

SPECIAL
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PER DAM ONLY

COPY NUMBER--10

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ROU: ME
R 270-342 APR 89
FM CIA/DDO
TO DIA//PW-MIA/ROBERT DESTATTE

ZYUW RUEATIA0063 1170512

~~SECRET~~
SECTION 1 OF 5
CITESUBJECT: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION ON POW/MIA LIVE SIGHTINGS,
DOG TAGS AND REMAINS

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM VARIOUS VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE, BORDER SMUGGLERS AND CASUAL SOURCES ON POW/MIA LIVE SIGHTINGS, DOG TAGS AND REMAINS. INFORMATION WAS PASSED AS NOTED TO JCRC AND/OR STONY BEACH. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO USE THIS INFORMATION WITH JCRC AND STONY BEACH.

2. WE ARE FORWARDING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON 15 VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE SOURCES AND FOUR BORDER SMUGGLERS WHO HAVE PROVIDED VARIOUS TYPES OF LIVE SIGHTING, DOG TAG/REMAINS REPORTING ON THE MIA/POW ISSUE. ALL INTERVIEWS WERE CONDUCTED BY [REDACTED] WHICH PASSED THE LEADS TO JCRC AND STONY BEACH FOR FOLLOWUP ACTION ON THE DATES NOTED BELOW WITH NO FURTHER FORMAL DISSEMINATION.

A. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE

[REDACTED] CLAIMED HE SAW AN AMERICAN LIVING WITH ETHNIC TRIBESMEN IN OCTOBER 1983 NEAR DAC TO VILLAGE, BAN ME THUOT PROVINCE. THE AMERICAN WAS DESCRIBED AS A CAUCASIAN WITH LIEUTENANT COLONEL RANK WHO WAS SHOT DOWN IN 1972. THERE HAVE BEEN MANY STORIES ABOUT AMERICANS LIVING WITH ETHNIC TRIBESMEN IN THIS AREA. THEY ARE OFTEN ATTRIBUTED TO AN INDIAN SUPPOSEDLY LIVING IN THE AREA. [REDACTED] ALSO REPORTED THAT IN OCTOBER 1984 HE SAW THREE AMERICANS IN SA HUYNH DISTRICT, QUANG NGAI PROVINCE. THE THREE AMERICANS WERE WORKING ON AN OIL PROJECT ON "HAI NAM" (PROBABLY HAINAM) ISLAND WHEN A STORM SENT THEM ADRIFT. ONE OF THE AMERICANS WAS [REDACTED] AS OF EARLY 1985, THE THREE AMERICANS WERE MOVED TO HANOI. [REDACTED] PROVIDED THE NAMES:

DOG TAGS FOR THE ABOVE NAMED INDIVIDUALS WERE TURNED OVER TO [REDACTED] OF THE INTERIOR MINISTRY IN HO CHI MINH CITY (HCMC). [REDACTED] HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A CHIEF INSPECTOR [REDACTED] WAS MOVED TO PHANAT NIKHOM ON 20 JANUARY 1988. INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO JCRC AND STONY BEACH ON 9 MARCH 1988.

B. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE

[REDACTED] CLAIMED HEARSAY FROM [REDACTED] ABOUT THE SINKING OF AN AMERICAN SHIP OFF THE COAST OF NGOC HIEN DISTRICT, MINH HAI PROVINCE. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] A NUMBER OF AMERICAN BODIES WERE NOT RECOVERED FROM THAT VESSEL. [REDACTED] WAS MOVED TO [REDACTED] INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO JCRC AND STONY BEACH ON 9 MARCH 1988.

C. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE

[REDACTED] CLAIMED AN ACQUAINTANCE HELD THE REMAINS OF ONE AMERICAN. [REDACTED] SAID THE ACQUAINTANCE COULD BE CONTACTED THROUGH HIS FAMILY AT [REDACTED] WAS MOVED TO PHANAT NIKHOM ON 20 JANUARY 1988. INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO JCRC AND STONY BEACH ON 9 MARCH 1988.

D. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE

[REDACTED] A FORMER ARVN CAPTAIN, CLAIMED HIS SISTER [REDACTED] HAD INFORMATION ABOUT THE REMAINS OF ONE AMERICAN. SHE COULD BE CONTACTED AT [REDACTED] WAS MOVED TO PHANAT

ACTION DIA/SPEC(10)

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NIKHOM ON 20 JANUARY 1988. INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO JCRC AND STONY BEACH ON 9 MARCH 1988.

E. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE

[REDACTED] CLAIMED A NEIGHBOR [REDACTED] HELD THE REMAINS OF ONE AMERICAN AT HIS HOME IN SAIGON. [REDACTED] REPORTEDLY TURNED THE REMAINS OVER TO GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES AND HOPED TO BE RESETTLED VIA THE ODP PROGRAM. [REDACTED] WAS MOVED TO PHANAT NIKHOM ON 20 JANUARY 1988. INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO JCRC AND STONY BEACH ON 9 MARCH 1988.

F. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE

[REDACTED] CLAIMED THAT WHILE IN REEDUCATION CAMPS IN YEN BAY AND HOANG LIEN SON HE CAME ACROSS A WHITE AMERICAN USING THE NAME "TRAN VAN NAM." AT THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 776TH UNIT WHICH WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTROLLING THE CAMP, [REDACTED] SAW NAM AND A BLACK MAN. ACCORDING TO GUARDS, THESE TWO AMERICANS VOLUNTEERED TO REMAIN AFTER THE WAR. IN EARLY 1980, WHILE IN HOA LO PRISON, [REDACTED] CLAIMED HE SAW TWO AMERICANS (ONE YOUNG AND ONE OLD). [REDACTED] STATED THAT HE CONTACTED THEM BY MORSE CODE AND THE TWO AMERICANS WERE VICTIMS OF A SHIPWRECK IN 1975 POSSIBLY NEAR CON SON. TUAT WAS INVOLVED IN SEARCHING FOR AMERICAN REMAINS AND CLAIMED INFORMATION ON NEARLY 40 SETS OF REMAINS, MOST OF WHICH WERE TURNED OVER TO VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES. [REDACTED] ALSO MENTIONED A HELICOPTER CRASH SITE ALONG THE BANK OF A RIVER NEAR THE BIEN HOA-PHUOC LONG-SONG BINH PROVINCIAL BOUNDARIES. [REDACTED] PRODUCED ONE NAME BUT WAS NOT SURE IT WAS CORRECT:

[REDACTED] WAS MOVED TO PHANAT NIKHOM ON 20 JANUARY 1988. INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO JCRC AND STONY BEACH ON 9 MARCH 1988.

G. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE

[REDACTED] CLAIMED TO HAVE INFORMATION ABOUT TWO SETS OF AMERICAN REMAINS BURIED IN HOC MON. [REDACTED] ALSO CLAIMED THAT HIS RELATIVES HELD ONE AMERICAN DOG TAG. [REDACTED] WAS MOVED TO PHANAT NIKHOM ON 20 JANUARY 1988. INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO JCRC AND STONY BEACH ON 9 MARCH 1988.

H. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE

[REDACTED] CLAIMED TO HAVE SEEN AN AMERICAN BETWEEN SEPTEMBER 1976 AND FEBRUARY 1978 AT THE CATHEDRAL IN SAIGON. THE AMERICAN WAS NAMED [REDACTED] WAS REPORTEDLY AN "INTERNATIONAL VOLUNTARY STUDENT" WHO WAS ALLOWED TO REMAIN AFTER THE WAR. [REDACTED] REPORTEDLY LIVED AT THE FAUCAUD MONASTERY ON CUONG DE STREET, HCMC. [REDACTED] WAS MOVED TO PHANAT NIKHOM ON 20 JANUARY 1988.

~~SECRET~~
SECTION 2 OF 5
CITE~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION ON POW/MIA LIVE SIGHTINGS, INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO JCRC AND STONY BEACH ON 9 MARCH 1988.

I. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE

[REDACTED] CLAIMED HIS AUNT [REDACTED] HAD INFORMATION ON AMERICAN REMAINS. THE AUNT LIVED AT [REDACTED] WAS MOVED TO PHANAT NIKHOM ON 20 JANUARY 1988. INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO JCRC AND STONY BEACH ON 9 MARCH 1988.

J. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE

[REDACTED] TURNED OVER ONE DOG TAG AND EIGHT RUBBINGS OF THE FOLLOWING NAMES:

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COPY NUMBER-----

ENLISTED MAN [] HAD CONTACTED OUR CHIANG MAI OFFICE. [] REPORTED THAT A FRIEND, "A FORMER LPA SOLDIER," HAD LOCATED THE BODY OF A U.S. MARINE IN LAOS. DOG TAG IS WITH THE REMAINS. DOG TAG READS: [] THIS INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO STONY BEACH TEAM.

7 IN EARLY SEPTEMBER 1988, A JAPANESE REPRESENTATIVE NAMED [] RECEIVED A LETTER FROM A LAO BUSINESS CONTACT NAMED [] WHICH REPORTED ON THE PRESENCE OF A LARGE NUMBER OF LIVE U.S. POW'S ALONG THE LAO/VIETNAMESE BORDER. TWO NAMES WERE PROVIDED: []

[] THIS INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO THE U.S. EMBASSY DAO OFFICE IN BANGKOK.

8. ON 22 SEPTEMBER 1988, OUR [] OFFICE WAS APPROACHED BY A FORMER CONTACT [] WITH POW/MIA RELATED INFORMATION. []

~~SECRET~~
FINAL SECTION OF 5
CITE []

SUBJECT: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION ON POW/MIA LIVE SIGHTINGS, SAKHON NAKHON PROVINCE. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO STONY BEACH. [] HAS AN ALLEGED JAW BONE FRAGMENT OF A PURPORTED UNIDENTIFIED U.S. POW. [] HE CLAIMS HE RECEIVED THE BONE FRAGMENT FROM UNSPECIFIED PERSONS IN NAKHON PHANOM PROVINCE WHO ALSO CLAIMED TO HAVE A DOG TAG WHICH APPARENTLY WAS FOUND AT THE SAME SITE AS THE BONE FRAGMENT. [] HAS A LIST OF 25 ALLEGED LIVE POWS IN LAOS-VIETNAM WHICH PURPORTEDLY WAS GIVEN TO A THAI DISTRICT OFFICIAL IN USON PROVINCE IN MAY 1988 BY A DRIVER (REF) OF LAO DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NOUNAK PHOUMSAVAN. [] ALSO HAS A LETTER FROM AN ETHNIC LAO RESIDENT OF THE U.S. NAMED [] CLAIMS TO HAVE CONTACT WITH UNIDENTIFIED U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHO HAVE OFFERED A REWARD OF ONE MILLION U.S. DOLLARS AND U.S. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT TO THE LAO RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN EXCHANGE FOR THE RETURN OF A LIVE POW. [] LETTER IS WRITTEN ON STATIONERY OF THE "NATIONAL MORREPLAN ORGANIZATION."

[] WAS PREPARED TO ASSIST IN ARRANGING A MEETING BETWEEN [] AND A STONY BEACH REPRESENTATIVE IF DESIRED. IN THE PAST, [] HAD PROVIDED POW/MIA RELATED INFORMATION WHICH WAS NOT ACCURATE. HE ALSO PROVIDED INTRODUCTIONS TO OTHER PERSONS WHOSE CLAIMED ACCESS TO POW INFORMATION WAS NOT ESTABLISHED.

[] BELOW IS A LIST OF 25 NAMES OF THE ALLEGED POW'S PROVIDED BY [] SOME OF THE NAMES ARE ILLEGIBLE AND THE SPELLINGS ARE PRESENTED AS LISTED. A COPY OF THE LIST IS ALSO AVAILABLE. THE NAMES INCLUDE:

9. ON 30 DECEMBER 1988, STONY BEACH AND JCRC WERE PASSED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FROM A []

[] ON 3 DECEMBER, [] EACH WITH SOMETHING LESS THAN ONE YEAR IN THAILAND. SAID THEY EXPECT TO HAVE TWO POWS IN HAND FROM LAOS IN LESS THAN ONE WEEK. []

[] HIS INTEREST IN POW/MIA AFFAIRS STEMS FROM HIS BEING THE NEPHEW OF DAVID HRDLICKA, WHOSE NAME POPS UP OFTEN AS BEING ALIVE IN LAOS. [] IS THE NEPHEW OF [] HE HAS NO APPARENT SOURCE OF INCOME, AND LIVES ACCORDINGLY. HIS INTEREST IN POW/MIA AFFAIRS IS STRICTLY MONETARY, AND MOST DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM REVOLVE AROUND HOW TO GET THE "REWARD MONEY" OFFERED BY POW ACTIVISTS IN THE U.S. ACCORDING TO THESE TWO, THEY HAVE CO-OPTED AN INVOLVED RESCUE OPERATION THAT BEGAN IN THE HANDS OF COLONEL JACK BAILEY (REF.) SOME TIME AGO. THE THAI CONNECTION IS THROUGH A "MR. CHAI," DETAILS UNKNOWN. THE LAO-CONNECTION IS A "FOUR STAR GENERAL" WHO RUNS THE PRISON CAMP WHERE THE TWO ARE HELD. THE SCAM REVOLVES AROUND THE FOUR STAR GENERAL, WHO WANTS TO RELEASE THE PRISONERS IN RETURN FOR HELP FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IN DEMOCRATIZING HIS COUNTRY. HIS MOTIVATION, IN A WORD, IS POWER. BUT NOBODY IN THIS WONDERFUL OPERATION TRUSTS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, SO THE PROBLEM IS HOW TO GET U.S. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT AND COOPERATION WITHOUT LETTING THE U.S. GOVERNMENT KNOW IT IS HELPING THE GENERAL.

10. NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

11. []

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COPY NUMBER-10

ROUTINE

R 282323Z MAR 90

FM CIA/DDO

TO DIA WASHINGTON DC//PW-MIA ATTN COL JOE SCHLATTER

ZYUW RUEAIIA8667 0872322

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SUBJECT: MIA REMAINS IN XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCE, LAOS

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM A SOURCE WITH GOOD ACCESS WHOSE REPORTING HAS OFTEN BEEN SUBSTANTIATED, WHO OBTAINED IT FROM AN OCCASIONAL CONTACT, A MEMBER OF AN ETHNIC MINORITY GROUP IN LAOS. THIS INFORMATION IS BEING PASSED TO STONY BEACH AND JCRC.

2. AT AN UNREPORTED TIME IN THE PAST AN AIRCRAFT CRASHED ABOUT 20 KILOMETERS FROM THE LAO-VIETNAMESE BORDER AT A SITE NEAR BAN (VILLAGE) PA KHAH (SIC), MUANG (TOWN) NONG HET, XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCE, LAOS. IN SEPTEMBER 1989 A COMPLETE SET OF REMAINS WERE FOUND AT THIS CRASH SITE. THE REMAINS PURPORTEDLY ARE OF A PILOT NAMED FRANK A. GOULD, SERIAL NUMBER [REDACTED] (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: THE SOURCE DID NOT INDICATE WHETHER THE REMAINS WERE IDENTIFIED BY A DOG TAG OR OTHER MEANS. THE CONTACT INDICATED THAT HE WOULD RETURN WITH THE REMAINS "IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS.")

3. [REDACTED]

4. CLASSIFIED BY SIGNER. [REDACTED]

104 Release TO PW-MIA 3/29/90 10:50 (Su)

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ACTION DIA/SPEC(10)

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PAGE 1 OF 1
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SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP ON MIA INFORMATION -- FRANK A. GOULD

REF:

1. THE FOLLOWING HAS BEEN PASSED TO JCRC BANGKOK BY OUR CHIANG
MAI OFFICE:

"PURSUANT TO OUR EARLIER MEMO ON MIA FRANK A. GOULD, WE NOW
HAVE HIS DOG TAG, HIS USG IDENTIFICATION CARD AND SEVERAL OTHER
ITEMS YOU WILL PROBABLY BE INTERESTED IN. IF YOU WOULD SEND ONE OF
YOUR REPRESENTATIVES TO OUR OFFICE IN CHIANG MAI, WE WILL GIVE HIM
THESE ITEMS, BRIEF HIM ON THE BACKGROUND OF THE CASE, AND GIVE HIM
THE NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE INDIVIDUAL HE CAN CONTACT FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION. REQUEST YOU ADVISE WHEN YOUR REP WILL BE ARRIVING.
REGARDS."

2. CLASSIFIED BY SIGNER.

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1cy Release TO PW-MIA 4/17/90 0935

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MCN=90107/01201

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PAGE 1 OF 1
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

29 October 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
 Assistant to the President for
 National Security Affairs

SUBJECT : Background Data Possibly Relevant to the
 Current Vietnamese Communist Prisoner
 Exchange Overture

1. The current Vietnamese Communist overtures on possible prisoner exchanges, covered in our memoranda of 27 and 28 October, seems to relate to the earlier BUTTERCUP activity that began in August 1967. We have checked the voluminous BUTTERCUP file and found three items of possible relevance. The pertinent traffic should be contained in your records, but in the interests of time and convenience we are repeating it here.

2. The January 1968 Letters. On 3 January 1968, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Richard Steadman was given five letters prepared in Washington for passage to five American citizens believed to be in VC hands. The pertinent message here is Secretary Rusk's cable to Ambassador Bunker transmitted on 3 January 1968 as

"Five letters to US personnel who may be held by VC being carried by Steadman for delivery to Calhoun. Steadman traveling with General William Depuy. ETA Saigon 1330 local January 4 on Braniff military charter flight 241. In view shortness of time suggest envelope be picked up from Steadman upon arrival Saigon.

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"Letters are addressed to following US personnel:
(Dates shown are date of casualty, which may be same
as date of capture if men are in fact prisoners.)

[]
John F. Conlon III, Capt. 79318, AF,
4 March 1966

David S. Demmon, SP4, 563 73 772, Army,
9 June 1965

William F. Eisenbraun, Capt. 04074803,
Army, 5 July 1965.

Douglas K. Ramsey, Foreign Service Officer,
17 January 1966

"Eisenbraun and Ramsey are confirmed prisoners.
[] Conlon, and Demmon are listed as missing in action,
but in each instance there is some reason to hope that
service man is actually prisoner of VC. Families unaware
letters being sent by this route."

~~SECRET~~/ []

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

4. The February 1968 List. In January and February 1968 there was much discussion about giving the courier for passage to Tran Bach Dang a list of US prisoners whose release we desired as part of any exchange. The most important message here is Secretary Rusk's 7 February 1968 cable to Ambassador Bunker transmitted as [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

"List of names to send to [REDACTED] should be drawn from list of US prisoners we have identified as held by the VC (18 at present). Since [REDACTED] has been specific with his lists we believe we should also be precise. We recognize problem of choosing among prisoners, and accordingly propose that we select those who have been held two years or longer. This would be a total of ten names: five officers, four EM, one civilian. There is a time gap of eight months between the most recent capture on the list of ten (January 1966) and the next most recent captures (August 1966). From released prisoners we know that the longer a man is held, the more likely he is to be seriously ill. In the absence of reliable information on the health of individual prisoners, a selection by duration of captivity appears to be fairest. Accordingly, the following list should be sent [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] with the request that at least three of the named prisoners be released. Message should also state that we would particularly like to have any prisoners who may be seriously sick or injured, whether or not their names are on list. (Date in each case is date of capture, and should not be transmitted to VC.)

Begin list:

T/Sgt Samuel Adams, AF, 31 Oct 65

Capt. Donald Gilbert Cook, MC, 31 Dec 64

Capt. William Forbes Eisenbraun, Army,

6 July 65

Pvt. Robert Russell Garwood, MC, 28 Sept 65

Capt. Lawrence Thomas Holland, AF,

12 June 65

SP/4 James Henry McLean, Army, 9 Feb 65

~~SECRET~~

M/Sgt Thomas Moore, AF, 31 Oct 65
Douglas K. Ramsey, Civ., 17 Jan 66
Capt. James Nicholas Rowe, Army,
29 Oct 63
Capt. Floyd James Thompson, Army,
26 Mar 64

"Believe we should inform Thieu of plan to send list
and give him opportunity to provide similar list of ARVN
prisoners."

6. The January 1969 List. In a later BUTTERCUP development,
on 30 January 1969 Secretary Rogers sent Ambassador Bunker the
following list of twenty names "suitable to give to VC with request that
they release ten of them in exchange for the four they have requested."
 info copies to Dr. Kissinger and Secretary Laird):

TSGT Samuel Adams, 18554000, AF,
October 31, 1965
Michael D. Bengé, Civilian,
January 31, 1968
SGT Richard Gordon Burgess, 2084229, MC,
September 25, 1966
MAJ Donald Gilbert Cook, 072794, MC,
December 31, 1964

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

Gary Daves, Civilian, January 31, 1968
 1st LT David Ronald Devers, 05321911,
 Army. August 13, 1966

[REDACTED]
 TSGT Charles Gale Dusing, 17203698,
 AF, October 31, 1965
 SGT Edwin Russel Grissett, Jr., 1938579,
 MC, January 22, 1966
 MAJ Lawrence Thomas Holland, 57577,
 AF, June 12, 1965
 Philip W. Manhard, Civilian, January 31, 1968
 SP4 James Henry McLean, 19722072, Army,
 February 9, 1965
 MSGT Thomas Moore, 14268347, AF,
 October 31, 1965
 SFC John Joseph O'Neill, 11212494, Army,
 August 13, 1966
 Thomas W. Ragsdale, Civilian, January 31, 1968
 Douglas Ramsey, Civilian, January 17, 1966
 SP5 Edward Daniel Reilly, Jr., 23933241, Army,
 April 26, 1966
 CAPT Floyd James Thompson, 05304076, Army,
 March 26, 1964
 Eugene Weaver, Civilian, January 31, 1968
 Charles Willis, Civilian, January 31, 1968

7. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the above list
 of twenty names was never passed to the Communists. Three of the names
 on the February 1968 list of ten were not included in the January 1969 list
 of twenty: US Army Captain Rowe, who escaped on 31 December 1968,
 US Army Captain William E. Eisenbraun (also an addressee of one of
 the five January 1968 letters) and USMC Private Robert R. Garwood.

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

8. I am sending copies of this memorandum on an eyes only basis to the other three recipients of my 27 and 28 October memoranda, namely, Secretary Rogers, Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer.

[REDACTED]
Richard Helms
Director

cc: Secretary Rogers
Secretary Laird ✓
Admiral Moorer ✓

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~SENATE - D.S.S. JCS PAPERS~~~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

29 October 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
 Assistant to the President for
 National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Background Data Possibly Relevant to the
 Current Vietnamese Communist Prisoner
 Exchange Overture

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"Five letters to US personnel who may be held by VC being carried by Steadman for delivery to Calhoun. Steadman traveling with General William Depuy. ETA Saigon 1330 local January 4 on Braniff military charter flight 241. In view shortness of time suggest envelope be picked up from Steadman upon arrival Saigon.

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~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

"Letters are addressed to following US personnel:
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[REDACTED]

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4 March 1966

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Army, 5 July 1965

Douglas K. Ramsey, Foreign Service Officer,
17 January 1966

"Eisenbraun and Ramsey are confirmed prisoners.

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but in each instance there is some reason to hope that
service man is actually prisoner of VC. Families unaware
letters being sent by this route."

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Capt. Donald Gilbert Cook, MC, 31 Dec 64
Capt. William Forbes Eisenbraun, Army,
6 July 65
Pvt. Robert Russell Garwood, MC, 28 Sept 65
Capt. Lawrence Thomas Holland, AF,
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SP/4 James Henry McLean, Army, 9 Feb 65

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

M/Sgt Thomas Moore, AF, 31 Oct 65
Douglas K. Ramsey, Civ., 17 Jan 66
Capt. James Nicholas Rowe, Army,
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Capt. Floyd James Thompson, Army,
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"Believe we should inform Thieu of plan to send list
and give him opportunity to provide similar list of ARVN
prisoners."

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on 30 January 1969 Secretary Rogers sent Ambassador Bunker the
following list of twenty names "suitable to give to VC with request that
they release ten of them in exchange for the four they have requested."
[REDACTED] info copies to Dr. Kissinger and Secretary Laird):

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October 31, 1965
Michael D. Bengé, Civilian,
January 31, 1968
SGT Richard Gordon Burgess, 2084229, MC,
September 25, 1966
MAJ Donald Gilbert Cook, 072794, MC,
December 31, 1964

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

Gary Daves, Civilian, January 31, 1968
1st LT David Ronald Devers, 05321911,
Army, August 13, 1966

[REDACTED]
TSGT Charles Gale Dusing, 17203698,
AF, October 31, 1965
SGT Edwin Russel Grissett, Jr., 1938579,
MC, January 22, 1966
MAJ Lawrence Thomas Holland, 57577,
AF, June 12, 1965
Philip W. Manhard, Civilian, January 31, 1968
SP4 James Henry McLean, 19722072, Army,
February 9, 1965
MSGT Thomas Moore, 14268347, AF,
October 31, 1965
SFC John Joseph O'Neill, 11212494, Army,
August 13, 1966
Thomas W. Ragsdale, Civilian, January 31, 1968
Douglas Ramsey, Civilian, January 17, 1966
SP5 Edward Daniel Reilly, Jr., 23933241, Army,
April 26, 1966
CAPT Floyd James Thompson, 05304076, Army,
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Eugene Weaver, Civilian, January 31, 1968
Charles Willis, Civilian, January 31, 1968


7. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the above list of twenty names was never passed to the Communists. Three of the names on the February 1968 list of ten were not included in the January 1969 list of twenty: US Army Captain Rowe, who escaped on 31 December 1968, US Army Captain William E. Eisenbraun (also an addressee of one of the five January 1968 letters) and USMC Private Robert R. Garwood.

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ 

8. I am sending copies of this memorandum on an eyes only basis to the other three recipients of my 27 and 28 October memoranda, namely, Secretary Rogers, Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer.


Richard Helms
Director

cc: Secretary Rogers
Secretary Laird
Admiral Moorer ✓

- 6 -

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

29 October 1971

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Background Data Possibly Relevant to the
Current Vietnamese Communist Prisoner
Exchange Overture

1. The current Vietnamese Communist overtures on possible prisoner exchanges, covered in our memoranda of 27 and 28 October, seems to relate to the earlier BUTTERCUP activity that began in August 1967. We have checked the voluminous BUTTERCUP file and found three items of possible relevance. The pertinent traffic should be contained in your records, but in the interests of time and convenience we are repeating it here.

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"Five letters to US personnel who may be held by VC being carried by Steadman for delivery to Calhoun. Steadman traveling with General William Depuy. ETA Saigon 1330 local January 4 on Braniff military charter flight 241. In view shortness of time suggest envelope be picked up from Steadman upon arrival Saigon.

982010-1647

0935

~~SECRET~~

"Letters are addressed to following US personnel:
(Dates shown are date of casualty, which may be same
as date of capture if men are in fact prisoners.)

