

CHART OF CIA PRODUCTIONS

Bates Nos.	Type of Record, Title	Date	Number (b)(1) redactions	Number (b)(3) redactions	Number (b)(6) redactions	Submitted with FOIA Request (Y)
1-3	Cover letter	October 7, 2020	0	0	0	NA
4-5	CIA Information Report: "Alleged American Held in Soviet Prison"	December 8, 1955	3	11	0	Y Request 12
6-8	CIA Information Report: "Prisoner-of-War Camps in North Korea and China"	July 17, 1952	4	11	0	Y Request 7
9-11	CIA Information Report: "US Prisoners of War in USSR"	April 27, 1954	3	12	0	Y Request 11
12-14	CIA Information Report: "Soviet Concentration Camps in the Vorkuta Area"	April 23, 1954	10	11	0	Y Request 10
15-16	CIA Information Report: "Exploitation of Prisoners-of-War of the Soviets"	March 24, 1954	7	8	0	Y Request 9
17-19	Cover Letter	October 23, 2020	0	0	0	NA
20-22	Memorandum for Joseph A. Schlatter	March 9, 1988	5	14	2	Y Request 14
23	CIA Information Report: "American Prisoners-of-War Held in the USSR"	December 31, 1953	5	7	0	Y Request 8
24-26	Cover Letter	January 8, 2021	0	0	0	N/A
27-28	CIA Information Report: "Preparations for Exchange of United Nations	January 5, 1952	9	13	0	Y Request 2

Exhibit A

	Prisoners in Central and South China”					
29-31	Cover Letter	April 30, 2021	0	0	0	N/A
32	Shipping Label	April 30, 2021	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
33-43	FBIS Concatenated Daily Reports: “Documents Reveal U.S. POWs Kept in GULAG”	1992	N/A	N/A	N/A	No
44-46	Cable: “Take 2 of 3 – Status of Quest for U.S. MIA’s Updated” (sic)	February 1992	0	1	1	No
47-49	Office of the Director: “U.S. Claims Hundreds of American POWs from Korea Were Taken to USSR.”	September 27, 1993	0	2	1	No
50	DOD JCS Message Center: “Possible Location of Remains of U.S. Soldiers Who Died During the Korean War: Prisoners of War Allegedly Still Living in North Korea”	June 3, 1985	1	6	0	No
51-53	USSR Survey: “Two Camps”	November 28, 1952	0	0	0	No
54	CIA Information Report: “US Prisoners of War Camps and Conditions”	May 13, 1953	0	6	0	No
55-74	Supplement VII: “UN Prisoners of War Camps and Conditions in	May 1, 1953	0	51	0	No

	Korea, Manchuria and China”					
75-77	Cover Letter	June 25, 2021	0	0	0	N/A
78-84	Memorandum: “Senator Conrad’s Request for Information on Possible Russian POW 1LT Warren J. Sanderson USAF”	August 2, 1994	0	27	53	No
85-259	DOD and CIA Joint Report: “A Review of the 1998 National Intelligence Estimates on POW/MIA Issues”	February 29, 2000	0	0	0	No
260-262	Letter from Inspector Generals of CIA and DOD: “Clarifying Comment”	September 27, 2000	0	0	0	No
263-265	Cover Letter	September 16, 2021	0	0	0	N/A
266-269	Robert Gates Letter to John Kerry	December 27, 1991	4	13	2	No
270	Committee on National Security Letter to CIA	September 25, 1996	0	0	0	No
271-275	Memo: “5 March 1999 Senate Member Briefing Re: POW/MIA”	March 5, 1999	13	48	5	No
276-302	Hearing Testimony: “Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Richard J. Kerr Appearance Before the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs United States Senate.”	November 25, 1991	28	27	3	No

303	Letter to Cheney, DOD	September 19, 1981	0	1	0	No
304-307	"Categories for Review/Redaction with Release of Classified POW/MIA Documents"	October 4, 1991	6	10	1	No
308-326	Memorandum: "POW/MIA Committee Hearing on 15 November"	November 18, 1991	1	8	5	No
327-345	Memorandum: "Interagency Committee on Vietnam MIA's/POW's"	November 12, 1985	15	37	9	No
346-347	Spot Report: "Update on PW-MIA Activities"	December 6, 1991	3	13	4	No
348	Joint Staff Info Service Center Exclusive: "POW-MIA Issues"	December 1991	5	6	0	No
349-352	Foreign Intelligence Information Report: "Alleged Soviet Incarceration of U.S. Vietnam Prisoners of War"	March 12, 1982	11	19	4	No
353-360	Letters to Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs	December 27, 1991	6	19	6	No
361-366	Spot Report: "Update on Committee Request for National Warning Files"	November 4, 1992	12	16	2	No
367-372	Letter to Frances Zwenig, Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs	November 17, 1992	3	25	6	No
373-375	Memorandum: "Responses to 20 October Requests from Senate"	November 23, 1992	0	12	9	No

	Select Committee for POW/MIA Affairs”					
376-386	Letter from Chief Counsel to CIA	October 20, 1992	0	7	1	No
387-388	CIA Information Report: “Exploitation of Prisoners-of-War of the Soviets”	March 24, 1954	2	3	0	Yes. Request 9
389-391	CIA Information Report: “Probable Communist Course of Action Regarding American Prisoners in Communist China”	December 20, 1954	0	2	0	No
392-393	CIA Report: “RIS Interrogation and Indoctrination of PWs”	August 19, 1955	1	5	0	No
394-395	Routing Slip	December 17, 1991	0	2	2	No
396-397	Letter to CIA and Fax Cover Sheet	December 12, 1991	0	1	1	No
398-401	Letter to Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs	December 24, 1991	0	2	2	No
402-403	Senate Letter to CIA	December 13, 1991	0	0	0	No
404-408	Letter to Select Committee on P OW/MIA Affairs	December 27, 1991	2	7	3	No
409-411	Senate Letter to CIA	December 12, 1991	0	3	3	No
412-414	Memorandum: “Information Concerning U.S. POWs/MIAs in the Former USSR”	December 24, 1991	1	7	4	No
415-418	Letter to Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs	December 27, 1991	4	8	2	No
419-420	Letter to U.S. Senate	July 24, 1998	0	1	7	No

421-422	Memorandum: "Request for CIA Reporting Pertaining to Soviet or Chinese Contact with American POWs"	February 7, 1992	0	6	3	No
423-425	Cover Letter	October 13, 2021	0	0	0	N/A
426-427	Memorandum: "POW/MIA Committee's Request for Access to National Indications Center (NIC) Archives"	November 10, 1992	2	9	5	No
428	Spot Report: "Committee Plans To Charge Agency"	November 10, 1992	0	2	0	No
429	Memorandum: "Interview with Rastvorov (former MVD) concerning U.S. Prisoners of War in USSR"	January 31, 1955	1 (says 1.3(a)(4))	0	0	No
430	Note: "POW/MIA Committee Request for Access to NIO/Warning Archives, 1948-1975"	unknown	0	2	2	No
431	Letter to Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs	October 20, 1992	0	0	0	No
432-433	Memorandum: "POW/MIA Committee's Request for Access to National Indications Center (NIC) Archives"	November 10, 1992	2	11	6	No
434-439	Article: "Soviet Defector Claims Soviets Holding US Korean War POWs"	April 10, 2018	0	0	0	No

440	Shipping Label	November 16, 2021	0	0	0	N/A
441-443	Cover Letter	November 16, 2021	0	0	0	N/A
444-446	Office of the Director Note: "American POWs in USSR—AP News Story"	September 27, 1993	0	4	3	No

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

07 October 2020

John Clarke, Esq.
1629 K Street, NW
Suite 300
Washington, DC, 20008

Reference: *Lois Moore, et al v. CIA*, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No: 1:20-cv-01027; F-2020-00473

Dear Mr. Clarke:

This is an interim response to your 25 November 2019 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request submitted by your client, Lois Moore, for the following:

1. From the period of March 16, 1954, through 1961, all records of the CIA's efforts in undertaking "clandestine and covert action to locate, identify, and recover those U.S. Prisoners of War still in Communist custody"
2. An unredacted copy of this report [January 5, 1952, *CIA Information Reports*] together with all intelligence material upon which it was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
3. Please produce the [following] referenced [in July 15, 1952, *CIA Cross Reference Sheet*]:
 - a. July 15, 1952 "Basic Communication"
 - b. June 24, 1953 "Basic Document"
 - c. Information described as "etcetera"
 - d. POW Information in, or otherwise "Router to, C.I. File"
 - e. POW information related to or bearing the "Cross Reference Number 040"
 - f. POW Information related to or bearing the "Classification Number 383.6 Korea."
4. All records regarding the June 1, 1951 shoot down and capture over North Korea of the American F-51 piloted by U.S. Air Force Captain Harry Cecil Moore, born February 11, 1924, in Elm Grove, West Virginia, service number AO 711850.
5. All records upon which the following statement from February 27, 1952 memo from Chief of Naval Personnel to Commanding General, Far East Air Force was

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based: "It is now believed that there is a possibility that Captain Moore survived and is now a Prisoner of War."

6. All records regarding Captain Moore's incarceration and transportation from North Korea to the Soviet Union, his locations in the Soviet Union, and all evidence that he "may have been interrogated by Soviet officials.
7. An unredacted copy of July 17, 1952, three page *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
8. An unredacted copy of December 31, 1953, *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
9. An unredacted copy of March 24, 1954, *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
10. An unredacted copy of April 23, 1954, *CIA Information Report*.
11. An unredacted copy of April 27, 1954, *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
12. An unredacted copy of December 8, 1954, *CIA Information Report*.
13. Any and all information relating to this Report [January 23, 1992 cable from Embassy Helsinki to Secretary of State]
14. An unredacted copy of March 9, 1988, CIA Memorandum to "US Army Chief, Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action," together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
15. All records relating to any of the POW/MIA's names in the attached list.
16. Any and all records relating that any POW/MIAs may have been held in the prisons identified in the attached list of Russian prison camps.
17. For the period beginning June of 1951, and continuing to the present time, please produce all POW records provided to, or receive from, any office of any component of the Department of Defense, including but not limited to:
 - a. CCRAK
 - b. Air Force 6004 Air Intelligence Service Squadron during the tenure of "Project American."
 - c. Missing in Action Office, including those provided in response to the attached February 12, 1997 letter from U.S. House of Representative James Talent seeking "Intelligence pertaining to American prisoners who were taken to China and the Soviet Union during the war" as well as:
 - i. The 389 American service members who into the 1980's were listed as unaccounted prisoners of war by the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) ii. All U.S. Air Force F-86 pilots who remain unrepatriated.
 - d. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, of AFOSI
 - e. Naval Criminal Investigative Service, or NCIS
 - f. Army Criminal Investigation Command, CID

- g. U.S. Army Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities Far East, or CCRAFE.**
- 18. All POW records prepared by any officer, agent, or employee of the CIA, prepared for the Office of the President including the President's Daily Brief, or PDB, that include information on the possibility of POW's being transferred to the Soviet Union or China.**
 - 19. All records reflecting communications with Members of Congress, or Congressional Oversight committees concerning the capture of American airmen during the Korean conflict who may have been transported to the Soviet Union or China and their presumed fate.**
 - 20. All records concerning POW's and KGB defector Yuri (or Yury) Rastvorov, who informed the United States Government that American military personnel were taken to the Soviet Union during the Korean Conflict. This request includes an unredacted version of the attached page with the heading, "Terminology".**
 - 21. All intelligence material (including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports) concerning statements made by former Czech General Jan Sejna and other former Czech Officials concerning former US POWs held, interrogated and experiment on by Czech and Soviet advisors, and thereafter transferred to China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and the Soviet Union.**

We are processing your request in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.

We have identified six (6) documents that may be released in segregable form with redactions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). Exemption (b)(3) pertains to Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 3507, noted as exemption "(b)(3)CIAAct" on the enclosed documents, and/or Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C § 3024(i)(1), noted as exemption "(b)(3)NatSecAct" on the enclosed documents. The documents are on the enclosed CD.

A final response will be provided to you on a later date.

Sincerely,



Mark Lilly
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

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INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

[Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

COUNTRY USSR

REPORT NO. CS-79883

SUBJECT Alleged American Held in Soviet Prison

DATE DISTR. 8 December 1955

NO. OF PAGES (b)(1) 1
REQUIRE (b)(3) NatSecAct

DATE OF INFO.

[Redacted]

PLACE ACQUIRED

DATE ACQUIRED

REFERENCES

BY CABLE

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE:

[Redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

In 1948 in Lita prison, source met an alleged American citizen, who had Polish documents in the name of (fnu) Fawitsky or (fnu) Favelaki. The latter refused to reveal his true name. He spoke German, Russian, French, and English fluently. The Soviets had a photograph of him in the uniform of an American enlisted man. Source last saw him in Lubyanka Prison in 1951.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

STATE ARMY NAVY AIR

Approved for Release
Date SEP 1995

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] TERMINOLOGY

Zakonservirovannyye agentury- literally deep frozen networks, or canned or preserved nets. Deep Cover nets. [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

Legalnaya rezidentura- Legal residency [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

gruppovedy- principal agents. [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

Trenirovochnoye raspisaniye- Signal Plan [redacted] for period contacts (b)(3) NatSecAct

Voyevoye Raspisaniye- Signal plan for use after W/T agent has been activate [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

Operativny Upolnomocheny (OPERUPOLNOMOCHENY)-Case officer [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

Starshy operativny upolnomocheny-Senior case officer(DR-19-495)

Pomeshchnik Operupolnomochemogo-Junior(sic) case officer. [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

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FEB 1952

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT

CD NO. (b)(3) CIAAct

COUNTRY Korea/China

DATE DISTR. 17 July 1952

SUBJECT Prisoner-of-War Camps in North Korea and China

NO. OF PAGES 3

DATE OF INFO.

PLACE ACQUIRED

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

GRADING OF SOURCE *						COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADING OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
		X						X			

* Except as noted

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, OF THE U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

War Prisoner Administrative Office and Camp Classification

- In May 1952 the War Prisoner Administrative Office (Chan Fu Kuan Li Ch'u) (2069/0199/4619/3810/5710) in P'yongyang, under Colonel No-men-ch'i-fu (6179/7024/1148/1133), an intelligence officer attached to the general headquarters of the Soviet Far Eastern Military District, controlled prisoner of war camps in Manchuria and North Korea. The office, formerly in Mukden, employed 30 persons, several of whom were English-speaking Soviets. LIN Mai (2651/6701) and NAM IL (0589/2480) were deputy chairmen of the office.
- The office had developed three types of prisoner-of-war camps. Camps termed "peace camps," detaining persons who exhibited pro-Communist leanings, were characterized by considerate treatment of the prisoners and the staging within the camps of Communist rallies and meetings. The largest peace camp, which held two thousand prisoners, was at Chungchun. Peace camps were also at K'aiyuan Hsien (124-05, 42-36) and Pench'i (123-43, 41-20).
- Reform camps, all of which were in Manchuria, detained anti-Communist prisoners possessing certain technical skills. Emphasis at these camps was on indoctrination of the prisoners.

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(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

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-2-

(b)(3) CIAAct

4. Normal prisoner-of-war camps, all of which were in North Korea, detained prisoners whom the Communists will exchange. Prisoners in the peace and reform camps will not be exchanged.
5. Officials of North Korean prisoner of war camps sent reports on individual prisoners to the War Prisoner Administrative Office. Cooperative prisoners were being transferred to peace camps. ROK army officers were being shot; ROK army soldiers were being reindoctrinated and assimilated into the North Korean army.

Kangdong Camp

6. In May the largest North Korean prisoner of war camp, detaining twelve hundred prisoners, was near T'ai Ling (1132/1545) mountain, six miles southeast of the Kangdong (126-05, 39-09) (BU-4837) railroad station.¹ The compound, divided with barbed wire and mud embankments into four partitions for American, English, and Turkish prisoners and prisoners of other nationalities, held 840 American, 100 English, 60 Turkish, and 200 hundred French, Dutch, and Canadian troops. Most of the United States prisoners were members of the 1 Cavalry Division and the 24 Infantry Division. General William Dean was moved from Harbin and Mukden to this camp in 1951.
7. The Kangdong camp, organized into study, management, sanitation, and finance sections, compelled the prisoners to study for three hours, to labor for four hours, and to discuss political problems for two hours.
- F-3 8. On 1 May nine thousand (sic) ROK army prisoners and fifty United Nations prisoners were in caves at the Kangdong camp, extending from approximately BU-492363 to BU-494368 in a valley at Adal-ni, Kangdong-myŏn (126-05, 39-09) (BU-4837).² Of the ROK army prisoners 10 percent were officers, 50 percent non-commissioned officers, and 40 percent privates. Of the United Nations prisoners 10 percent were Negroes. The prisoners, who received 600 grams of cereal and salt each day, were not required to work and spent only two hours each day out of the caves. An average of two prisoners were dying daily from malnutrition and eruptive typhus. The majority of prisoners at this camp were extremely anti-Communist in thinking. Three North Korean army guards, armed with PPSH's and rifles, were at the entrance of each cave.

Camp Number 106, Mirim

- F-3 9. On 1 May approximately sixteen hundred ROK army prisoners of war, including one hundred officers and five hundred non-commissioned officers, were at the North Korean prisoner of war camp number 106 at approximately YD-472214, 1.6 kilometers southwest of the Mirim railroad station (125-51, 39-01) (YD-4722). Prisoners held here, having been pressed through five ideological screenings, were believed to be potential converts to Communism. The prisoners believed that they were to be assimilated into the North Korean army. Members of political and security detachments maintained strict surveillance of the prisoners. The surveillance often was carried out by members of these bureaus who entered the camps disguised as prisoners.
- F-3 10. Each prisoner received 500 grams monthly, 1 kilogram of grain and 45 grams of soy bean oil, vegetables, salt, and soy bean paste daily. The prisoners were wearing North Korean army uniforms. The prisoners were constructing air raid shelters near the Mirim-ni airfield ten hours each day. Two hours of indoctrination lectures were also held daily. The prisoners had been organized into squads of ten men. Each of the camp's four battalions had three platoons and each platoon, four squads. A guard platoon, armed with M-1's, carbines, and PPSH's, was at the camp.

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(b)(3) CIAAct

-3-

Suan

- F-3 11. On 5 May 200 ROK army prisoners and 110 prisoners from other United Nations armies including 80 Negroes, were at the North Korean prisoner of war camp at the site of the former Suan mine (126-23, 38-47) (BT-7396), ten kilometers north of Suan (126-22, 38-42) (BT-7186).³ Lieutenant Colonel KIM Kyu-hwan (6855/1145/3562) commanded the camp. Although other United Nations prisoners were not required to work, the ROK army prisoners constructed shelters and trenches throughout the entire day. The prisoners received only rice balls for food. Several of the other United Nations prisoners had obtained wheat paste from villagers in exchange for watches and other personal possessions. Thereafter the villagers were prohibited from entering the camp area. No sanitary facilities were offered to the prisoners. Approximately fifteen prisoners, including both ROK and United Nations personnel, were too ill to stand.

Sariwon

- F-3 12. In late April approximately eight hundred United Nations prisoners were in a series of underground shelters at approximately YC-436673 in a valley between two hills four kilometers northeast of the Sariwon railroad station (125-46, 38-30) (YC-4064). On each side of the valley at the base of the two hills were 25 shelters. One shelter in every five accommodated the camp guards. Eight hundred Chinese Communist soldiers, armed with PPSH's and rifles, guarded the area. Dummy guards were also used at night. The majority of the guards were billeted in a nearby village of fifteen homes. The guard billets were easily visible from the air. Each prisoner received pork soup and 600 grams of cereal three times daily and a package of cigarettes each day. The prisoners were required to work for one hour and attend indoctrination meetings for two hours daily.

Mukden

13. On 6 January 1952 four hundred United States prisoners, including three hundred Negroes, were being detained in two buildings at Hsiao Nan Kuan Chieh, at the southeast corner of the intersection, in Mukden. One building, used as the police headquarters in Hsiao Nan Kuan during the Japanese occupation, was a two-story concrete structure, 30 meters long and 20 meters wide. The other building, one story high and constructed of gray brick, was behind the two-story building. Both buildings had tile roofs. All prisoners held here, with the exception of three second lieutenants, were enlisted personnel. The prisoners, dressed in Chinese Communist army uniforms, with a red arm band on the left arm, were not required to work. Two hours of indoctrination were conducted daily by staff members of the Northeast Army Command. Prisoners were permitted to play basketball in the courtyard. The attempt of three white prisoners to escape caused the withdrawal of permission for white prisoners to walk alone through streets in the vicinity of the camp. Two Chinese Communist soldiers guarded groups of white prisoners when such groups left the buildings. Negroes, however, could move outside the compound area freely and individually. Rice, noodles, and one vegetable were served daily to the prisoners in groups of 10 to 15 men. One platoon of Chinese Communist soldiers guarded the compound.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

1. Comment. In late February 1952 two thousand prisoners, slightly inclined toward Communism, were being detained at the base of a mountain three kilometers west of Kangdong, according to [redacted] and re(b)(1)iced reports.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

2. Comment. This is presumably information on the same camp as that reported in paragraphs 6-7 above.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

3. Comment. In March approximately 4,300 ROK prisoners, chiefly officers, were at the Suan camp, [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

(b)(3) CIAAct

COUNTRY USSR
SUBJECT US Prisoners of War in USSR



(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

DATE DISTR. 27 Apr 1954

NO. OF PAGES 3

NO. OF ENCLS.

SUPP. TO REPORT NO.


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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

1.



(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Information regarding the presence of US prisoners (captured during the Korean War) on the territory of Asiatic USSR. Mostly they were in Komsomolsk (Amur River), Magadan (Bay of Nogaev, Sea of Okhotsk), Chita, Irkutsk, Molotov, Gubalka (northwest of Molotov), Komi Permiak (Siberia), Kudymkar (northwest of Molotov), Chernoz (on the Kama River, north of Molotov. There is nothing to indicate that any of them have ever been returned.).

2.

Over a year ago, the Soviet authorities established camps for prisoners (not necessarily US) taken in Korea by the Sino-North Korean forces. These camps were located at:

- Komsomolsk, on the River Amur
- Magadan, on the bay of Nogaev, Sea of Okhotsk
- Chita
- Irkutsk

Prisoners from both the US and the various cooperating European armies were alike known as Voenno-plennnye Amerikantsi.



(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) CIAAct

-2-

3. In Feb 1952, three hundred US prisoners of war were transported by rail from Chita to Molotov (in Soviet Russia, east of the Ural Mountains). At Chita, in Eastern Siberia, the prisoners were sorted out.
4. The prisoners were dressed in cotton mattress-cover cloth of the Soviet type. They wore no insignia. They traveled on a train of nine cars under strict MVD (Ministry Internal Affairs) guard. They made a long halt at the prison of the city of Gubakha and were not sent on to the prison at Molotov until 5 Apr 52. In Mar 1952 there were reports of other loads of prisoners being transported. These men spoke English among themselves. They were shipped, in groups of about fifty, every fifteen days, though it is not known how long this continued.
5. About this same time, [redacted] a group of prisoners were being sent to Komi Permiak, in the northwestern part of Siberia. Their eventual destinations were Molotov, Gubakha (northwest of Molotov), Kudymkar' also northwest of Molotov), and Chermoz (on the Kama River, north of Molotov). (b)(3) NatSecAct
6. Still another report, dated April 1952, reported the presence of US prisoners. These were probably US officers. At Molotov this group of prisoners of war was designated, "American staff group." They were placed in an MVD building and completely isolated from the rest of the world.
7. The camps of Gubakha, Kudymkar' and Chermoz were also isolated and were under control of the MVD. The political control was in charge of a man named Edovin, of the Communist Party organization at Komi-Permiak. The three camps were under direction of a well-known Soviet officer, under the name of Kalypin, rank unknown. (b)(3) NatSecAct
8. In another camp, near the railroad station of Gubakha, called Zapretshdelanki, there were 150 US prisoners. ([redacted] has probably mixed up an "Entrance Forbidden" sign with the name of the camp. [redacted] Russian is mixed, but certainly "zapreshchat" means "to forbid.") (b)(3) NatSecAct
9. These prisoners were kept under constant surveillance by Soviet agents, who knew English perfectly. The Soviet authorities tried their best to build up a list of US prisoners who were not completely hostile to Soviet ideology or who were at least not inveterate foes of it. The US prisoners talked a good deal. In this way, the Soviet agents were able to pick out those who might be willing to ameliorate their situation by taking an interest in courses of political instruction.
10. Every two or three days, an MVD officer called away one or two prisoners (the Soviet first choices for such instruction). These prisoners never came back to the camp.
11. Some prisoners were sent to the forced labor camps and used in the construction of a railway line. This camp was called Gaysk. These prisoners wore padded tunics of the Russian style and pantaloons. They wore a civilian headdress called "sibirski". Conditions were primitive. Sickness and death rates were high.

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(b)(3) CIAAct

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
12. According to information covering the period Aug to Dec 1952, three hundred US prisoners were transported to the camps mentioned above. The total number of prisoners brought in the same direction reached six thousand.

13. According to information received  the following facts may be regarded as established:

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- a. Prisoners were taken by rail from the station of Poset (on the Chinese-Soviet boundary) over the line of the East Siberian Railway. They were taken to the eastern Urals.
- b. Prisoners were also taken by boat from the ports of Bulgha, Okhotsk, and Magadan. They then went by rail or truck to Vaikarem ^[sic] (on the Sea of Chukost) to Ust Maisk (on the Aldan River) and to Yakutsk (on the Lena River.)
- c. Transportation of prisoners to Vaikarem, or Vakairen, ^[sic] was followed by their distribution to a network of camps in the region of Nizhni Kolymsk, on the East Siberian Sea. These camps were run by the MVD, under the command of an officer of unknown rank, named Sorochuk (probably an MVD major) and a civilian official named Chimbo.
- d. At the highest possible estimate, there were no more than 12,000 of these prisoners. By Apr 1952, three hundred were dead and 400 had been taken to barracks, gravely ill.

- end -



(b)(3) NatSecAct

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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~~SECRET/CONTROL - US OFFICIALS ONLY~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

018521

COUNTRY	USSR (Tyumen Oblast)	REPORT	[REDACTED]
SUBJECT	Soviet Concentration Camps in the Vorkuta Area	DATE DISTR.	23 April 1954
DATE OF INFO.	[REDACTED]	NO. OF PAGES	3 (b)(3) CIAAct
PLACE ACQUIRED	[REDACTED]	REFERENCE NO.	RD
	(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct	REFERENCES	

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[REDACTED]

1. The commander of the concentration camp complex in the Vorkuta (N 66-22, E 70-08) area is an MVD officer, Major General Derevyankin. The political officer at Camp No. 14 is Senior Lieutenant Kech. The following are among the camp personnel at Camp No. 2:

- Major Malikov, Camp Commander
- Major Dikhtyaryov, Assistant Camp Commander
- Captain Makhalov, Supply Officer
- Captain Pokhomov, MVD Representative (Upolnomochenny MVD)
- Senior Lieutenant Prokhorov, MVD Representative
- Senior Lieutenant Kalikin, Administrative Officer
- Sergeant Major Mishinko, Assistant to the MVD Representatives
- Sergeant Major Kirilova (female), Head of the Medical Unit.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

2. [REDACTED]
Apparently, single guard units were responsible for guarding more than one camp, since many camps were located within a few kilometers of each other.

3. The city of Vorkuta has a population of approximately 60,000 people. Vorkuta has numerous new cultural buildings. The city is ringed with concentration camps, the prisoners being employed principally in coal mines. There are, however, also other enterprises such as brickyards, sawmills, and a cement factory, which also employ prisoners of the area. The camp numbers [REDACTED] ranged from 1 to 60. [REDACTED] Camp Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 14, 29, 30, 55, and 60; [REDACTED] possibly some of these camps are in an area other (b)(1) the Vorkuta area. (See sketch of the Vorkuta camp area on page 3.) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

4. Camp No. 2 is located approximately 20 kilometers north of Vorkuta on a single-track railroad line. The camp is for political prisoners only. In December 1953 there were 2,700 prisoners at this camp. This camp operated one mine shaft, No. 7. The prisoners worked in the mine 12 hours a day, although the official work-day was nine hours. Crude mining methods were employed.

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(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1)
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- 2 -

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

5. The following nationalities were represented among the prisoners at Camp No. 2: Western Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Russians, Germans (including Volga Germans), Moldavians, Chechens, Georgians, Armenians, [redacted] Komi, [redacted] Hungarians, Poles, Japanese, and Chinese. Of the Germans, 120 were from Germany as opposed to the Volga Germans. Ten of the 120 Germans were repatriated [redacted]. There were approximately 100 Russians in the camp. The Western Ukrainians and the Lithuanians were by far the largest two national groups at this camp. There were no Koreans at this camp.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

6. There were among the prisoners at Camp No. 2 many who had been sentenced for collaboration with or service in the German Army during World War II. There were, however, no Vlassovites at this camp. Except for the Western Ukrainians, who were called Zapadniki (Westerners) in camp, the various Soviet nationalities got along well together. There was, however, some discrimination against the Germans by the Soviet nationalities, particularly from former collaborators who claimed that the Germans had let them down. The Western Ukrainians were clannish and nasty to all other nationalities. There were a great number of informers among the Western Ukrainians.
7. From the beginning of 1952, the prisoners began to receive pay for their work and their rations were improved. Until August 1953, they received 100 rubles per month in cash and another 100 rubles were credited to their account. This money could be spent in the camp canteen. After August 1953, as the result of a strike (covered below) the prisoners' pay was raised to 150 rubles per month in cash and an equal amount was credited to their account.
8. The daily food ration at this camp for the prisoners was as follows:

200 grams of oat meal,
650 grams of soup,
23 grams of meat,
27 grams of sugar,
800 grams of bread,
50 grams of white rolls, and
20 to 25 grams of fat.

The above ration was known as the "northern ration" (severnnyy payok) and was much larger than the rations in concentration camps farther to the south. It was also more substantial than the average daily food consumed on many kolkhozy. Persons who refused to work had their daily ration reduced to 350 grams of bread and soup.

9. Motion pictures were occasionally shown to the prisoners. The frequency with which movies were shown depended upon the prisoners' achievement of production norms. There were loudspeakers in all barracks buildings. Newspapers and books were also available to the prisoners.
10. The guard personnel wore red shoulder boards with blue piping. Some troops with dark blue shoulder boards occasionally appeared for special checks. The interior guard consisted of middle-aged guards who were friendly to the prisoners. The exterior guard personnel were much younger and unpleasant.
11. There were 5,000 prisoners at Camp No. 14. One of the prisoners was an old Trotskyite who had been a prisoner since 1932. This camp contained a power plant. All particulars on this camp such as food rations, pay, attitude of Western Ukrainians, recreational facilities, etc., are similar to those at Camp No. 2.
12. There was no sign of organized anti-Soviet activity in the prison camp. On the basis of observations made at Camp No. 2 it is clear that prisoners were afraid to discuss politics because of the existence of informers among the prisoners. There were probably groups of friends among the prisoners who trusted each other and perhaps discussed political subjects. There were two young Russian prisoners in Camp No. 2 who had been sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment for distributing anti-Soviet leaflets in Moscow. It is not known whether these men belonged to any organization and what sort of leaflets they had distributed.

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(b)(3) CIAAct

13. Stalin's death did not bring about any improvements in the prison camps, judging from observations in Camp No. 2. Actually, the guards became worse. Improvements had been introduced a year earlier. Judging from extremely limited political conversations, nothing good was expected from Malenkov by the prisoners. The post-Stalin amnesty affected prisoners with five-year terms only, but it did include political prisoners in this category. In general, prisoners who were released had to remain in the Vorkuta area, but some released prisoners with families were sent to free exile settlements in Siberia and Central Asia. The prisoners learned of the 17 June riots in East Germany through Soviet newspapers and loudspeakers in July. Some of the prisoners expected immediate war and thought that arms would be dropped to them by the Americans.

14. As a result of Beriya's arrest a general strike by the prisoners in the Vorkuta area took place, lasting from 22 July to 1 August 1953. Camps No. 2, 3, 14, 29, 30, and possibly others were involved in the strike. The strikers insisted that, since Beriya had been denounced as a traitor and a foreign agent, they were being held illegally, as they had been arrested by Beriya. Soviet citizens demanded immediate release or transfer to free exile areas. Foreigners demanded repatriation or transfer to PW camps. Major General Derevyankin as well as another high MVD official came to Camp No. 2 and probably other camps to talk to the prisoners. The result of the strike was a cutting down of the work-day to nine hours, the removal of numbers from uniforms, higher pay (see paragraph 7), and the removal of certain restrictions. In some camps there was violence on the part of the guards who tried to force the prisoners to go back to work, but this was not the case at Camp No. 2. The strike was viewed as a great success for the prisoners.


15. [Redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

16. [Redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

Germans were released before the completion of their sentences. They were repatriated to Germany by train traveling on a circuitous route. Leaving Vorkuta, the train proceeded through Enta, Ukhta (N 63-34, E 53-42), Kotlas (N 61-16, E 46-35), Voroshilovgrad (N 48-34, E 39-20), and then west to Brest-Litovsk (N 52-07, E 23-42). In the early part of the journey they traveled on a separate prison train; later, through Brest-Litovsk and Poland, their car was hitched on to regular passenger trains.

Diagram of Camp Area [Redacted]

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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Received from CIA through Liaison Channels
Date 3-30-54

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(b)(3) CIAAct

COUNTRY	USSR (Far East)	REPORT	[Redacted]
SUBJECT	Exploitation of Prisoners-of-War of the Soviets	DATE DISTR.	24 March 1954 (b)(3) CIAAct
DATE OF INFO.	[Redacted]	NO. OF PAGES	1
PLACE ACQUIRED	[Redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD [Redacted]
		REFERENCES	[Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

1. [Redacted] the Soviet Intelligence Service is exploiting United Nations, particularly US, PWs in China and North Korea. [Redacted] some PWs listed as missing were in fact turned over to the Soviets by the Chinese and North Koreans. These PWs will be screened by the Soviets, and those eventually selected will be trained to be illegal residents either in [Redacted] (b)(1) or in other countries where they can live as Americans. (b)(3) CIAAct
2. Some selected PW personnel will also be used in propaganda work, especially as radio announcers because there is a shortage of this type of personnel.
3. Those PWs who are found to be unsuitable will never be released because they will have learned too much about Soviet PW handling techniques. Use will also be made of the identities and biographies of dead PWs in preparing legends of new Soviet agents.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

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(b)(3) CIAAct

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EX. - 106

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*Person
4-16-54*

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EXPLANATORY NOTE

Date of Info.—The date or dates on which, or between which, the events described in the report occurred or the conditions described existed.

Place Acquired.—The place where the information was first acquired by a controlled individual. A date following in parentheses indicates when the information was acquired.

Source Description.—A description of the individual from whom, and, when pertinent, of any other individual through whom the information was received.

Source Evaluation.—An indication of the reliability of a source, expressed either verbally or by means of a letter inserted parenthetically in the source description. Reliability includes competence, objectivity, honesty, and other factors likely to affect the accuracy of the source's reports. The source evaluation is definitive in the sense that it reflects everything known about the source, including his previous record of reporting. If the report was received from one source through another, each is evaluated separately. The key follows:

- A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable.
- E: Not reliable (applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F: Reliability cannot be judged (applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

Appraisal of Content.—A tentative opinion by the issuing office as to the probable truth of the report, expressed either verbally or by means of a number from 1 through 6. It is based on immediately available information which may or may not be complete, and does not purport to constitute final evaluation. The key follows:

- 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true.
- 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged. Documentary: Based on an original document which has been seen by a staff member of the issuing office.

The appraisal of content is independent of the source evaluation. A "B" source may submit a "4" report; and "E" source may submit a "1" report. Reliable sources tend to produce accurate reports, and conversely a series of accurate reports tends to establish the reliability of the source, but there is no necessary correlation in any particular instance.

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[REDACTED]

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

23 October 2020

John Clarke, Esq.
1629 K Street, NW
Suite 300
Washington, DC, 20006

Reference: *Lois Moore, et al v. CIA*, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No: 1:20-cv-01027; F-2020-00473

Dear Mr. Clarke:

This is an interim response to your 25 November 2019 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request submitted by your client, Lois Moore, for the following:

1. **From the period of March 16, 1954, through 1961, all records of the CIA's efforts in undertaking "clandestine and covert action to locate, identify, and recover those U.S. Prisoners of War still in Communist custody"**
2. **An unredacted copy of this report [January 5, 1952, *CIA Information Reports*] together with all intelligence material upon which it was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.**
3. **Please produce the [following] referenced [in July 15, 1952, *CIA Cross Reference Sheet*]:**
 - a. **July 15, 1952 "Basic Communication"**
 - b. **June 24, 1953 "Basic Document"**
 - c. **Information described as "etcetera"**
 - d. **POW Information in, or otherwise "Router to, C.I. File"**
 - e. **POW information related to or bearing the "Cross Reference Number 040"**
 - f. **POW Information related to or bearing the "Classification Number 383.6 Korea."**
4. **All records regarding the June 1, 1951 shoot down and capture over North Korea of the American F-51 piloted by U.S. Air Force Captain Harry Cecil Moore, born February 11, 1924, in Elm Grove, West Virginia, service number AO 711850.**
5. **All records upon which the following statement from February 27, 1952 memo from Chief of Naval Personnel to Commanding General, Far East Air Force was**

000017

based: “It is now believed that there is a possibility that Captain Moore survived and is now a Prisoner of War.”

6. All records regarding Captain Moore’s incarceration and transportation from North Korea to the Soviet Union, his locations in the Soviet Union, and all evidence that he “may have been interrogated by Soviet officials.
7. An unredacted copy of July 17, 1952, three page *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
8. An unredacted copy of December 31, 1953, *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
9. An unredacted copy of March 24, 1954, *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
10. An unredacted copy of April 23, 1954, *CIA Information Report*.
11. An unredacted copy of April 27, 1954, *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
12. An unredacted copy of December 8, 1954, *CIA Information Report*.
13. Any and all information relating to this Report [January 23, 1992 cable from Embassy Helsinki to Secretary of State]
14. An unredacted copy of March 9, 1988, CIA Memorandum to “US Army Chief, Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action,” together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
15. All records relating to any of the POW/MIA’s names in the attached list.
16. Any and all records relating that any POW/MIAs may have been held in the prisons identified in the attached list of Russian prison camps.
17. For the period beginning June of 1951, and continuing to the present time, please produce all POW records provided to, or receive from, any office of any component of the Department of Defense, including but not limited to:
 - a. CCRAK
 - b. Air Force 6004 Air Intelligence Service Squadron during the tenure of “Project American.”
 - c. Missing in Action Office, including those provided in response to the attached February 12, 1997 letter from U.S. House of Representative James Talent seeking “Intelligence pertaining to American prisoners who were taken to China and the Soviet Union during the war” as well as:
 - i. The 389 American service members who into the 1980’s were listed as unaccounted prisoners of war by the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) ii. All U.S. Air Force F-86 pilots who remain unrepatriated.
 - d. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, of AFOSI
 - e. Naval Criminal Investigative Service, or NCIS
 - f. Army Criminal Investigation Command, CID

- g. **U.S. Army Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities Far East, or CCRAFE.**
18. **All POW records prepared by any officer, agent, or employee of the CIA, prepared for the Office of the President including the President's Daily Brief, or PDB, that include information on the possibility of POW's being transferred to the Soviet Union or China.**
 19. **All records reflecting communications with Members of Congress, or Congressional Oversight committees concerning the capture of American airmen during the Korean conflict who may have been transported to the Soviet Union or China and their presumed fate.**
 20. **All records concerning POW's and KGB defector Yuri (or Yury) Rastvorov, who informed the United States Government that American military personnel were taken to the Soviet Union during the Korean Conflict. This request includes an unredacted version of the attached page with the heading, "Terminology".**
 21. **All intelligence material (including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports) concerning statements made by former Czech General Jan Sejna and other former Czech Officials concerning former US POWs held, interrogated and experiment on by Czech and Soviet advisors, and thereafter transferred to China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and the Soviet Union.**

We are processing your request in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.

We have identified two (2) documents that may be released in segregable form with redactions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6). Exemption (b)(3) pertains to Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 3507, noted as exemption "(b)(3)CIAAct" on the enclosed documents, and/or Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C § 3024(i)(1), noted as exemption "(b)(3)NatSecAct" on the enclosed documents. The documents are on the enclosed CD.

A final response will be provided to you on a later date.

Sincerely,



Mark Lilly
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

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Approved for Release: 2020/10/22 C00437028
~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~

(b)(3)
CIAAct

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

9 March 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Joseph A. Schlatter, US Army
Chief, Special Office for Prisoners of War
and Missing in Action

SUBJECT: Alleged Sightings of American POWs in
North Korea from 1975 to 1982 ~~(S-NF)~~

REFERENCE: Memo for the DDI fm Colonel Schlatter,
dtd 19 Feb 88, Same Subject

1. In response to your request, [redacted]

(b)(3)
CIAAct

[redacted] three separate reports of
such sightings, which are attached:

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

o The first report, dated April 1980, indicates that a [redacted] NatSecAct
sighted two Americans in August 1980

[redacted] on the outskirts of P'yongyang.

(b)(3) CIAAct

[redacted] about 10 military pilots
captured in North Vietnam were brought to North Korea.

(b)(3)

o The second report, also dated in ^{MAY} April 1980, apparently NatSecAct
describes the same incident [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(b)(3) CIAAct

o In the third report, dated March 1988, [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted] indicated sight
as many as 11 Caucasians, possibly American prisoners from NatSecAct
Korean war, in the fall of 1979 on a collective farm north of
P'yongyang. ~~(S-NF)~~

(b)(3) CIAAct

[redacted] (b)(3)
CIAAct

Approved for Release: 2020/10/22 C00437028

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2. [Redacted] (b)(1)
[Redacted] (b)(3)
[Redacted] NatSecAct

~~(S NF)~~

[Redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Office of East Asian Analysis

Attachments:
As stated

SUBJECT: Alleged Sightings of American POWs in North
Korea from 1975 to 1982 ~~(S NF)~~

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

C/OEA, [redacted] (9 Mar 88)

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[redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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(b)(3) CIAAct

COUNTRY	USSR [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct	REPORT NO.	[redacted]
SUBJECT	American Prisoners-of-War Held in the USSR	DATE DISTR.	31 December 1953
DATE OF INFO.	[redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct	NO. OF PAGES	1 (b)(3) CIAAct
PLACE ACQUIRED	[redacted]	REFERENCE NO.	RD [redacted]

BY CABLE

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE:

[redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

- a. As of 1951 the USSR had an interrogation center for United States POWs in the Chang-pai Shan area on the upper Yalu River. Most of the inmates were U. S. airmen, and the interrogation was done by Soviet commissars.
- b. When the North Korean forces were pushed north in Korea, the center reportedly was moved to An-t'u (N 42-34, E 128-22). [redacted] (b)(1)
[redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct the internees passed through Mutanchiang. [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct E 129-37), were brought down the Sungari River by boat, and after interrogation were taken to the USSR.
- c. Natives of the area said they had seen a group of about seven persons, reportedly "US Army spies", including US Nisei soldiers, brought to the An-t'u center in the spring of 1952.

~~SECRET/CONTROL--US OFFICIALS ONLY~~

RETURN TO THE BUREAU
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32-118125

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

8 January 2021

John Clarke, Esq.
1629 K Street, NW
Suite 300
Washington, DC, 20008

Reference: *Lois Moore, et al v. CIA*, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No: 1:20-cv-01027; F-2020-00473

Dear Mr. Clarke:

This is an interim response to your 25 November 2019 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request submitted by your client, Lois Moore, for the following:

1. From the period of March 16, 1954, through 1961, all records of the CIA's efforts in undertaking "clandestine and covert action to locate, identify, and recover those U.S. Prisoners of War still in Communist custody"
2. An unredacted copy of this report [January 5, 1952, *CIA Information Reports*] together with all intelligence material upon which it was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
3. Please produce the [following] referenced [in July 15, 1952, *CIA Cross Reference Sheet*]:
 - a. July 15, 1952 "Basic Communication"
 - b. June 24, 1953 "Basic Document"
 - c. Information described as "etcetera"
 - d. POW Information in, or otherwise "Router to, C.I. File"
 - e. POW information related to or bearing the "Cross Reference Number 040"
 - f. POW Information related to or bearing the "Classification Number 383.6 Korea."
4. All records regarding the June 1, 1951 shoot down and capture over North Korea of the American F-51 piloted by U.S. Air Force Captain Harry Cecil Moore, born February 11, 1924, in Elm Grove, West Virginia, service number AO 711850.
5. All records upon which the following statement from February 27, 1952 memo from Chief of Naval Personnel to Commanding General, Far East Air Force was

000024

based: "It is now believed that there is a possibility that Captain Moore survived and is now a Prisoner of War."

