

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

|                              |   |                        |
|------------------------------|---|------------------------|
| LOIS MOORE, et al.,          | ) |                        |
|                              | ) |                        |
| Plaintiffs.                  | ) |                        |
|                              | ) |                        |
| v.                           | ) | Case No. 20-1027 (RCL) |
|                              | ) |                        |
| CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, | ) |                        |
|                              | ) |                        |
| Defendant.                   | ) |                        |
| _____                        | ) |                        |

AFFIDAVIT OF BOB SMITH

Bob Smith hereby swears and affirms:

1. From 1985 to 1990, I served as a member of the United States House of Representatives for New Hampshire's 1st Congressional District. From 1990 to 2003, I served as the United States Senator, representing New Hampshire. The Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs was a special committee convened by the United States Senate during the George H. W. Bush administration (1989 to 1993) to investigate the Vietnam War POW/MIA issue, that is, the fate of United States service personnel listed as missing in action during the Vietnam, Korean, and Cold Wars. I wrote, and introduced, the Senate Resolution establishing that Committee, to attempt to get the documents and the truth released to the public. I served as the Committee's Vice Chairman. It was in existence from August 2, 1991 to January 2, 1993.

2. The Committee's inquiry included an exploration of the fates of unrepatriated Korean War POWs. On November 10, 1992, my office released a 54-page Report:

CHRONOLOGY OF POLICY AND INTELLIGENCE MATTERS  
CONCERNING UNACCOUNTED FOR U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL AT  
THE END OF THE KOREAN CONFLICT AND DURING THE COLD WAR

Prepared by the Office of Senator Bob Smith  
Vice-Chairman, Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs  
November 10, 1992

3. That Report appears below, in paragraphs 15 through 281, verbatim. The Report is accurate, and authoritative. Paragraphs 8-14 are portions of my opening remarks, verbatim, from the Select Committee's November 10, 1992 *Hearing on Cold War, Korea, WWII POWs*.

4. In the fall of 1997, Congress passed, and the President signed into law, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal Year 1998, which included a provision that I authored that required the Director of Central Intelligence to "provide analytical support on POW/MIA matters."

5. I personally have seen hundreds of classified documents that could and should be released as they pose no national security risk. What is really at risk are the reputations and careers of the intelligence officials who participated in and perpetrated this sorry chapter in American history.

6. During the Senate Select Committee's tenure, I fought with the bureaucrats, and Senators McCain and Kerry, to the point of exhaustion.

7. After decades of FOIA requests, emotional appeals from family members, senators and congressmen, and House and Senate Committee investigations, the intelligence agencies still keep numerous documents classified under the guise of national security. I can state without any evocation that they are still holding documents that

should be declassified. The families of these men, and the American public, deserve to know the truth of what is in those files.

Excerpts of Affiant's November 10, 1992 opening remarks, Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs *Hearing on Cold War, Korea, WWII POWs*

8. Regarding the Korean War, our investigators states, and I quote, "apparently reliable information from several former Soviet colonels now retired indicates that the Soviets did in fact participate in interrogations, and there appears to be a strong possibility that at least a handful of US POWs, possibly more, or transferred to Soviet territory during the Korean War."

9. In order to set a proper context for these hearings, I have attached to my statement for the record, and it is available, I believe, at the back of the room, what I believe is the most comprehensive compilation of US government policy and intelligence information concerning what we have known about the fate of many of our missing men from the Korean conflict and what we did about it.

10. It is a document that shows in explicit detail with a lot of research that the government and North Korea did not return a large number of American servicemen at the end of the war, and that some of the men left behind were sent to Communist China into the Soviet Union.

11. Internal documents and statements made at the time also show that our government believed that men were still alive in captivity, and until only a few months ago has kept that reality from the American people. It is covered up with a new truly pattern of denial, misleading statements, in some cases lies, and by doing so with regard to the Korean conflict it broke its commitment with the people who put on the uniform to fight for the

freedoms and protections that we and our allies enjoy today. It is not a very good chapter in American history.

12. The Soviets did, in fact, participate in interrogations, and there appears to be a strong possibility that at least a handful of us POWs, possibly more, were transferred to Soviet territory during the Korean War.

13. Today, we will hear from the departments in our own Government that were responsible for handling POW issues from the Korean war and the cold war, prior to the formation of this Committee and the establishment of the Joint Commission.

14. We will also hear today from some members of the Government and the military who were involved with the POW/MIA, or were POWs themselves, during the Eisenhower administration—people who received direct information on other American POWs still alive at the time who were transferred to camps in Northern China and Siberia.

CHRONOLOGY OF POLICY AND INTELLIGENCE MATTERS  
CONCERNING UNACCOUNTED FOR U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL  
AT THE END OF THE KOREAN CONFLICT AND DURING THE COLD WAR

15. “We do have certain evidence that indicates there are additional prisoners alive who should be returned.” August 6, 1953 Statement of U.S. General Mark Clark, Commander of the United Nations Command in Korea, Pentagon News Conference one week after the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement and the exchange of lists of POWs to be repatriated.

16. “A compilation of reports indicate that during the past two years, several POWs have been transferred from POW camps in North Korea to points in Manchuria, China, and Siberia.” August 19, 1953 Memorandum by the U.S. Army Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activity, Korea.

17. “There were 1,012 persons (U.S. personnel unaccounted for from the Korean Conflict) where there was evidence that they were alive in Communist hands.” March 9, 1954 Closed-door testimony of Army G-2 Intelligence Officer, Colonel Trammel, before Senate subcommittee.

18. "There is no evidence to suggest that any U.S. personnel were not released from captivity in Korea." November 9, 1989 Defense Intelligence Agency Chief of the POW/MIA Office, Colonel Joseph Schlatter.

19. "There are no intelligence indicators that US personnel from the Korean conflict were not returned to US control at the end of the war." June 28, 1990 testimony before Congressional hearing on the POW/MIA issue by the Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Rear Admiral Donald Marriott.

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## **1950**

20. June 25. North Korea, at the direction of President Kim Il Sung crosses the 38th parallel invading South Korea, beginning the Korean Conflict.

21. June 27. The United Nations Security Council passes Resolution 83 recommending that Member States furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea (South Korea). U.S. Air Forces are immediately committed.

22. July 7. The United Nations Security Council passes Resolution 84 recommending that the military forces provided by Member States be made available to a Unified Command under the United States, and authorizing that Command to use the United Nations flag at its discretion in the course of its operation. U.S. and member nation ground forces are immediately committed under the command of U.S. General Douglas MacArthur.

23. October 2. In a telegram to Stalin in the Soviet Union, China's Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong states, "We have decided to send part of the armed forces into Korea, under the title of Volunteer Army, to do combat with the forces of America and to assist our Korean comrades. We recognize this course of action as necessary."

24. October 13. In a telegram to China's Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, then in Moscow seeking Stalin's support, Mao states, "...we unanimously believe that having our troops enter Korea is more advantageous...If we do not send troops, allowing the enemy to press to the Yalu border and the arrogance of reactionaries at home to grow, this will be disadvantageous to all sides. Above all, it will be most disadvantageous to Manchuria; all of the South Manchurian electricity will be threatened."

25. November 24. By this date, the North Koreans are driven northward by the UN Member State forces under General MacArthur and eventually back to the Yalu River (the boundary between China and North Korea).

26. November 26. A large Communist Chinese army, under Mao's directive, invades the north in support of the North Koreans and help them drive the UN forces south

after much bitter fighting. Thousands of Americans are killed, wounded, and captured during this Communist offensive.

## **1951**

27. January 1. By this date, the North Korean-Chinese army has forced the UN forces back to the 38th parallel, and the South Korean capital of Seoul had fallen into enemy hands.

28. March 12. French intelligence sources inform the U.S. Far East Command that "according to report valued C-3 and dated December 9, 1950, 3,000 American POWs have been moved to the Korean border with China by December, 1950. The report adds that another 1,200 "lightly wounded" American POWs had been placed at an Air Defense hospital in An Tung, Manchuria. (now known as the Three Eastern Provinces of China.)

(Source: 12 March 1951 declassified State Department Cable)

29. March 14. A counter-offensive by the UN retakes Seoul.

30. April 9. The Central Intelligence Agency reports that source (still classified 11/10/92) has reported that "Officers captured in North Korea by the Chinese Communists are now interned in a former army prison in Mukden, Manchuria. Enlisted men are confined in concentration camps in T'unghua. The daily routine includes physical exercise, political training in Marxism and Leninism, and analysis of the Korean War by Communist political directors." The date of information is early April, 1951, according to CIA. CIA notes that another report, S0-54598, had also referred to U.S. POW camps in Mukden.

(Source: S0617354, Central Intelligence Agency, partially declassified.)

31. May 8, 1951. The Central Intelligence Agency reports that, according to a source, 25 American prisoners of war from Korea arrived in Canton by rail from Hankow at 6:00 p.m. on April 1, 1951 and were being held by 50 armed police and some plain-clothes men at facilities at Tung Hua Road.

(Source: Declassified Report No. S063715, CIA)

32. On May 8, 1951, according to a 6 September 1951 CIA report, 30 American prisoners of war depart Mukden, Manchuria for Hankow by rail. The prisoners are reported in good spirits and tidily dressed.

(Source: CIA declassified report dated 6 September 1951)

33. May 29. The Central Intelligence Agency reports that, according to a source, 45 American prisoners of war arrived in Canton at 6:00 p.m. on April 23, 1951 on two special cars of the Canton-Hankow Railroad, and were being held at facilities on Tung Hua Road. It is reported that on April 30, 1951, Chinese Communist authorities in Peiping

ordered that American POWs held at Tung Hua be taken to Kwailan. It is further reported that at 3:00 a.m. on May 2, the POWs were moved in two trucks, accompanied by four armored cars, to the Tashat'on Rail Station.

(Source: Declassified CIA Report No. S0 65066. 29 May 1951)

34. June 27. The Central Intelligence Agency reports that, according to a source, "By April 15, 1951, approximately 500 American prisoner of war from Korea had arrived in Hankow, and on April 18<sup>th</sup>, some of them were paraded through the streets of Hankow under heavy guard...In mid-April, 60 prisoners of war, most of whom were American, arrived in Canton via the Canton-Hankow railroad, and were being detained at facilities at Tung Hua road in Canton...In mid-June 1952, 52 American POWs from Korea were still incarcerated in the baptist church on Tung Hua Road, Canton.

(Source: Declassified CIA Report No. S066740 dated June 27, 1951.)

35. July. Peace negotiations commence at Kaesong.

36. August 11. The Central Intelligence Agency reports information from a subsource that, according to a North Korean staff member of the State Security Bureau in Seoul on 12 February 1951, "all American prisoners of war were sent to camps in Mukden, Tunghua, and Antung Provinces of Manchuria, where they were put to hard labor in mines and factories." (Note: February 12 is before the U.N. forces retook Seoul on March 14, 1951)

(Source: CIA Report No. S065823, declassified)

37. In another Central Intelligence Agency report, a source states that "On August 2, 52 American POWs from Korea, who had been held in the Baptist church on Tung Hua Road, Canton, left Canton by train for Peiping via Hankow under guard of a platoon of Chinese Communist soldiers."

(Source: CIA Declassified Report No. S069870)

38. August 22. The Central Intelligence Agency reports that, according to a source, some 40 U.N. POWs in Canton, including British and American officers and enlisted men, have participated in "propaganda tours and street demonstrations" in Canton in early May, 1951.

(Source: CIA Declassified Report No. S070338)

39. August 24. The Central Intelligence Agency reports that, according to a source, "78 American prisoners of war are in a camp at No. 35, Lane 1136 Yuyen Road, Shanghai. They have no freedom of movement and are not free to talk. They must attend meetings daily to study Communist doctrine. Camp officers are appointees of the Est China Bureau and the East China Military Area, and four English speaking Soviets." Ten names of

alleged U.S. servicemen, written in Chinese, are provided “from a scrap of paper picked up in the POW camp.” The identities are not evaluated by CIA.

(Source: 24 August 1951 declassified CIA report no. S070512.)

40. September 6. 60 American prisoners of war are reported being held in Canton as of mid-July, according to a CIA source. (Note: According to another source (11 August 1951), 52 American POWs were moved from Canton on August 2, 1951 by rail to Peiping.)

