 JUNE, 1966  
A/C TYPE/No.: DC-3/ B-827

REVIEWED BY:		DATE
AMF7		10 JUNE 66
CPO	FILE	

**NOTE:** SEE PAGE 4 FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON USE OF FORM.

HOOD TIME 1+10 INST. TIME \_\_\_\_\_ NIGHT TIME \_\_\_\_\_ TOTAL 5+49

1.  PILOT IN COMMAND  SECOND IN COMMAND

2.  "FLIGHT EVALUATION" (PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE) - TO ESTABLISH:

FLIGHT TRAINING SYLLABUS

INITIAL  RECURRENT  TRANSITION  UPGRADING

3.  "PROFICIENCY CHECK"

4.  "INITIAL FLIGHT TRAINING" (NO PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE)

**GROUP I**

A. EXAMINATION ( ) OR BRIEFING SESSION ( )	3
B. PRE-FLIGHT INSPECTION	3
C. ENGINE STARTING PROCEDURES	3
D. TAXIING	3
E. ENGINE RUN-UP	3
F. PRE-TAKE-OFF CHECKS	3

**GROUP II**

A. NORMAL TAKE-OFF	3
B. CLIMBING TURNS	3
C. STALLS (APPROACHES)	3
D. SLOW FLIGHT MANEUVERS	3
E. STEEP TURNS (45°)	3
F. EMERGENCY DESCENT	3
G. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP	3
H. ORIENTATION AND HOLDING	4
I. ENGINE OUT TAKE-OFF	3

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

# PILOTS FLIGHT RECORD FORM

NAME: DRIVER, C.N.  
DATE: 10 JUNE, 1966  
A/C TYPE/No. DC3, B-827

REVIEWED BY:	DATE
CPO	FILE

**NOTE:** SEE PAGE 4 FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON USE OF FORM.

HOOD TIME 0+20 INST. TIME \_\_\_\_\_ NIGHT TIME \_\_\_\_\_ TOTAL 1+30

1.  PILOT IN COMMAND  SECOND IN COMMAND
2.  "FLIGHT EVALUATION" (PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE) - TO ESTABLISH:

### FLIGHT TRAINING SYLLABUS

- INITIAL  RECURRENT  TRANSITION  UPGRADING
3.  "PROFICIENCY CHECK"
4.  "INITIAL FLIGHT TRAINING" (NO PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE)

#### GROUP I

A. EXAMINATION ( <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ) OR BRIEFING SESSION ( <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> )	3
B. PRE-FLIGHT INSPECTION	3
C. ENGINE STARTING PROCEDURES	3
D. TAXIING	3
E. ENGINE RUN-UP	3
F. PRE-TAKE-OFF CHECKS	3

#### GROUP II

A. NORMAL TAKE-OFF	3
B. CLIMBING TURNS	3
C. STALLS (APPROACHES)	3
D. SLOW FLIGHT MANEUVERS	3
E. STEEP TURNS (45°)	3
F. EMERGENCY DESCENT	3
G. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP	3
H. ORIENTATION AND HOLDING	3
I. ENGINE OUT TAKE-OFF	3



APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

GROUP III

A. Engine fire	3
B. Heater and cargo compartment fire: Smoke removal	3
C. Cabin fire: Smoke removal	3
D. Electrical fires and failures	3
E. Hydraulic system failure	2
F. Use of air brakes	3
G. Emergency descent (oral discussion of the two (2) types)	3
H. Fuel jettisoning	3
I. Propeller feathering procedure	3
J. Propeller unfeathering procedure	3

GROUP IV

A. ADF instrument approach	3
B. IIS instrument approach	N/A
C. VOR instrument approach	N/A
D. GCA and radar approach	N/A
E. Traffic control procedures	3
F. Landing - Normal ( )	2
G. Landing - Night ( )	N/A
H. Landing - Cross wind ( )	N/A
I. Landing - Zero flaps ( )	3
J. Landing - Engine(s) out ( )	N/A
K. Go around - engine out ( )	3
L. Landing - circling minimum conditions	3
M. Brake fire	N/A
N. Emergency evacuation	N/A
O. STOL Landing ( )	N/A

COMMENTS: Explanation of grades '1' and '5' to be entered here plus any other comments desired. Use additional blank page if more space required.

*CONSIDERING DRIVER'S EXPERIENCE IN THE C-123, HE HAS A GOOD KNOWLEDGE OF AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS AND GOOD AIRCRAFT CONTROL. HE IS AGGRESSIVE AND VERY THOROUGH. FOUR HOURS OF GROUND EXAMINATION AND PREFLIGHT MADE UP THE EXAMINATION PORTION OF THIS FLIGHT.*

FLIGHT PROFICIENCY RECORD SECTION

Flight proficiency check satisfactorily completed and certified this date.  
Crew member released for flight duty assignment.

[Redacted Signature Box]

Date 8 July 1966.

Check Pilot

(b)(6)

0022

TO : Clarence Driver

23 September 1971

FROM : CSY/VTE

CSY/VTE - 71-522

SUBJECT: Operation of Motor Vehicles by Americans

All American employees are obligated to comply with U.S. Mission AST Memorandum 72-006 which directs, in part, that all Americans :

A. Have all vehicles (Automobiles, trucks, motorcycles, motorscooters and motorbikes) registered in accordance with Lao Law.

B. Have a valid Lao driver's license in their possession whenever operating one of the foregoing vehicles. Persons between the age of 16 and 18 are prohibited from operating any of the foregoing vehicles without parents written permission. However, persons between the age of 12 and 18 may operate motorbikes, motorcycles and motorscooters when such are less than 49 cc.

C. Have insurance covering third party liability damage for all vehicles covered in paragraph "A" registered in the family name.

Your cooperation would be appreciated in answering the following questions and returning this memo to Security:



*Appathin* →



Vehicle descriptions and tag numbers (include 2-wheelers)

YEAR	MAKE	MODEL	COLOR	TAG NUMBER
1965	VW	Bettle	Grey	1097

If you have no vehicle, please so indicate

Insured by Manely's

Local Insurance Adjuster Manely's

*Sold  
April 1973*

Signature *Clarence Driver*

184

(b)(6)

173

FIRST OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT

Please judge First Officer on the qualities listed below. Each line is continuous scale, divided into spaces. Note that the lowest rating is not sub-divided, whereas the higher ratings are divided into two or three degrees. Place a check (✓) in space above the horizontal line (not on a dividing line) which most nearly expresses your judgment on each quality.

Descriptions beneath spaces are designed to convey as nearly the same meaning to all raters and employees as possible. All phrases beneath a particular space may not be pertinent to this individual. Purpose of descriptive phrases is to guide the rater, not necessarily to describe the individual completely.

NAME: Shirley, CN STATION: JTE DATE: October TYPE EQUIPMENT: C123

Table with 5 columns: ATTITUDE, APPEARANCE, KNOWLEDGE OF DUTIES, PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES, WORK, COMMAND ABILITY, ABILITY TO GET ALONG WITH OTHERS, KNOWLEDGE OF FAA & COMPANY REGULATIONS/PROCEDURES. Each row has sub-categories and a checkmark in the first column.

Dates of Last Three Landings and Takeoff's; 8 Oct 8 Oct 8 Oct

(To be filled in by CSS)

Remarks; \_\_\_\_\_

Capt. Signature; \_\_\_\_\_


APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE 09-Dec-2013

HOF211C

SUBJ VACANCY BID 71-41

REF TP886

1. THE FOLLOWING PILOTS HAVE BEEN CONTACTED BY TELEPHONE AND ARE NOT INTERESTED IN BIDDING ON THE SAIGON C-47 CAPTAIN AND FIRST OFFICER VACANCIES:



✓ 2. C. N. DRIVER SUBMITS BID FOR C-47 SAIGON CAPTAIN VACANCY.

3. THE FOLLOWING EMPLOYEES HAVE BEEN REPORTED BY RELATIVES TO BE IN THE FAR EAST OR ON THEIR WAY BACK TO THE FAR EAST:



4. [REDACTED] IS VISITING SOUTH AMERICA AND WILL NOT RETURN FOR APPROXIMATELY TWO WEEKS.

5. WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO CONTACT THE REMAINING PILOTS LISTED ON TP886 AS YET. SINCE WESTERN UNION IS ON STRIKE, WE WILL SEND LETTERS TO ALL THE ONES WE ARE UNABLE TO CONTACT BY TELEPHONE. THIS WILL MOST LIKELY RESULT IN SOME NOT BEING ABLE TO BID PRIOR TO THE BIDDING DEADLINE.

*Handwritten signature*

MGDR WAS

NNNN

SENT WAS JUN 21 1971

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

*Handwritten signature*


SUBJECT FILE COPY

.9 JUNE 1971

REC'D WAS JUN 10 1971

SUBJ VACANCY BID 71-41

1. THIS BID IS FOR FIVE CAPTAIN AND FOUR FIRST OFFICER VACANCIES IN THE C-47 PROGRAM AT SAIGON.
2. DUE TO THE SHORT NOTICE RECEIVED ON WHICH TO MAN THIS PROGRAM THE CLOSING DATE FOR COMPANY RECEIPT OF BIDS IS 0900Z 25 JUNE. FEPA CONCURS WITH THIS CLOSING DATE.
3. PLEASE CONTACT THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL TO ADVISE THEM OF THESE VACANCIES AND TO SOLICIT THEIR BIDS IF INTERESTED. PLEASE FURTHER ADVISE THEM THAT ALL BIDS MUST BE IN THE HANDS OF ASSISTANT SYSTEM CHIEF PILOT - ADMINISTRATION, TAIPEI, BY THE ABOVE-MENTIONED DEADLINE.

DRIVER, C.N. - MRS. ALLENE DRIVER, 

(PART ONE OF THREE OF IP886)

;



HO 191042

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 09-Dec-2013
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C06117170

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013


MGDR WAS



(PART TWO OF THREE OF TP886)

NNNN010

MGDR WAS



PRES TPE

(PART THREE OF THREE OF IP886)

;

HO 191104

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

MEMORANDUM

REC'D WAS JUN 23 1971

TO : MGDR via President *AS*  
FROM : Director of Personnel  
SUBJECT : Employee Proceeding to USA on Leave

DATE : JUN 18 1971  
REF. NO. PND-RS- 71/0840

This is to advise that the following employee will be proceeding to the United States on Leave:

NAME : DRIVER, C. N.  
TITLE : First Officer  
DEPARTMENT/DIVISION & BASE/STATION : Flying Division/Vientiane  
LEAVE PERIOD APPROVED : 24 June - 27 July 1971  
NATURE OF LEAVE : Combined Home Leave and Annual Vacation  
NAME OF AIRLINE : Trans World Airlines  
COMPLETE ADDRESS IN USA : c/o Mrs. Allene Driver

[Redacted]

TELEPHONE NUMBER IN USA

[Redacted]

REMARKS:

[Redacted]

Director of Personnel *J*

cc: P/File

PD-181



(b)(6)

FIRST OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT

Please judge First Officer on the qualities listed below. Each line is continuous scale, divided into spaces. Note that the lowest rating is not sub-divided, whereas the higher ratings are divided into two or three degrees. Place a check (✓) in space above the horizontal line (not on a dividing line) which most nearly expresses your judgment on each quality.

Descriptions beneath spaces are designed to convey as nearly the same meaning to all raters and employees as possible. All phrases beneath a particular space may not be pertinent to this individual. Purpose of descriptive phrases is to guide the rater, not necessarily to describe the individual completely.

NAME: DRIVER STATION: VTE DATE: July TYPE EQUIPMENT: E-23

Table with 5 columns: Quality, Excellent, Satisfactory, Below Average, Poor. Rows include Attitude, Appearance, Knowledge of Duties, Performance of Duties, Paper Work, Command Ability, Ability to Get Along with Others, and Knowledge of FAA & Company Regulations/Procedures.

Dates of Last Three Landings and Takeoff's; 13 July 70

(To be filled in by CSS)

Remarks;

Capt. Signature;

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 09-Dec-2013

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

**PERSONNEL DIVISION**  
**ADVANCE NOTICE OF PERSONNEL ACTION**

DATE 18 May 1971  
REF. NO. FWD-RS-71-1319

TO: THOSE CHECKED ON DISTRIBUTION

PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL ACTION IS BEING PROCESSED BY THE PERSONNEL DIVISION.

NAME	TITLE AND DEPT/DIV/OFFICE	LOC.	CODE	EFFECTIVE DATE RECOMMENDED	REMARKS
[Redacted]	F/O PD	VIE	B	15 June-14 July 1971	
WEISSENBACK, E. J.	F/O FD	VIE	B	15 June-15 July 1971	
[Redacted]	AFS TFC	VIE	D	20 Sep-19 Oct 1971	
[Redacted]	AFS TFC	VIE	D	15 Sep-14 Oct 1971	
WILKINSON, C. H.	Capt FD	VIE	B	20 June-20 July 1971	
[Redacted]	F/O FD	VIE	B	24 June-27 July 1971	
[Redacted]	Inst Plt FD	VIE	D, B	15 May-14 June 1971	
[Redacted]	Capt FD	VIE	B	1 May-5 July 1971	
[Redacted]	F/O FD	VIE	B	15 June-31 July 1971	

CODE: A - SEPARATION      C - M/S LWOP      E - ANNUAL VACATION/HOME LEAVE      G - TRANSFER (PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION)  
B - LWOP      D - ANNUAL LEAVE      F - EXTENDED SICK LEAVE

DISTRIBUTION: (CHECK THOSE APPLICABLE PER CHECK LIST ON REVERSE SIDE)

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> T/C'S OFFICE - TPE                                     | <input type="checkbox"/> EMPLOYMENT MANAGER, TPE                       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> ASSISTANT TREASURER, TPE                               | <input type="checkbox"/> DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, TPE                     |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CHIEF ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE - TPE             | <input type="checkbox"/> DIRECTOR COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION TPE          |
| <input type="checkbox"/> DIRECTOR, MAINTENANCE ACCOUNTING DIVISION, TNN         | <input type="checkbox"/> SUPPLY SUPERVISOR, TPE                        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> CHIEF, PAYROLL, TPE                                    | <input type="checkbox"/> CHIEF, MEDICAL DEPARTMENT, TPE                |
| <input type="checkbox"/> CHIEF, PAYROLL.HKG VIA MGR ACCTG HKG                   | <input type="checkbox"/> GROUND TRANSPORTATION DIVISION, TPE/TNN       |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ACCOUNTING SUPERVISOR OF BASE/STATION (VIE) | <input type="checkbox"/> STATION MANAGER/MANAGER AAL, HKG              |
| <input type="checkbox"/> INTERNAL AUDITOR, TPE                                  | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> P/FILE VIA MANAGER R/S AND W/L TPE |
| <input type="checkbox"/> SECRETARY, LEGAL COUNSEL, TPE                          | <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER   |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PERSONNEL MANAGER/REPRESENTATIVE (VIE)      |  |

SIGNED Original signed by [Redacted] TITLE M/RS

[Redacted]

Please - ASAP

FIRST OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT

Please judge First Officer on the qualities listed below. Each line is continuous scale, divided into spaces. Note that the lowest rating is not sub-divided, whereas the higher ratings are divided into two or three degrees. Place a check (✓) in space above the horizontal line (not on a dividing line) which most nearly expresses your judgment on each quality.

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NAME: DRIVER, C. STATION: VTE DATE: 29 MARCH 70 TYPE EQUIPMENT: C123K

Table with 5 columns: ATTITUDE, ENTHUSIASTIC, INTERESTED, GETS ALONG, INDIFFERENT. Rows include APPEARANCE, KNOWLEDGE OF DUTIES, PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES, PAPER WORK, COMMAND ABILITY, ABILITY TO GET ALONG WITH OTHERS, and KNOWLEDGE OF FAA & COMPANY REGULATIONS/PROCEDURES.

Dates of Last Three Landings and Takeoff's; 29 MARCH 70 29 MARCH 70 29 MARCH 70 (To be filled in by CSS)

Remarks;

Capt. Signat [Redacted]

C06117174 APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE 09-Dec-2013

FIRST OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT

Please judge First Officer on the qualities listed below. Each line is continuous scale, divided into spaces. Note that the lowest rating is not sub-divided, whereas the higher ratings are divided into two or three degrees. Place a check (✓) in space above the horizontal line (not on a dividing line) which most nearly expresses your judgment on each quality.

Descriptions beneath spaces are designed to convey as nearly the same meaning to all raters and employees as possible. All phrases beneath a particular space may not be pertinent to this individual. Purpose of descriptive phrases is to guide the rater, not necessarily to describe the individual completely.

NAME: DRIVER STATION: VTE DATE: 3 JAN 70 TYPE EQUIPMENT: C-123K

ATTITUDE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ENTHUSIASTIC	<input type="checkbox"/> INTERESTED	<input type="checkbox"/> GETS ALONG	<input type="checkbox"/> INDIFFERENT
APPEARANCE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EXCELLENT	<input type="checkbox"/> SATISFACTORY	<input type="checkbox"/> BELOW AVERAGE	<input type="checkbox"/> POOR
KNOWLEDGE OF DUTIES	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EXCELLENT	<input type="checkbox"/> SATISFACTORY	<input type="checkbox"/> BELOW AVERAGE	<input type="checkbox"/> POOR
PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EXCELLENT	<input type="checkbox"/> AVERAGE	<input type="checkbox"/> BELOW AVERAGE	<input type="checkbox"/> POOR
PAPER WORK	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NEAT AND CORRECT	<input type="checkbox"/> ACCURATE HARD TO READ	<input type="checkbox"/> NEAT BUT OFTEN MAKES ERRORS	<input type="checkbox"/> NEEDS HELP
COMMAND ABILITY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ASSUMES COMMAND OF THE AIR-CRAFT & CREW AT ALL TIMES	<input type="checkbox"/> BETTER THAN MOST	<input type="checkbox"/> SATISFACTORY BUT NEEDS MORE EXPERIENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> POOR
ABILITY TO GET ALONG WITH OTHERS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EXCELLENT	<input type="checkbox"/> ABOVE AVERAGE CONSIDERATE OF OTHERS	<input type="checkbox"/> TENDS TO ARGUE	<input type="checkbox"/> ATTITUDE TOWARD OTHERS POOR
KNOWLEDGE OF FAA & COMPANY REGULATIONS/ PROCEDURES	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EXCELLENT KNOWLEDGE OF ALL REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES	<input type="checkbox"/> HAS GOOD KNOWLEDGE OF REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES PERTAINING TO DUTIES, KNOWS WHERE TO FIND ANSWERS	<input type="checkbox"/> BELOW AVERAGE, NOT SURE, REQUIRES EXCESSIVE TIME TO LOOK UP.	<input type="checkbox"/> HAS LITTLE KNOWLEDGE OF REGULATIONS AND COMPANY PROCEDURES. NEEDS ASSISTANCE TO FIND CORRECT ANSWER

Dates of Last Three Landings and Takeoff's; 27 JAN 70 28 JAN 70 28 JAN 70

(To be filled in by CSS)

Remarks; F.O. DRIVER PERFORMS HIS DUTIES ON THE  
AVERAGE OF OTHER FIRST OFFICERS.

Capt. Signa

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 09-Dec-2013

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

CONTRACTOR CREWMEMBER RECORD

OMB APPROVAL NO. 22-R0197

(b)(6)

NAME OF CREWMEMBER (First, last, middle initial) <b>Clarence Driver N</b>		CONTRACTOR REPRESENTED (Name and address) <b>Air America, Inc. Field Executive Office APO 96239</b>	
IDENTIFY CREW POSITION  <input type="checkbox"/> TEST <input type="checkbox"/> SUPPORT			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FUNCTIONAL <b>Co-Pilot</b> <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify)			
MISSION, DESIGN AND SERIES AIRCRAFT OR OTHER REQUIREMENT FOR THIS QUALIFICATION  <b>C-123K</b>		BASE OR LOCATION WHERE QUALIFICATION ACCOMPLISHED  <b>Vientiane, Laos.</b>	

INITIAL QUALIFICATION  REQUALIFICATION

SECTION I - FLIGHT EXPERIENCE (Time to nearest hour)

FLYING TIME ABOVE TYPE		JET <b>2700</b> HRS.				TURBO PROP HRS.		RECIPROCATING HRS.		ROTARY HRS.		TOTAL FLYING TIME	
												<b>12,210</b>	
MISSION, DESIGN AND SERIES AIRCRAFT	PERIOD OF TIME	IP	IST. PILOT				COPILOT	AIRCRAFT COMMANDER	OTHER CREW MEMBERS (Specify)				
			TOTAL	WX	HOOD	NIGHT							
<b>C-123K</b>	LAST 12 MOS					<b>890</b>							
	LAST 4 YRS		<b>70:00</b>	<b>8:00</b>	<b>2:00</b>	<b>3:00</b>	<b>32:00</b>						
	TOTAL		<b>2670:00</b>				<b>2632:00</b>						
	LAST 12 MOS												
	LAST 4 YRS												
	TOTAL												
	LAST 12 MOS												
	LAST 4 YRS												
	TOTAL												
	LAST 12 MOS												
	LAST 4 YRS												
	TOTAL												
	LAST 12 MOS												
	LAST 4 YRS												
	TOTAL												

SECTION II - FLIGHT CHECK (Instructor fill in remarks where applicable)

1. PREFLIGHT INSPECTION AND FORMS	<b>Satisfactory</b>	7. IN-FLIGHT EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	<b>Satisfactory</b>
2. EMERGENCY ESCAPE PROCEDURES	<b>Satisfactory</b>	8. PRELANDING CHECK, TRAFFIC PATTERN AND LANDINGS	<b>Satisfactory</b>
3. PRESTART COCKPIT PROCEDURE AND ENGINE START	<b>Satisfactory</b>	9. POSTFLIGHT INSPECTION	<b>Satisfactory</b>
4. COMMUNICATIONS AND TAXI PROCEDURES	<b>Satisfactory</b>	10. ACCOMPLISHMENT OF FORMS AND AIRCRAFT SECURITY	<b>Satisfactory</b>
5. PRETAKEOFF COCKPIT CHECK AND ENGINE RUNUP	<b>Satisfactory</b>	11. INSTRUMENT PROFICIENCY CHECK	<b>Satisfactory</b>
6. TAKEOFF AND FLIGHT PROCEDURES	<b>Satisfactory</b>	12. OTHER (Specify)	

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:

09-DEC-2013

SECTION III-ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS (Fill in where applicable)

REQUIREMENT	CHECKED BY	GRADE	DATE AND PLACE	HOURS
13. PHYSICAL EXAMINATION		I	11 April 1972, Vientiane, Laos.	
14. PHYSIOLOGICAL/ATTITUDE INDOCTRINATION	N/A			
15. PRESSURE SUIT TRAINING	N/A			
16. GROUND SCHOOL (By Subject)		100%	2 November 1971, Vientiane, Laos.	16:00
AIRCRAFT GENERAL			Ditto	
AIRCRAFT PREFLIGHT			Ditto	
AIRCRAFT EMERGENCY PROCEDURE			Ditto	
ENGINE SYSTEM			Ditto	
OXYGEN SYSTEM			Ditto	
AIR CONDITIONING PRESSURIZATION	N/A		N/A	
FUEL SYSTEM			N/A	
INSTRUMENT SYSTEM			N/A	
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM			N/A	
HYDRAULIC POWER SYSTEM			N/A	
UTILITY SYSTEM			N/A	
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM			N/A	
AUTO PILOT SYSTEM			N/A	
ENGINE			N/A	
COMMUNICATIONS & NAVIGATION			N/A	
ROTARY SYSTEM			N/A	
OTHER REQUIREMENTS AS STATED IN APPROVED CONTR OPR PROCD				
17. QUESTIONNAIRE ON AIRCRAFT		96%	10 Sept. 1971, SGN	
18. FLIGHT SIMULATOR		I	31 May 1972, Vientiane, Laos.	2:00
19. SURVIVAL SCHOOL	N/A		N/A	
20. OTHER (SPECIFY)	N/A		N/A	

21. Have you ever had an aircraft accident (as defined by FAR or military procedures) or physiological reaction (e.g. hypoxia, decompression sickness, hyperventilation, spatial disorientation) as a pilot, or other crew member? \_\_\_\_\_ If yes, explain: \_\_\_\_\_

None

22. Have you ever been charged with a flying violation? If so, state the violation and circumstances.

Nones

SECTION IV-CERTIFICATIONS

I certify that I have read and understand all pertinent technical orders, handbooks, contractor's operating procedures, and pilot's operating instructions pertaining to the above aircraft.

DATE \_\_\_\_\_ SIGNATURE OF CREWMEMBER *[Signature]*

The above named crewmember has demonstrated proficiency in, and has a satisfactory knowledge of C-123K MDS aircraft and has satisfactorily completed the flight requirements for the type of flight check indicated above, and is fully qualified in this type aircraft.

The checkout consisted of 1:55 hours dual, \_\_\_\_\_ hours solo, \_\_\_\_\_ landings from right (or rear) seat, and 4 landings from left (or front) seat.

DATE 15 July 1972 BASE OR HOME STATION OF INSTRUCTOR Vientiane, Laos. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF INSTRUCTOR \_\_\_\_\_  
SIGNATURE OF INSTRUCTOR *[Signature]*

006117176  
 APPROVED FOR  
 RELEASE DATE:  
 09-Dec-2013

CERTIFICATION OF QUALIFICATION

This is to certify that C.N. Driver, Co-Pilot, FCF  
 (Name and Crew Position)

has satisfactorily completed the training or special qualification indicated hereon:

YEAR	TRAINING OR SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS	DATE COMPLETED	CERTIFYING OFFICIAL
1972	GROUND PHASE		
	WRITTEN EXAMINATION	10 Sept. 1971	S.E. Anderson
	EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	Ditto	Ditto
	CONTRACTOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS PROCEDURES	Ditto	Ditto
	EGRESS TRAINING	Ditto	Ditto
	PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING	Ditto N/A	Ditto N/A
	OTHER (Specify) <sup>1</sup>		
	FLIGHT PHASE	N/A	N/A
	PROFICIENCY	2 Dec. 1971	H.H. Boyles
	INSTRUMENT	Ditto	Ditto
	OTHER (Specify) <sup>1</sup>		
	GROUND PHASE		
	WRITTEN EXAMINATION		
	EMERGENCY PROCEDURES		
	CONTRACTOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS PROCEDURES		
	EGRESS TRAINING		
	PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING		
	OTHER (Specify) <sup>1</sup>		
	FLIGHT PHASE		
	PROFICIENCY		
	INSTRUMENT		
	OTHER (Specify) <sup>1</sup>		
	GROUND PHASE		
	WRITTEN EXAMINATION		
	EMERGENCY PROCEDURES		
	CONTRACTOR FLIGHT OPERATING PROCEDURES		
	EGRESS TRAINING		
	PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING		
	OTHER (Specify) <sup>1</sup>		
	FLIGHT PHASE		
	PROFICIENCY		
	INSTRUMENT		
	OTHER (Specify) <sup>1</sup>		
	GROUND PHASE		
	WRITTEN EXAMINATION		
	EMERGENCY PROCEDURES		
	CONTRACTOR FLIGHT OPERATING PROCEDURES		
	EGRESS TRAINING		
	PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING		
	OTHER (Specify) <sup>1</sup>		
	FLIGHT PHASE		
	PROFICIENCY		
	INSTRUMENT		
	OTHER (Specify) <sup>1</sup>		

<sup>1</sup>Formation, Refueling, Night or other special maneuver requirements.

FIRST OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT

Please judge First Officer on the qualities listed below. Each line is continuous scale, divided into spaces. Note that the lowest rating is not sub-divided, whereas the higher ratings are divided into two or three degrees. Place a check (✓) in space above the horizontal line (not on a dividing line) which most nearly expresses your judgment on each quality.

Descriptions beneath spaces are designed to convey as nearly the same meaning to all raters and employees as possible. All phrases beneath a particular space may not be pertinent to this individual. Purpose of descriptive phrases is to guide the rater, not necessarily to describe the individual completely.

NAME: Driver, C. H. STATION: VTF DATE: 5 May 1969 TYPE EQUIPMENT: C123

Table with 5 columns: ATTITUDE, APPEARANCE, KNOWLEDGE OF DUTIES, PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES, PAPER WORK, COMMAND ABILITY, ABILITY TO GET ALONG WITH OTHERS, KNOWLEDGE OF FAA & COMPANY REGULATIONS/PROCEDURES. Rows include categories like ENTHUSIASTIC, INTERESTED, GETS ALONG, INDIFFERENT, EXCELLENT, SATISFACTORY, BELOW AVERAGE, POOR, NEAT AND CORRECT, ACCURATE HARD TO READ, NEAT BUT OFTEN MAKES ERRORS, NEEDS HELP, ASSUMES COMMAND OF THE AIRCRAFT & CREW AT ALL TIMES, BETTER THAN MOST, SATISFACTORY BUT NEEDS MORE EXPERIENCE, ABOVE AVERAGE CONSIDERATE OF OTHERS, TENDS TO ARGUE, ATTITUDE TOWARD OTHERS POOR, EXCELLENT KNOWLEDGE OF ALL REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES, HAS GOOD KNOWLEDGE OF REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES PERTAINING TO DUTIES, KNOWS WHERE TO FIND ANSWERS, BELOW AVERAGE, NOT SURE, REQUIRES EXCESSIVE TIME TO LOOK UP, HAS LITTLE KNOWLEDGE OF REGULATIONS AND COMPANY PROCEDURES. NEEDS ASSISTANCE TO FIND CORRECT ANSWER.

Dates of Last Three Landings and Takeoffs: 29 Oct 1969 29 Oct 1969 30 Oct 1969

(To be filled in by CSS) 29 Oct 1969 29 Oct 1969 30 Oct 1969

Remarks: Weak in instrument procedures. Some times uses poor judgment.

Capt. Signature; [Signature]

Handwritten signature and date: 5/25/69

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 09-Dec-2013



MEETING OF  
THE BOARD OF REVIEW

(Re: Clarence N. Driver)

Date of Missing: 7 March 1973

Date of Employment: 15 May 1966

A meeting of the Board of Review convened, pursuant to the provisions of the Company Personnel Manual, Chapter: "Termination", Section: "Benefits due to Death, Injury, Capture or Internment", Paragraph "E" at 1430 hours local, 23 March 1973.

In attendance were the following members of the Board:

	President, who presided as Chairman;
	Vice President - Law;
	Controller, and
	, Director of Personnel, Secretary.

Also present were the following observers who were invited to express their opinions before the Board:

	Vice President Industrial Relations
	Vice President Administration
	Vice President, Flight Operations (Acting)
	, Director Traffic Division
	Manager Employee Services and Benefits

At 1435L the Chairman convened the meeting and noted that the matter before the Board was Clarence N. Driver - First Officer, Vientiane.

The Board was advised that on 7 March 1973, First Officer Driver was performing duties as Second in Command of C123K-554524, Captain Ackley was Pilot in Command, [redacted] and [redacted] were the assigned Airfreight Dispatchers.

The aircraft departed Luang Prabang at 0808Z. Departure message was received at 0811Z estimating Ban Houie Sai at 0905Z. Cargo was manifested as 40 empty cargo pallets. No further communication was heard from the aircraft. Search and rescue attempts were unsuccessful and the aircraft wreckage was sighted and confirmed at QB 2398 at approximately 0430Z on 14 March 1973. Due to ground fire both SAR aircraft departed the wreckage area. Debrief of pilots indicate that the wreckage is confined to a 400 foot area and destroyed by impact and fire. No apparent survivors and no parachutes were sighted in the area.

As of this date the crash site is still insecure and neither the recovery party nor the investigation team has been able to get to the aircraft crash area to perform the facet of recovery or investigation of this accident.



APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

First Officer Driver has been declared "Missing" as of 7 March 1973.


The Board determined the following:

1. First Officer Driver is considered Missing as a direct result of the performance of his duties.
2. Missing compensation payments and other benefits from the period 8 March 1973 until further determined shall be made in accordance with MDR Cable HOC143D of March 1973 utilizing the guidelines provided by the Department of Labor. Missing compensation will be payable to Mrs. C. N. Driver and to the dependent children in the percentages set forth in the War Hazards Act with 30% of the missing compensation being retained on Company books for the account of First Officer Driver.
3. The Company will continue to provide ALLIFE dependent medical coverage. No deductions will be made for FICA.


APPROVED BY

  —


Chairman

 —

Member

 —

Member

 —

Secretary

cc: ✓ MDR WAS via President  
 VP-L  
 Controller  
 Accident file  
 P file  
 Missing employee file  
 BOR file

FIRST OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT

Please judge First Officer on the qualities listed below. Each line is continuous scale, divided into spaces. Note that the lowest rating is not sub-divided, whereas the higher ratings are divided into two or three degrees. Place a check (✓) in space above the horizontal line (not on a dividing line) which most nearly expresses your judgment on each quality.

Descriptions beneath spaces are designed to convey as nearly the same meaning to all raters and employees as possible. All phrases beneath a particular space may not be pertinent to this individual. Purpose of descriptive phrases is to guide the rater, not necessarily to describe the individual completely.

NAME: Driver, C.N. STATION: VIENTIANE DATE: 04 July 1969 TYPE EQUIPMENT: C123K

Table with 5 columns: ATTITUDE, APPEARANCE, KNOWLEDGE OF DUTIES, PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES, PAPER WORK, COMMAND ABILITY, ABILITY TO GET ALONG WITH OTHERS, KNOWLEDGE OF FAA & COMPANY REGULATIONS/PROCEDURES. Each row contains descriptive terms and a checkmark indicating the rating.

Dates of Last Three Landings and Takeoff's; 28 June 1969 29 June 1969 30 June 1969

(To be filled in by CSS)

Remarks;

Capt. Signature;

[Signature box]

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

**FLIGHT OPERATIONS  
PERSONAL INFORMATION BRIEF**

DRIVER CLARENCE NESBIT

DATE 19 MAY '66

PHOTO NAME DRIVER CLARENCE NESBIT DATE OF BIRTH 7 MAR '21

LAST FIRST MIDDLE

PERMANENT ADDRESS Los Angeles Calif. CITY STATE CITIZEN OF USA

MARITAL STATUS  SINGLE  MARRIED NO. CHILDREN 2 NATIONALITY: USA

EDUCATION	NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	DATES ATTENDED	GRADUATE DEGREES	MAJOR SUBJECTS
HIGH SCHOOL	<u>David Starr Jordan Los Angeles Calif</u>	<u>1934-1940</u>	<u>yes</u>	<u>College prep. math.</u>
COLLEGE	<u>Los Angeles City College Los Angeles Calif.</u>	<u>1940-1942</u>	<u>none</u>	<u>math.</u>
TRADE, BUSINESS OR CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOL, OTHER	<u>Real Estate, Accounting, Money &amp; Banking, Physiology, and Business Adm. Electronics</u>			

WHAT FOREIGN LANGUAGES DO YOU SPEAK FLUENTLY? none READ none WRITE none

U.S. MILITARY SERVICE (BRANCH) USAF FROM: 1942 TO: 1964 RANK: MAJOR MILITARY SPECIALTY Pilot

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY				
POSITION	AIRLINE OR EMPLOYER	FROM	TO	DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU
<u>Chief Pilot</u>	<u>Ray Charles Int.</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>Flying, minor maint, scheduling etc.</u>
<u>USAF Pilot</u>	<u>USAF</u>	<u>1942</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>normal military flying duties.</u>

TRAINING HISTORY				CURRENT QUALIFICATIONS		
SCHOOL	LOCATION	A/C	DATE	TYPE	AIRCRAFT	
<u>Calif. Time Airline</u>	<u>BLR.</u>	<u>M-404</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>PILOT</u>	<u>M-404</u>	<u>M-407/202</u>
<u>USAF</u>	<u>Custer AFB, Calif</u>	<u>KC135</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>ENGINEER</u>		
<u>"</u>	<u>"</u>	<u>KC135</u>	<u>Inst 1960</u>	<u>NAVIGATOR</u>		
				<u>DISPATCHER</u>		
				<u>FLIGHT ATTENDANT</u>		
				A WET DITCHING DRILL WAS COMPLETED ON DATE: <u>1960</u>		
				SIGNATURE <u>Clarence N. Driver</u>		

C06117180

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

PILOT DATA AND FLIGHT TIME CRT

Employee Number	Name <i>Clarence N. DeLuper</i>	Position <i>First Officer</i>	Date <i>19 May 66</i>
Home Street	City		State Country <i>Los Angeles Calif.</i>
Date of Birth <i>7 MAR 21</i>	Place of Birth <i>Phoenix, Ariz.</i>	Citizenship <i>USA</i>	Nationality <i>USA</i>
Years of College <i>2+</i>	Type of Degree <i>NONE</i>	College Major <i>MATH</i>	Military Service <i>YES</i>
Military Speciality <i>USAF Pilot</i>	Language Read <i>NONE</i>	Write <i>NONE</i>	Speak
Rank or Rate <i>MAJOR</i>	Years of Service <i>23</i>	Marital Status <i>MARRIED</i>	Number of Children <i>2</i>
Passport Number	Issue Date <i>7 MAR 66</i>	Place <i>Los Angeles, Calif.</i>	

AIRMAN CERTIFICATES (ATR, Commercial, Inst.)

License	Pilot Ratings	Number	Type Ratings	Issued By	Date
<i>ATR</i>	<i>C-MEL</i>	<i>477924</i>	<i>M-404/212</i>	<i>FAB USA</i>	<i>27 July '65</i>

PILOT FLIGHT RECORD

Type of Aircraft	Military			Civil Flight Time			Company			Total	Total
	PIC	SIC	Total	PIC	SIC	Total	PIC	SIC	Total	Night	Inst.
<i>KC-135</i>	<i>1077</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>1127</i>								
<i>KC-97</i>	<i>840</i>	<i>510</i>	<i>1350</i>								
<i>R-50</i>	<i>398</i>	<i>198</i>	<i>596</i>								
<i>C-47</i>	<i>243</i>	<i>241</i>	<i>484</i>								
<i>C-46</i>	<i>75</i>	<i>33</i>	<i>108</i>								
<i>R-25</i>	<i>224</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>235</i>								
<i>C-45</i>	<i>38</i>	<i>48</i>	<i>106</i>								
<i>P-40</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>-</i>	<i>12</i>								
<i>P-39</i>	<i>150</i>	<i>-</i>	<i>150</i>								
<i>P-47</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>-</i>	<i>25</i>								
<i>P-51</i>	<i>525</i>	<i>-</i>	<i>525</i>								
<i>T-33 Jet</i>	<i>55</i>	<i>-</i>	<i>55</i>								
<i>T-6</i>	<i>260</i>	<i>-</i>	<i>260</i>								
<i>BT-13</i>	<i>55</i>	<i>-</i>	<i>55</i>								
<i>Stearman</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>-</i>	<i>30</i>								
<i>Cessna 310</i>				<i>325</i>		<i>325</i>					
<i>Marfan 404</i>				<i>500</i>		<i>500</i>					
<b>Total</b>			<b>825</b>			<b>825</b>					
Single Eng Prop	<i>1057</i>										
Wing Eng Prop	<i>1425</i>	<i>338</i>		<i>825</i>							
Single Eng Jet	<i>55</i>										
Eng Prop	<i>1238</i>	<i>708</i>									
Multi-Eng Jet	<i>1077</i>	<i>50</i>									
Turbo Prop											
Sea Plane											
Lite H'cptr P											
Med/Hvy H'cptr P											
Turbin H'cptr											
<b>Total</b>											

Date of Employment: *15 May 66*  
Company Assignment: *Vientiane*

Flight time last 6 mos. *160*  
Totals current as of *4871632*

C06117180

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

PILOT DATA AND FLIGHT RECORD

Employee Number	Name <i>Clarence N. Driver</i>	Position <i>First Officer</i>	Date <i>19 May 66</i>
Home Street Address	City	State <i>Los Angeles Calif</i>	Country
Date of Birth <i>7 MAR 21</i>	Place of Birth <i>Phoenix Ariz</i>	Citizenship <i>USA</i>	Nationality <i>USA</i>
Years of College <i>2+</i>	Type of Degree <i>none</i>	College Major <i>MATH</i>	Military Service <i>yes</i>
Rank or Rate <i>MAJOR</i>	Years of Service <i>23</i>	Marital Status <i>married</i>	Number of Children <i>2</i>
Military Speciality <i>USAF Pilot</i>	Language Read <i>NONE</i>	Write <i>NONE</i>	Speak
Passport Number	Issue Date <i>7 MAR 66</i>	Place <i>Los Angeles Calif</i>	

AIRMAN CERTIFICATES (ATR, Commercial, Inst.)

License	Pilot Ratings	Number	Type Ratings	Issued By	Date
<i>ATR</i>	<i>SFL-MEL</i>	<i>477924</i>	<i>M-404/202</i>	<i>FAA USA</i>	<i>27 July '65</i>

PILOT FLIGHT RECORD

Type of Aircraft	Military			Civil Flight Time			Company			Total Night	Total Inst.
	PIC	SIC	Total	PIC	SIC	Total	PIC	SIC	Total		
<i>C-135</i>	<i>1077</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>1127</i>								
<i>PC-97</i>	<i>540</i>	<i>510</i>	<i>1350</i>								
<i>P-50</i>	<i>398</i>	<i>198</i>	<i>596</i>								
<i>C-47</i>	<i>243</i>	<i>241</i>	<i>484</i>								
<i>C-46</i>	<i>75</i>	<i>33</i>	<i>108</i>								
<i>B-25</i>	<i>224</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>235</i>								
<i>C-45</i>	<i>58</i>	<i>48</i>	<i>106</i>								
<i>D-40</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>-</i>									
<i>P-39</i>	<i>150</i>	<i>-</i>									
<i>P-47</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>-</i>									
<i>P-51</i>	<i>525</i>	<i>-</i>									
<i>T-33 Jet</i>	<i>55</i>	<i>-</i>									
<i>T-6</i>	<i>260</i>	<i>-</i>									
<i>R-7 13A</i>	<i>55</i>	<i>-</i>									
<i>Steep MAN</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>-</i>									
<i>Cessna 310</i>				<i>325</i>		<i>325</i>					
<i>Martin 404</i>				<i>500</i>		<i>500</i>					
<b>Total</b>											
Single Eng Prop	<i>1057</i>										
Twin Eng Prop	<i>1425</i>	<i>333</i>		<i>825</i>							
Single Eng Jet	<i>55</i>										
Eng Prop	<i>1238</i>	<i>708</i>									
Multi-Eng Jet	<i>1077</i>	<i>50</i>									
Turbo Prop											
Sea Plane											
Lite H'cptr P											
Fed/Hvy H'cptr P											
Turbin H'cptr											
<b>Total</b>											

Date of Employment: *15 MAY 66*  
Company Assignment: *Vientiane*

Flight time last 6 mos. *160*  
Totals current as of *4831*  
Totals as of same date Year before Employment: *2800*

AFR-55-22  
AR-95-20  
NAVAIRINST 9710.1A  
DSAR 8210.1

8 October 1971

FORMAT FOR

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL FOR QUALIFICATION TRAINING

SUBJECT: Request for Government Approval for Aircrew Qualification and Training  
TO: Government Flight Representative

Name C.N. Driver Crew Position Co-Pilot  
Aircraft C-123K Date of Birth 7 March 1921  
Security Clearance - FAA Rating ATR

II. Provide a resume of education background. (High school, name and location; college or university name, location and degree obtained; flight school and date completed; test pilot school and date completed; and special professional schools.)

III. Have you ever served in any branch of the US Military Service?

Yes If so, state: Branch U.S. Air Force  
Service Dates: From 1942 To 1964  
Last Location Mather AFB, California  
Highest Rank Major SSAN [ ] Aero Rating Pilot  
Are you now a member of the Reserves or National Guard? None  
If yes, state: Branch N/A Present Rank N/A

IV. Provide a resume of experience in the flight test field. Include both engineering and aircrew experience by project, type of aircraft, and hours flown.

FLIGHT PHASE

V. I certify that I have read and understand all of the contractor's procedures and directives pertinent to the accomplishment of my assigned duty.

Claude N. Driver  
(Aircraft Signature)

Attachment 1

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

**ROUTE/LINE CHECK RECORD**  
(REF. CHAPTER IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

(b)(6)

DATE  
22 SEPT 1969

NAME: DRIVER C.N. PIC POSITION: PIC BASE: VTE ACFT TYPE: C-123K ACFT NO.: 556 CERTIFICATION:  ROUTE QUALIF.  LINE CHECK

ROUTE: LOS LS20A L22 LOS HOOD/INST: NIGHT: BLOCK TIME: 4755 GRADING LEGEND:  
1. Well Above Average 2. Above Average 3. Average 4. Below Average 5. Unsatisfactory

					1	2	3	4	5						1	2	3	4	5
1. ANALYSIS OF WEATHER								X		15. ENROUTE & ARR. KNOWLEDGE OF:									
2. FLIGHT PLANNING									X	A. ROUTE, TERRAIN AND HAZARDS									X
3. PRE FLIGHT INSPECTION							X			B. COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES							X		
4. COCKPIT PROCEDURE							X			C. AREA TERRAIN AND HAZARDS								X	
5. ENGINE STARTING PROCEDURES							X			D. AREA ARRIVAL PROCEDURES						X			
6. TAXIING							X			E. HOLDING PROCEDURES									
7. USE OF BRAKES							X			F. INSTRUMENT APPROACH PROCEDURES									
8. ENGINE RUN-UP							X			G. AIRPORT LAYOUT AND FACILITIES									
9. PRE-DEPARTURE PROCEDURES								X		H.									
10. TAKE-OFF PROCEDURES							X			16. LANDINGS									X
11. CLIMB PROCEDURES								X		17. AIRPORT ENTRY:									
12. ADHERENCE TO ATC INSTRUCTIONS										LOCATION:					TYPE APP:				
13. DEPARTURE-KNOWLEDGE OF:										A. AIRPORT LAYOUT AND FACILITIES									
A. AIRPORT LAYOUT AND FACILITIES							X			B. DEPARTURE PROCEDURES									
B. DEPARTURE PROCEDURES								X		C. AREA TERRAIN AND HAZARDS									
C. AREA TERRAIN AND HAZARDS								X		D. MINIMUM SAFE FLIGHT LEVELS									
D. MINIMUM SAFE FLIGHT LEVELS								X		E. NAV AIDS									
E. NAV AIDS							X			F. POSITION REPORTING POINTS									
F. POSITION REPORTING POINTS							X			G.									
G.										18. APPEARANCE									X
14. ABILITY TO:										19. CUSTOMER RELATIONS									X
A. MAINTAIN ASSIGNED ALTITUDE							X			20. CREW COORDINATION									X
A. MAINTAIN ASSIGNED ALTITUDE							X			21. ATTENTION TO PASSENGER COMFORT									X
B. TUNE AND IDENTIFY NAV FACILITIES							X			22. RESPONSE TO UNUSUAL SITUATIONS									X
B. TUNE AND IDENTIFY NAV FACILITIES							X			23. ATTENTION TO DUTIES									X
C. TRACK ON SELECTED NAV FACILITIES								X		24. KNOWLEDGE OF DIRECTIVES AND FAR'S									X
C. TRACK ON SELECTED NAV FACILITIES								X		25. PLANNING									X
D. RECOGNIZE STATION PASSAGE							X			26. KNOWLEDGE OF EQUIPMENT									X
D. RECOGNIZE STATION PASSAGE							X			27. STANDARDIZATION									X
E. MAP READ AND INTERPRET NAV CHARTS							X			28. JUDGMENT									X
E. MAP READ AND INTERPRET NAV CHARTS							X												
F. NAVIGATE BY DEAD RECKONING							X												
F. NAVIGATE BY DEAD RECKONING							X												
G.																			
G.																			
H.																			
H.																			

ABOVE CHECK CERTIFIED  SATISFACTORY  UNSATISFACTORY

COMMENTS AND EXPLANATION OF GRADES 1 AND 5:

DATE: 125 1969 MFSO (REVIEW AND POSTING) DATE: 19



APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

COMMENTS  
DRIVER

The takeoff and climb out from L08 to L16 was normal. Capt. Driver headed out on a mag course of 348° at an altitude of 8500 ft. The weather at L16 was reported to be 5000 overcast and 10 miles visibility with a large hole north west of the field.

After flying on this heading for about 30 minutes I asked Capt. Driver where he was going? He said I am going to L16. I then asked how are you going to get there? He replied there is supposed to be a hole north west of the field. I asked if he knew where he was? He said no not exactly we are above an overcast. I then said look at the TACAN it is setting on channel 113 and is reading 265° at 32 miles. He said yes I know. I then said what is the radial and distance from Skyline to L16? He said I don't know. I then gave him a plotter and map and asked him to plot it.

I then took over the aircraft and turned south towards L16. After a few minutes Capt. Driver said the radial is 060° at 29 miles. I said you mean L16 is north east of Skyline? He said no south west. I then asked him to take over the controls and take me to L16. He took the controls and turned to a heading of 060°. I then took the aircraft over and headed back south of L16.


I gave the aircraft back to Capt. Driver on the downwind leg. He made a normal approach but left the power on and landed about halfway down the runway.

I advised him to land at the first 100 ft. of the runway because many of our strips are short and he should practice for them.

Capt. Driver said the DFD told me if I ever land short again I will be in real trouble so I am going to make sure this never happens.

This portion of our schedule took one hour and thirty five minutes. It normally should take thirty minutes.

*Swy*



C06117183

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

# ROUTE / LINE CHECK RECORD

(b)(6)

(REF. CHAPTER IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

DATE

21 SEPT 1969

NAME <i>DRIVER CN</i>	POSITION <i>PIC</i>	BASE <i>VTE</i>	ACFT TYPE <i>C-123K</i>	ACFT NO. <i>545</i>	CERTIFICATION: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ROUTE QUALIF. <input type="checkbox"/> LINE CHECK
ROUTE <i>LOS L11 LOS T-10 LOS</i>	HOOD/INST	NIGHT	BLOCK TIME <i>7+44</i>	GRADING LEGEND: 1. Well Above Average    3. Average 2. Above Average        4. Below Average 5. Unsatisfactory	

					1	2	3	4	5						1	2	3	4	5
1. ANALYSIS OF WEATHER							X			15. ENROUTE & ARR. KNOWLEDGE OF:									
2. FLIGHT PLANNING									X	A. ROUTE, TERRAIN AND HAZARDS									X
3. PRE FLIGHT INSPECTION							X			B. COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES							X		
4. COCKPIT PROCEDURE							X			C. AREA TERRAIN AND HAZARDS									X
5. ENGINE STARTING PROCEDURES							X			D. AREA ARRIVAL PROCEDURES									X
6. TAXYING							X			E. HOLDING PROCEDURES									
7. USE OF BRAKES							X			F. INSTRUMENT APPROACH PROCEDURES									
8. ENGINE RUN-UP							X			G. AIRPORT LAYOUT AND FACILITIES									
9. PRE-DEPARTURE PROCEDURES								X		H.									
10. TAKE-OFF PROCEDURES							X			16. LANDINGS									
11. CLIMB PROCEDURES							X			17. AIRPORT ENTRY:									
12. ADHERENCE TO ATC INSTRUCTIONS								X		LOCATION:					TYPE APP:				
13. DEPARTURE-KNOWLEDGE OF:																			
A. AIRPORT LAYOUT AND FACILITIES							X												
B. DEPARTURE PROCEDURES								X											
C. AREA TERRAIN AND HAZARDS									X										
D. MINIMUM SAFE FLIGHT LEVELS								X											
E. NAV AIDS									X										
F. POSITION REPORTING POINTS							X												
G.																			
14. ABILITY TO:										18. APPEARANCE									
A. MAINTAIN ASSIGNED ALTITUDE							X			19. CUSTOMER RELATIONS									X
B. TUNE AND IDENTIFY NAV FACILITIES								X		20. CREW COORDINATION									X
C. TRACK ON SELECTED NAV FACILITIES									X	21. ATTENTION TO PASSENGER COMFORT									
D. RECOGNIZE STATION PASSAGE							X			22. RESPONSE TO UNUSUAL SITUATIONS									X
E. MAP READ AND INTERPRET NAV CHARTS								X		23. ATTENTION TO DUTIES									X
F. NAVIGATE BY DEAD RECKONING								X		24. KNOWLEDGE OF DIRECTIVES AND FAR'S									X
G.										25. PLANNING									X
H.										26. KNOWLEDGE OF EQUIPMENT									X
										27. STANDARDIZATION									X
										28. JUDGMENT									X

ABOVE CHECK CERTIFIED     SATISFACTORY    CHECK AIRMAN \_\_\_\_\_  
 UNSATISFACTORY

COMMENTS AND EXPLANATION OF GRADES 1 AND 5:

DATE <i>J 25 1969</i>	MFS (REVIEW AND POSTING)	DATE 19__
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APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

# ROUTE/LINE CHECK RECORD

(REF. CHAPTER IX, OPERATORS MANUAL,

(b)(6)  
8  
CLL

DATE  
8 JULY 19 68

NAME <b>DRIVER C.N.</b>	POSITION <b>CAPT.</b>	BASE <b>VTE</b>	ACFT TYPE <b>PC-6</b>	ACFT NO. <b>N196X</b>	CERTIFICATION: <input type="checkbox"/> ROUTE QUALIF. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> LINE CHECK										
ROUTE: <b>LS20/LS20A/LS81/LS15/LS20A/LS112/LS20/LS20A/LS81/LS20/LS4/LS4/LS117/LS20</b>		WIND/INST <b>0:50</b>	NIGHT <b>0:18</b>	BLOCK TIME <b>5:04</b>	GRADING LEGEND: 1. Well Above Average 2. Above Average 3. Average 4. Below Average 5. Unsatisfactory										
			1	2	3	4	5				1	2	3	4	5
1. ANALYSIS OF WEATHER					X			15. ENROUTE AND ARRIVAL-KNOWLEDGE OF:							
2. FLIGHT PLANNING					X			A. ROUTE, TERRAIN AND HAZARDS					X		
3. PRE FLIGHT INSPECTION					X			B. COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES					X		
4. COCKPIT PROCEDURE					X			C. AREA TERRAIN AND HAZARDS					X		
5. ENGINE STARTING PROCEDURES					X			D. AREA ARRIVAL PROCEDURES					X		
6. TAXIING						X		E. HOLDING PROCEDURES					X		
7. USE OF BRAKES					X			F. INSTRUMENT APPROACH PROCEDURES					X		
8. ENGINE RUN-UP				X				G. AIRPORT LAYOUT AND FACILITIES					X		
9. PRE-DEPARTURE PROCEDURES				X				H.							
10. TAKE-OFF PROCEDURES				X				16. LANDINGS					X		
11. CLIMB PROCEDURES					X			17. AIRPORT ENTRY:							
12. ADHERENCE TO ATC INSTRUCTIONS					X			LOCATION:			TYPE APPROACH:				
13. DEPARTURE-KNOWLEDGE OF:								<b>LS20A</b>			<b>ADF</b>				X
A. AIRPORT LAYOUT AND FACILITIES					X			<b>LS20</b>			<b>ADF</b>				X
B. DEPARTURE PROCEDURES					X										
C. AREA TERRAIN AND HAZARDS					X										
D. MINIMUM SAFE FLIGHT LEVELS					X										
E. NAV AIDS					X										
F. POSITION REPORTING POINTS					X										
G.															
14. ABILITY TO:								18. APPEARANCE						X	
A. MAINTAIN ASSIGNED ALTITUDE					X			19. CUSTOMER RELATIONS					X		
B. TUNE AND IDENTIFY NAV FACILITIES					X			20. CREW COORDINATION					X		
C. TRACK ON SELECTED NAV FACILITIES					X			21. ATTENTION TO PASSENGER COMFORT					X		
D. RECOGNIZE STATION PASSAGE					X			22. RESPONSE TO UNUSUAL SITUATIONS					X		
E. MAP READ AND INTERPRET NAV CHARTS					X			23. ATTENTION TO DUTIES					X		
F. NAVIGATE BY DEAD RECKONING					X			24. KNOWLEDGE OF DIRECTIVES AND FAR'S					X		
G.								25. PLANNING					X		
H.								26. KNOWLEDGE OF EQUIPMENT					X		
								27. STANDARDIZATION				X			
								28. JUDGMENT					X		

ABOVE CHECK CERTIFIED  SATISFACTORY  UNSATISFACTORY CHECK AREA

COMMENTS AND EXPLANATION OF GRADES 1 AND 5:

**G. TAXIED TO FAST AT LS20 & LS20A, CORRECT SAFE SPEED DEMONSTRATED. #8 & 10 USES CHECKLIST AT ALL TIMES USES F/F CHART FOR EVERY TAKE OFF. DRIVER IS AN AVERAGE PORTER PILOT. HIS CUSTOMER RELATIONS IS OUTSTANDING. A MUCH IMPROVED S.T.O.L. PILOT.**

MFD (RE)	DATE <b>12 JULY 19 68</b>	MFS (REVIEW AND POSTING)	DATE <b>19 68</b>
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C06117186

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

ROUTE/LINE CHECK RECORD  
(REF. CHAPTER IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

CLL (b)(6)

DATE  
19 Dec 1967

NAME <b>DRIVER C</b>	POSITION <b>Capt</b>	BASE <b>VTE</b>	ACFT TYPE <b>PC6C</b>	ACFT NO. <b>196X</b>	GRADING LEGEND: 1. Well Above Average 2. Above Average 3. Average 4. Below Average 5. Unsatisfactory
ROUTE <b>LS20A/LS170 LS213/LS26/LS17 LS161/LS20A</b>	HOOD	INSTRUMENT	NIGHT	FLIGHT TIME <b>3:03</b>	BLOCK TIME <b>3:10</b>

1. ANALYSIS OF WEATHER CHARACTERISTICS	3	15. AIRPORT ENTRY:	
2. FLIGHT PLANNING (WT & BAL. CO. FORMS, FUEL, ETC)	3	LOCATION	TAKE-OFFS
3. VISUAL EXTERNAL/INTERNAL INSPECTION	3	LANDINGS	TYPE APPROACH
4. COCKPIT PROCEDURE (CHECK LISTS, SOP, ETC)	2	LS20A	1
5. STARTING	3	LS213	1
6. TAXYING	3	LS26	1
7. USE OF BRAKES	3	LS17	1
8. ENGINE RUN-UP AND INSTRUMENT CHECK	2	LS161	1
9. ADHERENCE TO ATC INSTRUCTIONS	-	TF7896	1
		LS20A	1
TAKE-OFF AND CLIMB PROCEDURES	3	16. OVERALL PLANNING OF APPROACH	2
10. DEPARTURE-KNOWLEDGE OF:		17. OVERALL PLANNING OF INSTRUMENT FLIGHT	-
A. AIRPORT LAYOUT AND FACILITIES	3	18.	
B. DEPARTURE PROCEDURES	3	19.	
C. AREA TERRAIN AND HAZARDS	3	20.	
D. MINIMUM SAFE FLIGHT LEVELS	2	21.	
E. NAV AIDS AND POSITION REPORTING POINTS	2		
F.			
G.			
12. ABILITY TO:			
A. MAINTAIN ASSIGNED ALTITUDE	-	22. APPEARANCE	2
B. TUNE AND IDENTIFY NAV FACILITIES	-	23. ATTITUDE	2
C. TRACK ON SELECTED NAV FACILITIES	-	24. CREW COORDINATION AND COMMAND ABILITY	-
D. RECOGNIZE AND CONFIRM STATION PASSAGE	-	25. ATTENTION TO PASSENGER COMFORT	-
E. MAP READ AND INTERPRET NAV CHARTS	2	26. RESPONSE TO UNUSUAL SITUATIONS	3
F. NAVIGATE BY DEAD RECKONING	2	27. ATTENTION TO DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES	2
		28. KNOWLEDGE OF MANUALS, DIRECTIVES AND FAR	3
		29. PLANNING (TURBULENCE, ICE, HOLDING SKED ETC)	-
13. ENROUTE AND ARRIVAL-KNOWLEDGE OF:		30. KNOWLEDGE OF EQUIPMENT	2
A. ROUTE, TERRAIN AND OBSTRUCTION HAZARDS	3	31. STANDARDIZATION	3
B. COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES	2	32. JUDGMENT	2
C. AREA TERRAIN AND HAZARDS	3	33.	
D. AREA ARRIVAL PROCEDURES	3	34.	
E. HOLDING PROCEDURES	-		
F. INSTRUMENT APPROACH PROCEDURES	-		
G. AIRPORT LAYOUT AND FACILITIES	3		
H.			

14. PARKING

CERTIFICATION:  SATISFACTORY  UNSATISFACTORY

ROUTE QUALIF.  LINE CHECK  UNSATISFACTORY

CHECK AIRMAN [ ]

COMMENTS AND EXPLANATION OF GRADES 1 AND 5:  
*Capt DRIVER IS VERY CAUTIONS AND NEVER HURRY; BEYOND HIS OWN PACE.  
 He is VERY CAUTIONS ABOUT WIND CONDITIONS AND WILL NOT TAKE CHANCES.*

MFD [ ] DATE 22 Dec 1967 MFT (REVIEW AND POSTING) DATE 19 [ ]

C06117187

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

ROUTE/LINE CHECK RECORD

REF. CHAPTER IX, OPERATORS MANUAL

(b)(6)

DATE  
31 JULY 1967

NAME DRIVER, C.N.	POSITION SIC	BASE VTE	ACFT TYPE C-123B	ACFT NO. 54/655	GRADING LEGEND: 1. Well Above Average 2. Above Average 3. Average 4. Below Average 5. Unsatisfactory
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ROUTE LOB-(A/D)-LOB	HOOD 0:00	INSTRUMENT 0:00	NIGHT 0:00	FLIGHT TIME 1:24	BLOCK TIME 1:32
------------------------	--------------	--------------------	---------------	---------------------	--------------------

1. ANALYSIS OF WEATHER CHARACTERISTICS	3	15. AIRPORT ENTRY:	3
2. FLIGHT PLANNING (WT & BAL, CO. FORMS, FUEL, ETC)	2	LOCATION	TAKE-OFFS
3. VISUAL EXTERNAL/INTERNAL INSPECTION	2	LOB	1
4. COCKPIT PROCEDURE (CHECK LISTS, SOP, ETC)	2		1
5. STARTING	3		VMC
6. TAXIING	3		
7. USE OF BRAKES	3		
8. ENGINE RUN-UP AND INSTRUMENT CHECK	3		
9. ADHERENCE TO ATC INSTRUCTIONS	3		
TAKE-OFF AND CLIMB PROCEDURES	3	16. OVERALL PLANNING OF APPROACH	3
11. DEPARTURE-KNOWLEDGE OF :	-	17. OVERALL PLANNING OF INSTRUMENT FLIGHT	3
A. AIRPORT LAYOUT AND FACILITIES	3	18.	-
B. DEPARTURE PROCEDURES	3	19.	-
C. AREA TERRAIN AND HAZARDS	3	20.	-
D. MINIMUM SAFE FLIGHT LEVELS	3	21.	-
E. NAV AIDS AND POSITION REPORTING POINTS	3		-
F.	-		-
G.	-		-
12. ABILITY TO:	-		-
A. MAINTAIN ASSIGNED ALTITUDE	3		-
B. TUNE AND IDENTIFY NAV FACILITIES	3	22. APPEARANCE	2
C. TRACK ON SELECTED NAV FACILITIES	3	23. ATTITUDE	2
D. RECOGNIZE AND CONFIRM STATION PASSAGE	3	24. CREW COORDINATION AND COMMAND ABILITY	2
E. MAP READ AND INTERPRET NAV CHARTS	3	25. ATTENTION TO PASSENGER COMFORT	-
F. NAVIGATE BY DEAD RECKONING	3	26. RESPONSE TO UNUSUAL SITUATIONS	-
G.	-	27. ATTENTION TO DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES	2
H.	-	28. KNOWLEDGE OF MANUALS, DIRECTIVES AND FAR	2
13. ENROUTE AND ARRIVAL-KNOWLEDGE OF:	-	29. PLANNING (TURBULENCE, ICE, HOLDING SKED ETC)	-
A. ROUTE, TERRAIN AND OBSTRUCTION HAZARDS	3	30. KNOWLEDGE OF EQUIPMENT	2
B. COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES	3	31. STANDARDIZATION	2
C. AREA TERRAIN AND HAZARDS	3	32. JUDGMENT	3
D. AREA ARRIVAL PROCEDURES	3	33.	-
E. HOLDING PROCEDURES	3	34.	-
F. INSTRUMENT APPROACH PROCEDURES	3		-
G. AIRPORT LAYOUT AND FACILITIES	3		-
H.	-		-
14. PARKING	3		-

CERTIFICATION:  SATISFACTORY  UNSATISFACTORY  
 ROUTE QUALIF.  LINE CHECK

CHECK AIRMAN: [ ]

COMMENTS AND EXPLANATION OF GRADES 1 AND 5:  
 MR. DRIVER IS A GOOD PILOT & EMPLOYEE.

MFD	DATE 6 AUGUST 1967	MFT (REVIEW AND POSTING)	DATE 19__
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NAME		CREW POSITION	BASE	AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NUMBER	DATE
DRIVER, C.N.		PIC	VTE	C123	564374	25 Sep 1969
GRADING LEGEND: [S] Completed to Standard, [I] Incomplete. [X] Not applicable or not accomplished.						
1. MAPS				21. COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES		
2. WEIGHT & LOADING		X		22. INSTRUMENT APPROACHES ( )		
3. FIC BRIEFING		X		23. KNOWLEDGE OF:		
4. FLIGHT PLAN				A. ENROUTE AND AREA HAZARDS		
5. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)				B. EMERGENCY FACILITIES		
(EXTERIOR)				C. MINIMUM ENROUTE ALTITUDES		
6. ENGINE STARTING		X		D. SURVIVAL PROCEDURES		
7. TAXING		X		E. SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT		
8. USE OF BRAKES		X		F. LOST PROCEDURES		
9. ENGINE RUN UP		X		G. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES		
10. USE OF CHECK LIST		X		H. COMMUNICATIONS CODES		
11. CREW BRIEFING & TAKEOFF DATA		X		I. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE CHARTS		X
12. AREA DEPARTURES		X		24. CREW COORDINATION		X
13. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS		X		25. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP		X
14. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK				26. JUDGEMENT		X
15. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATIONS				27. SMOOTHNESS & COORDINATION		
16. RADIO NAVIGATION				28. ADHERENCE TO SOP		
17. D.R. NAVIGATION		X		29. CUSTOMER RELATIONS		
18. LOW & HIGH RECONNAISSANCE				30.		
19. AREA ARRIVALS		X		31.		
20. AIR DROPS : (FREE FALL)				32.		
(CHUTES)				33. TPE-331 START PROCEDURES (PC-6 & VTB)		

T/O's:	NORMAL		X-WIND		STOL		BALKED		E/FAIL		TOTAL	LDG's:	NORMAL		X-WIND		STOL		BALKED		E/FAIL		TOTAL
	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S			I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	
SITES												SITES											
208	X											2-16	X										

REMARKS:	AREA TRNG. & FAM.	PREV.	TODAY	TOTAL
	BLK. TIME AT CONTROLS	:	0:35	:
	BLK. TIME AS OBSERVER	:	:	:
	TIME CHARGED TO	:	:	:

INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN		DATE	MFD (REVIEW AND POSTING)	DATE
		30 Sept 1969		

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 09-Dec-2013

## FLIGHT WITH CAPT. DRIVER 25 September 1969

The following observations are forwarded regarding the flight on this date:

1. Did not properly analyze apparent malfunction of Aux feathering pump. Decided to abort but was shown that increased RPM gave desired reading.
2. Started taxiing through congested area and immediately requested "Taxi Check". He was briefed at this time on the necessity for constant vigilance when taxiing in congested areas.
3. Crew briefing did not include lift off speed, engine out climb speed, or approach speed in case of immediate return.
4. Takeoff was made without the "Line Up" check so the anti-skid was not on and the cowl flaps were in the full open position.
5. After takeoff, the landing gear and the flaps were retracting slowly and the hydraulic pressure went to 1000 PSI. He continued climb to 4500<sup>+</sup> and reduced power but did not try to analyze the malfunction. By this time, the landing gear and flaps had retracted and the hydraulic pressure was normal. At no time did he request a check on the fluid level. A decision was made to return to IO8 but cancelled when the gear and flaps were up and pressure normal. While level at 4500<sup>+</sup>, I completed the "Line Up" and "After Takeoff" checks.
6. The pattern at LL6 was flown at 2500<sup>+</sup> MSL, much too far out in view of recent unfriendly activity, and the rate of descent reached 2000 FPM on final. Approach speed was computed for land flaps but full flaps were used. Touch down was good but slightly long. The aircraft was parked in an area that was a possible hazard for other landing aircraft but was allowed as no other aircraft were expected. Adequate parking space was available nearby. Suspecting a possible hydraulic malfunction, at no time were special precautions made.
7. At LL6, it was determined that the left engine driven hydraulic pump was inoperative. On returning to Vientiane, no precautions were made for a known hydraulic malfunction.
8. While parking in the AOC area at IO8, the left wing tip grazed a utility pole.

Capt. Driver was briefed prior to departure that I was to act only as SIC. I recommended that the supervised line flying be extended to a minimum of 100 hours prior to his release as a pilot in comm and on the Line.



(b)(6)

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 09-Dec-2013

# AREA FAMILIARIZATION TRAINING RECORD

(b)(6)

NAME	CREW POSITION	BASE	AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NUMBER	DATE
DRIVER, C.N.	PIC	VOI	VTB	NG154U	19 OCT 1971
GRADING LEGEND: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard, <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete, <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable or not accomplished.					
1. MAPS				21. COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES	
2. WEIGHT & LOADING				22. INSTRUMENT APPROACHES ( )	
3. FIC BRIEFING				23. KNOWLEDGE OF:	
4. FLIGHT PLAN				A. ENROUTE AND AREA HAZARDS	
5. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)				B. EMERGENCY FACILITIES	
(EXTERIOR)				C. MINIMUM ENROUTE ALTITUDES	
6. ENGINE STARTING				D. SURVIVAL PROCEDURES	
7. TAXIING				E. SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT	
8. USE OF BRAKES				F. LOST PROCEDURES	
9. ENGINE RUN UP				G. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES	
10. USE OF CHECK LIST				H. COMMUNICATIONS CODES	
11. CREW BRIEFING & TAKEOFF DATA				I. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE CHARTS	
12. AREA DEPARTURES				24. CREW COORDINATION	
13. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS				25. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP	
14. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK				26. JUDGEMENT	
15. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATIONS				27. SMOOTHNESS & COORDINATION	
16. RADIO NAVIGATION				28. ADHERENCE TO SOP	
17. D.R. NAVIGATION				29. CUSTOMER RELATIONS	
18. LOW & HIGH RECONNAISSANCE				30.	
19. AREA ARRIVALS				31.	
20. AIR DROPS: (FREE FALL)				32.	
(CHUTES)				33. TPE-331 START PROCEDURES (PC-6 & VTB)	

T/O's:							LDG's:																
SITES	NORMAL		X-WIND		STOL		BALKED		E/FAIL		TOTAL	SITES	NORMAL		X-WIND		STOL		BALKED		E/FAIL		TOTAL
	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S		I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S		
VOI		X									1	V52		X								1	
V		X									1	V17		X								1	

REMARKS: NO PROBLEMS NOTED THIS FLIGHT.

AREA TRNG. & FAM.	PREV.	TODAY	TOTAL
BLK. TIME AT CONTROLS	1:33	1:07	1:44
BLK. TIME AS OBSERVER	0:0	0:0	0:0
TIME CHARGED TO		:	

ACK: \_\_\_\_\_ IN \_\_\_\_\_  
 MFD (REVIEW) \_\_\_\_\_ DATE 25 OCT 19 71 MFD (REVIEW) \_\_\_\_\_



C06117100

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 09-Dec-2013

# AREA FAMILIARIZATION TRAINING RECORD

(b)(6)

NAME	CREW POSITION	BASE	AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NUMBER	DATE
DRIVER, C.N.	PIC	SGN	VTB	N6154U	18 OCT 1971
GRADING LEGEND: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard, <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Not applicable or not accomplished.					
1. MAPS				21. COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES	
2. WEIGHT & LOADING				22. INSTRUMENT APPROACHES ( )	
3. FIC BRIEFING				23. KNOWLEDGE OF:	
4. FLIGHT PLAN				A. ENROUTE AND AREA HAZARDS	
5. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)				B. EMERGENCY FACILITIES	
(EXTERIOR)				C. MINIMUM ENROUTE ALTITUDES	
6. ENGINE STARTING				D. SURVIVAL PROCEDURES	
7. TAXIING				E. SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT	
8. USE OF BRAKES				F. LOST PROCEDURES	
9. ENGINE RUN UP				G. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES	
10. USE OF CHECK LIST				H. COMMUNICATIONS CODES	
11. CREW BRIEFING & TAKEOFF DATA				I. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE CHARTS	
12. AREA DEPARTURES				24. CREW COORDINATION	
13. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS				25. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP	
14. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK				26. JUDGEMENT	
15. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATIONS				27. SMOOTHNESS & COORDINATION	
16. RADIO NAVIGATION				28. ADHERENCE TO SOP	
17. D.R. NAVIGATION				29. CUSTOMER RELATIONS	
18. LOW & HIGH RECONNAISSANCE				30.	
19. AREA ARRIVALS				31.	
20. AIR DROPS : (FREE FALL)				32.	
(CHUTES)				33. TPE-331 START PROCEDURES (PC-6 & VTB)	

T/O's:								LDG's:															
NORMAL		X-WIND		STOL		BALKED		E/FAIL		TOTAL		NORMAL		X-WIND		STOL		BALKED		E/FAIL		TOTAL	
SITES	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	X	SITES	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	X
V01		X									1	V20		X									1
V17		X									1	V17		X									1
V20		X									1	V20		X									1
												V01			X								1

REMARKS: GENERALLY WELL CONDUCTED FLIGHT

AREA TRNG. & FAM.	PREV.	TODAY	TOTA
BLK. TIME AT CONTROLS	0:0	1:33	13'
BLK. TIME AS OBSERVER	0:0	0:0	0:0
TIME CHARGED TO		:	

PCK. \_\_\_\_\_  
 MFD (REVIEW) \_\_\_\_\_ DATE 25 Oct 19 71  
 MFD (REVIEW AND POSTING) \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ 19\_\_\_\_

AREA FAMILIARIZATION TRAING RECORD

(b)(6)

NAME	CREW POSITION	BASE	AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NUMBER	DATE
DRIVER, C.N.	SIC	VOI	VTB	N9956Z	8 OCT 1971
GRADING LEGEND: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard, <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete, <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable or not accomplished.					
1. MAPS			21. COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES		
2. WEIGHT & LOADING			22. INSTRUMENT APPROACHES ( )		
3. FIC BRIEFING			23. KNOWLEDGE OF:		
4. FLIGHT PLAN			A. ENROUTE AND AREA HAZARDS		
5. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)			B. EMERGENCY FACILITIES		
(EXTERIOR)			C. MINIMUM ENROUTE ALTITUDES		
6. ENGINE STARTING			D. SURVIVAL PROCEDURES		
7. TAXING			E. SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT		
8. USE OF BRAKES			F. LOST PROCEDURES		
9. ENGINE RUN UP			G. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES		
10. USE OF CHECK LIST			H. COMMUNICATIONS CODES		
11. CREW BRIEFING & TAKEOFF DATA			I. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE CHARTS		
12. AREA DEPARTURES			24. CREW COORDINATION		
13. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS			25. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP		
14. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK			26. JUDGEMENT		
15. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATIONS			27. SMOOTHNESS & COORDINATION		
16. RADIO NAVIGATION			28. ADHERENCE TO SOP		
17. D.R. NAVIGATION			29. CUSTOMER RELATIONS		
18. LOW & HIGH RECONNAISSANCE			30. FUEL SYSTEM MANAGEMENT		
19. AREA ARRIVALS			31.		
20. AIR DROPS: (FREE FALL)			32.		
(CHUTES)			33. TPE-331 START PROCEDURES (PC-6 & VTB)		

T/O's:									LDG's:														
SITES	NORMAL		X-WIND		STOL		BALKED		E/FAIL		TOTAL	SITES	NORMAL		X-WIND		STOL		BALKED		E/FAIL		TOTAL
	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S			I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	
V07		X									1	V86	X						X		X	3	
2		X									1	V04	X									1	
V04		X									1	V260					X					1	
V260					X	X					1	V202					X					1	
V202			X		X						2	V07	X									1	

REMARKS: SHOWS IMPROVEMENT IN ARES PREVIOUSLY WEAK. HAD DIFFICULTY LOCATING V260 USING ADF CROSS BEARING (NO NAV-AID ON FIELD). NEEDS WORK ON AIRFIELD IDENTIFICATION.

AREA TRNG. & FAM.	PREV.	TODAY	TOTA
BLK. TIME AT CONTROLS	23:55	4:00	27:5
BLK. TIME AS OBSERVER	20:59	2:49	23:9
TIME CHARGED TO		:	

ACK. \_\_\_\_\_ INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN \_\_\_\_\_  
 DATE 11 Oct. 19 71 MFD (REVIEW AND POSTING) DATE \_\_\_\_\_ 19 \_\_\_\_\_

# AREA FAMILIARIZATION TRAINING RECORD

NAME DRIVER, C.N.	CREW POSITION SIC	BASE V01	AIRCRAFT TYPE VTB	AIRCRAFT NUMBER N9956Z	DATE 7 OCT 1971
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GRADING LEGEND: [S] Completed to Standard, [I] Incomplete, [X] Not applicable or not accomplished.

1. MAPS	21. COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES	I	S		
2. WEIGHT & LOADING	22. INSTRUMENT APPROACHES ( )				
3. FIC BRIEFING	23. KNOWLEDGE OF:				
4. FLIGHT PLAN	A. ENROUTE AND AREA HAZARDS				
5. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)	B. EMERGENCY FACILITIES				
(EXTERIOR)	C. MINIMUM ENROUTE ALTITUDES				
6. ENGINE STARTING	D. SURVIVAL PROCEDURES				
7. TAXING	E. SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT				
8. USE OF BRAKES	F. LOST PROCEDURES				
9. ENGINE RUN UP	G. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES				
10. USE OF CHECK LIST	H. COMMUNICATIONS CODES				
11. CREW BRIEFING & TAKEOFF DATA	I. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE CHARTS				
12. AREA DEPARTURES	24. CREW COORDINATION				
13. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS	25. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP				
14. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK	26. JUDGEMENT				
15. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATIONS	27. SMOOTHNESS & COORDINATION				
16. RADIO NAVIGATION	28. ADHERENCE TO SOP				
17. D.R. NAVIGATION	29. CUSTOMER RELATIONS				
18. LOW & HIGH RECONNAISSANCE	30.				
19. AREA ARRIVALS	31.				
20. AIR DROPS : (FREE FALL)	32.				
(CHUTES)	33. TPE-331 START PROCEDURES (PC-6 & VTB)				

T/O's:										LDG's:											
NORMAL		X-WIND		STOL		BALKED		E/FAIL		TOTAL	NORMAL		X-WIND		STOL		BALKED		E/FAIL		TOTAL
I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S		I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	
V07	X									1	V13		X								1
V			X							1	V07	X									1
V09	X									1	V19		X								1
V19			X							1	V27		X								1
V27			X							1	V07	X									1
V07	X									1	V15	X									1
V15	X									1	V04	X									1
V04	X									1	V07	X									1

REMARKS: Shows improvement in cockpit organization. Also improved in utilizing NAV-AIDS. Still weak in dividing his attention. When questioned, admits he knew various items but failed to follow through on information which he had recently attained. Still needs work on functions of A/C systems.

AREA TRNG. & FAM.	PREV.	TODAY	TOTAL
BLK. TIME AT CONTROLS	18:42	5:43	23:5
BLK. TIME AS OBSERVER	20:59	-:-	20:5
TIME CHARGED TO	/ /	:	

ACK. \_\_\_\_\_ INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN \_\_\_\_\_  
 DATE 17 Oct. 71 MFD (REVIEW AND POSTING) DATE \_\_\_\_\_

# AREA FAMILIARIZATION TRAINING RECORD

NAME	CREW POSITION	BASE	AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NUMBER	DATE
DRIVER, C.N.	SIC	VOI	VTB	N99568	6 OCT 1971
GRADING LEGEND: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard, <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete.					
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Not applicable or not accomplished.					
1. MAPS		X	21. COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES		
2. WEIGHT & LOADING		X	22. INSTRUMENT APPROACHES (2) K-C/L, YRQ, GUT, GCA		
3. FIC BRIEFING		X	23. KNOWLEDGE OF:		
4. FLIGHT PLAN		X	A. ENROUTE AND AREA HAZARDS		
5. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)		X	B. EMERGENCY FACILITIES		
(EXTERIOR)		X	C. MINIMUM ENROUTE ALTITUDES		
6. ENGINE STARTING		X	D. SURVIVAL PROCEDURES		
7. TAXING		X	E. SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT		
8. USE OF BRAKES		X	F. LOST PROCEDURES		
9. ENGINE RUN UP		X	G. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES		
10. USE OF CHECK LIST		X	H. COMMUNICATIONS CODES		
11. CREW BRIEFING & TAKEOFF DATA		X	I. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE CHARTS		
12. AREA DEPARTURES		X	24. CREW COORDINATION		
13. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS		X	25. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP		
14. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK		X	26. JUDGEMENT		
15. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATIONS		X	27. SMOOTHNESS & COORDINATION		X
16. RADIO NAVIGATION		X	28. ADHERENCE TO SOP		
17. D.R. NAVIGATION		X	29. CUSTOMER RELATIONS		
18. LOW & HIGH RECONNAISSANCE			30.		
19. AREA ARRIVALS		X	31.		
20. AIR DROPS : (FREE FALL)			32.		
(CHUTES)			33. TPE-331 START PROCEDURES (PC-6 & VTB)		

T/O's:										LDG's:											
NORMAL		X-WIND		STOL		BALKED		E/FAIL		TOTAL	NORMAL		X-WIND		STOL		BALKED		E/FAIL		TOTAL
SITES	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	SITES	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S
V07		X								1	V232		X								1
V32		X								1	V04		X								1
V04		X								1	V86		X								1
V86		X								1	V07		X								1
V07		X								1	V01		X								1
V01		X								1	V86		X								1
V86		X								1	V28		X								1
V28		X								1	V07		X								1

REMARKS: NEEDS TO ORGANIZE MAPS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT IN A MANNER SUITABLE FOR SINGLE PILOT FLYING. SLOW TO UTILIZE ALL NAV. FACILITIES AVAILABLE. NEEDS TO CONDITION HIMSELF TO DIVIDE HIS ATTENTION TO PERTINENT MATTERS MORE FREELY. TENDS TO CONCENTRATE ON ONE FUNCTION AT A TIME. IS WEAK IN RETAINING PERTINENT INFORMATION FOR MORE THAN A SHORT TIME.

AREA TRNG. & FAM.	PREV.	TODAY	TOTAL
BLK. TIME AT CONTROLS	18:28	6:44	18:1
BLK. TIME AS OBSERVER	20:59	- : -	20:5
TIME CHARGED TO			

INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN

DATE 11 Oct 1971

MFD (REVIEW AND POSTING)

DATE

19

NAME	CREW POSITION	BASE	AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NUMBER	DATE
DRIVER, C.N.	SIC	VOI	VTB	N 770B	5 OCT 1971
GRADING LEGEND: [S] Completed to Standard, [I] Incomplete. [+/-] Not applicable or not accomplished.					
1. MAPS		X	21. COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES		
2. WEIGHT & LOADING		X	22. INSTRUMENT APPROACHES ( )		
3. FIC BRIEFING		X	23. KNOWLEDGE OF:		
4. FLIGHT PLAN		X	A. ENROUTE AND AREA HAZARDS		
5. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)		X	B. EMERGENCY FACILITIES		
(EXTERIOR)		X	C. MINIMUM ENROUTE ALTITUDES		
6. ENGINE STARTING		X	D. SURVIVAL PROCEDURES		
7. TAXING		X	E. SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT		
8. USE OF BRAKES		X	F. LOST PROCEDURES		
9. ENGINE RUN UP		X	G. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES		
10. USE OF CHECK LIST		X	H. COMMUNICATIONS CODES		
11. CREW BRIEFING & TAKEOFF DATA		X	I. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE CHARTS		
12. AREA DEPARTURES		X	24. CREW COORDINATION		
13. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS		X	25. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP		
14. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK		X	26. JUDGEMENT		
15. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATIONS		X	27. SMOOTHNESS & COORDINATION		
16. RADIO NAVIGATION		X	28. ADHERENCE TO SOP		
17. D.R. NAVIGATION		X	29. CUSTOMER RELATIONS		
18. LOW & HIGH RECONNAISSANCE		X	30.		
19. AREA ARRIVALS		X	31.		
20. AIR DROPS: (FREE FALL)		X	32.		
(CHUTES)		X	33. TPE-331 START PROCEDURES (PC-6 & VTB)		

T/O's:										LDG's:											
NORMAL		X-WIND		STOL		BALKED		E/FAIL		TOTAL	NORMAL		X-WIND		STOL		BALKED		E/FAIL		TOTAL
SITES	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	SITES	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S	I	S
V13		X								1	V07			X				X			2
V1				X						1	V11			X							1
V11				X						1	V07			X							1

REMARKS: DEMONSTRATES MORE CONFIDENCE IN ALL AREAS. NEEDS WORK ON SYSTEMS OPERATION. WEAK IN ANTICIPATING AND THINKING AHEAD. FAILS TO USE ALL NAV AIDS AVAILABLE.

AREA TRNG. & FAM.	PREV.	TODAY	TOTAL
BLK. TIME AT CONTROLS	11:04	2:24	11:28
BLK. TIME AS OBSERVER	10:59	0:40	11:39
TIME CHARGED TO			

ACK. \_\_\_\_\_

INSTRUCTOR CHECK ALLOWED

MFD (REVIEW AND POSTING) DATE \_\_\_\_\_ 1971

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

PROFICIENCY CHECK DOCUMENTATION

AND

WRITTEN EXAMINATION GRADING

NAME: DRIVER C.N. DATE 15 SEPT 1969 EXAM. NO. C123K-69-2

FAA LICENSE AND CERTIFICATES

FAA BOOK CHECK YES  NO  TOTAL TIME \_\_\_\_\_ RADIO/TEL PERMIT YES  NO

ATR  COM. # 477924 MED. CERT. DATE ISSUED: SEP 2 1969 196

RATINGS ATR: MARTIN 202-440.