John F. Conlon III, Capt. 79318, AF,
4 March 1966

David S. Demmon, SP4, 563 73 772, Army,
9 June 1965

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"Eisenbraun and Ramsey are confirmed prisoners.
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982010-1648

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~~SECRET~~

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Capt. William Forbes Eisenbraun, Army,
6 July 65
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 1st LT David Ronald Devers, 05321911,
 Army, August 13, 1966

TSGT Charles Gale Dusing, 17203698,
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7. [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] and the above list of twenty names was never passed to the Communists. Three of the names on the February 1968 list of ten were not included in the January 1969 list of twenty: US Army Captain Rowe, who escaped on 31 December 1968, US Army Captain William E. Eisenbraun (also an addressee of one of the five January 1968 letters) and USMC Private Robert R. Garwood.

982010 - 1651

3 0939

~~SECRET~~ 

8. I am sending copies of this memorandum on an eyes only basis to the other three recipients of my 27 and 28 October memoranda, namely, Secretary Rogers, Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer.


Richard Helms
Director

cc: Secretary Rogers
Secretary Laird
Admiral Moorer ✓

- 6 -

~~SEC~~

982010-1652

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~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

1 August 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR: NAME
DIA/POW-MIA

SUBJECT: POW-MIA Handwriting Analysis, [REDACTED]


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REFERENCE: Memo dated 24 July 1991 [REDACTED]

1. As requested, the [REDACTED] has completed the handwriting examination on the submitted photocopied known exemplars of John L. Robertson, Larry J. Stevens, and Albro L. Lundy Jr. with the submitted photographs, photocopies of photographs, and submitted questioned handwriting exemplars (1 original and 2 photocopied) received from Southeast Asia, allegedly from U.S. Prisoners of War. The questioned handwriting letters allegedly from John L. Robertson are dated 18-10-1990, the letters allegedly from Larry J. Stevens are dated 18-10-90, and the letters allegedly from Albro L. Lundy Jr. are dated 25-11-90. In one of the two submitted photographs there are three individuals standing together holding a sign that reads "Photo, LD -25-5-1990, NNTK!, K.B.E -19.", and in the other photograph there is a male individual in what appears to be a camouflage-type uniform with the name "GONZALES, FREDRIEC" on the collar. On the photograph that has been photocopied there are five standing individuals holding signs that bear names and other data written on them. [REDACTED]

2. The handwriting examination on the known submitted handwriting exemplars described above with the questioned letters purportedly from U.S. Prisoners of War revealed nothing of significance which would indicate that the authors of the known genuine handwriting exemplars (Robertson, Stevens, Lundy) prepared those letters that are in question. However, a definite conclusion could not be reached due to the fact that the genuine known exemplars, as well as, two of the questioned submissions are multi-generational photocopies vice originally prepared handwriting. [REDACTED]

CIA-910801-633



0307

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SUBJECT: POW-MIA Handwriting Analysis [REDACTED]

3. A few handwriting characteristics in common were observed in the handwriting of the letters purportedly from John L. Robertson, the photograph of the individual with the name GONZALES, FREDRIEC written on the collar, and on the photograph of five individuals holding signs, which would indicate that this author could not be eliminated as the possible writer on all three of these submissions. [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED] will retain photocopies of the submitted specimens in the event additional material becomes available for comparison. [REDACTED]

5. For further comments or questions, please contact the undersigned on [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

[REDACTED]

982010-108
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

29 October 1971



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MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

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Exchange Overture

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/s/
Richard Helms
Director

cc: Secretary Rogers
Secretary Laird
Admiral Moorer

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PRIORITY NODIS BUTTERCUP
FROM SECSTATE

TO ANBASSADOR BUNKER SAIGON

THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVE FOR MR. KISSINGER

SECDEF, EXCLUSIVE FOR SECRETARY LAIRD

DIRECTOR, CIA, EXCLUSIVE FOR MR. HELMS

REF SAIGON 240330Z JAN 69 (BUNKER 214)

1. CONCUR YOUR PROPOSED HANDLING AS SET FORTH REFTEL.
2. FOLLOWING IS LIST OF TWENTY NAMES (13 MILITARY, 7 CIVILIANS) SUITABLE TO GIVE TO VC WITH REQUEST THAT THEY RELEASE TEN OF THEM IN EXCHANGE FOR THE FOUR THEY HAVE REQUESTED. WE RECOMMEND ENTIRE LIST BE GIVEN TO VC, RATHER THAN OURSELVES SELECTING TEN. LIST INCLUDES SERIAL NUMBER, BRANCH OF SERVICE, AND CURRENT RANK FOR MILITARY PRISONERS, AND DATE OF CAPTURE FOR ALL OF THEM. SINCE RANKS HAVE CHANGED FOR SOME OF THE GROUP, WE RECOMMEND THAT THEY BE OMITTED WHEN LIST IS HANDED OVER. ALSO RECOMMEND THAT DATE OF CAPTURE BE OMITTED. BEGIN LIST:
TSOT SAMUEL ADAMS, 18554060, AF, OCTOBER 31, 1965
MICHAEL D. BENGE, CIVILIAN, JANUARY 31, 1968
SGT RICHARD GORDON BURGESS, 2084229, MC, SEPTEMBER 25, 1966
MAJ DONALD GILBERT COOK, 072794, MC, DECEMBER 31, 1964
GARY DAVES, CIVILIAN, JANUARY 31, 1968
1ST LT DAVID RONALD DEVERS, 05321911, ARMY, AUGUST 13, 1966
A2C BONNIE LEE DEXTER, 19781299, AF, MAY 9, 1966
TSOT CHARLES GALE DUSING, 17203698, AF, OCTOBER 31, 1965
SGT EDWIN RUSSEL GRISSETT, JR., 1938579, MC, JANUARY 22, 1966
MAJ LAWRENCE THOMAS HOLLAND, 57577, AF, JUNE 12, 1965
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DOUGLAS RAMSEY, CIVILIAN, JANUARY 17, 1966
SP5 EDWARD DANIEL REILLY, JR., 23933241, ARMY, APRIL 26, 1966
CAPT FLOYD JAMES THOMPSON, 05304076, ARMY, MARCH 26, 1964
EUGENE WEAVER, CIVILIAN, JANUARY 31, 1968
CHARLES WILLIS, CIVILIAN, JANUARY 31, 1968. END LIST.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

29 October 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
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SUBJECT : Background Data Possibly Relevant to the
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~~SECRET~~*Mac Choro*

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Capt. William Forbes Eisenbraun, Army,
6 July 65
Pvt. Robert Russell Garwood, MC, 28 Sept 65
Capt. Lawrence Thomas Holland, AF,
12 June 65
SP/4 James Henry McLean, Army, 9 Feb 65

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

M/Sgt Thomas Moore, AF, 31 Oct 65
 Douglas K. Ramsey, Civ., 17 Jan 66
 Capt. James Nicholas Rowe, Army,
 29 Oct 63
 Capt. Floyd James Thompson, Army,
 26 Mar 64

"Believe we should inform Thieu of plan to send list
 and give him opportunity to provide similar list of ARVN
 prisoners."

6. The January 1969 List. In a later BUTTERCUP development,
 on 30 January 1969 Secretary Rogers sent Ambassador Bunker the
 following list of twenty names "suitable to give to VC with request that
 they release ten of them in exchange for the four they have requested."
 [redacted] info copies to Dr. Kissinger and Secretary Laird):

TSGT Samuel Adams, 18554000, AF,
 October 31, 1965
 Michael D. Bengé, Civilian,
 January 31, 1968
 SGT Richard Gordon Burgess, 2084229, MC,
 September 25, 1966
 MAJ Donald Gilbert Cook, 072794, MC,
 December 31, 1964

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Gary Daves, Civilian, January 31, 1968
1st LT David Ronald Devers, 05321911,
Army, August 13, 1966

[REDACTED]

TSGT Charles Gale Dusing, 17203698,
AF, October 31, 1965
SGT Edwin Russel Grissett, Jr., 1938579,
MC, January 22, 1966
MAJ Lawrence Thomas Holland, 57577,
AF, June 12, 1965
Philip W. Manhard, Civilian, January 31, 1968
SP4 James Henry McLean, 19722072, Army,
February 9, 1965
MSGT Thomas Moore, 14268347, AF,
October 31, 1965
SFC John Joseph O'Neill, 11212494, Army,
August 13, 1966
Thomas W. Ragsdale, Civilian, January 31, 1968
Douglas Ramsey, Civilian, January 17, 1966
SP5 Edward Daniel Reilly, Jr., 23933241, Army,
April 26, 1966
CAPT Floyd James Thompson, 05304076, Army,
March 26, 1964
Eugene Weaver, Civilian, January 31, 1968
Charles Willis, Civilian, January 31, 1968

7. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the above list

of twenty names was never passed to the Communists. Three of the names on the February 1968 list of ten were not included in the January 1969 list of twenty: US Army Captain Rowe, who escaped on 31 December 1968, US Army Captain William E. Eisenbraun (also an addressee of one of the five January 1968 letters) and USMC Private Robert R. Garwood.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

8. I am sending copies of this memorandum on an eyes only basis to the other three recipients of my 27 and 28 October memoranda, namely, Secretary Rogers, Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer.

/s/
Richard Helms
Director

cc: Secretary Rogers
Secretary Laird
Admiral Moorer

DCI/SAVA:GACarver, Jr/mee 29Oct71

Distribution

1 - ER
1 - DDP
1 - C/FE

[redacted]

[redacted]

1 - GAC Carver

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~SECRET~~ []

[12/04/06]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

29 October 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Background Data Possibly Relevant to the
Current Vietnamese Communist Prisoner
Exchange Overture

File

1. The current Vietnamese Communist overtures on possible prisoner exchanges, covered in our memoranda of 27 and 28 October, seems to relate to the earlier BUTTERCUP activity that began in August 1967. We have checked the voluminous BUTTERCUP file and found three items of possible relevance. The pertinent traffic should be contained in your records, but in the interests of time and convenience we are repeating it here.

2. The January 1968 Letters. On 3 January 1968, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Richard Steadman was given five letters prepared in Washington for passage to five American citizens believed to be in VC hands. The pertinent message here is Secretary Rusk's cable to Ambassador Bunker transmitted on 3 January 1968 as

"Five letters to US personnel who may be held by VC being carried by Steadman for delivery to Calhoun. Steadman traveling with General William Depuy. ETA Saigon 1330 local January 4 on Braniff military charter flight 241. In view shortness of time suggest envelope be picked up from Steadman upon arrival Saigon.

~~SECRET~~ []

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

"Letters are addressed to following US personnel:
(Dates shown are date of casualty, which may be same
as date of capture if men are in fact prisoners.)

[REDACTED]
John F. Conlon III, Capt. 79318, AF,

4 March 1966

David S. Demmon, SP4, 563 73 772, Army,

9 June 1965

William F. Eisenbraun, Capt. 04074803,

Army, 5 July 1965

Douglas K. Ramsey, Foreign Service Officer,

17 January 1966

"Eisenbraun and Ramsey are confirmed prisoners.

[REDACTED] Conlon, and Demmon are listed as missing in action,
but in each instance there is some reason to hope that
service man is actually prisoner of VC. Families unaware
letters being sent by this route. "

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

4. The February 1968 List. In January and February 1968 there was much discussion about giving the courier for passage to Tran Bach Dang a list of US prisoners whose release we desired as part of any exchange. The most important message here is Secretary Rusk's 7 February 1968 cable to Ambassador Bunker transmitted as [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

"List of names to send to [REDACTED] should be drawn from list of US prisoners we have identified as held by the VC (18 at present). Since [REDACTED] has been specific with his lists we believe we should also be precise. We recognize problem of choosing among prisoners, and accordingly propose that we select those who have been held two years or longer. This would be a total of ten names: five officers, four EM, one civilian. There is a time gap of eight months between the most recent capture on the list of ten (January 1966) and the next most recent captures (August 1966). From released prisoners we know that the longer a man is held, the more likely he is to be seriously ill. In the absence of reliable information on the health of individual prisoners, a selection by duration of captivity appears to be fairest. Accordingly, the following list should be sent [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] with the request that at least three of the named prisoners be released. Message should also state that we would particularly like to have any prisoners who may be seriously sick or injured, whether or not their names are on list. (Date in each case is date of capture, and should not be transmitted to VC.)

Begin list:

T/Sgt Samuel Adams, AF, 31 Oct 65
Capt. Donald Gilbert Cook, MC, 31 Dec 64
Capt. William Forbes Eisenbraun, Army,
6 July 65
Pvt. Robert Russell Garwood, MC, 28 Sept 65
Capt. Lawrence Thomas Holland, AF,
12 June 65
SP/4 James Henry McLean, Army, 9 Feb 65

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

M/Sgt Thomas Moore, AF, 31 Oct 65
Douglas K. Ramsey, Civ., 17 Jan 66
Capt. James Nicholas Rowe, Army,
29 Oct 63
Capt. Floyd James Thompson, Army,
26 Mar 64

"Believe we should inform Thieu of plan to send list
and give him opportunity to provide similar list of ARVN
prisoners."

6. The January 1969 List. In a later BUTTERCUP development,
on 30 January 1969 Secretary Rogers sent Ambassador Bunker the
following list of twenty names "suitable to give to VC with request that
they release ten of them in exchange for the four they have requested."
 info copies to Dr. Kissinger and Secretary Laird):

TSGT Samuel Adams, 18554000, AF,
October 31, 1965
Michael D. Bengé, Civilian,
January 31, 1968
SGT Richard Gordon Burgess, 2084229, MC,
September 25, 1966
MAJ Donald Gilbert Cook, 072794, MC,
December 31, 1964

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

Gary Daves, Civilian, January 31, 1968
 1st LT David Ronald Devers, 05321911,
 Army, August 13, 1966

[REDACTED]

TSGT Charles Gale Dusing, 17203698,
 AF, October 31, 1965
 SGT Edwin Russel Grissett, Jr., 1938579,
 MC, January 22, 1966
 MAJ Lawrence Thomas Holland, 57577,
 AF, June 12, 1965
 Philip W. Manhard, Civilian, January 31, 1968
 SP4 James Henry McLean, 19722072, Army,
 February 9, 1965
 MSGT Thomas Moore, 14268347, AF,
 October 31, 1965
 SFC John Joseph O'Neill, 11212494, Army,
 August 13, 1966
 Thomas W. Ragsdale, Civilian, January 31, 1968
 Douglas Ramsey, Civilian, January 17, 1966
 SP5 Edward Daniel Reilly, Jr., 23933241, Army,
 April 26, 1966
 CAPT Floyd James Thompson, 05304076, Army,
 March 26, 1964
 Eugene Weaver, Civilian, January 31, 1968
 Charles Willis, Civilian, January 31, 1968

7. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the above list of twenty names was never passed to the Communists. Three of the names on the February 1968 list of ten were not included in the January 1969 list of twenty: US Army Captain Rowe, who escaped on 31 December 1968, US Army Captain William E. Eisenbraun (also an addressee of one of the five January 1968 letters) and USMC Private Robert R. Garwood.

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

8. I am sending copies of this memorandum on an eyes only basis to the other three recipients of my 27 and 28 October memoranda, namely, Secretary Rogers, Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer.

[redacted]
Richard Helms
Director

cc: Secretary Rogers
Secretary Laird
Admiral Moorer

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

The NSC has waived their classification equity for information within this White House/NSC document.

Your agency has been determined to be the agency of primary interest.

Please review for your agency's equities and obtain any necessary concurrences.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

P77-148 68

October 11, 1979

Dear Mr. Shjeflo:

This is in further response to your letters of April 13, June 7, and September 7, 1979, requesting under provisions of the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act certain information concerning Colonel Charles E. Shelton, USAF/POW.

As I indicated in my replies of May 11 and August 9, 1979, a search of the NSC files failed to locate any records pertaining to Colonel Shelton. Nor do NSC files contain any information which refers to him in any manner. Also, NSC files do not contain any uncorrelated information on Americans who were, or may have been, captured and/or missing during the Vietnam conflict.

You have made specific reference to categories of information described in letters dated March 19, 1979 to the Department of the Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency:

"6. A report apparently dated in early 1968 mentions Chinese execution of some U.S. POW's. Please report to us on the extent of Chinese involvement in handling U.S. POW's and the extent of your efforts to learn of their past and present involvement?

"8. Please provide information on POW's observed by or associated with Dieter Dengler prior to his 1966 escape. This was requested in [redacted] October 17, 1977 letter to Colonel Gratch of the Air Force.

"9. All information on USAF/POW Colonel David L. Hrdlicka. Colonel Hrdlicka was associated with Colonel Shelton in captivity and the copy provided of the July 15, 1976 letter from JCRC to DIA and the letter dated May 15, 1965, September 29, 1976 and November 23, 1976 mention many documents associated with both men. We are unable to locate these documents in the materials provided to us. In addition, the copy provided of the May 24, 1966 message correlated with Hrdlicka and "another pilot," and a December 3, 1978 information report referring to a radio broadcast by Pathet Lao radio and media photos concerning these men, but no particulars on the broadcast or photos are attached. We would appreciate receipt of these documents.

"10. That you identify the purpose and activities of the "CAS(NFI)" team mentioned in the biographic report supplied to us dated December 2, 1977. Did this team relate to Charles in any way?

Mr. Shjeflo

2


"11. That you explain why the May 4, 1977 letter from Air Force to DIA referring to Captain Daniel W. Thomas was included in the information provided to me? What is his connection with Charles?

"13. That you provide a copy of the text of the secret Vientiane Embassy telephone conversation stating that Shelton was captured. This is referred to in the May 2, 1966 message from AF to AFPMSC."

At your request, the NSC Staff has once more reviewed our files in this connection and has failed to locate any material meeting your description.

I regret that we cannot be of more assistance to you in this regard.

Sincerely,



Beverly Zweiben
Director
Freedom of Information

Walter E. Shieflo, Esq.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

[NSC/546/04/07]

HAK-

DOH

Summary

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HK

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1 APR 68White copy — Custodian. Pink copy — Recipient.
Post Card — Office of the Secretary of Defense.

~~TOP SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

13 MAR 1970


MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Questions and Answers on Laos

In response to your memoranda of March 9 and 10 on this subject, enclosed are responses to the three questions directed to the Department of Defense.

The casualty information provided in response to Question 2 is the best information available based on an extensive search of existing records. However, there is no way to guarantee its accuracy, particularly because those casualties that occurred in sensitive operations in Laos were not required to be separately identified. I believe that this information is still incomplete and, thus, subject to change.

The response to Question 2 has been coordinated with the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State (Mr. Corcoran).



Enclosures

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Page 1 of 1 Pages~~TOP SECRET~~

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QUESTION 2. What is the total number of American military personnel, excluding air combat casualties, killed in Laos since July 1962?

The following casualty information is the best available at this time to the Department of Defense. It is based on a search of existing records and these may not be complete. Thus, the information may be subject to change.

1. The number of US military personnel, excluding air combat casualties, killed in Laos since July 1962, as a result of hostile action is 72. This figure should not be used in public release. It includes those stationed in Laos and those stationed in South Vietnam and killed in PRAIRIE FIRE operations, but does not include those stationed in South Vietnam and killed in protective reaction operations.

-- The list at Tab A contains the name of only one individual killed while stationed in Laos.

-- 14 personnel stationed in Laos in a covert role were killed in Laos in 1967 and 1968. These are addressed in a separate memorandum.

-- 57 military personnel have been killed in PRAIRIE FIRE cross-border operations into Laos since the inception of the program in October 1965. As PRAIRIE FIRE personnel operate from South Vietnam, these casualties are listed with South Vietnam casualty figures, and are not separately identifiable.

-- There is no information available on personnel stationed in South Vietnam who have been killed in protective reaction operations.

2. The total number of US military personnel killed in Laos since 1 July 1962, not as a result of hostile action is 8. They were all killed in aircraft operations. A list is at Tab B.

3. The total number of US military personnel killed in Laos since 1 July 1962, in air operations as a result of hostile actions is 132. A list is at Tab C.

Enclosure 1

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Page 1 of 1 Pages

DEATHS OF U. S. MILITARY PERSONNEL
AS THE RESULT OF HOSTILE ACTION IN LAOS

20 January 1969 - 28 February 1970

In Other Than Air Action

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>MILITARY SERVICE</u>
10 Feb 1969	BUSH, Joseph K. Jr.	CAPT	ARMY

This information is based on a search of existing records and these may not be complete. There is no way to guarantee its accuracy and thus it is subject to change.

DEATHS OF U. S. MILITARY PERSONNEL
IN LAOS NOT THE RESULT OF HOSTILE ACTION

20 January 1969 - 28 February 1970

In Aircraft Operations

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>MILITARY SERVICE</u>
19 Aug 1969	WERBISKI, Phillip M.	MAJ	ARMY
19 Aug 1969	NELSON, Robert M.	CAPT	ARMY
1 Nov 1969	LYTLE, Richard W.	MAJ	AIR FORCE

This information is based on a search of existing records and these may not be complete. However, there is no way to guarantee its accuracy and thus it is subject to change.

DEATHS OF U. S. MILITARY PERSONNEL
IN LAOS NOT THE RESULT OF HOSTILE ACTION

July 1962 - 20 January 1969

In Aircraft Operations

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>MILITARY SERVICE</u>
25 Oct 1966	GREEN, Robert B.	SSGT	AIR FORCE
25 Oct 1966	NANCE, Richard A.	A1C	AIR FORCE
3 Aug 1967	BISCHOFF, John W.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
28 Aug 1968	MILLER, Robert C.	MAJ	AIR FORCE
28 Aug 1968	PHILLIPS, Elbers A.	TSGT	AIR FORCE

DEATHS OF U. S. MILITARY PERSONNEL
AS THE RESULT OF HOSTILE ACTION IN LAOS

20 January 1969 - 28 February 1970

In Air Action

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>MILITARY SERVICE</u>
5 Feb 1969	LYNN, Homer M. Jr.	MAJ	AIR FORCE
5 Feb 1969	NIGGLE, Harry T.	LTCOL	AIR FORCE
5 Feb 1969	OLSON, Robert E.	MAJ	AIR FORCE
5 Feb 1969	BURKE, Walter F.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
5 Feb 1969	HATTON, Wilton N.	MSGT	AIR FORCE
5 Feb 1969	CLEVER, Louis J.	TSGT	AIR FORCE
5 Feb 1969	SHERBURN, Hugh L.	TSGT	AIR FORCE
5 Feb 1969	DORSEY, James V. Jr.	SSGT	AIR FORCE
5 Feb 1969	GOTT, Rodney H.	SSGT	AIR FORCE
5 Feb 1969	MC NEILL, Clarence L.	SGT	AIR FORCE
12 Feb 1969	COLASUONNO, Vincent	MAJ	AIR FORCE
15 Feb 1969	NIEDECKEN, William C.	LTJG	NAVY
9 Mar 1969	REX, Robert F.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
17 Mar 1969	DINAN, David T. III	1ST LT	AIR FORCE
21 Mar 1969	LOVELACE, Charles K.	MAJ	AIR FORCE
28 Mar 1969	DAVENPORT, Robert D.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
28 Mar 1969	JUSTICE, William P.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
31 Mar 1969	CARPENTER, Ramey L.	LT	NAVY

This information is based on a search of existing records and these may not be complete. There is no way to guarantee its accuracy and thus it is subject to change.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>MILITARY SERVICE</u>
31 Mar 1969	WHITE, Danforth E.	CDR	NAVY
3 Apr 1969	CHRISTIANSON, Peter B.	MAJ	AIR FORCE
20 Apr 1969	BACH, John J. III	CAPT	AIR FORCE
22 Apr 1969	SCOTT, Vincent C. Jr.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
22 Apr 1969	VAN CLEAVE, Walter S.	LTCOL	AIR FORCE
26 Apr 1969	EAST, James B. Jr.	MAJ	AIR FORCE
4 May 1969	ADAMS, Michael T.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
17 May 1969	STEWART, Virgil G.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
24 May 1969	TAYLOR, Cecil F.	SSGT	AIR FORCE
24 May 1969	TROGLEN, Jackie W.	SSGT	AIR FORCE
23 Jun 1969	SAGE, Leland C. C.	LT	NAVY
2 Jul 1969	FLINN, John L.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
8 Jul 1969	SIZEMORE, James E.	MAJ	AIR FORCE
8 Jul 1969	ANDRE, Howard V. Jr.	MAJ	AIR FORCE
20 Jul 1969	SMILEY, Stanley K.	LT	NAVY
25 Aug 1969	SANDERS, Steven R.	MAJ	AIR FORCE
6 Nov 1969	HONEY, Richard L.	1STLT	AIR FORCE
5 Dec 1969	DAVISON, David M.	A1C	AIR FORCE
8 Dec 1969	DICE, Carl R.	MAJ	AIR FORCE
22 Dec 1969	BURRIS, Donald D. Jr.	CWO	ARMY *
5 Jan 1970	BURNES, Robert W.	1STLT	MARINE CORPS
5 Jan 1970	ROBINSON, Larry W.	MAJ	MARINE CORPS
7 Jan 1970	ZUMBRUN, James H.	SFC	ARMY

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>MILITARY SERVICE</u>
10 Jan 1970	LEHECKA, John A.	1ST LT	AIR FORCE
11 Jan 1970	CHORLINS, Richard D.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
15 Jan 1970	WARREN, Tommy R.	MAJ	AIR FORCE
11 Feb 1970	KIEFFER, William L. Jr.	LTCOL	AIR FORCE

* Investigation of cause and circumstances in this case has not been completed.