6. All records regarding Captain Moore's incarceration and transportation from North Korea to the Soviet Union, his locations in the Soviet Union, and all evidence that he "may have been interrogated by Soviet officials.
7. An unredacted copy of July 17, 1952, three page *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
8. An unredacted copy of December 31, 1953, *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
9. An unredacted copy of March 24, 1954, *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
10. An unredacted copy of April 23, 1954, *CIA Information Report*.
11. An unredacted copy of April 27, 1954, *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
12. An unredacted copy of December 8, 1954, *CIA Information Report*.
13. Any and all information relating to this Report [January 23, 1992 cable from Embassy Helsinki to Secretary of State]
14. An unredacted copy of March 9, 1988, CIA Memorandum to "US Army Chief, Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action," together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
15. All records relating to any of the POW/MIA's names in the attached list.
16. Any and all records relating that any POW/MIAs may have been held in the prisons identified in the attached list of Russian prison camps.
17. For the period beginning June of 1951, and continuing to the present time, please produce all POW records provided to, or receive from, any office of any component of the Department of Defense, including but not limited to:
 - a. CCRAK
 - b. Air Force 6004 Air Intelligence Service Squadron during the tenure of "Project American."
 - c. Missing in Action Office, including those provided in response to the attached February 12, 1997 letter from U.S. House of Representative James Talent seeking "Intelligence pertaining to American prisoners who were taken to China and the Soviet Union during the war" as well as:
 - i. The 389 American service members who into the 1980's were listed as unaccounted prisoners of war by the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) ii. All U.S. Air Force F-86 pilots who remain unrepatriated.
 - d. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, of AFOSI
 - e. Naval Criminal Investigative Service, or NCIS
 - f. Army Criminal Investigation Command, CID

g. U.S. Army Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities Far East, or CCRAFE.

- 18. All POW records prepared by any officer, agent, or employee of the CIA, prepared for the Office of the President including the President's Daily Brief, or PDB, that include information on the possibility of POW's being transferred to the Soviet Union or China.**
- 19. All records reflecting communications with Members of Congress, or Congressional Oversight committees concerning the capture of American airmen during the Korean conflict who may have been transported to the Soviet Union or China and their presumed fate.**
- 20. All records concerning POW's and KGB defector Yuri (or Yury) Rastvorov, who informed the United States Government that American military personnel were taken to the Soviet Union during the Korean Conflict. This request includes an unredacted version of the attached page with the heading, "Terminology".**
- 21. All intelligence material (including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports) concerning statements made by former Czech General Jan Sejna and other former Czech Officials concerning former US POWs held, interrogated and experiment on by Czech and Soviet advisors, and thereafter transferred to China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and the Soviet Union.**

We are processing your request in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.

We have identified three (3) documents that are responsive to your request. One (1) document is being released in full. One (1) document may be released in segregable form with redactions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). Exemption (b)(3) pertains to Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 3507, noted as exemption "(b)(3)CIAAct" on the enclosed documents, and/or Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C § 3024(i)(1), noted as exemption "(b)(3)NatSecAct" on the enclosed documents. One (1) document must be withheld in full based on FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) (under the National Security Act of 1947). The releaseable documents are on the enclosed CD.

A final response will be provided to you on a later date.

Sincerely,



Mark Lilly
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

Approved for Release: 2021/01/07 C02687201

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

CLASSIFICATION CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY
SECURITY INFORMATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT
CD NO.

COUNTRY China

DATE DISTR. 5 Jan 1952

SUBJECT Preparations for Exchange of United Nations Prisoners in Central and South China.

NO. OF PAGES 1

PLACE ACQUIRED (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

REFERENCE COPY

NO. OF ENCLS. LISTED BELOW

DATE OF INFO.

NOT CIRCULATE

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, OF THE U. S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

- Chinese Communist authorities ordered all United Nations prisoners of war in Central and South China sent to Hankow prior to 23 December 1951 for subsequent transfer to the Northeast to await exchange.
- On 13 November, 105 Republic of Korea prisoners of war were transferred to the Northeast via the Hankow-Canton railway. On 18 December, 13 American and 8 British prisoners of war who were formerly in a building at 52 Fu Hsing Road, Shameen were transferred by rail to Hankow. The Americans and British were escorted to Hankow by a company of Public Security troops under the command of LI Kuo-liang (李國良).

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) 1. Comment. American prisoners of war allegedly at 52 Fu Hsing Road, Shameen, Canton. (b)(3) NatSecAct

referred to American prisoners of war who were being kept in the former US consulate on Shameen. Another report referring to US prisoners in the Canton area stated that US prisoners were performing hard labor on airfields in the Canton area. from yet another source, as of early November 1951 there were no prisoners of war on Shameen.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Document No. 003

No Change in Class.

Decision

Class. Char. TS S (b)

Auth. Hq. TC-2

Date: 1952-01-20 By: (b)(3) CIAAct

CLASSIFICATION CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY (b)(1)

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ARMY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	AIR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FBI	

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

BY CARIE (b)(3) CIAAct

Approved for Release: 2021/01/07 C00199731

5

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAIN SUBJECT:
Location of Certain Soviet Transit
Camps for POW from Korea

CLASSIFICATION NUMBER: 383.6 Korea

To:

Date of Communication: 15 July 52 f/w

From: CIA

Date of Basic Document: 24 June 53

BRIEF SUMMARY:

In December it was known that transit camps for POW captured by the Communists in Korea had been established, etc. 3plc

Classifier: 488

Routed to: C.I. File

Typist: 488

Date of Classifying: 17 Aug 59

CROSS REFERENCE NUMBERS:

~~Confidential Intelligence Agency~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OCS FORM 273-3 Superseder ID Form 2-5 which may be used.
1 SEP 50 * U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1951-075614

(4)

NND 911509 - 1576

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

30 April 2021

John Clarke, Esq.
1629 K Street, NW
Suite 300
Washington, DC, 20008

Reference: *Lois Moore, et al v. CIA*, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No: 1:20-cv-01027; F-2020-00473

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based: “It is now believed that there is a possibility that Captain Moore survived and is now a Prisoner of War.”

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 - d. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, of AFOSI
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We are processing your request in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.

We have identified eight (8) documents that are responsive to your request. Three (3) documents are being released in full. Four (4) documents may be released in segregable form with redactions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(5) and (b)(6). Exemption (b)(3) pertains to Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 3507, noted as exemption "(b)(3)CIAAct" on the enclosed documents, and/or Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C § 3024(i)(1), noted as exemption "(b)(3)NatSecAct" on the enclosed documents. One (1) document must be withheld in full based on FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) (under the National Security Act of 1947). The releaseable documents are on the enclosed CD.

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Mark Lilly
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

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UNITED STATES US

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FBIS Concatenated Daily Reports, 1992

Document 10 of 13

Page 1

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED Status: [STAT]
 Report Number: FBIS-SOV-92-028 UDC Number:

Headline: Documents Reveal U.S. POWs Kept in GULAG

Source Line: 92UM0512A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Feb 92 Morning
 Edition p 3

Subslug: [Article by Valeriy Rudnev in the 'IZVESTIYA
 Investigations'' series: 'Where Are Robert Reynolds and
 His Friends? On 8 April 1950, American Pilots Were Downed
 Over the Baltics. Their Fate From Then on Is Unknown.'']

FULL TEXT OF ARTICLE:

1. [Article by Valeriy Rudnev in the 'IZVESTIYA Investigations'' series: 'Where Are Robert Reynolds and His Friends? On 8 April 1950, American Pilots Were Downed Over the Baltics. Their Fate From Then on Is Unknown.'']
2. [Text] Following the fate of our countrymen previously concealed in the secret archives of the Soviet state, the curtain is now beginning to be lifted over the similar fate of foreigners. The truth about the Poles shot in Katyn is already known. Documents on hard labor in the Soviet Union for Japanese prisoners of war have been released. Access has been opened to the files of Italians who were taken prisoner during the Great Patriotic War. The American theme also belongs in this sphere. Much is written about it at present, mainly in conjunction with the secret operations of Soviet secret services involving the internment of American servicemen. IZVESTIYA is embarking on its own investigation of the problem.
3. Lieutenant Robert Reynolds, a U.S. Navy pilot, was downed over the Baltic Sea on 8 April 1950 while on a reconnaissance mission. At any rate, this is what his widow, Jane Reynolds-Howard, maintains in her letter to the head of Soviet State Security, dated 4 November 1991. However, to this day neither she nor the families of other members of the crew-Frank Beckman, Joseph Barass, Tommy Burgess, Joe Denens, John Fett, William Homer, Edward Purcell, Howard Seasheff, and Jack Thomas [names as transliterated]-have received any definite information on their lot from either the American or the Soviet government.
4. Six months after the plane of Robert Reynolds was downed, his two girls, Christine and Caroline, were born. In another six months, Reynolds was officially declared dead. However, Jane hoped for the best. Despite things being very hard for her with two babies and without her husband, she started her own investigation, having abandoned hopes for assistance on the part of officials.

Approved for Release
 Date 01 MAR 1994

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Document 10 of 13

Page 2

5. It is known that America is very patriotic. Yuriy Smirnov, chairman of the Russian parliamentary subcommittee for the affairs of prisoners of war, who recently returned from the United States, testified: The unity of what appears to be a mixed and stratified society in its passionate, almost frenzied effort to find its soldiers who failed to return home from foreign lands, and to commemorate them, is striking. However, there are things which America cannot do.

6. At the end of last year, 92 American senators sent a letter to the president of Russia with a request to provide access to the archives of State Security and the GULAG [Main Directorate of Prison Camps] in order to come up with a clear-cut answer to a simple question: Are U.S. citizen prisoners held in Soviet camps or not? American journalists have requested assistance from their Soviet colleagues. Recently, one of the joint investigative reports about MIA's from the Vietnam War was shown in "The Fifth Wheel" on Russian TV. The American collector, Jim Atwood, is prepared to pay \$10,000 to anyone who will obtain documentary evidence concerning at least one fellow American held as a prisoner of war in the Union. If one succeeds in locating a live American prisoner of war the reward will be increased to \$1 million (!). A reward of \$100,000 is also offered for similar information from the American public organization "Accuracy in Media," which published its advertisement in one of the Moscow newspapers. Another public organization, the U.S. National Union of Prisoner of War Families, sent to the KGB a list of 120 names of servicemen, information on whom, as the Union of Families believes, is found in the special archives of the former USSR. The list includes World War II prisoners of war, violators of our airspace downed over our territory, and soldiers and officers missing in action in Laos, Vietnam, Korea, and other countries. The National Union of Families asks that the circumstances of the disappearance of specific individuals, including Robert Reynolds and his comrades, be checked out.

7. FROM A LETTER BY JANE REYNOLDS-HOWARD. "Bob and his comrades were seen in Camp No. 5 in the vicinity of Vorkuta in September 1950. Later, their tracks lead to the area of the Tayshet railroad station in Siberia (Camp No. 20) where an officer from Bob's crew died in one of the hospitals along the Tayshet-Bratsk line. There is information on the sightings of others in the Kolyma camps.

8. Why did we begin our investigation with a specific case? Would it not perhaps be much more important to examine the overall situation—the nature of our presence in Korea, Vietnam, and other hot spots on the planet? Or perhaps look for individuals who, as Russian officials maintain, deserted the U.S. Army in order to seek refuge in

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FBIS Concatenated Daily Reports, 1992

Document 10 of 13

Page 3

the territory of the USSR? Or try to unmask malicious schemes by our counterintelligence, and American counterintelligence as well? Of course, it is tempting for a journalist to work on such issues. However, let us not verify or denounce anybody for now. Let us just try to help a common American, Jane Reynolds-Howard, and her children, Christine and Caroline. Let us look at an episode which, by all signs, was typical of the "cold war" which (let us hope) is already past us. This was a war where no battles were fought openly, where enemy personnel were not taken prisoner or declared prisoners of war. Operations in the course of that war were conducted in secret, and people disappeared without a trace. However, it was not without a trace. The trace led to archives. This was where we began our search for Lieutenant Robert Reynolds and his comrades.

9. The Central State Special Archive. This is where the files of the Main Directorate for the Affairs of Prisoners of War and Internees are. Viktor Bondarev, director of the special archive, allowed IZVESTIYA staff to become familiar with some personal files of Americans classified "Top Secret." Of course, we did not find any genuine state secrets. At present, the materials of the special archive are quite accessible to researchers.

10. There were thin files in official looking covers. Registration file for prisoner of war Herman Sh. Camp No. 62, registration file No. 2744. Year and place of birth- 1923, Los Angeles. Property status of father-a house, 150 hectares of orchards. Date of arrival in camp-10 August 1944. The file was closed because of his death on 26 April 1945. Diagnosis-dystrophy. Buried at a public cemetery in Kiev.

11. Registration file of prisoner of war Charles G. Roy. Place of birth-New York. Taken prisoner in 1945. The file was closed on 12 February 1947 in conjunction with him being sent home.

12. V. Bondarev said: "According to data in the special archive as of today, during the entire Great Patriotic War, 108 American prisoners who fought on the side of Fascist Germany, ended up in our territory. After a short stay in Special Camp No. 188 in Tambov Oblast, 68 of them were freed and sent to their native country. Fourteen of them died, and the places of their burial have been determined. The fate of another 26 is not known for sure at present. At least as of 1947, they were entered in documents as being incarcerated in a camp. Probably, they were also handed over to the American side (in the main, the repatriation of Americans was over by 1950). We are now checking out the documentation based on this version. We are verifying the available lists."

13. [Rudnev] However, there are assertions in the press concerning

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FBIS Concatenated Daily Reports, 1992

Document 10 of 13

Page 4

thousands of American prisoners of war from the period of the Great Patriotic War.

14. [Bondarev] Apparently, this is about the thousands of our allies taken prisoner by the Germans, liberated by us, and sent to America through Odessa.

15. [Rudnev] What about the fate of U.S. citizens who could have ended up in GULAG camps after 1950?

16. [Bondarev] Our archive has materials concerning the prisoners of war of the Great Patriotic War only.

17. [Rudnev] Is this to say that you will not be able to clarify the fate of Robert Reynolds and his comrades who were downed over the Baltic Sea in April 1950?

18. [Bondarev] I cannot help you with this. Look for pertinent information in other archives.

19. We went to the addresses indicated.

20. Main Administration of Corrections. This militia establishment has information on those who are serving time for crimes committed in the territory of our country. Naturally, we approached them. After all, the R. Reynolds episode is somewhat reminiscent of another one, that of F. Powers who was downed in 1960, convicted for espionage, and for a while served time in a Soviet corrective labor facility.

21. The management of GUID [Main Administration of Corrections] knows about American servicemen who are supposedly held in Soviet camps from newspapers. According to the documents of the corrective labor facilities of our country, there are no American servicemen there at present. One of the GUID managers specified: "Not just servicemen, but other American citizens have not been held in our camps since at least 1970. There are Vietnamese, Arabs, Koreans, and citizens of other countries. The only citizen of Israel is serving time based on a court sentence. However, we do not have Americans. However, give us time and we will verify it. After all, we do not have any special secrets. People end up in our camps only on the basis of court sentences. Besides, the only camp for foreigners in our country is in the limelight. Dozens of delegations have already visited it."

22. Ministry of Defense, the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Armed Forces. There is a reason for our interest in the archives of the military establishment: Reynolds could only have been downed by the military; the exact date of this incident was known, and only

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Document 10 of 13

Page 5

details had to be established. However, it was not that easy. We could not even get into the Ministry of Defense: Everything came down to short conversations over the phone. Indeed, there is a problem..., we need to verify this and resolve the issue of declassifying certain documents..., of course, the public is entitled to know the truth..., however, I am not aware of this, you had better call N. So, yet another telephone number appeared in my notebook (by now there are 13). The telephone number of Chief of General Staff V. Samsonov became No. 13. As officers from the Ministry of Defense said, only he could authorize verification of the specific case involving Robert Reynolds. However, so far I have not succeeded in getting through to the general. This is why I will take advantage of this opportunity and write a short note to him: 'Esteemed Viktor Nikolayevich! Of course, we are interested in the opinion of the military on the topic of American prisoners of war which is being discussed in the press. We understand that a full search of the archives and the resolution of the issue of the classification of documents take time. This is why we are asking you to check out just one episode of the 'cold war': 8 April 1950, a U.S. Navy plane, the Baltic.'

23. FROM A LETTER BY JANE REYNOLDS-HOWARD. 'Bob and his comrades have long earned your forgiveness. The time has come to send American prisoners home. This action would initiate the healing of the wounds in the hearts of many Americans. I pray for you and your wife every day.'

24. Let us recall that Jane wrote this letter to the head of Soviet State Security, by now a former leader, who resolved to implement profound reforms in the KGB, and who took a step which is unusual in the practice of operations by special services: He handed over to the Americans monitoring equipment installed in the embassy building. How will the new leadership of state security behave?

25. Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation. This is how the former KGB is now called. However, we were greeted benevolently at the ministry, despite the fact that at present it is involved for the most part in restructuring and personnel reassignments. They even assigned an officer to help us.

26. I will admit that we were shown both the letter by Jane Reynolds-Howard and a picture of Lieutenant Reynolds at Lubyanka. At present, they believe that it is stupid to make secrets of such incidents because this gives rise to rumors, idle talk, or even false fabrications about the operation of Soviet special services. However, it is paradoxical that the formerly mighty establishment which held all the secrets of the state under its control has now disintegrated. The once joint archives are now in the jurisdiction of different chiefs. It is not all that easy even for the officers of State

UNCLASSIFIED

000037

UNCLASSIFIED

FBIS Concatenated Daily Reports, 1992

Document 10 of 13

Page 6

Security to respond now to a question about what transpired in the sky over the Baltic Sea on 8 April 1950. Even if the officers find this out they will not be able to reveal it: Many documents are classified ``Top Secret.``

27. Is there a way out? At Lubyanka, they believe that, in principle, the issue should be resolved with the participation of interested parties--the parliament, the government, the military, and the special services. This is also what the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Supreme Soviet, and the staff of the president believe. However, everything takes time.

28. Well, let us wait. Meanwhile, since we do not count on familiarizing ourselves with archival documents soon, let us turn to the memories of the people. Please let us know if you have any information about the incident involving Robert Reynolds or his fellow crew members, or if you can clarify the circumstances described in his wife's letter. Let us try to help at least several American families. It is our duty as people.

29. FROM A LETTER BY JANE REYNOLDS-HOWARD. ``I do not feel hostile toward the Soviet people. I understand the situation of Bob and his comrades which brought them to the Soviet GULAG. Of course, my data may seem unconvincing. This is why I ask for help in learning the whole truth about my husband and his comrades, no matter how sad it is...

30. In the picture: Lieutenant Robert Reynolds in 1950.

UNCLASSIFIED

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FBIS Concatenated Daily Reports, 1992

Document 1 of 2

Page 1

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED Status: [STAT]
 Report Number: FBIS-SOV-92-036 UDC Number:

Headline: Status of Quest for U.S. MIA's Updated

Source Line: MK2202123092 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 22
 Feb 92 p 4

Subslug: [Vladimir Abarinov article: 'Investigation: Prisoners of War Have Own Archipelago. U.S. Prisoners in Former USSR Still Not Martyrology']

FULL TEXT OF ARTICLE:

1. [Vladimir Abarinov article: 'Investigation: Prisoners of War Have Own Archipelago. U.S. Prisoners in Former USSR Still Not Martyrology']
2. [Text] The search for U.S. servicemen who disappeared on USSR territory in various circumstances has been stepped recently. We would remind you that NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA first addressed this problem last August. Since then there has been virtually no progress. However, available information and experience of similar searches gives us every reason to expect success.
3. For starters I must repeat some figures, since those doing the rounds in our press are imprecise and do not differentiate between prisoners of war [POW's] and those missing in action [MIA's] and are often rounded up- presumably, for the writer's convenience.
4. During the Korean war the United States lost 8,177 MIA's and 954 people who it is known for certain were captured and did not return home alive or dead. After the war in Indochina the Americans were missing 2,273 men, of whom 1,678 disappeared in Vietnam, while none of the 500 or more airmen brought down over Laos were repatriated.
5. Air crews downed near the Soviet borders-there were 86 of them in the fifties and sixties-form a separate category of MIA's. Moreover, in most cases the entire crew disappeared.
6. A considerable proportion of the prisoners dating back to the Korean and Vietnam wars were evidently never held on USSR territory-the exception being people of some operational interest. Americans 'liberated' by the Red Army from Nazi jails in the Balkans, in Poland, and East Germany (and incidentally from Japanese jails in Manchuria) are another matter. Some 20,000 of them failed to return home.
7. Last, officers abducted by the Soviet special services in Berlin,

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FBIS Concatenated Daily Reports, 1992

Document 1 of 2

Page 2

Vienna, and certain other points in the Soviet occupied zone during the early postwar years form a special group of MIA's. There are 18 such people in my file.

8. So, where should we look for them?

9. The countless references to the Gulag are totally incorrect: This is quite a justifiable euphemism for U.S. journalists, but for national journalists it is a true indication of incompetence. There were never any POW's in the Gulag—they were dealt with by another main commissariat of the NKVD-MGB [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs—Ministry of State Security], namely the Main Directorate for POW and Internee Affairs, which had its own camps. People convicted of espionage and other real or imaginary crimes are another matter. They not only could have but should have ended up in the Gulag (which was until recently called the GUITU, now the GUID [expansions unknown]).

10. They dealt in the same way with people who did not agree to be recruited or to cooperate in other ways and also with those whose services were no longer needed. The story of Stanislaw Swianewicz is typical; he escaped execution in the Katyn forest in 1940 at the last moment owing to a request from the USSR NKVD Main Directorate for State Security. Sitting in the inner Lubyanka jail, he wrote a treatise on the economy of the Third Reich (Professor Swianewicz was an unsurpassed specialist in this field), after which he was convicted and sent to a camp. These people were often kept in special jails as a "special contingent"—for example, before being exchanged for Rulof Abel, Francis Gary Powers served time in Vladimir jail. What is more, a foreigner could be under investigation for as long as they liked. Prominent Wehrmacht and SS officers captured at the end of the war were only sentenced in 1951–1952. Throughout these six or seven years they were kept in the Lubyanka jail, often in solitary confinement, both before and after sentencing. The same thing happened if there were any special circumstances: That happened, for instance, to Raoul Wallenberg's cellmates and fellow defendants.

11. There are known cases of prisoners (under investigation) being summoned from their cell "with their things" and disappearing without trace. That was the fate that befell Brigade General Leopold Okulice, commander of the Krajowa Army, who was sentenced to 10 years in the camps in June 1945 by the military collegium of the Supreme Court. Okulice's personal prison file was declassified recently, revealing that he died as a result of a failed surgical operation.

12. There were cases of a prisoner liable to repatriation not returning home either. That was the fate of Lieutenant General Reiner Stagel, one of the butchers during the Warsaw uprising. Sentenced to

UNCLASSIFIED

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FBIS Concatenated Daily Reports, 1992

Document 1 of 2

Page 3

25 years in jail and then amnestied, he did not reach the fatherland: The last document in his file is a burial certificate from one of the transit camps. You only have to destroy this last document, and the disappearance of the repatriant would be shrouded in mystery forever.

13. Quite often on his release a prisoner would remain under open surveillance, have his movements restricted, and be given a Russian name. The example of the former Greek Communist Party General Secretary Nikos Zakhariadis, who lived in Surgut under the name Nikolay Nikolayevich Nikolayev and committed suicide in 1979, is not entirely typical: His party colleagues knew of his situation. More often a prisoner did not have an opportunity to make himself known and, when the opportunity did arise, he was already as a rule totally assimilated, had a family, and could not even imagine returning. The author knows of several people like that, including people who are currently prospering—admittedly not Americans.

14. Last, a prisoner might have been executed under Article 58 of the RSFSR Criminal Code (usually charged with espionage or terrorism) or under the decree of 19 April 1943 if the accused were Wehrmacht servicemen or an "accomplice" of the occupiers. I have already written about this hitherto secret act, which has presumably lost its legal validity, that made provision for death by hanging. As far as I am aware, the Belgian national Yermak Lukyanov [name as transliterated] was executed under the draconian decree in May 1984.

15. The idea that U.S. pilots could have fought in Korea and Vietnam under assumed names, as was the practice in our country, must be considered groundless. U.S. Army Field Regulation FM 21-76 ("Survival, Avoidance of Capture, and Escape from Jail") in the chapter "Conduct Under Interrogation" recommends that a prisoner give his true name, rank, number, and date of birth. That was how the surviving crew members from the RB-47 aircraft downed over the Barents Sea 1 July 1960 behaved. Their story could serve as a model of what did happen or might have happened to U.S. pilots brought down near Soviet borders.

16. Second pilot Bruce Olsted and navigator John Makkoun [surnames as transliterated] spent almost seven months in Lubyanka. The interrogation indicates that investigator Colonel Pankratov prepared the trial on the basis of the Powers trial. The pilots were freed right after John Kennedy's inauguration as a "goodwill gesture" but only because no confessions were extracted from them. So Americans most likely gave their real names, although prisoners were nearly always given different names in jails and camps.

17. There is another specific difficulty. People of German, Japanese, and Italian descent served in the U.S. Army. It is quite

UNCLASSIFIED

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FBIS Concatenated Daily Reports, 1992

Document 1 of 2

Page 4

possible that these people could have gone to a camp on the basis of 'national allegiance,' especially since the Soviet Union never committed itself to complying with the Hague and Geneva conventions whereby military uniform is the crucial indication of citizenship.

18. In short, the practice of Soviet punitive organs illustrates that anything could have happened to prisoners. Yet there is nothing fantastic about the hope of finding Americans alive or at least traces of them.

19. The reports of Americans in Soviet camps and jails are specific enough to be able to start checking them out. There was a camp somewhere in Belarus in 1945 for black soldiers-nearby inhabitants would hardly have forgotten such an exotic detail. Colonel Gordon, arrested in Vienna in 1949, was seen in Lvov transit jail in 1953. An unnamed lieutenant and NCO [noncommissioned officer], participants in the Korean war, were seen at a phosphorus mine near Yakutsk (Camp No. 307) in 1960. Lieutenant Warren Sanderson was seen at Inte, and Pilot Joe Miller was seen at Karabas in March 1947-he had been brought down over Berlin in 1945. Colonel Jackson, arrested in Berlin, was seen in Dubrovlag (the report is dated mid-1953). The crew of a B-29 brought down over the Sea of Japan 13 July 1952 (13 men) were kept in Khabarovsk POW Camp No. 21 (October 1951), while one of the members of a crew brought down there 6 November 1951 was seen in a military hospital north of Magadan (1954). This pilot served 25 years for espionage. In both cases the reports have come from repatriated Japanese.

20. Dzhezkazgan, Magnitogorsk, Perm, Norilsk, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Pechora, Potma, Tayshet, Verkhneuralsk, Vladivostok, Vologda, Vrangal Island, Yavas, the renowned Vladimir Jail OD-1/st-2 [expansion unknown]-familiar names. Sometimes an American is cited by name, often not, but in these cases minimal additional information is given, for instance: date and place of capture, rank, category of troops. The most detailed information concerns the Vorkuta camps: Mine No. 40-William Bizet [surname as transliterated] from Korea, a lieutenant or NCO convicted under Article 58; Camp No. 6-Major Robert Shvarts [surname as transliterated], abducted in Kassel in 1949; Convalescent Camp-crew of a U.S. Navy Privateer aircraft brought down over the Baltic 8 April 1950 (10 men); Colonel Davison, abducted in Vienna in 1946, is also there.

21. Dmitriy Volkogonov has recently provided documentary confirmation once again that U.S. World War II prisoners were kept in Tambov's 'Rada' (No. 188) POW camp. The colonel general was clearly hasty in declaring his discovery a sensation: In this case it is a question of Americans who served in the German Army (there were at least 108 such people in the Tambov camp, according to 'special'

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FBIS Concatenated Daily Reports, 1992

Document 1 of 2

Page 5

archive figures).

22. I must particularly point out that documents concerning POW's and MIA's are still secret in the United States or have been only partially declassified. That is why in a number of cases we do not know the names of the Americans concerned or the source of the information- this information is carefully obliterated when the documents are declassified.

23. There is a great deal of shady business regarding the problem of POW's and MIA's. At one time NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA reported on a photograph that had caused a sensation in the West. It showed three U.S. pilots brought down over North Vietnam and Laos in 1966, 1969, and 1970. The photograph was dated May 1990. I remember a Pentagon spokesman saying that the photograph was a montage. The journal from which the falsifiers (''Cambodian opportunists'') cut the pictures-SOVETSKIY SOYUZ No. 1, 1990-was even named, and it was indicated that it had even been taken out of the Soviet Embassy library in Phnom Penh. It is hard to believe that the mother and the wives of the MIA's did not recognize their close relatives, but that is not the point: This journal is lying in front of me and there is nothing resembling the Cambodian photograph in it.

24. Late last year a KOMMERSANT report that one of the pilots brought down over Vietnam was still living in Kazakhstan caused a great deal of ballyhoo. The reporter for some reason decided not to disclose the pilot's name, however he gave the date that he was captured, from which it is easy to elucidate that he is Navy Lt. James Kelly Patterson, born 14 July 1940, who lived in Long Beach, California, before the war. I have something to say about Patterson. Patterson was a navigator in the crew under the command of Captain Eugene MacDaniel, now the prosperous founder and president of the U.S. Rehabilitation Institute, who spent six years in a Vietnamese jail. He said in an interview last year that he had once received a telephone call from the National Security Council asking him to stop making public statements about MIA's.

25. It is no wonder that the search has as yet had insignificant results.

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 REF: MK2202123092 MOSCOW NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA RUSSIAN 22 FEB///
 IN MYSTERY FOREVER.

TEXT:

((TEXT)) QUITE OFTEN ON HIS RELEASE A PRISONER WOULD REMAIN UNDER OPEN SURVEILLANCE, HAVE HIS MOVEMENTS RESTRICTED, AND BE GIVEN A RUSSIAN NAME. THE EXAMPLE OF THE FORMER GREEK COMMUNIST PARTY GENERAL SECRETARY NIKOS ZAKHARIADIS, WHO LIVED IN SURGUT UNDER THE NAME NIKOLAY NIKOLAYEVICH NIKOLAYEV AND COMMITTED SUICIDE IN 1979, IS NOT ENTIRELY TYPICAL: HIS PARTY COLLEAGUES KNEW OF HIS SITUATION. MORE OFTEN A PRISONER DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE HIMSELF KNOWN AND, WHEN THE OPPORTUNITY DID ARISE, HE WAS ALREADY AS A RULE TOTALLY ASSIMILATED, HAD A FAMILY, AND COULD NOT EVEN IMAGINE RETURNING. THE AUTHOR KNOWS OF SEVERAL PEOPLE LIKE THAT, INCLUDING PEOPLE WHO ARE CURRENTLY PROSPERING -- ADMITTEDLY NOT AMERICANS.

LAST, A PRISONER MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXECUTED UNDER ARTICLE 58 OF THE RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST REPUBLIC CRIMINAL CODE (USUALLY CHARGED WITH ESPIONAGE OR TERRORISM) OR UNDER THE DECREE OF 19 APRIL 1943 IF THE ACCUSED WERE WEHRMACHT SERVICEMEN OR AN "ACCOMPLICE" OF THE OCCUPIERS. I HAVE ALREADY WRITTEN ABOUT THIS HITHERTO SECRET ACT, WHICH HAS PRESUMABLY LOST ITS LEGAL VALIDITY, THAT MADE PROVISION FOR DEATH BY HANGING. AS FAR AS I AM AWARE, THE BELGIAN NATIONAL YERMAK LUKYANOV ((NAME AS TRANSLITERATED)) WAS EXECUTED UNDER THE DRACONIAN DECREE IN MAY 1984.

THE IDEA THAT U.S. PILOTS COULD HAVE FOUGHT IN KOREA AND VIETNAM UNDER ASSUMED NAMES, AS WAS THE PRACTICE IN OUR COUNTRY, MUST BE CONSIDERED GROUNDLESS. U.S. ARMY FIELD REGULATION FM 21-76 ("SURVIVAL, AVOIDANCE OF CAPTURE, AND ESCAPE FROM JAIL") IN THE CHAPTER "CONDUCT UNDER INTERROGATION" RECOMMENDS THAT A PRISONER GIVE HIS TRUE NAME, RANK, NUMBER, AND DATE OF BIRTH. THAT WAS HOW THE SURVIVING CREW MEMBERS FROM THE RB-47 AIRCRAFT DOWNED OVER THE BARENTS SEA 1 JULY 1960 BEHAVED. THEIR STORY COULD SERVE AS A MODEL OF WHAT DID HAPPEN OR MIGHT HAVE HAPPENED TO U.S. PILOTS BROUGHT DOWN NEAR SOVIET BORDERS.

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SECOND PILOT BRUCE OLSTED AND NAVIGATOR JOHN MAKKOUN ((SURNAMES AS TRANSLITERATED)) SPENT ALMOST SEVEN MONTHS IN THE LUBYANKA. THE INTERROGATION INDICATES THAT INVESTIGATOR COLONEL PANKRATOV PREPARED THE TRIAL ON THE BASIS OF THE POWERS TRIAL. THE PILOTS WERE FREED RIGHT AFTER JOHN KENNEDY'S INAUGURATION AS A "GOOD WILL GESTURE," BUT ONLY BECAUSE NO CONFESSIONS WERE EXTRACTED FROM THEM. SO AMERICANS MOST LIKELY GAVE THEIR REAL NAMES, ALTHOUGH PRISONERS WERE NEARLY ALWAYS GIVEN DIFFERENT NAMES IN JAILS AND CAMPS.

THERE IS ANOTHER SPECIFIC DIFFICULTY. PEOPLE OF GERMAN, JAPANESE AND ITALIAN DESCENT SERVED IN THE U.S. ARMY. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THESE PEOPLE COULD HAVE GONE TO A CAMP ON THE BASIS OF "NATIONAL ALLEGIANCE," ESPECIALLY SINCE THE SOVIET UNION NEVER COMMITTED ITSELF TO COMPLYING WITH THE HAGUE AND GENEVA CONVENTIONS WHEREBY MILITARY UNIFORM IS THE CRUCIAL INDICATION OF CITIZENSHIP.

IN SHORT, THE PRACTICE OF SOVIET PUNITIVE ORGANS ILLUSTRATES THAT ANYTHING COULD HAVE HAPPENED TO PRISONERS. YET THERE IS NOTHING FANTASTIC ABOUT THE HOPE OF FINDING AMERICANS ALIVE OR AT LEAST TRACES OF THEM.

THE REPORTS OF AMERICANS IN SOVIET CAMPS AND JAILS ARE SPECIFIC ENOUGH TO BE ABLE TO START CHECKING THEM OUT. THERE WAS A CAMP SOMEWHERE IN BELORUSSIA IN 1945 FOR BLACK SOLDIERS -- NEARBY INHABITANTS WOULD HARDLY HAVE FORGOTTEN SUCH AN EXOTIC DETAIL. COLONEL GORDON, ARRESTED IN VIENNA IN 1949, WAS SEEN IN LVOV TRANSIT JAIL IN 1953. AN UNNAMED LIEUTENANT AND NCO, PARTICIPANTS IN THE KOREAN WAR, WERE SEEN AT A PHOSPHORUS MINE NEAR YAKUTSK (CAMP NO. 307) IN 1960. LIEUTENANT WARREN SANDERSON WAS SEEN AT INTE. AND PILOT JOE MILLER WAS SEEN AT KARABAS IN MARCH 1947 -- HE HAD BEEN BROUGHT DOWN OVER BERLIN IN 1945. COLONEL JACKSON, ARRESTED IN BERLIN, WAS SEEN IN DUBROVLAK (THE REPORT IS DATED MID-1953). THE CREW OF A B-29 BROUGHT DOWN OVER THE SEA OF JAPAN 13 JULY 1952 (13 MEN) WERE KEPT IN KHABAROVSK POW CAMP NO. 21 (OCTOBER 1951), WHILE ONE OF THE MEMBERS OF A CREW BROUGHT DOWN THERE 6 NOVEMBER 1951 WAS SEEN IN A MILITARY HOSPITAL NORTH OF MAGADAN (1954). THIS PILOT SERVED 25 YEARS FOR ESPIONAGE. IN BOTH CASES THE REPORTS HAVE COME FROM REPATRIATED JAPANESE.

DZHEZKAZGAN, MAGNITOGORSK. PERM, NORILSK, NOVOSIBIRSK, OMSK, PECHORA, POTMA, TAYSHET, VERKHNEURALSK, VLADIVOSTOK, VOLOGDA, VRANGEL ISLAND, YAVAS, THE RENOWNED VLADIMIR JAIL OD-1/ST-2 ((EXPANSION UNKNOWN))... FAMILIAR NAMES. SOMETIMES AN AMERICAN IS CITED BY NAME, OFTEN NOT, BUT IN THESE CASES MINIMAL ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS GIVEN, FOR INSTANCE: DATE AND PLACE OF CAPTURE, RANK, CATEGORY OF TROOPS. THE MOST DETAILED INFORMATION CONCERNS THE VORKUTA CAMPS: MINE NO. 40 -- WILLIAM BIZET ((SURNAME AS TRANSLITERATED)) FROM KOREA, A LIEUTENANT OR NCO CONVICTED UNDER ARTICLE 56; CAMP NO. 6 -- MAJOR ROBERT (?) SHVARTS ((SURNAME AS TRANSLITERATED)), ABDUCTED IN KASSEL IN 1949; CONVALESCENT CAMP -- CREW OF A U.S. NAVY PRIVATEER AIRCRAFT BROUGHT DOWN OVER THE BALTIC 8 APRIL 1950 (10 MEN); COLONEL DAVISON, ABDUCTED IN VIENNA IN 1946, IS ALSO THERE.

DMITRIY VOLKOGONOV HAS RECENTLY PROVIDED DOCUMENTARY CONFIRMATION ONCE AGAIN THAT U.S. WORLD WAR II PRISONERS WERE KEPT IN TAMBOV'S "RADA" (NO. 188) POW CAMP. THE COLONEL GENERAL WAS CLEARLY HASTY IN DECLARING HIS DISCOVERY A SENSATION: IN THIS CASE IT IS A QUESTION

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OF AMERICANS WHO SERVED IN THE GERMAN ARMY (THERE WERE AT LEAST 108
SUCH PEOPLE IN THE TAMBOV CAMP, ACCORDING TO "SPECIAL" ARCHIVE
FIGURES).

I MUST PARTICULARLY POINT OUT THAT DOCUMENTS CONCERNING POW'S AND
MIA'S ARE STILL SECRET IN THE UNITED STATES OR HAVE BEEN ONLY
PARTIALLY DECLASSIFIED. THAT IS WHY IN A NUMBER OF CASES WE DO NOT
KNOW THE NAMES OF THE AMERICANS CONCERNED OR THE SOURCE OF THE
INFORMATION -- THIS INFORMATION IS CAREFULLY OBLITERATED WHEN THE
DOCUMENTS ARE DECLASSIFIED.

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Mon Sep 27 06:47:26 1993

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PM-US POWs, Bjt, 980
U.S. Claims Hundreds Of American POWs From Korea Were Taken To USSR

By ROBERT BURNS
Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) _ The U.S. government says it has ``broad and convincing'' evidence that the Soviet Union secretly and illegally moved hundreds of U.S. Korean War prisoners to its territory in the early 1950s and never released them.

It is by far the most dramatic and comprehensive assertion by Washington on a Soviet connection to missing U.S. servicemen since the Korean fighting ended in 1953.

The allegation was made in a detailed presentation by a senior State Department official at a meeting with Russian officials in Moscow earlier this month.

The evidence is detailed in a 77-page report titled ``The Transfer of U.S. Korean War POWs to the Soviet Union.'' It was given to the Russians at the Moscow meeting but the Clinton administration has refused to publicly release it.

A copy of the report was obtained by The Associated Press.

``The Soviets transferred several hundred U.S. Korean War POWs to the USSR and did not repatriate them,'' the report said. ``This transfer was mainly politically motivated with the intent of holding them as political hostages, subjects for intelligence exploitation and skilled labor within the camp system.''

It asserted that the evidence gave a ``consistent and mutually reinforcing description'' of Soviet intelligence services forcibly moving U.S. POWs to the USSR at a time when Soviet forces, including anti-aircraft units, were active in North Korea.

It did not assess how long the American servicemen _ mostly Air Force aviators _ may have lived, or whether any might still be alive in the former Soviet Union.

Just last year the U.S. government said it had no evidence of such transfers. Washington has known, though, since the end of the war that some evidence existed that U.S. POWs from Korea had been taken to the Soviet Union. It asked Moscow for information on this in May 1954 and again in July 1956. Both times the Soviet government denied any knowledge of U.S. POWs on its soil.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin said last year that Soviet records showed 59 captured U.S. servicemen in Korea were interrogated by Soviet officials, and that 12 crew members of U.S. aircraft shot down in reconnaissance missions unrelated to the Korea war were transferred to Soviet territory. But the Yeltsin government has yet to concede that Americans were taken from Korea.

In the three years of fighting in Korea, in which the United States led a U.N. force on the side of South Korea against communist North Korea, 54,246 Americans were killed. The government lists 8,140 as unaccounted for, although the number of missing for which there is no direct evidence of death is estimated at 2,195. Many of the ``unaccounted for'' were not recovered because they were buried in battlefield graves in North Korea or died in POW

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Mon Sep 27 06:47:26 1993

Page 2

camps.

The U.S. report on U.S. Korean War prisoners taken to the Soviet Union gave no specific figure but the analysis seemed to indicate it is fewer than 600.

It identified by name 31 missing Air Force F-86 fighter pilots who are among the most likely identifiable servicemen to have been taken by the Soviets for their knowledge of the plane's capabilities, plus six other Air Force aviators about whom the U.S. government believes Russia has additional information.

The report describes a top-secret program of the Soviet MGB (predecessor to the KGB) to capture American fliers and other U.S. and allied troops in Korea, interrogate them, and then transfer them into Joseph Stalin's notorious Gulag system of slave labor camps in Siberia and other parts of the Soviet Union.

"The range of eyewitness testimony as to the presence of U.S. Korean War POWs in the Gulag is so broad and convincing that we cannot dismiss it," the report said, adding that the prisoners probably were forced to assume new identities.

Since the report was written, a retired Russian colonel has come forward and told investigators for the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission for POWs-MIAs that a man he saw twice at a Siberian prison in the mid-1960s was described to him by the prison commander as an American brought there from the Gulag system.

The Russian colonel, Vladimir Malinin, said the man in the prison bore a convincing resemblance to Marine Corps Sgt. Philip Vincent Mandra, who disappeared on the northern Korean battlefield in August 1952 after an encounter with Chinese troops. U.S. officials view Malinin's testimony as credible, though not conclusive, evidence that Mandra was in the Siberian prison.

The report given to the Russians this month is based on a variety of sources: U.S. government records dating to the beginning of the Korean conflict in 1950, documents made available by Moscow since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and recent interviews by U.S. investigators with former Soviet officials, including retired officers who said they participated in the transfers.

The report said the Soviet intelligence apparatus had gained extensive experience with using POWs in the Gulag during World War II, and that when Stalin ordered the invasion of South Korea in June 1950 it simply expanded the practice.

"By the middle of 1950, the Soviet Union had at hand a vast, well-practiced, efficiently operating and profitable system for the collection, incarceration and exploitation of POWs" — American, South Korean and others, it said.

One hub of the Soviet operation against allied POWs was Khabarovsk, in extreme southeastern Russia, the report said. Prisoners were taken there from Korea, interrogated by military intelligence agents and then shipped off to labor camps in the Soviet interior. It said at least one American was taken to Moscow.

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DIST: 3 JUNE 1986

COUNTRY: NORTH KOREA

SUBJ: POSSIBLE LOCATION OF REMAINS OF U.S. SOLDIERS WHO DIED
DURING THE KOREAN WAR; PRISONERS OF WAR ALLEGEDLY STILL
LIVING IN NORTH KOREA

DOI: SPRING 1985 - FEBRUARY 1986

SOURCE: [redacted]

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(b)(1)

ADDENDUM

TEXT: 1. AN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE WITH THE ABOVE
HEADING AND NUMBER WAS ISSUED ON 4 APRIL 1986. THE SOURCE HAS
PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN RESPONSE TO
FURTHER REQUIREMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT.