RATINGS-COM: BEECHER 107-720 Fairchild C123

CPI: F/W  INST.  R/W  INST.  EXPIRATION DATE: 196

CCAA LICENSE AND CERTIFICATES

ATR  SR. COM.  COM. # \_\_\_\_\_ EXPIRATION DATE: 196

RATINGS/EXP. DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

RADIO/TEL PERMIT YES  NO  MED. CERT. DATE ISSUED: \_\_\_\_\_

OTHER CERTIFICATES AND REMARKS:

- |              |              |                   |           |           |
|--------------|--------------|-------------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1. <u>D</u>  | 11. <u>B</u> | 21. <u>B A</u>    | 31. _____ | 41. _____ |
| 2. <u>A</u>  | 12. <u>D</u> | 22. <u>C B-22</u> | 32. _____ | 42. _____ |
| 3. <u>B</u>  | 13. <u>B</u> | 23. <u>C</u>      | 33. _____ | 43. _____ |
| 4. <u>A</u>  | 14. <u>A</u> | 24. <u>B</u>      | 34. _____ | 44. _____ |
| 5. <u>A</u>  | 15. <u>B</u> | 25. <u>A</u>      | 35. _____ | 45. _____ |
| 6. <u>B</u>  | 16. <u>B</u> | 26. _____         | 36. _____ | 46. _____ |
| 7. <u>C</u>  | 17. <u>A</u> | 27. _____         | 37. _____ | 47. _____ |
| 8. <u>D</u>  | 18. <u>C</u> | 28. _____         | 38. _____ | 48. _____ |
| 9. <u>D</u>  | 19. <u>C</u> | 29. _____         | 39. _____ | 49. _____ |
| 10. <u>C</u> | 20. <u>A</u> | 30. _____         | 40. _____ | 50. _____ |

EXAMINATION GRADE 92 % EXAMINER \_\_\_\_\_



COMPLETION OF TRAINING RECORD

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

TO : See Distribution

FROM: DFOTD

The individuals named below completed the Ditching Procedures & Over training  
Water Equipment  
(aircraft) (type course)

course on Oct.19,20,21,22 1967. The training was conducted at VTE by [redacted]  
(station) (instructor)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Station at</u>	<u>Hours Instruction</u>	<u>Grade</u>
[redacted]	VTE	3:30	S
"	"	"	"
"	"	"	"
Driver C	"	"	"
[redacted]	"	"	"
[redacted]	"	"	"
[redacted]	"	"	"
[redacted]	"	"	"
[redacted]	"	"	"
[redacted]	"	"	"
[redacted]	"	"	"
[redacted]	"	"	"
[redacted]	"	"	"
[redacted]	"	"	"
[redacted]	"	"	"
[redacted]	"	"	"
[redacted]	"	"	"
[redacted]	"	"	"
[redacted]	"	"	"
[redacted]	"	"	"
[redacted] (E/E Custodian)	"	"	"
[redacted] (E/E Custodian)	"	"	"
[redacted] (E/E Custodian)	"	"	"
[redacted] (E/E Custodian)	"	"	"
[redacted]	"	"	"

- Distribution
  - 1 DED
  - 1 MFSD-BKK
  - 1 MFCT-BKE
  - 1 Each MFD concerned MFD/VTE
  - 1 File
- COPY

s/s [redacted] - DFOTD  
Manager, Flight Operations Trng

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

## M E M O R A N D U M

TO : For the Record

DATE: 25 October 1967


FROM: MFD/L

REF. No. MF/L-67-272

SUBJ: Ditching Drill

This is to certify that F/O C. N. Driver  
attended the Company approved Wet Ditching and Evacuation  
Training on 20 October 1967 and was instructed in  
ditching procedures, emergency airplane evacuation proce-  
dures and use of emergency water survival equipment.

cc: BMVTE  
DFD  
DOTD  
DSAFE  
File





APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

RECEIVED

(J)(6)

# COMPLETION OF TRAINING RECORD

TO: See Distribution

FROM: MFOT VTE


The individuals named below completed the C-123 ~~Recurrent~~ training  
(aircraft) (type course)  
course on 6 Sept. 69. The training was conducted at VTE by   
(date) (station) (instructor)

Name	Station at	Hours Instruction	Grade
Driver, C. N. ✓	VTE	12+00	97%

**Distribution**

- 1 DFOTD
- 1 DFD
- 1 DFOD (Dispatchers only)
- 1 MFOT-TAW
- 1 MFOT-VTE
- 1 Each MFD concerned
- 1 File

Original signed by



Manager, Flight Operations Training

# COMPLETION OF TRAINING RECORD

TO: See Distribution

FROM: MFOT VTE

The individuals named below completed the C-123K Recurrent training  
(aircraft) (type course)  
course on 7 Aug. 70. The training was conducted at VTE by [redacted]  
(date) (station) (instructor)

Name	Station at	Hours Instruction	Grade
1. [redacted]	VTE	12+00	96%
✓ 2. DRIVER, C. N.	VTE	12+00	100%
3. [redacted]	VTE	12+00	100%

**Distribution**

- 1 DFOTD
- 1 DFD
- 1 DFOD (Dispatchers only)
- 1 MFOT-TAW
- 1 MFOT-VTE
- ✓ 1 Each MFD concerned
- 1 File

Original Signed by

✓ [redacted]  
Manager, Flight Operations Training

CERTIFICATION OF GROUND TRAINING

NAME		CREW POSITION		STATION
DRIVER, C. N.		CAPT.		VTE
COURSE TITLE	HOURS	DATE COMPLETED	GRADE	
C-123K Recurrent	16+00	2 Nov. 1971	100%	

This is to certify that the individual named above has completed the Training course indicated. The training was conducted at VTE by [redacted]  
 Station Instructor

Distribution:  
 ✓ CP VTE *[Signature]*  
 SCP TPE  
 File

[redacted]  
 MFOID/SEA [redacted]

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

Name in Full	Driver, C.N.	Date of Birth	
State of Employment	18 July 1969	Total Flight Time at Employment	Hrs.
Present Position	F/O	Dual Rated	

**GROUND SCHOOL COMPLETED**

Basic			Recurrent			Initial/Transition			Up-grading		
Subject	Grade	Date	Subject	Grade	Date	Subject	Grade	Date	Subject	Grade	Date
Co-Processing			Aircraft			Aircraft			Aircraft		
Meteorology											
Ops-Regs											
Navigation											
Emergency			Emergency			Emergency			Emergency		
Total Hours:			Total Hours:			Total Hours:			Total Hours:		
Certified By:			Certified By:			Certified By:			Certified By:		

**ADDITIONAL TRAINING**

Basic			Recurrent			Initial/Transition			Up-grading		
Subject	Grade	Date	Subject	Grade	Date	Subject	Grade	Date	Subject	Grade	Date
			Survival	100%	7-18						
Total Hours:			Total Hours: 8			Total Hours:			Total Hours:		
Certified By:			Certified By:			Certified By:			Certified By:		

**LICENSE TRAINING**

US ATR			US Dispatcher			US-Flight Engineer			CCAA-ATR-SR.COMM.		
Subject	Grade	Date	Subject	Grade	Date	Subject	Grade	Date	Subject	Grade	Date
FAR			FAR			FAR			FAR		
WT & BAL			WT & BAL			WT & BAL			WT & BAL		
Navigation			Navigation			Aircraft			Navigation		
Meteorology			Meteorology			Meteorology			Meteorology		
Performance			Flt-Planning			Computation			Instrument		
ATC			ATC			Operation			ATC		
Total Hours:			Total Hours:			Total Hours:			Total Hours:		
Certified By:			Certified By:			Certified By:			Certified By:		

**DIRECTED STUDY WRITTEN EXAMINATIONS**

First Quarter		Second Quarter		Third Quarter		Fourth Quarter	
Date	Grade	Date	Grade	Date	Grade	Date	Grade

**REMARKS**

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

X O X J

*File*

351  
 OF TPEXTHO TNPXTHO SGNXTFA  
 VIEXTFA 131045  
 XOXO  
 AAA TEN FOUR  
 BBB C123K 540817  
 CCC UTH RTAFB TE6523 THAI  
 DDD B13 0102Z 1970  
 LEE PIC RJ STENSLOFF NONE FO CN DRIVER NONE AFS DERRINGTON  
 NONE  
 FFF NO PAX

GGG MINOR DAMAGE TO NOSE GEAR X EST RTN TO SERVICE BY  
 OSOOL B14  
 HHH AT 65-70 KTS DURING T/O ROLL ON RWY 30 THE LEFT JET  
 ENGINE FAILED CAUSING A/C TO SWERVE TO THE LEFT X  
 THE F/O EXERTED FWD PRESSURE ON YOKE AND THE CAPTAIN  
 APPLIED FULL REVERSE FULL RIGHT RUDDER FULL RIGHT  
 BRAKE AND ATTEMPTED TO USE RIGHT NOSE GEAR STEERING X  
 HOWEVER NOSE GEAR STEERING TO RIGHT WAS INOPERATIVE  
 AND A/C CONTINUED OFF LEFT SIDE OF RWY AFTER WHICH THE  
 NOSE GEAR STRUCK A 2 INCH ASPHALT LIP OF RUNWAY WIDTH  
 EXTENSION X AT THIS POINT NOSE GEAR SHOCK STRUT  
 FAILED ALLOWING DUAL NOSE GEAR WHEEL TO ROTATE  
 FORWARDS X

THE A/C THEN CAME TO REST WITH ALL GEAR EXTENDED AT  
 A POINT 2000 FEET FROM INITIATION OF T/O ROLL AND  
 APPROX 100 FEET TO THE LEFT OF THE RUNWAY EDGE X  
 AFTER INSTALLING A NEW SHOCK STRUT THE A/C WAS TOWED  
 TO THE AAM RAMP WHERE EXAMINATION REVEALED THAT  
 THE FAILURE OF THE NOSE GEAR STEERING WAS PROBABLY  
 CAUSED BY THE FAILURE OF THE NOSE LEVELLING GEAR  
 VALVE PULLEY SUPPORT P/N 8B425153-23 WHICH ALLOWED  
 NOSE GEAR STEERING CABLE SLACK AND THE PULLEY FORK  
 P/N 8B 425154-23 TO BECOME DISENGAGED FROM THE CONTROL  
 ARM TO THE NOSE GEAR DYDRAULIC-POWERED STEERING  
 SELECTOR VALVE X THIS IN TURN PREVENTED SELECTION  
 OF RIGHT NOSE GEAR STEERING AND LOSS OF CONTROL X  
 QUALITY CONTROL UTH IS INITIATING A SPECIAL INSPECTION  
 TO NON DESTRUCT TEST SUSPECTED PULLEY SUPPORT OF ALL  
 AAM C123 A/C AND WILL SUBMIT AND EMERGENCY UR IN  
 ACCORDANCE WITH TO 00-35D-54 REQUESTING METALURGICAL  
 EXAMINATION X

III NOT A FACTOR  
 JJJ THIS IS CONSIDERED TO BE AN INCIDENT AND WILL BE  
 REPORTED ON SAFE FORM 4 X A SYNOPSIS BY SAFETY WITH  
 CREW AND MAINT STATEMENTS WILL BE ATTACHED X THIS WAS  
 1ST T/O AFTER PHASE II INSPECTION X

KKK  
 LLL END SERIES  
 BM SOM MTS MFD DASEE VTE 131000

RECEIVED  
 16 FEB 1970  
 PERSC

*PA*

APPROVED FOR  
 RELEASE DATE:  
 09-Dec-2013

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

# AIRCRAFT MINOR INCIDENT & INFLIGHT IRREGULARITY REPORT

(Fill in all spaces applicable)

1. AIRCRAFT NO. AND TYPE:	2. TYPE OF MISHAP: <b>Taxi Incident</b>
---------------------------	--

<b>FLIGHT CREW Supervisory pilot</b>	
PILOT: <b>Clarence N. Driver</b>	F/O: _____
CREW MEMBER: _____	CREW MEMBER: <b>N/A</b> OTHER: <b>N/A</b>

<b>FLIGHT PLAN DETAIL</b>					
1. TYPE OF FLIGHT PLAN:	VFR <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	IFR <input type="checkbox"/>	LOCAL <input type="checkbox"/>	DIRECT <input type="checkbox"/>	AIRWAY <input type="checkbox"/>
2. WHERE FILED: <b>Vang Vieng, Laos (L-16)</b>					
3. TYPE OF FLIGHT(MARK ALL APPLICABLE ITEMS): PASSENGER <input type="checkbox"/> CARGO <input type="checkbox"/> TRAINING/TEST <input type="checkbox"/>					
4. ORIGIN OF FLIGHT: <b>L-08</b>		5. DESTINATION: <b>T-10</b>		6. GMT DATE AND TIME: <b>250258</b>	
7. FLIGHT CONTRACT NO: <b>342</b>		8. ENROUTE STOPS AND NEXT LANDING: <b>T-10</b>			
9. LAST POINT OF TAKE-OFF: <b>L-16</b>			10. ACTUAL DURATION OF FLIGHT: <b>0+33</b>		
11. NEAREST CITY/SITE AND COUNTRY: <b>Vientiane, Laos</b>			12. COORDINATE LOCATION: _____		
13. GROSS T.O./WEIGHT: <b>50000</b>		14. ALLOW. LDG. WEIGHT: <b>60000</b>		15. ACTUAL LDG. WEIGHT: <b>48000</b>	

<b>INCIDENT AND CONDITION</b>					
1. PHASE OF OPERATION:	PARKED <input type="checkbox"/>	TAXI <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	TAKE-OFF <input type="checkbox"/>	LANDING <input type="checkbox"/>	ENROUTE <input type="checkbox"/>
2. ATMOSPHERIC CONDITION AT TIME OF MISHAP: CLEAR <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SCATTERED <input type="checkbox"/> RAIN <input type="checkbox"/> BROKEN <input type="checkbox"/>					
SNOW <input type="checkbox"/> IN CLOUDS <input type="checkbox"/> HAIL <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (DESCRIBE): <b>N/A</b>					
3. PRESSURE ALTITUDE: <b>N/A</b>			4. WHAT PART OR SYSTEM WAS AFFECTED? <b>Wing Tip</b>		
5. WHAT WAS FIRST INDICATION OF TROUBLE? <b>Felt Bump</b> 6. SEVERITY OF ROUGHNESS? <b>Very Minor</b>					
7. WAS THERE A FIRE WARNING? YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>					
8. APPROXIMATE AMOUNT OF FUEL DUMPED <b>N/A</b> LBS. OR GALS.					
9. WHAT WAS THE EFFECT ON FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS? <b>None</b>					
10. WAS SMOKE, OIL OR FLAME OBSERVED? YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> WHERE? <b>N/A</b>					
11. WHAT PRECAUTIONARY ACTION WAS TAKEN? <b>Engines Secured and wing tip inspected</b>					
12. WAS CARGO JETTISONED? YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> IF SO, WHERE? <b>N/A</b> WEIGHT? <b>N/A</b>					
13. POWER SETTING AT TIME IRREGULARITY OCCURRED: RPM? <b>1000</b> MAN. PRESS.? <b>N/A</b> TORQUE? <b>N/A</b> FUEL FLOW? <b>N/A</b>					
14. INSTRUMENT READING AT TIME IRREGULARITY OCCURRED: OAT <b>N/A</b> IAS (WAS THERE A DECREASE?) <b>N/A</b>					
15. WAS POWER IMMEDIATELY REDUCED? <b>No</b> TO WHAT RPM? <b>N/A</b> MAN. PRESS.? <b>N/A</b> TORQUE? <b>N/A</b> FUEL FLOW? <b>N/A</b>					
16. WHAT WAS INDICATION OF ENGINE IGNITION ANALYZER? <b>N/A</b>					
17. WAS ENGINE SHUTDOWN? <b>Yes</b> WHEN (GMT)? <b>0258</b> WHAT LENGTH OF TIME WAS ENGINE SHUTDOWN? <b>N/A</b>					
18. WAS ENGINE RESTARTED? <b>N/A</b> POWER SETTING AFTER RESTARTING: <b>N/A</b>					
RPM <b>N/A</b> MAP <b>N/A</b> TORQUE <b>N/A</b> FUEL FLOW <b>N/A</b>					
NOTE: (N/A) NOT APPLICABLE (N/O) NOT OBTAINED					


APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

25 September 1969

STATEMENT

The following is the statement of the undersigned concerning the taxi incident of C-123, 56-4374 on 25 September 1969 at L-08, Laos.

I was in the right seat in the capacity of supervisory pilot with Captain Driver in the left seat, we had taxied into the "Tango" area at the Vientiane airport. While making a right turn, the left wing tip struck a telephone pole. Captain Driver was looking out the left side immediately prior to contact.



APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

25 September 1969

STATEMENT

The following is the statement of the undersigned concerning the taxi incident of C-123, 56-4374 on 25 September 1969 at L-08, Lacs.

On 25 September 1969 approximately 0258 hours while parking aircraft #374 on the ADC ramp, the left wing tip was slightly damaged. Was making a right turn and the left wing tip contacted a telephone pole.

I was attempting to park beside the Embassy C-47 instead of in front of its blocking him in. This was done because I needed maintainance for a left hydraulic pump and H. F. radio. It was going to take approximately 1½ hours to repair. Parking in this manner allowed either A/C to be moved without first moving mine.

Original Signed by

C. N. Driver.



DRIVER  
(P)

- FOR COMPANY USE ONLY -

MFD UTE

Aircraft Accident Review

4 November 1968

ACCIDENT

LOCATION : Up-country, Laos A/C : PC-6C, N196X  
 DATE : 9 July 1968 DAMAGE : Minor  
 TYPE ACCIDENT : Inflight structural failure INJURIES : Fatal to passenger

Safety Synopsis and CommentsA. Synopsis

At approximately 400 feet and while in a left turn during a climb-out from an up-country site, the right sliding door of the aircraft became disengaged from its lower track and opened out from the airframe. An indigenous passenger who was not provided a seat belt and who was leaning against the door fell out and was fatally injured.

The pilot had landed at the site and had on-loaded four passengers and two large pigs. He stated that one passenger was seated in the co-pilot's seat, one passenger sat in the kickers seat located in the right rear of the cabin, one passenger sat on the floor near the right rear seat and one passenger sat on one of the pigs. The door handle was checked prior to take-off and was found to be secure; however, the door opened in flight.

Investigation revealed that the aircraft carried a full complement of seats of which only two were installed in the cabin. It was also discovered that there had been log book discrepancy write-ups regarding the door on 3, 4 and 6 July. The write-ups on the third and fourth of July indicated that the door was hard to open. The corrections being to lubricate the door and replace a bumper. On the sixth, the door slid open in flight and the door lock was replaced.

Investigation also revealed that the exact nature of the failure which allowed the bottom of the door to separate from the aircraft was the looseness of the sliding door pin 6202.183 bottom retaining bracket. Several fasteners were found to have been stripped out and screws of an insufficient length had been used in other receptacles.

It was also discovered that Maintenance had not complied with the Engineering Authorization, EA-PC6-52-5 dated 20 July 1967 which calls out a modification of the sliding door bottom rail installation to prevent the door from jumping out of the bottom rail. This EA had been in effect for almost a year prior to the accident.

- NOT TO BE REPRODUCED OR CIRCULATED OUTSIDE OF THE COMPANY -

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 09-Dec-2013
--

**B. Comments**

The probable cause was listed as the failure of the pilot to provide seats with seat belts to all passengers aboard his flight. This should be listed as a contributing factor as the appropriate probable cause would be, "Failure to retain the right door due to design deficiency." A major contributing factor is, "Improper maintenance procedures." This is assessed as the result of the non-compliance of Maintenance to effect the door modification EA during a heavy maintenance inspection which occurred prior to the accident date.

Review of the report revealed that the Local Board was held 3 days after the accident and prior to the submission of the team report. This procedure is contrary to Safety Division instructions and impedes the investigation.

The pilot in this case erred in that he failed to provide the passengers with the seats that were available and he was in non-compliance with a Flying Division memorandum, FD-68-056, which calls for seat belts to be provided to all passengers. However, this, at times, is impractical due to the nature of our operation. Therefore, in order to provide the pilots with a workable, yet safe, cabin configuration, SA/P, DOED and Tainan are planning to install quick detachable canvas seats along the left side of the cabin. The left door is to be skinned over and the seats, which provide seat belts, can be extended or retracted in seconds to accommodate any practical load configuration required.

**C. Pertinent Recommendations and Action Taken****1. Mandatory compliance with EAs.**


Action : Maintenance is aware of their deficiencies and are making every effort to comply.

**2. Mandatory compliance with the Flying Division memorandum which calls out the use of seat belts by all personnel.**

Action : This is no problem in the larger aircraft but until collapsable seats are installed in the smaller aircraft, it will present an operating problem for our STOL aircraft.

**3. Installation of canvas folding seats in the Porter.**

Action : Evaluation is now in progress.

  
Director  
Safety Division

cc: VPFO  
VPTS  
DFD (2)  
MSAFE UDN (2)  
MSAFE SGN (2)  
MGS  
MFSD VTE (2)  
BM VTE (2)  
OM VTE (2)  
MFD VTE (4) ✓  
MTS VTE (4)  
MFD and MTS via BM BKK (5)  
MFD and MTS via BM UDN (5)  
MFD and MTS via BM SGN (5)  
MFD and STS via Manager   
SZ T11 (2)  
SZ VO3 (2)  
SZ VO7 (2)  
SZ L39 (2)  
Pilot concerned  
N196X file  
File

EDD/mc

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

LOG  
ACCIDENT FILE

# AIRCRAFT MINOR INCIDENT & INFLIGHT IRREGULARITY REPORT

(Fill in all spaces applicable)

1. AIRCRAFT NO. AND TYPE: B1961 PC-60 2. TYPE OF MISHAP: Door opened in flight.

**FLIGHT CREW**  
 PILOT: C. H. Driver F/O: \_\_\_\_\_  
 CREW MEMBER: \_\_\_\_\_ CREW MEMBER: \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER: \_\_\_\_\_

**FLIGHT PLAN DETAIL**

1. TYPE OF FLIGHT PLAN: VFR  IFR  LOCAL  DIRECT  AIRWAY

2. WHERE FILED: N/A

3. TYPE OF FLIGHT (MARK ALL APPLICABLE ITEMS): PASSENGER  CARGO  TRAINING/TEST

4. ORIGIN OF FLIGHT: IS20A 5. DESTINATION: IS20A 6. GMT DATE AND TIME: 8 July 1968  
AID 439-713

7. FLIGHT CONTRACT NO: \_\_\_\_\_ 8. ENROUTE STOPS AND NEXT LANDING: IS126

9. LAST POINT OF TAKE-OFF: IS126 10. ACTUAL DURATION OF FLIGHT: 10 minutes

11. NEAREST CITY/SITE AND COUNTRY: IS126, Laos 12. COORDINATE LOCATION: N/A

13. GROSS T.O./WEIGHT: 4,700 14. ALLOW. LDG. WEIGHT: 4,850 15. ACTUAL LDG. WEIGHT: 4,600

**INCIDENT AND CONDITION**

1. PHASE OF OPERATION: PARKED  TAXI  TAKE-OFF  LANDING  ENROUTE

2. ATMOSPHERIC CONDITION AT TIME OF MISHAP: CLEAR  SCATTERED  RAIN  BROKEN   
 SNOW  IN CLOUDS  HAIL  OTHER (DESCRIBE): \_\_\_\_\_

3. PRESSURE ALTITUDE: 3300' 4. WHAT PART OR SYSTEM WAS AFFECTED? Right door.

5. WHAT WAS FIRST INDICATION OF TROUBLE? None 6. SEVERITY OF ROUGHNESS? \_\_\_\_\_

7. WAS THERE A FIRE WARNING? YES  NO

8. APPROXIMATE AMOUNT OF FUEL DUMPED \_\_\_\_\_ LBS. OR GALS.

9. WHAT WAS THE EFFECT ON FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS? None

10. WAS SMOKE, OIL OR FLAME OBSERVED? YES  NO  WHERE? \_\_\_\_\_

11. WHAT PRECAUTIONARY ACTION WAS TAKEN? Landed at once.

12. WAS CARGO JETTISONED? YES  NO  IF SO, WHERE? \_\_\_\_\_ WEIGHT? \_\_\_\_\_

13. POWER SETTING AT TIME IRREGULARITY OCCURRED: RPM? 100% MAN. PRESS.? \_\_\_\_\_ TORQUE? 41 FUEL FLOW? 44

14. INSTRUMENT READING AT TIME IRREGULARITY OCCURRED: OAT 41 IAS (WAS THERE A DECREASE?) No

15. WAS POWER IMMEDIATELY REDUCED? No TO WHAT RPM? \_\_\_\_\_ MAN. PRESS.? \_\_\_\_\_ TORQUE? \_\_\_\_\_ FUEL FLOW? \_\_\_\_\_

16. WHAT WAS INDICATION OF ENGINE IGNITION ANALYZER? \_\_\_\_\_

17. WAS ENGINE SHUTDOWN? No WHEN (GMT)? \_\_\_\_\_ WHAT LENGTH OF TIME WAS ENGINE SHUTDOWN? \_\_\_\_\_

18. WAS ENGINE RESTARTED? \_\_\_\_\_ POWER SETTING AFTER RESTARTING: \_\_\_\_\_  
 RPM \_\_\_\_\_ MAP \_\_\_\_\_ TORQUE \_\_\_\_\_ FUEL FLOW \_\_\_\_\_

NOTE: (N/A) NOT APPLICABLE (N/O) NOT OBTAINED

APPROVED FOR  
 RELEASE DATE:  
 09-Dec-2013

TBANR138

20 VTE

XOXO

G 68 AAA TEN ONE

BBB PC6C N196X

CCC VF 5868 RPT VF 5868

DDD 090255Z

EEE P396 RPT P396 NIL INJURY

FFF 3 PAX NIL INJURY X 1 PAX DECEASED TOTAL 4 PAX

GGG NIL DAMAGE TO ACFT

HHH RIGHT SLIDING DOOR BOTTOM PORTION OPEN SHORTLY

AFTER TAKE OFF WITH TWO HOGS ON BOARD X 1 INDIGENOUS

PAX FELL OUT X PAXS HAD SEAT BELTS FASTENED ON TWO

SEATS AVAILABLE AND OCCUPIED

III NOT A FACTOR

IJJ CONTRACT 713

KKK P094 RPT P094

LLL END SERIES

MM OM A/NIS VTE 090304

*C.N. DRIVER*

*to file of*


RECEIVED  
10 JUL 1968  
PERSONNEL DIVISION  
TAIPEI

XOXO

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

WFD  
OK  
13 Sept 1968

MEMORANDUM



TO : VFPO

DATE: 5 September 1968

FROM : DFD

REF. No. FD-68-407

SUBJECT: Aircraft Accident (C. N. Driver)

On 9 July 1968, Captain C. N. Driver, P.I.C. of PC6C aircraft number N196X, had just departed IS 126 when the bottom portion of the right sliding door opened and a passenger fell out.

There were four passengers and cargo consisting of two animals aboard the aircraft at the time, however there were only two seats and two seat belts provided in the aircraft for the flight, the additional seats and belts were stored in the rear of the aircraft.



This was not an emergency flight and was of a routine nature, therefore seats and seat belts should have been provided for all passengers.

[redacted] A/DSAFE was the Safety Division investigator for this accident and provided all the facts and details concerning the accident at a meeting held by the DFD on 3 September 1968. [redacted] DSAFE, [redacted] A/DSAFE and [redacted] A/DFD, attended the meeting also.

All concerned concluded that Captain Driver should be reduced to First Officer status due to the obvious fact that Captain Driver did not exercise proper command authority and failed to provide his passengers with the basic safety devices required for the flight.

DFD concurs with the recommendation to reduce Capt. Driver to First Officer status and will utilize him as F/O in C-123 equipment.

Your concurrence and early reply will be appreciated.



APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

# TRAVEL ORDER

DEPARTMENT: **FD**  
 DIVISION : **OPMS**  
 OFFICE : **MFDO**

REF. No. CP/L-TO-73-114

DATE: 19 February 1973

NAME (IN ENGLISH)		<b>Driver, CN.</b>		(IN NATIVE LANGUAGE) <b>Passport no.</b>		
TITLE		<b>First Officer</b>		EMPLOYEE NO.		<b>07740</b>
PURPOSE OF TRAVEL: <b>Time Off Flight Schedule-B25</b>						
ITINERARY: (LIST ALL STATIONS ON ROUND TRIP BASIS IF APPLICABLE.) <b>VTE/LAX/VTE</b>						
KIND OF TRANSPORTATION:		<b>Disc. Commercial at own expense.</b>		DATE OF TRAVEL: (ON OR ABOUT)		<b>25 February 1973</b>
ON ARRIVAL, REPORT TO:				FOR DUTY, REPORT TO:		
FAMILY ENTITLED TO TRANSPORTATION	NAME	RELATION	AGE	FROM	TO	BAGGAGE ALLOWANCE
	-	-	-	-	-	<b>44 lbs.</b>
REMARKS: (TRAVEL, ADVANCE LIMITATIONS, ETC.) <b>Subject to Operational Requirements.</b> <b>MCSSVTE</b>					ANNUAL LEAVE DATES	TICKET VALIDITY
APPROVALS	SUPERVISOR //	DEPARTMENT HEAD	DIVISION DIRECTOR	OFFICER	DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL	PRESIDENT
	<b>CP - VTE</b>	<b>VP, Lacc</b>				
DP'S (OR HIS DESIGNEE'S) APPROVAL IS REQUIRED FOR ALL EMPLOYEE TRAVEL EXCEPT ON COMPANY BUSINESS.						
CHARGE: <b>cc: DFD via A/DFD</b> <b>E: 1-</b>		TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED				
		<b>A. 2 COPIES FOR ALL TRAVEL EXCEPT ON COMPANY BUSINESS</b> ORIGINAL: FOR SURRENDER BY EMPLOYEE (OR DEPENDENTS) TO TICKET OFFICE IN EXCHANGE FOR TICKETS. COPY : FOR FORWARDING TO PERSONNEL DIVISION FOR "P" FILE. <b>B. 3 COPIES FOR TRAVEL ON COMPANY BUSINESS</b> ORIGINAL AND 1 COPY : SAME AS ABOVE. ADDITIONAL SIGNED COPY: TO BE ATTACHED TO REQUEST FOR TRAVEL ADVANCES OR TRAVEL EXPENSE REPORT.				

PD-12 R7 (APR72)

APPROVED FOR  
 RELEASE DATE:  
 09-Dec-2013

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

ARRIVAL CHECKSHEET

DATE: 29 July 1971

NAME Driver C.N. TITLE F/O

ARRIVAL DATE 28 July 1971 ARRIVED FROM Vientiane

PASSPORT NUMBER [redacted] NATIONALITY American

Personnel Manager [redacted] Date 29 July 1971

Adm Ass't to BM [redacted] Date \_\_\_\_\_

Manage, Flying Dept [redacted] Date 29 July '71

Sr. Operations Manager [redacted] Date 29 July 71

Message Center Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Supply Superin [redacted] Date \_\_\_\_\_

Security Chief [redacted] Date 29 July 1971

Fire Chief \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Manager Technical Services \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Training Supervisor [redacted] Date \_\_\_\_\_

Statistical Representativ [redacted] Date 29/71

Accounting Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

APO Mail Room [redacted] Date July 29, 1971

Supervisor of [redacted] Date \_\_\_\_\_

Base Clinic [redacted] Date July 29, 1971

Base Manager \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

To facilitate proper reporting procedures all new arrivals at the Saigon Base must visit all offices as indicated by a (X) listed above.



C06117208

(b)(6)

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

# PROFICIENCY TRAINING

(REF. CHAP IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

NAME <b>DRIVER C.N.</b>		CREW POSITION <b>F/O</b>		BASE <b>UTE</b>	FLT. TIME <b>:34</b>	DATE <b>21 Nov</b>	<b>196 71</b>
AIRCRAFT TYPE <b>C-123K</b>	AIRCRAFT NUMBER <b>545</b>	LOCATION <b>UTE</b>	HOOD/INST <b>:</b>	NIGHT <b>:</b>	BLOCK TIME <b>:51</b>	GRADING LEGEND: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete	

	I		S			I		S	
1. DOCUMENTATION					21. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS				
2. FLIGHT PLANNING					22. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES				
3. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)					23. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK				
(EXTERIOR)					24. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION				
4. KNOWLEDGE OF A/C AND EQUIPMENT					25. INTERCEPTION AND TRACKING				
5. ENGINE STARTING					26. HOLDING				
6. TAXYING					27. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF- )				
7. USE OF BRAKES					(VOR- )				
8. ENGINE RUN-UP					(ILS- )				
USE OF CHECK LIST					(GCA- )				
10. CREW BRIEFING AND TAKE-OFF DATA					28. MISSED APPROACH				
11. TAKE-OFFS (NORMAL- <b>5</b> )				<b>S</b>	29. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES				
(CROSSWIND- )			<b>5</b>		30. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDINGS)				
(STOL- )					31. LANDINGS (CIRCLING MINIMUMS- )				
(REJECTED- )					(NORMAL- <b>5</b> )				<b>S</b>
(ENGINE FAILURE- )					(CROSSWIND- )				
12. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES					(ZERO FLAP- )			<b>5</b>	
13. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS					(ACCURACY/SPOT- )				
14. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)					(STOL- )				
15. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS					(NIGHT- )				
16. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED					(ENGINE(S) OUT- )				
17. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP									
18. ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING									
19. PROPELLER UNFEATHERING					32. LOW AND HIGH RECONNAISSANCE				
20. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:					ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES AND MANEUVERS				
FIRES- HEATER, CARGO, CABIN					33.				
SMOKE REMOVAL					34.				
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES					35.				
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)					GENERAL COMPETENCY				
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE					36. CREW COORDINATION				
FUEL DUMPING					37. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP				
BRAKE FIRE					38. JUDGEMENT				
EMERGENCY EVACUATION					39. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION				
BRAKE FAILURE					40. ADHERENCE TO SOP				
USE OF AIRBRAKES									

COMMENTS:

LANDING RECURRENCEY.

ACKNOWLEDGED:

Signature

Date

INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN

C06117209

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

PROFICIENCY TRAINING  
(REF. CHAP IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

(b)(6)

NAME <b>DRIVER, C.N.</b>		CREW POSITION <b>T-CAP</b>		BASE <b>BGN</b>	FLT. TIME :	DATE <b>12 OCT. 1971</b>
AIRCRAFT TYPE <b>VTB-17</b>	AIRCRAFT NUMBER <b>N9518Z</b>	LOCATION <b>V01</b>	HOOD/INST <b>1:00</b>	NIGHT <b>+</b>	BLOCK TIME <b>2:05</b>	GRADING LEGEND: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete

	I	S		I	S
1. DOCUMENTATION		X	21. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS		X
2. FLIGHT PLANNING		X	22. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES		-
3. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)		X	23. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK		X
(EXTERIOR)		X	24. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION		X
4. KNOWLEDGE OF A/C AND EQUIPMENT		X	25. INTERCEPTION AND TRACKING		X
5. ENGINE STARTING		X	26. HOLDING		X
6. TAXIING		X	27. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF- )	1	X
7. USE OF BRAKES		X	(VOR- )		-
8. ENGINE RUN-UP		X	(ILS- )	1 (ADC)	X
USE OF CHECK LIST		X	(GCA- )		-
10. CREW BRIEFING AND TAKE-OFF DATA		X	28. MISSED APPROACH		-
11. TAKE-OFFS (NORMAL- )	1	X	29. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES		X
(CROSSWIND- )	2	X	30. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDINGS)		-
(STOL- )	2	X	31. LANDINGS (CIRCLING MINIMUMS- )	1	X
(REJECTED- )		-	(NORMAL- )		-
(ENGINE FAILURE- )		-	(CROSSWIND- )	2	X
12. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES		X	(ZERO FLAP- )		-
13. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS		X	(ACCURACY/SPOT- )		-
14. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)		X	(STOL- )	2	X
15. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS		-	(NIGHT- )		-
16. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED		-	(ENGINE(S) OUT- )		-
17. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP		X	<b>IP DEMONSTRATED 2 STOLS</b>		
18. ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING		-	32. LOW AND HIGH RECONNAISSANCE		-
PROPELLER UNFEATHERING		-	ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES AND MANEUVERS		
20. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:			33.		
FIRES - HEATER, CARGO, CABIN		X	34.		
SMOKE REMOVAL		X	35.		
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES		X	GENERAL COMPETENCY		
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)		X	36. CREW COODINATION		-
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE		X	37. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP		X
FUEL DUMPING		X	38. JUDGEMENT		X
BRAKE FIRF		X	39. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION		X
EMERGENCY EVACUATION		X	40. ADHERENCE TO SOP		X
BRAKE FAILURE		X	A. TIME TRAINEE MANIPULATED FLIGHT CONTROLS FOR PURPOSE OF TRAINING	2:05	
USE OF AIRBRAKES		X	B. TRAINING TIME THIS TRAINEE LOGGED TO COMPANY AS NON-REVENUE TIME	2:05	

COMMENTS: **NOT HIGHLY PROFICIENT DUE TO LACK OF TIME IN VOLAR BUT I CONSIDER HIM TO BE SAFE IN ALL RESPECTS AND READY FOR CAPTAIN CHECK. LANDINGS WERE GOOD BUT HEAVY ON THE BRAKES AND LIGHT ON REVERSE PITCH.**

Acknowledged: En. Dave INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN [Signature Box]

Date: 12 OCT 71

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

PROFICIENCY TRAINING  
(REF. CHAP IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

(b)(6)

NAME		CREW POSITION		BASE	FLT. TIME	DATE	
DRIVER, C.N.		T-CAP		SGN.	:	11 OCT 1971	
AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NUMBER	LOCATION	HOOD/INST	NIGHT	BLOCK TIME	GRADING LEGEND:	
VTB	N9518Z	V01	1:00	0:04	2:26	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete	
			I	S		I	S
1. DOCUMENTATION					21. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS		
2. FLIGHT PLANNING					22. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES		
3. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)					23. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK		
(EXTERIOR)					24. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION		
4. KNOWLEDGE OF A/C AND EQUIPMENT					25. INTERCEPTION AND TRACKING		
5. ENGINE STARTING					26. HOLDING		
6. TAXIING					27. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF- )	1	
7. USE OF BRAKES					(VOR- )		
8. ENGINE RUN-UP					(ILS- )	1 (Loc)	
USE OF CHECK LIST					(GCA- )		
10. CREW BRIEFING AND TAKE-OFF DATA					28. MISSED APPROACH		
11. TAKE-OFFS (NORMAL- )	1				29. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES		
(CROSSWIND- )	3				30. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDINGS)	1	
(STOL- )	1	8			31. LANDINGS (CIRCLING MINIMUMS- )	1	
(REJECTED- )	1				(NORMAL- )	1	
(ENGINE FAILURE- )	2				(CROSSWIND- )	3	
12. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES					(ZERO FLAP- )	1	
13. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS					(ACCURACY/SPOT- )	10	
14. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)					(STOL- )	1	
15. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS					(NIGHT- )	1	
16. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED					(ENGINE(S) OUT- )	2	
17. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP							
18. ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING					32. LOW AND HIGH RECONNAISSANCE		
PROPELLER UNFEATHERING					ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES AND MANEUVERS		
20. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:					33. EMERG. CONDITION, JAMMED POWER LEVERS		
FIRES-HEATER, CARGO, CABIN					34. FUEL SYSTEM MANAGEMENT		
SMOKE REMOVAL					35.		
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES					GENERAL COMPETENCY		
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)					36. CREW COODINATION		
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE					37. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP		
FUEL DUMPING					38. JUDGEMENT		
BRAKE FIRE					39. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION		
EMERGENCY EVACUATION					40. ADHERENCE TO SOP		
BRAKE FAILURE							
USE OF AIRBRAKES					A. TIME TRAINEE MANIPULATED FLIGHT CONTROLS FOR PURPOSE OF TRAINING	2+26	
					B. TRAINING TIME THIS TRAINEE LOGGED TO COMPANY AS NON-REVENUE TIME	2+26	

COMMENTS: #4: WEAK IN IDENTIFYING A/C SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS. #11 STOL: USED IMPROPER PROCEDURE - RAISED FLAPS AT 90 KIAS - RAISED GEAR AT 100 KIAS. #12 & 29: LAX IN PROCEDURES / DIFFICULTY IN FOLLOWING ATC INSTRUCTIONS. #33: REACTION TO AND CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR ACTUAL EMERG. CONDITION SLOW AND NOT POSITIVE / #37-38: NOT CONSIDERED STRONG ENOUGH THIS AREA FOR INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN

Esto: 12 Oct 71

SINGLE PILOT WORK AT THIS TIME. RECOMMEND ADDITIONAL TRAINING.

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

# PROFICIENCY TRAINING

(REF. CHAP IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

(b)(6)

NAME <b>DRIVER, C. N.</b>		CREW POSITION <b>T. CAPT.</b>		BASE <b>SAIGON</b>	FLT. TIME :	DATE <b>9 SEP 1971</b>
AIRCRAFT TYPE <b>VTB-18</b>	AIRCRAFT NUMBER <b>N95772</b>	LOCATION <b>V01</b>	HOOD/INST <b>0:15</b>	NIGHT <b>- : -</b>	BLOCK TIME <b>2:42</b>	GRADING LEGEND: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete

	I		S			I		S	
1. DOCUMENTATION				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	21. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
2. FLIGHT PLANNING				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	22. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
3. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	23. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
(EXTERIOR)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	24. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
4. KNOWLEDGE OF A/C AND EQUIPMENT		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	25. INTERCEPTION AND TRACKING				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
5. ENGINE STARTING				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	26. HOLDING				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
6. TAXYING				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	27. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF- )				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
7. USE OF BRAKES				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(VOR- )				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
8. ENGINE RUN-UP				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(LOC + NDB) (ILS- 1 )				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
USE OF CHECK LIST				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(GCA- )				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
10. CREW BRIEFING AND TAKE-OFF DATA				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	28. MISSED APPROACH				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
11. TAKE-OFFS (NORMAL- 5 )				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	29. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
(CROSSWIND- )				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	30. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDINGS) 1				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
(STOL- 5 )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	31. LANDINGS (CIRCLING MINIMUMS- )				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
(REJECTED- 1 )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(NORMAL- 5 )				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
(ENGINE FAILURE- 1 )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(CROSSWIND- )				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
12. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(ZERO FLAP- )				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
13. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(ACCURACY/SPOT- )				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
14. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(STOL- 5 )				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
15. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(NIGHT- )				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
16. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(ENGINE(S) OUT- 1 )				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
17. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
18. ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
PROPELLER UNFEATHERING				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	32. LOW AND HIGH RECONNAISSANCE				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
20. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES AND MANEUVERS				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FIRES- HEATER, CARGO, CABIN				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	33. FUEL SYSTEM MANAGEMENT				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
SMOKE REMOVAL				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	34. F/A DESCENT CHECK DEMONSTRATION				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	35. ENG START OVER TEMP & FIRE PROCEDURES				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	GENERAL COMPETENCY				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	36. CREW COODINATION				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FUEL DUMPING				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	37. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BRAKE FIR				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	38. JUDGEMENT				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
EMERGENCY EVACUATION				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	39. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BRAKE FAILURE				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	40. ADHERENCE TO SOP				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
USE OF AIRBRAKES				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

COMMENTS: FOURTH TRAINING FLIGHT VTB. SHOWS SOME IMPROVEMENT IN HANDLING A/C, HOWEVER, NEEDS TO WORK ON CONTROL OF RATE OF DESCENT FOR APPROACH ON STOL LANDINGS, NEEDS TO IMPROVE ON FUEL SYS. MANAGEMENT, ATC & APPROACH PROCEDURES VERY POOR. RECOMMEND EXTENSIVE SIMULATOR TIME THIS AREA.

Acknowledged: [Signature] SINGLE ENG. LANDING NEEDS ADDITIONAL TNG. STUDENT NEEDS TO WORK ON THINKING AHEAD AND TO STRENGTHEN INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN

Date: 9 SEP 71 SIGNLE PILOT PROCEDURES, [ ]

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

PROFICIENCY TRAINING  
(REF. CHAP IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

NAME <b>DRIVER, C.N.</b>		CREW POSITION <b>TCAPT</b>		BASE <b>SGW.</b>	FLT. TIME <b>:</b>	DATE <b>8 SEP 1971</b>
AIRCRAFT TYPE <b>VTB-1B</b>	AIRCRAFT NUMBER <b>N9518Z</b>	LOCATION <b>VOI</b>	HOOD/INST <b>0:30</b>	NIGHT <b>---</b>	BLOCK TIME <b>2:12</b>	GRADING LEGEND: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete

	I	S		I	S
1. DOCUMENTATION		X	21. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS ..		X
2. FLIGHT PLANNING		X	22. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES		X
3. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)		X	23. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK		X
(EXTERIOR)		X	24. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION		X
4. KNOWLEDGE OF A/C AND EQUIPMENT		X	25. INTERCEPTION AND TRACKING		X
5. ENGINE STARTING		X	26. HOLDING		X
6. TAXYING	X		27. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF- <b>2</b> )		X
7. USE OF BRAKES		X	(VOR- )		X
8. ENGINE RUN-UP		X	(ILS- )		X
USE OF CHECK LIST		X	(GCA- )		X
10. CREW BRIEFING AND TAKE-OFF DATA		X	28. MISSED APPROACH		X
11. TAKE-OFFS (NORMAL- <b>5</b> )		X	29. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES		X
(CROSSWIND- )		X	30. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDINGS) <b>2</b>		X
(STOL- )	(7)	X	31. LANDINGS (CIRCLING MINIMUMS- <b>1</b> )		X
(REJECTED- <b>1</b> )		X	(NORMAL- <b>5</b> )		X
(ENGINE FAILURE- <b>1</b> )		X	(CROSSWIND- )		X
12. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES		X	(ZERO FLAP- <b>1</b> )	(8)	X
13. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS		X	(ACCURACY/SPOT- )		X
14. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)		X	(STOL- <b>1</b> )		X
15. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS		X	(NIGHT- )		X
16. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED		X	(ENGINE(S) OUT- <b>1</b> )		X
17. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP		X			X
18. ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING		X			X
PROPELLER UNFEATHERING		X	32. LOW AND HIGH RECONNAISSANCE		X
20. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:		X	ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES AND MANEUVERS		X
FIRES-HEATER, CARGO, CABIN		X	33.		X
SMOKE REMOVAL		X	34.		X
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES		X	35.		X
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)		X	GENERAL COMPETENCY		X
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE		X	36. CREW COODINATION		X
FUEL DUMPING		X	37. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP		X
BRAKE FIR		X	38. JUDGEMENT		X
EMERGENCY EVACUATION		X	39. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION		X
BRAKE FAILURE		X	40. ADHERENCE TO SOP		X
USE OF AIRBRAKES		X			X
			A. TIME TRAINEE MANIPULATED FLIGHT CONTROLS FOR PURPOSE OF TRAINING		2/2
			B. TRAINING TIME THIS TRAINEE LOGGED TO COMPANY AS NON-REVENUE TIME		2/2

COMMENTS: THIRD TNG FLIGHT. SHOWS IMPROVEMENT AND ADDED CONFIDENCE. NEEDS WORK ON ADF PROCEDURES. STILL ROUGH ON CONTROL MOVEMENT BUT SHOWS IMPROVEMENT. FEEL THIS PROBLEM WILL DIMINISH AS STUDENT GAINS ADDITIONAL TIME IN A/C.

Acknowledged: *[Signature]*  
Date: **8 SEP 71**

INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN

C06117213

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

PROFICIENCY TRAINING  
(REF. CHAP IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

(b)(6)

NAME		CREW POSITION		BASE	FLT. TIME	DATE
DRIVER, C.N.		T CAP		SAIGON	:	7 SEP 1971
AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NUMBER	LOCATION	HOOD/INST	NIGHT	BLOCK TIME	GRADING LEGEND:
VTB-18	N9518Z	VOI	- :-	- :-	2:35	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete
			I S			I S
1. DOCUMENTATION			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		21. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
2. FLIGHT PLANNING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		22. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES	
3. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		23. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
(EXTERIOR)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		24. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
4. KNOWLEDGE OF A/C AND EQUIPMENT			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		25. INTERCEPTION AND TRACKING	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
5. ENGINE STARTING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		26. HOLDING	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
6. TAXYING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		27. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF- )	
7. USE OF BRAKES			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		(VOR- )	
8. ENGINE RUN-UP			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		(ILS- )	
USE OF CHECK LIST			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		(GCA- )	
10. CREW BRIEFING AND TAKE-OFF DATA			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		28. MISSED APPROACH	
11. TAKE-OFFS (NORMAL- )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		29. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
(CROSSWIND- 8 )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		30. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDINGS)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
(STOL- )		(8)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		31. LANDINGS (CIRCLING MINIMUMS- )	
(REJECTED- )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		(NORMAL- )	
(ENGINE FAILURE- 1 )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		(CROSSWIND- 8 )	(8)
12. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		(ZERO FLAP- )	
13. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		(ACCURACY/SPOT- )	
14. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		(STOL- )	
15. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		(NIGHT- )	
16. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		(ENGINE(S) OUT- 1 )	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
17. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
18. ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
PROPELLER UNFEATHERING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		32. LOW AND HIGH RECONNAISSANCE	
20. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:					ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES AND MANEUVERS	
FIRES-HEATER, CARGO, CABIN					33. DEMONSTRATED STOL APPROACH-LANDING	
SMOKE REMOVAL					34. TAKEOFF	
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		35.	
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		GENERAL COMPETENCY	
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE					36. CREW COODINATION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FUEL DUMPING					37. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BRAKE FIR					38. JUDGEMENT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
EMERGENCY EVACUATION					39. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BRAKE FAILURE					40. ADHERENCE TO SOP	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
USE OF AIRBRAKES						
					A. TIME TRAINEE MANIPULATED FLIGHT CONTROLS FOR PURPOSE OF TRAINING	2+35
					B. TRAINING TIME THIS TRAINEE LOGGED TO COMPANY AS NON-REVENUE TIME	2+35

COMMENTS: SECOND FLIGHT VTB. DEMONSTRATED MARKED IMPROVEMENT IN KNOWLEDGE OF A/C & HANDLING OF A/C. STILL OVERCONTROLS, HOWEVER, IS MAKING PROGRESS IN THIS AREA.

Acknowledged: C.N. Driver

Date: 7 SEP 71

INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN: \_\_\_\_\_

DISTRIBUTION: 1 INDIV TNG FILE, VIA, MFD; 2 MFT RECORDS; 3 DFD, VIA MFT

OP-374 17 JUN 66

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

PROFICIENCY TRAINING  
(REF. CHAP IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

NAME		CREW POSITION		BASE	FLT. TIME	DATE
DRIVER, C. N.		T-CAP		SAIGON	:	6 SEP 1971
AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NUMBER	LOCATION	HOOD/INST	NIGHT	BLOCK TIME	GRADING LEGEND:
VTB-18	N3674G	VOI	-:-	-:-	1:52	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete
			I	S		
1. DOCUMENTATION			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		21. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS	
2. FLIGHT PLANNING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		22. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES	
3. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		23. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK	
(EXTERIOR)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		24. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION	
4. KNOWLEDGE OF A/C AND EQUIPMENT			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		25. INTERCEPTION AND TRACKING	
5. ENGINE STARTING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		26. HOLDING	
6. TAXYING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		27. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF- )	
7. USE OF BRAKES			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(VOR- )	
8. ENGINE RUN-UP			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		(ILS- )	
USE OF CHECK LIST			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		(GCA- )	
10. CREW BRIEFING AND TAKE-OFF DATA			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		28. MISSED APPROACH	
11. TAKE-OFFS (NORMAL- )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		29. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES	
(CROSSWIND- 3 )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		30. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDINGS)	
(STOL- )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		31. LANDINGS (CIRCLING MINIMUMS- )	
(REJECTED- )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		(NORMAL- )	
(ENGINE FAILURE- )			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		(CROSSWIND- 3 )	
12. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		(ZERO FLAP- )	
13. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		(ACCURACY/SPOT- )	
14. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		(STOL- )	
15. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		(NIGHT- )	
16. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		(ENGINE(S) OUT- )	
17. RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
18. ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
19. PROPELLER UNFEATHERING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		32. LOW AND HIGH RECONNAISSANCE	
20. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:					ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES AND MANEUVERS	
FIRES-HEATER, CARGO, CABIN			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		33. AIR START PROCEDURES	
SMOKE REMOVAL			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		34.	
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		35.	
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		GENERAL COMPETENCY	
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		36. CREW COODINATION	
FUEL DUMPING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		37. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP	
BRAKE FIR			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		38. JUDGEMENT	
EMERGENCY EVACUATION			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		39. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION	
BRAKE FAILURE			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		40. ADHERENCE TO SOP	
USE OF AIRBRAKES			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		A. TIME TRAINEE MANIPULATED FLIGHT CONTROLS FOR PURPOSE OF TRAINING: 52	
					D. TRAINING TIME THIS TRAINEE LOGGED TO COMPANY AS NON-REVENUE TIME: 52	

COMMENTS: FIRST FLIGHT VTB, KNOWLEDGE OF A/C AND SYSTEMS NORMAL THIS PHASE OF TRAINING. EMPHASIS PLACED ON A/C SYSTEMS & USE OF CHECKLISTS THIS PERIOD. OVER CONTROLS. GOOD POTENTIAL PIC CAPABILITIES.

Acknowledged: *[Signature]*  
Date: 6 SEP 71

INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN



APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

**PROFICIENCY TRAINING**  
(REF. CHAP IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

NAME		CREW POSITION		BASE	FLT. TIME	DATE
DRIVER, CLARENCE		T/F.O		L-08	6:50 7:43	16 DEC 17 DEC
196 67						
AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NUMBER	LOCATION	HOOD/INST	NIGHT	BLOCK TIME	GRADING LEGEND:
PORTER	PCB	L-08	- :-	- : 35	7:51 8:30	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete
			I	S		
1. DOCUMENTATION						
2. FLIGHT PLANNING						
3. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)						
(EXTERIOR)						
4. KNOWLEDGE OF A/C AND EQUIPMENT						
5. ENGINE STARTING						
6. TAXYING						
USE OF BRAKES						
ENGINE RUN-UP						
USE OF CHECK LIST						
10. CREW BRIEFING AND TAKE-OFF DATA						
11. TAKE-OFFS (NORMAL- 2)						
(CROSSWIND- 3)						
(STOL- 10)						
(REJECTED- 0)						
(ENGINE FAILURE- 0)						
12. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES		Not Done				
13. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS						
14. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)						
15. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS						
16. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED						
RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP						
ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING						
PROPELLER UNFEATHERING						
20. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:						
FIRES-HEATER, CARGO, CABIN						
SMOKE REMOVAL						
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES						
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)						
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE						
FUEL DUMPING						
BRAKE FIRE						
EMERGENCY EVACUATION						
BRAKE FAILURE						
USE OF AIRBRAKES		Not Done				
					A. Time trainee manipulated flight controls for purpose of training 10:00	
					B. Training time, this trainee, logged to company as non-revenue time 00:00	

COMMENTS: 1. AVERAGE PROGRESS AND ABILITY.  
2. PREVIOUS ERRORS NOT NOTED ON THIS FLT.  
3. TRAINEE RELEASED FOR FLT. THIS DATE.

INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN

AWAOS



APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

PROFICIENCY TRAINING  
(REF. CHAP IX, OPERATORS MANUAL)

(b)(6)

NAME		CREW POSITION		BASE	FLT. TIME	DATE	
DRIVER, CLARENCE		T/F.O		L-08	6:46 9:20	14 DEC 15 DEC	1967
AIRCRAFT TYPE	AIRCRAFT NUMBER	LOCATION	HOOD/INST	NIGHT	BLOCK TIME	GRADING LEGEND:	
PORTER	N-392-R	L-08	- :-	- :-	7:30 10:22	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Completed to Standard <input type="checkbox"/> Incomplete	
						I	S
1. DOCUMENTATION					21. CHECK OF INSTRUMENTS		X
2. FLIGHT PLANNING					22. RECOVERY FROM UNUSUAL ATTITUDES		N/D
3. INSPECTIONS (INTERIOR)					23. INSTRUMENT AIRWORK		
(EXTERIOR)					24. RADIO TUNING AND ORIENTATION		
4. KNOWLEDGE OF A/C AND EQUIPMENT					25. INTERCEPTION AND TRACKING		
5. ENGINE STARTING					26. HOLDING		
6. TAXYING					27. INSTRUMENT APPROACH (ADF- )		
USE OF BRAKES					(VOR- )		
ENGINE RUN-UP					(ILS- )		
USE OF CHECK-LIST					(GCA- )		
10. CREW BRIEFING AND TAKE-OFF DATA					28. MISSED APPROACH		
11. TAKE-OFFS (NORMAL- 3)					29. AREA ARRIVAL AND ATC PROCEDURES		N/D
(CROSSWIND- 2)					30. GO AROUND (BALKED LANDINGS)		X
(STOL- 6)					31. LANDINGS (CIRCLING MINIMUMS- )		
(REJECTED- 0)					(NORMAL- 4)		X
(ENGINE FAILURE- 0)					(CROSSWIND- 3)		X
12. AREA DEPARTURE AND ATC PROCEDURES					(ZERO FLAP- 0)		X
13. CLIMBS AND CLIMBING TURNS					(ACCURACY/SPOT- 8)		X
14. STEEP TURNS (450 BANK)					(STOL- 8)		X
15. STALLS/APPROACH TO STALLS					(NIGHT- 0)		X
16. MANEUVERING AT MINIMUM SPEED					(ENGINE(S) OUT- 0)		X
RAPID DESCENT AND PULL-UP							
ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE-FEATHERING							
PROPELLER UNFEATHERING					32. LOW AND HIGH RECONNAISSANCE		X
20. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES:					ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES AND MANEUVERS		
FIRES- HEATER, CARGO, CABIN					33.		
SMOKE REMOVAL					34.		
ELECTRICAL FAILURES-FIRES					35.		
EMERGENCY DESCENT(S)					GENERAL COMPETENCY		
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE					36. CREW COODINATION		X
FUEL DUMPING					37. GENERAL AIRMANSHIP		X
BRAKE FIR					38. JUDGEMENT		X
EMERGENCY EVACUATION					39. SMOOTHNESS AND COORDINATION		X
BRAKE FAILURE					40. ADHERENCE TO SOP		X
USE OF AIRBRAKES							
					A. Time trainee manipulated flight controls for purpose of training	12:00	
					B. Training time, this trainee, logged to company as non-revenue time	00:00	

COMMENTS: 1. AT TIMES WILL LAND IN SLIGHT LEFT CRAB TO LEFT.  
 2. PATTERNS TO WIDE.  
 3. TAKES TO MUCH TIME FOR LETDOWNS & PROCEDURES.  
 4. PROGRESS IMPROVING IN GENERAL.

INSTRUCTOR CHECK AIRMAN

AWA03

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013.

While I am an employee of Air America, Inc. and during my assignment in Laos, I agree to abide by local laws, in addition to the applicable Company regulations, and will respect local customs and conform to a high standard of moral and ethical conduct.

I further agree that I will not engage, for profit, directly or indirectly, either in my own name or in the name of through the agency of another person or entity, in any business, profession, or occupation in Laos, other than work assigned by competent authority within the Company while employed by Air America, Inc. nor will I participate in Laos.

I understand that the prohibitions and standards of conduct prescribed above are contractual requirements of the United States A.I.D Mission to Laos (USALM) as set forth in a contract between the Company and USALM, and I agree that violation of this agreement may result in and shall be good cause for the termination of my employment with Air America, Inc. and its associated companies.

[Empty rectangular box for stamp or signature]

20 JUN 1966  
Date


Clarence M. Quinn  
Employee's Signature

20 June 1966  
Date

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

I hereby certify that I have no firearms of any description in my possession in Southeast Asia.

I further certify that I have read and understood the pertinent sections of the Personnel Manual pertaining to firearms, that I will abide by these regulations and that any violation thereof will subject me to immediate termination.



*Clement N. ...*

Employee's Signature

20 June 1966  
Date

20 June 1966  
Date

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

USFAC/ALI/JLSEA/TTP/1

STATEMENT OF UNDERSTANDING

I CLARENCE N. DRIVER have been informed by my Station Control Official/Unit Commander of the contents of MACT regulation 60-1 pertaining to my responsibilities in exercising and safeguarding my duty-free privileges. I understand these responsibilities fully and hereby affirm that the items I am authorized to obtain through duty-free channel/outlets, to include the APC system will be solely for my own use and consumption and/or that of my bona-fide dependents. Further, I will:

- a. After receipt, willingly permit upon request duly authorized officials to inspect all major items/appliances transferred into base under duty-free importation laws or merchandise purchased from duty-free outlets in country at the items location whether on or off US Government installations, bases, or buildings.
- b. Report abuses of Exchange, Commissary, Class 1 or AIC privileges to the proper authorities.
- c. Not sell, loan, pawn, give or otherwise transfer any individual MACT ration control forms except as expressly authorized by MACT Regulation 60-1.
- d. Not possess or use any MACT ration control form except those issued by competent authority for my personal use.
- e. Not reproduce or otherwise alter any MACT ration control form.
- f. Be responsible for the safeguarding from theft or loss all items I obtain through the duty-free system.
- g. Take all precautions to protect such items particularly when transporting items from sales outlets to my place of residence, and in the event of such loss or theft I may be subject to restriction, suspension, or revocation of my duty-free privileges and/or disciplinary action under Article 15 of the UCMJ or other action as appropriate in the event I fail to report, in writing, to proper authorities, all such losses or theft within 24 hours.

I have been informed that it is my responsibility to advise my dependents of the foregoing and assume full responsibility for their actions in exercising their duty-free privileges.

Cl. N. Driver  
Signature  SSAN

Signature SSAN

## MEMORANDUM

TO : *JP* - TPE (Via Pres - TPE) DATE: 3 August 1962

FROM : *AMGDR* - DCA (Via *AMGDR* - DCA) REF. No. WG-62-3432

SUBJECT: Senior First Officer, C46 - Charles G. Herrick - RSE-337

Mr. Charles G. Herrick, age 43, has an FAA ATR and approximately 6400 hours of which 4200 hours are on C46 equipment. He also has a substantial amount of heavy single engine aircraft experience and is current on the DC7F.

Despite his age, Mr. Herrick was selected over 11 other candidates because of his excellent references, attitude and experience. I believe that he will be a career-type employee and that he is capable of early checkout.

This commits the last of the C46/C47/C123 type vacancies for which we have RSEs at this time.

GWG:ph

cc: VPO - TPE (Via Pres - TPE)

Personnel Division
--------------------


13 Aug 1962
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Paipai
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APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

International Cable & Radio Systems  
an ITT American


"Via All-America"  
"Via Commercial"  
"Via Globe"  
"Via Mackay Radio"



FOR FAST SERVICE, PLEASE INDICATE ONE ROUTING HERE

SENDER (TO BE REPEATED) CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT XBU-5 DATE 8/3/62

TO "Via"



TAIPEI

EMPLOYED [REDACTED] RSE401 BY ETD AUGUST SIXTEEN  
CHARLES HERRICK RSE337 ETD AUGUST TWENTYONE STOP  
[REDACTED] G202A DECLINED STOP TOKYO NOTIFIED ARRIVAL  
[REDACTED] G202A AUGUST EIGHT [REDACTED] G132A AUGUST SIX  
HO32A

PLEASE PRINT ABOVE MESSAGE SUBJECT TO RULES AND REGULATIONS SET FORTH IN THE COMPANIES' TARIFF BOOK OR FILE WITH THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

TYPE OR WRITE PLAINLY WITHIN BORDER

THIS MESSAGE WILL BE SENT FULL RATE UNLESS SENDER DESIGNATES (NY) LETTER TELEGRAM SERVICE. THE ET DESIGNATION SHOULD BE PLACED BEFORE THE CABLE ADDRESS.

GWC

1 - 8/3/62

AC&R FACSIMILE SENDING BLANK

C06117226

(b)(6)

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

Aug 2 1962

C06117227

ref chk

Chuck Herrick      applican      sfo

Ralecon w/

Paramount Hotel NYC  
Circle 6-5500

ref has known subj abt two years - professionally as well as socially.....

Pilot Ability/Quals - "Real good - (ref qualified the professional comment w/this is based on the period that he has been us)"

Potential - "yes"

Aptitude - "has displayed good apt and attitude"

Sober - "Yes, good family, very good as far as charact --his son and my son were on the swimming team together"

Incidents - none of which ref aware, no negative <sup>reput</sup> rep.


Dependable - "Good, always on time at crew call and is usually there before"

Would hire - "Yes"

good telecon --  ref indicated he would be interested as he has DC4-6-7 time; all ratings; etc -- during conversation then indicated his age 47; advised him that that was over our minimum...no animosity, indicated he understood. Ref gave good impression over phone - intelligence, good understanding, mature type answers....

.....  
(b)(6)

8-2-62



Ref. By

GETS ALONG WELL.

SORBER.

QUIET.

GOOD PILOT, KNOWS EQUIPT.

DEPENDABLE.

WARD RETHIRE


DEFINITELY CAPTAIN

MATERIAL.

(b)(6)



1-10-62  
Circled Herried  
San Antonio, Texas



Rec'd telegram  
and would like  
to talk to you.

Did not call collect -  
Will be in San Antonio  
(7/16) - told him you'd  
probably call  
File attached

C.S.

*Mr. [redacted]*

January 1962

(b)(6)

[redacted]  
San Antonio, Tex.[redacted]  
Deputy Managing Director  
Civil Air Transport

REC'D DCA JAN 26 1962

Dear Sir:

It is my understanding that since my application was returned to you for a position as a capt. that there are openings for co-pilots. My application was for a Capt position, but I would be interested in a co-pilot position with a possibility of a check out as Capt. at a later date. I am immediately available for a call and also have my passport and part of the required shots on my health record. Any consideration on these positions will be deeply appreciated by me.

Sincerely,  
Charles S. Herrick

[redacted]

Telefan

# WESTERN UNION INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS

To get fast, dependable service, write in **"Via W. U. CABLES" here**

To, QPJ 5/23/62  
NIGHT LETTER

CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT

Via \_\_\_\_\_

MR. CHARLES G. HERRICK  
[REDACTED]  
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

IF YOU ARE STILL INTERESTED IN EMPLOYMENT ~~IN EMPLOYMENT~~  
AS A PILOT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA PLEASE CALL ME COLLECT  
AFTER 2:00 PM, EDT, METROPOLITAN 8-2181,  
WASHINGTON, DC.

[REDACTED]  
CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT

1272 1C (6-55)

Send the above message subject to the terms of the Western Union Telegraph  
Company set forth in its tariffs on file with the Federal Communications Commission.

**PLEASE TYPE OR WRITE PLAINLY WITHIN BORDER—DO NOT FOLD**

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

C06117235

□.....  
(b)(6)

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

DP - TPE (Via Pres - TPE)

3 August 1962

AMGDR - DCA (Via MGDR - DCA)

WG-62-3432

Senior First Officer, C46 -- Charles G. Herrick - RSE-337

Mr. Charles G. Herrick, age 43, has an FAA ATR and approximately 6400 hours of which 4200 hours are on C46 equipment. He also has a substantial amount of heavy single engine aircraft experience and is current on the DC7F.

Despite his age, Mr. Herrick was selected over 11 other candidates because of his excellent references, attitude and experience. I believe that he will be a career-type employee and that he is capable of early checkout.

This commits the last of the C46/C47/C123 type vacancies for which we have RSEs at this time.

GWG:ph

cc: VPO - TPE (Via Pres - TPE)

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

3 August 1962

Ref.: WG-62-3420

Mr. Charles Grant Herrick

San Antonio, Texas

Dear Mr. Herrick:

We are enclosing the original and a copy of the letter setting forth the terms and conditions of employment. Please sign one copy and return it, if it meets with your approval.

You have received the Preplacement Physical Examination forms. A physical examination is required which will include blood test, blood count, chest X-ray and general physical condition. Please have your physician complete the forms, sign and return them to us. You are required to have Typhoid, Para-typhoid, Cholera and Smallpox immunizations and we advise Typhus and Tetanus for your protection. The Company will pay for these particular immunizations and for your physical examination so have your physician submit his bill to this office. Don't forget, all immunizations must be certified by a U.S. Public Health Office.

General instruction sheets regarding procedures to be used when you ship your personal/household effects have been given to you also. Please follow these directions carefully and itemize the contents of each carton or trunk you are shipping to the Far East.

It is absolutely essential that you have in your possession upon arrival in Taipei your up-to-date logbooks, properly certified, where required. Arrival without these records may seriously delay your assignment and flight duties.

It is important that you open a checking account prior to your departure and that you take along a supply of blank checks and deposit slips.

It is also suggested that you take along sufficient light weight clothing to be used until uniforms can be obtained locally.

J C A A

Y P O C

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

Mr. Charles Grant Herrick  
Page Two

5 August 1962

We shall be in touch with you in the very near future regarding your final travel arrangements.


Sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]

Assistant to Managing Director

GJG:ph  
Encc. - as stated

bcc: DP - TE (Via MGDR - DCA, Pres - TPE)  
Ref.: RSE-337, dated 4/10/62



APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

**AIR ASIA COMPANY LIMITED**

808 17TH STREET, N. W.  
WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

TELEPHONE ME 8-2181

CABLE ADDRESS  
"AIRASIA"

3 August 1962

Ref.: WD-62-3421

亞洲航空股份有限公司

Mr. Charles Grant Herrick

[REDACTED]  
San Antonio, Texas

Dear Mr. Herrick:

This letter constitutes an offer of employment in the position of **Senior First Officer** at a monthly salary of **\$650.**  
This offer is subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. Your possessing the necessary qualifications in our opinion for the above position being offered.
2. Completion to the satisfaction of the Company of such personal history checks as it may deem necessary or desirable.
3. Your satisfactorily passing a physical examination and meeting the physical requirements as set forth by the Company for the position offer to you.
4. Reporting for Duty:
  - (a) You will report for duty at Air Asia Co. Ltd., 46 Chung Shan Rd., North 2nd Section, Taipei, Taiwan on or before 24 August 1962 or at such other place as you may subsequently be notified.
  - (b) As you will travel by air and will have to adhere to the prescribed passenger baggage weight limitations, the Company will pay for the transportation by surface shipment of up to 1,000 lbs. (or 120 cubic feet, depending upon basis of computation) of your personal effects from your bona fide home or place of employment to your station of assignment. Any duty or customs fees collectible on the shipment to or importation into a foreign country of your personal effects must be borne by you.

Salary:

Your salary will commence the day you start travel enroute to the place stated in paragraph 4(a) above, provided no undue or voluntary delays result enroute. Salary will be paid by U.S. dollar check once a month.

6. Term of Employment:

Subject to your satisfactory completion of the probationary period, as set forth in the Company's Personnel Manual, your employment will be for an indefinite period. If you fail to meet at any time any of the conditions set forth in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above, or if your services become excess to the needs of the Company, and your services are therefor terminated by the Company, you will be given two weeks advance notice, or pay in lieu of such notice, with return passage to

~~San Antonio, Texas~~ If your services are terminated by the Company for any other reason you will be given return passage to ~~San Antonio, Texas~~ If, however, you resign prior to completion of at least three years of service, the Company will not be responsible for return passage for you or your dependents to ~~San Antonio, Texas~~ or for the repatriation of your personal property.

7. Location:

Your initial assignment will be at ~~Taipei, Taiwan~~; however, our operations in conjunction with those of our associated companies normally extend throughout the Far East and sometimes to other locations and you will be subject to assignment to work with an associated company and to assignment to any point of operations required by the Company.

8. Transportation for Dependents:

Transportation for your dependents will be provided by the Company upon certification by your Supervisor that you have successfully completed a probationary period of such duration as the Company deems necessary to evaluate your performance and suitability. However, if you wish to bring your dependents with you, you may do so at your own expense. You will, however, be reimbursed by the Company for dependent travel only after certification by your Supervisor, as provided above, that you have successfully completed your probationary period. In either case only travel by Company authorized route will be provided or reimbursed and reimbursement will be only at authorized Company discount fares.

9. Company Personnel Manual:

The terms, conditions, and benefits relating to employment with the Company are set forth in its Personnel Manual. Except and unless expressly provided to the contrary herein, the provisions of the Personnel Manual control, and where not expressly contrary to the Personnel Manual the matters set forth herein which are covered in the Personnel Manual are subject to the provisions of the Personnel Manual relating hereto. The following generalize some of the benefits of employment with the Company:

- (a) Annual Leave: Two weeks annual leave with pay for each full year of service. Annual leave may be accrued up to a maximum of four weeks. Payment for unused annual leave will be made upon separation from employment for the convenience of the Company (without prejudice), or upon separation for any reason provided such separation takes place after completion of a full year of service.



APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

- 3 -

- (b) Sick Leave: Two weeks sick leave per year. Unused sick leave is carried forward to the following year and is cumulative up to a maximum of sixty (60) days; however, no payment is made for unused sick leave.
- (c) Home Leave: After completion of three years service with the Company you will be entitled to ninety (90) days home leave with pay and transportation for you and your dependents to your bona fide home. Payment for accrued unused home leave will be made upon separation from employment in the event of termination of employment by the Company on a non-prejudice basis or upon termination for any reason after completion of two years continuous employment.

10. Personal Conduct:

We expect that personal conduct of our employees will reflect no discredit upon themselves, upon their fellow employees, or upon the Company. Excessive or even considerable use of intoxicants will not be permitted.

An employee's dependents for purposes of Company afforded travel referred to herein are his wife and children under eighteen years of age.

This letter constitutes the only authorized offer of employment to you from or on behalf of the Company. We have attempted to cover the general terms of your employment and some of the benefits which will result from your employment. As provided above, it is understood that the Personnel Manual (as it presently exists and as amended from time to time) is the final authority on details. It is an employee's privilege and responsibility to familiarize himself with the Company's Personnel Manual and the benefits provided therein.

If this offer of employment is acceptable to you, will you please indicate your acceptance by signing the enclosed copy hereof, as provided below, and returning that copy to us at the above letterhead address. This offer of employment shall remain in effect only for a period of thirty (30) days from the above date unless extended by written notice from me.

Very truly yours,

for



GAD:ed

I have read, understand, agree with, and accept the above offer of employment this 8 day of August, 1962.

Charles E. Herrick

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

(b)(6)

Dept. RPA No. VPO-RPA-62-394

Name HERRICK, Charles  
(In English) (In Chinese)

Payroll No. \_\_\_\_\_

Effective Date Requested \*  
(FOR SEPARATION, EFFECTIVE DATE MEANS LAST WORKING DAY, THEREFORE, ADD "AS OF CLOSE OF BUSINESS" AFTER THE DATE.)

Actual Effective Date (1) 28 August 1962  
(TO BE FILLED IN BY PERSONNEL DIV (b)(6)  
(2) SEP 13 1962)

PROPOSED ACTION: (1)  New Appointment  Change in Position/Salary  Separation  
(Check One)  Reinstatement  Disciplinary Action (2)  Other Assignment

	PRESENT STATUS	PROPOSED STATUS
TITLE & ACCOUNTING CODE NO.	Applicant	Senior First Officer
SALARY - GRADE, STEP & PAY STANDARD		FP/PS Rev. 11 Code "F" <i>with order</i>
EMPLOYMENT STATUS - PERMANENT, TEMPORARY OR FIXED TERM		Permanent
DEPARTMENT/DIVISION/OFFICE		CPO/Operations
LOCATION		** VTE <i>for 52VTE 131020</i>
*CLASSIFICATION - STAFF EMPLOYEE OR WORKER		Staff employee

As stipulated under Job Classifications in Personnel Manual.

Working under the immediate supervision of Chief Pilot  
(Name) (Title)

BASIS FOR RECOMMENDATION: (1) For New Appointment indicate authorization, e.g. approved Request for Salaried Employee (RSE), replacement; length of probationary period, etc. (2) For Separation indicate whether or not replacement is required.

Refer VPO-RSE-62-020 (D-RSE-337)

\*To be inserted by PND.

\*\*To be decided after applicant reports to Taipei and has been interviewed by VPO

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Approved	
<input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved	
Director of Personnel	

*Vacancy in order*

(Use reverse side if additional space is required)

Requested by: \_\_\_\_\_ VPO Date 6 August 1962  
 Department Head (Division Director or Officer)

Concurred by: Station Manager/ Regional Director Date \_\_\_\_\_  
 \*\*Head of Department/ Division or Office Date \_\_\_\_\_  
 Officer Date \_\_\_\_\_

Approved by: Officer Date 6 August 1962  
 President Date 3 Sept 62 (new 2 Sept)  
 Director of Personnel Date SEP 3 1962

(\*\*Where concurrence by a Department/Division or Office other than the originating Department/Division or Office is required, e.g. inter departmental or divisional transfer.)

Distribution by Personnel Division after final approval:

Original:  For Personnel Division.  
 Copy:  To \_\_\_\_\_ (Originator of RPA)  
 via \_\_\_\_\_ for notification of approval.  
 To \_\_\_\_\_ via \_\_\_\_\_ for information.

FOR PERSONNEL DIVISION USE ONLY									
ROUTING ORDER	117	6	2/F	7					
INITIALS	R/S	E/O	W/A	SEC	CPL	ADP	DP	P/F	
DATE	7/8								

REMARKS: CPO via GSS (info & files)

Personnel Division  
 7, August 1962  
 Taipei

C06117241

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

#

QU WASAYFA

.IPEAAFA 271159

MGDR WAS

TP1925 27 DECEMBER 1971

SUBJ TIME OFF FLIGHT SCHEDULE

REF TP1176 DATED 11 AUGUST 1971

REC'D WAS DEC 27 1971

1. VIENTIANE FIRST OFFICER C. N. DRIVER FROM 23 DECEMBER THRU

3 JANUARY HIS ADDRESS IS [REDACTED] LOS ANGELES,  
CALIFORNIA. PHONE 292-3875.

2. THIS REPORT COVERS BOTH 25 AND 27 DECEMBER.

PRES IPE

;

271340

271342

BOC 011

C06117244

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

#V

QU WASAYFA  
TPEXTFA 060825

MGDR WAS  
IP3840 6 OCTOBER 1972  
SUBJ TIME OFF FLIGHT SCHEDULE  
REF TP1176 DATED 11 AUGUST 1971

REC'D WAS OCT 6 1972

FIRST OFFICER C. N. DRIVER FROM 4 OCTOBER THROUGH 13 OCTOBER HIS  
ADDRESS IS [REDACTED], LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90043,  
TELEPHONE 295-3875.

GREEN FOR PRES TPE

060907  
060909  
BOC 004

C06117245

(b)(6)

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

ZCZC MC059  
QF TPEOAHQ  
VTENFFA 071015

*3/1/73*  
*P. files*

IMT  
TO : VPFO TPE  
INFO: VP/L MTS S/MTC CP/L SRTM PM CSY ISIVE VTE VP/SOM UTH  
SUBJ: OPS ALERT C123K 554524  
REF :

J.H. ACKLEY C.N. DRIVER F/O [REDACTED] (15634) AFD  
[REDACTED] (21512) AFD.

AIRCRAFT DEPARTED L54 0808Z ETA L25 0905Z. AND IS OVERDUE.  
SAR INITIATED USING PC6C N365F, N367F.  
L54 CUSTOMER REPORTS NO PASSENGERS OR CARGO. 0900Z L25 WEATHER  
25 OVERCAST VISIBILITY 2 MILES WITH TRW. WILL ADVISE.

SOM VTE C73 071010Z

NNNNNN

#  
QU WASAYFA  
.TPEXTFA 081145

*DW*  
*copy*  
[Redacted]  
*A-Lior*

(b)(6)

MGDR WAS  
TP4899 8 MARCH 1973  
SUBJ VIENTIANE REPORTS MISSING C123K 554524

REC'D WAS MAR 8 1973

*M*

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

1. VIENTIANE REPORTS THE FOLLOWING:

AAA PRESUMED 10-1 (4)  
BBB C123KF . DRIVER F/O NKNOWN  
[Redacted] (15634) AFD UNKNOWN  
[Redacted] (21512) AFD UNKNOWN  
FFF NIL  
GGG UNKNOWN AIRCRAFT REMAINS MISSING  
HHH AIRCRAFT DEPARTED LUANG PRABANG (L-54) AT 0808Z.  
DEPARTURE MESSAGE RECEIVED AT 0811Z ESTIMATING  
BAN HOUEI SAI (L-25) AT 0905Z. CARGO MANIFESTED  
AS 40 EMPTY CARGO PALLETS. NO FURTHER COMMUNICATION  
I FROM AIRCRAFT REPORTED. REPORTS FROM PILOTS IN THE  
AREA AT 0800 TO 0900Z REPORT THUNDERSTORMS, RAIN AND  
STRONG SOUTHWEST WINDS;. COMMUNICATIONS AND AIR  
SEARCH 07 PM FRUITLESS. SAR 08 USING C7A 605430,  
DMC6 N6868, N389EX AND VTB N9542Z DISCONTINUED  
080515Z DUE ADVERSE AREA WEATHER. WILL CONTINUE SAR  
C09 USING C7A, DHC6, VTB AND HUGHES 500.  
III 0300Z L-54 PARTIAL OBSCURATION 3,000 BROKEN 8,000 OVERCAST  
C DEW POINT 21 DEGREES C ESTIMATED ALTIMETER 2995 WINDS ALOFT  
AT 10,000 FEET 190 TO 210 DEGREES AT 15 TO 20 KNOTS  
JJJ 0002  
KKK [Redacted], ACP/L  
LLL WILL ADVISE

2. MRS. DRIVER IS CURRENTLY RESIDING CONUS AND IT IS REQUESTED THAT SHE BE ADVISED OF MISSING STATUS.

MRS. ALLENE L. DRIVER  
[Redacted]

3. MRS. ACKLEY IS CURRENTLY AT VIENTIANE AND HAS BEEN NOTIFIED. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, CAPTAIN ACKLEY'S DAUGHTER, [Redacted] PLANS TO CALL HER BROTHER, [Redacted] AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. OUR MOST RECENT RECORD ADDRESS FOR [Redacted] IS:

[Redacted]


WE SUGGEST THAT HOME OFFICE ALSO CONTACT [Redacted] AND ADVISE HIM THAT HIS FATHER IS MISSING IN CASE [Redacted] IS UNABLE TO COMPLETE HER PLANNED TELEPHONE CALL.

4. WILL ADVISE OTHER DETAILS AS KNOWN.

*4* 3/8/73

C06117247

#V  
QU WASAYFA  
.TPEXTFA 081055



m 9

MGDR WAS  
TP4898 8 MARCH 1973  
SUBJ XOXO - C123K 554524

~~REC'D WAS MAR 8 1973~~

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

AAA PRESUMED 10-1 (4)  
BBB C123K 554524  
CCC UNKNOWN  
DDD UNKNOWN 07 MARCH 1973 AFTER 0811Z  
EEE J. H. ACKLEY PIC UNKNOWN  
C. N. DRIVER F/O UNKNOWN

[redacted] (15634) AFD UNKNOWN  
[redacted] (21512) AFD UNKNOWN

FFF NIL  
GGG UNKNOWN, AIRCRAFT REMAINS MISSING  
HHH AIRCRAFT DEPARTED LUANG PRABANG (L-54) AT 0808Z. DEPARTURE  
MESSAGE RECEIVED AT 0811Z ESTIMATING BAN HOU EI SAI (L-25)  
AT 0905Z. CARGO MANIFESTED AS 40 EMPTY CARGO PALLETS. NO  
FURTHER COMMUNICATION FROM AIRCRAFT REPORTED. PIREPS FROM  
AREA AT 0800 TO 0900 REPORT THUNDERSTORMS, RAIN AND STRONG  
SOUTH WEST WINDS. COMMUNICATIONS AND AIR SEARCH 07 PM  
FRUITLESS. SAR C08 USING C7A 605430, DHCG N6368, N389EX AND  
VTB N9542Z DISCONTINUED 080515Z DUE ADVERSE AREA WEATHER. WILL  
CONTINUE SAR C09 USING C7A, DHCG, VTB AND HUGHES 500.  
III 0800Z L-54 PARTIAL OBSCURATION 3,000 BROKEN 8,000 OVERCAST  
4 MILES VISIBILITY WITH GROUND FOG TEMPERATURE 23 DEGREES  
C DEW POINT 21 DEGREES C ESTIMATED ALTIMETER 2995 WINDS ALOFT  
AT 10,000 FEET 190 TO 210 DEGREES AT 15 TO 20 KNOTS

JJJ 0002  
KKK [redacted], ACP/L

BEVANS FOR PRES TPE

— 4

3/8/73





APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

QU TPEXTFA  
.WASAYFA 081729Z

TO PRES TPE  
FROM MGDR WAS HOC083D  
SUBJ MISSING C123K 554524  
REF TP4899

MRS. ALLENE L. DRIVER AND  NOTIFIED.

*WMD*  
*JEM*

,

#

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

NNNNZCZC MC 028  
OF TPEGPHO TNNNGPHO SGNXTFA  
VTERMA 080605

*Handwritten:*  
3 copies  
3/8/73  
1430L

TO : TPE TNN SGN UTH BKK  
INFO :  
SUBJ : XOXO  
REF :

AAA PRESUMED 10-1 (4)  
BBB C123K 554524  
CCC UNKNOWN  
DDD UNKNOWN 07 MARCH 1973 AFTER 0811Z  
EEE J.H. ACKLEY PIC UNKNOWN  
C.N. DRIVER F/O UNKNOWN  
[redacted] (15634) AFD UNKNOWN  
[redacted] (21512) AFD UNKNOWN

FFF NIL  
GGG UNKNOWN, AIRCRAFT REMAINS MISSING  
HHH AIRCRAFT DEPARTED LUANG PRABANG (L-54) AT 0808Z.  
DEPARTURE MESSAGE RECEIVED AT 0811Z ESTIMATING  
BAN HOU EI SAI (L-25) AT 0905Z. CARGO MANIFESTED  
AS 40 EMPTY CARGO PALLETS. NO FURTHER COMMUNICATION  
FROM AIRCRAFT REPORTED. PIREPS FROM AREA AT 0800 TO  
0900Z REPORT THUNDERSTORMS, RAIN AND STRONG SOUTHWEST  
WINDS. COMMUNICATIONS AND AIR SEARCH 07 PM FRUITLESS.  
SAR 008 USING C7A 605430, DHC6 N6868, N389EX AND VTB  
N9542Z DISCONTINUED 080515Z DUE ADVERSE AREA WEATHER.  
WILL CONTINUE SAR 009 USING C7A, DHC6, VTB AND  
HUGHES 500.  
III 0808Z L-54 PARTIAL OBSCURATION 3,000 BROKEN S,000  
OVERCAST 4 MILES VISIBILITY WITH GROUND FOG TEMPERATURE  
23 DEGREES C DEW POINT 21 DEGREES C ESTIMATED ALTIMETER 2995 WINDS  
ALOFT AT 10,000 FEET 190 TO 210 DEGREES AT 15 TO 20 KNOTS

JJJ 0002  
KKK [redacted] ACP/L  
LLL WILL ADVISE.

VP/L CP/L MTS/L SOM MSAFE/VTE 080556Z

*AWGCH* #V  
QU WASAYFA  
.TPEXTFA 091101

*[Handwritten signature]*

(b)(6)

REC'D WAS MAR 9 1973

MGDR WAS  
TP4910 9 MARCH 1973  
SUBJ MISSING C123K-554524  
REF HOC083D  
TP4899

*OK  
msd*

1. ACKLEY FAMILY HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH SON [REDACTED] (DATE OF BIRTH [REDACTED]) AND MRS. ACKLEY REQUESTS THAT HOME OFFICE MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR [REDACTED] TO TRAVEL TO VIENTIANE. FURTHER SHE ADVISED THAT IF DAUGHTER [REDACTED] (DATE OF BIRTH [REDACTED]) DESIRES TO TRAVEL TO VIENTIANE, THE HOME OFFICE MAY MAKE SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS. COST OF TRAVEL WILL BE DEDUCTED FROM [REDACTED] ACCOUNT.

*OK  
msd*

2. FROM OUR RECORDS, WE ARE UNABLE TO PROVIDE A CURRENT ADDRESS ON [REDACTED] HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT [REDACTED] WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE SAME. WE ARE ADVISED THAT [REDACTED] WILL BE IN CONTACT WITH HOME OFFICE IN CONNECTION WITH HIS TRAVEL TO VIENTIANE.

3. VIENTIANE ADVISES THAT CSY HAS TAKEN CUSTODY OF A VOLKSWAGON VEHICLE WHICH IT IS BELIEVED BELONGS TO F/O DRIVER BUT WHICH IS STILL REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF [REDACTED]. PLEASE CONTACT [REDACTED] AND REQUEST THAT HE ADVISE OWNERSHIP OF THE CAR. [REDACTED] CONTACT ADDRESS IS:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

BEVANS FOR PRES TPE

[REDACTED]

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

:

*AW/CC/11* #V  
QU WASAYFA  
.TPEXTFA 091101

REC'D WAS MAR 9 1973

MGDR WAS  
TP4910 9 MARCH 1973  
SUBJ MISSING C123K-554524  
REF HOC083D  
TP4899

*OK  
MAD*

1. ACKLEY FAMILY HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH SON [REDACTED] (DATE OF BIRTH [REDACTED]) AND MRS. ACKLEY REQUESTS THAT HOME OFFICE MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR [REDACTED] TO TRAVEL TO VIENTIANE. FURTHER SHE ADVISED THAT IF DAUGHTER [REDACTED] (DATE OF BIRTH [REDACTED]) DESIRES TO TRAVEL TO VIENTIANE, THE HOME OFFICE MAY MAKE SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS. COST OF TRAVEL WILL BE DEDUCTED FROM [REDACTED] ACCOUNT.

*OK  
MAD*

2. FROM OUR RECORDS, WE ARE UNABLE TO PROVIDE A CURRENT ADDRESS ON [REDACTED] HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT [REDACTED] WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE SAME. WE ARE ADVISED THAT [REDACTED] WILL BE IN CONTACT WITH HOME OFFICE IN CONNECTION WITH HIS TRAVEL TO VIENTIANE.

3. VIENTIANE ADVISES THAT CSY HAS TAKEN CUSTODY OF A VOLKSWAGON VEHICLE WHICH IT IS BELIEVED BELONGS TO F/O DRIVER BUT WHICH IS STILL REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF [REDACTED]. PLEASE CONTACT [REDACTED] AND REQUEST THAT HE ADVISE OWNERSHIP OF THE CAR. [REDACTED] CONTACT ADDRESS IS:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

BEVANS FOR PRES IPE

[REDACTED]

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
99-Dec-2013

MGDR WAS  
TP4917 10 MARCH 1973  
SUBJ MISSING C123K 554524  
REF TP4899

SAR CONTINUES WITH NO FURTHER RESULTS REPORTED AT  
1945 LOCAL TAIPEI TIME.

FOR PRES TPE

PRESIDENT FILE

VPIR

VPFO

VPL

VPA

DSAFE

DP

MSB

*Pff*

MGDR WAS  
TP4929 13 MARCH 1973  
SUBJ MISSING C123K 554524  
REF TP4899

SAR CONTINUED WITH NO FURTHER RESULTS REPORTED AT 1700 LOCAL  
TAIPEI TIME.

FOR PRES TPE

PRESIDENT FILE

- VPIR
- VFFO
- VPL
- VPA
- DSAFE
- DLRG
- DP
- MESE

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

MEDR WAS  
TP4936 14 MARCH 1973  
SUBJ MISSING C123K 554524  
REF TP4899

1. VIENTIANE ADVISES THE FOLLOWING:  
QUOTE LLL 554524 WRECKAGE SIGHTED AND CONFIRMED BY N354X  
AND N366F AT QB 2398 APPROXIMATELY 140430Z. DUE TO GROUND  
FIRE, BOTH SAR AIRCRAFT DEPARTED THE SCENE AND ARE NOW  
ENROUTE TO L54. DUE TO AREA SECURITY AND POLITICAL SITUATION,  
ACCESS TO SITE NOT FORE-SEEABLE IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE. WILL  
KEEP INTERESTED PARTIES ADVISED. UNQUOTE
2. WE WILL DISCONTINUED DAILY STATUS REPORTS AND WILL ADVISE  
INFORMATION CONCERNING EMPLOYEES, DEPENDENTS, ETC. AS  
NECESSARY.

FOR PRES TPE

PRESIDENT FILE  
VPIR  
VPOO  
VEL  
VPA  
DSAPT  
DLRG  
DP  
MSSB

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

**OFFICE OF VICE PRESIDENT/SECRETARY-LEGAL COUNSEL**

OFFICE OF  
PRESIDENT  
**REC'D**  
SEP 21 1962  
HEAD OFFICE

TRANSLATION No. 14022.

Letter No. AN-1-51-04896

Date: September 21, 1962

REC'D DCA SEP 28 1962

To : Air Asia Company Limited

From : Aviation Safety Division, CAA

With reference to your A-51-10359 [VPO-62-2427-C/87] and A-51-10366 [VPO-62-2437-C/87] of September 3 and 7 respectively, please notify [redacted] and C. G. Herrick to take the written examination at our Conference Room at 8:30 a.m., 27 September 1962.

Aviation Safety Division, CAA

[redacted]

- ATD

8/25

HELIO

Herrick -

ATD

8/28

C46 (POTENTIAL R/CAPT)

*MCDBR*  
*AS*

Distribution: President  
VPO - Action  
GAM  
File

Remarks:

*[Signature]*

for Office of Vice President/Secretary-Legal Counsel  
September 21, 1962



APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

MGDR WAS  
TP4939 15 MARCH 1973  
SUBJ MISSING C123K 554524  
REF TP4899, TP4936

VIENTIANE ADVISES THE FOLLOWING:

"DEBRIEF OF PILOTS OF N366F AND N354X INDICATES WRECKAGE CONFINED TO 400 FOOT AREA AT QB2398 AND DESTROYED BY IMPACT AND FIRE. NO APPARENT SURVIVORS AND NO PARACHUTES SIGHTED IN AREA. FURTHER ACTION PENDING INFORMATION ON SITE SECURITY FROM CUSTOMERS. WILL KEEP INTERESTED PARTIES ADVISED."

FOR PRES TPE

PRESIDENT FILE

VPIR

VPFO

VPL

VPA

DSAFE

DLRG

DP

MESB

C06117258

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09 Dec 2013

(b)(6)

*WJ*

MGDR WAS  
TP4905 9 MARCH 1973  
SUBJ MISSING C123K 554524  
REF TP4399

SEARCH SOMEWHAT HAMPERED BY WEATHER HAS DISCLOSED NO NEW  
INFORMATION THROUGH APPROXIMATELY 1530L MARCH 9.

FOR PRES

PRESIDENT FILE  
VPIR  
VPFO  
VP-L  
VPA  
DSAFE  
DLRG  
DLRF  
~~DP~~  
MESB

*Pf*



# TRAVEL ORDER

(b)(6)

DEPARTMENT:

DIVISION:

OFFICE: Chief Pilot's Office

REF. No. CP-TO-62-468

DATE: 11 Sept 1962

NAME (IN ENGLISH) <b>C. G. Herrick</b>		(IN NATIVE LANGUAGE)				
TITLE <b>Sr. First Officer</b>		IDENTIFICATION CARD/PAYROLL No.				
PURPOSE OF TRAVEL: <b>Report P/A Station for area familiarization and flight training Return ticket for coming CCAA written exam soon as arranged</b>						
ITINERARY: (LIST ALL STATIONS ON ROUND TRIP BASIS IF APPLICABLE.) <b>TPE-HKG-BKK-VTE &amp; RETURN</b>						
KIND OF TRANSPORTATION: <b>Company aircraft</b>		DATE OF TRAVEL: (ON OR ABOUT) <b>11 Sept 1962</b>				
ON ARRIVAL, REPORT TO: <b>ODHKG OMBKK OMVTE</b>		FOR DUTY, REPORT TO: <b>SZ/OMBKK SZ/OMBKK RCP/SEA</b>				
FAMILY ENTITLED TO TRANSPORTATION	NAME	RELATION	AGE	FROM	TO	BAGGAGE ALLOWANCE
	-	-	-	-	-	-
REMARKS: (TRAVEL ADVANCE LIMITATIONS, ETC.) <b>N/A</b>					ANNUAL LEAVE DATES	TICKET VALIDITY
					-	-
<b>APPROVALS</b>						
SUPERVISOR	DEPARTMENT HEAD	DIVISION DIRECTOR	OFFICER	DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL	PRESIDENT	
DP'S (OR HIS DESIGNEE'S) APPROVAL IS REQUIRED FOR ALL EMPLOYEE TRAVEL EXCEPT ON COMPANY BUSINESS.						
CHARGE:		TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED				
1. BSA (CPO)		A. 2 COPIES FOR ALL TRAVEL EXCEPT ON COMPANY BUSINESS				
2. Contract #57-08		ORIGINAL: FOR SURRENDER BY EMPLOYEE (OR DEPENDENTS) TO TICKET OFFICE IN EXCHANGE FOR TICKETS.				
AF62(531)-1683		COPY: FOR FORWARDING TO PERSONNEL DIVISION FOR "P" FILE.				
cc: SZBKK via OMBKK		B. 3 COPIES FOR TRAVEL ON COMPANY BUSINESS				
SZVTE via OMVTE		ADDITIONAL SIGNED COPY TO BE ATTACHED TO REQUEST FOR TRAVEL ADVANCES OR TRAVEL EXPENSE REPORT.				
RCPSEA via RDSEA						

PD-12 86

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

INTER-OFFICE ROUTING S. 2

REF. No. OR IDENTIFICATION  
OF THE ATTACHED:

TO

VFO


ACTION

- For your information
- Initial and pass on
- For your comments
- Please handle
- Take up with me
- For your approval
- For your decision
- Investigate and report
- Bring up to date
- Draft reply
- For your file
- Note and destroy
- Please return to:

REMARKS:

[Redacted] - Flight Engineer  
**HERRICK, Charles G.** - Senior First Officer

Enclosed herewith each one advance copy of application for employment for the abovelisted personnel.

(Turn over for additional space)

8 August 1962

DATE \_\_\_\_\_ FROM \_\_\_\_\_

RR-PND

CS-3

C06117285

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

PERSONNEL DIVISION

ORIENTATION SLIP

C-46

Name HERRICK, Charles G. Title Senior First Officer - ~~XXXX~~

The above named employee is required to report to the Officers and/or Division Directors indicated below for pre-assignment general orientation.

(To be checked by Director of Personnel)

		<u>Date</u>	<u>Signature</u>
1	P & V	<u>Aug. 31, 1962</u>	<u>S. G. Lee</u>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Chief, Medical Department	<u>31 Aug 1962</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
<input type="checkbox"/>	President		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Assistant Vice President		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Vice President - Operations	<u>3 Sept '62</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Manager, Operations Training	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Director of Security	<u>4 Sept 62</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
<input type="checkbox"/>	Supply Coordinator - TPE Area		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Vice President - Traffic & Sales		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Vice President - Secretary/Legal Counsel		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Treasurer-Controller		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Vice President - General Affairs		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Director of Public Relations/Advertising		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Vice President - Technical Services		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Director of Personnel	<u>Sept 62</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>

Upon completion of orientation, this form should be returned to PND where it will be placed in the employee's Personnel file.

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

# AIR AMERICA INC.

Box 1  
APO San Francisco 96263

25 January 1973

P-73-07

Mr. C.N. Driver

[Redacted Address Line]

Los Angeles, Calif. 90043

Dear Mr. Driver :

On January 22, 1973, the Far East Pilots Association, as the sole bargaining agent of you and your fellow pilots, advised the Company through a letter from the Association's President that the pilots of Air America, Inc. would stand down from the services of the Company effective midnight January 23.

At that point the Company began circulation of the enclosed letter and attachment to each pilot in the Far East. As you will note, each pilot not on leave was directed to report to duty at 8 A.M. on January 24 under the terms and conditions outlined in the attachment.

The Company is extremely gratified that with minimal exceptions Air America's pilots reported as directed, and operations are continuing normally. In the belief that you will be vitally interested, we are hereby advising you and your fellow pilots on leave of the new terms and conditions of employment, which confer numerous increased benefits and which, with possibly minor exceptions, are effective January 1, 1973.

We hope that you are enjoying your leave and look forward to your return to duty as scheduled. If for any reason your plans should change, would you please advise the Company as soon as possible.

Sincerely  
*Original Signed By*

[Redacted Signature]

*President*

[Redacted Title]

President  
Air America, Inc.

cc: ✓ MGDR  
VPIR  
VPFO  
DP

VP//~~AM~~ VTE , Upon reporting in at VTE , please make sure Mr. Driver is given this letter prior to being assigned to the Flight Schedule.

TO : C. H. DRIVER via AVPPG/DFD, VP DATE : JAN 15 1973  
 FROM : MRS METD, PND, TPE <sup>Laos, HAVTE, CP/L</sup> REF.NO.: PND-RS-73/0001  
 SUBJECT : Leave and Travel Status Notification (as of 31 December 1972)

The following particulars concerning your accrued unused leaves and travel status as of 31 December 1972 are furnished for your information. Please contact us if you have any questions.

Your Date of Employment/Adjusted Anniversary Date: 15 May 1960	
You are a participant of the Annual Vacation/Travel Program	
Number of Days of Accrued Unused Leave as of 31 December 1972:	
Annual Vacation	: 0 days
Annual Leave (residual):	8.80 days
Home Leave (residual)	: 4.83 days
Travel Time Earned (pro-rated)	: 1.40 days
Home Leave Travel Allowance (residual)	: US\$ —
Date Annual Vacation Travel Due: 15 May 1973	
Remarks: Please note that according to paragraph B1, page 33, Annual Vacation/Travel Program section, Leave chapter of Personnel Manual, "there shall be no accrual of Annual Vacation in excess of 60 days."	

Original signed by

MRS

Original signed by

METD

cc: DFD  
 HAVTE

RS File

√P/F

PD-215A R1 (for Cockpit Personnel) (1 Jan. 1973)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 09-Dec-2013
--

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

MEMORANDUM

TO : C.N. Driver via AMFD/C-123

DATE: 3 Oct. 1968

FROM : MFD/L

REF. No. AA/MFD/L-68-125

SUBJECT : Change in Position

This is to advise the effective date of your change in position to First Officer is 13 September 1968.