(Source: declassified CIA report dated 6 September 1951)

41. September 27. According to a CIA source, as of late August, 1951, “Many American prisoners of war are being used in Peiping for propaganda purposes.”

42. September 28. The Central Intelligence Agency reports information from a source that as of Mid-September 21 American prisoners of war are confined at Lo Chia Shan in Wuch'ang, Communist China, and that their political instruction is being carried out by a former Chinese student in America and a Soviet major.

(Source: Declassified CIA report No. S072900, dated 28 September 1951)

43. October 4. The Central Intelligence Agency reports, that according to a source, the Chinese Communists held a meeting on August 1, 1951 to celebrate Army Day. “During the meeting, 5 American prisoners of war, captured in Korea, were escorted by Communists soldiers to the rostrum. Two of them addressed the gathering.”

(Source: Declassified CIA Report No. S073337, dated 4 October 1951.)

44. October 23. 170 U.N. prisoners of war are reported by a CIA source to have arrived in Canton by train from Hankow on October 3, 1951.

(Source: CIA declassified report no. S074469)

45. October 25. A CIA source reports the existence of an American and British POW camp at Shamsen, Canton, and lists some of the names, in Chinese, of U.S. 8th Army personnel. The names are not further evaluated by CIA.

(source: Declassified CIA report no. S074807 dated 25 October 1951)

46. October 27. A CIA source reports that 125 American prisoners of war were observed walking to Antung, China on the night of March 25, 1951.

(declassified CIA report)



47. October. Peace negotiations between the Communists and the United Nations Command continue at Panmunjom, Korea.

48. December. The Psychological Strategy Board under President Truman, in a Top Secret memorandum, makes the following observations concerning the question of forced repatriation of North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war, in the context of an exchange of POWs following the Korean Conflict:

“Our treatment of Soviet and satellite expatriates has an unfortunate history, as you will recall. As a result of an agreement at Yalta, the United States in the years immediately after World War II assisted the Soviet Union in the repatriation of various categories of Soviet bloc persons--chiefly prisoners of war, escapees, and displaced persons. The result of our cooperation was that more than four million Soviet citizens were returned to the Soviet Union and that thousands were executed or punished in other ways without regard to the conditions which caused their displacement from Soviet-controlled territory.”

“In addition, persons escaping from the Soviet area after World War II were forcibly returned to Soviet control as a matter of U.S. policy up until well into 1948. This treatment of Soviet expatriates became well known to the populations within the Soviet area, and, as has been well documented, became the cause of widespread despair. It practically stopped the flow of defectors, and it would make it very difficult to wage effective psychological warfare against the Red Army in event of war.”

“Our policy was subsequently changed so that persons entering the Allied areas of Germany and Austria are no longer forcibly returned. The treatment we have given defectors has, however, not been sufficiently good or well publicized to erase the former picture.”

“This is the background within which the question of forcible repatriation of Chinese and North Korean prisoners of war must be examined. Repetition of our previous mistake would discourage defection by Chinese communist forces in any future conflict.”

“It would therefore in the long run cost us more American lives than are involved in the exchange of prisoners problem.”

The writer of the memorandum concludes stating:

“I have learned by way of hearsay that the President is informed on this question and is inclined to oppose forcible repatriation.”

(Source: declassified memorandum December, 1951, Truman Presidential Library)

## 1952

49. January. Army captain Mel Gile of the Far East Command Liaison Group reports that one of his agents had found that 63 U.S. POWs were being shipped by truck and rail from Pyongyang, North Korea to Chita, in the Soviet Union. Gile states the U.S. command cancelled air strikes on the railway he reported would be carrying the POWs.

(Source: 1990 Wash. Times and USA Today Interviews with Gile)

50. January 2. U.S. Army Intelligence receives information that more than 500 U.N. prisoners were in a camp in Tung Kuan Ying, 10 miles east of Mukden, Manchuria "to be given short-term training pending transfer to the Soviet Union on order of central authorities." The same reports states that 494 U.N. POWs had been observed inside China since December, 1951.

51. January 4. A CIA source reports that in mid-November, 1951, "the U.N. prisoners of war who had arrived in Canton on October 3 were removed and sent elsewhere. Complete secrecy was maintained during the move from Shamsen, Canton to a destination unknown."

(Sources declassified CIA report No. 79124)

52. January 5. A CIA source reports that 13 American and 8 British prisoners of war were transferred by rail from Canton to Hankow. CIA also reports they have another report of U.S. POWs in the Canton area "performing hard labor on airfields."

(Source: 5 January 1952 CIA declassified report.)

53. February 6. A CIA source reports that around December 27, 1951, "the Chinese Communists moved 300 U.S. POWs...into a concentration camp near Tat'ung. The prisoners are under the instruction of Europeans" CIA reports that the report is possibly a fabrication as the information appears doubtful.

(Source: CIA declassified report dated 6 February 1952)

54. February 14. A CIA source reports that about the first week of January, the Chinese Communists were parading U.S. captives (prisoners of war) in Paoshan, Yunnan Province, for propaganda purposes. The source reports the Communists pointed the U.S. soldiers to the spectators, saying "these are the people we've been fighting -- and have conquered."

(Source: CIA declassified report dated 14 February 1951)

55. February 19. The declassified "post-agenda discussion" suggested notes for a meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board under President Truman state:

“Subject: The Strategic Significance of Involuntary POW Repatriation in Korea.

“At the present time, there is no widespread active concern in the U.S. on the question of possible failure on the part of the Chinese to return all American prisoners. But articles now beginning to appear in the press raise the specter that the issue might be presented to the American public as an “exchange of Chinese lives for American lives.” Should this develop, it is likely that the public outcry would obscure the basic moral issue and jeopardize the effectiveness of the U.S. policy decision.”

“At the present time, it appears that the Department of State and the Department of Defense are engaged in the collection and careful analysis of the facts pertaining to this problem. Preliminary indications are that perhaps 3,000 Chinese and up to 10 percent of the North Korean POWs will fall within the category of those whose return to their homelands would result in their death, or who for other reasons do not wish to be repatriated.”

(Source: Declassified notes from Truman Library 19 February 1954 – U.S. Psychological Strategy Board

56. March. Admiral R.E. Libby, U.S. negotiator in Korea, advises his communist counterparts, “You denied that you hold in Korea more than 11,500 prisoners whose names you gave us... You denied that you ever held any of our captured personnel outside Korea... we have evidence which clearly convicts on both counts. Earlier, he states “We have convincing evidence you are holding prisoners in retention camps outside Korea without reporting them to our side.” Libby had further stated “a number of captured communist soldiers have told of escorting UN prisoners to camps in China.” Libby states one of the captured Communist Chinese soldiers “described in detail a prisoner of war processing center in Harbin (deep in Central Manchuria to which he had helped escort captured United Nations personnel. The soldier stated he had seen “more than 1,000 UN prisoners—Americans, South Koreans and others—at the Harbin processing camp.”

(Source: South China Morning Post March 9, 1952)

57. April 15. The Central Intelligence Agency reports, that according to a source, “In November, 1951 about 50 American prisoner of war were brought under guard from Shanghai to Hangchow, and were taken to Maochiafou and placed in the detention center there.” The report further states that as of February 10, 1952, 15 of them were taken elsewhere, leaving only 35. Maochiafou is reported as “probably near Hangchow.”

(Source: CIA report dated 15 April 1952, declassified)

58. May 2. The Central Intelligence Agency reports, that according to a source, “In April 1952, there were 35 American prisoner of war at the Maochiafou Camp. The following is a partial list of the Americans.” No evaluation of the names is done by CIA.

(Source: CIA declassified report dated 2 May 1952)

59. June 13. B-29 is downed by a Soviet MIG over the Sea of Japan.

(Source: DoD, Russian Archives.)

60. July 17. The Central Intelligence Agency, in a report from a still classified source, states:

“In May, 1952, the War Prisoner Administrative Office in P'yongyang...under the control of an intelligence officer attached to the general headquarters of the Soviet Far Eastern Military District, controlled prisoner of war camps in Manchuria and North Korea. The office, formerly in Mukden (Manchuria), employed 30 persons, several of whom were English-speaking Soviets.”

“The office had developed three types of prisoner of war camps. Camps termed “peace camps” detained persons who exhibited pro-Communist leanings, and were characterized by considerate treatment of the prisoners and the staging within the camps of Communist rallies and meetings.”

“Reform camps, all of which are in Manchuria, detained anti-Communist prisoners possessing certain technical skills. Emphasis at these camps was on redoctrination of the prisoners.”

“Normal prisoner of war camps, all of which were in North Korea, detained prisoners whom the Communists will exchange. Prisoners in the peace and reform camps will not be exchanged. Officials of North Korean prisoner of war camps sent reports on individual prisoners to the War Prisoner Administrative Office. Cooperative prisoners were being transferred to peace camps.”

“On 6 January 1952, four hundred United States prisoners, including three hundred Negroes, were being detained...in Mukden, Manchuria...All prisoners held there, with the exception of three second lieutenants, were enlisted personnel...The prisoners, dressed in Communist Chinese Army uniforms were not required to work...two hours of indoctrination were conducted daily by staff members of the Northeast Army Command. Prisoners were permitted to play basketball in the courtyard.”

(Source: CIA Report No. SO 91634, dated July 17, 1952)

61. October. Truce negotiations between the Communists and the U.N. forces break down.

## **1953**

62. January 2. Despite the December, 1951 report by President Truman's Psychological Strategy Board, U.S. Senator Wiley is told by the Department of Defense that "no information is available which would enable the Department of Defense to prepare a statistical and descriptive account of the ultimate fate of these individuals after their repatriation to Soviet authorities pursuant to the terms of the Yalta Agreement." The December, 1951, in discussing the question of forced repatriation for Korean War POWs, states that four million Russians at the end of World War II were forcibly sent back, and that thousands of them were subsequently executed and punished by the Russians.

(Source: Defense Department letter dated January 2, 1953)

63. January 18. A U.S. Navy patrol aircraft is shot down in the South China Sea. A U.S. Coast Guard seaplane crashes during rescue operations in the vicinity. According to the United States, the planes are not engaged in operations for the United Nations Command. The U.S. later expresses the belief that personnel from these incidents fall into Communist custody

(Source: 5 May 1954 Defense Department summary)

64. February 24. An Army Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities Korea memorandum states:

"The following information was received from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea Government. Report originally came from Nationalist Chinese Embassy—"

"According to reliable information, the Communist Chinese Forces have transferred UN POWs to Russia in violation of the Geneva Conference. These POWs will be specially trained at Moscow for espionage work. POWs transferred to Moscow are grouped as follows: British 5, Americans 10, Canadians 3, and 50 more from various countries."

"Russia has established a Higher Informant Training Team at Uran, Hodasong (phonetic) in Siberia in October, 1952. 500 persons are receiving training, one third of them women. Japanese constitute the largest group and the others are Korean, Filipinos, Burmese, and American."

The date of information is given as "October - 22 December 1952."

Comments in this report by the U.S. Army Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities, Korea state:

"This office has received sporadic reports of POWs being moved to the USSR since the very inception of the hostilities in Korea. These reports came in

great volume through the earlier months of the war, and then tapered off to a standstill in early 1951, being revived by a report from January of this year (1953). It is definitely possible that such action is being taken as evidenced by past experience with Soviet authorities. All previous reports state POWs who are moved to the USSR are technical specialists who are employed in mines, factories, etc. This is the first report that they are being used as espionage agents that is carried by this office.”

(Source: U.S. Army Combined Command report dated 24 Feb. 53)

66. April 20-26. Peace talks are resumed and Operation Little Switch, the first prisoner exchange, takes place. The Communists release 600 United Nations “sick and wounded” prisoners. The United Nations releases 6,000 “sick and wounded” Communist prisoners.

67. May. Esquire Magazine reports that the Foreign News Service had obtained information from a “reliable” source they encountered in 1952 that American POWs were being screened by Chinese and Soviet personnel who spoke fluent English. The source reports that an initial decision to keep these POWs back or place them in POW camps on the North Korean side of the Yalu River was made during this initial screening. The source reports that very important personnel were flown to the USSR, while others were shipped by rail to the Soviet Union for further processing. The Foreign News Service reports that they have no way of confirming the story, but that the extensive detail provided brought them to the conclusion that the information was accurate.