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2. IN FEBRUARY 1986 [redacted]

[redacted] LEARNED OF THE DISCOVERY OF
HUMAN REMAINS IN THE CH'ANGJIN-HO AREA OF NORTH KOREA FROM
TUK-NAM, A DIRECTOR IN CHARGE OF FILMS IN THE KOREAN WORKERS'

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[redacted] THE REMAINS OF FEWER THAN TEN
INDIVIDUALS WERE UNEARTHED FIVE YEARS AGO; MANY HAD DOG TAGS.
AFTER DISCOVERY THE REMAINS WERE LEFT IN THE SAME PLACE AND
COVERED OVER.

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3. PRISONERS OF WAR (POW) HAVE NOT APPEARED IN ANY
FILMS OTHER THAN THE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED "NAMELESS HEROES."

4. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: SOURCE DID NOT KNOW THE
EXACT NUMBER OF DOG TAGS RECOVERED WITH THE REMAINS. HE HAD NO
INFORMATION ON THE DISCOVERY OF ANY OTHER REMAINS OF U.S. OR
THIRD-COUNTRY PERSONNEL IN NORTH KOREA. HE WAS AWARE OF NO POW
BEING HELD IN NORTH KOREA OTHER THAN THE INDIVIDUAL WHO REPORTDLY
PLAYED A ROLE IN THE FILM "NAMELESS HEROES." HE HAD NO
INFORMATION ON WHERE POWS WERE HELD.)

ACQ: (LATE MAY 1986).

ACTION DIA(1) (U,6,7)
INFO CJCS(4) NIDS(1) JS(2) SECDEF(9) USDP(11) C3I:TP&S(3)
ASD:PA&E(1) USDP:DSAA(4) DR(1) DD(1) ED(1) DI-1(1)
NMIC(1) RTS 2B(1) RTS-2D2(1) NWS(1) JSI-3C(1) AT(1)
AT-3(2) DIO-GA(1) DIO(1) DE-2(1) DB-2(1) DB-2D(1)
DB-4D(1) DX-5D2(1) DX-6C(1) DT-1(1) DT-5(1)
DC-4A3(1) D900(1)
+OCSA WASHINGTON DC
+CNO WASHINGTON DC
+CSAF WASHINGTON DC
+CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
+CMC WASHINGTON DC
+HQ AFOSI BOLLING AFB DC
+SAFE

MCN=86154/02916 TOR=86154/1040Z TAD=86154/1040Z

CDSN=MAJ962

PAGE 1 OF 1
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28 NOVEMBER 1952

- 1 -

Korea

T W O C A M P S

KOREAN WAR

Moscow Stresses Repatriation Principle: The consistent Communist emphasis on the principle of repatriation of all prisoners of war and denunciation of the U.S. advocacy of no forced repatriation remain the dominant elements in Moscow comment on the U.N. debates on Korea. The Soviet position is made explicit in the Vishinsky speech on 24 November in which the Indian draft resolution is denounced. Communist objection to the 17 November resolution became evident in a 20 November TASS review of the proposal reporting the similarity between the Indian resolution and the U.S. position. TASS reports the "uneasiness" of other delegations as a result of the Menon speech, but there is no emphasis on Western disunity.

More explicit Communist opposition to the resolution was contained in a commentary on 22 November which "rumored" that the U.S. "has decided to take a favorable stand on this draft resolution." This broadcast charges that the resolution "is based on the principle of forcible screening and detention of war prisoners" and declares that the functions of the proposed repatriation commission would consist "of running the concentration camps where the war prisoners would languish." The "doom" awaiting these war prisoners is likened to the "tragic fate of the displaced persons who, after the second world war were forcibly detained ... and then became the slaves of landowners and capitalists." This may be an attempt by Moscow to discredit the position of the West in granting political asylum to war prisoners. Previous Moscow comment has rejected the concept of asylum for POWs and has insisted that the prisoners were being detained to provide cannonfodder for the armies of Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee.

Attention to Communist-Proposed Commission Fades: Comment on the Communist-proposed Korean Commission--which had been touted as making possible peaceful settlement of the Korean question--disappears as the Indian proposal comes under attack. The 10 November Vishinsky speech endorsing and elaborating on this commission was broadcast 87 times, compared to the 167 and 101 devoted to his first two U.N. speeches. A commentary by Romanov on 16 November--broadcast to the UK only--continued the trend toward greater specificity on this proposed commission and seemed to indicate the importance placed upon it by the Communists. Romanov called for "action" as opposed to the "talk of principles," for "only action can advance the Korean truce talks." He also suggested that "the only way to continue the (truce) talks is to transfer them to a higher level," presumably the Korean commission. The importance of a resumption of the truce talks is emphasized by Romanov's statement that "it will not be possible to make another step toward ending this...war until the truce talks are resumed." No explanation of how final agreement can be achieved is made however.

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000051

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28 NOVEMBER 1952

- 2 -

That this commentary was intended to prompt favorable British attention to the Communist proposal seems indicated by the following: (1) the British U.N. delegation was taken to task for dismissing the Vishinsky proposal for a Korean commission "without taking the trouble to examine it at all impartially;" and (2) the favorable response evoked by the proposal, even from those "who certainly cannot be suspected of leaning toward the Soviet viewpoint" was cited. However, Moscow has not directed a similar commentary to any other nations which might be considered especially receptive to a compromise settlement of the Korean issue.

Self-Strength Subject of Explicit Comment: Recent Moscow comment has become more specific concerning the strength of the Chinese and Korean forces. A rare review of military events in Korea by Col. Tolchenov--broadcast to the home audience only--refers in unusually specific terms to the improved technical equipment, especially artillery, to the powerful fortifications and strong "joint defense system" established across Korea, to the plentitude of weapons and ammunition and to the generally improved capabilities of the Korean and Chinese troops. The theme is echoed by TASS correspondent Tkachenko in Pyongyang who quotes a downed U.S. pilot, Captain Robert Henry, as admitting the growing difficulties faced by the U.S. Air Force since "the Koreans and Chinese have now acquired a great many anti-aircraft batteries and planes." This specificity, unusual in Moscow comment to date, has been foreshadowed by Peking comment on recent military events. Reference to the increased military and air capabilities has not been broadcast to the Koreans however.

New Threats Minimized By Inherent Weaknesses: The Soviet home and Korean audiences hear of the continued threat raised by U.S. aggressiveness. The home audience is told that despite our "disgraceful military failures" in Korea, a campaign is now in progress in the United States calling for increased military pressure on Korea, the bombing of Manchuria, the blockade of China and the use of the A-bomb. The blackmail which this campaign represents however is termed "the weapon of the weak against the cowards" and Moscow--in its first reaction to the announcement of hydrogen bomb experiments--implies that "hydrogen blackmail" will be no more successful than was atomic blackmail.

Moscow reports to its Korean listeners that inasmuch as the United States has failed to get sufficient troops from its satellites and is unwilling to provide more itself, South Koreans are to be armed in increasing numbers. Listeners are reassured however that the South Koreans hate their "oppressors" and are considered "unreliable" as military allies by the United States, while other comment reviews the record of South Korean resistance operations. At the same time a warning is extended to the United States that if it persists in its plan for mobilization of the South Koreans, much the same result can be expected as took place in China when wholesale desertions weakened the conscripted Chiang army.

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000052

KOREAN WAR: Intransigence on POW Issue Continues Korea

Comment on the United Nations debate on Korea reflects the continuing Communist intransigence on the POW repatriation issue. The following points sum up the Communist position:

1. The real issue is the forcing of prisoners to refuse to go home, not forcing the prisoners to go home as the United States claims.
2. The Geneva Convention does not recognize any choice on the part of prisoners regarding repatriation, hence discussion of "political asylum" in this context by America and its allies confuses the real issue. 14 Nov 52
3. The compromise proposals of Peru and Mexico are contrary to international law since they predicate the right of prisoners to deny repatriation.

This position is made clear in Moscow comment on the speeches of Soviet delegates as well as in criticism of the speeches supporting the U.S. position. The United States is charged with "dodging the issue in an endeavor to whitewash itself in the eyes of public opinion," while those delegates who supported the U.S. stand on repatriation are accused of being "tedious and boring."

Peaceful Settlement Through New Commission Stressed: Originally proposed by Poland as part of its omnibus resolution on 17 October, the commission plan received no attention from Moscow until specifically endorsed by Vishinsky on 29 October. Comment during the past week, as well as the Vishinsky address of 10 November--which has been broadcast 54 times to date--states that the new commission should extend "assistance to the repatriation of all prisoners of war" but there is no explanation of how this "assistance" would be facilitated or on what principles it would be based. At the same time, Moscow drops all reference to the compromise proposals offered at Panmunjom on 8 October by the Communist delegation and ignores recent Peking hints that repatriation covers some form of reclassification.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY	Korea/Manchuria/China	REPORT NO.	
SUBJECT	749 UN Prisoners of War Camps and Conditions	DATE DISTR.	13 May 1953
DATE OF INFO.	See attachment	NO. OF PAGES	1 (b)(3) CIAAct
PLACE ACQUIRED		REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
		REFERENCES	

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
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Forwarded herewith for your information and retention is Supplement III of "UN Prisoners of War Camps and Conditions in Korea, Manchuria and China", dated 1 May 1953.

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S E C R E T
Security Information

**UN PRISONERS OF WAR
CAMPS AND CONDITIONS
IN
KOREA, MANCHURIA
AND CHINA**

**SUPPLEMENT VII
1 May 1953**

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS..... 2

POW CAMPS AND CONDITIONS..... 2

 KOREA

 Acknowledged Camps..... 2

 Unacknowledged Camps..... 8

 New Listings..... 8

 Old Listings, New Confirmations..... 10

 MANCHURIA AND CHINA

 Old Listings, New Confirmations..... 12

SUMMARY CHART..... 13

TRENDS AND MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS (OPINION)..... 14

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

1. The purportedly wounded and sick POWs exchanged last month were collected in three camps, Chon-Ma, #7 (by 1 Dec/52 CCRAK camp numbering); Pyoktong, #5; and Manpojin. All three camps lie along the Yalu River, on the Manchurian border. The existence of Manpojin, northernmost of the three, had not previously been acknowledged by the Communists, but had been carried on our maps until 20 Jan/53, when it was considered abolished as there had been no report on it since 15 Apr/52. Why the Communists should suddenly, and in this fashion, admit that there was a collection camp at Manpojin is a mystery. The coordinates for Manpojin are BA 7259; the nearest listed camp is at Kuup-tong (#4), at BA 4930, too great a distance away to be part of the same camp.

2. A number of single reports, all unconfirmed and all some months old, have come in on new camp locations at:

Changan-sa	DT 1974	Sosong-dong	YD 2151
Chinnapo	YC 0988	Sokkal	CT 0143
Chuk-chon	CU 5408	Sonam	BT 5115
Hoeyang	CT 7884	Songhwa	XC 8549
Kobang-san	YD 4715	Songnae-dong	XE 5644
Coal Mine		Song-ni	CU 3589
(Pyongyang)		Tangsong-ri	YD 3123
Musong-ni	YC 1198	Tonso-dong Area	YD 4222
Nae-dong	CU 3589	Umchon-dong	BT 6049
Pack'un-jang	CU 6499	Yongdae-ri	BU 5722
Pongnae-do	YD 3518	Yulmong-ri	YC 4078
Sanghung-dong	YD 3725	Yusong	EV 5295
Sanun-dong	YD 3433	Yongbong-ri	YD 3582

The majority of these reports indicated that the enclosures were small, possibly transient, and the majority of POWs were South Koreans. Details will not be included in this or future reports, unless further confirmation is forthcoming.

3. Since there have been no reports on the following camps since 1 Sept/52, they will be considered abolished for purposes of this report:

KOREAN CAMPS

Chasong	CA 0392	Namchon-up	BT 7346
Haeryang-ni	CU 4713	Pongung	CV 7714
Hungdong-ni	BT 9794	Sangaenggun	YC 0579
Hwangju	YC 4138	Sego-ri	YC 0438
Hwapung-ni	CT 1075	Sinyang	YC 4059
Kyongchang-ri	YD 3721	Taesu-ri	YD 5516
Mayul-ri	BT 6247	Um-dong	BU 5035
Myohyang-san	BT 6532	Yanggu	DT 1171

} Possibly
} same camp

- 1 -

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

MANCHURIA-CHINA

Antung	124-18, 40-38	Harbin	124-10, 42-50
Chekiang Prov.		K'aryun Shien	124-05, 42-36
Chungchun	125-20, 40-53	Pench'i	123-43, 41-02

I. KOREAN POW CAMPS

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A. Acknowledged Camps (arranged by camp number) (Only those camps about which there has been additional information since the 20 Jan/53 report will be listed.)

1. Imsan-ni (XE 8779): Camp #1 is 10 mi. ENE of Sakchu (Paengyong). (Comment: Sakchu was removed from listing as not having been heard from since Aug/51, but may now prove to be part of #1 complex.)
2. (Branch 2) Changson: In Sept/52 a camp with approximately 1,250 UN POWs housed in six large barracks (70 x 5 x 3 m) was at XE 8779, SW of Chang-ni (XE 8780). Only US POWs were seen in compound. Barracks had earth walls and cement roofs, POWs lived four to a room. Fed mostly bread, seemed undernourished. Some of POWs wore old uniforms, other blue fatigues. Camp was garrisoned by 150 CCE (Diagram of camp attached to cited report.)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

5. Pyoktong (Kuksa-ri, YE 0699) - FBIS, Pyongyang, 4 Mar/53 broadcasts stated Enoch and Quinn were in Camp #5. One convoy of exchanged POWs collected at, or were already interned in Pyoktong, which has long been known as "The University" for indoctrination.
7. (a) Chon-ma (XE 6448): One convoy of exchanged POWs collected at this camp.
(b) Yongsan-ni (XE 5644): Unconfirmed report states there are 200 ROK POWs in this camp. Possibly Camp #7, Branch 1.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

8. Anju (YD 2887)

- (a) In Sept/52 source was sent to Anju to transport supplies. Observed 400 ROK in vicinity being compelled to repair roads. Wooden boxes strapped to each POWs back to hamper escape. Source heard camp for ROK POWs located 1½ km. SW of Anju.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- 2 -

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

- (b) As of Sept/52, there were five independent enclosures in Camp #8 in and around a former primary school, approximately 300 m. W of Taet'aryong-ni gate (YD 3524). 1,000 ROK POWs slated to serve in NKA, but returned to POW status after peace talks began. POWs worked four hours a day, took three hours indoctrination per week. Most POWs didn't accept Communism, many planned escape and sang ROK songs while marching. POWs fed 600 gr. rice, kaoliang, soy oil a day; undernourished and diseased. Wore blue coveralls. PO-RO in red on camp roofs. Camp guarded with four light machine guns, posted at 10 m. intervals, during the night.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (c) Yongso-ri (YD 2688, vic. Anju) Unconfirmed report of 600 ROK POWs at this location.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

9. Chaedong-ni (Singchang-ni) (BU 6073)

- (a) As of Sept/52, there was a camp with 2,000 POWs at the foot of a hill near Singch'ang (BU 5265), established in June/52. Camp was 500 x 300 m., fenced with barbed wire. POWs worked six hours a day, given two hours indoctrination a day, screened once a month for potential agents to be used against the South Koreans.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (b) In Apr/52, source was in vicinity of Songhyon-ni (BU 5165; heard that thirty ROK POWs had escaped from nearby camp. June/52, in same vicinity, source saw a number of POWs getting firewood on hill. POWs in groups of three, guarded by two NKA. In Oct/52, source heard that the Political Commissar had told men they "must capture more prisoners", and to "treat them well".

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

10. Sunan (YD 3241)

- (a) As of Sept/52, there was a camp with 3,000 ROK POWs in sixteen dugout shelters at the foot of a hill E of Sunan. Camp had been established in early July/52. Camp was 2½ km. around, fenced with barbed wire. POWs worked six hours a day, given two hours indoctrination. Screened twice a month for potential agents vs. South Korea.

(Comment: According to SO 99143, a camp with 1,000 ROK POWs was at the site of the former Sunan High School, next to cemetery 1 km. NE

S E C R E T

of Sunan RR Station. This camp had been moved to Sunan from Kirim-ni 20 July/52 because of UN bombings. Field comment in this report states Camp #13 at Sunan was listed by the Communists 12 July/52.)

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11. Pyongyang Complex

- (a) Huan-dong (YD 4333) As of 30 Nov/52, 24 USAF pilots were interned in Huan-dong. Camp in building 20 x 6 x 4 m. Guard posted in four phases of building. 50 personnel in charge of camp ops. POW schedule: up at 7; breakfast at 8, indoctrination 9:30-12; lunch 12:30; free from 7-8; supper 8:30, recreation 10; bed 10:30. Fed 600 gr. rice, vegetables, soy oil per day; weak, yellow complectioned from diet. No medical equipment in camp. Billets DDT sprayed once a week. POWs wore one-piece fatigues and USAF pilot jackets. POWs refused to listen to lectures, were homesick. Building surrounded by barbed wire, guarded by one squad of soldiers. Camp was moved here July/52 from Pyongyang area.

(Comment: Directorate had one previous report of camp with 20 UN pilots at YD 4136 [CCRAK #F-1589, 12 July/52].)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b) Kirim-ni (YD 3823):

- (1) As of Oct/52, 2,000 ROK POWs were interned at YD 3832, probably Kirim-ni camp.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (2) As of 21 Sept/52, 1,500 ROK POWs were in a red brick, 2-story school building at YD 3824 in Kirim. POWs worked in groups of 25 repairing bomb damage. Daily ration of 700 gr. of corn or rice with salt and seaweed.

(Comment: Probably same camp as Sinsong-dong [See p. 7, item(e)], Hasokhwa-ri [See p. 6, item (b)].)

- (3) As of 13 Sept/52, the NK bureau supervising POW camps in NK HQs in semi-underground houses 10 x 3 x 2 m. at YD 3824 on NW edge of Moran-bong in Kirim-ni. POWs were brought here immediately after capture, sent to Kangdong after interrogation, and thence to other camps in North Korea.

(Field Comment: SO 103362 [See p. 6, item (a)] states there was an interrogation camp at YD 4234.)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

S E C R E T

- (c) Mirim-ni (YD 4622) Branch 2: As of Sept/52, a camp with 2,000 ROK POWs was located in one wooden building and two one-story concrete buildings at YD 5524, approximately 8,500 m. E of Mirim-ni. POWs had worked at Mirim airfield from Apr/51 to Apr/52, when construction work stopped because of UN raid. Camp was operated by a company of NKA. POWs given daily three hour indoctrination. Allowed to walk within 200 m. radius of camp in groups of two or three with consent of guards.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (d) Nangyo-dong (YD 3526): As of Sept/52, source saw POW camp for ROKs in vicinity YD 3522. Source heard from another soldier that there were 1,000 ROK POWs in the camp. Camp administered by Pyongyang Security Regt. Located at former Parim People's School. PO-RO characters on roof of building.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (e) Namsa-ri (YD 4725): 12 US POWs reported at these coordinates. 18 Oct/52 photos neither confirm nor disprove.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

(f) Pyongyang Area:

- (1) CCRACK CR #140, 20 Aug/52 reported 500 ROK (NK anti-Communists) POWs at YD 3822 in five personnel shelters. 8 Nov/52 photos neither confirm nor disprove.
- (2) As of late Sept/52, 50 UN POWs (30 ROK, 20 US) seen in Pyongyang. Appeared haggard and dirty, but clothes in fair condition. POWs being marched north.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (3) Source saw 50 ROK POWs escorted to gate of Pyongyang camp for lunch by one-star NK officer and four NCOs. POWs in blue overalls. Source didn't know number of POWs in camp.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (g) Sosong-ni (YD 3622) Branch 1: Camp at YD 364214 photographed 8 Nov/52. 1,000 ROK POWs had been reported here. Camp probably Branch 1, Camp #11 as reported by Communists. Photos neither confirmed nor disproved.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- 5 -

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

- (h) Yongsong (YD 4033): As of Dec/52, a POW camp for USAF was located on a wooded hill in Yongsong-ni area (YD 4233) with 26 Caucasian, 8 Negro POWs. Camp approximately 100 m. in circumference, enclosed with barbed wire, guarded by platoon of NKA. POWs treated better than infantry POWs, no forced labor. Camp often visited by Soviet AF advisors.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (i) Wasan-ni (YD 3928): This camp possibly closed in July-Aug/52 POW camp re-shuffle. CCRAK F-1979, 15 July/52 stated 20-50 UK POWs this location and numerous reports from March to mid-July/52 tend to confirm each other as to camp's existence during that period.

- - - - -

The following are new camp listings in the Pyongyang area:

- (a) Hach'u-dong (YD 4234), Interrogation camp: As of Aug-Sept/53, UN and ROK POWs were interrogated in buildings of a former brick factory in this location. Camp attached to NKA General HQ, established in Mar/51. POWs from all parts of front interrogated here prior to assignment to other camps. 15 Aug/52 there were 150 ROK and 30 other UN POWs here. Number of POWs varied because of large turn-over, but averaged 150. Other UN POWs separated from ROKs and interrogated in English. When more POWs were to be interrogated than camp could accomodate, the excess was sent to other camps and English-speaking interrogators sent with them. Daily rice ration of 700 gr. with supplemental rations of vegetable soup and mackerel. ROK POWs had bread as main food (probably in lieu of rice.) All POWs wore blue fatigues and received regulation NK issue of beds and everyday articles. POWs did light work in camp area. Lt. Col. YI (fnu) was commanding officer, aged 38, graduate of English Literature at Nippon University, member SK Labor Party prior to war.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (b) Hasokhwa-ri (YD 2538): As of 30 Sept/52, there was a camp holding 2,000 ROK POWs in 12 dug-out shelters near Hasokhwa-ri. Camp established Aug/52. Area $1\frac{1}{2}$ km. circumference, fenced with barbed wire. POWs worked on nearby farms 8 hours a day, given 2 hours indoctrination daily. Screened three times monthly for potential agents to be used vs. South Koreans.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- 6 -

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

- (c) Pyongsang Prison Area (YD 3721): 800 ROK POWs reported in this location in Pyongyang. Prison and schools in area had been virtually demolished but possible POWs were still in area. (Photos made 8 Nov/52.)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (d) Sijong-myon (YD 4933), probably interrogation camp: Source observed 60 US POWs being taken to Sijong-myong office by NKA officer from NKA GHQ. Source said POWs lived in a number of civilian homes in area.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (e) Sinsong-dong (YD 2151): As of 30 Sept/52, a camp containing 3,700 ROK POWs was in 18 dug-out shelters at the foot of a hill this location. Camp 2 km. diameter and fenced with barbed wire. POWs worked 8 hours a day, given 2 hours indoctrination daily. Screened twice a month for potential agents to be used vs. South Koreans.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

12. Ch'ahwangch'on (YD 3538)

- (a) CCRACK A-208 places Soyang-ni (Hung-ni) at YD 3734, holding 2,500 ROK POWs. This may be incorrect reference to camp #12, but the number of POWs is excessive if so.

- (b) Camp #12 is headquarters for the "American-British POW Organization for Peace", which puts out a newspaper there. Ambrose Nugent is a POW in #12.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

21. Chail-li (YD 2649), Indoctrination Camp. POW camp for AF personnel at YD 2649. POWs undernourished, averaged 3-4 in sick bay, treated by doctors from nearby ChiCom ambulance unit. Innoculations given by three male nurses from unit; (POWs told innoculations necessary to protect from germ warfare, but caused fever and POWs suspicious of them.) Recreation: volleyball and swimming at irregular times -- games short and few who played didn't overdo. Compulsory indoctrination in camp. 2-3 POWs eager to learn but majority not interested. POWs represented by a leader. Those who tried to escape lost meal privileges and forced to write self-criticism. If escape successful, POW leader to be punished, but beatings now allowed. Roll call in camp. Guards regular NKA, treated POWs well, made regular rounds of camp at night. (Sketch of camp layout attached to cited report.)

(Comment: Prior to June/52, a camp housing US POWs was in five large buildings at YD 267497 near Chail-li--almost certainly same as above. First building at YD 272497, second at YD 265487, third at YD 273477, fourth at YD 300503, fifth at YD 296508. In June/52, 120 POWs moved to

S E C R E T

Kangdong camp (BU 4837.) [SO 96821 stated there were 80 Caucasian POWs (believed US) and 150 ROKs in Kangdong as of late June/52, 8 Oct/52 56 NKA Evacuation Hospital was in houses vacated by POWs. One company of troops at YD 374505, another 600 m. N of Chail-li, another 2 mi. S of HQ at YD 374505.)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

22. Tari-gol (Pukchin (YE 3732-3454)

- (a) A POW camp with 1,600 ROK and 400 other UN POWs located in two school buildings at YD 3353, W of Pukchin. ROK POWs in larger building (2-story brick, 80 x 90 x 12 m.) UN POWs in smaller building. (flat cement 25 x 20 x 8 m.) Daily ration of 600 gr. rice, 200 gr. sorghum often cut because of shortages. POWs wore NK uniforms, cloth shoes. Some worked transporting machine parts to Unsan gold mine (YE 3253), others worked in mine in two shifts of 12 hours each.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (b) As of 13 Sept/52, there was a POW camp containing 1,500 ROK and 600 US in caves formerly occupied by the Unsan gold mine at YE 3732, E of Maebong-dong (YE 3823). POWs given daily ration of 700 gr. of food (70% grain.) Many POWs were ill, wore ragged dirty NKA uniforms. US POWs rarely seen. ROK POWs made NKA uniforms on sewing machines and did other machine and tool work. Compulsory indoctrination three hours a week, plus periodic debate and criticism sessions, and occasional rallies denouncing SK and US governments. Camp had 120 guards armed with four light machine guns.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Manpojin (BA 7259): Camp never listed by the Communists; last information re its existence over a year old. One convoy of exchanged POWs nevertheless collected at this camp.

B. Unacknowledged Camps

1. New Listings

- (a) Kasong-ni (YD 3189): 400 ROK ex-POWs in NKA "Liberation Unit" this location (unconfirmed).

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (b) Kowon-gun (CU 5266): In June/52, 200 ROK, 30 Caucasian, 7 Negro POWs transferred by truck from South Hamgyong Province penitentiary to Kowon-gun where they were to repair damaged railroads. POWs chained together in groups of five. While traveling through Kungjon-ni

S E C R E T

district of Hamhung City (CV 7517), 5 US, 7 ROK POWs and 2 of 20 NK guards were killed in UN air raid. Guards said that POWs would be transferred to Musan area (EB 1875) to avoid future raids.

(Comment: Camp probably no longer in existence.)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (c) Kung-dong (YC 4268): Unconfirmed report of 600 ROK POWs this location.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (d) Naedong-ni (YD 1273): As of 22 Nov/52, camp housing approximately 500 ROK POWs located in civilian houses. Camp established late July/52.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (e) Oksang-dong Gold Mine (YD 3975): 1,000 ROK POWs reported confined this location. One report states old Camp #8 (Taesong-ni) might have moved here. Camp used to give newly captured POWs six month indoctrination course. Photos taken 26 Nov/52 neither confirm nor disprove.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (f) Powon-ni (YD 0667): An unconfirmed report states 200 POWs of unknown nationality lived in eight civilian houses and did farming in this area.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (g) Sinjong-ni (YC 2755): Unconfirmed report states 400 ROK POWs lived in 40 civilian houses this area. Worked repairing bridge at YC 2652.

- (h) Sohang-ni (YD 2385):

- (1) There have been sporadic reports over a long period of a camp at this location, containing 2,500 ROK POWs. Photos made 27 Sept/52 show possibility of camp location here.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (2) CCRAK F-5640, 2 & 3 Nov/52 lists another Sohng-ni at YD 5303, with unknown number of ROK POWs. States this camp is an indoctrination center.

- (i) Song'yong (CT 5191): A POW camp containing 100 US, 500 ROKs in a former school and nearby houses this location. POWs fed 500gr. grain a day. No clothes or bedding issued. US and ROK POWs given same

S E C R E T

treatment, including indoctrination. Converted ROK POWs taken into NKA, called "Liberated Soldiers".

(Comment: Possibly same camp reported by different source in SO 102998.)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

CCRAK J-1223, July/52 reported 100 US, 500 ROK POWs this location. No photo coverage.

- (j) Sohwa Electric Factory (YE 0302): Single reports states some of the 700 US, 1,800 ROK POWs in camp near this location work in factory, remainder are being indoctrinated.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (k) Togwon-ni (BU 4455): 400 US, 70 ROK POWs reported this location. Kirim-ni camp said to have been moved here. (Photo coverage 25 Nov/52 neither confirms nor disproves.)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

2. Old Listings, New Confirmations

- (a) Chosan (YF 3623) (Once considered abolished for report purposes, reinstated on basis of following information.): As of mid-Sept/52 a POW camp containing 300 ROKs was located in coal mine pits near Chosan. POWs mined coal on an average of 7 hours daily. Fed 700 gr. rice and 30 gr. other grain. Sick treated by NKA surgeons, but treatment inadequate. POWs were taught NKA regulations and basic military subjects, given 2-3 hours indoctrination daily. Camp guarded by platoon of NKA, who were forbidden contact with civilians. Most of the POWs had enlisted in the 22nd Brigade, NKA after capture but were discharged in Apr/52 and sent to Chosan to wait POW exchange.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (b) Kangdong (Chiktong camp, YD 5423)

- (1) 180 US, 120 ROK POWs reported here. 130 of US POWs were Negroes, 50 were USAF. POWs lived in five houses 9 x 4 x 4 m. US POWs in three of houses ROKs in two. Barbed wire around camp. Camp guarded and operated by 60NKA. Camp commander a Major. POWs worked repairing roads. Fed 1,000 gr. food daily. Dressed in brown one-piece fatigues. Given haircut every two weeks, bath once weekly. Each POW wore white numbered tag by which he was identified. POWs got occasional package of cigarettes. Camp occasionally inspected by three Russians. Camp said to have been moved to this location Mar/52.

S E C R E T

(Comment: Directorate has had no other reports of Camp at these exact coordinates, but many reports of camp in general area.)

[Redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (2) Photo coverage of 24 Oct/52 neither confirms nor disproves the many reports on Kangdong camp. Conflict because of confusion of this camp with Camp #11, Branch 3 (formerly Camp 8) where 180 UN Caucasians and 900 ROK POWs are said to be held.

[Redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (3) As of 13 Sept/52, Kangdong Camp #8, with 2,000 ROK POWs living in houses formerly occupied by Taeson Coal Mine (YD 5724) employees was at this location. POWs organized in four companies and transportation company; four platoons to a company and four squads to each platoon. POWs used as squad leaders and assistant platoon leaders. Fed 600 gr. (20% rice) per day. Wore ragged blue coveralls. Medical facilities poor, POWs unhealthy. Worked around camp 3-4 hours daily, had 2-3 hours indoctrination twice a week, discussion periods periodically (where truce talks not mentioned.) POWs hostile toward guards, some escaped (usually during air raids). Camp organization: Maj. head; Captains in charge of political, management, supply sections; medical section of four under a Jr. Lt.; approximately 30 additional personnel on total staff. Camp guarded by 150 NKA under command of Ministry Internal Affairs, armed with four light machine guns. Officers carried pistols, EM carried burp guns and Soviet rifles. PO-RO marker on roof of camp.

[Redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (c) Karyoju-ri (CT 2691): As of Sept/52, 500 ROK POWs reported this location. No confirmation or photo coverage.

[Redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (d) Koem-ni (YD 5622) (Once considered abolished, reinstated on following basis): As of Sept/52, a camp containing 300 ROK POWs was in a village at YD 558222, near Koem-ni. The village was formerly for employees of a nearby coal mine. POWs slept in a building 30 x 3 x 3 m., formerly the billet for male mine workers. Two hour indoctrination course given three times a week in a tile-roofed building 40 x 20 x 5 m, with eight windows on N and S sides, eight entrances. PO-RO marker on S side of roof. POWs mined coal eight hours a day, beginning work at 8 a.m. Three - four POWs shared one blanket, used hemp or rice bags as mattresses. POWs fed 500 gr. rice, 200 gr. soy or corn, with

S E C R E T

vegetable side dish. POWs in poor condition because of hard labor, poor food, lack of camp sanitation. Camp guarded by three platoon IKA armed with Soviet rifles and PPShs who patrolled area day and night.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (e) Pakchun-gol (XC 8550): 10,000 ROK POWs said to be located along valley 3 km. N of Pakchun. Source saw 1,000 of these POWs working on river bank construction project.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

II. MANCHURIA-CHINA

A. Old Listings, New Confirmations

1. Mukden (126-93, 46-05) (Considered abolished in former report, existence reconfirmed by following information): 14 politico-military cadres well versed in English and Korean were assigned 15 Nov/52 by the General Political Department, ChiCom Military Council to Mukden to form US and ROK POWs for thought reform and espionage training. POWs were divided into three categories:

- (a) Younger POWs from Company Officer up who were considered straightforward to be trained in thought reform and espionage;
- (b) POWs desultory in thought and accustomed to POW life were to be bribed by material inducements and set to gathering propaganda which would give them a good impression of the Communists. Their family correspondence would publicize "happy life" in camps and create US anti-war sentiment;
- (c) Stubborn POWs were to be segregated from categories (a) and (b), put to forced labor and refused correspondence.

The ChiCom Military Council selected Quinn, O'Neal and seven other AF men from Camp #2 as the first group to be trained in Mukden (phonetic names given by original agent.)

More than 80 ROK POWs were to be selected for three month training at Mukden. Those considered progressive thinkers to be either released or smuggled to South Korea for espionage work.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

2. Peiping (116-24, 39-36): General Dean refused to cooperate in promotion of EW campaign. Reported sent to Peiping.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- 12 -

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

SUMMARY OF POW CAMPS

	ACKNOWLEDGED CAMPS	UNACKNOWLEDGED CAMPS
KOREA	No.	
	1. Imsan-dong (Sakchu)	Chosan (back in)
	2. Changson (Er. 2)	Kangdong
	# 5. Pyoktong (Kuksa-ri)	Karyoju-ri
	# 7. Chon-ma (Yongsan-ni)	Kasong-ni*
	8. Anju	Koem-ni (back in)
	Taet'aryong-ni*	Kowan-gun*
	Yongso-ri	Kung-dong*
	9. Chaedong-ni	Naedong-ni*
	Singchang-ni	Oksang-dong Gold Mine*
	Songhyon-ni	Pakchun-gol
	10. Sunan	Pwon-ni*
	11. Pyongyang Complex	Sinjong-ni*
	Huan-dong	Sohang-ni*
	Hachu-dong*	Sohwa Electric Factory*
	Hasokhwa-ri*	Sonp'yong*
	Kirim-ni	Togwon-ni*
	Mirim-ni (Br. 2)	
	Nangyo-dong	
	Namsa-ri	
	Pyongysang Prison Area*	
	Soson-ni (Br. 1)	
	Sijon-myon*	
Sinsong-dong*		
Yongsong		
Wasan-ni ?		
12. Ch'ahwangch'on		
Soyang-ni		
21. Chail-li		
22. Tari-gol (Pukchin)		
- - - - -		
# Manpojin (back in)		
MANCHURIA- CHINA		Mukden (back in) Peiping

LEGEND: # Camps at which POWs collected for Apr/53 exchange
 * New Listings
 ? May have been abolished
 (back in) Camps believed abolished for lack of information.
 New reports reinstate existence.

S E C R E T

TRENDS AND MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS (OPINION)

1. In Korea, the foregoing shows twelve acknowledged, eleven numbered camps (#21 and #22 acknowledged by CCRAK only.) April exchange POWs collected at Camps #5 and #7, and the previously unacknowledged, unnumbered Manpojin (except for those POWs captured in Mar/53 and Apr/53.) It also shows sixteen unacknowledged camps, eleven of which are new listings, two of which have previously been considered abolished but which have been reinstated on the basis of new information. In Manchuria-China, there are two listings: General Dean reported in Peiping, and Mukden as a thought training and espionage center.

2. POW Control and Movement:

a. A POW General Command has reportedly been set up in the Pyongyang area at YD 825228 in ten caves of unknown size with four entrances. (See cited report, Ex. A #10 for location Ex. 10 for details of camp.) This Command believed to be governing all POW enclosures in NK. Source was told by civilian in vicinity that the POW registration section of this HQ was responsible for POW files, and all information re food, medical treatment, supplies. Area guarded by 150 NKA from the Home Ministry Guard Unit, armed with three heavy machine guns, six light machine guns, 100 PPShs. Area heavily wooded, naturally camouflaged. No civilians allowed to enter area.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

b. According to an article in magazine Hsing-tao Chou-pao of Hong Kong, by a Seoul correspondent, all UN POWs under ChiCom control were being sent either to target areas or to China in large numbers. The first action had been instituted by the Koreans to decrease UN bombing activity; latter action was used by Chi-Coms as ammunition in further truce talks. Source said it was very possible the ChiComs would send all UN POWs to the Chinese mainland.

(Comment: There have been previous reports re evidence of POW movements in NK in vicinity of military targets and from NK in vicinity of military targets and from NK into China and Manchuria.)

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

3. POW Interrogation and Indoctrination:

a(1) Procurement and interrogation of UN POWs: Communist forces attempt to indoctrinate all troops to the value of capturing UN personnel, or inducing them to surrender. Troops to squad level given oral propaganda phrases to memorize, interrogation forms to be filled in by UN POWs immediately after capture, instructions for use in Chinese and English for front line units. Forms ask information and diagrams re strength and disposition of POWs' unit, artillery positions, supply dumps, ammo and other equipment reserves, etc. After front line interrogation Communists rely on shock and fear to get cooperation. Before POWs sent to rear, they're told of CCF good treatment policy, and that CCF thought "all capitalists their enemies." After first phases of capture, UN POWs' chances for survival are good: they are interrogated by "psychological persuasion", and POWs refusing to fill out interrogation forms are not punished.

- 14 -

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

a(2) Indoctrination of UN POWs: The Communists' attempt to indoctrinate UN POWs on first contact, greeting them as "liberated brothers", telling them they have been misled and are "imperialist tools", not individually responsible for anti-Communist actions. They are also told they will see the error of their ways and learn the right of Communism. Only torture used was psychological--release hopes were alternately build up and dashed. Degree of indoctrination depended on eventual use planned for POWs.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

b. As of Dec/52, the Recon. Platoon of the 91st Regt, captured US POW in vicinity of Hill 601 (DT 3550) and brought him to Recon. Plat. CP. Here US POW was treated as a guest, given same food as NK troops. He was interrogated by a Sr. Lt. imported from 45th NK Div. CP. When he was released (for unknown reasons) he was accompanied by five members of the Recon. Plat. to UN MLR, and given a parting Christmas gift by the Sr. Lt.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

c. Five loose notebook sheets of a captured enemy document (printed in Chinese) sets forth these principles for indoctrination of US POWs:

(1) How we treat US POWs: don't kill or maltreat, don't take personal possessions, treat the wounded. Treat all POWs equally because "US capitalists are the real enemy and the majority of POWs were laborers who were forced to fight." If POWs lay down their arms, they are not the enemy. POWs must obey orders or they will be punished.

(2) For whom are they fighting and why?

(3) Who invaded whom?

(4) Who won and who lost?

(5) Who is enemy of the US people?

500th MISG Bul. Enemy Documents, #101, 22 Dec/53

4. Treatment of UN POWs:

a. Stories of POW treatment told by exchanged POWs vary widely. It is noteworthy that the prisoners in the first convoy (19 Apr/53) to be exchanged felt, on the whole, that the Reds "had done as well by us as they could." Ten of the POWs in this convoy, which collected at Chon-ma came from Pyoktong, known to be the largest of the NK indoctrination camps, and four of these ten are on the Communist-suspect "watch list", available from intelligence sources.

- 15 -

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

While ten of the prisoners in the 20 Apr/53 convoy had been interned at Pyoktong, none of their names appear on the watch list, and several of them told reporters stories of atrocity and brutality to POWs, so apparently their indoctrination had not been successful. (In this connection, it must be noted that most of the reported atrocities occurred in late 1950 and early 1951.) The three watch list suspects from this group came from Changson camp, as did the three from the group repatriated 23 Apr/53.

Brutal treatment of sick, wounded, and undernourished POWs, according to one of the few officers exchanged to date, "improved or fell off according to progress at the truce talks....when the negotiations picked up, the Chinese had buddy buddy week with us." The officer, 1st Lt. Roy M. Jones, Minneapolis, also said indoctrination was stopped completely last year when "we saw in the Communists' paper that the Commies had objected at the truce talks to indoctrination of their prisoners. After that they stopped indoctrinating us."

POW exchange of the third day was of prisoners all but two of whom were captured in March, and who had thus never been in a rear-area camp. These men had little complaint of their treatment.

b. The prisoner exchange and several recent magazine articles have made the public more aware of the 3,000 plus discrepancy between the Defense Department MIA total and the US prisoners admittedly in Communist hands. 1950-51 atrocities, malnutrition, forced labor, resulting illness, etc., might account for many of this number, but not for all. Attention is called to three magazine articles, all published in April 1953:

- (1) "Unreported G.I.'s in Siberia," Nagorski, ESQUIRE, May issue, p. 51.
- (2) "Deal for US POWs in Korea," US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, April 24 issue, p. 35.
- (3) "I Saw Your Prisoner Sons," Yeh Min, PARADE, Sunday, April 5,

While none of these articles are based on confirmed information, all mention the possibility of unaccounted-for POWs being in Manchuria, China, and/or Russia. Released as they were at the time of the POW exchange, and coupled with stories of returning POWs themselves, they will undoubtedly influence general suspicion of Red motives and intentions in any possible future POW exchanges.

Regarding motives and intentions, the primary POW-returnee complaint was that much sicker men had been left behind in camp. Several were actually bewildered as to why they had been selected for exchange. It is always possible that the unforeseen immediacy of the exchange caught the Reds unaware and without the time for proper screening of sick and wounded POWs. However, viewing the geographic spread of the returnees'

S E C R E T

hometowns, it is more logical to believe that they had been carefully selected, and long in advance of the exchange, not for extent of wounds or illness, but for possible use to the Communist Party. Returnees will come back to homes concentrated along lines of communication and in the southern mountain coal mining area. In almost every case, the returnee's hometown is within easy distance of some strategic US defense area (Oak Ridge, Alamogordo, Rock Island Arsenal, several large air force bases, etc.) A top-heavy percentage comes from Puerto Rico.

Of the watch list returnees, one comes from a small town in southern Maine, not far from Boston; one each from New York City and Philadelphia with their shipyards; one from Oklahoma City and its oil supply; two from the southern coal mining area; one from Syracuse and the Great Lakes shipping system; and one from San Francisco.

5. Propaganda:

a. During February and March 1953, the BW campaign, which had continued with varying intensity since its inception in February 1952, was revived by the ChiComs.

(1) 20 Feb/53 Peiping broadcast (FBIS-monitored): "US planes dropped insects on Manchurian and North Korean towns during December."

(2) 22 & 24 Feb/53, Peiping broadcasts: "Two senior USMC 1st Marine Air Wing officers confirmed that the JCS directed planned BW, following reports of international investigating bodies. (Col. F. H. Schwable, Maj. R. H. Bley's depositions followed.)

(3) 5 Mar/53 broadcast: Peiping accused British Minister of State Selwyn Lloyd of "covering up" US BW by denying Alan Winnington's accusations of "a conspiracy of silence in Tokyo, Washington and London."

(4) 6 Mar/53 Pyongyang broadcast: POW Enoch (Camp #5) had sent a letter to The Congress of Peoples for Peace in Vienna during Dec/52 calling for an early solution to the war and a halt to BW. POW Quinn (also at Camp #5) had written a similar letter to the Congress. (NB: Both letters were introduced on the broadcast by identical wording in their forwards.)

b. Early April 1953 broadcasts concentrate on the latest effort to achieve a peaceful settlement of the prisoner issue; broadcasts made after the POW exchange had begun recite the "good treatment of POWs"-line.

The following elements characterize the current propaganda pattern:

(1) A drop in atrocity charges prior to the resumption of truce talks in 6 Apr/53 indicate a desire to avoid comment which might hinder a truce agreement. This is the first time attention has been given to an amenability phase of the Korean war rather than to the denunciation of US "aggression or bestiality."

S E C R E T

(2) Increased comment on recent military operations, which may stem from a desire to prove the Commies are negotiating from a position of strength. Propaganda-wise, Peiping seems to be setting the stage for a claim that their basic objectives in Korea have been attained.

(3) Repatriation of UN POWs: description of good treatment on convoys; POW comment on ending the war; claim that many of wounded POWs had been hurt in UN bombings of camps; description of farewells in camp; gratitude of POWs to captors for good treatment while interned; suggestion by various returnees that they would probably be "hospitalized" for quite awhile after their return--misgivings over prospects of the "screening and remodeling course" awaiting them on the other side.