Original Signed by

[Redacted Signature Box]

[Redacted Signature Box]

cc: BMVTE  
PMVTE ✓  
AMFD/C-123  
ASVTE  
SRVTE  
File




MEMORANDUM

TO : See Distribution List Below

FROM : VP-P

SUBJECT: Return of Missing Employees

REFERENCE: VPA memo dated 26 January 1973



DATE: 29 May 1973

NO.: VPA-73-87

FD


Attached please find four more pamphlets which provide information about the following employees who are listed as missing in Southeast Asia as of 8 March, 1973:

Name

Position

James H. Ackley  
Glarence W. Driver

Captain  
First Officer  
Air Freight Dispatcher  
Air Freight Dispatcher



- cc: CEO via RVP-OSG
- President, Air Asia
- RVP-OSG P/T TPE
- VP-L - OSG P/T TPE
- VPO-OSG P/T TPE
- VPIR-OSG P/T TPE
- Controller
- VP-SVND SCN
- VP-LD VIE
- VP-NTD UTH
- AVP-BKI
- GM-HPD-OKO
- DP (2)
- File
- A/File



# TRAVEL ORDER

DEPARTMENT:

DIVISION :

OFFICE :

REF. No RDJ-TO-197-62

DATE: 27 August 1962

NAME (IN ENGLISH) <b>HERRICK</b>		(IN NATIVE LANGUAGE)				
TITLE		IDENTIFICATION CARD/PAYROLL No.				
PURPOSE OF TRAVEL: <b>Initial employment per Washington cable H242D</b>						
(ITINERARY: (LIST ALL STATIONS ON ROUND TRIP BASIS IF APPLICABLE.) <b>TYO/TPE</b>						
KIND OF TRANSPORTATION: <b>CAT</b>		DATE OF TRAVEL: (ON OR ABOUT) <b>CT25/30 August</b>				
ON ARRIVAL, REPORT TO:		FOR DUTY, REPORT TO:				
FAMILY ENTITLED TO TRANSPORTATION	NAME	RELATION	AGE	FROM	TO	BAGGAGE ALLOWANCE
REMARKS: (TRAVEL ADVANCE LIMITATIONS, ETC.)					ANNUAL LEAVE DATES	TICKET VALIDITY
<b>APPROVALS</b>						
SUPERVISOR	DEPARTMENT HEAD	DIVISION DIRECTOR	OFFICER	DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL	PRESIDENT	
ORIGINAL SIGNED BY						
DP'S (OR HIS DESIGNEE'S) APPROVAL IS REQUIRED FOR ALL EMPLOYEE TRAVEL EXCEPT ON COMPANY BUSINESS.						
CHARGE:	TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED					
	A. <u>2 COPIES FOR ALL TRAVEL EXCEPT ON COMPANY BUSINESS</u> ORIGINAL: FOR SURRENDER BY EMPLOYEE (OR DEPENDENTS) TO TICKET OFFICE IN EXCHANGE FOR TICKETS. COPY : FOR FORWARDING TO PERSONNEL DIVISION FOR "P" FILE. B. <u>3 COPIES FOR TRAVEL ON COMPANY BUSINESS</u> ADDITIONAL SIGNED COPY TO BE ATTACHED TO REQUEST FOR TRAVEL ADVANCES OR TRAVEL EXPENSE REPORT.					

PD-12 '65

APPROVED FOR  
 RELEASE DATE:  
 09-Dec-2013



DATA CHECK SHEET  
for  
BOARD OF REVIEW

RE: EMPLOYEE INJURY/ILLNESS/DEATH

- 1. Employee: Clarence N. Driver No.: 07740
- 2. Age: 51 Nationality: USA Passport No. \_\_\_\_\_
- 3. Permanent/~~TEMPORARY~~
- 4. Date of Employment: 15 May 1966
- 5. Date of ~~Injury/Illness/Death~~ Missing: 7 March 1973
- 6. On Date of ~~Injury/Illness/Death~~ Missing
  - a. Job Assignment: SIG
  - b. Contract No. 0002
  - c. Station of Permanent Assignment: VTE
  - d. Station of Assignment: VTE
  - e. Title: First Officer
  - f. Salary: FP/PS-D (Pilots)
- 7. Nature of ~~Injury/Illness/Death~~ Missing Aircraft accident
  - a. Death Certificate: Yes/No
    - (1) Issued by \_\_\_\_\_
    - (2) At: \_\_\_\_\_ (3) On: \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. Other Documents Obtained: \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. Cause of Injury/Illness/Death: \_\_\_\_\_
  - d. Period of Last Illness in the Event of Death: N/A
  - e. Hospitalized at : N/A
    - from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

~~Missing~~

f. ~~Injury/Illness/Death~~ Occurred At:

(1) City: QB2398

(2) Time and Date: after 0811Z, 7 March 1973

g. Accident Reports Submitted: \_\_\_\_\_

8. Company Medical Doctor's Report(s):

a. Issued by: \_\_\_\_\_

b. On: \_\_\_\_\_

c. Summary: \_\_\_\_\_

9. Any History of Illness/Cause of Death Reflected in Company Records:

a. Yes/No

(1) If so, summarize: \_\_\_\_\_

10. Any Medical Waivers in "P" File:

a. Yes/No

b. If so, summarize: \_\_\_\_\_

11. Participation in any Company Retirement Plan:

a. Yes/~~No~~

b. If so, identify: 1151

c. Beneficiary: Allene L. Driver

12. Next of Kin Notified:

a. Yes/~~No~~

b. If so, when: 8 March 1973

how: By Home Office

whom notified: Mrs. Allene Driver - wife

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

13. Relatives:

a. Spouse: Allene L. Driver

(1) Address: [Redacted]

b. Children (Name, ages, address) [Redacted]

[Redacted] same as above.

c. Other : \_\_\_\_\_

d. Summarize Repatriation Arrangements made/to be made for Dependents:

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

14. Remains:

a. Disposition: How: \_\_\_\_\_

Where: \_\_\_\_\_

When: \_\_\_\_\_

15. Washington Office Notified:

a. Yes/~~No~~ How: TPI, 899

When: 8 March 1973

16. Disposition and Beneficiary Form:

a. Yes/~~No~~

b. Name of Beneficiary/Personal Representative: \_\_\_\_\_

Mrs. Allene Driver - wife

17. Personal Effects:

a. Nature: \_\_\_\_\_

b. Location: \_\_\_\_\_

c. Disposition, if any: \_\_\_\_\_

d. Other: \_\_\_\_\_

18. Additional Remarks: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

FOR DECISION BY THE BOARD OF REVIEW:

1. Injury/Illness/Death - in Line of Duty/Not in Line of Duty

2. If LOD:  
a. Hazardous/Non-Hazardous  
b. Basis for determination \_\_\_\_\_

3. If not LOD:  
a. Was cause through employee's misconduct: \_\_\_\_\_  
b. If so, summarize: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

4. Benefits to be Determined:  
a. Amount: \_\_\_\_\_  
b. Basis: \_\_\_\_\_  
c. To whom to be paid: \_\_\_\_\_  
d. How Payment to be effected: \_\_\_\_\_

5. Who to bear the following costs: \_\_\_\_\_  
a. Cost of last illness: \_\_\_\_\_  
b. Preparation of remains for burial: \_\_\_\_\_  
c. Repatriation of:  
(1) Remains of \_\_\_\_\_  
(2) Rental of Containers, etc. \_\_\_\_\_  
(3) Personal Effects \_\_\_\_\_  
(4) Dependents \_\_\_\_\_

6. Other Items for Decision:  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

### EMPLOYEE ACCIDENT REPORT

Date: 21 March 1973

Department Ref. No. GP/L-73-EAR-010

1. Name Driver, C. N. Employee No. 07740 Dept/Div Flying  
Job Title First Officer Base/Station Vientiane

2. Date and Time of Accident 0838Z 7 March 1973

3. Exact Place Accident Occurred Between L-54 and L-25

4. Equipment Involved C-123K 55-4524

5. Description in full of how accident occurred (Relate the events which resulted in the injury. Tell what the injured person was doing at the time of the accident. Tell what happened and how it happened. Name any objects or substances involved and tell how they were involved. Give full details on all factors which led or contributed to the accident. Use additional sheets, if necessary).

a. By Employee:

*[Faint signature and text]*

b. By Supervisor or Department Head:

55-4524 disappeared on a flight from L-54 to L-25

6. Apparent Nature and Extent of Injury should be described by a physician or employee's supervisor or department head if a physician is not available. (Name part of body affected, e.g., fractured left leg, bruised right thumb, etc. If there is a loss of part of the body, describe.)

Missing

7. a. Time and place of first medical treatment N/A

b. Name and address of physician or hospital N/A

c. X-Rays: By whom taken? (State if none) N/A

d. Further treatment: Estimated type, frequency and duration N/A

e. Estimated period of disability for 1) Regular duties N/A  
2) Modified/Limited duties N/A

f. Describe any permanent disability or disfigurement expected (State if none) N/A

g. If death ensued, give estimated time and date N/A

h. Time/Date if employee has already returned to duty N/A

(CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE)

N/A RECEIVED  
26 MAR 1973  
PERSONNEL DIVISION  
TAIPEI

8. a. What duties were assigned at the time of the accident and by whom (provide specific instructions given, time duties began and estimated time of completion).  
 b. What contract were the duties in connection with, if any.

Duty time started 0137Z  
Contract 002 IASB -039

9. a. Did the injured employee follow prescribed safe work practices? \_\_\_\_\_

Yes  No

- b. Was the employee given instructions regarding safe work practices?  
 By whom and in what manner? N/A

In what publications are the applicable safe work practices prescribed? N/A

- c. If the prescribed safe work practices were not followed what is the reason given by the employee for not doing so? N/A

10. Names and addresses of other persons involved

Capt. Ackley 06501  
15634  
21512

11. Names and addresses of eye witnesses

None

12. Corrective action taken to prevent recurrences of this type of accident

N/A

**STAFF EMPLOYEE**

**TO BE DETERMINED BY DP**

NOT IN LINE OF DUTY  
 IN LINE OF DUTY

A. FOLLOWING APPLICABLE TO REGULAR LABORERS AND WORKERS ON TAIWAN ONLY:

1. TO RECEIVE PAY PRESCRIBED BY LAW  
 2. TO RECEIVE FULL PAY PRESCRIBED UNDER "PAYMENT DURING ABSENCE DUE LINE OF DUTY INJURY" IN AACL PERSONNEL MANUAL PART ONE A OR PART TWO AS APPLICABLE

B. FOLLOWING APPLICABLE TO INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL IN JAPAN:

1. TO RECEIVE NON-DUTY COMPENSATION PAID BY WORKMEN'S ACCIDENT COMPENSATION INSURANCE ONLY  
 2. TO RECEIVE 1. ABOVE PLUS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 1. AND THE EMPLOYEE'S FULL PAY FOR A PERIOD NOT TO EXCEED 3 MONTHS.

8  
 DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

**FOR PERSONNEL DIVISION USE ONLY**

ROUTING	DP	CEC	W/A	R/S		P/F
INITIALS						
DATE						

DEPARTMENT HEAD NOTIFIED PER PND-RS  
 DATED

[Signature] CPVTE  
 (NAME), (TYPE OR PRINT) (TITLE)  
[Signature] 21 March 1973  
 (SIGNATURE) (DATE)

- DISTRIBUTION:**
- ORIGINAL: DP  
 COPIES: DIRECTOR, SAFETY DIVISION - TPE  
 DIRECTOR, INSURANCE (VIA CONTROLLER, VP-L)  
 CMD VIA BMO  
 VP-L (DEATH CASES ONLY)  
 BASE/STATION MANAGER  
 DEPARTMENT/DIVISION HEAD CONCERNED  
 BASE PERSONNEL OFFICE CONCERNED



Via All America  
Via Commercial  
Via Globe  
Via Mackay Radio

DATE 3/23/62

SENDER (TO BE BILLED) CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT XBU-48

TO [REDACTED] TOKYO

ARRIVING TOKYO HERRICK 0A0345 AUGUST THIRTY REQUEST  
HOTEL AND TRANSPORTATION TAIPEI H242D

THIS MESSAGE WILL BE SENT FULL RATE UNLESS SENDER DESIGNATES BY LETTER TELEGRAM SERVICE THE LT DESIGNATION SHOULD BE PLACED BEFORE THE LT ADDRESS


EXTRA COPY

(b)(6)

NY-6FQ-AC&R

American Cable & Radio System  
An ITT Associate

"Via All America"  
"Via Commercial"  
"Via Globe"  
"Via Mackay Radio"



FOR FAST SERVICE, PLEASE INDICATE ONE ROUTING HERE

SENDER (TO BE BILLED) CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT XBU-48

DATE 8/24/62

TO [REDACTED] TAIPEI

"Via"

EMPLOYED [REDACTED] RSE452 ETD SEPTEMBER THIRTEEN  
[REDACTED] RSE464 ETD SEPTEMBER FOUR STOP TOKYO  
NOTIFIED ARRIVAL HERRICK H032A AUGUST THIRTY H242C

SEND THE ABOVE MESSAGE SUBJECT TO RULES AND REGULATIONS SET FORTH IN THE COMPANIES' RATE BOOK OR FILE WITH THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION.

1 - 8/24/62

TYPE OR WRITE PLAINLY WITHIN BORDER  
THIS MESSAGE WILL BE SENT FULL RATE UNLESS SENDER DESIGNATES BY LETTER TELEGRAM SERVICE THE LT DESIGNATION SHOULD BE PLACED BEFORE THE LT ADDRESS.

AC&R FACSIMILE SENDING BLANK

GWG

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

[REDACTED]  
SAN ANTONIO, TEX

REC'D DCA AUG 10 1962

[REDACTED]  
CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT  
WASHINGTON, 6, DC.

CWC

DEAR [REDACTED]:

THE EMPLOYMENT OFFER ENCLOSED AND SIGNED, WAS DELAYED, BEING DELIVERED BECAUSE OF AN ADDRESS ERROR. THERE MUST HAVE BEEN A SUBSTITUTE POSTMAN ON DUTY AS OUR REGULAR POSTMAN, WAS UNDER MY COMMAND IN THE AF RES, SQUADRON HERE AT BROOKS AFB, AND IS FAMILIAR WITH MY ADDRESS. SO I WISH TO APOLOGISE FOR THIS LETTER BEING DELAYED IN BEING RETURNED.

YOURS TRULY

Charles S. Herrick

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

DP - TPE (Via Pres - TPE)

7 August 1962

Personnel Secretary (Via MGDR - DCA)

WP-62-3477

Mr. Charles G. Herrick's Flight Crew Form  
Ref.: RSE-337, dated 4/10/62

Attached is the revised Flight Crew Supplementary form  
which Mr. Charles G. Herrick has forwarded.

[Redacted]

Attachment

C06117303

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013



(b)(6)

# TELETYPE

TO ORD SCP DP MRS TPE  
INFO CP PM VP VTE  
SUBJ  
REF A/SCP G100023

AAA F/O DRIVER/CN DEPARTED KOL ON TOPS K13 CMA  
[REDACTED]. LAX CALIF 90043.  
[REDACTED]

HCSSVTE K72 0501200Z

*9/11/13*

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR  
BUREAU OF EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION  
680 ALA MOANA, ROOM 302  
HONOLULU, HAWAII 96813

May 20, 1964



REFER TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

REC'D WAS MAY 22 1964

Air America, Inc.  
808 Seventeenth Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C., 20006

Attention:

Gentlemen:

Please refer to our letter of March 24, 1964 regarding the death of two American pilots employed by you in Laos. It will be appreciated if you will let us have a prompt reply to our letter.

*Cheney  
Harrick*

Very truly yours,

Deputy Commissioner

*Copied for VPSLC & DP (via Pres) - 6/12/64*

Preliminary Report of Aircraft Accident

- 1. Operating Company: Air America Inc.
- 2. Aircraft: Make Curtiss Model C-46F & Registry No. B-150 Nationality \_\_\_\_\_ Flt. No. 342
- 3. Brief Circumstances of Accident Aircraft was proceeding from Savannakhet, Laos, to Ban Houei Sane, Laos, on a drop-mission when it apparently encountered ground fire in the vicinity of Moung Phine, Laos.
- 4. Damages: Substantial or Minor -- Extent Destroyed
- 5. Crew:
  - 1. Capt. Cheney J. C. (presumed deceased) Injuries 5. [redacted] (interned)
  - 2. F/O Herrick C. G. (presumed deceased) " 6. [redacted] (interned)
  - 3. [redacted] (interned) " 7. [redacted] (interned)
  - 4. AFS DeBruin E.H. (interned)
- 6. No. Passengers - Injuries: Fatal - Serious - Minor - Unknown -
- 7. Location of Accident XD 0239, Laos
- 8. Date of Accident 5 Sept. 1963 Time of Accident Est. 0835Z
- 9. Civil Aviation Agency Concerned N/A
- 10. Last Departure Point Savannakhet, Laos Time \_\_\_\_\_ Destination Ban Houei Sane (air drop) then return to Savannakhet, Laos
- 11. Weather \_\_\_\_\_
- 12. Traffic Control Clearance N/A
- 13. Last Radio Contact & Position 0835Z. announced heavy ground fire at 0832Z, right engine fire at 0833Z, engine feathered at 0835Z. (computed and assumed position WD 9035, Laos)
- 14. Security Established \_\_\_\_\_
- 15. Remarks \_\_\_\_\_

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

Submitted by: [redacted]

Date submitted: 8 Nov. 1963

(If necessary, use reverse side)

1700L - We received word from the search planes that the crash had been sighted and prepared to take off for the area. At this point we received word to delay our trip until the next morning.

September 8, 1963

0600L - We took off for Moung Phalane, landing at 0640L, with Teams A and B and our AFDs. At Moung Phalane we dropped off all our AFDs and picked up some Lao army troops for whom [ ] had made arrangements for the night before. [ ] is the Savannakhet base commander.

Approximately 0715L - We took off for the site of the crash, arriving about twenty minutes later. We circled the crash area twice and could see no sign of life and decided to land in a clearing approximately 75 yards from the downed aircraft. [ ] landed first and dropped off four or five Lao troops and took off again with [ ] remaining on board. [ ] landed next and dropped off myself, [ ], and three Lao troops and we proceeded to the crash as [ ] again took off. We reached the crash a few minutes later and I stationed the three Laos around the area to watch for movement in the surrounding area. We were at the crash site about one hour before leaving.

There was a steady rain at the site during our entire stay. I determined that the aircraft was in fact C-46 150 by observing this number on one of the troop doors which was lying near the crash and also the number was visible on the right wing of the plane. The plane had gone straight into the ground and buried most of the fuselage with about six or seven feet of the tail sticking straight up above the ground. The tail appeared to be intact. Both wings were present and parts of both engines could be observed. I also saw the propeller of the left engine. The plane had apparently exploded on impact and pieces from the cockpit could be seen about the area and a large quantity of rice. I do not think the plane burned after the crash. Some pieces of the right wing appeared to have burned before the crash. On the north side of the crash, I could see bits and pieces from the flight deck such as flight kits, papers, seat cushions, safety belts, foam rubber from cushions, and a flashlight with Herrick's name. I also observed a piece of flesh with hair on it and at first thought it might be a scalp. Upon further observation I remarked to [ ] that it did not look like human hair to me as it was thinly cropped and very coarse. I gained access to the fuselage through the tail and could see about three or four feet down in which I saw only broken and twisted pieces of wood and aluminum. The large quantity of wood present in the fuselage indicates to me that the fuselage did not burn before or after the crash. Moreover during my entire period at the scene I did not see anything that would indicate the presence of any of the crew at the time of the crash, such as pieces of chutes, harnesses, clothing, belts, pocket items, boots, or parts of human bodies.

After our arrival at the crash scene I remained there during my entire stay on the ground. [ ] was working with the URC-4 radio and was back and forth between the site and the chopper. [ ] arrived

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09-Dec-2013


about twenty minutes after I did and remained at the site of the crash.

After about an hour at the crash site, a shot was fired from the area north east of the chopper pad. As we could do nothing further at the site without equipment and as the choppers were getting low on fuel and the weather was closing in, we decided to return to Moug Phalane, where we intended to wait out the weather and acquire excavating equipment. All persons who were brought into the site including the Lao soldiers were at this time taken back to Moug Phalane. Enroute to Moug Phalane we received word to return to Savannakhet. We deposited all the soldiers at Moug Phalane and picked all Company personnel up and returned to Savannakhet.

Upon our return to Savannakhet I proceeded to the Lao army air drop section to see exactly what had been put aboard the aircraft, as no one seemed to know how much of what was on board. The manifest showed that there were 110 sacks of rice and 300 kilos of water buffalo meat put on board. The commander told me the meat had been killed and quartered the morning of the trip. He further stated that the skin and hair had been left on the meat.

September 9, 1963

Returned to Vientiane via Udorn aboard aircraft 03X.





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RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

STATEMENT

September 5, 1963

On the day of September 5, 1963, I was working on aircraft 06X with [redacted]. After returning from a rice drop, I proceeded to the operations building at Vientiane to attend to my duties as an Air America AFS. The time was now 1530L and I was informed in Operations that our C-46 aircraft 150 had been fired upon and might be down somewhere east of Savannakhet, Laos. I immediately informed the Chief of the aerial delivery section and we set about making preparations for a rescue attempt. It was determined about this time that several aircraft would be dispatched on the search about 1600L from Vientiane. As the aircraft on which I had been working was to go on the search, I quickly rounded up such items that I would need if we found the aircraft. Just prior to take off, I was informed by [redacted] that I was to stay in Vientiane and that [redacted] would take my place. I remained at the airport until 2200L awaiting any word from the search planes. At 2215L a meeting was called by [redacted] who informed us that two rescue crews would be dispatched to wait at Savannakhet. [redacted] was to be in charge of Team A and [redacted] in charge of Team B and some AFDs would be sent along to aid.

Team A - [redacted]  
[redacted]

Team B - [redacted]  
[redacted]

AFDs - [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

September 6, 1963

At 0505L we left Vientiane and arrived at Savannakhet at 0620L. Shortly thereafter, two helicopters arrived to aid in the rescue; H-15 from Udorn and H-12 from Vientiane flown by [redacted] and [redacted].

Soon after the arrival of the choppers, we met [redacted] of USAID who informed us he had made arrangements to lodge us at the USAID compound in Savannakhet. [redacted] was very helpful throughout the search period.

1400L - Teams A and B consisting of [redacted] and [redacted] in one chopper and [redacted] and [redacted] in the other took off from Savannakhet bound for the village of Moung Phalane a FAR outpost. At Moung Phalane we requested the commander to do all he could to obtain some word of the ill-fated 150. After a 10 minute stay at Moung Phalane we flew directly back to Savannakhet.

September 7, 1963

1330L - We returned with the same personnel aboard as the previous day to Moung Phalane. The commander told us he had been unable to gain any information as yet. We then proceeded directly back to Savannakhet.

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RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

S T A T E M E N T

Capt. Cheney was briefed by me the evening prior to the day of the accident. I gave him a list of three DZ's (XD63-37, XD71-14, and XD56-24) and told him to go only to those three. I also cautioned him to avoid VE9644 and VE9745 as indicated on the Form Laos 147. Generally all FAR DZ's are checked by me prior to scheduling and those which appear too hazardous are verified with the COR. In this instance I did not check them because of the notation on the Form 147 by the COR which indicated they already had been checked and were considered acceptable.

I was alerted by the flight watch section two minutes after B150 reported heavy ground fire. [redacted] was in my office and we both proceeded to the radio room. By this time B150 had reported engine fire and engine feathered. I called the aircraft and asked for a position and altitude. The answer was slightly garbled but was copied by me as "40 minutes out of Savannakhet heading 300 degrees at 4000 feet". The rest of the transmission went something like "ETA Savannakhet-----standby one". We waited about 30-45 seconds and called again but received no answer. Nothing more was heard after that. We then put O5X, O6X, 865, and 73Z on a search, positioned H12 at Savannakhet from Udorn and called H15 down from up country for positioning at Vientiane.

The second day, after the aircraft was spotted, a ground party reached the scene by helicopter and determined that certain tools and equipment were required to get to the interior of the aircraft. The weather was bad and the hour late, so all aircraft participating in the search were returned to V08, S08 or V39 and plans were completed for a first light departure to wrap up the investigation. The U.S. embassy then refused to grant permission to continue, mainly because the helicopter at the scene had reported hearing gunfire when departing.

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
OMATOG/VIE

Mr. Charles G. Herrick  
Sr. First Officer  
Chief Pilot's Office

Date: November 27, 1962

Ref. No.: PND-ES-62/2958

Dear Mr. Herrick:

This is to advise that you successfully completed your Probationary Period of employment with the Company on November 27, 1962. ~~Employee's services are terminated and Company Identification Card. Please sign the card, place it in a sealed envelope and return it to the Director of Personnel for the card to be destroyed.~~

[Redacted Signature]

Director of Personnel

Encls: as stated  
cc: ✓P/File

AMGDR via President  
CAPD

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

TO : SEVEN via CPL/AAP, DP, VPO & RCP-SEA  
FROM : E/S, PND, TPE  
SUBJECT: Completion of Probationary Period

DATE: December 8, 1968  
REF. NO. PND-EO-62/1033

Please confirm to the following ~~employees~~ employees that ~~beginning~~ they have successfully completed ~~has~~ their probationary period of employment with the Company:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Title/Department</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Effective Date</u>
✓ HERRICK, Charles G.	Sr. First Officer CFO/Operations	VTE	November 27, 1968
[Redacted]	"	"	November 28, 1968
[Redacted]	"	"	November 30, 1968

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY  
[Redacted]  
Employment Manager

RFL/SHA  
cc: E/O  
✓ P/File

CSC/klc

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

TO : E/O C.G. Herrick  
FROM : SZVTE  
SUBJECT : Completion of Probationary Period

DATE: Dec. 24, 1962

This is to confirm that as of ~~November 27,~~ 1962 you  
have successfully completed your probationary period of employment  
with the Company.

Original Signed By

[Redacted Signature]

[Redacted Signature]

cc: EC, PHD  
File

Personnel Division  
D. Dec 962

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

MEMORANDUM

*Henry J. ...* (b)(6)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : President

DATE: 14 September 1963

FROM : VPSLC

REF. No. VPSLC-63-355

SUBJECT: Aircraft Accident -- B-150, 4 September 1963

Of the seven personnel killed in subject accident, three of them were U.S. nationals: Messrs. Cheney, Herrick, and DeBruin.

Attached is a three page "MEMO FOR RECORD" relative to the applicability of the Defense Base Act in the matter of the deaths of those three employees. A copy of this memorandum is being forwarded at this time (prior to the Board of Review hearing) inasmuch as you may wish to forward it to the Washington office for general information.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

[Redacted Signature Line]

[Redacted Signature Line]

Encl.: as stated

cc: File

CSC/lc

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

MEMORANDUM

REC'D WAS NOV 8 1963


TO : Counsel-WAS via MGDR-WAS  
FROM : DP-TPE via President-TPE, VPSLC-TPE  
SUBJECT: The late Charles G. Herrick

DATE: November 2, 1963

REF. No. PND-DP-63/2365

Enclosed is the original and one signed copy of Report of the Death of an American Citizen (Presumptive) in the case of Charles G. Herrick. We received the original and two copies from the Station Manager, Vientiane, and have retained one copy for our files.

It is doubtful if Mrs. Herrick has received this report and she will probably look to you to provide her with whatever copies she may require.

  
Director of Personnel

Encls.

cc: P/File  
File  
R/File

BS/aw

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE 09-Dec-2013

Form FS-192  
7-19-51

AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE

REPORT OF THE DEATH OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN

Presumptive

22 October 1963, Vientiane, Laos  
(Place and date)

Name in full Charles G. HERRICK Occupation Pilot

Native or naturalized Native Last known address  
in the United States \_\_\_\_\_

Date of death September 5 1963 Age 45  
(Month) (Day) (Hour) (Minute) (Year) (As nearly as can be ascertained)

Place of death \_\_\_\_\_  
(Number and street) or (Hospital or hotel) (City) (Country)  
RD 0239 Laos

Cause of death Official communique of Pathet Lao's spokesman  
(Include authority for statement)

Disposition of the remains At site

Local law as to disinterring remains Not applicable

Disposition of the effects Shipped to next of kin by Air America, Inc.

Person or official responsible for custody of effects and accounting therefor Air America, Inc.

Informed by telegram:

NAME	ADDRESS	RELATIONSHIP	DATE SENT
<u>Mrs. Charles Herrick</u>	[Redacted]	<u>Wife</u>	<u>Sent by assistant to Vice President.</u>
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	<u>Father</u>	[Redacted]

Copy of this report sent to:

NAME	ADDRESS	RELATIONSHIP	DATE SENT

Traveling or residing abroad with relatives or friends as follows:

NAME	ADDRESS	RELATIONSHIP

Other known relatives (not given above):

NAME	ADDRESS	RELATIONSHIP

This information and data concerning an inventory of the effects, accounts, etc., have been placed under File 234 in the correspondence of this office.

Remarks: Request passport No. [Redacted] be canceled as of 5 September 1963-- assumed to be with body.

(Continue on reverse if necessary.)

[SEAL]

No fee prescribed.

[Redacted Signature]

(Signature on all copies)

[Redacted] Vice Consul of the United States of America.



DP-TPE (Via Pres.-TPE)

22 November 1968

Counsel-WAS (Via MGDR-WAS)

WC-63-3898

Death Certificate for Messrs. Cheney and Herrick

The survivors of Messrs. Cheney and Herrick are having difficulty obtaining recognition by certain agencies and individuals of the Presumptive Report of the Death of an American Citizen which was issued by the American Vice-Consul in Vientiane, Laos. One of the principal items which has been causing trouble and on which the Vice-Consul could elaborate is the cause of death, which is now stated as "Official communique of Pathet Lao's spokesman". This obviously is not the cause of death, but the source of information concerning the death.

There is no information contained in the report that the individuals were killed in an airplane crash nor the location of the crash. It would seem appropriate that a revised Report of Death be issued and that this information be inserted as the cause of death. We would appreciate your attempting to obtain a revised "Report of Death of an American Citizen" from the Vice-Consul for both Messrs. Cheney and Herrick. We would also appreciate about five copies of each report in order that the survivors will have adequate official copies to give to the interested parties. The Department of State will not issue certified copies but claims that additional copies must be secured from the Embassy in Laos.

JHB:ns

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

## MEMORANDUM

(S) Dec 18 (b)(6)

TO : SZVTE  
 FROM : DF  
 SUBJECT: Death Certificate for Messrs. Cheney and Herrick

DATE: December 4, 1963

REF. No. PND-DP-63/3637-S

We quote below Counsel-WAS memo WC-63-3898 dated November 22, 1963:

"The survivors of Messrs. Cheney and Herrick are having difficulty obtaining recognition by certain agencies and individuals of the Presumptive Report of the Death of an American Citizen which was issued by the American Vice-Consul in Vientiane, Laos. One of the principal items which has been causing trouble and on which the Vice-Consul could elaborate is the cause of death, which is now stated as "Official communique of Pathet Lao's spokesman". This obviously is not the cause of death, but the source of information concerning the death.

There is no information contained in the report that the individuals were killed in an airplane crash nor the location of the crash. It would seem appropriate that a revised Report of Death be issued and that this information be inserted as the cause of death. We would appreciate your attempting to obtain a revised "Report of Death of an American Citizen" from the Vice-Consul for both Messrs. Cheney and Herrick. We would also appreciate about five copies of each report in order that the survivors will have adequate official copies to give to the interested parties. The Department of State will not issue certified copies but claims that additional copies must be secured from the Embassy in Laos."

Please send us all copies of the reports requested above plus an extra copy of each report for transmittal to WAS and lodgment in P/Files.

cc: P/Files  
 R/File

BRT/aw

APPROVED FOR  
 RELEASE DATE:  
 09-Dec-2013

MEMORANDUM

REC'D WAS DEC 23 1963

DATE: December 14, 1963

REF. No. PND-DP-63/3725


TO : Counsel-WAS via HEDR-WAS

FROM : DP-TPE via President-TPE

SUBJECT: Death Certificate for Messrs. Cheney and Herrick

Reference: WC-63-3898

We enclose five copies each of the revised presumptive "Report of Death of An American Citizen" for Cheney and Herrick per referenced memo.



Encls.

cc: P/Files  
R/File  
File

DRF/aw

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

C06117318

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

12/12/13

VP-L  
178 JUL 1978

ZCZC PFF053  
QK HKGZZFA

QK VTEXTFA-UTHXTFA BKKXTFA  
.TPEBDHO 170820

TO : VP-LD VTE ✓  
INFO : VP-NTD UTH AVP BKK VP-L OSG P/T TPE  
SUBJ : AIR AMERICA PERSONNEL MISSING IN LAOS

PREPARATION OF PROPOSED AD SHAPING UP BUT FIND WE ARE MISSING  
PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL:

- 1) JOSEPH C. CHENEY, II
- 2) CHARLES G. HERRICK
- 3) [REDACTED]
- 4) [REDACTED]
- 5) [REDACTED]

IF YOU OR ANY OF THE INFOEES HAVE PHOTOS OF THE AFOREMENTIONED  
PERSONNEL PLEASE FORWARD TO THIS OFFICE ASAP. PLEASE ADVISE.

DTD FOR DPRA TPE G73 17281ZZ

NNNN

NY 6 RS-ACR

**American Cable & Radio System**  
All America Via Commercial Jackay Radio

2885/HB1796/FH15

REG'D WAS SEP 5 1963

AN IRTI ASSOCIATE

TAIPEI 71/70 5 2153

CATAIR WASHINGTONDC

TP217 STATION MANAGER VTE ADVISES B150 REPORTED HEAVY GROUND FIRE 050832Z RIGHT ENGINE FEATHERED 0635 RESULT FIRE STOP RADIO CONTACT LOST STOP COMPUTED OR ASSUMED POSITION FIFTY MILES EAST SENO STOP TWO C123 CONDUCTED SEARCH WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS SO FAR WILL RESUME FIRST LIGHT JO6 STOP PIC JOSEPH C CHENEY SIC CHARLES G HERRICK ONE RADIO OPERATOR FOUR AFD ONBOARD STOP WILL ADVISE WHEN FURTHER DETAILS KNOWN

MADISONTRAYLOR

4 - 9/5/63

A C & R FACSIMILE RECEIVING BLANK

8 DUROPT CRIDE H.W. WASHINGTON, D. C. DUROPT 7-5100

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

NY 6 RS-ACR

**American Cable & Radio System**  
All America Via Commercial Jackay Radio

RVNN

REG'D WAS SEP 7 1963

AN IRTI ASSOCIATE

ZCZC AF1103/HB2887/FH157

1963 SEP 7 AM 3 33 g

TAIPEI 54/52 7 1234

CATAIR WASHINGTONDC

TP219 TP218 TP217 CHENEYS WIFE NOTIFIED AIRCRAFT OVERDUE AND PRESUMED MISSING SEARCH RESULTS NEGATIVE TO DATE X SUGGEST SIMILAR NOTIFICATION TO HERRICKS WIFE MRS CHARLES HERRICK

Wireless Radio Cables and Radio Cables

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

\* NOT CORRECT ADDRESS

4 - 9/7/63

THIS IS Mrs HERRICKS FATHER'S MOTHERS ADDRESS

A C & R FACSIMILE RECEIVING BLANK

NY 8 RS-ACR

**American Cable & Radio System**  
 Via All America Via Commercial Via Mackay Radio

TRIPLEI 50 8 428P

REC'D WAS SEP-9 1963

WASHINGTON, D. C. DUPOINT 7-5100

8 DUPOINT CIRCLE N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C.

SEP 8 AM 4 54 8

GWG

CATAIR WASHINGTONDC

TP221 TP220 UH34 AND GROUND PARTY AT WRECKAGE MORNING JOB

REPORT WRECKAGE LARGELY BURIED BY IMPACT POSITIVE AIRCRAFT

IDENTIFICATION NOT YET MADE NO APPARENT SURVIVORS BUT ONLY ONE

UNIDENTIFIED REMAINS SO FAR FOUND STOP SZVTE REPORTS USEMBL

JOB ORDERED RECOVERY EFFORTS CEASE UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE DETAILS

YET UNKNOWN

4 - 9/10/63

A C & R FACSIMILE RECEIVING BLANK

APPROVED FOR  
 RELEASE DATE:  
 09-Dec-2013

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

RCA COMMUNICATIONS  
A SERVICE OF RADIO CORPORATION OF AMERICA  
1812 M STREET, N.W.

YW21  
FB261 FU125  
TAIPEI 36 9 2145

RCA COMMUNICATIONS, INC.  
A SERVICE OF RADIO CORPORATION OF AMERICA  
1812 M STREET, N.W. TEL. FE. 8-7500




CATAIR WASHINGTONDC

REC'D WAS SEP 9 1963

SEP 9 1963  
AM 9

COMMUNICATIONS, INC.  
A SERVICE OF RADIO CORPORATION OF AMERICA  
1812 M STREET, N.W. TEL. FE. 8-7500

TP224 TP221 SZVTE LATEST REPORT WRECKAGE POSITIVELY  
IDENTIFIED B150 BUT ENTRY NOT YET EFFECTED  
TO DETERMINE WHETHER REMAINS INSIDE ACCURACY PRIOR  
REPORT ONE REMAINS NOW QUESTIONABLE DUE LOAD INCLUDED  
300 KILOS FRESH MEAT



4-9/10/63



# American Cable & Radio System

"Via America" "Via Commercial" "Via Majority Radio"

AN IT & T ASSOCIATE

REC'D WAS OCT 19 1963 <sup>GWTG</sup>

1963 OCT. 19 AM 8:25 <sup>04</sup>

2:55 PM

Radio  
Wireless  
Cables  
Radio  
Cables  
Radio  
Wireless  
Radio  
Cables  
Wireless  
Radio  
Cables

AM1328 0  
 HBA238/FH283  
 TAIPEI 83 19 2009  
 CATAIR WASHINGTONDC  
 TP249 TP224 SZVTE REPORTS AMEMB RECEIVED ADVICE FROM PL  
 SOURCE THAT CHENEY HERRICK DECEASED ALL OTHER CREW MEMBERS CAPTIVE  
 AND ALL RIGHT STOP WE ADVISING NOK RESIDENT FE OF REPORT BUT  
 THAT WE UNABLE CONFIRM ACCURACY AND AGAINST REACHING HASTY  
 CONCLUSIONS IN ABSENCE MORE SUBSTANTIAL INFORMATION ASSUME YOU  
 WILL WISH ADVISE NOK THERE SIMILARLY PRESS AWARE SOMETHING NEW  
 AND SZVTE ANTICIPATES PRESSURE FOR STATEMENT WHICH ALREADY CLEARED  
 WITH AMEMB HOWEVER WE RELUCTANT MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT UNTIL MORE  
 POSITIVE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE



COL TP249 TP

A C & R FACSIMILE RECEIVING BLANK

DEPT. OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301  
8 HONORABLE DECEASED NOK  
DEPT. OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301  
3 HONORABLE DECEASED NOK

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013



APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

□  
(b)(6)

*Herrick*  
MGDR

15 October 1963

AMGDR

B-150 Accident

[redacted] of Department of State, Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, called at approximately 3:30 P.M. today to advise that he has heard through State Department channels and through both AP and UP the following information:

The ICC went up into Laos on October 14 and at the request of the Soviet and Polish Ambassadors the Communist Pathet Lao Ministers addressed a letter to the ICC advising that the families of the Air America crew members could write to the crew members if they wished and that the Communists would deliver this mail. The Pathet Lao Ministers did or could not say how many survived or what their names are.

Simultaneously, another Communist Minister called in Ambassador Unger and stated that the Pathet Lao would permit the families to write to the prisoners, that they were being treated humanely, but that he could not say how many had survived, or who they were.

[redacted] was concerned that the press might publish a garbled version of this which would raise the hopes of the families unnecessarily, and he suggested that we call them first to caution them against premature hopes.

Should any of the families wish to write on the chance that their relative has survived, the accident, he suggested that letters be addressed as follows:

[redacted]  
Office of Southeast Asian Affairs  
Department of State  
Washington 25, D. C.

This information was read to you in essence and with your concurrence the information was then passed by telephone to Mrs. Herrick, [redacted] and [redacted]. Copies of the information thus transmitted are included in the files of Mr. Cheney, Mr. Herrick and [redacted]

dm  
[redacted]

C06117328

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

**AERONAUTICAL MESSAGE DRAFT**

(b)(6)  
**OPERATIONS**  
COMMUNICATIONS  
DEPARTMENT

**PRIORITY:**

DD

FF

GG

JJ

KK

LL

**ADDRESS :** PO BALOB

**TEXT :** VP001 300640

B66 PSE ADV DATE OF ARRIVAL LOS OF THE FOLLOWING NEW  
EMPLOYEES [ ] F/O ON DRIVER [ ] [ ]

CC: AMG DFD via VPFO CSD  
DTD via VPT&S.  
PNC File  
P/FILE (4)

**ORIGINATOR :**

**DTG :**

CKT No.

TOT

OPR. SIG.

OPS. 407 R2


AERONAUTICAL  
MESSAGE DRAFT

PRIORITY: DD  FF  GG  JJ  KK  LL   
C O P Y

ADDRESS : AH 074  
FP PR COL CY RM LO8  
TEXT : H66 YT 110610 MSG SENT TO OC OP COL QUOTE CN DRIVER  
ARR LO8 FL4 FOR DUTY UNQUOTE BY OC/LO8 F150221  
FL LO8 111035



*For your info & action*



AUG 12 1966

ORIGINATOR : TOR 1400/MW

DTG :

CKT No. OPS. 407 R3	1174	TOT	OPR. SIG. FP PR
------------------------	------	-----	--------------------

AERONAUTICAL  
MESSAGE DRAFT

OPERATIONS  
COMMUNICATIONS  
DEPARTMENT

PRIORITY: DD  FF  GG  JJ  KK  LL

ADDRESS : FO HALOB CY RPT09  
PFCOL 080800  
TEXT : F66 REMY E300640 X PSE ADVZ DATE OF ARRIVING   
 CN DRIVER X

CC: AMG DFD via VPFO CSD  
PND File  
VP/File

ORIGINATOR :

DTG :

CKT No. OPS. 407 R2		TOT	OPR. SIG.
------------------------	--	-----	-----------

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

815 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006

Telephone 298-7840

January 4, 1966

REC'D WAS JAN 13 1966

320th B. W. - Wg. C. O. SAC  
Mayther Air Force Base, California

Dear [redacted]:

We are considering... Clarence N. Driver ..... for a position with our Company.

We will appreciate very much your filling in the information requested below and returning this form to us at your earliest convenience. All information will be handled in a very confidential manner.

~~Very truly yours,~~

[redacted signature box]

FOR H. H. Dawson  
Assistant for Personnel

How long have you known the applicant? ..... 2 YEARS .....  
Have you had business contact with the applicant? .....  
How would you rate his:

Check One

	Excellent	Good	Average	Below Average	Poor
1. Ability ( )		X			
2. Resourcefulness		X			
3. Production		X			
4. Conduct		X			
5. Relations with other people		X			

Remarks: .....  
I was commander of Wing to which Major Driver was assigned. He is an accomplished and skilled pilot who was well thought of by his fellow associates.  
.....

[redacted signature box]

Signature

[redacted name box]

COL Name WSAF  
COMDR 320 B.W.  
Title

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

815 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006  
Telephone 298-7840

January 4, 1966  
REC'D WAS JAN 10 1966

[Redacted]

Dear [Redacted]

We are considering..... Clarence N. Driver..... for a position with our Company.

We will appreciate very much your filling in the information requested below and returning this form to us at your earliest convenience. All information will be handled in a very confidential manner.

Very truly yours,

[Redacted Signature]

FOR [Redacted] Assistant for Personnel

How long have you known the applicant? ...23 years.....  
Have you had business contact with the applicant? .yes.....  
How would you rate his:

Check One

- 1. Ability ( )
- 2. Resourcefulness
- 3. Production
- 4. Conduct
- 5. Relations with other people

Excellent	Good	Average	Below Average	Poor
X				
X				
X				
X				
X				

Remarks: In my opinion, Clarence N. Driver is an exceptional man,.....  
successful in everything that he undertakes, a dedicated man.....  
who would be an asset to any organization:.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

[Redacted Signature]

Signature

[Redacted Name]

Name

Chief Appraiser, Bdwy. Fed. Savings  
Title

*mm*

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

815 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006  
Telephone 298-7840

(b)(6)

January 4, 1966

REC'D WAS JAN 21 1966

[Redacted]

We are considering..... Clarence N. Driver..... for a position with our Company.

We will appreciate very much your filling in the information requested below and returning this form to us at your earliest convenience. All information will be handled in a very confidential manner.

Very truly yours,

[Redacted Signature]

FOR [Redacted] Assistant for Personnel

How long have you known the applicant? ... 15 years .....  
Have you had business contact with the applicant? ... No .....  
How would you rate his:

Check One

	Excellent	Good	Average	Below Average	Poor
1. Ability ( )	✓				
2. Resourcefulness		✓			
3. Production	✓				
4. Conduct	✓				
5. Relations with other people	✓				

Remarks: Mr. Driver & I were assigned to same SAC Wing as pivot. He is a very competent pivot. I have known him as a friend since his USAF retirement.

[Redacted Signature]

Signature

[Redacted Name]

Name

Project Coordinator  
Title

815 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006

Telephone 298-7840

January 4, 1966

(b)(6)



Dear [Redacted]:

We are considering... Clarence N. Driver ..... for a position with our Company.

We will appreciate very much your filling in the information requested below and returning this form to us at your earliest convenience. All information will be handled in a very confidential manner.

Very truly yours,



FOR [Redacted] Assistant for Personnel

How long have you known the applicant? .....
Have you had business contact with the applicant? .....
How would you rate his:

Check One

- 1. Ability ( )
2. Resourcefulness
3. Production
4. Conduct
5. Relations with other people

Table with 5 columns: Excellent, Good, Average, Below Average, Poor. Rows correspond to the 5 criteria in the list.

Remarks: .....
.....
.....
.....
.....

Signature

Name

Title

APPROVED FOR
RELEASE DATE:
09-Dec-2013

*[Handwritten signature]*

(b)(6)

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

815 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006

Telephone 298-7840

January 4, 1966

REC'D WAS FEB 5 1966

Dear

We are considering... Clarence N. Driver ..... for a position with our Company.

We will appreciate very much your filling in the information requested below and returning this form to us at your earliest convenience. All information will be handled in a very confidential manner.

Very truly yours,

FOR Assistant for Personnel

How long have you known the applicant? ..... 26 years .....  
Have you had business contact with the applicant? ..... yes .....  
How would you rate his:

Check One

	Excellent	Good	Average	Below Average	Poor
1. Ability ( )	✓				
2. Resourcefulness	✓				
3. Production	✓				
4. Conduct	✓				
5. Relations with other people	✓				

Remarks: This individual is a mature, competent pilot with extensive experience as an Airline Transport Pilot. He has lots of jet time including extensive overwater flying.

Signature

Name

Pilot, Air America.....  
Title



APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

*International  
Telegram Via*

*Facsimile  
Sending Blank*

Sender  
To be billed CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT XBU

Date  
5/4/66

To  
[ ] TOKYO

*Via*  
Insert "ITT"

ARRIVING TOKYO [ ] NW THREE MAY SIXTH [ ]  
NW SEVEN MAY NINTH [ ] NW SEVEN [ ] PA845  
MAY ELEVENTH CN DRIVER PA845 MAY SIXTEENTH [ ]  
DEPENDENTS PA845 MAY TWENTYTHIRD NUSUB E026A [ ]  
DELAYED E046E

Type or write within the border

All messages are accepted subject to rates, rules and regulations in the applicable tariffs on file with the Federal Communications Commission  
Full rate unless LT specified

ITT World Communications Inc. subsidiary of International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation

NY-6FD

*International  
Telegram Via*

*Facsimile  
Sending Blank*

Sender  
To be billed CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT XBU

Date  
5/4/66

To  
[ ] TAIPEI

*Via*  
Insert "ITT"

ARRIVING TAIPEI [ ] MAY SEVENTH [ ]  
MAY TENTH [ ] MAY TWELFTH CN DRIVER  
MAY SEVENTEENTH ADVISE [ ] DEPENDENTS ARRIVING  
BANGKOK CT THREE MAY TWENTYFOURTH [ ] NUSUB ENTRY  
VISA REQUESTED [ ] Z185691 NUSUB E026B [ ]  
DELAYED NUSUB FORMER EMPLOYEE AFS [ ] DESIRES  
REEMPLOYMENT AND WILL PROVIDE OWN TRANSPORTATION TAIPEI  
ADVISE IF INTERESTED E046F

Type or write within the border

All messages are accepted subject to rates, rules and regulations in the applicable tariffs on file with the Federal Communications Commission  
Full rate unless LT specified

ITT World Communications Inc. subsidiary of International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

March 18, 1966

REC'D WAS MAR 21 1966

AIR ASIA COMPANY LIMITED  
815 Connecticut Ave. N. W.  
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear

Enclosed is my "signed" passport. I have also received my "Restricted" Radiotelephone Operator Permit". Unpo the completion of my shots on 21 March, 1966 I will have fulfilled all necessary requirements prior to my departure date as requested by your wonderful organization.

Now for the sticky or <sup>un</sup>desirable part of my letter, and I can only hope and pray for your understanding, indulgence and sense of fair play, as I have really burned my bridges behind me with this company. During our conversation and in a previous letter I informed ~~you~~ you I was under contract until 25th of April, 1966. The company is bitter about my resignation and still refuses to pay me a decent salary or expenses. Therefore if I'm not retained by your company I'm quitting this one. They have even had the attorney to inform me that I will be legally prosecuted, percuted and a restraining order obtained to stop me from leaving the country until I fulfill the obligation of this contract.

In view of the above I'm requesting a thirty (30) day extension of the orginal reproting date of the 9th of April, 1966. I am sure that you and your company willl agree that this is the best and the easiest way to handle a distastful situation to the mutual satisfaction of all concerned.

Enclosed is a copy of our schedule which will give you some idea why they take this negative attitude and Im requesting the 30 day extansion. We have obtained a replavement pilot effective 1st of April, 1966 who will be in training under my supervision for the first three (3) weeks of April. Anxiously hoping you will grant my request I remain.

Very sincerely yours,  
RAY CHARLES ENTERPRISES  
*Clarence D. Driver*  
Clarence Driver  
CHIEF PILOT

*please excuse my  
typing smilg  
c.s.d.*

Telefax

# WESTERN UNION

SENDING BLANK

Telefax



APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

CALL LETTERS	QFJ	3/21/66	CHARGE TO	CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT
NIGHT LETTER <span style="float: right;">(b)(6)</span>				
MR. CLARENCE DRIVER				
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA				
30 DAY EXTENSION GRANTED PROVIDED WE HAVE OPENING FOR YOU ON 9 MAY 1966.				
AIR ASIA COMPANY LIMITED				

Send the above message, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

PLEASE TYPE OR WRITE PLAINLY WITHIN BORDER—DO NOT FOLD  
1269—(R 4-55)

Telefax

# WESTERN UNION

Telefax



LA025 (2) PBO10 18087  
 LA1756 WRL PD LOS ANGELES CALIF 28H  
 AIRASIA CO LTD 215 CONN AVE NORTHWEST WASHDC  
 I HAVE COMPLETED ALL PRE REQUISITES ETC FOR THE JOB PLEASE WIRE  
 ME BY EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE IF I CANNOT FOLLOW THROUGH WITH  
 ANY PLANS WITHOUT IT VERY TRULY YOURS  
 CLARENCE DRIVER.

REC'D WAS APR 29 1966  
51

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

## MEMORANDUM

TO : EM VTE  
FROM : MAS VTE  
SUBJECT : Missing Employees

DATE : 25 February 1974

REF. No. MAS-VTE-74-019

- REF. : 1. VPIR-RPA-74-003 (E. J. Weissenback)  
2. VPIR-RPA-74-004 (C. N. Driver) ✓  
3. VPIR-RPA-74-005 (G. L. Kitter)  
4. VPIR-RPA-74-006 (R. F. Townley)  
5. VPIR-RPA-74-007 (H. H. Boyles)  
6. VPIR-RPA-74-008 (J. W. Cavill)  
7. VPIR-RPA-74-009 (J. H. Ackley)

The referenced RPA's were originated by VPIR to record the change of status of these employees from Company-paid benefits to benefits paid by the U.S. Department of Labor.

It is noted that administrative control of one of these missing employees, E. J. Weissenback, was transferred from Vientiane to Taipei on 28 December 1971. This was authorized by RPA reference number FND-WA-AM-72-183. In view of the uncertain status of the Company in Vientiane, and the possibility that the fate of the remaining missing employees may not be resolved for a long period of time, it would appear that action should be taken now to transfer them to the Administrative Control of VPIR or the Washington Office. To delay such a transfer until the closing of Vientiane Base does not appear to serve any useful purpose and will only add to the workload and confusion at that time.

If you concur, perhaps a cablegram could be sent to CEO requesting guidance in this matter.

Original Signed by

AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE

REPORT OF THE DEATH OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN

Presumptive

22 October 1963, Vientiane, Laos  
(Place and date)

Name in full Joseph G. CHENEY III Occupation Pilot

Native or naturalized Native Last known address  
in the United States Wayne, Michigan

Date of death September 5 1963 Age 43  
(Month) (Day) (Hour) (Minute) (Year) (As nearly as can be ascertained)

Place of death XD 0239 Laos  
(Number and street) or (Hospital or hotel) (City) (Country)

Cause of death Official communique of Pathet Lao's spokesman  
(Include authority for statement)

Disposition of the remains At site

Local law as to disinterring remains Not applicable

Disposition of the effects Shipped to next of kin by Air America, Inc.

Person or official responsible for custody of effects and accounting therefor Air America, Inc.

Informed by telegram:

NAME	ADDRESS	RELATIONSHIP	DATE SENT
<u>Mrs. Bertha Cheney</u>	<u>[Redacted]</u>	<u>Wife</u>	<u>Delivered in person</u>

Copy of this report sent to:

NAME	ADDRESS	RELATIONSHIP	DATE SENT

Traveling or residing abroad with relatives or friends as follows:

NAME	ADDRESS	RELATIONSHIP
<u>[Redacted]</u>	<u>[Redacted]</u>	<u>Daughters</u>

Other known relatives (not given above):

NAME	ADDRESS	RELATIONSHIP

This information and data concerning an inventory of the effects, accounts, etc., have been placed under File 234 in the correspondence of this office.

Remarks: Request passport No. [Redacted] be canceled as of 5 September 1963—  
assumed to be with body.

(Continue on reverse if necessary.)

[Redacted]

(Signature on all copies)

[Redacted] of the United States of America.  
American Vice Consul

[SEAL]

No fee prescribed.

DP

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

*CFC*

INTER-OFFICE ROUTING *Bangkok Post*

REF. NO. OR IDENTIFICATION  
OF THE ATTACHED:

JANUARY 7, 1972

TO

*PRE-5A*  
VDFCA  
VDFU  
OFFICE OF  
PRESIDENT  
710 JAN 1972  
*1500*

# Air America calls off search

VIENTIANE, Thurs.— Air America yesterday called off search of three Americans missing since their plane disappeared over northwestern Laos last week.

The Americans were identified as George Ritter, Roy Townley and Edward Weissenback. All three had their families in Vientiane.

They are officially listed as missing since a week-long search turned up no clue of their fate.

They were flying a C123 transport plane on a supply mission to pro-government guerrillas operating near the Thai border and failed to arrive at their destination.

Initial reports suggested their plane might have been shot down by Chinese Communist anti-aircraft fire. The Chinese are building a road across northern Laos through Pathet Lao-controlled territory.

The road is off-limits to American and Laotian aircraft because of heavy anti-aircraft defence.

Air America sources yesterday said they considered it unlikely the missing plane has flown close enough to the road to be shot down. —AP

REMARKS:

*From the Post - 7 Jan*

*Keep for P file (4)  
missing baggage file (1)  
Weissenback*

(Turn over for additional space)

DATE

*7 Jan 72*

FROM

[Redacted]

CS-3

RECEIVED

10 JAN 1972

PERSONNEL DIVISION  
TAIPEI

*Express*

## THE WASHINGTON POST

Wednesday, Dec. 29, 1971

R

**CIA Airliner Is Lost  
Over Northern Laos**


An Air America C-123 transport plane was missing over north Laos yesterday, according to the airline's office here.

Reports from Vientiane, capital of Laos, speculated that the plane had been shot down by Chinese anti-aircraft known to be deployed in parts of northern Laos.

Air America is an airline run by the Central Intelligence Agency. Its transports ferry material and men around Vietnam and Laos.

The reports from Laos by the French news agency, Agence France-Presse, said that there were four Americans, a Chinese and a Meo aboard and that the plane was 24 hours overdue at its destination.

The Chinese Communists have been building roads in northern Laos for several years and have deployed several battalions of antiaircraft to protect their roadworkers. A recent official U.S. estimate was that there were 14,000 Chinese in the area.



*Weissenback* (b)(6)

INTER-OFFICE ROUTING SLIP

REFERENCE NUMBER OR IDENTIFICATION OF THE ATTACHED VP, Laos-72-IORS-094

TO  
MGDR via PRESIDENT  
  
  
  
Subj: Missing Crewmembers

- ACTION
- For your information
  - Initial and pass on
  - For your comments
  - Please handle
  - Take up with me
  - For your approval
  - For your decision
  - Investigate and report
  - Bring up to date
  - Draft reply
  - For your file
  - Note and destroy
  - Please return to

REMARKS

Attached are two copies of the Lao newspaper carrying the company's reward offer for information concerning the missing crewmembers. This advertisement will run for the full month of July. We are also offering the same reward via the Lao radio.

*4- 7/27/72*

*mcopied for VPL July 21/Jan DP*

*File C-123 293*

From		Date	17 July 1972
	A/VP		

FORM 5270210 (SEP 68)

(TURN OVER FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE)

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013



JAWSON  
FILE

SAIGON NEWSPAPER

W. M. J. [Signature]  
Don GAR [Signature]

CHINH LUAN, newspaper dated 31 December 1971

REC'D WAC JAN 10 1972

-One more airplane of GIA in Laos was shot down by  (b)(6)  
Chicom anti-aircraft gun

Vientiane: 29 December 1971. AFP- An available source of news in Vientiane said many American airplanes have searched for the wreckage of the Air America, Inc C-123 missing since last Monday (27 Dec). It is suspected that the airplane was shot down by Chicom anti aircraft fire along the Lao China frontier in the North of Laos.

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

Until present, there was negative success in the search. Three Americans, one Chinese, one Lao and one Meo (montagnam) were reported aboard. Reliable information said this airplane was shot down by air defense of red china road construction project.

This is the second airplane missing. The first one was missing during a month in the region that US Investigation Senate Committee had described last year. It is the most well defended air defense region in the world.

On 22 Dec., Lao Airlines disclosed that a cargo plane carried material for Honisay village was missing without reason in the North of Laos. The air crew were two Chinese.

It would not be surprising if the two airplanes were shot down by anti-aircraft fire of Red China along the road under construction in North Laos as all pilots in that region had known "Communist China fires all airplanes in the sky" since the time they shot down two T-28 airplanes of Lao Air Force at the beginning of 1970.

The investigation report of US Senate Committee in April 1971 recorded that of 20 China soldiers along the road under construction from 3 to 7 soldiers served on anti-aircraft guns and air defense is guarded by 100 to 395 guns. Some guided by radar and able to shoot down the airplanes at 68,000 feet altitude.

At present, they have completed 100 km (963 miles) linking the Laos China frontier to Muong Houn lying 60 km from Laos-Thai frontier. Last September, Communist China attempted to continue the road to Muong Houn, Pak Beng on the Mekong riverside 30 Km through Thai territory.

Washington has forbidden all military and civil airplanes to fly over the Red China Road Working region. It is sure that the two missing airplanes were the victims of the prolonging road toward the West.

Translated by:   
Guard Supervisor/Investigator

cc: BM/SGN  
PM/SGN  
DSY/TPE ✓  
File.

RE: [ ]  
4 JAN 1972  
[ ]

I have copy

TP1921 27 DECEMBER 1971  
 SUBJ THIRD TWIN OTTER, OVERDUE C123K  
 REF TP1916, 24 DECEMBER 1971

*Wessanbach*

1. WE WERE ADVISED BY ACTING BASE MANAGER, [REDACTED], VIENTIANE THE AFTERNOON OF 26 DECEMBER THAT [REDACTED] HAD APPROACHED HIM SHORTLY BEFORE THAT TIME SUGGESTING THAT AAM CAREFULLY CONSIDER WHETHER THEY SHOULD COMMIT FOR A THIRD TWIN OTTER IN THE FACE OF THE UNEXPECTED RECENT AND CONTINUING LOSS OF TERRITORY WHICH CASB RECKONED WOULD REDUCE REQUIREMENTS FOR AIRLIFT, POSSIBLY EVEN TO THE EXTENT OF RENDERING SOME OF THE EXISTING FLEET OF TWIN OTTERS (OURS AND CASIS) IN LAOS SURPLUS. CASB ALSO SUGGESTED THAT N774M MIGHT BE UTILIZED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS ORIGINALLY PROJECTED FOR OUR THIRD TWIN OTTER. [REDACTED] HAD NOT, AT THE TIME HE PHONED, BEEN IN TOUCH WITH 342 CONTRACTING OFFICER [REDACTED] OR 713. TO ASSURE COORDINATION OF ALL PARTIES CONCERNED [REDACTED] WAS ASKED TO CONTACT [REDACTED] AND 713 AND FURTHER ADVISE US. SUBSEQUENTLY WE RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE:

"TO : PRESIDENT TPE  
 INFO : VP/CA VP-L TPE BM VTE  
 SUBJ : TWIN OTTER  
 INFO : OUR TELECOM

M71 [REDACTED] IS FULLY AWARE AND THEY SAY NO PROBLEM IF THE COMPANY ELECTS. DCASB SAYS HE INITIATED DISCUSSION OF NEAR FUTURE REQUIREMENTS. HE DOES NOT FEEL THAT AN ACCURATE ESTIMATE OF AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS CAN BE MADE BEFORE A10. IT IS STRICTLY A GUESS ON HIS PART BUT HE SAYS IT LOOKS LIKE A LARGE REDUCTION IN FLYING TIME.

A/BM VTE 270705 "

(PART ONE OF TWO OF TP1921)

APPROVED FOR  
 RELEASE DATE  
 09-Dec-2013

*4 Copies*

NEITHER THE TELECON NOR THE MESSAGE SUFFICIENTLY CLARIFY THE  
MATTER AND [REDACTED] WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE TO CLEAR IT UP BEFORE 27  
DECEMBER AS HE WENT UPCOUNTRY IN THE LATE AFTERNOON TO PARTICI-  
PATE IN THE SEARCH FOR C123K 57-6293 OVERDUE SINCE ABOUT 11:20  
THIS MORNING ON A FLIGHT T08 L69 T08, APPARENTLY ON THE T08 L69  
LEG (PIC G. L. RITTER, SIC R. F. TOWNLEY, AFS E. J. WEISSENBACK,  
[REDACTED], ALL IMMEDIATE FAMILIES REPORTEDLY  
ARE IN VIENTIANE).

2. WE SEND THIS INCONCLUSIVE MESSAGE AT THIS POINT WITH THE THOUGHT  
THAT WE SHOULD ADVISE YOU AS PROMPTLY AS WE CAN OF A POSSIBLE  
QUESTION OF ACQUIRING N389X SO IF YOU HAVENT ALREADY COMMITTED  
FOR IT PERHAPS YOU SHOULD DEFER NEGOTIATIONS FOR A DAY OR SO  
TO ALLOW US TIME TO CLARIFY THE SITUATION AT THIS END TO THE  
EXTENT POSSIBLE.

PRES TPE

(PART TWO OF TWO OF TP1921)

Copy: President file

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*m/c CEC*

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

NNNNZCZC JJ106 GGO FFO88 EE030 DD017 CC039 I 36 HH030 KK021 PP015  
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.VTERKFA 230545  
XOXO TO : TPE TNN SGN UTH BKK  
AAA TEN FOUR  
BBB PC6 N197X C123K 54613  
CCC LS20A TG8214  
DDD 0140Z 24 DECEMBER 1971  
EEE

*Handwritten signatures and initials, including 'CRAK'.*

[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
AFS WEISSENBACK, [Redacted]

FFF NIL

GGG BOTH AIRCRAFT TOTALLY DESTROYED

HHH AFTER THE PIC OF N197X HAD BEEN BRIEFED BY THE CUSTOMER, HE TAXIED OUT BETWEEN TWO PARKED C123'S. AS HE SWUNG SLIGHTLY TO THE RIGHT FOR BETTER VISION, THE PROPELLER STRUCK A SEAL DRUM OF JP-1 FUEL WHICH HAD BEEN OFF LOADED A C123K. THE BURST DRUM IGNITED ALMOST INSTANTANEOUSLY AND THE PIC EVACUATED THE PC6 IMMEDIATELY THRU THE CARGO DOOR. THE BURNING AIRCRAFT, DUE TO THE SLOPE OF THE RAMP, ROLLED TAIL FIRST INTO THE RIGHT REAR SIDE OF 54613 WHICH WAS ABOUT TO BE OFF LOADED. THE BURNING PC6 PLUS THE BURNING JP-1 FLOWING DOWN SLOPE UNDER THE C123K CAUSED THE LATTER TO START BURNING. THE PIC AND THE F/O IN THE COCKPIT AND THE AFD IN THE CABIN OF 54613 EVACUATED VIA THE REAR DOOR. THE AFS WAS ON THE RAMP, CLEAR OF THE SCENE. THE PIC OF C123K SUSTAINED SLIGHT SCRATCHES ON HIS HAND AND KNEES WHEN HE FELL TO THE GROUND AFTER AVACUATING THE AIRCRAFT.

III SIX THOUSAND FEET SCATTERED CLOUDS, VISIBILITY 10 MILES, WIND CALM.

JJJ THIRD PARTY DAMAGE LIMITED TO RAMP SURFACE BENEATH AIRCRAFT HULKS. CONTRACT 713 FOR BOTH AIRCRAFT.

KKK [Redacted]

LLL END SERIES.

A/BM CP MTS A/SOM VTE 240534

240622

RECEIVED  
24 DEC 1971  
PERSONNEL DIVISION  
TAIPEI

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

## MEMORANDUM

(b)(6)

TO : VP-L WAS

DATE : 16 May 1974

FROM : VP-NTD

REF. No. VPNTD-M74-078

SUBJECT : Letter to Mrs. Townley

Ref: (1) VP-NTD D74 221445  
(2) VP-L WAS E74 081925

Per paragraph 7 of Ref. (2) we contacted [redacted] at the JCRC (NKP) and he has forwarded a copy of the report (2-237-0095-72) requested by Mrs. Townley. On first contact we were told that the report could be given to Mrs. Townley and Mrs. Ritter but when a copy of the report arrived here [redacted] informed us that controls had been tightened and that we now could not release the report to the survivors.

Therefore, I will write a letter to Mrs. Townley quoting from your suggested wording in Ref. (2). I will answer her question on the JCRC report with a statement advising here that we are not able to release JCRC reports.

Original Signed By:

[redacted]

Atch.  
Report

cc: VP-OCA WAS  
VPIR-OSG BKK  
2.08  
File

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION**

The report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

(Classification and Control Markings)

1. COUNTRY: LAOS/NORTH VIETNAM

2. SUBJECT: (U) Prisoner of War Report - Crash of an American Aircraft and Reported Detention Facility for U.S. PWs

3. DATE OF INFORMATION: June-July 1972

4. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Vientiane, LAOS 4-14 August 1972

6. EVALUATION SOURCE: E/E/E INFORMATION 6

7. SOURCE: Casual source from [redacted] from [redacted]

8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 237 0095 72 (5310-03-E)

9. DATE OF REPORT: 17 August 1972

10. NO. OF PAGES: 3

11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 1016, 6G; SICR D-7CX-4901E AFS Series L7015, Edition 1

12. ORIGINATOR: COMUSMACV VIENTIANE, LAOS

13. PREPARED BY: [redacted] Assistant Army Attache

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: [redacted] COL, GS U. S. Army Attache

REC'D DISTRICT 11 SEP 1972

15. SUMMARY: (CNF) This IR transmits information obtained during the alleged debriefing of Pathet Lao (PL) or Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) defector [redacted] by [redacted]. This report provides questionable information concerning the downing of an American aircraft in December 1971, the capture of its crew members, and their subsequent imprisonment. This report includes the location and the description of the detention facilities containing the crew members, four additional Americans, and several high ranking Thai and Lao officers. The caveat NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION is required because release of information would be detrimental to sources and the preparer of this report.

*Better Townley Weissbach* } Civilian 269

1. (CNF) Circumstances of Alleged Defection. On 4 August 1972, a casual source stated that [redacted], a resident of Vientiane, LAOS, was a personal friend of [redacted], a member of the Pathet Lao (PL) or Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS). [redacted] wanted to defect to the Royal Lao Government (RLG), but was afraid of being killed or severely punished. According to the casual source, [redacted] wanted to defect to the Americans to insure his personal safety. This same PL or NLHS member had information pertaining to the downing of an aircraft with a tail number of 293 and the subsequent capture of three Americans and one Lao. [redacted] was allegedly the prison camp commander of the detention facility containing these three Americans, four additional Americans and several high ranking Thai and Lao officers. [redacted] reportedly had personally seen the seven Americans as of 60 days ago and had information which indicated that the Americans were still in the camp as of 15 July 1972. On 13 August

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COMUSMACVTHAI  
DEPCJUSMACVTHAI  
SOUTH MI GROUP  
HQ, 7/13 AF (UDORH)  
CM, SPEC ACTIVITIES, BANGKOK

17. CLASSIFICATION DATA

Classified by  
U.S. Army Attache Laos  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE  
OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY: 2

DECLASSIFY ON:  
31 Dec 82

18. ATTACHMENT DATA

None

date received 25 Sep 72 Dist 6 Oct 72

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 11

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REPLACES THE FORMS... WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 68

CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 21 005 72  
PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES  
ORIGINATOR OUSAL  
Vientiane, LAOS

1972, [ ] was contacted by the preparer of this report. [ ] allegedly debriefed [ ] and obtained the following information.

(Leave Blank)

2. (C) Reported Sighting of Downed American Aircraft

a. [ ] allegedly observed the crash of an aircraft in December 1971. It appeared as if the aircraft was attempting to make a landing at Muong Sai airfield (RC 123393); however, it landed in the middle of a stream within a two kilometer radius of RC 1189. Just before the crash, the aircraft sounded as if it had run out of gas. The aircraft finally came to a stop in the middle of a stream, the tail section sticking out of the water. The number on the tail was 293. Three Americans and one Lao were captured and at a later unknown date were taken to a detention facility in the vicinity of UG 425730.

3. (C) Reported Condition of Crew Members

a. The pilot of the aircraft suffered a broken left arm. Otherwise, he was in excellent condition.

b. The co-pilot suffered an unknown type injury to the knee. Otherwise, he was in excellent condition.

c. The American kicker suffered an injury over the left eye. Otherwise, he was in excellent condition.

d. The Lao kicker, named KHAMPHANH, lost one tooth. Otherwise, he was in excellent condition.

e. One American reportedly had a small caliber pistol in his hip pocket or strapped to the upper part of his leg. After he arrived at the detention facility, he reportedly gave the pistol to one of the guards. The guard sold it and bought food for the American.

4. (C) Activities After Capture

a. [ ] reportedly stated to [ ] that the three US and one Lao PWs were taken to the detention facility at UG 425730 on an unknown date. [ ] reportedly escorted the prisoners to that location. [ ] reportedly was the camp commander at the detention facility and saw the Americans on a daily basis for several months.

b. [ ] initially reported through the casual source that according to [ ] the Americans were still at the detention facility as of July 1972; however, [ ] reported on 13 August 1972 that [ ] had stated that the Americans were taken out of the detention facility in June 1972 and transferred to Tuyen Quang (NCA), NORTH VIETNAM. (No further information.)

5. (C) Description of Detention Facility

a. The detention facility was reportedly located inside a cave which had a five to six meter-high waterfall running over the entrance of the cave. Two cells were inside the cave. One cell was for U. S. PWs and the other was for the high ranking Thai and Lao personnel. Outside of the cave were areas for growing vegetables including an area for growing pumpkins. Approximately 90 enemy personnel reportedly consisting of PL were within one kilometer of the camp. (No further information.)

6. (C) Daily Activities of the American PWs. The Americans reportedly bathed in a nearby stream once a week, cut fire wood in the vicinity of UG 423740, and were also utilized to grow vegetables. (No further information.)

COMMENTS: (C/NF)

a. The casual source who initially provided the information concerning the

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CONTINUATION SHEET	<p align="center"><b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>  <b>NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION</b></p> <p align="center"><small>(Classification and Control Markings)</small></p>	<p>REPORT NO. 2 237 0095 72  PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES  ORIGINATOR DUSARUM  Vientiane, LAOS</p>
<p>availability of an enemy defector has been providing information to this office on a daily basis for several years. Information previously provided has been from unknown sources and of questionable validity. The casual source has in the past tended to maximize, minimize, or manufacture information to meet the requirement of the particular question that was asked him. In addition, he is particularly inept at asking the proper questions when debriefing any one of his "many" sources.</p> <p>b. Local liaison was conducted and it was determined that in fact S.C-123 aircraft with tail number 293 was lost in December 1971, that three Americans and one Lao were on the aircraft, and that the aircraft mysteriously disappeared during a routine mission.</p> <p>c. After proper coordination with appropriate in-country agencies had been effected, the casual source was again contacted and told to arrange a meeting with the PL. The casual source was immediately told that if the PL was who he said he was and had the information which the casual source had indicated, appropriate rewards for all concerned would be made. He was additionally told that means existed to determine the veracity of the information. Repeated attempts, according to the casual source, were made to contact [ ] and [ ]. Contact was finally effected with [ ] on 13 August 1972. At that time, [ ] stated that [ ] had made arrangements to defect to the RLG in Pakse and that SK was defecting his entire organization to include 47 men and one woman. The actual defection would take place on 14 August 1972. Therefore, it would not be necessary for [ ] to meet the preparer of this report. When [ ] was reminded of the rewards which could be made if the information was accurate, he then stated that [ ] would attempt to return to Vientiane and provide the detailed information pertaining to the Americans and the aircraft downing after the details of his defection were arranged.</p> <p>d. It has been apparent to this office from the initial reporting of the information that the entire report strongly hinted of a fabrication or at least was being partially manufactured. However, because pieces of information matched favorably with known aircraft downing data, it was determined necessary to attempt to effect contact with the alleged defector.</p> <p>e. Air America has publicly announced available rewards for information concerning the downing of the aircraft and the disposition of the crew members. The casual source made mention of this reward during his first report of the availability of a knowledgeable source. He later indicated that [ ] was aware of the reward and that [ ] had told [ ] of the reward. The tail number of the aircraft was not made public; however, during the SAR effort, Air America representatives participating in the effort stated that the number 293 was used over the airways and could have been picked up by anyone listening in on that particular frequency. [ ] is the name of the missing Lao crew member. The fact that [ ] was able to provide the name of the Lao kicker is not that significant in that his name could easily be obtained locally.</p> <p>f. Information contained in this report has been passed to Irregular Assets for further exploitation if and when [ ] surfaces in Pakse, LAOS. If [ ] in fact exists, it is doubtful that he had access to the type of information given in this report. It is probable that most information contained in this report has been fabricated in an attempt to obtain monetary rewards.</p> <p>g. On 20 August 1972, after final preparation of this report, the casual source reported that [ ] had defected in Pakse, LAOS, together with 53 personnel. On 21 August 1972, the casual source reported that [ ] would be made available on 21 August for detailed debriefings.</p> <p>h. As of 21 August 1972, according to Irregular Assets, no information has been received which indicates that a defection of this many personnel has taken place. No report has been received which would indicate that [ ] has defected.</p> <p>i. Further attempts will be made to contact [ ] for detailed debriefing concerning information contained in this report. Information obtained will be forwarded in a subsequent IR.</p>		
<p align="center"><b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>  <small>NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION</small></p>		<p align="center">APPROVED FOR  RELEASE DATE:  09-Dec-2013</p>



leave to pick up a "child" who was waiting for him down the street. At this time, I asked him if he could stay for five more minutes to look at some pictures. He agreed. He was then taken over to a corner of the room where there would be less interference from [redacted] was shown five groups of pictures with each group containing four pictures. Crew member pictures were intermingled within the total 20 pictures. Source studied each group for approximately one minute and was unable to determine any positive identification. The pictures were then placed on a flat surface and grouped into two categories - five pictures of Lao personnel and 15 pictures of American personnel. Source studied the Lao group for approximately 15 minutes and finally produced a picture which was not a picture of the Lao crew member. He then studied the 15 pictures of Americans for approximately 15 minutes. He was very nervous during this entire 30 minutes and finally stated that he was sure that three pictures he had chosen were the three Americans reported as the American crew members. None of the pictures were of the crew members. By this time, [redacted] tried to assist Source by asking him what problems he was having. Source then re-examined the Lao pictures. [redacted] was mumbling something to him at this time. About 10 minutes later, Source stated that he had changed his mind, that this picture (the one of [redacted]) was the Lao crew member. It should be noted that the pictures in no way resembled one another. Source then went back through the pictures of the Americans and decided that another picture was one of the Americans. This picture was a picture of one of the American crew members.

j. At this time, [redacted] and Source left with [redacted] stating that Source would try to return the following day. During a subsequent 15 minute conversation with the casual source during which I indicated that I suspected Source's story, he stated that he felt Source and [redacted] were lying, that it was a fabrication, and that it was probable that Source was a resident of Vientiane and had never been to Muong Sai.

k. According to appropriate U.S. Mission officers, as of 25 August 1972, Source has not defected to the RLG.

l. As is evident from the above date and comments, Source and [redacted] have fabricated this entire story to obtain monetary rewards offered by Air America. It could very well be that the casual source is directly or indirectly involved. This office considers the incident terminated.

m. Copies of this report have been provided to the U.S. Mission.

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REPLACES DA FORM 158-1, 1 FEB 68  
AND DA FORM 204, 1 APR 67

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RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 13, 1975

[Redacted]  
Air America, Inc.  
1725 K Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C.

Dear [Redacted]:

Enclosed for your information is a copy of the State Department report of the Death of an American Citizen issued December 17, 1974 for Edward J. Weissenback. As you will note, it lists the cause of death "as missing and presumed dead as a result of enemy action in Northern Laos," on December 27, 1971.

Certified copies of this form are also being send to the Office of Workers Compensation Programs in the Labor Department and to Karen.

If you have any questions, I hope you will let me know.

Sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]  
[Redacted Name]

Special Assistant for  
Prisoner of War and  
Missing in Action Matters

Enclosure:  
As stated

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

# REPORT OF THE DEATH OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN

Vientiane, Laos, December 17, 1974

(Place and date)

Name in full Edward J. Weissenback Occupation Crewman

Native or naturalized Native Last known address

in the United States Unknown

Date of death December 27 1971 Age 29  
(Month) (Day) (Hour) (Minute) (Year) (As nearly as can be ascertained)

Place of death Crash of C-123 aircraft in Northern Laos  
(Number and street) or (Hospital or hotel) (City) (Country)

Cause of death Missing and presumed dead as result of Enemy Action in Northern Laos  
(Include authority for statement)

Disposition of the remains n/a

Local law as to disinterring remains n/a

Disposition of the effects c/o Mrs. Karen J. Weissenback

Person or official responsible for custody of effects and accounting therefor Mrs. Karen Weissenback

Informed by telegram:

NAME	ADDRESS	RELATIONSHIP	DATE SENT
<u>n/a</u>			

Copy of this report sent to:

NAME	ADDRESS	RELATIONSHIP	DATE SENT
<u>Karen W. Weissenback</u>	<u>[Redacted]</u>	<u>Spouse</u>	<u>12/7/1974</u>
	<u>[Redacted]</u>		

Traveling or residing abroad with relatives or friends as follows:

NAME	ADDRESS	RELATIONSHIP
<u>Air America, Inc.</u>	<u>Vientiane, Laos</u>	<u>Employer</u>

Other known relatives (not given above):

NAME	ADDRESS	RELATIONSHIP

This information and data concerning an inventory of the effects, accounts, etc., have been placed under File 234 in the correspondence of this office.

Remarks:

[Redacted]

(Continued on reverse if necessary.)

[Redacted]

[Stamp: No fee prescribed]

(Signature on all copies)  
Consul  
of the United States of America.

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RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

I hereby certify that I have no firearms of any description in my possession in Southeast Asia.

I further certify that I have read and understand the pertinent sections of the Personnel Manual pertaining to firearms, that I will abide by these regulations and that any violation thereof will subject me to immediate termination.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Supervisor  
*Sept. 25, 70*  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

*Edward J. Pissenback*  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Employee's Signature  
*9-25-'70*  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

While I am an employee of Air America, Inc. and during my assignment in Laos, I agree to abide by local laws, in addition to the applicable Company regulations, and will respect local customs and conform to a high standard of moral and ethical conduct.

I further agree that I will not engage, for profit, directly or indirectly, either in my own name or in the name or through the agency of another person or entity, in any business, profession, or occupation in Laos, other than work assigned by competent authority within the Company while employed by Air America, Inc. nor will I make loans or investment to or in any business, profession or occupation in Laos.

I understand that the prohibitions and standards of conduct prescribed above are contractual requirements of the United States A.I.D. Mission to Laos (USAID) as set forth in a contract between the Company and USAID, and I agree that violation of this agreement may result in and shall be good cause for the termination of my employment with Air America, Inc. and its associated companies.

Witness

*Sept. 25, 70*

Date

*Edward J. Pessenbach*  
Employee Signature

*9-25-'70*

Date

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

*Vaccine 2581*

August 7, 1970

Ref.: WH-70-2861

AIRMAIL - SPECIAL DELIVERY

Mr. Edward J. Weissenback

  
 Grants Pass, Oregon 97526

Dear Mr. Weissenback:

We are enclosing herewith two copies of our offer of employment. This offer sets forth the terms and conditions of your employment with us. Please sign one copy and return it to us. The second copy is for your file.

Please read carefully the household effects letter that we have included with the offer and itemize the contents of each carton and trunk that is part of your shipment.

You will be required to take a complete physical examination which includes various laboratory tests and a survey of your general physical condition. This physical examination should be administered by a doctor of your choice. We have attached our Company forms for your doctor to complete. It is important that we receive these completed physical examination forms at least two weeks prior to your scheduled reporting date. We have to forward them to the Chief of our Medical Department in Taipei prior to your departure. Late receipt of these forms will delay your departure as well as the date your salary commences.

You are required to have cholera and smallpox immunizations in connection with your trip to the Far East. We advise you also have typhus, typhoid, paratyphoid, and tetanus for your protection. Your immunizations will not be valid unless you submit your completed yellow books (sample copies attached) for certification by a U.S. Public Health Office. We also advise beginning polio immunizations and taking oral polio vaccine. This series may be completed after your arrival in the Far East, if necessary. The Company will pay for the above immunizations except the polio vaccine, and for your physical examination. Please have your physician submit his bill to this office for payment.

Should you not have a valid U.S. Tourist Passport, please refer to the attached Passport application form for information as to how you can obtain one. Once you obtain your Passport, sign it, and return it along with the attached Visa application forms for China, Japan, Thailand, and Laos. China requires two signed Visa forms; Japan requires one signed Visa form; Thailand requires two signed Visa forms; and Laos requires three signed Visa forms. Just. **RECEIVED AIR AMERICA**

Y P O O

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 09-Dec-2013
--

Mr. Edward J. Weissenback  
 Ref.: WH-70-2861

August 7, 1970  
 Page Two

Visa forms where indicated, we shall extract the necessary information from your Application For Employment forms and fill in the Visa forms for you. We would appreciate your sending us eight passport-size photographs which will be used in connection with your trip. It will be necessary, however, for us to be provided with the paid invoices before reimbursement can be made. If a prospective new employee does not report to Taipei, all expenses incurred for physical examination, immunizations, passport, etc., must be borne by the individual concerned and any bills received by the Company will be returned to him for payment.

It is important that you open a personal checking account in the United States prior to your departure and that you take an adequate supply of blank checks. In addition to the \$50 travel allowance which we shall provide, you must carry at least \$150 in your funds. Although the Company does have personal check cashing facilities for employees at certain points in the system, you must not plan to make use of them until you have been briefed by our Far East offices concerning how and when this may be done. At most points in the Far East you cannot legally receive U.S. dollars for checks drawn on U.S. banks, and specifically not in Tokyo and Taipei. Kindly let us know the name of your bank, its address, and your checking account number on the attached form.

Upon receipt of your signed Passport, the signed Visa application forms and required photographs and your completed physical examination forms, we will make air travel and hotel reservations and will be in touch with you concerning these arrangements.

You will note that we have indicated September 15, 1970, or sooner as your reporting date. This date is purely an estimate on our part to give you a time reference and will not necessarily coincide with your actual date of employment, which will be the date you start your travel enroute to the place designated in Paragraph 4.a of your employment letter. Any voluntary delays enroute will be counted as leave without pay.

We would like to remind you that no firearms should initially be brought with you, even if you are proceeding to an assignment outside of Taiwan. Under no circumstances will employees permanently assigned to Taiwan be permitted to bring in firearms now or in the future shipment of their personal effects. If you are not assigned to Taiwan and desire to have firearms shipped to you later, you must first consult with the Director of Security and determine if it will be permissible to do so. If permissible, it must be shipped directly to you rather than via Taiwan.

Cordially,

[Redacted Signature]

Assistant for Personnel

HHD:ddh

AIR AMERICA INC.

COPY

APPROVED FOR  
 RELEASE DATE:  
 09-Dec-2013

Mr. Edward J. Weissenback  
Ref.: WH-70-2861

August 7, 1970  
Page Three

bcc: DP (via MGR, Pres.)  
VFT&S (via MGR, Pres.)  
Ref.: DC-RSE-2349  
Air Freight Specialist  
G453 + 28  
Medford, Oregon  
September 15, 1970

**AIR AMERICA, INC.**

**COPY**

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013



**AIR ASIA COMPANY LIMITED**

815 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N. W.  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

TELEPHONE 298-7840

June 25, 1968

CABLE ADDRESS  
"AIRASIA"

Ref.: WH-68-4245

REC'D WAS JUL 1 1968

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Mr. Edward J. Weissenback

[Redacted Address]

Redmond, Oregon 97756

Dear Mr. Weissenback:

This letter constitutes an offer of employment in the position of **AIR FREIGHT SPECIALIST** at a monthly salary of **\$652.00.**

This offer is subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. Your possessing the necessary qualifications in our opinion for the above position being offered.
2. Completion to the satisfaction of the Company of such personal history checks as it may deem necessary or desirable.
3. Your satisfactorily passing a physical examination and meeting the physical requirements as set forth by the Company for the position offered to you.

4. Reporting for Duty:

(a) You will report for duty at **AIR ASIA COMPANY LIMITE D, 108 CHUNG SHAN ROAD NORTH, SECOND SECTION, TAIPEI, TAIWAN** on or before **17 JULY 1968** or at such other place as you may subsequently be notified.

(b) Since you will travel by air and will have to adhere to the prescribed passenger baggage weight limitations, the Company will pay for the transportation by surface shipment of up to 2,500 pounds (7½ cubic tons or 300 cubic feet, depending upon the basis of computation) of your personal effects from your bona fide home or place of employment to your station of assignment. Any duty or customs' fees collectable on the shipment to or importation into a foreign country of your personal effects must be borne by you.

Salary:

Your salary will commence the day you start travel enroute to the place stated in paragraph 4(a) above, provided no undue or voluntary delays result enroute. Salary will be paid by U.S. Dollar check once a month.

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

6. Term of Employment:

Subject to your satisfactory completion of the probationary period, as set forth in the Company's Personnel Manual, your employment will be for an indefinite period. If you fail to meet at any time any of the conditions set forth in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above, or if your services become excess to the needs of the Company, and your services are therefore terminated by the Company, you will be given two weeks advance notice, or pay in lieu of such notice, with return passage to

**REDMOND, OREGON** If your services are terminated by the Company for any other reason you will be given return passage to  
**REDMOND, OREGON** If, however, you resign prior to completion of at least three years of service, the Company will not be responsible for return passage for you or your dependents to  
**REDMOND, OREGON** or for the repatriation of your personal property.

7. Location:

Your initial assignment will be at **TAIPEI, TAIWAN** ; however, our operations in conjunction with those of our associated companies normally extend throughout the Far East and sometimes to other locations and you will be subject to assignment to work with an associated company and to assignment to any point of operations required by the Company.

8. Transportation for Dependents:

Transportation for your dependents will be provided by the Company upon certification by your Supervisor that you have successfully completed a probationary period of such duration as the Company deems necessary to evaluate your performance and suitability. However, if you wish to bring your dependents with you, you may do so at your own expense. You will, however, be reimbursed by the Company for dependent travel only after certification by your Supervisor, as provided above, that you have successfully completed your probationary period. In either case only travel by Company authorized route will be provided or reimbursed and reimbursement will be only at authorized Company discount fares.

9. Company Personnel Manual:

The terms, conditions, and benefits relating to employment with the Company are set forth in its Personnel Manual. Except and unless expressly provided to the contrary herein, the provisions of the Personnel Manual control, and where not expressly contrary to the Personnel Manual the matters set forth herein which are covered in the Personnel Manual are subject to the provisions of the Personnel Manual relating thereto. The following generalize some of the benefits of employment with the Company:

- (a) Annual Vacation/Travel: You will accrue 2.5 days per month vacation and air transportation at the rate of one round trip, Economy Class ticket each year for yourself and dependents (as specified below) between your place of assignment and the airport nearest your home.

(b) Sick Leave: Two weeks sick leave per year. Unused sick leave is carried forward to the following year and is cumulative up to a maximum of sixty (60) days; however, no payment is made for unused sick leave.

10. Personal Conduct:

We expect that personal conduct of our employees will reflect no discredit upon themselves, upon their fellow employees, or upon the Company. Excessive or even considerable use of intoxicants will not be permitted.

An employee's dependents for purposes of Company afforded travel referred to herein are his wife and children under eighteen years of age.

This letter constitutes the only authorized offer of employment to you from or on behalf of the Company. We have attempted to cover the general terms of your employment and some of the benefits which will result from your employment. As provided above, it is understood that the Personnel Manual (as it presently exists and as amended from time to time) is the final authority on details. It is an employee's privilege and responsibility to familiarize himself with the Company's Personnel Manual and the benefits provided therein.

If this offer of employment is acceptable to you, will you please indicate your acceptance by signing the enclosed copy hereof, as provided below, and returning that copy to us at the above letterhead address. This offer of employment shall remain in effect only for a period of thirty (30) days from the above date unless extended by written notice from me.

Very truly yours,

[Redacted signature box]

GAD:cd

I have read, understand, agree with, and accept the above

offer of employment this 28 day of June, 196 8

Edward James Weissenback

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

AIR AMERICA, INC.  
1725 K STREET, N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006  
TELEPHONE 223-6130

(b)(6)

MANAGING DIRECTOR

CABLE ADDRESS  
"AIRAMERICA"

August 7, 1970

Ref.: WD-70-2860

REC'D WAS AUG 20 1970

AIRMAIL - SPECIAL DELIVERY

Mr. Edward J. Weissenback

Grants Pass, Oregon 97526

Dear Mr. Weissenback:

This letter constitutes an offer of employment in the position of  
AIR FREIGHT SPECIALIST at a monthly salary of \$680.  
This offer is subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. Your possessing the necessary qualifications in our opinion for the above position being offered.
2. Completion to the satisfaction of the Company of such personal history checks as it may deem necessary or desirable.
3. Your satisfactorily passing a physical examination and meeting the physical requirements as set forth by the Company for the position offered to you.
4. Reporting for Duty:
  - a. You will report to Air Asia Company Limited, an associated company, at its offices located at 108 Chung Shan North Road, Second Section, Taipei, Taiwan, for further employment processing on or before September 15, 1970 or at such other place as you may subsequently be notified.
  - b. As you will travel by air and will have to adhere to the prescribed passenger baggage weight limitations, the Company will pay for the transportation by surface shipment of up to 2,500 lbs. (or 300 cubic feet, depending upon basis of computation) of your personal effects from your bona fide home or place of employment to your station of assignment. Any duty or customs fees on the shipment to or importation into a foreign country of your personal effects must be borne by you.
5. Salary:  
Your salary will commence the day you start your travel en route to the place stated in paragraph 4.a. above, provided no undue or voluntary delays occur en route. Salary will be paid by U.S. dollar check once a month.

6. Term of Employment:

Subject to your satisfactory completion of the probationary period, as set forth in the Company's Personnel Manual, herein identified as Personnel Manual For American Employees, your employment will be for an indefinite period. If you fail to meet at any time any of the conditions set forth in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above, or if your services become excess to the needs of the Company, and your services are therefore terminated by the Company, you will be given two weeks advance notice, or pay in lieu of such notice, with return passage to MEDFORD, OREGON. If your services are terminated by the Company for any other reason you will be given return passage to MEDFORD, OREGON. If, however, you resign prior to completion of at least three years of service the Company will not be responsible for return passage for you or your dependents to MEDFORD, OREGON or for the repatriation of your personal property.

7. Assignment to Associated Companies:

In accepting this offer you will evidence your agreement to any assignment to perform like services for any associated company at the Company's election, as long as the terms contained herein are met. When so assigned you may receive a salary based upon the local value of your services directly from the associated company, in which event that amount will be offset against the amount payable by the Company. Any difference between any such salary payment and your agreed compensation will be paid by the Company. No such assignment shall operate to dissolve the employer-employee relationship herein created nor to release you from your obligations hereunder and you will continue to hold yourself available for services on behalf of the Company upon its request. By the same token no such assignment shall relieve the Company of any of its obligations to you except as stated above.

8. Transportation for Dependents:

Transportation for your dependents will be provided by the Company upon certification by your Supervisor that you have successfully completed a probationary period of such duration as the Company deems necessary to evaluate your performance and suitability. However, if you wish to bring your dependents with you, you may do so at your own expense. You will be reimbursed by the Company for dependent travel only after certification by your Supervisor, as provided above, that you have successfully completed your probationary period. In either case, only travel by Company authorized route will be provided or reimbursed and reimbursement will be only at authorized Company discount fares.

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

9. Company Personnel Manual:

The terms, conditions and benefits governing your employment with the Company are set forth in the Personnel Manual identified in paragraph 6. above, and shall be controlling unless expressly provided to the contrary herein.