68. July 15. The Central Intelligence Agency reports information from a source that “In late May, 1953, approximately 1,500 United Nations prisoners of war were confined in a camp at Tungchutin, Tientain, in Communist China. The majority of these prisoners of war were American Marine officers and men who were sent to this camp after recovery from wounds.” CIA comments that “a POW camp once tentatively accepted in Tientain, was dropped from available listings in January, 1953 because of a lack of recent reports concerning it.”

(Source: CIA declassified report dated 15 July 1953)

69. July 22. During the peace negotiations, the Communists report they are holding 12,763 prisoners to be repatriated.

70. July 27. The Armistice Agreement is signed between the Communists and the U.N. Forces at Panmunjom, Korea. A Military Armistice Commission, a temporary Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission are established to enforce the terms of the armistice. No formal peace treaty is ever concluded. Paragraph 13f of the Armistice Agreement provides for the voluntary repatriation of POWs and for the repatriation of remains.

71. July 29. An RB-50, with a crew of 17 members, is shot down by Russian MIG-15 jets over the Sea of Japan. An American vessel rescues the co-pilot who had parachuted. The U.S. Government informs the Soviets that "it appears highly likely that the other crewmembers survived and that they were possibly rescued by the Soviet vessels."

72. August 5. Operation Big Switch commences with the exchange of POWs "desiring repatriation" by both sides. The United Nations Command begins the transfer of 75,823 POWs directly to the Communists in the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The Communists begin the transfer of 12,773 Allied POWs (3,597 U.S. POWs) in return.

73. August 6. The Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command General Mark Clark returns to Washington from Korea, after signing the Armistice on July 27th. He holds a news conference at the Pentagon, which is covered by the New York Times as follows:

"General Clark pledged to press the Communists for further information on the additional troops he believed they held and for a possible exchange. He said that he pointed out the wide discrepancy between his information and that supplied by the Communist on prisoners during the truce negotiations. He had been advised by his superiors in the Pentagon, he said, not to delay the armistice negotiations over the discrepancy but to reserve the privilege of later protest. This will be done, the general said, first at the Military Armistice Commission, and, if there is no satisfaction there, later at the political conference that will follow. General Clark, stating that the only thing that the Communists respected was force, declared in a detailed discussion of the prisoner question:

"They respect force and I know of no way except through political and diplomatic means of getting any reaction from them on this prisoner of war question other than the application of force, which is not in the cards, in my opinion," said Clark.

"Conceding that Army authorities in the Far East could not prove that additional US soldiers and airmen are being held captive..., General Clark said there nevertheless remained "other information that leads us to believe that they have more."

"We do have certain evidence that indicates that there are additional prisoners alive who should be returned, and I assure you, as Commander in Chief, while I am there, I will press that in the military and political conferences," Clark declared.

At the same press conference, General Clark announces his retirement effective October 31, 1953.

(Source: New York Times article dated August 7, 1953)



74. August 7. General James A. Van Fleet, Commander of the U.S. 8th Army in Korea, states: "A large percentage of the 8,000 American soldiers listed as missing in action in Korea are still alive.

75. August 7. Communist controlled radio in Peiping, China reports that United Nations POWs had now been informed that they had a right to refuse to return and that "if any prisoners of war do not wish to be repatriated directly, the United Nations would be informed of the number "as soon as possible." (Source: New York Times, 7 August 1953, Tokyo byline, same day)

76. August 10. A Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activity Korea Army Memorandum states:

"A. A compilation of reports indicate that during the past two years, several POWs have been transferred from POW camps in North Korea to points in Manchuria, China, and Siberia. These points include Mukden, Harbin, Antung, Yench'eng, Chiamusso, Miensien, Peiping, Shanghai, Chungking, Timesin, Canton..."

"B. Figures show that the total number of MIAs plus known captured less those to be US repatriated leaves a balance of over 8,000 unaccounted for."

(Source: declassified 10 August 1953 Army Memorandum)

77. August 31. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2 received a memorandum from the Army General Staff listing 23 U.S. personnel "believed not desiring repatriation." The information is submitted "from interrogation Big Switch repatriates inclusive to 23 August 1953."

(Source: 31 August 1953 Army memorandum)

78. September 1. The Joint Intelligence Processing Board, Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Far East (ADV) prepares a memorandum listing 32 United States Prisoners of War who have "elected to refuse repatriation." The information is based on information provided by released American POWs. The report further states that "much of the information is based on rumor and hearsay and consequently quite difficult to evaluate."

(Source; 1 September 1953 Army Memorandum)

79. September 6. The United Nations Command and the Communists announce that repatriation (Operation Big Switch) has been completed for all individuals who had elected to be returned.

(Source: 12 /22/53 Memo to SecArmy from Ass.Sec. Army)



80. September 9. The United Nations Command presents a list to the Communists of 3,404 U.N. and South Korean personnel still unaccounted for. The list includes the names of 944 U.S. personnel, of which 610 were Army. It is later reported that General Mark W. Clark handed over the list to the Communists demanding that they be returned "or else." General Clark is reported to say that the list was compiled from statements of the communists themselves, radio broadcasts originating in Peiping, letters written from prisoners' camps, or from the observations of former U.N. prisoners of war in Red prisons.

(Source: 31 December 1953 CINCUNC message, News Article by Joseph F. McLaughlin, Boston)

81. September 12. Communist correspondent Burchett indicates that the Chinese Communists continue to retain in a non-prisoner of war status certain United States Air Force personnel, alleged to have overflown Chinese territory. Burchett indicates that their return must be sought through diplomatic negotiations.

(Source: March 5, 1954 State Department memorandum)

82. September 16. Communist broadcasts over the Government-controlled Peiping radio state that the 3,400 roster from the United Nations Command is "fake" and is designed by the United Nations Command "to obscure the fact that the Allies are forcibly detaining prisoners on our side."

(Source: New York Times, Tokyo byline, Sept. 16, 1953)

83. September 21. The Communists, in response to the September 9th UN message, state that 518 of the 3,404 had already been repatriated, and another 380 had previously been reported to the UN as dead, escaped, or already returned. No identification of these individuals is made by name or nationality, though the U.S. subsequently learns on October 3rd that 112 of the total figure were Americans. On the same day, the Communists submit a roster of 98,742 POWs for whom they demand an accounting (15,584 Chinese and 83,158 Koreans)

(Source: 12/ 22/53 Memo to SecArmy from Ass. SecArmy, 4/29/53  
Army Assistant Chief of Staff memorandum)

84. September 23. The United Nations Command turns over 22,604 "non-repatriates" (ie: POWs who had refused repatriation) to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

85. September 24. The Communists deliver 359 United Nations Command "non-repatriates" (23 U.S.)

86. September 25. The U. N. Command makes a second demand for the accounting of the 3,404 UN/South Korean unaccounted for personnel stating that the first reply was completely unsatisfactory.

87. October 3. The Communists again counter the September 25, 1953 demand by referring to a list of 98,783 names of Communists who they claim are being held in United Nations custody. They also provide a further breakdown of 899 United Nations Command personnel of the 3,404 UNC total referred to on September 21, 1952. The Communists state 112 of the total were U.S. personnel who had either died, escaped, or were released at the front. (The U.S. privately notes that 70 of the 112 names had been reported as dead by U.S. returnees at Operation Big Switch.)

(Source: 31 December 1953 message from CINCUNC)

88. October 20. The Communists by letter to the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command claim that they have accounted for the 899 UNC personnel (on October 3rd), and demand that the UN Command account for their September 21<sup>st</sup> list of 98,000 POWs.

(Source: 31 December 1953 CINCUNC Memo)

89. November 21-23. Three former members of the Republic of Korea Army, escaped through the demilitarized zone "and reported to the United Nations Command that Communists still held large numbers of prisoners of war." The United Nations Command protests in the Military Armistice Commission and demands that the Communists "hand over to the custody of the Custodian Forces of India all those prisoners that your side still retains."

90. December 1. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission declines to conduct an investigation into the allegations of the three Koreans who escaped on November 23, 1953 concerning large numbers of POWs still being held.

91. Communists at Peiping to seek the return of UNC personnel who may still be in Communist custody. It is noted that there are 18 USAF personnel who have been retained whose return should be sought through diplomatic negotiations.

92. Department of Defense concurrence in this proposal is requested. The letter further notes that the Defense Department had already signed off on an approach being undertaken by the British on behalf of 11 non-UNC Navy and Coast Guard personnel missing on January 18, 1953.

## **1954**

93. March 9. During a classified session of a Senate Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, the Senators are told the

following by the Department of Defense concerning numbers of POW's and MIA's from the Korean War (transcript now declassified):

Colonel Trammell: (G-2 Department of Defense): "...on the 18th of January, 1954...G-2 (Army Intelligence) considered, for all services, that there were 1,012 persons where there was evidence that they were alive, that they had been alive at one time in Communist hands. Also, on that same day of those whom the Adjutant General had listed as known captured, 120 of those were not accounted for.

Senator Potter: "120 that the Adjutant General had classified—"

Colonel Trammell: "Classified as known captured were not accounted for. In other words, both the Adjutant General and G-2 agreed that this certain number were known captured and yet in (Operation) Big Switch (August/Sept. 1953), 120 of the known captured were not accounted for...

...of those that G-2 has listed in Section 3 as having been in Communist hands alive at one time, as of the 18th of January, 892 were not accounted for. Among those we had some evidence as late as April 1953 which we consider a positive indication that the man was alive as late as that time."

Senator Potter: "As late as April 1953?"

Colonel Trammell: "As late as April 1953 we had convincing evidence that the man was alive and in Communist hands. But 892, as indicated, were not accounted for in that group. The two figures I have just given you, that is, the 120 and the 892 total the 1,012 which is the figure I started with as of January 18.

94. March 10. The Department of the Army, G-2, requests the Army CIC center at Ft. Holabird, Md. to detail six CIC type investigators for a period of two weeks to comply with a Senate request "for the most recent information on Americans captured in Korea, and on whom the Communist forces in Korea have failed to render sufficient accounting...Senator Potter, as a subcommittee consisting of one member, is examining the basis on which the United States is demanding the return of, or accounting for, from the Communist Forces, Americans taken as prisoners of war and on whom sufficient accounting has not been rendered."

(Source: 10 March 1954 G2 Army Memorandum)

95. March 11. The G2, Department of the Army informs the Air Force that Senator Potter, Acting Chairman for a Special Study being conducted by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, has requested that he be furnished with "the number, by Services, of personnel still carried in a missing in action or captured status."

The G-2 requests the Air Force to furnish them “with a copy of any findings and determinations of death made by your office subsequent to Operation Big Switch. These findings and determinations of death will be used to adjust the rosters prepared as a result of information previously furnished pursuant to Reference Disposition Form, file G2-CDOR dated 25 August 1953.”

96. On the same day, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, is informed that “the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations is attempting to formulate a course of action to follow to effect the recovery of American personnel believed to be alive and still in Communist custody...I have requested the U.S. Air Force to furnish a roster of all persons carried as MIA or captured at the termination of “Operation Big Switch” for incorporation in a final consolidated roster from all sources of personnel who might possibly remain in Communist custody.”

97. March 15. The Army CIC center complies with the March 10, 1954 request from the Army G-2 for six additional personnel to help respond to Senator Potter's request

(Source: 15 March 1954 Army CIC memorandum)

98. In a separate memorandum, the Acting Chief of the Returnee Section, G2, Department of the Army, mentions that “Senator Potter has requested that the figures (presented to his committee on March 9, 1954), both for officially listed as captured and personnel considered by G2 to have been under Communist control, be broken down as of 18 January 1954, by military services. Returnee section possess certain rosters enumerating American personnel in the category mentioned above. All personnel named in the “G2 Believed Captured Roster” are known to have been alive in Communist custody at some time after their having been reported missing in action. Copies of these rosters were furnished CGAFFE immediately subsequent to the completion of Operation Big Switch. Currently, these rosters are in the process of being brought up to date, at which time, a final accounting will be made available to Senator Potter.”