DEATHS OF U. S. MILITARY PERSONNEL
AS THE RESULT OF HOSTILE ACTION IN LAOS

1 July 1962 - 20 January 1969

In Air Action

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>MILITARY SERVICE</u>
15 Jul 1963	PARKS, Raymond F.	SSGT	ARMY
18 Nov 1964	MARTIN, William R.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
19 Feb 1965	RONCA, Robert F.	MAJ	AIR FORCE
11 Apr 1965	SWANSON, William E.	LT	NAVY
22 Jun 1965	CORDERO, William E.	MAJ	AIR FORCE
29 Dec 1965	RAWSTHORNE, Edgar A.	CDR	NAVY
29 Dec 1965	HILL, Arthur S. Jr.	LT	NAVY
14 Feb 1966	HILLS, John R.	MAJ	AIR FORCE
24 Feb 1966	HETRICK, Raymond H.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
2 Mar 1966	WORST, Karl E.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
7 Apr 1966	WALKER, Thomas T.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
7 Apr 1966	BARNETT, Robert R.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
19 Apr 1966	ROBBINS, Richard J.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
19 Apr 1966	BROWN, Joseph O.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
29 Apr 1966	EGAN, William P.	LTCDR	NAVY
13 May 1966	FARROW, David A.	MAJ	AIR FORCE
25 May 1966	HUNTER, ROBERT G.	1STLT	AIR FORCE

10 Jun 1966	PACKARD, Dan B.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
28 Jun 1966	WOLFE, Thomas H.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
28 Jun 1966	DUDLEY, Charles G.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
28 Jun 1966	CAVALLI, Anthony F.	1STLT	AIR FORCE
4 Aug 1966	BURNS, John R.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
20 Oct 1966	WAGENER, David R.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
20 Oct 1966	TOFFERI, Charles E.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
10 Nov 1966	O'BRIEN, John L.	MAJ	AIR FORCE
29 Nov 1966	ROPER, John M.	MAJ	AIR FORCE
10 Jan 1967	GAULEY, James P.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
14 Jan 1967	TYSZKIEWICZ, Arthur K.	LTCDR	NAVY
17 Jan 1967	COGDELL, William K.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
17 Jan 1967	KROGMAN, Alva R.	1STLT	AIR FORCE
31 Jan 1967	KUBLEY, Roy R.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
31 Jan 1967	WALKER, Lloyd F.	MAJ	AIR FORCE
31 Jan 1967	MULHAUSER, Harvey	CAPT	AIR FORCE
31 Jan 1967	BARDEN, Howard L.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
31 Jan 1967	MIYAZAKI, Ronald K.	A1C	AIR FORCE
16 Feb 1967	PULLARA, Angelo	CAPT	AIR FORCE
22 Feb 1967	CAMPBELL, Dwight S.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
22 Feb 1967	SHOLL, Robert L.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
25 Feb 1967	HART, Joseph L.	LTCOL	AIR FORCE
4 Mar 1967	CARLOCK, Ralph L.	MAJ	AIR FORCE
4 May 1967	ROGERS, Charles E.	MAJ	AIR FORCE

4 Jun 1967	ROBINSON, Lewis M.	LTCOL	AIR FORCE
21 Jun 1967	SPINLER, Darrell J.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
27 Aug 1967	JENSEN, Bruce A.	LTCOL	AIR FORCE
27 Aug 1967	SMILEY, Francis E.	MAJ	AIR FORCE
6 Oct 1967	ARMSTRONG, Frank A. III	MAJ	AIR FORCE
9 Nov 1967	BROWER, Ralph W.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
9 Nov 1967	CLAY, Eugene L.	SSGT	AIR FORCE
9 Nov 1967	MAYSEY, Larry W.	SGT	AIR FORCE
11 Jan 1968	ANDERSON, Denis L.	LTJG	NAVY
11 Jan 1968	STEVENS, Philip P.	LTJG	NAVY
11 Jan 1968	OLSON, Delbert A.	CDR	NAVY
11 Jan 1968	BUCK, Arthur C.	LTJG	NAVY
11 Jan 1968	MANCINI, Richard M.	AE2	NAVY
11 Jan 1968	ROBERTS, Michael L.	AD2	NAVY
11 Jan 1968	WIDON, Kenneth H.	PH2	NAVY
11 Jan 1968	SIOW, Gale R.	ATN3	NAVY
11 Jan 1968	THURESEN, Donald N.	ADJ2	NAVY
17 Feb 1968	HAYDEN, Glenn M.	CDR	NAVY
17 Feb 1968	KRAVITZ, James S.	LTJG	NAVY
17 Feb 1968	THURMAN, Curtis F.	LT	NAVY
17 Feb 1968	WONN, James C.	ENS	NAVY
17 Feb 1968	COONS, Chester L.	ADJ2	NAVY
17 Feb 1968	DAWSON, Frank A.	ADJAN	NAVY
17 Feb 1968	DONATO, Paul N.	ATNI	NAVY
17 Feb 1968	ASHBY, Clayborn W. Jr.	AO2	NAVY

17 Feb 1968	MARTIN, James E.	AEAN	NAVY
27 Feb 1968	HARTZHEIM, John F.	ATN2	NAVY
29 Feb 1968	DRISCOLL, Francis M.	1STLT	AIR FORCE
13 Mar 1968	BYRNE, Joseph H.	MAJ	AIR FORCE
13 Mar 1968	COLLINS, Guy F.	LTCOL	AIR FORCE
24 Apr 1968	HERTLEIN, George B. III	CAPT	AIR FORCE
22 Sep 1968	KUHLMANN, Charles F.	MAJ	AIR FORCE
29 Sep 1968	NEWBERRY, Wayne E.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
5 Oct 1968	WESTER, Albert D.	MAJ	AIR FORCE
5 Oct 1968	LAWRENCE, Gregory P.	SGT	AIR FORCE
30 Oct 1968	SIEGWALT, Marlin L.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
7 Nov 1968	BALLOU, Charles D.	LTCOL	AIR FORCE
27 Nov 1968	MC BRIDE, EDWARD E.	MAJ	AIR FORCE
8 Dec 1968	PIRRUCCELLO, Joseph S. Jr.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
22 Dec 1968	GREENHALGH, Terry L.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
17 Jan 1969	MARTIN, Walter W.	MAJ	AIR FORCE
17 Jan 1969	FLEMING, Richard A.	CAPT	AIR FORCE
17 Jan 1969	DAVIS, Albert J..	SSGT	AIR FORCE
17 Jan 1969	BOLTON, Wayne F.	LTCOL	AIR FORCE
17 Jan 1969	KURTYKA, George A.	TSGT	AIR FORCE
17 Jan 1969	MALDONADO, Juan A.	TSGT	AIR FORCE

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QUESTION 5. Do the figures revealed by the President on March 6 include all personnel who may come into Laos on TDY or brief visits in connection with official duties in Thailand and elsewhere. What is the average number of personnel in this category by month for the past 6 months?

The US Ambassador to Laos stated that the 228 military personnel in Laos (plus 15 Marine Guards and one officer assigned to USIA) that were incorporated in the President's totals included all military personnel on TDY in Laos but did not include those on brief inspection or orientation visits. The 228 figure obtained as of 28 February 1970.

He provided the following information.

-- The average number of TDY personnel for the past six months was 92.

<u>SEPT 69</u>	<u>OCT 69</u>	<u>NOV 69</u>	<u>DEC 69</u>	<u>JAN 70</u>	<u>FEB 70</u>
91	87	86	87	101	97

-- The approximate number of military visitors for the past six months was 69.

<u>SEPT 69</u>	<u>OCT 69</u>	<u>NOV 69</u>	<u>DEC 69</u>	<u>JAN 70</u>	<u>FEB 70</u>
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-- The Embassy does not maintain records on the number of civilian visitors to Laos.

Enclosure 2

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QUESTION 6. The Press Corps has requested a break-out of costs of our operations in Laos. This information has not been provided in the past and it appears that it would be inadvisable to provide it at this time. Your recommendations on this issue are requested.

Unless there is a policy decision to announce costs of the war in Vietnam, it certainly would be inconsistent to announce such costs, even if they could be accurately computed separately from Vietnam. Because our combat operations in Laos are predominantly in the air support category, the costs are high and could be misleading. The recommendation is made that we continue for the present the policy of not discussing estimates of costs in Laos.

Enclosure 3

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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Memorandum

THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Information as of 1600
26 July 1966~~TOP SECRET~~

C02985239



TOP SECRET

26 July 1966

HIGHLIGHTS

Cambodia's Sihanouk has indicated his willingness to sign a border agreement with a Viet Cong representative now in Phnom Penh, accept a permanent Liberation Front representative and exchange ambassadors with Hanoi in return for Viet Cong acceptance of Cambodia's version of the border.

I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
The headquarters of the US 25th Infantry Division at Chu Chi was attacked by the Viet Cong with mortar and recoilless rifle fire today (Para. 1). Allied forces stepping up efforts to counter intensified Viet Cong activity in the Saigon area (Para. 2). Joint US - South Vietnamese Army Operation FRANKLIN/LIEN KET 50 initiated in Quang Ngai Province in the same area of a successful Allied operation last March (Paras. 4-7). Another North Vietnamese regiment confirmed in South Vietnam (Paras. 8-11). North Vietnamese troops contract malaria in Quang Tri Province (Paras. 12-13).

II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Thich Thien Hoa, recently selected as acting chairman of the Buddhist Institute, today issued a relatively noncontroversial communique, although he probably will soon be influenced by the Institute council's militant majority (Paras. 1-2). Retail prices in Saigon have dropped for the first time since devaluation measures were announced last month (Para. 3). A more complete profile of candidates for the constitutional assembly elections in Saigon, Gia Dinh Province, and I Corps has been received (Paras. 4-8).

III. North Vietnamese Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.

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
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V. Communist Political Developments: A comparison of recent Chinese Communist and North Vietnamese comments on the role of the Geneva agreements in any future settlement of the war reveals a basic identity of view (Paras. 1-4).

VI. Other Major Aspects: Cambodia's Sihanouk has indicated a readiness to sign a border agreement with the Viet Cong (Paras. 1-3). The Laotian Communists have raised the issue of their treatment of captured US pilots and hinted at the possible release of one of them (Para. 4).

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TOP SECRETI. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Viet Cong guerrillas attacked the headquarters of the US 25th Infantry Division at Cu Chi in Hau Nghia Province on 26 July with an estimated 135 rounds of mortar and recoilless rifle fire. The base camp is located 18 miles northwest of Saigon on the edge of a rubber plantation in a forested area that has long been a Viet Cong stronghold. According to preliminary reports, there were no fatalities, but 18 Americans were wounded, two seriously. Damage to property and facilities was reported as insignificant.

2. The Viet Cong have apparently intensified their activities in the Saigon area, possibly hoping to take some of the pressure off their forces in Quang Tri Province where Communist units are suffering heavy losses from allied Operation HASTINGS. To counter their activity, allied forces have stepped up "harassing and interdiction" artillery barrages against Viet Cong positions around Saigon.

3. One battalion of the 6th Royal Australian Regiment initiated Operation HOBART, a search-and-destroy operation approximately 40 miles southeast of Saigon in Phuoc Tuy Province, on 24 July. Yesterday, contact was made with an estimated company-size Viet Cong force. Three Australians were killed and 16 wounded. Enemy losses are not known.

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Background of New Operation in Quang Ngai

4. Two US Marine battalions and three South Vietnamese Army battalions have begun Operation FRANKLIN/LIEN KET 50 in an area along the coast in northern Quang Ngai Province. The concept of this clearing operation is to establish blocking positions along Route 1 and then attack eastward in an attempt to capture or destroy enemy troops and equipment located between Route 1 and the sea. Two battalions of the 1st Viet Cong Regiment and one battalion of the 21st North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Regiment are reported to be in the area.

5. A similar USMC/ARVN operation, called UTAH/LIEN KET 26, contacted elements of the 21st NVA Regiment in the same area in early March 1966. The enemy lost 586 killed, as against Allied losses of 113 killed (83 US). Many of the enemy dead were North Vietnamese.

7. Since then, if current Viet Cong/NVA practices have been observed, many of the casualties the 21st suffered in March have been replaced by southerners.

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TOP SECRETNew North Vietnamese Regiment

8. MACV has accepted another North Vietnamese Army Regiment in South Vietnam. This unit, the North Vietnamese 3rd Regiment, has a strength of 1,500 men and is located in Quang Tin Province. It is believed that the 3rd Regiment is subordinate to the 620th NVA Division. The date of arrival of this unit is not presently known. It is the nineteenth North Vietnamese regiment confirmed to date in South Vietnam.

9. MACV has also confirmed four support battalions of the 620th Division. These are the RQ 20 Signal Battalion with a strength of 300 men, the RQ 22 75-mm. Recoilless Rifle Battalion with a strength of 300, and the RQ 23 120-mm. Mortar Battalion with a strength of 300 and the RQ 24 Engineer Battalion with a strength of 150. All four of these units had been carried in the "possible category for some months. They are also located in Quang Tin Province.

10. Units of the 620th Division have been reported in recent weeks preparing for offensive action in the Quang Tin - Quang Nam border area of I Corps, specifically in the Hiep Duc - Loc Son area.

11. MACV has dropped the 31st NVA regiment from its order of battle for lack of information. With these actions, the current confirmed North Vietnamese strength in South Vietnam now stands at 41,360 men. Another 1,100 men are carried in the probable or possible categories.

26 July 1966

I-3

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~~TOP SECRET~~North Vietnamese Troops Contract Malaria

12. Malaria is suspected in the deaths of two of three North Vietnamese Army (NVA) soldiers who were captured in northern Quang Tri Province by allied units participating in Operation HASTINGS. The third soldier is in a delirious condition and is also apparently suffering from malaria. Three of the nine NVA personnel previously interrogated were also suspected of having malaria. These men stated that they were issued antimalaria pills during their infiltration into South Vietnam. MACV comments that in all probability, personnel of the 324B NVA Division contracted malaria since their arrival in Quang Tri Province and the number of personnel suffering from malaria in the division may be as high as ten percent.

13. Sometimes malaria rates run much higher.

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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Thich Thien Hoa, recently appointed as acting chairman of the Buddhist Institute, today signed an Institute communiqué that called upon its followers not to conduct protest suicides against the government. A young Buddhist monk recently died as a result of burns he sustained on 21 July. Police classified the incident as murder, stating that the monk claimed he was set afire against his will. Although today's communiqué was directed specifically against suicides, it probably was intended indirectly to refute government claims that the monk's death was not a bona fide suicide.

2. The US Embassy has commented that although Thien Hoa is considered relatively nonpolitical, he will probably be dominated by the militant supporters of Tri Quang on the Institute council. For example, several communiqués issued last month and representing militant interests were signed by Thien Hoa. Press reports today speculated that a Buddhist Institute policy statement would soon be issued that would reassert Buddhist opposition to the government.

Break Reported in Saigon Price Rise

3. For the first time since early June, retail prices in Saigon dropped slightly during the week ending 18 July. The prices of most imported commodities also dropped for the first time since the government's devaluation measures went into effect last month. Prior to these decreases, prices had risen some 30 percent since early June. The US Embassy has reported no significant changes in the economic situation since 18 July.

Election Developments

4. A recent report from the embassy permits some insight into the numbers and types of candidates who will be standing for election to the National Constitutional Assembly in September.

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Information so far includes only I Corps and Saigon with surrounding Gia Dinh Province. In these areas, a total of 43 seats are being contested by 322 regular and alternate candidates, of whom only 27 are active military. By area, the number of seats are: I Corps, 17; Saigon, 16; and Gia Dinh, 10. A total of 12 electoral districts are involved, including the two municipalities of Hue and Da Nang in I Corps.

5. Registered candidates in the I Corps zone now stand at 87, while Saigon and Gia Dinh Province show 138 and 97, respectively. However, these figures will probably be subject to some shrinkage as a result of resignations and screenings by local election councils.

6. Initial screening of candidates in the Da Nang area has resulted in the dropping of two two-man slates: one composed of municipal councilors who were disqualified on the basis of affiliation with the recent anti-GVN "struggle" movement; the other for having one candidate who had not met military service requirements and another who was a dismissed civil servant. In Saigon, the original 39 lists filed had already shrunk to 26 by the time the election council eliminated four others. Of the four eliminated, one list was disqualified because of the alleged Communist connections of one of its members, the other three were disqualified for a lack of sufficient documentation. There apparently has been no action on the original 16 lists registered in Gia Dinh Province. All candidates disqualified as a result of action by local election councils have a right to appeal to the Central Election Council, whose decision will be final.

7. Political affiliations of the registered candidates in the Saigon/Gia Dinh area are somewhat ephemeral, whereas in the I Corps area, not unexpectedly, the nationalist parties--the VNQDD and the Dai Viet--largely dominate the political picture. Thirty-nine of the 87 candidates in I Corps are VNQDD members or affiliates, and at least six Dai Viets are running. Almost no "struggle" members

26 July 1966

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have shown up among the candidates running in I Corps, nor have any strong religious groupings appeared.

8. In the Saigon area, several lists are grouped vaguely around political personalities, such as former chief of state Phan Khac Suu and Dai Viet political leader Dan Van Sung in the first electoral district, and municipal council head La Thanh Nghe, who is running two slates in the second district. In Gia Dinh Province, the most notable political personality is Dr. Phan Quang Dan, leader of the National Democratic Bloc, who has fielded one slate in each of the province's two electoral districts.

26 July 1966

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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM


1. There is nothing of significance to report.

26 July 1966

III-1

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~~TOP SECRET~~IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

4. The activity at Yen Bai has primarily been associated with the construction of an airfield. However, recent photographic analysis indicates that this project involves much more: over 700 new military buildings dispersed throughout the hills have been identified in this area. In terms of its size and apparent priority, this is the most ambitious project the Chinese are now undertaking in North Vietnam.

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IV-1

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TOP SECRETV. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. The differing propaganda treatment by the Chinese and North Vietnamese of the role of the 1954 Geneva agreements in a possible settlement of the Vietnam war was highlighted in recent days. A close examination of their statements, however, reveals that their positions are actually very close. Peking's comments reflect consistent antipathy toward even discussing the possibility of a political settlement of the war, while Hanoi tends to emphasize how closely its four points parallel the Geneva Accords.

2. Chinese officials in the past two weeks have claimed that US actions in Vietnam have in effect torn up the Geneva Accords. This, Peking claims, has resulted in the destroying of the line of demarcation between North and South Vietnam and the "further" removal of the restriction on Chinese assistance to the Vietnamese. In addition, Peking propaganda has ruled out any proposals for the reconvening of the Geneva conference and any "peace talks" connected with the accords short of a total US capitulation. An NCNA broadcast on 24 July described Indian Prime Minister Gandhi's proposal along this line as a "plot" undertaken in collusion with the Soviet leaders and asserted that it was "absurd to prate at this time about solving the Vietnam question in accordance with these non-existent agreements."

3. Peking's attack on the Geneva Accords was not, however, directed at the actual provisions of the agreements. Rather, the Chinese appeared to be using their propaganda diatribe against the accords as part of an appeal for greater unity between North and South Vietnam and to stiffen the resolve of the Vietnamese Communists by offering hints of further Chinese assistance.

26 July 1966

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4. The North Vietnamese, for their part, have consistently maintained that their four-point solution for settling the war contains the main provisions of the Geneva agreements and as such provides the sole just solution to the Vietnam problem. This stand was most recently illustrated in an authoritative Commentator article in the DRV party daily Nhan Dan on 24 July. The Nhan Dan article gave the most detailed explanation of the four points in some time. In addition, it strongly criticized third nation proposals calling for the reconvening of the Geneva conference claiming that they do not deal with the basic issue of US aggression and "in practice are not far from the viewpoint of the American aggressors." Without mentioning Mrs. Gandhi's proposal, Commentator chided "a number of persons" who in their efforts to bring about a settlement of the Vietnam problem hesitate to condemn strongly the US violation of the Geneva Accords. The article implied that there is no point in reconvening a Geneva conference to secure US compliance with provisions already adequately outlined in the 1954 agreement and incorporated in the DRV's own position for which there is "no alternative."

26 July 1966

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~~TOP SECRET~~Captured US Pilots in Laos

4. The Laotian Communists have raised the issue of their treatment of captured US pilots by broadcasting an alleged appeal for release by US Air Force pilot David Hrdlicka. The broadcast of 26 July over the clandestine Pathet Lao radio contained a tape recording supposedly by Hrdlicka admitting to "crimes" against the Laotian people and thanking the Pathet Lao for the good treatment he has received. The request for release was not in the taped portion but was carried only in the Laotian language translation. The broadcast gave no hint that the release of the pilot will be effected. A likely opportunity for such a release--the anniversary of the Laotian Geneva Accords on 25 July--passed with no mention of such a gesture of amnesty.

26 July 1966

VI-2

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> *ERMS4060002706K*

ACE NAME:

SOURCE

CASE #:

7842

ALIAS:DATE CASE CREATED:

4 May 88

SIGHTING SUMMARY:

Telephonic Interview with SOURCE

PRIMARY ANALYST:

ANALYST

SECONDARY:

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

<u>TAB</u>	<u>DOCUMENT</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
1	VO-PW MFR	14 Apr 88	POW-F/H: Telephone conversation between Analyst and SOURCE
2	VO-PW To SECSTATE	151317Z Apr 88	Request for assistance
3	Printout	15 Apr 88	Other source reporting from Vientiane
4	VO-PW msg to USDAO Bangkok TH	181605Z Apr 88	Source directed requirement S-VOP-05160
5	VO-PW msg to SECSTATE	191532Z Apr 88	Correction and additional information
6	AMEMB Vientiane msg to Secstate	210640Z Apr 88	Update efforts on SOURCE file
7	Amemb Vientiane	050703Z May 88	Comments on SOURCE by Emb case officer and on electric acquisition in Vientiane
8	VO-PW MFR	20 May 88	Analyst's update on the SOURCE
9	USDAO BK PW/MIA TM	131112Z May 88	Interview with former Wattay air controller. Only Soviets at airfield. Chomphen Rajabong not on list air controllers.
10	DX5D2	10 Jun 88	IAM of Wattay. Annotates buildings of airfield
11	VO-PW	15 Jul 88	DIA Evaluation

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PAGE 1

THIS PAGE CONFIDENTIAL IF AKA FILLED OR
CONFIDENTIALITY IS YES

NAME 3 : Source ID # 2 : 7842

AKA 16 : CONFIDENTIALITY 37:

BOAT NUMBER 34 : CONTACTED 32: 1A
CATEGORY: 1ACNTRY LOCATED 23 : US STATE/CITY 15 :
CNTRY REPORTED 10: LA
TYPE SIGHTING 46 : POW-F/H
1ST SIGHTING 42 : 11 12SUBSOURCES 27 :
ACTIONS 31 : 880414 VO-PW MFR
880415 VO-PW DTG 151317Z
880418 VO-PW S-VOF-05160

CURRENT ACT 45 : CAPTIVITY 39: -

REMARKS 36 : FOLREG 1 CAU WATTAY AIRPORT LA ANALYST 13: RH

DATE RECEIVED 8: 880419 DATE OF INFO 35 8705

ACT DATE 38: ADDRESS 25:

ORIGIN CODE 17: L

POLYGRAPH CATEGORY 33: 07 UNDER ANALYSIS

POLYGRAPH RESULTS 24:

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NO 982022 1251

SEA ID#

FUGEE NAME

NAT NUMBER

COUNTRY LOCATED

COUNTRY REPORTED ON

TYPE SIGHTING

LOCATION

SUB-SOURCES

ACTIONS/HISTORY

ONLY CATEGORY 53

ONLY RESULTS 24

CATEGORY: 50

ORIGINAL
SOURCE 17

EXPENSE 38

PENDING ACTIONS:

STATUS/REMARKS

ANALYST

UNCLASSIFIED NAME

REFUGEE LOCATION

U.S. ADDRESS

CONFIDENTIALITY REQUESTED: 37

DATE RECEIVED: 8 880418

DATE OF INFO: 35 8705

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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

14 APRIL 1988

SUBJECT: TELEPHONIC INTERVIEW WITH *Source*

1. ON 12 APR 1988, DIA RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM A MEMBER OF VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S STAFF INDICATING THAT *Source* HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE OFFICE OF THE VP AND HAS INFORMATION OF INTEREST TO THE PW/MIA ISSUE. *Source* WAS CONTACTED ON 13 FEB 1988 TELEPHONICALLY IN ALABAMA ((BY VO-PW. HE STATED THAT HE SAW A CAUCASIAN AT WATTAY AIRPORT IN VIENTIANE, LAOS, ON EITHER 4 OR 5 MAY 1987 AND WAS TOLD BY AN ETHNIC LAO FRIEND THAT THE CAUCASIAN WAS A FORMER U.S. PW WHO STAYED BEHIND AFTER THE WAR.

Source CLAIMS THAT HE SOUGHT A VISA THROUGH THE LAO EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, DC. IT HAD BEEN HIS PLAN TO SEEK INFORMATION ON U.S. PWS WHILE HE WAS IN LAOS. IN ORDER TO DISGUISE HIS PURPOSE, HE PASSED HIMSELF OFF TO THE LAO AS A NATIVE AMERICAN WHO WAS INTERESTED IN THE WELFARE OF THE LAO PEOPLE. TO BOLSTER THAT IMAGE, *Source* STATES, HE CARRIED \$800.00 OF UNSPECIFIED MEDICINES AND VARIOUS CHILDREN'S ATHLETIC EQUIPMENT ON HIS TRIP. HE TRANSITED BANGKOK, THAILAND AND ARRIVED IN VIENTIANE SOMETIME IN APRIL 1987. UPON ARRIVAL AT WATTAY AIRPORT, VIENTIANE, *Source* SAYS HE WAS DETAINED THERE FOR 62 1/2 HOURS WHILE THE LAO CLEARED HIM THROUGH CUSTOMS; HIS PAPERWORK WAS NOT IN ORDER, HE SURMISED.

3. ON EITHER 4 OR 5 MAY 1987 *Source* WAS AT THE WATTAY AIRPORT. FROM A VANTAGE POINT INSIDE THE TERMINAL, WHERE HE WAS STANDING WITH HIS LAO FRIEND, CHOMPENG RAJAVONE, HE SAW A CAUCASIAN MALE WALKING FROM A QUONSET HUT TOWARD AN OFFICE BUILDING. THE DISTANCE TO THE CAUCASIAN WAS 75 YARDS. CLAIMED THAT THE DISTANCE PREVENTED HIM FROM DISTINGUISHING FEATURES BUT THAT HE WAS ABLE TO NOTICE THAT THE MAN WAS WEARING A NONDESCRIPT HAT, TAN SHIRT AND TROUSERS. HE APPEARED HEALTHY, APPROXIMATELY 5'10" TALL AND APPROXIMATELY 150 TO 170 POUNDS IN WEIGHT. THE CAUCASIAN WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AN ORIENTAL, ASSUMED TO BE LAO, IN A TAN MILITARY UNIFORM.

4. RESPONDING TO A QUESTION FROM *Source* ABOUT THE NATIONALITY OF THE CAUCASIAN, CHOMPENG REPLIED THAT HE WAS A FORMER U.S. PW WHO HAD ELECTED TO REMAIN BEHIND IN LAOS AFTER THE

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CHOMPHEG AND HIS ADDRESS, AND REQUESTED AMEMB BANGKOK TO PROVIDE ANY INFORMATION THEY MAY HAVE ON HIS ACTIVITIES IN SEA. WE ALSO REQUESTED [REDACTED] TO FORWARD ANY REPORTS THEY MAY HOLD ON CHOMPHEG AND THE PW-MIA TEAM IN BANGKOK TO LOCATE AND INTERVIEW *SOA SOURCE* WHO IS REPORTEDLY AT NAPHO CAMP AND IS A FORMER AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER WHO HAD WORKED AT WATTAY. AN SDR WAS DRAFTED ON 15 APRIL THAT PROVIDED REQUIREMENTS FOR THAT INTERVIEW.

10. A FURTHER INTERVIEW OF *source* I WILL BE CONDUCTED ON 19 APRIL IN WHICH A THOROUGH EXPLORATION OF HIS PAST ACTIVITIES IN THE PW/MIA ISSUE WILL BE ELICITED AS WELL AS A DAY-BY-DAY DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS DURING HIS VISIT TO LAOS IN 1987. ADDITIONALLY, HIS RELATIONSHIPS WITH LAO AND THAI NATIONALS WILL BE EXPLORED, PARTICULARLY THE EVENTS SURROUNDING HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH CHOMPHEG.

ANALYST

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NO 982022 ----- 1254

S E C R E T



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-

DIA EVALUATION OF PW/MIA INFORMATION
PROVIDED BY AMERICAN CITIZEN

SUMMARY: Source stated that he saw a Caucasian male at Wattay Airport, Vientiane, Laos, in May 1987, who was said to have been an American prisoners of war who elected to stay in Laos.