10. Personal Conduct:

We expect that personal conduct of our employees will reflect no discredit upon themselves, upon their fellow employees, or upon the Company. Excessive or even considerable use of intoxicants will not be permitted.

An employee's dependents for purposes of Company afforded travel referred to herein are his wife and children under eighteen years of age.

This letter constitutes the only authorized offer of employment to you from or on behalf of the Company. We have attempted to cover the general terms of your employment and some of the benefits which will result from your employment. As provided above, it is understood that the Personnel Manual (as it presently exists and as amended from time to time) is the final authority on details. It is an employee's privilege and responsibility to familiarize himself with the Company Personnel Manual and the benefits provided therein.

If this offer of employment is acceptable to you, will you please indicate your acceptance by signing the enclosed copy hereof, as provided below, and returning that copy to us at the above letterhead address. This offer of employment shall remain in effect only for a period of thirty (30) days from the above date unless extended by written notice from me.

Very truly yours

[Redacted signature box]

GAD:hw

I have read, understand, agree with, and accept the above offer of employment this 13<sup>th</sup> day of August, 1970.

*Edward J. Reissenbach*  
.....  
(Signature)

**HWP**

INFORMATION SHEET FOR PREPARATION OF OFFER OF EMPLOYMENT

*mm*

NAME: EDWARD J. WEISSENBACK

POSITION: AIR FREIGHT SPECIALIST

HIRE AGAINST DC-RSE: 2349

MONTHLY SALARY: (\$) 680.00 (Grade & Step) G453+28

HOME OF RECORD: NEW YORK, NEW YORK

CITY DEPARTING FROM: MEDFORD, OREGON

ORIGIN OF HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS: GRANTS PASS, OREGON AND BANGKOK, THAILAND

DATE OF DEPARTURE: SEPTEMBER 15, 1970

CREDIT REPORT NECESSARY (Circle one)

YES

→ **ALREADY DONE**

NO

**AND WIFE**

EMPLOYEE <sup>A</sup> NEEDS PASSPORT (Circle one)

YES

NO

TYPE VISAS REQUIRED: CHINA: MULTIPLE ENTRY TOURIST  
THAI TRANSIT  
JAPAN: NONE  
LAO ENTRY

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: SEND OFFER VIA AIRMAIL-SPECIAL DELIVERY TO: [ ] GRANTS PASS, OREGON. MRS. WEISSENBACK WILL ACCOMPANY HER HUSBAND TO THE FAR EAST AND WILL REIMBURSE US FOR THE COST OF HER TICKETS. BE SURE YOU SEND ENOUGH USA APPLIC. FORMS. PREPARE, AND ENCLOSE WITH OFFER OF EMPLOYMENT A HH/PE LETTER (NOTE THE SPLIT SHIPMENT). ALSO ENCLOSE A NEW APPLIC. FOR EMPLOYMENT (AL) AND STAPLE TO IT A NOTE ASKING MR. WEISSENBACK TO FILL IT OUT ASAP.

PREPARED BY: [ ]

DATE: 8/6/70

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)

ZCZC AWA220 TGB841 50176

UIWA HL CNTA 043

LT TAIPEI 43/41 13 1512

1970 JUL 13 AM 2 53 8



WASHINGTONDC

REC'D WAS JUL 13 1970

IP401 G060P [REDACTED] RECEIVED JULY THIRTEENTH PLEASE DISREGARD TP398  
AS PERTAINS [REDACTED] STOP PLEASE ADVISE AAA PND3734 [REDACTED] RETURN  
DUTY EFFECTIVE AUGUST ONE VIA TAIPEI ACCEPTABLE (BBB) REEMPLOYMENT  
STATUS TP362 WEISSENBACK (CCC) RETURN DUTY INTENTIONS PND1322 GENTZ



NO RESPONSE NECESSARY... WH-70-2337 Refers. WOB

7/16/70 CURRENT CONTACT FOR WEISSENBACK IS :



REDMOND, OREGON  
(NO TELEPHONE)

Vertical stamp or text on the right edge of the page.





NNNN

AAZCZC YW0473 FBC1289 ZC FUS594 50098

URWA HL CNTA 083

TAIPEI 83/73 7 1814

ral 8-7500

JUL 8 1970



WASHINGTONDC REC'D WAS JUL 8 1970

Reply via RCA: call Federal 8-7500

TP381 PND1340 RSE2349 UDORN INSTRUCTOR [ ] SHOULD BE RSE2350

DUE TP362 PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED RSE2349 AFS FOR WEISSENBACK

REEMPLOYMENT STOP DUE PND0466 [ ] RESIGNATION EFFECTIVE SEPTEMBER

ONE PROPOSE EMPLOYMENT WH1293 TP284 [ ] ASSISTANT CHIEF SECURITY

GAS6D LOCATION PROBABLY VIENTIANE REPORTING TAIPEI BY AUGUST FIFTEEN

MOST DESIRABLE STOP WITH

EMPLOYMENT WH1498 [ ] NO CURRENT INTEREST WHO488 [ ]

NO INTEREST REEMPLOYMENT WH2180 [ ] / WH2179 [ ] REEMPLOYMENT

ACCEPTABLE AGAINST ANY VACANT UH34 RSE



ply via RCA: call Federal 1

gram Gal telegram

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

JULY 7, 1970

MR. WEISSENBACK'S CURRENT ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE  
NUMBER IS:

GRANTS PASS, OREGON 97526

TEL.:

C O P Y  
MEMORANDUM  
(b)(6)~~COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : SRIMVTE via BMVTE

DATE: 6 March 1969

FROM : DTD

REF. No.DTD-219/69/203

SUBJECT: Air Freight Department Personnel Complement

An analysis of the need for a balanced staffing pattern in the Air Freight Department dictates the necessity for readjustment of personnel strength in view of the projected operational requirements.

To this end, you are charged to review your Air Freight Specialist complement and select five (5) members to be released for the convenience of the Company.

Prepare and forward to this office the necessary documents to release five (5) Air Freight Specialists from employment effective with the close of business 31 March 1969.

(Signed)

cc: File - S/C

AKR/ml

~~COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL~~

C O P Y

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

[Redacted] (b)(6)

TO: Mr. Edward J. Weissenback  
Air Freight Specialist, Traffic Division  
via EMVTE, DTD, VPT&S

DATE : 30 Oct. 1968

REF.NO.: PND-ES-68/6726

REC'D WAS NOV 04 1968

Dear Mr. Weissenback :

This is to advise that you successfully completed your Probationary Period of employment with the Company on 16 October 1968.

[Redacted Signature Box]

for Director of Personnel

cc: P/File  
Assistant for Personnel via MGDR, President  
D/RAD  
R/S  
E/S

PD-165

C06117387

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

P File

(b)(6)

September 4, 1968

Ref.: WH-68-5908

Commanding Officer  
U.S. Army Administration Center  
Attn: AGUZ-RP-A  
9700 Page Boulevard  
St. Louis, Missouri 63132

Ref.: Edward J. Weissenback, Service No. ER 51551423

Dear Sir:

The above referenced individual is employed by Air America, Inc. as an Air Freight Specialist. Mr. Weissenback was employed July 17, 1968, and is presently assigned to Vientiane, Laos. His duties as an Air Freight Specialist encompass all phases of Loadmaster activities.

Please consider this letter as a request for a Critical Civilian Occupation Classification for the above individual. Air America, Inc. is currently engaged in performing flight and aircraft maintenance services in the Far East pursuant to contracts with agencies of the United States government; among them the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Air Force and the United States Army. Mr. Weissenback's work for our company is directly related to the performance of the above contracts. Our work in the Far East is consistent with the national interest, and this work will be handicapped if we are deprived of Mr. Weissenback's services. Therefore, we request that Mr. Weissenback's classification be granted while he is performing services for our company.

Mr. Weissenback has asked that we forward to your office the attached USAAC Form 171 with this letter verifying his employment.

If you require any additional information from our company, we should be pleased to comply with your request. Please advise our company as well as Mr. Weissenback when you have made a decision with respect to this request.

Cordially,

[Redacted Signature]

Assistant for Personnel

RECEIVED  
1. SEP 1968  
AIR AMERICA  
PERSONNEL DIVISION  
TAIPEI

HHD:WHB:cm

Attachment

C06117387

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

bcc: ✓ DP (via MDR, Pres. )  
Mr. Edward J. Weissenback (via Pres.)

Ref.: PND-DP-68/5908, dated 4 September 1968

For your information and files.

**AIR AMERICA, INC.**

**C O P Y**

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

MY RESERVE STATUS AND ADDRESS VERIFICATION  
Complete and Return Within 15 Days

DATE: AUG 68

Read Reverse Side Before Completing This Form

A. DATA ITEM	B. INFORMATION NOW ON FILE	C. MAKE NECESSARY CORRECTION OR CHANGE
1. GRADE	SP4 A	
2. NAME	WEISSENBACK EDWARD J	<i>Co Air America Inc. APO San Francisco, Calif. 96352</i>
3. SERVICE NUMBER	ER 51551423	
4. ADDRESS	[Redacted]	
5. CITY, STATE	ASHLAND, OREG	
6. ZIP CODE	97520	
7. FOREIGN LANGUAGE NO 1		
8. FOREIGN LANGUAGE NO 2		
9. CIVILIAN EDUCATION LEVEL	3-4 YRS COLG, NON-GRAD	
AVAILABILITY FOR ASSIGNMENT TO USAR UNIT	OBLIGATION AP	<input type="checkbox"/> Available (See Instructions) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Not Available
11. SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS (See Section A of USAAC Form 170a)	a. First b. Second c. Third	a. First b. Second c. Third
12. PRESENT CIVILIAN OCCUPATION (Record your Job Title and Duties in Column C)		<i>Air Freight Specialist. Loadmaster duties on aircraft in Southeast Asia.</i>
ITEM 13 IS FOR ENLISTED PERSONNEL ONLY		
13. MARITAL STATUS & NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Do not count yourself as a dependent)	SINGLE-0 0165/0170	<i>Married - 1 dependent</i>
ITEM 14 IS FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY		
DOT CODE	000 STUDENT	

CLAIM OF CRITICAL OCCUPATION

If you claim to be engaged in, apprenticing in, or studying for a critical occupation read and comply with the instructions which appear on the attached USAAC Form 170a and check one of the following:

- a.  Engaged in a critical civilian occupation (See Section B of USAAC Form 170a for required documentation).
- b.  Apprenticing or studying for a critical occupation (See Section B of USAAC Form 170a for required documentation).
- c.  Preparing for or engaged in the ministry (See Section B of USAAC Form 170a for required documentation).
- d.  Belonging to a religious faith requiring individual missionary work (See Section B of USAAC Form 170a for required documentation).

NOTE: Unless the required documentation is returned with this form, notice will not be taken of your claim.

16. CERTIFICATE OF PHYSICAL CONDITION

Check one of the following to indicate your current physical condition:

- To the best of my knowledge and belief I have no medical condition or physical defect that would prevent my performance of active military service.
- My current physical condition may preclude the performance of active military service. The certificate of a physician outlining my physical condition is attached.

17. Signature of Reservist <i>Edward J. Weissenback</i>	18. Date <i>August 25, 1968</i>
--	------------------------------------

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

June 25, 1968

Ref.: WH-68-4244

Mr. Edward J. Weissenback

Redmond, Oregon 97756

Dear Mr. Weissenback:

We are enclosing the original and a copy of the letter setting forth the terms and conditions of employment. Please sign one copy and return it, if it meets with your approval. Also enclosed are your preplacement physical examination forms, general instructions and an immunization card for you. Upon receipt of your signed offer, we shall send you instructions for shipping your personal/household effects.

Please sign and return two of the enclosed Chinese and one Japanese visa application forms with your valid signed passport (to be valid a passport must be signed on page two of the passport booklet where signature of bearer is indicated) and two passport-type photographs as soon as possible. We shall fill in the necessary information. Each passport bearer is required to sign two Chinese and one Japanese visa application forms.

A physical examination is required which will include blood test, blood count, chest X-ray and general physical condition. Please have your physician complete the forms, sign and return them to us promptly. You are required to have typhoid, para-typhoid, cholera and smallpox immunizations, and we advise typhus and tetanus for your protection. The Company will pay for these particular immunizations and for your physical examinations so have your physician submit his bill to this office. The physical and personal forms must be forwarded to this office and transmitted to our Chief, Medical Department prior to your arrival in Taipei. Late receipt of these forms will delay your departure and date your salary commences. Please pass this information to your physician. It is essential that you have your immunizations certified by a U. S. Public Health Office.

Please carefully follow the instructions regarding procedures to be used when you ship your personal/household effects and itemize the contents of each carton or trunk you are shipping to the Far East.

It is important that you open a personal checking account in the USA prior to your departure and that you take an adequate supply of blank checks. In addition to the \$50 travel allowance which we shall provide, you must carry at least \$150 in your funds. Although the Company does have personal check cashing facilities for employees at certain points in the system, you must not plan to make use of them until you have been briefed by our Far East offices concerning how and when this may be done. At most points in the Far East you cannot legally receive U. S. dollars for checks drawn on U. S. banks, and specifically not in Tokyo or Taipei.

Y 9 0 5



Mr. Edward J. Weissenback  
Redmond, Oregon

-2-

June 25, 1968

You will note that we have indicated 17 July 1968 or sooner as your reporting date. This date is purely an estimate on our part to give you a time reference and will not necessarily coincide with your actual date of employment which will be the date you start your travel enroute to the place designated in Paragraph 4.a. of your employment letter. Any voluntary delays enroute will be counted as leave without pay.

We would like to remind you that no firearms should initially be brought with you, even if you are proceeding to an assignment outside of Taiwan. Under no circumstances will employees permanently assigned to Taiwan be permitted to bring in firearms now or in the future shipment of their personal effects.

If you are not assigned to Taiwan and desire to have firearms shipped to you later, you must first consult with the Director of Security and determine if it will be permissible to do so. If permissible, it must be shipped directly to you rather than via Taiwan.

We shall be in touch with you in the very near future regarding your final travel arrangements.

Sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]


Assistant for Personnel

HHD:ar

Enclosure

bcc: VDP (via MGR, Pres.)  
VPT&S  
LRSE-2140  
Air Freight Specialist  
G4S3D  
Redmond, Oregon  
17 July 1968

AA CL  
C O P Y



MEMORANDUM

TO: *[Signature]* (via Pres.)  
FROM: Assistant for Personnel (via MGDR) *[Signature]*  
SUBJECT: Former Employee Edward J. Weissenback

DATE: July 7, 1970


REF. NO.: WH-70-2337

Ref.: TP362  
PND-DP-69/0743 dated March 20, 1969  
DC-RSE-2349 Air Freight Specialist

Mr. Weissenback contacted the office of the Managing Director today by telephone and indicated that he will be unable to accept our offer of re-employment at this time due to the fact that he was recently injured in a parachute jump in connection with his duties at the U. S. Forest Service.

Mr. Weissenback did indicate that he is quite interested in being considered for reemployment as soon as he is fully recovered. His doctor indicates this will be approximately January 1, 1971.

Please advise the name of an alternate candidate for employment against DC-RSE-2349.



HHD:WHB:ds

*return to file soon*

RECEIVED  
14 JUL 1970  
PERSONNEL DIVISION  
TAIPEI

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

(b)(6)



Sept. 26, 1970

American Commissary  
Vientiane, Laos


Dear

The bearer of this letter, Mr. E.J. Weissenback is newly assigned to Vientiane, Laos.

It will be appreciated if you allow him to make purchases without the required deposit 31 December 1970.

Sincerely yours,

AIR AMERICA, INC.



Personnel Manager  
Vientiane, Laos

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

**AIR ASIA COMPANY LIMITED**

815 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N. W.  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

TELEPHONE 298-7840

*INACTIVE  
AFS*

(b)(6)

亞洲航空股份有限公司

CABLE ADDRESS  
"AIRASIA"

February 5, 1968

Ref.: WH-68-0993

*AFS*

Mr. Edward J. Weissenback

Ashland, Oregon

Dear Mr. Weissenback:

Thank you very much for your recent application for employment with Air Asia Company Limited.

Since receiving your application, we have reviewed your qualifications carefully. Unfortunately, we do not have an opening in which your work interests and experience could be utilized.

We appreciate your interest in our Company, and are sorry that we cannot be more optimistic about your employment opportunity with us. However, we do wish you every success in your efforts to find a suitable position.

Cordially,

[Redacted Signature]

Assistant for Personnel

HHD:WHB:cg

bcc: DP (via MGDR, Pres.)

Ref.: PND-DP-68/413, dated 26 January 1968  
WH-68-0404, dated 17 January 1968

A copy of this letter is being sent to you for your information only. We will hold this application in our Inactive Files for a period of six months, then dispose of it.

RECEIVED  
FEB 11 1968

APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
09-Dec-2013

□ (b)(6)  
✓  
Lefle(5)

VP-L  
18 JUL 1979

ZCZC PFF053  
QK HKGZZFA

QK VTEXTFA-UTHXTFA BKKXTFA  
.TPEBDHO 172820

TO : VP-LD VTE ✓  
INFO : VP-MTD UTH AVP BKK VP-L OSG P/T TPE  
SUBJ : AIR AMERICA PERSONNEL MISSING IN LAOS

PREPARATION OF PROPOSED AD SHAPING UP BUT FIND WE ARE MISSING  
PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL:

- 1) JOSEPH C. CHENEY, II
- 2) CHARLES G. HERRICK
- 3) [REDACTED]
- 4) [REDACTED]
- 5) [REDACTED]

IF YOU OR ANY OF THE INFOEES HAVE PHOTOS OF THE AFOREMENTIONED  
PERSONNEL PLEASE FORWARD TO THIS OFFICE ASAP. PLEASE ADVISE.

DTD FOR DPRA TPE G73 170810Z

NNNN

DIA SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

~~SECRET~~

JOCS INFORMATION SERVICE CENTER

NO FURTHER DISSEM OR REPRD. REL PER DAM ONLY

COPY NUMBER

01A

ROUTINE  
R 071753Z JUN 88  
FM CIA/DDO  
TO DIR//VO-PW

~~SECRET~~

CITE CIA/DDO

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

NIR

SUBJECT: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION ON LIVE SIGHTING, MIA REMAINS AND DOG TAGS

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM THE DEBRIEFING OF FOUR VIETNAMESE REFUGEES, WHO ARE NOW LOCATED IN THE SITE TWO CAMP IN THAILAND. THIS INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO JCRC AND THE STONY BEACH TEAM ON 1 JUNE 1988 AND IS BEING SENT TO YOU FYI.

2. [REDACTED] (DPOB: [REDACTED]), A FORMER ARVN OFFICER, WAS HELD IN REEDUCATION CAMPS IN NORTHERN VIETNAM FROM 1976 UNTIL JANUARY 1985. WHILE AT YEN BAI (JUNE 1976-OCT 1977), [REDACTED] CLAIMS TO HAVE SEEN AN AMERICAN DESCRIBED AS LIGHT SKINNED, ABOUT 35 YEARS OLD. THE AMERICAN USED THE NAME "HO CHI NAM" AND WORKED AS AN ELECTRICIAN AT MANY CAMPS IN THE NORTH. IN ADDITION TO YEN BAI, [REDACTED] WAS ALSO HELD AT THE CENTRAL REEDUCATION CAMP 1 AT LAO KAY, TAN LAP CAMP, AND NAM HA CAMP. ON 21 MAY, [REDACTED] WAS MOVED TO SITE TWO FROM A THAI POLICE HOLDING CENTER, THA LUAN, IN TRAT PROVINCE.

3. [REDACTED] (DPOB: [REDACTED]) CLAIMS THAT HIS WIFE IS HOLDING TWO AMERICAN DOG TAGS AT HER RESIDENCE IN SAIGON. THE ADDRESS IS [REDACTED] SAIGON. [REDACTED] ARRIVED AT SITE TWO FROM THA LUAN ON 21 MAY.

4. [REDACTED] (DPOB: [REDACTED]) REPORTED THAT TON OF HIS FRIENDS KNOW THE WHEREABOUTS OF AMERICAN REMAINS. THE FRIENDS ARE:

[REDACTED] SAIGON.

[REDACTED] SAIGON. [REDACTED] TOLD [REDACTED] THAT HE SENT SOME BONES TO BANGKOK (TIMEFRAME UNKNOWN), BUT HAD RECEIVED NO FEEDBACK. SC ARRIVED AT SITE TWO FROM THA LUAN ON 21 MAY.

5. A CROSS BORDER SMUGGLER TURNED OVER TWO DOGTAG RUBBINGS AND A HAND COPIED NOTE FROM A DOGTAG TO A THAI POLICE OFFICIAL IN TRAT PROVINCE WITH THE FOLLOWING NAMES:-

THOMAS W. KNUCKEY, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

THESE DOCUMENTS WILL BE TURNED OVER TO JCRC AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

6. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ORIGINATED WITH CAMBODIAN SMUGGLERS. IT WAS PASSED TO JCRC ON 1 JUNE. [REDACTED] (ACCOMPANYING THE NOTE BEARING THIS INFORMATION WERE TWO TEETH.)

7. NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Copy # 10A sent to VO-PW per [REDACTED] 8 JUN 88 - 1000

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 07-Jan-2014

2

HE HAD CALLED VICHIT AT THE CONSULATE BECAUSE SC KNEW  
 [REDACTED] FROM THE GRITZ AFFAIR AND HAD COME TO CONSIDER [REDACTED] A  
 GOOD FRIEND. SC

DATA  
 DATA SC SAID THAT HE HAD SOME VERY  
 IMPORTANT INFORMATION PERTAINING TO POW/MIA MATTERS. [REDACTED] THEN  
 CONTACTED AN AMERICAN OFFICIAL. @

OFFICIAL AND [REDACTED] TRAVELED TO NKP THE SAME DAY WHERE THEY MET  
 WITH SC. SC INTRODUCED HIS NEPHEW, SUB-SOURCE, WHO  
 REPORTEDLY HAD RECENTLY BECOME INVOLVED WITH THE LAO RESISTANCE.  
 HE SAID THAT HE WAS INVOLVED WITH A GROUP ASSOCIATED WITH PHOUMI  
 NOSAVAN. SUBJECTS PROVIDED A XEROXED COPY OF A DOCUMENT REPORTEDLY  
 OBTAINED IN LAOS. THE DOCUMENT IS ENTITLED "BIOGRAPHY OF  
 PRISONER" AND CONSISTS OF A SERIES OF QUESTIONS ON PERSONAL DATA  
 WRITTEN IN ENGLISH SCRIPT. ON THE DOCUMENT WAS NAME AND BIO DATA  
 REPORTEDLY WRITTEN BY A LIVE AMERICAN POW IN LAOS. THE BIO,  
 WRITTEN IN BLOCK LETTERS, IS AS FOLLOWS:

NAME;	WALTER HUGH MOON (POSSIBLY HUGHMOON)
DPOB;	RUDY, ARKANSAS, USA
RANK;	CAPTAIN, US ARMY
CAPTURED;	24 APRIL 1961; PHA HONE, LAOS

THE DOCUMENT ENDED WITH XIENGHOUNG, 6/5/61 AND IS SIGNED BY  
 WALTER HUGH MOON IN SCRIPT. A PHOTO OF A CAUCASIAN WITH A BANDAGE  
 AROUND HIS FOREHEAD IS ATTACHED TO THE DOCUMENT. [REDACTED] REFUSED  
 TO GIVE ANY DETAILS ABOUT THE ACQUISITION OF THE DOCUMENT CITING  
 CONCERN FOR THE SAFETY OF HIS SOURCE, BUT DID SAY THAT HE HAD  
 ACCESS TO 300 MORE SUCH DOCUMENTS FROM AN LPDR MILITARY SITE IN  
 LAOS. NO FURTHER INFORMATION.

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Assistant Vice Director for Collection Management  
 Defense Intelligence Agency  
 Principal Advisor for Prisoner of War  
 Missing in Action Affairs  
 (International Security Affairs)  
 Department of Defense  
 Director, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia  
 Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs  
 Department of State  
 Office of the Assistant to the President for  
 National Security Affairs  
 National Security Council  
 Director, National Security Agency

**SUBJECT :** Crash Site in Binh Tri Thien or Quang Nam-Da Nang  
 Province, Vietnam

1. The attached report is from the debriefing of a Vietnamese  
 refugee who claimed to know the location of the remains of a U.S.  
 pilot, Harley B. Pyles.

2. This information is for your background use only. There  
 will be no further distribution of this report and additional  
 dissemination or extraction of this information requires prior  
 approval from this Agency. DIA is authorized to pass this  
 information to the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) and its  
 representatives in Bangkok.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Clair E. George  
 Deputy Director for Operations

**CC:** DCI  
 DDCI  
 EXEC DIR  
 [Redacted]  
 DDI  
 DDO

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Attachment: Report as Stated

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[redacted] (sic). S was unable to explain this obvious error, but surmised that to [redacted] an uneducated individual, the trip along the treacherous jungle trails might have seemed a considerable distance. According to *SOURCE PROTECTION*

[redacted] reiterated that the crash site mentioned above is different from the one cited in [redacted]. He added, however, that wreckage cited in the previous report was discovered in 1985, not 1983, as he previously stated.)

[redacted]

[redacted]

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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

SANITIZED COPY

13 June 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. General Donald V. Bennett, USA  
Director  
Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : Sighting of a U.S. POW in Quang Binh  
Province, North Vietnam.

We are forwarding the attached report through this channel because it may involve a change of status for an MIA. The report has been given limited dissemination in the field and no Washington distribution other than that listed below; however, there are no inherent restrictions on the report and further dissemination may be at the discretion of the service concerned.

Attachment

CS 317/09062/72 |

cc: Admiral Epes  
Admiral Rectanus  
Admiral Whitnire  
Admiral Murphy  
Colonel Iles  
Colonel Allen  
Colonel Quillian ✓  
Captain Harris  
Mr. Negroponte  
Mr. Siverts

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DATE 5 MAY 1977

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CS 317 062/72  
Field

SANITIZED COPY

13 June 1972

## MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Sighting of U.S. Prisoner of War, Quang Binh Province,  
North Vietnam

1. At about 1800 hours on 10 April 1972, four women were observed carrying an American on a stretcher in the vicinity of XD978834 in Vinh Linh District, Quang Binh Province, North Vietnam, apparently in the direction of an ambulance parked nearby. According to the women, the American was a U.S. pilot who had bailed out of his aircraft and was captured in the jungle west of Vinh Linh District on the morning of 9 April. One of the women said he was a captain, and that he had been wounded by shrapnel from the artillery shell which hit his aircraft, but it was only a flesh wound which would heal in two or three weeks.

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She said he had been given first aid treatment immediately after his capture. Observed from a distance of about one meter, the pilot was wearing a gray flight suit and appeared to be about 70 inches tall, 27 or 28 years old, with brown curly hair and a dark complexion. His weight could not be estimated, but the women complained that he was heavy to carry. No rank or insignia was visible.

2. \ Comment: When shown pictures provided by the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) of pilots missing in action in early April 1972, \ stated that the prisoner most resembled First Lieutenant Bruce C. Walker, [redacted] but the prisoner's complexion was darker. According to JPRC, however, [redacted] was captured before Walker was missing in action. The closest correlation with \ information is Captain Larry F. Potts, who is listed as missing in action on 7 April at XD195655.)

3. From 2 to 10 April, the 102nd Regiment of the 308th North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Division was camped near the Nui Thi Ve high point (XD936881) in Quang Binh Province for rest before continuing its infiltration into South Vietnam. On 10 April, the Regiment broke camp and traveled by truck to XD978839 along Route 193, where a new road was being constructed west-southwest, through a plantation, and then south parallel to Route 193. An ambulance was parked at XD978839, where the troops left the trucks to travel by foot, apparently waiting for the women to bring the U.S. prisoner.

4. |

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# A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

of the

## 1998 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)

### on Vietnamese Intentions,

### Capabilities, and Performance

### Concerning the POW/MIA Issue

Prepared and Submitted by the Office of U.S. Senator Bob Smith<sup>1</sup>.  
November, 1998

<sup>1</sup> Sen. Smith is the U.S. Chairman of the Vietnam War Working Group of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POWs and MIAs. He is also a senior Member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the former Co-Chairman

of the Senate Select Committee on POW / MIA Affairs (1991-1993).

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*UNITED STATES SENATE  
WASHINGTON DC.*

A [REDACTED]

*OF THE  
1998 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE (NIE)  
ON VIETNAMESE INTENTIONS, CAPABILITIES, AND PERFORMANCE  
CONCERNING THE POW/MIA ISSUE (U)*

*Prepared and Submitted by the Office of U.S. Senator Bob Smith (R-NH)  
November, 1998*

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Office of ~~Senate Security~~  
DCN OSS-~~1998-2800~~  
Pages: 208  
Copy: 19 of 110 ]



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**A Critical Assessment**  
*of the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Vietnamese Intentions,  
 Capabilities, and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue (U)*

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	English translation of the so-called 1205 Document, based on translation from Vietnamese into Russian by Soviet GRU in 1972.	
	English translation of the so-called 735 Document, based on translation from Vietnamese into Russian by Soviet GRU in 1971.	

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## I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

### Recommendation:

The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the Vietnam POW/MIA disseminated earlier this year (the Key Judgments of which were released publicly in redacted form in August and September, 1998<sup>1</sup>) should be retracted based on the findings of this ~~critical assessment~~. (U)

A copy of this ~~critical assessment~~ is being sent to the Members of the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) and the Military Intelligence Board (MIB), along with a request that those boards meet to consider and approve this request that the NIE be retracted. A copy has also been sent to relevant Congressional leaders, along with requests that oversight hearings concerning this NIE be conducted at the earliest possible date. (U)

In addition, copies of this ~~critical assessment~~ have been sent to officials who may rely on the NIE, such as U.S. policy-makers with responsibility for U.S. relations with the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) and U.S. military officials with responsibility for POW/MIA accounting efforts in Southeast Asia. It is recommended that these officials not rely on the judgments in the NIE for the reasons noted in this ~~critical assessment~~. (U)

### Conclusions:

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<sup>1</sup> Letter from Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, to U.S. Senator Max Cleland, dated August 3, 1998; Letter from Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, John Gannon, to National Commander of The American Legion, dated August 19, 1998; News Release by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), entitled *POW/MIA Document Declassified and Released*, dated August 27, 1998; and Defense POW/MIA Weekly Update, published under the auspices of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (POW/Missing Personnel Affairs), dated September 10, 1998. (U)

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~~SECRET~~*Vietnamese Cooperation*

With respect to POW/MIA cooperation by the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), the NIE judges that "Vietnam has become more helpful in assisting US efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting of American personnel missing in action during the Vietnam conflict," and that "... Vietnam's overall performance in dealing with the POW/MIA problem has been good in recent years..."(U)

However, my conclusion is that the NIE fails to adequately distinguish between improved Vietnamese assistance with U.S. field operations to recover potential remains of U.S. personnel killed during the war, and continued Vietnamese stonewalling in providing full disclosure of documents from relevant Communist Party holdings that would shed light on SRV policy and knowledge concerning the fate or status of unaccounted for captured and missing in action personnel. Accordingly, the NIE's judgment of overall SRV performance on the POW/MIA problem as "good" is not reliable in view of the SRV stonewalling referenced above, which is detailed in this ~~critical assessment~~. Moreover, there are *numerous* instances, also detailed in this ~~critical assessment~~, where the analysis in support of the NIE's judgments of SRV cooperation is factually inaccurate, misleading, incomplete, shallow, and seriously flawed. (U)

*The "1205" and "735" Documents*

With respect to the so-called "735" and "1205" documents,<sup>2</sup> the NIE judges that "many of the details of the documents are implausible or inconsistent with reliable evidence" and therefore does not assess the likely range of numbers of American POWs in the spring of 1973.<sup>3</sup> The NIE further judges that "[n]either document

<sup>2</sup> The 1205/735 documents are Soviet GRU acquisitions of alleged high-level secret wartime reports by North Vietnamese officials who state that Hanoi was holding substantially more U.S. POWs in the 1970-1972 period than those released in 1973.

<sup>3</sup> The NIE terms of reference were coordinated with the Senate Select Committee on

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provides a factual foundation upon which to judge Vietnamese performance on the POW/MIA question." (U)

However, I conclude, for the reasons noted in this ~~critical assessment~~, that the NIE's judgment on the 1205/735 documents cannot be accepted with confidence because it is *replete* with inaccurate and misleading statements, and lacks a reasonably thorough and objective analytical foundation on which to base its judgment. I further conclude, based on a review of relevant U.S. data, that many of the statements contained in both the 1205/735 documents [redacted] discussed herein are indeed supported or plausible, and have very serious implications which should warrant an *urgent* review of U.S. policy toward the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). (U)

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### *The Politicizing of Intelligence*

Congress and the leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) need to examine what role the White House, its National Security Council, and certain US policy-makers responsible for advancing the Administration's normalization agenda with Vietnam may have played in influencing or otherwise affecting the judgments of the IC as reflected in the NIE. The evidence, which appears to warrant such an examination, is detailed in this ~~critical assessment~~ under Part IV. (U)

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Intelligence (SSCI), as noted in SSCI Chairman/Vice-Chairman letter dated October 27, 1997, and OCA/CIA letter dated November 21, 1997. (U)

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## II BACKGROUND:

In the spring of 1997, in relation to Senate confirmation of a U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Samuel R. Berger, directed the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) to undertake a special National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the Vietnam War POW/MIA issue and to provide the IC's updated assessment of the so-called "1205" and "735" documents from the Russian archives. Mr. Berger further directed the IC to consult with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) on the terms of reference for the NIE.<sup>3</sup> Mr. Berger's directives followed personal discussions with both myself and the Senate Majority Leader, Senator Trent Lott. (U)

Subsequent to Mr. Berger's pledge to have the IC conduct a special NIE, I met personally with the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. Patrick Hughes, to underscore the importance I attached to the need for this NIE to be thorough and objective. (U)

In the Fall of 1997, Congress passed, and the President signed into law, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 which included a provision I authored that required the Director of Central Intelligence to "provide analytical support on POW/MIA matters."<sup>4</sup> The legislative history of this provision made clear that it was related to both the preparation of the forthcoming NIE which would be relied on by departments and agencies involved with POW/MIA matters, and the need for better intelligence support for POW/MIA investigative activity — a need highlighted by the findings of a bipartisan inquiry by the SSCI in April, 1998 — an inquiry which determined that the IC had not provided input for the President's certification on whether Vietnam was fully cooperating on the POW/MIA issue. (U)

<sup>3</sup> Letter to the Senate Majority Leader from the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, dated April 10, 1998. (U)

<sup>4</sup> Public Law 105-85, Section 1067, entitled *POW/MIA Intelligence Analysis*. (U)

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The National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for East Asia, [redacted] was subsequently assigned the lead role by the Director of the National Intelligence Council (NIC), John Gannon, in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), George Tenet. An Asian analyst from the Directorate of Intelligence, [redacted] was assigned the role of principal author and was instructed to draft the NIE under the guidance of [redacted] [redacted]

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In early November, 1997, I met with [redacted] to again underscore my concerns that the forthcoming NIE be prepared in as thorough and comprehensive a manner as possible. The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. Patrick Hughes, also continued to pledge that he would become personally engaged in the NIE analytical effort, to ensure that it was thorough, objective, and subjected to rigorous review.<sup>6</sup> (U)

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EO 12958 6.1(c)-10Yrs

The SRV POW/MIA issue addressed in the NIE centered on two key questions, as stated in the NIE's Scope Note: (1) Since 1987, to what extent has the leadership of Vietnam demonstrated a commitment to cooperating with the United States to achieve the fullest possible accounting of missing in action personnel, and (2) What is the Intelligence Community's assessment of the so-called "1205" and "735" documents from the Russian archives? (U)

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<sup>5</sup> Transcript of Briefing on National Intelligence Estimate to U.S. Side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POWs and MIAs, Comments by NIC Director, page 3, dated June 17, 1998.

<sup>6</sup> Letter from Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, to Sen. Smith dated December 11, 1997(U).

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As of 1998, over 2,070 U.S. personnel remain missing or otherwise unaccounted for in Southeast Asia as a result of the Vietnam War. (U)

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EO 12958 1.5(c)-10Yrs

**III DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF NIE STATEMENTS:****Scope Note (P.1):**

NIE STATEMENT: *"Some of the judgments it (the NIE) reaches are based upon assessments made by experienced American officials rather than upon a sizable body of intelligence reporting." (p.1)*

**ASSESSMENT:**

I question why any National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) would make judgments in areas if there is no sizable body of intelligence reporting within the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) upon which to base such judgments, in whole or even in part. Moreover, based on a listing of documents compiled by my office, scanning thirty-plus years, there does, in fact, appear to be significant intelligence reporting concerning the areas where the IC was asked to make judgments. Assessments made by U.S. officials outside the IC can certainly be reviewed by the principal drafter of a NIE, but they should not then be cited as the primary basis for some of the judgments of the NIE itself, especially when relevant intelligence information is, in fact, available. This was not done in the prior Special National Intelligence Estimate, entitled *Hanoi and the POW/MIA issue*, dated September, 1987, has not been done in NIE's on other topics which I have reviewed (for example, see NIE 95-19, entitled, "Emerging Missile Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years") and it should not have been done here. The extent and the process by which any NIE's judgments are allowed to be predominantly based upon the views of individuals outside the IC, rather than upon intelligence reporting, should be reviewed by Congress and the leaders of the IC.

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The National Intelligence Council (NIC) should be required to provide a listing of the judgments in this NIE which are "based upon assessments made by experienced

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American officials rather than upon a sizable body of intelligence reporting" so the reader of the NIE can more easily distinguish between NIE judgments based on intelligence reporting, and NIE judgments predominantly based on the views of individuals outside the IC. As noted above, I do not believe it was appropriate for the NIE to make judgments in areas where there is not a sizable body of intelligence, if that, in fact, is the case. Any real collection gaps should have been more fully noted in this regard, and judgments that are not predominantly based on intelligence reporting should also be clearly noted in the text of the NIE.

EO 12958 1.5(c)-10Yrs

U.S. decision-makers are quite capable of obtaining the views of other individuals outside the IC with respect to Hanoi and the POW/MIA issue. Finally, it should also be noted that this was not a requirement noted in the terms of reference coordinated with the SSCI.

EO 12958 1.5(c)-10Yrs

## NIE STATEMENT:

*"In some cases we had to consider intelligence reporting that is as much as 25 years old"*

EO 12958 1.5(c)-10Yrs

*"For these and other reasons, there are important gaps in our knowledge of these sensitive issues, and our judgments must therefore be cautious." (p.1)*

EO 12958 1.5(c)-10Yrs

## ASSESSMENT:

Since one of the NIC's two main taskings with regard to this NIE was to evaluate Soviet GRU reports disseminated to the Soviet leadership in 1971 and 1972, concerning the numbers of U.S. POWs during the war and North Vietnamese policy toward their release, it is bizarre that the NIE would infer so definitively up front that the GRU was a foreign intelligence service of "unknown reliability."

EO 12958 1.5(c)-10Yrs

<sup>7</sup> See letters to CIA/OCA from SSCI dated May 29, 1997 and October 27, 1997, and CIA/OCA letter to SSCI dated November 21, 1997. (U)

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Additionally, if the date of these reports was a reason for the NIE's judgments to be "cautious," it strains credulity to expect the reader of the NIE to later accept the NIE's blunt "current assessment" of these documents as "not what they purport to be."<sup>8</sup>

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EO 12958 6.1(c)-10Yrs

<sup>8</sup> See page 26 of the NIE (Part II, IC Assessment of 1205/735 Documents, Current Assessment).

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### III DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF NIE STATEMENTS: (continued)

#### Key Judgments (P.5-8):

NIE STATEMENT: *"Since the early 1990s, we have seen evidence for increased Vietnamese cooperation on the POW/MIA issue in the strengthened staffing, increased responsiveness, and growing professionalism of the Vietnamese organizations that deal with this issue."* (p.5)  
(U)

EO 12958 6.1(c) &lt;10Yrs

#### ASSESSMENT:

EO 12958 6.1(c) &lt;10Yrs

The relevant Key Question identified earlier in the Scope Note was: "Since 1987, (emphasis added) to what extent has the leadership (emphasis added) of the Government of the SRV demonstrated a commitment to cooperating with the United States to achieve the fullest possible accounting (emphasis added) of American personnel missing in action during the Vietnam Conflict."

The Key Judgment response begins "since the early 1990s, (emphasis added) we have seen evidence for increased Vietnamese cooperation on the POW/MIA issue in the strengthened staffing, increased responsiveness, and growing professionalism of the Vietnamese organizations that deal with this issue (emphasis added). (U)

Nowhere in the NIE is there a discussion of SRV leadership intentions, performance, and capabilities on the POW/MIA issue between 1987 and the early 1990s, as required by the Key Question, developed in coordination with the SSCI



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
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<sup>9</sup> As of 1991, 798 American personnel listed by their services as missing in action in 1973 were still unaccounted for in Vietnam, with an additional 333 for Laos, 85% of whom were lost in areas of Laos controlled by North Vietnamese forces during the war. As of 1997 (latest available figures), the number has dropped 57 to 739 in Vietnam and has dropped 47 to 286 for Laos. These numbers *exclude*, as of 1991, 1,053 American personnel listed by their services as killed in action/body not recovered in 1973 in the same geographic locations, down to 1,007 as of 1997.  
(U)

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NIE STATEMENT: *"In our view, Hanoi judges that...normalization requires progress on the POW/MIA issue." (p.5) (U)*

ASSESSMENT:

EO 12958 1.5(c) &lt;10Yrs

In view of the fact that the U.S. removed objections to international financial institution lending to Vietnam in 1993, lifted the U.S. trade embargo on Hanoi in 1994, established full diplomatic relations with Vietnam in 1995, confirmed a U.S. Ambassador to Hanoi in 1997, and the President certified Vietnam's full and good-faith cooperation on the POW/MIA issue in 1996, 1997, and 1998, the NIE's nebulous judgment above warrants clarification. (U)

Specifically, the NIE glaringly fails to define what constitutes *progress* on the POW/MIA issue from Hanoi's standpoint ie: *maintaining* their current level of cooperation or *improving* their current level of cooperation -- these differences in how progress is defined from Hanoi's standpoint have serious implications for U.S.

<sup>10</sup> The 1987 special NIE, entitled, *Hanoi and the POW/MIA Issue*, states "...there is considerable evidence that the Vietnamese have detailed information on the fates of several hundred US personnel. North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces had policies governing the handling of US remains that included removing identifying data, burying the remains, and sending the identification and location of the gravesite to Hanoi. We estimate that the Vietnamese have already recovered and are warehousing between 400 and 600 remains. Thus, Hanoi could quickly account for several hundred US personnel by returning warehoused remains and by providing material evidence that could aid in determining the fate of other personnel." (U)

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policy makers and are critical to judging the timing and likelihood for resolution of key outstanding POW/MIA accounting issues. As such, the NIE's judgment here is inadequate and incomplete. (U)

US policy makers deserve the benefit of an IC judgment as to whether Hanoi believes they can just maintain the status quo without any need for improvement in their POW/MIA cooperation as a condition for further expansion of economic relations, to include the establishment of normal trade relations. (U)

NIE STATEMENT: *"On the issue of recovering and repatriating American remains of U.S. personnel, we rate Vietnamese cooperation as excellent."* (p.5) (U)

ASSESSMENT:

EO 12958 6.1(c)-10Yrs

The question of exactly *who* is rating Vietnamese cooperation on recovery and repatriation of US remains, as reflected above in the NIE, is germane because the above-quoted NIE statement is repeated again in the NIE in a blue chart on page 7, entitled *Summary Evaluation: Vietnamese Cooperation with the United States on POW/MIA Accounting*. The category element is listed as *Joint Field Activities; Recovery and Repatriation of Remains*, with the level of cooperation listed as *excellent*. (U)

The source for the chart is identified in a footnote as *US officials responsible for carrying out research, investigation, and joint recovery operations of American POW/MIAs*, later identified as Joint Task Force (Full Accounting) officials.

There is no distinction drawn anywhere else in either the chart or in the above-quoted NIE contention between *joint* US-SRV recovery/repatriation of remains and *unilateral* SRV recovery/repatriation of remains. Since there is no other category element in the chart to reflect unilateral SRV activity, the reader must assume that the term *recovery and repatriation of remains* refers to both unilateral and joint

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efforts. (U)

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This assumption is supported by a subsequent statement on page 16 that reads, "Vietnamese responsiveness on the recovery and repatriation issue is currently described by JTF-FA officials as excellent."

For the NIE to then reflect as its own IC judgment, a position that SRV cooperation concerning joint and unilateral recovery and repatriation of US remains is *excellent*, based solely on assurances provided to the IC from one non-intelligence entity (ie: JTF-FA), belies comprehension, and is especially disturbing for three main reasons:

(1) there is evidence available to the Intelligence Community concerning:

(a) Vietnamese manipulation of witnesses and material evidence at

and (b) Vietnamese

recovery of US remains that have not been repatriated to the United States.<sup>12</sup> (U) EO 12958 1.5(c) <10Yrs

(2) the Research and Analysis Directorate of the Department of Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO), consisting of former IC analysts, and responsible for JTF-FA policy guidance on operations and investigations in Vietnam, has consistently maintained that "our own estimates regarding the number of US remains collected and stored by Hanoi are well within the range of acceptable error" for the 400-600 rough first-hand estimate provided by a source deemed reliable by that office and subsequently reflected in the 1987 special NIE. DPMO has further stated, "our analysis indicates that in total,

<sup>12</sup> Comprehensive Report/Case Assessments prepared by Department of Defense POW/MIA Office, and sent to Congress on November 13, 1995, and December 5, 1995, pursuant to Public Law (U); and DoD Inspector General Report of Interview with Garnett "Bill" Bell, former Chief, U.S. POW/MIA Office, 1991, dated October 10, 1996, and IC reporting since 1987. (U)

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Vietnam collected and stored an estimated 300 US remains.<sup>13</sup>

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At the same time, information made available by the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory (CILHI) indicates that approximately 170 US remains repatriated by Hanoi since the end of the war show evidence of storage.<sup>14</sup>

[Redacted] EO 12958 1.5(d) <10Yrs

(3) As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs himself recently indicated, "While, in recent years, the Vietnamese have been constructive and cooperative in facilitating the forensic review and repatriation of remains, since September 1990, these remains have all been *jointly* (emphasis added) recovered in the field or turned in by local citizens...Failure to repatriate these remains would be a very hostile act.

EO 12958 1.5(d) <10Yrs

[Redacted] EO 12958 6.1(c) <10Yrs

[Redacted] EO 12958 1.5(c) <10Yrs

In essence, the NIE chose to base an evaluation of Vietnamese cooperation in the area of remains recovery on assurances from one non-intelligence entity (JTF-FA), alone, without even factoring in the positions of the non-intelligence entity that oversees JTF-FA and evaluates Vietnamese performance and knowledge in this

EO 12958 1.5(c) <10Yrs

<sup>13</sup> Memorandum for Under Secretary of Defense, Walter Slocombe, #I-98/69271

[Redacted]

<sup>14</sup> See Memorandum of CILHI statistics, distributed by Executive Director, National League of Families of Americans Missing and Prisoner in Southeast Asia, dated September 1, 1998. (U)

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particular area (ie: DPMO). But even more disturbing is the NIO's statement, with respect to this specific assessment, that the IC itself cannot be expected to be a source for such an evaluation in an NIE because [redacted]

[redacted] This contention has serious ramifications for the reputation of the U.S. Intelligence Community, and would be akin to a statement that the IC cannot assess North Korean performance on missile proliferation because the IC does not deal with North Korea on this subject [redacted]

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## NIE STATEMENT:

*"We think Hanoi's decision to be more cooperative with the United States on POW/MIA accounting has not come easily to the Vietnamese leaders...But our reporting suggests that the POW/MIA issue no longer has the political sensitivity it once had."* (p.5) (U)

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## ASSESSMENT:

The NIE contends that evidence for increased Vietnamese cooperation has occurred "since the early 1990s." Yet, inexplicably, the NIE simultaneously ignores the obvious by minimizing the issue's sensitivity: It is because of the political sensitivity of the POW/MIA issue and its perceived public linkage to normalization of U.S.-SRV relations beginning in 1991 that Vietnam has taken the steps at the working level, referenced in this NIE, to give the appearance of overall progress. In point of fact, at no time since the end of the war in 1973, was the need for Vietnamese action on the POW/MIA issue more politically sensitive for Hanoi than when normalization of relations with the United States period was so close at hand, and then underway the last few years, while at the same time, the issue itself was under close scrutiny in Washington.<sup>17</sup> (U)

<sup>16</sup> Transcript of Briefing on National Intelligence Estimate provided to U.S. side of U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, U.S. Capitol, S. 407, on June 17, 1998 (p.26) [redacted]

<sup>17</sup> At the time of publication of the 1987 special NIE on this subject, the White House

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Indeed, the surfacing of the so-called "1205" and "735" documents from Russian archives in 1993 (discussed in Part Two of this NIE), and Hanoi's response, proves beyond any doubt that the issue itself has become *more* politically sensitive *not less* as implied in the NIE. Moreover, for the NIE to directly state that "our reporting suggests" less sensitivity mandates a full review of the IC's holdings on this judgment as it again strains credulity, in view of public events, to believe that the IC has no reporting to suggest Hanoi's continued, and even increased, sensitivity to perceptions of its cooperation on the POW/MIA issue in recent years. (U)

NIE STATEMENT: *"Incidents of outright refusal to cooperate with U.S. investigators have decreased..."* (p.5) (U)

ASSESSMENT:

Several questions come to mind with this NIE contention above because the NIE provides no clear time frame of reference for the statement and no apparent sourcing. Incidents of outright refusal have decreased compared to what previous period - since 1987, since the early 1990's? Who is the source for this broad statement in the NIE — intelligence reporting, JTF-FA officials, etc...? Is this a realistic and reliable indicator of cooperation, and is it based on a convincing analysis of documented US requests to SRV officials which have been flatly denied, and has the record of US requests been consistent enough over time to

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appointed a Special Emissary to Hanoi on the POW/MIA Issue, General John Vessey. Four years later, in August, 1991, the United States Senate voted unanimously to establish a Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, in view of continued suspicions about Hanoi's cooperation and the U.S. Government's handling of the issue. During this same period, the Department of State presented SRV officials with a road map to normalization of U.S.-SRV relations, requiring increased POW/MIA cooperation. The Department of Defense subsequently established a Joint Task Force contingent in January, 1992, under the U.S. Pacific Command, reporting to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There is little doubt that Hanoi recognized that the issue was becoming more politically sensitive for them, not less. (U)

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accurately reflect a cooperative SRV trend? These questions warrant a response and a further review of the evidence available to the IC. (U)

NIE STATEMENT: *"...there are still instances in which the Vietnamese raise objections to POW/MIA activities. In most cases, the Vietnamese cite considerations of sovereignty — for example, in refusing to make internal Politburo documents accessible to US investigators; security, such as not allowing US officials to enter classified locations and facilities; or technical problems, such as difficulty locating documents or records. Occasionally, the Vietnamese state that local villagers are concerned about the intrusive nature of investigations and recovery operations." (p.5-6) (U)*

ASSESSMENT:

The NIE fails to judge, from an intelligence point of view, the credibility of the above-referenced SRV excuses (e.g. does a Communist dictatorship really care about the views of local villagers), and the potential implications of these objections (ie: is this where the goods are if Hanoi's leaders had, in fact, decided to withhold certain critical information that directly bears on the POW/MIA accounting question). Moreover, the reader is led to infer from the NIE statement itself that the excuses, may, in fact, be persuasive and genuine. The failure to make a judgment in this critical area concerning SRV intentions, capabilities, and performance, renders its inclusion in the Key Judgments section of the NIE meaningless. (U)

NIE STATEMENT: *"...Vietnam's performance generally has improved with respect to the US POW/MIA issue...Vietnam's overall performance in dealing with the POW/MIA problem has been good in recent years..." (p.6) (U)*

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
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## ASSESSMENT:

A Key Judgment that "performance generally has improved" and "overall performance has been good" requires at least some attempt under this heading to define what is meant by the term "generally" and "overall." Information and testimony clearly indicate that performance has not significantly improved since the early 1990s with respect to access to any relevant POW/MIA material contained in Communist Party Politburo or Central Committee-level holdings, in addition to better access to SRV Ministry of National Defense and General Political Directorate wartime documentation on American losses along the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos.<sup>18</sup> (U)



And according to the Commander of the Joint Task Force (Full Accounting), the U.S., in point of fact, no longer has a full-time presence with Vietnamese counterparts working in North Vietnamese museums and archives, something which was once heralded as a breakthrough in the POW/MIA accounting mission.<sup>19</sup> (U)

All of the above information was available to the principal drafter of the NIE, who concedes having relied on JTF-FA opinions in both defined and undefined sections of the NIE, as opposed to intelligence reporting which is alleged not to exist. Yet, for none of the areas outlined above to warrant inclusion and consideration relating to a judgment under the heading of *performance generally* or *overall performance*

<sup>18</sup> DoD Testimony to House National Security Subcommittee on Military Personnel, dated June 28, 1995, November 30, 1995, and June 19, 1996 (U); and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (POW/MIA Affairs) letter to U.S. Senator Hank Brown, dated April 25, 1996. (U)

<sup>19</sup> Memorandum for the Record, Meeting with JTF-FA Commander, General Terry Tucker, dated June, 1998. (U)

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on the POW/MIA issue implies a clear lack of knowledge of the relevant aspects to the POW/MIA accounting effort, and is especially disturbing because the referenced information was previously made available to the IC.<sup>20</sup> (U)

The NIE notes earlier that performance has improved in some areas, such as increased staffing, responsiveness, and professionalism, but this can hardly be interpreted as the sole basis for good overall performance *with respect to the US POW/MIA issue*. Because the NIE's judgment in this area is not supported by available evidence, it is inadequate, misleading, and cannot be accepted with any confidence. (U)

## NIE STATEMENT:

*"...we think Hanoi has not been completely forthcoming on certain POW/MIA matters: In some instances, we believe full disclosure would prove embarrassing to the regime. For example, Hanoi continues to deny that US POWs were mistreated while in captivity in the North. We think Vietnam still has records it could make available to US investigators but which would discredit its denials of mistreatment. A few reports of transfers of US POWs to Russia and other countries are unexplained, and the books remain open."* (p.6) (U)

## ASSESSMENT:

Under the heading Key Judgments above, the NIE chooses to define "certain" POW/MIA matters where Hanoi is not completely forthcoming as (1) for example, records which would discredit SRV denials of POW torture, and (2) a few reports of transfer of US POWs to Russia and other countries. (U)

<sup>20</sup> Letter from Chairman and Vice-Chairman, SSCI, to CIA, dated December 3, 1997 and letters to DIA Director from Sen. Smith dated February 6, 1998 and April 15, 1998. (U)

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With respect to (1), it remains unexplained given the gravity of key outstanding POW/MIA questions why torture would be cited in this Key Judgments portion of the NIE as the most important and relevant example to use, and not other more embarrassing examples such as the holding back of any unacknowledged American POWs after Operation Homecoming in 1973. (U)

On June 17, 1998, I asked [redacted] the NIO for East Asia, the following question:

EO 12958 6.1(c)<10Yrs

*Sen. Smith: Would it not also be embarrassing to release information that they held back American prisoners? Yes or no.*

[redacted] *Yes.*

EO 12958 6.1(c)<10Yrs

*Sen. Smith: ...So why wouldn't you say just as conjecture, that if it is embarrassing for them to provide torture information, it would be just as embarrassing for them to tell us that they held back American POWs after the war. Wouldn't it?*

EO 12958 6.1(c)<10Yrs

[redacted] *I suppose it would.*<sup>21</sup> [redacted]

The fact that the NIE does not reflect a more relevant example bearing on the POW/MIA accounting issue under the Key Judgments heading is not only disappointing, but very misleading to the NIE reader concerning the scope of knowledge the SRV may still possess concerning unaccounted for POW/MIAs. (U)

EO 12958 1.5(d)<10Yrs

It bears noting that the Office of the Secretary of Defense has also formally expressed concern with the citing of this specific example under the Key Judgments portion of the NIE, stating, in part:

[redacted]

EO 12958 1.5(c)<10Yrs

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<sup>21</sup> Transcript of Briefing on National Intelligence Estimate provided to U.S. side of U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, U.S. Capitol, S.407, June 17, 1998, p. 26-27. [redacted]

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With respect to (2), on unexplained reports of possible POW transfer from Vietnam to Russia and other countries, the NIE judges that because a few reports are unexplained, and the books remain open, then this means that Hanoi *has not been completely forthcoming*, even though the NIE subsequently states in a later section on p. 24, "...we lack good evidence that POWs were transferred to the USSR..."  
 EO 12958 6.1(c) <10Yrs

Given this subsequent statement, it seems odd that the NIE can reach a Key Judgment on p. 6 that Hanoi has not been completely forthcoming on this topic. [REDACTED]

I agree that the books must definitely remain open on the transfer issue based on more pressing information previously made available to the IC but inexplicably not referenced in the NIE under the heading of unresolved transfer reports on p. 22.<sup>23</sup>  
 EO 12958 6.1(c) <10Yrs

[REDACTED]

However, these matters notwithstanding, the evidence before the IC has been much more continuous and voluminous than Hanoi did not acknowledge and return all US POWs under its control in 1973 than is has been on the transfer issue. As such, it is bizarre that some unexplained reports of transfer would meet the threshold for inclusion in this section, yet a larger body of evidence on other unresolved subjects bearing on continued SRV stonewalling on POW/MIA issues would not be included here. As such, the Key Judgment in this section is woefully inadequate, shallow, and misleading to the NIE reader with respect to the potential scope of SRV knowledge.  
 EO 12958 1.5(c) <10Yrs

[REDACTED]

<sup>23</sup> See [REDACTED] Soviet-MIG defector, Alexander Zuyev [REDACTED] follow-up JCSD interviews with him (U), and published claims by Zuyev in Malcolm McConnell's book, *Fulcrum* (U); in addition to the report by Russian Presidential Advisor and Co-Chairman of the Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, the late Dmitri Volkogonov, discovered in early January, 1998,  
 EO 12958 1.5(c) <10Yrs

concerning evidence of a KGB assigned mission and plan to "transfer knowledgeable Americans to the USSR" in the late 1960s, made available to the NIC by the JCSD on January 14, 1998. (U)

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## NIE STATEMENT:

*"We have reviewed the so-called "1205 and 735 documents," which purport — falsely in our view — to be reports to the party leadership containing statements that Hanoi held large numbers of US POWs above those acknowledged to the United States. We believe the judgments in the 1993 IC assessment released by DoD remain valid: that the documents are probably authentic GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence) - collected documents. But many of the details of the documents, including dates and other facts, are implausible or inconsistent with reliable evidence...We believe that neither document provides a factual foundation on which to judge Vietnamese performance on the POW/MIA issue." (p.8)*

(U)

## ASSESSMENT:

The referenced 1993 IC assessment released by DoD was actually released by DoD on January 24, 1994. It states, in part, the following in relation to the 1205 and 735 documents:

1205 Document Assessment by IC/DoD released in January, 1994:

- *We believe it probably is an authentic Soviet document...(it) appears to be an authentic Russian intelligence report.*
- *We found portions of the "1205 Report" that were unrelated to the POW-MIA issue to be plausible...the most credible of which is in the section about political operations planned for South Vietnam.*
- *For example, it identifies several South Vietnamese leaders who were known opponents of the regime of President Nguyen Van Thieu and who were*

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reported to have had clandestine contacts with representatives from the North.

- It accurately depicts the circumstances surrounding the surrender of a South Vietnamese unit during the 1972 Easter Offensive, admitting that the North's propaganda had misrepresented the event.
- It predicts an upsurge in terrorist attacks beginning in October, 1972, which was indeed noted in the Mekong Delta region in November...
- We cannot dismiss the "1205 Report" as a fabrication, but before we can accept it as what the Russian cover memo claims it is, we must have better evidence of its authorship and credibility.
- There probably also is more information in Vietnamese party and military archives that could shed light on this document. We continue to pursue this.
- As further information becomes available, this assessment will be updated.<sup>24</sup>  
(U)

735 Document Assessment by IC/DoD released in January, 1994:

- We have only two complete pages, 11 and 18, of a longer report, making it difficult to analyze closely.
- Like the "1205 Report", it is a GRU document, transcribing and translating the text of an oral report presented at a Vietnamese Communist Party conclave.
- We believe the report is a genuine GRU document, not a fabrication, as claimed by Hanoi.
- The "735 Document" is too fragmentary to permit detailed analysis...
- There probably also is more information in Vietnamese party and military archives that could shed light on this document. We continue to pursue this.<sup>25</sup> (U)

<sup>24</sup> Department of Defense News Release/Memorandum for Correspondents, No. 028-94, dated January 24, 1994. (U)

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

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Based on the above quotations from the previous assessment, it is clear that the current NIE has not accurately represented this earlier judgment by stating "...many of the details of the documents, including dates and other facts, are implausible or inconsistent with reliable evidence" and *not* acknowledging that portions of the 1205 report, were, in fact, accurate or plausible based on evidence available to the IC, and represented as such in January, 1994. (U)

Equally important, the earlier assessment specifically *rejected* Hanoi's contention that the 735 Document was a fabrication, and not a genuine GRU document, and specifically judged that there was probably more information in Vietnamese party and military archives that could shed light on both documents, and that this information would be pursued in Hanoi. (U)

For the current NIE to say that the *judgments* in the prior assessment *remain valid*, but then say that neither document provides a factual *foundation upon which to judge Vietnamese performance* on the POW/MIA question, is simply irreconcilable, especially given the undeniable fact that, as of this writing, Hanoi has yet to disclose any relevant data from party archives that could shed light on either of these documents. The prior judgments put a lie to Hanoi's performance and credibility on this aspect of the 1205/735 documents, leaving the NIE reader with a Key Judgment that is not supported by the prior judgments the NIE itself references. (U)

Finally, every piece of relevant data on the issue of authenticity gathered and made available to the IC since the prior assessment was conducted in 1994 has reinforced the contention that the documents, are, in fact, legitimate GRU acquisitions.<sup>26</sup> For the NIE to be timid and hesitant to remove the 1994 term "probably" for purposes of the current NIE Key Judgment on whether the documents are, in fact, authentic GRU collected materials, is extremely misleading to the NIE reader. In point of

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<sup>26</sup> See Record of USRJC meetings and JCSD interviews and investigations conducted between 1994-1998, maintained by the Vietnam War Working Group, JCSD, Defense POW/MIA Office, Department of Defense, and the Office of Senator Bob Smith. (U)

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fact, aside from Hanoi's rhetorical claims against the documents, no credible witness or information has surfaced to suggest that these are not authentic wartime GRU acquisitions. Continuance of the term "probably" injects unwarranted speculation concerning authenticity which is unsupported by the historical record concerning the discovery and release of this information to the United States in 1993, and subsequent investigations by the Joint U.S.-Russia Commission on POWs and MIAs. (U)

NIE STATEMENT: *(With respect to the 1205/735 documents), "In particular, the numbers of POWs allegedly held by Hanoi at the times mentioned are inconsistent with reliable US Government statistics and far outnumber the actual total of open cases." (p.8) (U)*

ASSESSMENT:

The NIE statement that the number of POWs allegedly held is *inconsistent with reliable US Government statistics* is not proven or demonstrated anywhere in the NIE -- it is merely *asserted*. Given the priority assigned by the National Security Advisor to the President for an assessment of these documents, it is simply unacceptable that a detailed analysis of the numbers is not presented in the NIE. This is especially disturbing because the NIE's claim on its face is, in fact, demonstrably false as shown below. (U)

First, with respect to the so-called "735" Document:

According to the English translation of the 735 document, the Russian GRU reports a statement by a North Vietnamese official to a North Vietnamese leadership gathering, that "...we published the names of 368 American pilots who were shot down and taken captive in the territory of the D.R.V. (North Vietnam)...The overall number of American pilots imprisoned in the D.R.V. is 735. As I already stated, we published the names of 368 pilots. This is our diplomatic move." The time frame

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for the report is dated "End of December, 1970/early January, 1971," according to the GRU cover page to the translated text from Vietnamese to Russian. (U)

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It is true and verifiable that during this time-frame, Hanoi did, in fact, publish a list of exactly 368 names, entitled, "U.S. Pilots Captured in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam from August 5, 1964 to November 15, 1970." Yet, nowhere in the NIE is the confirmation of this statement in the "735" document acknowledged. The IC has a responsibility to share this information with the reader of the NIE. It did not. Why?

The 368 list was published by the DRV's Ministry of National Defense, and is dated November 15, 1970. The list was released to representatives of Senators Kennedy and Fulbright in Paris on December 22, 1970, and provided to certain other foreign governments as well.<sup>27</sup> All of the names of the men on the list had previously been unofficially provided to American peace activist Cora Weiss between May and November, 1970.<sup>28</sup> (U)

The 368 list itself consisted of 339 Air Force and Navy pilots and crewmembers currently in captivity, 9 such personnel previously released, and 20 such personnel listed as dead.<sup>29</sup> The status of the 339 men listed as captives was already known to

<sup>27</sup> Memorandum to President Nixon from National Security Advisor, Henry A. Kissinger, dated December 23, 1970; Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum for the Record of the December 22, 1970 meeting of the NSC Ad-Hoc Group on Vietnam, dated December 23, 1970; Memorandum of Conversation of the USSR Ambassador to Vietnam with Chief of the Department of the USSR of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, dated December 22, 1970; AP Bulletin dated December 22, 1970, UPI Bulletin dated December 22, 1970; New York Times News Service, dated December 25, 1972; and American Embassy Rome message, May 3, 1971. (U)

<sup>28</sup> See "Cora Weiss" lists of POWs obtained by Defense Intelligence Agency, released to Sen. Smith in 1993 from DIA holdings previously sent to National Archives in 1984 (U); Memorandum from Secretary of Defense to Service Secretaries, dated August, 1971. (U)

<sup>29</sup> Memorandum from Chief, Evasion and Escape Branch, Production Support and Resources Division, Defense Intelligence Agency, dated June 21, 1972. (U)

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the Pentagon based on the Cora Weiss lists and U.S. intelligence and casualty information at the time, although this was the first "official" acknowledgment of their status by Hanoi.<sup>30</sup> (U)

Based on Department of Defense POW/MIA lists<sup>31</sup>, only 335 Air Force and Navy pilots and crewmembers captured in North Vietnam prior to November 15, 1970 were later repatriated to the United States (one in Sept. 72, and the remainder following the signing of the Peace Accords in 1973 (Jan-Apr). (U)

This fact essentially means only two things: Hanoi made the political decision to release a full and complete list of airmen captured in North Vietnam in December, 1970 (which was the only category of men in this category from this time period later released in 1973) *or* Hanoi, as the 735 Document alleges, viewed the December, 1970 list as a diplomatic move, whereby the decision was made not to acknowledge all airmen captured by North Vietnamese forces at this point in the war. (U)

Incredibly, the NIE is completely silent on this vital and obvious question of Vietnamese intentions, as described above. More importantly, the evidence is powerful that Hanoi did not and would not have released, in 1970, a complete list of airmen captured by North Vietnamese forces, nor did the U.S. Government believe it to be a complete list of U.S. POWs held in North Vietnam at the time.<sup>32</sup> Yet, the

<sup>30</sup> Statement by Dr. Roger E. Shields, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, dated January 28, 1974, p.4. (U)

<sup>31</sup> Chronological List of U.S. Personnel lost, captured, missing, and repatriated from Southeast Asia, Defense POW/MIA Office Official Reference Document, dated May, 1997. (U)

<sup>32</sup> U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird stated at the time, based on DoD's review of the 1970 list, "I do not accept it as a complete list of all the prisoners held in North Vietnam." (Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, dated August, 1971). He reinforced that position 21 years later in testimony before the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs on September 21, 1992, stating "I felt those lists were inadequate...it was not complete information, and we knew of the existence of other POWs when those lists were delivered to us... We felt there were more... We had solid, confirmed evidence

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NIE would have its readers believe otherwise without even attempting to demonstrate its unsupported contention. (U)

In addition, according to official U.S. Government statistics, forwarded to the Director of Central Intelligence during this period, as of December, 1970 (the same month as the alleged "735" report), the Department of Defense officially listed 462 POWs, 962 MIAs, and 117 Non-Hostile missing, for a total of 1,541 "missing and captured personnel."<sup>33</sup> This statistic alone puts a lie to the NIE's contention that "735" (less than half of 1,541) is *inconsistent* with reliable U.S. Government statistics. (U)

Based on an examination of these wartime statistics, to include factoring in all U.S. air losses over both North Vietnam and North Vietnamese controlled areas of Laos (no airmen captured in Laos were on the disclosed 368 list), it is plausible that Hanoi could have had a pool of 367 additional US personnel "imprisoned in the DRV" who were not acknowledged as captive in December, 1970 (367 + 368 list = 735). Moreover, based on the actual total of open POW or MIA cases from North Vietnam and Laos, (as of 1997 - 607, of which the majority were loss prior to January, 1971), and inherent uncertainties concerning dates of death with respect to many of the approximately 500 remains repatriated from Southeast Asia since the end of the war, the *possibility* of 367 additional personnel having been held in

that there were more POWs in the North at that time." In addition, Acting Secretary of the Army, Thaddeus Beal, wrote to the Secretary of Defense on July 10, 1970, stating, "At present, Cora Weiss maintains that about 334 Americans are detained by Hanoi. But the facts are that 780 Americans are listed as missing in North Vietnam, and 769 in South Vietnam and Laos. We know with some certainty that of this number, 376 are PW in North Vietnam and 78 are PW elsewhere in Indochina. *We expect that among those listed as missing, substantial numbers will eventually turn up as captives...* To accept Hanoi's admission of responsibility for less than 350 US PW as conduct constituting reasonable, humane, or internationally responsible conduct is to betray those other forgotten Americans." (U)

<sup>33</sup> Message for Director, Central Intelligence Agency from American Embassy Saigon, "following are official figures from missing and captured personnel lists prepared by Deputy Comptroller for Information, DoD...", dated May 10, 1971. (U)

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captivity during this period, in point of fact, does not *far outnumber the actual total of open cases*, as the NIE claims. This is a glaring and readily apparent mathematical error in the NIE. (U)

The plausibility of the scenario in the "735" document being more historically accurate than the NIE's implicit contention that Hanoi chose to list all POWs it held in the North in 1970, is further demonstrated by information in another Soviet-era report previously disclosed to the IC.<sup>34</sup> In that report, originated by the Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi during the war, I.S. Scherbakov, and entitled, "Soviet-Vietnamese Negotiations in April, 1967," the Soviet Ambassador advises his North Vietnamese counterparts, "it is not necessary to inform the Americans on the exact number of prisoners. A half of them could be handed over and the others could be released later in exchange for repair of damage inflicted by the U.S. bombardment of the DRV."<sup>35</sup> It is interesting to note that the 735 Report describes a similar scenario being followed by Hanoi's leaders. Yet, inexplicably, this evidence is not presented in the NIE. (U)

Second, with respect to the so-called "1205" Document:

According to the English translation of the 1205 document, the Russian GRU reports statements by a North Vietnamese official to a North Vietnamese leadership gathering, to include the following:

"the total number of American POWs captured to date on the fronts of Indochina, ie: in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, comprises 1205 people...624 aviators captured in North Vietnam, 143 aviators captured in South Vietnam, 47 diversionists and other American servicemen captured in North

<sup>34</sup> See letter from Chairman and Vice-Chairman, SSCI, to CIA, dated December 3, 1997 and letters to DIA Director from Sen. Smith dated February 6, 1998 and April 15, 1998. (U)

<sup>35</sup> Extract from report entitled "Soviet Vietnamese Negotiations of April, 1967 and the Following WPV Policy with regard to a Vietnamese Problem Settlement," dated August, 1967, from Soviet Embassy, Hanoi. (U)

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Vietnam, and 391 American servicemen of other categories, which includes 283 captured in South Vietnam, 65 in Cambodia, and 43 in Laos..."

"We intend to resolve the American POW issue in the following manner: The U.S. Government must demonstrate compliance with a cease-fire and the removal of Nguyen Van Thieu...Nixon must compensate North Vietnam for the great damage inflicted on it by this destructive war... For now, we have officially published the list of the 368 POWs. The rest are not acknowledged. The U.S. Government is aware of this, but they do not know the exact number of POWs, or they perhaps only assume an approximate number based on their losses. That is why in accordance with instructions from the Politburo, we are keeping the number of POWs secret...when the American government resolves the political and military issues on all three fronts of Indochina, we will set free all American POWs." (U)

The time frame for the report is dated "September 15, 1972," according to the GRU cover page to the translated text (from Vietnamese to Russian). (U)

As demonstrated under the previous section with respect to the 735 document, it is true and verifiable that Hanoi did, in fact, officially release a list of exactly 368 names of captured Americans, which is again referenced above in the 1205 document. As noted earlier, this fact is not pointed out to the reader anywhere in the NIE. (U)

But more importantly, the NIE fails to offer the reader any convincing analysis of the numbers in the 1205 report to demonstrate their accuracy or inaccuracy. This is especially disturbing in view of U.S. statistics which listed approximately 1,800 U.S. personnel as captured or missing in Indochina as of September, 1972,<sup>36</sup> thereby on its face giving credence to an alleged North Vietnamese statistic that 1,205 Americans had actually been captured by communist forces as of that date. (U)

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<sup>36</sup> Chronological List of U.S. Personnel lost, captured, missing, and repatriated from Southeast Asia, Defense POW/MIA Office Official Reference Document, dated May, 1997. (U)

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With respect to one of the two largest categories of captured Americans noted in the 1205 report — 624 aviators captured in North Vietnam as of September, 1972<sup>EO 12958 1.5(c) <10Yrs</sup> U.S. statistics, based on Operation Homecoming in 1973, show that 405 aviators captured and held in North Vietnam as of September 15, 1972, returned alive, which would leave a discrepancy of 187 U.S. aviators (an adjusted high end figure which factors in early returnees and died in captivity airmen) if the 1205 report were plausible. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In view of the fact that, following Operation Homecoming, the U.S. Government still listed as captured or missing 430 airmen lost over North Vietnam prior to September, 1972, the question is whether 187 of 430 missing men could have been captured alive. The question is even more relevant given the fact that 1.) over 300 American airmen are still missing in action from incidents over North Vietnam alone; and 2.) none of these statistics include so-called Killed in Action/Body Not Recovered cases compromising men believed during the war by the U.S. side to have died without their bodies being recovered. (U)

With respect to the second of the two largest categories of captured Americans noted in the 1205 report — 283 captured American servicemen (not aviators) captured in South Vietnam as of September, 1972 — U.S. statistics, based on Operation Homecoming in 1973, show that 77 Army personnel and 17 Marines were returned to U.S. control, the majority of which had been captured prior to September, 1972. The 1205 report alleges, therefore, that approximately 190 additional U.S. ground personnel were captured by communist forces in South Vietnam. In view of the fact that, following Operation Homecoming, the U.S. Government still listed as captured or missing approximately 400 Army and Marine Corps personnel lost in South Vietnam, the question is whether 190 of 400 missing men could have been captured alive. And again, the question is even more relevant given the fact that 1.) over 300 men in this category are still missing in action from incidents in South Vietnam; and 2.) none of these statistics include so-called Killed in Action/Body Not Recovered cases compromising men believed during the war by the U.S. side to have died without their bodies being recovered. (U)

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The numbers of captured U.S. POWs in the 1205 report are also consistent with U.S. estimates in other smaller categories as well. For example, with respect to Laos, the 1205 report alleged "from other categories of American servicemen in Indochina, we have captured...forty-three in Laos." U.S. estimates were quite close to this figure. In January, 1973, the Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense told White House officials "we don't know what we will get from Laos. We have only six known prisoners in Laos, although we hope there may be forty or forty-one."<sup>37</sup> (U)

Once again, the NIE fails to offer any convincing analysis of these numbers and possibilities, and instead, forces its reader to accept an inaccurate claim on its face that the numbers in the 1205 document are *inconsistent and far outnumber the actual total of open cases*. Moreover, the NIE inexplicably ignores statements by credible Russian officials since 1993, (which were provided to the NIE principal author in early 1998), indicating their judgment that the total number of referenced US POWs was true or plausible. As examples —

- In September 1996, the Russian Chairman of the U.S.-Russia POW/MIA Commission, General-Major Vladimir Zolotarev, stated "*We consider the number of American POWs given in that report quite plausible.*"
- In August, 1995, the Chief State Archivist of the Russian Federation, Dr. Rudol'f Pikhoya, stated "*I am absolutely certain that the numbers cited in the 1205 report are true. I believe that data still exists in Vietnam which deals specifically with US POWs.*"
- Also, in August, 1995, Captain 1<sup>st</sup> Rank Alexander Sivets of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff of the Russian Federation stated "*We consider that the Vietnamese leaders, in their desire to exploit the POW problem for their own interests, would publicly cite a lower figure than*

<sup>37</sup> Excerpt from transcript of the Washington Special Actions Group (WASAG) Meeting, White House Situation Room, January 29, 1973. (U)

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*the real one. This is something that we do not doubt...we believe there were more American POWs than Vietnam was publicly admitting to" as the 1205/735 documents claim.*

- In a conversation with Gen. Vessey on June 22, 1993, Russian General Volkogonov stated "*the Vietnamese would naturally not keep those prisoners the US knew were in captivity,*" thus lending credibility to the fact that, with the exception of 16 individuals, all POWs captured during the Vietnam War prior to the date of the 1205 report, were, in fact, known to be POWs and so listed by the Pentagon prior to their release. <sup>38</sup> (U)

Finally, the NIE ignores credible testimony from former U.S. officials, (also provided to the principal NIE author in early 1998) which would tend to corroborate indications in 1973 that Hanoi had not acknowledged all US POWs in the lists turned over in Paris in January, 1973 for repatriation under the peace accords. As examples —

- On September 21, 1992, former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird testified before the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, stating "*Now when you get into the lists that were finally given to the Administration on January 27, 1973...I did not think at that time that those were full lists, that was my gut reaction...my expectations were higher, and I was disappointed.*"
- On June 24, 1992, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas R. Moorer, stated, in response to questioning by Senator Harry Reid on the reasons Moorer believed there were more POWs still in Southeast Asia in 1973, "*Well, because of the scope of the operations, and the number of persons that were involved and the number of aircraft that were shot down and so on, where we didn't find immediate information about what happened to the pilot and son on. I thought also, in view of the fact that the war had been going on*

<sup>38</sup> see DoD Enclosures for the Record, Hearing of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, September 24, 1992, p. 838. (U)

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*for 9 years, you know, I certainly would expect it to be more than the 591 (acknowledged POWs returned by Hanoi in 1973). I think that was the number on the initial list. I didn't think you could clean it up that fast."*

- On September 21, 1992, former Special Assistant to Dr. Kissinger, Winston Lord, stated *"We were disappointed that the lists were not longer...we were naturally suspicious of Hanoi after all our experience."*
- Another assistant to Dr. Kissinger, Peter Rodman, stated in his Senate deposition in 1992 that *U.S. negotiators were "stunned" that there were not more names of POWs on the lists turned over in Paris in January, 1973, for repatriation.*
- On September 21, 1992, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and Secretary of Defense, Dr. James R. Schlesinger, stated, in response to questioning by Senator Charles Grassley on whether Schlesinger believed men were left behind, *"I think that, as of now, I can come to no other conclusion, Senator...Despite the Paris agreements, there was no reason, in my judgment, to assume that the North Vietnamese would release everybody."*
- On June 24, 1992, in response to questioning by Senator John Kerry on reaction to the lists turned over by North Vietnam in Paris in January, 1973, former Director of Intelligence for the Pacific Command, and Director, DIA, Lt. Gen. Eugene Tighe, stated *"My personal view was shock because I had a great deal of faith in the approximate numbers of those lists we had compiled and the dossiers, and my reaction was that there was something radically wrong with the lists versus our information. They should have contained many more names. That was my personal judgment and it was the collective judgment of all those that had worked compiling the lists. It pertained to the personnel aspects of casualty reporting and the intelligence reports."*
- On September 9, 1992, former Director of the National Security Agency and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, testified in his Senate deposition, in response to a question on his view on whether men

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were still alive left behind in 1973, *"In '73, a large number of us shared the view that there were, simply because we had known people had gotten to the ground, and that there were substantial prisoners in Laos that were unaccounted for..."*

- On June 5, 1992, former Military Assistant on the NSC in 1973, and subsequently National Security Advisor in the Reagan Administration, Robert C. "Bud" McFarlane testified in his Senate deposition *"I told President Reagan that I believe there were hundreds of Americans that were alive after they were lost in North Vietnam or Laos, and that many of them were undoubtedly murdered, many of them were undoubtedly held...if a lot of them were alive right after they went down, then it becomes a matter of did the Vietnamese have more of an interest in keeping them alive or keeping them dead, killing them. It seems to me logical that they would have kept some alive, all of them perhaps..."*
- McFarlane subsequently stated in an interview on October 26, 1994, *"I think that at the end of the war, there were live American prisoners, and I think it's one of the real scandals of our history of that war...although we might not have been able to get them back, at least we ought to have held the Vietnamese publicly to account about it...I am willing to forgive as well as the next person, but I don't like to be had, and the Vietnamese are getting all of our leverage given away to them for nothing..."*
- On June 30, 1993, Dr. George Carver, former Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs to three successive Directors of Central Intelligence between 1966 and 1973, testified that *"...during 1973's initial months, a number of government officials, myself included, were convinced that the Vietnamese Communists were not leveling and never had leveled with the United States on the matter of American POWs..."* (U)

The NIE also ignores supporting evidence for these views made available to the principal author of the NIE, including a report previously forwarded by CIA to the

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National Security Council in 1973, and an analysis of POW numbers done by DIA that same year.<sup>40</sup> (U)

In conclusion, it is apparent that neither the 1994 IC/DoD Assessment of the 1205/735 documents nor the current NIE demonstrates the inaccuracy of the numbers cited in these documents. Both assessments *assert* the documents' inaccuracies, but neither *demonstrates* it. If the NIE cannot demonstrate the inaccuracy of the numbers cited, then its judgment that *neither document provides a factual foundation to judge Hanoi's performance on POW/MIA issues cannot be accepted* with any degree of confidence. (U)

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<sup>40</sup> Central Intelligence Agency Memorandum for Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Subject: *Indication that the Communists are Holding Previously Unlisted U.S. POWs as a Future Bargaining Tool*, dated March 20, 1973; Defense Intelligence Agency Memorandum, Subject: *The Status of U.S. Prisoners in Laos*, dated March 24, 1973, "...DIA has analyzed the number we thought should be prisoners in North Vietnam against the number the DRV has listed and found that 45% of our possibles turned up on the final list. A similar comparison in South Vietnam yields the figure of 21%. Since we carry 352 as possible in Laos, nine Americans on the Pathet Lao list gives a ridiculously low figure of 2.5%." (U)

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### III DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF NIE STATEMENTS: (continued)

#### Discussion. (P.9):

EO 12958 6.1(c) &lt;10Yrs

#### *Part One: The Question of Vietnamese Cooperation*

"...Vietnam is a hard-line Communist state, and we make a big mistake judging things like credibility by our standards. They have a different set of standards. For them, world revolution is ethical and proper... We shouldn't try to judge what they say or assess its credibility by any other standard than what is in their interest and furthers their cause."

— Rep. Henry Hyde, (R-IL) <sup>41</sup>

#### NIE STATEMENT:

"In some instances, Vietnamese on recovery teams have willingly worked beyond the terms of their contracts to successfully complete operations. Cultural reasons contribute to this record." (p.11)

"...for local officials, participation in joint field activities can be financially profitable. People in their villages can earn much more by working on the activity than they could in their normal work."

<sup>41</sup> From transcript of Press Conference by Congressional delegation to Hanoi to discuss POW/MIA issues, dated January 15, 1980 (press conference held in Bangkok, Thailand, see State cable 151820Z Jan 80, from American Embassy, Bangkok to SecState). (U)

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EO 12958 1.5(d)<10Yrs

[Redacted]

ASSESSMENT:

The above two conflicting statements appear to leave an NIE reader wondering "which is it?" Are the Vietnamese assisting U.S. efforts "for the money" and if so, then I question why these statements are cited in the NIE as good indicators of Vietnam's cooperative intentions. [Redacted]

NIE STATEMENT:

*"...U.S. requests to see Politburo documents pertaining to US POW/MIA issues have been turned aside...Vietnamese authorities have said they will research the records and provide relevant POW/MIA information,* [Redacted]

(p. 15)

ASSESSMENT:

EO 12958 1.5(c)<10Yrs

This is the first apparent indication to the Congress of which I am aware that

[Redacted]

Based on my own review [Redacted]

of this particular aspect of the POW/MIA issue, I seriously question the accuracy of this NIE statement, especially because the Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO) has indicated the opposite in both open testimony and written communication to Congress. [Redacted]

NIE STATEMENT:

*"Vietnamese Initiative in Recovery Operations: (Two) Recent Examples...Case 1927, Lt. Daniel Borah...In 1995, the VNSOMP (ie: Vietnam) reported that it had located a veteran of an antiaircraft battery whose members had found a dead American pilot named Borah,*

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*and had buried the body. The VNSOMP located a witness to the burial and then provided this information (though not the witness) to U.S. investigators...team subsequently excavated the site and recovered a complete set of remains...subsequently identified as Lt. Daniel Borah." (p. 17)*

EO 12958 6.1(c) &lt;10Yrs

EO 12958 6.1(c) &lt;10Yrs

## ASSESSMENT:

EO 12958 6.1(c) &lt;10Yrs

I question why the NIC would make a decision to include, in a separate blue box on page 17, two examples of cooperation by Vietnam on MIA cases, but not also give examples of cases where Hanoi has not been very cooperative, especially when such evidence exists in the judgment of the same DoD analysts who have worked on and analyzed the two referenced cases. I further question the appropriateness of selecting these cases and pointing the reader toward Vietnamese cooperation on MIA recovery operations without also pointing out similar cases where apparent stonewalling continues

Moreover, it is very interesting to note that with respect to Case 1927 (Lt. Borah) cited above, the family of Lt. Borah continues to believe that Vietnamese officials manipulated the crash site investigation, based on the evidence uncovered by JTF-FA personnel (ie: including a flight suit in remarkable condition for having allegedly been lying in acidic soil for 25 years as claimed by the Vietnamese)<sup>42</sup>, and Vietnam's refusal to facilitate an interview with the alleged witnesses to the burial. Moreover, declassified National Security Agency intercepts from 1972 confirm North Vietnamese knowledge of this particular incident, including the status of the pilot at the time of shutdown, making it difficult to believe Vietnam could not have resolved this case fully years earlier. As a result, I question what independent analysis the IC conducted on this particular case before determining to include it as an example of positive Vietnamese initiative. The NIE's judgment with respect to including this case as a positive highlight in an NIE appears quite naive.

<sup>42</sup> Photographs of the recovered flight suit and other information from DoD pertaining to this case have been provided to the Office of Senator Bob Smith.

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NIE STATEMENT: *"A 1987 Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) stated that we had evidence that Vietnam was storing about 400 to 600 sets of remains. But that judgment was retracted (by an NIO/EA assessment) in 1996 because it turned out to have been based on the unsupported testimony of a single unreliable source (emphasis added)." (p.18) [redacted]*

EO 12958 6.1(c)&lt;10Yrs

ASSESSMENT: [redacted]

EO 12958 6.1(c)&lt;10Yrs

This statement represents one of the most egregious and unsupported misrepresentations of facts in the entire NIE — a misrepresentation that was defended, incredulously, by the NIO for East Asia, [redacted] during a closed-door meeting on June 17, 1998 with myself and other members of the U.S. side of the U.S-Russia Commission on POWs and MIAs.<sup>43</sup> [redacted]

The issue at hand is the phrase "unsupported testimony of a single unreliable source." The referenced source is an ethnic Chinese former mortician who was forced to leave Hanoi in 1979, and was subsequently located and interviewed by the U.S. Defense Attaché Office in Hong Kong in a refugee camp later that year. Prior to leaving Hanoi, he worked on the preservation and treatment of U.S. servicemen remains from the war which were being stored by the SRV in Hanoi, and there is convincing evidence attesting to his bonafides (e.g. he was photographed along with other SRV technicians at an official Vietnamese repatriation of U.S. remains ceremony attended by U.S. officials in 1976 at Gia Lam airport on the outskirts of Hanoi.) [redacted]

EO 12958 6.1(c)&lt;10Yrs

During the past 18 years, beginning in the Carter Administration, through the

<sup>43</sup> Transcript of referenced NIC Briefing to Joint Commission, pages 36-38. "Sen. Smith: You said he is unreliable. NIO [redacted] That is correct, and we do consider him unreliable." [redacted]

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Reagan Administration to the current Administration, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, relevant Congressional committees, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and most recently the Defense POW/MIA Office have all reaffirmed and stood by the reliability of this source, thereby rejecting Vietnam 2012 58 6.1(c) <10Yrs official rhetoric to the contrary.<sup>44</sup> Some examples of this include the following statements before Congress and elsewhere:

<sup>44</sup> The official Vietnamese position with respect to the mortician was formally first put forth in a letter from SRV Vice Foreign Minister Phan Hien to The Honorable Lester Wolff, Chairman, U.S. House International Relations Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs, dated January 18, 1980. The letter followed a visit to Hanoi on January 15, 1980 by CODEL Wolff during which Vietnamese officials "discounted" the information from the mortician (see American Embassy Bangkok cable, Subject: CODEL Wolff press conference transcript, dated January 15, 1980) The SRV letter read, in part, "...the information you received is a complete fabrication...I sincerely recommend that you not believe in fabrications of that sort because such lies disrupt your as well as our efforts to pursue humanitarianism." (See American Embassy Bangkok cable, Subject: CODEL Wolff: Visit to Hanoi, dated January 19, 1980. Vietnamese officials repeated their denials in a subsequent meeting with a State Dept. official and the SRV UN Mission Charge on MIAs on February 8, 1980, "indicating there was no point in discussing rumors which had been concocted for malicious purposes. (SRV official) emphasized that reliance on rumors would poison the atmosphere between us and that publicizing distortions and fabrications like the story of the 400 remains would only antagonize ordinary Vietnamese who ultimately had to provide MIA information." (See SecState cable, Subject: Meeting with Vietnamese on MIAs, dated February 12, 1980) On February 20, 1980, in response to concerns raised by Secretary of State Vance, the SRV Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through its UN Ambassador, stated that the report of 400 remains "was completely untrue, spread with ill-intention, and aimed at creating further complications to the relations between our two countries and to the search itself for the American MIA...It was a tremendous fabrication, and even opinion among American political circles was also skeptical about the single source of spreading speculation. I, therefore, believe there is no sound justification for a serious concern in the United States..." The SRV Ministry of Foreign Affairs then published a so-called White Paper in April, 1980 in which they again dismissed the account as having been fabricated, stating, "In this election year of 1980, some politicians in the United States concocted the story, based on Beijing's allegations, of Vietnam holding the remains of 400 US servicemen killed in Vietnam. The story was concocted for political ends with familiar political tricks and with fictional details which can confuse public opinion." (copy on file in Sen. Smith's office).

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*"DIA obtained information that the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has in its possession in Hanoi the remains of more than 400 U.S. military personnel who were lost as a result of hostilities in Southeast Asia. This information was furnished by a technician who reported that he had personally prepared the skeletal remains of many of these U.S. personnel...The technician's personae vita has been cross-checked and independently verified. His polygraph examination conducted by DIA indicated no deception. The allegation that the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is maintaining and withholding 400 remains of U.S. personnel is judged by the Defense Intelligence Agency to be valid."*

— *Statement of Lt. Gen. Eugene T. Tighe, Jr., USAF, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, before Congress on June 27, 1980 (U)*

*"In November, 1979, we learned that a refugee from Vietnam stated he knew that the Vietnamese were holding the remains of over 400 Americans...The refugee was exhaustively debriefed and was found to be a credible source."*

— *Statement of Michael Armacost, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, before Congress on June 27, 1980. (U)*

*"Since 1975, DIA has received over 700 reports from Indochinese refugees... From that body of reporting came the significant testimony of a former mortician, concerning his knowledge of over 400 remains of U.S. MIA's being held in Hanoi. DIA's efforts resulted in providing solid information to Congress, subsequently used in making an official approach to Hanoi in 1980."*

— *Remarks of Lt. Gen. Richard Lawson, USAF, "on behalf of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. David C. Jones," as delivered before the National League of Families on June 28, 1980. (U)*

*"Chairman Guyer: General, back in the June 27 hearing of this subcommittee,*

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*which was a public hearing in which the Vietnamese mortician testified, he said that he had seen and handled 400 sets of remains in Hanoi...Does the DIA still consider his testimony valid? Gen. Tighe: I stand by the testimony at that time. I stand by him as a credible witness."*

— *Transcript of Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs with Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. Eugene Tighe, on December 2, 1980. (U)*

*"Admiral Paulson: ...a Vietnamese mortician provided information, which we judged to be valid, that the Vietnamese have in their possession the remains of approximately 400 U.S. military men lost in the Vietnam War...we have spent a considerable effort to establish the mortician's authenticity; he clearly was a Government mortician...Chairman Solarz: Do we believe that his report is accurate with respect to the remains? Admiral Paulson: Yes."*

— *Transcript of Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs with Admiral A. G. Paulson, Assistant Vice Director for Collection Management, Defense Intelligence Agency, on March 22, 1983. (U)*

*"We remain convinced that the Hanoi government does have the remains of U.S. servicemen lost in Vietnam. In November of 1979, information was received that the Vietnamese Government had in its possession the remains of more than 400 U.S. military personnel who were lost as a result of hostilities in Indochina. This information was furnished by a mortician who observed the stored remains and reported that he personally prepared the skeletal remains of many of these U.S. personnel. We know that he was a Government mortician, we have additional evidence that supports his contention, and he indicated no deception on a polygraph. We consider his testimony valid in spite of our inability to determine precisely where the remains may now be held."*

— *Statement of Lt. Gen. James A. Williams, Director, Defense*

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*Intelligence Agency, before Congress on July 14, 1983. (U)*

*"We put the mortician through every proof and cross-check that we could possibly run, and there's no doubt in my mind that he was not only very truthful, but also what he reported was very accurate."* EO 12958 1.5(c)-10Yrs

— *Remarks by former DIA Director, Lt. Gen. Tighe, as quoted in First Heroes, p.92, published 1987. (U)*

*"We have found information from this source, a Vietnamese mortuary technician, reliable and have consistently maintained so."*

*our own estimates regarding the numbers of U.S. remains collected and stored by Hanoi are well within the range of acceptable error for the rough firsthand estimates provided by this source. His estimates are also consistent with information from members of the VNOSMP regarding how many remains they collected. Moreover, they are backed up by other less well placed sources, information in Vietnamese records, and U.S. forensic analysis of repatriated remains."* EO 12958 6.1(c)-10Yrs

— *Memorandum to Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, signed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs on June 30, 1998.*

Additionally, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance approached Vietnamese officials in writing on February 7, 1980, and it was explained to SRV officials at the time that the mortician was "believed to have had sufficient access to information about MIAs to warrant our asking Vietnamese leaders about his allegations."<sup>45</sup> (U)

Moreover, relevant Congressional committees that looked into this matter as far back as 1980 also considered the mortician to be a "highly credible source" who

<sup>45</sup> SecState cable, Subject: Meeting with Vietnamese on MIAs, dated February 12, 1980

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“convincingly reported” information that was judged to be “significant and reliable.”<sup>46</sup> (U)

The source was also deposed at length by the bipartisan Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs in December, 1991, and further determined to be reliable.<sup>47</sup>

The record with respect to the reliability of this source could not be more clear. Moreover, it stood unchallenged by the Intelligence Community until I made a request to the Director of Central Intelligence in the spring of 1996 for the 1987 Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) on Hanoi and the POW/MIA issue to be processed for declassification, as it should have been under an Executive Order from President Bush in July, 1992 and NSC memoranda to the DCI (done at the urging of a Senate resolution), which encompassed such documents. That SNIE had contained judgments, based in part, on the mortician's testimony.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> American Embassy Bangkok cable, Subject: CODEL Wolff press conference transcript, dated January 15, 1980; and transcript of House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs hearing, dated June 27, 1980. (U)

<sup>47</sup> Final Report of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs (Rpt. 103-1), p.288-289, January, 1993 *Note:* Sen. Bob Smith was present at the deposition of the mortician, and heard his testimony first-hand. (U)

<sup>48</sup> See letter from Sen. Smith to Director of Central Intelligence, dated June 10, 1996. Copies of referenced Executive Order, Senate Resolution, and NSC instructions to DCI are attached to this letter. That request was initially denied because of CIA and National Intelligence Council concerns about the “uncertainty inherent in judgments on some of the key issues addressed in the estimate” (1987 SNIE); as well as concerns that the release of the SNIE might jeopardize U.S. efforts to normalize relations with Hanoi (see CIA letters to Senator Smith dated September 26, 1996, and October 29, 1996, and CIA briefing to Congressional staff, held at House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, on November 20, 1996.) The reasons for these denials of my declassification request in 1996 continue to warrant additional scrutiny in my judgment, because of the implications they have for Congressional oversight on intelligence matters. My request eventually resulted in the NIO for East Asia conducting his own study, later released in October, 1996 alongside the declassified 1987 SNIE, in which he claimed that the SNIE's judgment that Hanoi had warehoused 400 to 600 sets of American remains was “based on limited direct evidence whose reliability was open to question.” That judgment, however, did not represent a

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Based on the testimony cited above, it is obvious that the NIE's claim that the mortician was an "unreliable source" who provided "unsupported testimony" is demonstrably false. This judgment in the current NIE should, therefore, be immediately retracted by the Intelligence Community (IC), because the IC has already attested to the reliability of the mortician.