99. March 16. The Air Force Liaison Office in Hong Kong sends a report to the G2, USAF, in Washington. The report is filed by Colonel Delk Simpson, the Assistant Air Liaison officer who had arrived in Hong Kong for duty on November 3, 1953. The report reads, in pertinent part:

“This office has interviewed refugee source who states that he observed hundreds of prisoners of war in American uniforms being sent into Siberia in late 1951 and 1952. Observations were made at Manchouli on USSR-Manchurian border. Source observed POWs on railway station platform loading into trains for movement into Siberia. In railway restaurant source closely observed three POWs who were under guard and were conversing in English. POWs wore sleeve insignia which indicated POWs were Air Force noncommissioned officers. Source states that there were a great number of Negroes among POW shipments and also states that at no time later were any POWs observed returning from Siberia. Source does not wish to be

identified for fear of reprisals against friends in Manchuria, however is willing to cooperate in answering further questions and will be available in Hong Kong for questions for the next few days."

100. March 17. The Department of the Air Force forwards to the Department of the Army a list of 18 USAF personnel "alleged to have been captured in Manchuria, and who are being retained as political prisoners. Three of these persons, identity unknown, were reported to have died."

(Source: 17 March 1954 Memorandum)

101. The Department of the Army, G2, forwards to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Att: Senator Potter) a "breakdown by service of American Personnel Unaccounted for in Korea as of January 18, 1954:

- A. Officially captured - 120 (98 Army, 18 Marines, 4 USAF)
  - B. Personnel Considered by G-2 to have been in Communist custody - 892 (827 Army, 1 Navy, 6 Marines, 58 USAF)
- Recap for all services, Officers 85, Warrant Officers 2, Enlisted Men, 805."

(Source: 17 March 1954 Army G2 Memorandum to Senate)

102. March 19. The Deputy Secretary of Defense responds to the Secretary of the Army's February 8th memorandum on formulating plans for United Kingdom participation on securing an accounting of missing UNC personnel. In regards to releasing a public statement on U.S. efforts to gain an accounting, "the Department of Defense and the Department of State have jointly agreed, however, that no formal press release on the subject is desirable at the present time. . . . If the subject remains relatively quiescent in the public mind, it is not felt that a formal release will be necessary."

103. March 23. The American Consul General in Hong Kong, Julian F. Harrington, sends an updated cable to the Secretary of State, entitled. "American POWs reported en route to Siberia." The cable refers to the March 16, 1954 interview with the refugee and states, in pertinent part:

"A recently arrived Greek refugee from Manchuria has reported seeing several hundred American prisoners of war being transferred from Chinese trains to Russian trains at Manchouli near the border of Manchuria and Siberia. The POWs were seen late in 1951 and in the spring of 1952 by the informant and a Russian friend of his. The informant was interrogated on two occasions by the Assistant Air Liaison Officer and the Consulate General agrees with his evaluation of the information as probably true and the source as of unknown reliability."

Harrington concludes stating that the refugee was leaving by ship today. The reporting officer at the Embassy further states, "Source is very careful not to exaggerate information

and is positive of identification of American POWs." The cables contain amplifying information on the substance of the report in great detail.

(Source: 23 March 1954 cable.)

104. April 12. The Department of Defense by letter concurs in the British proposal outlined in the State Department's March 5, 1954. They also forward to the Department of State a list of 18 USAF personnel retained by the Communists in a non-prisoner of war status.

(Source: 12 April 1954 DoD letter to State with attached list.)

105. April 19. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sends a cable to the American Embassy in Moscow instructing that the Soviets be given an Aide-Memoire from the United States on U.S. POWs having been transported into the Soviet Union. Dulles tells the U. S. Embassy that the Soviets should be told "we have reliable accounts of transfers of POWs at Manchouli." Dulles also refers to a recent report from Hong Kong on POW transfers which "corroborates previous indications that UNC POWs might have been shipped to Siberia during Korean hostilities." Finally, Dulles notes that the Department of State had just accepted a British offer to make representations in Red China to gain the release of POWs.

(Source: declassified cable dated April 19, 1954)

106. April 22. In a memorandum, the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command states, "Senior Member UNCMAC is of opinion Communist Contingent Geneva will demand an account for 98,742 alleged Communist POWs. Recommend immediate account by category and number if questions raised, with reasons for objecting to account by name; that is, fear of reprisals against families, pressures against subject individual, and so forth. Believe such an accounting will have maximum propaganda and psychological value for UNC, will be disconcerting to Communists and might jeopardize additional Communist preparing statements for Geneva use. Also recommend U.S. follow up by demanding accounting for or release of 3,405 UNC POWs . . . This office concurs in the UNCMAC recommendation.

107. April 29. In a memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of the Army from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Major General Robert Young states, "unconfirmed reports received by G-2 indicate the possibility that some American personnel may still be in the hands of the Communist Forces. However, no positive individual identification has been established and the reports are lacking confirmation." The memorandum further states that the Department of the Army, under the provisions of Public Law 490, "has placed 618 soldiers, known to have been in enemy hands and unaccounted for by the Communist Forces in the following categories--313-Finding of Death (Administratively determined), 275 - report of death, 21 - dishonorable discharge, 4 - under investigation (missing in action for less than one year), 3 - under investigation, prognosis undecided, missing in action for over one year."



108. General Young states, "Efforts by the U.S. to negotiate for the return or information relative to these personnel have been hampered by Communist forces' claims that we have not properly accounted for 98,742 POWs allegedly held by the United Nations Command." General Young concludes his memorandum stating:

"The intelligence agencies are making an intensive effort through world-wide information systems to obtain reports on missing personnel that may still be in Communist hands. A plan has been formed by use of clandestine systems to obtain recovery of one or more such persons to establish the case beyond doubt before the world that such persons are being held."

"It is the established position of the Army to obtain the return of any UNC personnel which may remain in Communist control and all feasible efforts will be taken to accomplish this result."

109. May 5. A diplomatic message is delivered to the USSR by the U.S. Embassy in Moscow per instructions by the Secretary of State. The message reads, in pertinent part,

"The United States Government has recently received reports which support earlier indications that American prisoners of war who had seen action in Korea have been transported to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and that they are now in Soviet custody. The United States desires to receive urgently all information available to the Soviet Government concerning these American personnel and to arrange for their repatriation at the earliest possible time."

(Source: declassified cable.)

110. The Defense Department participates in preparing a summary showing 944 U.S. military personnel "presumed to be in Communist custody" and for whom "the United Nations Command has not received a satisfactory accounting." The summary also lists the names of 18 USAF personnel for whom "the United States has reason to believe are being held by Communist China." Finally, the memorandum lists 11 U.S. military personnel downed on January 18, 1953 in the South China Sea, and for whom "the United States has reason to believe that they may be in Communist custody."

(Source: 5 May 1954 summary prepared in Geneva with Defense Department participation.)

111. May 11. At the UN Geneva Conference, the U.S. delegation to the conference, headed by Ambassador Johnson, holds a meeting with representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Ambassador Johnson explains to the Red Cross the Korean War casualties on the U.S. side -- 23,196 killed in action, 105,871 wounded in action (of this figure, 2,495 subsequently died of wounds), 13,108 missing in action. Of the 13,108 U.S. military personnel listed as missing in action, 5,131 had returned to military control, 7,956 were missing, and 21 "refused repatriation." The May 5, 1954 is attached to the

memorandum of conversation of this meeting showing 944 United States "Prisoners of War."

112. During the meeting, the Red Cross officials ask "whether we knew why these 944 were being retained, although so many others had been repatriated through the Military Armistice Commission. We replied that this might be the result of slipshod personnel reports to the Communist Command (who perhaps were unaware of all those under their control) or a desire to retain those individuals whose technical knowledge might be valuable to the Communist war potential, or who might continue to have some propaganda value to the Communist cause."

(Source: Department of Defense Memorandum of Conversation dated May 11, 1954)

113. May 13. The Soviet Union responds to the May 5, 1954 US diplomatic message on POWs stating:

"The assertions in the note of the United States Government that American war prisoners, participants in military action in Korea, have been transferred to the Soviet Union and are at the present time maintained under Soviet guard are without any kind of basis and are clearly invented, as there are not and have not been any such persons in the Soviet Union."

(Source: New York Times article, May 13, 1954)

114. May 17. The Department of the Army, G-2, in a memorandum for the record, states:

"This letter complies with the request by Senator Potter that he be provided with new statistics approximately six weeks subsequent to the hearing. The listing in paragraph 2.b., is composed of those US personnel, identified through the use of their names in broadcasts and propaganda or whose names appeared on the return address of POW mail, who are considered to have been admittedly held by the Communists. In addition the Communists have not declared these individuals as dead and no witnesses to their deaths have been uncovered. These revised statistics, when compared with the official casualty figures based on the original UNC request for accounting of 944 (618 Army) reveal only minor difference in total numbers."

"General Powell of G-1 has discussed the subject of the two lists, the Adjutant General Casualty Roster and the G-2 intelligence roster, with General Wieble and (Assistant Secretary of the Army Hugh Milton) Mr. Milton. In the event the G-2 statistics are publicized in an attempt to show that G-2 and the Adjutant General are not in agreement, it may place the Army in an unfavorable position temporarily from a public relations standpoint. G-2, G-1, and the Adjutant General have been working together on this matter, and it is believed that any misrepresentation of the G-2 statistics can be quickly



refuted. It must be pointed out that the Returnee Section does not possess any information which indicates any Army individual believed to have been in Communist custody, is alive today." "It should be noted, however, that this office has on file seven reports which indicate that there still may be Americans in Communist custody."

(Source: 17 May 1954 Army Memorandum)

115. May 25. In a memorandum to Senator Potter from the Department of the Army, "currently adjusted statistics of American personnel which G2 believes to have been in Communist custody at one time" are forwarded to the Senate subcommittee. The memorandum provides the following new breakdown of the 1,012 personnel provided to the Committee on March 17, 1954 -- "Personnel accounted for by US reports of known deaths, return to military control, and dishonorable discharge (21): -- 601. Personnel accounted for by US administrative presumptive findings of death: -- 393 Alleged diplomatic prisoners: 18 (furnished by Air Force) Total: 1,012." The memo further states, "Even though a presumptive finding of death, an administrative determination, was made under the authority of the Missing Persons Act, a basis exists for believing that 393 US personnel were at one time in the hands of the opposing forces and are, therefore, maintained by this office as active cases until a more conclusive accounting can be obtained."

116. July. The U.S. Air Force initiates "Project American", a secret project of the 6004 Air Intelligence Service Squadron and the 6002 Air Intelligence Service Group at Shiroy Air Base, Japan. The purpose of the project is "carrying out extensive research with regard to USAF personnel unaccounted for after the Korean conflict." The 1957 Historical Report of the Squadron (then classified) states:

"Through information collected from repatriated U.S. and U.N. prisoners of war, Japanese repatriates, foreign refugees, and numerous intelligence reports, a strong possibility emerged that a large number of the personnel listed as missing in action may still be alive and interned in Communist prison camps. The objective of this project is to investigate the identification of as many of these men as possible. This objective is to be accomplished by the exploitation of all possible documentary and human sources."

(Source: declassified Semi-Annual Historical Report, 6004 Air Intelligence Service Squadron. #1)

117. July 29. The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations sends a letter to Department of Defense asking for a breakdown of U. S. personnel held in Iron-Curtain countries.

118. August 17. The United Nations Command and the Communists agree at Panmunjom to an "Understanding" on the delivery and return of remains.

(Source: UNCMAC Point Paper dated 4 January 1988)

119. August 18. An Army memorandum, in anticipated response to the Senate subcommittee's July 29, 1954 request, states that the Adjutant General of the Army has submitted a list of 526 names. The memo also lists 18 Army personnel who were held in Manchuria as prisoners of the Chinese and North Korean Communists, and later repatriated. The memo states:

“While there is reason to believe that these persons were, at one time, alive and in the hands of the Communist Forces in Korea, there is no positive evidence that any of them are alive as of this date...”

“Of the reports received to date on material provided by repatriated Japanese prisoners of war, there have been nine (9) nebulous, inconclusive references to United States personnel; however, in no case was a name remembered nor any other information furnished which could be considered positive for identification purposes...”

“Some information concerning American servicemen who were taken into China after having been captured in the Korean conflict has been received from intelligence sources other than the military.”