DETAIL: During interviews with DIA in April 1988, *SOURCE* stated that on 4 or 5 May 1987, while being loosely detained in the customs section of the terminal at Wattay Airport in Vientiane City, Laos, he saw a male Caucasian walking between buildings outside the terminal. *SOURCE* viewed the man through the window at an estimated distance of 75 yards. Accompanied by an oriental in a tan uniform, the Caucasian had exited from a quonset hut and was walking across an open area toward a small building. *SOURCE* described the Caucasian as approximately five feet ten inches tall, 150-170 pounds, healthy, and wearing a tan shirt and trousers and a hat. During the sighting *SOURCE* was standing next to a Lao national who had pointedly struck up an acquaintance some hours earlier. The Lao had introduced himself as Chompheng Rajavong and had claimed that he worked as an air controller at the airport. After *SOURCE* asked Chompheng who the Caucasian might be, Chompheng departed and returned after a short interval stating that the man was an American PW from the war who had opted to remain in Laos. Chompheng furnished the purported American's name and said that the man was married to a Lao woman, had two children, and worked running the Vientiane Power Plant.

ANALYSIS: In response to a DIA request, the American Embassy at Vientiane confirmed the presence of *SOURCE* at Wattay during May 1987. *SOURCE* had tried to enter Laos without proper documentation. U.S. Embassy personnel had had several meetings with *SOURCE* at the airport while he was kept there. Commenting on the Caucasian sighted by *SOURCE* the Embassy alluded to various types of westerners known to have business at Wattay and who may have been seen there. No Americans were known to be among them. The power plant in Vientiane is inoperative. Vientiane City gets its electricity from the Nam Ngun plant. Across the street from the Vientiane plant is the Swedish Embassy's Guest House and tennis courts and, in the opinion of the American Embassy staff, if an American worked there, that knowledge would quickly become common in the small western community of Vientiane.

USDAO Bangkok PW/MIA Team personnel interviewed a Lao refugee in Thailand in May 1988, who had been an air controller at Wattay for several years prior to his departure from Laos. Although this source provided a list of air controllers at Wattay, Chompheng Rajavong was not on it. Only Soviet and Soviet Bloc advisors were known to frequent the airfield.

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NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

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CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, THAT HE WAS MARRIED TO AN ETHNIC LAO, AND HAD TWO CHILDREN. ACCORDING TO CHOMPENG, THE AMERICAN WORKED AT THE VIENTIANE ELECTRIC POWER PLANT. CHOMPENG ALSO PROVIDED A NAME FOR THIS ALLEGED AMERICAN, BUT HIS PRONUNCIATION OF THE NAME WAS SO BAD, SOURCE WROTE IT DOWN IN FOUR VERSIONS. SOURCE DEPARTED LAOS ON 6 MAY 1987, TRANSITING BANGKOK, AND RETURNED TO THE UNITED STATES.

5. SOURCE 1 STATED THAT CHOMPENG RAJAVONG WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF LAO AVIATION AS AN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER AND HAD GIVEN SOURCE THE ADDRESS, POST OFFICE BOX 119, VIENTIANE. THE SUBJECT OF CHOMPENG WAS NOT PURSUED FURTHER DURING THIS SEGMENT OF THE VO-PW INTERVIEW WITH SOURCE

6. SOURCE RELATED THAT DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 1987 HE CONTACTED MR. MARK WAPLE BY TELEPHONE IN FAYETTEVILLE, NC. SOURCE HAD READ AN ARTICLE ABOUT THE SMITH/MCINTYRE CASE IN A LOCAL NEWSPAPER AND, SINCE HE WAS SEEKING FINANCING TO RETURN TO LAOS, HE FELT WAPLE MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP. WAPLE INVITED SOURCE TO FAYETTEVILLE, AND SOURCE VISITED WAPLE ON 9 SEPTEMBER 1987. WHEN SOURCE SHOWED WAPLE THE FOUR VERSIONS OF THE NAME, WAPLE PICKED OUT THE NAME TOM HART AND SAID THAT HART'S WIFE WAS ONE OF HIS CLIENTS. AT FIRST SOURCE WAS VERY RELUCTANT TO PROVIDE THE VO-PW INTERVIEWER WITH HART'S NAME. HE CLAIMED LATER THAT HE WAS TO MEET WITH MRS. HART AND WAPLE IN WAPLE'S OFFICE IN FAYETTEVILLE ON 18 MAY 1988 WHEN THEY WOULD DISCUSS WHAT SOURCE SAW AND HOW SOURCE MIGHT FINANCE ANOTHER TRIP TO LAOS IN ORDER TO CONTACT TOM HART.

7. SOURCE WHO HAS THE ALIAS 'SOURCE' SAID HE ENTERED THE

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

8. ON 13 APRIL 1988, VO-PW CONTACTED ARMY CASUALTY, WHICH HOLDS MICROFICHE RECORDS OF ALL RETIREES, REQUESTING THAT SOURCE'S SERVICE BE VERIFIED.

9. ON 15 APRIL 1988, VO-PW DISPATCHED A MESSAGE OUTLINING THE CASE. WE REQUESTED SECSTATE TO VERIFY SOURCE'S VISA APPLICATION WITH THE LAO EMBASSY, REQUESTED AMEMB VIENTIANE TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER SOURCE VISITED LAOS DURING APR-MAY 1987, INFORMATION ON ANY CAUCASIAN APPEARING INDIVIDUALS WORKING AT THE VIENTIANE POWER PLANT AND SOLICITED COMMENTS ON

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NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

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NO 982022 -----1256

S E C R E T

Imagery analysis of the Wattay airfield showed no quonset hut less than 1000 meters from the terminal. There are buildings within view of the terminal that could be those seen and described by SOURCE they are an estimated 150 meters away.

Errors in distance and description notwithstanding, there is no reason to suspect SOURCE was not truthful in his account. However, it is doubtful that the individual who called himself Chompheng Rajavong was an air controller at Wattay.

DIA concurs with the American Embassy Vientiane that, if an American stay-behind was in Vientiane and worked at the power plant, it would have been known to the western community there. There is no other reporting that would support the presence of an American stay-behind in Vientiane.

DIA EVALUATION: The Caucasian sighted by SOURCE was not an unaccounted-for American.

DATE OF EVALUATION: 15 July 1988.

CATEGORY: Non-American Caucasian.

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S E C R E T
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

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RUNNING THE VIENTIANE ELECTRIC POWER PLANT. THIS AMERICAN IS SAID TO BE MARRIED TO A LAO NATIONAL AND HAS TWO CHILDREN. A NAME WAS GIVEN FOR THIS AMERICAN WHICH ~~source~~ WROTE DOWN IN FOUR WAYS DUE TO

PAGE 03 RUEKJCS8816 S E C R E T

THE DIFFICULT-TO-UNDERSTAND WAYCHOMPENG PRONOUNCED IT. ~~source~~ RETURNED TO THE US, ACCORDING TO HIS STATEMENTS, ON 6 MAY 1987 VIA BANGKOK TH.

C. ~~source~~ CLAIMS HE OBTAINED A VISA FOR HIS VISIT TO LAOS FROM THE LAO EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON DC, AND TRAVELLED TO LAOS IN APRIL 1987. AFTER ARRIVAL, ~~source~~ STATES, HE WAS DETAINED AT WATTAY AIRPORT FOR 62 HOURS UNTIL HE WAS CLEARED. NO EXPLANATION FOR THIS DETENTION WAS ELICITED DURING THIS PHASE OF THE INTERVIEWING.

D. ~~source~~ STATED THAT DURING THE FIRST WEEK IN SEPTEMBER 1987, HETELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED ATTORNEY MARK WAPLE IN FAYETTEVILLE, N.C. HE SAID HE LEARNED OF WAPLE THROUGH PRESS REPORTS RELATED TO THE SMITH/MCINTYRE CASE SURROUNDING THEIR CLAIMS TO POSSESSING A VIDEO TAPE OF AMERICAN PWS IN LAOS. ON 9 SEP 1987, ~~source~~ VISITED WAPLE IN FAYETTEVILLE AND PROVIDED WAPLE THE FOUR VERSIONS OF THE NAME ~~source~~ RECEIVED FROM CHOMPENG. ACCORDING TO ~~source~~ WAPLE IDENTIFIED THE NAME AS THAT OF AN AMERICAN LOST IN LAOS, AND STATED THAT ONE OF HIS CLIENTS IS THE WIFE OF THIS AMERICAN. ~~source~~ IS TO MEET WITH WAPLE AND THE WIFE ON 18 MAY 1988, IN FAYETTEVILLE, WHERE A DISCUSSION WILL TAKE PLACE ABOUT THE BEST MEANS OF FINANCING TO RETURN TO LAOS AND CONTACT THE AMERICAN.

PAGE 04 RUEKJCS8816 S E C R E T

E. DIA INTERVIEW OF ~~source~~ WILL CONTINUE. IN THE INTERIM WE ARE SEEKING TO VERIFY ASPECTS OF HIS CLAIMS.

2. (S/WN) FOR SECSTATE: REQUEST CONFIRMATION ~~source~~ OBTAINED TRAVEL VISA FROM LAO EMBASSY, WASHINGTON DC, FOR APRIL 1987.

3. (S/WN) FOR AMERICAN EMBASSY VIENTIANE: REQUEST CONFIRMATION OF ~~source~~'S VISIT TO LAOS DURING APRIL-MAY 1987, OR ANY OTHER DATE. REQUEST ANY INFORMATION ON AND IDENTITIES OF ANY CAUCASIAN-APPEARING INDIVIDUALS WHO WORK AT THE VIENTIANE POWER PLANT AND MAY HAVE BEEN AT WATTAY AIRPORT DURING MAY 1987. IF ~~source~~, CHOMPENG, OR ADDRESS CITED FOR CHOMPENG ARE KNOWN TO THE EMBASSY, REQUEST COMMENTS. ALSO, REQUEST COMMENTS ON PLAUSIBILITY OF ~~source~~ THAT HE WAS DETAINED FOR 62 HOURS AT WATTAY AIRPORT WHILE WAITING CUSTOMS CLEARANCE.

4. (S/NF) FOR REQUEST YOU PROVIDE ANY PRIOR REPORT ON CHOMPENG AND COMMENTS ON HIM AND THE ADDRESS HE SUPPOSEDLY GAVE TO PENN.

5. (S/WN) FOR AMEMB BANGKOK: REQUEST YOU PROVIDE ANY INFORMATION ~~source~~'S ACTIVITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA THAT MAY BE KNOWN TO YOU.

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ENVELOPE

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HEADER

P 151345Z APR 88

FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUWSAAA/MAC INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//INO//

RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

RHHMBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI

RUEALGX/SAFE

P 151317Z APR 88

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PW//

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EAP/VLC//

RUMJFS/AMEMB VIENTIANE LA

RUEHBK/AMEMB BANGKOK TH

RUEHBK/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC/

INFO RUHQBPA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

RUEHBK/JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

RUEADWW/NSC WASHINGTON DC

BT

CONTROLS

S E C R E T NOFORN WNINTEL

S/NF/WN-0450/VO-PW

BODY

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE (U)

1. (S/WN) BACKGROUND:

A. ON 12 APRIL 1988, BASED ON A TIP FROM A STAFF MEMBER OF THE OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE US. VO-PW CONDUCTED A TELEPHONE INTERVIEW OF 1 SOURCE

REPORTED THAT WHILE ON A TRIP TO LAOS IN MAY 1987 HE SAW A CAUCASIAN WHO HE WAS TOLD WAS A FORMER U.S. PW. SOURCE REQUESTS

PAGE 02 RUEKJCS8816 S E C R E T

CONFIDENTIALITY IN USG CONTACTS WITH THE NEXT OF KIN OF THIS AMERICAN. SOURCE

SOURCE STATED THAT ON 4 OR 5 MAY 1987, HE WAS AT WATTAY AIRPORT, VIENTIANE, AND SAW A CAUCASIAN, AT A DISTANCE OF 75 YARDS, WALKING FROM A QUONSET HUT TOWARD ANOTHER BUILDING. THE CAUCASIAN WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AN ORIENTAL, PRESUMED TO BE LAO, IN A TAN UNIFORM. THE CAUCASIAN WAS DESCRIBED AS HEALTHY IN APPEARANCE, APPROXIMATELY FIVE FEET TEN INCHES TALL (5'10"), ABOUT 150-170 POUNDS IN WEIGHT, AND WEARING A TAN SHIRT, TAN TROUSERS, AND A HAT. ACCORDING TO SOURCE DISTANCE PREVENTED HIM FROM DISTINGUISHING FEATURES CLEARLY AND HE DOES NOT REMEMBER ENOUGH ABOUT THE HAT TO DESCRIBE IT. STANDING NEAR SOURCE INSIDE THE TERMINAL WAS AN ETHNIC LAO ACQUAINTANCE, CHOMPHENG RAJAVONE. CHOMPHENG IS REPORTED BY SOURCE TO BE AN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER IN THE EMPLOY OF LAO AVIATION, POST OFFICE BOX 119, VIENTIANE. WHEN SOURCE ASKED WHO THE CAUCASIAN WAS, CHOMPHENG REPORTEDLY SAID THE INDIVIDUAL WAS A FORMER AMERICAN PW WHO OPTED TO REMAIN IN LAOS AND WHOSE PRESENT OCCUPATION WAS

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PAGE 05 RUEKJCS8816 S E C R E T

6. (S/NF) FOR USDAO BANGKOK//PW-MIA//: REQUEST YOU LOCATE AND
INTERVIEW LAO REFUGEE Subsouele, REPORTED TO BE AT
NAPHO. HE IS SAID TO BE A FORMER AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER AT
WATTAY. SDR ON sub- SHOULD ARRIVE ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THIS
MESSAGE. Sculle

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DL 151317Z APR 88 PP SSSS

DIA WASHINGTON DCA/VO-PW//

SECSTATE WASHINGTON DCA/7EAP/VLC//

AMEMB VIENTIANE LA

AMEMB BANGKOK TH/TH/BU

USDAO BANGKOK TH/2B/EMIAZ/BA

CIA WASHINGTON DCA/

INFO CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

NSC WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T NOFORN UNINTEL

S/NF/WN-D450/VO-PW

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE (U)

1. (S/UN) BACKGROUND:

IN THE AFTERNOON OF 12 APRIL 1988, BASED ON A TIP FROM A STAFF MEMBER OF THE
 OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., VO-PW CONDUCTED A TELEPH
 INTERVIEW OF: SOURCE, RESIDENT OF ALABAMA.

REPORTED THAT WHILE ON A TRIP TO LAOS IN MAY 1987 HE SAW A
 CAUCASIAN WHO HE WAS TOLD WAS A FORMER U.S. PW. SOURCE REQUESTS
 CONFIDENTIALITY IN USG CONTACTS WITH THE NEXT OF KIN OF THIS.

DIA/NMIC/VO/VO-PW

HYP/VO-PW/X50501/DAB

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WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
 SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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AMERICAN. SOURCE

HE SOURCE STATED THAT ON 4 OR 5 MAY 1987, HE WAS AT BATTAY AIRPORT, VIENTIANE, AND SAW A CAUCASIAN, AT A DISTANCE OF 75 YARDS, WALKING FROM A QUONSET HUT TOWARD ANOTHER BUILDING. THE CAUCASIAN WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AN ORIENTAL, PRESUMED TO BE LAO, IN A TAN UNIFORM. THE CAUCASIAN WAS DESCRIBED AS HEALTHY IN APPEARANCE, APPROXIMATELY FIVE FEET TEN INCHES TALL {5'10"}, ABOUT 150-170 POUNDS IN WEIGHT, AND WEARING A TAN SHIRT, TAN TROUSERS, AND A HAT. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, DISTANCE PREVENTED HIM FROM DISTINGUISHING FEATURES CLEARLY AND HE DOES NOT REMEMBER ENOUGH ABOUT THE HAT TO DESCRIBE IT. STANDING NEAR SOURCE INSIDE THE TERMINAL WAS AN ETHNIC LAO ACQUAINTANCE, CHOMPENG RAJAVONE. CHOMPENG IS REPORTED BY SOURCE TO BE AN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER IN THE EMPLOY OF LAO AVIATION, POST OFFICE BOX 119, VIENTIANE. WHEN SOURCE ASKED WHO THE CAUCASIAN WAS, CHOMPENG REPORTEDLY SAID THE INDIVIDUAL WAS A FORMER AMERICAN PW WHO OPTED TO REMAIN IN LAOS AND WHOSE PRESENT OCCUPATION WAS RUNNING THE VIENTIANE ELECTRIC POWER PLANT. THIS AMERICAN IS SAID TO BE MARRIED TO A LAO NATIONAL AND HAS TWO CHILDREN. A NAME WAS GIVEN FOR THIS AMERICAN WHICH SOURCE WROTE DOWN IN FOUR WAYS DUE TO

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WARNING NOTICE—SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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THE DIFFICULT-TO-UNDERSTAND WAY CHOMPENG PRONOUNCED IT.

RETURNED TO THE US, ACCORDING TO HIS STATEMENTS, ON 6 MAY 1987 VIA BANGKOK TH.

C. SOURCE CLAIMS HE OBTAINED A VISA FOR HIS VISIT TO LAOS FROM THE LAO EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON DC, AND TRAVELLED TO LAOS IN APRIL 1987. AFTER ARRIVAL, SOURCE STATES, HE WAS DETAINED AT WATTAY AIRPORT FOR 62 HOURS UNTIL HE WAS CLEARED. NO EXPLANATION FOR THIS DETENTION WAS ELICITED DURING THIS PHASE OF THE INTERVIEWING.

D. SOURCE STATED THAT DURING THE FIRST WEEK IN SEPTEMBER 1987, HE TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED ATTORNEY MARK WAPLE IN FAYETTEVILLE, N.C. HE SAID HE LEARNED OF WAPLE THROUGH PRESS REPORTS RELATED TO THE SMITH/MCINTYRE CASE SURROUNDING THEIR CLAIMS TO POSSESSING A VIDEO TAPE OF AMERICAN PWS IN LAOS. ON 9 SEP 1987, SOURCE VISITED WAPLE IN FAYETTEVILLE AND PROVIDED WAPLE THE FOUR VERSIONS OF THE NAME SOURCE RECEIVED FROM CHOMPENG. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, WAPLE IDENTIFIED THE NAME AS THAT OF AN AMERICAN LOST IN LAOS, AND STATED THAT ONE OF HIS CLIENTS IS THE WIFE OF THIS AMERICAN. SOURCE IS TO MEET WITH WAPLE AND THE WIFE ON 18 MAY 1988, IN FAYETTEVILLE, WHERE A DISCUSSION WILL TAKE PLACE ABOUT THE BEST MEANS OF FINANCING SOURCE

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WARNING NOTICE—SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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TO RETURN TO LAOS AND CONTACT THE AMERICAN .

E. DIA INTERVIEW OF SOURCE WILL CONTINUE. IN THE INTERIM WE ARE SEEKING TO VERIFY ASPECTS OF HIS CLAIMS.

2. {S/WN} FOR SECSTATE: REQUEST CONFIRMATION SOURCE OBTAINED TRAVEL VISA FROM LAO EMBASSY, WASHINGTON DC, FOR APRIL 1987.

3. {S/WN} FOR AMERICAN EMBASSY VIENTIANE: REQUEST CONFIRMATION OF SOURCE'S VISIT TO LAOS DURING APRIL-MAY 1987, OR ANY OTHER DATE. REQUEST ANY INFORMATION ON AND IDENTITIES OF ANY CAUCASIAN-APPEARING INDIVIDUALS WHO WORK AT THE VIENTIANE POWER PLANT AND MAY HAVE BEEN AT WATTAY AIRPORT DURING MAY 1987. IF SOURCE, CHOMPHEUNG, OR ADDRESS CITED FOR CHOMPHEUNG ARE KNOWN TO THE EMBASSY, REQUEST COMMENTS. ALSO, REQUEST COMMENTS ON PLAUSIBILITY OF SOURCE'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS DETAINED FOR 62 HOURS AT WATTAY AIRPORT WHILE WAITING CUSTOMS CLEARANCE.

4. {S/NF} FOR REQUEST YOU PROVIDE ANY PRIOR REPORT ON CHOMPHEUNG AND COMMENTS ON HIM AND THE ADDRESS HE SUPPOSEDLY GAVE TO

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WARNING NOTICE—SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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SOURCE

5. {S/WN} FOR AMEMB BANGKOK: REQUEST YOU PROVIDE ANY INFORMATION ON SOURCE 'S ACTIVITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA THAT MAY BE KNOWN TO YOU.

6. {S/NF} FOR USDAO BANGKOK//PW-MIA//: REQUEST YOU LOCATE AND INTERVIEW LAO REFUGEE SUBSOURCE , REPORTED TO BE AT

NAPHO. HE IS SAID TO BE A FORMER AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER AT WATTAY. SDR ON SUBSOURCE SHOULD ARRIVE ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THIS MESSAGE.

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SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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INITIAL SOURCE DATA

VIENTIANE OR WAT TAY SOURCE REPORTING

ID	NAME	SIGHT	PURPORTED INFO	DOS	CTRY
9007		GRV-HSY	1 GRV VIENTIANE 1957	57	LA
1237		NO INFO	UNK#US VIENTIANE 75-77	77	LA
7194		CRS-F/H	CRS-VIENTIANE PROV-77		LA
2676		POW-F/H	1-6 PWS VIENTIANE 8410	8410	LA
4164		POW-HSY	45 US NEAR VIENTIANE	80	LA
9300		POW-HSY	2 US MONKS NR VIENTIANE	75	LA
4946		POW-F/H	CAU GP VIENTIANE 74	74	LA
4947		POW-F/H	1 BLK WAT TAY 78	7810	LA
6061		CAMP	VIENTIANE PROVINCE INFO	84	LA
6683		CRS-F/H	A/C VIENTIANE, LA	71	LA
6233	SOURCES	CAMP	DUN KATAY&VIENTIANE	87	LA
4421	NAMES	POW-HSY	2 US MONKS VIENTIANE 81	81	LA
1942		POW-HSY	18US 400KM NE VIENTIANE	0000	LA
5971		POW-HSY	20 ALIVE NR VIENTIANE	87	LA
3664		GRV-HSY	3US VIENTIANE 721001	7210	LA
7048		GRV-F/H	1-3GRVS&A/CVIENTIANE-LA		LA
5988		CAMP	MUANG ET & VIENTIANE	81	LA
7554		GRV-HSY	POSS RMS VIENTIANE		LA
5959		CAMP	XIENGKHOUANG&VIENTIANE	81	LA
5191		CAMP	CAMP INFO VIENTIANE	83	LA
2570		GRV-HSY	2US HELI VIENTIANE 60'S		LA

TOTAL SIGHTINGS-

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4947

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6233

4421

1942

5971

3664

7048

5988

7534

5959

5191

2570

0045

TENT FRENCH/NO US IN LAOS-1957

NO PW INFORMATION

861216 IAG APP'D FABRICATION

FAILED POLYGRAPH

870327 IAC APP'D NON-US/WTNERS

870327 IAC APP'D NON-US/WTNER

ABSENCE OF AMERICANS

ABSENCE OF AMERICANS

DIA TO JCRC-LNO 22NOV REQ INTV

ADMITTED FALSE

ABSENCE OF AMERICANS

SOURCES
NAMES.

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DL 181605Z APR 88 PP SSSS

DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PW//
USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//
INFO CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH
USDLO HONG KONG HK//PW-MIA//
USDAO MANILA RP//PW-MIA//
USDAO SINGAPORE SN//PW-MIA//
USDAO KUALA LUMPUR MY//PW-MIA//
JCS WASHINGTON DC//OCJCS/PW-MIA/J5//
NSC WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J3/J36/J233//
CIA WASHINGTON DC/

SECRET NOFORN

S/NF-D459/VO-PW

SUBJECT: SOURCE DIRECTED REQUIREMENT {U}

REF: DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PW// MSG DTG 151317Z APR 88, REQUEST
FOR ASSISTANCE.

1. {C} IN REPLY CITE: S-VOP-05160. SOURCE: SOURCE OF REF. TITLE:

DIA/NMIC/DC-4A/VO/VO-PW/DAH-1/DAH-3/DAM

HYP/VO-PW/X50501/DAB

VO-PW,CHF

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PW/MIA INFORMATION {U}. COUNTRY: LA. OBJECTIVE: PG2430.

2. {S/NF} BACKGROUND:

A. REFERENCE MESSAGE OUTLINED REPORT FROM SOURCE AND REQUESTED ASSISTANCE FROM ADDRESSEES REGARDING THE CASE. PARAGRAPH 6 REQUESTED THE PW-MIA TEAM TO LOCATE AND INTERVIEW SUBSOURCE IN NAPHO REFUGEE CAMP. SUBSOURCE IS SAID TO BE A FORMER AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER AT WATTAY AIRPORT, VIENTIANE, LAOS, AND SHOULD HAVE INFORMATION THAT WOULD ASSIST IN THE ANALYSIS OF SOURCE'S CLAIMED SIGHTING OF A CAUCASIAN AT THAT AIRPORT ON 4 OR 5 MAY 1987. SUBSOURCE IS REPORTED TO HAVE LEFT LAOS IN AUGUST 1987. SOURCE CLAIMED HE WAS TOLD BY ANOTHER AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER, CHOMPENG RAJAVONE, THAT THE CAUCASIAN WAS A FORMER U.S. PW WHO ELECTED TO REMAIN BEHIND IN LAOS AND GAVE THE NAME OF THAT AMERICAN. ANY INFORMATION THAT WOULD CONFIRM/DENY THE PRESENCE OF A FORMER U.S. PW IN VIENTIANE IS URGENTLY NEEDED. THIS IS THE FIRST REPORT INDICATING THAT AN AMERICAN STAY-BEHIND WORKS AT THE VIENTIANE ELECTRIC POWER PLANT.

B. ACCORDING TO SUBSOURCE DATA, A WEALTHY LAO CONTRACTOR WHO HAS TIES TO COLONEL PHETSAMONE VONGPHAYTHONE OF THE LPDR MOI,

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SUBSOURCE IS ^{SUBSOURCE}DATA 'S "SON." DURING AN INTERVIEW WITH VO-PW IN LATE 1987, ^{SUBSOURCE}DATA SUGGESTED USG OFFICIALS CONTACT AND INTERVIEW HIS "SON," ^{SUBSOURCE}DATA, ON 13 APRIL 1988, VO-PW CONTACTED ^{SUBSOURCE}DATA 'S SON, ^{SUBSOURCE}DATA, A RESIDENT OF VIRGINIA, WHO HAD BEEN PRESENT DURING ^{SUBSOURCE}DATA 'S INTERVIEW. ^{SUBSOURCE}DATA CLARIFIED ^{SUBSOURCE}DATA 'S RELATIONSHIP TO ^{SUBSOURCE}DATA BY STATING THAT ^{SUBSOURCE}DATA IS REALLY ^{SUBSOURCE}DATA 'S SON-IN-LAW. HE ALSO OPINED THAT ^{SUBSOURCE}DATA COULD IDENTIFY ANY AND ALL CAUCASIANS IN VIENTIANE AND AT WATTAY AIRPORT. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE MENTIONING OF ^{SUBSOURCE}DATA BY ^{SUBSOURCE}DATA IN 1987, THE SURFACING TO THE USG OF ^{SUBSOURCE}DATA STORY IN APRIL 1988, AND ^{SUBSOURCE}DATA 'S RECENT SUGGESTIONS OF TOPICS TO DISCUSS WITH ^{SUBSOURCE}DATA ARE NOT ACCIDENTAL AND IT IS ADVISABLE TO EXERCISE CAUTION WHEN INTERVIEWING ^{SUBSOURCE}DATA IT MAY ALSO BE ADVISABLE TO DETERMINE ^{SUBSOURCE}DATA CONTACTS AND ACTIVITIES IN THAILAND PRIOR TO INTERVIEWING HIM.