EO 12958 6.1(c)&lt;10Yrs

NIE STATEMENT: *"We have no evidence that the Vietnamese presently are storing remains of American dead...The Vietnamese Government collected and stored remains during the Vietnam War, but we do not know how many."* (p.18)

EO 12958 6.1(c)&lt;10Yrs

EO 12958 1.5(d)&lt;10Yrs

## ASSESSMENT:

Both of these sentences, which appear in the same paragraph in the NIE, would seem to each contradict the other.

12958 6.1(c)&lt;10Yrs

formal retraction of the 1987 SNIE's judgment because the study itself was not approved or coordinated within the Intelligence Community under established procedures for publication of an intelligence estimate, such as the 1987 SNIE. Indeed, the cover page to this study stated "CIA defers judgment on this Assessment to those Community components with expertise and information files on the location, identification, and availability of US remains in Southeast Asia." (It remains unclear which IC components are being referred to in that statement.)

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## NIE STATEMENT:

*"As of March, 1998, 1,565 Americans were listed as unaccounted for in Vietnam (emphasis added)...Of the 1,565, there were 825 confirmed dead at wartime by their commanders and comrades. Subsequent, intensive research by US Government officials has established that half the remainder — about 370 people — are dead. Only 48 are considered to be priority discrepancy cases — that is, cases involving American personnel who were known to be alive, not gravely wounded, and in proximity to the enemy at the time of their loss. Source: DPMO" (p. 19)*

EO 12958 6.1(c) &lt;10Yrs

## ASSESSMENT:

The NIE chose to only list the number of unaccounted for Americans "in Vietnam" thereby implying to the NIE consumer that Hanoi's capabilities and performance on POW/MIA cases should be limited to those incidents of loss which took place within the commonly recognized borders of Vietnam alone. This decision ignores the undisputed fact that over 85 percent of American losses in Laos, and many in Cambodia, occurred in areas of those countries (such as the Ho Chi Minh Trail) which were controlled by communist North Vietnamese forces during the war. Once again, the NIE has inserted a misleading statistic, demonstrating its lack of understanding of Hanoi's knowledge of POW/MIA issues, even though such knowledge is demonstrated by Intelligence Community reporting dating back to the war, and has since been confirmed through countless historical documents and publications available to the public at large

When questioned on this serious omission of nearly 500 unaccounted for U.S. servicemen earlier this year, the NIO for East Asia claimed that the terms of reference for the NIE "did not include Laos, and that was agreed to by the Senate

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Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI).<sup>49</sup> There is no record, however, that the SSCI ever indicated that Vietnamese knowledge of American losses in Laos should not be considered under the established terms of reference for the NIE. Moreover, SSCI staff have confirmed to me that there was no such understanding. Indeed, any such understanding would have been ludicrous.

This omission notwithstanding, the statistics cited in the NIE for Vietnam are presented in such a way as to leave the reader to believe that there are only 48 possible POWs still unaccounted for, which would tend to further discredit the numbers cited in the 1205 and 735 documents discussed earlier in this assessment.

EO 12958 6.1(c)&lt;10Yrs

However, a careful analysis of the 1,565 statistic broken down in the NIE reveals the following: If you have 1,565 still unaccounted for Americans in Vietnam, and 825 were confirmed dead during the war by their commanders (ie: KIA/BNR), that leaves 740 question marks. The NIE asserts that 370 of this remaining 740 number have been established as "dead" based on further research by US Government officials. That leaves 370 other question marks, of which 48 are cases where there is information the person was alive in proximity to the enemy. Again, these 48 are part of the remaining 370. In conclusion, using the NIE's figures, this means that there are 370 Americans, including the 48, where there is not an evidentiary basis that the individuals died, and their fate is still unknown.

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*The NIE fails to point this fact out to the reader, even though the statistics by which such a conclusion can be logically drawn are readily apparent. One of the reasons this distortion by omission is of critical concern is because when one adds to this 370 figure the large number of still unaccounted for Americans in North Vietnamese controlled areas of Laos, the case becomes more persuasive for the claims about the total number of POWs made in the 1205 and 735 documents from Russian archives discussed earlier in this assessment.*

EO 12958 6.1(c)&lt;10Yrs

<sup>49</sup> Transcript of Briefing by NIC to U.S. side of Joint U.S.-Russia Commission on POWs and MIAs, p. 39-40, dated June 17, 1998.

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## NIE STATEMENT:

*"We also have credible reports that US POWs were not transferred out of Vietnam. General Volkogonov told the U.S.-Russian Commission on POWs and MIAs that his delegation had uncovered no evidence that US prisoners had been transported from Vietnam to the USSR... K. P. Katushev, former Central Committee Secretary..., told US interviewers that he would have known if US POWs were transferred to the USSR. He believes no such transfers occurred." (p.24)*

## ASSESSMENT:

The NIE's account of the information provided by the above Russian sources is inaccurate or lacking in important detail. This view has been expressed by the Joint Commission Support Directorate at DoD, and it is one with which I agree, by virtue of my direct involvement with these matters as US Chairman of the Vietnam War Working Group of the Joint U.S.-Russia Commission on POWs and MIAs.

EO 12958 6.1(c) &lt;10Yrs

First, as is noted in the NIE statement above, Russian Gen. Volkogonov said that "his delegation *had uncovered no evidence*" of a transfer (emphasis added). The absence of evidence, however, is not proof that an event did not take place. The NIE, therefore, is wrong to characterize Volkogonov's statement as a "credible report that US POWs were *not* transferred out of Vietnam." This is especially true in view of Gen. Volkogonov's testimony on this specific question before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs on November 11, 1992 in which he stated, "Hypothetically, we cannot dismiss the possibility that several individual American servicemen were taken to the Soviet Union from Vietnam or Korea."

EO 12958 6.1(c) &lt;10Yrs

More importantly, after Volkogonov made the above-quoted NIE statement about having uncovered no evidence, Volkogonov received a very serious indication that a transfer might have taken place during the Vietnam War era, and he writes about

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this indication in a brief autobiographical sketch dated August, 1994. This notation, which specifically mentions the existence of a KGB plan to transfer Americans in the late 1960s, was discovered by my Commission staff in February, 1998, and was immediately shared with the NIE principal author. It is the subject of high-level approaches by the US Government to the Russian Government at the present time. (Indeed I personally pursued this matter during my own visit to Moscow in early 1998) The existence of this notation by Volkogonov makes clear that by 1994, Volkogonov himself had serious misgivings about the transfer issue. He referenced it as "a secret which I was unable to penetrate." Yet, in view of this evidence shared with the NIC earlier this year, the NIE omits any reference to it, and instead, by doing so, misrepresents the views of Gen. Volkogonov. As such, the NIE statement, on its face, is both inaccurate and seriously incomplete.

EO 12958 6.1(c)-10Yrs

With respect to K.F. Katushev, identified in the above-quoted NIE statement as having provided a "credible report that US POWs were not transferred," the record of this interview, which was arranged at my request in July 1997 during a visit to Moscow, does not support the NIE statement. First, the NIE falsely cites Katushev as an example of testimony from a Russian "who served in Vietnam during the war, and would have reason to know." In point of fact, although he traveled to Hanoi just once to negotiate an agreement with the North Vietnamese, Katushev did not serve in Vietnam. He worked in Moscow as a CPSU Central Committee Secretary during the Vietnam War.

EO 12958 6.1(c)-10Yrs

Second, Katushev actually stated "he would have known if US POWs were transferred to the USSR." Our Commission, however, has frequently heard the claim "I would have known", during routine interviews with former Soviet officials displaying an inflated view of their own importance. Based on Commission investigations to date, we continue to believe that any covert, highly sensitive GRU or KGB operation to remove any American POWs from Southeast Asia to the former USSR would have been known to only a handful of Soviet officials. It is unlikely that a Central Committee Secretary would have been one of them. In any event, Katushev's claim that he would have known is assuredly *not* a "credible report that US POWs were *not* transferred out of Vietnam."

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## NIE PHOTOGRAPHS:

*The NIE contains only two photographs, both provided by the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory (CILHI) in Hawaii, and both found in Part One under Discussion. One, on p. 25 of the NIE, is labeled "Having made the ultimate sacrifice, a veteran returns home with full military honors." The other, on p. 18, is labeled "A recovery team excavates the site of a B-52 crash just outside Hanoi, Vietnam."* EO 12958 6.1(c) <10Yrs

## ASSESSMENT:

I question why an undated photograph of a casket draped with an American flag being escorted across a runway at Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii has any direct relevance to Vietnam's intentions, performance, or capabilities on the POW/MIA issue, thereby justifying its inclusion in a National Intelligence Estimate, especially since such events have transpired for nearly 25 years with respect to Vietnam. EO 12958 6.1(c) <10Yrs

Likewise, I question the need for a photograph of a crash site excavation. Neither of these photographs, labeled Figure 1 and Figure 2 in the NIE, but not specifically referenced anywhere in the text of the report, shed light on an intelligence estimate of Hanoi and the POW/MIA issue.

If the NIE had included photographs of the alleged 1205 author, Gen. Tran-Van Quang, or the alleged 735 author, Hoang Anh, both of whom have met with US officials, then the inclusion of such photographs would have had credible relevance to the subject at hand. But instead, we are treated to pictures which hardly seem directly germane to the estimate's terms of reference. I find such action by the NIC troubling, especially when there is no precedent for such action with respect to other NIEs.

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### III DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF NIE STATEMENTS: (continued)

#### Discussion. (P.26):

#### *Part Two: Intelligence Community Assessment of the "1205" and "735" Documents*

**"With respect to the Russian documents, given the serious potential implications of these documents, I am sure you would agree that we must accord them the most careful analysis in the context of all other known information. In doing so, we must of course, avoid the mindset to debunk, but we also have a responsibility to provide our best analysis of the facts."**

**— William Jefferson Clinton  
President of the United States<sup>50</sup>**

**"I assure you that I remain personally and deeply committed to the most thorough and objective review possible of these important issues. I intend to monitor closely the NIE process and the Community's examination of the GRU (1205/735) documents and related issues...I will assure rigorous review of the final NIE draft by the Military Intelligence Board, which I chair, and the National Foreign Intelligence Board, on which I sit."**

**— Patrick M. Hughes  
Lieutenant General, US Army  
Director, Defense Intelligence  
Agency<sup>51</sup>**

<sup>50</sup> Letter from President Clinton to Senator Smith, dated December 10, 1993. (U)

<sup>51</sup> Letter from Lt. Gen. Hughes to Senator Smith, dated December 11, 1997. (U)

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Tran Van Quang (above)  
Reported by GRU as 1205 Author

Hoang Anh (below)  
Reported by GRU as 735 Author



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NIE STATEMENT: "...we believe the assessment released by DoD remains valid: that is, the documents were probably collected by the military intelligence department of the former Soviet Union (GRU), but are not what they purport to be (emphasis added)" <sup>52</sup> (p.26) [redacted]

EO 12958 6.1(c) <10Yrs

ASSESSMENT:

If the documents are "not what they purport to be" — ie: reports by North Vietnamese officials to North Vietnam's leadership during the Vietnam War which is what Russian officials continue to maintain, and Western scholars and other credible individuals continue to affirm — then what are they? This question becomes critical for one to even consider accepting the NIE's judgment, especially given Vietnam's assertions that the documents are Russian fabrications, and their denials that they would have themselves fabricated such a report to pass to the Russians during the war, in addition to the NIE's conclusion that the documents were probably collected by Soviet military intelligence. The lack of any serious, in-depth discussion of this question reflects one of the most serious shortcomings in the NIE itself. The NIE has failed to bridge in any meaningful way this gap in the Russian and Vietnamese statements concerning the 1205/735 documents. By failing to address this question, and especially in view of the many NIE inaccuracies and shortcomings outlined in this section, the NIE's judgment that the documents are not

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<sup>52</sup> The assessment referred to was released by DoD on January 24, 1994. The principal author of this earlier assessment was [redacted] who at the time worked on the National Intelligence Council as Deputy NIO for East Asia, (See Task Force Russia Memorandum for Record, Sub: Meeting on Analysis of VN-1205 Document, 24 May 93). [redacted] currently serves as NIO for East Asia, and it was under his auspices that the current NIE was prepared, as noted on the NIE's cover page. In a meeting with Senator Smith in November, 1997, [redacted] had pledged that his principal deputy preparing the report, [redacted] would be given complete discretion to draw different conclusions than [redacted] had previously drawn on the 1205/735 documents, and that [redacted] would footnote any objections he might have to any conclusions drawn by [redacted] which differed from [redacted] earlier conclusions in the previous report. No such footnotes appear in the current NIE. [redacted]

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EO 12958 1.3(c) <10Yrs

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what they purport to be cannot be accepted as credible or convincing.

## NIE STATEMENT:

*"The work of the Intelligence Community was the basis for a news release by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, entitled "Recent Reports on American POWs in Indochina: An Assessment." (footnote-p.26)*

## ASSESSMENT:

This statement is incomplete, misleading, and factually inaccurate. The referenced assessment released by DoD in 1994 hardly constituted a formal or official Intelligence Community (IC) product by any established standard or precedent. <sup>EO 12958 6.1(c) <10Yrs</sup> By stating that the work of the Intelligence Community was "the basis" for the assessment, the NIE footnote cited above misleads the reader into believing that this was an officially-coordinated community-wide assessment, performed by the IC alone in 1993/94, which it most certainly was not.<sup>53</sup> Indeed, the product was tasked by an Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense as a document *to be prepared for release to the general public* in response to the controversy generated by release of the 1205 document in Russia in April, 1993.<sup>54</sup> Indeed, in directing the tasking, the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary had also stated "there are many things wrong with the document...goal is to produce an unclassified report which could be released to the mass media."

The input from portions of the IC appears to have been prepared in less than 30 days and was limited to the 1205 report alone.<sup>55</sup> The input hardly proceeded from

<sup>53</sup> The bipartisan inquiry by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) in April, 1997 concluded that the 1205/735 documents had not been the subject of a formal Intelligence Community review. (U)

<sup>54</sup> Memorandum from Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (POW/MIA Affairs), Subject: Single Assessment of Russian POW/MIA Document, dated May 21, 1993. (U)

<sup>55</sup> Task Force Russia Memorandum for Record, Subject: Meeting on Analysis of VN-1205

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an *objective* baseline. Indeed, the input was prepared following the first meeting to discuss preparation of the referenced tasking noted above. At this first meeting, the then-Deputy NIO for East Asia, [redacted] (under whose auspices the current NIE was drafted) reportedly stated that the document "contained so many inaccuracies that it could not be what it purported to be, a report by a Deputy Chief of the North Vietnamese General Staff to the North Vietnamese Politburo. According to [redacted] the tone of the document was wrong, the Politburo would not be addressed in the manner of the 1205 document, Gen. Quang was not in the position claimed for him by that document, the numbers of US POWs mentioned could not be correct...<sup>56</sup>" All of [redacted] reported pronouncements, made prior to any serious IC analysis, amazingly became the core of the IC's final input to the 1994 DoD-released product, and even the current NIE.

EO 12958 1.5(c)-10Yrs

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Additionally, the portions of the referenced 1994 DoD-released product concerning the 735 document appear to have been drafted by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs' Defense POW/MIA Office in October, 1993.<sup>57</sup> In view of the above, the very limited work performed by elements of the IC was not "*the*" basis for the assessment. [redacted]

EO 12958 6.1(c)-10Yrs

Document, 24 May 93, dated May 25, 1993 (*note*: this was the first meeting to discuss preparation of the assessment requested by Dep. Asst. Secretary Ross); and National Intelligence Council Memorandum from [redacted] National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for East Asia, to Ed Ross, Acting Asst. Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs, forwarding the "final product," Re: on Recent Reports on American POWs in Indochina, dated June 21, 1993. (U)

EO 12958 6.1(c)-10Yrs

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> See Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs' Defense POW/MIA Office Newsletter, Subject: Russian Provide New Document About US POWs in Vietnam, dated October, 1993, distributed to all Senators by Sen. John Kerry by letter dated October 12, 1993. (*Note*: the contents of the analysis about this new document — ie: the 735 report — are virtually identical to the product referenced in the NIE which was released by DoD on January 24, 1994.)

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Active participants in the drafting process were drawn from non-intelligence community entities, especially OSD/ISA's Defense POW/MIA Office and, to a lesser extent, Army's Task Force Russia. Only DIA, CIA, and State I&R participated from the IC.<sup>58</sup> The other elements of the IC, such as NSA, FBI, and other intelligence elements of the four military services, did not participate. Thus, the assessment included input from some *elements* of the Intelligence Community, but *not* the Community as a *whole*, and it was never coordinated as such, or even presented as such to either the Military Intelligence Board, the National Foreign Intelligence Board, or other officials within the Intelligence Community.

EO 12958 6.1(c)-10Yrs

NIE STATEMENT: *"The 1,205 figure was 669 more than the highest number the US Government ever believed might be held captive..."* (p.26)

## ASSESSMENT:

The NIE judges that 536 American POWs (1,205 minus 669) constitutes "*the highest number the US Government ever believed might be held captive.*" One assumes that the NIE is referring to Americans held captive as of September, 1973, the date of the 1,205 report. In any event, **the NIE statement is demonstrably false and misleading** as shown by previous testimony by former U.S. Government officials (see pages 36-38) and 1973 Intelligence Community reporting and assessments (see footnote #40).

Following the return of 591 American POWs during Operation Homecoming in February and March, 1973, there remained 1,363 Americans listed as missing in action. This figure did *not* include over 1,100 additional Americans who had been declared killed in action/body not recovered by their wartime commanders as of

<sup>58</sup> Task Force Russia Memorandum for Record, Subject: Meeting on Analysis of VN-1205 Document, 24 May 93, dated May 25, 1993; and Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) release, p.1, dated January 24, 1994. (U)

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1973.<sup>59</sup> In May, 1973, DoD decided to maintain an official position, and so testified to Congress, that "we do not know whether those 1,300 MIAs now unaccounted for are alive or dead."<sup>60</sup> (U)

Moreover, in late 1972/early 1973 (prior to Operation Homecoming), there were over 1,950 Americans who were either possibly captured or known captured in Southeast Asia (1,363+591 returned).<sup>61</sup> The figure 1,950 is obviously much larger than the 536 number of US POWs ever believed to have been captured during this time frame as asserted by the NIE. In addition to the testimony of former US officials referenced earlier (footnote #37), the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs received additional testimony in 1992 that the list of "potential POWs" compiled by US intelligence in 1972 consisted of up to 1,000 to 1,600 names.<sup>62</sup> Again, based on these facts, the NIE judgment — that 536 Americans was

<sup>59</sup> See letter to the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Dr. Roger E. Shields, dated March 31, 1975, p. 9 and 12. (Entire letter is contained as Enclosure for the Record of the Hearing of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, September 24, 1992, p. 835-849.) (U)

<sup>60</sup> See Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Subject: Current PW/MIA Issues, signed by Dr. Roger E. Shields, dated May 24, 1973 — "I have said that we have over 1,300 American MIAs who were unaccounted for, and that this meant that we had no information to show conclusively that a man was either alive or dead. I am scheduled to testify on the MIA issue... With your concurrence, I will maintain the position that we do not know whether those MIAs now unaccounted for are alive or dead." Dr. Shields furthered testified at the referenced hearing on May 31, 1973, "As for those who are thought to have been captured alive, but who have not been returned, let me say that this is perhaps the most agonizing and frustrating issue of all." (U)

<sup>61</sup> On January, 28, 1974, Dr. Roger E. Shields, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, again testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "At the time of the signing of the (Paris) agreement, the United States listed over 1,900 Americans as captured or missing... While we are profoundly grateful for the return of the men (at Operation Homecoming), our joy and sense of accomplishment are tempered by the fact that over 1,300 others listed by our Government as missing and captured did not return." (U)

<sup>62</sup> See testimony and deposition of Col. Lawrence Robson, Gen. Eugene Tighe, and Adm.

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the highest number of POWs ever believed to have been captured — is substantially inaccurate.

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## NIE STATEMENT:

*“Russian recollections are hazy on whether the “1205” document was allegedly written in Vietnamese. General Volkogonov, advisor to President Yeltsin, thought he remembered seeing an original Vietnamese version. In any event, no Vietnamese version of the document has been located.”* (footnote, p.26)

EO 12958 6.1(c) &lt;10Yrs

## ASSESSMENT:

This NIE statement is misleading, incomplete, and inaccurate. It contradicts credible information provided to the principal author of the NIE during the estimate’s drafting stage. Specifically:

- The Chief of the GRU in 1994, General Ladygin, whose agency acquired the 1205 and 735 documents in 1971 and 1972, stated in writing to me in June, 1994 that “The translation of the report was actually done by the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff and sent to the CPSU Central Committee in November, 1972...*The original report in the Vietnamese language* (emphasis added) was destroyed after translation in accordance with the document handling procedures established by the GRU of the General Staff.<sup>63</sup>”
- This GRU authoritative statement was confirmed by the current Chief of the GRU in a meeting with myself and the Chairman of the Senate Select

Thomas Moorer, as referenced on page 78 of the Final Report of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, dated January, 1993 (Senate Rpt. 103-1). (U)

<sup>63</sup> Letter to Senator Bob Smith from Chief, GRU of the General Staff, Russian Armed Forces, Colonel General F. Ladygin, dated June 30, 1994. (U)

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Committee on Intelligence, Senator Shelby, in Moscow on July 1, 1997. During that meeting, General Korabelnikov cited General Ladygin's letter, asking us "to pay close attention to the words in his letter." He then amplified on that letter, in response to my questioning, stating, "The translation was indeed performed in the GRU in Moscow in 1972. But, unfortunately, we no longer have the Vietnamese language version."<sup>64</sup>

EO 12958 1.5(c) <10Yrs

- Moreover, the GRU cover pages to each of these two documents, prepared in 1971 and 1972, clearly state "translated from Vietnamese into Russian."<sup>65</sup>
- Additionally, Russian officials and the GRU cover sheet itself indicate that the translations were done in Moscow.<sup>66</sup>



EO 12958 1.5(c) <10Yrs

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<sup>64</sup> Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Meeting Notes: CODEL Smith/USRJC - Kokoshin/Korabelnikov, July 1, 1997, 4:45 p.m. - 5:45 p.m., Russian Ministry of Defense. (U)

<sup>65</sup> See Appendix to this Assessment for copies of complete English translations of the 1205/735 GRU acquisitions from North Vietnam. (U)



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[Redacted]

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Based on the above, the NIE statement cannot be accepted. There is no doubt or haziness on the Russian side that an original Vietnamese language version of the 1205 GRU acquisition, in fact, existed at one time.

[Redacted]

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1.5(d)<10Yrs

A side question for the U.S. Government is whether it might still exist. The NIE is silent on this issue.

[Redacted]

NIE STATEMENT:

*"Since the original examination of the document by the Intelligence Community in 1993, interviews with Russian officials who were knowledgeable about the (1205) document continue to validate the claim that it is an authentic GRU document and not a Russian fabrication...While supporting the authenticity of the document, none of the Russians claimed that the figure of 1,205 POWs was accurate." (p.26)*

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ASSESSMENT:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]


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
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More importantly, even if the NIE judgment is limited to the  individuals referenced in this section of the NIE, the judgment is *still* inaccurate, because one of those individuals, GRU Captain A.I. Sivets, in fact, *did* comment on the accuracy of the numbers in the document (see footnote #38). He further “*emphatically*” stated, during an interview with U.S. officials in October, 1997, that “the Vietnamese would not have deceived themselves at a closed Politburo session; they might have provided inaccurate information in press releases or in their negotiations with the Americans, but they would have no reason to do so within closed sessions of their political leadership.”<sup>68</sup>

EO 12958 1.5(c) &lt;10Yrs

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<sup>68</sup> Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Meeting with Captain First Rank A.I. Sivets, dated October 14, 1997, p.3 (U)

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NIE STATEMENT: "General Volkogonov, in statements to the press in 1993, expressed doubt about the reliability of the numbers."

(p.27) 

## ASSESSMENT:

I knew General Volkogonov personally for several years prior to his unfortunate death in late 1995. Throughout 1993 and in the two years that followed, General Volkogonov consistently maintained, both publicly and privately, that only the Vietnamese knew about the reliability of the numbers contained in the report. He personally had no basis for doubting the figures and, at the same time, could not vouch for the figures — but at the same time, he maintained, "I personally don't doubt at all the authenticity and the genuine character of this document," as he told *CNN* on April 14, 1993. In that same interview<sup>69</sup>, Volkogonov speculated on whether the Vietnamese author of the 1,205 report had reported accurate figures to his own North Vietnamese leadership; but then emphasized "one has to ask that man in Hanoi; was he telling the truth when preparing this report. We in Moscow in our commission have no answer to that question." (U)

Moreover, Volkogonov told the *New York Times* in Moscow on April 21, 1993 when challenged on the numbers, "True, I cannot guarantee that its (the 1205 document) content is a true reflection of past reality. Only the Vietnamese can know this." He later stated in December, 1994, "I have studied exhaustively the mechanism used to gather this document, and I can state that I do not know of any case where such information would have been fabricated...North Vietnamese General Quang (1205 author) was fully competent to give this report." (U)

Based on these facts, previously made available to the principal author of the NIE, it is extremely misleading to then cite General Volkogonov, based on unspecified

<sup>69</sup> A transcript of Volkogonov's interview with *CNN* was made available to the NIC by the SSCI earlier this year. My office had prepared the transcript in 1993 after obtaining from *CNN* directly the tape of the full interview which, incidentally, never aired. (U)

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press reports, as somehow vindicating the NIE's judgment that the 1205 number is not accurate

EO 12958 6.1(c) &lt;10Yrs

NIE STATEMENT: *"A TASS correspondent who served in Vietnam during the period (1972), V. Kobchev, stated that the (1205) numbers were too high." (p. 27)*

EO 12958 6.1(c) &lt;10Yrs

## ASSESSMENT:

In addition to the staff at the Joint Commission Support Directorate, I, too, have serious reservations about the value of the testimony of journalists, considering how remote is the chance that they would have been privy to reliable information on these sensitive issues. The NIE itself, on p. 23, claims "those Russians who were in Vietnam during the war have stated that the Vietnamese, sensitive about sovereignty, did not allow the Soviets to be involved in interrogations of American POWs." If the NIE's assertion is that Soviet military officials could not get close to American POWs, then it strains credulity to accept the NIE's implied assertion that a TASS journalist could have had access to reliable information on how many POWs were, in fact, held by Hanoi. Moreover, although Soviet and other Eastern European journalists were routinely invited to staged press conferences with selected US POWs in Hanoi, these POWs had all been previously acknowledged by Hanoi as being held. Thus, while journalists were privy to information about POWs being used for propaganda purposes, they were not in a position to reliably estimate how many POWs were, in fact, captured by North Vietnamese forces during the war. Citing them in a NIE only degrades the evidentiary base the NIE is unsuccessfully trying to build. Finally, it should be noted that the Joint Commission Support Directorate at DPMO, responsible for coordinating POW/MIA-related interviews with Russian officials since the Commission's inception, has no record of the interview cited in the NIE.

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NIE STATEMENT: *"One interviewee, V.V. Dukhin, who served... in Hanoi*

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*from 1992 to 1995, said that the former DCM in Hanoi, I.A. Novikov (now deceased) told him he was aware of the 1205 document when it was acquired...he (Novikov) stated that the GRU agent who acquired the document was not reliable." (p.27)*

## ASSESSMENT:

EO 12958 6.1(c)-10Yrs

A review of the diplomatic roster for the Soviet Embassy in 1971 shows that Novikov occupied a junior attaché, non-military, position in the embassy. As such, he would have been unlikely to know anything about GRU military intelligence operations in Hanoi, and certainly nothing about the GRU's most sensitive agents.

EO 12958 6.1(c)-10Yrs

More importantly, it is bewildering that the NIE would choose to include mention of this interview, but not include amplification of the more germane comments by GRU Capt. A.I. Sivets on this very topic, even though he is mentioned briefly on the previous page (p.26), and his full testimony was provided to the NIC in early 1998. Capt. Sivets, who researched this matter within the GRU, in his capacity as the GRU representative to the Joint U.S.-Russia POW/MIA Commission since 1992, told US officials in October, 1997, that:

- The 1205 document was received from a Vietnamese agent of the GRU who provided the GRU with a number of materials during the war, which were judged to be reliable.
- The GRU performed two assessments of the source's reliability. In 1993, GRU Chief General Ladygin ordered a review of the activity and reliability of the agent. Based primarily on an assessment of the agent that was performed at the beginning of the 1970s, the agent was judged to be "reliable," that everything with this agent "was in order" and the agent was "working for us."
- The GRU assessment had also determined that the information received from

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this agent was first-hand information and accurately reflected the internal political situation in North Vietnam.

- Sivets further told US officials that "the GRU would never have sent this information to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee if there had been any doubt about the reliability of the information provided by this agent."<sup>70</sup>

EO 12958 6.1(c) <10Yrs

It is further bewildering that the NIE would not mention the relevant testimony on this specific subject by K.F. Katushev, who is also mentioned briefly on another matter elsewhere in the NIE, and whose full testimony was provided to the NIC in early 1998. Katushev, former USSR Central Committee Secretary in charge of Maintaining Ties with Other Socialist Countries in the early 1970s, told US officials during my visit to Moscow in July, 1997 that the GRU had "good channels and connections" and he had no reason to doubt that the 1205 document was not what it purports to be. He also noted that the document contained new information that was worthy of the attention of the Soviet Communist Party leadership.<sup>71</sup>

EO 12958 6.1(c) <10Yrs

Finally, the NIE makes no reference to the views of noted Russian and American scholars on Vietnam issues, with regard to this specific point, even though this information was made available to the NIC. For example, Ilya Gaiduk, interviewed by DoD officials on October 8, 1997, elaborated on the claims in his book<sup>72</sup> that

<sup>70</sup> Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Meeting with Captain First Rank A. I. Sivets, Moscow, October 14, 1997, p.4, signed by Roger Schumacher, Senior Analyst, Joint Commission Support Directorate, DoD (U)

<sup>71</sup> Joint Commission Support Directorate, USJRC/DPMO, Report of Interview with Konstantin Katushev, dated July 1, 1997. *Note: Katushev's own handwriting from 1972 appears on the 1205 document found in Soviet Central Committee archives in 1993. In his note, he requests additional information for the Soviet leadership on American POWs held by North Vietnam.* (U)

<sup>72</sup> Gaiduk is the author of *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War*, Ivan R. Dee Publishers, Chicago, 1996. (U)

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Soviet intelligence penetrated the highest leadership organs of the North Vietnamese Government during the Vietnam War. He claims that the Soviets had reliable sources with direct access to persons who either participated in North Vietnamese Politburo sessions or were privy to the content of these sessions. In addition, Harvard researcher, Mark Kramer, has indicated that a published memoir of a former GRU official speaks of the GRU having penetrated the North Vietnamese Politburo during the war.  EO 12958 6.1(c)<10Yrs

As such, the inclusion in this NIE of Dukhin's second-hand account about what Novikov allegedly recalled, *at the exclusion of more relevant testimony from more knowledgeable Russian officials and others as noted above*, is evidence of extremely shallow analysis by the principal author of the NIE. To make Dukhin's hearsay report the only reference in the entire NIE that explicitly pertains to the "reliability of the GRU agent" is extremely misleading to the NIE reader.  EO 12958 6.1(c)<10Yrs

NIE STATEMENT: *"Vietnamese officials continue to claim the report is a fabrication."* (p.27)  EO 12958 1.5(d)<10Yrs

ASSESSMENT:


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
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


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[Redacted]

EO 12958 1.5(c) <10Yrs

NIE STATEMENT: "None of the new information helps to confirm the accuracy of the 1205 report." (p.27) [Redacted]

EO 12958 6.1(c) <10Yrs

ASSESSMENT:

This statement is factually inaccurate. As previously demonstrated, the information provided by GRU Capt. A.I. Sivets [Redacted] briefly referenced in the NIE under the heading "New Information" — does, in fact, help to confirm that the 1205 document was an accurate representation of the political-military situation in North Vietnam in 1972. So does the information provided by former USSR Central Committee Secretary Katushev, and two Chiefs of the GRU -- Generals Ladygin and Korabelnikov -- in 1994 and 1997. In short, since 1994, the GRU has expressed its confidence in both the authenticity and the reliability of the information in the 1205 report. To ignore this evidence implies that the GRU being confident enough in the information it acquired in 1972 to forward it to the Soviet Central Committee (whose own official viewed it with confidence) is somehow *not* helpful information in judging whether the 1205 report could have

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
been accurate. For the NIE to assert such an argument is absurd.



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NIE STATEMENT:

*"Quang's<sup>75</sup> responsibilities as a battlefield commander in a combat situation make it unlikely that he would be brought to Hanoi to report on issues that were not within his scope of responsibility..."*




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(p.27)

ASSESSMENT:

This NIE judgment is *contradicted* by substantial evidence originated by or made available to the Intelligence Community prior to and during the drafting of this estimate. This includes information which indicates Quang was hardly just a battlefield commander with a scope of responsibilities limited to his battlefield command position, (who would have had to have been "brought to Hanoi") but rather was a top leader in the communist North Vietnamese hierarchy during the Vietnam War. As examples —

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<sup>75</sup> North Vietnamese Lt. General Tran Van Quang, now Chairman of the Vietnamese War Veterans Association (elected in November, 1992), was reported by the Russian GRU in 1972 to be the North Vietnamese author of the "1205" report acquired by the GRU and dated September 15, 1972. (U)

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Military Affairs Party Committee (CMAPC), and held those positions from 1960 until 1976. Quang was noted publicly in these positions in 1974, but as a member, vice 'alternate' member. [REDACTED] b12958 6.1(c)<10Yrs.

[REDACTED] which had responsibility for the handling and exploitation of US POWs.<sup>76</sup> [REDACTED] EO 12958 1.5(c)<10Yrs

- This information is corroborated by a U.S. Joint Public Affairs Office

<sup>76</sup> Note: The Central Committee of Vietnam's Communist Party was the elite governing body of North Vietnam consisting of the country's leadership positions. The Military Affairs Committee of the Party Central Committee (CMAPC), who Secretary was Politburo member General Vo Nguyen Giap, was charged with conducting the war itself, and has been referred to as "second only to the Politburo as the center of decision making in the DRV..., and more important than the National Defense Council in terms of DRV policy making" (See *Bases of Power in the DRV*, Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, #107, p.7-8, published October, 1972). Quang's membership in the CMAPC, which also reportedly included certain non-military Politburo members such as Le Duc Tho (Kissinger's counterpart in Paris), makes him one of the most powerful and influential figures in North Vietnam during the war. Additional background on the Central Committee role during the war, and specifically its Military Affairs section, can be found in *The Party in Command: Political Organization and the Viet Cong Armed Forces*, Vietnam Documents and Research Notes #34, published May, 1968, which includes notes from captured COSVN documents, for example, "The Central Committee establishes the Party Central Military Affairs Committee (including a number of Central Committee military and non-military members) to help it in its leadership of the People's Army. The General Political Directorate is placed under the Central Committee, which to some extent, delegates its power to the Party Central Military Affairs Committee... Thus, the Central Committee directly decides upon major affairs related to the armed forces. The Party Central Military Affairs Committee, which exercises command over the armed forces under the direct leadership of the Central Committee, is a part of the Central Committee... These facts show the supreme power of the Central Committee over the armed forces. The Central Committee exerts direct control of the armed forces in all fields, particularly in ideological matters. To help the Central Committee, there has been established a large political organ, the General Political Directorate which works under the supervision of the Central Committee and the Party Central Military Affairs Committee." Additional information on the key role played by both the Party Central Military Affairs Committee and the Party's Political Bureau (ie: Politburo) can be found in the Communist publication, *Our Great Spring Offensive*, by General Van Tien Dung, Chief of Staff, Vietnamese People's Army, 1977. (U)


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
(JUSPAO), American Embassy Saigon, listing from July, 1972 listing Quang as a member of North Vietnam's Communist Party's Central Military Affairs Committee and a Deputy Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese People's Army (VPA)<sup>77</sup>. (U)



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


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<sup>77</sup> Note: The Russian GRU cover pages to the 1205 document, and another report by General Quang in 1972, also note Quang's title as "Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Vietnamese People's Army."



(January, 1974 was the date Quang was first identified again publicly as Deputy Chief of Staff, according to FBIS reports). However, as noted, U.S. records did still carry him with that title in July, 1972, and again in a Vietnam Document and Research Note dated 1973.



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Quang having been "probably the most powerful single individual in the entire communist apparatus in South Vietnam<sup>80</sup>," as well as a key military and political leader in North Vietnam's Communist Party. The reasons for this are multifold and noteworthy [redacted]

- Accorded to the captured notebook of senior North Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee member and high ranking PAVN official "Muoi Khan<sup>81</sup>"), obtained by U.S. forces in 1967, Quang

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[redacted] For open source biographic material on Quang's alias names, "Tran Nam Trung," and "Bay Tien," see Vietnam Courier, No. 29, p. 19, October, 1974; *The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam*, Duiker, 1996, p. 198, 210, and 399(n32); International Yearbooks of Communist Affairs, 1969-1973; Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, studies published by the U.S. Mission in Vietnam during the war. [redacted]

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<sup>79</sup> Memorandum for Record, Defense POW/MIA Office Research and Analysis Directorate, dated March 11, 1997 (see translated enclosures). (U)

<sup>80</sup> *The Communist Party of South Vietnam, A Study*, published by the United States Mission in Vietnam, Saigon-Vietnam, March, 1966, p. 25. (U)

<sup>81</sup> The document was captured by the Fourth U.S. Infantry Division on March 30, 1967, during Operation Junction City II. It is described as the notebook of "Muoi Khan, appointed Chief of the Administrative Staff of the Military Affairs Committee for COSVN in 1961." *Note*: According to the communist Hanoi publication, *Tho vao Nam (Letters to the South)*, published in 1985 by Su That Publishing House in Hanoi (p. 311), "Muoi Khang" was the alias for Lt. Gen Hoang Van Thai, a Deputy Chief of Staff of the VPA and Vice-Minister of Defense (Feb. 1961), who was a member of the Vietnam Workers (Communist) Party Central Committee in Hanoi, including the CC's Military Affairs Committee, as well as "Assistant Secretary of the Regional Party Military Affairs Committee of the Central Office for South Vietnam." The contents of the notebook are discussed in detail (including the identification of Bay Tien as Tran Van Quang and

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(referenced in the notebook under his alias Bay Tien) was one of two high-ranking communist North Vietnamese officials instrumental in the reestablishment in 1961 of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN<sup>82</sup>), ie: North Vietnam's Communist Party's southern branch

his reporting to North Vietnam's Politburo) in Vietnam Documents and Research Notes #40, *The Central Office of South Vietnam*, published by the American Embassy, Saigon (JUSPAO), dated August, 1968, p. 5, 21, and 23.

<sup>82</sup> COSVN, and its relation to the PRP and NLF is discussed and identified in various wartime and postwar U.S. Government studies and records, in addition to other academic publications, as — (1) “officially set up as the top command post for all communist activities in South Vietnam. It is responsible for both control of political affairs and direction of Viet Cong military activities. Through interlocking organization and concurrent assignments, COSVN members guide the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), the National Liberation Front (NLF) and all other elements of the infrastructure and the South Vietnam Liberation Army. COSVN itself is subordinate to Hanoi and reports directly to officials there. It is the forward headquarters of the Vietnam Workers' Party (Lao Dong) of the North. The key leaders of COSVN are members of the Central Executive Committee or Politburo of the Northern Party...COSVN appears to have fairly direct access to the Hanoi Politburo...At the time COSVN was recreated in 1961, it became the central organ for the Southern Branch of the (Communist North's) Lao Dong/Workers' Party. When the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) was established on January 1, 1962, COSVN then became the Central Committee of the new party for the South with its highest leaders making up the Standing Committee of the PRP. Establishment of the PRP was a tactical maneuver appropriate to Hanoi's strategy of depicting the revolution in South Vietnam as a movement strictly indigenous to the South.” see VDRN #40, August, 1968, p.1-2 and 5; (2) “The PRP Central Committee frequently is referred to as the Central Office, South Vietnam (COSVN). The implication of this usage sometimes is that the Central Office is organizationally and geographically separated from the Central Committee of the NLF, but the PRP at all times works through the Front and is not separate from it. The PRP is referred to by communist sources as :the vanguard of the NLF, the soul of the NLF. Its pipeline into North Vietnam was by means of the Lao Dong Party (North Vietnam's Communist Party) apparatus, and the party itself appears to be its chief sponsor in Hanoi...Captured Lao Dong cadre documents state “the creation of the People's Revolutionary Party is only a matter of strategy...it is a means of...advancing the plan of invasion of the South...it has only the appearance of an independent existence, but actually, it is nothing but the Lao Dong Party (of North Vietnam), the chief of which is President Ho...take care to keep this strictly secret, especially in South Vietnam so that the enemy does not perceive our purpose...According to instructions of the Central Committee, one must not tell the people or

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(top command post or forward headquarters for the South), also known as the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) headquarters beginning in January, 1962, and the headquarters for the National Liberation Front (NLF) established in December, 1960 (in essence, the PRP was the backbone of the NLF, the leadership of which constituted a Secretariat known as COSVN under the North's Central Committee and Politburo direction). (U)

- Quang, according to this information, had become in late 1961, the head of COSVN's (ie: NLF) Military Affairs Committee (in addition to being a COSVN member), simultaneously serving as executive officer and NLF representative of the People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF), (also established in 1961 with COSVN serving as its headquarters). Other intelligence reporting corroborates Quang's early involvement with COSVN's Military Affairs Committee and the PLAF.<sup>83</sup> EO 12958 6.1(c)-10Vrs

party sympathizers that the People's Revolutionary Party and the Lao Dong (Communist Workers) Party of (North) Vietnam are one. One must not say that it is only a tactic, because it would not be good for the enemy to know." see *The Communist Party of South Vietnam, A Study*, published by the U.S. Mission in Saigon-Vietnam, March, 1966, p.3-25; and (3) "The top COSVN leaders were all Party veterans with a history of loyalty to the organization. At the end of each year, a leading COSVN member attended a Politburo meeting in Hanoi to consult with Party leaders and receive directions for future strategy in the South...In early 1962, Hanoi decided to set up a southern branch of the VWP, the People's Revolutionary Party, or PRP. The PRP was initially described as an independent party with no formal connections with the VWP in the North. This was a fiction designed to avoid identification of the southern movement with the Party leadership in the North. In reality, the PRP was directly subordinate to the parent organization in the DRV through COSVN." *The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam*, Duiker, 1996, p. 230. (U) EO 12958 1.5(c)-10Vrs

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A DIA biographic summary, forward to the Army's Task Force Russia in April, 1993 states, "In 1960...just as his important

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- Also, according to the information from the captured notebook, *Quang* was reported to be preparing and sending reports directly to the Central Committee of the Communist (Lao Dong/Workers') Party in North Vietnam. (U)
- Quang was subsequently reported, under the alias Tran Nam Trung, in 1963, 1964, and thereafter, to still be the NLF representative of the PLAF, and the head of the NLF's Military Affairs Committee, but also the Secretary General of the PRP, and a Vice-Chairman (or Vice-President) of the NLF's Central Committee Presidium -- all of whose entities, as previously noted above, were created and directed by North Vietnam's Communist Workers'/Lao Dong Party (VWP) in Hanoi, even though Hanoi's involvement was kept secret at the time for propaganda reasons (hence the need for Quang's alias name).<sup>84</sup>
- Quang's stature as Secretary General of the North's party apparatus in the South (ie: the PRP)<sup>85</sup>, while simultaneously serving on the North's

military staff and political positions were being recognized, he received assignment to become Commander of the South Vietnam Liberation Army and concurrently a member of the Military Committee of the Central office for South Vietnam"; official communist publications in Hanoi, dated November 21, 1962, and December 12, 1962, state "When the war of liberation of the South was developing, he (Quang) was appointed Member of the Military Committee of COSVN..."

<sup>84</sup> *The Communist Party of South Vietnam, A Study*, U.S. Mission in Saigon-Vietnam, March, 1966, p. 4, 17, and 25; Vietnam Documents and Research Notes #41, *The Leadership of the National Liberation Front (NLF)*, p. 1-4, August, 1968; International Yearbook of Communist Affairs, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1971, p. 689, 1972, p. 597; Vietnam Documents and Research Notes #105, *People's Revolutionary Party*, p. 24, June, 1972. (U)

<sup>85</sup> As discussed in a preceding footnote, and amplified here, the establishment of the PRP in 1962 was the outcome of Hanoi's judgment that there was a need to provide more effective leadership and organization to the National Liberation Front (NLF) of South Vietnam, founded on December 20, 1960. Captured NLF cadre documents made clear that the PRP was to be "the

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elite Central Military Affairs Party Committee, is significant because it further established Quang as Hanoi's senior military *and* political figure for military operations and party activities in the war effort in Central and South Vietnam. Interesting, when a biographic note on Quang was published in Hanoi in 1985<sup>86</sup>, it did reference Quang as having been the Vietnam Communist (Lao Dong/Workers') Party Secretary of the Tri-Thien-Hue Region Party Committee and Commander of that same Military Region, in essence, a significant part of the same area that was under the COSVN (PRP/NLF) apparatus, thus verifying Quang's stature both politically and militarily in the various roles cited above.

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- When the leaders in Hanoi, through clandestine direction, established the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) for the South in 1969 under direct COSVN guidance, *Quang, again under the alias of Tran Nam Trung, became the PRG Defense Minister*, a position he concurrently held, along with his other reported ongoing positions, through 1972 during the timeframe of the 1205 report.<sup>87</sup> Interestingly,

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paramount organization" which would be "responsible for the leadership of all other organizations, the liberation associations, the mutual aid associations, as well as for the leadership of all the people who would overthrow the old regime for the sake of the new." (Quoted in *Viet Cong*, by Douglas Pike, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1966, p. 40.) "The PRP is, in fact, the southern branch of the Vietnam Workers' Party (Lao Dong VWP) of North Vietnam" (International Yearbook of Communist Affairs, 1970, p. 714.) (U)

<sup>86</sup> Memorandum for Record, Defense POW/MIA Office Research and Analysis Directorate (see translated enclosures), dated March 11, 1997. (U)

<sup>87</sup> See Vietnam Documents and Research Notes published by North Vietnam Affairs section, JUSPAO, American Embassy, Saigon, #60, June, 1969, p.2; #66, September, 1969, p. 21; #101, January, 1972, p. 13 and p. 27; #105, June, 1972, p.v, 7, 8, 13, and 24; #111, April, 1973, p. 7, 10, 12, and 40-42; and International Yearbook of Communist Affairs, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1970, p. 721; 1972, p. 597; 1973, p. 573; and *Le Monde*, Paris, November 25, 1972. (U)

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in its public pronouncements, communist liberation radio referenced the PRG as having been formed from representatives of many of the same geographic areas which at the time comprised Quang's concurrent battlefield command areas in the North Vietnamese Army. Quang's alias name, Tran Nam Trung, is also referenced in a North Vietnamese postwar memoir as having been present, along with Le Duc Tho, in clandestine strategy sessions in the South for the final offensive against Saigon in 1975<sup>88</sup>, which again attests to Quang's stature in the North Vietnamese leadership structure.

- According to an American Embassy, Saigon, assessment in June, 1972, "...PRG-NFL leaders probably have resided in Hanoi for a protracted period...many of the national figures may be assumed to have been in Hanoi, as of May, 1972. Some may be with NVN troops in the northern-most provinces of the Republic of Vietnam, others with COSVN." This assessment,

lends plausibility to Quang making presentations before NVN leaders, possibly gathered in Hanoi, in December, 1970/early January, 1971 (as the 735 report alleges); in February, 1972 (as Quang himself concedes); in June, 1972 (as the Russian GRU claims), and again in September, 1972 (as the Russian GRU claims, ie: the 1205 report).

- It also bears noting that NVN ralliers reported during this same time period that PRG Defense Minister "Tran Nam Trung" was "in fact, a senior officer of the North Vietnamese People's Army and an alternate member of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers' Party"<sup>89</sup> — descriptions which match that of Tran Van Quang.

<sup>88</sup> See *Our Great Spring Victory*, by North Vietnamese Army Chief of Staff, General Dung, p. 150-151, published 1977. (U)

<sup>89</sup> Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, *The Provisional Revolutionary Government*


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- According to the 1970/71 so-called "735" report obtained by the Russian GRU in 1971, during the course of his remarks, Hoang Anh states, in two instances, that Comrade General Tran Van Quang would be reporting to the North's Vietnam Workers' (Communist) Party Central Committee in greater detail concerning plans in South Vietnam "on behalf of the Vietnam Workers' Party Central Committee Military Section and the VPA Command in South Vietnam." The reference to Quang in this manner lends credence to the significant responsibilities held by General Quang referenced above, to include under his reported alias  EO 12958 6.1(c) <10Yrs

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- According to an April, 1993 Defense Intelligence Agency study of General Tran Van Quang's background, it was "completely plausible that a person of his distinguished command background, and eminent political standing, would be the person who could offer a political thesis to the politburo which involved further future aggressive moves for takeover of the South and

(PRG), North Vietnam affairs section, JUSPAO, American Embassy, Saigon, January, 1972, p. 13. (U)



<sup>91</sup> *Tho vao Nam (Letters to the South)*, Edited by Duc Luong, et al., Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, p. 311-314, 415, re: reference to Gen. Tran Van Quang in August, 1972 as alternate member of the Central Committee of the Viet Nam Workers Party, published 1985, subsequently obtained by Defense Intelligence Agency, and translated by Defense POW/MIA Office Research and Analysis Directorate on March 8, 1997. (U)

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political arguments advocated for the toughest deal to be made with the American negotiators.<sup>92</sup> (U)

- According to official communist Vietnamese documentation — published in 1985 by the Vietnamese Government's Su That Publishing House in Hanoi and subsequently obtained by the Defense Intelligence Agency — “Comrade Tran Van Quang” is identified as “alternate member of the Central Committee of the Viet Nam Workers Party (Vietnamese Communist Party)” EO 12958 6.1(c) <10Yrs  
*as of August, 1972.*<sup>93</sup> (U)
- Former North Vietnamese Sr. Colonel Bui Tin, identified General Tran Van Quang as someone who would have been knowledgeable about the subject of American POWs, and possible Russian involvement, 16 months *prior* to the surfacing of the 1205 document from Russian archives.<sup>94</sup> (U)
- According to the Russian Federation —
  - General Quang, even though he served in command of the ‘Fourth Military District,’ “was frequently sent to South Vietnam to evaluate

<sup>92</sup> Defense Intelligence Agency Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action unclassified fax with enclosure, sent to Task Force Russia, Department of the Army/USRJC, dated April 29, 1993. (U)

<sup>93</sup> Memorandum for Record, Defense POW/MIA Office Research and Analysis Directorate, dated March 11, 1997 (see translated enclosures). (U)

<sup>94</sup> See letter from Bui Tin to Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, dated December 16, 1991. In a subsequent interview with US officials in 1997, as noted in the NIE, Tin indicated he thought it was plausible that Quang could have reported to the Politburo, and that Quang could have gone by helicopter to Hanoi to make a report, and that this would not have been an unusual practice. The fact that this latter testimony was referenced in the NIE makes it strange that the NIE would then judge that circumstantial evidence makes it “unlikely Quang would be brought to Hanoi.”

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activities and returned to deliver reports to the Politburo;”<sup>95</sup> (U)

- “General Tran Van Quang, according to the position he held in the Vietnamese military political leadership in 1972, was *fully competent in the matters stated in the report and qualified to speak about them at Politburo sessions of the Vietnamese Worker's Party Central Committee;*”<sup>96</sup> (U)
- “This number (1205) was announced by Quang at a closed Politburo meeting. As an archivist and someone who has analyzed a great many documents, military and otherwise, I can tell you that this is an absolute truth;”<sup>97</sup> (U)
- According to interviews conducted by US officials, several Russian and other Eastern European representatives, stationed in Hanoi during the Vietnam War, have reported having known or met General Quang during their assignments, to include seeing him in Hanoi in 1972, and vacationing with him and his wife in 1968 at the Soviet Union's Black Sea resort of Sochi (Quang was reportedly “requested” by the Soviet Government to vacation there);<sup>98</sup> (U)

<sup>95</sup> See Memorandum for Task Force Russia, Subject: Vietnamese General Tran Van Quang, “Summary: General Volkogonov stated that... Quang had a special relationship with the Politburo and made reports to them. While Quang was not officially appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff until sometime in 1974, Volkogonov said, he functioned earlier in his special relationship.” Volkogonov further described what he was passing to the U.S. side as “the latest information from the GRU,” dated July 2, 1993. (U)

<sup>96</sup> See letter from General F. Ladygin, Chief of the GRU of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces to Senator Bob Smith, dated June 30, 1994. (U)

<sup>97</sup> Statement by Dr. Rudol'f Germanovich Pikhoya, Chief State Archivist of the Russian Federation, August, 1995. (U)

<sup>98</sup> For examples, see Defense Intelligence Agency messages containing Joint Commission Support Directorate interviews dated December 6, 1996; March 7, 1997; April 24, 1997; June 12,

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- According to the GRU and other Russian officials, General Quang authored at least two additional presentations made by him to sessions of the North Vietnamese leadership, one in 1970, (the contents of which have not yet been disclosed to US officials by the Russian Government) and the other dated June 26, 1972<sup>99</sup> — in the middle of the so-called “Easter Offensive,” (the contents of which were briefly shared with US officials in July, 1993, and were subsequently judged by DoD to be “an authentic text of a PAVN report that, based on its content, could have been prepared by Gen. Tran Van Quang. DoD further judged that “most of the information in the text of that document is historically accurate.”<sup>100</sup>) (U)

1997; and January 29, 1998. The June, 1997 report, and interview with former USSR Central Committee Secretariat official Yevgeniy Glazunov, refers to the Black Sea 1968 visit — Glazunov accompanied Quang on this visit (see DIA 120707Z Jun 97). Additional interviews have taken place since publication of the NIE in classified form in April, 1998, which further confirm this point. For example, see DIA 020147Z, Jun 98, Subj: Interview with former USSR Central Committee International Department official, Anatoliy Voronin. (Note: Voronin served as Quang’s interpreter during the Black Sea visit). Also, the communist Polish Press Agency correspondent in Hanoi in 1972, Ryszard Rymaszewski, has told US officials that he met Gen. Quang in Hanoi when he stumbled into a meeting in 1972 of “top Vietnamese military brass to include Quang, the Vietnamese being rather irritated by his presence.” It was also Mr. Rymaszewski’s opinion that “since Quang was a key member of the military, he would have had the opportunity to address Politburo sessions and meet with American POWs.” (U)

<sup>99</sup> See Interim Analysis by Senator Bob Smith to Ambassador Malcolm Toon, dated July 21, 1993; Memorandum for Task Force Russia, Subject: Vietnamese General Tran Van Quang, dated July 2, 1993; GRU translation of the so-called 1970/71 “735” report wherein author Hoang Anh references a report to the plenum by Gen. Quang; and Joint Commission Support Directorate Moscow office correspondence to Russian officials, dated February, 1997. (U)

<sup>100</sup> Memorandum for Record, Subject: Assessment of a Text Purported to be a Translation of a 26 June 1972 Speech by PAVN Lt Gen Tran Van Quang, Research and Analysis Directorate, Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office, dated March 11, 1997. (U)

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
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- According to the text of the Russian GRU translation of the so-called 735 report (a speech by North Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee Secretary Hoang Anh during the war), General Quang was one of 10 individuals selected by the Politburo to serve on an organization committee for preparation of the Communist Party's Fourth Congress — other individuals on the list of 10 included the top NVN leadership, (Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, Truong Chinh, Pham Hung, Le Duc Tho, etc...)<sup>101</sup> This reference to Quang among these comrades adds considerable merit to the argument that Quang was a top-ranking North Vietnamese political and military figure during the war. (U)

EO 12958 1.5(c)&lt;10Yrs

EO 12958 1.5(c)&lt;10Yrs



EO 12958 1.5(c)&lt;10Yrs

- According to the former US Government official who headed the US POW/MIA Office in Hanoi in 1991 and worked Vietnam issues for over 20 years, "LTC Quang was a former Political Commissar, a former deputy head of the General Political Directorate (GPD), a former director of the Military Security Department, a former member of the National Defense Council, a former head of the South Vietnam Liberation Armed Forces, a former Deputy Secretary of the COSVN Military Affairs Committee, a former member of the Military Affairs Committee of the Party Central Committee, and a former Chief of the Enemy Proselytizing Department. That being the case, it is highly unlikely that LTC Quang does not possess significant information relative to US POW/MIA."<sup>103</sup> Interestingly, this same official identified Gen.

<sup>101</sup> See p.19 of English translation of the 735 report obtained by the Russian GRU. (U)



<sup>103</sup> Letter to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs from Garnett E.

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Quang as a key Vietnamese official who should be interviewed by US officials for US POW information some 16 months *prior* to the surfacing of the 1205 document.<sup>104</sup> (U)

- General Quang himself authored two reports in 1966, one of which was published in Hanoi on July 7, 1966 — over two weeks after his June 20, 1966 appointment (date indicated in Vietnamese publication<sup>105</sup> [redacted] as Commander of the newly formed B.4 Front (Military Region IV). The substance of both of these reports, which were obtained and translated by U.S. intelligence in 1966<sup>107</sup>, in addition to the timing of the second report, indicate that Quang was quite capable of holding multiple positions in the Vietnamese military and political hierarchy at the same time, and was competent enough to speak across the spectrum of Vietnam War issues with approval of the rest of the Vietnamese leadership. (U)
- Quang himself conceded to US officials in 1993 that, on at least one occasion “in about January-February, 1972,” he had “reported to the North Vietnamese Politburo.”<sup>108</sup> (U)

EO 12958 1.5(c) &lt;10Yrs

“Bill” Bell, former Chief, US POW/MIA Office in Hanoi (1991), dated March 24, 1996. (U)

<sup>104</sup> Letter to US Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs from Mr. Bell, dated December, 1991. (U)

EO 12958 1.5(c) &lt;10Yrs

<sup>105</sup> Memorandum for Record, Defense POW/MIA Office Research and Analysis Directorate, dated March 11, 1997 (U)

EO 12958 1.5(c) &lt;10Yrs

<sup>107</sup> See Central Intelligence Agency Office of Congressional Affairs unclassified transmittals to Senate, dated April 15, 1993, and April 29, 1993, containing the translated text of the referenced reports, prepared by US intelligence (FBIS) in 1966. (U)

<sup>108</sup> See Footnote #105 (U)

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- There is information from Russian and U.S. sources (previously made available to the NIC) that not all 1972 Politburo or Central Committee sessions involving North Vietnam's leadership were actually held in Hanoi, but may have been held in Hoa Binh, North Vietnam.<sup>109</sup> In view of the fact that there is no indication in the text of the 1205 report, that the Politburo session involving Gen. Quang actually took place *in Hanoi*, the NIE's statement that Quang would have had to have been "*brought to Hanoi*" to make his report reflects a failure to take into account other possible meeting locations, which could have been supported by the fact that the city of Hanoi was itself partially evacuated, under the command of Col. Doan Phung, Chief Political Officer for all troops stationed in the capital area, following the heavy U.S. bombing campaign which began in mid-April, 1972 and lasted for several months. (Note: Although it is important to point out these analytical failures in the NIE, in this case, subsequent information received by me in November, 1998 from a Russian intelligence official indicates that General Quang's presentation (ie: the 1205 report) was actually given at a meeting of the Politburo held at the Ministry of National Defense in the Citadel in Hanoi. The receipt of this new and significant information does not, however, negate the NIE's failure, as noted above, based on the information available to the IC at the time of publication earlier this year.)
- In the text of the 1205 report, General Quang reportedly states the topics being covered in his September, 1972 presentation are: (1) the general offensive conducted from March 30<sup>th</sup> (1972) to the present; (2) our errors and deficiencies in the offensive...; (3) positive and negative aspects of the offensive; (4) immediate plans of the enemy, and our operations; (5) analysis of errors permitted in strategic and tactical leadership; (6) our contacts with

EO 12958 6.1(c)-10Yrs

<sup>109</sup> Memorandum from Harvard researcher Stephen Morris, enclosing notes taken from USSR document referencing the "expanded meeting of the DRV politburo in Hoa Binh in early October, 1972," dated June 30, 1993; and Memorandum from former US POW/MIA official Garnett "Bill" Bell, Subject: 1972 Meetings of North Vietnamese leadership in Hoa Binh, dated July 21, 1997.(U)

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political figures of South Vietnam from the Saigon regime; and (7) the matter of American POWs captured on the three fronts of Indochina. The NIE claims that these "*issues were not within his scope of responsibility,*" however, even the Vietnamese, Quang himself, US intelligence, Russian intelligence, and open source materials, confirm, that at the very least, six of the above seven issues, were, in fact, within the scope of Quang's wartime responsibilities. Quang himself only challenges his reported knowledge on the American POW situation during the war (the 7<sup>th</sup> topic covered in his alleged 1205 report), a challenge which is contradicted by Quang's reported positions noted above, which would have necessitated knowledge of US POW matters.) As such, the NIE statement is seriously inaccurate, incomplete, and misleading.

EO 12958 6.1(c) &lt;10Yrs

EO 12958 6.1(c) &lt;10Yrs

In view of the preponderance of relevant evidence referenced above, and previously made available to or originated by the Intelligence Community, the NIE judgment that Quang was merely *a battlefield commander in a combat situation who claims to have been with his troops and plausibly argues that he would not have delivered a report like the 1205 document*, is not supported. The judgment is seriously inaccurate and based on shoddy and incomplete research, which, itself, reflects very poorly on the U.S. Intelligence Community. To ignore this overwhelming body of evidence, and not even reference it, is troubling and makes me wonder what the intent of the Intelligence Community is with respect to this analysis. This is especially disturbing because an assessment of this document was one of the two main taskings for this Estimate.

EO 12958 1.5(c) &lt;10Yrs

Finally, although the NIE itself notes that

it fails to point out the most glaring, and perhaps directly relevant, example which should cause anything Quang or the SRV Government alleges about the 1205 report, and the fate of American POWs, to be viewed with great skepticism.

EO 12958 1.5(c) &lt;10Yrs

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
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EO 12958 1.5(c)-10Yrs

Communist publication.<sup>110</sup>

also concluded that



<sup>110</sup> See *Our Great Spring Victory* by North Vietnamese Army Chief of Staff, General Dung, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1977, p. 104. (U)

<sup>111</sup> See *Vietnam* by Karnow, p. 276-279; *Inside Hanoi's Secret Archives* by McConnell, p. 271; *The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War* by Kutler, (under "Hue"). For denial by General Quang, see *Vietnam, A History*, by Stanley Karnow, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, 1997, p.543, "Revisiting Vietnam in 1981 and again in 1990, I was able to elicit little credible evidence from the Communists to clarify the episode. General Tran Do, a senior Communist architect of the Tet offensive, flatly denied that the Hue atrocities had ever occurred, contending that films and photographs of the corpses had been "fabricated." *I heard the same line from General Tran Van Quang, who commanded the Communist forces in the region.*" (U)

<sup>112</sup> FBIS translations of *Nhan Dan* and *Voice of Vietnam* reports from Hanoi, November, 1992; December, 1992; and December, 1997. The Vietnam War Veterans Association is an entity of the Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF) which is under the control of the Vietnam Communist Party leadership, as established under Vietnam's constitution of 1960. (See FBIS Daily Report 22 Dec 1997, *International Yearbook of Communist Affairs*, 1972, p. 591, and *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, #103, February, 1972, p. 4, 9.) (U)

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## NIE STATEMENT:

*"The length of the (1205) report would be inappropriate for a Politburo meeting...the purpose of the meetings was to make decisions, not listen to long oral reports." (p.27)*

EO 12958 6.1(c)-10Yrs

## ASSESSMENT:

The Intelligence Community has provided no reporting to support this bizarre claim. As proof of this fact, the NIE is only able to vaguely cite the views of one, unidentified, "academic specialist on Vietnam." In light of this, it is inappropriate for the NIE to attempt to make a judgment in this area.

12958 1.5(c)-10Yrs

As such, there is no basis for comparing what constitutes an appropriate "length" of a report to the Politburo. If anything, the length of the 1205 report, in fact, tracks with the length of the June, 1972 report by Gen. Quang previously made available to US officials. As such, the NIE judgment does not rest on any solid foundation, and cannot be accepted with confidence.

Moreover, a North Vietnamese Communist publication in 1977 attests to the fact that the Politburo (also referred to as the "Political Bureau") did in fact meet to listen to reports by the Central Military Affairs Party Committee (of which Gen. Quang is reportedly speaking on behalf of in the 1205 document), especially before reaching critical decisions. And that publication also reveals that both the Political Bureau and the Military Committee often met jointly to analyze and reach decisions concerning the war. Politburo members would also sit in on meetings of the Military Committee when reports and assessments were being presented and discussed.<sup>113</sup> (U)

<sup>113</sup> *Our Great Spring Offensive*, by North Vietnamese Army Chief of Staff, General Van Tien Dung, published in 1977. There are numerous references in this publication of the meetings of the Political Bureau and Central Military Committee, including references to instances when "the

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## NIE STATEMENT:

*"The tone of the report also is inappropriate. A person of Quang's subordinate status would not have lectured the Politburo on what its policies were. Such hard-core revolutionaries as Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, and Truong Chinh probably would not have been spoken to in such manner or have tolerated such language."*

(p.27,29)

EO 12958 6.1(c) &lt;10Yrs

## ASSESSMENT:

The NIE judgment is not supported. As already demonstrated in this assessment, Quang himself was a member of North Vietnam's elite Central Committee, comprised of the political-military leadership of the country, including the Politburo members, and he was also a member of that Committee's Military Affairs section. Quang was just as much a "hardcore revolutionary" as his colleagues referenced in the NIE statement,

EO 12958 1.5(c) &lt;10Yrs

In addition, his family had a close association with Ho Chi Minh and General Giap and he was also reportedly a close friend of General Van Tien Dung, Chief of the General Staff of the Vietnamese People's Army, and the Deputy Secretary of the Central Military Affairs Party Committee in 1972.<sup>114</sup>

EO 12958 1.5(c) &lt;10Yrs

Moreover, Quang states in the 1205 document that he is reporting to the Politburo on the matters outlined in the presentation "on assignment of the Supreme Command, National Defense Council, and the Military Committee of the Politburo." It is certainly plausible that General Giap, who chaired or co-chaired (with Premier Pham Van Dong) these entities as a Politburo member, wanted Quang to report on

Political Bureau met to hear the Central Military Committee report on the developing situation..."  
(U)

<sup>114</sup> Defense Intelligence Agency study, dated April 29, 1993. (U)

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the referenced matters to the rest of the Politburo membership, to include non-military members of the Politburo such as the Vice-Premier for Economic Issues, and the Vice-Chairman of the National Assembly Standing Committee. There is only one sentence in the entire 25-page translated 1205 report where Quang could possibly be interpreted as "lecturing the Politburo" wherein he states "we condemn individualistic mistaken views current among us on this (the American POW) matter." Quang's use of the word "we" in this sentence, and the fact that he states he is reporting on assignment of entities headed or co-chaired by General Giap, could plausibly have given Quang the cover to have used such language at that point in the report, given the importance of the topic to the military leadership, and the very close working relationship between the Politburo and the Central Military Committee during the war. (U)

Additionally, the NIE itself judges, in a subsequent section (p.31) that "Factionalism and disagreement over policy broke out during the period of collective leadership after the death of Ho Chi Minh (1969)." Why, then, would one sentence in a 25-page report revealing evidence of disagreement before a session of the Politburo in 1972 be implausible? In any event, there is hardly enough compelling evidence for the NIE to judge that "Quang would not have lectured the Politburo" FOI 12958 1.5(c) <10Yrs

[REDACTED] 12958-1.5(c) <10Yrs

NIE STATEMENT: *"The timing of the Politburo meeting is questionable. The report supposedly was given on 15 September, 1972, but the Vietnamese claim there was no meeting on that date."*

[REDACTED] (p. 29)

ASSESSMENT:

First, while the NIE accurately reflects Vietnam's claim, the claim itself<sup>115</sup> — from a

<sup>115</sup> *The Washington Post* reported from Hanoi on April 19, 1993 that Vietnamese Foreign

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communist regime that to date has produced no evidence to support its claim — is hardly a basis for judging, as the NIE does, that the timing of the Politburo meeting is *questionable*. Indeed, the NIE itself, earlier on p. 27, states that “the Politburo met weekly during this particular period according to an academic specialist.” Why then is a meeting on or around September 15<sup>th</sup> “*questionable*?” Moreover, the NIE statement fails to include additional, pertinent information, previously made available to the principal NIE author, which makes Vietnam’s claim more questionable than the date of the meeting itself. For example, during a subsequent meeting between Foreign Minister Cam and U.S. Senator John Kerry in Hanoi on May 31, 1993, “Senator Kerry requested a copy of the Politburo calendar for that time period, so a comparison could be made. The Vietnamese misunderstood the request, believing Senator Kerry wanted Politburo minutes. They became very upset and almost canceled the rest of the meeting. The misunderstanding was corrected and order was restored.”<sup>116</sup> To date, the Vietnamese, at a minimum, have not produced any tangible evidence to prove their contention that no session of the Politburo was held at the time alleged by the GRU. They have not produced a record of dates on which meetings were held in the Summer/Fall of 1972, nor, as the NIE itself acknowledges in an earlier section, has Hanoi produced any information from Politburo archives that bears on POW/MIA issues. EO 12958 1.5(c) - 10Vrs

Minister Nguyen Manh Cam had stated a day earlier, during a joint news conference with an American delegation headed by General John Vessey, that “records of North Vietnam’s policy-making Central Committee show no Politburo meeting on the date in question.” On April 22, 1993, Hanoi’s state-run Voice of Vietnam issued a broadcast, stating, in part, “There was no meeting of the Politburo on 15 September, 1972.” (U)

<sup>116</sup> Memorandum for the Record, prepared by Vietnam Veterans of America (VVA), June, 1993. (Note: VVA accompanied Sen. Kerry on this trip and attended the meeting with Minister Cam.) (U)


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Third, the NIE fails to explore other possible scenarios, such as the suggestion by Russian General Volkogonov, that the date assigned to the 1205 document by the GRU, which is reflected on the GRU cover page to the translated text (ie: September 15, 1972) could have been the date the report was actually *prepared* by North Vietnamese General Quang, not the actual date the report was *presented*.<sup>117</sup>

EO 12958 6.1(c)-10Yrs



NIE STATEMENT: "*On that day (September 15, 1972), Le Duc Tho, who ranked 5<sup>th</sup> in seniority on the Politburo, was meeting with Henry Kissinger at a key juncture in the Paris peace talks.*" (p. 29)

EO 12958 6.1(c)-10Yrs



<sup>117</sup> Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Conversation between Gen. Volkogonov and Gen Vessey during visit at Walter Reed Medical Center on June 22, 1993, signed by Major General Bernard Loeffke, US Army, Director, Task Force Russia, DoD. (U)

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## ASSESSMENT:

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In point of fact, the meeting between Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho on September 15, 1972 did not represent a "key juncture in the Paris peace talks." The breakthrough in the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho discussions did not come until October 8, 1972.<sup>118</sup>

More importantly, declassified cables and subsequent statements by Dr. Kissinger himself, made available to the principal author of the NIE in late 1997 and early 1998, contradict the NIE's judgment that September 15, 1972 represented a *key juncture* in the Paris peace talks. For example, on September 27, 1972, in a then-Top Secret message from Dr. Kissinger in Paris to Gen. Haig at the White House, Kissinger stated, "There has been no significant progress...we held firm in our basic program, including political questions...in other areas, it emerged clearly both from DRV document and discussions that we remain far apart on a number of major issues..."  EO 12958 6.1(c) <10Yrs

Finally, with this statement, the NIE seems to imply that the Politburo would not have met without Le Duc Tho, to discuss military and political strategy concerning the war. If this is not the implication, then the inclusion of this sentence serves no purpose. If this *is* the implication, then the NIE judgment is seriously undermined by the fact that Le Duc Tho was physically located in Paris in early to mid August, mid to late September (to include a few days prior to September 15<sup>th119</sup>), and early to mid October. To imply that the Politburo would not have met during these periods, and that communication channels with Le Duc Tho were not firmly established between Hanoi and Paris, is simply ludicrous. Moreover, Le Duc Tho had just been present in Hanoi on September 4, 1972 during a wreath laying ceremony marking the 3<sup>rd</sup> anniversary of the death of Ho Chi Minh.<sup>120</sup>  EO 12958 6.1(c) <10Yrs

<sup>118</sup> Final Report of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, p. 507, dated January, 1993 (Senate Rpt. 103-1). (U)

<sup>119</sup> See *White House Years*, by Henry Kissinger, p. 1333-1334 (U)

<sup>120</sup> Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, #107, entitled *Bases of Power in the DRV*, dated

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## NIE STATEMENT:

*"On that day (September 15, 1972), Quang Tri fell to South Vietnamese forces... Would the Politburo be discussing POW/MIA issues with a general whose forces were defending, and losing, a key city?" (p. 29)*

## ASSESSMENT:

As previously discussed, the NIE has produced no evidence,

Moreover, in view of  EO 12958 1.5(c) <10Yrs  
 voluminous evidence outlined earlier that Quang's wartime responsibilities transcended his reported battlefield command position, that he reported on several military developments and planned operations in the 1205 report (not just POW issues), and that he might merely have issued instructions to the Front by radio from Hanoi, the NIE has not demonstrated the implausibility of Quang speaking to a session of the Politburo during this time frame. Additionally, Hanoi has produced no contemporary wartime records from September, 1972 which convincingly demonstrate that General Quang was physically located at the Front on September 15, 1972

Furthermore, the NIE has not convincingly demonstrated that a discussion of US POW matters could *not* have been one of the *many* topics addressed by General Quang, as noted in the 1205 report. In fact, U.S. intelligence reports and studies, interviews with Vietnamese witnesses, and other information made available to the principal author of the NIE in late 1997 and early 1998 indicate that General Quang

October, 1972. See p. 2 (U) *Note*: Reportedly, the Party's Central Military Affairs Committee also laid a wreath. As noted earlier, Quang was a secret member of this Committee. It is unclear, at the moment, whether Quang may have been present as well in Hanoi for this ceremony. (U)

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had served as Chief of the Central Committee's Enemy Proselytizing Organization between 1951-1954, and subsequently as Deputy Director of the General Political Directorate (GPD) of the General Staff of the Vietnamese People's Army (PAVN) in charge of the Department of Enemy Proselytizing (EPD). He was also reported to have headed a conference of the EPD in 1963. The Central Committee's Enemy Proselytizing Organization and the PAVN GPD's EPD were those elements of the North Vietnamese Government responsible for the utilization, security, documentation, and exploitation of enemy prisoners.

Moreover, in interviews with US officials in 1993, General Quang himself verified that he had dealt with prisoner of war matters, though he claimed it was only with French prisoners during the French Indochina War. The above information certainly does not prove that General Quang could not have included a discussion of US POW matters in his alleged report before a session of the North Vietnamese Politburo in 1972. Given his prior involvement with prisoner matters, his continuing position as a CMAPC member in 1972 which supervised GPD activities, along with his role as PRG Defense Minister, he certainly had the stature to do so, and would have been privy to, if not directly involved with, details about the status of US POWs captured on all fronts of Indochina.

Finally, although ARVN forces recaptured the Quang Tri provincial capital city on September 15<sup>th</sup> or 16<sup>th</sup>, 1972 (accounts vary on the actual date), the ARVN counterattack to retake the city actually began at the end of June, and had dragged on for some time.<sup>121</sup> And there is evidence from the Russian GRU that Quang reported to the Politburo on June 26, 1972 about the difficulties being encountered, to include "the strong groupings of American and puppet forces currently located

<sup>121</sup> See *Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, Quang Tri*, Kutler, p. 463. A Communist perspective on the ARVN counterattack battle for Quang Tri is contained in North Vietnamese Army Chief of Staff General Dung's postwar memoire, *Our Great Spring Victory*, p. 45. Dung claims "after successfully defeating enemy counterattacks throughout an eighty-six-day-and-night battle to protect the citadel and the town, in the end we were only able to hold the area north of the Thach Han River. The enemy recaptured Hai Lang district, part of Trieu Phong district, and the ruins of the citadel and town." (U)

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along the fronts, with the groupings in Quang Tri and Dong Ha being the strongest.<sup>122</sup> In view of this, and other supporting evidence previously discussed, it is not implausible that Quang was *not* physically located at the Front during every major military development in the spring-summer campaign. Conversely, it is also plausible that the final ARVN assault on Quang Tri city itself in mid-September caught PAVN forces, and Quang, by surprise, and it could have conceivably happened *after* Quang's presentation to the Politburo. (U)

NIE STATEMENT: *"Although the circumstantial evidence above is not definitive, the content of the (1205) report casts even more doubt on its accuracy."* (p. 29)

EO 12958-6.1(c)-10Yrs

## ASSESSMENT:

This statement represents one of the most glaring examples of distortion by omission in the entire NIE. The NIE reader is left with the clear impression that the "content of the report" casts doubt on its accuracy. There are no qualifiers to this statement. In fact, nowhere in the NIE is evidence presented which tends to *corroborate* the content of the 1205 report. Instead, the NIE makes a giant leap from the above statement directly to the next sentence which reads "the portions of the report dealing with the POW issue are inaccurate..." However, the NIE fails to point out other relevant information concerning the accuracy of much of the content of the 1205 report, to include information previously acknowledged as accurate or plausible by elements of the Intelligence Community.<sup>123</sup> Why? As such, the NIE seriously misleads its reader with the above statement, which taken in its totality, is

<sup>122</sup> See Appendix to Interim Analysis by Sen. Bob Smith, dated July 21, 1993 (re: notes taken from GRU report containing translated text of report by Gen Quang to NVN Politburo on June 26, 1972.) (U)

<sup>123</sup> See *Recent Reports of American POWs in Indochina: An Assessment*, p. 2, released by the Department of Defense on January 24, 1994, with input from elements of the Intelligence Community. (U)

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not supported by evidence previously made available to, originated by, or obtained by the Intelligence Community  For example —

- Statements by Dr. Henry Kissinger, former National Security Advisor to President Nixon, on the accuracy of portions of the 1205 report:

*"Having read the document carefully, I can only say that the description of the North Vietnamese government policy toward the South and the North's position on negotiations with the United States conforms with what we knew to be their position at the time."*<sup>124</sup>

*"When they (General Quang) described what their negotiating tactics were, those were the tactics they were using in negotiating with us...they say in this document that their proposals were first a cease-fire and the overthrow of President Thieu, after which they would use the prisoners to negotiate whatever other concerns they had. Now, as of the date of that document, those were their proposals. A month later they changed it but I could see if you make a report to the Politburo in the middle of September and you want to summarize what the negotiating position is, this was exactly the negotiating position they had as of the date of that document. To be precise, on October 8<sup>th</sup>, about three weeks after this document, they changed their position, but up to that time, they had insisted on exactly the conditions that are in that document..."*<sup>125</sup>

- White House/National Security Council declassified records from 1972 confirm that the U.S. delegation in Paris was privately being told by the NVN delegation during this period precisely the same negotiating position General Quang was referencing before the NVN Politburo.<sup>126</sup> It is further worth noting that neither the content of Quang's report

<sup>124</sup> Letter from Dr. Henry Kissinger to Sen. Bob Smith, dated June 22, 1993. (U)

<sup>125</sup> Transcript of comments by Henry Kissinger, *The MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour*, dated April 13, 1993. (U)

<sup>126</sup> See declassified National Security Council cables, previously made available to the IC, dated August 17, 1972, August 18, 1972, September 26, 1972, and September 27, 1972. (U)

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before the NVN Politburo or the content of the secret US-NVN talks in Paris this same month had been publicly disclosed at the time, but yet they match in many important respects, thereby adding considerable merit to the argument that the 1205 report is genuine.

- The report identifies contacts being made with several South Vietnamese leaders who were known opponents of the regime of President Nguyen Van Thieu and who were reported independently to US intelligence to have had clandestine contacts with representatives from the North.<sup>127</sup>
  - The report accurately depicts the circumstances surrounding the surrender of a South Vietnamese unit during the 1972 Easter Offensive, admitting that the North's propaganda had misrepresented the event.<sup>128</sup>
  - It predicts an upsurge in terrorist attacks beginning in October, 1972, which was indeed noted in the Mekong Delta region in November.<sup>129</sup>
- (U)

EO 12958 6.1(c) &lt;10Yrs

## NIE STATEMENT:

*"The portions of the (1205) report dealing with the POW issue are inaccurate with respect to how the prisoners were segregated by rank, where they were located, how they were classified, and the conditions of their release." (p. 29)"*

<sup>127</sup> See footnote #123.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid. In addition, the International Yearbook of Communist Affairs (IYCA) for the year 1972 notes that "During 1972, there were approximately 40,000 reported incidents of Viet Cong terrorism — an all time high for the Vietnam War — and it was estimated that over 10,000 additional incidents went unreported (*The New Yorker*, 13 January, 1973)" IYCA, p. 571. (U)

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## ASSESSMENT:

EO 12958 6.1(c)-10Yrs

Once again, the NIE *asserts* that the portions of the 1205 report dealing with the specified POW issues are inaccurate, but fails to convincingly *demonstrate* this point. This is especially disturbing because there is, in fact, evidence that the North Vietnamese classified POWs according to their level of cooperation or progressivity, that some had been segregated by rank, that there were more suspected US POWs camps during the war, and that the conditions outlined for the release of US POWs was either plausible or actually presented as such to Henry Kissinger during the peace talks.<sup>130</sup> In addition, the NIE fails to inform its reader about other portions of the 1205 report dealing with the POW issue that can be readily accepted as accurate or plausible based on information available to the US Government  For example —

- In the 1205 report, General Quang states, “For now, we have officially published a list of only 368 POWs.” This statement is factually accurate as discussed in great detail earlier in this assessment.<sup>131</sup> EO 12958 1.5(c)-10Yrs
- In the 1205 report, General Quang states, “Shortly, we will release several POWs in order to put pressure on the Nixon administration, observe his reaction, and the reaction of the American public, as well as to demonstrate our good intentions in this matter.” Again, this statement is factually accurate. On September 2, 1972, North Vietnam’s General Political Directorate of the VPA<sup>132</sup> announced that three US POWs would be freed “as

<sup>130</sup> Interim Analysis of the 1205 Report, with referenced documentation, presented to Ambassador Malcolm Toon by Senator Bob Smith, dated July 21, 1993, (see pages 44-50). (U)

<sup>131</sup> See Critical Assessment of “Key Judgments”; concerning the 735 report.

<sup>132</sup> Note:

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a sign of gratitude to that part of the progressive American public which has been calling for an immediate end to US aggression in Vietnam." That same day, North Vietnam's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement saying "North Vietnam will hand over the released pilots to a U.S. social organization animated with good will..."<sup>133</sup> The three US POWs were not actually released until September 25, 1972 when they were turned over to American anti-war activist Cora Weiss and her delegation. They departed Hanoi on September 26, 1972. This was the first release of US POWs by Hanoi in over three years (1969). (U)

EO 12958 1.5(c) &lt;10Yrs

- In the 1205 report, General Quang states the among the captured American aviators are "three astronauts: that is, three people who have completed the necessary training for space flight." There is evidence to support this statement. For instance, on February 11, 1965, Lt. Cmdr. Robert Shumacher, USN, had been shot down and captured over North Vietnam. A communist Vietnam News Agency release at the time had stated that Commander Schumacher "had been selected to be an astronaut."<sup>134</sup> Moreover, the Romanian Defense Attaché in Hanoi reported to the Intelligence Community in February, 1972 that he had met Shumacher whom the North Vietnamese described as "having been selected to be an astronaut prior to his capture."<sup>135</sup> Two, possibly three, additional US POWs had also gone through astronaut training in the United States prior to their capture in North Vietnam.<sup>136</sup> Based on these facts, it is certainly plausible for the 1205 report to state that three

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<sup>134</sup> See *P.O.W.*, by John Hubbel, Reader's Digest Press, 1976. (U)

<sup>135</sup> U.S. Defense Attaché Office Morocco message to CIA, DIA, JCS..., Subject: US POW in Hanoi, dated February 4, 1972. (Note: Romanian DATT referenced was interviewed by JCSD in May, 1998, and confirmed this account.) (U)

<sup>136</sup> Interim Analysis by Sen. Bob Smith, p. 43-44, dated July 21, 1993, and Memorandum for Record, Office of Senator Bob Smith, dated September 1, 1998. (U)

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people who had completed "the necessary training for space flight" were among those captured in North Vietnam. (U)

- In the 1205 report, General Quang states that among the captured American aviators are "15 US Air Force aces having more than 4,000 flight hours each." Again, it is factually accurate that there were several USAF pilot "aces" shot down and captured over North Vietnam — two of whom (Jim Kasler and Robbie Risner) had been on the cover of Time Magazine with profiles of their career background prior to their capture. (U)
- In the 1205 report, the names of four US POWs are specifically mentioned (Russian versions of American names as rendered from Vietnamese). According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, "two of the four named Americans are identifiable returned POWs. A third is a possible identification (also a returned POW), and the fourth name is too badly garbled to identify.<sup>137</sup>" The badly garbled name "Jim Intist Shasht," is believed to possibly correlate, at least phonetically, to "Jim Hiteshow," an Air Force colonel shot down over North Vietnam in 1967 who returned alive in 1973.<sup>138</sup> (U)
- In the 1205 report, General Quang states "We intend to resolve the American POW issue in the following manner: The US Government must demonstrate compliance, that is, a cease-fire and the removal of Nguyen Van Thieu, and then both sides can begin discussing the matter of returning POWs to the Nixon government...Nixon must (also) compensate North Vietnam for the great damage inflicted on it by this destructive war. Here then are the principles on the basis of which we may resolve the American POW issue."

<sup>137</sup> Defense Intelligence Agency memorandum, Subj: Vietnamese POW/MIA Document from Russian Archives, dated April 12, 1993, signed by Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action. (U)

<sup>138</sup> *An Interim Analysis of the 1205 Document - Report to Ambassador Malcolm Toon, US/Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs*, by Sen. Bob Smith, dated July 21, 1993, p. 44. (U)

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As already demonstrated by the comments made by Henry Kissinger, this was, indeed, the North Vietnamese negotiating position as of September, 1972. Moreover, the Central Intelligence Agency had itself verified Hanoi's intentions in its POW negotiating strategy, (as described in the 1205 report), in the summer of 1971.<sup>139</sup> Additional testimony and documentation supports the accuracy of Quang's reported statement. (U) For example —

- On August 18, 1972, Kissinger, in reporting on his August discussions with North Vietnamese officials, told South Vietnamese President Thieu, "They (the North Vietnamese) think they can use the prisoners of war to overthrow you."<sup>140</sup> (U)

- A former member of the U.S. negotiating team in Paris (1969-1971), Philip Habib, has testified "...in one of the first lists of negotiating points put forward by the North Vietnamese, the Communist side bracketed the release of prisoners with what they described as 'US responsibility for war damage in Vietnam' in a single numbered point...I know of no instance in which an adversary so openly treated this humanitarian problem in this way. We recognized from an early date what we were up against."<sup>141</sup> (U)

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<sup>139</sup> A Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence Memorandum, entitled Hanoi and US Prisoners of War, and dated June 28, 1971, stated, in part: "To understand Hanoi's approach to the question of prisoners of war, one should keep in mind the broader military and political issues the Communists insist must be resolved to their satisfaction *before* the prisoners can be released. Hanoi still insists on termination of American involvement in Vietnam, and end to Communist government in South Vietnam, and the establishment of a new regime affording the Communists a solid position from which to work toward full control of the South and reunification of all Vietnam." (U)

<sup>140</sup> Declassified NSC Transcript of Meeting between Kissinger and Thieu, dated August 18, 1972. (U)

<sup>141</sup> Testimony of Philip Habib, Under Secretary of State, before House Select Committee on Missing Persons, dated July 21, 1976. (U)

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- On September 26, 1972, Kissinger sought assurances from Le Duc Tho that "all American prisoners held in Indochina will be returned as a result of an agreement." Le Duc Tho responded, stating "Regarding the question of prisoners of war...if you satisfactorily solve the political question and the question of reparations, then we can find an understanding."<sup>142</sup> (U)
- In a 1992 Senate deposition with Ambassador Vernon Walters, who served as defense attaché in Paris during many of the secret US-DRV negotiations, the following exchange took place:

*Q: Was there ever any effort by the North Vietnamese that you were aware of to link the subject of our payments to them with the release of our prisoners?*

*A: Reparations were sine qua non for peace, return the prisoners for everything.*

*Q: From the North Vietnamese perspective you mean?*

*A: Yes.*

*Q: So there's no question that Dr. Kissinger was aware of the North Vietnamese desire to link reparations with the release of US prisoners?*

*A: Not in my mind.*

*Q: And you say that because you saw Dr. Kissinger discussing the subject with the North Vietnamese?*

*A: I was translating what he was saying into French and they were translating back what they were saying into English.<sup>143</sup> (U)*

- As referenced earlier in this assessment, in a wartime report originated by the Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi, I.S. Scherbakov, and entitled, "Soviet-Vietnamese Negotiations in April, 1967," the Soviet Ambassador advised his North Vietnamese counterparts, "it is not necessary to inform the Americans on the exact number of prisoners. A half of them could be handed over and the others could be released

<sup>142</sup> Declassified NSC Memorandum of Conversation between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, dated September 26, 1972. (U)

<sup>143</sup> Deposition of Vernon Walters, taken by the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, on September 1, 1992, p. 33-34. (U)

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later in exchange for repair of damage inflicted by the U.S. bombardment of the DRV." (U)

- Several additional [redacted] reports and analyses disseminated prior to and well after (even years after) Operation Homecoming in 1973 [redacted]

[redacted] and [redacted] that it fully expected war reparations — all of which adds additional plausibility to the policy referenced by General Quang.<sup>144</sup> [redacted]

EO 12958 1.5(c) &lt;10Yrs

<sup>144</sup> Intelligence Community reporting and analysis in support of the contention that there was a relationship between the release of US POWs and payment of war reparations for DRV reconstruction is too voluminous to list here, but they include, as examples only, — Memorandum from Director of Central Intelligence Schlesinger to National Security Advisor Kissinger, Subject: Indication that the Communists are holding previously unlisted US POWs as a future bargaining tool to obtain additional concessions from the United States, dated March 20, 1973; [redacted]

EO 12958 1.5(c) &lt;10Yrs

[redacted] Memorandum for National Security Advisor Anthony Lake from National Intelligence Officer for East Asia (NIC/CIA), indicating it was "possible" Hanoi held back US POWs in 1973, and was angry reparations from the U.S. had not been forthcoming, dated December 13, 1973. Additional reporting that Hanoi was expecting war reparations from the U.S. as part of a tentative agreement reached in October, 1972 can be found in Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, #108, November, 1972, p. 26, and #109, p. 32, 34, 39, and 41. Following the signing of the final accords in January, 1973, and in the 25 years that followed, there is extensive and continuous reporting in FBIS files, other press reports, and in closed-door US-Vietnam negotiations, wherein Hanoi repeatedly has called on the U.S. to implement Article 21 of the Accords (wherein the US pledged to help rebuild North Vietnam), and President Nixon's specific pledge to DRV Premier Pham Van Dong in February, 1973 to contribute up to \$4.75 billion in economic reconstruction of the North (\$3.25 billion in reconstruction aid, plus up to \$1.5 billion in "other forms of aid") — all of which indicated Hanoi having linked that issue to

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In addition to these examples, there are other plausible statements concerning American POWs referenced by General Quang in the 1205 report, to include comments about technical and weapons information obtained through interrogations of U.S. POWs, which even Russian officials have verified receiving from their North Vietnamese counterparts during the war. (U)

Based on all of the above, it is clear that the NIE has seriously misled its readership by failing to point out information which tends to corroborate "the content of the

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their cooperation on U.S. POW/MIA accounting. Again, while the reporting is too voluminous to detail here, a few examples to illustrate this widely understood point include the following — The Washington Post Editorial Page cartoon, April 7, 1973, p. A18, (shows NVN official dragging US POW in front of President Nixon, declaring, "That's the last of the prisoners...now, where's all the money to rebuild North Vietnam,"); Memorandum to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger from Under Secretary of State Philip Habib, November 13, 1976, Re: Meeting with the Vietnamese, November 12, "...The Vietnamese representative stuck to the standard Hanoi linkage of the MIA question with our obligation to provide aid..." The meeting was described in a French AFP press report as "the first face-to-face talks since the 1973 Vietnam peace negotiations" (AFP, Paris, November 12, 1976); Final Report of the House Select Committee on Missing Persons, December, 1976, p. 4, "...The Socialist Republic of Vietnam has called for selective implementation of the Paris Peace Agreement, specifically Article 21 dealing with American reconstruction aid to Vietnam, in exchange for POW/MIA information under Article 8b."; Defense Intelligence Agency Task Force (the "Tighe Report) Examination, May 27, 1986, "...Vietnam is waging a war of politics using the POW/MIA issue as the leverage for compelling the US to pay a blood debt."; Analysis Report by FBIS, *Vietnam: Toughened Stance on MIA Issue*, July 20, 1987, "...Hanoi has toughened its line on the question of American servicemen missing in action during the Vietnam war, reviving its pre-1978 hard line linking resolution of the question to a U.S. aid commitment under the Paris Peace Accords."; Kyodo News Service, Hanoi, July 26, 1997, "a former top leader of the Vietnamese Communist Party, and current advisor to the Party, Nguyen Van Linh, cited the accounting of American soldiers as missing in action as a prominent case of inequality in international relations — 'The Vietnamese government lets the US comb any place where its troops were stationed...(but) they promised to pay more than 3 billion dollars, and have for more than 20 years now not paid a single cent...' Linh said."