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

25 June 2021

John Clarke, Esq.
1629 K Street, NW
Suite 300
Washington, DC, 20008

Reference: *Lois Moore, et al v. CIA*, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No: 1:20-cv-01027; F-2020-00473

Dear Mr. Clarke:

This is an interim response to your 25 November 2019 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request submitted by your client, Lois Moore, for the following:

1. From the period of March 16, 1954, through 1961, all records of the CIA's efforts in undertaking "clandestine and covert action to locate, identify, and recover those U.S. Prisoners of War still in Communist custody"
2. An unredacted copy of this report [January 5, 1952, *CIA Information Reports*] together with all intelligence material upon which it was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
3. Please produce the [following] referenced [in July 15, 1952, *CIA Cross Reference Sheet*]:
 - a. July 15, 1952 "Basic Communication"
 - b. June 24, 1953 "Basic Document"
 - c. Information described as "etcetera"
 - d. POW Information in, or otherwise "Router to, C.I. File"
 - e. POW information related to or bearing the "Cross Reference Number 040"
 - f. POW Information related to or bearing the "Classification Number 383.6 Korea."
4. All records regarding the June 1, 1951 shoot down and capture over North Korea of the American F-51 piloted by U.S. Air Force Captain Harry Cecil Moore, born February 11, 1924, in Elm Grove, West Virginia, service number AO 711850.
5. All records upon which the following statement from February 27, 1952 memo from Chief of Naval Personnel to Commanding General, Far East Air Force was

000075

based: “It is now believed that there is a possibility that Captain Moore survived and is now a Prisoner of War.”

6. All records regarding Captain Moore’s incarceration and transportation from North Korea to the Soviet Union, his locations in the Soviet Union, and all evidence that he “may have been interrogated by Soviet officials.
7. An unredacted copy of July 17, 1952, three page *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
8. An unredacted copy of December 31, 1953, *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
9. An unredacted copy of March 24, 1954, *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
10. An unredacted copy of April 23, 1954, *CIA Information Report*.
11. An unredacted copy of April 27, 1954, *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
12. An unredacted copy of December 8, 1954, *CIA Information Report*.
13. Any and all information relating to this Report [January 23, 1992 cable from Embassy Helsinki to Secretary of State]
14. An unredacted copy of March 9, 1988, CIA Memorandum to “US Army Chief, Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action,” together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
15. All records relating to any of the POW/MIA’s names in the attached list.
16. Any and all records relating that any POW/MIAs may have been held in the prisons identified in the attached list of Russian prison camps.
17. For the period beginning June of 1951, and continuing to the present time, please produce all POW records provided to, or receive from, any office of any component of the Department of Defense, including but not limited to:
 - a. CCRAK
 - b. Air Force 6004 Air Intelligence Service Squadron during the tenure of “Project American.”
 - c. Missing in Action Office, including those provided in response to the attached February 12, 1997 letter from U.S. House of Representative James Talent seeking “Intelligence pertaining to American prisoners who were taken to China and the Soviet Union during the war” as well as:
 - i. The 389 American service members who into the 1980’s were listed as unaccounted prisoners of war by the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) ii. All U.S. Air Force F-86 pilots who remain unrepatriated.
 - d. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, of AFOSI
 - e. Naval Criminal Investigative Service, or NCIS
 - f. Army Criminal Investigation Command, CID

g. U.S. Army Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities Far East, or CCRAFE.

- 18. All POW records prepared by any officer, agent, or employee of the CIA, prepared for the Office of the President including the President's Daily Brief, or PDB, that include information on the possibility of POW's being transferred to the Soviet Union or China.**
- 19. All records reflecting communications with Members of Congress, or Congressional Oversight committees concerning the capture of American airmen during the Korean conflict who may have been transported to the Soviet Union or China and their presumed fate.**
- 20. All records concerning POW's and KGB defector Yuri (or Yury) Rastvorov, who informed the United States Government that American military personnel were taken to the Soviet Union during the Korean Conflict. This request includes an unredacted version of the attached page with the heading, "Terminology".**
- 21. All intelligence material (including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports) concerning statements made by former Czech General Jan Sejna and other former Czech Officials concerning former US POWs held, interrogated and experiment on by Czech and Soviet advisors, and thereafter transferred to China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and the Soviet Union.**

We are processing your request in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.

We have identified five (5) documents that are responsive to your request. One (1) document is being released in full. Two (2) documents may be released in segregable form with redactions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(3) and (b)(6). Two (2) documents must be withheld in full based on FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6). Exemption (b)(3) pertains to Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 3507, noted as exemption "(b)(3)CIAAct" on the enclosed documents, and/or Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C § 3024(i)(1), noted as exemption "(b)(3)NatSecAct" on the enclosed documents. The releasable documents are on the enclosed CD.

A final response will be provided to you on a later date.

Sincerely,



Mark Lilly
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

000077

[Redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

2 August 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Senator Conrad's Request for Information on Possible Russian POW 1LT Warren J. Sanderson USAF

1. On Monday, 25 July 1994, I received a call from [Redacted] of Senator Kent Conrad's (D-ND) office requesting a meeting with the DCI to discuss getting the Intelligence Community's cooperation in retrieving data on the fate of subject Air Force officer, shot down in the Soviet Far East on 29 July, 1953. [Redacted] claimed that there was evidence to support a belief on the part of Sanderson's heirs that the flier, who was on an electronics intelligence collection mission, had survived the crash of his RB-50 (modified B-29) and had been incarcerated in a Russian POW camp.

(b)(6)

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2. The Senator's aide further explained that the Sanderson inquiry was being spearheaded by [Redacted] one of Conrad's constituents. Faust stressed that [Redacted] was "playing by the rules" and had succeeded so far in getting good cooperation from DIA, NSA and the Air Force. [Redacted] has also travelled to Moscow to discuss his case with the US/Russian Commission on Cold War POWs and has been invited to formally present the case before that body at the end of August 1994.

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
3. While in Moscow, [Redacted] said, [Redacted] had met with former KGB officials who told him that 7 of the 9 members of the RB-50 crew had survived the crash in the waters off Vladivostok and had been picked up by NKVD patrol boats. From DoD [Redacted] had previously learned that another crew member had been picked up by a US destroyer 22 hours after the crash but that he did not know the fate of his compatriots. [Redacted] told [Redacted] that US Ambassador Malcolm Toon and Russian General Volkogronov (sp?) of the POW Commission had agreed that this was the "priority case" among the Cold War POW incidents because of the availability of credible evidence.

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4. [Redacted] said that what Conrad wanted on behalf of his constituent was discovery of whether [Redacted] Sanderson had in any way been employed by CIA at the time he was lost, whether the Agency had in any way been involved in the planning or follow-up of the failed mission, and whether we

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000078

SUBJECT: Senator Conrad's Request for Information on Possible Russian POW 1LT Warren J. Sanderson USAF

had any information indicating that the flier had been incarcerated in a POW camp. I told [redacted] that those were all legitimate questions for us to address but suggested that a Conrad-Woolsey meeting was not necessarily the best way to go about it. I suggested that we could save the time of both our principals if he would settle for my making at least a preliminary survey of the lay of the land at the staff level rather than insisting on a meeting. [redacted] agreed on the condition I report back to him on Tuesday, noting that he wanted a "yes or no" answer on a meeting with the Director since [redacted] now in Washington, was returning to [redacted]

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5. I turned first for information to [redacted] Chief of the Agency History Staff. He said he knew of no one now in the Agency with direct knowledge of the issues [redacted] had raised. MacDonald added, however, that a retired CIA Officer, Donald Welzenbach, had been retained on contract by the History Staff to write two studies of the Agency's involvement in aerial reconnaissance, one focused on the U-2 missions and the other on the OXCART (SR-71) program. He said that in the course of this work Welzenbach had become knowledgeable about other US programs of this type and could be a useful source for [redacted]

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[redacted]

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(b)(3) NatSecAct
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[redacted] He explained that, while DCI Dulles chaired the US Intelligence Activities Board (interagency commission that approved such missions), he preferred to leave such collection missions to Defense until the Agency could acquire its own airborne collector, i.e. the U-2. As a result, [redacted] said, he believed any search of CIA records would not turn up 1LT Sanderson.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted]

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7. On [redacted] recommendation, I called Welzenbach [redacted] who proved to be a font of information about the period in question [redacted]

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[redacted]

000079

SUBJECT: Senator Conrad's Request for Information on Possible Russian POW 1LT Warren J. Sanderson USAF

[Redacted]

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8. Welzenbach said he would be pleased to talk with [Redacted] and provided two leads that he could pursue if he had not already done so. The first was a BBC television program called "Spies in the Sky" which was shown in the US on the A&E channel on 28 May 1994. He characterized it as a very professional and comprehensive video report and said

[Redacted]

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9. Welzenbach also recommended two studies published by the RAND Corporation at the SECRET and TOP SECRET level which he claimed covered every one of the missions flown around the periphery of the Soviet Union from 1935 to 1954 in great detail. He said that he believed that these studies had been declassified or at least downgraded recently and would be a valuable source, directly or indirectly, [Redacted] Welzenbach added that the RAND studies showed that the Soviets had been fairly passive in reacting to intrusions of their airspace until 1949 but in the early fities became increasingly aggressive. Welzenbach said that he remembered the shutdown of the RB-50 on which Sanderson had been lost and recalled that by 1953 Russian interceptors were not only challenging intruders over the Sea of Japan but were pursuing them over Japanese territory.

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10. Welzenbach recommended that [Redacted] get in touch with a Mr. Cargill Hall at the Air Force Center for History. He said that since the death of BGEN Millard Lewis in 1993, the officer who had planned all the USAF missions of this type in the period 1950-54, Hall was the most informed person in the Air Force on this program. He added that Hall

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] Welzenbach said [Redacted] should use his name in introducing himself to Hall. (b)(6)

[Redacted]

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SUBJECT: Senator Conrad's Request for Information on Possible Russian POW 1LT Warren J. Sanderson USAF

12. On Tuesday, 26 July, I reported back to [redacted] much of the information related above and said that we would proceed with a computer run of our employment records and should have an answer for him the next day. [redacted] expressed his gratitude and said that he would pass on [redacted] the leads that [redacted] and Welzenbach had supplied. Later on the same day, [redacted] called back to say that [redacted] was already aware of the RAND reports and that Defense had previously put him in touch with Hall at the Air Force History Center. He also said that [redacted] had just called Welzenbach and had found that conversation helpful. [redacted] asked me if [redacted] could talk with me by telephone in lieu of a meeting. Since avoiding a meeting for the Director had been one of my objectives from the outset, I agreed--with the caveat that I had no substantive expertise on the matters in question. [redacted] said [redacted] just wanted to thank me for the Agency's efforts so far and to provide additional information that might assist our search.

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13. [redacted] called shortly thereafter with data OS wanted on [redacted] date of birth, Social Security number and Air Force serial number. He also told me that 1LT Sanderson had been assigned to the 55th Reconnaissance Wing, 343rd Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron but was detailed to the 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, based in Yokota, Japan at the time of the crash. [redacted] added that he believed [redacted] had been imprisoned at the "Inta" camp near "Verkuta" in the Soviet Far East.

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15. [redacted] said he would like the CIA to search its records to determine the validity of these leads as well as to determine whether there were any intelligence overflights of the crash area immediately after the RB-50 was lost. He also had heard that a team of "Japanese nationals" had been inserted into the Vladivostok area after the crash to check on the whereabouts of the downed crew and he wondered whether the Agency's files would reveal anything about this effort.

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SUBJECT: Senator Conrad's Request for Information on Possible Russian POW 1LT Warren J. Sanderson USAF

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16. Finally, [redacted] said that he would mail me a "package" of information documenting these leads more fully. I replied that we would consider addressing the package after we had found out the answer to his initial question, i.e. whether [redacted] was ever employed in any way by the Agency. [redacted] stressed the importance of a quick reaction by CIA since he needed to make the most complete case possible to the US/Russian POW Commission later this month.

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but had no luck. I then reached [redacted] at Senator Conrad's office and told him what we had found. [redacted] said he would pass the news on to [redacted]. We agreed that the next step was to examine the package of documentary evidence [redacted] said he would deliver to this office and, if possible, to get [redacted] an answer before his trip to Moscow in late August. I agreed to keep [redacted] informed of our progress.

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senate Liaison

[Redacted block]

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Distribution:

- Original - OCA Records
- 1 - D/OCA
- 1 - DD/SA
- 1 - [redacted]

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Action Number:

Action Status: Closed

Tasked By:

Action POC: (b)(3) CIAAct

Action Type:

Action Categories:

Reference Number:

Internal Due Date:

Dissemination Date:

Created Date: 08/02/1994 00:00

Internal POC:

Organization POC:

Event Date From:

Event Date To: (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Organization/Subcomponents:

Subject:

SENATOR CONRAD'S REQUEST FOR INFORMANTION ON POSSIBLE RUSSIAN POW 1ST LT. WARREN J. SANDERSON (USAF)

Assignees:

Info Only:

Task Lead:

Details:

Action Attachments:

None

Action Related Links:

None

(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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Action Number:

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Response Status: Closed

Date Submitted:

Response from:

(b)(3) CIAAct

Responding to:

Response Text:

No response has been saved.

Response Attachments:

None

Response Related Links:

None

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
AND
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**



A JOINT REPORT

**A REVIEW OF THE 1998 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON
POW/MIA ISSUES AND THE CHARGES LEVIED BY
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE ESTIMATE
(1999-5974-IG)
(00-OIR-04)**

29 February 2000

*Donald Mancuso
Deputy Inspector General
Department of Defense*

*L. Britt Snider
Inspector General
Central Intelligence Agency*

000085

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
GLOSSARY OF TERMS.....	vii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	ix
PART I: INTRODUCTION.....	1
BACKGROUND	1
OBJECTIVE.....	2
STRUCTURE OF REPORT.....	2
PART II: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE.....	4
OPERATION HOMECOMING AND THE END OF THE WAR.....	4
THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.....	5
PROGRESS ON POW/MIA ISSUE	5
<i>Carter Years (1977-1980).....</i>	<i>5</i>
<i>Reagan Years (1981-1988).....</i>	<i>6</i>
<i>Bush Years (1989-1992).....</i>	<i>7</i>
<i>The Road Map</i>	<i>8</i>
<i>Senate Select Committee</i>	<i>8</i>
<i>Clinton Years (1993 to date).....</i>	<i>9</i>
<i>Four Key Areas</i>	<i>9</i>
<i>Normalization.....</i>	<i>9</i>
<i>Certification/Determination Of Cooperation.....</i>	<i>10</i>

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CAPABILITY11
 CIA Turns to Department of Defense.....11
 Intelligence Priorities and Standing Requirements.....12

EVOLUTION OF THE DEFENSE POW/MISSING PERSONNEL OFFICE12

DOD AGENCIES SUPPORTING POW/MIA MISSION.....15
 Joint Task Force-Full Accounting.....15
 Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii15
 Stony Beach15

ROLE OF U.S.-RUSSIA JOINT COMMISSION ON POW/MIAS16

PRIVATE GROUPS16

PART III: POW/MIA ESTIMATE PROCESS18

STANDARD NIE PROCESS18
 Intelligence/Policy Nexus.....19
 Interagency Participants.....19

REQUEST FOR POW/MIA ESTIMATE: POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT.....19

NEGOTIATION OF TERMS OF REFERENCE (APRIL-NOVEMBER 1997) ...20
 Initial Drafts20
 SSCI Delays23
 Changing Actors.....23
 SSCI Response and Final TOR23
 The Issue of Timing25

SENATOR SMITH MEETING WITH NIO/EA25

RESEARCH, ANALYSIS, AND DRAFTING
(NOVEMBER 1997-FEBRUARY 1998).....26
 Role of DPMO.....27

Policy/Analytic Dichotomy27

DPMO Withdraws from Process28

Meetings with DPMO Analyst.....28

Examining the DO Files.....29

Other Contributors of Data.....29

REVIEW AND COORDINATION (FEBRUARY-MARCH 1998).....30

First and Second Drafts (6 and 20 February 1998)30

Third Draft (17 March 1998).....31

Fourth Draft (23 March 1998)32

Outside Readers33

IC Coordination Meeting34

Fifth Draft (31 March 1998).....35

MIB AND NFIB MEETINGS (APRIL 1998)35

ANOTHER ROUND OF REVIEW36

The SSCI Documents.....36

Two More Outside Readers37

DCI Input.....38

CRITICISM OF ESTIMATE.....40

Senator Smith Meets With NIO/EA (June 1998).....40

Release of Critical Assessment (November 1998).....40

MIB AND NFIB MEETINGS (JANUARY 1999).....41

PART IV: CRITICAL ASSESSMENT CHARGES:

SUBSTANCE.....44

RELEVANT DOCUMENTATION45

VIETNAMESE COOPERATION.....48

A Question of Political Sensitivity.....49

Refusal to Cooperate50

MISTREATMENT OF POWS51

RECOVERY AND REPATRIATION OF REMAINS53

Manipulation of Witnesses.....54

Repatriation of Remains.....55

THE SAGA OF THE MORTICIAN57

NUMBERS OF POW/MIA: THE 735 AND 1205 DOCUMENTS62

Two Distinct Methodologies62

The Documents65

Historical Setting of the 735 Document.....65

Historical Setting of the 1205 Document.....69

A Point of Logic74

ASSESSMENT OF COMMENTS BY RUSSIAN SOURCES ON
THE 735 AND 1205 DOCUMENTS75

Our Approach75

Validity and Credibility76

SEPARATE OR SECOND PRISON SYSTEM78

ALLEGED TRANSFERS OF POWS FROM VIETNAM TO THE USSR83

The Russian General84

The Central Committee Secretary86

CASE ASSESSMENTS88

Our Methodology89

The McDonnell Case91

Facts93

Circumstances of Loss93

The Vietnamese Account.....94
Captain McDonnell's Status Changes.....95
Three Times a Discrepancy Case95
Our Assessment.....96

PART V: CRITICAL ASSESSMENT CHARGES:

POLITICIZATION 98

SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZATION99

DoD Testimony (March and June 1998).....99

Outside Readers.....102

Policy Contacts.....104

Charges of Politicization in 1993/94.....105

NSC Tasking.....106

IC Analysis: Timing of Release.....107

Charges of Improper Direction110

GENERAL CHARGE OF POLITICIZATION112

PART VI: CONCLUSIONS 116

RELEVANT DOCUMENTATION117

QUALITY OF NIE ANALYSIS.....118

POLITICIZATION122

A FINAL NOTE123

ANNEXES:

A - Methodology

B - Summary of Selected Prior Reports

C - Methodology Used in Examining Charges in the *Critical Assessment*

D - Intelligence Community Publications Reviewed by National Intelligence Estimate Drafter

E - Recovery and Remains Documentation Reviewed by NIE Drafter

F - Comments by Russian Sources

G - Case Review Methodology

H - Results of Compelling Case Review

I - Captain McDonnell Case Review

J - Distribution List

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Acronym

AG	Analytic Group (National Intelligence Council)
AII POW-MIA	Advocacy and Intelligence Index for Prisoners of War-Missing in Action
ASD (C³I)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CILHI	Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DDCI	Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
DI	Directorate of Intelligence (CIA)
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DO	Directorate of Operations (CIA)
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
DPMO	Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service
GRU	Soviet Military Intelligence
IC	Intelligence Community
IG	Inspector General
INR	Bureau of Intelligence and Research (DoS)
ISS	Interrepublic Security Service
JCRC	Joint Casualty Resolution Center
JCSD	Joint Commission Support Directorate (DPMO)
JTF-FA	Joint Task Force-Full Accounting
KIA-BNR	Killed in Action-Body Not Recovered
KGB	Soviet Intelligence and Security Service
MIB	Military Intelligence Board
NFIB	National Foreign Intelligence Board
NIC	National Intelligence Council
NIE	National Intelligence Estimate
NIMA	National Imagery and Mapping Agency
NIO	National Intelligence Officer
NIO/EA	National Intelligence Officer for East Asia

NRO	National Reconnaissance Office
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
OCA	Office of Congressional Affairs (CIA)
OIA	Office of Imagery Analysis (CIA)
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PFOD	Presumptive Finding of Death
POW/MIA	Prisoner of War/Missing in Action
RA	Research and Analysis Division (DPMO)
SNIE	Special National Intelligence Estimate
SRV	Socialist Republic of Vietnam
SSCI	Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
TFR	Task Force Russia
TOR	Terms of Reference
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USPACOM	U.S. Pacific Command
VNOSMP	Vietnam Office for Seeking Missing Persons
VWWG	Vietnam War Working Group (U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

On 10 April 1997, the President's National Security Adviser indicated in a letter to the Senate Majority Leader that he would direct the Intelligence Community to prepare a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Vietnam's cooperation with the United States on Prisoner of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA) issues. Terms of Reference for the estimate were formulated by the National Intelligence Council and coordinated with members of the Intelligence Community and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The draft estimate was presented to the Military Intelligence Board and the National Foreign Intelligence Board for approval in April 1998, and NIE 98-03, "Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue," was published in May 1998.¹

Senator Robert C. Smith issued *A Critical Assessment* of the NIE in November 1998 and asked that the Military Intelligence Board and the National Foreign Intelligence Board retract the estimate for reasons cited in his assessment. In January 1999, the Director of Central Intelligence advised Senator Smith that both boards had voted unanimously to let the estimate stand, describing it as an accurate assessment of current knowledge and understanding of the POW/MIA issue. Senator Smith continued to demand that the estimate be retracted and, on 18 March 1999, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence requested that the Inspectors General of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense examine the estimate and the charges made in the *Critical Assessment*. We began a joint inquiry in mid-April 1999.

The Intelligence Community was asked to address two key issues in NIE 98-03 – the extent to which Vietnam has cooperated with the United States since 1987 to achieve the fullest possible accounting of American personnel missing in action during the Vietnam conflict and the credibility of the 735 and 1205 documents, acquired from Russian archives, which raised questions about whether all American prisoners of war were released

¹ The NIE has been declassified for release and is available on the CIA public website at <http://www.foia.ucia.gov> or by writing to Information and Privacy Coordinator, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. 20505.

by Vietnam in 1973.² The estimate stated that Vietnam has become more helpful in assisting U.S. efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting, but that unresolved issues suggest the need for continued close attention by the U.S. Government. It concluded that the 735 and 1205 documents probably had been acquired in Vietnam by Soviet military intelligence, but that many of the details in the documents are implausible, particularly those dealing with the numbers of prisoners of war allegedly held by Hanoi in the early 1970s.

Senator Smith's *Critical Assessment* challenged the estimate's conclusions on both key issues. On the subject of Vietnamese cooperation, it cited numerous instances where the estimate's analysis was "factually inaccurate, misleading, incomplete, shallow, and seriously flawed." With respect to the 735 and 1205 documents, the *Critical Assessment* stated that the estimate's judgment cannot be accepted because it is "replete with inaccurate and misleading statements, and lacks a reasonably thorough and objective foundation on which to base its judgment." The *Critical Assessment* urged Congress and the Intelligence Community to examine the role policymakers responsible for advancing the Clinton Administration's normalization agenda with Vietnam may have played in influencing judgments in the estimate.

Objective

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence asked us to examine the *Critical Assessment's* charges that the estimate reflected a premeditated effort to discredit relevant information, inadequate analysis, and possible politicization. Our objective was to assess the validity of those charges in order to evaluate the estimate's analytical vigor, objectivity, accuracy, and completeness.

² For a more detailed description of these documents, see page 21 of the report.

Results

Based on our review, we conclude that:

- ◆ The estimate drafter and members of the Intelligence Community who participated in the preparation of the estimate made no effort to discredit relevant information. The drafter had access to and reviewed relevant documentation.
- ◆ The estimate drafter is vulnerable to criticism that he did not pay sufficient attention to pre-1987 documentation, relying on finished intelligence products for analysis of pre-1987 data. The issue of the period of time the estimate would cover was never resolved.
- ◆ Delay in the completion of the Terms of Reference from July to October 1997; the Senate Select Committee's additional requirement that the estimate reassess the 735 and 1205 documents; and the introduction of both a new National Intelligence Officer for East Asia and a new drafter contributed to misunderstandings about estimate objectives.
- ◆ We searched for documentation as far back as the document trail allowed. None of the information we reviewed contradicted the conclusions or changed the judgments reached by the estimate.
- ◆ The overall quality of the estimate is high. The argumentation is vigorous and logical, and the conclusions are well-documented. At the same time:
 - ◆ The withdrawal of the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office from the estimate process inhibited analysis. While not a member of the Intelligence Community, that office possesses most of the U.S. Government's data and expertise on POW/MIA issues.

- ◆ Several analytical mistakes made in the estimate could have been prevented had the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office reviewed the draft estimate. None of these mistakes affected the conclusions or judgments of the estimate, however.
- ◆ The estimate's judgment that Vietnam's performance in dealing with POW/MIA issues has been good in recent years is properly cautious, particularly given the caveat that unresolved areas of Vietnamese cooperation warrant continued close attention by the U.S. Government.
- ◆ The Intelligence Community did not conduct an in-depth re-evaluation of the 735 and 1205 documents. The Intelligence Community also did not undertake an independent review of the numbers of prisoners of war held by the Vietnamese. Instead, the estimate accepted both the 1994 Intelligence Community position related to the legitimacy and accuracy of the documents and the U.S. Government analysis of the numbers of prisoners of war and missing in action. We reviewed both in considerable depth.
- ◆ We determined that the estimate's evaluation of the 735 and 1205 documents remains valid. The documents are genuine, but the information contained in them related to numbers of prisoners of war held by the Vietnamese is inaccurate.
- ◆ Our analysis of discrepancy or compelling cases for which verified remains have not been returned determined that, at most, three of the cases and, in all likelihood, none on a list of 324 provided by Senator Smith to the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs in 1992 remain compelling today.
- ◆ The estimate failed to capture the intricacies of the story of the mortician who worked on the remains of American prisoners of war in Vietnam. It mislabeled the mortician an unreliable source when in fact he was reliable with respect to remains he had actually worked on; his estimate of stored remains that he had not worked on was less accurate.

- ◆ The estimate overstated its case that there is no evidence the Vietnamese currently are storing the remains of American prisoners of war.
- ◆ The estimate did mention, however, that a Department of Defense study on the subject would provide additional information.
- ◆ That study, issued in June 1999, more than a year after publication of the estimate, concluded that there is strong evidence in two cases involving five remains that remains were collected and taken to Hanoi, but not repatriated. Investigation continues.
- ◆ We found no credible evidence to support the thesis that a second prison camp system for prisoners of war existed or that American prisoners of war were transported out of Vietnam to the former Soviet Union or elsewhere.
- ◆ We found no credible evidence that any member of the Clinton Administration tried to influence the estimate or that the Administration tried to influence intelligence reporting on POW/MIA issues related to the 735 and 1205 documents. On the contrary, the concern expressed by policymakers was that the Intelligence Community not appear to be dismissing or debunking information from those documents.
- ◆ Senator Smith and his staff did have an impact on the estimate. They played a role in framing the final Terms of Reference. Senator Smith expressed his opinion on issues to be addressed in the estimate to members of the Intelligence Community, and he said that he was not confident that the Clinton Administration would not interfere in the estimate process.

- ◆ Members of the Intelligence Community as well as outside readers of the draft estimate were keenly aware that the estimate would be criticized by those who believed the Vietnamese were not cooperating in good faith on POW/MIA matters and those who believed that American prisoners of war were left behind in Vietnam and elsewhere in 1973. At numerous stages in the production of the estimate, these intelligence officials and outside readers successfully urged a softening of the tone to placate those who might be critical. These interventions did not change the judgments of the estimate.

Finally, while we were not asked to address this issue, we did not find a single factual thread that supports a finding contrary to that reported to the Speaker of the House of Representatives by Congressman G. V. (Sonny) Montgomery in December 1976, following his Committee's investigation of POW/MIA issues. He conveyed the committee's belief that "no Americans are still being held alive as prisoners in Indochina, or elsewhere, as a result of the war in Indochina." Every U.S. Administration since 1976 has agreed with this conclusion, and we found nothing in the course of this inquiry that suggests otherwise.

PART I: INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

On 10 April 1997, in a letter to the Senate Majority Leader, the President's National Security Adviser indicated that he would direct the Intelligence Community (IC)³ to prepare a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)⁴ on Vietnam's cooperation with the United States on Prisoner of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA) issues.⁵ He said that the IC should "consult" with the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) on the estimate's Terms of Reference (TOR). The TOR were formulated by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and coordinated with the IC and the SSCI. The NIE draft report was presented to the Military Intelligence Board (MIB) and the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) for approval in April 1998. NIE 98-03, "Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue," dated April 1998, was issued in May 1998.

Senator Robert C. Smith published *A Critical Assessment* of NIE 98-03 in November 1998. In a letter accompanying the *Critical Assessment*, he requested the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to convene meetings of the NFIB and the MIB, respectively, to consider his request that the NIE be retracted for reasons cited in the *Critical Assessment*. The MIB met on 15 January 1999 to review the matter in detail and the NFIB convened four days later. The DCI advised Senator Smith that IC members had voted unanimously to let the estimate stand, describing it as an accurate assessment of current knowledge and understanding of the POW/MIA issue.

³ The IC is composed of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), and intelligence elements of the Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Energy, and the Military Services.

⁴ NIEs are produced by the NIC. They are prepared for the President and other senior policymakers on issues that have strategic implications for the United States. They are the most authoritative written assessments of the DCI and the IC because they present the coordinated views of senior officers of the IC.

⁵ POWs are persons known to be, or to have been, held by the enemy as live prisoners or last seen under enemy control. MIAs are persons removed from control of U.S. forces due to enemy action, but not known to be either prisoners of war or dead.

On 18 March 1999, the SSCI informed the Inspectors General (IG) of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of Defense (DoD) that Senator Smith "continues to assert that NIE 98-03 is a product of either 'shoddy' research or possible politicization, which may reflect a premeditated and deliberate effort to discredit relevant information." Further, the SSCI said, Senator Smith believes the NIE should be retracted and that policymakers should disregard the conclusions. The SSCI requested that the IGs conduct an inquiry to determine the NIE's "analytical vigor, objectivity, accuracy and completeness." A joint CIA/DoD inquiry began in mid-April 1999.

OBJECTIVE

Our objective was to examine NIE 98-03 and address the charges levied in the *Critical Assessment* that there had been:

- ◆ A premeditated effort to discredit relevant information;
- ◆ Inadequate analysis; or
- ◆ Possible politicization.

Our approach was to review the process of producing the estimate and assess the validity of the *Critical Assessment's* specific charges. By so doing, we could evaluate the NIE's analytical vigor, objectivity, accuracy, and completeness.

STRUCTURE OF REPORT

Our report is presented in six parts, including the Introduction (Part I). Part II provides an historical perspective of the Vietnam War POW/MIA issue. Part III describes the standard NIE process and the process followed for NIE 98-03. Part IV examines the specific, substantive charges levied in the *Critical Assessment*. Part V addresses the *Critical Assessment's* charges of politicization. In Part VI, we provide our conclusions. Annex A describes the methodology we used in preparing our report, and Annex B provides a summary of previous reports and reviews related to topics addressed in this report. Annex C describes our methodology in addressing the *Critical Assessment's* charges against the NIE. Annexes D and E list U.S. Government publications reviewed by the drafter of the NIE. Annex F summarizes the interviews of Russian officials

concerning the validity of the 735 and 1205 documents found in the archives of Soviet military intelligence (GRU) and the credibility of the information in those documents relating to numbers of POWs held by the Vietnamese. Annex G describes the methodology we used in conducting our review of selected discrepancy cases, and Annex H supplies the supporting matrix of information relating to that review. In Annex I, we detail the process used to examine a single case of a U.S. MIA. Annex J contains our distribution list. A list of commonly used acronyms is at the front of our report.

PART II: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

OPERATION HOMECOMING AND THE END OF THE WAR

During the period of U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia, nearly three million American military personnel served in-theater.⁶ More than 58,000 were killed and another 300,000 were wounded. At the time of Operation Homecoming in February/March 1973, 591 U.S. prisoners were repatriated. The fate of more than 2,500 service personnel, however, had not been determined. U.S. efforts to resolve cases involving those still missing have continued and have been the subject of considerable debate, ranging from high praise to strong criticism. The issue of the number of servicemen still unaccounted for also has remained controversial.⁷

On 27 January 1973, representatives from the United States, the Republic of Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam ("Viet Cong"), signed "The Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam," also known as the Paris Peace Accords. Article 8(b) of the Accord stated:

The parties shall help each other to get information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action, to determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the remains, and to take any such other measure as may be required to get information about those still considered missing in action.

The Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) was established in 1973 to help the Military Services:

... resolve the status of United States missing/body not recovered personnel through the conduct of operations to locate and investigate crash/grave sites and recover remains, as appropriate, throughout Southeast Asia

⁶ The Indochina War Era covers the period from 8 July 1959 through 15 May 1975.

⁷ The term "unaccounted for" is an all-inclusive term which includes Americans initially listed as POW/MIA, Killed in Action—Body Not Recovered (KIA-BNR), or as having a Presumptive Finding of Death (PFOD).

The JCRC formed a relationship with the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory, which was charged to examine and identify any remains recovered as a result of JCRC searches or unilateral repatriation of remains by the North Vietnamese. The JCRC and the Army Central Identification Laboratory moved to Hawaii in 1976; the latter became the Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI).

THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

In September 1975, the U.S. House of Representatives formed a Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, headed by Congressman G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery; the committee was tasked to conduct a full and complete investigation and study of:

- ◆ The problem of U.S. servicemen still identified as missing in action, as well as those known dead whose bodies have not been recovered, as a result of military operations in Indochina; and
- ◆ The need for additional international inspection teams to determine whether there are servicemen still held as prisoners of war or civilians held captive or unwillingly detained.

The committee conducted a comprehensive, 15-month investigation. Its final report, issued in December 1976, concluded that "no Americans are still being held alive as prisoners in Indochina, or elsewhere, as a result of the war in Indochina." Half of the ten committee members voiced displeasure with that conclusion as well as other judgments and recommendations in the report.

PROGRESS ON POW/MIA ISSUE

Carter Years (1977-1980)

Early in his Administration, President Carter created a Presidential Commission headed by Leonard Woodcock, the President of the United Auto Workers. The purpose of the Commission was ". . . to obtain the best possible accounting for MIAs and the return of the remains of our dead." The report of the Presidential Commission concluded, ". . . there is no evidence to indicate that any American POWs from the Indochina conflict

remain alive." The commission recommended that normalization of relations with the Vietnamese should be pursued through the resumption of talks in Paris. Several members of the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs strongly criticized the report in hearings conducted in March 1977.

Direct talks aimed at normalization between the United States and Vietnam took place in Paris in May 1977. Little progress on the issue of missing Americans was made, however. Several congressional delegations traveled to Hanoi and members of the JCRC visited Hanoi in 1980 for technical discussions with officials from the Vietnam Office for Seeking Missing Persons (VNOSMP), but the exchanges were largely unproductive. In January 1980, an interagency group was established "to review and assess current events and policies [and] to consider future direction/policy to resolve the POW/MIA problem." Members of the group included representatives from the Departments of State (DoS) and Defense, the National Security Council (NSC), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia.

Reagan Years (1981-1988)

In February 1982, after President Reagan designated the POW/MIA issue a matter of the highest national priority, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense led a delegation to Vietnam to discuss cooperation. Vietnamese officials indicated that there was a connection between their cooperation on the MIA issue and the U.S. attitude toward Vietnam. Between 1982 and 1986, several additional U.S. Government delegations visited Vietnam to discuss expanded cooperation, and technical meetings between JCRC, CILHI and the Vietnamese were conducted.

By 1987, nearly 15 years after Operation Homecoming, resolution of the POW/MIA issue remained a distant possibility. In an effort to energize the issue, President Reagan appointed General John W. Vessey, Jr. (USA Ret.) as his special emissary to Vietnam in February 1987. In August 1987, General Vessey met with the Vietnamese Foreign Minister for three days of talks in Hanoi. The Foreign Minister committed the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) to resuming efforts to resolve the MIA issue and agreed to address the most urgent cases, those in which the missing person was last known by the United States to be alive but who did not return during Operation Homecoming. These became known as the Vessey discrepancy

cases. Both parties also agreed to resume technical talks. The result was a series of technical meetings in Hanoi between JCRC/CILHI members and the VNOSMP to work on casualty resolution and other meetings to discuss the provision of prosthetics with SRV public health and social affairs officials. In June 1988, General Vessey met the SRV Foreign Minister in New York to review the progress made since their initial meeting in 1987. The level of cooperation improved to the extent that six technical meetings were conducted in Hanoi during 1988, and U.S. teams participated for the first time in joint investigative activity in Vietnam. In October 1989, General Vessey visited Hanoi a second time to discuss casualty resolution progress.

An "Inter-Agency Report of the Reagan Administration on the POW/MIA Issue in Southeast Asia," issued on 19 January 1989, concluded that "we have yet to find conclusive evidence of the existence of live prisoners, and returnees at Operation Homecoming in 1973 knew of no Americans who were left behind in captivity." The report went on to say that:

Nevertheless, based upon circumstances of loss and other information, we know of a few instances where Americans were captured and the governments involved acknowledge that some Americans died in captivity, but there has been no accounting of them.

Bush Years (1989-1992)

In an exchange of letters between General Vessey and the SRV Foreign Minister in July 1990, the General pointed out that, after some initial positive results regarding the POW/MIA issue, "progress has become painfully slow, in fact, almost non-existent," and that there was "a real need for progress." The Foreign Minister disputed the General's assessment. He stated that more than 20 years had elapsed since the war ended and that "Vietnam continues its efforts to solve this humanitarian issue, including the seeking of war-time records." The Foreign Minister invited General Vessey to return to Vietnam to clarify remaining issues. General Vessey did not return to Vietnam until April 1991, but that visit was noteworthy because agreement was reached to open a U.S. liaison office in Hanoi. The purpose of the office was to improve the coordination between SRV casualty resolution officials and the United States and to speed joint investigative fieldwork. The liaison office opened in May 1991.

The Road Map

As a result of U.S.-SRV meetings in April 1991, the Bush Administration adopted a policy of reciprocal U.S.-Vietnamese actions in accordance with a road map that had three major sets of U.S. objectives:

- ◆ Support for the United Nations peace process in Cambodia;
- ◆ Release of re-education camp detainees; and
- ◆ Assistance in achieving the fullest possible accounting of POW/MIAs.

At intermediate points along the "road," both parties would take specific actions, such as the lifting of U.S. restrictions on the travel of American business and veterans groups to Vietnam. Later, the U.S. trade embargo would be lifted and U.S. opposition to international lending to Vietnam would be halted. Vietnam would accelerate its efforts to account for missing U.S. personnel.

Senate Select Committee

On 2 August 1991, a Senate resolution established the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. The committee requested and received unprecedented access to the records of a wide range of U.S. Government agencies, including intelligence agencies and the White House. It solicited the sworn testimonies of "virtually every living U.S. military and civilian official or former official who has played a major role in POW/MIA affairs over the past 20 years." The committee reviewed procedures for accounting for POW/MIA and investigated U.S. intelligence activities in relation to these issues. Its report, issued on 13 January 1993, acknowledged that "there is no proof that U.S. POWs survived, but neither is there proof that all of those who did not return had died." The report suggested that there was evidence that indicated the possibility of survival, at least for a small number after Operation Homecoming.

Clinton Years (1993 to date)

Four Key Areas

Although the Clinton Administration does not use the term, its policy has been based on the road map developed by the Bush Administration. President Clinton asked General Vessey to conduct another mission to Vietnam in April 1993 to seek further progress. On 2 July 1993, President Clinton announced that:

Progress [on POW/MIA] to date is simply not sufficient to warrant any change in our trade embargo or any further steps toward normalization. Any further steps in U.S.-Vietnamese relations will strictly depend on further progress by the Vietnamese on the POW/MIA issue.

President Clinton's statement set out four key areas in which the United States expected to see greater efforts by Vietnam:

- ◆ Concrete results from efforts by Vietnam to recover and repatriate American remains;
- ◆ Continued resolution of the remaining discrepancy cases, and continued live sighting investigations and field activities;
- ◆ Further assistance in implementing trilateral investigations with the Lao of POW/MIA cases along the Lao-Vietnam border; and
- ◆ Accelerated efforts to provide all POW/MIA-related documents that will help lead to genuine answers.

Normalization

A Presidential delegation that visited Vietnam later in July 1993 reinforced the commitment to the fullest possible accounting for POW/MIAs and made it clear that the United States must see tangible progress in the four key areas. Vietnam representatives indicated that they were committed to helping the United States resolve the issue and pledged

to make every effort to achieve progress, but cautioned not to expect dramatic breakthroughs. In January 1994, the Senate approved a non-binding resolution urging the President to lift the trade embargo against Vietnam, a move supporters hoped would assist in getting a full accounting of Americans still listed as missing in the Vietnam War. On 3 February 1994, President Clinton announced the lifting of the trade embargo and, on 11 July 1995, he announced normalization of relations with Vietnam, saying that the time had come to move forward and bind up the wounds from the war. The U.S. Embassy in Hanoi was opened in August 1995. In April 1997, Congressman Douglas "Pete" Peterson, a former POW, was confirmed as the first U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam since the end of the war and the first to be posted to Hanoi.

Certification/Determination Of Cooperation

In 1996, Congress prohibited the use of appropriated funds to open a new U.S. diplomatic post in Vietnam or increase the number of personnel assigned to the mission beyond the level existing on 11 July 1995 unless the President certified within 60 days, based upon all information available to the United States Government, that the Government of the SRV was "cooperating in full faith" with the United States in the four areas related to achieving the fullest possible accounting for American POW/MIAs from the Vietnam War. The four areas were those laid out by President Clinton in 1993.⁸ In the 1998 iteration of that law, Congress changed the wording to certification that Vietnam is "fully cooperating in good faith."

President Clinton issued Presidential Determinations on 29 May 1996 and 3 December 1996 that Vietnam was cooperating "in full faith." Presidential Determinations of 4 March 1998, and 3 February 1999 declared that Vietnam was "fully cooperating in good faith." The President issued determinations in lieu of certifications, stating that the Department of Justice had advised him that it was unconstitutional for Congress to require him to certify because it "purports to use a condition on appropriations as a means to direct my execution of responsibilities that the Constitution commits exclusively to the President." The President

⁸ Title VI, Section 609, of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, as contained in the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-134), and the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 (Public Law 104-208).

stated that he had decided to issue the determinations not because he was legally required to do so but rather as a matter of inter-branch "comity."

The decision to certify or to determine that Vietnam is cooperating "in full faith" or "fully cooperating in good faith" on the four key issues related to POW/MIAs is a policy decision. While the IC does not participate in that decision, the responsible policy agencies have available to them all the relevant intelligence information. Two policy directorates, the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO), in coordination with the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA), and the DoS, Office of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, are the major contributors to the NSC on this issue. The DoS establishes the policy position for annual certification (determination), and the DPMO reviews the proposal for accuracy after consultation with JTF-FA. The Director for Indochina, Thailand, and Burma, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) also coordinates on the draft certification (determination) proposal. DoS, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), an IC member, reviews the draft proposal for accuracy only.

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CAPABILITY

CIA Turns to Department of Defense

In November 1985, the then-DCI sent a memorandum to the NFIB, stating that he was establishing an Interagency Committee on Vietnam POW/MIAs under the aegis of DIA. The purpose of the committee would be to:

... exhaust all intelligence within the Community regarding the location and identification of Americans who might be held or interned [sic] in Southeast Asia.

The DCI asked that the appropriate NFIB agencies nominate representatives to serve on the committee and that all intelligence "presently held within the Intelligence Community" be given to the committee. In the years that followed, the DCI memorandum was interpreted to mean that DIA had been designated the lead agency for POW/MIA affairs and that other agencies would play a supporting role in that effort.

Subsequently, the DIA Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs assumed a higher profile. The Special Office handled technical investigations or specific cases and debriefings of refugees and other sources; it collated the information, then disseminated reports. Other government agencies provided support.

In 1993, the DPMO was established as a separate office outside of DIA. DPMO was designed to consolidate POW/MIA issues (analytic, policy, and operations) under one umbrella. While this arrangement is unusual, it is not unique. DoS and DoD have both policy and operational missions, but they maintain elements that perform intelligence analysis. In that regard, elements of the IC that address the Vietnam POW/MIA issue include the analytical components of DPMO and analysts in other agencies who are experts on Vietnam and who have worked the issue in the past.

Intelligence Priorities and Standing Requirements

Presidential Decision Directive-35 (PDD-35), dated 2 March 1995, which provides overall guidance for the IC, does not explicitly include POW/MIA issues. The DCI Guidance on Intelligence Priorities, dated 10 February 1997, builds on PDD-35 by addressing worldwide priorities in the context of the President's guidance. POW/MIA issues are included under support to military operations, and the IC has standing requirements that cover POW/MIA issues.