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3. {S/NF} REQUIREMENTS: LOCATE AND INTERVIEW ^{SUBSOURCE}DATA ...

A. ELICIT COMPLETE BIOGRAPHIC DATA TO INCLUDE:

{1} DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH.

{2} NAMES, AGES, RELATIONSHIPS, AND PRESENT ADDRESSES OF

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RELATIVES TO FIRST COUSIN LEVEL. {INCLUDE IN-LAWS}.

{3} CHRONOLOGY OF OCCUPATIONS AND LOCATIONS TO INCLUDE
IDENTITY OF SUPERVISORS AND CO-WORKERS.

{4} CHRONOLOGY OF ADDRESSES WITHIN LAOS.

{5} CHRONOLOGY AND DURATION OF ALL TRAVEL INSIDE AND OUTSIDE
LAOS, PARTICULARLY VIETNAM.

B. ELICIT COMPOSITION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE LAO CIVIL AVIATION
DEPARTMENT TO INCLUDE:

{1} LIST OF ALL KNOWN COMPONENTS.

{2} LIST OF ALL KNOWN DEPARTMENT AND SECTION HEADS, THEIR
TITLES AND LOCATIONS.

{3} LIST OF ALL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS AS OF 1987 TO INCLUDE
BIO SKETCHES, DESCRIPTIONS, LOCATIONS, AND INDICATIONS OF TIES WITH
OTHER AGENCIES IN THE LAO GOVERNMENT AND/OR SMUGGLING ACTIVITIES.

{4} IDENTITY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE WATTAY AIRPORT MANAGER AND
HIS SUBORDINATE DEPARTMENT TO INCLUDE PASSENGER/FREIGHT TRAFFIC,
AIRPORT RESTAURANT/FOOD SERVICE AND RELATED DEPARTMENTS.

C. DETERMINE SOURCE'S KNOWLEDGE OF VIENTIANE CITY UTILITIES
ORGANIZATION AND EXPLOIT FOR INFORMATION ON THE CITY ELECTRIC POWER

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SYSTEM. IF PERSONALITIES ARE KNOWN TO SOURCE ELICIT NAMES, POSITIONS, BIO SKETCHES, AND PRESENT LOCATIONS. IDENTIFY ALL FOREIGN SPECIALISTS ENGAGED IN INSTALLATION AND/OR POWER MAINTENANCE.

D. DETERMINE SOURCE'S KNOWLEDGE OF CAUCASIANS IN THE VIENTIANE AREA, ESPECIALLY AT THE ELECTRIC POWER PLANT AND WATTAY AIRPORT, WHO MIGHT BE AMERICANS OR CONFUSED AS AMERICANS BY OTHERS. IF SOURCE MENTIONS ANY POSSIBLE PERSONS WHO MEET THIS CRITERIA, EXPLOIT FULLY. NEGATIVE REPORTING REQUIRED.

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4. {C} GUIDANCE:

A. THIS REQUIREMENT CANNOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, THEIR DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVES AND/OR OTHER FOREIGN NATIONALS. DISCREET USE OF THIS INFORMATION MAY BE MADE BY COLLECTORS IN CONTACT WITH FOREIGN NATIONALS ONLY AS PRESCRIBED IN DIAM 58-13, PART TWO, CHAPTER 1, PARAGRAPH 16 B.

B. REQUEST ALL RESPONSES TO THIS REQUIREMENT BE PREPARED IN MESSAGE FORMAT AND FORWARDED TO DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PW//, WITH INFO FOR CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI AND JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH.

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ORIGINALS OR LEGIBLE PHOTOCOPIES OF ALL SKETCHES, DOCUMENTS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, ETC. (EXCEPT HUMAN SKELETAL REMAINS) SHOULD BE SENT VIA REGISTERED MAIL DIRECTLY TO THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ATTN: VO-PW, ROOM 2E23D, THE PENTAGON, WASHINGTON D.C. 20340-5390. IF HUMAN SKELETAL REMAINS ARE RECEIVED, ADDRESSEES SHOULD SUBMIT AN IIR TO THAT EFFECT AND TRANSMIT AN ELECTRICAL MESSAGE DIRECTLY TO CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI REQUESTING DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS.

C. IAW DOD POLICY, RESPONSES TO THIS REQUIREMENT WILL BE CLASSIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

{1} LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS: AT THE MINIMUM, SECRET.

{2} CRASH OR GRAVE SITE REPORTS: AT THE MINIMUM,

CONFIDENTIAL.

{3} ALL OTHER PW/MIA-RELATED INFORMATION (E.G. INFORMATION REGARDING REMAINS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, INCLUDING DOG TAGS, DETENTION CAMPS, ETC): CONSISTENT WITH POLICY CONCERNING SOURCES, METHODS OF COLLECTION, AND CONTENT.

D. ORIGINATOR'S CONTROL NUMBER IS S-VOP-88012. POC IS ANALYST, AUTOVON 225-0501; SECURE 960-8158; KY-3 THE PENTAGON DROP

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APR 88 PP

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DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PW//

SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EAP/VLC//

AMEMB VIENTIANE LA

USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//

CIA WASHINGTON DC/

INFO CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

NSC WASHINGTON DC

~~SECRET~~ UNINTEL

S/WN-D463/VO-PW

REF: DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PW// MSG DTG 151317Z APR 88, REQUEST
FOR ASSISTANCE. {U}

SUBJECT: CORRECTION AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION {U}

1. {S/WN} REFERENCE MESSAGE ERRONEOUSLY SPELLED AMCIT INVOLVED AS
SOURCE CORRECT SPELLING IS SOURCE HIS PLACE AND DATE
OF BIRTH BIOGRAPHIC DATA

2. {U} REGRET ERROR. REGARDS.

DECL OADR

DIA/NMIC/VO/VO-PW

HYP/VO-PW/X50501/DAB

USA,VO-PW,CHF

POC

~~SECRET~~

026

SECRET

ROUTINE
R 210640Z APR 88
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 180Z
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 8238
CIA WASHDC
JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

ZYUW RUPJISAD677 1120659

DIA WASHDC//VO-PW//
USDAO BANGKOK TH
CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI
NSC WASHDC

SECRET VIENTIANE 0877

DEPT FOR EAP/22F: CIA FOR NSC FOR CHILDRESS

I.O. 12255: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MCF5, LA

SUBJ: SOURCE

REF: R. DIA 151317Z APR 88, S. 87 VIENTIANE 0777
8045505Z MAY 87), C. 87 VIENTIANE 0790 (050400Z MAY 87)

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. ~~Source~~ WAS DETAINED AT WATTAY AIRPORT IN VIENTIANE FROM MAY 2-7, 1987 FOR VIOLATION OF IMMIGRATION REGULATIONS, I.E., NOT IN POSSESSION OF VISA FOR LAOS. HE HAD TRAVELED TO LAOS, HE CLAIMED, IN A PRIVATE CAPACITY TO BRING MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO AREAS OF LAOS WHERE HE WORKED AS A PARAMEDIC IN 1952. A FULL-BLOODED AMERICAN INDIAN, "CHIEF OF THE MIC-MEC," HE ALSO HAD FLOOR LENGTH HEADRESS IN DRY CLEANING BAG AND WISHED TO DEMONSTRATE TRADITIONAL DANCE IN REMOTE AREAS OF THE COUNTRY. ~~Source~~ SAID LAO EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON HAD ENCOURAGED HIS VISIT, AND TOLD HIM HE WOULD BE MET AND ASSISTED AT THE AIRPORT. HE CLAIMED HE PAID, AT LAO EMBASSY'S REQUEST, DOLS 15 FOR HIS VISA, POSTAGE AND PROCESSING. BUT DID NOT UNDERSTAND VISA WAS NECESSARY PRIOR TO ARRIVAL.

3. WHILE ~~Source~~'S ADDRESS IS IN ALABAMA, WE SEEM TO RECALL CALLING CARD WITH TEXAS ADDRESS AS MEMBER OF VETERANS GROUP SUPPORTING POW/MIA SEARCH EFFORTS. WHEN CONOFF RETURNS FROM R & R MAY 2 WILL ADVISE ANY FURTHER INFO HE MIGHT HAVE. DETAILS OF BACKGROUND AND REASONS FOR COMING TO LAOS DID NOT QUITE MESH IN THE COURSE OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH THREE EMOFFS AT VARIOUS TIMES DURING HIS DETENTION. HE STRUCK ALL AS AN INDIVIDUAL WITH EXTREMELY VIVID IMAGINATION.

4. ADDRESS CITED BY CHOMPHEUNG RAJAVONE IS THE CORRECT ADDRESS FOR WATTAY AIRPORT. EMBASSY HAS NO INFORMATION ABOUT CHOMPHEUNG.

5. WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY CAUCASIAN ADVISORS TO VIENTIANE ELECTRIC POWER PLANT, ALTHOUGH IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE FROM SOVBLDC ADVISORY GROUP ASSIGNED THERE. THERE ARE MANY SOVIET ADVISORS ASSISTING BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN AVIATION SECTORS. A BELGIAN NATIONAL RUNS SHELL OIL INTERESTS IN VIENTIANE AND HIS POL STORAGE FACILITY IS LOCATED AT WATTAY AIRPORT. SUSPECT ~~Source~~ MAY BE EMBROIDERING HIS TALE, OR ELSE CHOMPHEUNG TOLD ~~Source~~ SOMETHING HE WANTED TO HEAR IN HOPES OF SOME TYPE OF RECOMPENSE. IT DOUBTFUL THAT A FORMER U.S. POW LIVING FREELY IN VIENTIANE WOULD ESCAPE NOTICE AMONG INDIVIDUALS IN OUR GOSSIP-RIDDEN FOREIGN COMMUNITY, MUCH LESS AT HIGHLY VISIBLE AIRPORT FACILITY.

6. EAP/VLC DESK OFFICER ~~POC~~ MAY HAVE FURTHER DETAILS AND INSIGHTS REGARDING THIS CASE. ISOM BT

ACTION: VO-PW//

(U) (E) (F)

INFO: AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 8238

*FOR AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 8238
*USDAO BANGKOK TH
*JCRC BARBERS PT HI
*SAFE

MCN=88112/03174 TOR=88112/0804Z TAD=88112/0804Z JCRCN=KIA45E

NO 982022 ----- /277

TOP SECRET

C1HYP

PAGE 000

MSGNO 205 (PCXX) *05/05/88* *08:05:53.7.5*

ZCZC 13:04:12Z (PC)

EMI DTG : 88050507050407

RTTSZYUW RUEKJCS0990 1261041-SSSS--RUEALGX.

ZNY SSSSS

R 051041Z MAY 88

FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUCJAAA/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SOJ2//

RUDMNSC/NISC WASHINGTON DC

RUCIAEA/FTD WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB OH//SIIR//

RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

RHHMBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI

RUEALGX/SAFE

R 050703Z MAY 88

<> FM AMEMBASSY <><>VIENTIANE<><>

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1885

RUEKJCS/DIA ASHDC//VO-PW//

INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 8272.

RUEHBK/USDAO BANGKOK TH

RUEHBK/JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

RUHQBPA/CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

RUEADWW/NSC WASHDC

BT

EZ1:

S E C R E T VIEBOANE 0990

EZ2:

DEPT FOR EAP/VLC; CIA FOR

NSC FOR CHILDRESS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MOPS, LA

<> SUB: *Source*

REF: A. DIA 151317Z APR 88; B. VIENTIANE 0877 (210640Z APR 88)

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.)

<> 2. EMBASSY OFFICER WHO DEALT WITH MR. *Source* ARREST CASE HAS RETURNED TO POST AND HAS THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONS TO REF B.

-- AT NO TIME DURING SEVERAL PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH EMBOFF

<> DID *Source* MENTION HAVING SEEN THE CAUCASIAN REPORTED IN REF A. HE ALSO MADE NO MENTION OF CHOMPENG RAJAVONE. EMBOFF IS<> CURIOUS WHY *Source* -- WHO SEEMED TO BE A NATURALLY TALKATIVE INDIVIDUAL -- WAITED NEARLY A YEAR TO COME FORWARD WITH THIS INFORMATION.

-- VIENTIANE GETS ITS ELECTRICITY FROM THE NAM NGUM DAM, AND SO DOES NOT REALLY HAVE A POWER PLANT ANY MORE. THE PLANT USED IN THE PRE-NAM NGUM DAYS STILL EXISTS, BUT SELDOM RUNS. MOREOVER, IT IS DIRECTLY ACROSS THE STREET FROM THE BUSY SWEDISH EMBASSY GUEST HOUSE AND TENNIS COURT. A CAUCASIAN WORKING FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME AT THE PLANT WOULD SURELY BE NOTICED AND DISCUSSED BY THE WESTERN COMMUNITY HERE.

<> -- REGARDING PARA 3 OF REF B, *Source* IDENTIFIED HIM AS HEAD OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

TOP SECRET

028

NO 982022 ----- /278

TOP SECRET

C1HYP

PAGE 00

OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, NOT A VETERANS GROUP INTERESTED IN POW/MIA ISSUES.

<> SOURCE CLAIMED TO HAVE WORKED WITH DR. TOM DOOLEY (OR HIS ORGANIZATION) IN LUANG NAM THA AND SAYABOURY IN THE EARLY 1960S. OTHER DOCUMENTS IN HIS POSSESSION INDICATED HE WAS ON ACTIVE DUTY WITH THE ARMY AT THE TIME. A SEARCH OF THE RECORDS OF BOTH GROUPS MIGHT CLARIFY SOME OF THE DISCREPANCIES

<> OF SOURCE STORY.

3. WILL ADVISE WHEN WE LEARN ANYTHING MORE ABOUT CHOMPHENG RAJAVONE. ISOM

BT

#0990

NNNN

NNDD

TOP SECRET

029

ND 982022 1779

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

20 MAY 1988

INTEL

SUBJECT: ANALYST'S UPDATE ON THE SOURCE INFO

1. ON 15 APRIL 1988, VO-PW REQUESTED STATE DEPARTMENT, AMEMB VIENTIANE, TO COMMENT ON SOURCE VISIT AND ON WHETHER ANY CAUCASIANS WORKED FOR THE VIENTIANE POWER PLANT OR FOR THE CITY'S UTILITIES. WE ALSO ASKED WHAT CAUCASIANS ARE USUALLY IN THE VICINITY OF WATTAY AIRPORT. AMEMB VIENTIANE RESPONDED ON 21 APR 1988, AND ON 5 MAY 1988. POINTS MADE IN THOSE RESPONSES WERE THAT NO KNOWN CAUCASIAN WORKS WITH OR FOR THE VIENTIANE POWER PLANT, THAT SOVIET ADVISORS AND BELGIANS ARE AT WATTAY AIRPORT FREQUENTLY, THAT THE WESTERN COMMUNITY WOULD KNOW IF ANY NON-SOVIET BLOC PERSONNEL WERE WORKING IN OR LIVING IN THE VICINITY OF VIENTIANE, AND THAT THEIR ASSESSMENT OF SOURCE WAS THAT HE SEEMED TO HAVE AN EXTREMELY VIVID IMAGINATION.

2. VO-PW ALSO REQUESTED IMAGERY ON WATTAY AIRPORT IN ORDER TO ASSESS THE ACCURACY OF SOURCE'S DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA OF

THE SIGHTING. DX5 RESPONDED ON 19 APRIL WITH IMAGERY AND A SKETCH OF THE AREA IMMEDIATELY SURROUNDING THE AIR TERMINAL AND ADJACENT AREAS OF WATTAY AIRFIELD. THERE IS NO QUONSET HUT WITHIN 1000 METERS OF THE TERMINAL. HOWEVER THERE ARE BUILDINGS WITHIN VIEW OF THE TERMINAL, OVER AN ESTIMATED 150 METERS AWAY, THAT COULD MATCH THE CONFIGURATION OF BUILDINGS BETWEEN WHICH THE CAUCASIAN WAS WALKING.

3. ON 19 APRIL 1988, SOURCE WAS RECONTACTED AND REINTERVIEWED (A CONTINUATION OF THE 12-13 APR 88 INTERVIEW). IT WAS LEARNED THAT SOURCE DID NOT LEAVE WATTAY AIRPORT, VIENTIANE BUT WAS DETAINED THERE FOR THE ENTIRE PERIOD THAT HE WAS IN LAOS. THE OTHER ELEMENTS OF HIS NARRATIVE WERE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS REPORTED IN DIA MFR OF 14 APRIL 1988, TELEPHONIC INTERVIEW WITH SOURCE DURING THE 19 APRIL CONVERSATION. SOURCE DESCRIBED HIS CONTACT WITH AIR CONTROLLER, CHOMPHENG RAJAVONG, WHO INITIATED THE ENCOUNTER. SOURCE WOULD NOT DISCUSS HIS THAI AND OTHER LAO CONTACTS EXCEPT FOR THE LAO OFFICIALS WITH WHOM HE DEALT IN TRYING TO ENTER LAOS. SOURCE WAS RAMBLING IN HIS ACCOUNT AND HAD DIFFICULTY STAYING ON THE SUBJECT

4. AT VO-PW REQUEST, USDAD/PW-MIA TEAM IN THAILAND INTERVIEWED A FORMER WATTAY AIRPORT AIR CONTROLLER WHO

RECENTLY DEPARTED LAOS FOR THAILAND. HE REPORTEDLY WORKED AT WATTAY FROM 1976 UNTIL MAY 1987. ALTHOUGH THIS SOURCE NAMED SEVERAL AIR CONTROLLERS WITH WHOM HE HAD BEEN WORKING, CHOMPHENG'S NAME WAS NOT AMONG THEM. WE WILL REQUEST THE USDAD TEAM TO FURTHER INTERVIEW THIS SOURCE.

5. OUR PRESENT ASSESSMENT OF SOURCE ACCOUNT IS THAT HE DID NOT SEE AN AMERICAN AT WATTAY AIRPORT. THERE IS NO REASON AT THIS TIME TO SUSPECT SOURCE WAS UNTRUTHFUL IN HIS ACCOUNT, NOTWITHSTANDING THE INACCURACIES IN HIS STATEMENTS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE INDIVIDUAL HE ENCOUNTERED AT WATTAY WHO PROVIDED HIM WITH THE HART NAME IS NOT A CONTROLLER THERE, BUT WORKS FOR LAO STATE SECURITY. IF VO-PW DISCOVERS THAT NOONE FROM THE WATTAY AIR CONTROLLER SECTION HAS THE NAME CHOMPHENG, THAT BECOMES PROBABLE.

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

CONFIDENTIALDJS INFORMATION
SERVICE CENTER

ROUTINE

ZYUW RUEHKA3978 1341114

R 131122Z MAY 88

FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//

TO DIA WASHINGTON DC//VO-PW/DAM//

INFO WHITEHOUSE WASH DC//NSC MR CHILDRESS//

SECDEF WASH DC//OASD-ISA/PW-MIA//

JCS WASH DC//J5/OJCS-PW-MIA//

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J2/J233/J3/J36//

CIA WASH DC//

USDAO KUALA LUMPUR

USDAO MANILA RP

CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

USDAO SINGAPORE

USDLO HONG KONG

TEXT: 1. (C/NF) REFER TO SOURCE BIO REPORT FOR
SOURCE'S DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH.2. (C/NF) REFER TO SOURCE BIO REPORT FOR NAMES,
AGES, RELATIONSHIPS AND PRESENT ADDRESSES OF SOURCE'S
RELATIVES TO FIRST COUSIN LEVEL INCLUDING IN-LAWS.3. (C/NF) CHRONOLOGY OF OCCUPATIONS AND LOCATIONS
WITH SUPERVISORS AND CO-WORKERS:

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 05 BANGKOK TH//PW- 23978

CORRECTED COPY (ADDITIONAL SECTIONS ADDED)

CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN

THIS IS A STONY BEACH MESSAGE

SERIAL: (U) IIR 6 024 0354-88.

COUNTRY: (U) LAOS (LA).

SUBJECT: IIR 6 024 0354-88/LAO CIVIL AVIATION
DATA (U).WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT.
NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
REPORT CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 870521.

REQS: (U) S-VOP-05160.

SOURCE: (C/NF) //SEA 0077-88// SOURCE IS A FORMER
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER AT WATTAY INTL AIRPORT,
VIENTIANE, LAOS, WHO IS NOW A REFUGEE AT NAPHO REFUGEE
CAMP IN THAILAND. RELIABILITY OF SOURCE HAS NOT BEEN
ESTABLISHED.SUMMARY: (C/NF) THIS IS A STONY BEACH REPORT. THIS
REPORT PROVIDES INFORMATION ON LAO CIVIL AVIATION AND
LIMITED INFORMATION PERTAINING TO CAUCASIANS WORKING
IN VIENTIANE, LAOS. IT IS KEYED TO PARAGRAPHS IN SOR
S-VOP-05160.

ACTION VO-PW(2)

(U,6,7,8,F)

INFO EJCS(5) CJCS-PW-MIA(5) DJS:(1) SJCS(1) J3:NMCC(1)
J2(1) J3(4) MIDS(1) J5(2) QUAL CONTROL(1) SECDEF:(1)
SECDEF(8) USDP(8) ASD:PA&E(1) USDP:ISA(1)
USDP:EAP(3) USDP:DSAA(4) USDP:NA(1) USDP:FMRA(1)
USDP:TSO(1) USDP:MIA(1) USDP:TWF(1) USDP:TRADE(1)
USDP:DTSA(1) DI-1(1) NMIC(1) RTS-2B(1) NWS(1)
JSI-3B(1) DAH-3(2) DIO(1) DE-2(1) DB-2(1) DB-2C(1)
DB-2C2(1) DX-6C(1) DIA(1) DX-5C2(1) DC-4A3(1) DAM(1)
+OCSA WASHINGTON DC
+CNO WASHINGTON DC
+CSAF WASHINGTON DC//XO-CTC//
+AFIS AMHS BOLLING AFB DC
+CSAF WASHINGTON DC//XO-CTC/ROXX//
+SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
+CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
+DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
+CMC WASHINGTON DC
+USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SQJ2//
+USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
+CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
+MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
+SAFE

74

THIS IS A STONY BEACH MESSAGE

SERIAL: (U) IIR 6 024 0354-88.

COUNTRY: (U) LAOS (LA).

BIOGRAPHIC
DATA

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 05 BANGKOK TH//PW- 23978

CORRECTED COPY (ADDITIONAL SECTIONS ADDED)

CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN

THIS IS A STONY BEACH MESSAGE

SERIAL: (U) IIR 6 024 0354-88.

COUNTRY: (U) LAOS (LA).

BIOGRAPHIC
DATA

031

- 23 SEP 86 - 21 MAY 87 SOURCE WAS ASIGNED RS IN AIR
TR AFFIC CONTROLLER AT WATTAY INTL AIRPORT, IE

MCN=88134/04316

TOR=88134/1116Z

TAD=88134/1127Z

CDSN=MIA778

PAGE 1

CONFIDENTIAL

NNJ 982022 ----- 1281

CONFIDENTIALOJCS INFORMATION
SERVICE CENTER

BIOGRAPHIC

TIANE,
LAOS. UTM GRID COFROS TE 49 J. HIS SUPERVISOR AND
CO-WORKERS) EBLIS ED AND DESCRIBED IN B(3) BELOW.

4. (C/NF) CHRONOLOGY OF A
DRESSES

- 2. ADMINISTRATION SERVICE, CHIEF: DATA
- 3. AIRPORT SERVICE (LOCATED AT WATTAY AIRPORT),
CHIEF:

BIOGRAPHIC
DATA

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 05 BANGKOK TH//PW- 23978

CORRECTED COPY (ADDITIONAL SECTIONS ADDED)

CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN

THIS IS A STONY BEACH MESSAGE

SERIAL: (U) IIR 6 024 0354-88.

COUNTRY: (U) LAOS (LA).

BIOGRAPHIC
DATA

GUN.

BIOGRAPHIC
DATA

1. 10
6H10232E//

5. (C/NF) CHRONOLOGY AND DURATION OF TRAVEL IN LAOS
AND VIETNAM: EXCEPT FOR SOURCE'S RESIDENCE AT
HOUEISAI AIRPORT FROM 1972-75, SOURCE NEVER TR
AVELED
TO ANY OTHER PROVINCE IN LAOS, AND HAS NEVER TRAVELED
A ROAD EXCEPT FOR TRAINING IN THAILAND, UN
T L HIS
DEPARTURE TO THAILAND IN MAY 1987. SOURCE HAS NEVER
BEEN TO VIETNAM.

B. COMPOST ID
AND ORGANIZATION OF LAO CIVIL
AVIATION:

1. CIVIL AVIATION DEPARTMENT (DIRECTOR PHOUN
KHAMMOUNHEUNE) LOCATED AT THE CIVIL AVIATION BUILDING
IN VIENTIANE.

A. SUBORDINATE UNITS ARE CALLED SERVICES AND INCLUDE:

6. (C/NF) LIST AND BIOGRAPHIC DATA OF ALL AIR
TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS KNOWN TO SOURCE:

BIOGRAPHIC
DATA

032

BIOGRAPHIC
DATA

TDR-88134/1116Z TAD-88134/1127Z CDSN-MIA778

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIALDOCS INFORMATION
SERVICE CENTERBIOGRAPHIC
DATA

.....R IN SECTION

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 04 OF 05 BANGKOK TH//PW- 23978

CORRECTED COPY (ADDITIONAL SECTIONS ADDED)

CONFIDENTIAL MOFORM

THIS IS A STONY BEACH MESSAGE

SERIAL: (U) IIR 6 024 0354-88.