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1205 report" with respect to the POW issue and the other issues previously noted.



**NIE STATEMENT:**

*"If there were additional POWs, we would have known of them unless Vietnam maintained a separate prison system unknown to POWs who returned in 1973. We have uncovered no reliable evidence that a separate prison system existed for certain POWs; nor do we have such indicators as plausible site locations." (p.30)*

EO 12958 6.1(c)&lt;10Yrs



**ASSESSMENT:**

In addition to ignoring the views of former senior US officials referenced earlier in this assessment, this NIE statement also ignores undisputed evidence that some of the returned US POWs only became aware of each other by virtue of the North Vietnamese forces bringing them together in the weeks before Operation Homecoming began in February, 1973 — even though some had been held together in the same prison system. We would not have known about these POWs had the North Vietnamese not decided to consolidate them with the other returning POWs.<sup>145</sup> This point was further documented in a post-Homecoming Defense

<sup>145</sup> During a hearing of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs on December 3, 1992, the senior returned POW from the Hanoi prison system in North Vietnam, Admiral James Stockdale, testified that "we learned that in '71 they (NVN) started bringing in lots of people we didn't know about, Army and Marine people, ground soldiers, and some helicopter pilots, but there was never any mixing of the two until the whistle blew and we all came home." Stockdale further testified about the existence of 4 USAF pilots from Laos who were brought to a Hanoi-area prison camp (nicknamed "the plantation") in early 71, stating "we never had an interchange of names with them, and we never saw any of them until the whole bunch was released." Stockdale also pointed out to the Senate committee that he "does not claim iron-clad 100 percent accountability for anybody outside the 351" previously acknowledged POWs held in the Hanoi prison system and subsequently released in 1973. (U)

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Intelligence Agency study, entitled *PW Camps in North Vietnam*,<sup>146</sup> and a Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Appraisal, entitled *A Summary of Prisoner of War Experience in Southeast Asia, a Briefing*<sup>147</sup>, and it was again amply demonstrated in a Senate hearing exchange between U.S. Senator John Kerry and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency's POW/MIA Office, Robert Sheetz, on August 4, 1992:

*Sen. Kerry: There were groups of prisoners brought together for the release who only learned of each other being alive by virtue of the process of being brought together, correct?*

*Mr. Sheetz: There were prisoners that were consolidated toward the end.*

*Sen. Kerry: And some were held in different locations, perhaps 10 people in one location. Is that not accurate?*

*Mr. Sheetz: That is correct.*

*Sen. Kerry: ...Is it not possible, however, that a whole group of 10 held somewhere were never brought back to the main group and therefore held back in some other circumstances?*

*Mr. Sheetz: That is possible.*

*Sen. Kerry: So, the mere fact of debriefings not showing that somebody was not accounted for does not in and of itself dispose at all of the notion that somebody else could have been held elsewhere?*

*Mr. Sheetz: That's true...<sup>148</sup> (U)*

Thus, it is clear that the North Vietnamese had the capability to keep some

<sup>146</sup> Defense Intelligence Agency study, entitled *PW Camps in North Vietnam*, dated 1973. As further confirmation of the above-mentioned argument, the study indicates that "the period from 1968 to 1972 was marked by the movement of US POWs from South Vietnam and Laos into North Vietnam for detention. With few exceptions, the personnel moved into North Vietnam were kept separated from the men actually captured in North Vietnam." (U)

<sup>147</sup> The referenced DIA study is dated May 8, 1973, and was published by the Deputy Director for Intelligence, DIA. (U)

<sup>148</sup> Hearing of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, dated August 4, 1992. Also referenced in *Interim Analysis of the 1205 Report* by Sen. Bob Smith, dated July 21, 1993. (U)

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unacknowledged US POWs *within the same prison system* as the acknowledged US POWs (approx. 350 as of Sept. 72), and we would not have known about those POWs if the North Vietnamese had not decided to repatriate them. Moreover, it is also clear that the North Vietnamese went to considerable lengths to prevent even the acknowledged US POWs from learning about each other in the course of late night sudden movements of these personnel between camps.<sup>149</sup> (U)

But even more egregious is the NIE statement above that there were no indicators of plausible site locations for other possible US POW prisons unknown to the POWs who returned in 1973 (ie: a separate or second prison system). While it is true that repatriated POWs were only aware of those within their system, the NIE judgment is nonetheless *contradicted* by substantial information and evaluations originated by or made available to the U.S. Intelligence Community both during and/or after the Vietnam War. For example —

- *Defense Intelligence Agency estimate:* In the 1205 report, General Quang states that there are currently (as of Sept. 15, 1972) 11 prisons in North Vietnam where all the American POWs are being held. DIA knew from the debriefings of US POWs who returned in 1973, that as of September, 1972, there were 6 prisons in North Vietnam holding the US POWs who were later repatriated.<sup>150</sup> Using the established fact that, in September, 1972, 6 camps

<sup>149</sup> See *The Raid*, by Benjamin F. Schemmer, 1976, p. 17, "It was a scary thing for the POWs being moved to another camp, usually at night, always on short notice...the guards blindfolded them...guards were put between groups of POWs to make sure no one lifted a blindfold or talked. The North Vietnamese didn't want them to see who the other prisoners were, or where they were headed." (U)

<sup>150</sup> The nicknames given by the returned POWs for these 6 camps were the Hanoi Hilton, the Zoo, Plantation, Dogpatch, Mountain Camp, and Rockpile. (See DIA 1973 PW Camp Study). It also should be noted that the Intelligence Community only learned the exact number after North Vietnam released the acknowledged POWs in 1973. Indeed, as of September 4, 1972 (five months prior to Homecoming), DIA estimated that only 4 of the "confirmed" US POW camps in North Vietnam were estimated to be "probably" or "possibly" holding US POWs as of September, 1972. (U)

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held subsequently repatriated US POWs, that leaves 5 additional prisons in the North for General Quang's number of total camps to be accurate (ie: 11-6=5). As of September, 1972, DIA had identified, in a published study, a total of 8 confirmed US POW camps in North Vietnam, and an additional 18 possible US POW camps in North Vietnam. A "confirmed" camp was defined as "one in which there is conclusive evidence that American prisoners are, or were, detailed on a permanent basis." A "possible" camp was defined as "one in which there is some information or evidence that it might be, or could have been, used for the detention of American prisoners on a permanent basis."<sup>151</sup> Accordingly, based on the fact that DIA had identified 26 (8+18) confirmed or possible US POW camps in North Vietnam, as of September 1972, it is demonstrably inaccurate for the NIE to claim that the Intelligence Community had uncovered "no such indicators as plausible site locations" for 5 additional prisons for US POWs (11-6), as of the date of the 1205 report (Sept. 72). (U)

- *Central Intelligence Agency study:* A CIA study, conducted "in response to recent human source reporting on American POWs still in North Vietnam," and disseminated in early 1976, concluded that "the possibility of a second prison system for the detention of American POWs in North Vietnam cannot be disregarded." CIA further concluded, based on the results of this study, that it was "precluded from drawing a firm conclusion that all the camps which held American POWs have been identified." The CIA study included "a comparative analysis of six confirmed American POW camps outside of the Hanoi area with 19 other suspect camps not known to have contained Americans in order to determine which camps reacted to the (November 21, 1970) Son Tay raid by constructing new defensive positions such as AAA sites, AW positions, trenching and/or foxholes." CIA determined, based on photography and debriefings of the POW returnees, that the 6 confirmed US

<sup>151</sup> Defense Intelligence Agency study, entitled *Prisoner of War Camps in North Vietnam*, dated November, 1972. (Note: While the study itself is dated November, 1972, the actual date of the most current information used in this study is listed as September 4, 1972) (U)

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POW camps used in the study had all reacted to the raid in the same manner. But, more importantly, CIA determined that 7 of the other 19 camps used in the study had also reacted similarly to the raid by taking the referenced precautionary defensive measures, while the remaining camps had not reacted in a discernible fashion to defend against any additional US efforts to free US POWs from camps in the North.<sup>152</sup> (U)

- *Central Intelligence Agency memorandum:* A CIA memorandum, entitled "Re-evaluation of PW/MIA Information," was prepared for the Director of Central Intelligence, and sent to him via the Deputy Director for Operations, on August 13, 1976. In the memorandum, CIA analysts outlined "information that can be interpreted as indicating a probability that there are still American PWs alive in North Vietnam." The information, further described as "not an exhaustive list," included reference to (1) at least one suspect detention camp for American PWs which had immediately reacted to the November, 1970 Son Tay raid, yet none of the repatriated PWs had been held there; (2) several sources reported seeing American PWs working on the main bridge across the Red River at Hanoi. None of the returned PWs had ever worked on the bridge, according to the debriefings; (3) ...several reports indicating that various North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese communist officials have stated that there are still American PWs alive in North Vietnam. Not all of these reports have been brought to the attention of the (House) Select Committee (on Missing Persons); (4) repatriated PWs identified a number of cases in which pilots had been seen on the ground in what appeared to be captivity, but were never again seen and were not accounted for by the North Vietnamese; (5) a captured North Vietnamese official, most of whose information was highly accurate, indicated that North Vietnamese

<sup>152</sup> Central Intelligence Agency PW Camp Study, dated 1976, obtained from Defense Intelligence Agency PW/MIA intelligence records forwarded to the National Archives on May 4, 1984, and subsequently declassified and forwarded to Sen. Bob Smith by the Acting Deputy Director (POW/MIA Affairs), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, dated November 12, 1993. (U)

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EO 12958 6.1(c) &lt;10Yrs

officials would hold some American PWs completely out of public view and not return them; and (6) two additional reports to support the probability of unacknowledged American PWs from North Vietnam not released in 1973.<sup>153</sup> Once again, this information contradicts the NIE contention that "if there were additional POWs, we would have known of them..."

- *The discrepancy of US POWs related to the Son Tay POW Camp Raid:* According to several U.S. intelligence reports, testimony of former US officials, interviews with Russian officials, and even statements by Vietnamese officials, US POWs had been moved from the Son Tay prison camp in North Vietnam *approximately 10 days to one month prior to the failed US rescue attempt on November 21, 1970, because the North Vietnamese had learned about the forthcoming raid and a foreign journalist or peace activist had visited the camp.* US intelligence and defense officials had suspected that US POWs were still present at the camp in November, 1970 prior to launching the raid. However, those US POWs repatriated in 1973 who had been held at Son Tay in 1970 had been moved out of the camp on July 14, 1970 — *four and 1/2 months prior to the raid* — in a routine move, also attributed to potential flooding at the Son Tay camp in July, 1970. This serious discrepancy suggests other US POWs, not repatriated in 1973, had been moved in and out of the Son Tay camp after July 14<sup>th</sup> and prior to November 21<sup>st</sup> (U)
- *Other Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency reporting:* Although this can hardly be considered an exhaustive listing, there are other unexplained IC reports which lend credibility to the existence of other US POWs and/or US POW camps in North Vietnam during the war, such as: (1) CIA 240202Z Jul 82, Subject: Organization and Inmates of Tan Lap Prison, Vinh Phu Province (North Vietnam), "former detention site for US POWs...Long-held inmates noted that up to 1973, American prisoners had

<sup>153</sup> Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Re-evaluation of PW/MIA Information, dated August 13, 1976. (U)

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been interned at this prison." *Note:* No repatriated US POWs were held there at this facility; (2) see Defense Intelligence Agency 15-Volume Study and Report of Uncorrelated Information Relating to Missing Americans in Southeast Asia, dated December 15, 1978; (3) see Defense Intelligence Agency Task Force Examination of PW/MIA Analysis, submitted by Lt. Gen. Eugene Tighe, USAF-ret., former Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, dated May 27, 1986; and (4) see Defense Intelligence Agency (or DPMO) database index of HUMINT reporting on POW/MIA in Southeast Asia, broken down by originating agency. All of these reports are not "resolved."  
(U)

## NIE STATEMENT:

*"The 1,205 figure is inconsistent with our understanding of how many Americans survived the events in which they became lost to become captives...The number of Americans whose fates are uncertain (on the priority case list) has been reduced to 48."* (p.30)

## ASSESSMENT:

As referenced earlier in this assessment (see discussion of chart on p. 19 of NIE), the number of Americans whose fate is still uncertain in 1998, using the NIE's own figures, is at least 370, of which 48 are priority cases. However, the priority case list, first developed by Presidential POW/MIA Emissary to Hanoi, General John Vessey, has always been a listing of cases where survival was suspected based on information obtained by the United States and subsequently reflected in U.S. POW/MIA case files maintained by DoD. It was never intended to be the end-all list of the only cases where an American might have survived his incident to become captured, simply because it was recognized by General Vessey and U.S. intelligence officials that the Vietnamese could very likely have information on those MIA cases where the U.S. had no information to suggest death or survival. The NIE misleads its reader by not clarifying the genesis of the so-called "priority case list" in the above statement, in addition to not referencing the 370 figure and pointing out again

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that the 1,205 figure included over 500 subsequently repatriated US POWs as well.



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NIE STATEMENT: *"Circumstantial evidence suggests the information in the ("735") report<sup>154</sup> is inaccurate."* (p. 30)



ASSESSMENT:

EO 12958 6.1(c) &lt;10Yrs

While the NIE presents evidence to "suggest the information in the 735 report is inaccurate, *no where in the NIE is there a similar presentation of evidence that suggests information in the 735 report is accurate.* This is a serious shortcoming in the NIE, and is especially disturbing in view of the NIE's acknowledgment that, while only two pages of the report (which referenced US POWs) were available to the IC in 1993, there are now over 27 pages of the remainder of the report available to the IC which had never been formally assessed by the Community. Included in these additional 27 pages of text are an extensive report outlining North Vietnamese political, military, and diplomatic developments throughout the year 1970 and related plans for 1971. Among these general topics are specific comments concerning —

- the situation within the Vietnamese Workers' (Communist) Party.
- the restoration of Party unity.
- the foreign policy and diplomatic strategy of the Party.
- an overview of military personnel losses.
- the U.S. incursion into Cambodia in April, 1970.
- a detailed discussion of the military and political situation in both Cambodia and Laos.

<sup>154</sup> As noted earlier in this assessment, the "735" report is so named by US officials because in the text of this 1971 29-page Russian translation of a North Vietnamese report, there is one sentence that refers to 735 American fliers having been captured in the DRV, while only 368 had been publicly acknowledged as a diplomatic move.

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- U.S. efforts to achieve "Vietnamization" in the South; particularly in the Mekong River Valley.
- military successes and losses, to include the disruption of the Communist transportation system on Cambodian territory which is reported to have adversely affected the supplying of communist troops in South Vietnam.
- the opening of a new supply route in the area of the Chiong Shon Mountains in central Vietnam.
- military plans in the South, including troop deployment plans.
- the continued deployment of NVN forces on land through Laos.
- the amount of weapons, ammunition, military hardware, and food deployed to the fronts in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.
- the need for literature and art to play an enormous propagandistic and educational role in support of the war effort.

EO 12958 6.1(c) &lt;10Yrs

Again, no where in the NIE is there an assessment of the **accuracy** of the matters outlined above. More importantly, there would appear to be evidence to confirm the historical accuracy, from the communist perspective, of many of the subjects above which are outlined in the text of the 735 report. As such, the NIE judgment referenced above is misleading, incomplete, and, taken as a whole, inaccurate.

EO 12958 1.5(c) &lt;10Yrs

NIE STATEMENT:

*"The dates are wrong. The (735) report says it was given at the 20<sup>th</sup> plenary session of the Central Committee in late December, 1970 or early January, 1971. In fact, the 20<sup>th</sup> Plenum was not held until February, 1972. The plenum held in January, 1971 was the 19<sup>th</sup>." (p.30) "...*

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EO 12958 1.5(c)-10Yrs

## ASSESSMENT:

EO 12958 1.5(c)-10Yrs

The NIE has not demonstrated, with the statements above, that the dates given for the 735 report are "*wrong*." It has only demonstrated that the date given by the Russian GRU for the 735 report is *inconsistent* with information currently available

EO 12958 6.1(c)-10Yrs

The NIE's judgment is further undermined by the following information which should have been brought to its readers' attention

- The 18<sup>th</sup> Plenum of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers (Communist) Party, according to a 1980 publication by the Vietnamese Army paper, *Quan doi Nhan dan*<sup>155</sup>, took place in *January, 1970*, a full

<sup>155</sup> The title of the actual publication was *Cuoc Khang chien Chong My Cuu nuoc, 1965-1975: Nhung Su kien Quan-su (The Anti-U.S. war of national salvation, 1965-1975; Military events)*, p. 203-207, as referenced in *Communist Road to Power*, Duiker, 1996, p. 306-307. (U)

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year prior to the date given for the meeting reported on in the 735 report. Yet, according to the Statute of the Vietnam's Workers Party, adopted in 1960, the Central Committee was to "usually meet *once every six months*.<sup>156</sup>" This meeting schedule was confirmed in an interview by US officials with the reported 735 author, Hoang Anh, in Hanoi, earlier this year, who indicated, at two different points, that the Central Committee conducted *semi-annual meetings*, and that Anh presented *oral semi-annual and annual reports at these sessions in the early 1970's*.<sup>157</sup> Under that scheduling scenario, a 20<sup>th</sup> meeting *could* have taken place in *January, 1971*, with the 19<sup>th</sup> meeting having occurred earlier in the prior summer months, possibly to coincide with the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Third Party Congress (September, 1960). (U) EO 12958 6.1(c)-10Yrs

- It is interesting to note that the 735 report scenario — that the 20<sup>th</sup> Central Committee meeting took place at the end of December, 1970 — is *consistent* with the 1205 report scenario — that the 23<sup>rd</sup> meeting had already taken place by September 15, 1972. Indeed, based on six month time-frames, a 23<sup>rd</sup> meeting could have occurred in June/July, 1972, and there is, indeed, evidence from the Russia GRU of a report to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party having been presented on June 26, 1972 (U). Again, the NIE is silent on this evidence
- According to the translated text of the 735 report, Anh makes clear several times in his report that he is discussing "the basic features of our activities in 1970, over the period that extends from the 18<sup>th</sup>

<sup>156</sup> Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, #103, *The Structure of Power in the DRV: Constitution and Party Statute*, p.16, February, 1972, American Embassy, Saigon (JUSPAO). (U)

<sup>157</sup> See Interview of Hoang Anh by U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, Pete Peterson, p.3-4 (DIA 270934Z Jul 98). (U)

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Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers Party (CC VWP) until now.” (As noted above, the referenced 18<sup>th</sup> Plenum had indeed taken place in 1970 - in January of that year - which the NIE *fails* to note - a fact which contradicts its judgment that the “dates” given in the 735 report are “wrong.”) Anh further states, “at this Plenary session, an assessment will be given of our victories in 1970...At the 18<sup>th</sup>, 19<sup>th</sup>, and now at the 20<sup>th</sup> Plenary sessions of the CC VWP, repeated emphasis was placed...” Anh goes on to report in great and extensive detail a summation of activities that had taken place *in 1970* as well as a discussion of forthcoming communist and perceived enemy plans *for 1971*. He further discusses events that had already taken place at the “19<sup>th</sup>” Plenum. Thus, there is no wiggle room for the time-frame of the report, or that it might have been the 19<sup>th</sup> meeting, according to the GRU acquisition — it clearly took place at the end of 1970, beginning of 1971

- All that is currently known about the time-frame of the 19<sup>th</sup> Plenum appears to be based on the Communiqué of the 19<sup>th</sup> Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers Party which was broadcast by the Vietnam News Agency in Hanoi on February 1, 1971, and referenced in two editorials in Party papers during the next two days, all of which was thought to have been done to coincide with the 41<sup>st</sup> Anniversary of the Founding of the Indochinese Communist Party, the VWP’s predecessor organization, on February 3, 1930, by Ho Chi Minh.<sup>158</sup> The timing of the publication of the communiqué is not, in and of itself, *proof* that the 19<sup>th</sup> Plenum actually took place during the time-frame given by the GRU for the 735 report (“End of December, 1970/Early January, 1971). Indeed, there is evidence that communiqués were often not published until *months* after the conclusion of the plenary meetings. For example, scholars have

<sup>158</sup> Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, #91, the 19<sup>th</sup> Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Viet-Nam Workers Party and its Reference Documents, p.1-27. (U)

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reported that the 15<sup>th</sup> Central Committee Party Plenum, related to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Congress, "took place in January, 1959, even though the communiqué was not broadcast by the Vietnam News Agency until May 13, 1959.<sup>159</sup>" (U)

- There is no verifiable evidence that the "19<sup>th</sup> Plenum" was held at the end of "December, 1970" — the date given by the Russian GRU — [redacted] 2958 1.5(c) <10Yrs  
[redacted] However, there *is* evidence from the Central Intelligence Agency dated December, 1970 (inexplicably not referenced in this NIE), of a "possible high-level DRV meeting in Hanoi.<sup>160</sup>" [redacted]
- Finally, there is considerable confusion, and contradictions, in the absence of official internal Party records from Hanoi, about the dates of Central Committee Party Plenums in the early 1970s which *precludes* relying on the NIE's judgment that the dates reported by Russian military intelligence (GRU), — which plausibly had better internal access to the truth — , are *wrong*. [redacted] EO 12958 1.5(c) <10Yrs

[redacted] As additional examples, the 21<sup>st</sup> Plenum, according to some reports, including publications from Hanoi, took place in October, 1973, yet other publications from Hanoi indicate the 22<sup>nd</sup> Plenum took place "in late 1973," while still other Vietnamese officials have reported that the Central Military Affairs Committee met in March,

<sup>159</sup> See *The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam*, Duiker, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, 1996, p.400, fn#35. (U)

<sup>160</sup> Memorandum for the Record, 22 December, 1970, Subject: Meeting of the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Vietnam, see para. 4, "Possible High-Level DRV Meeting in Hanoi: Mr. Carver from CIA noted that DRV Ambassadors to Moscow and Peiking, three NLF representatives to the Scandinavian countries and certain other senior DRV diplomats in Europe are converging on Hanoi in the next few days. Increased intelligence watches for possible results of such a meeting are being instituted. No output is expected before the first of the year." (U)

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1974 to consider the resolutions of the 21<sup>st</sup> Plenum. If the 21<sup>st</sup> Plenum was indeed in late 73/early 74, it makes the NIE's earlier claim that the 20<sup>th</sup> Plenum took place as early as February, 1972 even stranger (ie: no Central Committee plenum meetings for over 21 months?). Also, as noted earlier, even the dates for the exact month that the 20<sup>th</sup> Plenum took place, allegedly in 1972 according to US analysts, are in dispute, casting further doubt on the reliability of the NIE's judgment. Some analysts say April, others say February, and the NIE itself says February, [REDACTED]

EO 12958 1.5(c)-10Yrs

## NIE STATEMENT:

*"Hoang Anh was indeed a Secretary of the Central Committee at that time and was responsible for agriculture... There is no reason why he would deliver a report that deals extensively with political and military developments and the situations in Laos and Cambodia. Agriculture is mentioned only briefly." (p.30) [REDACTED]*

EO 12958 6.1(c)-10Yrs

## ASSESSMENT:

According to U.S. biographic records and various communist Vietnamese documents (all previously available to the principal drafter of the NIE), Hoang Anh, as noted, did indeed have the title of Central Committee Secretary of the Vietnamese Workers' (Communist/Lao Dong) Party in December, 1970/January, 1971, as the Russian GRU correctly notes on its cover page to the 735 report. In fact, the leading Communist Party publication in Hanoi, *Nhan Dan*, in a report dated one month prior to the alleged "735" report, referred to Anh as "Secretary of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee."<sup>161</sup> (Interestingly, Anh sidestepped and then denied having this title in interviews with US officials in April and July, 1998<sup>162</sup>;

<sup>161</sup> *Nhan Dan*, Hanoi, November 17, 1970, p.1, translated by FBIS and US Embassy, Saigon.  
(U)

<sup>162</sup> In his first interview with US Ambassador to Vietnam, Pete Peterson, in Hanoi on April 6,

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while at the same time privately telling a Russian GRU official that he had been "reprimanded by the Vietnamese Communist Party because the Americans managed to obtain a copy of the speech delivered by Anh (ie: the 735 report)."<sup>163</sup>) (U)

However, the NIE fails to note that records also indicate Anh was assessed by the U.S. Government in 1971 as "*one of the most senior members of the Vietnam Communist (Lao Dong/Workers') Party hierarchy short of Politburo membership...with broad-ranging political, military, and managerial experience.*"<sup>164</sup>

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1998, Anh only referred to his Government ministerial position, and not his Party secretariat position, stating "that the Ambassador should understand his role during the war years. As Minister of Agriculture, he was responsible for food production and related industries..." Anh further stated, "There was no night or day. There were very few opportunities to meet at the Central Committee level. We were exhausted. I never had time to be involved with other matters. I, myself, had no knowledge of POWs." Anh stated "he left the position as Minister of Agriculture in 1970, after which he worked on the consolidated report on agriculture until 1975." In his second interview with Ambassador Peterson on July 18, 1998, Anh was specifically pressed whether he had "ever held the position of Secretary of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers' Party..." Anh replied, "At the end of 1970, I continued to serve the Central Committee as the Acting Secretary for Agricultural, Marine, and Fishery matters. Mr. Anh emphasized that this was a specific, yet temporary duty assigned to him by the Central Committee, and *not a named or titled position, such as Secretary of the Central Committee.*" Anh further stated, "I was never a permanent member of the Central Committee...I personally had no time for the Central Committee." (U)

<sup>163</sup> Memorandum for the Record, Subj: Private Meeting with (Russian Executive Secretary for the Joint POW/MIA Commission) Colonel Osipov, dated August 10, 1998, Joint Commission Support Directorate, DoD/USRJC, "...Osipov claimed that Colonel Yuri A. Potapov, defense attaché at the Russian Embassy in Hanoi for the past four years, told Osipov that he (Potapov) knows Hoang Anh. Potapov was told by Anh that he was reprimanded by the Vietnamese Communist Party because the Americans managed to obtain a copy of the speech delivered by Anh (this is apparently a reference to the so-called "735 document.")" (U)

<sup>164</sup> *Members of the VWP Central Committee*, North Vietnam Affairs Division, JUSPAO, American Embassy Saigon, dated 1971. (U)

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He had been elevated to the rank of Deputy Prime Minister/Vice-Premier in 1970/71, serving as "the senior in age and political experience" among the Vice-Premiers serving on the Party Secretariat.<sup>165</sup> Moreover, as a senior member of the Secretariat and Central Committee member since the early 1950's, Anh held a very influential position in the DRV leadership structure, having been referred to as one of two individuals who "followed just behind the top leaders of the Party in status," holding the "greatest power and influence in North Vietnam" by virtue of occupying "key posts within both Party and state."<sup>166</sup> (U)

As a further example of Anh's influence as a veteran Secretariat member, a 1972 U.S. study states "the top of the power pyramid of North Vietnam is the Politburo supported by the Party Secretariat, the center of second level leadership is the Central Committee."<sup>167</sup> Additionally, the power of the Secretariat is confirmed by the "Statute of the Vietnam Workers Party adopted by the Third Party Congress of the Party in September, 1960," which provides that "the Secretariat solves daily problems and controls the carrying out of Party decisions under the leadership of the Central Executive Committee and the Politburo."<sup>168</sup> (U)

[REDACTED] prior to 1970 (the alleged date of the TSS report), Anh had been "a close associate of General Vo Nguyen Giap" and served on the National Defense Council and as a Vice-Minister

<sup>165</sup> See Memorandum (U) from Douglas Pike, (who is acknowledged in the NIE as a noted expert and scholar on Vietnam (S)), dated December 22, 1995; and Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, *Bases of Power in the DRV*, dated October, 1972. (U)

<sup>166</sup> Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, *VWP-DRV Leadership, 1960 to 1971, Part II, the Government*, p.94, published by North Vietnam section, JUSPAO, American Embassy, Saigon, dated July, 1973. (U)

<sup>167</sup> Ibid, part II.

<sup>168</sup> See Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, *The Structure of Power in the DRV: Constitution and Party Statute*, p. 17, published by the North Vietnam Affairs Division, Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (USPAO), American Embassy, Saigon, dated February, 1972. (U)

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of Defense for at least four years (the only person lacking formal military rank to have held this title), during which time he reportedly planned the partial demobilization of the Vietnamese People's Army (VPA). He also headed PAVN's General Directorate for Rear Services, preceded by a stint as a Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the VPA. He had reportedly written a widely acclaimed treatise on guerrilla warfare in 1951, and had been active in the early 1950's fighting in the Resistance (Viet-Minh) war against the French, and concurrently serving as Chairman of Interzone Committees IV and V in Central Vietnam.<sup>169</sup> (U) EO 12958 1.5(c)-10Yrs

He is also reported [redacted] as having been a member of the Vietnamese Communist Party's (Lao Dong/VWP) Central Committee, in addition to serving on its Secretariat, from as far back as 1951, with subsequent simultaneous membership on North Vietnam's National Assembly's Standing (Leadership Ruling) Committee, which wrote the Constitution for North Vietnam during Anh's tenure on the Committee, (was subsequently adopted in 1960.) His listing as a full member of the Party's Central Committee is further confirmed by open source accounts from the early 1970's<sup>170</sup>, even though Anh told US officials earlier this year that "I was never a permanent member of the Central Committee...I personally had no time for the Central Committee."<sup>171</sup> (U) EO 12958 1.5(c)-10Yrs

[redacted] on Anh also show him serving as Minister of Finance from November, 1958 until 1965 when he was appointed as Minister of Agriculture. (U) EO 12958 1.5(c)-10Yrs

While he did, therefore, have expertise and responsibility for agriculture (he had left EO 12958 1.5(c)-10Yrs

<sup>169</sup> Memorandum dated May 3, 1997 from Douglas Pike, Vietnam scholar [redacted]

(U)

<sup>170</sup> International Yearbook of Communist Affairs, 1970, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University; and Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, *Bases of Power in the DRV*, dated October, 1972, and published by the American Embassy, Saigon. (U)

<sup>171</sup> Interview of Hoang Anh by US Ambassador to Vietnam, Pete Peterson, dated July 18, 1998. (Cable cite: DIA 270934Z July 98). (U)

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the position of Minister of Agriculture "in 1970" according to an interview he gave to US officials on April 6, 1998), Anh also clearly had expertise, authority, and responsibility *beyond* agriculture as a senior veteran member of the Secretariat in 1970. He would have been amply qualified to address the range of agricultural, economic, political, and military matters contained in the 735 report at a session of the Central Committee by virtue of his background described above, especially his tenure on the Secretariat spanning 20 years. Indeed, in 1965 and 1968, CIA had assessed Anh as having had "experience in three different fields — defense, finance, and agriculture," making him "the type of multi-purpose specialist familiar in Communist countries." (U)

EO 12958 6.1(c)-10Yrs

It is also conceivable that Anh may have been designated to present a report to the Central Committee plenum covering the range of specified topics, with input being received from the other Secretaries of the Central Committee. The NIE fails to consider this scenario.

Moreover, contrary to the NIE's assertion above, agriculture is not "mentioned only briefly" in the text of the 735 report. In point of fact, Anh's spirited defense of the DRV's agricultural policies is one of the central topics of the 735 report, with over 13 paragraphs in the report's text devoted to a detailed discussion of agriculture policies, including an assessment of mistakes, criticisms, statistics, and goals which are outlined by Anh. Given Anh's background in agriculture, these facts lend credence to the GRU acquisition being reliable.

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
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NIE STATEMENT:

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## ASSESSMENT:

The NIE statement is inaccurate and misleading. The NIE does not demonstrate convincingly that the contents of the 735 report with respect to agricultural issues

*In point of fact, Anh does discuss "the need to strengthen agricultural collectives" and "the adaptation of technology for agriculture" in the 735 report. For example, Anh states*



- *"Marxism teaches that agricultural collectivization is an extremely important condition for the development of a socialist economy...in our country, where colonialists left us a heritage of a backward economy, this matter is particularly important. With all our effort, we must develop agriculture, placing it on a collective basis. It will be necessary to develop a strong network of cooperatives in the entire territory of South Vietnam."*
- *"The cooperatives need to be provided with technology, which will ensure they will develop successfully."*
- *"Our leadership is giving a great deal of attention to issues of cooperative farming, and is continuing to seek ways to boost agriculture...The Politburo and Secretariat have given instructions to scientific organizations to actively participate in boosting agriculture."*  
(U)

Additionally, there are obvious other statements in the Anh report concerning agriculture which are confirmed by the historical record. For instance, Anh claims the DRV would have had even more difficulties in 1970 "if it were not for the help

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from brotherly socialist countries, which permits us successfully to restore agriculture." According to the International Yearbook of Communist Affairs for 1970, (published by the Hoover Institute at Stanford in 1971), "Failure to attain self-sufficiency in agriculture...has forced the DRV to depend on the U.S.S.R. and China for its vital supplies." (U)

NIE STATEMENT: *"The report speaks extensively about preparations for the 4<sup>th</sup> Party Congress, including the establishment of a preparatory committee. In fact, the Politburo did not decide when to hold the 4<sup>th</sup> Party Congress until July, 1975...The 4<sup>th</sup> Party Congress was not held until December, 1976."* (p.31) EO 12958 6.1(c)-10Yrs

## ASSESSMENT:

Once again, the NIE's judgment is not convincing and misleads the NIE reader. It is also ironic to note the NIE's use of the term "*extensively*" with respect to the 4<sup>th</sup> Party Congress remarks in the 735 report, versus the term "*mentioned only briefly*" with respect to agriculture. In point of fact, the discussion of agriculture in the 735 report is *lengthier* than the discussion of the 4<sup>th</sup> Party Congress preparations. More importantly, Anh specifically states in the text of the 735 report that the Politburo would *not* decide when the 4<sup>th</sup> Party Congress would be held until after several specific matters had been discussed at the Plenary Session and specific decisions had been made on them. Only then would the Politburo decide "when" to hold the 4<sup>th</sup> Party Congress. He goes on to say "the issue of holding the 4<sup>th</sup> Congress is extremely important, and we must prepare with the greatest care for it. Every issue must be studied and discussed thoroughly." Anh also states, correctly, that 10 years had passed since the 3<sup>rd</sup> Party Congress.<sup>172</sup> EO 12958 6.1(c)-10Yrs

<sup>172</sup> The Third National Party Congress was held in Hanoi from September 5 through September 12, 1960. (U)

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EO 12958 6.1(c) &lt;10Yrs

The fact that the Politburo, in the end, waited until after the reunification of the country under its new name, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, to decide "when" to hold the 4<sup>th</sup> Party Congress is not incongruous with Anh's presentation. Additionally, since the 3<sup>rd</sup> Party Congress had occurred 10 years earlier, it is not unusual that the Politburo may have been considering, as of 1970, when to hold the next Party Congress, and towards that end, made a decision to create an organizational committee to prepare for the next Congress. (U)

Furthermore, the NIE fails to reveal that the make-up of the 10 individuals referenced by Anh as having been selected to serve on the organizational committee can be confirmed as actual North Vietnamese leaders who are presented in order of seniority. Perhaps even more important is Anh's reference to (alleged 1205 author) Tran Van Quang as a member of that Committee, in addition to Anh himself.

EO 12958 1.5(c) &lt;10Yrs

## NIE STATEMENT:

*"Another key anomaly in the purported report is the charge against 16 opportunist members of the Central Committee, 6 of whom are named. If this were true, they should have been promptly ousted from their positions... In fact, no action appears to have been taken then...Furthermore, if opportunism and disunity were of such concern, indirect references in the party press would have followed the plenum."*

EO 12958 6.1(c) &lt;10Yrs

## ASSESSMENT:

The NIE presents no evidence to support its claim that the referenced opportunist members of the Central Committee "should have been promptly ousted from their positions" if such was indeed the case. Nor does the NIE present, as plausible, a scenario where many of the referenced members could have fallen back in line by the conclusion of the plenum without retribution recognizable to the outside world. Nor does the NIE mention that one of the 6 named individuals, Nguyen Van Vinh,

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correctly noted in the GRU footnote as Chairman of the Committee for Unification, was, in fact, apparently ousted during National Assembly elections later that spring, a development noted by Western observers at the time<sup>173</sup>. And nor does the NIE concede that the other 5 named individuals were all, in fact, correctly identified in the 735 report as either alternate or current members of the Central Committee, which is verified by a review of published information from the same time period<sup>174</sup>.



Additionally, Anh makes clear in the text of the 735 report that “in a few days from now, these 16 comrades must present to us written explanations of their positions and then we will decide how to deal with them. He also states that the disharmony must be worked out so it does not “emerge into the open and become accessible to widespread publicity.” Therefore, the NIE’s claim that there apparently were not references to the disunity evident at the start of the plenum in the days following the conclusion of the plenum is not noteworthy.



More importantly, it should be noted that official communist publications in Hanoi, dated February 2, 1971 and February 3, 1971, marking the 41 anniversary of the founding of North Vietnam’s communist party, *did* refer to the need for “singlemindedness and solidarity within the Party” in addition to “absolute loyalty to the Party’s lines, stands, viewpoints, and principles” by all Party members<sup>175</sup> — a view that seems consistent with Hoang Anh’s call for unity among Party members presented in the 735 report in late December, 1970/early January, 1971. (U)

<sup>173</sup> *Yearbook (for 1971) on International Communist Affairs*, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1972, p. 591-592. (U)

<sup>174</sup> *Yearbook (for 1969) on International Communist Affairs*, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1970, p. 687. (U)

<sup>175</sup> See FBIS translations of Nhan Dan editorials dated February 2-3, 1971 “On the Forty-First Anniversary of the Founding of the Indochinese Communist Party.” (U)

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NIE STATEMENT: "Some of the dissenting policy positions alleged in the 735 report are plausible. But others — such as a proposal to invite foreign (presumably Chinese) troops to help in Laos and South Vietnam — are not." (p.31 )

ASSESSMENT:

EO 12958 6.1(c) <10Yrs

The NIE presents absolutely no evidence to support its claim that a reference by Hoang Anh in the 735 report to a *dissenting* policy position by some opportunists in the Central Committee to invite foreign (presumably Chinese) troops onto DRV territory, and on into Laos and South Vietnam, is simply implausible. The burden is clearly on the NIE to provide evidence to support its judgment, especially given the Russian GRU footnote to the 735 report on this specific point (added during translation in Moscow in 1971) which states that "the possibility of bringing Chinese troops into the DRV has been discussed numerous times." It simply strains credulity for a NIE to claim, in this instance, that it knows better than an alleged translated report of an internal North Vietnamese meeting, supported by a 1971 GRU analysis on this very point, what *dissenting* proposals may have been surfacing internally within North Vietnam's decision-making body in 1970/71. Finally, given the level of Chinese military support to communist North Vietnamese and Laotian forces during the Vietnam War and specifically the 735 report time period, which is confirmed in open-source reports from Beijing and elsewhere<sup>176</sup>, it

<sup>176</sup> A Reuters article from Hong Kong, entitled *China Admits Role in Vietnam*, states "China has admitted for the first time that it sent more than 300,000 combat troops to Vietnam to fight against U.S. forces and their South Vietnamese allies. The semi-official China News Service said today in a report monitored in Hong Kong that China sent 320,000 soldiers to Vietnam during the 1960s. It also spent over \$20 billion to support Hanoi's regular North Vietnamese army and Viet Cong guerrilla units. The agency report cited the *History of the People's Republic of China*, published by the official State Archives Publishing House, as saying that more than 4,000 Chinese soldiers were killed during the war. During the war, China repeatedly denied US allegations that its soldiers were operating in Vietnam." Additionally, a *New York Times* article from the 735 report time period, dated January 18, 1971, reported that the PRC had provided some \$200 million in 1970 alone in military and economic aid. Further agreements, including military aid for 1971, had been signed in Beijing on October 6, 1970. According to the *International Yearbook*

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hardly seems implausible that a dissenting proposal similar to that referenced by Anh, could have been circulating among some Party members in 1970/71. As such the NIE judgment cannot be accepted with confidence.  EO 12958 6.1(c)-10Yrs

NIE STATEMENT: *"The 1993 DoD report concluded that the 735 number was too high...The total prisoners Hanoi could have been holding at that time (before 1971) could not have exceeded 470 according to US Government records. No evidence has come to light since 1993 that would cause us to revise our judgment."* (p.31)  EO 12958 6.1(c)-10Yrs

ASSESSMENT:

First, the 735-related analysis of POW/MIA cases in the referenced DoD report (actually released in January, 1994) was not conducted by elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community, but by personnel working in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.<sup>177</sup> At the very least, the authors of the NIE should have conducted an independent review of POW/MIA cases bearing on the 735 time-frame, in light of Anh's report  EO 12958 6.1(c)-10Yrs

Second, as already demonstrated earlier in this assessment (see discussion of 735 document under Key Judgments assessment), official U.S. Government statistics, forwarded to the Director of Central Intelligence for December, 1970 (the same

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*on Communist Affairs* covering the year 1970, "Chinese interest in military developments in Vietnam continued unabated. In an unusual move, on 21 and 22 December 1970, NLFSV and North Vietnamese military men reported on the current situation in Vietnam to Chinese Foreign Ministry meetings attended by Li Te-sheng, alternate member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party and head of the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army" (p.685) (U)

<sup>177</sup> See Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Defense POW/MIA Office Newsletter dated October, 1993.

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month as the alleged "735" report), listed 462 POWs, 962 MIAs, and 117 Non-Hostile missing, for a total of 1,541 "missing and captured personnel."<sup>178</sup> (U)

In addition, while DoD, and the current NIE, continue to claim that the 735 number was "*too high*," no where does the NIE reference the judgment of US officials in 1970/71 that the published December, 1970 list of 368 POWs (also referenced by Anh himself as their diplomatic move) was "*too low*,"<sup>179</sup> yet this is, in essence, the only group of Air Force and Navy fliers held in the North during this time frame to be repatriated in early 1973.<sup>180</sup> (U)

<sup>178</sup> Message for Director, Central Intelligence Agency from American Embassy Saigon, "following are official figures from missing and captured personnel lists prepared by Deputy Comptroller for Information, DoD...", dated May 10, 1971.

<sup>179</sup> U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird stated at the time, based on DoD's review of the 1970 list, "I do not accept it as a complete list of all the prisoners held in North Vietnam." (Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, dated August, 1971). He reinforced that position 21 years later in testimony before the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs on September 21, 1992, stating "I felt those lists were inadequate...it was not complete information, and we knew of the existence of other POWs when those lists were delivered to us... We felt there were more... We had solid, confirmed evidence that there were more POWs in the North at that time." In addition, Acting Secretary of the Army, Thaddeus Beal, wrote to the Secretary of Defense on July 10, 1970, stating, "At present, Cora Weiss maintains that about 334 Americans are detained by Hanoi. But the facts are that 780 Americans are listed as missing in North Vietnam, and 769 in South Vietnam and Laos. We know with some certainty that of this number, 376 are PW in North Vietnam and 78 are PW elsewhere in Indochina. *We expect that among those listed as missing, substantial numbers will eventually turn up as captives...* To accept Hanoi's admission of responsibility for less than 350 US PW as conduct constituting reasonable, humane, or internationally responsible conduct is to betray those other forgotten Americans." (U)

<sup>180</sup> The list of 368 names published by Hanoi was entitled, "U.S. Pilots Captured in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam from August 5, 1964 to November 15, 1970." The list was published by the DRV's Ministry of National Defense, and is dated November 15, 1970. It was released to representatives of Senators Kennedy and Fulbright in Paris on December 22, 1970, and provided to certain other foreign governments as well. All of the names of the men on the list had previously been unofficially provided to American peace activist Cora Weiss between May and November, 1970. The 368 list itself actually consisted of 339 Air Force and Navy pilots and


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


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ASSESSMENT:

This statement's choice of words is extremely incomplete and misleading to the NIE reader in several important respects —


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crewmembers currently in captivity, 9 such personnel previously released, and 20 such personnel listed as dead. Based on Department of Defense POW/MIA lists, only 335 Air Force and Navy pilots and crewmembers captured in North Vietnam prior to November 15, 1970 were later repatriated to the United States (one in Sept. 72, and the remainder following the signing of the Peace Accords in 1973 (Jan-Apr). (U)

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
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
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



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


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
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<sup>186</sup> Ibid. [Redacted]

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
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
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


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


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[Redacted]

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According to a Defense

Intelligence Agency Directorate for Intelligence Research published study in 1977, a report was received in the Fall of 1976 indicating that two North Vietnamese officials who had recently come to southern Vietnam had told a "high PRG official" that 235 US POWs were executed in northern Vietnam in July, 1976<sup>188</sup>

[Redacted]

2958 1.5(c) <10Yrs

[Redacted]

958 1.5(c) <10Yrs

- Former National Security Advisor to President Carter (1977-1980), Zbigniew Brzezinski, provided the following assessment, [Redacted]

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[Redacted] when

<sup>188</sup> Recent Reports of U.S. PWs and Collaborators in Southeast Asia, Defense Intelligence Agency, information cut-off date April 1, 1977, see pages 65, and 69-70. The person who had actually learned of the above information and then passed it to U.S. intelligence had been an American left behind in the Fall of Saigon who was released on August 1, 1976. (U)

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interviewed during the MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour in April, 1993 about the number of US POWs reported in the 1205 document —

*BRZEZINSKI: I suspect that the Vietnamese had the view that this would be a very prolonged conflict in which at best the United States might partially disengage from South Vietnam, but would continue supporting it and that further leverage on the United States would be desirable for them to have...In the meantime, they had gone on record repeatedly as having only had the number to which they admitted themselves having and as having no more than those that they released. And they were stuck with a situation in which they no longer needed leverage against the United States and yet had several hundred surviving Americans, many of whom they had classified as reactionaries, and therefore, as enemies, and I'm, therefore, knowing how the Vietnamese regime has behaved in the past, for that matter how the Soviet regime has behaved in the past, I'm led sadly to the conclusion that in all probability sometime after the conclusion of the Paris Agreements, or perhaps after the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, they executed those that were still living, perhaps with the exception of a small number whom they retained for continuing intelligence or technical purposes.*

*MACNEIL: ...In other words, it's just a straight, deliberate execution?*

*BRZEZINSKI: Yes, because they (the Vietnamese) were, in effect, in a situation of their own making. They had thought they would use these people as leverage on us and it's hinted in that (1205) report, the document which is now public. And they were then faced with a situation in which they no longer needed to exercise that leverage, and they had been publicly committed to the proposition that they had no more Americans, and, therefore, some of them might have felt, the leadership might have felt that this was the easiest way out. And that, incidentally, explains the howls of outrage that are now emanating from Hanoi.<sup>189</sup> (U)*

- Former National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (1969-1976), when asked on the same news program to comment on Mr. Brzezinski's statement above, replied —

*KISSINGER:...if they held prisoners that they didn't acknowledge, then there is considerable plausibility to Zbig's theory...one would have thought that if they held them*

<sup>189</sup> Transcript of the MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour, Show #4605, Tuesday, April 13, 1993. (U)


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
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*in order to blackmail us, they would have at some point produced them. Whether they though this was no longer necessary after Saigon collapsed...after that they might have believed that there was no longer any negotiating tool.*<sup>190</sup> (U)



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- A DIA contract agent reported being privately told in 1993 by a Vietnamese PAVN General Political Directorate (GPD) officer in Hanoi that "perhaps hundreds" of the unreturned U.S POWs had been executed by North Vietnam, and that this was "Hanoi's darkest and worst secret."<sup>192</sup> (U)



2958 1.5(c)-10Yrs

<sup>190</sup> Ibid.

<sup>191</sup> Department of Defense JCRC Liaison, Bangkok, TH, priority message, info to DIA Washington, USCINCPAC, SECDEF, P 080156Z March, 1985. (U)

<sup>192</sup> See *Inside Hanoi's Secret Archives* by Malcolm McConnell with Theodore "Ted" Schweitzer, 1995, p. 268-270. (U)

<sup>193</sup> Letter from Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey to Sen. Bob Smith, dated July

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- Russian Presidential Advisor and Co-Chairman of the Joint U.S.-Russia Commission on POW/MIAs, General Volkogonov, told President Clinton's Special POW/MIA Emissary to Hanoi, General Vessey, in 1993, that "he feared" some of the alleged 465 US POWs with reactionary views referenced in the September, 1972 1205 report "may have been later executed."<sup>194</sup> (U)

[Redacted]

EO 12958 1.5(c) <10Yrs

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EO 12958 1.5(c) <10Yrs

- Earlier that same month, The Washington Post reported, in a front page article, entitled "*No Hope, MIA Families Told,*" that Congressman Sonny Montgomery, Chairman of the House Select Committee on Missing Persons, had told POW/MIA family members gathered in

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26, 1993 (see enclosures).

[Redacted]

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<sup>194</sup> Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Conversation between GEN Volkogonov and GEN Vessey during visit at Walter Reed Medical Center, dated June 22, 1993. (U)

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Washington that, based on the almost year long investigation by his Committee, he had been "forced to the painful conclusion that our MIAs lost their lives in the service to their country." (U)

- The Post, in the same above-referenced story, also reported that "the Vietnamese Government has indicated that the U.S. must pay a price of \$3.25 billion in reconstruction aid for any information it has on the missing men. The League (of POW/MIA Families) is opposed to paying such blackmail and acknowledges that such a gesture is out of the question politically." (U)
- In a related editorial at the time, the Post further pointed out that Congressman Montgomery and his Committee had "also made an earnest attempt to get the Vietnamese Government to understand that, no matter what they thought had been promised at a certain point by President Nixon, reparations or reconstruction aid is now politically out of the question." (U)
- Chairman Montgomery had indeed told the Vietnamese, as early as a December 21, 1975 meeting with North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong in Hanoi that "they are not going to get reconstruction aid from the United States, and we weren't going to bargain or pay blackmail." (U)
- At a public Congressional hearing on April 16, 1976, then U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had testified that "we cannot accept the proposition that we have an obligation to provide aid, which we have not. We believe that the Paris accords have been breached so completely (by the North's military conquest of the South) that it would be completely absurd to let only one article survive when all the other obligations have been totally abridged by North Vietnam... We have no plans to give any aid." (U)

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- Kissinger's comments followed, by three weeks, a statement by President Gerald Ford, characterizing the North Vietnamese as "international pirates." (U)

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- [redacted] the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was again told, this time in a State Department diplomatic note to Hanoi's Foreign Ministry dated July 19th, that "The United States does not consider that it has an obligation to provide reconstruction assistance to Vietnam." [redacted]

EO 12958 1.5(c) <10Yrs

- In a potentially ominous commentary in Hanoi in October, 1976 [redacted] the Communist Party of Vietnam publication, *Nhan Dan*, noted "... The United States has denied its responsibility and obligation to implement Article 21 of the Paris agreement on healing the wounds of war and postwar reconstruction of Vietnam... Is it that Ford and Kissinger have really been concerned about the families of American soldiers who were killed or listed as missing while perpetrating crimes in Vietnam? Not at all. Had they been truly concerned about the lives of Americans as they have been claiming, then they would have fully implemented all the provisions of the Paris agreement, including the very important Article 21 (providing for reconstruction aid)." [redacted]

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
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- As noted earlier in this assessment, Quang was dual-hatted with his positions in the North during the 1960's with positions in Central and South Vietnam as a Member of COSVN and the National Liberation Front (NLF) Central Committee, heading the Military Affairs Committee there and commanding PLAF forces. According to communist Viet Cong "Liberation Radio" broadcasts on June 24, 1965 and September 26, 1965, monitored by U.S. intelligence at the time, *three US POWs<sup>197</sup> were executed* "on orders of the National Liberation Front (NLF) Central Committee" in retaliation for South Vietnamese and U.S. actions in the South. In view of his leadership roles, *Quang undoubtedly was directly involved with ordering these executions of US POWs*. These three U.S. servicemen were subsequently listed as <sup>EO 12958 6.1(c)-10Yrs</sup>

<sup>196</sup> See *Vietnam* by Karnow, p. 276-279; *Inside Hanoi's Secret Archives* by McConnell, p. 271; *The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War* by Kutler, (under "Hue"). For denial by General Quang, see *Vietnam, A History*, by Stanley Karnow, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, 1997, p.543, "Revisiting Vietnam in 1981 and again in 1990, I was able to elicit little credible evidence from the Communists to clarify the episode. General Tran Do, a senior Communist architect of the Tet offensive, flatly denied that the Hue atrocities had ever occurred, contending that films and photographs of the corpses had been "fabricated." *I heard the same line from General Tran Van Quang, who commanded the Communist forces in the region.*" (U)

<sup>197</sup> The US POWs identified in the communist broadcasts were U.S. Army military advisor Sgt. Harold Bennett, U.S. Army Special Forces Sgt. Kenneth Roraback, and U.S. Army Special Forces [redacted] For additional references, see *Newsweek*, October 11, 1965, p.48, article entitled *The War in Vietnam*. (U)

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“died in captivity” by the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) in their POW list turned over in Paris in January, 1973, and their remains, as of 1998, have still not been repatriated to the United States. (As noted earlier, Quang had also served as the PRG Defense Minister following its establishment in 1969, and would have logically prepared or approved, under that leadership capacity, the PRG US POW list presented in Paris. (U)


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
Following the return of acknowledged US POWs in 1973, there remained over 1,300 U.S. personnel in a missing in action status, and DoD could not say whether those individuals “were alive or dead.” Moreover, U.S. officials at the time had expected a higher number of US POWs to be returned, as earlier indicated in this assessment. Finally, the figures referenced by the NIE itself (p.19) show that, as of 1998, there remain 370 unaccounted for U.S. personnel, in the judgment of DoD, whose fate has not been determined, including 48 on the “priority” last known alive list.

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
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#### IV POLITICIZING OF INTELLIGENCE:

As noted in this assessment's Executive Summary, Congress and the leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) need to examine what role the White House, its National Security Council, and certain US policy-makers responsible for advancing the Administration's normalization agenda with Vietnam may have played in influencing or otherwise affecting the judgments of the IC as reflected in this NIE. If any improper communication or influence took place, immediate steps should be taken to determining how this could have occurred. Such a review is critical to ensuring that the IC is providing objective and independent analysis to its customers. (U)

This is especially important because the NIE was prepared and published in classified form during the same period that the President and his Administration were required by Public Law to determine whether Vietnam was "fully cooperating in good faith" with the United States on the POW/MIA issue. An affirmative certification is required for the expenditure of funds for US diplomatic operations in Vietnam. (U)

A bipartisan report from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) had determined in April, 1997 that the IC had provided no input, nor was input solicited, in determinations for 1996 and 1997, even though the certification, by law, is required to be "based on information available to the US Government." This SSCI finding was one of the reasons National Security Advisor Berger had been requested by the Senate to have this NIE prepared. (U)

The President himself had recognized the potential impact of the NIE on the certification process, stating in a letter to me dated February 25, 1998 (8 days prior to his 1998 determination), that "the results of the National Intelligence Estimate regarding the extent of Vietnam's disclosure of information on our missing service personnel will be taken into account as we continue to advance our agenda with

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The President issued his 1998 determination that Vietnam was fully cooperating in good faith on March 4, 1998 -- one month *prior* to the NIE's official dissemination, and, again, only 8 days after his letter to me. (U)

Although the NIE had not yet been approved or published, there apparently was communication and coordination between the National Intelligence Council and, at the least, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (under OSD/Policy), concerning the draft contents of the NIE. Moreover, the National Intelligence Council has confirmed that it selected "four individuals outside the Intelligence Community with expertise on the Vietnam POW/MIA issue" — whom it has not yet identified to Congress — who "reviewed the draft and provided their commentary to us."<sup>200</sup> Additionally, the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, has also stated the "the draft was reviewed by several experts from outside the Community."<sup>201</sup> Were any of these individuals employed in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, which includes DoD's POW/MIA Office, — an office which supports U.S. policy that Vietnam is fully cooperating in good faith on the POW/MIA issue?

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Questions concerning the politicizing of intelligence have naturally arisen as a result of these revelations. On its face, the prior pledge by the Director of Central Intelligence that the NIE would be done "*with the objectivity, timeliness, and independence that characterize our analytical efforts*"<sup>202</sup> needs to be further

<sup>199</sup> Letter from President Bill Clinton to Senator Bob Smith, dated February 25, 1998. (U)

<sup>200</sup> Transcript of Briefing by National Intelligence Council to U.S. side of the US-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, p. 5-6, dated June 17, 1998

<sup>201</sup> Letter from Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet to Executive Director, National League of POW/MIA Families Ann Mills Griffiths, dated October 28, 1998. (U)

<sup>202</sup> Letter from Central Intelligence Agency, "the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has asked me to respond..." from John H. Moseman, Director of Congressional Affairs, CIA, dated

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examined. (U)

Questions concerning the politicizing of intelligence are further underscored by the following exchange at a Congressional hearing on June 17, 1998 between Congressman Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman of the House Committee on International Relations, and Mr. Frederick C. Smith, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense (under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) —

*Chairman Gilman: In March of this year, President Clinton certified that the Government of Vietnam was fully cooperating in good faith on the POW/MIA issue. What role did our Department of Defense play with respect to that decision on certification?...*

*Mr. Smith: The Department of Defense did make an input...Our recommendation was that Vietnam was fully cooperating with our efforts in this area...*

*Chairman Gilman: When you made that decision in the Defense Department, did you have before you the National Intelligence Estimate on Vietnam's performance on the POW/MIA issue?*

*Mr. Smith: We were actually working on it at about the same time, because we were working with the Central Intelligence Agency on that issue, and so it was concurrent, simultaneous.*

*Chairman Gilman: Did you have that estimate before you at the time you made your decision and made your recommendation to the President?*

*Mr. Smith: The final copy of the estimate was issued in April, 1998, and the determination was made in March.*

*Chairman Gilman: So you actually didn't have the final National Intelligence Estimate?*

*Mr. Smith: We did not have the final estimate that was issued. That is correct. But we certainly knew what was in it, and we were involved in the preparation of the estimate.*

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November 17, 1997. (U)

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*Chairman Gilman: You were working on the Estimate? Were you working on the Estimate?*

*Mr. Smith: Yes. The estimate had been in preparation for a number of months before hand.*

*Chairman Gilman: And you would have had the occasion to see what the report said at the time you made your decision?*

*Mr. Smith: Yes.*

*Chairman Gilman: Is it your view that the report supports the President's certification that Vietnam is fully cooperative?*

*Mr. Smith: Yes. I believe that the information about the improved cooperation we've received from the Vietnamese, and the reasons that the estimate gives for this improved cooperation are correct.<sup>203</sup> (U)*

The above testimony would further seem to cast doubt on the reliability of testimony by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Walter Slocombe (Mr. Smith's superior in the OSD chain of command), on the day after the President's March 4, 1998 determination.. On March 5, 1998, before a hearing of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, the following exchange took place between myself and Under Secretary Slocombe —

*Under Secretary Slocombe: Senator, I'm not familiar with the details of what input the national intelligence community had in this particular determination.*

*Sen. Smith: Well, you're aware there's an intelligence community estimate going on now, correct?*

*Under Secretary Slocombe: Yes.*

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<sup>203</sup> Transcript of Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives, *A Worldwide Review of the Clinton Administration's POW/MIA Policies and Programs*, p. 10-11, dated June 17, 1998 (U)

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*Sen. Smith: ...wouldn't it seem reasonable to wait until the national intelligence estimate came back?...*

*Under Secretary Slocombe: I think it's wholly appropriate to do an intelligence estimate. What I do not know, and am not in a position to comment on is what information was obtained from the Intelligence Community in connection with this determination, because I simply do not know.<sup>204</sup> (U)*

The testimony from Deputy Assistant Secretary Smith further casts doubt on the reliability of the assurance from Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet that "at no stage was there higher level or other intervention to change or shape the body or judgments of the NIE.<sup>205</sup>" (U) EO 12958 1.5(c)-10Yrs

Moreover, in the course of preparing this intelligence estimate, the principal author  interviews with US Ambassador to Vietnam, Douglas "Pete" Peterson<sup>206</sup>, in addition to conducting interviews with Dr. Lou Stern, Director for Indochina, Thailand, and Burma in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs at the Pentagon<sup>207</sup> — two of

<sup>204</sup> Transcript of Hearing of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 5, 1998. (U)

<sup>205</sup> Letter from Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet to Executive Director, National League of POW/MIA Families, Ann Mills Griffiths, dated October 28, 1998. (U)

<sup>206</sup> Ambassador Peterson, a former POW from the Vietnam War, did not arrive in Hanoi until May, 1997, following his Senate confirmation in April of that year. Prior to confirmation, Ambassador Peterson served as a Democrat Congressman from Florida during which time he consistently advocated full U.S. normalization of relations with the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. During that same tenure, he served as US Chairman of the Vietnam War Working Group of the US/Russia Joint Commission on POWs and MIAs where he maintained his position that the so-called 1205 and 735 documents, assessed in this current NIE, were not valid. (U)

<sup>207</sup> Dr. Stern has been a consistent advocate for closer US ties with Vietnam during his tenure at the Department of Defense spanning several years. While employed by DoD, he has published a book on the development of US-Vietnam relations. He has also been directing involved with DoD hosting of several high-level Vietnamese delegations to the United States, and has

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the Administration's biggest advocates for continued expansion of US relations with Hanoi.  EO 12958 6.1(c) <10Yrs

When I questioned the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia   under whose auspices the current NIE was prepared, on the Intelligence Community's role with respect to the 1998 certification and the NIE's bearing on it, the response was quite abrasive, defensive, and disturbingly evasive —

*Sen. Smith: Let me ask you this question, and I would like a yes or no. Did the President ask you for your input prior to the certification in March, 1998 that the Vietnamese were fully cooperating or cooperating in good faith?* EO 12958 6.1(c) <10Yrs

*Did he ask me personally?*

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*Sen. Smith: Well, did he ask the agency?*

*I do not know.*

*Sen. Smith: You do not know the answer to that?*

*I do not.*

EO 12958 6.1(c) <10Yrs

*Sen. Smith: ...Does your intelligence estimate disagree with the President's statement that the Vietnamese are being fully cooperative, yes or no?*

*...I would say that the intelligence assessment, which was not intended to answer that specific question, comes down on both sides of the issue, that there has been improved cooperation, but that it is not perfect. And the reasons for its not being perfect are cited in the estimate.<sup>208</sup> (U)*

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strategized with Vietnamese officials concerning ways to achieve normalization of relations without the POW/MIA issue being an obstacle. (U)

<sup>208</sup> Transcript of Briefing by the National Intelligence Council to the U.S. side of the US-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, p. 23-24, and 29, dated June 17, 1998.

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Interestingly, [redacted] careful wording above on June 17, 1998 — using the term “*improved cooperation*” in response to a question about the validity of the President’s determination that Vietnam was “fully cooperating in good faith” — is *the exact phrase* used by Deputy Asst. Secretary Smith at a House hearing *on the same day in response to the same question*. This exact phraseology is not found in the NIE itself, and raises more questions about additional collaboration between the National Intelligence Council and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Questions, in the context of the current NIE, about the politicizing of intelligence on issues bearing on U.S. policy toward Vietnam are particularly relevant in view of prior indications suggesting that such actions took place during the current Administration on the same issues being reviewed in the current NIE. (U)

For example, an “interagency intelligence assessment” on the “1205” and “735” documents was disseminated to the media, with a January 24, 1994 release date, three days prior to a U.S. Senate vote on whether to urge the lifting of the U.S. trade embargo on Hanoi, and one week prior to the President’s announcement of his determination to lift the embargo. The timing of the release of this assessment became suspicious when it was learned that it had, in fact, been prepared, completed and forwarded to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in an unclassified format for release, through the National Intelligence Council *by June 21, 1993 — seven months earlier* (with the exception of two paragraphs later added by DoD) — even though the President had continued to maintain in communications with Congress, as recently as December, 10, 1993 that he “intended to release publicly our analysis and conclusions as soon as possible. I am sure you would agree that we must accord them the most careful analysis...” Clearly, the release of this unclassified document of information prepared with major input by elements of the Intelligence Community, had been delayed for political purposes in order to obtain maximum effect on decisions being made and/or announced within the Congress and the White House. (U)

In addition, one year earlier, on February 12, 1993, then Deputy National Security

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Advisor Sandy Berger, after having been briefed on the discovery of the so-called 1205 document in Moscow, tasked the Intelligence Community, through the Department of Defense, in an Eyes Only Memorandum, to "*analyze the implications of the following hypothetical scenario. Assume that a document from a senior North Vietnamese Army official established that on September 15, 1972 the North Vietnamese were holding 1205 American prisoners of war...; the North Vietnamese were deliberately concealing the true number of prisoners they were holding from the outside world; the fate of these prisoners was under consideration by the Hanoi Politburo...if such a document were deemed reliable...what are the implications of this information generally, what are the implications in light of Vietnam's obligations under the Paris Peace Agreement?*"<sup>209</sup> (U)

The phrasing of this White House tasking, ie: *if such a document were deemed reliable, what are the implications...*, can be interpreted as politicizing of intelligence, because it opens the door for an Administration judgment that a document is *not* reliable if it is deemed to have *negative* implications for planned U.S. policy toward Vietnam if it is judged to *be* reliable. Indeed, the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA's) apparent response to this memorandum, dated February 25, 1993, concluded that "hypothetically, the Vietnamese would have been holding 665 more POWs than we know them to have held; ...hypothetically, all of these extra POWs...would also have had to be placed in a completely separate prison system: ...hypothetically, some of these men would have survived to the present in Vietnam."<sup>210</sup> Furthermore, this initial eyes only tasking was posed during

<sup>209</sup> Eyes Only Memorandum from then-Deputy National Security Advisor Samuel R. Berger, dated February 12, 1993, forwarded to Director, Office of Senate Security, by National Security Council Senior Director for Records and Access Management, in unclassified, redacted form on March 12, 1997. A second copy of the same memorandum was received in the Senate directly from the Department of Defense on April 12, 1993. (U)

<sup>210</sup> DIA further stated in the same response that the "hypothesis was refuted by undisputed evidence provided by 30 years of intelligence collection." The referenced Defense Intelligence Agency memorandum was received in the Senate in April, 1993, and subsequently received again, as an unclassified document, on March 25, 1997, from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (POW/Missing Personnel Affairs). (U)

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the same period that the Administration had begun a high-level review of U.S. policy toward Vietnam with the goal of further advancing normalization of U.S. relations with Hanoi, beginning with the hoped-for removal of U.S. objections to International Financial Institution (IFI) lending to Vietnam during a planned April meeting of world financial officials — the same month the 1205 report was subsequently disclosed publicly. (U)

Whether there was any such politicizing of intelligence by the Administration, and the extent of the Intelligence Community's participation in any such effort, has not yet been firmly established, but the concerns are further underscored by the fact that subsequent to the above-referenced memorandum from Deputy National Security Advisor Berger, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy formally requested that an assessment of the 1205 document be prepared *for release to the media*. This directive followed a White House meeting with the President, Vice-President, National Security Advisor, and two other Defense and State Department officials involved with POW/MIA accounting efforts, during which time the President reportedly stated that he "did not want the 1205 document to get in the way of normalization of relations with Vietnam." (U)

At the first meeting to discuss preparation of this assessment, the Deputy NIO for East Asia, [redacted] reportedly announced to those gathered that the 1205 report was *not reliable* with respect to US POWs, and that was the operating assumption under which the 1993/94 DoD-released product was consequently prepared. (U)

Based on this admittedly circumstantial evidence, a further review of this matter by appropriate Congressional committees and the leaders of the Intelligence Community appears warranted.

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~~SECRET~~**V CONCLUSION:**

On September 3, 1998, the American Embassy in Hanoi reported that Communist publications there had carried a Vietnam News Agency (VNA) report under the title "*No evidence of American POWs in Vietnam -- Affirms U.S. Intelligence.*" The reports went on to say that the "U.S. National Intelligence Council report...affirms that the Russian documents are fake...and that Vietnam has cooperated with the United States in accounting for American personnel listed as Missing in Action." (U)

As shown in this critical assessment of the above-referenced NIE, the judgments of the Intelligence Community are not supported and should be retracted. It is equally disturbing that the IC has aggressively and inexplicably gone way beyond standard and historical criteria for reaching judgments in a NIE in an effort to dismiss compelling evidence which conflicts with the NIE's judgments. (U)

It is also a sad commentary that, in the end, the NIE places more reliance on statements by communist Vietnamese officials in Hanoi than on statements from Russian officials in Moscow who are part of the emerging democratic government there. It is further unfortunate that the NIE's judgments, and their public release, will likely seriously undermine "*continued U.S. efforts to acquire additional information on the Russian documents from the Vietnamese Government... including access to other relevant Party and government archival materials*" as pledged by the President's National Security Advisor, Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger, in his letter to the Senate Majority Leader, Trent Lott, in April of last year. (U)

The NIE's judgments, and their public release, will also likely undermine any serious US effort to convince Hanoi to increase their level of cooperation with US officials, (as opposed to maintaining the status quo), especially with regard to additional unilateral disclosures of POW/MIA material from relevant archives in Hanoi, as also pledged by Mr. Berger, which would include the key, relevant records of entities such as the Central Military Affairs Party Committee. (U)

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Based on the contents of this critical assessment of the NIE, Congress and the leaders of the Intelligence Community must reexamine the judgments reached in the NIE with the goal of ensuring that U.S. policy and decision-makers are relying on judgments that are based on "the most careful analysis in the context of all other known information," a standard which was originally promised by our President himself, in a letter to me dated December 10, 1993. To do anything less is a tremendous disservice to the POW/MIA families and the memory of those still unaccounted for from the Vietnam Conflict. (U)

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GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR  
MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE [GRU]

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## REPORT

OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE  
VNA [VIETNAMESE PEOPLES ARMY] GENERAL-LIEUTENANT TRAN VAN QUANG  
AT THE POLITBURO MEETING OF THE TSK PTV  
15 SEPTEMBER 1972  
(translation from Vietnamese into Russian)

Moscow - 1972

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Dear comrades!

I reported to you earlier about the situation which has developed and about the fundamental characteristics of the past stage of our people's conflict against the American imperialists. I will cover the main tasks of the people and the army of North and South Vietnam which were proposed by the 23rd Plenum of the TsK PTV.

These tasks once again confirm our resolve to attain victory. This is a very correct course for our party and people at the present stage of conflict. We have already worked out measures for achieving the resolutions of the 23rd Plenum of the TsK. We will also cover a number of the Supreme Command's and the Government Defense Council's positions, in which an evaluation of our victories gained over the period from 30 Mar 72 to the present is given.

The military situation for us is developing favorably on all fronts. A number of profound changes which took place in the military situation demanded that we develop a necessary frame of reference for solving all issues which arise during the war. Several meetings between us and the US aimed at developing measures on resolving the Vietnam issue have already taken place.

We have decisively rejected a number of proposals put forth by the American side. With assistance from a number of countries, there were to be secret meetings in Paris and in other places aimed at drawing up a solution to the Vietnam issue. Such meetings took place. They once again testified to the deranged nature of the proposals put forward by the American side. As before, we have maintained our position, the essence of which includes the following: if the US truly wants to resolve the Vietnam issue, then above all else it must refuse to support the Nguyen Van Thieu regime, and only afterwards will we engage in a discussion about a cease fire. This demand is the main tenet in our conflict against the American imperialists.

If Nixon continues adhering to his policy of "Vietnamization" of the war and desires to leave the present Saigon Government of Thieu in power, then the peace negotiations between us and the US will not yield any results.

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During our general offensive on the fronts of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, the progress which we have attained in implementing our strategic and tactical line [direction, orientation] was clearly evident.

Earlier, I analyzed the activity of our command, elucidated the great victories we have attained and also explained the shortcomings and mistakes that we made during the general offensive. The lessons we learned from analyzing the mistakes we made were also discussed. I stated all of this to the Politburo in order to work out a direction for solving the fundamental principal problems.

Today I will report a number of positions regarding expanding the scope of our future offensive.

We organized meetings with South Vietnamese representatives aimed at preparing a solution of the military and political issues in South Vietnam according to the Politburo's and State Defense Council's plan. These meetings have great significance for us, and we are linking several of our plans with them [South Vietnamese representatives]. A number of our comrades have met with representatives of the South Vietnamese authorities, and it can be said that we have succeeded in winning their sympathy at these meetings. We were able to exchange ideas not only orally, but also in written form during these meetings and contacts. This gave us the opportunity to draw definite conclusions. Recently, we have conducted 8 similar meetings with representatives of the Saigon authorities and South Vietnamese political figures.

First, we will cover meetings with General Ngo Dinh Dzu<sup>1)</sup>. Earlier Ngo Dinh Dzu was listed as a candidate for president of South Vietnam and fought with Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Cao Ky for this post. Ngo Dinh Dzu is a prominent South Vietnamese capitalist and well-known political figure. He occupied the post of chairman of the upper chamber of the Saigon Parliament and during the Ngo Dinh Diem government, he was a senator in the upper chamber. Ngo Dinh Dzu, in his own opinion, is a nationalist. He speaks

<sup>1)</sup> Commander of the 2nd Regional Corps of South Vietnam, General-Lieutenant (GRU's note).

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against American troops on South Vietnamese territory, and also against several policy positions conducted by the Saigon authorities. At the same time, he is characterized as a reactionary, an enemy of communism. Afterwards, as Ky and Thieu attained victory in the presidential elections, the latter undertook all measures to take revenge on General Dzu. Dzu used the pre-election campaign to criticize the Saigon regime and to undermine its security. He spoke against American troops on South Vietnamese territory, for which he was subjected to bitter attacks from Nguyen Van Thieu. General Dzu was forced to leave the political arena after 9 months under pressure from Thieu. Afterwards, General Dzu became an even greater enemy of Nguyen Van Thieu and his government. This is why we tried to win this person over to our side.

Despite General Dzu remaining an enemy of communism, his relations with Nguyen Van Thieu and the present Saigon factions, as well as our meetings with him have allowed him to see the nature of the Americans and the true colors of the Saigon Government.

We sent one of our comrades from the Supreme Command to Saigon for meetings with General Dzu. At the meeting, which lasted 3 hours, General Dzu agreed to enter into a future coalition government and spoke out against the policy of "Vietnamization" of the war carried out by Nixon and also against the Nguyen Van Thieu clique. During this meeting he also stated that he will fight against Nguyen Van Thieu's clique and Nixon's present designs.

Now, we see clearly how significant changes have taken place in General Dzu's life and way of thinking. He is no longer the same ardent anticommunist. Now prevailing in his views are those features such as the conflict against Nixon's policy of "Vietnamization" of the war and against Nguyen Van Thieu's clique which he considers as fascist and as expressing the interests of the financial oligarchy which is against freedom and independence. And finally, General Dzu is for the expansion of democracy and freedom over the entire territory

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of South Vietnam. Such are General Dzu's basic national qualities which correspond to our present course. This is why we are attempting to win General Dzu over to our side and why we entered into contact with him. After the first meeting, there were three other recent meetings during which he expressed his opinions. During these meetings, we understood what kind of major changes took place in his way of thinking and in the position he has taken and in his approach to solving the problem.

Thus, we can ascertain that these meetings and contacts with General Dzu had very good results. Recently, General Dzu requested to meet with one of the prominent leaders of the NFO [National Liberation Front] of South Vietnam. We are now busy preparing for the upcoming meeting between General Dzu and Hyuyn Tan Phat. This meeting will be conducted in secret to insure the fulfillment of our main principles as we understand that this new person is contradictory - he is among those in the Saigon Government whose number is daily growing.

The second person is Nguyen Khanh. He earlier occupied the post of prime minister for three years after the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem. Nguyen Khanh is a representative of the army. Earlier he served in the French Army; now he is a prominent South Vietnamese capitalist whose capital is invested in various foreign enterprises, especially in France. Nguyen Khanh is a representative of the new trend. This is why we have entered into contact with him. These contacts took place in Paris, where we have conducted 5 meetings.

Nguyen Khanh maintains constant contact with military circles in the Nguyen Van Thieu government. After being removed from his post, he left the country, but periodically returns to Saigon where he engages in political activities in the capacity of an emigree representative.

In summarizing the five meetings, we noticed in Nguyen Khanh the following: first, as regards the ruling faction he believes that Nguyen Van Thieu is a dictator and fascist who is not capable of being the head of the government. Khanh considers the present government to be rotten to the core; second, he is against the bombing of North

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Vietnam; third, while criticizing the Nguyen Van Thieu faction, he speaks against the participation of Saigon troops in combat actions on Cambodian territory. He believes that the Saigon Army is in danger of disintegration and that it has poor morale and combat spirit. Nguyen Khanh speaks for the establishment of a new government which would have authority with the people and which would carry out a nationalist policy, while receiving foreign aid. These are the views of Nguyen Khanh. He says nothing about his feelings toward the policy of "Vietnamization" of the war. This is explained primarily by his connections with military circles. Therefore, we are not striving to directly attract him to our side. Presently, Nguyen Khanh is maintaining connections with the current Saigon generals.

The third person is Duong Van Minh, who also represents the military circles. Previously, he occupied the post of prime minister after Nguyen Khanh, and was then sent out of the country as an ambassador. The political views of Duong Van Min' differ from the political views of Nguyen Khanh. This is first expressed in Duong Van Min' speaking out against Nixon's policy of "Vietnamization" and for the independent solution of internal problems by the Vietnamese without US interference. He believes that the US should be responsible for prolonging the Vietnamese War and for its consequences. He subjects the Vietnamese policy of Nixon to sharp criticism, as well as the policy carried out by the current Saigon Government. These are very good political views. He speaks against Thieu's clique, considering it to be pro-fascist, anti-democratic and not capable of carrying out the leadership of the country. These are the primary political views of Duong Van Min'.

As a result of these contacts with Duong Van Minh, we have attained an important victory, which has forced him to reflect. He also met with Nguyen Thi Binh several times in Paris. At these meetings, Duong Van Minh felt that, as before, he was close to the Fatherland and that he is Vietnamese. This is why he began to conduct this great work with us and with the intelligentsia and military circles located outside of the country. He did this with the aim of entering into a coalition government and in the hope of solving the Vietnamese issue

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on the basis of conducting consultations and negotiations between the various political factions of South Vietnam. This is Duong Van Min's desire.

The fourth person is the former emperor Bao Dai. At one time the possibility existed that the former emperor would have been behind us. But, under pressure from reactionary factions after the August revolution, he was forced to emigrate to France. As before, Bao Dai holds great influence amongst the political figures in the Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces and also in the city of Hue, the ancient capital of Vietnam. This is why we moved to make contact with Bao Dai. We are not hoping that Bao Dai becomes a part of the coalition government, but to attract him to our side is to attract his supporters in the regions where he has influence. As a result of the meetings conducted, we clarified that Bao Dai will come out against the presence of American troops on the territory of South Vietnam, and he also criticizes Nguyen Van Thieu's existing regime. Bao Dai is also calling for all political factions to create a free, neutral, peace-loving government that would resolve the tense situation that has taken form in the country. This is why we entered into contact with Bao Dai and are trying to win him over to our side. We hope that he, in turn, will work with his people in a plan for securing peace and freedom for our country.

The fifth person is General Nguyen Van Vi who previously occupied the post of Minister of Defence of South Vietnam. Tkhieu removed him from his post for disorder and chaos in the army's financial affairs. The real reason, however, for Nguyen Van Vi's retirement was the series of serious defeats that the puppet army has suffered. From Nguyen Van Tkhieu's viewpoint, the military circles responded to this move with a specific reaction. We also had contacts with General Nguyen Van Vi which allowed us to understand his political position. He thinks that the US will certainly suffer defeat in this war and that a war in Vietnam is not the responsibility of the American Army. This is why Nguyen Van Vi is also coming out for the creation of a coalition government in order to resolve the Vietnam issue through peaceful negotiation between all of the political factions of South Vietnam.

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Nguyen Van Vi is also coming out against Nixon's "Vietnamization" of the war. Such are the basic political views of General Nguyen Van Vi. We scored a great victory at the meeting with him; we received his agreement to take part in a coalition government to resolve the Vietnam issue through peaceful negotiation between all of the political factions of South Vietnam. Nguyen Van Vi also officially recognized the victories won by the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, i.e. our victories.

As concerns our contacts within the South Vietnamese governing apparatus, it is fitting to mention here the letter from Nguyen Cao Ky addressed to us. In the letter, he lays out his views on the course to a resolution of the Vietnam problem.

I have reported to you today on the contacts with all of these people so that you would know how the Politburo's instructions to win over these people to our side is being carried out.

The strong protest from their side is a result of a growth of contradictions within Nguyen Van Tkhiu's clique and of contradictions of Nixon's "Vietnamization" of the war. We can use these contradictions to improve the situation in South Vietnam and to resolve the issue in our favor. Their agreement to enter into a coalition government will precisely go in our favor. In addition to a resolution of the issue by military means on the battlefields of South Vietnam, we have engaged in contacts with several South Vietnamese political figures, who may be able to join the ranks of a coalition government. As a result of these contacts we have gained an understanding of the political views of these people and have expressed our point of view on ways to resolve the Vietnam problem.

These contacts with people who occupy high stations, prominent military and political figures, ministers and senators of the upper and lower chambers of the Saigon parliament provide the basis for making the following conclusions:

1. They are against the present regime of Nguyen Van Tkhiu, considering that Nguyen Van Tkhiu's clique is dictatorial, pro-fascist, rotten and not

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capable of carrying out the leadership of the country under the present situation that has developed in South Vietnam. They also think that if the US withdraws its troops from South Vietnam and stops aiding the regime, the government would instantly collapse.

2. The majority of them are against Nixon's "Vietnamization" of the war, against the escalation of the bombing of North Vietnam, and think that Nixon does not want to resolve the Vietnam issue or the Indochina issue as a whole.

3. They consider that the National Liberation Front has recently scored enormous victories on the military, political and diplomatic fronts. They recognize that on the military front we were able to win over extensive heavily populated regions. They also recognize the National Liberation Front's great success with the strengthening of the army, the increase in its combat ability and leadership level, the improvement in cooperation between the branches of service and many other areas.

We also tried to win over to our side the category of people from the provinces and many towns who occupy less important positions in the state apparatus. It is possible to say that they are also ready to aid in the creation of a coalition government. They are also against the policy of "Vietnamization", against Nguyen Van Tkhieu's clique and want to resolve the Vietnamese issue on the basis of a cessation of war.

Thus, on the orders of the Politburo we have been preparing to conduct meetings with various categories of the South Vietnamese population, aimed at resolving the South Vietnamese issue through peaceful negotiations between all of the political factions of South Vietnam. As a result of the contacts that have taken place to win these people over to our side, conditions have presented themselves so that these people will be able to aid us in the creation of a coalition government and in the overthrow of Nguyen Van Tkhieu's dictatorial regime. We see that we have chosen the correct course. This is also clearly indicated in the resolutions of the 23rd Plenum of the Central Committee.

In other words, we should win these people over to our side, and bring them into the coalition government so that we

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can use them to our favor in the diplomatic and political plan. In order to create a base for the successful resolution of the issues that stand before us, we specifically want to bring into the coalition government those people who earlier worked in the South Vietnamese state apparatus and held or are holding at the present a high post in the power structure.

If we are successful in resolving these issues, we will be concluding a mammoth case on which we will again report to the Politburo so that you are well informed on these issues and have formed a plan of action for mission completion. Thanks to these meetings, we are able to know who supports us and who is against us in South Vietnam. We have also worked out a new plan for the realization of our new intentions in South Vietnam and now know which representatives of the present South Vietnamese power apparatus are in favor of the war.

The meetings and contacts which we initiated were conducted with complete equality of rights and helped us win over representatives of all strata of South Vietnamese society to our side. This is our grandest victory, won in the course of these contacts with the aim of resolving the Vietnamese issue.

Thus, thanks to these contacts we understand which part of the population considers the course we are taking to be just, i.e. we have exposed all of those who are against Nixon's politics for the prolongation of the war, against Nguyen Van Tkhieu's clique and will join with us in the creation of a coalition government.

In addition to the military issues, this is one of the problems we are trying to resolve. We are therefore conducting these meetings and contacts directed at the resolution of political and diplomatic problems.

With the goal of realizing these aims, the Supreme Command, in conjunction with the Governmental Council of Defense, has developed directives for the army to prepare and conduct the "Ba Be" plan, which is scheduled to be executed in October. The "Ba Be" plan provides for the resolution of a number of goals. Four hundred and six individuals [406] were sent to execute the plan in South Vietnam. These individuals had gone through sufficient training and

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are well armed. Earlier, these people worked in the governing apparatus of South Vietnam. After the August revolution, during the period of the war of resistance against the French colonials, we left these people behind. They actively worked for the enemy and subsequently joined various organs of the Saigon governing apparatus. We trained and armed them well to carry out the "Ba Be" plan before they left for South Vietnam.

The basic aims of the "Ba Be" plan:

- Elimination of all people who are resistant and oppose our course and of those who occupy leadership positions at the province-district level and above; a full paralysis of the will of such people.

- Conduct of activities to carry out a disruption of the Saigon governing apparatus at the province level and below with the goal of a subsequent replacement of this apparatus with new people. We are attentively observing those people who oppose us and our decision with regards to this group must be very serious and firm. This matter has an important place in the execution of the "Ba Be" plan. We must have lists and full dossiers on these people beforehand in order to conduct the preparatory training to quickly do away with them and disrupt their routine.

- Search for and acquire materials which testify to crimes by Americans and their puppets with regard to the Vietnamese people, so that during opportune conditions, we can accuse them of committing these crimes by publishing the materials.

These are the three basic missions for the people who were dispatched for execution of the "Ba Be" plan. As for the time of completion, it is generally believed that it will be executed simultaneously with the TS-6 plan (Chyong Shon-6), i.e. in the month of October. This plan must be executed well in order to influence the course of the Paris Peace talks on Vietnam as well as the development of the situation in the near future. This is very important task. Its outcome may help us make a more successful advance on the front. We need to increase the pace of development on the front to win great victories in a short span of time. Therefore, the "Ba Be" plan is already being executed and we are continuing to train people to carry it out.

\*The TS-6 plan is a VNA plan of military action in South Vietnam with the main effort concentrated in the Hue region (GRU note).

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The pace of the plan must be increased. We have to quickly move these people from North to South Vietnam in order to destroy a large quantity of enemy personnel. In other words, the elimination of all traitors, reactionaries, and counter-revolutionaries who currently make up a fairly significant part in South Vietnam is an important mission of the "Ba Be" plan.

We must attract the neutral forces to our side; those who are fighting for national independence from the USA; those forces who earlier fought against the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem and now fight against the regime of Nguyen Van Thieu. We must do everything necessary in order to successfully carry out the "Ba Be" plan.

Along with that, we must work on the demoralization of the puppet army on all fronts. Under good conditions, such work will lower the fighting spirit of the puppet army soldiers in the future and increase the number of servicemen who defect to our side. This is a basic requirement which helps us create the conditions for revolts in the puppet army. We were faced with this matter after the victory in Quang Tri.

Was there actually a collective anti-military uprising in the puppet 56th Regiment? No, in actuality it was not like that at the front. After we surrounded hill 241, the Regiment command understood the futility of further resistance and surrendered along with its soldiers. However, to increase the effect, we announced that because of good use of propaganda, there was an anti-military uprising in the 56th Regiment. This is a new form of stimulating anti-military uprisings in the puppet army.

The political views of puppet army officers captain and above are very reactionary. Previously they were officers or soldiers in the French Army. Now they are remaining in the army and speak in favor of the previous Saigon government, inciting counter-revolution and anti-nationalism. They hate the revolution. Therefore, applying propaganda amongst soldiers and especially amongst the officer corps is difficult and varied, demanding study from all sides

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and a creative approach in the choice of methods and means.

The brilliant results must be given their due; results which we in the propaganda organization recently achieved among the High Command staff, right up to Saigon Army generals.

We had contacts and meetings with a number of officers. For example, with General Khoang Xuan Lam, the former 1st Regional Corps Commander. He was very reactionary and spoke against our revolution. After the defeat at Quang Tri, Thieu removed him, and he began to make contact with us. At the meetings, Khoang Xuan Lam told us--if it can be said this way--a number of his views. In his opinion, the Saigon puppet army will not be able to execute missions which the plan of "Vietnamization" of the war places on the army. He believes that the revolutionary forces will achieve victory and that the puppet army will not be able to impede this. The Thieu regime is a dictatorship, is pro-fascist, and does not have the support of the people. These are some of the basic tenets expressed by General-Lieutenant Khoang Xuan Lam.

As for the closest person to the Thieu regime--General Ngo Dinh Dzu--in meetings with us, he expressed the opinion that even the 2nd Regional Corps will be lost and that the puppet army will be unable at any cost to withstand us in this region, i.e. the Tay Nguyen region. Thus, Dzu has expressed the same ideas that Khoang Xuan Lam has. He also said that the puppet army will be unable to withstand us if the Americans leave Vietnam. Ngo Dinh Dzu sees an increase in insurgency and revolution in South Vietnam, an increase in authority for the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, a rise in the level of our strategic and tactical leadership as well as in the level of combat actions. Dzu understands that Nguyen Van Thieu is a bloody dictator, a fascist and that the regime he created is wholly anti-democratic.

Thus, we see that these meetings with the generals are a great victory for us and will be beneficial to us. In order to successfully manage a resolution of the issues linked to conducting propaganda work with the South Vietnamese Army generals aimed at awakening their consciousness and winning them over to our side,

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it is necessary to understand that the outcome of the coming battle depends upon the solution of these important issues. It is necessary to attain a clear understanding among the generals that the Thieu regime will never employ popular support and cannot exist. Such are the fundamental issues which we should resolve in the near future.

From the utterances of the generals set forth above, we see that the situation is developing in a direction favorable to us. We can bring Plan "BA BE" into being, but for this we should expand the net of communications and contacts with people who will carry out Plan "BA BE," in order to obtain from them all necessary materials. We should likewise search for ways to establish connections with officers and officials of the Saigon government. This matter occupies a significant place in the implementation of Plan "BA BE." The Supreme Command and Ministry of State Security discussed all matters related to successful implementation of this plan and levied new tasks upon the commands of the combat zones responsible for implementation of this plan. We successfully inserted and deployed our forces in all regions and are now conducting the final work in order to complete preparatory measures for this Plan by September 30th of this year. In comparison to other plans, the preparation of Plan "BA BE" is developing well. This is the first time we are implementing such a plan on the territory of South Vietnam. In the course of its realization we will acquire experience which can help us counter the designs of the enemy at the front.

The more savage the bombings and barrages of the enemy may become, the more victories we should grasp at the front, because such victories will aid realization of Plan "BA BE." We are linking great hopes to the implementation of this plan, especially in accelerating the pace at which the offensive at the front develops, of which I reported to you above. The favorable development of the situation will be a huge and significant factor in the collapse of US military designs and of the puppets at the front in South Vietnam. We must thwart the reactionary and treacherous plans of the enemy; successful carrying out of Plan "BA BE" will indeed help us to grasp new victories. These victories will have great strategic significance in implementation of Plans TS-6 and

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Plan S-6, which were topics above.

The goal of Plan "BA BE" is introduction of division into the ranks of the enemy and lowering of his will to resist. Successful implementation of Plan "BA BE" will help us to attain successes at the Paris negotiations on Vietnam. The nearer the victory, the more clearly will appear the treacherous designs of the Nixon-Kissinger-Laird clique, and likewise those of the puppet government of Nguyen Van Thieu. Therefore implementation of Plan "BA BE" will be a great step in the resolution of many issues in the current situation. Because of this, its significance is so great.

For successful realization of this plan we should as soon as possible insert our forces, in order to begin implementation of this plan in the month of October in accordance with indicated deadlines.

In the Paris negotiations on Vietnam we have met with a series of difficulties in recent days. These difficulties are explained by the fact that Nixon being stubborn as before and is trying above all to achieve a solution of the military issue and only then to move to settlement of political issues, which will exercise great influence on the course of development of the contemporary situation in Vietnam. As a result of exchanging opinions in private meetings with Kissinger--Nixon's advisor--Kissinger, we understood that Nixon as before is being stubborn on settling the situation which is developing today in Vietnam. To attain settlement we should conduct careful preparation to counter Nixon's designs. Let him understand: if he does not renounce this war, then precisely the US will suffer defeat in it. However, Nixon is being stubborn in continuing the aggressive war and maintaining the status quo. That is why we think, that with the US taking such a position, peaceful solution of the Vietnam issue is not possible. We see that the US obstinately continues aggression, while Nguyen Van Thieu as before holds to his insolent position. That is why we are resolved to carry out Plan "BA BE," the realization of which will be a turning point in the settlement of the situation at the front.