EVOLUTION OF THE DEFENSE POW/MISSING PERSONNEL OFFICE

The Secretary of Defense established the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) in July 1993 to provide centralized management of POW/MIA affairs within the DoD. The DPMO was headed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Regional Security Affairs), now the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). Creation of the office brought together four disparate DoD offices that had been working POW/MIA issues:

- ◆ **Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (POW/MIA).** This office was established in 1991 within the office of the Secretary of

Defense to develop U.S. and DoD policies on POW/MIA issues. The Deputy Assistant Secretary continued as the Director, DPMO, reporting to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy;

- ◆ **DIA Special Office for POW/MIAs.** This office was established during the Vietnam conflict to support operational commanders by collecting information on American service members classified as POWs or MIAs;
- ◆ **Central Documentation Office.** This office was established by the Secretary of Defense in 1991 to review and declassify materials pertaining to American POWs and MIAs lost in Southeast Asia. The office reported to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence [ASD C³I]); and
- ◆ **Task Force Russia (TFR).** This office was established by the Army in 1992 to support the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs.

The 1996 Defense Authorization Act directed that DoD establish an office for missing persons. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Affairs was designated as the Director of the newly restructured and renamed Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO). The DPMO mission is to exercise policy, control and oversight within the DoD of the entire process for investigation and recovery related to missing persons (including matters related to search, rescue, escape and evasion); coordinate for the DoD with other departments and agencies of the United States on all matters concerning missing persons; and establish procedures to be followed by DoD boards of inquiry and by officials reviewing the reports of such boards. The DPMO maintains and gathers data on POW/MIA affairs for World War II, the Korean War, Vietnam, and the Cold War. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy provides authority, direction and control over the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense reports through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

International Security Affairs and serves as the principal assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for all prisoner of war and missing in action matters. The primary responsibility of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense is developing and coordinating policy on such matters and representing the DoD in interagency processes. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense also ensures that the DoD effectively conducts efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting for U.S. personnel not yet accounted for from the Vietnam conflict.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs is assigned the collateral responsibility to serve as the Director, DPMO. This was done to ensure that the activities of the DPMO are fully integrated with the Office of the Secretary of Defense POW/MIA policy direction. The Director serves as the DoD focal point for all POW/MIA matters including representing the DoD during negotiations with foreign governments. DPMO customers include the DoD, the Congress, POW/MIA families, and veterans organizations.

While the DPMO is not an intelligence organization, it incorporates intelligence reporting into its all-source analysis of POW/MIA issues and individual cases. DPMO systematically requests that CIA, DIA, NSA, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) provide required information. In fact, the National Defense Authorization Act for 1998 (Public Law 105-85), Section 934, states that:

The Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall provide intelligence analysis on matters concerning prisoners of war and missing persons . . . to all departments and agencies of the Federal Government involved in such matters.

Further, the Act directs the Secretary of Defense to:

. . . ensure that the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office takes into full account all intelligence regarding matters concerning . . . prisoners of war and missing persons . . . in analyzing cases involving such persons.

DOD AGENCIES SUPPORTING POW/MIA MISSION

Joint Task Force-Full Accounting

In January 1992, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) formed the JTF-FA, at Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii. The JTF-FA replaced the JCRC as the primary organization focused on full accounting for missing U.S. personnel. The JTF-FA mission is to resolve the cases of Americans still unaccounted for as a result of the Indochina War through investigations, archival research, and remains recovery operations. The JTF-FA is structured to conduct the wide range of operations necessary to obtain the fullest possible accounting in Southeast Asia. The JTF-FA has four permanently deployed detachments in Southeast Asia to support JTF-FA teams that perform investigations and recovery efforts: Detachment 1 in Thailand, Detachment 2 in Vietnam, Detachment 3 in Laos, and Detachment 4 in Cambodia.

Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii

The Department of the Army is designated as the executive agent for the Joint Mortuary Affairs Program. As the executive agent, the Army maintains a Central Mortuary Affairs Office and CILHI for processing remains from past conflicts. The CILHI mission is foremost humanitarian and requires deployment of its personnel throughout the world. CILHI supports the full accounting mission by providing the personnel who make up the remains recovery teams deploying to Southeast Asia and by conducting forensic analysis of recovered remains.

Stony Beach

In 1987, DIA supplemented the JCRC effort by assigning a small group of language-qualified personnel the task of gathering information related to possible live sightings of American POW/MIAs in Indochina. The Stony Beach program collects information and performs analyses on alleged live sightings of U.S. POW/MIAs. Stony Beach operations are conducted exclusively in support of the POW/MIA issue.

ROLE OF U.S.-RUSSIA JOINT COMMISSION ON POW/MIAS

The DPMO supports the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, established in 1992 by direction of the Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation. The commission serves as a forum through which both nations seek to determine the fates of their missing service personnel, Americans missing from the Vietnam, Korean and Cold Wars and Russians lost in Afghanistan. The commission consists of representatives from the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. and Russian Governments. The U.S. side of the commission includes members of Congress, senior DoS and DoD personnel, and a representative from the U.S. National Archives. Within the DPMO, the Joint Commission Support Directorate (JCSD) functions as the sole collection, research, analytical, and administrative support element to the U.S. side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission.

PRIVATE GROUPS

The wife of a POW held captive in North Vietnam formed the National League of Families of Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia in 1966. In 1970, the League was formally structured as a "tax-free, non-profit, nonpartisan, humanitarian organization." The League's bylaws specified that only family members of prisoners, missing, or killed-in-action personnel were eligible for membership. In the beginning, most leadership positions were held by wives of POWs and MIAs. Operation Homecoming changed the composition and character of the League. A new Executive Director liberalized membership requirements, and leadership evolved to parents away from the wives. The category of family members eligible for membership was expanded to include blood or lawful relatives of an American who was a prisoner or missing in Southeast Asia.

In 1979, the Executive Director of the League was given access to POW/MIA classified information. In 1982, for the first time, a League delegation traveled to Vietnam and Laos to meet with government officials. The Executive Director was made a full member of the U.S. interagency group that discussed POW/MIA issues. The Executive Director has testified before congressional committees and has been

included in numerous government proceedings with Southeast Asia government officials.

Traditional veterans' organizations have shared interest in the POW/MIA issue, including the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Disabled American Veterans, and the Vietnam Veterans of America. The 1990s brought the emergence of a new organization, the National Alliance of Families for the Return of America's Missing Servicemen, World War II-Korea-Cold War-Vietnam. It is the only organization representing U.S. servicemen from all wars and their families.

PART III: POW/MIA ESTIMATE PROCESS

A National Intelligence Estimate is a compendium of basic judgments, accompanied by some supporting detail, that represent the collective viewpoint of the Intelligence Community. It is not an exhaustive compendium of every conceivable alternative explanation on every point of detail, slanted to support a particular point of view. The operative word is "judgments," over which disagreements are common.

Senior DIA official

STANDARD NIE PROCESS

The National Intelligence Council (NIC) is an Intelligence Community (IC) entity, responsible for producing coordinated interagency papers. The NIC, which reports to the DCI in his capacity as head of the IC, consists of a Chairman, Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Officers (NIO), and several staffs and production committees. The NIOs interact regularly with senior intelligence consumers to assess and support their long-term needs. In addition, they actively consult with experts from academia, the corporate world, and think tanks in producing estimates and other coordinated IC products.

The NIC manages the IC's estimate process, bringing together expertise from inside and outside the government. The NIC is one of the few bodies which speaks authoritatively on substantive issues for the IC as a whole. National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) are prepared for the President and other senior policymakers on issues that have strategic implications for the United States. They are the most authoritative written assessments of the DCI and the IC because they present the coordinated views of the senior officers of the IC.

Typically, an NIO presents a proposal for an estimate to the Chairman of the NIC, who presents it to the DCI for approval. The NIO prepares Terms of Reference (TOR) that are reviewed by the NIC, coordinated with IC representatives, then submitted to the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) principals.⁹ The NIO may serve as the drafter for the estimate or may select a drafter from CIA or another IC

⁹ The NFIB principals are the DCI; the Deputy Director, CIA; Director, DIA; Director, DoS, INR; Director, NSA; Director, FBI; Director, NIMA; and Director, NRO.

member. The NIO and the drafter prepare an outline of the prospective NIE, meet to coordinate both the TOR and the outline with IC representatives, then send the final TOR to the NFIB principals. The drafter conducts research for the topic and drafts the report, frequently with support from members of the IC. The draft is then coordinated by IC representatives and sent to the NFIB for final approval.

Intelligence/Policy Nexus

To reduce the possibility that policy considerations will influence intelligence analysis, the estimate process is kept separate from its consumers in the policy community. Members of the policy community may request an estimate and may convey interest in having certain issues addressed; the drafter may even consult with the customer to ensure that all customer concerns are being addressed. During the research phase, policymakers may be asked to provide input in areas where they have specific knowledge or expertise. To ensure that they do not influence the judgments or conclusions of the estimate, policymakers do not have a role in coordinating either the TOR or the report itself. Permitting such close involvement would increase the risk of politicization of intelligence.

Interagency Participants

All IC agencies may be involved in the production and/or coordination of an estimate. In practice, agencies having no stake in the issue often withdraw from the process. On occasion, agencies outside the IC may be asked to participate in the process, either by contributing information or by attending coordination sessions as "back benchers" whose input is considered relevant and useful but who have no vote at the table.

REQUEST FOR POW/MIA ESTIMATE: POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

A number of aspects of the process followed in the production of the NIE addressing the Vietnamese POW/MIA issue were unusual, reflecting the political environment that spawned it. The estimate had its genesis in the policy debate concerning normalization of relations with Vietnam. President Clinton announced his intention to normalize relations in July 1995, and the U.S. Embassy in Hanoi opened the following month. In May and December 1996, the President issued "determinations" that the

Vietnamese were "cooperating in full faith" on POW/MIA matters. By so doing, the President opened the way for increasing the personnel assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Hanoi, including the appointment of an ambassador. He nominated Congressman Peterson for that post.

In March 1997, the SSCI asked the CIA to provide a copy of the IC assessment that had informed the Presidential determinations. CIA responded that, because the DPMO was responsible for intelligence bearing on the issue, other elements of the IC had not been formally involved in the process leading to the determinations. Several Senators, including the Majority Leader, indicated that they would hold up Congressman Peterson's confirmation unless the IC undertook its own, independent, analysis of Vietnamese cooperation on POW/MIA issues. In a letter to the Majority Leader on 10 April 1997, the President's National Security Adviser stated that he would direct the IC to prepare a special NIE on the subject. He also agreed to ask for an "updated assessment from the Intelligence Community" on the 735 and 1205 documents acquired from the Russian archives. The National Security Adviser went on to say that "we will consult" with the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the SSCI on the TOR for the estimate. He expressed hope that the Senate would confirm Congressman Peterson as soon as possible. Ambassador Peterson was confirmed the same day.

NEGOTIATION OF TERMS OF REFERENCE (APRIL-NOVEMBER 1997)

Initial Drafts

From the start, Senator Smith and his staff played a key role in shaping the TOR, using the SSCI to funnel requirements to the NIC. According to one of Senator Smith's legislative assistants, the Senator particularly wanted an updated assessment of the "Russian documents" because he did not believe the IC assessment of the documents, released in 1994, was thorough. The Senator wanted the IC to look at the 735 and 1205 documents and wanted that assessment to be part of the estimate. In a memorandum that he sent to an SSCI staff member on 24 April, Senator Smith's legislative assistant with responsibility for POW/MIA matters wrote that:

Per our discussion, I'm forwarding to you input to consider during the required consultation between SSCI and NSC and IC on tasking, which, as you know, was coordinated with Senator Smith.

The 735 and 1205 Documents

In 1993, the United States received copies of two documents discovered in the archives of Soviet military intelligence (GRU) in Moscow. The documents are Russian translations of purported policy speeches delivered by senior Vietnamese officials in the early 1970s. The original Vietnamese language documents have not been located. The two documents received a great deal of attention because they indicated that the number of American POWs held in North Vietnam was greater than the number officially acknowledged by Hanoi. The documents are known as the 735 and 1205 documents.

The 735 document, dating from late December 1970 or early January 1971, stated that the number of American pilots imprisoned in North Vietnam was 735, not the 368 acknowledged by the Vietnamese Government. The document implied that the unreported POWs would be used as leverage during peace negotiations with the United States. The 1205 document, dating from September 1972, stated that 1205 American POWs were being held in North Vietnam. The document indicated that the officially published list of 368 American pilots was part of the 1205 figure and stated that the "rest are not acknowledged."

The IC issued an assessment of the 735 and 1205 documents in 1994, discounting Hanoi's claims that the documents were fabrications and concluding that the documents appeared to be genuine. The assessment made the distinction between the documents being genuine (i.e., a GRU translation of a Vietnamese speech) and the information in those documents being accurate. The IC assessment stated that the numbers given in the 735 and 1205 documents were "inconsistent with our understanding of how many Americans would have survived the events in which they were lost to become captives."

At the time of its assessment, the IC had the entire 1205 document but only two pages of the 735 document—those that contained the references to U.S. POWs. Thus, the *Critical Assessment* stated that the remainder of the 735 report had "never been formally assessed by the Community."

The NIO for East Asia (NIO/EA), who served from July 1995 until August 1997, began work on the TOR after being notified by the Chairman of the NIC and the NSC about the agreement to produce an estimate. His draft TOR focused on the commitment of the Vietnamese leadership to cooperate with the United States to achieve the fullest possible accounting of American personnel missing in action and the extent to which Hanoi was able to deliver on its commitment. The NIO/EA envisioned separating Vietnamese cooperation from the issue of the Russian documents; he planned to ask a small group of Vietnam analysts to examine whether the IC conclusions reached on the documents in 1994 were still valid. The draft TOR dealt with the issue by posing the general question, "Has there been any change in the assessment of the so-called '735 document' and '1205 document' from the Russian archives?"

On 8 May, the NIO/EA took the draft TOR to a meeting that included the SSCI Staff Director and Minority Staff Director as well as majority and minority staff members. Agreement was reached that the SSCI staff would provide questions and comments for consideration by the NIO/EA in fulfillment of the agreement to consult with the SSCI. On 29 May, the SSCI suggested changes to the TOR, asking that the NIE address numerous additional points relating to the POW/MIA issue. The points raised were extensive and appeared to require more substantial research than did the original TOR.

The NIO/EA was concerned that the suggested changes would require months of detailed research as well as a review of the work done by DPMO and other agencies. He revised the TOR, then coordinated them with the NSA, INR, the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (DI), DPMO, and the DIA. The revised draft TOR were forwarded to the SSCI on 3 July 1997. The NIO/EA told the SSCI that he had tried "to accommodate as much as possible the suggestions in your letter of 29 May." He stated that he had expanded his original estimate question to include the issue of performance but that "it would be inappropriate" for an NIE to establish a standard for "the fullest possible accounting" against which to identify measures the SRV could take; he argued that that was a policy decision. He went on to say that he had collapsed the various questions on SRV personnel, records, and artifacts into two secondary questions in the TOR and expressed confidence that these questions would cover all the issues raised in the SSCI letter of 29 May.

SSCI Delays

Despite repeated requests by the NIO/EA, conveyed by the CIA's Office of Congressional Affairs (OCA), the SSCI did not provide its formal response to the draft TOR until late October 1997. OCA indicated that the initial delay was caused by the fact that the SSCI Chairman, who wanted to look at the TOR and discuss them with senior staff, had departed on a world tour and would not return until the end of August. The SSCI staff reported to OCA that it was working on the issue during September and October. During this period, NIO/EA research on the estimate was put on hold, pending approval of the TOR.

Changing Actors

Between July and November 1997, all of the major actors involved in the POW/MIA estimate at the CIA and the NIC changed. Both the NIO/EA and a DI analyst who was to have provided support in research and drafting departed in August. A new Chairman of the NIC arrived in October and was briefed on the background of the estimate by the Deputy NIO/EA, who had been designated to carry on the project; the deputy left in November.

The new participants in the process arrived with different backgrounds and perceptions. The newly appointed NIO/EA returned from the NSC in November 1997. As the Deputy NIO/EA in the early 1990s, he had been the drafter of the 1994 IC assessment of the 735 and 1205 documents. Senator Smith, who disagreed with that assessment, expressed his displeasure with the NIO/EA's involvement in the NIE during a meeting in November. No Deputy NIO/EA would be appointed during the drafting of the estimate, and the DI would not provide another analyst to support the project. In November 1997, the NIO/EA appointed a CIA East Asian specialist and veteran NIE drafter to draft the NIE.

SSCI Response and Final TOR

In its letter of 27 October responding to the TOR sent on 3 July, the SSCI requested an expansion of the TOR question, "Has there been any change in the assessment of the so-called '735 document' and '1205 document' from the Russian archives?" The SSCI suggested that the issue

be rephrased and added to the "Key Questions" portion of the TOR as follows: "What is the intelligence community assessment of the so-called '735' document and the '1205' document from the Russian archives?" The SSCI went on to say that:

. . . if the intelligence community judges these documents to be accurate . . . in their characterization of the number of American POWs held by North Vietnam, then it should answer the following question: "What is the likely range of numbers of American POWs under the control of the communist side when the Paris Peace Accords were signed in January 1973?"

The SSCI's suggested change represented a significant shift in parameters for the estimate. The original task had been limited to determining if the IC had changed its assessment of the documents since 1994. The new phrasing required that the IC assess the documents (i.e., start from the beginning and evaluate their credibility). The SSCI then stipulated that, if the IC determined the documents to be accurate in assessing the numbers of POWs held in North Vietnam, the estimate should address the number of POWs held in Vietnam in 1973. These were the issues that the former NIO/EA originally had intended to assign to a separate group of analysts for in-depth research.

The CIA responded to the SSCI on 21 November 1997, enclosing the "final terms of reference" for the NIE. The draft TOR had been revised to reflect the SSCI suggestions, thus expanding the scope of the estimate. At the same time, the number of individuals supporting the project had decreased from two to one, and the time allocated to complete the estimate had remained the same (about 90 days). The final TOR were approved at a 26 November IC coordination meeting, and the NFIB concurred at its meeting on 19 December 1997.

This level of involvement in the estimate process by both the SSCI and a U.S. Senator, not a member of the SSCI, in the negotiation of the TOR is unprecedented. The SSCI was given coordination authority over the TOR, implicitly by the President's National Security Adviser and, *de facto*, by the NIC. The then-NIO/EA believed that he could not proceed with the estimate until the SSCI had responded to each version of his TOR, resulting in accumulated delays of almost six months. None of the more than 80 individuals we interviewed knew of an instance, other than this one, in

which coordination of a TOR by an organization not a member of the IC had occurred.

The Issue of Timing

The issue of the period of time the estimate would cover arose early in the process. The original TOR explicitly stated that the estimate would cover the period from 1987-1998, that is, the period since the most recent estimate on the subject (Special National Intelligence Estimate [SNIE]: "Hanoi and the POW/MIA Issue," published in September 1987). The original TOR had not included a re-evaluation of the Russian documents; rather, it had asked as a secondary question whether there had been any changes to the analysis of those documents. When a re-evaluation (as opposed to an updated evaluation) of the documents was included in the TOR, the parameters shifted because the documents dated from the early 1970s. At the TOR coordination session in November 1997, the INR representative suggested that a search for new materials might need to go back before 1987. The NIE drafter never focused on this shift.

The introduction to the estimate indicated that it would cover the period after 1987. In fact, the drafter used 1992 as the cut-off date, explaining that the period from 1987-1992 was covered extensively in a 1992 CIA study, "Vietnam: Adjusting Its Strategy on the POW/MIA Issue." The NIE drafter said that the IC "will be asked to accept that study as definitive." The IC would do as he asked, but the *Critical Assessment* would take him to task for not having covered the time period as defined in the TOR.

SENATOR SMITH MEETING WITH NIO/EA

Before the final approval of the TOR, Senator Smith met with the new NIO/EA on 7 November 1997. The purpose of the meeting was to have the NIO/EA provide an update on the NIE process to Senator Smith. According to notes taken at the meeting, Senator Smith expressed his views on POW/MIA issues. He criticized the Clinton Administration for its POW/MIA policy and for its failure to fully analyze the documents found in the Russian archives. He stated that the documents had surfaced at a time when they could have complicated policy and claimed that "we all know" the documents are legitimate. He accused the NIO/EA, who

had written the 1994 analysis of these documents, of having treated him poorly.

The NIO/EA assured Senator Smith that an analysis of the 735 and 1205 documents would be included in the estimate. He also stated that, because of his past service at the NSC and his previous work on POW/MIA issues, he would leave substantive responsibility for the NIE to the drafter so there would be no doubt about the integrity of the process. The NIO/EA said that he would not impose his views and would indicate his input in footnotes should he differ from the drafter. He pledged that the estimate would be "fair and honest." Senator Smith again emphasized his views of the Russian documents and said he was not confident that the Clinton Administration would not interfere in the estimate process.

Senator Smith suggested that it would help if the SSCI and other staff were involved in the estimate process. Senator Smith's legislative assistant urged the NIO/EA to "reach out" to the Senate, warning that the DPMO has a "mindset." The NIO/EA said that the analytic process needs distance from both the policy community and the Congress. The legislative assistant stated that the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs was also an "intelligence repository" and that the drafter should talk to the Senate as well as to DPMO. The SSCI majority staff member who attended the meeting told the NIO/EA that the SSCI planned to "review" the estimate.

RESEARCH, ANALYSIS, AND DRAFTING (NOVEMBER 1997-FEBRUARY 1998)

The NIC is not a repository of data. The drafter of an estimate must rely on other elements of the IC to provide information and analysis, and this was true in the case of the POW/MIA estimate. A considerable number of documents had been turned over to the former NIO/EA during the six-month period when the TOR were being negotiated. The CIA analyst assigned to help the NIO/EA had provided DI files, and DPMO had provided a package of material. At the 26 November 1997 IC coordination meeting, the consensus was that much of the material the NIE drafter would need was located in DPMO files. Other potential sources of information included the CIA; DoD organizations involved in POW/MIA matters (e.g., JTF-FA and CILHI); INR; NSA; DIA, to include Stony Beach; and policymakers dealing with Vietnam to resolve POW/MIA issues. In

addition, Senator Smith and the SSCI held documents that were relevant to the project.

Role of DPMO

Policy/Analytic Dichotomy

DPMO is the primary organization responsible for supporting policy on POW/MIA matters and is also the primary repository of information concerning POW/MIA matters. Analysts familiar with that information reside in DPMO, having moved there from DIA when DPMO was created in 1993. Because of this policy/analysis connection, critics question DPMO's analytic objectivity and argue that the IC should refocus on the POW/MIA issue in order to provide an independent view.

Within DPMO, JCSD functions as the sole collection, research, analytical, and administrative support element to the U.S. side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs. JCSD's position and responsibilities are unusual because it reports to two distinct organizations with two distinct missions. While JCSD is within the DoD chain of command, its officials respond to the requests and interests of the members of the commission, which focuses on collecting information in Russia on U.S. POWs and MIAs. This dichotomy has created tension between JCSD and the rest of the DPMO, particularly its Research and Analysis (RA) Division.

A major source of contention between JCSD and RA has been the analysis of the documents found in the Russian archives (the 735 and the 1205 documents) that refer to numbers of POWs held by North Vietnam before Operation Homecoming in 1973. RA has argued that, no matter what the validity of the documents, the numbers are wrong because they are far higher than the numbers of POWs that could have been held. JCSD has focused on trying to determine the credibility of the documents, arguing that, if the documents are valid, the numbers contained in them must be taken seriously and the RA analysis of the numbers should be reviewed.

Many critics of U.S. policy toward Vietnam argue that Vietnam may have continued to hold U.S. POWs after Operation Homecoming and that some may still be alive or may have been held alive for a number of years.

Some maintain that POWs may have been transferred to the former Soviet Union. These critics question the U.S. Government's assessments of the numbers of POWs held by the Vietnamese. Because DPMO, RA is the government organization responsible for these assessments, they question the reliability and objectivity of RA analysis. One of Senator Smith's objectives in seeking an intelligence estimate on the issue was to gain an independent IC review of the Russian documents, followed by an independent analysis of the numbers of POWs held by Vietnam. Neither the NIC nor other members of the IC conducted such an independent review and analysis. Instead, they accepted the IC assessment of 1994 as the basis of their review of the Russian documents, and they accepted DPMO's analysis of the numbers of POWs held by Vietnam.

DPMO Withdraws from Process

DPMO leadership decided that it would not participate formally in the estimate process because of challenges to its ability to produce objective analysis. When the estimate was proposed, the DIA official with responsibility for the issue told the Acting Director, DPMO that DPMO should draft the estimate because DIA did not have the capability. The Acting Director declined, arguing that, if DPMO were to take the lead, the issue would quickly become political. He said DPMO would cooperate by providing information and support as needed; by remaining uninvolved, he argued, DPMO would benefit from an outside, objective review that would test its analysis. Thus, the organization that was the repository for information on POW/MIA matters and had the main corps of analysts dedicated to the issue was removed from the formal NIE process.

Meetings with DPMO Analysts

The NIE drafter held a number of meetings with DPMO analysts, both in RA and in JCSD; he received briefings from both groups and collected a considerable amount of data. The meetings began in November 1997 and continued into February 1998, when the initial NIE draft was completed. During these sessions, the drafter encountered and had to deal with the commonly held perception within RA and the DPMO that JCSD may not have been abiding by applicable security procedures in providing classified information to the Joint Commission. The drafter experienced this problem first-hand. A JCSD analyst responsible for Vietnam matters insisted that he must report on meetings with the drafter to the Joint

Commission. The drafter disagreed, stating that JCSD should not be sharing discussions and information with outside parties, particularly before the estimate was finished. The JCSD analyst indicated that he would figure out a way to discharge his obligations to the commission without compromising sensitive information.

Examining the DO Files

The Directorate of Operations (DO) is the CIA component responsible for maintaining records of all clandestine foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities and operations conducted by the CIA involving human assets. In the early 1990s, in accordance with Executive Order 12812 ("Declassification and Release of Material Pertaining to Prisoners of War and Missing in Action," 22 July 1992) that ordered declassification of POW/MIA records, the DO conducted an unprecedented search of its files. It declassified and released most of the CIA holdings on POW/MIA issues in 1993. These documents were funneled through DPMO to the Library of Congress.

A number of documents were not declassified for a variety of reasons. The NIE drafter told us that he had reviewed these documents, and the DO continued to provide him with reports collected since 1993. According to the DO officers and managers we interviewed, the NIE drafter had access to all DO reporting on the POW/MIA issue. The drafter told us that he is confident he had access to all these documents. We reviewed the available material as well as the material in the drafter's possession at the time the estimate was drafted. We believe that the drafter did have access to the relevant DO documentation.

Other Contributors of Data

In the course of his research, the drafter visited organizations within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, DIA, DPMO, INR, and NSA and interviewed key officials associated with and knowledgeable of POW/MIA affairs. He also traveled to Hawaii and Southeast Asia, where he held discussions with U.S. officials.

REVIEW AND COORDINATION (FEBRUARY-MARCH 1998)

First and Second Drafts (6 and 20 February 1998)

The NIE drafter finished the first draft of the estimate in early February 1998. While he indicated that both the NIO/EA and the Chief of the NIC's Analytic Group (AG) had the draft for review, only the latter commented in writing. If the NIO/EA did review the first draft, his views either coincided with those of the Chief, AG or were not factored into the changes made to the second draft. Noting that he had read the draft from "the perspective of a hostile critic," the Chief, AG indicated that, "from that vantage point, there are some points of vulnerability" that should be addressed. These included assessments that appear to be inadequately supported by evidence and judgments that could give rise to suggestions that "we have been unjustifiably credulous" about the motivations behind Vietnamese actions. Each modification to the second draft introduced language that was more skeptical of Vietnam's motives and behavior. For example:

- ◆ Removal of "*humanitarian grounds*" as a driving factor in Hanoi's increasing cooperation with the United States on POW/MIA issues;
- ◆ Introduction of language conveying skepticism about Vietnam's explanations for instances of non-cooperation (e.g., less acceptance of "*sovereignty*" as a valid rationale); and
- ◆ Qualification of judgments. After stating that "our research suggests" that areas where Vietnam refuses to conduct joint field activities are genuine sensitive facilities, the new draft adds, "*We cannot be sure, however.*" Whereas the first draft had stated that, "We think Vietnam has *been fully cooperative* on these cases," the later version reads, "We think Vietnam has, *for the most part, been cooperative* on these cases."

On 20 February, the NIC sent the revised draft estimate to U.S. officials in Hawaii and Southeast Asia. The drafter then traveled to those locations, holding discussions with relevant officials and sending comments back to Washington for consideration in the next stage of drafting. The NIO/EA accompanied him on part of this trip.

Third Draft (17 March 1998)

Numerous changes were made to the next draft. Most were factual additions rather than modifications of data. While many of the changes are difficult to evaluate in terms of their impact on the tone of the NIE, a number served to further reinforce skepticism about Vietnamese cooperation. For example, in the section of the draft dealing with "Instances of Vietnamese Non-Cooperation:"

- ◆ The lead sentence had said that "We found *no* instances in which Vietnamese authorities have flatly refused US requests" The new version was changed to, "We found *few* instances . . . ;" and
- ◆ Sentences were added to a series of instances dealing with Vietnamese explanations for non-cooperation to the effect that "*We cannot ensure they have provided everything;*" and "*We cannot absolutely verify such claims;*" and "*We cannot verify this information.*"

Some changes tended to strengthen judgments challenging the credibility of the 735 and 1205 documents; the alleged transfers of POWs to the Soviet Union; and the alleged interrogation of POWs by Soviet officials. For example:

- ◆ The 20 February draft stated that, while the documents are probably authentic GRU-collected intelligence reports, "*We nevertheless also concluded that the documents were factually inaccurate.*" The 17 March draft states that they are probably authentic GRU-collected intelligence reports, "*but they are not what they purport to be. We concluded that the documents contain significant inaccuracies and anomalies;*"
- ◆ The original text stated that, "*In view of . . . contradictions, we cannot definitively conclude that US POWs were not interrogated by Soviets.*" The new language states, "*We doubt that American POWs were directly questioned by Russians;*" and

- ◆ The original text said that, "we have *equally* convincing reports that claim US POWs were not transferred out of Vietnam." The new language says that, "we have *more* convincing reports"

The drafter met with the U.S. Ambassador to discuss the draft. In the section of the draft dealing with Vietnamese refusal to provide Politburo documents, a phrase indicated that Vietnam would not provide such documents, "*any more than foreign governments, such as the United States, would open their sensitive records to Vietnamese officials.*" A handwritten note by the drafter indicates that "the Ambassador wants this emphasized." Not only was the Ambassador's request rejected, the entire phrase eventually was deleted.

The NIO/EA showed the 17 March draft to the Acting Director, DPMO on 20 March. The drafter recalls that the Acting Director read the draft, disagreed with language in one section of the report, and provided written comments. The Acting Director recalls reading part of the draft at the request of the NIO/EA, but told us that he made no comments. The NIO/EA recalls that the Acting Director read part of the draft, but does not recall what his reaction was or whether he provided comments to the drafter. We found neither written comments nor an annotated draft attributable to the Acting Director, DPMO. No changes were made in the text of the section mentioned by the drafter.

Fourth Draft (23 March 1998)

The changes made to the 23 March version of the estimate are modest and do not move the tone of the draft in any consistent direction. In the "Key Judgments," the comparison of Vietnamese sensitivities to those of the United States (previously mentioned) is removed as is a sentence stating that, "*We think US high-level attention to the POW/MIA issue as one component of the overall relationship will be helpful.*" Changes in the "Discussion" section also are minimal:

- ◆ At several points dealing with Vietnamese non-compliance with U.S. requests for documents, a modifying phrase has been added that emphasizes the positive in terms of cooperation: "*Although Vietnam has provided thousands of documents to the US side. . . .*" and "*Vietnam has provided over 28,000 documents to US officials . . . ;*"

- ◆ In several places, language questioning Vietnamese claims that had been added to the 17 March version has been removed: "*We cannot absolutely verify such claims,*" and "*Again, we cannot absolutely verify this information,*"
- ◆ In one area, language has been toughened: rather than "some elements of Vietnam's bureaucracy *fell short of* a desire for full engagement," the text now reads, "some elements . . . *did not favor* full engagement;" and
- ◆ The much-changed language dealing with reports that POWs had not been transferred to the Soviet Union has been changed from, "we have *more convincing* reports . . ." to "we have *credible* reports"

These changes do not provide a clear indication of an effort to shift tone or judgment.

Outside Readers

The 23 March draft was sent to the IC representatives, with notification that a coordination meeting would be held on 27 March. At the same time, the draft was provided for comment to two outside readers: a former Deputy Chairman of the NIC and East Asia specialist and a former National Security Adviser, who had held that position in 1993, when the original analysis of the Russian documents was undertaken. We found written comments from the NIC Deputy Chairman, but not from the former National Security Adviser in the NIC files.

The primary concern expressed by the former Deputy Chairman of the NIC, who provided his comments on 24 March, was that the tone of the "Key Judgments" was "overly rosy." That created two problems, he said. The first was that, before having read the body of the estimate, those readers "who are already doubters will turn off." He said that some of the adjectives could be softened and the NIE would still carry the message that there has been improvement in Hanoi's performance. The second problem was that the draft identifies many cases of non-compliance, thus undercutting the "rosy hue" of the "Key Judgments." He went on to raise several other issues, particularly the degree to which Hanoi's senior leaders have delegated authority for POW/MIA issues. He said that, if true, this is

one of the chief changes for the better and should be in the "Key Judgments;" he noted, however, that this judgment rests on the testimony of one listed source. He also recommended that the draft highlight the fact that the principal cause of Vietnamese non-compliance is the regime's wish not to reveal past brutalities.

In responding to the comments of the outside readers, the NIE drafter referred to the recommendations of the former Deputy Chairman, NIC; these included changing adjectives throughout to say that Vietnam has become "*more*" cooperative rather than "*increasingly*" cooperative and putting more emphasis on the reasons why the Vietnamese have not cooperated more completely, such as "their sensitivity about the historical record on their handling of POWs." His only specific reference to comments made by the former National Security Adviser was to say that he was concerned that a list of SRV officials involved in the POW/MIA issue did not include any officials who were not cooperative.

IC Coordination Meeting

The IC representatives met on 27 and 30 March to coordinate the estimate, working with the 23 March version of the draft. In their reports of the sessions, they indicated that there was little disagreement and that no major problems had emerged. They noted that both the outside readers and DIA had argued that, in a few instances, the draft was "too apologetic" to the Vietnamese or "unduly charitable in rating Vietnam's performance." Therefore, a more circumspect, but still basically positive, appraisal had emerged from the coordination sessions. One representative stated that both outside readers had suggested that modifying the language would "make for a more persuasive paper" and "would not immediately set off critics of Vietnam's record of cooperation on this issue." Another indicated that the new language would stress that Vietnam cooperates mainly because to do so is in its larger interest, but that "long-standing secretiveness and suspicion of the United States will continue to limit its cooperation." The NIO/EA suggested several changes to the draft that reflected the suggestions of the former Deputy Chairman of the NIC and the recommendations of the IC representatives; these changes reinforced skepticism of Vietnam's motives and performance.

Fifth Draft (31 March 1998)

The 31 March draft reflected these suggestions. Vietnam's "*increasing cooperation*" was changed to "*more cooperative approach*" and showing "*increasing*" flexibility was changed to showing "*more*" flexibility. The conclusion that Vietnam's performance on the U.S. POW/MIA issue "*has improved significantly*" was changed to "*has definitely improved.*" A number of additional, but minor, changes served to further reduce the "overly rosy" tone criticized by the former Deputy Chairman of the NIC.

MIB AND NFIB MEETINGS (APRIL 1998)

The Director, DIA convenes the MIB to be certain that he is representing the coordinated military intelligence view when he attends an NFIB meeting to approve an estimate. On 26 March, the DIA Associate Director for Estimates suggested that the Director convene a MIB in this instance because of the "politically-charged nature of this particular estimate." He further recommended that, while DPMO should not be part of the coordination process, a DPMO official might attend the meeting to help "clarify issues" relating to POW/MIA matters. The background paper prepared for the Director, DIA noted that the estimate "will almost certainly be judged inadequate by some SSCI members and staff, Senator Smith, and POW/MIA activists." It also said that a DPMO official would attend the MIB session to address questions "on the POW/MIA issue as a whole, but not issues specifically related to the SNIE [sic]."

When the MIB met on 9 April, the Director, DIA began by mentioning that he had received a call two hours earlier from Senator Smith. The Senator asserted that he wanted the Director to be aware of his concerns, which were significant. Senator Smith charged that the IC had not done a good job of examining all the documents and attendant information on the POW/MIA issue. He claimed that there were 300 to 350 documents available at the SSCI, but that no one had come to review them. If the IC published the NIE without reviewing those documents, Senator Smith said, then "I can't believe in it." In addition, the Director said that he had received a fax from the Executive Director of the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia, in which she said that she looked "forward to reviewing the results" of the estimate and that the League was relying on him to ensure its "objectivity and thoroughness." The Director said that POW/MIA issues were

emotional, but that the important thing was to "deal as objectively as possible with the intelligence facts at hand." The MIB recommended approval of the estimate by the NFIB; all members concurred. The DPMO official said that, while he had not read the estimate, he had no problem with the major judgments as they had been presented. He said that it did seem that the IC was being a little hard on the Vietnamese on the issue of their cooperation with live sighting investigations.

The NFIB, chaired by the DCI, met on 13 April to discuss the estimate. The Chairman of the NIC reported that there were no major substantive differences within the IC on the NIE. The NIO/EA stated that he had removed himself from the process because of accusations that he had "politicized the 1993 [sic] report to which Senator Smith takes exception." He said that the IC had agreed to the main judgments of the estimate and there had been no controversies. After the Deputy Director, DIA raised the issue of Senator Smith and the documents, the DCI directed that a team visit the SSCI to read the documents before the estimate was published.

The NFIB members debated language concerning the alleged transfer of POWs to the USSR. The DCI did not like the use of the word "doubt;" he argued that, because the IC does not know whether these events occurred, it should not make the judgment that it doubted this had occurred. It should use language indicating that there are contradictory reports and that the matter requires further investigation. Both the NIO/EA and the drafter argued that evidence that transfers did not occur was persuasive. The principals agreed to change the language to, "*Although we doubt that POWs were transferred to the USSR, we also conclude that the books remain open on this.*" The net effect of the debate on these issues, initiated by the DCI, was to further modify the judgment made in the NIE on alleged transfers.

ANOTHER ROUND OF REVIEW

The SSCI Documents

In early December 1997, the SSCI had sent a letter to the CIA, OCA, offering to provide material for the estimate and listing the documents in its possession. In early January 1998, the NIE drafter noted that, while most of the material was already in the possession of the IC, he would like

copies of 17 of the documents; this request was passed to the SSCI. That was where this issue stood at the time of Senator Smith's call to the Director, DIA on 9 April and the DCI's directive on 13 April that a team review the SSCI holdings.

When the CIA, OCA contacted the SSCI majority staff member holding the documents on 14 April to set up an appointment to review the documents, the staff member asked that the NIE drafter call him personally. He subsequently told the drafter that he would give him access to specific documents but not to the entire collection which, he said, was not in a single location. He suggested that the drafter review the list again. After consulting with the DIA representative, the drafter added 18 documents to the original list of 17 he had requested in January 1998. In a memorandum for the record, he explained in detail why more documents had not been selected. On 17 April, the drafter and the DIA representative visited the SSCI to review the additional documents. In reporting back to the DCI on 23 April, the NIO/EA explained that the team had reviewed the documents and found that the vast majority of the documents in the SSCI files had been seen in other IC archives and that the review "did not uncover any new information bearing on judgments or analysis in the Estimate" (details of the SSCI document issue are discussed in Part IV, *Critical Assessment Charges: Substance*, under "Relevant Documentation").

Two More Outside Readers

Following the NFIB meeting, at the direction of the DCI, the NIC provided the draft to two more outside readers, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy and a former DCI. Both commended the draft and said they had no major problems with it; each had a few suggestions. The former Defense official recommended that the draft provide more quantitative data to demonstrate the improvement in Vietnam's performance; that it emphasize the weaknesses of GRU reporting and sourcing; and that it analyze what it would take to reverse the current positive trend in Vietnamese behavior. In the end, none of these suggestions was taken.

The former DCI said his suggestions were "intended to strengthen our case against the minority of readers who would be reflexively critical." He recommended that the estimate acknowledge that Vietnam's archival capabilities were probably not good; that the estimate speculate on the

origins of the Russian documents and why the Vietnamese prepared them; and that the drafter remedy the fact that the characterization of the Russian documents was different in the text and the annex. He said that the above points, if addressed, "would simply strengthen the text against criticism." In the end, the draft was revised to incorporate several of his revisions for clarity.

Neither of these readers made suggestions designed to alter the substance or judgments of the NIE draft. While the former DCI indicated that his comments would help deflect criticism, his suggestions were modest and probably not sufficient to have had an impact on the tone of the estimate or on reaction to it.

DCI Input

In early April, the NIC sent the DCI talking points on the NIE, laying out the key judgments: that the Vietnamese are cooperating to help the United States achieve full accounting of POW/MIAs and that the 735 and 1205 documents are neither accurate nor a good foundation for judging Vietnamese performance on the POW/MIA issue. The talking points indicated that the judgments would be politically controversial because some elements within DPMO believe that Vietnam is withholding material and believe the CIA is part of a U.S. Government cover-up on the POW/MIA issue. Furthermore, the talking points stated, Senator Smith probably will not like the conclusions because he and members of his staff have been strongly critical of U.S. Government handling of the issue.

After seeing a copy of the estimate on 17 April, the DCI indicated that he wanted to delete sentences that included the phrase, "We doubt...." He instructed the NIE drafter simply to state what we do and do not know. He also indicated that he wanted to see a revised draft that included the comments of the second set of readers. In his reaction to this note, the NIE drafter stated that, while the DCI was not remembering accurately what had been agreed to at the NFIB about language expressing doubt, it would be best to reword the language to say that "there is no persuasive evidence that POWs were transferred to Russia or other countries."

The NIC sent a revised copy of the draft to the DCI on 23 April, describing the comments made by the additional readers and explaining why most of their suggestions had not been adopted. In his response on

26 April, the DCI indicated that he did not necessarily agree that the suggestions of the outside readers should not be incorporated; he was particularly interested in the recommendations to add quantitative information and more speculation regarding the "inaccurate" Russian documents. In the end, however, he was persuaded that it was not advisable to add either. He did argue strongly and successfully, however, that the order of paragraphs in the "Key Judgments" be shifted; he wanted to put the relevant evidence first, rather than leading with the judgment that Vietnamese cooperation had improved. Neither the Deputy Chairman of the NIC nor the NIO/EA agreed with this change in the ordering, but both recommended accommodating the DCI.

In the draft that went back to the DCI on 28 April, the evidence was put first, followed by the judgment that the Vietnamese were cooperating. On 29 April, the DCI returned the "Key Judgments" to the NIC with a handwritten comment saying that the paragraph regarding Vietnamese cooperation should be removed because it was "too subjective." The paragraph read:

Consequently, we judge that Vietnam has become more helpful in assisting U.S. efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting of American personnel missing in action during the Vietnam conflict.

In the end, the DCI was persuaded that, because this paragraph specifically answered one of the two key questions in the TOR and was a key judgment of the estimate, it should remain. The effect of the change recommended by the DCI would have been to further modify the language of the "Key Judgments."

On 1 May 1998, the DCI approved the NIE. Although the date on the NIE is April 1998, it was not published and disseminated until early May. On 21 May, the NIE drafter met with members of the SSCI staff to brief them on the NIE. The SSCI majority staff member challenged the analytic techniques used by the drafter; he particularly wanted to know why the estimate had not analyzed the number of POWs held by the Vietnamese. The drafter responded that this had not been part of the TOR and that the IC does not have the resources or capability to conduct that analysis.

Criticism of Estimate

Senator Smith Meets With NIO/EA (June 1998)

NIE 98-03 was provided to the SSCI and then to Senator Smith's office in mid-May 1998. On 17 June 1998, the Chairman of the NIC and the NIO/EA were invited to speak about the estimate to members of the U.S. side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs; among the participants was Senator Smith. The Chairman of the NIC outlined the origins of the estimate, describing the NIE as "unconventional" because it looked to the past rather than the future and required a review of archival materials. The NIO/EA then provided a background briefing on the methodology used by the NIE drafter and the IC coordination process.