COUNTRY: (U) LAOS (LA).
THREE. MARRIED, AGE 35, 5'6" TALL, BLACK HAIR, BROWN
EYES, LIGHT S
IN AND THIN.TO THE BEST OF SOURCE'S KNOWLEDGE NONE OF THE AIR
TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS HAVE ANY RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER
LAO GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND SOURCE HAS NEVER HEARD OF
ANY SMUGGLING BEING CONDUCTED USING LAO CIVIL AVIATION
PERSONNEL OR FACILITIES.7. (C/NF) THE AIRPORT MANAGER AT WATTAY
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IS MR. SINGKHAM (LNU). SOURCE
DOES NOT KNOW HIS AGE BUT DESCRIBES HIM AS 5'5" TALL,
BLACK HAIR, BROWN EYES, LIGHT SKIN, AND MEDIUM BUILD.
HIS JURISDICTION AT THE AIRPORT IS DESCRIBED ABOVE IN
B(2). SOURCE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT HE HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE PASSENGER OR FREIGHT TRAFFIC,
FOOD SERVICES OR RELATED DEPARTMENTS. THOSE SERVICES
BELONG TO THE LAO AVIATION SERVICE WHOSE CHIEF IS
THANG PHOUYPHANITH. SOURCE STATED THAT FOOD AND OTHER
SERVICES ARE NOT PROVIDED TO AIRPORT EMPLOYEES AND IT
WAS THEIR PRACTICE TO PURCHASE FOOD OUTSIDE THE
AIRPORT AND BRING IT WITH THEM TO WORK.A. (C/NF) SOURCE HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE VIENTIANE
CITY UTILITY COMPANIES OR ORGANIZATION. HE HAS NEVER
BEEN TO A POWER PLANT AND DOES NOT KNOW ANYONE WHO
WORKS FOR THE ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM.B. (C/NF) TO SOURCE'S BEST KNOWLEDGE THE ONLY
CAUCASIANS WORKING AT WATTAY AIRPORT ARE SOVIET
MILITARY ADVISORS AT THE MILITARY SECTION OF THE
AIRPORT AND THE AEROFLOT FLIGHT CREW WHO LAND THERE.
SOURCE HAS MET SEVERAL AEROFLOT PILOTS WHILE PASSING
THE BRIEFING ROOM LOCATED IN THE CONTROL TOWER.SOURCE BELIEVES THEY COULD BE MISTAKEN FOR AMERICANS
BUT WHEN HE HAS SEEN THEM THEY WERE ACCOMPANIED BY
INTERPRETERS. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS SOURCE HAS SEEN
CAUCASIANS IN THE VICINITY OF THE MILITARY FACILITIES
AT THE AIRPORT. HE DOESN'T RECALL SEEING ONE MORE
THAN ONCE AND WAS UNABLE TO DESCRIBE THEM. HE ASSUMES
THEY ARE ALSO SOVIETS. HE WAS UNABLE TO ESTIMATE THE
NUMBER OF CAUCASIANS WORKING AT THE MILITARY SECTION
OF THE AIRFIELD. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS SOURCE HAS
HEARD RADIO CALLS MADE BY MIG-21 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT ON
THE CIVILIAN TOWER FREQUENCY WHICH HE BELIEVES WERE
MADE BY SOVIET PILOTS. ALTHOUGH THE CALLS WERE MADE
IN ENGLISH, SOURCE BELIEVES HE CAN DETECT A DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN ENGLISH SPOKEN BY LAO PILOTS AND ENGLISH
SPOKEN BY OTHER NON-NATIVE SPEAKERS. SOURCE HAS NO
OTHER KNOWLEDGE OF CAUCASIANS WORKING IN VIENTIANE
CITY BUT BELIEVES THERE ARE. SOURCE HAS SEEN
CAUCASIANS IN VIENTIANE BUT DOES NOT KNOW IF THEY ARE
WORKING RESIDENTS OR TOURISTS. SOURCE COULD ONLY
RECALL ONE OCCASION WHERE HE SAW CAUCASIANS, WHILE
PASSING THE HOTEL.C. (C/NF) SOURCE SAID THAT AN ATMOSPHERE OF FEAR AND
TENSION PERSISTED AMONG THE CONTROLLERS AT WATTAY
AIRPORT BECAUSE THE ADMINISTRATION SUSPECTED THE
CONTROLLERS OF BEING REACTIONARIES AND WOULD ACCUSE
THE CONTROLLERS OF ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE IF ANY SERIOUS
ERRORS IN CONTROLLING AIRCRAFT OCCURRED. TO
ILLUSTRATE THIS, SOURCE DESCRIBED THE INCIDENT WHICH
CAUSED HIM TO FLEE TO THAILAND. SOURCE WAS ON DUTY AT
WATTAY AIRPORT IN MAY 1987 WITH TWO AIRCRAFT AIRBORNE.
ONE WAS ON FINAL FROM AN INSTRUMENT APPROACH WITH
CLEARANCE TO LAND. THE OTHER WAS IN THE AIRPORT RADAR
TRAFFIC PATTERN ON BASE LEG. THE PILOT ON BASE
ATTEMPTED TO LAND WITHOUT CLEARANCE, NARROWLY MISSING
THE AIRCRAFT ON FINAL. ACCORDING TO CIVIL AVIATION
REGULATIONS, THE PILOT WITHOUT CLEARANCE WAS AT FAULT.
SOURCE WAS CALLED TO THE AIRPORT MANAGER'S OFFICE AND
ACCUSED OF ATTEMPTING TO KILL, VIA SABOTAGE, A VIP ON
THE AIRCRAFT THAT LANDED OUT OF TURN. SOURCE DID NOT
KNOW THE AIRCRAFT HAD A VIP ON BOARD AND THAT EVEN IF
HE HAD KNOWN, THE AIRCRAFT ON FINAL WOULD STILL HAVE
HAD PRIORITY.COMMENTS: (C/NF) SOURCE WAS FULLY COOPERATIVE DURING
THE SIX HOUR INTERVIEW. HE EXPRESSED HIS WILLINGNESS

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 05 OF 05 BANGKOK TH//PW- 23978

CORRECTED COPY (ADDITIONAL SECTIONS ADDED)

CONFIDENTIAL MOFORM

THIS IS A STONY BEACH MESSAGE

SERIAL: (U) IIR 6 024 0354-88.

COUNTRY: (U) LAOS (LA).
TO PROVIDE FURTHER INFORMATION SHOULD RO WISH TO
REINTERVIEW HIM.

//TPSP: (U) PG 2430//.

//CDKSD8: (U) 521//.

PROJ: (U) 6999-10.
INSTR: (U) US: MO.
PREP: (U) TM-04.
ACQ: (U) THAILAND (880425).
WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL.
- NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.
DECL: OADR BT.

MCN-88134/04316

TOR-88134/1116Z

TAD-88134/1127Z

CDSN-MIA778

CONFIDENTIALPAGE 3 OF 3
131122 MAY-88

NO 982022 ----- 1283


 DIRECTORATE FOR
IMAGERY EXPLOITATION

DX

IMAGERY ANALYSIS MEMORANDUM

DATE 10 June 1988

SNF-08-58256-88DX5D

REPLY TO

ATTN OF: DX-5D2 Analyst

SUBJECT: Vientiane Airfield Study (U)

TO: VO-PW
(Attn:

1. REQUIREMENTS (U) PAI 10036788D9

2. Imagery Analysis: (U)

A. (U) This report satisfies the above PAI (U).

B. Summary (S/NF/WN): VO-PW requested DX-5D prepare a study of Vientiane (Wattay) Airfield, Laos in response to the reported sighting of a caucasian (allegedly an American PW/MIA) in the vicinity of the passenger terminal. The study's purpose is to identify buildings located within 150 meters of the passenger terminal at the airfield. DX-5D was requested to give special attention to quonset huts located at the airfield. The only quonset hut identified at the airfield is located in the military section of the airfield 1025 meters northeast of the passenger terminal. A probable Soviet-owned AN-12 Cub is present in the civilian parking area. A Soviet pilot or technician associated with the Cub could possibly have been the caucasian seen by the source.

C. (S/NF/WN) Analysis: Vientiane Airfield (BE 0617-08406), located on the western side of Vientiane, Laos, is functionally divided into a civilian section and a military section. The civilian section is located southeast of the runway, while the military section is located northeast of the runway.

(1) The facilities located within the civilian section include the passenger terminal, control tower, operations area, maintenance area, weather station and POL storage. The following table provides descriptions,

from the passenger terminal to selected buildings.

#	Description	Meters
01	Passenger Terminal	NA
02	Control Tower	101
03	Ops Building	160
04	Vehicle Storage Building	191
05	Terminal/General Admin Building	61
06	Vehicle Maintenance Building	108
07	Aircraft Support Building	133
08	Aircraft Support Building	173
09	Hanger	256
10	Hanger	184
11	Hanger	483
12	Hanger	502
13	Support Building (Quonset Hut)	1025

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED
Classified by DoD TS-6105 21-4F-3
Declassify on OADR

SECRET

Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
Authorized for Release to

Page 1 of 2 pages

034

NO 982022

1284

SECRET

(2) The facilities located within the military section consist of a Fishbed support area, GCI-EW radar area and high explosive storage area (Print 3).

(3) A probable Soviet AN-12 Cub and two American-made C-123 Providers were present at Vientiane Airfield. The following table lists the AOB for the civilian section of the airfield.

#	Type	# of Airframes
01	Prob AN-26 Curl	2
02	Conf AN-24 Coke	1
03	Conf AN-26 Curl	3
04	Conf MI-8 Hip-C	3
05	Conf C-123 Provider	2
06	Prob AN-12 Cub	1
07	Conf AN-2 Colt	5
08	Prob C-54	1
09	Conf MI-6 Hook	2

3. (U) ANALYST'S COMMENTS.

A. (S/NF/WN) Map Reference: Series L9011, sheets Vientiane 3-TPC, 1:12,500

B. (U) Questions concerning this report should be addressed to
 POC DX-5D2, Secure phone 936-1436 or Open phone 475-

4. APPROVED BY:

ANALYST

Imagery Analyst

POC

Chief, World-Wide Issues Section

12 Enclosures

- 04 12 x 10 Prints with annotated overlays (S/NF/WN)
- 04 12 x 10 Prints (S/NF/WN)
- 04 12 x 10 Duplicate Positive (S/NF/WN)

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
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
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SUBJECT: Interview with SOURCE Ref "Live-Sighting"

- During the period 8-10 August, two VO-PW interviewers interviewed: SOURCE in response to SOURCE's contact with GEN Kingston.

- SOURCE claims that during a May 1987 trip to Laos he observed a Caucasian at Vientiane airport. He has made further claims relative to that sighting which have varied with each telling.

-- SOURCE was told by a "Laotian air traffic controller" that the American was a former U.S. pilot, Thomas Hart, shot down over Laos, now living with Lao wife and children and operating electrical generating plant in Vientiane.

SOURCE changed this story in our recent interviews to say that "Hart" is the chief administrator for electrical power for all Laos and only has an office in Vientiane.

-- SOURCE observed "Hart" at a distance of 75 yards for approximately 30 seconds to 1 minute.

-- Last year, SOURCE met with Mr. Mark Waple, Fayetteville, NC, attorney who has been active in PW/MIA related lawsuits. SOURCE told Waple his story and later told the story to Mrs. Hart.

-- FYI: Thomas Hart, CAPT, USAF, was crewmember on AC-130, downed in 1972. Crashsite was excavated in 1985 and Hart's remains were identified. Mrs. Hart has sued over the identification and was awarded \$20 million - government is appealing the judgement. There has been considerable publicity over this lawsuit and the Hart identification.

- After having talked with SOURCE several weeks ago, we conducted an investigation into his sighting and concluded that, whoever he saw at Vientiane airport, he did not see Hart or any other U.S. MIA.

- SOURCE entered Laos in May 1987, carrying with him an American Indian headdress and a "rucksack of medicine"; he intended to travel through rural Laos, demonstrating Native American dances, dispensing medicine and looking for U.S. MIAs. SOURCE also states that he was dressed in full tribal regalia when he arrived in Laos.

+ Embassy verified that he did enter Laos, without a visa, early May 1987. Lao detained him at the airport for several days, put him on next flight out; he was visited daily by Embassy consular officer who described SOURCE as "a curious man with a lively imagination."

SOURCE claims to be a "Mic-Mec" Indian, native of Boston.

-- Personnel from U.S. Embassy in Vientiane and Bangkok

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regularly pass through the airport; they are familiar with several Westerners including Soviet-bloc technicians who are frequently at the airport.

-- It is inconceivable that a U.S. PW could be living freely in Vientiane without U.S. Embassy [] detecting his presence.

-- The "power plant" that "Hart" is supposed to be operating has not been in operation for years and is located across the street from the Swedish Embassy swimming pool and tennis courts, frequented by U.S. Embassy personnel. There have never been any hints of U.S. PWs anywhere near the power plant.

-- VO-PW has interviewed a former Lao military and civil pilot who was based at Vientiane airport and a former Lao air traffic controller from Vientiane airport. Both have reported reliably. Both stated they know of several Westerners at and around the airport, none of whom are Americans.

- Other stories told by SOURCE included:

-- He was captured by Japanese in WWII. The Japanese PW camp commander was a Harvard graduate. When he found that SOURCE was from Boston, he released SOURCE.

-- He was captured during the Korean War and, while being moved north, noted that the North Korean guards were watching for American escapees headed south. He escaped by heading north -- an unexpected move -- and then evading through the countryside back to his unit. Enroute, he picked up approximately 600 stragglers from various units, forming them into a relatively cohesive unit before returning to U.S. lines.

-- He was captured by the Pathet Lao in Laos, 1962, who used him as a medic until his medicine ran out. They then released him to go back and get more medicine if he would promise to return to confinement. He gave them the slip but is somewhat distressed that he "lied" to them about returning to captivity.

- SOURCE is best described as a "character" with a vivid imagination.

-- He regularly pressed our interviewers to have a few drinks with him before starting interviews. They declined.

-- SOURCE is a 30-plus-year Army veteran with service in WWII, Korea and Vietnam (eight purple hearts total).

-- He is extremely difficult to talk to because of senility, will not stay on the subject, delivers rambling "war stories" and makes marked changes in his stories.

SOURCE presented our interviewers with a list of expenses incurred on his trip to Laos. He suggested, strongly, several times that we help him with his expenses, listed at \$8,219.53.

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- VO-PW will produce a detailed report and assessment after reviewing tapes and notes of the interview.

- I anticipate we will hear from SOULLE, through various channels for some time into the future. As an old soldier, he has, and will exploit, contacts such as that with GEN Kingston.

INTERVIEWER

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3040

COMMAND, CONTROL,
COMMUNICATIONS
AND INTELLIGENCE

S-014/DoD POW/MIA CDO

17 JAN 1992

The Honorable John Kerry
Chairman, Select Committee on
POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Kerry:

In response to your two letters dated 20 December that requested information pertaining to Laos and the POW/MIA issue, the enclosed source folders have been delivered to the Senate Security Office. We anticipate providing the responses to the queries in the 20 December letters the week of 20 Jan 1992. Additional source folders will be provided as expeditiously as possible on a weekly basis.

If you have any questions concerning the status of these Laos reports, please contact our office at (703) 908-2706.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Alex S. Od", followed by the typed text "CAPT, USAF".

5 Encls
See page 2

FOR

MARGARET R. MUNSON
Director, DoD POW/MIA Central
Documentation Office

cc:
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w/o enclosures
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ENCLOSURE LISTING TO S-014/DoD POW-MIA CDO

1. Source Folder #2676,
(S/NF/ORCON), 1cy
2. Source Folder #14102,
(C/NF), 1cy
3. Source Folder #10128,
(S/NF), 1cy
4. Source Folder #10171
(S/NF), 1cy
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5. Source Folder #7842
(S/NF), 1cy

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



VIETNAM CHECKLIST FOR THE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Information as of 1600
19 December 1965



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This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

GROUP 1
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19 December 1965

HIGHLIGHTS

Mekong Delta. The military uprising by tribal elements sympathetic to the autonomy movement FULRO has subsided except in one Special Forces camp. Prospects for a successful resolution of the tribal dissidence remains doubtful. So far, Hanoi has not followed up on its 18 December commentary which denounced US statements on the Fanfani - La Pira peace initiative as "groundless fabrications." The North Vietnamese may have been genuinely surprised by the uproar over their conversations with La Pira.

I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Viet Cong forces were particularly active in the Saigon/Capital Military Region area during the weekend and the Viet Cong campaign of terrorism continued unabated (Paras. 1-3). The joint USMC/- ARVN multibattalion ground sweeps--HARVEST MOON and LIEN KET 18--are continuing while in the initial phases of the US Army Operation CLEAN HOUSE elements of the 1st Air Cavalry Division have established heavy contact with enemy forces (Paras. 4-6). The Viet Cong are maintaining heavy pressure against South Vietnamese military positions in coastal Quang Ngai Province, but there are indications that enemy operations in northwestern Binh Duong Province may be at least temporarily suspended (Paras. 9-10).

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II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
The military uprising by tribal elements sympathetic to the autonomy movement FULRO has subsided except in one Special Forces camp, where troops are apparently awaiting FULRO authorization before resubmitting to government control (Paras. 1-3). Prospects for a successful resolution of the tribal dissidence, which has been simmering since a similar revolt in late 1964, remain dubious in view of deep-seated mutual distrust and past government performance (Paras. 4-5). The South Vietnamese Government has agreed to permit International Red Cross inspection of some prisoner of war camps and to release seven North Vietnamese prisoners to Red Cross custody (Para. 6). Three US Air Force sergeants, captured with a fourth sergeant who successfully escaped in early November, are reported by a defector to have been killed in the escape attempt (Para. 7).

III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
US air attacks were carried out on two major bridges on 19 December (Para. 1). Another US aircraft--the ninth--was lost to a SAM (Para. 2).

19 December 1965

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
V. Communist Political Developments: Communist propaganda is using the fifth anniversary of the National Liberation Front (NFLSV) to extol the NFLSV's domestic and international position. Communist prospects in South Vietnam are "splended," according to the military commander of Viet Cong forces (Paras. 1-5). Hanoi has so far not followed up on its 18 December commentary denouncing US statements in connection with the Italian peace initiative (Para. 6). In a recent conversation with Ambassador Harriman, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin advanced the standard Soviet line that a cessation of US bombing of North Vietnam "for a long enough period" might lead to discussions for a peaceful settlement. (Paras. 7-8).

VI. Other Major Aspects: A wrap-up of ROLLING THUNDER 44, conducted from 10 through 16 December, is given (Paras. 1-3).

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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Viet Cong forces were particularly active again in the Saigon/Capital Military Region area during the weekend. Enemy units last night reportedly placed mortar and automatic weapons fire on government positions less than four miles from the downtown business section of Cholon, the Chinese section of the capital. No friendly casualties were reported. Meanwhile, just west of Saigon, in Hau Nghia Province, a reinforced three-battalion ARVN sweep force was heavily engaged on 18 December by the Viet Cong near the district capital of Duc Hoa. Eleven government soldiers were killed and 48 wounded (2 US), as against enemy losses of nine killed and one captured. Southwest of Saigon, in Ba Xuyen Province, Viet Cong elements placed mortar fire on Soc Trang Airfield. However, no aircraft were damaged and there were no friendly casualties.

VC Terrorist Activity

2. The Viet Cong campaign of terrorism against US personnel also continued unabated in Saigon over the weekend. An enemy terrorist, who was subsequently apprehended by police, last night hurled a grenade from a moving vehicle at the Manor BOQ in downtown Saigon. The grenade detonated in the street in front of the US officers billet, wounding five Vietnamese, but resulting in no American casualties. On 18 ~~Nov~~ ^{DECEMBER} ~~ember~~, terrorists masquerading as policemen tossed a grenade at three US soldiers walking on a street in downtown Saigon, slightly wounding two of them.

3. In an attempt to provide added protection against the announced intentions of the Viet Cong to increase their terrorist activity, the US Military Command in Vietnam (MACV) has imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew for all American military personnel in Saigon for an indefinite period. Two hundred high-ranking US officers were reportedly evacuated from the Brink BOQ in Saigon on Saturday night, because of an alleged bomb threat.

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Allied Military Operations

4. On 18 December, one of three USMC battalions participating in Operation HARVEST MOON--a search-and-destroy ground sweep along the Quang Nam - Quang Tin Province border--established heavy contact with an estimated 200-man Viet Cong force. Seventy-six Communist troops were killed and 20 weapons captured, in contrast to US losses of six killed and 25 wounded.

5. HARVEST MOON was begun on 8 December in conjunction with a three-battalion ARVN operation-- LIEN KET 18. The joint operations have thus far resulted in cumulative Viet Cong losses of 379 killed (body count), 51 captured, 229 suspects detained, and 74 weapons seized. Allied casualties currently stand at 153 killed (45 US), 280 wounded (150 US), and 181 missing (2 US).

6. Elements of the US 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile) established heavy contact with a Communist force of undetermined strength on 18 December in the opening phase of Operation CLEAN HOUSE, 15 miles north-east of Qui Nhon, in central coastal Binh Dinh Province. Preliminary reports placed Viet Cong losses at 43 killed, two captured, and 39 suspects detained, as against US casualties of seven killed and 44 wounded. In addition, four supporting US helicopters were downed by intensive enemy ground fire, two of which were subsequently recovered.

7. US and Australian forces have been withdrawn from the search-and-destroy/rice harvest security operation, NEW LIFE 65, which was initiated in Binh Tuy Province on 21 November. Five ARVN battalions will continue to provide security for the rice harvest. During the combined US/Australian/ARVN participation phase, 22 Viet Cong were killed and 159 captured, as against allied casualties of three killed (2 US, 1 Australian) and 26 wounded (9 US, 2 Australian, and 15 ARVN).

8. Operation SMASH, by two battalions plus artillery elements of the US 1st Infantry Division, one battalion of the US 173rd Airborne Brigade, and one ARVN Ranger battalion, continues according to plan in the

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Long Thanh - Binh Ba area of Phuoc Tuy Province. The multibattalion ground sweep, initiated on 16 December as a follow-up to the 15 December B-52 strike against a suspected enemy supply facility in the operational area, yesterday established contact with an estimated Viet Cong battalion 25 miles north of Ba Ria (Phuoc Le), the provincial capital. In the engagement that ensued, 16 guerrillas were killed, four captured, and 20 suspects detained, as against American casualties of three killed and nine wounded.

VC Military Actions


9. The Viet Cong are continuing to maintain heavy pressure against South Vietnamese military positions in coastal Quang Ngai Province. On 19 December, an unknown number of Communist guerrillas attacked a Regional Forces company ten miles north of Quang Ngai city, inflicting friendly casualties of 23 killed and 13 wounded and capturing 29 weapons. Enemy losses were placed at two killed and one wounded.

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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. A military uprising by armed units of FULRO, a tribal autonomy movement in the central highlands, has apparently completely subsided except for sympathetic tribesmen in one government Special Forces camp who are believed awaiting instructions from the FULRO leader. The atmosphere at this camp, Plei Djereng in Pleiku Province, is reported to be calm.

2. The revolt broke out in four highlands provinces on 18 December following two days of apparent unrest among Montagnard troops and civilians near the provincial capital of Pleiku. Armed FULRO units took over Gia Nghia, the capital of Quang Duc Province, for about five hours before surrendering peacefully to regular South Vietnamese Army relief troops. In Phu Bon Province, a Regional Force company revolted and seized Phu Thien district capital, where some fighting occurred before the town was recaptured by the government. Three Special Forces/-CIDG camps were also affected: Plei Djereng and Plei Mrong in Pleiku and Lac Thien at a district headquarters in Darlac Province.

3. At the present time, the government has reasserted control over all of the trouble areas except Plei Djereng, and has agreed with FULRO elements in Quang Duc Province to resume negotiations on long-pending tribal demands for greater autonomy, more representation in the government, and special assistance in such areas as social welfare and the preservation of their cultural institutions. About 250 FULRO followers are being held by government forces, including some 100 arrested in Pleiku city. In the fighting at Lac Thien in Phu Bon, 32 persons were killed including the district chief, and 22 were wounded; most of the insurgents escaped into the surrounding hills.

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4. Tribal dissidence has been simmering since September 1964, when a similar revolt occurred in four government CIDG camps. Elements from these camps have since formed the core of the FULRO autonomy movement under Rhade tribal leader Y-Bham Enoul, now reportedly based across the border in Cambodia. Following the 1964 revolt, former premier Khanh outlined a program of government reforms and assistance in an effort to curb FULRO proselyting and the spread of dissidence to other tribes in the highlands. Little of this program has been seriously implemented. More recently, the Ky government agreed to negotiate terms for the return of FULRO units to the government side, provided the demand for autonomy was dropped. The negotiations were plagued by chronic mutual suspicions, however, and only about 400 FULRO troops have returned voluntarily to government control.

5. Despite suppression of the latest insurrection, prospects of a satisfactory solution of the problem of tribal unrest are dubious. Hostility and distrust are deep-rooted on both sides, and Vietnamese officials have been suspicious of US prodding for concessions. Although some Communist penetration of FULRO has been reported, there continues to be no evidence of collusion to date between FULRO and the Viet Cong.

GVN to Allow Red Cross Visits to POWs

6. The South Vietnamese Government has agreed to furnish the International Red Cross a list of about 450 names of prisoners of war, and to permit Red Cross representatives to visit some of these prisoners in POW camps

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beginning about 20 December. In addition, Saigon has informed the Red Cross that it will release seven PAVN prisoners to Red Cross custody, with the option of choosing the country to which they wish to be repatriated. Saigon continues to regard the bulk of non-PAVN, nonuniformed prisoners in its hands as rebels rather than prisoners of war in the legal sense. The prisoner release is designed to encourage the possibility of future PW exchange.

7. Three of four US Air Force sergeants captured by the Viet Cong about 1 November while driving east of Saigon were shot and killed during an attempted escape on 2 November, according to a recent Viet Cong defector. The fourth, [redacted] who had successfully eluded his captors and returned to US control, had been unable to determine whether any of the other three had survived the escape attempt. [redacted] missing men are identified as [redacted]

[redacted] and Technical Sergeant Thomas Moore.

19 December 1965

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~~TOP SECRET~~**III. NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS**

1. US aircraft struck two major bridges in North Vietnam on 19 December. A night strike was conducted by navy A6 Intruders against the Hai-phong highway bridge, 47 miles east of Hanoi on Route 10. Pilots were unable to assess damage to this 1,350-foot bridge because of darkness. Air force F-105 Thunderchiefs once again attacked the Bac Can highway bridge on Route 3 some 65 miles north of Hanoi. Two spans of the bridge were reportedly dropped.

2. An air force F4C Phantom flying MIG cover for the Bac Can strike group was apparently damaged by a surface-to-air missile. The aircraft was able to fly as far as Thailand before the two crew members were forced to eject. Both were safely picked up. This is the ninth US aircraft lost to a SAM.

DRV Air Force Developments

19 December 1965

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TOP SECRET**Bomb Damage to Offshore Islands**

however. Tiger Island, as well as several other offshore islands in the Tonkin Gulf, have been used for months as secondary targets or areas in which unexpended ordnance is disposed. Many of these islands formerly housed radar installations, but it is likely that all radar equipment has now been removed to safer locations. The air strikes have had very little effect on the small garrisons which are apparently housed in caves or underground bunkers on many of these islands.


DRV Naval Activities

19 December 1965

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
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS



19 December 1965

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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. The Communists continued today to use the fifth anniversary of the National Liberation Front, which falls on 20 December, as the peg point for a spurt of propaganda extolling the NFLSV's domestic and international position. This was the main theme of a lengthy communiqué by the Front's news agency, broadcast by Hanoi on the 19th. It declared that the NFLSV is "in practice now assuming the functions of a strong, stable, really democratic state of the people" in South Vietnam. In the "international arena," said the communiqué, the Front exerts a "broad influence and a great prestige." The objective in this propaganda line seems to be to build up as strong an image of NFLSV authority as possible for foreign audiences, while carefully avoiding any flat claims to de jure governmental status on the part of the Front.