This would be our first military thrust on the front aimed at resolving the complicated political issue at the present stage.

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I) Plan S-6 -- Plan for military operations in the Saigon region  
(footnote of the GRU)

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Until this, the Supreme Command had never tried working out a plan similar to the plan "Ba Be".

Over the course of six months, we prepared to execute this plan. During this time, we gathered everyone who should take part in its realization, and then conducted a thorough training of them. The intelligence directorate of the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of State Security conducted the training of these people. We well understand that the better the training of these people is conducted, the fewer the losses we will suffer and the faster we will be able to attain execution of this plan.

Thus, once again evaluating the plan "Ba Be", the thorough training which is now going on, and which will be realized jointly with the plan TS-6 in October, it can be said that its successful realization will assist us to attain new great victories at the Paris negotiations on Vietnam. These are very serious issues which we must devote constant attention to.

Yesterday the State Defense Council directed the Supreme Command to conduct a conference for the cadres responsible for training and carrying out this plan. At this conference, the forms, means and methods were stated, which were worked out according to the organs and confirmed at a Politburo session.

We can now say that we have achieved great successes and we are convinced that this plan will be realized. Presently, this plan is being carried out. We have already succeeded in inserting a portion of our comrades into South Vietnamese territory. We succeeded with difficulty in certain areas and for this we had to procure all possible means. In other areas, this operation was carried out more successfully, and now our people are occupying stable positions in the puppet governing apparatus.

Dear Comrades! In summing up what is stated above, it can be said that we are going in the right direction in carrying out our plans, especially the plans TS-6 and "Ba Be", and also in training for the realization of our plan S-6, the realization of which is slated for the near future.

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In addition to these issues, in accordance with the instructions from the Politburo, I will also report to you today on American POWs captured on the various fronts of Indochina.

The work with American prisoners of war has always been within the field of vision of the Politburo and has been reflected in its decisions, such as decision No. 21 DST dated 23 Mar 71, and decision No. 21 E dated 4 Apr 72. Both of these decisions concern the issues of exploiting these American POWs captured during the war. This disturbs the public opinion of the whole world and of the US. There are various thoughts on the American POW issue. Some of these are correct, others are not, but even among us there are a number of comrades whose opinions differ from the opinion of the Politburo. These comrades are not taking into consideration the particulars of the developing situation nor the inherent difficulties in their judgements. These opinions harm us in our search for methods of resolving the American POW issue.

Dear comrades! The American POW issue is very complex. The peoples of the world [world opinion] and the peoples of our fraternal socialist nations [allied popular opinion] as well as our [people] want to know the exact number of POWs located in North Vietnam. Allow me to inform you specifically on this matter. We have captured a very large number of American POWs on the fronts of Indochina since the time that the US introduced their troops into Vietnam, escalated the air war against North Vietnam, and expanded the total scope of their aggression by spreading this aggression onto the territories of Laos and Cambodia. At first, the number of American POWs was not large and world public opinion paid little attention to them. The number of American POWs in North Vietnam grew day by day after 5 Aug 64 when the US imperialists started massive air bombing and off-shore bombardment by the 7th fleet of the territory of North Vietnam, and after having expanded their aggression onto the territories of Laos and Cambodia. The number of American POWs in the DRV has not been made public to this day. We have kept this figure secret. At today's Politburo session, I will report to you, Comrades, the exact number of American POWs.

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The total number of American POWs captured to date on the fronts of Indochina, i.e. in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, comprises 1205 people. Of them, 671 people were captured in North Vietnam and 143 aviators [were captured] in South Vietnam. This means the total number of aviators, and diversionists [special operations] (American advisors on diversionary ships and divers), captured on the territories of North and South Vietnam comprises 814 people. In addition, from other categories of American servicemen in Indochina, we have captured 391 people, including: 283 in South Vietnam, 65 in Cambodia and 43 in Laos; 814 and 391 comprise 1205 people.

Here is more data on the 1205 POWs.

We have captured 624 American aviators in North Vietnam, to include 7 colonels, 85 lieutenant colonels, 183 majors, i.e. the total number of senior US Air Force and Navy officers comprises 275 people. The 624 American aviators include 3 astronauts, i.e. three people who have completed the necessary training for space flight, for instance, Jim Katlo, who was captured in the vicinity of Hanoi. This figure also includes 15 US Air Force aces having more than 4000 flight hours each: Norman Klarvisto, Karmet, Jim Intist Shasht and others. This is the specific data on American aviators captured in North Vietnam.

Among the other 47 prisoners captured in North Vietnam, there are 36 advisors of diversionary detachments who were inserted in the border region between the DRV and Laos; lone diversionists who were conducting reconnaissance of our main transportation routes from helicopters and reconnaissance ships; and several seamen who abandoned their ships that we damaged and whom we picked up. Therefore the figures 624 and 47 add up to 671.

In South Vietnam we have captured 143 US aircrew members, mainly helicopter aviators and some jet aviators.

Among the 391 American POWs captured in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, we have 9 colonels, 19 lieutenant colonels and 52 majors. The remaining officers are captain and below,

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as well as American enlisted soldiers.

Thus in summary, I want to remind you again that the 1205 American POWs presently in prisons of North Vietnam include:

- 524 aviators captured in North Vietnam;
- 143 aviators captured in South Vietnam;
- 47 diversionists and other American servicemen captured in North Vietnam;
- 391 American servicemen of other categories, which includes 283 captured in South Vietnam, 65 in Cambodia, and 43 in Laos.

All of them are presently in prisons in North Vietnam. Currently we have 11 prisons where American POWs are held. We used to have 4 large prisons, however after the American attempt to free their POWs from Ha Tay [Son Tay] we expanded this number to 11. Each prison holds approximately 100 POWs.

Seven Air Force colonels captured in North Vietnam and nine colonels of various branches of service captured in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia (16 officers in all) are being held together; through them, we are attempting to gain an understanding of the current situation which has developed in the American Army, extract the material and information we need, and determine our position toward them.

We are also holding 104 American lieutenant colonels in one location and are attempting to extract information - secret information about troop dispositions and information concerning the US Defense Department from them.

We have 235 majors concentrated in two locations.

Thus we have dedicated special prisons for senior officers of the American Army: one for colonels, one for lieutenant colonels and two for majors. The rest of the POWs, captains and below, were placed in other prisons.

A few words about the political views and attitudes of American POWs.

There are 368 POWs who have progressive attitudes.

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They understand very well that this war is unjust and unpopular on their part. They condemn the American administration and express a strong protest against this war. We will be able to release these 368 POWs first, if as a result of the struggle of the progressive peoples of the world, including the American people, a favorable international environment will develop, forcing Nixon to move toward a resolution of the political issue. We are carrying out work with this category of POWs to explain to them the aggressive nature of the war being conducted by the Nixon administration and the nature of the Nguyen Van Thieu regime, and also to make them understand the unjust character of this war which is inflicting great damage on the American people. One can assert that this group of POWs is progressive in their political views.

There are 372 of the POWs who hold neutral views, i.e. their political outlook is not fully progressive, yet not too reactionary. We plainly see that they still do not clearly understand the role of the American administration in unleashing the aggressive war in Indochina.

The remainder of the POWs hold reactionary views. In spite of the work carried on to explain to them the real state of things, they have not changed their reactionary views.

The following is a summation:

- 368 POWs holding progressive views can be released first:
- 372 POWs hold neutral positions:
- 465 POWs hold reactionary views.

All the POWs among the senior officers hold reactionary views, i.e. they do not condemn Nixon, they do not protest his policies, and they distort our course of action. We understand that these officers come from rich families. Their reactionary views are precisely a result of this.

We well understand that the American POW issue has great significance for the resolution of the South Vietnamese problem. We must continue propagandistic and educational work with the American POWs, leading to their understanding

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of the nature of the aggressive war which the US is carrying out in Vietnam, as well as the senseless obstinateness of Nixon, which only delays the release of POWs and their return to their homeland. Soon we will free several POWs in order to put pressure on the Nixon administration, observe his reaction and the reaction of the American public, as well as to demonstrate our good intentions in this matter.

Thus, the 1205 American POWs captured on the fronts of Indochina (in North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia), presently kept in prisons in North Vietnam represent a significant force in the American army, a basic part of which is made up of American aviators.

The large number of American aviators imprisoned during the time of Johnson and Nixon inflicted huge damage on the US Air Force. This should cause the US government and Nixon himself to reflect. We intend to resolve the American POW issue in the following manner:

1. The US government must demonstrate compliance, i.e. a cease fire and the removal of Nguyen Van Thieu, and then both sides can begin discussing the matter of returning POWs to the Nixon government.
2. While the American side is resolving the above-mentioned problems, we can free several more aviators from the number who are progressively inclined. Nixon should not hinder the return of these aviators to their homeland and not undertake any disciplinary measures toward them.
3. Nixon must compensate North Vietnam for the great damage inflicted on it by this destructive war.

Here then are the principles on the basis of which we may resolve the American POW issue. However, Nixon continues to resist resolving the Vietnamese question, thereby delaying the resolution of the American POW issue.

I have reported these specific figures and fundamental aspects of the American POW issue to the Politburo. But we also have these comrades who do not understand this problem correctly.

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It is necessary to resolve this issue taking into account settling the military and the political aspects of the Vietnamese problem. If we take a path of concession toward Americans and release POWs, then we would lose much. That is why our point of view on this issue remains the same: this issue must be resolved on the basis of military and political aspects of settlement.

Holding 1205 POWs creates certain difficulties for us, but more importantly, the loss of 1205 POWs, particularly aviators, is a great detriment to the American Army, particularly the US Air Force. At the same time, we were able to collect data about American weapons and also valuable scientific materials about the US Army, for instance, material on how to use different types of weaponry, tactical/technical characteristics of aircraft, Air Force directives, as well as materials about other types of armament of the US Army. We have been able to uncover US intentions in the international arena and on a number of other issues which are related to war in Indochina.

That is why we are convinced that our position concerning POWs has and continues to be correct. If we could successfully resolve the POW issue, then the other issues would not exert any influence on our policy toward the US. That is why we are now concentrating on the successful resolution of this problem on the collection and study of materials from interrogations of American aviators who were shot down over North Vietnam and American scientists captured in this war, particularly Air Force specialists, as well as scientists in other technical areas. Their loss is a major liability for the American Army, because in no other war have there been so many captured Americans as there are in this war of aggression.

The 1205 American POWs kept in the prisons of North Vietnam represent a large number. For now, we have officially published a list of only 368 POWs. The rest are not acknowledged. The US government is aware of this, but they do not know the exact number of POWs, or they perhaps only assume an approximate number based on their losses. Therefore in accordance with the instructions from the Politburo, we are keeping the number of POWs secret.

We continue to collect and study materials from interrogations

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of POWs in order to have a basis in specific circumstances to expose US designs in the Indochina war of aggression as well as in other matters. Collection and study of these materials has provided us great assistance in studying the scientific discoveries of the US, in developing methods to counter contemporary weapons, including chemical, which have inflicted great harm upon us in this war.

I reported to the Politburo several fundamental aspects related to the matter of American POWs, namely: concerning the policy we are implementing on this matter, I gave the specific number of American POWs seized in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

We still have among us Comrades who think: why do we keep these POWs and not take advantage of the Nixon proposals? Do we really want to resolve this matter after all? It needs to be noted that such a point of view is profoundly mistaken. This is not political bargaining but rather a key condition and serious argument for successful resolution of the Vietnam problem. That is why the matter of the American POWs has great significance in exposing Nixon's designs in this aggressive war in Vietnam. We are completely unanimous in this matter and condemn individualistic mistaken views current among us on this matter. We firmly hold to our position -- when the American government resolves the political and military issues on all three fronts of Indochina, we will set free all American POWs. We consider this a very correct course.

Dear Comrades!

I have reported the following matters to Politburo sessions: the course of our party on the general offensive conducted in South Vietnam from March 30th to the present; our errors and deficiencies in the offensive and summing up results of the offensive in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia; positive and negative aspects of the offensive; immediate plans of the enemy and our operations; analysis of errors permitted in strategic and tactical leadership; our contacts with political figures of South

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Vietnam from the Saigon regime; the matter of American POWs, captured on the three fronts of Indochina.

Today on assignment of the Supreme Command, the State Defense Council and the Military Committee of the Politburo, I reported to you on these matters so that the Politburo could study these problems, could express its opinion on them, and set forth forms and methods for their resolution. Soon the State Defense Council, together with the Supreme Command will study matters related to carrying out new operations at the front. The State Defense Council assigned the Supreme Command, and the latter in turn the General Staff, to address matters related to the development of new military plans for the year 1973. At the present time these plans are being worked out with the goal of preparing the necessary forces for their implementation. We are occupied with matters of mobilization and training of reinforcements for all three Indochinese fronts. We should mobilize 250,000 men, 200,000 of which would be sent to South Vietnam and 50,000 to Laos and Cambodia.

Summing up this report it is necessary to say that I have touched on the fundamental features of the situation which has developed in South Vietnam, on our difficulties and successes, and also on the difficulties existing for the enemy. I set out our plans and our course, and also illuminated a series of matters which the Politburo assigned to the State Defense Council and Supreme Command. At the next Politburo session, I shall set forth matters touching upon the present situation in Laos and Cambodia and views on its development.

Presently, the situation is turning out quite favorably. The peoples of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia have decisively frustrated the plan for "Vietnamization" of the war and identical plans being implemented in Laos and Cambodia. We hold high the invincible banner of Marxism-Leninism!

We are carrying out the precepts of Ho Chi Minh. The war of resistance against American imperialists for the salvation of the Fatherland will yet be stubborn and hard, yet we will definitely grasp victory. We will decisively frustrate the plans of Nixon or anyone who takes his place and continues the aggressive war!

The course of our party is assuredly correct. Our people are heroic

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people. Our forces are heroic forces!

The three countries of Indochina, closely united one with another, will fight to the last drop of blood for the freedom and independence of their Fatherlands. The Vietnamese people will fully carry out its international duty toward the fraternal peoples of Laos and Cambodia!

To the current session of the Politburo I wish successful work. I have completed the presentation of the report.

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The brochure contains 24 pages of text RKSS/I 2235-24. II.72,  
Title page and cover order № 00/817

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ADMINISTRATION [GRU]

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## REPORT

by Hoang Anya, Central Committee Secretary,  
Vietnamese Workers Party

at

20th Plenary Session of the Central Committee, VWP  
End of December 1970, Early January 1971

(Translation from Vietnamese)

Moscow - 1971

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Comrades!

Today, at the 20th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of our Party, in the name of the Politburo and Secretariat of the Central Committee, I am reporting to you regarding the basic features of our activities in 1970, over the period that extends from the 18th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers Party [CC VWP] until now.

At this Plenary Session an assessment will be given of our victories in 1970. The past year was of enormous historical significance for our country, both in the North and in the South.<sup>1</sup> The Politburo met several times at the end of last year in order to analyze the situation over the preceding period. At these sessions it was noted that all our successes are the result of a correct Party policy. At the 18th, 19th, and now at the 20th Plenary Sessions of the CC VWP repeated emphasis was placed on the guiding role of the Party in the life and struggle of our people. Our people developed a patriotic spirit in 1970, continuing with great enthusiasm to carry out

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the socialist revolution in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The major victories achieved in all these theaters of military action are a service of our Party, our people. Over the past year we have achieved great successes in economics and other areas.

Along with this, at the 20th Plenary Session it will be necessary for us to discuss important issues related to our long-term activities, and reach decisions on these issues. As before, the main item of our activity must be carrying out revolution in both parts of our country. At the same time, a great deal of attention must be given to the revolutions in Cambodia and Laos. In my report I will deal with problems such as

- the situation in the party
- the situation in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia
- preparation for the next, Fourth VWP Congress.

#### 1. SITUATION IN THE VIETNAMESE WORKERS' PARTY

In 1970 we attained many glorious victories and achieved significant successes in issues related to administering the building of socialism in the North, and carrying out revolution in the South. The issue related to the guiding role and activity of the Party in current conditions was one of the central ones during the past year. Much attention was given to it at the 18th and 19th Plenary Sessions of the CC VWP. It must be noted that a series of important issues in this plan was decided in previous Plenary Sessions, but some issues remained unresolved. At this Plenary Session we are continuing the discussion of all questions relating to the tasks and role of the Party in the current stage of revolutionary development in the North and South of our country. At this Plenary Session it will also be necessary for us to plan measures directed toward strengthening the guiding role of the Party, increasing its authority among the people, developing plans for long-term economic reconstruction in the D.R.V. and evolving the revolutionary struggle in South Vietnam.

In the past year of our Party it was necessary to decide complex issues of an economic, political and military nature. After Comrade Ho Chi Minh's death, many difficult problems demanding resolution presented themselves to our party's leadership. Demonstrating collective leadership, our comrades from the Politburo directed their efforts at solving these problems.

In 1970 we carried out very large-scale and important work, politically, militarily and diplomatically. In this regard the solidification of our Party's cadres was given particular attention, since this is a pledge and necessary condition for working out a correct policy and putting it into practice at the appropriate time. Overall in the past year we were successful in giving comprehensive attention to all party organizations,

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indicating deficiencies to them in a timely way. This resulted in a qualitative improvement in party ranks. There was significant strengthening in the ranks of our cadre workers who boldly carried the Party's ideas to the masses.

Along with this, it must be mentioned that of late in many Party organizations, Party cells and even in the central apparatus, we observe, as before, disorder and lack of unity, although to a certain extent these have diminished. In 1971 we will have to give considerable effort to restoring full unity in the Party. In order to achieve this, it must be our constant concern to increase the vigilance of all Party members. The unity issue in the Party, as before, will be one of the most important in the activities of all Party organizations. Without this unity, we will not have the strength to resolve any of the issues before us. If there is no unity in the central organs, then there will be no unity locally. And vice versa: the situation in lower-level Party organizations will have an influence on the central apparatus.

The contradictions that we have had from as far back as the 18th Plenary Session of the CC VWP have been manifested in a great variety of ways, and have a negative effect on our economic, political and military courses. Even at the 18th Plenary Session of the CC VWP, many comrades were not in agreement with the policy of our Party, and some of them continue to hold to their own positions. Therefore, at this Plenary Session it will be necessary for us to take active measures to eliminate all contradictions that still exist.

It is all the more necessary that we eliminate existing contradictions in that during its forty-year history our party has always been united, and this unity was what secured all our victories. If we wish to continue to be victorious and achieve still further successes, we must restore full unity in the Party.

Today, at the 20th Plenary Session of the CC VWP, the matter of Party unity is before us with particular urgency. We must resolve it in Leninist fashion. In order to eliminate conflicting opinions, it is essential to strengthen the collective leadership. Our Party is the ruling party and it possesses all the conditions to inculcate a single correct course. We are moving along the path of building socialism in the North and carrying out revolution in the South. Therefore, I must again repeat that the Party unity issue is an issue of first importance.

A number of comrades even in previous Plenary Sessions expressed disagreement with our policy on various issues: the role of the Party, forms and methods of Party work, and so on. However, under current conditions the issue of the Party's leading role cannot and ought not be discussed. From now on we should direct our efforts toward increasing the Party's

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authority among the masses. This will also serve the cause of strengthening unity within the Party.

In 1970 we had some major victories in military, political and diplomatic relations. We significantly strengthened Party ranks from the bottom upwards. Our line in the area of ideological development is the correct one, and it fully accords with the decisions made at the 3rd Congress. We may make bold to say that the 20th Plenary Session of the CC VWP is being conducted in a situation where our Party has been significantly strengthened in qualitative and organizational terms.

Along with this, there still exist forces that are bringing dissent into our ranks, attempting to deflect the Party from the true path. We must wage a decisive fight against them, increasing discipline and vigilance by every possible means in the Party, and increasing communist self-knowledge. We must root out any growths of opportunism, and destroy this harmful ideology in our Party. Restoration of Party unity will in large measure depend on eliminating all opportunistic tendencies. We have made good studies of examples of the fight against opportunism, since in every Party there is a stage at which opportunistic forces appear. These forces strive to break the unity in the Party, and force it to depart from the correct path. We have comrades who do not see opportunism as anything that threatens the Party. They consider that this is normal diversity of opinion, characteristic of any Party. This is a very superficial and dangerous point of view which can cause us to deviate seriously if it is not headed off in time. In short, we must purge the Party of everything that interferes with its carrying out its duties.

At present, the industrialization of the economy is a large and important task that is before us. If we achieve a restoration of Party unity, then we will carry out this task. We must determine in specific terms who is straying in regard to what, who is not in agreement with our general line regarding what, in order to determine the correct measures to combat all the deviations. We must know exactly who is daring to criticize our line, and decisively rebuff these individuals.

Along with this, we should check on how those who constantly subject our line to criticism are dealing with their own direct responsibilities. How are they providing leadership in the areas of economics, politics, and on the diplomatic front? Do they have sufficient grounds for the criticism directed at us? Are they acting in accord with the principles of Marxism-Leninism?

While rebuffing those that heap criticism on us, it is necessary to emphasize that our basic policy is correct. However, we, like all people, may permit mistakes. But these mistakes must be analyzed and eliminated, and we must not just occupy ourselves with criticizing them. These mistakes are not

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so major that they could have an effect on the entirety of our course. They are of a private nature, they are natural. For example, we permitted a series of errors in administering agricultural cooperatives. But overall, the cooperative movement in the country is developing normally; certain successes have been achieved in agriculture. We noted the mistakes in time and planned a specific path toward eliminating them. Thus, we make note of permissible errors and strive to prevent their repetition. Why do some comrades say that we are pursuing an incorrect policy in agriculture?

Marxism teaches that agricultural collectivization is an extremely important condition for development of a socialist economy. In any country where this issue is given little attention, there will be great difficulties in the economy. And in our country, where colonialists left us a heritage of a backward economy, this matter is particularly important. With all our effort we must develop agriculture, placing it on a collective basis. It will be necessary to develop a strong network of cooperatives in the entire territory of South Vietnam.

The cooperatives need to be provided with technology, which will ensure they will develop successfully. Our leadership is giving a great deal of attention to issues of cooperative farming, and is continuing to seek ways to boost agriculture. At the present time, cooperatives have been created in 78.8% of the farming regions of the DRV.

Agriculture has enormous significance in our country, because it supplies food to the North Vietnamese population and to the patriotic forces of South Vietnam. In addition, we must do our international duty by helping patriotic forces in Laos and Cambodia, which also implies large expenditures. Therefore, administration of agriculture on the part of the Party must be precise, logical and comprehensive.

Many comrades do not understand this, and criticize our policy in the area of agriculture. They criticize us in general terms, and do not get specific about what mistakes have been permitted and how they are to be corrected. I wish once again to repeat that no one is insured against making mistakes. In a number of instances we permitted failures, and in some areas not everything is working out favorably with cooperative farming. We know about the mistakes that have been allowed to happen, and we are taking measures to correct them in a timely way. We have been occupied with agricultural cooperatives for a long time. A lot of attention was devoted to them at the 15th, 16th and 17th Plenary Sessions of the CC VWP. The D.R.V. is a major rear-echelon area for South Vietnam; therefore, development of agriculture in the North will do much to promote our successes in the South.

We would have had even more difficulties if it were not for

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the help from brotherly socialist countries, which permits us successfully to restore agriculture.

The Politburo and Secretariat are unflagging in their efforts to monitor the work of all the organizations that relate to agriculture. They have given instructions to scientific organizations to actively participate in boosting agriculture.

Once again I wish to emphasize that the administration of the Party by the Politburo and Central Committee is correct. Our Party is a Marxist one, and therefore we are capable of noting, analyzing, admitting and correcting our mistakes. We do not fear our errors; we fear something else: division in the Party. At present there is a dispute about whether our Party's course is correct or not.

Overall we are providing correct guidance to the economy, and are correctly conducting external and internal policy. But our comrades still have deficiencies in their working methods, which creates certain difficulties for us. These difficulties, however, are not insurmountable. The mistakes, in the main, are not crucial ones. The matter of mistakes and inadequacies is very important, and we must discuss it in detail, in order to select the correct path toward eliminating all deficiencies.

For a long time many comrades have been speaking out against our basic policy in agriculture. As a result of this, a struggle is going on constantly in our Party leadership. This started as far back as the 17th Plenary Session, continued in the 18th, and reached its height in the 19th Plenary Session of the CC VWP.

Of those present here, many comrades are not in agreement with our policy. What do they want? What route do they wish to go? How to resolve the growing problems? We consider that this is factional, revisionist activity.

In the forty years of our Party's history, there have never been such strong disagreements. We are the ruling party, and in order to carry out our functions in administering the national masses, we must above all be united.

In 1970 the Politburo undertook the major task of combating opportunism and other deviations, against all the opponents of our economic and military policy. We feel that our military policy in South Vietnam is absolutely correct. Our course in Laos and Cambodia is also correct.

This conclusion is based on an analysis of conditions. If we conduct a fight only in South Vietnam, we will encounter great difficulties. The more than one-million-man-strong army of the American aggressors and their stooges is a large force, and dealing with it will not be all that easy. All the more since all of this force is concentrated in one place - South

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Vietnam. We are experiencing great difficulties at the fronts, and opportunism in the military leadership is going to compound those difficulties.

Revolution in South Vietnam is currently entering its final stage, the stage of military victory. We must not overestimate the enemy's forces, but we have no right to underestimate them. The enemy's forces are very large and in a military sense we are weaker than they. Therefore we must carry out a people's war strategy. Our military forces are not large; we have insufficient modern weapons to fight a war effectively. Meanwhile, the U.S.A. has enormous military and economic potential. Therefore, we must not fight open battles against the enemy's strong army. However, we are achieving victories, and these victories are the result of a struggle by the entire people.

Along with this, in order to achieve victory at the front, we must accompany our armed struggle with a diplomatic struggle. We must recall the words of Ho Chi Minh: "We must achieve complete victory over the American aggressors." This precept of our leader can be carried out only when there is unity in the party. Therefore, we severely judge all opportunists who interfere with our moving toward victory.

We severely judge those who intend to solve the Vietnamese problem only militarily, who wish to invade South Vietnam with an army 2,000,000 strong and fight there without interruption. Do we have enough human resources? Yes, but we do not have a necessity to create such large-scale military forces in order to solve the Vietnamese problem militarily.

We need to remember that we have already borne significant personnel losses, and that we are constantly losing people. Therefore, we ask all those who are criticizing our policy: do you want still greater personnel losses?

We are obligated to, and we must, carry out Ho Chi Minh's precept. But we will have to do this not in an unthinking manner, and not allowing huge personnel losses. We must consider three forms of struggle: military, political and diplomatic.

Of course, in South Vietnam we do have the option of concentrating a large number of divisions in more important sectors and surrounding the enemy in those areas. But does it make sense to do this, when the enemy has enormous firepower? No. The lives of our warriors are dear to us. We must analyze with the greatest care and weigh every step. Once again I emphasize that our military policy is correct.

But what do the opportunists want? They wish to introduce foreign troops onto our territory<sup>2</sup> and move along with them to occupy Laos and free South Vietnam. But we cannot and we ought.

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not to go this route, as this policy will result in unheard-of losses for us.

Our victories are great ones. But we must not forget that these victories cost us a great deal. The military aspect of the struggle is very important. But we will be on an incorrect course if we overestimate it, resulting in renewed personnel losses. If you recall, during the Tet offensive and the general uprising in January-February 1968, we lost about 100,000 people. And if we organize such offensives twice each year, then how many people will we lose?

Therefore, we must not try to break the enemy with a single blow. It is necessary to conduct a lengthy conflict, exhausting the enemy's forces, destroying him piece by piece. Simultaneous with this, we are required to activate a struggle on the political and diplomatic fronts.

Such is our point of view on the military issue. If we are not united on this matter, then we will not be victorious. Can it be that our military policy is not understandable to some comrades? In that case, we ask them to think over this policy once again, and they will understand that our military policy is correct. We can be proud that we are carrying out such a policy.

Despite the fact that we did not mount any major offensives in 1970, we did succeed in achieving large victories, destroying significant numbers of the enemy. Along with this, we avoided large losses on our side. This is also a great victory for our strategic policy.

Now, another matter. When we published the names of 368 American pilots who were shot down and taken captive in the territory of the D.R.V., the opportunists began saying that this was a concession to the Americans. This is not so. This was no concession, but rather a blow to Nixon in the political sense. By this means we achieved a lot. The opportunists also say that we are moving toward concessions to the Americans and toward negotiations in Paris. This is also not true. Our course in the negotiations is the right one.

Thus, overall we are pursuing the correct line, although we have permitted some mistakes to be made. But the opportunistic political faction is grasping at these small mistakes in order to show that the whole policy of our Party is erroneous. Its members say that we fear difficulties and losses. This is not so. We do not fear difficulties and losses, but one other thing must be allowed for - our people already have been conducting continuous armed conflict for 25 years. During that time, very many people have perished. If we truly feared difficulties and losses, as the opportunists maintain, we would not have started an armed conflict against the Americans. But one must see the connection between the victories and the losses, and objectively

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assess the situation.

Naturally, we have had mistakes in military policies in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, in policies of economic development in the D.R.V., in policies related to boosting the well-being of the populace. We are particularly concerned about improving the people's living conditions. One must allow for the fact that our options are limited in this area, and therefore this problem has not yet been solved. But along with all other factors, it is the opportunists who interfere with our solving it.

We clearly see all the errors of the opportunistic faction, and at this Plenary Session, having analyzed their views with the greatest care, we are doing decisive battle with them. We leave them the right and option to recognize their mistakes and correct them. Then they again will be able to serve the Party and the people.

Comrades! In the past year the Politburo and Secretariat of the CC VWP have done major work in administering the Party as regards building socialism in the North and conducting a struggle for liberation in the South. By our victories we are obligated to the creative leadership on the part of the Politburo. With this leadership and our determination to chase the American aggressors out of Vietnam, we are sure to achieve still more major victories.

It will be necessary for us to direct still greater efforts at the long-term development of socialism in the D.R.V., and developing revolution in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Along with this, it is necessary to fight decisively against all manifestations of opportunism in the Party, and achieve full unity in it. This is our main task for the period directly ahead.

## 2. SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA

In 1970 we continued the military successes achieved in 1968 and 1969 in all theaters of military action. Along with this, in 1970 an aggravation of the situation in Indochina was noted, resulting in a revolution in Cambodia and an incursion of American and Saigonese forces into its territory.

The situation was tense in South Vietnam in 1970. By their actions the Americans showed that the U.S.A. does not intend to leave South Vietnam. However, pressured by public opinion, the Nixon administration was forced to remove part of their forces from there. Several other countries who are participating in the war against us were also forced to act in this way.

During the past year, the Americans were busy with making their "Vietnamization" plan a reality. This consisted of transferring to the puppet forces the task of fighting against

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patriotic forces. Thus the Americans have put into practice the principle of "using Vietnamese to kill Vietnamese," "using Asians to kill Asians."

The U.S.A. began "Vietnamization" with the Mekong River Valley. There they intend to create a base for developing "Vietnamization" in other areas. It was not by chance that the Mekong River Valley was chosen. This area is rich in rice, feeding all of South Vietnam with this basic product. If the Americans and their puppets do not have a strong base in the Mekong River Valley, they will encounter great economic difficulties, which will be reflected in the course of military operations. Therefore, they have concentrated great forces in this region to hold it firmly.

We, for our part, have undertaken significant efforts to thwart Abrams's intentions, and overall we were successful in this. The Americans and their puppets suffered large losses in the Mekong River Valley, and were not able to put their "Vietnamization" plans into effect. In addition, in 1970 the Americans were forced to disperse their forces and move a part of their troops into Cambodia, thus creating additional difficulties for themselves.

Overall, the Americans suffered a defeat in inculcating their plans to "Vietnamize" the war.

The main efforts of our troops in 1970 were concentrated in the Mekong River Valley, in the Saigon area and in the northern part of South Vietnam. In all these areas we inflicted significant losses on the enemy.

Along with this, in 1970 we encountered significant difficulties. These difficulties mainly resulted from the incursion of American and Saigonese forces into Cambodia. The enemy succeeded in seriously disrupting our transportation system on Cambodian territory, which affected the supplying of our troops in South Vietnam.

At present, Abrams is developing new plans to conduct military operations against us during the dry season of 1971, and also for further "Vietnamization." But these plans of the enemy will also meet defeat, since we are strong. As before, we must direct our efforts at defeating the plans for "Vietnamization" of the war, and inflicting maximum losses on the enemy in live forces and military supplies.

The South Vietnamese theater of military actions continues to remain the basic one. We must give it our main attention. Therefore, in South Vietnam we intend to concentrate large-scale forces and direct powerful strikes at the enemy. Comrade Chan Van Kuang will report to you in greater detail regarding our plans in South Vietnam.

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I wish only to say a few words regarding the Americans. Abrams made a big mistake by making an incursion into Cambodia. He soon realized this, and the Americans were forced to pull their troops out of there, leaving puppet troops in Cambodia. Since the Americans and the puppets are using significant forces in Cambodia, favorable conditions have been created for us in South Vietnam. Later on even the Americans, including some prominent military figures, expressed the opinion that introducing U.S. forces into Cambodia was a mistake, and that the Americans in South Vietnam suffered a defeat. We have spoiled the Americans' plans to 'Vietnamize' the war. Now it is appropriate to make efforts to consolidate and further develop the successes achieved. At the present time, the situation is moving into a favorable direction for us. The enemy is experiencing significant difficulties, militarily, politically and diplomatically.

1970 was a year in which we undertook large-scale military offensives. It was still another evidence that our Party is providing correct leadership in regard to solving the Indochina problem. It is necessary to note, however, that in South Vietnam in 1970 we had serious failures. In certain areas we suffered large losses in manpower. Over 10 years of armed conflict in South Vietnam, we have lost 410,000 people, including 230,000 killed or missing in action.<sup>3</sup> In 1970 we lost 100,000 people. The majority of personnel losses were suffered as a result of bombing and artillery fire of the enemy.

In 1970 we met with serious difficulties in supplying our troops with weapons, ammunition and food, since the enemy conducted continuous bombings of our transport lines in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. Not having the option of using previously built transport routes, in 1970 we opened a new supply route in the area of the Chiong Shon Mountains.<sup>4</sup> By this means we can carry out deployments of personnel, weapons and food to all theaters of military action in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.

In 1970 the enemy continuously inflicted blows on our home supply bases, fearing an offensive by us toward the sites of highest priority to us. His assumption that we have large-scale concentrations of troops in rear-echelon bases was correct. We do in fact have large potential possibilities to strike blows at enemy sites. But the enemy's attacks on our home supply bases did significant harm to personnel and equipment, and complicated our offensive efforts.

Supplying our troops in 1970 was additionally made difficult by the fact that earlier we could use the sea route, while after the uprising in Cambodia, we were deprived of this option.<sup>5</sup> In addition, we intended to carry out a part of our deployments by air, using airfields in Cambodia for this. But for now we have not decided to do this, fearing that our aircraft will be attacked and shot down by American aviation.

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Therefore, at present, as before, we continue to deploy on land through Laos. And right now we still have significant difficulties in deploying personnel, weapons, ammunition and food.

In 1970 the amount of weapons, ammunition, military hardware and food deployed to the fronts in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos came to 273,000 tons, while in 1971 we are continuing to deploy more than 300,000 tons of loads just to South Vietnam. This volume is very great, and in order to convert our estimates into real life, we are going to have to labor strenuously and seriously. We must mobilize significant forces to carry out this assignment.

If we succeed in 1971 in spoiling the enemy's plans for "Vietnamization" of the war and "pacification" of the South Vietnamese populace, we shall consider that we have scored a huge victory. Overall, all our successes in 1971 will depend on solving supply problems. Reports on that matter will be given by comrades from the CC Military Division and the Vietnamese People's Army [VPA] command in South Vietnam.

Along with solving the problem of home-base supplying of our troops in South Vietnam, we must discuss the issue of the quantitative makeup of VPA troops assigned for use in the South. At the present time, eight divisions of our regular troops (overall total of 110,000 men) are in South Vietnam, participating directly in military actions. In 1971 we expect to increase the number of our regular troops there to 200,000 men. Allowing for this, the overall number of People's Liberation Forces in South Vietnam is 430,000 men. In order to send 200,000 more men to South Vietnam, we are going to have to do an additional mobilization. But in that case we will have to reckon that if the U.S.A. resumes bombing of the D.R.V., we will have to have a sufficient quantity of troops in North Vietnam to deflect these blows.

Thus, we must be able to ensure the South's needs for troops, and the North's needs for defense. If we can be sure that the Americans will not resume bombing of the D.R.V., then we can direct all our efforts at carrying out revolution in South Vietnam. At the moment, however, we have no such assurances, since the enemy periodically carries out bombing raids in several areas of the D.R.V.

To conduct the fight successfully in the South, we must answer two questions: regarding the numbers of our troops used there, and supplying them. The Politburo and Central Committee of our Party is giving a very great amount of attention to these two issues, in order to decide them in the shortest time possible. However, as I have already said, we are encountering great difficulties. To overcome these difficulties we must apply a very great effort. We must recall that 1971 for us will be a year of decisive victories. It will be a difficult year.

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We know very well that the enemy has major advantages over us: aviation, modern weapons and military technology. We must counteract him with our ability to conduct a people's war. As I have already told you, Comrade Chan Van Kuang will report to you on this in detail, on behalf of the CC VWP Military Section and the VPA Command in South Vietnam.

In addition, the enemy has available large-scale diversionary forces which constantly strike blows at our home-supply bases in South Vietnam, and also are active in the D.R.V. These forces represent a great danger to us; their activities bring great harm militarily and politically. We must devote the most serious attention to rebuffing the enemy's diversionary forces.

To conduct a long-term revolutionary struggle in South Vietnam, we must enlarge our material and personnel resources. Therefore, it will be necessary to carry out an additional mobilization among the North Vietnamese population.

Thus, the basic problems in South Vietnam are deployment and the human resources issue. We must do everything to solve these two largest problems. It is from this that is derived the need to increase rear-echelon defenses and, most importantly, the major supply rear: North Vietnam. The Americans and their puppets are making greater and greater efforts to destroy our home bases, depriving us of material and human resources. Abrams understands very well that if he succeeds in inflicting a knockout blow to our home-base rear, he will achieve an enormous advantage in the theater of military operations.

Our losses from enemy aircraft are great. But nonetheless, the enemy does not have the strength using only aviation to cause us sufficient harm to have ruinous consequences for us. But if the enemy, using his diversionary forces (as well as other troops) should undertake an offensive into the North, we will suffer great loss. Therefore, we must increase our vigilance, and rebuff all the aggressor's machinations. In our opinion, the enemy could undertake such an incursion by land-based forces and marines with powerful support by aviation and the navy. We imagine that the enemy will not try to invade the entire territory of North Vietnam, but only those areas where important transport routes run that lead to Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. Along with achieving his military goals, the enemy reckons that the incursion will apply political pressure on us, demoralize the people, and force them to refuse to fight for the liberation of the South.

Now I wish to devote some time to yet another issue: the captured American pilots. The overall number of American pilots imprisoned in the D.R.V. is 735. As I already stated, we published the names of 368 pilots. This is our diplomatic move. If the Americans agree to withdraw their troops from South Vietnam, as a start we will return these 368 men to them. And

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if the Americans do withdraw their troops, we will turn over the remaining ones to them. The matter of imprisoned American pilots, in view of what was said earlier, is of very great significance for us.

Overall, speaking of the situation in South Vietnam, I wish to emphasize that it is very favorable for us, although we are encountering significant difficulties. We try to do everything that depends on us to achieve even greater successes in South Vietnam.

After the reactionary revolt of March 18, 1970 in Cambodia, and the incursion of American and Saigonese forces into its territory on April 30, 1970, the situation became more complicated for us. At the present time, we have more than three divisions of our troops on Cambodian soil. The enemy in Cambodia is strong and we must exert significant efforts in order to attain an advantage there. Cambodia for us is a very important region, and the development of events in South Vietnam depends in large measure on the situation in Cambodia.

The enemy has no intention of yielding the initiative to us in Cambodia. The Americans have concentrated significant contingents of puppet South Vietnamese troops there. Following its policy of "Vietnamization" of the war, the American high command wishes to ensure itself of success in this area. Therefore, it is doing all it can not to allow penetration of our troops into South Vietnam. A particularly dense covering force made up of puppet troops has been created along the entire border between South Vietnam and Cambodia, where more than 50 battalions of Saigonese troops are concentrated. That is a great force.

On the other hand, it must be noted that the Americans and their puppets, having started the aggression in Cambodia, have gotten bogged down there. The American high command, after a series of defeats, was forced to remove its troops from Cambodia, but for now they have allowed South Vietnamese troops to remain there. In our view, at the present time the Americans have no opportunity to expand aggression once more in Cambodia. If they attempt to do this, they will bog down even deeper in war.

According to the Americans' calculations, the task of puppet South Vietnamese troops in Cambodia is to ensure the success of "Vietnamization" of the war, and also to help Lon Nol to fortify the reactionary regime in the country.

At the present time Lon Nol is in control of only some of the cities. As for the farming areas and the strategically significant roads, they are under our control. We have succeeded in isolating Pnom Penh from other areas of the country, and have cut Route 4 from Pnom Penh to Sihanoukville. This road is very important to the Lon Nol government; the

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Cambodian capital is supplied via it.

As a result of our decisive actions in the Pnom Penh area, a threatening situation has been created for the enemy. The enemy tried to mount a counterattack on Routes 3, 6 and 7, but we did not allow them an opportunity to do this. The large-scale operation begun by Lon Nol's forces in the fall of 1970 came to naught, and Lon Nol was forced to withdraw his forces from Pnom Penh.

Presently Lon Nol is preparing to go on the counterattack and seize a number of important strategic areas that are under our control. However, the enemy is encountering significant difficulties in implementing his plans. These difficulties were not eliminated even after the Americans thrust in Saigonese puppet troops to aid Lon Nol. The enemy's situation in Cambodia is deteriorating with each passing day.

Our base areas in Cambodia have been considerably strengthened and enlarged of late. Here we have a strong concentration of our troops, more than three divisions, as I already said. These forces suffice to carry out successful military actions.

We must devote great attention to Cambodia, since in large measure our successes in South Vietnam will depend on how effectively we operate in Cambodia.

We feel that the main efforts should be concentrated on surrounding Pnom Penh and isolating it from other areas of the country. Capturing Pnom Penh, as was intended earlier, is not appropriate. It is sufficient to surround it and mobilize the masses of the people to revolt and overthrow Lon Nol's regime.

The matter of Cambodia is very important. To resolve it successfully, we must increase our military efforts and our material aid to local patriotic forces. Just as in South Vietnam, what will ensure successes in Cambodia is uninterrupted supplying of troops. If we have defective deployments, we will encounter very great difficulties.

We must strengthen the revolutionary base in Cambodia and lead this country along the road to socialism. That is our Party's policy.

The situation in Cambodia favors us. The Americans are experiencing defeats. We must do our duty and help the Khmer people to throw off their puppets. For this, we must increase the number of our troops on Cambodian soil to 70,000. Along with patriotic Cambodian forces, the overall number of the liberation forces will amount to 140,000 men. These forces will be fully sufficient to defeat Lon Nol's army of slightly more than 100,000. We must achieve victory over Lon Nol, because all of our failures in Cambodia will have a negative impact on

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military operations in South Vietnam.

Overall I can report to the Plenary Session that we have achieved significant successes in Cambodia. Not long ago I met with the leaders of the patriotic Cambodian forces. They highly value our assistance and welcome all measures that we undertake for the purpose of overthrowing the puppet regime of Lon Nol.

Expanding the scale of military actions in Cambodia, the Americans hoped that we would no longer be able to operate successfully in South Vietnam, deprived of base areas on Cambodian soil. But their calculations turned out to be unjustified. In addition, the Americans themselves encountered great difficulties and were forced to remove their troops from Cambodia, back to South Vietnam.

Thus I can say that militarily and politically we have a great advantage over the enemy in Cambodia.

In Laos, the situation becomes more complicated each day. Souvanna Phouma has gone over completely to the pro-American position. The Americans are concentrating efforts with the purpose of attacking liberated areas and capturing key positions. Following a series of successful operations by us in 1970, the Americans are concerned about the fate of their puppets. They were forced to yield Saravan, Attape and several other important regions to us. They strengthened Vientiane's defenses, fearing that we might capture it. The Americans increased air strikes directed at our rear-echelon bases, so as to deprive us of a chance to attack. They concentrated a large aviation force in Thailand (including B-52 bombers), using which they expect to inflict powerful blows. These are far-reaching plans, but, in our opinion, the Americans will not be able to carry them out.

One very important region, both for us and the Americans, is Sieng Kuang, and therefore the situation in that area will constantly remain tense.

At the start of 1970 we had about 50,000 men in Laos. But after the incursion of American and Saigonese forces into Cambodia, we were forced to redeploy some of our forces there. However, despite the fact that our forces in Laos were reduced, we succeeded in achieving a series of convincing victories over the enemy.

At the present time we are experiencing significant difficulties in Laos. But it is essential that we attain victory there over the enemy, which will reflect positively on the situation in Cambodia and South Vietnam. As in South Vietnam and Cambodia, in Laos we are having great difficulties in ensuring deployment of troops and supply items. If we solve this problem, we can carry out effective military actions on Laotian soil.

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Thus, the situation on all fronts is favorable for us, but along with that we are experiencing considerable difficulties everywhere. In part they are caused by objective conditions, and in part they are the fault of certain military leaders who allowed serious mistakes to be made in their operations. For example, many comrades are expressing disagreement with our policy in Laos. They feel that it is necessary to solve the Laotian problem militarily as quickly as possible. This is an incorrect point of view. The problem of Laos is very complex and the need is to approach its solution rationally, without haste.

Not long ago we had a three-sided meeting with Cambodian and Laotian leaders. At this meeting we discussed measures for long-term coordination of efforts in the battle against the American aggressors and their puppets. We came to the general conclusion that the situation in Indochina is developing to our benefit, and that we are capable of fighting successfully against the enemy.

That conclusion refutes the viewpoint of the opportunists who call for a summons for help from foreign governments. Why drag foreign troops into Indochina? Our opinion is that there is no need for it. We feel that introduction of foreign troops, and their participation in military operations in any of the countries in Indochina will only complicate the situation, bringing us no benefit. We ourselves must deal with the enemy. For that it is essential to improve the management of troops, regulate supplies, increase the responsibility of every communist for the business entrusted to him, try to eliminate the consequences of old errors, and not permit new ones to be made.

We must adjust the close interaction between theaters of military action in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. This will bring us success. We must strengthen and further develop the successes achieved, and achieve new victories.

### 3. PREPARATION FOR THE 4TH VWP CONGRESS AND INTERNAL PARTY TASKS

Recently the Politburo of the CC VWP issued a directive to the Secretariat to create an organizational committee whose job is to prepare for the 4th Congress of our Party. At the recent expanded Secretariat meeting we discussed issues related to preparation for the Congress.

Today, on behalf of the Politburo and CC VWP Secretariat, I shall report to the Plenary Session on the process of preparation for the Congress.

Ten years have passed since the 3rd Congress of our Party took place. Under wartime conditions we did not have any opportunity to hold the next Party Congress. Now, in our

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opinion, the time has come to hold a Party Congress. To ensure its success, it will be necessary to complete major work in lower-level party organizations. Now I will devote some time to details of issues of preparing for the Congress.

The Politburo has made a decision to create an organizational committee for preparation for the Congress with the following makeup:

1. Le Zuan - committee chairman
2. Chiong Tin - deputy chairman
3. Pham Van Dong - deputy chairman
4. Pham Hung - deputy chairman
5. Le Duc Tho - committee member
6. To Hiu - committee member
7. Hoang An - committee member
8. Suang Thui - committee member
9. Le Van Liang - committee member
10. Chan Van Kuang - committee member

If the proposed candidates are approved at today's Plenary Session, then the organizational committee will commence its work at once.

We assume that at today's Plenary Session it will be necessary for us to examine those issues which will be included for discussion at the Congress. These issues include the following:

First, the matter of the account report at the Congress. We believe that this report will be ready by March 1971. Comrade Le Zuan will compile the report.

Second, changing several articles in the charter of the VWP. This is a very important matter, and it must be discussed very thoroughly.

Third, regarding the activity of the Communist Party in South Vietnam. We regard it as appropriate to announce openly in the press that the two Parties have merged, the VWP and the Party in South Vietnam.

Fourth, regarding unity of action of the three Indochina Parties: the Vietnamese, Laotian and Cambodian ones.

And finally, issues regarding the foreign policy course of our Party, and elections of Party leadership.

After all these matters have been discussed at the Plenary Session and specific decisions have been made on them, the Politburo will determine when the Congress will be held.

The issue of holding the 4th Congress is extremely important, and we must prepare with the greatest care for it. Every issue must be studied and discussed thoroughly. If we do not think through each issue properly, this will have a negative impact on the efforts of the Congress.

But before the Congress it is critically essential that we settle the matter of some comrades' opportunistic activities.

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This is a very important matter. All the victories we have achieved are the result of correct policy on the part of the leadership of our Party, with the decisions of the 3rd VWP Congress having been translated into real life creatively and consistently.

Of late in our Party there have arisen opportunists who are interfering with our going along the path indicated. There are not many of them, but they are dangerous. The opportunist faction does great harm to our Party. I have already reported to the Plenary Session that there is disunity between us and the opportunists. Opportunists speak out against our agrarian policies, our military policy, and the foreign policy line of our Party.

We feel that the foreign policy of our Party is correct. Our Party is independent. It depends on no one, neither on large nor small parties of other nations. We have our own program, our own way that we are going, holding high the Marxist-Leninist banner. There is nothing unclear in our foreign policy.

Because the U.S.A. has undertaken aggression against us, we are forced to request aid from brotherly nations and parties, in order to fight still more successfully against the American invaders. We have some disagreements with other brotherly parties, mainly relating to Marxist-Leninist theory issues. In numerous meetings with representatives of those parties with whom we have disagreements, we have presented to them our point of view on many issues of Marxism-Leninism. The goal of foreign policy efforts at the present time is to promote reestablishment of unity in the international communist and workers' movement.

Many comrades do not understand our policy and criticize us for our position in relations with China and the Soviet Union and on other issues. In particular, we do not feel that the present leaders of the Soviet Union are revisionists, or that they threaten the unity of the international communist and workers' movement. As for China, we agree on the need to carry out a "great proletarian cultural revolution," but are not in agreement with the methods of carrying it out. Some comrades also criticize us for this disagreement.

One needs to consider that if, under present conditions, we do not have, and will not have, a united viewpoint, we will encounter great difficulties. Therefore, I wish to repeat what matters it is on which we have disagreements.

First of all, regarding the collectivization of agriculture. What route to take? Take the route we have already chosen, or another route? We feel that the route selected is the correct one. If we do not demonstrate flexibility in solving problems of cooperation, we will not be able to revitalize agriculture. This ought not to raise doubts.

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But if we go the route of creating large cooperative enterprises, we will not solve the problems facing us. In order to create large enterprises, technology and mechanization are needed. But at the present time we cannot provide cooperatives with large-scale agricultural technology. Big cooperatives need electrification, and right now we cannot supply electric power to all of the cooperatives.

We are following the path of peasant collectivization. But this needs to be done skillfully, having beneath one's feet a solid base and appropriate conditions.

But for now we do not have these conditions. We must still do much work in order to create a solid base for collectivization of agriculture and creating of large-scale cooperatives.

Secondly, regarding the matter of relations with Cambodia, China and other brotherly parties such as those of Rumania and Poland: Comrade Le Van Lyong will report to you in greater detail on this.

But I in my report wish once more to emphasize that the existence of opportunistic tendencies in our Party will do us much harm. The opportunists speak out against our policy. We feel that before the Congress it will be essential to work with comrades who do not understand our policy, and explain their mistakes to them, so that they will realize and correct them.

We feel that it will be necessary to decide the issue of contradictions in the Party on the basis of principle. In connection with that, at this Plenary Session we must discuss the following four questions: regarding the reasons why deviations arose; regarding ideological battle against opportunists; the results already achieved in this struggle; and regarding several organizational measures directed toward re-establishing unity in the Party.

Disharmony in our Party plays into the hands of the enemy. It is an urgent priority for us to eliminate the existing contradictions and carry out a decisive campaign against the opportunists; otherwise a threatening situation will be created in the Party.

I can cite many examples which show the harm caused to us by the opportunists. For one, many of the senior military leaders that belong to the opportunist faction do not carry out orders by their superiors, which has a negative impact on the conduct of military operations. For example, after the American and Saigonesse forces invaded Cambodia, the Politburo decided to use large-scale forces to strike a blow against the enemy in the Tay Ninh area, in order to protect our troops that were operating in Cambodia. But the military leaders in that region held differing opinions, and their actions, which contradicted

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those of the Politburo, created significant difficulties for us and lowered the effectiveness of our armed forces' actions. We subjected these comrades to severe but just criticism; but a favorable moment was allowed to slip away. This is a very obvious example of what serious consequences can result from such actions.

At present 16 members of the CC VWP are numbered in the opportunist faction. They constantly criticize our Party's policy. Some of them distribute published works in which they expound their opportunistic views. This does great harm to the Party. In addition to criticizing us, they do not carry out instructions and directives of higher authority.

The Politburo and Secretariat of the CC VWP has exerted much effort to get these comrades to understand and admit their mistakes. As far back as before the 18th Plenary Session of the VWP, we held many discussions with these comrades, showing them their errors; some of them admitted they had been wrong. However, many continued to defend their erroneous views at the 18th Plenary Session. They spoke out against Plenary Session decisions, and by their actions they continued to cause harm to the Party. With each passing day they made new mistakes, moving along a path of factional activity and by doing so violating the unity of our Party.

At the 19th Plenary Session, the factional activity in the Party reached its height. The opportunists continued to speak out against our policy. In particular, Le Liem' and a number of others spoke out against the policy of the Party in the sphere of culture. We feel that the creativity of those among us who produce literature and art should reflect the heroism of present days, the self-sacrificing struggle of the Vietnamese people against the aggressors and the splendid work at the front of agricultural reconstruction. It should dramatize our successes and summon us to overcome difficulties. But not everything is done as it ought to be, and many comrades feel that in literature and art all is well.

We must subject these comrades to the severest possible criticism, because under present conditions literature and art play an enormous propagandistic and educational role. If we are not timely in showing these comrades their errors, then they will go even further in their delusions.

Thus, we are faced with some large assignments in combating all deviations, and all opportunistic tendencies. We must carry on the fight not only in the central apparatus, but locally as well. We consider it to be appropriate that all the CC secretaries be assigned to regions for which they are responsible. Then we will be able to increase control of all party organization activities.

Overall I must note that at the present time we are faced

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with great difficulties that must be overcome. There are many unresolved issues related to principle in the internal life of the Party. Therefore, we ought to strive to have every communist, every leading worker increase his responsibility for the work entrusted to him, exerting all his efforts to do his revolutionary duty.

Under present-day conditions, internal Party work has greater significance with every passing day. Each Party cell, each Party organization, Party committee, must be permeated with the high revolutionary spirit, clarifying to themselves our course and actively converting the Party's policy into real life.

Any individual who disagrees with us on something may openly express his opinion. We will hear him out, discuss his point of view and accept it if it turns out to be correct, or else show that comrade how he has erred.

We must exert every effort to obtain victory over the enemy throughout the entire Indochina peninsula. We must strike blows against the Americans until they withdraw all their troops from this region. We must destroy the puppet forces of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The peoples of Indochina must be free and in close friendship. Having closed ranks, we will commence the building of a new life. And for this, I repeat again, it is essential that there be unity in the Party. We must restore it, or otherwise we not only cannot complete our tasks; we will suffer great harm.

We must follow the precepts of Ho Chi Minh, operating in Marxist fashion. We must restore unity in the Party based on principle. It is essential that we eliminate all the consequences of errors and obviate the chance they will be repeated or that new failures will be permitted. We must conduct a battle on all fronts - military, political, diplomatic, and ideological - against the enemy and against opportunist elements within the Party. This will require very great force, but we will achieve success.

Once again we must talk with the 16 comrades who do not agree with us on any issues and show them their errors. If we do not work out this disharmony in time, it will emerge into the open and become accessible to wide-spread publicity. A few days from now these 16 comrades must present to us written explanations of their positions and then we will decide how to deal with them.

The following comrades belong to this group: Le Liem, Nguyen Khan Toan<sup>9</sup>, Ha Hui Zuap<sup>9</sup>, Bui Cong Ching<sup>10</sup>, Nguyen Van Vin<sup>11</sup>, Song Hao<sup>12</sup>, and a number of others. They all affirm that our Party's policy is incorrect. Naturally, any member of the Party may freely express his opinion, but their behavior passes all boundaries of free expression.

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At this 20th Plenary Session we will not move toward compromise with them, as was done at the 19th. We will engage them in decisive combat.

We simply must achieve full unity in the Party and leadership. It is particularly important to eliminate disharmony right now, when we are intending to issue a summons to a 4th Congress of our Party. We must come to the Congress with unified opinions on all basic matters.

I think that we certainly will achieve successes, both in restoring Party unity and in battling against the American aggressors and their puppets.

In the brochure there are 29 pages of text RKSS/I-268, a title page and cover order no. 00/119.

## FOOTNOTES

1. What is meant are the D.R.V. and South Vietnam [note by GRU].
2. Probably what is meant are Chinese troops. The possibility of bringing them into the D.R.V. was discussed numerous times [note by GRU].
3. According to American data, People's Army losses in South Vietnam from 1961 to 1971 totaled about 700,000 killed [note by GRU].
4. The Chiong Son Mountains are located in the central area of South Vietnam [note by GRU].
5. Before the revolution in Cambodia, the D.R.V. used the port of Sihanoukville [note by GRU].
6. It is apparent that what is meant is the People's Revolutionary Party of South Vietnam, which in effect is the South Vietnamese branch of the VWP and manages the activities of the NFO [note by GRU].
7. Candidate for membership in the CC VWP, assistant minister of education [note by GRU].
8. Candidate for membership in the CC VWP, director of the Academy of Social Sciences of the D.R.V. [note by GRU].
9. Member of CC VWP [note by GRU].
10. Candidate for membership in the CC VWP [note by GRU].
11. Candidate for membership in the CC VWP, lieutenant general, chairman of the committee for unification of the country [note by GRU].

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12. Member of the CC VWP, lieutenant general, head of the Main Political Administration of the Ministry of National Defense of the D.R.V. [note by GRU].

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
[Redacted] These letters were captured together on 17 May 1970 from a dead VC in Quang Tin Province, IMR, RVN. The documents appear to have been written by PFC Donald Lee Sparks, US 56 547 065, Americal Division, who was MIA on 17 June 1969 in Quang Tin Province.

2 (U) The TAB A letter has been reviewed by NOK and returned at Army request. NOK comments concerning the letter are contained in the Survivor Assistance Officer's report at TAB C. NOK provided handwriting samples in the form of the two most recent letters sent by Sparks from RVN before his missing status (TABs D and E).

3. (C) The Vietnamese writing across the back of the TAB A letter has been translated by two unrelated Army resources. These translations are attached at TAB F for your information. The first translation, performed by a native Vietnamese, is believed to be more accurate. It seems quite obvious, in view of the Vietnamese notes, that the VC had no intention of sending Sparks' letter to his family.



6 Incl  
TABs A-F (U)



MAJOR, GS  
Army Member, IPWIC

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
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

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Handwritten notes and scribbles, including the word 'Bugs' at the top right and various illegible markings.

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
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
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315



AGPC-S Sparks, Donald L.

SSAN [redacted] (b)(6)

3 AUG 1970

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Letter

[redacted] (b)(6)

Request that you deliver the inclosed letter to Mr. and Mrs. Calvin P. Sparks, parents of Specialist Four Donald L. Sparks, who is missing in Vietnam.

[redacted]  
Adjutant General

WNEJR (3 Aug 70) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Transmittal of Letter

(b)(6)

[redacted]

TO: Office of the Adjutant General, Department of the Army, ATTN: AGPC-S  
Washington, DC 20315

Letter delivered to Mr & Mrs Calvin P Sparks, as requested. Subject letter with two other letters written by Donald, inclosed. Mr & Mrs Sparks of the belief writing very similar and thought process of 11 April 70 letter very much in line with Donald's manner of speaking. All subject matter in letter as they remember Donald except for that portion concerning a partnership with father, as he had never spoke of this before. Mr & Mrs Sparks now think they have favorable information concerning Donald. Their spirits much improved.

3 Incl  
as

*William N. Batt Jr.*  
WILLIAM N. BATT JR  
1st COLONEL

*Pg 8 of 10 pgs*

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20310

INTELLIGENCE TRANSLATION NO. J-8688LANGUAGE: Vietnamese TRANSLATOR: WLH (Native V/K)SUBJECT: LetterAttacking the Enemy

- (1) Destroying Traitors
  - Attacking the Enemy
  - Complementing our Forces
- (2) Winning the People
  - Formation and organization
- (3) DTCT (?) - Sarving uprisings against the enemy
  - Maintaining ... positions
  - Building ranks (All people, organizations)
  - Soldiers, hard-corps, assault
  - Proselytizing Soldiers:- building fifth column in all types (combat youth, self-defense militiamen)
  - fifth column (self-destruction, military service) dissolution
  - Building village-hamlet... cables

Military Tactics

NOTE: DTCT can be guessed a quote tactics for working the people's mind.  
If, I hope I am correct, the initials stand for (Dan, Tri, Chin, That.)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20310

INTELLIGENCE TRANSLATION NO. J-8688

LANGUAGE: Vietnamese TRANSLATOR: BK 529<sup>th</sup> AIC GP, Ft. Hu

SUBJECT: Letter

Enemy Side

1. Hold position

- Enemy side

- Reinforce, [TN: Next word illegible]

2. Prepare for battle

- Situation information

3. OTOT [TN: Abbreviation unknown] - serve with the B.4 Party Committee  
keeping the work in order

- Establish cover ([TN: Next four words illegible])

- [TN: First word illegible], reinforce, shell

BV [TN: Abbreviation has several possible meanings; encircle, defend,  
security guard, troop proselyting, platoon, Political Officer] - Establish  
four lines [TN: Or wires] in [TN: Next two words unknown] (Combat

Youth Group members)

- Internal agent (suicide, serve [TN: Next two words unknown])

Disperse:

- Establish Party Chapter group immediately at village only

[TN: Abbreviation illegible]

END OF TRANSLATION

pg 10 of 10

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C02022171  
Pages 1-45:  
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# Red Cross Pleads for P.O.W.'s And Civilians in Vietnam War

Special to The New York Times

GENEVA, May 19—The leaders of the International Red Cross appealed today to all sides in the war in Vietnam to assure "proper and humane treatment" of prisoners and to conclude a cease-fire to end the civilian population's "intolerable burden of human misery."

The appeal was made by the presidents of the three central bodies of the International Red Cross as concern mounted in the United States over the fate of downed pilots and other Americans held prisoner by North Vietnam and the Vietcong.

In a seven-point statement, the Red Cross officials also urged the warring parties to "refrain from all deliberate attacks upon innocent civilians in Vietnam, whether by aerial or ground weapons, or by torture or wanton murder."

They asked that every effort be made to avoid causing death or injury to civilians during all ground, air and naval operations.

Under international law, they stressed, the right to choose the means of injuring the enemy is "not unlimited."

The statement was issued by Samuel Gonard, president of the all-Swiss International Committee of the Red Cross; José Barroso-Chavez of Mexico, president of the league to which 106 national Red Cross societies belong, and the Countess of Lime- rick, a former president of the British Red Cross who now

heads the nine-member International Standing Commission of the Red Cross.

The three officials said that, during one of the periodic meetings that they had just held here, they had "viewed with deep concern the mounting tide of human suffering and loss of life in the tragedy being enacted in Vietnam."

They said it was the traditionally humanitarian role of the Red Cross that led them to solemnly call on all concerned in the Vietnam fighting in an effort to reduce the human suffering it was causing.

The three officials urged that the distribution of medicines and other urgently needed relief supplies be permitted unimpeded throughout Vietnam.

At the same time, they asked that representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross be permitted to visit "all parts of Vietnam" so that they might carry out the humanitarian function assigned to the traditionally neutral body by the Geneva Conventions.

These international treaties entrust the committee with the duty of checking the observance of the rules they lay down on the treatment of prisoners and civilian war victims by belligerents.

Despite repeated appeals to Hanoi, the committee has never been permitted to send representatives to North Vietnam although the North Vietnamese signed the treaties.

# FOE THREATENS TO EXECUTE G.I.'S

## Pledges to Kill P.O.W.'s if Three Terrorists Die

SAIGON, South Vietnam, June 16 (AP) — The Hanoi radio said today the Vietcong had warned that they would execute some American prisoners of war as "our due re- pay" if the South Vietnamese Government put to death three Vietcong agents in its custody.

The Vietcong did not say how many American prisoners might be killed. According to the United States State Department, 21 Americans were known to be in Vietcong hands May 31, and 128 others were listed as missing and believed captured.

The Vietcong warning, attributed to the guerrillas' high command, was said to have been dated June 12. The North Vietnamese broadcast said the three Vietcong agents were sentenced to death by a special military tribunal in Saigon May 29.

"Should the U.S. aggressors and their Saigon stooges execute three Vietnamese patriots sentenced to death by a so-called special military tribunal in Saigon May 29, 1967, the liberation armed forces would mete out due punishment to a number of American aggressors captured by them, including a major," the Vietcong said, according to the Hanoi radio.

Only one of the three sentenced in the Saigon trial that ended May 29 was condemned to die. He is 37-year-old Bui Van Chieu, who was convicted of "high treason, unlawful possession of war weapons and destruction by explosives with a view to infringe upon national security."

A confessed member of the

Vietcong, he is said to have commanded a sabotage platoon in the bombing of the National Police headquarters and the Metropole Hotel in Saigon.

At the same court proceedings, two women were sentenced to five years in prison on charges of having caused a "breach of public security."

They were Pham Thi Thieu, a nurse accused of being a Vietcong liaison agent, and Nguyen Thi Nhao, described as a member of the Vietcong Liberated Women's Association.

However, two other guerrillas — Le Minh Chau and Truong Thanh Danh — were sentenced June 5 to death on charges of treason, illegal possession of weapons and attempted murder. They were accused of having hurled grenades at policemen, American civilians and others.

Listed as prisoners in North Vietnam, are 158 servicemen — four marines, 70 air force men and 84 navy men. These are men who have written to their families who have been reported captured by Hanoi or have been seen by visitors, including journalists.

The statistics also list 300 who are believed to be captives — 234 air force men, 62 navy men and four marines. These include men who were seen parachuting over North Vietnam or who were spotted on the ground by fellow pilots. In some cases, contact was made with the men through radio signals.

Two years ago, the guerrillas killed three American captives in reprisal for the execution of Vietcong terrorists by the South Vietnamese.

A 25-year-old army sergeant, Harold George Bennett of Perryville, Ark., was killed June 25, 1965, after three terrorists were put to death in Saigon.

Capt. Humbert Versace, 28, of Baltimore, and S. Sgt. Kenneth M. Roraback, 33, of Fayetteville, N.C., were shot to death Sept 24, 1965.

# Saigon Releases 39 Prisoners in Gesture to the North

## Hopes Hanoi Also Will Free Sick and Wounded

By JONATHAN RANDAL

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, June 12 — South Vietnam today released 39 seriously sick and wounded prisoners of war in a gesture intended to persuade the North Vietnam to reciprocate. The North Vietnamese prisoners, and a captive Vietcong woman entertainer and her 3-month-old baby, were released

at noon at the bridge over the Benhai River, which separates the North and South Vietnamese sectors of the six-mile-wide demilitarized zone.

In Quihon, Premier Nguyen Cao Ky released four Vietcong prisoners in a ceremony at Binh Dinh Province headquarters attended by Vietnamese generals, Eugene M. Locke, the Deputy American Ambassador, and other allied diplomats.

Informed sources said that the release had been prompted by the United States Government, which has become increasingly worried over reports and photographs of American airmen who have been shot down

over North Vietnam and paraded through the streets of Hanoi.

It was hoped that the moves today would persuade the North Vietnamese Government to release seriously sick and wounded American prisoners in accordance with Articles 109 and 110 of the Geneva Convention, which require direct repatriation in such cases, the sources said.

### No Repatriation by North

North Vietnam has failed to repatriate any American prisoners and has labeled captured American aviators as "war criminals."

Moreover, for the Hanoi regime to accept the principle of reciprocity in releasing prisoners, would represent a major about-face since North Viet-

nam has consistently denied that any of its troops were fighting in the South.

Unlike previous prisoner releases, today's was not announced in advance.

The release at the Benhai bridge followed what has become a ritual over the years. In a brief ceremony at Dongha, the prisoners were offered the option of remaining in South Vietnam. Three prisoners made such a choice earlier at the Bienhoh prisoner of war camp, 20 miles north of Saigon.

Driven from the ceremony in a Vietnamese Army convoy, the prisoners were released at the bridge. Many of them ripped off their clothes as they crossed the 300-yard steel span and shouted, "Long Live Ho Chi Minh."

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OCI No.0614/65

Copy No. 89

# WEEKLY REPORT




## THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

7 April 1965

INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY  
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE

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07-Jan-2014

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OCI No. 0614/65

Published by the Directorate of Intelligence  
Central Intelligence Agency

**THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM**

(31 March - 7 April 1965)

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The Weekly Report on the Situation in South Vietnam is based on contributions from CIA, DIA, and INR edited and published by CIA without final coordination. A fully coordinated Monthly Report will be disseminated the first Friday of each month.


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THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE

The Quat government continues to take modest steps designed to accumulate a record of accomplishments, to increase its prospects of surviving, and to invigorate the war effort. Essentially, government attention has been directed toward strengthening its administrative machinery and popular base, mobilizing additional manpower for the armed forces, tightening security and expanding psychological warfare efforts, and improving its diplomatic posture, particularly in Africa.


Despite the indications of an improved political climate in recent weeks, and the absence of reports of serious coup plotting, there continue to be indications of rivalries and discontent on the part of various generals over the present uneasy power relationship among them. The internal divisions reflected by these reports have ramifications both of Buddhist-Catholic hostility and military leadership rivalries. For the present, however, the Buddhists are continuing to refrain from overt political involvement and are making some moves which suggest a stronger anti-Communist stand.

The low level of Viet Cong military activity over the past several weeks continues to suggest that the Viet Cong are readying themselves for another major effort. The appearance of People's Army of Vietnam units in South Vietnam could presage heavier Communist attacks and more direct DRV action.


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**SECRET**I. SITUATION WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAMA. POLITICAL SITUATION

1. Premier Quat continues to take a number of modest steps to strengthen his government and to try to invigorate the war effort. In addition to a planned reorganization of pacification and refugee machinery, the government has held a seminar on education and student discipline, and expects to hold a psychological warfare congress this month.

2. Government officials have been urging a strengthened effort to exploit in the psychological field the impact of the air strikes against North Vietnam. In Saigon, the government sponsored a small but publicized demonstration protesting the bombing of the US Embassy. Since the embassy bombing, Quat has also asked approval by the National Legislative Council of tighter legal measures to punish "any action beneficial to the Communists."

3. The government is also moving to crack down on draft doggers as well as to increase the appeal of military service through pay increases and combat promotions. These efforts could have an adverse effect if essential civilian pacification cadres are drafted; exemptions are now being handled on an individual basis and greater efforts are being made to recruit women pacification workers.

4. In the political field, the government intends to establish a press center to handle problems of licensing and censorship and to provide itself a coordinated public voice. New consideration is being given to the feasibility of holding elections for a constituent assembly

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and of establishing elected municipal and provincial councils in secure areas. In an effort to make the government "available to the people," Quat has announced that he is setting aside certain hours to receive complaints and suggestions. In the diplomatic field, a competition has been announced to fill diplomatic and consular vacancies.

5. Despite an apparently improved political climate and the lack of indications of coup plotting, there continue to be reports of discontent and rivalries among various generals. Defense Minister General Thieu is said to desire further command changes to remove certain ambitious officers or suspected tools of the Buddhists. General Minh recently was reported concerned over a possible move to oust him as commander-in-chief-- if not by Air Vice Marshal Ky and I Corps Commander Thi then by the Marine and Ranger commanders. Marine Brigade Commander Khang recently complained of Minh's alleged inadequacies in the top military position and implied that Minh would be removed at the next Armed Forces Council meeting. Naval Commander Admiral Cang has criticized Quat's leadership, and Quat in turn has expressed to US officials his disenchantment with what he terms Minh's growing political role and the ambitions of various generals to become new General Khanh.

6. The discord reflected in these comments is further abetted by the clandestine presence around Saigon of the leaders of the February coup attempt, particularly Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao. Both the government and the military appear reluctant to move against Thao, although they appear to desire his exile abroad, lest they trigger some reactions to disturb the present Buddhist-Catholic calm vis-a-vis the government. Thao was most recently reported trying to inform General Khiem, the Vietnamese ambassador in Washington, of his success in cementing relations

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


among the Catholics and the Tam Chau Buddhist faction, and boasting that his plans would produce "better results this time." Although Thao is probably exaggerating his support, particularly among the Buddhists, he remains a source of potential trouble, particularly because of his contacts among junior officers, many of whom reportedly resent the behavior of their superior officers.

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there has been no outward sign that the Buddhists are preparing any new political challenge to the government. In fact, beginning with an official appeal to their youth organizations to be wary of pacifist propaganda, the Buddhist leaders have taken several quiet steps suggesting a more firmly anti-Communist posture. In addition to commemorative services for victims of the US Embassy bombing, they have ordered prayers for a monk who allegedly burned himself to death to dramatize the cruelties suffered under temporary Viet Cong occupation of his hamlet, and for 17 Buddhist notables reportedly kidnaped elsewhere by the guerrillas. Tri Quang has told the US Consul in Hué that instructions are being sent to Buddhists in Quang Nam Province to help them defend the religion against increasing Viet Cong oppression. The Saigon press reports that monk Quang Lien has abandoned his peace movement and may travel to Japan, although Lien himself indicates that he has merely resigned as chairman of the movement. One activity of the Buddhists with which the government now seems inclined to cooperate is the establishment of Buddhist committees in the armed forces and at the provincial and district echelons. Military authorities in I Corps, where Buddhist orientation is strong, reportedly believe that by cooperating, they can place reliable officers on these committees to monitor Buddhist activities and try to channel them into a constructive link with the government.

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8. Following the major terrorist bombing of the US Embassy in Saigon on 30 March--in which two Americans, 19 Vietnamese, and one unidentified national were killed and 52 Americans, 131 Vietnamese, and three French nationals wounded--rumors have circulated in Saigon of impending terrorist attacks on US and South Korean installations. On 4 April, a self-proclaimed terrorist reportedly surrendered himself, claiming that he had orders to blow up the Caravelle Hotel and that another bombing was to be targeted at the USIS offices. One of two terrorists so far apprehended in the embassy bombing is scheduled to face a military tribunal when he recovers from wounds received as he tried to flee the embassy site. A Hanoi Radio broadcast, citing the Viet Cong Liberation Radio, has warned that if this terrorist is executed, US AID officials Gustav Hertz, who was kidnaped by the Viet Cong in early February, will be executed in reprisal. Meanwhile, a temporary stay of execution was granted for another terrorist arrested for carrying concealed explosives on 4 April in Da Nang.

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#### B. MILITARY SITUATION

1. The Viet Cong remain in an essentially defensive posture, with the important contacts made through government-initiated operations. Statistically, the level of Viet Cong activity declined last week to the lowest point in 14 months. There were no large-scale actions and only eight small-scale attacks. The 30 March embassy bombing was the most notable action. Of paramount significance was the receipt of evidence, provided by a Communist rallier, that elements of the PAVN 325th Division have been present in Kontum Province of South Vietnam since February. Information thus supplied led to a government-initiated operation which resulted in an encounter between the reported PAVN units and South Vietnamese forces from 26-31 March. MACV accepts this as first identified presence of regular North Vietnamese units in South Vietnam.

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COMUSMACV has tentatively confirmed the presence of one battalion of the 101st Regiment, 325th Division, in the area northwest of Kontum city. The regiment's other two battalions are probably also present in the general area, and less positive evidence indicates that other elements of the same division may be in the mountains west of Da Nang. The rallier claimed that the 101st Regiment participated in operations in Kontum Province during the month of March.

2. Governmental operational activity was generally maintained at the same pitch as the previous week, although there was a marked increase in the number of small-unit actions conducted. The search-and-destroy operation initiated on 26 March, as the result of information provided by a Communist rallier and other intelligence, encountered an estimated two PAVN battalions, in a valley oriented toward the Laotian border, northwest of Kontum city. After making contact, the Ranger battalion was surrounded for two days but managed to slip out intact at night. Government losses were 24 killed, 47 wounded (including 2 US), seven missing in action. Communist losses were reported as 82 killed plus some documents and miscellaneous equipment. Although this operation was not entirely successful, the losses suffered by the PAVN units are significant and the action is viewed as confirming for the first time the presence of organized North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam. The degree of success was lessened by the inability of the ARVN division to resupply its maneuver element. Rugged terrain and dense jungle foliage made artillery adjustment difficult, and observers were unable to assess the damage of artillery and air strikes. This situation will not improve in the coming months; the rainy season descends upon the mountain highlands in a few weeks.

A three-day operation was conducted in the Quang Tin/Quang Nam border area in a region believed to have contained two Viet Cong main

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force battalions. Airlifted troops came under intense ground fire at the onset of the operation. ARVN units received substantial air support but failed to exploit it, so the results of the battle were inconclusive. This is the second time in a month this regiment has failed to take advantage of air strikes in the battle zone. Government casualties were 23 killed (including two US), 85 wounded (including 19 US) and 20 missing. The Communists lost 70 killed (body count) and an estimated 270 others killed by the air strikes.

3. Despite the low intensity of the war, casualties for both sides increased. Government casualties rose to 685 (189 KIA) this week from 296 (89 KIA). Viet Cong casualties sharply increased to 875 (795 KIA) from 431 (325 KIA) last week. Government forces lost 241 weapons compared to 117 lost the previous week; they captured 198 weapons from the Viet Cong, up from 114 weapons recovered last week.

#### C. RURAL RECONSTRUCTION (Formerly PACIFICATION)

1. Nationwide, "rural reconstruction" activities were generally at a standstill during the past week. Significant gains were reported only from III Corps area. These improvements were, however, confined to two provinces and were largely offset by Communist advances in other provinces of III Corps.

2. The government organizational framework for the counterinsurgency program is being revamped. The Internal Security Council and the Central Pacification Committee are to be abolished, with a new Rural Reconstruction Council assuming most of their functions. General Thieu, in his capacity as deputy premier, will serve as secretary general of the Rural Reconstruction Council, assisted by a newly established executive directorate general. The organization for rural reconstruction at the corps level will be similar to that of the central government body.

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Removal of the term "pacification" from the new organization's title appears to have resulted from Premier Quat's desire to give counter-insurgency operations a new look, and to eliminate a term which has undesirable historical associations in the Vietnamese mind.

The Minister for Social Welfare and the new Rural Reconstruction Council have been given responsibility for the refugee program. Two action committees--one a planning and policy committee with GVN interministerial, USOM, and MACV representation and the other a technical support committee--have been established. Indications are that the former will be responsible for immediate relief activities while the latter will work on a longer range program of permanent relocation. In view of this reorganization, the above committees apparently will handle refugee activities in lieu of the central refugee organization proposed earlier.


3. The refugee problem in I and II Corps was discussed at the joint GVN-US Mission meeting of 2 April. Social Welfare Minister Thuan reported that staff level meetings of the refugee committee had resulted in recommendations for establishing primary and support responsibilities to supplying commercial commodities, transportation, and the warehousing of supplies.

Fifty million piastres have been received for the refugee resettlement program, of which 42 million piastres have been disbursed to the province chiefs and the balance held as a central reserve. Province chiefs, according to Thuan, have been told how to implement refugee programs and to spend allotted funds.

Thuan also reported that because of the improved security situation in Binh Dinh Province the influx of refugees has not been as great as had been expected. He also claimed some of the refugees have moved back to their hamlets and villages as a result of the improvement in the military picture.

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4. There was little progress in the rural reconstruction program in I Corps area during the week. Refugees, now totaling approximately 112,000, remain a major problem although the corps commander has shown little disposition to grapple seriously with it. The senior American advisor to I Corps formally approved a draft refugee relief plan, mainly in an effort to stimulate General Thi's interest in this problem.

A new special sector has been created in the Da Nang area. The sector commander has been given the responsibility for conducting operations in support of rural reconstruction efforts in his area.

5. Increased Viet Cong activity has not only halted rural reconstruction efforts in the II Corps zone, but has caused further erosion of the government position in several areas. Viet Cong incidents appeared to be directed particularly toward New Life Hamlets. Hamlet attacks or harassments were recorded in all II Corps provinces except Phu Yen, Ninh Thuan, and Tuyen Duc.

In Binh Tuy Province, increased Communist pressure has forced the government to abandon the northernmost district of Hoai Duc. Approximately 7,800 people from 21 hamlets are being resettled in the southern part of the province.

Two thousand Montagnards abandoned nine hamlets in the northern part of Quang Duc Province. The present location of these evacuees is unknown, but some are believed to have gone to Darlac Province and others to Cambodia.

In Darlac Province, it was confirmed that nine Land Development Centers, with about 6,500 people, in the northeastern part of the province had been seized by the Viet Cong. The Communists are reportedly consolidating their hold through propaganda campaigns, the establishment of political committees, and the issuance of weapons.

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6. In III Corps, exclusive of the Hop Tac area, progress in the rural reconstruction program was reported from Tay Ninh and Binh Long provinces. Tay Ninh reported 14 hamlets as "completed," while Binh Long reported two more hamlets as meeting the six-point criteria for New Life Hamlets.

Mobile Action Cadres are being lost to the rural reconstruction program in Long Khanh, Phuoc Thanh, Phuoc Tuy, Binh Long, and Phuoc Long provinces. They are either being drafted into the armed forces or leaving the program because of low pay. Some of the affected provinces are recruiting women to replace male cadre losses.

7. No tangible progress was noted in the rural reconstruction effort in IV Corps. Government activity comprised mainly of plans and proposals and minor readjustments of the rural reconstruction organization.

In Binh Long, Kien Tuong, Chau Doc, and Kien Giang provinces, US Special Forces "A" Detachments have been assigned sub-sector advisory responsibilities. A larger detachment of US Special Forces has been given sector advisory responsibility for Kien Tuong Province. These new missions will be performed in conjunction with the units normal border surveillance duties.

8. The Hop Tac area effort is burdened with two problems which are adversely affecting the program. A budget for the current calendar year's program has not yet been approved. Normal operating expenses are being met from advance funds, but no advance funds were available for rural reconstruction projects. The other problem relates to the conscription of draft-age cadres working in the reconstruction program, only half of whom are receiving deferments. Both problems have been referred to the Hop Tac Council for action.

For the first time in four weeks, no hamlets were reported as "completed" during the past week in the Hop Tac area.

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II. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS

A. CAMBODIA

Prince Sihanouk, seizing upon recent border incidents in which Cambodians allegedly were killed, has renewed his threat to break relations with the United States at the next such incident. He noted that he had served such warning in November but was renewing it now, rather than automatically breaking relations, both because no Americans were involved with the South Vietnamese forces in the most recent incident and because his earlier warning might have been forgotten. He insisted that there would be no further warnings or postponements.

B. PHILIPPINES

On 6 April, Philippine Defense Secretary Peralta issued instructions that the second Philippine 35-man medical team would be sent to South Vietnam "within two days, or as soon as possible thereafter."

C. GRC

The first step toward increasing the GRC psychological warfare advisory effort to the ARVN through the division level will begin with the dispatch of five additional GRC advisors within the next month. Further increment to total 20 advisors will be spread through the next year subject to GVN concurrence.

D. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

The GVN is taking the diplomatic initiative to improve its image abroad. The South Vietnamese have announced that their embassy in Ethiopia, established by decree on 29 March but not yet functioning, will also have the responsibility for maintaining contact with other African states

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represented at the Organization of African Unity headquarters in Addis Ababa. Saigon will also establish an information center for all Africa in its Addis Ababa Embassy. Deputy Prime Minister Tuyen plans to head a ministerial level delegation to tour Africa to strengthen GVN diplomatic relations and to lay groundwork for the South Vietnamese position at the Afro-Asian Conference to be held in Algeria in June. Although the exact schedule and itinerary are not yet fixed, it is expected that the delegation will leave within the week for Tunisia, Morocco, Nigeria, the Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, the United Arab Republic, and perhaps Algeria.

E. NONALIGNED COUNTRIES

In reply to an appeal by the 17 nonaligned countries for a negotiated peace in Vietnam without prior conditions, South Vietnam reaffirmed its position taken at a 1 March press conference. While the GVN wishes peace restored to Vietnam, any negotiations for this purpose can succeed only if the Communist first show their sincerity by withdrawing their armed units and political cadres from South Vietnam.

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**SECRET****III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC**

1. Hanoi called two important meetings this week-- a special session on the Council of Ministers on 4 April and a central committee meeting of the Fatherland Front on 7 April. Both concerned the action North Vietnam is taking as a result of the intensification of US air strikes. The council meeting was addressed by President Ho Chi Minh who spoke of the "new situation and tasks" and received the pledge of the council to support any "new tasks." The council also endorsed the spirit of "self-reliance," while making full use of the approval and support of socialist allies. The public references to the council meeting did not spell out any new policy initiatives but implied that some may have been considered.

Three days later the regime called a central committee meeting of its principal mass organization, the Fatherland Front, to discuss the same problems. The Fatherland Front has been resurrected in the past year to serve as a focal point for expressing Hanoi's support and cooperation with the Liberation Front in South Vietnam. Speakers at the 7 April meeting discussed the entrance of North Vietnam into a "new situation" in which the struggle against US imperialism was "embarking on a new and more arduous period." The theme of "self-reliance," expressed at the Council of Ministers, was echoed at the Fatherland Front meeting as was the unity of purpose between the Vietnamese in both North and South Vietnam in the struggle against the US "aggressors."

2. In what may be an additional effort to emphasize the unity between North and South Vietnam, Hanoi on 7 April appointed a former South Vietnamese resistance leader as foreign minister. This was the first major government change in about two years; involved the appointment of a full Politburo member, Nguyen Duy Trinh as minister of foreign affairs and a Central Committee member, Hoang Anh, to the regime's two top agricultural organizations --the Ministry of Agriculture and the premier's Agricultural Board. Nguyen Duy Trinh is already a deputy premier and has been the regime's principle economic planner; he replaces Foreign Minister Xuan Thuy who is ailing, according to the Hanoi announcement. The official explanation for Xuan Thuy's removal may well be true; he has not represented the Foreign Ministry at official functions for several months. His replacement

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by Trinh, upgrades the Foreign Ministry, bringing a full Politburo member to the post for the first time since Pham Van Dong relinquished it in 1961. The change in agriculture brings both of the regime's top agricultural posts under one man--a prominent central committeeman with considerable experience in financial administration.

3. The US Embassy in Saigon has examined the differences in recent statements by Hanoi, the Liberation Front and Peiping on key issues in the Vietnam situation. The embassy has cautioned against interpreting differences in this propaganda as necessarily a reflection of differences in basic position among the three Communist partners. The embassy believes such differences are more apt to reflect different tactics, local situations, and at times a lack of immediate coordination. Analysis of recent variances between the Front and Hanoi indicates that they are differences of tone rather than substance--the Front's tone being somewhat sharper. This can be explained in part by the Front's desire, under Hanoi's guidance, to maintain the image of a separate identity as well as to offset any decline in Viet Cong morale as a result of the increased US war effort. Hanoi's more restrained and sober handling of the war, however, is basically just as tough as the Front's. The more cautious North Vietnamese approach may be prompted in part by a desire to avoid giving its own people the impression that the war is developing to the point where North Vietnam might be engulfed by invaders. Hanoi's treatment of the war may be due in part also to its wish to maintain abroad an image of responsibility in the face of unjustified aggression and provocation.

Differences between the Chinese and North Vietnamese are sometimes related to the Sino-Soviet dispute. Hanoi is frequently disturbed by the Chinese passion for bludgeoning the Soviets with alleged shortcomings in their support for the Vietnamese. Hanoi prefers to project the image of bloc unity in support of the Vietnamese war and avoids the Chinese campaigns designed to discredit the USSR. The North Vietnamese do not hesitate, however, to be equally as militant as the Chinese in attacks on the US.

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
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The embassy further cautioned against taking differences between the Front and Hanoi statements as a sign that Peiping is increasing its influence over the Front at the expense of Hanoi. It appears doubtful, at present, that any split exists between the Front and Hanoi. The US Mission has not seen any evidence that DRV control over the Front is anything less than complete.

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
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

# MEMORANDUM

## *The Situation in Vietnam*

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
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14 June 1967

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Information as of 1600  
14 June 1967

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HIGHLIGHTS

Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu has publicly announced his candidacy for South Vietnam's presidency. The Viet Cong has threatened to try US POWs if three convicted Communist terrorists are executed by the Saigon government.

I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:

There were several sharp enemy contacts in I Corps and in the Mekong Delta on 13 June, interrupting the recent lull in the ground war in South Vietnam (Paras. 1-2).

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[Redacted]

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Weekly

Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics (Para. 6).

II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:

On 14 June, Chief of State Thieu told newsmen in Hue that he is a presidential candidate (Para. 1). Premier Ky has reportedly made arrangements to establish a covert political action organization (Paras. 2-3). The Viet Cong Liberation Front has threatened "appropriate" retaliation against American prisoners if Saigon carries out a death sentence allegedly imposed on three Viet Cong "patriots" (Paras. 4-5).

III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:

There is nothing of significance to report.

IV. Other Communist Military Developments:

There is nothing of significance to report.

V. Communist Political Developments:

There is nothing of significance to report.

VI. Other Major Aspects: North Vietnamese food imports, ration levels, food prices and future food prospects are discussed (Paras 1-4).

ANNEX:


South Vietnam Battle Statistics  
1963 to week of 4-10 June 1967

- Weapons and Personnel Losses
- Viet Cong Attacks and Incidents

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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Several sharp enemy contacts in I Corps and in the Mekong Delta on 13 June broke the recent lull in the ground war in South Vietnam.

2. South Korean Marines report that 54 enemy were killed in a number of clashes in Quang Nam Province between 11 and 13 June. In the Mekong Delta province of Chau Doc, Communist forces attacked Tri Ton city and nearby South Vietnamese Regional Force positions on 13 June, killing 29 and wounding 47. Three enemy troops were reported killed in the action. In other delta fighting, South Vietnamese Army troops claim that 80 Communist soldiers have been killed since 11 June in Operation DAN CHI 289/A in Vinh Binh Province.



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Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics

6. The Week of 4 - 10 June compared with the week of 28 May - 3 June.

I. VIET CONG INCIDENTS

	<u>28 May - 3 June</u>	<u>4-10 June</u>
Attacks	30	44
Battalion or larger.....	1	0
Small Unit.....	29	44
Harassment	330	361
Terrorism	33	40
Sabotage	10	23
Propaganda	17	8
Antiaircraft	<u>271</u>	<u>206</u>
Total Incidents	691	682

II. CASUALTIES

	<u>VC/NVA</u>		<u>GVN</u>	
	<u>28 May - 3 June</u>	<u>4-10 June</u>	<u>28 May - 3 June</u>	<u>4-10 June</u>
Killed	2,420	1,156	235	215
Wounded	--	--	787	496
Missing/ Captured	<u>--</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>38</u>
Totals	2,420	1,156	1,077	749

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II. CASUALTIES (continued)

	US		FREE WORLD	
	28 May - 3 June	4-10 June	28 May - 3 June	4-10 June
Killed	214	175	15	18
Wounded	1,160	928	29	26
Missing/ Captured	--	--	--	--
Totals	1,374	1,103	44	44


III. WEAPONS CAPTURED

	VC/NVA		GVN	
	28 May - 3 June	4-10 June	28 May - 3 June	4-10 June
Individual Crew-Served	527 60	Not Reported	115 5	154 3
Totals	587		120	157

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
14 June 1967

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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. On 14 May, Chief of State Thieu told newsmen, apparently without qualification, that he is a presidential candidate. Thieu's announcement came at a press conference in the northern city of Hue and was repeated when he arrived at the Saigon airport later in the day. Thieu said he would name a civilian as his vice-presidential candidate. He discounted the danger of a falling out within the military, since there would be no candidate of the "military" as such. Although it appears that this is Thieu's final decision concerning the presidency, he still has until the beginning of July before officially filing his application, should he decide to change his mind.

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Liberation Front Threatens US POWs

4. The Presidium of the Liberation Front Central Committee, in a clandestine broadcast on 14 June, threatened to "try captured Americans" and "to punish them according to their crimes" if the Saigon government carried

14 June 1967

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[REDACTED]

out the sentence of three "patriots" condemned to death on 29 May. The broadcast alleged that the captured Americans have committed "many crimes against the Vietnamese people" and named a "Major Ramsey" as one of these who would undergo trial. Ramsey is probably FSO Douglas Ramsey, an AID officer captured in January 1966 and known to have been in the same prison camp as two US soldiers released by the Communists early this year. The identity of the allegedly condemned "patriots" held by the GVN is not yet available, but Saigon has on occasion strongly argued its right to execute captured terrorists, if warranted under criminal law.

5. Over the past several years, the Viet Cong have periodically raised the threat of retaliation against US POWs, and on at least two occasions--June and September 1965--executed captured US soldiers. Additionally, the Communists have tied the fate of captured USAID official Gustav Hertz to that of Nguyen Van Hai, a terrorist condemned to death for his participation in the bombing of the US Embassy in Saigon in March 1965.

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14 June 1967

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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM

IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS


V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. There is nothing of significance to report.

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14 June 1967

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VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS

1. North Vietnamese food imports continue to increase. Sea deliveries of grain and grain products during May totaled over 50,000 tons compared with about 21,000 tons for April. About 57,000 tons were delivered during the entire period of January through April. Food products have accounted for 28 percent of the tonnage of all sea deliveries to North Vietnam in 1967.

2. Hanoi has used food imports--in conjunction with additional vegetables and rice substitutes grown in Vietnam after the 1966 shortfall in rice production--to maintain ration levels. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the minimum "rice" ration of 13 kg. per person per month has been honored, although at times up to 40 percent of the ration has consisted of substitutes such as maize, sweet potatoes, and manioc.