Senator Smith directed a series of questions to the NIO/EA, challenging the judgments of the estimate and indicating that it was not a credible intelligence product. He provided his own views, including the question, "so does that not mean that there are still 370 cases of Americans where we do not have evidence that they died in their incident?" As a result, he said, you cannot dismiss the 1205 document based on the numbers as "they are trying to do here in this estimate." He charged that the estimate was "totally misleading and frankly it is an effort to discredit the 1,205 number." Senator Smith went on to say that, "This is a terrible job and not an intelligence estimate at all It is full of erroneous information"

Release of Critical Assessment (November 1998)

Senator Smith issued his *Critical Assessment* in November 1998. He sent the assessment with an accompanying cover letter to members of the MIB and the NFIB, with a request that those boards meet to consider and approve his request that the NIE be retracted. He sent copies to Congressional leaders, with a request that oversight hearings concerning the NIE be conducted. In addition, he sent copies to officials:

. . . who may rely on the NIE, such as U.S. policy-makers with responsibility for U.S. relations with the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) and U.S. military officials with responsibility for POW/MIA accounting efforts in Southeast Asia with the admonition that they not rely on the judgments of the estimate for the reasons cited in the *Critical Assessment*.

The *Critical Assessment* took issue with all the major judgments of the estimate. It stated that, because the NIE had failed to distinguish between Vietnam's improved assistance with field operations and its stonewalling in providing full disclosure of documents, the judgment of an overall "good" SRV performance on the POW/MIA problem is not reliable. Moreover, it states:

... there are **numerous** [emphasis in original] instances, also detailed in this critical assessment, where the analysis in support of the NIE's judgments of SRV cooperation is factually inaccurate, misleading, incomplete, shallow, and seriously flawed.

The *Critical Assessment* states that:

... the NIE's judgment on the 1205/735 documents cannot be accepted with confidence because it is **replete** [emphasis in original] with inaccurate and misleading statements, and lacks a reasonably thorough and objective foundation on which to base its judgment. I further conclude, based on a review of relevant U.S. data, that many of the statements contained in the 1205/735 documents...are indeed supported or plausible. ...

Finally, with respect to the politicizing of intelligence, the *Critical Assessment* says that:

Congress and the leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) need to examine what role the White House, its National Security Council, and certain U.S. policymakers responsible for advancing the Administration's normalization agenda with Vietnam may have played in influencing or otherwise affecting the judgments of the IC as reflected in the NIE.

MIB AND NFIB MEETINGS (JANUARY 1999)

The DCI responded to Senator Smith's letter on 17 December 1998, stating that he had directed that the evaluation of the NIE be put on the NFIB agenda scheduled for January 1999. The MIB met on 15 January, before the NFIB, and recommended that:

- ◆ The IC stand by the NIE and reject the request for retraction;

- ◆ The DCI reject charges of "politicization;"
- ◆ The IC avoid point-by-point rebuttals of the *Critical Assessment*; and
- ◆ The IC be prepared for congressional hearings.

All MIB members concurred with the recommendations.¹⁰

The NFIB convened on 19 January 1999 to consider Senator Smith's criticism of the estimate and made several decisions:

- ◆ The Board would not engage in a point-by-point rebuttal of the critique;
- ◆ The DCI would respond to Senator Smith on behalf of the IC, stating that the NFIB principals stand firmly behind the NIE. He would acknowledge that there are "unresolved mysteries with respect to the POW/MIA issue and that the Intelligence Community will continue to work to resolve them." Finally, in his letter, the DCI would refute Senator Smith's claim that the NIE reflected "shoddy research" or a "pre-determined strategy to discredit relevant information;" and
- ◆ The Director, DIA, speaking on behalf of the uniformed military, would send a separate letter to Senator Smith in concert with the DCI letter.

¹⁰ The MIB consists of DIA; the Military Departments to include the Marine Corps; the Unified Commands; NSA; NIMA; NRO; Joint Staff; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence); U.S. Forces Korea; Coast Guard; Associate, DCI for Military Support; and Defense Information Systems Agency.

In his response to Senator Smith, dated 1 February 1999, the DCI reported that the NFIB had voted unanimously to let the estimate stand. He acknowledged critical gaps in intelligence and assured the Senator that NFIB members would provide any new information collected to those responsible for dealing with the POW/MIA issue. He stated that NFIB members had again commended the analyst who drafted the NIE and the "rigorous interagency process" that made the NIE an IC product, not the work of a single author. He said that he accepted the word of those who worked on the draft and coordinated it that "there was at no time any effort to distort judgments from outside or inside the Community."

PART IV: *CRITICAL ASSESSMENT* CHARGES: SUBSTANCE

We evaluated NIE 98-03 and the *Critical Assessment* using a comparative approach (see Annex C for discussion of the methodology used in this section). The *Critical Assessment* took issue with 51 NIE statements (excluding politicization issues). We examined the criticisms levied against the NIE and grouped them into specific topics for discussion as follows:

- ◆ Relevant Documentation;
- ◆ Vietnamese Cooperation;
- ◆ Mistreatment of POWs;
- ◆ Recovery and Repatriation of Remains;
- ◆ The Saga of the Mortician;
- ◆ Numbers of POW/MIA: the 735 and 1205 Documents;
- ◆ Assessment of Comments by Russian Sources on the 735 and 1205 Documents;
- ◆ Separate or Second Prison System; and
- ◆ Alleged Transfers of POWs from Vietnam to the USSR.

In addition to these topics, we reviewed two issues not specifically addressed in either the NIE or the *Critical Assessment*. We evaluated each of the cases of U.S. personnel listed by Senator Smith in 1992 for whom verified remains have not been returned by Vietnam. We undertook this task because, according to Senator Smith's legislative assistant, the Senator had expected the drafter of the NIE to do so and he did not; we agreed with Senator Smith that such a review is relevant to an analysis of the POW/MIA issue and that it should be conducted by independent analysts. In addition, we examined one particular MIA case, that of Captain John T.

McDonnell, U.S. Army, to demonstrate both the polarized nature of the MIA issue and the difficulty of making determinations of fate.

RELEVANT DOCUMENTATION

The *Critical Assessment* questions why any NIE:

. . . would make judgments in areas if there is no sizable body of intelligence reporting within the U.S. Intelligence Community

It goes on to say that:

. . . based on a listing of documents compiled by my [Senator Smith's] office, scanning [sic] thirty-plus years, there does, in fact, appear to be significant intelligence reporting.

The assessment repeatedly criticizes the NIE drafter for failing to use information made available to the IC and cites several letters that address "a listing of documents" that contain "significant intelligence reporting." We begin our discussion of the use of relevant documentation and the alleged discrediting of relevant information by the NIE drafter with an examination of those letters.

On 2 December 1997, Senator Smith, through his legislative assistant, transferred document holdings to the SSCI as a "complete response to meet his pledge to make any relevant information available to the drafter of the NIE, from his holdings and from the Senate Select Committee, POW/MIA." The next day, the SSCI Chairman and Vice Chairman forwarded a list of those holdings to the drafter of the NIE. That list consisted of 317 line items (the term "line items" is more accurate than the term "documents" since one line item may contain one or more documents) in two parts. The first part included 134 line items held in binders by the JCSD to assist its work in support of the VWWG of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission. Senator Smith chairs that working group. The second part included 183 line items that represented the contents of the growing files of Senator Smith as held for him by the SSCI as of 3 December. That list of 317 line items represents what the NIE drafter thought was the relevant material held by the SSCI.

On 6 February 1998, Senator Smith sent a letter to the Director, DIA, in which he stated:

I believe there are currently over 350 documents on the POW/MIA topic I hope you will not hesitate to ask SSCI to review any of this material that may not already be readily available to DIA.

Senator Smith is referring to an expanded list that included 80 line items passed directly to the NIE drafter by the JCSD during the course of several joint discussions and an additional 84 line items added to the growing Smith files during the period December 1997-January 1998.

On 9 April 1998, Senator Smith called the Director, DIA, and referred to "300-350 documents available at the SSCI for people that want to review them." Senator Smith stated that "no one has ever come to review these documents. If the IC published the NIE without having reviewed these documents, I can't believe in it." Senator Smith's call caused the DCI to halt the NIE process and direct the NIE drafter and a DIA representative to visit the SSCI to review documents of concern to Senator Smith.

The body of information Senator Smith referred to in his 9 April call differs from the body of information officially made available to the drafter of the NIE. Moreover, the body of information to which Senator Smith referred contained considerable information already reviewed by the drafter well before the Senator's call. By the time of Senator Smith's call, the drafter of the NIE had considered, at a minimum, 97 documents on Senator Smith's new list: the 80 passed to him by JCSD and 17 that he had selected from the list passed to him by the SSCI on 3 December 1997.

The *Critical Assessment* refers to a 15 April 1998 letter from Senator Smith to the Director, DIA, in which he refers to the documents held by the SSCI. We have been unable to locate this letter. According to Senator Smith's legislative assistant, there was a 15 April 1998 memorandum from him (the legislative assistant) to the Director, DIA, which a SSCI staff member was to deliver the next day. The legislative assistant gave us a copy of that memorandum. The SSCI staff member told us that he took the memorandum to DIA on or about 16 April 1998. Neither the Director, DIA's executive correspondence office nor his POW/MIA policy office has

a record of any correspondence from Senator Smith or his staff dated 15 April 1998.

The SSCI staff member did hand the updated document list, without a cover memorandum, to the drafter of the NIE and the DIA representative on 16 April 1998, during their document review visit to the SSCI. According to the NIE drafter, "on arrival, the staff assistant handed us a new list of documents in SSCI's possession that he said we should look at." We did not find a copy of the 15 April 1998 cover memorandum in the NIE drafter's files. Further, on 9 September 1999 we showed the drafter a copy of the memorandum and he stated that he had never seen it.

We reviewed the SSCI holdings related to the 3 December 1997 letter. We also reviewed the document holdings of the NIE drafter. The drafter's holdings, coupled with files provided to him by other organizations far exceeded the SSCI holdings. Moreover, the NIE drafter had extensive folders pertaining to specific topics. Not only did the drafter have access to relevant intelligence information but he also made multiple visits to DPMO, both RA and the JCSD, to acquire documents held by those two key offices. Further, he had an extensive network of informal sources including academia. We found that the NIE drafter considered relevant intelligence information from 1987 onwards, as specified in the TOR. Based on his reading of previous IC publications, however, he did not specifically review raw data dating from before 1987 (see Annex D for a listing of IC publications reviewed by the estimate drafter).

In our review of CIA, DO files, centrally gathered for the government-wide POW/MIA document declassification effort in the early 1990s, we found that relevant intelligence information concerning the POW/MIA issue prior to that time was available and that the NIE drafter had reviewed those files. Further, the DO manager responsible for those documents told us that he personally assisted the drafter, a process that included a review of the draft report. We also found that the drafter's boxes of information contained documentation going back to the 1950s. We believe that the NIE drafter considered relevant information but, by design, focused on the decade 1987 through 1997.

Senator Smith's legislative assistant told us that, given the emergence of a re-evaluation of the 735 and 1205 documents as a key

question, the TOR obligated the NIE drafter to consider information back to the 1960s. We cannot reconcile these two divergent points of view. We note, however, the delay in the completion of the TOR; the addition of the 735 and 1205 documents to the "Key Questions" of the TOR; and the introduction of a new NIO/EA and a new NIE drafter, neither of whom had been involved in the negotiations of the TOR. Whereas the former NIO/EA had intended to treat the 735 and 1205 documents as a separate project, the new NIO/EA and drafter accepted the final TOR with its expanded focus without changing the time frame on which the research should focus. In conducting this review of the NIE and the *Critical Assessment*, we found it necessary to search as far back as the document trail allowed.

VIETNAMESE COOPERATION

The *Critical Assessment* claims that the NIE did not consider information available to the IC in assessing Vietnamese cooperation on POW/MIA matters. At issue are the NIE statements that "Vietnam has become more helpful in assisting U.S. efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting of American personnel missing in action during the Vietnam conflict" and that Vietnam's overall performance in dealing with the POW/MIA issue "has been good in recent years." The *Critical Assessment* asserts that the NIE judgment of Vietnam performance as "good" is not reliable and argues that the judgments on cooperation are "factually inaccurate, misleading, incomplete, shallow, and seriously flawed."

For example, one of the key questions in the NIE TOR and "Scope Note" is:

To what extent since 1987 has the leadership of the SRV demonstrated a commitment to cooperating with the United States to achieve the fullest possible accounting of American prisoners missing in action during the Vietnam conflict?

The *Critical Assessment* claims that the NIE makes no mention of SRV leadership intentions, performance and capabilities on the POW/MIA issue between 1987 and the early 1990s, as required by the key question in the TOR. It is a fact that the "Key Judgments" of the NIE address only the period since the early 1990s, stating that, since the early 1990s, there has been evidence of increased Vietnamese cooperation in terms of strengthened

staffing, increased responsiveness, and growing professionalism. In its "Discussion" section, however, the NIE addresses the question of Vietnamese cooperation since 1987 in some detail. It includes highlights from the "Key Judgments" of the February 1992 CIA Assessment, "Vietnam: Adjusting Its Strategy on the POW/MIA Issue," that describe Vietnamese cooperative gestures during the period 1987 through 1991.

The *Critical Assessment* argues that the NIE "Key Judgments" "glaringly fails to define what constitutes progress on the POW/MIA issue from Hanoi's standpoint" The Vietnamese define progress on the POW/MIA issue almost solely in terms of progress in improving the political relationship between the United States and Vietnam and the amount of money the United States is investing in Vietnam. While the estimate does not say this in so direct a way, the "Key Judgments" state that ". . . better ties to the United States are in Vietnam's own security and economic development interests and that normalization requires progress on the POW/MIA issue." The "Discussion" asserts that Vietnam has become more cooperative for a variety of reasons, including a desire for engagement with Washington, particularly since the collapse of the Soviet Union, which had been a key ally of Vietnam. Further, the NIE contends that Vietnam considers cooperation with the United States essential to enhancement of its economic and security objectives, explaining that Vietnamese leaders recognize that Washington will be a key power in the region and that American business is a potential major source of investment. Also, the NIE mentions that the Vietnamese understand that cooperation on POW/MIA issues is likely to foster a better bilateral relationship with Washington.

The *Critical Assessment's* charges with respect to the NIE's treatment of Vietnam's cooperation on POW/MIA issues are not supported by the facts. The assessment asserts that the NIE does not deal with certain issues when it does, albeit not necessarily in the manner or in the terms preferred by the *Critical Assessment*.

A Question of Political Sensitivity

In another area related to Vietnamese cooperation, the *Critical Assessment* disputes the NIE claim that the POW/MIA issue no longer has the political sensitivity that it once had within the Vietnamese leadership. The assessment argues that, if anything, the issue has become more

politically sensitive, not less, because of intensified U.S. interest. The *Critical Assessment* indicates that the appointment of General Vessey as the Special Emissary to Hanoi, the establishment of a Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, and creation of the 1991 road map to normalization of relations demonstrate intense U.S. interest.

The February 1992 CIA assessment, cited in the NIE, argues that the Vietnamese were wrestling with their foreign policy in the early 1990s. The report states that there was a growing body of evidence that suggested Hanoi's leadership was debating the pace and scope of improving relations with the United States. Using the 1992 CIA assessment as a backdrop, the NIE drafter researched documentation and discussed Vietnamese political sensitivity with both members of the IC and operational entities that work POW/MIA issues on a regular basis. A senior U.S. military official stated that the President of Vietnam clearly understood that the POW/MIA issue remained a matter of high priority for the United States. Another senior official indicated that, as operations became more routine, the Vietnamese had become more comfortable with the United States. Thus, over time, a more trusting relationship developed between the two countries and the need for high-level interaction on POW/MIA issues diminished. The NIE drafter was told that operational POW/MIA issues have long been entrusted by the Vietnamese leadership to the VNOSMP and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The drafter of the estimate had sufficient evidence to conclude that the POW/MIA issue no longer has the political sensitivity it once had in the Vietnamese leadership.

Refusal to Cooperate

The *Critical Assessment* takes issue with the NIE regarding additional statements related to cooperation, including the NIE claim that incidents of outright Vietnamese refusal to cooperate with U.S. investigators have decreased and instances wherein the Vietnamese raise objections to POW/MIA activities have diminished. The NIE drafter reviewed DoS documents; the results and impending actions of the Presidential Special Emissary to Vietnam (General Vessey); FBIS reporting; DPMO records; and USPACOM, JTF-FA, CILHI, and Stony Beach documentation. He also conducted interviews with numerous government officials who had knowledge of Vietnamese cooperation on POW/MIA issues. Using the time frame mandated in the TOR, the NIE concludes that, even though instances of refusal to cooperate with U.S. investigators have decreased, the

Vietnamese continue to object to U.S. POW/MIA activities on occasion. The NIE explains that Vietnam's political system is secretive and distrustful of foreign influences and that Vietnamese officials fear that divulging information could undermine governmental authority. Also, according to the NIE, defending its sovereignty and protecting its secrets might be the major reasons why Vietnam has not been completely forthcoming with respect to POW/MIA issues.

Given that background, the NIE cites several "significant examples" where Vietnam has hindered activities, including refusing requests to see Politburo documents; denying interviews with some senior retired military officials; and refusing to allow joint field activities in "classified" military areas. Even though several documents reviewed by the NIE drafter and interviews he conducted revealed that significant progress had been made in Vietnamese cooperation, the NIE concludes that there are limits to what the United States could expect to achieve.

The NIE suggests that much remains to be accomplished in terms of Vietnamese cooperation on the POW/MIA issue. We believe that the NIE drafter appropriately used both relevant documentation and interviews with knowledgeable officials in reaching the conclusion that Vietnam's performance in dealing with the POW/MIA issue has been good in recent years and that incidents of refusal to cooperate have declined. That conclusion did not come easily, but, taken in the aggregate and coupled with the chronicle of continuing cases of uncooperative behavior, we believe the overall NIE judgment is sufficiently balanced and cautious, particularly given the caveat that the unresolved areas of Vietnamese cooperation "suggest the need for continued close attention by the U.S. Government."

MISTREATMENT OF POWS

The *Critical Assessment* discussed mistreatment of POWs as part of the record of Vietnamese cooperation; we treat it separately here because of its importance. The assessment claims that the NIE used a poor example of Vietnam's lack of forthrightness on certain POW/MIA issues by stating that Vietnam continues to deny that U.S. POWs were mistreated while in captivity and that full disclosure of that information would prove embarrassing to the regime. The *Critical Assessment* argues that other

embarrassing examples, such as "the holding back of any unacknowledged American POWs after Operation Homecoming in 1973," would have been more relevant. Use of the mistreatment example, according to the assessment, "is not only disappointing, but very misleading to the NIE reader concerning the scope of knowledge the SRV may still possess concerning unaccounted for POW/MIAs."

During the 17 June 1998 briefing on the NIE provided to the U.S. side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, Senator Smith posed a question to the NIO/EA: if the Vietnamese regime would be embarrassed to provide torture information, he asked, would it not be just as embarrassed to admit that American POWs were held back after the war? The response was "I suppose it would." The two issues are very different in nature, however.

There are countless, first-hand accounts of Vietnamese mistreatment of U.S. POWs. The U.S. Ambassador to Hanoi, a former POW, told the NIE drafter that during a discussion with a Vietnamese official he had described how he had been dragged around like a dog with a rope around his neck. The Vietnamese official denied that the incident occurred. Congressman Sam Johnson's 1992 book, Captive Warriors, and the 1998 book, Honor Bound - The History of American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia 1961-1973, prepared at the request of a former Deputy Secretary of Defense, graphically describe POW mistreatment at the hands of Vietnamese captors. The NIE states that Vietnam would never provide documents to the United States that reveal mistreatment of POWs because such disclosure would be extremely embarrassing. The DPMO has never raised the issue of mistreatment of POWs because that office considers the issue particularly sensitive; if the issue were raised, DPMO believes, it would "provoke a counterproductive Vietnamese reaction." The DPMO claims that the subject of mistreatment is irrelevant to "our accounting effort, and we have not requested documents that might bear directly on these matters." While requests for such information may not be relevant to the DPMO, the NIE raises the issue to advise the reader that Vietnam has not been forthcoming because divulgence would prove embarrassing to the regime.

While instances of torture are well documented, virtually all studies, dating back to the 1976 report of the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, conclude that there is no evidence to indicate that any American POWs from the Indochina conflict remain alive. The January 1993 Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs report concluded that there was no proof U.S. POWs had survived in North Vietnam after Operation Homecoming, while acknowledging that there also was no proof that all of those who did not return had died. The committee report indicated that it could not prove a negative, but concluded that there is "no compelling evidence that proves that any American remains alive in captivity in Southeast Asia."

The NIE indicates that 120 live sighting investigations have been conducted and none has generated any credible evidence of American POWs left in Vietnam. We confirmed this with U.S. officials who work with the refugee program. The Senate Select Committee report of 1993 suggests that, if efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting of Vietnam-era POW/MIAs are to be effective and fair to the families, "they must go forward within the context of reality, not fiction." The reality is that there is no credible evidence that American POWs remained behind in 1973. The alleged holding back of POWs is not an appropriate example of Vietnam's lack of forthrightness on POW/MIA issues.

RECOVERY AND REPATRIATION OF REMAINS

As with other topics discussed under cooperation, the *Critical Assessment*, in discussing repatriation, refers to information available to the IC that allegedly was not used. The assessment takes issue with the NIE judgment that Vietnamese cooperation on the recovery and repatriation of remains of U.S. personnel is excellent. Charging that the NIE judgment is based solely on information provided by a non-IC organization, the *Critical Assessment* contends that additional evidence was not factored into the judgment. The drafter of the NIE collected documentation on recovery and repatriation of remains and interviewed key officials in organizations involved in POW/MIA matters. While these organizations are not all members of the IC, they are consumers of information from the IC. The IC gathers and analyzes information from all sources, including non-intelligence entities to provide comprehensive assessments and judgments to decisionmakers. The JTF-FA and CILHI are the U.S. Government organizations most closely associated with recovery and repatriation of

remains and, even though not part of the IC, their documented experiences were of legitimate import to the NIE drafter.

In December 1997, the drafter of the NIE met with U.S. officials dealing directly with POW/MIA issues. During those sessions, participants stated that the Vietnamese had approached the issue of repatriation more seriously after 1992 and that Vietnamese cooperation in recovery and repatriation of remains since 1992 has been excellent. The NIE drafter took those views into consideration, balancing them with document holdings. In addition, he examined numerous publications that addressed recovery and repatriation of remains (see Annex E).

Manipulation of Witnesses

The *Critical Assessment* describes NIE judgments regarding recovery and repatriation of remains as "especially disturbing," because, it says, there is evidence that Vietnam has manipulated witnesses and evidence at crash sites and has recovered remains that have not been repatriated. The NIE drafter was told by knowledgeable U.S. officials that, in the past, an unknown number of witnesses had been coached, but that this no longer occurs. Similarly, other officials indicated that they were aware of only one where a witness was coached. We also conferred with these U.S. officials and learned that, between 1988 and 1992, the team leader for 18 of the first 20 joint field investigations saw no evidence of witness manipulation and did not see tampering with any crash site. The team leader told us that Vietnamese national level officials wanted to know what a witness would say before meeting the Americans because they did not want to be surprised, but in no way did Vietnamese officials interfere with the recovery process. The team leader said that, during early joint investigations, Vietnamese officials were suspicious of U.S. intentions because they believed the investigations were related to intelligence collection activities. After those initial suspicions were allayed, however, they became more supportive.

Repatriation of Remains

The NIE states that there is no evidence the Vietnamese "presently are storing remains of American dead." It indicates that the Vietnamese did collect and store remains during the war, but "we do not know how many." The *Critical Assessment* argues that it is misleading to say "categorically that there is no evidence" the Vietnamese are storing remains, citing discrepancies in numbers of collected and stored remains provided by DPMO and CILHI; a "review of evidence available to the IC;" and the testimony of the "mortician."

The NIE overstated its case that there is no evidence that the Vietnamese currently are storing the remains of American POWs. The DPMO's 1995 zero-based comprehensive review concluded that there had been some cases indicating that specific remains recovered by the Vietnamese Government had not been turned over. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs report, "Vietnam's Collection and Repatriation of American Remains," published in June 1999 and reviewed by knowledgeable senior analysts in the IC, concludes that, "Based on available information, it is not possible to confirm independently whether Vietnam has repatriated all the American remains it collected." According to the report, Vietnam last repatriated stored remains in September 1990. The 1999 report indicates that there is strong evidence in two cases involving five remains that the remains were collected and taken to Hanoi but not repatriated. Discussions on those cases with the Vietnamese Government continue. Furthermore, the report states that, on two occasions, Vietnamese officials provided information that it had remains that had not been repatriated. While the events cannot be refuted or confirmed, investigation continues.

The *Critical Assessment* mentions that, in September 1998 (the NIE is dated April 1998), CILHI reported that approximately 170 U.S. remains repatriated by Hanoi since the end of the war showed signs of storage. The assessment then concludes that, based on the DPMO estimate that "Vietnam collected and stored some 300 remains, vice the 400 to 600 asserted by the 1987 Special National Intelligence Estimate," the resulting discrepancy (170 versus 300) makes the NIE assertion that Vietnam's repatriation record is excellent "extremely inaccurate."

CILHI found that 219 remains, returned unilaterally by the Vietnamese, exhibited forensic evidence of storage. As of 1 April 1999, it had identified 172 of those and continued to analyze the others. Independent of the CILHI determination, DPMO identified 274 remains that had signs of storage. Of those, DPMO said that 249 had been identified and that CILHI was analyzing the others. The disparity in numbers is the result of the different criteria and methods used by DPMO and CILHI. While DPMO analyzes documentation, testimony, and other source reporting to reach its findings, CILHI bases its numbers on the examination of remains. In the 1999 remains study, CILHI states that, "the examination of skeletal remains can yield considerable information . . . but not as much as desired. There are real limitations to the data that can be obtained." Further, CILHI cautions that its judgments on storage are subjective and imprecise because there are no tests, measurements, or means of standardization to arrive at determinations.

The estimate mentioned that DPMO, in conjunction with CILHI, was investigating the question of Vietnamese storage of remains and that further conclusions had to await the results of that investigation. The 1999 remains report, issued more than one year after publication of the estimate, determined that a case-by-case analysis of all remains repatriated revealed that, between 1970 and 1993, Vietnamese central authorities had collected and stored 270 to 280 sets of remains. The report claims the disparity of 20 to 30 between that number and the number estimated to have been collected (300) is smaller than had been thought previously and that "we will continue to seek more data about the extent and limits of Vietnam's effort to collect American remains."

The NIE overstated its case on the lack of evidence regarding storage of American remains; it did not factor in the evidence suggesting that remains may not have been repatriated in two cases involving five remains. It did, however, indicate that an in-depth study on the issue was being prepared and that conclusions should await publication of that report.

THE SAGA OF THE MORTICIAN

The NIE makes no claim regarding the number of stored remains. It does report that the 1987 SNIE had suggested that there was evidence Vietnam was storing "about 400-600 sets of remains." That judgment was retracted in October 1996 by IC Assessment 96-05, "Vietnamese Storage of Remains of Unaccounted U.S. Personnel." The NIE states that the 1987 judgment was retracted by the 1996 Assessment because it was based on "the unsupported testimony of a single unreliable source," the mortician.

The *Critical Assessment* takes the NIE to task on the subject of the mortician, calling for "an accurate review of evidence available to the IC." The assessment argues that the NIE rationale regarding the 1996 IC Assessment retraction of a judgment made in the September 1987 SNIE about the storage of 400 to 600 sets of remains, is "egregious" and misrepresents the facts. While the NIE correctly cites the 1996 Assessment as the basis for the retraction, we do not agree with the NIE rationale that the retraction was made because the source of the information was unreliable and his testimony insupportable. Our judgment is based on a comprehensive examination of the source of the storage of remains issue, the mortician.

The mortician, an ethnic Chinese, Vietnamese citizen, worked in his family's funeral business in Hanoi. In the late 1950s, the government assigned mortuary personnel to public service and the mortician worked for the Director of Cemeteries, where he was responsible for grave digging as well as preparing and interring remains. Beginning in 1969, he was assigned the duties of preparing skeletal remains of Americans. In 1979, he was arrested and deported to Hong Kong. While residing in a refugee camp in Hong Kong, he attracted the attention of the U.S. Defense Liaison Office by alleging that he personally had inspected the remains of over 400 U.S. military personnel that were in secret storage in Hanoi.

The U.S. Government conducted a polygraph examination of the mortician prior to expediting his resettlement to the United States. His responses to the following three relevant questions resulted in an indication of deception:

- ◆ Between 1974 and 1977, did you inspect the remains of more than 400 Americans? – Yes;
- ◆ Did you make up the story about the remains of 400 Americans being stored in Hanoi? – No; and
- ◆ Did you personally see three live American soldiers in Hanoi after 1976? – Yes.

The U.S. Government adjudicated the results of the polygraph examination and determined that the examiner had made the “correct call.” The mortician was brought to Washington, where he was interviewed and given another polygraph examination, this time administered by a private company. We could not determine why a private examiner was hired to perform the second examination. The responses to the following three relevant questions in the second polygraph examination indicated no deception:

- ◆ When you left Hanoi, Vietnam, were skeletal remains of Americans being kept there?—Yes;
- ◆ At the time you left Vietnam, was the Vietnam Government keeping skeletal remains of U.S. military personnel at Hanoi like you say?—Yes; and
- ◆ Did the Vietnam Government force you to leave Vietnam like you say?—Yes.

The private company conducted a third polygraph examination. The relevant questions focused on whether the mortician had seen three Americans between 1974 and 1979 in Hanoi. He responded affirmatively and no deception was indicated.

The mortician's claim to have seen three Americans was investigated as a live sighting report. One of the individuals, always seen with a Vietnamese escort, was determined to be Robert Garwood.¹¹ The other two individuals, seen unescorted, were determined to be either journalists or Russian military advisers. In January 1984, the U.S. Government addressed the inconsistencies in the previous polygraph examinations of the mortician. Its assessment concluded that the polygraph examination results should not have been the sole or primary basis for assessing the mortician's story and that the mortician's story was true.

The number of remains of U.S. military personnel stored in Vietnam and the veracity of the mortician's statements remain subjects of continuing debate. During his June 1980 testimony before the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the mortician claimed to have processed "some 400, some 452 of these remains, that 26 were turned over to the United States; that leaves about 400 plus. I have seen them." Between 1980 and 1983, senior U.S. officials used the more than/over 400 figure in public statements. The 13 January 1993 report of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs states that, in 1980, the mortician testified that he had processed 452 sets of remains.

The 1987 SNIE addressed the storage of remains of U.S. military personnel. Without further explanation, it states that, "We estimate that the Vietnamese have already recovered and are warehousing between 400 and 600 remains." The 1996 IC Assessment mentions that IC participants in the 1987 SNIE deferred to the principal drafter on the number of warehoused remains because the drafter's agency (DIA) had the responsibility and expertise for assessing technical aspects of the remains issue. The drafter of the 1987 SNIE, since retired, told us that he could not recall using the 400 to 600 figure. He said that, while he was convinced that storage of remains had occurred, he was not certain there was sufficient evidence to determine the numbers involved. Both the Director and Deputy Director, Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs, DIA at the time, told us that they had no direct knowledge as to the rationale for using

¹¹ Marine Corps PFC Robert Garwood was first listed as a POW by U.S. authorities—but never by the Vietnamese — in 1965. He returned to the United States voluntarily in 1979. He was convicted of collaborating with the enemy.

the 400 to 600 figure in the 1987 SNIE. Both speculated that the numbers were extrapolated from the mortician's estimate on the number of boxes he believed he saw.

The 1996 IC Assessment states that the mortician:

. . . carefully differentiated between the sets of remains he *said* [emphasis in original] he worked on (280 to 310) and what he *believed* [emphasis in original] was the total number of boxes (400). He arrived at a figure of 426 by combining the 400 boxes he estimated in the room (warehouse) in 1977 and two other groups of remains (26 sets) that he worked on that could not have been in the room

These figures coincide with those in the detailed interview DIA conducted with the mortician in November 1979, just prior to the second polygraph examination. The 1996 Assessment concludes that the 1987 SNIE statement regarding warehousing 400 to 600 sets of remains was based on limited direct evidence whose reliability was open to question. It further concludes that the 400 figure was not "a precise point estimate" and the 600 figure was based on "uncorroborated hearsay evidence or . . . the result of questionable extrapolation."

The drafter of the 1998 NIE grappled with the differences of opinion on the mortician and discussed those differences at length during IC coordination sessions leading up to formulation of the draft report. IC participants agreed with the language that appeared in the NIE that the storage of 400 to 600 sets of remains was retracted from the 1987 SNIE by the 1996 IC Assessment because the information turned out to have been based on the "unsupported testimony of a single unreliable source." Many factors, including possible mistranslation of testimony and interviews; confusion on the part of the mortician and interviewers and translators; diverse polygraph examination questions; differences in what the mortician actually observed (remains he worked on) and what he speculated; and the drafter's contention that the information provided by the mortician that appeared in the 1987 SNIE was erroneous convinced the NIE drafter that the mortician and his information were unreliable. According to the drafter, the 1998 NIE did not discuss the numbers of warehoused remains because the mortician was considered an unreliable source. The 1996 IC Assessment did not discredit the mortician and his

information, however. It claimed that the 1987 SNIE numbers were based on limited direct evidence whose reliability was open to question.

In a 30 June 1998 memorandum for the Director, DIA, the DPMO argued that the 1996 Assessment characterized the evidence rather than the source as unreliable, describing the figures (400 to 600) as rough estimates not firm enough to serve as a baseline for U.S. policy. The DPMO found information provided by the mortician reliable, and, "dueling polygraphs aside," estimated that the number of remains collected and stored in Hanoi is "well within the range of acceptable error for the rough firsthand estimates provided by this source." DPMO analysts explained that the "range of acceptable error" was the 280 to 310 figure detailed in the 1996 Assessment. Those were the numbers that the mortician processed or worked on rather than the more than 400 he perceived or believed to have been stored. The DPMO concludes that Vietnam collected and stored some 300 U.S. remains rather than the 400 to 600 described in the 1987 SNIE.

We believe that the NIE language reflects misunderstanding of the meaning of the 1996 IC Assessment. That assessment outlined the rationale behind the decision to judge the 1987 SNIE statement that Hanoi had warehoused 400 to 600 sets of remains as based on "limited direct evidence whose reliability was open to question." We believe that the mortician was truthful in explaining his knowledge of warehoused remains, but that his information regarding the numbers of remains was not accurate. The second polygraph examination, in-depth interviews, a comprehensive post-polygraph investigation, and the U.S. Government's conclusion in January 1984 concerning the mortician's truthfulness provide ample evidence and justification for our position. Had the DPMO been involved in coordinating the 1998 NIE, the "unreliable" and "unsupported" language might have been challenged and the statement on the mortician might have been explained more fully.

We cannot explain why the U.S. Government contracted for two private commercial polygraph examinations of the mortician. Nor can we explain why the U.S. Government believed additional polygraph examinations of the mortician were necessary. We are confident that the 1984 acceptance of comprehensive post-polygraph investigation of the

mortician are sufficient justification to conclude that he was truthful, but not completely accurate in his assessment of the number of remains in question. We agree with the 1996 IC Assessment claim that the mortician "carefully differentiated between the sets of remains he *said* he worked on and what he *believed* was the total number of boxes."

The NIE incorrectly claimed that the 1996 IC Assessment retracted the statement in the 1987 SNIE that Vietnam was storing 400 to 600 sets of remains because the information was based on the unsupported testimony of a single unreliable source, the mortician. The misreading of the 1996 IC Assessment on the mortician does not change the basic thrust or key judgments of the NIE nor does the misread make the NIE statement regarding the source of stored remains an "egregious and unsupported misrepresentation of facts . . ." as claimed by the *Critical Assessment*.

NUMBERS OF POW/MIA: THE 735 AND 1205 DOCUMENTS

Two Distinct Methodologies

On the issue of numbers of American POWs in Vietnam, the *Critical Assessment* claims that the IC has not reviewed all relevant documentation. In addition, it asserts that, "It is simply unacceptable that a detailed analysis of the numbers is not presented in the NIE." Before we address the issue of the numbers specifically, it is important to understand that two different accounting methodologies have been used to support arguments that there either are or are not U.S. MIAs still alive in Southeast Asia. Since Operation Homecoming in 1973, the U.S. Government has based its accounting on the cases of individuals who were expected to be repatriated, but were not. Over the years, these have been termed discrepancy or priority cases. The Senate Select Committee summarized 135 of those as the "Vessey Discrepancy Cases." The 35-year, DoD accounting history has focused on these discrepancy cases in the remains recovery effort; as of August 1999, the cases DoD considered to be still unresolved had been reduced to 43.

The alternate methodology, which has run parallel to the DoD accounting system in at least rudimentary form since Operation

Homecoming, considers all MIA, regardless of sub-category (e.g., Killed in Action-Body not Recovered (KIA-BNR),¹² over water, non-hostile) to be potentially alive, unless "fullest possible accounting" has occurred. Fullest possible accounting is defined as either verified repatriation of remains or return of a live person. Based on that approach there remain over 2,000 persons not accounted for, all potentially live MIA. Supporters of this methodology do, however, tend to accept the U.S. Government's KIA-BNR accounting. Accepting KIA-BNR reduces the number of potential MIA to 1,172 as of December 1992.

The 1993 Senate Select Committee POW/MIA report stated that Senator Smith had compiled a list of "compelling" cases, reducing the number of MIA from 1,172 to "324 still unaccounted for U.S. personnel from the Vietnam conflict." Senator Smith did not describe his methodology but did say that he considered his list "a working document" and "at best conservative." Based on verified remains returned of those on his list of 324, the list has been reduced to 289 names.

The dichotomy between the two methodologies was not resolved during the work of the Senate Select Committee, POW/MIA Affairs. In its final report, the Committee created an "Appendix of Case Summaries," and simply reported two lists of cases, the government's discrepancy list and Senator Smith's list of compelling cases.

The U. S. Government's case methodology factors out both those cases that the DoD determined to be KIA-BNR and those cases in which there was evidence of death. The methodology also factors out cases that are considered to be over water or off-the-scope.¹³ The total number is reduced as remains are recovered and identified or when individuals are released.¹⁴ The methodology considers only the remaining cases to be MIA. There is no POW category in this methodology because the U.S. Government believes there are no remaining POWs.

¹² KIA-BNR refers to persons known to have been killed in action, but body or remains not recovered by U.S. forces, e.g., an aircraft exploding in midair or crashing, or a person with unquestionably terminal wounds and not recovered due to enemy action, or being lost at sea.

¹³ Off-the-scope is a term used to refer to aircraft losses in Southeast Asia, primarily in Laos, where the aircraft loss occurred outside of radar coverage and the location is unknown.

¹⁴ Since 1973, only one U.S. military member, Robert Garwood, has returned alive from Vietnam.

The alternate methodology considers the above methodology to be flawed and bases its accounting on total numbers. While it also factors out KIA-BNR, returnees, and remains recovered and identified, it includes cases in which there is evidence of death, over water cases, and off-the-scope cases. The methodology considers all remaining cases to be potential POW as well as MIA and uses the terminology POW/MIA.

Apart from consistent treatment of KIA-BNR and remains recovered and identified, the two methodologies have different evidentiary bases. The discrepancy-based methodology relies on real-time incident reporting; results of search and rescue efforts; chain-of-command actions; the Presumptive Finding of Death (PFOD), which is a Military Services and DoD process;¹⁵ and the ongoing work of JTF-FA. It is driven by operational reporting.

The total numbers-based methodology is also based on real-time incident reporting and results of search and rescue efforts. It discounts chain-of-command actions and PFOD determinations, however. It is driven by single-source intelligence, interviews, and other one-time reports. In order to account for its numbers of missing personnel, it hypothesizes a second prison system and the transfer of individuals to the former Soviet Union. Since the work of the Senate Select Committee in 1992, it has relied heavily on the two Russian archival documents, the 735 and 1205 documents, which were acquired after the Select Committee finished its work.

We opted neither to compare the two methodologies further nor to accept one over the other. Instead, we went back to an unfinished thread in the 1994 IC report, "Recent Reports on American POWs in Indochina: An Assessment." That assessment contained the following statement, without amplification:

¹⁵ PFOD is an administrative finding by the appropriate Military Service Secretary, after statutory review procedures, that there is no current evidence to indicate that a person previously listed as MIA or POW could still be alive.

Finally, analysts noted that the "735 Document" and the "1205 Document" are inconsistent with each other by any accounting. To have had 1,205 US pilots in captivity by late 1972, Hanoi would have to have held far more than 735 by early 1971.

That incomplete analysis, combined with the Senate Select Committee's decision not to take a position on the two methodologies, persuaded us to evaluate those sections of the 735 and 1205 documents dealing with numbers of U.S. POWs.

The Documents

We compared the 735 and 1205 documents to each other using the Fulbright/Kennedy and Vessey lists as a basis (the lists will be described as discussed). We focused on those sections of the documents that address the number of POWs held by the Vietnamese because it is those sections that are relevant to the POW/MIA issue. This methodology allowed us to proceed without questioning either the authenticity of the documents or the accuracy of those sections in each document that are not relevant to the POW issue. This approach precludes questions concerning the *bona fides* of either purported author, his location and position at the time of each report, or the intended audience. It also sets aside consideration of South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia and focuses solely on the North Vietnamese prison system. A close examination of the portions of the 735 and 1205 documents that address the POW issue reveals that both cannot be true. They are mutually exclusive—as the 1994 IC assessment concluded. The relevant portion of at least one of these documents, if not both, is demonstrably false.

Historical Setting of the 735 Document

On 22 December 1970, a U.S. official representing Senators William Fulbright and Edward Kennedy was handed a list: "Hanoi, November 15, 1970." The cover sheet was headed, Ministry of National Defense, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and titled, "US Pilots Captured in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam from August 5, 1964, to November 15, 1970." The list totaled 368 names: 339 in the North Vietnamese prison system, 20 deceased and nine released.

We can assume that senior Vietnamese officials familiar with the issue would have been aware of both the numbers provided to the United States in the Fulbright/Kennedy list and the breakdown of those numbers (i.e., 339 living POWs and 29 individuals who had died or had been released). Both the 735 and the 1205 documents are attributed to senior Vietnamese officials. Both documents, in referring to the number of living American POWs that the Vietnamese had "acknowledged" to be in captivity, used the number 368. This was not the true number of live POWs, and these officials would have known it.

In late 1970 or early 1971, a Vietnamese agricultural official purportedly authored a primarily agricultural report that was found in GRU archives in the summer of 1993. That report became known as the 735 document. The GRU-acquired document indicates that the Vietnamese official briefly addressed the POW issue twice in the report. In a section titled "Situation in the Vietnamese Workers' Party," the report states that, "... we published the names of 368 American pilots who were shot down and taken captive in the territory of the D.R.V." Later, in a section titled, "Situation in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia," the report states that:

The overall number of American pilots imprisoned in the D.R.V. is 735. As I already stated, we published the names of 368 pilots. This is our diplomatic move. If the Americans agree to withdraw their troops from South Vietnam, as a start we will return these 368 men to them.

If the reporting official (or any other senior Vietnamese official) had been in a position to give an authoritative report on this subject and to use the number 368, he also would have known that 29 of the men whose names were on the published list could not be returned to the United States because they had either been released previously or died in captivity. The acknowledged number of live POWs who could have been returned was 339.

In the meantime, however, U.S. officials were unintentionally institutionalizing the incorrect number. On 2 September 1971, the Secretary of Defense forwarded the Fulbright/Kennedy list in a memorandum, "December 1970 PW List from NVN" to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. In the text, the Secretary referred to "a list of 368 servicemen who are or have been prisoners of war." In his 1995 book,

Imprisoned or Missing in Vietnam, Lewis M. Stern, commenting on the 735 document stated, "The document, which stated that Vietnam held 735 U.S. aviators as POWs in 1971 instead of the 368 whose names the Vietnamese had publicly released" Stern has been involved with DoD policymaking on the POW/MIA issue since September 1989 and accompanied General Vessey to Hanoi five times. Currently he is the Director for Indochina, Thailand and Burma, International Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense. He did not question the 368 figure in the 735 document when we interviewed him.