2. The communiqué also dealt with alleged US plans to push the Republic of Vietnam army into the background and to fight a direct war against the "South Vietnamese people" with the US armed forces. This has been an underlying theme in Communist propaganda for some time, but was more directly developed in this communiqué than in the past. The communiqué claimed, for example, that the "puppet army is now being used as a supplementary force on certain battlefields, and is given only auxiliary tasks." While the obvious purpose of this propaganda is to stir US - South Vietnamese dissension, it probably also reflects some genuine Vietnamese Communist concern with the increasingly direct confrontation between US and Viet Cong armed forces.

3. Chinese Communist propaganda on the Front anniversary has also focused on the military and political situation in South Vietnam.

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A People's Daily editorial on 19 December claimed that the situation "had never been so favorable as it is now" for the Viet Cong. In a lengthy pep talk, the editorial argued that it was imperative for the South Vietnamese to keep up the fight since "armed struggle" is the "main and decisive" way to defeat the US. Proper spirit and tactics in the struggle, declared the editorial, would overcome any "hardships and difficulties" faced by the insurgents. The editorial reasserted Chinese promises of full support for the Vietnamese in their fight, but did not go beyond long-standing Peking formulations in this regard.

4. The editorial's optimistic view of the situation was also echoed in an interview broadcast by Peking on the 19th which purportedly took place between a Chinese correspondent and the "commander" of the Viet Cong forces, somewhere in South Vietnam. This is the first time we have seen the Communists voice the opinions of the "commander" of the Viet Cong military arm. According to the Viet Cong boss, the insurgents prospects are "splendid." Although he implied that the commitment of US ground troops to the fighting had temporarily arrested the ARVN drift toward defeat, he argued that the US forces themselves had suffered "crushing" defeats from the "middle of October through November," and that the Americans have "still not seized the initiative on the battlefield." The Viet Cong commander said that the insurgents expect further US "counterattacks," especially before the "dry season" ends in the South, but he declared that the Viet Cong would win in the end.

5. Moscow chimed in with a propaganda treatment of the Front anniversary similar to that in other Communist capitals. An article published

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in Pravda on the 19th by Dang Quang Minh, head of the NFLSV mission in the USSR, claimed that the Front "holds a prominent place and enjoys great authority throughout the world." Minh also voiced "profound gratitude" for Soviet assistance and support.

The Italian Peace Initiative

6. So far, Hanoi has not followed up on its 18 December commentary which denounced US statements on the Fanfani - La Pira peace initiative as "groundless fabrications." The 18 December commentary declared that there had not been any negotiations "probe" by Hanoi through the Italians and that US statements on this score were designed to cover further US military escalation of the war. The wording of the DRV commentary suggested that the North Vietnamese were genuinely surprised by the uproar over their conversations with La Pira. The commentary attempted to make it clear that Ho and Pham Van Dong had talked to La Pira at the latter's request, and that the DRV position on the war had been restated in standard terms.

Soviets Pressing Privately for Bombing cessation

7. In a recent conversation with Ambassador Harriman, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin took the line that a cessation of US bombing of North Vietnam "for a long enough period" might lead to discussions for a peaceful settlement. Dobrynin, however, would not explain what led the Soviets to believe that Hanoi would adopt a more conciliatory attitude in the event the US attacks ceased. He implied that Moscow would encourage the North Vietnamese in this direction, but avoided any claim that Russian "encouragement" would in fact significantly influence Hanoi's decision.

19 December 1965

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
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8. Significantly, Dobrynin stopped short of any firm prediction or assurance as to what North Vietnamese concessions could be expected if the bombings were stopped. In this respect his comments followed the example of private statements made by Russian spokesmen during similar conversations in the past.

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VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS

1. ROLLING THUNDER 44, conducted from 10 through 16 December, was severely hampered by the Northeast Monsoon which caused poor weather over much of North Vietnam. The majority of sorties were devoted to armed reconnaissance along lines of communication. A number of strikes were also conducted against coastal and island radar sites and the unused Nghio Lo Airfield, some 80 miles west-northwest of Hanoi. One leaflet drop was made near Hoi Xuan, some 65 miles southwest of Hanoi.

2. The most significant strike of the week took place on 15 December against the Uong Bi thermal power plant north of Haiphong. Due in large part to bad weather, only five of the 24 aircraft scheduled to make the strike were successful in dropping their bombs on target. The remainder were either diverted to other missions or were canceled. Pilots reported that several bombs hit the warehouse and storage area and in the transformer yard. The generator yard was reportedly also hit and several secondary explosions noted. No photographic assessment of the damage has been received as yet. Subsequent to the

3. One US aircraft, an F-105 Thunderchief, was lost in the Uong Bi strike. The pilot was rescued. Another navy aircraft, an A4 Skyhawk, was lost while attempting to land on its carrier. The pilot was killed. Total US aircraft losses during operations against North Vietnam now stand at 177; of these 166 have been lost due to hostile action, the remainder have been lost as a result of malfunction or other causes.

19 December 1965

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~~Secret~~(b)(1)
(b)(3)*National Intelligence Estimate*

Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue (U)

*Produced by the National Intelligence Council*REGISTRY < 538 - 417 >
AUTHOR

VIA OFFICE PRODUCTION STAFF

~~Secret~~NIE 98-03
April 1998

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NIE 98-03

Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue (U)

This Estimate was approved for publication by the
National Foreign Intelligence Board under the
authority of the Director of Central Intelligence. ☐

*This National Intelligence Estimate was prepared
under the auspices of ☐ National
Intelligence Officer for East Asia. ☐*

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Scope Note

Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue (U)

This National Intelligence Estimate was requested by Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in conjunction with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. It addresses two key questions:

- Since 1987, to what extent has the leadership of the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) demonstrated a commitment to cooperating with the United States to achieve the fullest possible accounting of American personnel missing in action during the Vietnam conflict?
- What is the Intelligence Community's assessment of the so-called "1205" and "735" documents from the Russian archives? (These two intelligence reports raised troubling questions about whether all American prisoners of war (POWs) were released during "Operation Homecoming" in 1973 by citing substantially higher numbers of live American prisoners in Hanoi than were ultimately released.)

This NIE differs from standard estimative papers in that it has an historical focus rather than projecting forward to the future. Some of the judgments it reaches are based upon assessments made by experienced American officials rather than upon a sizable body of intelligence reporting. In some cases we had to consider intelligence reporting that is as much as 25 years old

For these and other reasons, there are important gaps in our knowledge of these sensitive issues, and our judgments must therefore be cautious. Accordingly, the Estimate contains a lengthy annex on methodology that describes available information, intelligence gaps, and how the judgments were reached.

~~Secret~~NIE 98-03
April 1998

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Key Judgments

Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue ☐

Since the early 1990s, we have seen evidence for increased Vietnamese cooperation on the POW/MIA issue in the strengthened staffing, increased responsiveness, and growing professionalization of the Vietnamese organizations that deal with this issue:

- In our view, Hanoi judges that better ties to the United States are in Vietnam's own security and economic development interests and that normalization requires progress on the POW/MIA issue.
- US financial support for cooperative action and willingness to agree to reciprocity on Vietnamese humanitarian concerns also encourage cooperation.

Consequently, we judge that Vietnam has become more helpful in assisting US efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting of American personnel missing in action during the Vietnam conflict. On the issue of recovering and repatriating remains of US personnel, we rate Vietnamese cooperation as excellent. Cooperation also has been good on assisting with trilateral investigations and providing documents (see table on page 7). ☐

We think Hanoi's decision to be more cooperative with the United States on POW/MIA accounting has not come easily to the Vietnamese leaders. Longstanding ideological distrust, animosity lingering from the war, suspicion of American motives, and fear of intelligence exploitation all have operated at times to limit Vietnam's willingness to cooperate on recovering or accounting for US MIAs. But our reporting suggests that the POW/MIA issue no longer has the political sensitivity it once had. ☐

Incidents of outright refusal to cooperate with US investigators have decreased, but there are still instances in which the Vietnamese raise objections to POW/MIA activities. In most cases, the Vietnamese cite considerations of sovereignty—for example, in refusing to make internal Politburo documents accessible to US investigators; security, such as not allowing US officials to enter classified locations and facilities; or technical

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problems, such as difficulty in locating documents or records. Occasionally the Vietnamese state that local villagers are concerned about the intrusive nature of investigations and recovery activities.

Moreover, although Vietnam's performance generally has improved with respect to the US POW/MIA issue, we think Hanoi has not been completely forthcoming on certain POW/MIA matters:

- In some instances, we believe full disclosure would prove embarrassing to the regime. For example, Hanoi continues to deny that US POWs were mistreated while in captivity in the North.
- We think Vietnam still has records it could make available to US investigators but which would discredit its denials of mistreatment.
- A few reports of transfers of US POWs to Russia and other countries are unexplained, and the books remain open.

Although 120 live-sighting investigations have been carried out by US teams, none has generated any credible evidence of American POWs left in Vietnam. Hanoi protests having to investigate such cases, but reports appear regularly—most recently on five POWs possibly being held in Laos—and established procedures for resolving them continue to be in effect.

Although Vietnam's overall performance in dealing with the POW/MIA problem has been good in recent years, the unresolved issues noted above suggest the need for continued close attention by the US Government.

We assess continued progress in POW/MIA accounting will require overcoming two types of obstacles:

- Technical problems, such as difficulty in retrieving archival materials, contacting leads, and conducting field activities by the Joint Task Force—Full Accounting (JTF-FA), are more amenable to resolution than political obstacles. Not all can be overcome—the passage of time and geographic change increase the difficulty of recovery operations—but some can be overcome through improving technology, maintaining US financial commitment, and supporting continued professionalization on the Vietnamese side.

Figure 1
Summary Evaluation: Vietnamese Cooperation
With the United States on POW/MIA Accounting

Element	Level of Cooperation	Comments
Joint field activities; recovery and repatriation of remains	Excellent	Has been improving since early 1990s; increasing professionalism on part of Vietnamese.
Assisting with trilateral investigations	Good	Vietnamese work hard to obtain Laotian cooperation in recovery efforts.
Providing documents, personal artifacts, and equipment	Good	Vietnamese have willingly provided numerous documents but probably are holding out on those that would embarrass the government.
Making officials available for interviews	Fair to good	Some retired officials may resist interviews.
Live-sighting	Reluctant, but cooperation still reasonably good	Vietnamese resent live-sighting investigations and question their utility.
Transfer of POWs to Soviet Union	Uncertain	Vietnamese say none were transferred, but issue remains open.

Source: US officials responsible for carrying out research, investigation, and joint recovery operations of American POW/MIAs.

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- Overcoming political obstacles—such as Vietnam's sensitivities about infringements on its sovereignty and obstructionist tendencies on archival research and live-sighting reports—will be more difficult. In the past, Vietnam has reacted best to straightforwardness combined with respect and US acknowledgment of Hanoi's own MIA accounting efforts.

We have reviewed the so-called "1205" and "735" documents, which purport—falsely in our view—to be reports to the party leadership containing statements that Hanoi held large numbers of US POWs above those acknowledged to the United States. We believe the judgments in the 1993 Intelligence Community assessment released by the Department of Defense (DOD) remain valid: that the documents are probably authentic

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GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence)—collected documents. But many of the details of the documents, including dates and other facts, are implausible or inconsistent with reliable evidence. In particular, the numbers of POWs allegedly held by Hanoi at the times mentioned are inconsistent with reliable US Government statistics and far outnumber the actual total of open cases. We believe that neither document provides a factual foundation upon which to judge Vietnamese performance on the POW/MIA question.

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Discussion

Part I: The Question of Vietnamese Cooperation ☐

Since 1987, Vietnam's attitude and overall approach toward cooperation with the United States on prisoners of war or missing in action (POW/MIA) issues have improved. ☐

First and foremost is the improved staff professionalism and efficiency of the Vietnamese agencies that deal with US POW/MIA issues. ☐

Over the last 10 years this situation has changed substantially. ☐

☐ Officials are increasingly professional and are upwardly mobile in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of the Interior. Many Foreign Ministry junior personnel receive training there. According to US officials, many Vietnamese officials who work POW/MIA issues have demonstrated skill and initiative. ☐

Hanoi has been moving toward better cooperation since that time for a variety of reasons, but particularly since 1992—when the United States began seriously to discuss easing trade

restrictions and normalizing relations—Vietnam has become more cooperative in assisting the United States locate and recover the remains of MIAs. Also, the easing of bilateral tensions after the Paris Agreement on Cambodia in 1991 (which ended Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia) created a climate more conducive to Vietnamese cooperation. We assess that Vietnam has become more cooperative for these reasons:

- Hanoi wants engagement with Washington, especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union, which had been Vietnam's key ally and supporter. Vietnam now perceives cooperative relations with the United States to be essential for furthering its economic and security objectives. Vietnamese leaders recognize that Washington will be a key power in the region, and American business is a potential major source of investment. They recognize that better cooperation on the POW/MIA issue is central to Washington's ability to forge a better bilateral relationship. Normalization of relations has generally reinforced Vietnam's willingness to improve cooperation.
- The effort does not place any great demand on Vietnam's own limited resources. The United States provides financial backing for cooperative endeavors to account for MIAs—about \$9.5 million annually to underwrite

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~~Secret~~*The 1992 CIA Study* ☐

Some of the highlights of the Key Judgments of the CIA Study, Vietnam: Adjusting Its Strategy on the POW/MIA Issue, of January 1992, include:

During the past four years, Vietnam has become more cooperative in resolving questions concerning US military personnel reported as possible prisoners of war or missing in action (POWs/MIAs) in the Vietnam war. The government has made several important gestures since 1988, including turning over more remains and material evidence than during the preceding 13 years; participating, for the first time, in joint investigations of sites where American planes crashed or missing US servicemen were last seen; and, beginning in 1990, giving US experts limited access to military museums and archives containing records detailing Vietnamese investigations of American losses.

Even under the best of circumstances, there are limits to what the United States could expect to achieve.

joint recovery efforts in Vietnam. Most of this goes to Vietnam to fund the five joint field activities held annually.¹ ☐

Vietnam's more cooperative approach was observed by CIA analysts in the early 1990s (see inset). Since then, reciprocal actions by the US and Vietnamese Governments have fostered an even better climate for approaching the POW/MIA issue:

- The US "Hanoi Office" (US MIA Office) was opened in June 1991.
- In March 1992, Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam told the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific that Vietnam would expand cooperation with the United States on POW/MIA issues. The two sides agreed on a 24-month recovery/repatriation program, a mechanism to investigate live-sighting reports, and a process for providing US humanitarian aid to Vietnam.
- In July 1993, Vietnam received the highest level US delegation since the end of the Vietnam war and agreed to allow US State Department officials to be stationed in Hanoi to assist JTF-FA activities.
- In May 1994, Vietnam agreed to opening a US liaison office in Hanoi to facilitate progress on POW/MIA accounting and as a prelude to diplomatic relations. US officials arrived in August, and the office formally opened in January 1995. ☐

¹ According to JTF-FA estimates, since FY 1995 each field recovery activity in Vietnam has cost about US \$1.6 million.

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Responding To US Government Accounting Efforts

Since 1992, Hanoi also has become much more cooperative in allowing US officials to meet and interview Vietnamese citizens who could be knowledgeable of MIA information.

Recent Vietnamese Intentions

[redacted] Vietnam [redacted] to be more cooperative with the United States on POW/MIA accounting. This decision has not come easily to the Hanoi Government, in our view. Longstanding ideological distrust, animosity lingering from the war, suspicion of American motives, and fear of intelligence exploitation all have operated at times to limit Vietnam's willingness to cooperate on recovering or accounting for US MIAs. Vietnamese officials frequently point to the disparity between their work to recover missing American soldiers and efforts to account for their own, which number more than 300,000. They must also overcome interbureaucratic rivalries and central-local disputes to maximize their cooperation. But our reporting indicates to us that the POW/MIA issue no longer has the political sensitivity it once had. (S)


A good indicator of Vietnamese intentions is the degree to which Vietnamese officials have undertaken unilateral efforts—that is, efforts without direct participation by the JTF-FA—to assist in locating remains of US MIAs. [redacted]

[redacted] US officials at JTF-FA suggest [redacted] that the Vietnamese side has worked energetically to follow up leads and schedule field activities to locate and recover remains. In some instances, Vietnamese on recovery teams have willingly worked beyond the terms of their contracts to successfully complete operations (see inset on page 17). [redacted]


Cultural reasons, in addition to official policy, contributes to this record. Families are of great importance to the Vietnamese. Vietnamese workers who participate in the field recovery efforts frequently express respect for US efforts to recover remains of American dead. [redacted]


For local officials, participation in joint field activities can be financially profitable. People in their villages can earn much more by

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
working on the activity than they could in their normal work. Local officials usually seek to parcel out work force assignments based on kinship ties and other traditional connections.

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Instances of Vietnamese Noncooperation
Vietnam's Marxist-Leninist political system is habitually secretive and distrustful of foreign influences, fearful that any information it

divulges may be used to undermine its authority, punish its past behavior, or embarrass it politically. In our view, it is adept at defending


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its sovereignty and protecting its secrets. That said, there have been few instances in which Vietnamese authorities have flatly refused US requests concerning an accounting for MIAs. Vietnamese tend to avoid direct refusals. Rather, they indirectly decline US requests by asserting that Vietnam will undertake unilateral



measures to achieve the accounting the US seeks. Among the most significant examples:

- Although Vietnam has provided thousands of documents to the US side, US requests to see Politburo documents pertaining to US POW/

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MIA issues have been turned aside. The Vietnamese insist that these records are sensitive and can not be directly viewed by foreigners. Vietnamese authorities have said they will research the records and provide relevant

POW/MIA information, 


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- Vietnamese authorities have not facilitated interviews with some senior retired military officers whom US officials think could provide POW/MIA information. Vietnamese authorities claim that these retirees do not wish to be interviewed by US officials and in some instances lack knowledge.
- Vietnam does not allow joint field activities in "classified" military areas. Vietnam offers to undertake unilateral searches in these areas when detailed and credible leads are provided. In a few instances, the Vietnamese have been able to provide remains from these locations to US authorities.

At the working level, Vietnamese officials are not always amenable to US requests.

Vietnam's Bureaucracy: Responsiveness and Resistance

Our review of the past decade suggests that some key elements of Vietnam's government initially were reluctant to assist the United States in resolving POW/MIA issues. Such

opposition was lessened by Politburo decisions in the early 1990s

We occasionally see some hints of continuing dissatisfaction, however. For example, in March 1996 the Army Newspaper *Quan Doi Nhan Dan* warned that the United States was taking advantage of MIA searches to "grasp and exploit many of our secrets." The tone of the article was that cooperation with the United States could threaten Vietnam's interests.

this statement

did suggest that some elements of Vietnam's bureaucracy did not favor full engagement with the United States on POW/MIA issues. Consequently, for cooperation to continue, Vietnamese leaders and VNOSMP officials probably will continue to have to maintain pressure on all elements of the bureaucracy.

The Record of SRV Responsiveness

Recovery and Repatriation of Remains. Vietnamese responsiveness on the recovery and repatriation issue is currently described by JTF-FA officials as excellent. According to Vietnamese figures, since the end of the war, Hanoi

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Vietnamese Initiative in Recovery Operations: Recent Examples

Case 1364

On 22 January 1969, SP5 Douglas Alan Ross was killed during a combat operation in South Vietnam. His unit was forced to take cover. Other dead and wounded were recovered in an extensive search the next day, but the body of SP5 Ross was not found. He eventually became Case 1364.

In January 1994, a joint US-Vietnamese team investigated Case 1364 in La Mo Nong Village, Chu Pa District, Gia Lai Province. The team searched a 600-square-meter area and questioned local residents but found no information.

In early July 1997, two Vietnamese villagers reported to Gia Lai Province officials that, while using a metal detector to search for scrap aluminum, they had found the grave of an American. They produced identification tags reading: Ross, Douglas, US 56719861, A, Lutheran. Provincial authorities notified the central government, which then informed the JFT-FA detachment in Hanoi. A joint team was dispatched to Pleiku township on 6 July to question local witnesses and retrieve the remains. These were repatriated in September 1997 and approved for identification by the Armed forces Identification Review Board on 18 February 1998.

Case 1927

On 24 September 1972, Lt. Daniel Borah's aircraft was hit by antiaircraft fire and

crashed into the jungle in North Vietnam. Two other aircraft saw a parachute and heard voice radio transmissions while the parachute was in the air. After the parachute landed in the trees, an emergency beacon was heard for a short time, then silence. Other aircrew saw the parachute pulled down through the trees. Large concentrations of PAVN forces in the area precluded a ground search. Three days of air search and rescue efforts failed to locate any sign of Lt. Borah.

In 1991, photographs purporting to be of Lt. Borah and his Lao guard surfaced in Southeast Asia. Borah family members stated that the man in the photos was indeed Lt. Borah. The world press cited this as evidence of live American POWs still in Southeast Asia. Extensive investigation into the origin of the photos, however, revealed that they were in fact a hoax. The individual believed to be Lt. Borah was actually a Lao named Ahrao, as was confirmed in interviews with him.

In September 1995, the "Office for Seeking Missing Persons" (VNOSMP) reported that it had located a veteran of an antiaircraft battery whose members had found a dead American pilot named "Borah" and had buried the body. The VNOSMP located a witness to the burial and then provided this information (though not the witness) to US investigators in January 1996. In March, a joint US-Vietnamese team excavated the site and recovered a complete set of remains. The remains were subsequently identified as those of Lt. Daniel Borah.

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Figure 2. A recovery team excavates the site of a B-52 crash just outside Hanoi, Vietnam. ☐

Photo Courtesy CILHI

has returned remains to US officials on 67 occasions, totaling 717 sets (not all of which were of US personnel). Since January 1992, when joint recovery operations began in earnest, the Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii (CILHI) reports that 263 sets of remains have been repatriated. Of these, identification has been completed on 101 sets, while identifications on 25 sets are pending review by Service Secretaries, and 51 sets are undergoing final lab review. Procedures for handling remains have been jointly developed and work smoothly. ☐

We have no evidence that the Vietnamese presently are storing remains of American dead. A 1987 Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) stated that we had evidence that Vietnam was storing about 400 to 600 sets of remains. But that judgment was retracted in 1996 because it turned out to have been based

on the unsupported testimony of a single unreliable source.² The Vietnamese Government collected and stored remains during the Vietnam war, but we do not know how many. A considerable number were returned to various US delegations that visited Vietnam:

- CILHI reports that since the early 1990s there has been no indication of storage in the remains returned by the Vietnamese to the United States, including those sets of remains obtained outside the JTF-FA joint recovery efforts.³ ☐

² Intelligence Community Assessment 96-05, *Vietnamese Storage of Remains of Unaccounted US Personnel* (October 1996). ☐

³ DPMO in conjunction with CILHI presently has a study underway to investigate the question of Vietnamese storage of the remains of US personnel. Further conclusions on this issue must await the results of this study. ☐

[REDACTED]

Resolution of Discrepancy Cases. According to the Department of Defense POW and Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) data, 48 "priority discrepancy" cases remain to be resolved with Vietnam. This compares with the original 196 cases in 1990.⁴ These are cases where US information about a missing US serviceman seems to differ from that of the Vietnamese. Vietnam facilitates a US special team that has extensive geographic access to conduct research and investigations on discrepancy cases. [REDACTED]

US officials believe Vietnam has, for the most part, been cooperative on these cases. The main difficulty in resolving such cases is in obtaining leads. When we or the Vietnamese obtain such leads, they have acted promptly to help resolve the discrepancy, according to US officials. [REDACTED]

Assistance in Implementing Trilateral Investigations With Laos. [REDACTED]

⁴ The original priority discrepancy cases were established by US officials after visits to Vietnam by General Vessey, the US special representative, in the late 1980s and early 1990s. [REDACTED]

POW/MIA Accounting [REDACTED]

The Department of Defense POW and Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) maintains the record of unaccounted for Americans in Vietnam. As of March 1998, 1,565 Americans were so listed. The vast majority of these cases involve individuals who are known to have been killed or were last seen in circumstances in which death was a near certainty:

- *Of the 1565, there were 825 confirmed dead at wartime by their commanders and comrades.*
- *Subsequently, intensive research by US Government officials has established that half the remainder—about 370 people—are dead.*
- *Only 48 are considered to be priority discrepancy cases—that is, cases involving American personnel who were known to be alive, not gravely wounded, and in proximity to the enemy at the time of their loss.*

^a Source: DPMO

[REDACTED] US officials note that the Laotians have become somewhat more cooperative over the last two or three years, perhaps because they are gaining experience with US POW/MIA issues. [REDACTED]

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Trilateral investigations focus on those areas of Laos that were more or less controlled by Vietnam during the war. The procedures for conducting operations are gradually becoming less cumbersome, such as those for interviewing witnesses and conducting field activities. Joint recovery activities in Laos have been conducted according to geographic priorities, mostly on a North-to-South basis, [REDACTED]

Provision of POW/MIA-Related Documents, Personal Artifacts, and Equipment. Vietnam has provided over 28,000 documents to US officials, but we believe the Vietnamese probably could improve their record in providing these materials. [REDACTED]

- Vietnam's archival filing and retrieval system for material 25 to 30 years old may not be adequate to readily produce relevant

documents. [REDACTED]

Nevertheless, Vietnam has become more cooperative than before in providing such materials. In several instances, Vietnam has provided documents that its investigators uncovered unilaterally. When the US side has good leads, the process of obtaining records and artifacts has been eased. For example, in May 1995, Vietnamese authorities gave a US delegation over 200 pages of documents, sketch maps, and witness reports collected by their investigation teams. The documents included a comprehensive review of all special remains cases, including photographs, grave registration lists, and "died in captivity" lists. [REDACTED]

Live-Sighting Reports. Live-sighting investigations are a particularly difficult problem. Hanoi is sensitive about allegations it is holding POWs since the releases mandated by the Paris accords in 1973 and expresses doubt that investigations of such reports will yield any results. Hundreds of such reports have been found to be inaccurate during a prescreening process, including many that were received through intelligence channels. Since 1987, US officials have conducted 120 on-site investigations of live-sighting reports. Thus far, none has turned up convincing evidence of live American POWs still in Vietnam. After investigation, many of the reports turned out to be scams. Still others were deemed inaccurate because the investigators could not find the locations or structures cited in the reports. A few have

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Documents ☐

The Vietnamese have turned over a wide array of wartime and postwar documents that have contributed directly to accounting for missing Americans, resolving questions about why remains cannot be recovered, and confirming loss locations for downed aviators. Among the most useful are a collection of contemporary reports, prepared for Vietnam's internal use, that list US casualties, note whether remains were collected and buried, identify grave sites, and indicate whether the central government was able to collect remains. So far US officials have acquired documents of this type for 21 of 26 northern wartime provinces. Of the five provinces for which these officials do not yet have such records, all are in the far north of Vietnam; there are only two in which Americans were lost in any number.