120. September. The United Nations Military Armistice Commission and the Communists conclude negotiations regarding the recovery of deceased servicemen who were interred in territory under the control of the opposing forces. The Communists turn over approximately 4,023 United Nations deceased personnel, including 1,869 alleged remains of U.S. servicemen. The exchange takes place at the Demilitarized Zone. The U.S. later states that not all of the remains of U.S. servicemen actually interred in the North were turned over.

(Source: 16 January 1956 Army Memorandum, 16 November 1954 Army letter, October 1987 Defense Department Memorandum)

121. October 30. The United Nations Command and the Communists agree to terminate the August 17, 1954 “Understanding” on the return of remains, but to keep in effect Paragraph 20 of the Understanding, which provides that any remains discovered subsequent to the termination of the agreement would be returned through the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) Secretaries. North Korea interprets this to mean that “the MAC is not competent or obligated to deal with searching for remains, but that any remains discovered by chance will be returned through the MAC secretaries in accordance with Paragraph 20 of the Understanding.”

(Source: 4 January 1988 UNCMAC Point Paper)

122. November 16. The next of kin of a missing servicemen is informed by the Department of the Army that the remains turned over by the Communists in September

"have been evacuated to our scientifically equipped laboratories at Camp Kokura, Kyushu, Japan, for examinations by professional anthropologists and identification specialists... this task may be quite time-consuming."

## **1955**

123. January 12. John Noble, an American, is released from a Soviet prison camp after getting word to the United States of his existence, via a postcard to Switzerland sent by an inmate. He reports that while he was in prison at Putma, Irkatak, and Taichet, he is told by various German prisoners about American officers and enlisted men, who were captured in Korea, who were then in the Soviet prison system.

(Source: declassified State Dept. January 1955 cable)

124. Noble also reports being told by a German Yugoslav living in the Soviet Union that he had seen 8 American fliers who had been shot down over the Baltic Sea and "picked up by a Soviet Coast Guard vessel." Noble states he is told by the German Yugoslav that the plane was shot down in 1950, which correlates the information to the April 8, 1950 shutdown.

(13 January 1955 declassified Berlin communication 421)

125. January 12. The State Department reports that, according to the source, "the fliers stated that they feared being lost or hidden in USSR because the Soviet authorities had reported that they had been killed by being shot down, by the crash...they were on their way to the north or had just arrived in Vorkuta as of June 30, 1954."

(Source: State Department Berlin Communication 12 January 1955 declassified.)

126. The State Department reports information from a German POW who had been imprisoned in the Soviet Union that 9 American fliers from Korea were at Kirov, in the Soviet Union.

(Source: declassified State Dept. Berlin communication 420 12 January 1955, No.4-32)

127. May 31. Fifteen mothers of U.S. POW/MIAs return their son's medals to President Eisenhower, stating, "Our sons want your loyalty, not your medals."

128. June 8. The Chief of Special Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense, prepared memorandum concerning the "recovery of unrepatriated prisoners of war." The memorandum concludes:

"We have been *unable* under existing national policy considerations, to bring about an accounting by the Commies on the original 944 list. With regard to the "political prisoners" (15 USAF personnel held in Manchuria), diplomatic and political pressure must be credited with effecting partial release, but

only in the context of an emerging Chinese Communist strategy of making a play for world public opinion to gain political objectives vis-a-vis the U.S.”

“Various alternate courses of action have been developed by the military. They have never been implemented because of a Presidential decision, publicly announced, that “all peaceful means” must be exhausted before any other course would be considered. Most often mentioned alternate courses have been in the general field of sea and air blockade of the China Coast or U.S. supported retaliatory measures by the Chinese nationalists against the mainland. Current Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations (which could be characterized as “stand-by” alternatives) are on file in JCS and SecDef offices.”

(Source: 17 June 1955 declassified Defense Dept. memorandum)

129. June 17. The Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War meets to discuss the June 8, 1955 memorandum from the Office of Special Operations. (The results of this meeting are not known.)

(Source: 17 June 1955 declassified Defense Dept . memorandum)

130. June 28. A U.S. Special Agent for Army Intelligence 441st Counter Intelligence Corps files a report entitled “United States Nationals Held As Prisoners of War in China.” The report lists six (6) accounts of observations of POWs in various locations in China, to include An Tung, Shen Yang, a Peiping penitentiary, Hei Hua Fa rm, Ts'ao T'an Farm, and a Tai Yuan Machine Factory in Shanhsi Province.

(Source: declassified Army Special Agent report.)

131. June. The list of 526 unaccounted for POWs from the Korean Conflict is reduced by this date to 450.

(Source: 1960 JCS Cable.)

132. July 25. An 82-page report on POWs is issued by a ten-member committee of the Secretary of Defense. The panel consists of four generals and one admiral. The report is entitled, “The Fight Continues After the Battle.” The report applies a survival ratio of 62 percent to 4,735 American servicemen who have been declared “missing and presumed dead.” The report concludes that the Communists should be held “strictly accountable” for (then) 470 Americans still missing.”

133. July. Three of the 21 “voluntary non-repatriates” are returned to U. S. control. (Coward, Griggs, and Bell)

134. August 1. The Department of the Air Force 6004 Air Intelligence Service Squadron, responsible for Project American begun in July, 1954, prepares a report entitled

“USAF Personnel Possibly Alive in Communist Hands.” The report begins, “This report, prepared by the Escape and Evasion Section 6004th is a summary of information collected on USAF personnel “missing in action” during the “Korean hostilities.” The report “lists 137 personnel who may be alive in communist prison camps.” The report states that “it does not include ‘possibly missing’ personnel.”

(Source: Declassified August 1, 1955 report, including list of names and intelligence information.)

135. August 1- 4. The remainder of the 15 USAF “political prisoners” are released. This includes, USAF serviceman Steve Kiba who reports to Air Force Intelligence, CIA, and the State Department, that he had seen other U.S. servicemen alive in captivity who had not been returned. (Kiba later reports that he “was ordered to forget what I had seen...and to never discuss this matter with anyone.”

(Source: Statement by Steve Kiba, November 4, 1978)

136. August 17. President Dwight Eisenhower signs an Executive Order committing all facilities of our Government to “establish contact with, support and obtain the release of all of our prisoners of war.”

(Source: 27 October 1956 declassified memorandum signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense.)

137. November 26. The United Nations Command representative to the Military Armistice Commission passes a list to the Communists of unaccounted for UNC POWs.

1956

138. January 16. The Department of the Army in a notice to the next of kin of a U.S. POW states, “Available evidence indicates that many of the casualties which are carried on the records of the Department of Defense as missing in action in South Korea were actually captured and transported to North Korea where they subsequently died; however, specific information is lacking as to the number, identity or circumstances surrounding their disappearance.”

(Source: 16 January 1956 Army Board of Officers Memorandum on Sfc Lewis W. Sowles.)

139. February 25. The Communists, during a Military Armistice Commission meeting at Panmunjom, Korea, gives an accounting of some of the individuals on the UNC lists which had been passed on November 26, 1955. According to the United Nations Command, “final revisions result in a United Nations Command list of 2,233 unaccounted for POWs.”

140. April 28. General Mark Clark, former Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command in Korea, states to the New York Times that three thousand United

Nations soldiers captured in Korea, including 1,000 Americans, are being held as hostages by the Communists. These prisoners will be used to bargain with us at some future time--perhaps to get a seat for Red China in the United Nations.

(Source: New York Times, April 28, 1956)

141. May 29. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) sends a memorandum to the Service Secretaries stating, "...it has become apparent that only in those instances where solid evidence of the identity and location of U.S. personnel is displayed, can the Communists be made to negotiate on a practical basis...In order to strengthen the hand of the State Department representatives at Geneva as well as our military representatives at Panmunjom, it is requested that an attempt be made by your Department to consolidate any and all information now on hand and to prepare an intelligence estimate in each of the cases representing missing personnel from your services." The consolidated estimates are requested by July 1, 1956.

(Source: 29 May 1956 Defense Department memorandum)

142. June 20. State Department reports that a crew member of the B-29 downed over the Sea of Japan on June 13, 1952 had been observed in October, 1953 in a Soviet hospital north of Magadan near the crossing of the Kolyia River between Elgen and Debin at a place called Narionburg." The crew member reportedly had stated that he had been convicted wrongfully under Item 6 of Article 58 of the Soviet Penal Code.

143. Secretary of State Dulles sends a cable to U.S. Embassies in Moscow and Tokyo concerning whether it was "desirable at this time to question the Soviet Government specifically with reference to the detention of American fliers whose presence has been reported by repatriates from Soviet prison camps." Dulles further states, "There have been reports mentioned in the communications under reference, from American, Japanese, and other sources indicating specifically the detention of American aviation personnel since 1949 and the possibility that among them are included air crew members of such lost or destroyed aircraft." Dulles recommends an Aide-Memoire be presented to the Soviets stating:

"The United States Government has for some time received from persons of various nationalities freed from Soviet Government imprisonment during the last several years, reports that they have conversed with, seen or heard reports concerning United States military aviation personnel, belonging either to the United States Air Force or to the United States Navy Air arm, in actual detention in the Soviet Union... the reports concerning such personnel have now become so persistent and detailed, and so credible, that... it requests the Soviet Government to inform the United States Government in detail concerning each American military person who has been detained."

144. July 2. The Department of the Army responds to the May 29, 1956 memorandum and encloses "Data Sheets" on 188 U.S. Army personnel listed as "missing."

It is stated that the data sheets are maintained by the Adjutant General and that 'the information reflected therein is based on interviews of various personnel returned to military control, enemy and domestic news publications, enemy radio broadcasts, command reports, photographs, etc.' (The names of 188 personnel are attached to the memorandum)

(Source: 2 July 1956 Memorandum containing listing of 188 Army names.)

145. July 16. The U.S. formally presents to the Soviets the Aide-Memoire proposed by Secretary of State Dulles on June 20th concerning the presence of American POWs in the Soviet Union. The diplomatic note goes on to cite specific examples stating "the United States Government is informed and is compelled to believe that the Soviet Government has had and continue to have under detention the following:

1. One or more members of the crew of a United States Navy Privateer-type aircraft which came down in the Baltic Sea area on April 8, 1950. The United States Government has since that time received reports that various members of the crew of this U.S. aircraft were, and are, detained in Soviet detention places in the Far Eastern area of the Soviet Union.
2. One of more members of the crew of a United States Air Force B-29 which came down on June 13, 1952. An officer, believed by the United States Government to have been a member of this crew was observed in October, 1953, in a Soviet hospital north of Magadan near the crossing of the Kolyma iver between Elgen and Debin at a place called Narionburg. This officer stated that he had been wrongfully convicted under Item 6 of Article 5B of the Soviet Penal Code."

146. August 13. The Soviet Government, in response to the July 16th U.S. message, categorically denies holding any United States military personnel.

147. August 21. State Department dispatch from Vienna, Austria, details information from a returned Austrian prisoner of war concerning an American POW named Lt. Racek, who "had been a lieutenant of armored troops in Korea, where he was captured." The Austrian source reports that Lt. Racek was held with him in Prison #2, Irkutsk, and subsequently in Lubyanka Prison in Moscow. The U.S. Embassy in Vienna reports, "Source did appear sincere in his desire to help Racek and he was altogether positive in his information."

(Source: State Department declassified cable 21 Aug. 56)

148. October 13. W.C. Daniel, National Commander of The American Legion, sends a telegram to President Dwight Eisenhower, expressing concern about U.S. POWs.



149. October 19. President Eisenhower responds to The American Legion stating that “all American servicemen known to be held prisoner by the Communists in Korea were released by September 6, 1953 (the last day of Operation Big Switch.)”

“There remained 15 USAF personnel who had been illegally retained in Communist China, in violation of the Korean armistice agreement. Through invoking the good offices of the United Nations and the assistance of friendly countries, we secured the return of these men to their homes in 1955.”

“Still of concern to the United States government is a group of several hundred missing military personnel feared dead of whose exact fate we have reason to believe the Communists should have knowledge. We have never ceased to press the Communists, through both military and diplomatic channels, for an accounting of these men.”