On the other hand, the figure cited by the Vietnamese in 1970 has been accurately reported, implicitly if not explicitly, at least five times: twice in the POW/MIA literature, twice by Senator Smith, and once by the IC. In his 1976 book, P.O.W., A Definitive History of the American Prisoner-of-War Experience in Vietnam, 1964-1973, John G. Hubbell stated, "In mid-December, 1970, members of Hanoi's delegation to the Paris Peace talks handed over to representatives of Senators William Fulbright and Edward Kennedy a list of 339 American POWs in North Vietnam." In his 1993 book, M.I.A. or Mythmaking in America, (expanded and updated edition) H. Bruce Franklin stated that, "The following month [December] North Vietnam . . . provided what it officially certified as the 'full and complete' list of all 339 prisoners it held"

Senator Smith has accurately referred to the number of living POWs cited in the Fulbright/Kennedy document on two occasions. In his 21 July 1993, "An Interim Analysis of the 1972 Translation of [the 1205 document]," he stated, "On December 22, 1970, the North Vietnamese delegate to the Paris Peace talks, Mai Van Bo, released to representatives of U.S. Senators Kennedy and Fulbright a list of the names of 368 POWs, 20 of whom were listed as having died, and nine of whom had previously been released." Senator Smith repeated that same information later in his analysis.

In the *Critical Assessment*, Senator Smith stated, "The 368 list itself consisted of 339 Air Force and Navy pilots and crew members currently in captivity, 9 such personnel previously released, and 20 such personnel listed as dead." He went on to say that, "The status of the 339 men listed as captives was already known to the Pentagon . . . , although this was the first 'official' acknowledgment of their status by Hanoi." He repeated the

information again in a *Critical Assessment* footnote (180), over 100 pages later.

In the *Critical Assessment*, Senator Smith hypothesized that only one of two conclusions could be drawn; either the Vietnamese had made a full accounting or they had decided not to make a full accounting, as the 735 document alleges. Senator Smith referred back to The Secretary of Defense's memorandum and stated that, "I do not accept it [the 368 list] as a complete list of all the prisoners held in North Vietnam."

In 1993, the IC was on the verge of focusing on the Vietnamese figure of 339 living POWs and the implications of that number, but missed the opportunity. In a 13 September 1993 DoS memorandum, "Vietnam-
INR Comment on the '735' Document," the Acting Chief, INR stated:

The report says Hanoi had "published the names of 368 fliers shot down and captured on the territory of the DRV" and that these would be returned "as a start" when the US "agreed" to withdraw. There . . . are inconsistencies in this statement. True, in December 1970, Hanoi passed to Senators Fulbright and Kennedy a list—the first ever—of 368 names purporting to be all the airmen captured over Vietnam. But only 339 were still living prisoners—20 were deceased, and 9 had been released years earlier. [The author's] purported statement that once the US had agreed to withdraw "we will, as a start, return to them these 368 people" is curious since only 339 prisoners remained.

Finally, handwritten notes taken during an IC discussion (DoS, DIA, Task Force Russia, CIA, NIO) after the surfacing of the 735 document contain two illuminating comments. First, "INR—. . . Number is peculiar," and second, "DIA—. . . Numbers 735 and 1205 can't both be right." There is no evidence that these INR and DIA comments were ever pursued. Neither the drafter of the 1994 IC assessment nor the drafter of NIE 98-03 picked up on this discrepancy.

The 368 figure cited in the second relevant section of the 735 document cannot be an informed North Vietnamese statement. For internal consumption, the figure had to be 339 because the Vietnamese knew that 29 of the 368 servicemen they were referring to had either died or been released. For external consumption, the figure could accurately have been no more than 359 (368 less the nine known by the world to have

been released). Based on the actual makeup of the "368" list as known to both the U.S. and North Vietnamese Governments in December 1970, the second paragraph in the 735 document relating to American POWs provides a false number.

Historical Setting of the 1205 Document

On 31 March 1968, a U.S. bombing halt north of the 20th parallel went into effect. On 31 October 1968, a complete bombing halt was ordered. That halt, excepting sporadic retaliatory strikes in 1969 and 1970 and again from February to September 1971, remained in effect until authorization was given for attacks on southern North Vietnam MiG bases on 7-8 November 1971. Operation Linebacker, including mining of North Vietnamese ports, began on 8 May 1972 and lasted until October 1972.

Accounting of U.S. Military Personnel Lost in Southeast Asia

1 January 1971-September 1972

Two sets of statistics provide comprehensive lists of U.S. military personnel lost in Southeast Asia by date of loss. One is a chronological name list that was maintained by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), based on information provided by the military services. The other is a chronological reference document maintained by DPMO. The January 1975 Comptroller's list and the May 1997 DPMO list provide a range of all possible U.S. losses in Southeast Asia between the dates of the 735 and 1205 documents, the end of December 1970 and 15 September 1972 respectively. The Comptroller's list is limited to military personnel unaccounted for in specific categories, such as KIA-BNR, while the DPMO list accounts for every loss regardless of category and includes returnees. We deleted foreign nationals and U.S. civilians from the DPMO list to maintain consistency with both the Comptroller's list and the contents of the 735 and 1205 documents.

The January 1975 Comptroller list includes 131 military personnel who were either captured or missing in Southeast Asia during the period from 1 January 1971 through 15 September 1972. Based on these figures, the 735 and 1205 documents cannot both be accurate; the addition of 131 names is far less than the 470 difference between the 735 and the 1205 numbers.

A higher figure is provided in the May 1997 DPMO list which includes 455 military personnel whose date of incident/loss occurred during the period from 1 January 1971 to 15 September 1972. Assuming that the 735 document is accurate and given the impossibility that all 455 personnel became POWs,¹⁶ the highest possible POW total at the time of the 1205 document would have been 1190. Conversely, assuming that the 1205 document is accurate, the lowest possible total at the time of the 735 document would have been 750.

¹⁶ The United States unilaterally recovered the bodies of 16 personnel, 11 of those in 1972.

Thus, opportunities for the U.S. pilot population in the North Vietnam prison system to grow were limited between the release of the 368 list in December 1970 and the purported 15 September 1972 date of the 1205 report.

The U.S. Government, just prior to the surfacing of the 1205 document in February 1993, acknowledged the detailed makeup of the 368 names on the Fulbright/Kennedy list and its relationship to what the United States knew. In its final report, released in January 1993, the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs stated that:

By September 1970, the number of confirmed American prisoners had risen to 335 [three months before the 735 speech]. On December 22, 1970, North Vietnam provided Senator Edward Kennedy with a list of 368 In mid-1972, the [Japanese news Agency] released a list of 390 U.S. POWs. DIA analysis found that 339 of the names on this list had been acknowledged previously as POWs by the DRV, 9 were individuals already released, 20 were servicemen the DRV had reported earlier as dead, and 22 were new names, all airmen lost over North Vietnam between December 1970 and May 1972 By the fall of 1972 [the time of the 1205 document], the list of confirmed U.S. POWs held by North Vietnam had risen to more than 400.

The Vessey documents are germane at this point. The Vietnamese provided General Vessey seven documents in 1993. Two of those documents are lists of American prisoners. The first of these is a copy of a handwritten spreadsheet in the Vietnamese language that accounts for American accessions into the North Vietnamese prison system since the capture of Lieutenant Everett Alvarez, U.S. Navy, who was shot down over North Vietnam in August 1964 and became the first entry on the list. The second document is a listing in English that is probably a continuation of the list of 368 names provided to Senators Fulbright and Kennedy in December 1970. The Vessey documents provide a way to extrapolate the number of Americans in the North Vietnamese prison system relevant to the 1205 document, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Status of U.S. Personnel Once in the North Vietnamese Prison System

Category	December 1970	December 1971	September 1972
POW	339	345	404
Deceased	20	20	22
Released	9	9	12
Total	368	374	438

Source: Fulbright/Kennedy list of December 1970 and Vessey Documents

The list of 368 Americans who the North Vietnamese claimed had entered their prison system remained static until December 1971, when six additional U.S. prisoners entered the system. Beginning on 16 February 1972, the list increased rapidly, reaching a figure of 438 by the date of the 1205 document. During that time, however, three more prisoners were released and two more died. Therefore, the figure relevant to the 1205 document of U.S. prisoners in the North Vietnam prison system was 404 (438 minus 22 deceased and 12 returnees), not 368. That is the figure that knowledgeable North Vietnamese would have used for internal consumption.

Concerning the number 368, the 1205 document states:

The 1205 American POWs kept in the prisons of North Vietnam represent a large number. For now, we have officially published a list of only 368 POWs. The rest are not acknowledged.

As discussed earlier, the figure of living U.S. POWs cited by a senior Vietnamese official to his leadership at this time should have been either 339 for consistency with the 735 document or 404 to be consistent with the numbers in the Vessey documents—because at least 29 POWs had either died or been released. Therefore, the reference in the 1205 document to 368 POWs is inaccurate. The 1205 document also notes that, "The work with American prisoners of war has always been within the field of vision of the Politburo and has been reflected in its decisions." If that is true, then the Politburo would have been aware of the increases and attrition cited previously.

Further, the 1205 document states, "We have captured 624 aviators in North Vietnam." That figure directly contradicts the 735 figure. By September 1972, the 735 figure would have increased to at least 805 (735 plus the 70-name increase to the 368 list, including deceased and released names). In sum, the 1205 document does not track with the 735 document, and it perpetuates a static 368 figure that knowledgeable Vietnamese would have known was inaccurate. Therefore, in our judgment, the POW/MIA section of the 1205 document is also false.

The Russian position on the numbers in the 1205 document has been communicated to the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on at least two occasions. In a 30 June 1994 letter to Senator Smith, the Chief of the GRU stated that, "We cannot confirm the correctness of the number of American prisoners (1205) mentioned in the report, inasmuch as this data was not relevant for us and was not rechecked." On 1 July 1997, the new Chief of the GRU repeated that statement to Senators Smith and Shelby and Representative Johnson during a Joint Commission meeting at the Russian Ministry of Defense. He concluded by saying that, "I do not have anything more to add concerning what [my predecessor] said."

A DoS analysis of the 1205 document in April 1993 raised two additional points that should have been addressed by the author of the 1205 document but were not. DoS argued that the document should have referred to a decision made two weeks earlier by the Vietnamese to release three additional pilots whose families were due in Hanoi on 16 September 1972. Secondly, DoS noted that the 1205 document did not address the increased number of prisoners as a result of the heavy U.S. bombing campaign of May-October 1972 and the resultant Vietnamese propaganda exploitation of POWs.

The JCSD files support the assessment that Vietnamese leaders would have been accurately informed about the numbers of American POWs being held. Those files contain a TFR (JCSD's predecessor) undated assessment, "Vis-a-vis the Russians: Analysis of the 1205 Document." In reference to the author of the 1205 document, the TFR document states that, he "cited the continued interest of the Politburo in the question of American prisoners of war." His speech strongly suggested ongoing discussion and debate within the Politburo regarding the disposition of American POWs.

Therefore, updated information on the number and disposition of POWs must have been discussed by the Vietnamese Politburo within the time frame of the 1205 document. The TFR analysis also states that:

Given the many inconsistencies and contradictions of the 1205 document, this type of analysis will allow the burden of proof to be placed on those who are holding back information, i.e., the Russians and Vietnamese. This may alleviate the need for the U.S. Government to derive a definitive truth from a partial piece of evidence—we do not have enough information to know what the 1205 document really means.

The *Critical Assessment* supports the view that accurate information would have been provided to the Vietnamese Politburo by senior Vietnamese officials. In addressing the NIE statement that "none of the Russians claimed that the figure of 1205 POWs was accurate," the assessment cites a GRU officer (as of October 1977) as stating during an interview that:

... the Vietnamese would not have deceived themselves at a closed Politburo session; they might have provided inaccurate information in press releases on their negotiations with the Americans, but they would have no reason to do so within closed sessions of their political leadership.

A Point of Logic

It does not matter whether the 735 and 1205 documents are genuine GRU documents or whether the contents not dealing with POW numbers are accurate. An analysis of the statements in the *Critical Assessment* devoted to proving that, because the documents are genuine and elsewhere accurate, the sections about POW matters are accurate as well is not warranted. It does not necessarily follow that because a document is genuine and two of its three parts are plausible that the third part is also plausible. Conversely, because one of three parts of a document is not plausible does not necessarily mean that the other two parts are also not plausible or that the document itself is not genuine.

Much effort has been expended to prove the *bona fides* of the 735 and 1205 documents and their respective authors. The pursuit thus far has been fruitless. As one member of the JCSD team conducting interviews

with Russians on the documents told us, "the process is more important than the results because there are no results." Nor does it matter. We accept the authenticity of the two documents, and we accept the accuracy of some of the contents of the documents. We do not accept references in the documents to the numbers of POWs held by the Vietnamese.

Nevertheless, because so much has been made of the testimony of and interviews with Russian sources, we reviewed the statements of Russian sources who have been interviewed by JCSD, including those mentioned in both the NIE and the *Critical Assessment*, to determine their opinions of the 735 and 1205 documents.

ASSESSMENT OF COMMENTS BY RUSSIAN SOURCES ON THE 735 AND 1205 DOCUMENTS

The NIE uses the results of five Russian interviews in its discussion of the IC's assessment of the 735 and 1205 documents. Based in part on those interviews, which the NIE categorizes as "new information," the NIE concludes that "none of the new information helps to confirm the accuracy of the 1205 report" and that the IC assessment of the 735 and 1205 documents released in January 1994 "remains valid."

A large portion of the *Critical Assessment* is a detailed analysis of the NIE's assessment of the 735 and 1205 documents. The *Critical Assessment* refers to four of the five Russian sources cited in the NIE and concludes that:

... the NIE's judgment on the 1205/735 documents cannot be accepted with confidence because it is **replete** [emphasis in original] with inaccurate and misleading statements and lacks a reasonably thorough and objective analytical foundation on which to base its judgment.

Our Approach

Both the NIE and the *Critical Assessment* refer to Russian sources, but cite them differently. We reviewed statements of 31 Russians made during interviews with JCSD analysts or in meetings with U.S. personnel. To assess the statements, we first defined the level of access that each individual had. We established three levels of access based on the

individual's level of responsibility and the nature of his assignments as follows:

- ◆ High—Reasonable expectation that the official had knowledge of policy and could have had access to documentation;
- ◆ Medium—Some expectation that the official had knowledge of policy and could have had access to documentation; and
- ◆ Low—Limited or no expectation that the official had knowledge of policy and could have had access to documentation.

We next reviewed the statements to establish how each Russian source rated the validity of the 735 and 1205 documents as genuine GRU acquisitions and the credibility of the information in each document concerning POW numbers.

Validity and Credibility

Thirteen of the 31 Russian sources (42 percent) considered the documents valid. Further, when only medium and high access levels are considered, 13 of 21 (62 percent) considered the documents valid. None of the Russian sources considered them not valid, and some had no opinion.

Five of the 31 Russian sources (16 percent) considered the documents credible. Three (10 percent) considered them not credible. Thus, 23 of 31 (74 percent) made no judgment. Only two of 12 individuals with a high level of access believed that the information in the 735 and 1205 documents was credible. One individual based his judgment on his belief that the GRU had the means to collect such information—not on validation of the information by other means. The other said that, if the Vietnamese claimed they held 735 American POWs, that was more than the Soviets had estimated. Three of nine individuals with medium access thought the information was credible. One, a Navy Captain in the GRU who had no direct knowledge of the 735 and 1205 documents, stated that the numbers cited in them could not be confirmed; he believed that Russia had no interest in having these numbers confirmed. The second individual, a 32-year veteran of the Soviet intelligence and security service (KGB), had no direct

knowledge of the documentation and said he never saw any information indicating POWs were detained after the Vietnam War. The third individual, the sole KGB representative to the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi between 1975 and 1979, commented that the documents confirmed his personal opinion that not all POWs were released. Not one of the five Russians who found the information credible had any independent means of verification.

Two Russian sources with high access believed the information was not credible. The Russian Ambassador in Hanoi between 1974 and 1986 questioned the credibility of the information because at no time during his tenure as Ambassador did he learn of any American POWs being held after the war. Another highly placed diplomat who worked on political issues concerning Vietnam at the Central Committee between 1963 and 1986 never saw or was made aware of the existence of the 735 and 1205 documents. One source with medium access who served in the Russian Embassy in Hanoi when the two documents surfaced stated that the 1205 document could be in error due to inaccurate GRU reporting, translation errors, or mistakes by the purported author and his staff.

Previously, we stated that we accept that the 735 and 1205 documents were genuine acquisitions. Statements made by Russian sources reinforce that acceptance. Furthermore, we found that one section of the 735 document and the section of the 1205 document pertaining to POW numbers were both false. Based on the statements made by 31 Russian sources, that finding stands. No estimate of credibility concerning numbers of U.S. POWs cited in the 735 and 1205 documents can be made based on the 31 Russian sources.

The *Critical Assessment* claims that the NIE statement that the new information from the Russian interviews does not help to confirm the accuracy of the 735 and 1205 documents is "factually inaccurate." The assessment indicates that the information provided by a number of GRU officers helps to confirm that the 1205 document was "an accurate representation of the political military situation in North Vietnam in 1972." Further, the assessment states that, "since 1994, the GRU has expressed its confidence in both the authenticity and the reliability of the information in the 1205 report." We reviewed the statements made by the GRU officials and found that none of them supports the POW-related contents of the 1205 document.

The Navy Captain claimed that the GRU had no interest in the POW issue nor did it perform an analysis of the 1205 document. In his opinion, the only value in the 735 and 1205 documents was the description of North Vietnam's internal political situation. Another GRU officer claimed that the Soviet estimate of the number of U.S. POWs in Southeast Asia in 1972 was far short of the purported figure in the 1205 document. JCSD concluded that, "the Soviet assessment supports the POW-related content of neither the 735 nor the 1205 document." The former Chief of the GRU said that the GRU could not confirm the accuracy of the number of American POWs in the 1205 document because the information "was not essential" to the Soviets. His successor said that he had nothing more to add to that statement.

The *Critical Assessment* claims that the GRU "has expressed its confidence in both the authenticity and the reliability of the information on the 1205 report." It does not mention, however, that the GRU sources do not support the POW-related content of the documents.

SEPARATE OR SECOND PRISON SYSTEM

The NIE stated that, if there were additional POWs, the IC would have known of them unless Vietnam maintained a separate prison unknown to the POWs who returned in 1973. The estimate concluded that, "we have uncovered no reliable evidence that a separate prison system existed for certain POWs; nor do we have such indicators as plausible site locations."

Concerning the issue of a separate or second prison system, the *Critical Assessment* refers to "substantial information and evaluations originated by or made available to the U.S. Intelligence Community both during and/or after the Vietnam War." The assessment asserts that, based on the 735 and 1205 documents, the large number of POWs not repatriated had to have been held in a separate or second prison system. Included in the evidence cited in the *Critical Assessment* is a reference to a CIA study in

early 1976 that concluded, "the possibility of a second prison system for the detention of American POWs in North Vietnam cannot be disregarded."

A more expansive quotation from the so-called CIA study appeared in a 1998 book, Code-Name Bright Light, The Untold Story of U.S. POW Rescue Efforts During the Vietnam War, by George Veith:

An analysis of 19 camps not known to have contained Americans revealed inconsistencies in the various camps' reaction to the Son Tay raid Some camps reacted defensively to the raid, others did not Only selected camps reacted initially to the raid The reason for this inconsistency in the various camps' reactions to the raid is not known. Because of this inconsistency . . . the possibility of a second prison system for the detention of American POWs cannot be disregarded.

In an end note, Veith sourced his quote to the:

Senate *Congressional Record*, January 26, 1994, p. S-163, Senator Bob Smith of New Hampshire is quoting from a just-declassified CIA photographic study of selected prison facilities in North Vietnam. The study was done in 1976.

We obtained a copy of the CIA prison camp study referred to by the *Critical Assessment* from the SSCI's holdings. The "study" is an untitled, undated, handwritten draft, apparently contained in a file folder titled "CIA PW Camp Study." The draft somehow survived the archival process and was included as a line item on page 119 of a 130-page transmittal record dated 4 May 1984, forwarded by the DIA POW/MIA Office to the Federal Archives and Records Center. An extract of the transmittal record and a copy of the handwritten draft were forwarded to Senator Smith on 12 November 1993 by the Acting Deputy Director, DPMO.

We located a second copy of the handwritten draft in the archives of the DIA Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs. Included with that undated draft marked "Working Paper" was a six-page, undated DIA informal review of the draft. The DIA conclusion was that:

None of the finding [sic] presented in this study provide [sic] any evidence to support the presence of U.S. PWs in the "Other Camps" or that a second prison system was maintained in North Vietnam for the purpose of holding U.S. PWs not released at Homecoming.

DPMO analysts told us that, in the 1980s, DIA pursued the possibility of a second prison system, ruling out the possibility for three reasons:

- ◆ Returned POWs did not describe a system of collection and evacuation that would split a segment of the POW flow from the North Vietnamese prison system;
- ◆ Extensive source reporting in the 1970s and 1980s did not validate a second prison system; and
- ◆ Reporting from former South Vietnamese commando returnees asked about contact with or observation of American POWs in the prison system in which they were held. There was no such contact or observation.

We found work relevant to the draft "study" in the holdings of CIA's DO-held POW/MIA-related information. Two folders in that collection contained documents associated with the search for POW camp information. None of the documents we reviewed drew a conclusion about the presence of American POWs at a particular camp based on imagery alone. For example, a typical document entry was, "Imagery alone cannot determine camp schedules, patterns of activity and nationality and dress of prisoners and guards." Positive identification of the presence of American POWs was made only when human source information was also factored in. Typically, the imagery analytical conclusion was either, "there is no sign of any activity indicating [that] the buildings are being used to house American POWs," or "There is no sign of any activity that could be associated with a POW detention camp."

The DO documents revealed that CIA, Office of Imagery Analysis (OIA) had systematically searched for POW camp information since at least 12 September 1966. Beginning in at least 1966, a formal standing requirement was levied each year, worded, "Identification of Installations in Southeast Asia Which May Contain American Prisoners."

Relevant work for the CIA prison camp study mentioned in the *Critical Assessment* was done by three individuals whose signatures were on several project-related memoranda. We interviewed the action officer for the study; he verified that he was the author of the handwritten draft that survived the archival process. He could not confirm which draft (first, second, final) had been archived because his practice had been to rewrite by hand each draft after management review. He said the task had been based on the premise that we "knew about the 'known camps'," (i.e., the camps that held Americans) and had identified a number of detention facilities not known to hold Americans. The requirement was to determine, using imagery, additional camps that might hold Americans. The methodology was to use the aftermath of the November 1970 Son Tay raid to determine what changes in security had taken place at the camps not known to hold Americans. Having determined those changes, the analytical question became, "could we use that change to provide evidence of American presence?" Although he drafted the wording quoted by the *Critical Assessment*, the action officer said that:

there was no way I could prove it; the change as determined from imagery was in itself not proof. There were no other sources of information.

The Director, OIA provided a status report on the study in a late December 1976 memorandum to the CIA, Deputy Director for Intelligence, that stated:

... we have performed a study of 25 prisons/POW Camps in northern Vietnam in an attempt to identify some method of analysis or signature to indicate the presence of U.S. POWs. Our study consisted of a comparative analysis of six confirmed American POW camps and 19 other prisons using photography dated prior to and after the 21 November 1970 raid on Son Tay. We found that all six of the known POW camps and 14 of the 19 prisons had new defenses added between

November 1970 and December 1972. Although this may be a possible indicator, it is not conclusive evidence of an American presence.

The Chief, Land Forces Division signed the completed study as a CIA internal memorandum on 7 February 1977. The study was based solely on imagery and focused primarily on the presence or absence of defensive positions. The handwritten draft which the *Critical Assessment* cited contained the following statement, in context:

This inconsistency [different patterns of post-reaction to the Son Tay raid] and the fact that several reports have been received recently stating that Americans are still being held in North Vietnam, the possibility of a second prison system for the detention of American POWs cannot be disregarded.

That statement did not survive the CIA review process. The final assessment made in the CIA internal memorandum was:

Although these may be possible indicators, it is not conclusive evidence of an American presence. We searched the official DoD files on the 19 prisons to correlate any reporting of an American presence with our photographic analysis. No correlation could be made.

In other words, the CIA, OIA, in the aggregate, followed the same logic it had used for individual camp assessments. Imagery alone (without all-source reporting, in this case the addition of human source information) cannot be used as a determinant.

In critiquing the original language, the Deputy Division Chief, OIA asked the imagery analyst if he was trying to sway the reader to a certain conclusion, perhaps not supported by the evidence. The analyst told us that, "maybe I wanted to find some new camps," and in consultation with the supervisor he recalled that perhaps he had not been "standing back and taking an unbiased look." He said he was a junior analyst at the time and might have been off the analytical track. He summarized by saying that, "I will have to say that [his] work, based solely on imagery, is even today, inconclusive." With one exception he never saw anything in his entire career that supported the statement he had made in the draft of the memorandum. The one exception was that he thought at one time there

"might be something" at a camp called Dong Ha that he recalled was in the Haiphong area. Nothing was ever substantiated. The imagery analyst was shown the signed internal memorandum; he said it accurately reflected his unbiased analysis.

We interviewed the CIA, DO counterintelligence analyst responsible for evaluation of the North Vietnamese security services and the North Vietnamese prison system. He held that analytical account continuously from 1965 to 1992, the first seven of those years working for the Chief of Station in Saigon. He stated that he was constantly attuned to the thesis that there might be a separate or second prison system, and he continuously looked for such a system. He never found any evidence of the existence of such a system.

In sum, there never was an all-source CIA "Prison Camp Study." Instead, the CIA, OIA provided an internal, imagery-based assessment to the DO. The coordination of a handwritten draft of that assessment with DIA resulted in the archiving of the handwritten draft by the DoD. That archived draft was assumed, erroneously, by researchers in the 1990s to be an IC product. It was neither an IC product nor a CIA product; it was the preliminary work of a junior imagery analyst that stated that the evidence from imagery was inconclusive.

ALLEGED TRANSFERS OF POWs FROM VIETNAM TO THE USSR

On the issue of the alleged transfers of POWs to Russia or elsewhere, the *Critical Assessment* states that:

... the books must definitely remain open on the transfer issue based on more pressing information previously made available to the IC but inexplicably not referenced in the NIE under the heading of unresolved transfer reports

The assessment differs with the NIE, particularly with respect to statements made by a late Russian General, who served as a military adviser to President Yeltsin and was the Co-Chairman of the Russian side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, and a former USSR Central

Committee Secretary. The *Critical Assessment* claims that the NIE accounts of information provided by the two officials are "inaccurate or lacking in important detail." We reviewed the statements made by those individuals and other Russian officials, and we examined evidence associated with the possible existence of a second prison camp system. We agree with the NIE assertion that, because of a lack of conclusive evidence disproving transfers, the "books should remain open" on the issue. To date, however, most, if not all, reporting avenues have been explored with negative results. Our review of the transfer issue, with particular emphasis on the comments of the late Russian General and the former Central Committee Secretary, follows.

The Russian General

The NIE states that the General told the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs that his delegation had uncovered no evidence that U.S. prisoners had been transported from Vietnam to the USSR. The *Critical Assessment* argues that the fact that the General did not uncover evidence of transfer does not constitute proof that such an event did not occur. The assessment cites as evidence a statement the General made to the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs on 11 November 1992, in which he said, "Hypothetically, we cannot dismiss the possibility that several individual American servicemen were taken to the Soviet Union from Vietnam." The *Critical Assessment* does not mention, however, that, in concluding that thought, the General said, "But, again, we have no precise information about such cases. It can only be called a possibility and I believe not a very strong possibility." In the same testimony, he claimed that there were no archives in Russia that he did not have access to and added:

No U.S. citizens are currently being detained within the territory of the former USSR. The conclusion is based on a thorough analysis of all archival documents, interviews with witnesses, and on-site inspections of possible American housing sites.

We examined several documents issued prior to this testimony that support the General's statement that no U.S. citizens were being detained. On 3 December 1991, the Interrepublic Security Service, successor to the former KGB Second Chief Directorate, told the U.S. Government that it had undertaken "an exhaustive search of available information and resources,

and had come up with no indication of such presence in the USSR past or present." On 6 December 1991, the Interrepublic Security Service advised the U.S. Government that, "On our part, we also do not have any information about American military personnel located on the territory of the USSR who were missing in action during the course of military activities in Indochina." Finally, in a 20 May 1992 letter to President Yeltsin, the Russian Minister of Security said that:

The Security Ministry, the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Russian Communist Party Archive do not have materials about the retention of American POWs on the territory of the former USSR. An analogous response was received from the Ministry of Defense and the GRU of the General Staff, OVS (Unified Armed Forces), SNG (Commonwealth of Independent States).

In spite of that, when asked in a 16 June 1992 "Dateline" interview about rumors that American POWs from the Vietnam War were transferred to the former Soviet Union, President Yeltsin responded that:

Our archives have shown that this is true. Some of them were transferred to the former Soviet Union and were kept in labor camps. We don't have complete data and can only surmise that some of them may still be alive. That is why our investigations are continuing. Some of them may have ended up in psychiatric asylums.

President Yeltsin's statement contradicts information provided to him by his Minister of Security barely one month prior to his "Dateline" interview. In late June 1992, the U.S. Co-Chairman of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission said that President Yeltsin "misspoke" when he said U.S. POWs might still be in the former Soviet Union. And, on 30 June 1992, following a meeting with President Bush, the Co-Chairman said that he had found no evidence in Moscow that any living American POW was being held against his will in the former Soviet Union.

In a July 1992 interview with the Russian newspaper, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, the General said that President Yeltsin had been mistaken and that archives showed no sign of any such prisoners ever being held in the former Soviet Union. During November 1992 hearings before the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, a letter signed by President

Yeltsin was entered into the record. The letter mentions evidence of Americans "staying in camps and prisoners of the former USSR," and says that some had been executed by the Stalin regime (1924-1953) and that others may still reside in the former Soviet Union. Yeltsin concluded that there were no Americans being held against their will in Russia. The IC has no information to support the claim made by President Yeltsin that U.S. POWs from the Vietnam War were held in Soviet prison camps; certainly, none was executed during the regime of Stalin, who died in 1953.

The *Critical Assessment* asserts that, after his November 1992 testimony before the Senate Select Committee, the Russian General said in an August 1994 autobiographical sketch that he had received a "very serious indication" that a transfer of U.S. POWs to the USSR may have taken place in the late 1960s. The *Critical Assessment* does not mention, however, that he goes on to say that, after discovering the "sensational document" about such a transfer, he immediately brought it to the attention of the Director of Foreign Intelligence. The Director's staff searched for any indication that the plan referred to in the document had been implemented. The General then said, "As I expected, they did not find the indications. They said the mission was not carried out." The autobiographical sketch concludes by stating, "The regime (Soviet) was such at the time that it was possible to contemplate the wildest scenarios."

The Central Committee Secretary

The NIE uses a former Central Committee Secretary for Maintaining Ties with Other Socialist Countries as an example of an official who served in Vietnam during the war and would have reason to know whether U.S. POWs were transferred to the USSR. The NIE reports that the Secretary served in Vietnam and told interviewers that he would have known if transfers had occurred; he believed no such transfers had taken place.

The *Critical Assessment* asserts that, although the Secretary traveled to Hanoi once to negotiate an agreement with North Vietnam, he did not serve in Vietnam. We found no information suggesting that the Secretary served in Vietnam. The *Critical Assessment* also states that the U.S. side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission frequently hears the claim, "I would have known" during routine interviews with former Soviet officials who display

an inflated view of their importance. We agree. We found several statements by former Soviet officials who claimed to be in a position to know about certain events, but whose claims we cannot prove or disprove without more evidence.

The NIE used the interview with the Secretary to point out that certain former Soviet officials did not believe that transfers of POWs to the USSR had occurred. The Secretary was just one of several possible examples. The NIE could have used a better example than the Secretary. For example, one official served in Vietnam from 1960-1962 and again from 1977-1983, when he was an adviser to the Soviet Ambassador; he worked for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the International Department dealing exclusively with Vietnamese issues from 1962-1977. In a March 1997 interview, the official stated that such transfers would not have taken place without the Politburo's knowledge and consent, and that if such a decision had been made, he would have known about it. The NIE also could have cited a career GRU Colonel who served in Hanoi from 1968-1972. During a December 1996 interview, the Colonel, commenting on the credibility of reports of transfers, said, "I will tell you quite frankly that the staff of the military attaché was not involved in such a thing. I do not know of a single incident." He added, "I never heard of this during my four years there. I also knew people in other services, and they would have told me."

Despite the statements of Soviet officials who had served in Vietnam, which the NIE drafter might have cited, the lack of conclusive evidence disproving transfers led to the NIE's conclusion that "the books should remain open on this issue" and, that "until some of the reporting . . . is clarified, we cannot say definitively that no POWs were transferred from Vietnam." The 17 June 1996 "Comprehensive Report of the U.S. Side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs" bolsters the argument that while the "books should remain open" on the issue, most, if not all, avenues have been explored with negative results. The report states that:

A four-year investigation into the activities of Soviet officials in Southeast Asia during the years of the Vietnam War has found no first-hand, substantiated evidence that American prisoners of war were taken from Southeast Asia to the Former Soviet Union.

The 1996 report reveals that the American side of the commission had been told "in definitive terms" that the Soviets "did not at any time" transfer American POWs to the Soviet Union. The report went on to state that the commission had interviewed more than 200 Soviets who had served in Southeast Asia during the war and that:

. . . every witness, without exception, stated that he had not known or heard of any operation to transport American prisoners to the Soviet Union.

According to the report, every senior Soviet official interviewed said that, if transfers had occurred, he "would have known about it." The report also mentions that, during debriefings of the nearly 600 returned POWs, none suggested that American POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union. Finally, among the documents collected by the commission, none contained information on transfers of American POWs to the Soviet Union.

CASE ASSESSMENTS

The final TOR for NIE 98-03 stipulated that:

. . . if the intelligence community judges these documents [the 735 and 1205 documents] to be accurate . . . in their characterization of the number of American POWs held by North Vietnam, then it should answer the following question: "What is the likely range of numbers of American POWs under the control of the communist side when the Paris Peace Accords were signed in January 1973?"

The IC determined that the 735 and 1205 documents were not accurate in their characterization of the number of POWs held by North Vietnam and therefore did not pursue the issue of numbers of POWs held by North Vietnam at the time of Operation Homecoming. Senator Smith and staff members of the SSCI had anticipated that NIE 98-03 would address the issue of the number of POWs held by the Vietnamese at the time of Operation Homecoming and that it would look at the related issue of MIAs still unaccounted for from the war in Southeast Asia. It did not do so.

The 1993 report of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs left the issue of the discrepancy cases unresolved. Senator Smith

had continuing questions about the cases and developed a listing of 324 names which he titled, "U.S. POW/MIAs Who May Have Survived in Captivity," dated 1 December 1992. Repatriated remains reduced the number of names to 289 as of our review. In the 1995 time frame, DPMO prepared case assessments (two- to four-page summaries) of each missing person file.

Senator Smith's legislative assistant told us he had expected that the drafter of the NIE would review the case assessments pertaining to Senator Smith's compelling cases. No one reviewed those cases. DPMO confirmed that the drafter of the NIE did not review the case assessments and no one—other than DPMO—has validated or attempted to validate Senator Smith's list. We obtained from DPMO the case assessments for the 289 cases on Senator Smith's list of 324 names for which verified remains have not been returned. We undertook the task of reviewing these cases, and we have provided a framework that others can use to assess them (see Annex G for a discussion of our case assessment methodology).

Our Methodology

We believe that these cases are at the heart of the controversy over POWs in Vietnam and that an effort to evaluate them is essential. We therefore conducted our own assessment of the cases in a manner that can be replicated. Each member of our three-person review team independently evaluated the 289 cases without consultation or collaboration. The team was unconstrained in the time required to make an informed assessment and score each of the cases (see Annex H for results of our compelling case review). The six factors evaluated were:

- ◆ Is there evidence the individual survived the incident?
- ◆ Is there evidence the individual could have been taken captive?
- ◆ Is there evidence the individual entered a prison system?
- ◆ Can any of three governments (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) account for the individual?

- ◆ Was the case compelling prior to December 1992 (date of Senator Smith list) based on information available at that time?
- ◆ Is the case compelling today based on information received since December 1992?

Other than to simply make "yes," "no" or "inconclusive" entries in each of the six columns for each case, no further scoring was done until the three individual assessments were completed. We judged "compelling" twice, because the files available to us contained updated information since the publication of Senator Smith's list in December 1992. The word "compelling" needs to be clarified because it was undefined by Senator Smith. We accepted the term as being similar to the term "discrepancy" as used in the Vessey cases.¹⁷ For our purposes, compelling meant that there was something more to be known about the fate of the individual.

We decided to present the data in a way that provides the strongest possible support for Senator Smith's list of U.S. POWs who may have survived in captivity. We extended the range of each of the six factors listed above by scoring the data as follows:

- ◆ If all three reviewers scored a factor "yes" for a given case, we counted that as a unanimous group response; and
- ◆ If one reviewer scored a factor "yes" and at least one other reviewer scored that same factor either "yes" or "inconclusive" we counted that as a consensus group response.

Based on that two-fold scoring, the results for the first four factors of our independent review of 289 cases listed as compelling by Senator Smith are:

- ◆ At least 40 and as many as 91 of the 289 individuals could have survived the incident of loss;

¹⁷ General Vessey's discrepancy cases are those POWs who were expected to be repatriated, but were not. In August 1992, that number was 135; as of August 1999, the cases still not resolved had been reduced to 43. Senator Smith's list of cases has been referred to as "compelling" by Advocacy and Intelligence Index for Prisoners of War-Missing in Action (AII POW-MIA), and we use it here to distinguish it from the Vessey list. Based on verified remains recovery, the compelling case list had been reduced to 289 names at the time of our review.

- ◆ At least 13 and as many as 34 of those individuals could have been captured;
- ◆ At least six and as many as nine of those individuals could have entered a prison system; and
- ◆ One of the current Southeast Asia governments may be able to account for at least 25 and as many as 114 of the 289 individuals.

Further, concerning the "compelling" factor both in 1992 and today, the results of our independent review of the 289 cases are:

- ◆ At least one and as many as 19 of the 289 cases was compelling based on information available in late 1992; and
- ◆ At most, three cases are compelling today, none unanimously. None of these losses occurred in Cambodia, Laos, or North Vietnam; all occurred in South Vietnam.

Each member of the review team evaluated the files for each of these cases and made independent evaluations. These evaluations are intuitive, but the methodology can be replicated by others. We describe one particular case, that of Captain John McDonnell, that illustrates the difficulty of making such evaluations.

The McDonnell Case

The case of U.S. Army Captain John T. McDonnell (Case 1402) is complicated and has been reviewed repeatedly since his helicopter went down in 1969. The case reflects the polarization that exists concerning the MIA issue. A detailed discussion of our rationale for selecting the case and the steps we took to understand it is in Annex I.

The 1993 Senate Select Committee POW/MIA report portrayed the McDonnell case as follows:

On March 6, 1969, Captain McDonnell was the pilot [sic] of an AH-1G Cobra helicopter hit and downed by hostile fire in Thua Thien Province.

His crew member, a First Lieutenant, was rescued alive on March 7, but was unable to provide any information on the fate of Captain McDonnell. A search mission was also unsuccessful.

Captain McDonnell was declared missing and, in February 1977, was declared dead/body not recovered. Returning U.S. POWs were unable to shed any light on his fate.

U.S. investigators in Vietnam during January 1991 interviewed witnesses who described the capture of an American pilot in the area where Captain McDonnell disappeared. They reported he had a broken and bleeding arm when taken prisoner and brought to a People's Army of Vietnam regimental headquarters which received instructions to transport him to the Tri Thien Hue Military Region Headquarters. He died en route, was buried, and the U.S. field team was shown his purported burial site. The site was excavated but no remains were located.

A different story was contained in a 12 September 1999 posting on the Internet by the Advocacy and Intelligence Index for Prisoners of War-Missing in Action (AII POW-MIA). An article entitled, "Captain John T. McDonnell United States Army, ONE OF THE MEN WE LEFT BEHIND," began:

The next time someone asks you to name one American serviceman left behind in Southeast Asia, name just one Look them straight in the eye and say Capt. John T. McDonnell, United States Army, last known duty station Vietnamese Prison Camp Location Ba To, Quang Ngai Province, South Vietnam. Last seen in mid to late February 1973.

The AII POW-MIA analysis observed that:

- ◆ Examination of the downed helicopter revealed that Capt. [sic] McDonnell's seat belt and harness were open and placed neatly on the seat;
- ◆ On 16 February 1973 a North Vietnamese rallier reported that he observed two U.S. Prisoners of War with the North Vietnamese Army in Laos on three different occasions, between May and July 1971;

- ◆ On 10 April 1973 a North Vietnamese defector reported that in 1972 he saw an American Captain at the MR-5 PW Camp who was "a captured American artillery officer;" and
- ◆ A Project X study concluded there is a possibility that as many as 57 Americans could be alive. Captain McDonnell is included among the 57.

Facts

There are only two verifiable facts concerning this case. First, Captain McDonnell was last seen alive on 6 March 1969 entering aircraft 845, a Cobra AH-IG helicopter. Second, on 17 May 1992, Captain McDonnell's military identification card was located in the Hue Military Museum. All other information related to determining his fate is contained in the results of interviews. No intelligence information or other official reporting factually correlates to Captain McDonnell.

Circumstances of Loss

Sworn testimony taken by a Missing Person Board convened shortly after the loss revealed that Captain McDonnell was the team leader of a flight of two helicopter gunships, the Aircraft Commander of his gunship, and sat in the gunner's position on the day of his incident. He was not the pilot that day. His pilot executed a rocket run from which he could not recover and the gunship crashed into the side of a mountain. There was initial confusion as to whether the loss was due to hostile fire. The pilot of the other gunship reported no hostile fire. In an unsigned statement, Captain McDonnell's pilot reported hostile fire.

According to a certified extract of the Official Log, 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), the wreckage was found on 8 March 1969 and appeared not to have been disturbed. The front seat and safety harness were intact. An officer of the ground troops conducting the search reported that the wreckage had not been disturbed by the enemy. The position of the seat belts and safety harness indicated that the gunner [McDonnell] unbuckled himself and left the wreckage.

Additional sworn testimony taken by the board indicated that Captain McDonnell's commanding officer thoroughly searched the wreckage and the immediate area. The gunner's compartment was completely open with no evidence of damage to the seat. (According to the 1969 edition of Jane's All The World's Aircraft, the gunner's position of an AH-1G Cobra helicopter is located in the front, lower compartment. The aircraft is flyable from both positions, however). The shoulder harness was not broken and the seat belt was unlatched. The commanding officer said that:

. . . it was not possible to establish that the helicopter had been hit by ground fire. Although portions of the tail boom and main body showed no evidence of being penetrated, so much damage was inflicted by the crash that a positive determination could not be made.

The Vietnamese Account

JTF-FA reports of interviews with Vietnamese indicate that Captain McDonnell survived the crash and, while attempting to evade the enemy, was shot in the arm and captured. He was taken to the command post of the People's Army of Vietnam 4th Regiment. The regiment contacted the region headquarters for instructions and was directed to evacuate Captain McDonnell to the region hospital. Captain McDonnell did not survive the evacuation. The regimental commander forwarded Captain McDonnell's identification card to higher headquarters with a report concerning his capture and death. A senior district party official received the report and the identification card and forwarded them to province authorities. A Hue museum curator stated that Captain McDonnell's identification card was turned over to him by the senior district party official sometime after 30 April 1975.

Captain McDonnell's Status Changes

Initially, the Missing Person Board determined that Captain McDonnell was missing, not missing in action. The board apparently did not consider the helicopter pilot's unsigned statement about hostile fire persuasive. In a later signed statement, the pilot said that:

I broke left, we received fire and simultaneously entered the low clouds. The cyclic went limp and I could not turn the helicopter. I remember pulling pitch, then awoke laying [sic] on the ground on my chest protector.

Based on that statement, Captain McDonnell's status was changed from missing to missing in action.

In late 1976, Captain McDonnell's next of kin petitioned the Department of the Army to issue a death certificate. On 18 February 1977, the Army's Adjutant General found Captain McDonnell "to be dead." On 6 June 1994, a flag/general officer-level review convened by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs, assisted by two DPMO analysts and the Intelligence Officer, JTF-FA, voted 3-0 for a "confirmation of fate." The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense voted for the confirmation, despite advice from DPMO analysts to the contrary, and the case was removed from the discrepancy list.

Three Times a Discrepancy Case

The 1994 removal of Captain McDonnell from the discrepancy list culminated a near 20-year history of that case having been singled out three times as unresolved.