3. The price of the staple food--rice and its major substitutes--has remained stable. Prices for food sold on the free market--virtually everything but grain products--have risen considerably. The rise in free market prices in Hanoi and Haiphong, as well as in other areas of North Vietnam, stems largely from disruption to normal distribution caused by the air attacks. The availability of certain foods has probably been less affected in the countryside than in Hanoi and Haiphong.

4. North Vietnam will probably have to continue the stepped-up levels of food imports at least through 1967. The early rice crop was planted late and thus gave a bad start to the year. However, it is too early to predict the size of the 1967 rice harvest.

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14 June 1967

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
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
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### Weapons Losses



### Personnel Losses (Killed only)\*




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US Casualties to Date: Killed 10,955 Wounded 66,129 Captured 175 Missing 441


\*Due to a change in the reporting of personnel losses, beginning 12 February 1967, the weekly and monthly figure will represent only personnel killed.




### Viet Cong Attacks




4-10 JUNE



### Viet Cong Incidents (Excluding Attacks)



4-10 JUNE




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21 July 1967

Reported Presence of US Prisoners of War  
In the Hanoi Power Plant

1. A CIA memorandum prepared on 5 July for Mr. Walt Rostow on the subject of POWs in Hanoi is attached. In essence, it states that it is unlikely the North Vietnamese would put US prisoners in a bombing target area. The memo also states that if the initial report were intended as a signal to the US, it would shortly be followed by other signals.

2. The absence of any further "signals" in the more than two weeks since the initial very weak "signal" raises further doubt that the original report was officially inspired. Communist propaganda in reaction to official US concern voiced over the status of Gustav Hertz and all US prisoners in the hands of the Vietnamese Communists has been seeking to allay suspicions that the prisoners are in danger and has, instead, stressed the "humane" treatment being given such prisoners. Three US prisoners being held in North Vietnam were shown on Polish TV on 17 July, apparently to demonstrate how well they are being treated. The Bulgarian news agency on 18 July stated that the DRV Government has given proof of "the good treatment" being given captured pilots.

3. A close examination of aerial photography of the Hanoi power plant fails to disclose any indication that US POWs are being held there. It is improbable that any substantial number of POWs are being housed in the main buildings of the power plant. The transformer house, boiler house, and generator hall of a power plant are typically crowded with equipment and the presence of more than a few POWs would interfere with normal operations. At the Hanoi power plant, they would also interfere with some repair activities that are still under way.

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4. Aerial photography shows that 300 to 600 feet west of the main buildings of the power plant there are some one-story sheds that probably are used for light repair activities and storage. These buildings could be used to house substantial numbers of POWs. In addition, there are a number of other buildings (function unknown) in the immediate neighborhood of the plant that are large enough to hold substantial numbers of POWs. Aerial photography (and available ground reporting) fails to reveal, however, any watch towers, major cleared areas, or fences that would be expected to be found near POW compounds.

5. The possibility that small numbers of POWs are being held in or near the power plant cannot be ruled out. If the North Vietnamese desired to deter additional air attacks against the Hanoi power plant by housing POWs in or near this installation, however, it is probable that they would recognize that the hostage value and credibility of their tactic would be greatly increased by erecting a few fences or watch towers clearly visible in aerial photography.

**Attachments:**

- Copy of memorandum dated 5 July 1967
- Photo of Hanoi Power Plant

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5 July 1967

SUBJECT: Reported Presence of US POWs in Hanoi  
Power Plant

1. This report could be a calculated effort on the part of the North Vietnamese to get the US to cease its air strikes on the Hanoi power plant. If it is an officially inspired story, we would expect to hear it again shortly. It should be noted, however, that this kind of rumor was floating around Hanoi in late 1966 but was never followed up by the regime. There need not be any truth to the statement [redacted] that

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US prisoners are housed in the power plant. Hanoi may believe that the report itself will suffice to result in at least a temporary halt to the attacks on the power plant. If this ploy works, Hanoi may be encouraged to try floating similar rumors in regard to other key installations.

2. Coming through this unofficial channel, Hanoi can always deny the validity of the report. This is important to the North Vietnamese, who learned the hard way about world and particularly US public reaction to threats against US prisoners. The public outcry against Hanoi's threat to try US prisoners as war criminals in July 1966 was a major factor in North Vietnam's backing down quickly and affirming publicly that its policy was to treat US prisoners "humanely."

3. On balance, it is unlikely that Hanoi has, as yet, actually placed US prisoners in a target that is being bombed. They have never resorted to this tactic in the past, despite the fact that any number of key installations have been struck. Moreover, the Hanoi power plant is not significantly more important to the North Vietnamese than other targets that have been hit. Thus, there would appear to be no particular reason for the North Vietnamese to run the risk of provoking a wave of adverse publicity in order to protect the already heavily damaged plant.

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Central Intelligence Agency

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Washington, D.C. 20505

7 JUN 1985

70-3

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary  
National Security Council

SUBJECT: Release of Information on U.S. Servicemen  
Still Missing

REFERENCE: 9 April 1985 memorandum, same subject

1. This memorandum is being provided as a follow-on to our conversation on this subject. I would like to offer some comments on your 9 April 1985 memorandum, describe briefly how we handle requests for POW/MIAs, and then offer some suggestions for how we might be able to accommodate what appears to be the intent of your memorandum. (U)

2. We have researched our files and collective memories regarding the Department of Defense (DoD) policy and procedure. We discovered that a few officers on the working level in the Agency had only recently become aware of a DoD policy. The CIA, however, was not a party to any discussions preceding the establishment of the DoD policy nor did we receive notice of it accompanied with any announced expectations that we would abide by its provisions. (U)

3. Now let me describe briefly how we handle the typical FOIA request for records concerning POW/MIAs.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]


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## C O N F I D E N T I A L


Mr. Robert Kimmitt



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5. The last paragraph of your memorandum mentions our release of information "before DoD could notify and seek permission from the next-of-kin." The subject of the released information is apparently AF Colonel Charles E. Shelton, the last remaining, officially designated MIA. The CIA reports concerning Col. Shelton were first publicly released in response to an FOIA request in 1978. They have been released a number of times since then, without any difficulties we have been aware of. DoD has known of our previous releases. (U)

6. The Agency is not opposed to changes in the existing procedures. We do need, however, to ensure that our attempts to collaborate with DoD in this matter take into account all of the legal imperatives imposed upon the Agency, as well as, the DoD by the pertinent statutes and executive orders. Toward this end we are prepared to consult with the DoD for the purpose of identifying any problems and resolving the difficulties that may result with our continuing with our current procedures. (U)

~~Conf~~  
  
Executive Secretary

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DATE: 07-Jan-2014

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJECT: Release of Information on U.S. Servicemen Still Missing

DA:LA/OIS: [redacted] vg (16 May 85, Retyped 5 June 85) 25X1

Distribution:

- Original - Addressee
- 2 - Executive Secretary
- 2 - DDA
- 2 - D/OIS
- 1 - IMS/FPLG
- 1 - OGC/LD Atten: [redacted]

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DATE: 07-Jan-2014

C O N F I D E N T I A L

## Thais Probe Adventurers' Search for POWs in Laos

By William Branigin  
Washington Post Foreign Service

BANGKOK, Feb. 21—It was around midday on Feb. 3, 1971, when U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. Robert Standerwick bailed out of his F4 Phantom jet while flying a reconnaissance mission over the Ho Chi Minh Trail in eastern Laos.

According to U.S. Embassy records here, Standerwick was known to be alive on the ground in heavy jungle south of the Mugia Pass when his copilot, Maj. Norbert Gotner, who had also ejected safely, heard gunfire in the area.

"I'm hit, I'm hit," Standerwick radioed to his wingman flying overhead. "I'm going to give up." Gotner was captured by Vietnamese troops, imprisoned for two years and released. But that was the last ever heard from Standerwick, one of nearly 2,500 U.S. servicemen listed by the Pentagon as missing in Indochina and presumed dead.

Now, 12 years later, Standerwick's daughter, Lynn, 25, and another American, U.S. Special Forces veteran, Lance Edward Trimmer, 43, are under investigation in northeastern Thailand for involvement in illegal forays led by retired Special Forces officer and Vietnam war hero James G. (Bo) Gritz to search for American prisoners of war who he believes are still alive in Laos.

Trimmer and Standerwick were arrested Feb. 13 at a rented house in the town of Nakhon Phanom in northeastern Thailand just across the Mekong River from Laos. They were jailed for two days and charged with possession of an unlicensed radio transmitter, an offense punishable by a five-year jail term. Also found in the house were fatigues, scuba diving equipment, jungle knives, cartridge belts and a gas mask.

The two Americans, now free on bail, rejected the charges and denied involvement in Gritz's rescue efforts. But a former Gritz associate who says he participated in Operation Lazarus, an unsuccessful Hollywood-financed raid into Laos in November, has said Trimmer and Standerwick were involved in communications support for Gritz's operations.

Their presence in Nakhon Phanom has fueled speculation that the 44-year-old former Green Beret lieutenant colonel, the Oklahoma-born son of a bomber pilot killed in World War II, may have launched another foray into Laos with another group of American veterans.

[The Los Angeles Times reported Monday that it had received a 12-page handwritten letter from Gritz saying he and two other Americans are in Laos on a new rescue mission. The letter, carried out of Laos by a runner, said Gritz had found "some POW ID" but did not describe it.

[The Times quoted the letter, which was dated Feb. 12, as saying both the Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency were aware of Gritz's plans. Spokesmen for both agencies denied Gritz's allegations to the Times.]

The Thai police Special Branch has stepped up a search for Gritz in Thailand, and both Vietnamese troops and forces of the Communist Pathet Lao government in Vientiane are reported to be hunting him and his men in the jungles of Laos.

The episode and the tangled tale surrounding it illustrate the powerful emotions that still color the issue of prisoners-of-war and servicemen missing-in-action 10 years after the last American combat troops withdrew from Vietnam. But they also serve to crack open a window on Thailand's murky underworld of foreign mercenaries, private army-resistance groups and intelligence operatives who often are united only by their opposition to the Communist governments in Indochina. (b)(3)

Gritz, his associates and their activities also raise questions about top U.S. government officials' role in and attitude toward his private POW rescue operations. The government has denied any involvement in Operation Lazarus, saying it neither supports nor condones such actions and considers them "very unhelpful" to official efforts to resolve POW-MIA issues. The Justice Department has said it has the case "under review."

However, a participant in Operation Lazarus, former Special Forces sergeant Charles Patterson of Dinuba, Calif., has said that President Reagan was told about the operation and gave it his tacit blessing at a meeting set up by actor Clint Eastwood at Reagan's California ranch.

[A White House spokeswoman in Washington said she had "no knowledge of such a meeting" and added that the government does not "support or condone cross-border forays which serve to jeopardize" other efforts to obtain information about possible American captives in Indochina. She said people "involved" in such efforts "have been so informed."]

An "operations plan," purportedly written by Gritz, says it was assumed that "the U.S. government cannot commit official assets until positive proof of U.S. POW presence is provided," but that "once such a determination has been made the U.S.G. will follow the president's stated pol-

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

*Memorandum*



THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Information as of 1600  
19 December 1965

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HIGHLIGHTS

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[Redacted] The military uprising by tribal elements sympathetic to the autonomy movement FULRO has subsided except in one Special Forces camp. Prospects for a successful resolution of the tribal dissidence remains doubtful. So far, Hanoi has not followed up on its 18 December commentary which denounced US statements on the Fanfani - La Pira peace initiative as "groundless fabrications." The North Vietnamese may have been genuinely surprised by the uproar over their conversations with La Pira.

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
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:  
 Viet Cong forces were particularly active in the Saigon/Capital Military Region area during the weekend and the Viet Cong campaign of terrorism continued unabated (Paras. 1-3). The joint USMC/- ARVN multibattalion ground sweeps--HARVEST MOON and LIEN KET 18--are continuing while in the initial phases of the US Army Operation CLEAN HOUSE elements of the 1st Air Cavalry Division have established heavy contact with enemy forces (Paras. 4-6). The Viet Cong are maintaining heavy pressure against South Vietnamese military positions in coastal Quang Ngai Province, but there are indications that enemy operations in northwestern Binh Duong Province may be at least temporarily suspended (Paras. 9-10).

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
the US search and destroy ground sweep nicknamed "Operation SMASH" (Paras. 11-13). Increased Viet Cong communications activity in Military Region 9 may presage stepped-up military operations there (Para. 14).

II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:


The military uprising by tribal elements sympathetic to the autonomy movement FULRO has subsided except in one Special Forces camp, where troops are apparently awaiting FULRO authorization before resubmitting to government control (Paras. 1-3). Prospects for a successful resolution of the tribal dissidence, which has been simmering since a similar revolt in late 1964, remain dubious in view of deep-seated mutual distrust and past government performance (Paras. 4-5). The South Vietnamese Government has agreed to permit International Red Cross inspection of some prisoner of war camps and to release seven North Vietnamese prisoners to Red Cross custody (Para. 6). Three US Air Force sergeants, captured with a fourth sergeant who successfully escaped in early November, are reported by a defector to have been killed in the escape attempt (Para. 7).

III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:

US air attacks were carried out on two major bridges on 19 December (Para. 1). Another US aircraft--the ninth--was lost to a SAM (Para. 2).



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


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
V. Communist Political Developments: Communist propaganda is using the fifth anniversary of the National Liberation Front (NFLSV) to extol the NFLSV's domestic and international position. Communist prospects in South Vietnam are "splended," according to the military commander of Viet Cong forces (Paras. 1-5). Hanoi has so far not followed up on its 18 December commentary denouncing US statements in connection with the Italian peace initiative (Para. 6). In a recent conversation with Ambassador Harriman, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin advanced the standard Soviet line that a cessation of US bombing of North Vietnam "for a long enough period" might lead to discussions for a peaceful settlement. (Paras. 7-8).

VI. Other Major Aspects: A wrap-up of ROLLING THUNDER 44, conducted from 10 through 16 December, is given (Paras. 1-3).

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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Viet Cong forces were particularly active again in the Saigon/Capital Military Region area during the weekend. Enemy units last night reportedly placed mortar and automatic weapons fire on government positions less than four miles from the downtown business section of Cholon, the Chinese section of the capital. No friendly casualties were reported. Meanwhile, just west of Saigon, in Hau Nghia Province, a reinforced three-battalion ARVN sweep force was heavily engaged on 18 December by the Viet Cong near the district capital of Duc Hoa. Eleven government soldiers were killed and 48 wounded (2 US), as against enemy losses of nine killed and one captured. Southwest of Saigon, in Ba Xuyen Province, Viet Cong elements placed mortar fire on Soc Trang Airfield. However, no aircraft were damaged and there were no friendly casualties.

VC Terrorist Activity

2. The Viet Cong campaign of terrorism against US personnel also continued unabated in Saigon over the weekend. An enemy terrorist, who was subsequently apprehended by police, last night hurled a grenade from a moving vehicle at the Manor BOQ in downtown Saigon. The grenade detonated in the street in front of the US officers billet, wounding five Vietnamese, but resulting in no American casualties. On 18 November, terrorists masquerading as policemen tossed a grenade at three US soldiers walking on a street in downtown Saigon, slightly wounding two of them.


3. In an attempt to provide added protection against the announced intentions of the Viet Cong to increase their terrorist activity, the US Military Command in Vietnam (MACV) has imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew for all American military personnel in Saigon for an indefinite period. Two hundred high-ranking US officers were reportedly evacuated from the Brink BOQ in Saigon on Saturday night, because of an alleged bomb threat.

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Allied Military Operations

4. On 18 December, one of three USMC battalions participating in Operation HARVEST MOON--a search-and-destroy ground sweep along the Quang Nam--Quang Tin Province border--established heavy contact with an estimated 200-man Viet Cong force. Seventy-six Communist troops were killed and 20 weapons captured, in contrast to US losses of six killed and 25 wounded.

5. HARVEST MOON was begun on 8 December in conjunction with a three-battalion ARVN operation--LIEN KET 18. The joint operations have thus far resulted in cumulative Viet Cong losses of 379 killed (body count), 51 captured, 229 suspects detained, and 74 weapons seized. Allied casualties currently stand at 153 killed (45 US), 280 wounded (150 US), and 181 missing (2 US).

6. Elements of the US 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile) established heavy contact with a Communist force of undetermined strength on 18 December in the opening phase of Operation CLEAN HOUSE, 15 miles north-east of Qui Nhon, in central coastal Binh Dinh Province. Preliminary reports placed Viet Cong losses at 43 killed, two captured, and 39 suspects detained, as against US casualties of seven killed and 44 wounded. In addition, four supporting US helicopters were downed by intensive enemy ground fire, two of which were subsequently recovered.

7. US and Australian forces have been withdrawn from the search-and-destroy/rice harvest security operation, NEW LIFE 65, which was initiated in Binh Tuy Province on 21 November. Five ARVN battalions will continue to provide security for the rice harvest. During the combined US/Australian/ARVN participation phase, 22 Viet Cong were killed and 159 captured, as against allied casualties of three killed (2 US, 1 Australian) and 26 wounded (9 US, 2 Australian, and 15 ARVN).

8. Operation SMASH, by two battalions plus artillery elements of the US 1st Infantry Division, one battalion of the US 173rd Airborne Brigade, and one ARVN Ranger battalion, continues according to plan in the

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
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
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Long Thanh - Binh Ba area of Phuoc Tuy Province. The multibattalion ground sweep, initiated on 16 December as a follow-up to the 15 December B-52 strike against a suspected enemy supply facility in the operational area, yesterday established contact with an estimated Viet Cong battalion 25 miles north of Ba Ria (Phuoc Le), the provincial capital. In the engagement that ensued, 16 guerrillas were killed, four captured, and 20 suspects detained, as against American casualties of three killed and nine wounded.

VC Military Actions

9. The Viet Cong are continuing to maintain heavy pressure against South Vietnamese military positions in coastal Quang Ngai Province. On 19 December, an unknown number of Communist guerrillas attacked a Regional Forces company ten miles north of Quang Ngai city, inflicting friendly casualties of 23 killed and 13 wounded and capturing 29 weapons. Enemy losses were placed at two killed and one wounded.


10. The Viet Cong may have suspended their active campaign against allied forces operating in northwestern Binh Duong Province in the vicinity of the Michelin rubber plantation.



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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. A military uprising by armed units of FULRO, a tribal autonomy movement in the central highlands, has apparently completely subsided except for sympathetic tribesmen in one government Special Forces camp who are believed awaiting instructions from the FULRO leader. The atmosphere at this camp, Plei Djereng in Pleiku Province, is reported to be calm.

2. The revolt broke out in four highlands provinces on 18 December following two days of apparent unrest among Montagnard troops and civilians near the provincial capital of Pleiku. Armed FULRO units took over Gia Nghia, the capital of Quang Duc Province, for about five hours before surrendering peacefully to regular South Vietnamese Army relief troops. In Phu Bon Province, a Regional Force company revolted and seized Phu Thien district capital, where some fighting occurred before the town was recaptured by the government. Three Special Forces/-CIDG camps were also affected: Plei Djereng and Plei Mrong in Pleiku and Lac Thien at a district headquarters in Darlac Province.

3. At the present time, the government has reasserted control over all of the trouble areas except Plei Djereng, and has agreed with FULRO elements in Quang Duc Province to resume negotiations on long-pending tribal demands for greater autonomy, more representation in the government, and special assistance in such areas as social welfare and the preservation of their cultural institutions. About 250 FULRO followers are being held by government forces, including some 100 arrested in Pleiku city. In the fighting at Lac Thien in Phu Bon, 32 persons were killed including the district chief, and 22 were wounded; most of the insurgents escaped into the surrounding hills.

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4. Tribal dissidence has been simmering since September 1964, when a similar revolt occurred in four government CIDG camps. Elements from these camps have since formed the core of the FULRO autonomy movement under Rhade tribal leader Y-Bham Enoul, now [REDACTED] based across the border in Cambodia. Following the 1964 revolt, former premier Khanh outlined a program of government reforms and assistance in an effort to curb FULRO proselyting and the spread of dissidence to other tribes in the highlands. Little of this program has been seriously implemented. More recently, the Ky government agreed to negotiate terms for the return of FULRO units to the government side, provided the demand for autonomy was dropped. The negotiations were plagued by chronic mutual suspicions, however, and only about 400 FULRO troops have returned voluntarily to government control.

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5. Despite suppression of the latest insurrection, prospects of a satisfactory solution of the problem of tribal unrest are dubious. Hostility and distrust are deep-rooted on both sides, and Vietnamese officials have been suspicious of US prodding for concessions. Although some Communist penetration of FULRO has been reported, there continues to be no evidence of collusion to date between FULRO and the Viet Cong.

GVN to Allow Red Cross Visits to POWs.

6. The South Vietnamese Government has agreed to furnish the International Red Cross a list of about 450 names of prisoners of war, and to permit Red Cross representatives to visit some of these prisoners in POW camps.

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beginning about 20 December. In addition, Saigon has informed the Red Cross that it will release seven PAVN prisoners to Red Cross custody, with the option of choosing the country to which they wish to be repatriated. Saigon continues to regard the bulk of non-PAVN, nonuniformed prisoners in its hands as rebels rather than prisoners of war in the legal sense. The prisoner release is designed to encourage the possibility of future PW exchange.


7. Three of four US Air Force sergeants captured by the Viet Cong about 1 November while driving east of Saigon were shot and killed during an attempted escape on 2 November, according to a recent Viet Cong defector. The fourth, Staff Sergeant Jasper Page who had successfully eluded his captors and returned to US control, had been unable to determine whether any of the other three had survived the escape attempt. The three missing men are identified as Staff Sergeant Samuel Adams, Staff Sergeant Charles Dusing, and Technical Sergeant Thomas Moore.

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
III. NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1. US aircraft struck two major bridges in North Vietnam on 19 December. A night strike was conducted by navy A6 Intruders against the Hai-phong highway bridge, 47 miles east of Hanoi on Route 10. Pilots were unable to assess damage to this 1,350-foot bridge because of darkness. Air force F-105 Thunderchiefs once again attacked the Bac Can highway bridge on Route 3 some 65 miles north of Hanoi. Two spans of the bridge were reportedly dropped.


2. An air force F4C Phantom flying MIG cover for the Bac Can strike group was apparently damaged by a surface-to-air missile. The aircraft was able to fly as far as Thailand before the two crew members were forced to eject. Both were safely picked up. This is the ninth US aircraft lost to a SAM.




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


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
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
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. The Communists continued today to use the fifth anniversary of the National Liberation Front, which falls on 20 December, as the peg point for a spurt of propaganda extolling the NFLSV's domestic and international position. This was the main theme of a lengthy communiqué by the Front's news agency, broadcast by Hanoi on the 19th. It declared that the NFLSV is "in practice now assuming the functions of a strong, stable, really democratic state of the people" in South Vietnam. In the "international arena," said the communiqué, the Front exerts a "broad influence and a great prestige." The objective in this propaganda line seems to be to build up as strong an image of NFLSV authority as possible for foreign audiences, while carefully avoiding any flat claims to de jure governmental status on the part of the Front.


2. The communiqué also dealt with alleged US plans to push the Republic of Vietnam army into the background and to fight a direct war against the "South Vietnamese people" with the US armed forces. This has been an underlying theme in Communist propaganda for some time, but was more directly developed in this communiqué than in the past. The communiqué claimed, for example, that the "puppet army is now being used as a supplementary force on certain battlefields, and is given only auxiliary tasks." While the obvious purpose of this propaganda is to stir US - South Vietnamese dissension, it probably also reflects some genuine Vietnamese Communist concern with the increasingly direct confrontation between US and Viet Cong armed forces..

3. Chinese Communist propaganda on the Front anniversary has also focused on the military and political situation in South Vietnam.

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A People's Daily editorial on 19 December claimed that the situation "had never been so favorable as it is now" for the Viet Cong. In a lengthy pep talk, the editorial argued that it was imperative for the South Vietnamese to keep up the fight since "armed struggle" is the "main and decisive" way to defeat the US. Proper spirit and tactics in the struggle, declared the editorial, would overcome any "hardships and difficulties" faced by the insurgents. The editorial reasserted Chinese promises of full support for the Vietnamese in their fight, but did not go beyond long-standing Peking formulations in this regard.

4. The editorial's optimistic view of the situation was also echoed in an interview broadcast by Peking on the 19th which purportedly took place between a Chinese correspondent and the "commander" of the Viet Cong forces, somewhere in South Vietnam. This is the first time we have seen the Communists voice the opinions of the "commander" of the Viet Cong military arm. According to the Viet Cong boss, the insurgents prospects are "splendid." Although he implied that the commitment of US ground troops to the fighting had temporarily arrested the ARVN drift toward defeat, he argued that the US forces themselves had suffered "crushing" defeats from the "middle of October through November," and that the Americans have "still not seized the initiative on the battlefield." The Viet Cong commander said that the insurgents expect further US "counterattacks," especially before the "dry season" ends in the South, but he declared that the Viet Cong would win in the end.

5. Moscow chimed in with a propaganda treatment of the Front anniversary similar to that in other Communist capitals. An article published

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in Pravda on the 19th by Dang Quang Minh, head of the NFLSV mission in the USSR, claimed that the Front "holds a prominent place and enjoys great authority throughout the world." Minh also voiced "profound gratitude" for Soviet assistance and support.

#### The Italian Peace Initiative

6. So far, Hanoi has not followed up on its 18 December commentary which denounced US statements on the Fanfani - La Pira peace initiative as "groundless fabrications." The 18 December commentary declared that there had not been any negotiations "probe" by Hanoi through the Italians and that US statements on this score were designed to cover further US military escalation of the war. The wording of the DRV commentary suggested that the North Vietnamese were genuinely surprised by the uproar over their conversations with La Pira. The commentary attempted to make it clear that Ho and Pham Van Dong had talked to La Pira at the latter's request, and that the DRV position on the war had been restated in standard terms.

#### Soviets Pressing Privately for Bombing cessation

7. In a recent conversation with Ambassador Harriman, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin took the line that a cessation of US bombing of North Vietnam "for a long enough period" might lead to discussions for a peaceful settlement. Dobrynin, however, would not explain what led the Soviets to believe that Hanoi would adopt a more conciliatory attitude in the event the US attacks ceased. He implied that Moscow would encourage the North Vietnamese in this direction, but avoided any claim that Russian "encouragement" would in fact significantly influence Hanoi's decision.


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


8. Significantly, Dobrynin stopped short of any firm prediction or assurance as to what North Vietnamese concessions could be expected if the bombings were stopped. In this respect his comments followed the example of private statements made by Russian spokesmen during similar conversations in the past.

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
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


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VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS


1. ROLLING THUNDER 44, conducted from 10 through 16 December, was severely hampered by the Northeast Monsoon which caused poor weather over much of North Vietnam. The majority of sorties were devoted to armed reconnaissance along lines of communication. A number of strikes were also conducted against coastal and island radar sites and the unused Nghio Lo Airfield, some 80 miles west-northwest of Hanoi. One leaflet drop was made near Hoi Xuan, some 65 miles southwest of Hanoi.

2. The most significant strike of the week took place on 15 December against the Uong Bi thermal power plant north of Haiphong. Due in large part to bad weather, only five of the 24 aircraft scheduled to make the strike were successful in dropping their bombs on target. The remainder were either diverted to other missions or were canceled. Pilots reported that several bombs hit the warehouse and storage area and in the transformer yard. The generator yard was reportedly also hit and several secondary explosions noted.



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3. One US aircraft, an F-105 Thunderchief, was lost in the Uong Bi strike. The pilot was rescued. Another navy aircraft, an A4 Skyhawk, was lost while attempting to land on its carrier. The pilot was killed.




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FOIA

**ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET**

**SUBJECT:** (Optional) Letter from Lt. Col. Schlatter, dated 15 January 1988, Subject: CIA-Originated Reports Relating to Fall of Lima Site 85 in Laos

**FROM:**  
Maurice A. Sovern  
Chief, Policy and Coordination Staff

*MS*

**EXTENSION**  
43899

**NO.** OCA 88-0110

**DATE**  
21 January 1988

**TO:** (Officer designation, room number, and building)

**DATE**  
RECEIVED FORWARDED

**OFFICER'S INITIALS**

**COMMENTS** (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED	
1. EPS/LG			
2.			
3.			
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The attached was received on 20 January 1988 and transmits a congressional request dated 16 December 1987. From my reading of the congressional request, it is essentially a request for declassification of the material in the file. In my view, it is an FOIA request for material in CIA files, in the guise of a constituent request. We are referring it to EPS/LG for action with OCA, EA/ICOG and IMS/MPG/FOIA. OCA may wish to give the congressman an interim reply, with an info copy to DIA/POW-MIA.

*MS*

CC: OCA  
EA/ICOG  
IMS/MPG/FOIA

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: 07-Jan-2014

ORIGINATOR VO-PW		DATED. 17 Jan 88		CLASSIFICATION SECRET		CONTROL NUMBER S-0048/VO-PW	
DATE RECEIVED IN DIA		SUSPENSE DATE		REGISTERED NUMBER		FILE DESIGNATION	
DESCRIPTION OF MATERIAL:							
Ltr: to Mr. M.A. Sovern, Chf, Policy & Coordination Staff, CIA, Washington, DC. 1 pg with 3 encls - one copy of all.							
Nothing follows-----Last Item-----							
TO AVOID TRACER ACTION SIGN & RETURN RECEIPT							
OFFICE	COPY	DATE/TIME		OFFICE	COPY	DATE/TIME	SIGNATURE
1	M.A. Sovern	1/20/88		4			
2				5			
3				6			
DESTRUCTION CERTIFICATE (Check appropriate box)							
THE MATERIAL LISTED HEREON HAS BEEN <input type="checkbox"/> DESTROYED <input type="checkbox"/> TORN AND PLACED IN BAG NO. _____ AND COMMITTED TO THE AUTHORIZED DESTRUCTION FACILITY (DIAR 50-2)							
SIGNATURE CERTIFYING OFFICIAL		OFFICE SYMBOL		SIGNATURE WITNESSING OFFICIAL		OFFICE SYMBOL	
		DATE				DATE	

DIA FORM 13 (1-68) DIA ROUTING & CONTROL RECORD

(Previous Edition is Obsolete)

DIAR 50-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: 07-Jan-2014



## DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-



15 JAN 1988

S-0048/VO-PW

TO: Mr. Maurice A. Sovern  
Chief, Policy and Coordination Staff  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

SUBJECT: CIA Originated Reports Relating to the Fall of Lima Site 85 in Laos

REFERENCE: CIA Memo dated 6 November 1987 (S) (enclosure 1).

1. With reference CIA transmitted 40 reports which primarily related to enemy troop activities in preparation for the 1968 communist attack on Lima Site 85 in Laos.
2. At approximately the same time as we received the aforementioned reports, we received a query from Congressman Don Bonker, who was writing in behalf of his constituent, [redacted] whose husband was killed during the attack on the Lima Site. In response to his query, we explained that we had reviewed CIA materials on the subject and were convinced that your Agency held no information relating to [redacted] husband or the other Americans lost at the site.
3. Enclosure 2 is Congressman Bonker's response to the DIA letter. As you will note, he believes it would be helpful if [redacted] could personally review the CIA documents so as to reassure her they do not bear on her husband. Inasmuch as the documents in question are classified and are not DIA's to release, we have told the Congressman that his request would be passed to CIA for action. A copy of our letter is at enclosure 3.
4. Any assistance you can provide in responding to Congressman Bonker's request in behalf of [redacted] would be appreciated.

Sincerely,

JOSEPH A. SCHLATTER  
Lieutenant Colonel, USA  
Chief, Special Office for Prisoners  
of War and Missing in Action

3 Enclosures

1. CIA memo dated 6 Nov 87 (S)
2. Bonker ltr dated 16 Dec 87 (U)
3. DIA ltr (U-1700/VO-PW),  
6 Jan 88 (U)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: 07-Jan-2014

S E C R E T



Washington, D.C. 20505



6 NOV 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General James W. Shufelt  
Deputy Director for Operations, Plans and  
Training  
Defense Intelligence Agency


SUBJECT: Request for Information Relating to Fall  
of Lima Site 85 in Laos


REFERENCE: DIA Memo of Lima Site 85, 22 May 1987

1. Regarding your request on behalf of [redacted] wife  
of TSGT. [redacted] who has been missing in action since  
Lima Site 85 in Laos was overrun by Communist forces in 1968,  
listed below are the retrievable documents for your determination  
as to which ones are pertinent to [redacted] request. Please  
note that declassification will have to be requested before any  
documents or portions of them may be released to [redacted]




APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: 07-Jan-2014





Attachments: as stated

  
Maurice A. Sovern  
Chief, Policy and Coordination Staff

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: 07-Jan-2014

C05871286ER

~~Third~~ CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT  
STATE OF WASHINGTON

COMMITTEES:  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY  
AND TRADE  
MERCHANT MARINE AND  
FISHERIES  
SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON AGING  
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON  
HOUSING AND CONSUMER  
INTERESTS  
CHAIRMAN, HOUSE EXPORT  
NO CARRIER

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

December 16, 1987

434 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515  
(202) 225-3538

DISTRICT OFFICES:  
207 FEDERAL BUILDING  
OLYMPIA, WA 98501  
(206) 753-9528

700 EAST EVERGREEN BOULEVARD  
VANCOUVER, WA 98661  
(206) 896-7842

U.S. POST OFFICE  
LONGVIEW, WA 98632  
(206) 838-5280

Brigadier General James W. Shufelt  
Deputy Director for Operations, Plans and Training  
Defense Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20340

Dear General Shufelt:

Thank you for the prompt and thorough response to my letter on behalf of [redacted]. Although unpleasant, it was helpful and I appreciate the commitment of you and your staff.

I think it would be helpful for [redacted] if she were able to personally review the CIA files surrounding the overrun of Lima Site 85. I understand from your letter that they do not contain useful information about her husband, but I believe that it would be more reassuring for her to come to this conclusion herself.

Again, I appreciate your assistance. If there are any problems, please feel free to contact [redacted] of my staff who is very familiar with the case.

Sincerely,

[redacted signature box]

Don Bonker  
Member of Congress

DB/tb

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: 07-Jan-2014



## DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-



U-1710/VO-PW

10 5 JAN 1988

Honorable Don Bonker  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Bonker:

This is in reference to your letter of 16 December which followed up on earlier correspondence relative to [redacted] and the 1968 loss of her husband at Lima Site 85 in Laos.

Inasmuch as the Central Intelligence Agency documents we reviewed are classified, they cannot be furnished to [redacted] until the CIA reviews them for declassification/sanitization and authorizes their release. To that end, I am forwarding your letter to the CIA with the request that they review the materials for release and coordinate with you to ensure all possible information is made available to [redacted].

I also want to reiterate that the documents in question do not provide any information as to the fate of the Americans at the Lima Site. Instead they are primarily raw, unevaluated reports of enemy troop strength and movements in preparation for the attack, with only brief references to the attack and defense of the site.

If we may be of future assistance, please feel free to call upon us.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

JAMES W. SHUFELT  
Brigadier General, USA  
Deputy Director for Operations,  
Plans and Training

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: 07-Jan-2014

C05916795  
Pages 1-60:  
Non-responsive



44-

~~SECRET~~ [Redacted]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Vice Director For Collection Management  
Department of Defense  
Principal Advisor For Prisoner of War Missing In Action Affairs  
(International Security Affairs)  
Director, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea  
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Identification of Possible U.S. Prisoners of War Camp in Saravane Province, Lao People's Democratic Republic

NO HARD COPY FOLLOWS

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: 07-Jan-2014

~~SECRET~~ [Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

1. Attached as of possible interest to you is a report

[Redacted]  
from the debriefing and subsequent inconclusive technical examinations of a Lao refugee who obtained the information while working in southern Laos. The refugee observed an apparent detention camp in Saravane Province, Laos, which a local village militia chief told him contained 23 American Prisoners of War.

2. This very sensitive information is for your background use only. There will be no further distribution of this report and additional dissemination or extraction of this information requires prior approval from this Agency. DIA is authorized to pass this information to the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) and its representatives in Bangkok.

[Redacted]

Clair E. George  
Deputy Director For Operations

cc:

.....

Attachment: Report as stated

[Redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE: 07-Jan-2014

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

SUBJECT: Identification of Possible U.S. Prisoner of War Camp in Saravane Province, Lao People's Democratic Republic

TEXT: 1. Circa March 1983, ((MEUT)) (NLN), a militia chief of Kadon Village (YB 1195), Saravane Province, Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR), claimed that there is a Prisoner of War (POW) Camp located at the foot of Ngoua Mountain (NCA), approximately 25 kilometers south of Kadon Village. According to Meut there were 23 American prisoners of war (POW's) detained in the camp. Prior to 1975 the camp contained 25 American POW's, but two had since died. Meut said that Kadon Village is responsible for growing food for the camp and insisted that he had personally seen the POW's on numerous occasions while escorting food convoys to the camp. He added that the militia forces of Chavan Village (YB 2197) were actually responsible for security at the camp.

2. The above information was obtained from the debriefing and subsequent technical examination of a Lao refugee, DPOB, January 1924 in Saravane Province. He joined the French Foreign Legion in 1948 and subsequently served in the Royal Lao Army (FAR), attaining the rank of Lt. Colonel in 1960. He was elected to the Royal Lao Government National Assembly in 1972. He was arrested and sent to a Phongsaly Province Reeducation Camp in 1975, released in 1980 and attached to the joint Lao/Vietnamese mobile medical team where he served until defecting to Thailand in April 1984. He is currently residing in NAPHO refugee camp. The results of the technical examination of Khamtan were inconclusive. He said he obtained this information directly from Meut, an ethnic Lao Theung of the Alak tribe, while he was serving as an interpreter for a joint Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV)/LPDR mobile herbal medicine team whose mission was to provide aid to Lao People's Army (LPA)/People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) forces in the southern LPDR. He said Meut

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escorted him to the top of Nqoua Mountain and pointed out the camp to him. According to [redacted] the camp consisted of four buildings and was surrounded by a fence and a canal. [redacted] did not claim to see any of the POW's. Both Chavan and Kadon Villages have been under the influence/control of the Communist Pathet Lao since circa 1954.)

3. [redacted] account is the first believable story on the possibility of live American POW's in the LPDR that has been heard since 1975.) [redacted] Comment: The source is experienced Lao and has developed a healthy degree of skepticism during the years in receiving and evaluating information on the LPDR.)

[redacted]

WARNING--REPORT CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

[redacted]

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DATE: 07-Jan-2014

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

C05916795  
Pages 65-70:  
Non-responsive

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT,

SUBJECT: Alleged Sightings of Live U.S. Prisoners of War  
in the Lao People's Democratic Republic

1. On 24 February 1983, the Third Platoon of the 33rd Lao Resistance Regiment, an active anti-Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) organization that operates in Khammouan Province, LPDR, was in the area of Ban (village) Song where several members of the platoon were attending a propaganda session. According to an ethnic Lao medic attached to the 33rd Regiment who was present in that village, two Caucasians and six People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) soldiers were at that session. One of the Caucasians was giving a speech in Lao praising the LPDR regime. (Headquarters Comment: The medic did not explain why he believed that the two Caucasians were U.S. Prisoners of War (POW's).)

2. On 25 February 1983, a member of an anti-LPDR resistance group who operated between Mahasai, Khammouan Province, and Savannakhet Province, LPDR, informed the medic of the 33rd Regiment mentioned above that there were four U.S. POW's being held at the Nadeng Prison in the LPDR. member stated that the prison was divided into two sections. One part of the prison was used to confine former Royal Lao Government (RLG) officials and Royal Lao Army (FAR) officers. The other part of the facility was for the four U.S. POW's. One of the Americans was ill with "sciatic disease." Another U.S. POW was allowed to look after him. The two other U.S. POW's were allowed to accompany PAVN soldiers who conducted propaganda operations. According to the medic, 18 PAVN soldiers were guarding the prison.

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

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DATE: 07-Jan-2014

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3. The 33rd Regiment medic indicated that his regiment was willing to attempt to rescue the four Americans without advance funds for their efforts, and would hold the liberated U.S. POW's until negotiations for a reward were completed. (Headquarters Comment: The medic asked how much money the resistance group might get for each U.S. POW.)

4. An escapee from Nadeng Prison claimed to have met with two U.S. POW's during his one and one-half year detention from mid-1981 to January 1983. The escapee said that the two alleged U.S. POW's were not incarcerated within the prison facility but were held in a nearby cave. (Headquarters Comment: The was not able to identify either of the two alleged U.S. POW's by name. He stated that one of their "serial number plates" was available at Ban Nondeng (WE2507). The Lao resistance member cited in Paragraph 2 of this report stated that he would attempt to recover the plate by 1 April 1983.)

5. The above information was obtained from the debriefings of (1) a medic with the 33rd Lao Resistance Regiment, who resided in late March 1983 in Napho Refugee Camp; and (2) a member of an anti-LPDR resistance group who operates between Mahasai District, Khammouan Province, LPDR, and Savannakhet, LPDR. obtained the information from [redacted] (LNU), a contact in an anti-LPDR resistance force, while in Ban Song Village, Mahasai District, Khammouan Province. [redacted] acquired his information from [redacted] (LNU) who claimed to have escaped from Nadeng Prison in late January 1983. [redacted] resided at 8/17 Mua Muang District, Mukdahan Province, Thailand.)

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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DATE: 07-Jan-2014

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

~~SECRET~~ [Redacted]

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

8 JUL 1982

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Assistant Vice Director for Collection Management  
Department of Defense

John Fer, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF  
Principal Advisor for Prisoner of War and Missing in Action Affairs  
(International Security Affairs)  
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Mr. Desaix Anderson  
Director, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea  
Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs  
Department of State

**FROM:** : John H. Stein  
Deputy Director for Operations

**SUBJECT:** : Claimed Sightings of U.S. Personnel  
Missing in Action in Laos in the  
Period 1969-79

**NO HARD COPY FOLLOWS**

Attached as of possible interest to you is a report obtained from the debriefing of a Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) defector who provided sketchy information on four past incidents, of which three involve possible U.S. personnel missing in action.

[Redacted Signature]  
John H. Stein

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: 07-Jan-2014

Attachment: Report as stated

[Redacted]  
~~SECRET~~  
[Redacted]



6 6  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
SECRET -

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: CLAIMED SIGHTINGS OF U.S. PERSONNEL POSSIBLY MISSING  
IN ACTION IN LAOS IN THE PERIOD 1969-79

1. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON U.S. PERSONNEL POSSIBLY MISSING IN ACTION (MIA) IN LAOS IN THE PERIOD 1969-79 WAS OBTAINED FROM THE DEBRIEFING OF A FORMER LAO PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (LPLA) AIR FORCE PILOT.

TECHNICAL EXAMINATION OF [REDACTED] ON THE INFORMATION REPORTED BELOW REVEALED NO ATTEMPT TO WITHHOLD INFORMATION OR DECEIVE ON HIS PART, ALTHOUGH THE ACCURACY OF WHAT HE REPORTED CANNOT BE CONFIRMED.)

2. IN A CONVERSATION IN THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (LPDR) WITH [REDACTED] IN FEBRUARY 1981, AN UNIDENTIFIED LPLA OFFICER SAID THAT HE HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN ASSIGNED TO GUARD U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR (POW'S) WHO WERE IMPRISONED IN A CAVE IN HOUA PHAN (SAM NEUA) PROVINCE. THIS LPLA OFFICER SAID THAT ALL OF THESE POW'S WERE SENT TO THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SRV) "IN 1979." THE LPLA OFFICER GAVE NO FURTHER DETAILS.

3. ABOUT DECEMBER 1971, WHILE [REDACTED] WAS PILOTING AN H-34 HELICOPTER CARRYING FORMER ROYAL LAO GOVERNMENT (RLG) GENERAL [REDACTED] AND LIEUTENANT [REDACTED] FROM LONG TIENG (TG 8313) TO ABOUT FIVE KILOMETERS SOUTHWEST OF LATSEN (UG 0338) IN XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCE, HE SET HIS AIRCRAFT DOWN BESIDE AN AIR AMERICA UH-1 HELICOPTER THAT HAD VIRTUALLY BEEN DEMOLISHED. THE COCKPIT OF THE HELICOPTER, WHICH WAS ON A LANDING ZONE BEING FIRED UPON BY HOSTILE FORCES, CONTAINED THE BODY OF AN AMERICAN PILOT, AND IT WAS APPARENT THAT HE WAS DEAD. [REDACTED] SAID FIRING BY THE ENEMY, WHO HAD ALREADY OVERRUN LATSEN, PREVENTED HIM FROM RECOVERING THE BODY. (SOURCE COMMENT: [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] WITNESSED THIS INCIDENT.) (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: AIR AMERICA RECORDS CANNOT CONFIRM THIS INCIDENT WITH THE TIME FRAME AND DETAILS GIVEN HERE.)

[REDACTED]  
3  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: 07-Jan-2014

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~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

4. ABOUT NOVEMBER OR DECEMBER 1970 A HMONG RLG MILITARY REGION II OFFICER AT BOUAMLONG (UG 2585) TOLD THAT A BUNKER CONTAINING THREE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL HAD SUSTAINED A DIRECT ENEMY HIT AND THAT THESE MEN WERE NOT SEEN TO EMERGE FROM THE BUNKER. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: THE EXACT TIME FRAME AND LOCATION WERE NOT GIVEN NOR WERE FURTHER DETAILS AVAILABLE.)

5. ABOUT AUGUST 1969 ..... WHILE FLYING TO PHATHUNG (TH 1726) ABOUT 50 KILOMETERS NORTHEAST OF LUANG PRABANG, HEARD THE DISTRESS CALL OF A DOWNED U.S. A-7 AIRCRAFT. FOLLOWING THE SIGNAL, ..... LOCATED A U.S. PILOT, PICKED HIM UP, AND TURNED HIM OVER TO AN AMERICAN OFFICIAL AT LUANG PRABANG. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: APPARENTLY NO MIA IS INVOLVED IN THIS INCIDENT.)

~~REPORT CLASS SECRET~~

[Redacted]

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DATE: 07-Jan-2014

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

C05916795  
Pages 76-78:  
Non-responsive

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: REPORTED SIGHTING OF AMERICAN PRISONERS IN  
CENTRAL LAOS

1. THE INFORMATION IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH WAS OBTAINED ON 30 MAY 1978 FROM THE DEBRIEFING OF FORMER ROYAL LAO AIR FORCE (RLAF) AND LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (LPDR) AIR FORCE PILOT, [REDACTED] WHO DEFECTED HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY IS UNDETERMINED. HE OBTAINED THE INFORMATION DURING A STOPOVER AT SARAVAN, LAOS, IN OCTOBER 1976, FROM A FORMER RLAF MASTER SERGEANT, [REDACTED] WHO WAS ASSIGNED TO THE SARAVAN AREA.

2. FOLLOWING THE COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF LAOS IN 1975, THE LPDR ESTABLISHED INDOCTRINATION CAMPS FOR FORMER ROYAL LAO GOVERNMENT MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS AT XEPON AND SARAVAN, WHICH WERE LITTLE MORE THAN FORCED LABOR CAMPS. THE PRIMARY TASK OF THE PRISONERS AT THESE CAMPS WAS THE CONSTRUCTION OF A ROAD LINKING THE TWO TOWNS. DURING A ROUTINE ROAD SURVEY IN EARLY OCTOBER 1976, [REDACTED] CLAIMED TO HAVE SEEN A GROUP OF AMERICAN PRISONERS BEING HELD IN A SPECIAL PRISON COMPOUND LOCATED IN A MOUNTAIN CAVE ABOUT 60 KILOMETERS NORTH-NORTHWEST OF SARAVAN. (SOURCE COMMENT: [REDACTED] PROVIDED NO FURTHER INFORMATION ON THIS SUBJECT.)

CLASSIFIED BY SIGNER: [REDACTED]

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APPROVED FOR  
RELEASE DATE:  
07-Jan-2014

~~SECRET~~

VOL. 10

DOCUMENTS FROM DOD/CDO SOURCE FILES  
REQUIRING DECLASSIFICATION

Volume 30

<u>Dissem #</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Dissem Date</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Field #</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
1.	[REDACTED]	07 NOV 87	[REDACTED]		
	LPDR Vice Foreign Minister Soubanh's Comments Regarding LPDR Policy on Excavating Crash Sites With Remains of U.S. MIA Personnel				
2.	[REDACTED]	07 JUN 88	[REDACTED]		
	VN: Miscellaneous Information on Live Sighting, MIA Remains and Dog Tags				
3.	[REDACTED]	14 MAR 88	[REDACTED]		DENIED-SP
	Update on Lao MIA/POW Sources Linked to Hostile LPDR Intelligence and Private Recovery Efforts				
4.	[REDACTED]	07 MAR 88	[REDACTED]		
	Lao Live Sighting Source Linked to LPDR Intelligence and Private Recovery Efforts				
5.	[REDACTED]	20 JAN 88	[REDACTED]		
	Two Accounts of the Capture of an Alleged U.S. Airman at Gia Duc (now Minh Duc) Village, Thuy Nguyen District, Hai Phong Municipality, ca June/July 1972				
6.	[REDACTED]	JAN 88	[REDACTED]		
	Two Accounts of the Capture of an Alleged U.S. Airman at Gia Duc (now Minh Duc) Village, Thuy Nguyen District, Hai Phong Municipality, ca June/July 1972				
7.	[REDACTED]	20 JAN 88	[REDACTED]		
	Two Accounts of the Capture of an Alleged U.S. Airman at Gia Duc (now Minh Duc) Village, Thuy Nguyen District, Hai Phong Municipality, ca June/July 1972				
8.	[REDACTED]	06 JAN 87	[REDACTED]		
	Alleged Capture in 1971 of a U.S. Airman at Gia Duc Village, Trang Kenh, Thuy Nguyen District, Haiphong Municipality; source refugee debriefing of [REDACTED]				
9.	[REDACTED]	18 OCT 86	[REDACTED]		
	Reported Capture of a U.S. Airman in the Minh Duc/Gia Duc Area, Thuy Nguyen District, Haiphong Municipality				
10.	[REDACTED]	3 JUN 89	[REDACTED]		
	Crash Site and Remains Found on Mindanao; Dog Tag Impressions from Vietnam				
11.	[REDACTED]	3 JUN 89	[REDACTED]		
	Crash Site and Remains Found on Mindanao; Dog Tag Impressions from Vietnam				
12.	[REDACTED]	30 APR 88	[REDACTED]		
	Lao, Cambodian and Vietnamese Refugee Sources on the U.S. MIA/POW Issue				
13.	[REDACTED]	30 APR 88	[REDACTED]		
	Lao, Cambodian and Vietnamese Refugee Sources on the U.S. MIA/POW Issue				
14.	[REDACTED]	30 APR 88	[REDACTED]		
	Lao, Cambodian and Vietnamese Refugee Sources on the U.S. MIA/POW Issue				
15.	[REDACTED]	11 JUN 87	[REDACTED]		
	Absence of Americans at and Description of the T-9 Reeducation Camp in Hoang Lien Son Province, Northern Vietnam; source: refugee debriefing of [REDACTED]				

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~~SECRET~~

16. [REDACTED] 11 JUN 87 [REDACTED]  
Absence of Americans at the Thanh Lam Production Zone in Thanh Oha Province, Northern Vietnam; source: refugee debriefing [REDACTED]
17. [REDACTED] 11 JUN 87 [REDACTED]  
Absence of Americans at and Description of the Cat Lai Reeducation Camp in Dong Nai Province, Southern Vietnam; source: refugee debriefing of [REDACTED]
18. [REDACTED] 08 NOV 86 [REDACTED]  
Absence of Americans at the Can Tho Internal Security Prison; the Cai Rang Prison and the 5th Canal Reeducation Camp in Hau Giang Province, Southern Vietnam; source: refugee debriefing
19. [REDACTED] 08 NOV 86 [REDACTED]  
CORRECTION OF FIELD REPORT NUMBER: Absence of Americans at the Can Tho Internal Security Prison; the Cai Rang Prison and the 5th Canal Reeducation Camp in Hau Giang Province, Southern Vietnam; source: refugee debriefing
20. [REDACTED] 24 DEC 86 [REDACTED]  
Absence of Americans at and Description of the Bien Hoa Air Base Reeducation Camp in Dong Nai Province, Southern Vietnam; source: refugee debriefing of [REDACTED]
21. [REDACTED] 16 MAR 87 [REDACTED]
22. [REDACTED] 09 JUN 88 [REDACTED]  
Contact to Vietnamese .... Claiming POW/MIA Information
23. [REDACTED] 28 MAR 90 [REDACTED]  
MIA Remains in Xieng Khouang Province, Laos
24. [REDACTED] 17 APR 90 [REDACTED]  
Follow-Up on MIA Information -- Frank A. Gould
25. [REDACTED] 08 AUG 90 [REDACTED]  
Dog Tags and MIA Remains from Ho Chi Minh City
26. [REDACTED] 12 OCT 89 [REDACTED]  
POW/MIA Information From Lao Informant

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Date: 30 September 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: (b)(3):10 U.S.C. §1305b: [Redacted]

SUBJECT: Results of Photo Comparison  
Case No. 12,220

REFERENCE: DIA/AF ~~XXXXXXXX~~ 365-8-1-70-INT  
Photo No. 61

1. The following report contains the final technical results of the comparison between the unidentified photo and the enclosed photos submitted by your office:

Capt. Gary H. Fors, USMC:

Independent opinions from three identification technicians indicate that the probability of Captain Fors' being the subject of photo 61 is less than even. (There is less than a 50-50 chance that they are one and the same.) Observation was made of head shape, nose shape, mouth shape, face shape, labial folds, and probable skeletal form. [Since the subject of photo 61 appears to have been either wounded or beaten, the skeletal structure may be altered (by swelling)]

The extremely poor-quality photo 61 has been "identified" by four different NOK. It is believed in this office that no definite identification can be based on this photo.

ND:SS  
MAG  
LH/AP:TC copy  
TC/ASA Orig.  
LGH/LSIFE

Approved for Release  
Date 8 NOV 1977

Enclosure Five photographs of Capt. Gary Fors

SANITIZED COPY

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DOCUMENT\_ID: 1446706  
 INQNO: DOC370 00253233  
 DOCNO: 270902ZMAR964702  
 PRODUCER: CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU  
 SOURCF: MILITARY  
 DOCTYPE: OTHER  
 DOR: 19960329  
 TOR: 152756  
 DOCPREC: R  
 ORIGDATE: 199603270902  
 MHFNO: 96 3671026  
 DOCCCLASS: U

## HEADER

RR RUEAIIA  
 DE RUHPSGG #4702 0870902  
 ZNR UUUUU  
 R 270902Z MAR 96 ZYB  
 FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//  
 TO RHRMPC/HQ AFPC RANDOLPH AFB TX//DPWCM//  
 INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//  
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//  
 RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC  
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//  
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//  
 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC  
 RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J30-M//  
 RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC  
 RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//  
 RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//  
 BT

## CONTROLS

UNCLAS //N03460//

COMBINE: COMPLETE

## TEXT

MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J252//  
 SUBJ/EVALUATION OF ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM (OHP) REPORT: (b)(6)  
 THAN PROVIDES POSSIBLE INFORMATION ON CASES 0343 AND (b)(3);50 USC § 435  
 REF/A/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/130012ZDEC93//  
 REF/B/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/120912ZDEC95//  
 REF/C/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/080932ZJAN96//  
 REF/D/RMG/CDR JTF-FA/090842ZFEB96//  
 NARR/REF A IS THE ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE GROUP 559 DOCUMENTATION  
 TITLED "DOWNED AIRCRAFT - RECORD OF ENEMY AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN FROM  
 1965 TO 1975". REF B IS THE OHP REPORT OF INTERVIEW OF (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)

RMKS/1. BACKGROUND: ON 10 NOV 95, A JOINT U.S./VNOSMP RESEARCH AND  
 INVESTIGATION TEAM (RIT) INTERVIEWED (b)(6) AT THE JOINT  
 DOCUMENTS CENTER IN THE ARMY MUSEUM, HANOI (b)(6) WAS A WARTIME  
 MEMBER OF THE 10TH ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY (AAA) BATTALION (BN), GROUP  
 559. FROM 1966 TO 1969, (b)(6) WAS STATIONED WITH THE 10TH AAA BN

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AT VARIOUS LOCATIONS IN LAOS AND CENTRAL VIETNAM. OF THE SEVERAL U.S. AIRCRAFT THAT (b)(6) UNIT SHOT DOWN, FIVE AIRCRAFT CRASHED CLOSE ENOUGH TO THE UNIT'S POSITION FOR THE 10TH BN'S MEMBERS TO INVESTIGATE.

A. THE FIRST INCIDENT INVOLVED THE SHOOT DOWN OF FOUR U.S. AIRCRAFT NEAR CA TOC VILLAGE (48Q XE 117923), KHAMMOUAN PROVINCE, LAOS ON 18 MAY 66. THE FOUR AIRCRAFT INCLUDED ONE L-19, ONE A-4B, ONE T-28 AND ONE F-4H. THE L-19 CRASHED NEAR THE UNIT'S POSITION WITH THE PILOT, WHO WAS UNABLE TO EJECT, INSIDE THE AIRCRAFT. SHORTLY AFTER THE L-19 CRASHED, SEVERAL T-28, A-4B AND F-4H AIRCRAFT ATTACKED AND THE BATTALION SHOT DOWN ONE OF EACH TYPE. ALTHOUGH THESE AIRCRAFT CRASHED TOO FAR AWAY FOR THE UNIT TO INVESTIGATE, ONE PILOT EJECTED AND LANDED NEAR THE UNIT'S POSITION. AFTER THE BATTLE, (b)(6) UNIT MOVED TO A NEW POSITION AND THREE DAYS LATER FOUND THE DEAD BODY OF A PILOT HANGING FROM HIS PARACHUTE IN A TREE. THE BODY WAS BURIED ON THE SPOT, HOWEVER (b)(6) DOES NOT KNOW WHO BURIED THE PILOT AND NEVER SAW THE BURIAL SITE.

B. THE SECOND INCIDENT OCCURRED SOON AFTER THE FIRST INCIDENT AND AFTER THE 10TH BN HAD MOVED TO NOONG MA (NEAR 48Q XE 256083), SAVANAKHET PROVINCE, LAOS. AT 1600 OR 1700 HOURS ON AN UNRECALLED DAY IN JUN 66, TWO U.S. AIRCRAFT APPROACHED THE BN'S POSITION AND FLEW EAST INTO QUANG BINH PROVINCE, VIETNAM OVER A BORDER MARKER SEVEN MILES FROM THE BATTALION'S POSITION. THE AIRCRAFT RETURNED, FLYING AT AN ALTITUDE OF ABOUT 1500 TO 2000 METERS. THE BN FIRED AT THE AIRCRAFT ON THE LEFT. THE AIRCRAFT BURST INTO FLAMES AND CRASHED NEAR THE UNIT'S POSITION WITHOUT EXPLODING. AFTER THE CRASH, OTHER AIRCRAFT CIRCLED THE AREA AND DROPPED CLUSTER BOMBS VERY CLOSE TO THE 10TH BN'S POSITION. AFTER THE BATTLE (b)(6)

(b)(6) INVESTIGATED THE CRASH SITE WHICH WAS LOCATED NORTHWEST OF NOONG MA, WEST OF BAN TRE (UNLOCATED) AND APPROXIMATELY 500 METERS NORTH OF ROUTE 20, NEAR BAN TA LE (TA LEE) (NEAR 48Q XE 212031). BEFORE REACHING THE BURNING AIRCRAFT (b)(6) FOUND THE DEAD BODY OF A CAUCASIAN, U.S. PILOT. THE PILOT WAS WEARING A GRAY FLIGHT SUIT AND HELMET. IT APPEARED THAT THE PILOT TRIED TO EJECT BUT HIS PARACHUTE FAILED TO OPEN (b)(6) FOUND A BLACK MOVADO WATCH AND A RING ON THE BODY BUT FOUND NO IDENTIFICATION MEDIA. CLOSER TO THE AIRCRAFT (b)(6) FOUND ANOTHER DEAD BODY WHICH WAS BURNED BEYOND RECOGNITION. BOTH BODIES WERE BURIED TOGETHER ABOUT A METER DEEP NEAR THE AIRCRAFT. AN EMERGENCY BEEPER, THREE COLT REVOLVERS, AND A MAP WERE ALSO FOUND AT THE CRASH SITE. ALL OF THESE ITEMS, INCLUDING THE WATCH AND THE RING, WERE TAKEN BACK TO THE BATTALION AND SENT TO HIGHER ECHELONS (NFI). THE ANNOTATION "T01-B26KK1" WAS FOUND ON THE MAP AND INDICATED THAT THE AIRCRAFT WAS A B-26K.

C. (b)(6) PROVIDED INFORMATION OF SEVERAL OTHER AIRCRAFT WHILE THE 10TH BN WAS STATIONED IN SAVANAKHET PROVINCE. HOWEVER, THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED FAR FROM THE 10TH BN POSITION AND HE DID NOT KNOW THE FATE OF THE PILOTS.

2. EVALUATION: THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY (b)(6) POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASES 0343 AND (b)(6) 50 USC § 435

A. (b)(6) ACCOUNT OF THE FIRST INCIDENT IN WHICH AN L-19 WAS SHOT DOWN NEAR CA TOC VILLAGE, CORRELATES WITH CASE 0343 BASED ON EXACT DATE AND AIRCRAFT TYPE (O-1 AND L-19 ARE THE SAME AIRCRAFT). THERE IS A DISCREPANCY IN THE INCIDENT LOCATION DESCRIBED BY (b)(6) AND THE CASE 0343 INCIDENT LOCATION (b)(6) STATED THAT THE L-19 CRASHED NEAR CA TOC VILLAGE (48Q XD 117923) WHILE CASE 0343 INVOLVED

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THE CRASH OF AN O-1 AT GRID COORDINATES 48Q XD 256083, WHICH IS APPROXIMATELY 21 KILOMETERS FROM CA TOC VILLAGE. ACCORDING TO (b)(6) HIS UNIT WAS STATIONED IN NOONG MA (NOONGJ MA) VILLAGE (NEAR 48Q XD 256083) IN JUN 66. (b)(6) MAY BE CONFUSING CA TOC VILLAGE WITH NOONG MA VILLAGE AS THE LOCATION WHERE THE L-19 CRASHED. (b)(6) STATEMENT OF AN L-19 SHOOT DOWN ON 18 MAY 66 IS SUBSTANTIATED BY A VIETNAMESE GROUP 559 DOCUMENT (REF A, PAGE 12, LINE 45) WHICH PROVIDES INFORMATION OF COMPANY 15, 10TH BN SHOOTING DOWN AN L-19 AIRCRAFT ON 18 MAY 66. HOWEVER, THE DOCUMENT DOES NOT PROVIDE A LOCATION OF WHERE THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED.

B. CASE 0343, AN UNRESOLVED CASE, INVOLVED THE 18 MAY 66 LOSS OF AN O-1F AIRCRAFT AND TWO CREWMEN (AIR FORCE CAPTAIN LEE D. HARLEY AND AIRMAN ANDRE R. GUILLET) AT GRID COORDINATES 48Q XE 256083 IN KHAMMOUAN PROVINCE, LAOS.

C. (b)(6) ACCOUNT OF THE SECOND INCIDENT IN WHICH A B-26K WAS SHOT DOWN NORTHWEST OF NOONG MA IN JUN 66, POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH CASE (b)(6) BASED ON AIRCRAFT TYPE (THE A-26 WAS REDESIGNATED THE B-26 AFTER WORLD WAR II), MONTH AND YEAR OF INCIDENT AND GENERAL LOCATION OF INCIDENT. THERE IS A DISCREPANCY WITH REGARD TO THE EXACT LOCATION OF THE CRASH SITE. (b)(6) STATED THAT THE CRASH SITE WAS NORTHWEST OF NOONG MA AND NEAR BAN TA LE (NEAR GRID COORDINATE 48Q XE 212031). ALTHOUGH THE (b)(6) AIRCRAFT CRASHED VERY CLOSE TO GRID COORDINATE XE 212031, THIS LOCATION IS SOUTHWEST OF NOONG MA INSTEAD OF NORTHWEST AS (b)(6) CLAIMED. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT (b)(6) WAS DISORIENTED WHILE LOOKING AT THE MAP DURING THE INTERVIEW AS IN THE FIRST INCIDENT, THE CRASH SITE LOCATION DESCRIBED BY (b)(6) IS NOW IN VIETNAM BECAUSE OF A CHANGE IN THE BORDER SINCE THE INCIDENT OCCURRED.

D. (b)(3):50 USC § 435 AN UNRESOLVED CASE, INVOLVED THE LOSS OF AN A-26A

(b)(3):50 USC § 435

COORDINATE 48Q XE 192056 IN KHAMMOUAN PROVINCE, LAOS ON 28 JUN 66.

3. COMMENTS: THERE ARE A FEW DIFFERENCES IN THE DETAILS PROVIDED

(b)(6)

ALL MEMBERS OF THE 10TH AAA BN. THESE DIFFERENCES ARE PROBABLY DUE TO THE PASSAGE OF TIME AND THE FACT THAT THE 10TH AAA BN WAS INVOLVED IN NUMEROUS SIMILAR INCIDENTS IN 1966 AND 1967. RECOMMEND THAT ALL 10TH BN MEMBERS BE INTERVIEWED AS A GROUP IN ORDER TO RESOLVE THE MINOR DISCREPANCIES IN THEIR STATEMENTS. (b)(6) ALSO IDENTIFIED

(b)(6)

INDIVIDUALS WHO MAY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE MORE INFORMATION ON 10TH BN SHOOT DOWN INCIDENTS. RECOMMEND THESE INDIVIDUALS BE INCLUDED IN ANY GROUP INTERVIEW. IF THE CRASH SITES DESCRIBED BY (b)(6) IN LAOS, HE IS AN EXCELLENT CANDIDATE FOR THE TRILATERAL WITNESS PROGRAM.

4. FOR AFPC/DPNCH: FORWARDED FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION. A SANITIZED COPY OF REF D WILL BE FORWARDED SEPARATELY.

ADMIN

5. EVAL: BLH//  
END OF MESSAGE

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DOCUMENT ID: 183568439  
PRODUCER: CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//  
SOURCE: MILITARY  
DOCTYPE: OTHER  
DOR: 19990706  
TOR: 221740  
DOCPREC: R  
ORIGDATE: 199907060912  
MHENO: 99 6097621  
DOCCLASS: U

HEADER  
RR RUEAIIA  
DE RHHMCC #1530 1872001  
ZNR UUUUU ZUI RUHEMADD452 1870912  
R 060912Z JUL 99 ZYB  
FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//  
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/DPMO//  
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/OCS/ACS/EAP/VLC//  
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5//  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC/[REDACTED]  
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC  
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J32//  
RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC  
RUEHBK/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//  
RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//  
BT

CONTROLS  
UNCLAS //N03460//

TEXT  
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SECTION 02 OF 03  
MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J24A//  
SUBJ/TRANSLATION AND ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT: REPORT OF  
UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION OF THE 10TH ANTI-AIRCRAFT BATTALION,  
GROUP 559//  
RMKS/

[REDACTED]

(b)(6)

COMBAT ENGINEER REGIMENT, WHO PARTICIPATED IN OPENING THE ROAD  
FROM KILOMETER MARKER 14 (IN QUANG BINH PROVINCE) TO THE LOUMBOUM  
(LOUMBOUM) THREE-WAY INTERSECTION IN TA KHONG ((TAF KHOONGS)),  
XE PON ((X)) (FROM HAI PHONG) AND KNEW THAT  
DURING THE ABOVE TIME FRAME THE 10TH AAA BATTALION ALSO OPERATED  
IN THIS SAME AREA. ((b)) DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN CAPTURING OR  
BURYING ((ANY)) AMERICAN AVIATOR.

[REDACTED]

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CHU TOWNSHIP ((THIJ TRAANS CHUX)), LUC NGAN DISTRICT, BAC GIANG PROVINCE. UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM IV WENT TO THE ABOVE LOCALITY, BUT NEITHER (b)(6) LOCATION (SEE ATTACHED WITNESS VERIFICATION REPORT). THE TEAM, IN COORDINATION WITH RESPONSIBLE AGENCIES FOUND AND WORKED WITH (b)(6)

PHONG)), CHU TOWNSHIP. BOTH OF THESE MEN ARE FORMER MILITARY MEMBERS FROM THE 6TH COMPANY, 5TH BATTALION, 4TH REGIMENT.

(b)(6)

B. CONCERNING WITNESSES NOT YET LOCATED AND TASKS MANAGED: ((PAGE SIX))

(b)(6) FORMER NOONG-MA HAMLET CHIEF, KHAMMOUAN PROVINCE (LAOS). THE TEAM COULD NOT LOCATE OR MEET HIM.

(b)(6) ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE 10TH AAA BATTALION THAT THE TEAM MET CONFIRMED THAT IN THE 10TH AAA BATTALION ORGANIZATION DURING THE 1966-1967 TIME FRAME, THERE WAS NO ONE WITH SUCH A NAME; THE ONLY POSSIBILITIES ARE (b)(6)

(b)(6) COMMANDER OF THE 18TH 12.7MM AAA COMPANY (4TH COMPANY). ACCORDING TO A NUMBER OF WITNESSES (b)(6) MAY LIVE IN THAI BINH PROVINCE. THE TEAM WENT TO THAI BINH, BUT DID NOT FIND ANYONE WITH A SIMILAR NAME WHO SERVED IN A UNIT WITH THE DESIGNATOR WE WERE LOOKING FOR (SEE ATTACHED WITNESS VERIFICATION REPORT).

(b)(6) FORMER SOLDIER SUBORDINATE TO THE 10TH AAA BATTALION DURING THE 1966-1967 TIME FRAME WHO DIRECTLY PARTICIPATED IN BURYING A NUMBER OF AVIATORS.

(b)(6) IS SERVING A CRIMINAL JAIL SENTENCE, SO WE COULD NOT MEET HIM.

(b)(6) FORMER COMMANDER OF THE 16TH COMPANY (2ND COMPANY); DURING THE VERIFICATION PROCESS, THE TEAM LEARNED (b)(6) WAS FROM NONG CONG DISTRICT, THANH HOA PROVINCE, NOT FROM QUANG BINH PROVINCE AS INDICATED IN THE INFORMATION FROM THE AMERICAN SIDE. HOWEVER, (b)(6) MOVED TO GIA LAI PROVINCE LONG AGO AND NOW NO ONE KNOWS WHERE (b)(6) RESIDES. OTHER FORMER MEMBERS OF THE 10TH AAA BATTALION SAID (b)(6) DID NOT DIRECTLY PARTICIPATE IN BURYING ANY AVIATORS. THE JOB OF BURYING AVIATORS WAS NOT THE MISSION OF A COMPANY COMMANDER.

(b)(6)

(b)(6) GUARD SQUAD LEADER (b)(6) SUBORDINATE TO THE 10TH AAA BATTALION. MANY FORMER FELLOW UNIT MEMBERS CONFIRMED (b)(6) PARTICIPATED IN BURYING AVIATOR(S) AND HE MAY BE FROM THAI BINH PROVINCE. THE TEAM WENT TO THAI BINH TO FIND (b)(6) BUT ((WE HAVE)) NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO FIND HIM (SEE ATTACHED WITNESS VERIFICATION REPORT).

(b)(6) FORMER 10TH AAA BATTALION MEMBERS CONFIRMED THAT DURING THE 1966-1967 TIME FRAME, THE POLITICAL OFFICER OF THE 17TH COMPANY (3RD COMPANY)

(b)(6) THERE WAS NO ONE

(b)(6) CURRENTLY, NO ONE KNOWS WHERE (b)(6) RESIDES.

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(b)(6) FORMER COMPANY-LEVEL CADRE MEMBER SUBORDINATE TO THE 10TH AAA BATTALION. ACCORDING TO FORMER FELLOW UNIT MEMBERS, (b)(6) IS FROM THUY QUYNH VILLAGE ((XAX THUY QUYNH)), THAI THUY DISTRICT, THAI BINH PROVINCE, AND HE MAY HAVE INFORMATION ABOUT THE CASES UNDER INVESTIGATION AND MAY KNOW WHERE (b)(6) (05) RESIDES. THE TEAM WENT TO THE ABOVE LOCALITY, BUT IN 1975, (b)(6) ((PAGE SEVEN))

WORK AND LIVE IN ((THE FORMER)) SONG BE PROVINCE. CURRENTLY, NO ONE KNOWS (b)(6) ADDRESS (SEE ATTACHED WITNESS VERIFICATION REPORT).

### III. CONSOLIDATED INFORMATION:

IN THIS SECTION, UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM IV CONSOLIDATED AND ARRANGED THE INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM THE WITNESSES AND EDITED OUT THE UNSPECIFIC, UNCLEAR, AND REPEAT INFORMATION.

#### C- BATTLE ON 29/04/1966 (SKETCH ONE):

THIS WAS THE 10TH AAA BATTALION'S FIRST BATTLE IN LAO TERRITORY (KATOK HAMLET, KHAMMOUAN PROVINCE).

ON APPROXIMATELY 27 OR 28/04/1966, A C-147 ((SIC)) AIRCRAFT FLEW TOWARD THE GUN EMPLACEMENTS. THE ENTIRE UNIT OPENED FIRE, BUT DID NOT HIT THE AIRCRAFT. ON THE NIGHT OF THAT SAME DAY, THE ENTIRE BATTALION MET TO DRAW UPON EXPERIENCE ((RUTS KINH NGHIEEMJ)) AND REARRANGE THE UNIT'S BATTLE FORMATION. THE NEXT DAY, U.S. AIRCRAFT FLEW TOWARD THE GUN EMPLACEMENTS AND THE ENTIRE UNIT FOUGHT WELL AND SHOT DOWN FIVE AIRCRAFT (ONE A-4 AND FOUR F-4'S). FROM ONE OF THOSE AIRCRAFT, ONE AVIATOR PARACHUTED OUT, BUT THE PARACHUTE DID NOT DEPLOY. THE AVIATOR FELL DOWNWARD AND HIS BODY WAS IMPALED, FROM BOTTOM TO TOP, ON A TREE BRANCH. THE AVIATOR WAS SUSPENDED WITH HIS FEET JUST TOUCHING THE GROUND. THREE DAYS AFTER THE BATTLE, THE UNIT DISCOVERED THE CAUCASIAN AVIATOR'S BODY APPROXIMATELY 300 METERS BEHIND A KITCHEN BELONGING TO THE 17TH COMPANY (3RD COMPANY), BEHIND A STONE WALL ((LENF DAS)). THE BODY SMELLED BADLY AND ANTS AND TERMITES WERE EATING THE BODY, INCLUDING THE EYES. THE PILOT'S SEAT FELL APPROXIMATELY 10 METERS AWAY FROM THE 17TH COMPANY'S KITCHEN.

(b)(6) REMEMBERED THE AVIATOR'S NAME WAS "MU-LEN" (MULLEN). THE INDIVIDUALS WHO DIRECTLY BURIED THE PILOT WERE (b)(6)

(b)(6) THE INDIVIDUALS FROM THE BATTALION WHO WENT TO THE SITE AND WHO WITNESSED AND HAVE KNOWLEDGE ARE: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

STATEMENT: (b)(6) CLIMBED THE TREE AND DETACHED THE PARACHUTE AND THE BELT, TOOK THE AVIATOR'S IDENTIFICATION CARD AND BLOOD CHIT, THEN DRAGGED THE AVIATOR TO A PLACE WHERE THE TERRAIN WAS FLAT, APPROXIMATELY 6-7 METERS FROM THE OLD PLACE ((SIC)). THE GROUP OF INDIVIDUALS WHO BURIED THE AVIATOR USED MILITARY SHOVELS TO DIG A HOLE (FINE, GRAVELLY SOIL) APPROXIMATELY 0.6-0.7 METERS DEEP TO BURY THE PILOT. THE PILOT'S BODY WAS INTACT WITH CLOTHES AND SHOES ((OR BOOTS)). THEY THEN PILED DIRT IN A MOUND WHICH MEASURED APPROXIMATELY 0.2-0.3 METERS HIGHER THAN THE SURFACE OF THE GROUND. THEY DID NOT MARK THIS SPOT.

NEVERTHELESS, THIS LOCATION CAN BE DETERMINED USING A NUMBER

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OF IMPORTANT LANDMARKS, SUCH AS: THE 17TH COMPANY'S KITCHEN, THE STONE WALL, ONE LARGE, PARTIALLY DEAD TREE TO THE NORTHWEST (SURROUNDED BY A FIELD OF NEOHOUZEUA BAMBOO).

THE INDIVIDUALS WHO CONDUCTED THE BURIAL WERE (b)(6)

(b)(6)

((PAGE EIGHT))

THE INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE WITNESSES AND WHO ARE FAMILIAR WITH

(b)(6)

G2- BATTLE ON 18/05/1966 (SKETCH TWO):

INFORMATION FROM WITNESSES SUBORDINATE TO THE 10TH AAA BATTALION: ALL THE WITNESSES REMEMBERED THIS BATTLE BECAUSE IT OCCURRED BEFORE HO CHI MINH'S BIRTHDAY AND ALSO BECAUSE DURING (b)(6) THE 17TH COMPANY COMMANDER, WAS KILLED BY U.S. AIRCRAFT THAT WERE BOMBING THE 10TH AAA BATTALION'S FORMATION IN THE NOONG-MA AREA (SOUTH OF ROUTE 20 AT APPROXIMATELY KILOMETER MARKER 72); TO THE NORTH WAS SAN HAMLET ((BANR SAN)), AND TO THE EAST WAS PA-AC HAMLET ((BANR PA-ACS)). AN L-19 WAS SHOT DOWN AND ANOTHER AIRCRAFT WAS DAMAGED. THE UNIT DID NOT SEND ANYONE TO FIND AND CAPTURE OR BURY THE AVIATOR BECAUSE THE UNIT HAD MORTAL CASUALTIES AND BECAUSE THEY HAD TO RESOLVE THE BATTLE DAMAGE.

INFORMATION FROM (b)(6)

(b)(6) AT APPROXIMATELY 0700-0800, TWO L-19 AIRCRAFT WERE FLYING FROM XE PON TOWARD THE VIETNAM-LAOS BORDER, THEN IT CIRCLED BACK TO KILOMETER MARKER 68 AT THE VIETNAM-LAO BORDER. AT THAT POINT, THE 10TH AAA BATTALION OPENED FIRE AND STRUCK ONE AIRCRAFT CAUSING IT TO BREAK INTO TWO PIECES AND CRASH NEAR THE 5TH BATTALION COMMAND POST. THE SECOND AIRCRAFT WAS DAMAGED AND FLEW BACK TOWARD XE PON. A MOMENT LATER, MANY F-4'S, B-57'S, AD-6'S AND HELICOPTERS FLEW IN THE AREA OF THE 10TH AAA AND 5TH COMBAT ENGINEER BATTALIONS' POSITIONS SEARCHING FOR THE DOWNED AVIATOR.

(b)(6)

(b)(6) 5TH BATTALION DEPUTY COMMANDER, ALONG WITH (b)(6)

(b)(6) WENT TO FIND AND CAPTURE THE AVIATOR. IN PA-AC HAMLET, THE SEARCH TEAM DISCOVERED AN AVIATOR LYING BESIDE THE TRAIL. (b)(6) STOOD VIGILANT IN CASE THE AVIATOR WAS STILL ALIVE, WHILE (b)(6) USED THE COVER OF THE JACKFRUIT TREES, CRAWLING TO GET CLOSE TO THE AVIATOR. WHEN HE WAS STILL FIVE TO SIX METERS AWAY AND HE DID NOT SEE THE AVIATOR STIR, (b)(6)

(b)(6) THREW SMALL PEBBLES AT THE AVIATOR, BUT HE ((THE AVIATOR)) DID NOT REACT. (b)(6) ADVANCED NEAR THE AVIATOR AND PRESSED HIS GUN TO THE AVIATOR'S NECK AND DISCOVERED HE WAS DEAD. THE GROUP OF THREE INDIVIDUALS THEN DISCONNECTED AND COLLECTED THE PARACHUTE, REMOVED THE CLOTHING, AND TOOK THE IDENTIFICATION CARD (RANK CAPTAIN) (b)(6) ONE SHAVING RAZOR, ONE BOTTLE OF DRINKING WATER, ONE CAN ((OR BOX)) OF DRY COFFEE, FOUR CIGARETTES, ONE MAP WITH A MARK ON PA-AC HAMLET, ONE COLT REVOLVER ((LITERALLY, COLT 6)), ONE WRISTWATCH, AND ONE BUNCH OF KEYS. THEY ALSO REMOVED THE SHOES ((OR BOOTS)). ALL THE ABOVE ITEMS WERE TURNED OVER TO UPPER ECHELONS. THREE DAYS LATER, A GROUP INCLUDING (b)(6) RETURNED TO THAT LOCATION; ((THEY)) DUG A HOLE APPROXIMATELY 0.6-0.7 METERS DEEP (GRAVELLY SOIL) AND BURIED THE AVIATOR'S BODY IN ITS UNDERCLOTHES. THE BODY WAS

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(b)(6) THE GRAVE HAD A MOUND APPROXIMATELY 0.2-0.3 METERS HIGHER THAN THE SURFACE OF THE GROUND. THE GRAVE WAS LOCATED NEAR TWO JACKFRUIT TREES, APPROXIMATELY TEN METERS FROM THE TRAIL TO PA-AC HAMLET, AND APPROXIMATELY ONE KILOMETER SOUTH OF ROUTE 20. (b)(6) UNIT WAS STATIONED IN THIS OPERATING AREA FOR SIX TO SEVEN MONTHS ((AFTER THE INCIDENT)), SO THE ENTIRE 5TH BATTALION COMMAND POST KNEW THIS PLACE WAS IN PA-AC. ((PAGE NINE))

INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE BURIAL: (b)(6) (b)(6) DID NOT REMEMBER CLEARLY).

INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE INCIDENT AND WHO ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE TERRAIN INCLUDE: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

03- BATTLE ON 28/06/1966 IN NOONG-MA HAMLET (SKETCH THREE): MANY MILITARY MEMBERS SUBORDINATE TO THE 10TH AAA BATTALION REMEMBER THIS BATTLE FOR A NUMBER OF SPECIAL REASONS: THE AIRCRAFT TYPE WAS A B-26K (MR. THAN REMEMBERS CLEARLY THAT IT WAS T01-B26K ((SIC)); THE AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN NEAR THE GUN EMPLACEMENTS AND CAUSED A BIG FIRE, WHICH UNIT MEMBERS HAD TO EXTINGUISH; THREE AVIATORS WERE KILLED NEAR THE UNIT AND THE UNIT FINAL SECTION OF 03 MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR JTF-FA/J24A// SUBJ/TRANSLATION AND ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT: REPORT OF CORRELATES WITH LAO PRIORITY CASE 0323.

(1) CASE 0323: ON 29 APRIL 1966, MARINE CAPTAIN WILLIAM F. MULLEN WAS THE PILOT OF AN A-4E AIRCRAFT IN A FLIGHT OF THREE ON A DAYTIME STRIKE MISSION OVER KHAMMOUAN PROVINCE, LAOS. AS THE FLIGHT MADE A HIGH SPEED, LOW ALTITUDE RUN TO SALVO THEIR WEAPONS, THE FIRST TWO AIRCRAFT RECEIVED HEAVY, WELL DIRECTED FIRE AT THEIR PLANES AND CAPTAIN MULLEN'S AIRCRAFT WAS HIT BY GROUND FIRE JUST AFT OF THE CENTERLINE DROP TANK. THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE FLIGHT ENTERED A CLOUD FORMATION AND DID NOT SEE CAPTAIN MULLEN'S AIRCRAFT AGAIN. A FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER SAW SMOKE FROM THE VICINITY OF GRID COORDINATES XD180940, NEAR BAN TALI, NONGMA SUB-DISTRICT, BOULAPHA DISTRICT. SEARCH AND RESCUE (SAR) FORCES HEARD STRONG ELECTRONIC BEACON SIGNALS FROM THE TARGET AREA, BUT VOICE CONTACT WITH CAPTAIN MULLEN WAS NOT ESTABLISHED. CAPTAIN MULLEN IS UNACCOUNTED-FOR.

(2) THE INFORMATION PRESENTED IN SUBJECT REPORT CONCERNING THE A-4 SHOT DOWN NEAR BAN KATOK (XE113930) IN APRIL 1966 AND THE DEATH OF THE PILOT CORRELATES WELL THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 0323, BASED ON THE DATE, LOCATION, TYPE OF AIRCRAFT, AND RACE AND NAME OF THE CREWMEMBER INVOLVED. THIS INFORMATION IS CONSISTENT WITH WITNESS ACCOUNTS OBTAINED DURING PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS AND OHP INTERVIEWS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE. DURING JFA 95-1L, A JOINT TEAM LOCATED THE CASE 0323 CRASH SITE AT GRID COORDINATES XD181921 NEAR BAN TALI, APPROXIMATELY SEVEN KILOMETERS EAST OF BAN KATOK. REFS B THRU J REFER. A SEARCH OF JTF-FA FILES REVEALS CASE 0323 IS THE ONLY LOSS INCIDENT INVOLVING UNACCOUNTED-FOR CREWMEMBERS THAT OCCURRED ON 29 APRIL 1966 WITHIN 15 KILOMETERS OF BAN KATOK. (b)(6)

(b)(6) BY-NAME IDENTIFICATION OF THE CREWMEMBER KILLED ON

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29 APRIL 1966 NEAR BAN KATOK CONFIRMS CAPTAIN MULLEN DID NOT SURVIVE HIS LOSS INCIDENT.

B. THE BATTLE THAT OCCURRED ON 18 MAY 1966 ALONG ROUTE 20 NEAR BAN SAN (XE227083) AND BAN PA-AK, BDLAPHA DISTRICT, KHAMMOUAN PROVINCE. THIS INFORMATION CORRELATES WITH CASE 0343.

(1) ON 18 MAY 1966, AIR FORCE CAPTAIN LEE D. HARLEY, PILOT, AND AIRMAN SECOND CLASS ANDRE R. GUILLET, OBSERVER, WERE CREWMEMBERS ABOARD AN O-1F LIGHT OBSERVATION AIRCRAFT IN A FLIGHT OF TWO ON A DAYTIME, VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE AND FORWARD AIR CONTROL MISSION ALONG PAVN ROUTE 20 NEAR THE LAOS-VIETNAM BORDER. THE AIRCRAFT WAS APPARENTLY HIT BY AAA FIRE AND CRASHED IN THE VICINITY OF GRID COORDINATES XE256083, APPROXIMATELY TWO KILOMETERS NORTHEAST OF BAN SAN HAMLET. THE CREW OF THE OTHER AIRCRAFT IN THE FLIGHT OBSERVED THE BURNING WRECKAGE AND SAW NO SIGNS OF SURVIVORS. ANOTHER AIRCREW IN THE AREA REPORTED HEARING AN ELECTRONIC BEACON SIGNAL COMING FROM A VILLAGE NEAR THE CRASH SITE, BUT COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE SOURCE. SAR EFFORTS WERE SUSPENDED DUE TO HEAVY ENEMY GROUND FIRE IN THE AREA. CAPTAIN HARLEY AND AIRMAN GUILLET ARE UNACCOUNTED-FOR.

(2) AN ENTRY IN REF A DOCUMENT CREDITS COMPANY 15, 10 AAA BATTALION WITH SHOOTING DOWN THE CASE 0343 AIRCRAFT. THE ENTRY PROVIDES NO INFORMATION REGARDING THE FATE OF THE AIRCREW.

(3) THE INFORMATION PRESENTED IN SUBJECT REPORT CONCERNING THE L-19 (O-1) AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN IN MAY 1966 NEAR BAN SAN HAMLET CORRELATES WELL WITH THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS ASSOCIATED WITH CASE 0343 BASED ON THE DATE, LOCATION, APPROXIMATE TIME OF DAY, AIRCRAFT TYPE, NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT IN THE FLIGHT, AND THE RANK AND FATE OF ONE OF THE CREWMEMBERS INVOLVED. THIS INFORMATION IS CONSISTENT WITH WITNESS ACCOUNTS OBTAINED DURING PREVIOUS JOINT INVESTIGATIONS AND OHP INTERVIEWS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE. JOINT TEAMS HAVE NOT YET LOCATED THE CASE 0343 CRASH SITE OR A GRAVE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE. REFS H, I AND K THRU R REFER. A SEARCH OF JTF-FA FILES REVEALS CASE 0343 IS THE ONLY O-1 LOSS INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED WITHIN 15 KILOMETERS OF BAN SAN HAMLET.

C. THE BATTLE THAT OCCURRED ON JUNE 28 1966 NEAR BAN NONG MA, BOULAPHA DISTRICT, KHAMMOUAN PROVINCE. THIS INFORMATION CORRELATES

(b)(3):50 USC § 435

11 (b)(3):50 USC § 435 ON 28 JUNE 1966. (b)(3):50 USC § 435

(b)(3):50 USC § 435

CREWMEMBERS ABOARD AN A-26A ATTACK BOMBER IN A FLIGHT OF TWO ON AN DAYTIME, ARMED RECONNAISSANCE MISSION NEAR THE LAOS-VIETNAM BORDER. THE AIRCRAFT WAS HIT BY GROUND FIRE DURING A BOMBING RUN AND CRASHED IN THE VICINITY OF GRID COORDINATES XE192056, NEAR THE TA LE STREAM (NAM TA LE), AND ABOUT THREE KILOMETERS NORTHWEST OF ROUTE 20, BOULAPHA DISTRICT, KHAMMOUAN PROVINCE. THE CREW OF THE OTHER AIRCRAFT HEARD SAW NO PARACHUTES AND HEARD NO ELECTRONIC BEACON SIGNALS. SAR EFFORTS WERE NOT INITIATED.

(b)(3):50 USC § 435

ARE UNACCOUNTED-FOR.

(2) AN ENTRY IN REF A DOCUMENT CREDITS THE 10TH AAA BATTALION WITH SHOOTING DOWN THE (b)(3):50 USC § 435 THIS ENTRY PROVIDES NO INFORMATION REGARDING THE FATE OF THE CREWMEMBERS INVOLVED.

(3) THE INFORMATION PRESENTED IN SUBJECT REPORT

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CONCERNING THE B-26K (A-26A) AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN NEAR BAN NONG MA IN JUNE 1966 CORRELATES WELL WITH THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOSS ASSOCIATED WITH [REDACTED] BASED ON THE DATE, LOCATION, AIRCRAFT TYPE, AND THE NUMBER OF THE CREWMEMBERS INVOLVED. THIS INFORMATION IS CONSISTENT WITH WITNESS ACCOUNTS OBTAINED DURING PREVIOUS JOINT INVESTIGATIONS AND OHP INTERVIEWS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE. JOINT TEAMS HAVE NOT YET LOCATED [REDACTED] CRASH SITE OR ANY GRAVES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE. REFS D, H, I O, P AND S THRU U REFER. A SEARCH OF JTF-FA FILES REVEALS [REDACTED] IS THE ONLY A-26 LOSS INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED WITHIN 15 KILOMETERS OF BAN NONG MA HAMLET.

D. THE BATTLE THAT OCCURRED IN DECEMBER 1966 OR JANUARY 1967 NEAR KILOMETER MARKER 15 ON PAVN ROUTE 20. THIS INFORMATION CORRELATES WITH CASES 0571 AND 0572.

(1) CASE 0571: ON 17 JANUARY 1967, AIR FORCE CAPTAIN WILLIAM K. COGDELL WAS THE PILOT OF A T-28 AIRCRAFT IN A FLIGHT OF TWO THAT WAS DIVERTED TO CONDUCT A SAR MISSION FOR THE PILOT OF A DOWNED O-1F AIRCRAFT (CASE 0572) IN NORTHERN SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE. THE AIRCRAFT WAS HIT BY AAA FIRE AND CRASHED IN THE INFORMATION THAT IS NOT YET TRULY COMPLETE OR IS ONE-SIDED, IF APPLICABLE. THIS WILL BE HELPFUL BECAUSE THE INCIDENTS OCCURRED SUCH A LONG TIME AGO (33 YEARS) IN THE CONTEXT OF FIERCE BOMBING. AFTER THE INCIDENTS, THE WITNESSES EXPERIENCED EVEN MORE FIERCE BATTLES AND NOW THEY ARE ADVANCED IN AGE, WITH DIMINISHED MEMORIES.

- TRILATERAL OPERATIONS HAVE RECOMMENDED THAT A NUMBER OF WITNESSES GO TO LAOS TO DETERMINE AVIATORS' BURIAL LOCATIONS. HOWEVER, THESE WITNESSES SAID THE TIME ALLOTTED FOR THEM ((TO LOCATE THE GRAVES)) WAS TOO LITTLE (UNDER AN HOUR) AND THE TERRAIN HAD CHANGED GREATLY IN OVER 30 YEARS. THEY TRULY NEED TIME TO RE-LOCATE AREAS WITH WHICH THEY WERE FAMILIAR (PLACES WHERE THEIR UNITS WERE STATIONED, BATTLE FORMATION DEPLOYMENT AREAS, ETC.), AND FROM THERE THEY CAN CHOOSE ONE OR SEVERAL POINTS WITH WHICH THEY ARE FAMILIAR, THEN DETERMINE THE AVIATORS' BURIAL LOCATIONS WITH THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF CERTAINTY. THERE SHOULD BE AN ALLOTTED TIME OF TWO TO THREE DAYS FOR THE WITNESSES IN THE AREA OF THE SITE. WHEN IT IS POSSIBLE, DEPLOY AT LEAST TWO WITNESSES TO PARTICIPATE TOGETHER IN A SEARCH OPERATION SO THEY CAN SUPPORT EACH OTHER IN DETERMINING THE LOCATION IN AN EASIER AND MORE TIMELY MANNER. ((WE)) SHOULD CREATE CONDITIONS FOR THE WITNESSES TO CONTACT THE LOCAL POPULACE. THE SPECIALISTS FROM THE THREE SIDES MUST ACCOMPANY THE WITNESSES TO SUPPORT THEM AND ENSURE THEIR SECURITY.

THE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM REPORTS THE RESULTS OF THE ACTIVITY PHASE AND WISHES TO SUGGEST THAT THE DIRECTORS OF THE VNOSMP REVIEW THE ABOVE RECOMMENDATIONS AND COORDINATE THEM WITH THE CONCERNED PARTIES SO THAT SUBSEQUENT MISSION PHASES ACHIEVE GOOD RESULTS.

HANOI, 16/01/1999

REPRESENTING UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION TEAM IV

TEAM LEADER

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((END TRANSLATION))//

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