(Source: 19 October 1956 White House Communications Center copy of message from Eisenhower to Daniel)

150. October 27. Deputy Secretary of Defense Reuben Robertson sends a memorandum to the Service Secretaries requesting “that you initiate a program to screen exhaustively all files and records on each case in order to provide as completely as possible the identifying data about each person, a complete account of the circumstances surrounding his capture or disappearance, and any evidence which will demonstrate when and where the individual was in the hands of the Communists.” Robertson requests that an initial report be prepared no later than 1 December 1956 and quarterly thereafter until further notice.

(Source: 27 October 1956 declassified memorandum.)

151. November 27. On behalf of the Department of the Army, Assistant Secretary of the Army Hugh Milton responds to the October 27, 1956 memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Milton writes, “a program has been initiated to screen all files and records and to document all information available concerning each of the men believed to have been captured in Korea and for whom no satisfactory accounting has currently been obtained.” Milton encloses three summaries concerning Corporal Richard G. Desautels, Private First Class Archie Walker, and Private Frank Worley, and states “further reports will be forwarded quarterly hereafter.”

(Source: 27 November 1956 Army memorandum)

1957

152. January 22. Rear Admiral Ira Nunn at Panmunjom states to wire services, “I am sure some of these prisoners are still alive. Today’s meeting (with the Communists) was



called in the hope we will obtain further information on these unaccounted for prisoners we believe are alive. Also, the meeting would give some comfort to the families."

153. May 27. The Far East and Pacific Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee holds a hearing on American prisoners of war. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve), Stephen S. Jackson, states:

"Shortly after the official exchange of POWs had been completed in September of 1953 officials of the U. N. Command handed the Communist side a list of 3,404 names of missing U.N. Command personnel, including the names of 944 United States servicemen of whom we had reason to believe the Communists should have some knowledge...Our belief that the Communists should have knowledge of the individuals was based upon several sources of information:"

"First, interviews with repatriated personnel who stated that had seen certain named individuals who had not been repatriated, who had not otherwise been accounted for, and who had been alive and in Communist hands; secondly, Communist radio broadcasts giving the names of certain U.N. Command personnel and admitting that they were under Communist control; thirdly, propaganda pictures in our possession which had been taken by the Communists and circulated for propaganda purposes showing American military personnel on forced marches taking part in parades in Communist-held cities, undoubtedly against their will; fourthly, mail which had been written by POWs to their friends and relatives in the United States attesting to the fact that they were in a POW status; fifthly, air crews who had seen our airmen parachute from disabled aircraft and, after safe landings, surrounded enemy forces or civilians. In addition, other intelligence reporting supported our contentions."

"The point I am trying to make here is that there is considerable circumstantial evidence from which to draw the conclusion that these individuals were alive and under Communist control in relatively stable situations, removed from battle, and at periods ranging from several days to many months after they had become missing in action from their own U.N. Command units."

"The efforts of the United States Government to get the Communists to fulfill their commitments (under the Korean Armistice Agreement) have been continuous, persistent, frustrating, and largely unrewarding...In addition to efforts to secure an accounting (by the Communists) through the Military Armistice Commission, the graves registration units of the U.N. Command continued their investigations, the Military Services continued the sifting of thousands of reports, interviews with returned POWs, and the interrogation of friendly sources of Korean and other nationalities, attempting to piece together all available information which would throw light on the fate of the missing."

“Through the unilateral efforts of the United States Government, which I have just mentioned, the list of 944 had been reduced to 526 by August, 1954. This reduction came about because the efforts we had made produced conclusive evidence of death for 418 of the original list.”

(Note: The Committee subsequently releases the names of 450 unaccounted for American prisoners of war, and by resolution of the House and Senate, calls on the Executive Branch to “make the return of the four hundred and fifty American prisoners of war still imprisoned by Communist forces the foremost objective of the foreign policy of the United States.” H.Con.Res.140 introduced in March, 1957)

154. October 15. The American Consulate in Strasbourg, France receives information from a Polish National who had been held as a prisoner in the Russian concentration camp of Bulun, in the province of Yakutak. The source reports having been held with three American soldiers who had been captured during the Korean War.

(Source: State Department declassified cable dated 21 October 1957)

## **1958**

155. February 28. The Director of Collection and Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, Colonel Harry J. Kieling, sends a memorandum to the Commander in Chief of Pacific Air Forces, Att: Director of Intelligence, entitled “Collection Requirements Pertaining to American Prisoners Held in Communist Countries.” Kieling forwards “dossiers of 187 missing USAF personnel for your retention.” Kieling requests CINCPAF to prepare, on a one-time basis, a status report on Project American and to continue to maintain and update this program consistent with USAF objectives in recovering personnel.

156. July 1-December 31. The U.S. Air Force, 6004 Air Intelligence Service Squadron in Japan formulates plan to “expand theatre collection efforts” on Project American. Discussions are held with Lt. Colonel Showalter, J-2, USFJ. The Squadron reports, “it is hoped that these plans may be implemented in the near future.”

157. July 7. The United Nations Command passes the list of unaccounted for POWs to the Communist side at Panmunjom, asking for an accounting.

158. July 9. In a letter to Senator Knowland from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, it is stated: “At the present time, there are approximately 450 American military personnel on whom the Department of Defense has information which indicates that they were at one time in the hands of the Communists and for whom we have not received a satisfactory accounting.”

## **1959**

159. January 29. The United Nations Command to the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom inquires to the Communist side on the list of unaccounted for UNC POWs.

160. April 28. North Korean Major General Chu Chang Joon States, "We did our duty of counting your prisoners satisfactorily. The issue is all settled as far as our part is concerned."

161. April 29. President Dwight Eisenhower, at a press conference, states in response to a question on the number of POWs unaccounted for and efforts to recover them, "Now, I recall from memory that there were a great number of people that we couldn't account for, and we have had long, serious and even continuing discussions with the Chinese Communists, trying to make them disclose where our prisoners were held... We have gotten back a few and there are still some left there...but the details we would have to look up for you, and you could get them from Mr. Hagerty (White House Press Secretary James C. Hagerty.) Hagerty later states, "I think I can add...the chances are they are not alive, but there may be some. We just don't know. It is because of those who may survive that we cannot give up any hope."

(Source: Public Papers of the President, No.89 p.88)

162. October. In an interview with Pulitzer Prize Newhouse Newspaper reporter Ed Mowery, the former chief of Intelligence (G-2) of the Far East Command under General Douglas MacArthur, states, "I suggest that the assumption of presumption of death (on unaccounted for POW/MIAs) in this instance is a unilateral act by our own (Pentagon) statisticians. The Defense Department, administratively, has eliminated them from an accounting. Why not presume them alive?"

## **1960**

163. June 24, 1960. The United Nations Command representative to the Military Armistice Commission passes the list of unaccounted for POWs to the Communist side.

164. July 28. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reduces the list of 450 unaccounted for POWs from the Korean War (earlier reduced from 944) to 391 "largely through the efforts of U.S. Graves Registration Units and the US intelligence agencies, working with little or no cooperation or assistance from the North Koreans or Chinese Communists." The JCS states that "definite evidence of death has been established (in reducing the number) through the continuing efforts of the military services to establish the facts in each individual case."

In a public release by the Department of the Defense, it is stated:

"Although the possibility cannot be completely foreclosed that some few of them (the 391) might still be alive, there are no reliable facts to support such a conclusion."

(Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff cable dated 28 July 1960)

## **1961**

165. A Chinese defector, Wu Shu-jen claims to have seen 70-80 Americans at a machine tools factory in Tsingtao, China (Shantung province). He claims that a factory official told him they were American POWs.

(Source: testimony before the House Committee on Internal Security.)

166. January 16. The Department of the Air Force Manual No. 200-25, in an Official Use Only document, provides data information “on each of the 187 Air Force officers and airmen still missing in action as a result of the Korean conflict. It is provided for use by intelligence personnel of the United States and its allies in acquiring additional information regarding their fate.”

167. October 11. President John F. Kennedy, in response to a question about the prospect of talks with the Chinese Communists, states, “We have been meeting periodically for the past three or four years, for a period at Geneva and most recently at Warsaw, in which we talked about the exchange of prisoners, or rather the release of prisoners...”

168. December 2. The Saturday Evening Post Magazine reports that the prisoners referred to by President Kennedy on October 11th are

[P]resumably the American servicemen who were captured by the Chinese Communists during the Korean War and for whom the Communists have never made any adequate accounting. Although the State Department takes the attitude that the majority of these men are presumed dead, while “some few of them might still be alive”, it is apparent that some of them at least are still considered a matter for negotiation, and that the Chinese Communists regard them as pawns in the game of power politics. If we surrender on (the question of recognizing) Formosa, it is implied, the Communists might talk about prisoners. Of course, these men may be dead but, unless many have been shot, it is hard to believe that all of them—young men in the prime of life—have succumbed

## **1962**

169. January 16. The United Nations Command representative to the Military Armistice Commission passes the list of unaccounted for UNC POWs to the Communist side at Panmunjom, Korea.

170. February 5. A Miami News article refers to POW information from a Russian MVD intelligence officer who defected to the West in Tokyo in 1954. The agent is reported to have stated the officials in the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo had reported to him that U.S. POWs from Korea had been taken to Russia.

(Note: The defector, Uri Rastvorov, was interviewed by Colonel Philip Corso in the mid-1950s)

171. June 4. U.S. Senator Thomas J. Dodd is informed by letter from the Department of State that they have a “classified list of United States citizens imprisoned in Communist countries.” The State Department writes that “this is a matter of considerable sensitivity.”

172. February 23. The United Nations Command representative to the Military Armistice Commission passes the list of unaccounted for UNC POWs to the Communist side at Panmunjom, Korea.

173. August 11. The list of unaccounted for UNC POWs is again passed to the Communist side at Panmunjom.

1965

174. June 4. The list is again referred to during a MAC meeting with the Communist side.

**1966**

175. October 11. The list is again referred to during a MAC meeting with the Communist side.

**1967**

176. Chinese defector, Wu Shu-jen, claims to have seen Americans again at a factory in Qingdao, China.

177. November 7. The list of unaccounted for UNC POWs is again referred to during a MAC meeting with the Communist side at Panmunjom, Korea.

1968

178. January 23. The U.S. Navy reconnaissance ship Pueblo is captured by the North Koreans off the North Korean East Coast with a crew of 73 persons on board. Negotiations lead to the subsequent release of the crew.

179. 1968. A North Korean defector claims to have seen two American POWs on the outskirts of P'yongyang, and is reportedly told that there were 10 American pilots at this location that had been sent to North Korea during the Vietnam Conflict. The defector is debriefed by U.S. and South Korean sources in 1980 in Seoul.

(In March, 1992, the Department of Defense refuses to honor a Select Committee request for access to the source, without compromising his identity. - Source: 9 March 1992 meeting between Chuck Wells of Defense, Staff Director Frances Zwenig, and Deputy Staff Director Dino Carluccio, subsequent March 1992 Defense Department letter to Senator Kerry/Smith)

### **1969**

180. May 26. The United Nations Command Senior Member sends a letter to his Communist counterpart requesting information on unaccounted for UNC POWs.

### **1970**

181. April 10. The United Nations Command Senior Member sends a letter to his Communist counterpart requesting information on unaccounted for UNC POWs.

### **1971**

182. April 16. Another letter is sent to the Communist side by the UNC requesting an accounting.

183. May 5. The Communist side at Panmunjom responds to the 16 April UNC request stating that they had “repatriated all prisoners to the UNC side” and that the United Nations Command “must return” North Korean POWs.

### **1972**

184. April 25. The United Nations Command sends a letter to the Communist side requesting information concerning unaccounted for UNC POWs.

185. May 26. The communist side responds stating that the UNC must return all North Korean POWs and that all UNC prisoners had been repatriated.

### **1973**

186. February 1. At a Senate hearing by the Judiciary Committee, investigating internal security laws, a former Soviet prisoner, Avraham Shifrin, testifies that he was in a concentration slave-labor camp near Kazakhstan from 1953 to 1963. He states, “First, I must ask you to excuse my English, because I cannot speak like you. I learned my English in concentration camps and my first teachers were kidnapped American officers.”