For several of these same areas, Vietnam has also provided records prepared by wartime military organizations that detail the locations of downed aircraft. Using data from these "shootdown rosters," US officials have been able to locate previously unknown aircraft crash sites and to send joint teams to investigate on the ground and find out what happened to the aircrews.

The documents have also helped determine which US losses were known to Vietnamese forces within a defined geographic area and which were not. Establishing which losses


occurred without Vietnamese awareness has enabled US officials to assess the degree to which they should expect assistance from Vietnam in investigating particular cases. In some cases, such evidence has enabled US officials to conclude that certain aircraft crashed at sea or in remote unpopulated areas.

The ability to prepare, preserve, and transport documents declined precipitously outside northern Vietnam. In southern Vietnam and in the border areas of Cambodia and Laos, the field conditions in which Communist forces operated and the mobility of their headquarters, which frequently came under attack by US and Allied forces, militated against extensive recordkeeping.

The few records acquired from outside northern Vietnam relate chiefly to POWs who died in captivity. One exception is a list of aircraft downed by PAVN forces in southern Laos. This record is a postwar compilation of electronic message traffic from units in this area. The terse entries suggest the focus was identifying units that should be credited with a downing and not where aircraft crashed or what happened to the aircrews.

The Vietnamese have permitted US personnel to examine thousands of open-source wartime records, including museum artifacts and receipts, documentary films, news photos, and central and provincial newspapers.

turned up Americans or Eurasians who were not former POWs.⁶ [redacted]



⁶ One case, for example, turned out to be a former US serviceman, not a POW, who returned to Vietnam to live with his Vietnamese wife and Amerasian child. [redacted]

The SRV's Dedication of Resources to the POW/MIA Issue

Vietnam's primary resource is people, not money. We assess that Vietnam has assigned increasingly qualified people to POW/MIA issues and has given them the authority to act in conjunction with their US counterparts. This assessment is based on the experience of US officials who have longtime experience working with the Vietnamese on the POW/MIA issue. The Vietnamese have become adept at adjusting their support for joint field activities to meet US requirements. [redacted]

[redacted]

Vietnam's primary interest will continue to be engagement with the United States, and Hanoi will watch carefully for signs that Washington's efforts to achieve full accounting are flagging. Vietnam would adjust its policies accordingly. Vietnam probably would regard a US decision to reduce expenditures for the POW/MIA mission or to reduce field activities as an indicator that US interest was waning. [redacted]

Were POWs Interrogated by Russians?

We are uncertain whether Vietnam or Russia have been fully forthcoming on cases of Russian interrogations of POWs. This question is important because no returning POWs, except

~~Secret~~**Live-Sighting Investigations** ☐

Although 120 live-sighting investigations have been carried out, none has generated any credible evidence of American POWs left in Vietnam. Hanoi protests having to investigate such cases, but reports surface regularly—most recently on five POWs possibly being held in Laos—and established procedures for resolving them continue to work well. For example, the latest live-sighting case in Vietnam was resolved in March 1998. ☐

for one CIA civilian employee, reported knowledge of being interrogated by Russians. The Russians may have witnessed the interrogation of some POWs without the POW's knowledge. For example, in interviews with US officials, V. G. Panov (Lt. Col., ret.) said that he, along with other foreign officers (Chinese, Korean, and perhaps European), witnessed the interrogations of American POWs on four separate occasions. Panov also stated, however, that he believed the POWs may have been unaware that he was a Soviet officer. ☐


The evidence on Russian involvement in interrogations is contradictory. Former KGB General Kalugin said that Russians had questioned US POWs; President Yel'tsin also claimed this had happened.⁷ Besides Panov, noted above, other Russian officers interviewed by DPMO's Joint Commission Support Directorate have said they were present during the interrogation of American POWs. ☐

Other Russians, however, have denied such allegations. Those who were in Vietnam during the war have stated that the Vietnamese, sensitive about sovereignty, did not allow the Soviets to be involved in interrogations. Rather, the Soviets would pass to the Vietnamese their questions, and the Vietnamese would occasionally provide information. Panov, for example, stated that he could only witness interrogations of Americans when his questions were being asked. The Russian questions reflected the Soviet preoccupation with technical intelligence. ☐

Given these competing claims, the reports require continuing investigation. ☐

Were Some POWs Transferred to Russia or Elsewhere?

We have reviewed many reports that claim that POWs were transferred out of Vietnam. None of these reports have been substantiated, and many have proved unreliable.⁸ But a few received since 1992 remain under investigation or unresolved. ☐

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Although we lack good evidence that POWs were transferred to the USSR, we also conclude that the books should remain open on this issue. Until some of the reporting above is clarified, we cannot say definitively that no POWs were transferred from Vietnam. ☐

Improving Accounting

We have identified above two types of obstacles to MIA accounting: technical and political. Technical obstacles are those related to retrieving archival materials, pursuing leads, and conducting field activities. They also would include such problems as the circumstances under which the loss of a US soldier occurred or changes in geography—for example, the shifting of rivers or changes in fields and forests. They primarily involve logistics. We assess Vietnam is most likely to be cooperative in resolving these obstacles under these conditions:

- Continued US cooperation with Vietnamese authorities in applying the best technology and communications to help recover and identify remains.
- Continued US financial commitment to resolution endeavors. We think that the Vietnamese side measures its own efforts by evaluating the US commitment, in addition to relying on the funding.
- Continued nurturing of Vietnamese professional competence. This will require patient engagement but can also encourage the type of mutual respect at the working level that enhances prospects for successful recovery efforts. ☐

We also have credible reports that US POWs were *not* transferred out of Vietnam. General Volkogonov told the US-Russian Commission on POW/MIA Affairs that his delegation had uncovered no evidence that US prisoners had been transported from Vietnam to the USSR. Several of the Russians who served in Vietnam during the war, and would have reason to know, were interviewed by US officials and insisted that no US POWs were transferred to the USSR. For example, K. F. Katushev, former Central Committee Secretary for Maintaining Ties With Other Socialist Countries in the early 1970s, told US interviewers that he would have known if US POWs were transferred to the USSR. He believed no such transfers occurred.

☐





Figure 3. Having made the ultimate sacrifice, a veteran returns home with full military honors.

Photo Courtesy CILHI

Political obstacles may be somewhat more difficult to resolve. We think the primary issue will be Vietnamese sensitivity over cooperation with the United States on the POW/MIA issue. The question could become more problematic as local officials question the degree of effort being put toward resolution of US cases

Overall SRV Performance

On balance, we conclude that Vietnam's performance on the US POW/MIA issue has definitely improved over the past decade.



Part II: Intelligence Community Assessment of the "1205" and "735" Documents ☐

Current Assessment


Although since 1993 we have obtained new information about the two documents above, we believe the assessment released by DOD⁹ remains valid: that is, the documents were probably collected by the military intelligence department of the former Soviet Union (GRU) but are not what they purport to be. That report concluded that the documents contain significant inaccuracies and anomalies. Most important, on the basis of US Government records, the numbers of POWs cited in these documents as being held by North Vietnam were much too high. ☐

"1205" Document

The 1205 document purports to be a report by General Tran Van Quang to the Vietnamese Politburo in September 1972. The document came to light in 1993. One copy was found by an American researcher in the Russian archives. Another was provided US officials by Presidential Adviser Volkogonov. Among other

things, the lengthy report states that Vietnam was holding 1,205 US POWs in September 1972. The 1,205 figure was 669 more than the highest number the US Government ever believed might be held captive and more than twice as many as the 591 released by Vietnam during Operation Homecoming in 1973. ☐

New Information. Since the original examination of the document by the Intelligence Community in 1993, interviews with Russian officials who were knowledgeable of the document continue to validate the claim that it is an authentic GRU document and not a Russian fabrication:



- GRU Capt. A. I. Sivets told US interviewers in October 1997 that the original document was destroyed, that the source had provided other Vietnamese documents to the GRU, and that the 1205 document was genuine.
- K. F. Katushev, CPSU Central Committee Secretary responsible for maintaining ties to other socialist countries in the early 1970s, when interviewed by US officials on 1 July

¹⁰ Russian recollections are hazy on whether the "1205" document was originally written in Vietnamese. General Volkogonov, adviser to President Yel'tsin, thought he remembered seeing an original Vietnamese version. In any event, no Vietnamese version of the document has been located. ☐

⁹ The work of the Intelligence Community was the basis for a news release by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs on 24 January 1994, entitled, "Recent Reports on American POWs in Indochina: An Assessment." ☐

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1997, remembered that he had received a copy of the document in early December 1972.

- Y. P. Glazunov, who served in the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi from 1962 to 1965 as a junior diplomat and again from 1974 to 1978, told US interviewers on 7 March 1997 that he had heard of the 1205 document in the early 1970s when he served in the International Department of the Central Committee. ☐

While supporting the authenticity of the document, none of the Russians claimed that the figure of 1,205 POWs was accurate. General Volkogonov, in statements to the press in 1993, expressed doubt about the reliability of the numbers. Similarly, a TASS correspondent who served in Vietnam during the period, V. Kobchev, stated that the numbers were too high. Several of the Russians interviewed indicated that information about US POWs probably would not have been high on the Soviet agenda, and not much scrutiny would have been given the number:

- One interviewee, V. V. Dukhin, who served as a Political Counselor in Russia's Embassy in Hanoi from 1992 to 1995 said that the former DCM in Hanoi, I. A. Novikov, (now deceased) told him he was aware of the 1205 document when it was acquired. Novikov described the document acquisition as "slipshod and not a very conscientious effort." He further stated that the GRU agent who acquired the document was not reliable. ☐

In an interview in April 1997, Vietnamese Sr. Col. (ret.) Bui Tin said that he had a close relationship with General Quang, the putative author of the report. He thought it plausible that Quang could have reported to the Politburo and


that the report could have been in Quang's style. Nevertheless, Tin found the document "very strange."¹¹ ☐

By way of contrast, General Quang, in interviews with US officials consistently denies that he was the source of the report. Vietnamese officials continue to claim the report is a fabrication. ☐

Assessment. None of the new information helps to confirm the accuracy of the 1205 report. As noted in 1993, circumstantial evidence casts doubt on the validity of the report:

- Quang's responsibilities as a battlefield commander in a combat situation make it unlikely that he would be brought to Hanoi to report on issues that were not within his scope of responsibility ☐
- The length of the report would be inappropriate for a Politburo meeting. According to an academic specialist on Vietnam, during that particular period the Politburo met weekly and was unlikely to have entertained long reports.
- The purpose of the meetings was to make decisions, not listen to long oral reports.
- The tone of the report also is inappropriate. A person of Quang's subordinate status would not have lectured the Politburo on what its policies were. Such hardcore revolu-

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tionaries as Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, and Truong Chinh probably would not have been spoken to in such manner or have tolerated such language.

- The timing of the Politburo meeting is questionable. The report supposedly was given on 15 September 1972, but the Vietnamese claim there was no meeting on that date. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On that day, Quang Tri fell to South Vietnamese forces and Le Duc Tho, who ranked 5th in seniority on the Politburo, was meeting with Henry Kissinger at a key juncture in the Paris peace talks. Would the Politburo be discussing POW/MIA issues with a general whose forces were defending, and losing, a key city? [REDACTED]

Although the circumstantial evidence above is not definitive, the content of the report casts even more doubt on its accuracy. The portions of the report dealing with the POW issue are inaccurate with respect to how the prisoners were segregated by rank, where they were located, how they were classified, and the conditions of their release. More important, the numbers of POWs the report claims were held are not accurate:

- The 1993 DOD report observed that the 1,205 figure was 669 more POWs than suggested by any reliable source. We have received no new evidence that would alter that assessment.

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- If there were additional POWs, we would have known of them unless Vietnam maintained a separate prison system unknown to the POWs who returned in 1973. We have uncovered no reliable evidence that a separate prison system existed for certain POWs; nor do we have such indicators as plausible site locations.
- The 1,205 figure is inconsistent with our understanding of how many Americans survived the events in which they were lost to become captives. Based on information available to US researchers as of 19 January 1994 (when the original analysis of the 1205 and 735 documents was released by DOD), at most, the fates of 73 Americans thought to have been last known alive (on the priority case list) were uncertain. Since then, more US remains have been discovered and returned to the United States from Vietnam. Thus far, the circumstances of these recoveries accord with data and leads obtained by Vietnamese and US authorities. Consequently, the number of Americans whose fates are uncertain (on the priority case list) has been reduced to 48. The recoveries contradict the assertion that Vietnam secretly hid, and perhaps secretly eliminated, hundreds of US POWs. ☐

Consequently, the Intelligence Community assesses the information in the 1205 document to be unreliable and not a sound foundation for judging Vietnamese performance on the POW/MIA question ☐

"735" Document


The 735 document purports to be a report to the Central Committee by Hoang Anh (mistranslated Anya), a Central Committee Secretary, in late December 1970 or early January 1971. Like the 1205 document, it was acquired by the

GRU. A paragraph in the report says that Hanoi is holding 735 Americans though it has disclosed only 368 to the United States. It also says these POWs will be returned when US forces withdraw from Vietnam. ☐

New Information. In 1993 we had only two pages of the 735 report; we now have the full text. The Russian sources who claimed the 1205 document was authentic make the same claim for the 735 document. ☐


Assessment. The new information reinforces the case that this document is an authentic GRU-collected report. Nevertheless, as with the 1205 document, circumstantial evidence suggests the information in the report is inaccurate:


- The dates are wrong. The report says it was given at the 20th plenary session of the Central Committee in late December 1970 or early January 1971. In fact, the 20th plenum was not held until February 1972. The plenum held in January 1971 was the 19th.
- Hoang Anh was indeed a Secretary of the Central Committee at that time and was responsible for agriculture.¹² There is no reason why he would deliver a report that deals extensively with political and military developments and the situations in Laos and Cambodia. Agriculture is mentioned only briefly.



¹² Hoang Anh served in this capacity until his removal in 1974.


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- The report speaks extensively about preparations for the 4th Party Congress, including the establishment of a preparatory committee. In fact, the Politburo did not decide when to hold the 4th Party Congress until July 1975, which was several months after the 24th plenum of the Central Committee. The 4th Party Congress was not held until December 1976.
- Another key anomaly in the purported report is the charge against 16 "opportunists" members of the Central Committee, six of whom are named. If this were true, they should have been promptly ousted from their positions. Yet the report says the controversy had dragged on for years, and Anh's call for retribution seems unusually weak. In fact, no action appears to have been taken then, and one alleged "opportunist" remained in his sensitive post, heading the army's General Political Department, until after the war. Factionalism and disagreement over policy broke out during the period of "collective leadership" after the death of Ho Chi Minh. Some of the dissenting policy positions alleged in the 735 report are plausible. But others—such as a proposal to invite foreign (presumably Chinese) troops to help in Laos and South Vietnam—are not. Furthermore, if opportunism and disunity were of such concern, indirect references in the party press would have followed the plenum. 



As in the case of the 1205 document, the circumstantial evidence against the validity of the report is buttressed by the data on the numbers reported:

- The 1993 DOD report concluded that the 735 number was too high. US records indicate that 384 of the 591 POWs released in 1973 were captured before 1971. The total prisoners Hanoi could have been holding at the time could not have exceeded 470 according to US Government records. No evidence has come to light since 1993 that would cause us to revise our judgment.
- The continued recovery of US remains through the joint field activities since 1993 casts doubt on the likelihood that Vietnam could have been hiding that many unaccounted POW/MIAs. 

Consequently, we conclude the 735 document also offers no foundation to support a conclusion that Vietnam has not been forthcoming on POW/MIA issues. 


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
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




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


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


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


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



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
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The Federal Bureau of Investigation
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
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



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

SECRET

29

29 October 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT : Background Data Possibly Relevant to the
Current Vietnamese Communist Prisoner
Exchange Overture

1. The current Vietnamese Communist overtures on possible prisoner exchanges, covered in our memoranda of 27 and 28 October, seems to relate to the earlier BUTTERCUP activity that began in August 1967. We have checked the voluminous BUTTERCUP file and found three items of possible relevance. The pertinent traffic should be contained in your records, but in the interests of time and convenience we are repeating it here.

2. The January 1968 Letters. On 3 January 1968, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Richard Steadman was given five letters prepared in Washington for passage to five American citizens believed to be in VC hands. The pertinent message here is Secretary Rusk's cable to Ambassador Bunker transmitted on 3 January 1968 as

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)

"Five letters to US personnel who may be held by VC being carried by Steadman for delivery to Calhoun. Steadman traveling with General William Depuy. ETA Saigon 1330 local January 4 on Braniff military charter flight 241. In view shortness of time suggest envelope be picked up from Steadman upon arrival Saigon.



[REDACTED]

"Letters are addressed to following US personnel:
(Dates shown are date of casualty, which may be same
as date of capture if men are in fact prisoners.)

[REDACTED]

John F. Conlon III, Capt. 79318, AF,
4 March 1966

David S. Demmon, SP4, 563 73 772, Army,
9 June 1965

William F. Eisenbraun, Capt. 04074803,
Army, 5 July 1965

Douglas K. Ramsey, Foreign Service Officer,
17 January 1966

"Eisenbraun and Ramsey are confirmed prisoners.
[REDACTED] Conlon, and Demmon are listed as missing in action,
but in each instance there is some reason to hope that
service man is actually prisoner of VC. Families unaware
letters being sent by this route."

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4. The February 1968 List. In January and February 1968 there was much discussion about giving the courier for passage to Tran Bach Dang a list of US prisoners whose release we desired as part of any exchange. The most important message here is Secretary Rusk's 7 February 1968 cable to Ambassador Bunker transmitted as CAS

[REDACTED]

"List of names to send to [REDACTED] should be drawn from list of US prisoners we have identified as held by the VC (18 at present). Since [REDACTED] has been specific with his lists we believe we should also be precise. We recognize problem of choosing among prisoners, and accordingly propose that we select those who have been held two years or longer. This would be a total of ten names: five officers, four EM, one civilian. There is a time gap of eight months between the most recent capture on the list of ten (January 1966) and the next most recent captures (August 1966). From released prisoners we know that the longer a man is held, the more likely he is to be seriously ill. In the absence of reliable information on the health of individual prisoners, a selection by duration of captivity appears to be fairest. Accordingly, the following list should be sent [REDACTED] with the request that at least three of the named prisoners be released. Message should also state that we would particularly like to have any prisoners who may be seriously sick or injured, whether or not their names are on list. (Date in each case is date of capture, and should not be transmitted to VC.)

Begin list:

T/Sgt Samuel Adams, AF, 31 Oct 65
Capt. Donald Gilbert Cook, MC, 31 Dec 64
Capt. William Forbes Eisenbraun, Army,
6 July 65
Pvt. Robert Russell Garwood, MC, 28 Sept 65
Capt. Lawrence Thomas Holland, AF,
12 June 65
SP/4 James Henry McLean, Army, 9 Feb 65

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
M/Sgt Thomas Moore, AF, 31 Oct 65
Douglas K. Ramsey, Civ., 17 Jan 66
Capt. James Nicholas Rowe, Army,
29 Oct 63
Capt. Floyd James Thompson, Army,
26 Mar 64

"Believe we should inform Thieu of plan to send list
and give him opportunity to provide similar list of ARVN
prisoners."

[REDACTED]

6. The January 1969 List. In a later BUTTERCUP development,
on 30 January 1969 Secretary Rogers sent Ambassador Bunker the
following list of twenty names "suitable to give to VC with request that
they release ten of them in exchange for the four they have requested."

[REDACTED] info copies to Dr. Kissinger and Secretary Laird):

TSGT Samuel Adams, 18554000, AF,
October 31, 1965
Michael D. Bengt, Civilian,
January 31, 1968
SGT Richard Gordon Burgess, 2084229, MC,
September 25, 1966
MAJ Donald Gilbert Cook, 072794, MC,
December 31, 1964

[REDACTED]

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[redacted]
Gary Daves, Civilian, January 31, 1968
1st LT David Ronald Devers, 05321911,
Army, August 13, 1966
[redacted]

TSGT Charles Gale Dusing, 17203698,
AF, October 31, 1965
SGT Edwin Russel Grissett, Jr., 1938579,
MC, January 22, 1966
MAJ Lawrence Thomas Holland, 57577,
AF, June 12, 1965
Philip W. Manhard, Civilian, January 31, 1968
SP4 James Henry McLean, 19722072, Army,
February 9, 1965
MSGT Thomas Moore, 14268347, AF,
October 31, 1965
SFC John Joseph O'Neill, 11212494, Army,
August 13, 1966
Thomas W. Ragsdale, Civilian, January 31, 1968
Douglas Ramsey, Civilian, January 17, 1966
SP5 Edward Daniel Reilly, Jr., 23933241, Army,
April 26, 1966
CAPT Floyd James Thompson, 05304076, Army,
March 26, 1964
Eugene Weaver, Civilian, January 31, 1968
Charles Willis, Civilian, January 31, 1968

7. [redacted]

[redacted] the above list
of twenty names was never passed to the Communists. Three of the names
on the February 1968 list of ten were not included in the January 1969 list
of twenty: US Army Captain Rowe, who escaped on 31 December 1968,
US Army Captain William E. Eisenbraun (also an addressee of one of
the five January 1968 letters) and USMC Private Robert R. Garwood.

[redacted]

8. I am sending copies of this memorandum on an eyes only basis to the other three recipients of my 27 and 28 October memoranda, namely, Secretary Rogers, Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer.

/s/
Richard Helms
Director

SECRET

cc: Secretary Rogers
Secretary Laird
Admiral Moorer

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
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
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
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
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




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









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
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




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






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









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










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




















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
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


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

















CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

29 October 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT : Background Data Possibly Relevant to the
Current Vietnamese Communist Prisoner
Exchange Overture

1. The current Vietnamese Communist overtures on possible prisoner exchanges, covered in our memoranda of 27 and 28 October, seems to relate to the earlier BUTTERCUP activity that began in August 1967. We have checked the voluminous BUTTERCUP file and found three items of possible relevance. The pertinent traffic should be contained in your records, but in the interests of time and convenience we are repeating it here.

2. The January 1968 Letters. On 3 January 1968, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Richard Steadman was given five letters prepared in Washington for passage to five American citizens believed to be in VC hands. The pertinent message here is Secretary Rusk's cable to Ambassador Bunker transmitted on 3 January 1968 as

"Five letters to US personnel who may be held by VC being carried by Steadman for delivery to Calhoun. Steadman traveling with General William Depuy. ETA Saigon 1330 local January 4 on Braniff military charter flight 241. In view shortness of time suggest envelope be picked up from Steadman upon arrival Saigon.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

"Letters are addressed to following US personnel:
(Dates shown are date of casualty, which may be same
as date of capture if men are in fact prisoners.)

John F. Conlon III, Capt. 79318, AF,
4 March 1966

David S. Demmon, SP4, 563 73 772, Army,
9 June 1965

William F. Eisenbraun, Capt. 04074803,
Army, 5 July 1965

Douglas K. Ramsey, Foreign Service Officer,
17 January 1966

"Eisenbraun and Ramsey are confirmed prisoners.

Conlon, and Demmon are listed as missing in action,
but in each instance there is some reason to hope that
service man is actually prisoner of VC. Families unaware
letters being sent by this route."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

4. The February 1968 List. In January and February 1968 there was much discussion about giving the courier for passage to Tran Bach Dang a list of US prisoners whose release we desired as part of any exchange. The most important message here is Secretary Rusk's 7 February 1968 cable to Ambassador Bunker transmitted as [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

"List of names to send to [REDACTED] should be drawn from list of US prisoners we have identified as held by the VC (18 at present). Since [REDACTED] has been specific with his lists we believe we should also be precise. We recognize problem of choosing among prisoners, and accordingly propose that we select those who have been held two years or longer. This would be a total of ten names: five officers, four EM, one civilian. There is a time gap of eight months between the most recent capture on the list of ten (January 1966) and the next most recent captures (August 1966). From released prisoners we know that the longer a man is held, the more likely he is to be seriously ill. In the absence of reliable information on the health of individual prisoners, a selection by duration of captivity appears to be fairest. Accordingly, the following list should be sent [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] with the request that at least three of the named prisoners be released. Message should also state that we would particularly like to have any prisoners who may be seriously sick or injured, whether or not their names are on list. (Date in each case is date of capture, and should not be transmitted to VC.)

Begin list:

T/Sgt Samuel Adams, AF, 31 Oct 65
Capt. Donald Gilbert Cook, MC, 31 Dec 64
Capt. William Forbes Eisenbraun, Army,
6 July 65
Pvt. Robert Russell Garwood, MC, 28 Sept 65
Capt. Lawrence Thomas Holland, AF,
12 June 65
SP/4 James Henry McLean, Army, 9 Feb 65

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

M/Sgt Thomas Moore, AF, 31 Oct 65
Douglas K. Ramsey, Civ., 17 Jan 66
Capt. James Nicholas Rowe, Army,
29 Oct 63
Capt. Floyd James Thompson, Army,
26 Mar 64

"Believe we should inform Thieu of plan to send list
and give him opportunity to provide similar list of ARVN
prisoners."

6. The January 1969 List. In a later BUTTERCUP development,
on 30 January 1969 Secretary Rogers sent Ambassador Bunker the
following list of twenty names "suitable to give to VC with request that
they release ten of them in exchange for the four they have requested."
[REDACTED] info copies to Dr. Kissinger and Secretary Laird):

TSGT Samuel Adams, 18554000, AF,
October 31, 1965
Michael D. Bengé, Civilian,
January 31, 1968
SGT Richard Gordon Burgess, 2084229, MC,
September 25, 1966
MAJ Donald Gilbert Cook, 072794, MC,
December 31, 1964

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

Gary Daves, Civilian, January 31, 1968
1st LT David Ronald Devers, 05321911,
Army, August 13, 1966

[REDACTED]

TSGT Charles Gale Dusing, 17203698,
AF, October 31, 1965
SGT Edwin Russel Grissett, Jr., 1938579,
MC, January 22, 1966
MAJ Lawrence Thomas Holland, 57577,
AF, June 12, 1965
Philip W. Manhard, Civilian, January 31, 1968
SP4 James Henry McLean, 19722072, Army,
February 9, 1965
MSGT Thomas Moore, 14268347, AF,
October 31, 1965
SFC John Joseph O'Neill, 11212494, Army,
August 13, 1966
Thomas W. Ragsdale, Civilian, January 31, 1968
Douglas Ramsey, Civilian, January 17, 1966
SP5 Edward Daniel Reilly, Jr., 23933241, Army,
April 26, 1966
CAPT Floyd James Thompson, 05304076, Army,
March 26, 1964
Eugene Weaver, Civilian, January 31, 1968
Charles Willis, Civilian, January 31, 1968

7. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the above list of twenty names was never passed to the Communists. Three of the names on the February 1968 list of ten were not included in the January 1969 list of twenty: US Army Captain Rowe, who escaped on 31 December 1968, US Army Captain William E. Eisenbraun (also an addressee of one of the five January 1968 letters) and USMC Private Robert R. Garwood.

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

8. I am sending copies of this memorandum on an eyes only basis to the other three recipients of my 27 and 28 October memoranda, namely, Secretary Rogers, Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer.

/s/
Richard Helms
Director

cc: Secretary Rogers
Secretary Laird
Admiral Moorer

~~SECRET~~