187. May 31. The United Nations Command requests an accounting of POWs from the Communists at Panmunjom.

188. June 18. The Communist side at Panmunjom provides reply similar to previous years.

## **1974**

- 189. May 17. Accounting requested by UNC side.
- 190. May 28. The Communists provides reply similar to previous years.

## **1975**

191. A Romanian POW since 1945, George Risiou, escapes from the Soviet Union with five others. He reports 900 American POWs still held in a secret KGB prison camp. He states that Soviet authorities had assigned Russian names to American, English, French, and other POWs there, for deniability.

(Source: John Brown, 2 December 1990 Sunday Oregonian.)

192. While speaking with a staff member of a communist embassy based in Algiers, Reverend Paul Linstrom of Illinois reports being told that nine U.S. crewmen from a plane shot down in the Sea of Japan in 1953 were seen in August, 1973 in a Soviet slave-labor camp at Gandala.

(Source: Los Angeles Times, July 8, 1990)

193. According to a 3/8/92 Associated Press account filed in Seoul, U.S. officials from Seoul and Washington meet in 1975 in Hawaii to plan a possible prisoner release through North Korea of Vietnam conflict U.S. POWs. The Associated Press cites "a reliable source who attended the talks."

- 194. June 19. The UNC requests an accounting at Panmunjom.
- 195. June 28. The Communists reply similar to that of previous years.

196. November 2. In reference to the Baltic Sea shoot down of a U.S. aircraft and subsequent reports that some of the crew were captured and held in Soviet prisons, the U.S. Government states they "have no reason to believe reports that 8 of the 10 crewmen were prisoners in Soviet camps."

(Source: International Herald Tribune article.)

## **1976**

- 197. July 2. The UNC requests an accounting at Panmunjom.
- 198. July 12. The Communists reply similar to that of previous years.

## **1977**

199. August 17. The UNC requests an accounting at Panmunjom.

200. August 22. The Communists reply similar to that of previous years.

### **1978**

201. August 17. The UNC requests an accounting at Panmunjom.

202. August 24. The Communists reply similar to that of previous years.

### **1979**

203. June 20. A cable to the Secretary of State from the U.S. Embassy in Seoul discusses the annual submission to the Communists by the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission of the list of unaccounted for American POWs. The cable states:

“We are aware that UNC attempted in 1971 to terminate annual submission of letters but was instructed by Defense to continue with the ritual. Although there may be lingering bureaucratic reasons for perpetuating the submission of these letters, we think it is time to stop.”

204. August 20. The United Nations Command sends a letter to the Communist side at Panmunjom requesting information on unaccounted for UNC POWs.

205. August 29. The Communist side refer to their previous letters.

206. October. Romanian design engineer Serban Oprica claims to have seen in 1979 11 Caucasians working on a collective farm north of Pyongyang while in North Korea on a bus tour. He is told that they were “American prisoners, prisoners of war in North Korea.”

207. Rev. Paul Lindstrom meets with a Soviet dissident who served time in Gandala prison. Lindstrom states, “He told me that at Gandala he had spoken to two American men from the downed flight (over the Sea of Japan in 1953) as recently as 1975.”

(Source: Los Angeles Times, July 8, 1990)

### **1980**

208. August 8. The UNC sends letter to Communist side requesting information concerning unaccounted for UNC POWs.

209. August 13. Communist side refers to their previous letters.



### **1981**

210. September 3. The UNC sends letter to Communist side requesting information concerning unaccounted for UNC POWs.

### **1982**

211. August 11. The UNC sends letter to Communist side requesting information concerning unaccounted for UNC POWs.

212. August 17. The Communist side refer to their previous letters.

213. November. In reference to the court case of Private Roger Dumas, captured during the Korean Conflict, a USG memorandum to the Office of the Secretary of the Army states, "We are in agreement that every effort to keep this matter out of the public eye should be made. It is clear from your memo that you wish no additional information be provided to the Justice Department. Your course of action seems appropriate."

214. December 21. The United Nations Command Senior Member requests the Communist side to conduct a search of the burial sites of UNC POWs at UNC POW Camp No. 5 for possible UNC remains and passes a map depicting the burial site. The Communist side ignores the request.

### **1983**

215. July 23-26. The status of Army private Roger Dumas, captured during the Korean Conflict, is the subject of a trial at the Federal District Court in Connecticut. After three days of hearings, the judge orders the Army to grant Dumas' brother a full hearing on the matter. As a result, in 1984, the status of Roger Dumas is changed from MIA to POW for the period 4 November 1950 until 26 February 1954. The presumptive finding of death dated 26 February 1954 is affirmed by the Adjutant General of the Department of the Army.

216. August 17. The UNC Senior Member requests the Communist side for information on unaccounted for UNC POWs. The UNC also asks the Communist side for the return of UNC remains.

217. August 22. The Communist side simply refer to their previous letters.

### **1984**

218. August 17. The UNC Senior Member requests the Communist side for information on unaccounted for UNC POWs. The UNC also asks the Communist side for the return of UNC remains.

219. August 24. The Communist side simply refer to their previous letters.

## **1985**

220. August 28. The UNC Senior Member requests the Communist side for information on unaccounted for UNC POWs. The UNC also asks the Communist side for the return of UNC remains.

221. August 31. The Washington Post does a report on the March, 1954 Hong Kong report filed by Colonel Simpson on the refugee who claimed to have seen several hundred US POWs being transferred to Russian trains in late 1951 and 1952. The Pentagon informs the Post that “they suspect, but are not certain, that they were French troops being repatriated after the French negotiated an end to the Indochina war in May, 1954.” The Pentagon fails to mention that the sightings actually took place in late 1951 before the end of the French Indochina war and the return of French POWs.

222. October 20. The North Korean Foreign Minister tells Mr. Frank Kerr of the U.S. Chosin Few veteran's organization in New York that North Korea will cooperate in returning military remains if the United States formally requests a search for and recovery of U.S. war dead. (Source 4 January 1988 UNC Point Paper)

223. October. A North Korean staff officer comments informally at Panmunjom to the UNC side that North Korea “might start looking for remains if asked to do so.”

224. November 23. The United Nations Command follows up asking the North Koreans to search for and repatriate UNC remains.

## 1986

225. January/February. The following positions are outlined by the UNC and Communist side during discussions at Panmunjom on searching for and repatriating remains.

\*UNC position: The subject of military remains is a humanitarian issue. Remains should be returned through the Military Armistice Commission.

\*North Korea position: The Armistice does not cover search and exhumation. It is recommended that the U.S. and North Korea have bilateral negotiations on this issue.

(Source: 4 January, 1988 UNC Point Paper.)

226. February 11. The United Nations Command sends letters to the 16 United Nations Command Member Nations requesting all available information on the status of MIA's.

227. February 14. The UNC sends letter to Communist side stating that the Military Armistice Commission should handle the remains issue, and that the remains issue involves all UN/ROK forces, not just the U.S.

228. March 4. North Korea responds at Panmunjom stating that military remains will be returned when recovered, but the Armistice Agreement does not require search and exhumation of remains.

229. June. The Pentagon states in writing that “there is a possibility that the soldiers (referred to in Colonel Simpson’s 1954 report) were captured French troops being repatriated after the Indochina War.” Again, the Pentagon fails to mention that the sightings took place before the repatriation of French prisoners.

230. June. Colonel Henry Land of the Office of the Secretary of Defense is quotes as saying, in reference to Korean Conflict POW/MIAs, “the bottom line is that until the North Koreans get to a position and they want to release prisoners and the remains that are up there. They will do it when they feel it is to their advantage.

231. The Department of Defense in its POW/MIA Factbook states, “At every opportunity, the U.S. Government continues to press for the fullest possible accounting of Americans still unaccounted for as a result of the Korean War.”

232. August. The United Nations Command representative to the Military Armistice Commission passes to the North Koreans information pertaining to the location of UNC remains. The materials pinpoint burial sites associated with 13 former POW camps and a POW hospital, seven former UNC cemeteries in the North, and listed 291 crash sites from which UNC airmen had not been recovered.

233. September. North Korea responds stating the information had been passed to the “appropriate agencies.”

234. December 11. The United Nations Command meets with representative of the Chosin Few veterans' organization and briefs them on the United Nations Command position on remains negotiations.

235. December 18. The UNC sends following up letter to North Korean side asking if they have had any success in discovering remains.

236. December 29. North Korean side responds stating the information has been passed to “relevant organs.”

1987

237. 1987. The U.S. Government receives information that a high ranking North Korean diplomat is reported to have told a visiting Westerner in North Korea that his country was holding up to 2,500 sets of remains of U.S. servicemen.

238. July 30. The United Nations Command representative to the Military Armistice Commission makes the following points to the North Korean side:

1. North Korea has an obligation to return UNC remains which North Korean officials have told US veterans that they have recovered.
2. The remarks made by North Korean staff officer (October, 1985) led the United Nations Command to believe North Korea may have already discovered UNC remains.
3. The question of remains is not only an Armistice issue but also a humanitarian issue. The MAC is the appropriate agency to deal with the remains issue.
4. The UNC is prepared to negotiate a subsequent agreement similar to the one of 1954 (17 August) to eliminate any technical problem involving the question of searching for and discovery of remains.
5. The UNC is prepared to dispatch a multinational team, accompanied by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission representative, to assist North Korea in locating UNC remains.
6. North Korea must return the UNC remains through the MAC.
7. North Korea states in response that the search for and recovery of remains is not an Armistice issue.

239. Following the MAC meeting, the UNC Senior Member holds a press conference and states that North Korea is using the remains issue in an attempt to force bilateral negotiations with nations that currently do not recognize North Korea.

240. October. A factsheet on "Americans Unaccounted for in the Korean War" is released by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs. The factsheet begins, "The U.S. Government has ongoing efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting of Americans missing and unaccounted for while serving their country." The factsheet concludes, "the lack of responsiveness thus far by the KPA (North Korea) on this issue will not blunt the determination of the U.S. Government to achieve the fullest possible accounting of Americans missing and unaccounted for as a result of the Korean War."

241. November 14. The United Nations Command in a letter to the North Korean side, requests that they return UNC remains which North Korean already has in its possession, and that the MAC will be the appropriate agency to handle the issue.

242. November 21. The North Korean side responds again stating that the issue of Korean War remains is "outside the purview of the Military Armistice Commission."

**1988**

243. January. North Korea advises the United Nations Command that they would be interested in meeting to discuss the return of UNC remains. Just before the meeting to discuss returning remains, South Korea accuses the North of complicity in the KAL November, 1987 bombing. Outraged by the adverse publicity generated by South Korea, North Korea withdraws from its proposed arrangements for the return of two sets of remains which they identify by name and serial number.

(Source: March, 1989 letter to Senate from Assistant Secretary of Defense.)

244. August 7. The Defense Intelligence Agency states, in response to a Freedom of Information request, that it “holds no records on those missing or captured during the Korean Conflict.”

### **1989**

245. October 23. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs informs a U.S. Senator that an 18-month inquiry and review of documents, employing researchers from the National Archives, the U.S. Army Center for Military History... had concluded that allegations that the U.S. Government abandoned POWs in World War II and Korea were “unfounded.” The letter further states, “This detailed investigation failed to discover any evidence that American military personnel are being detained in the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, or any third country. This was not a preconceived conclusion, but we are not surprised. The United States has always placed a high priority on accounting for all its military personnel, living and dead.”

246. November 9. The Chief of the POW/MIA Office at the Defense Intelligence Agency, Colonel Joseph A. Schlatter, responds to a letter from a next of kin of a missing servicemen from the Korean Conflict. He states:

There is no evidence to suggest that any U.S. personnel were not released from captivity in Korea. The 389 “known to be held in North Korea” is a misleading statement that unfortunately has gained public acceptance...There is no evidence that 389 (or any other number) Americans were held in captivity and not released at the end of hostilities.

(Source: 9 November 1989 letter signed by Col. Schlatter)

247. December. The Department of Defense, in a written statement, says, “As far as we can tell, no American POWs from the Korean Conflict were taken out of North Korea and into the USSR or China, and not ever accounted for. We don’t know if the Communists continued to hold any Americans after the armistice was signed, because we have never been fully satisfied with their accounting for our missing men... At present, we have no evidence that there are American POWs from that conflict being held against their will... The United States Government has never “written off” any American service members in Korea, or anywhere else.”

## **1990**

248. May 28. North Korea returns five sets of U.S. servicemen remains to a Congressional delegation led by Congressman Sonny Montgomery.

249. June 28. In testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Defense Intelligence Agency Deputy Director Rear Admiral Ronald Marryott states:

Although stories have surfaced from time to time alleging that Americans are still being held by the North Koreans, Chinese, or the Soviets, there are no intelligence indicators that U. S. personnel from the Korean conflict were not returned to U.S. control at the end of the war.

Likewise, the Soviet Union has been the central focus of U.S. and Allied intelligence activities for most of this century, and China has been watched for almost 50 years. I believe this scrutiny would likewise have revealed at least a hint of American prisoners held in either country had they been taken there. Again, no such evidence has ever surfaced.

250. July. In an interview with Major Garrett of the Washington Times, Retired General Eugene Tighe, a former Air Force intelligence agent during the Korean Conflict, states, "Let me say that intelligence reports I received left no doubt at all to me that American POWs left North Korea to go to the Soviet Union and China."

251. July 8. American Red Cross spokeswoman Donna Schneider in Seattle, Washington, states that her agency knows of 12 reported sightings of American POWs in Siberia, some as recently as the 1970s.

(Source: Los Angeles Times)

252. In response, the Defense Department states, "...the reports may at one time have been believed... (but) there is no reason to think any Americans are currently being held as a result of the Korean War anywhere in the world."

253. In the same article, former director of the Foreign News Service, Zygmunt Nagorski, Jr. states that during the 1950's his foreign reporters had an extensive "source network" of truck drivers and other working-class Soviets employed at or near prisons in Molotov, Khabarovsk, Chita, Omsk, Chermoz, and elsewhere. Nagorski claims his sources informed him that there were still up to 1,000 American POWs in Siberia from the Korean War when he last had contact with them in the late 1950's.

(Source: Los Angeles Times, July 8, 1990)

254. September 14. Former DIA Director Lt. General Daniel Graham, states on CBN, “They (the Soviets) would come with a list of specialties and find out whether such specialties existed among the U.N. prisoners in the camps in North Korea and China... and then they would ship them off.”

### **1991**

255. January 2. A report by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress states:

The end of the Korean War in 1953 was followed by a period of intensely bitter political relations between the US on the one hand, and the North Koreans and the Chinese on the other. The temper of the times thus could suggest that the two Communist enemies of the United States during the Korean War, as well as a Stalinist Soviet Union, might be inclined to hold live Americans—perhaps even more so than Vietnam in the 1970’s.

256. February. At the request of the Korean War Veterans Association, Senator Bob Smith begins a series of discussions with a North Korean diplomat in New York on the subject of unaccounted for POWs and MIAs from the Korean Conflict.

257. June. Senator Smith travels to Panmunjom, Korea where he meets with Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-Chu at Tong il Gak in North Korea. North Korea returns the remains of 11 U.S. servicemen following the meeting.

258. September. Senator Smith holds a follow-up meeting in New York with North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Chu, with the concurrence and participation of the State Department in an effort to establish a process to gain information on unaccounted for POWs and MIAs. In preparation for the meeting, and in conjunction with urging from Senator Smith, the State Department proposes in writing that “a Committee be established as a humanitarian organization separate from the Military Armistice Commission and separate from the auspices of the United Nations Command to regularize the return of MIA remains and the exchange of information about Korea War POWs and MIAs.”

(Source: State Department talking point paper Sept. 1991)

259. The proposal is presented to the Vice-Foreign Minister, and he is informed that the U.S. would soon be presenting it formally through its Beijing channel with North Korea. The Vice-Foreign Minister accepts the proposal “in principle.”

(Source: Meeting notes Sept.91, U.N. visit)

260. December 5. 96 U.S. Senators send a letter to Russian President Boris Yeltsin urging him “to facilitate the release of GRU and MSB intelligence reports, files or



information that may ease the pain for thousands of American families who have never learned the fate of their loved ones.”

## **1992**

261. January 6. The Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs both receive correspondence from retired Colonel Philip Corso, former National Security Staff Assistant to President Dwight Eisenhower. Corso states:

When I was a member of the National Security Council on the White House staff under President Eisenhower (1953-1957), I interrogated Yuri Alexandrovitch Rastvorov, a Russian KGB officer who defected to the U.S. from the USSR embassy in Japan in January, 1954... Rastvorov revealed that Russian diplomats coming to Japan had seen U.S. POWs in the USSR. Rastvorov personally had seen a trainload of U.S. POWs heading into Siberia after changing trains at the Manchurian-Russian border...I submitted my report...In a few days, President Eisenhower decided not to make this information public because he was concerned about adverse effects on the families of missing POWs.

262. After a check with still classified documents on file with the Eisenhower Presidential Library, it is confirmed that Corso did interrogate Rastvorov after the Korean Conflict in January/February 1955. Rastvorov remains under Central Intelligence Agency protection in the United States. He is interviewed by Select Committee staff in February, 1992.

263. February, 1992. During the trip by the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs to Moscow, Chairman John Kerry and Vice-Chairman Bob Smith are provided with a list of 536 names, which is described by a high-ranking Russian intelligence official as U.S. POWs from the Korean Conflict who were interrogated by the Soviets, some of whom had then been sent to Communist China.

264. A subsequent check of the names with the National Records Center in St. Louis reveals that up to 125 of the 536 names are unaccounted for U.S. servicemen from the Korean Conflict.

266. Also, during the Select Committee's trip, General Dmitri Volkogonov informs the Chairman and Vice Chairman of a specific incident "after the Korean War when an American helicopter landed in North Korea." Volkogonov states that records showed the Communists denied any knowledge of the incident, but internally, North Korea had informed the USSR that "two of the fliers were captured alive." Finally, during the trip, the Senators push for the formation of a Joint Commission on POWs.

267. May 13. North Korea releases 15 sets of U.S. servicemen remains at Panmunjom, Korea. On May 28 North Korea releases 15 more sets of U.S. servicemen remains at Panmunjom, Korea.

268. June. In response to a press question, Pentagon POW/MIA spokeswoman Captain Susan Strednansky states: "We don't have any evidence that anyone was transported from Korea to the Soviet Union."

269. June 9. The Select Committee investigator in Moscow interviews a Russian ex-prisoner who claims he was imprisoned with a Korean War American POW in the 1980's at a prison camp in the Ural Mountains. The name of the POW is reported as David Marken. Marken, according to the ex-prisoner, had told him he left for Korea in 1952, was shot down in 1953, was wounded and captured, and spent six months in a North Korean hospital. Marken told the ex-prisoner, during the time they spent together in prison, that there were approximately 50 Americans in a group in North Korea awaiting transfer to the Soviet Union, but he was transferred by military aircraft as part of a group of 5 to 10 Americans. Marken reportedly told the source he did not know where the others were. The source arrived at the Pechora camp, 500 miles north of Moscow, in September, 1982 where he met Marken and knew him until he was released in 1986. Marken was reported to be about 62 years old in 1982. The source went back to bring Marken a package of cigarettes, tea, onions, and sausage in 1989, and was told by one of the inmates that Marken was still alive.

270. June 18. Following a request by Senator Smith to the Russian Chairman of the Joint Commission on POWs, General Volkogonov, arrangements are made five days following the request for U.S. investigators to travel to the Pechora prison camp to search for Marken. The investigation is inconclusive at best. Following the trip, another former inmate of the prison confirms that Markin had been a prisoner assigned to his work detail. Finally, another source has since surfaced from the Ukraine who reports that Markin was last seen at Knyazhpogost, Russia in January, 1991. The investigation continues.

271. June 19. In response to a request from the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff prepares a summary of 39 Cold War personnel involving a total of 132 U.S. personnel who are still unaccounted for. The request follows statements by Russian President Yeltsin about the existence of U.S. servicemen on the soil of the former Soviet Union following World War II, the Korean Conflict, Vietnam, and during the Cold War, and his letter to the Select Committee of POW/MIA Affairs.

272. June 23. Senator Smith releases the list of up to 125 names (from February, 1991 Moscow trip and subsequent research) of U.S. servicemen who were reportedly interrogated by Soviets during the Korean Conflict and sent to China. Senator Smith request the Secretary of State to pursue the matter with the People's Republic of China.

273. June 25. Malcom Toon, head of the U.S. side of the U.S. Russia Joint Commission, states, "I think we're going to end up with absolutely zero...my gut feeling is that there's nobody alive under Russian control."

274. July. The People's Republic of China Embassy in Washington releases a statement saying, "The Chinese side settled the issue of American prisoners of the Korean

War long ago...all the POWs were treated in a humanitarian manner. None of the POWs under Chinese control was transferred to a third country or to Chinese territory.”

275. August 4. A U.S. representative to the Joint Commission on POW/MIAs interviews a former Russian prisoner at Khabarovsk, Siberia who reports having observed three Americans who arrived at his camp in October 1952, and left three months later. Joint Commission investigators are following up on leads provided during this interview.

276. August 12. The Department of Defense releases a POW/MIA Fact Sheet in which it is stated, in reference to Korean War era POW/MIAs and what is being done to search of them:

“Unfortunately, there are no detailed records available from the Korean War, making today’s searches difficult. The U.S. Government is prepared to accept any remains that the North Koreans may have on a purely humanitarian basis and not tied to any political or diplomatic agenda.”

“Records for the Korean War era are not nearly as extensive as those for the Vietnam War, making the search for those POW/MIAs much more difficult.”

In regards to Cold War incidents, it is stated:

“There are 135 individuals still unaccounted for as a result of 14 air losses during the Cold War: 10 related to the former Soviet Union, three China-related, and one Korea-related incident. The Defense Department has done a thorough review of these incidents and each will be discussed with the appropriate governments. All information held by the Department of Defense has been shared with the affected families and with the Congress.”

277. August 19. Select Committee investigator in Moscow interviews Russian Colonel (retired) Gavril Ivanovich Korotkov, a Far East expert with the Scientific Research Institute, formerly part of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. Colonel Korotkov reports he served from July 1950 to mid-1954 as part of a General Staff analytical group reporting to the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Far East Military District on developments from the ongoing war in Korea. Korotkov outlines in great detail the fact that the Soviets interrogated American POWs in Korea. Korotkov states that on several occasions he had visited the Soviet Naval Base at Pos’Yet, located in the USSR/China/North Korea Tri-Border Region, which served as a transit point for the movement of American servicemen north to Khabarovsk, Siberia. Although there was an airfield nearby, he believes that the bulk of the Americans transported from Pos’Yet to Khabarovsk were transported by rail, but most likely at least some of the American POWs were moved from North Korea or China by air.

278. Although Korotkov did not know the exact number, he states that the number of American Korean War POWs processed through Khabarovsk was in the hundreds. Korotkov states that operational directives during the Korean Conflict said that Americans should be captured alive, not killed. Korotkov further states that the North Koreans were quite willing to allow the Russians direct access and eventual control over

American POWs. Finally, Korotkov states that he had personally interrogated two American POWs. He could not remember the names of any of the American POWs who were processed through Khabarovsk, except for a Lieutenant Colonel Black. (Note: Possibly Lieutenant Colonel Vance Eugene Black, recorded as captured on November 1, 1951.) Korotkov is reported by Select Committee investigator to be "highly credible and forthcoming."

279. October 27. U.S. investigators in the U.S./Russia Joint Commission interview a Russian citizen who served four and half years in prison in Zinka Camp near Knyazhpogost, Russia. He reports that in the fall of 1952 or the spring of 1953, he had an encounter with an American pilot who had been shot down in North Korea and forced to land in Soviet territory near Vladivostok. The pilot said he had a plane of three, and that his radioman had been in Zinka as well. The pilot did not know what happened to the third member. The pilot remained at Zinka for three to six months, and was then transferred to an unknown location.

280. November 9, 1992. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Ken Quinn is scheduled to raise the POW/MIA issue during an on-going visit to the People's Republic of China.

281. November 10. Kim Il Sung continues his 44 year reign as the leader of North Korea. He undoubtedly knows the fate of several thousand unaccounted for American MIAs from the Korean Conflict.

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Date: July 7, 2020.

I hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the forgoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

*Bob Smith*

Bob Smith