- ◆ **PROJECT X:** PROJECT X was a study initiated in August 1975 by the Commanding Officer, JCRC to "evaluate the possibility of any of the unaccounted for being alive." Captain McDonnell was included in the resultant list of 57 individuals. The Commanding Officer concluded that, "There is a possibility that as many as 57 Americans could be alive, although it is highly probable that the number is much smaller, possibly zero;"

- ◆ **Discrepancy Case:** Because Captain McDonnell was last seen alive—sworn testimony included in the Missing Person Board review confirmed that he entered the gunship the day of the incident—his case became a discrepancy case, consistent with the U.S. Government’s methodology; and
- ◆ **Compelling Case:** Because Captain McDonnell was allegedly correlated to two separate live sighting intelligence reports, his case became a compelling case, consistent with the full accounting methodology.

Our Assessment

Viet Cong policy, based on U.S. POW returnee experience and information in CIA files, was that any American who survived his immediate capture and transport would have entered the prison system or, if wounded, the hospital system. The report of the evacuation of Captain McDonnell is consistent with that policy. Intelligence reports from at least 1966 consistently state that Viet Cong policy concerning American captives was to evacuate them expeditiously to higher headquarters. While an evacuation of Captain McDonnell was ordered, he was never seen in the Vietnamese detention system.

AII POW-MIA argues that two live sighting reports—one filed with a JCRC tag line that “records indicate the source probably observed CAPT John T. McDonnell, USA,”—document Captain McDonnell’s status as POW/MIA. The other report was possibly correlated to Captain McDonnell or one other individual, but no JCRC determination was made. There is no reason to link either of the two reports to Captain McDonnell. Both reports describe an American in collaborative circumstances. None of the files we reviewed suggest that Captain McDonnell was a collaborator. He was a multiple-tour, decorated Vietnam veteran, *post-facto* promoted to the rank of Major.

We believe there is no factual information to support the contention that Captain McDonnell was left behind alive in Southeast Asia. There is, however, circumstantial evidence of his fate (see Annex I). Because that evidence is circumstantial, the case is likely to remain controversial—a continuing example of the polarization that has consumed the POW/MIA

issue. The DoD believes that all POWs are accounted for. All POW-MIA does not.

The McDonnell case is typical of several that we reviewed. Despite 30 years of continuous effort, there is no independently verifiable evidence of Captain McDonnell's fate. The information that has been collected, however, supports the conclusion that Captain McDonnell died in Vietnam after his capture.

PART V: CRITICAL ASSESSMENT CHARGES: POLITICIZATION

In addressing assertions of possible politicization made in the *Critical Assessment*, we have examined both the assessment's specific charges and its overarching implication that political pressure was applied to the estimate process by the Clinton Administration. The general charge of politicization is the more serious allegation because such a charge, even if vague and unsubstantiated, tends to gain credibility if it is repeated frequently. Indeed, the fact that many within the community of POW/MIA families believe that politicization exists is reflected in letters and memoranda written to government officials by the Executive Director of the National League of Families of Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia.¹⁸ This perception has been fed over the years by accusations of a government conspiracy to cover up the contention that American POWs were abandoned in Vietnam after Operation Homecoming in 1973.

We have examined each phase of the production of NIE 98-03, from the time it was requested in April 1997 through its publication in May 1998, to determine whether parties outside the IC attempted to influence the estimate's substance, judgments, or tone and, if they did, to what extent they succeeded. Because the *Critical Assessment* also implies that there was politicization of a prior IC publication (the 1994 assessment of the 735 and 1205 documents), we have reviewed the process of producing and releasing that document, looking for similar evidence of political pressure.

Attempts by policymakers to influence intelligence analysis are risky because they contradict the stated mission of intelligence and the professional ethic of the intelligence officer. Intelligence managers and analysts may react strongly if they believe that they are being pressured to slant or repress intelligence. We have made the assumption that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a policymaker to exert influence on the IC over a period of time without producing, at the very least, resistance and resentment by those intelligence analysts and managers whose analysis was being manipulated. For that reason, in our

¹⁸ In a letter to the DCI on 29 July 1997, the Executive Director said that the product of DPMO analysts had been "spun, covered with political documents, distorted in public statements and unconscionably delayed due to political considerations related to normalization of relations with Vietnam. This is all documentable and well known." The Executive Director urged the DCI to produce another NIE that is "clear, objective, and does not pull punches."

interviews with those involved in the production of NIE 98-03, we raised both the question of political pressure and the issue of the integrity of the process and the product.

The general reference to possible politicization made by Senator Smith in the *Critical Assessment* is that:

Congress and the leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) need to examine what role the White House, its National Security Council, and certain US policymakers responsible for advancing the Administration's normalization agenda with Vietnam may have played in influencing or otherwise affecting the judgments of the IC as reflected in the NIE.

The assessment states that, if improper communication or influence took place, immediate steps should be taken "to determine how this could have occurred." Such a review is critical, it says, to ensure "that the IC is providing objective and independent analysis to its customers." Our review will look first at the specific charges made in the assessment to support this general allegation, then return to a discussion of the broader assertion of politicization of NIE 98-03.

SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZATION

DoD Testimony (March and June 1998)

The *Critical Assessment* connects the timing of the NIE's preparation and publication and the Clinton Administration's determination in March 1998 that Vietnam was "fully cooperating in good faith" with the United States on the POW/MIA issue. President Clinton, it says, told Senator Smith that the results of the NIE "would be taken into account as we continue to advance our agenda with Vietnam." But, the assessment states, the President issued his 1998 determination that Vietnam was fully cooperating in good faith on 4 March 1998—"one month *prior* to the NIE's official dissemination."

Having established a juxtaposition of events, the *Critical Assessment* describes several incidents that imply that political influence was exerted on the estimate process through the DoD. This presumed chain of influence runs from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs through his Principal Deputy through DPMO to the NIC. The evidence supporting the

implication involves congressional testimony given by the Under Secretary on 5 March 1998, the day after the President issued his determination, and by the Principal Deputy on 17 June 1998. The assessment states that the testimony of the Principal Deputy undermined assurances provided by the Under Secretary and casts doubts on assurances from the DCI that "at no stage was there higher level or other intervention to change or shape the body or judgments of the NIE."

On 5 March, the Under Secretary appeared before the Senate Committee on Armed Services (of which Senator Smith is a member). In response to questions posed by Senator Smith, the Under Secretary said that he was aware that the POW/MIA estimate was being prepared, but that he was "not in a position to comment on what information was obtained from the IC in connection with the determination." In his interview with us, the Under Secretary re-confirmed his testimony. He said that he had had no association with the NIE—that he never saw it in draft, was never asked to comment on it, and never talked with anyone about it. He reaffirmed that he did not know what information the DoD may have provided the President on the issue of certification. Furthermore, he stated, his testimony on 5 March had nothing to do with POW/MIA affairs; rather, Senator Smith had "branched off" into that subject.¹⁹

In his appearance before the House Committee on International Relations on 17 June to testify on POW/MIA matters, the Principal Deputy was asked by the Chairman of the Committee what role the DoD had played in the Presidential determination. When the Principal Deputy responded that the Department had indicated that Vietnam was fully cooperating, the Chairman asked whether the Principal Deputy had before him the NIE on POW/MIA affairs at that time. The latter responded that, "We were actually working on it at the same time, because we were working with the Central Intelligence Agency on that issue, and so it was concurrent, simultaneous." He went on to say that the estimate was not issued until April 1998 and that, while he did not have the final estimate before him in March, "we certainly knew what was in it, and we were involved in the preparation of the estimate." The Chairman then asked him

¹⁹ The Under Secretary was testifying before the Committee on Armed Services; the subject was "The Role of the Department of Defense in Countering the Transnational Threats to the 21st Century, Including Terrorism, Narco-Trafficking, and Weapons of Mass Destruction."

if "he would have had the occasion to see what the report said at the time you made your decision;" the Principal Deputy responded, "Yes."

The Principal Deputy's testimony reveals that he did have knowledge of the contents of the draft NIE by early March 1998. In our interview with him, however, he indicated that he had not actually seen the estimate prior to its publication in April 1998 and that his positive response to the question of his having seen it had been "hasty." He stated that he was not directly involved in the estimate, but knew that the process was ongoing and that the NIC was working with DPMO. When he testified that "we" were working on the NIE, he meant that DoD analysts were working with the drafter. He stated that the Acting Director, DPMO kept him advised of the progress being made; when the certification issue came up in March, he asked the Acting Director, DPMO if the developing NIE was consistent with certification and was told that it was. He said he thought he would have known what the key judgments were going to be and what the findings might be, although he did not see them in the drafting phase.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, to whom the Principal Deputy reports, does not remember being involved in the estimate process. He was aware the NIE was being done and remembers seeing it when it was finished, but he is positive that he did not see it in draft. He told us that DPMO would almost certainly have helped prepare both the Under Secretary and the Principal Deputy for testimony that involved POW/MIA issues. As noted previously, however, the Under Secretary had not expected to be testifying about POW/MIA issues before the Senate Committee on Armed Services.

The *Critical Assessment* asserts that the testimony of the Principal Deputy casts doubt on the reliability of assurances that there was no higher level intervention to change the substance or judgments of the NIE. In fact, the testimony does not imply that there was intervention to shape the judgments of the NIE. At the most, it reveals that the Principal Deputy had knowledge of the contents of the estimate before it was published. It is very likely and hardly surprising that he did have such knowledge and that his information came from the DPMO, as he explains. The first draft of the estimate had been completed by early February, and the drafter had been communicating with DPMO analysts since the beginning of the process. Furthermore, the draft had been sent to organizations that work

closely with the DPMO. There is little doubt that DPMO had knowledge of the basic judgments of the draft estimate by early March. The draft report was not forwarded to the DPMO, however. We believe that the draft estimate was seen for the first time by a DPMO official on 20 March, when the Acting Director was shown a copy by the NIO/EA. We found no information suggesting that the draft was seen by DoD policymakers in DoD before it was released. Nor did we find information to support the charge that any intervention was made on the part of DoD policymakers to influence the estimate.

The *Critical Assessment* makes one more assertion of a linkage between the DoD and the preparation of the NIE. It states that the NIO/EA, in his briefing to the U.S. side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, and the Principal Deputy, in his testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, both of which occurred on 17 June, used the same phrase to characterize Vietnamese cooperation on POW/MIA matters. Both indicated that there had been "improved cooperation." Because this "exact phraseology" is not found in the NIE, the assessment charges, and because these two individuals used the same language "on the same day in response to the same question," this raises "more questions about additional collaboration between the National Intelligence Council and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy." The phrase "improved cooperation" is commonly used phrasing, however, and is so close to other language used to define Vietnam's performance ("more" cooperation or "increased" cooperation) that the *Critical Assessment* charge is unconvincing.

Outside Readers

The *Critical Assessment* states that the NIC selected four individuals from outside the IC "with expertise on the Vietnam POW/MIA issue" to review the draft and provide commentary. The assessment cites as its source the briefing provided by the NIC to the U.S. side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs on 17 June 1998. In that briefing, the NIO/EA stated that the NIC had reached out to people outside the IC who had expertise "in this area." Of the four outside readers, two had expertise in Southeast Asia issues ; none had specific expertise on the Vietnam POW/MIA issue; and two had no expertise in either Southeast Asia or the POW/MIA issue.

The *Critical Assessment* asks whether one or more of these individuals may have been employed in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, which includes DPMO—an "office which supports U.S. policy that Vietnam is fully cooperating in good faith on the POW/MIA issue." None of the four outside readers was from DPMO or from any other DoD office, although one had served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy during the Bush Administration. The draft estimate was shown to a fifth "outside" reader, however, the Acting Director, DPMO.

To determine what impact the outside readers may have had on the substance, judgments, and tone of the NIE, we examined annotated copies of draft reports as well as messages and memoranda addressing the comments and suggestions of various readers. In addition, we reviewed the draft reports, comparing them for changes that affected substance, judgments, or tone. Because the assessment expressed particular concern that DPMO may have influenced the NIE, we have included an analysis of the changes made to the draft after the Acting Director, DPMO reviewed it.

The NIO/EA showed a copy of the 17 March draft estimate to the Acting Director, DPMO on 20 March. The Acting Director was not one of the four outside readers; rather, he was shown the draft because of his background knowledge of the POW/MIA issue. The Acting Director reportedly expressed an opinion on the draft's language concerning Vietnamese mistreatment of POWs. As indicated previously, the DPMO position on this issue differed from that reflected in the NIE. No changes were made in the text on this subject. Changes made to the 23 March version of the estimate are modest and do not move the estimate in any consistent direction. There is no indication that the review by the Acting Director, DPMO resulted in any changes to the draft.

The 23 March NIE draft was provided for comment to two outside readers. The suggestion of the first, a former Deputy Chairman of the NIC, was to soften the tone of the estimate, which he called "overly rosy," in order to avoid antagonizing those "who are already doubters." We have some concern about the selection of the second reader, both because he had been National Security Adviser in 1993, when the original IC analysis of the 735 and 1205 documents was undertaken, and because he had been involved in the Clinton Administration's policy of normalizing relations with Vietnam. He had little comment on the draft, however; he did

express concern that the box listing SRV officials involved in the POW/MIA issue did not include any officials who were not cooperative.

There was little disagreement at the IC coordination sessions, held in late March. According to the accounts of representatives to the meetings, the first two outside readers and DIA had indicated that, in a few instances, the draft was "too apologetic" to the Vietnamese or "unduly charitable in rating Vietnam's performance." Both outside readers had suggested that making the language more modest would "make for a more persuasive paper" and "would not immediately set off critics of Vietnam's record of cooperation on this issue." As a result, a more circumspect, but still basically positive, appraisal of Vietnam's performance emerged from the coordination sessions.

Following the NFIB meeting on 13 April 1998, at the request of the DCI, the NIC provided the draft to two more outside readers. In his comments, the former DCI said his suggestions were "intended to strengthen our case against the minority of readers who would be reflexively critical." The suggestions he made included adding data and analysis to bolster judgments made in the estimate. In the end, however, the suggestions of these readers were not reflected in the draft.

The *Critical Assessment's* implication that the outside readers influenced either the body or judgments of the NIE is unfounded. None of the outside readers made suggestions designed to alter either. Several readers did, however, recommend changes designed to modify the tone of the language to deflect the anticipated negative reaction of those who were critical of Vietnam's record of cooperation on the POW/MIA issue.

Policy Contacts

The *Critical Assessment* emphasizes that, in the course of preparing the estimate, the NIE drafter interviewed the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam and the Director for Indochina, Thailand, and Burma, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The assessment describes these two men as the Clinton Administration's "biggest advocates for continued expansion of US relations with Hanoi." The implication is that these two officials may have influenced the views of the drafter and the judgments in the NIE.

The drafter met with the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam in February 1998. The only clear indication of a point the Ambassador wanted to make occurred in the section of the NIE draft dealing with Vietnamese refusal to provide Politburo documents. A phrase in the 20 February draft that was reviewed by the Ambassador indicated that Vietnam would not provide such documents "*any more than foreign governments, such as the United States, would open their sensitive records to Vietnamese officials.*" A handwritten note by the drafter states that "the Ambassador wants this emphasized." While the Ambassador did try to influence the draft in this instance, his request was rejected; in fact, the entire phrase was deleted from the estimate. The 17 March version of the estimate, which would have reflected the Ambassador's views, showed no change in language that could be considered more supportive of Administration policy; in fact, the changes tended to reinforce skepticism about Vietnamese cooperation.

The drafter met with the Director for Indochina, Thailand, and Burma, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs early in the research phase of the process. The Director told us that they discussed the early history of the issue; key decision points for both the Vietnamese and U.S. leadership; specific questions concerning the 735 and 1205 documents; and the structure of Vietnamese organizations dealing with the POW/MIA issue. Other than providing background information and suggesting documents that the drafter should read, the Director stated that he had no contact with the drafter and did not contribute to the NIE; nor did he see the estimate until it was released. Interviewing policymakers who have specific knowledge or expertise is neither unusual nor out of line during the research phase of an estimate. In the case of this estimate, the drafter makes it clear that he consulted with U.S. policymakers in order to gather information on Vietnamese cooperation.

Charges of Politicization in 1993/94

The *Critical Assessment* maintains that the questions it has raised about the politicizing of intelligence with respect to the NIE are relevant in view of "indications suggesting that such actions took place during the current Administration on the same issues being reviewed in the current NIE." It then makes a number of assertions about the events leading up to the DoD release in January 1994 of an unclassified interagency intelligence analysis of the 735 and 1205 documents.

NSC Tasking

The *Critical Assessment* states that, on 12 February 1993, the then-Deputy National Security Adviser, having been briefed on the discovery of the 1205 document, tasked the IC to analyze the implications of the following hypothetical scenario:

Assume that a document from a senior North Vietnamese Army official established that on September 15, 1972, the North Vietnamese were holding 1205 American prisoners of war . . . ; the North Vietnamese were deliberately concealing the true number of prisoners they were holding from the outside world; the fate of these prisoners was under consideration by the Hanoi Politburo . . . if such a document were deemed reliable . . . what are the implications of this information generally, what are the implications in light of Vietnam's obligations under the Paris Peace Agreement?

The assessment goes on to say that:

. . . the phrasing of this White House tasking, i.e., if such a document were deemed reliable, what are the implications . . . , can be interpreted as politicizing of intelligence, because it opens the door for an Administration judgment that a document is *not* reliable if it is deemed to have *negative* implications for planned U.S. policy toward Vietnamese if it is judged to *be* [emphases in original] reliable.

By omitting a key portion of the tasking (in bold below) and creating a false continuous sentence, the *Critical Assessment* has created an out-of-context quotation that distorts the meaning of the language. In fact, the tasking listed the various conditions of the document (i.e., the North Vietnamese were holding 1205 American POWs, concealing the true numbers, and deliberating their fate). The tasking then began a new paragraph which asked:

If such a document were deemed reliable, **how would this information conform with our existing knowledge of American POWs?** [emphasis added] What are the implications of this information generally? What are the implications in light of Vietnam's obligations under the Paris Peace Agreement?

While the wording of the tasking may be awkward, it is not asking what the implications are for U.S. policy as the *Critical Assessment* implies. It

does not appear to be pre-judging the conclusions of the analysis it is requesting. Nor does it imply that the Administration plans to judge the document as *not reliable* if it is deemed to have *negative* implications for planned U.S. policy. The tasking appears to be raising questions of legitimate interest and concern to policymakers, particularly during a period when the Clinton Administration was trying to establish its policy toward Vietnam. In any event, it is the prerogative of policymakers both to task the IC and then to do what they want with the information and analysis they receive.

In its response to the tasking, the DIA Office for POW/MIA (the predecessor to DPMO) discussed the implications of such a claim, i.e., that the North Vietnamese were holding 1205 American POWs in September 1972. As cited in the *Critical Assessment*, the DIA response provides hypothetical conditions such a fact might imply (e.g., that the Vietnamese would have been holding 665 more POWs than we were aware of at that time; that these POWs would have to have been spirited away from the point of capture and placed in a completely separate prison camp; and that some of these men would have survived to the present). In addition, the DIA response analyzes these hypotheses and conditions, concluding that, "the undisputed evidence provided by 30 years of intelligence collection refutes the hypothesis."

IC Analysis: Timing of Release

The *Critical Assessment* states that the interagency analysis of the 735 and 1205 documents was disseminated to the media on 24 January 1994, "three days prior to a U.S. Senate vote on whether to urge the lifting of the U.S. trade embargo on Hanoi, and one week prior to the President's announcement of his determination to lift the embargo." It terms the timing of the release suspicious, because the study had been prepared and forwarded to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in an unclassified format seven months earlier and because the President had stated on 10 December 1993 that he intended to release the analysis as soon as possible. According to the *Critical Assessment*:

Clearly, the release of this unclassified document of information prepared with major input by elements of the Intelligence Community, had been delayed for political purposes in order to obtain maximum effect on decisions being made and/or announced within the Congress and the White House.

The *Critical Assessment* is correct in asserting that there was an unexplained delay in the release of the report and that it may have occurred for political reasons. The delay was not as long as the assessment implies, however. On 21 May 1993, the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs requested that an interagency study of the 1205 document be prepared; he noted that several agencies had done analyses of the document and published initial findings, but that the findings should be combined into a coordinated document. He noted that the outcome of the meeting would be a final paper that DoD could release and that would serve as a position paper for testimony, media inquiry, and other scrutiny. The Deputy NIO/EA agreed to chair an IC panel to assess the 1205 document.

Much of the work for the interagency study already had been done. DIA, INR, and the Deputy NIO/EA (drawing on both the DI and the DO) had analyzed the 1205 document separately. Each had concluded independently that, while it probably was a valid GRU document, the information it contained on American POWs was not valid. The Deputy NIO/EA prepared a draft and sent it to the IC representatives in early June 1993. The draft's "bottom line judgment" was that "the document is not what it claims to be, and the information suggesting more than 600 additional POWs were held in Vietnam is not accurate." This judgment would not be disputed by any IC member and would be the judgment of the paper released to the public in January 1994 by the DoD. Two coordination meetings were held to discuss the study, and minor changes were made.

The coordinated study was sent to the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs in late June 1993. He did not release it publicly at that time. The Acting Deputy told us that he thought the assessment was fair and straightforward, but that he knew it would draw criticism because it had political implications. He said that politics might have been a consideration in his reluctance to release it to the public.

On 2 September 1993, portions of the second GRU document, the 735, were made public, and DoD again requested an IC assessment. The Deputy NIO/EA gathered the same interagency group and updated the original study to include an analysis of the available portions of the 735 document. The study was sent to the Acting Deputy, who "again chose not

to release it," according to the Deputy NIO/EA, who went on to say that the Acting Deputy "had complained that some of the points were a bit to [sic] sharp....

The study also raised concerns in the NSC. The Acting Deputy was not alone in arguing that the analysis of the documents was too sharp. According to several accounts, the National Security Adviser indicated that he wanted the analysis "flattened" in the study that was going to be released to the public. A member of the NSC staff confirmed that the National Security Adviser considered the study "too dismissive" of the 735 and 1205 documents and wanted the drafter to state that the books would not be closed on these reports. The Deputy NIO/EA wrote on 19 January 1994 that:

... the White House is perhaps oversensitive to charges that we are "debunking" these reports (the 735 and 1205) and appears to want to hold out at least the possibility that they may be valid.

According to the Deputy NIO/EA, the Acting Deputy believed that "we have to call them as we see them." In addition, the Acting Deputy indicated that DPMO analysts were resisting the changes that "flattened" the language and might insist that they be restored. The Deputy NIO/EA would have had no problem restoring the original language; he argued that the critics are going to "dive bomb the Administration no matter what and cannot be assuaged with word-noodling." The political issue that held up release of the unclassified study, at least at this stage, appears to have been pressure from the National Security Adviser to "flatten" the tone of the language to make it more palatable to those who accepted the validity of the 735 and 1205 information, combined with reluctance on the part of the Acting Deputy to release a study that would be attacked by critics of Administration policy. We found no evidence that the delay was linked to a decision on lifting the trade embargo as the *Critical Assessment* alleges.

The unclassified interagency analysis of the Russian documents was released by the DoD on 24 January 1994. The analysis and conclusions were the same as those in the separate DIA, INR, and Deputy NIO/EA studies as well as those in the coordinated draft studies. The tone of the study, however, is somewhat more conciliatory; the door is open to new information that may shed more light on the validity of the information in the documents. While the drafter of the IC study did not feel political

pressure from the Clinton Administration to change judgments, he did feel pressure to soften the tone of the report to make it more compatible with the views of those who believed that the 735 and 1205 documents contained valid information on the number of American POWs held by the Vietnamese in 1972.

Charges of Improper Direction

At the end of its section on politicization of the 1993/94 process, the *Critical Assessment* implies that, on several occasions, improper comments were made or directions given that constituted politicization. The first is said to have occurred at a White House meeting with the President, Vice-President, National Security Adviser, and two other DoD and DoS officials involved with POW/MIA accounting efforts. The assessment indicates that this meeting occurred before the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy formally requested that an assessment of the 1205 document be prepared for release to the public (the DoD request was made in May 1993). During the meeting, according to the *Critical Assessment*, the President reportedly stated that he "did not want the 1205 document to get in the way of normalization of relations with Vietnam." The implication is that the President's statement precipitated a decision to produce and release to the public a politicized study that would dismiss the 1205 document.

We interviewed two senior officials who met with President Clinton on 15 April 1993 to discuss the POW/MIA issue. One indicated that he had heard the President utter the statement exactly as quoted above, but that it would be inappropriate for him to comment further about the meeting. The other senior official, read the following excerpt from his notes of the meeting:

He [the President] wanted to move forward [with normalization], but Vietnam had to take the initiative with the fullest possible accounting of MIAs; must have tangible progress to resolve the 1205 document [sic].

This official said that he did not recall the President saying anything about not letting the 1205 document get in the way of normalization or any words to that effect.

In the aftermath of the meeting of 15 April, the President's Special Emissary to Vietnam, General John Vessey, traveled to Hanoi. Both his talking points in preparation for the trip and his news briefing after the trip

indicate that resolution of questions related to the 1205 document was a major issue during his trip. At his news briefing on 21 April, General Vessey stated that he had come away from meetings with the President before his trip and after his return from Vietnam with the view that, "the fullest possible accounting for missing Americans is a high priority issue." He said that the President had "made it clear to me before I went to Vietnam, he made it clear to me today [sic]." A senior official who served on the NSC during this period told us that, while there was natural concern that the 1205 document would have an impact on policy, there was never any indication that we should not do everything necessary to follow up on it.

In the months that followed, the Clinton Administration reaffirmed its commitment to the fullest possible accounting for POW/MIAs and continued the trade embargo against Vietnam pending further progress on POW/MIA accounting. President Clinton announced the lifting of the trade embargo in February 1994, after the Senate approved a non-binding resolution urging that he do so. In July 1995 (more than two years after his alleged comments on the 1205 document), President Clinton announced the normalization of relations with Vietnam.

We found no credible evidence that the Clinton Administration tried to pressure the IC to ignore or dismiss the 1205 document in 1993. Rather, the evidence available to us suggests that the Administration's political concern was just the opposite—that it not appear to be dismissing or debunking the 1205 document; this concern would be expressed again in 1998 as NIE 98-03 was being prepared.

The final allegation in the *Critical Assessment* is that, at the first meeting to discuss preparation of the 1994 assessment of the 1205 document, the Deputy NIO/EA:

... reportedly announced to those gathered that the 1205 was not reliable with respect to U.S. POWs, and that was the operating assumption under which the 1993/94 DoD-released product was consequently prepared.

This charge is not supported by the facts. The first meeting to discuss the interagency study was held on 4 June 1993, after the Deputy NIO/EA had disseminated his rough draft which included the analysis that the 1205 document was not reliable with respect to numbers of U.S. POWs and after each of the participating agencies had disseminated separate reports that

independently arrived at the same conclusion on POWs. All participants had reached the conclusion that the information on POWs in the 1205 document was not reliable before coming to the interagency meeting; it was not a conclusion dictated to them by the Deputy NIO/EA.

The *Critical Assessment* acknowledges that the evidence brought to bear on specific charges of politicization is "circumstantial." We found only one incident raised by the *Critical Assessment* that is supported by our evidence and that suggests political considerations affected intelligence reporting on the POW/MIA issue; that instance is the DoD delay in releasing the unclassified interagency study on the 735 and 1205 documents in 1993-94. While it is not the right of the policymaker to change the substance or judgments of an intelligence product, it is the prerogative of a policymaker to request that an intelligence product be declassified for release and to decide whether and when to release such a product. While the decision of the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs to delay publication probably was influenced by political considerations, it was within his authority to make. The handling of the matter did not affect the findings of the intelligence product.

GENERAL CHARGE OF POLITICIZATION

The general allegation that the Clinton Administration has politicized intelligence on the POW/MIA issue and specifically on NIE 98-03 certainly will persist. It stems from the belief that the U.S. Government is covering up the fact that American POWs were abandoned in Vietnam after Operation Homecoming in 1973. In this section, we will address the allegation that NIE 98-03 was politicized by reviewing instances of attempted influence on the process.

We interviewed more than 80 individuals in the IC and the policy side of the Executive Branch to understand the steps involved in the process of preparing, coordinating, and approving NIE 98-03. These interviews uncovered no instances of pressure from the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government to influence the body or judgments of the estimate. The National Security Adviser requested that the NIC produce the estimate and that the TOR be coordinated with the SSCI. After that, neither he nor any other member of the NSC played any role in the production of the NIE. The DoD's involvement included the data and

analysis from DPMO, CILHI, Stony Beach, and JTF-FA and draft coordination by DIA and the members of the MIB. At no time did any DoD policymaker attempt to influence the body or substance of the estimate. At the DoS, the INR analyst played a role in coordinating the draft estimate. Aside from the request by the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam that a point in the draft estimate be emphasized, there was no attempt by DoS policymakers to influence the body or substance of the estimate. Similarly, in its meeting to approve the NIE, the NFIB, which is made up of the most senior members of the IC, made no attempt to influence the body or substance of the estimate.

We found unusual interest and involvement in the estimate process by parties outside the IC, however. Both the SSCI and Senator Smith had an impact on the estimate process, beginning with the negotiation of the TOR. The NIO/EA believed that he could not proceed until the SSCI had responded to each version of his TOR. This resulted in accumulated delays of almost six months. It also resulted in some confusion about the actual scope of the estimate and the time frame it would cover. None of the individuals we interviewed knew of an instance, other than this one, in which coordination of TOR by a non-IC organization had occurred.

Senator Smith and his staff also played a key role in shaping the TOR. The NIO/EA at the time the TOR were being negotiated intended that a re-evaluation of the 735 and 1205 documents would be a separate research study. Senator Smith wanted the re-evaluation to be part of the NIE and this view was conveyed to the SSCI staff; the SSCI suggested changes to the TOR in late October 1997 that included a re-evaluation of the 735 and 1205 documents as one of the two key questions to be addressed in the estimate.

In his November 1997 meeting with the NIO/EA, Senator Smith went further, telling the NIO/EA what conclusions he thought the NIE should reach. He expressed his views about the key issues involved, particularly on the subject of the 735 and 1205 documents, and he said that he was not confident that the Clinton Administration would not interfere in the estimate process. His legislative assistant offered to participate in the estimate process itself.

On the eve of the MIB and NFIB meetings of April 1998, Senator Smith raised the issue of the documents held at the SSCI, stating that no

one had reviewed them and that, if the IC published the NIE without such a review, he could not "believe in it." His concern resulted in a delay in publication of the estimate. The DCI directed that a team visit the SSCI to read the documents and that two more outside readers review the draft NIE. In addition, the DCI became more involved in questioning the language of the estimate.

While we found no evidence that any member of the Clinton Administration made any effort to influence the substance, conclusions, or judgments of NIE 98-03, members of the IC as well as outside readers of the estimate were keenly aware that the NIE would be criticized by those who believed that the Vietnamese were not cooperating in good faith on POW/MIA matters and those who believed that American POWs were left behind in 1973. At numerous stages in the production of the estimate, readers urged that the tone of the estimate, but not its fundamental conclusions, be softened to placate potential critics. The result was an estimate which softened its language on issues involving Vietnamese cooperation; the alleged transfer of American POWs to the USSR; the assessment of the 735 and 1205 documents; and the charge that American POWs were left behind following Operation Homecoming.

From the beginning, Senator Smith had an impact on the estimate process:

- ◆ The TOR process was delayed;
- ◆ Confusion over the scope of the estimate and the time frame it would cover was never fully resolved;
- ◆ Both DPMO and the NIO/EA, who had been criticized by Senator Smith, withdrew from formal participation in the preparation of the estimate. These decisions weakened the substantive and analytic expertise brought to bear on the subject; and
- ◆ Senator Smith's insistence that the SSCI documents be reviewed delayed final NFIB approval and release of the NIE.

In addition, while Senator Smith's interventions did not directly affect the substance or fundamental judgments of the estimate, concern about his

reaction and that of other Administration critics did have an impact on the tone of the report. The language of the estimate was repeatedly modified, thus conveying less confidence about certain issues than the IC actually had.

If politicization of NIE 98-03 occurred, it was in softening the tone of the NIE to placate likely critics, rather than in supporting the foreign policy objectives of the Clinton Administration. The IC responded to Senator Smith's expressions of his position and to the cumulative advice from members of the IC, including the DCI, and from outside readers to modify the language of the estimate to avoid criticism. The body and the fundamental judgments did not change, but repeated modifications of language did soften the tone of the NIE.

PART VI: CONCLUSIONS

We have studied NIE 98-03 and its production to determine whether the drafter of the NIE failed to use all relevant documentation, sought to discredit relevant information, or engaged in faulty analysis. We have examined the process of producing the estimate to determine whether politicization occurred or was attempted. Finally, we have analyzed the specific charges made in the *Critical Assessment*, cross-walking those charges to the relevant NIE statements in order to assess their validity. These approaches have enabled us to assess the NIE's analytical vigor, objectivity, accuracy, and completeness, as requested by the SSCI.

We conclude that:

- ◆ The drafter had access to and reviewed relevant documentation;
- ◆ There was no attempt to discredit relevant information;
- ◆ The drafter used appropriate methodology and sound analysis in producing the estimate;
- ◆ No official of the Clinton Administration put pressure on either the drafter or other members of the IC to influence the substance or fundamental judgments of the estimate;
- ◆ Senator Smith and his staff had an influence on the tone of the estimate:
 - ◆ Members of the IC reacted to their perception that Senator Smith and other critics of Administration policy would be critical of the NIE. Concerned that the estimate might appear to be dismissive of the concerns of critics, reviewers at all levels recommended modifying the language of the NIE;
 - ◆ These modifications produced softer language than the NIE drafter and the IC originally had proposed;
 - ◆ The fundamental substantive judgments of the NIE were not altered;

- ◆ Overall, the NIE demonstrates analytical vigor, objectivity, accuracy, and completeness; and
- ◆ Several decisions made by the NIC and the NIE drafter created openings for criticism, and some of the analysis in the NIE is flawed. Neither these decisions nor the analytic shortcomings affected the judgments of the estimate.

RELEVANT DOCUMENTATION

No effort was made by either the NIE drafter or other members of the IC to discredit relevant information, and no repository of information was overlooked. On the contrary, the NIE drafter pursued relevant information and was given complete access to that information. This included documents and/or complete lists of documents from DPMO, both RA and JCSD; CIA; organizations within the Office of the Secretary of Defense; DoS; DIA; NSA; JTF-FA; and CILHI. In addition, the drafter met with knowledgeable officials to review the information and make sure he was not missing anything. Given the amount of time he had to complete the estimate, the NIE drafter did a credible job of reviewing available information held by the IC, in particular, and the U.S. Government, in general.

The NIE drafter is vulnerable, however, to criticism that he did not pay attention to pre-1987 documentation. The issue of the period of time the estimate would cover arose early in the process and was never resolved. The drafter made it clear to us that his understanding of the tasking and the TOR was that he should cover the period since 1987. In addition, he and the IC agreed to accept a 1992 CIA study as having covered the period from 1987 to 1992 in its analysis. While the original TOR explicitly stated that the estimate would cover the period since 1987, they did not include a re-evaluation of the 735 and 1205 documents. When re-evaluation, as opposed to an update of the 1994 assessment of the documents, was included in the TOR, the parameters shifted. Senator Smith's legislative assistant told us that re-evaluation of the 735 and 1205 documents as a key question for the NIE obligated the drafter to search as far back as the document trail allowed.

We have not attempted to reconcile these two divergent points of view, which reflect a legitimate disagreement based on differing perceptions of the tasking. We note, however, the delay in the completion of the TOR (the SSCI held the draft TOR from early July 1997 until the end of October 1997); the addition of the 735 and 1205 documents to the "Key Questions" of the TOR; and the introduction of a new NIO/EA and a new NIE drafter, neither of whom had been involved in the negotiations of the TOR. The former NIO/EA had intended to treat the 735 and 1205 documents as a separate research project. The new NIO/EA and the NIE drafter accepted the final TOR with their expanded focus without changing the time allocated to complete the NIE, the time frame on which the research would focus, or their perception of the scope of the project.

In our review of the NIE and the *Critical Assessment*, we did find it necessary to search for documentation as far back as the document trail allowed. The information we reviewed provided new insights into many of the issues treated in the NIE and the *Critical Assessment*. None of this information contradicted the conclusions or changed the judgments reached by the NIE drafter and the IC.

QUALITY OF NIE ANALYSIS

We found the overall quality of analysis in the NIE to be good. The argumentation is vigorous and logical, and the conclusions are balanced and well-documented. On the subject of Vietnamese cooperation on POW/MIA matters, the drafter used relevant information and interviews with knowledgeable officials in reaching the conclusion that Vietnam's performance in dealing with the POW/MIA issue has been good in recent years. The NIE judgment is properly cautious, particularly given the caveat that unresolved areas of Vietnamese cooperation warrant continued close attention by the U.S. Government.

On the subject of the NIE's re-evaluation of the 735 and 1205 documents, a basic misunderstanding developed about what the NIE was to accomplish. Whereas the former NIO/EA planned to address the 735 and 1205 documents in a separate research study, Senator Smith wanted these issues addressed in the NIE; according to his legislative assistant, he wanted an independent review of the 735 and 1205 documents as well as an independent analysis of the numbers of POWs held by Vietnam.

Whereas Senator Smith expected an in-depth analysis of the 735 and 1205 documents and related issues, the assumptions of the NIC, the NIE drafter, and the IC were quite different. They assumed that the NIE would reflect the best judgments of the IC as developed by knowledgeable analysts; they did not plan to undertake basic research and analysis. As a result of his perception of the task, the drafter of the NIE did not undertake an in-depth re-evaluation of the 735 and 1205 documents. Instead, he accepted the IC position on the legitimacy and accuracy of the documents as well as the U.S. Government's position on the basic question of numbers of POWs held by the Vietnamese. The combination of this acceptance of previous positions and the limited time allocated to completing the project prevented the NIE drafter from taking a fresh look at a number of contentious issues.

The NIE did not come to grips with the issue of the numbers of POW/MIAs not accounted for and the impact of the 735 and 1205 documents on that issue. No organization or person felt compelled to do the research and analysis necessary to illuminate and challenge the polarized interpretations that have developed over the years. We took on that task, an unusual undertaking for statutory oversight organizations, because we wanted to determine whether there was evidence that might have affected the NIE if it had been taken into account. It took us nearly three months of research and analysis to understand that neither of the mutually-exclusive accounting methodologies was sufficient. That being said, the NIE's judgments on this issue remain valid; the 735 and 1205 documents are genuine GRU documents, but the information contained in them related to numbers of POWs held by the Vietnamese cannot be relied upon. The two documents are mutually inconsistent in that regard.

As a result of our analysis, we can conclude with far greater confidence than did the NIE that the numbers of POWs reported in the 735 and 1205 documents are inaccurate. We accept that the documents are genuine and that other information contained in them is valid. But the information on the numbers cannot be accurate.

Because of the existence of competing methodologies and polarized positions, we also undertook an independent analysis of the discrepancy or compelling cases. This issue had been avoided by the Senate Select Committee in 1993, and only DPMO had analyzed the cases. Senator Smith's legislative assistant told us that he had assumed that the NIE

drafter would conduct such an analysis, but he did not. Once again, we believed that it was our responsibility to determine whether relevant information existed that might have affected the judgments of the NIE. We obtained the case assessments for the 289 cases on Senator Smith's list of 324 names for which verified remains have not been returned. Our review suggests that, at most, three of the cases (and, in all likelihood, none) remain compelling today. We do not claim to have resolved any of these cases. We believe, however, that our methodology can be replicated and that a far better understanding of the remaining number of compelling cases might be achieved.

The withdrawal of DPMO from the estimate process inhibited analysis of POW/MIA issues. Several of the mistakes made by the drafter could have been prevented had DPMO analysts been more closely involved in coordinating the estimate. While not a member of the IC, DPMO possesses most of the U.S. Government's data and analytic expertise on POW/MIA issues. NIE deliberations frequently include the participation of non-IC members who are particularly knowledgeable as "back benchers." In our view, the decision by DPMO management, accepted by the IC, to exclude DPMO was unfortunate.

One of the mistakes DPMO could have prevented was the NIE's characterization of the mortician and his information. The NIE failed to capture the intricacies of the mortician's story and its implications. Since that story was a major point of disagreement between the SNIE of 1987 and the NIE of 1998, the story had to be told accurately and completely. The NIE did not do that and exacerbated the issue by not taking into account the conclusion reached in the 1996 IC Assessment. The IC Assessment did not discredit the mortician. It claimed that the numbers in the 1987 SNIE were based on limited direct evidence whose reliability was open to question. The NIE mislabeled the mortician an unreliable source. The DPMO argues that the mortician was reliable with respect to the remains he had actually worked on, but that his estimate of stored remains that he did not work on was less accurate. We agree with the conclusions of the 1996 IC study and the DPMO.

Another area in which DPMO might have helped the NIE drafter is on the issue of Vietnamese mistreatment of POWs. The NIE's approach to this issue is limited and does not directly address the problem the issue causes for both Vietnamese and U.S. policymakers. There is substantial

evidence that mistreatment occurred; there also is substantial evidence that the Vietnamese will not admit that mistreatment occurred. U.S. policymakers are concerned that emphasizing this point to the Vietnamese can only undermine efforts to achieve full accounting.

The NIE overstated its case that there is no evidence that the Vietnamese currently are storing the remains of American POWs. The NIE did indicate, however, that the DPMO in conjunction with CILHI was investigating the question and that further conclusions had to await publication of that study. The DPMO remains report was issued in June 1999, more than one year after the NIE was published. The study concludes that remains may not have been repatriated in two cases involving five sets of remains. That conclusion was not factored into the NIE, but those preparing the remains study may not have made that determination by the time the NIE was published. In addition, the DPMO's 1995 zero-based comprehensive review concluded that there were some cases where the Vietnamese Government did not turn over recovered remains. That conclusion also was not factored into the NIE.

The *Critical Assessment* challenges the NIE's judgments with respect to the possible existence of a separate prison camp and/or the possible transfer of U.S. POWs to the former Soviet Union. The assessment cites a 1976 CIA "study" that concluded that the possibility of a second prison system "cannot be disregarded." We found the alleged study and determined that it was an internal CIA draft based solely on the preliminary work of a junior imagery analyst. The junior analyst hoped to find evidence of live POWs and a second prison camp system, but that hope was not realized. The CIA desk officer who had responsibility for evaluating the North Vietnamese prison system from 1965 to 1992 never found credible evidence of the existence of such a system. In our review of documents and statements made by Russian officials and others, we found no credible evidence to support either the existence of a second prison camp system or the transfer of American POWs from Vietnam to the former Soviet Union or elsewhere.

None of our criticisms of the estimate affects its basic substance and judgments; these stood up to rigorous examination. We found that the IC understanding of the issues was sound and that the NIE judgments were accurate.

POLITICIZATION

We found no indication that any member of the Clinton Administration attempted to influence the NIE in any way. Nor did we find support for charges that the Clinton Administration tried to influence intelligence reporting on issues relating to POW/MIA during 1993-1994, when the first IC analysis of the 735 and 1205 documents occurred, with the exception of the efforts of some to make the tone more acceptable to anticipated critics. The concern expressed by Administration policymakers was that the IC not appear to be dismissing or debunking the information contained in those documents.

We did find that Senator Smith had an impact on the estimate process and the tone of the estimate. He played a role in framing the final TOR, ensuring that a re-evaluation of the 735 and 1205 documents was included as one of the key questions. In his meeting with the NIO/EA in early November 1997, he expressed his opinion on issues to be addressed in the estimate and implied that any differing conclusion would be the result of pressure from the Clinton Administration. He and his legislative assistant tried to insert themselves into the estimate process. Senator Smith called the Director, DIA before the MIB meeting of April 1998, stating that the NIE drafter had failed to review documents held by the SSCI and indicating that he could not accept the estimate if the documents were not reviewed.

Members of the IC, as well as outside readers of the estimate, were aware that the NIE would be criticized by those who believed that the Vietnamese were not cooperating in good faith on POW/MIA matters and those who believed that American POWs were left behind in 1973. At numerous stages in the production of the estimate, they urged that the tone of the estimate be softened to placate those who might be critical. The result was an estimate with modified language on issues relating to Vietnamese cooperation and to the 735 and 1205 documents.

A FINAL NOTE

We are concerned by the *Critical Assessment's* overarching implication that political pressure has been applied to the intelligence process by the Clinton Administration. Such a charge, even if vague and unsubstantiated, tends to gain credibility if it is repeated. Many in the community of POW/MIA families have come to believe that politicization exists. This perception has been fed by persistent accusations of a government conspiracy to cover up the contention that American POWs were abandoned in Vietnam after Operation Homecoming in 1973. No such conspiracy exists.

We found caring and sensitive people working on the POW/MIA issue at all levels of the government. Addressing the issue is especially difficult for those who must put emotion and personal considerations aside in pursuit of factual information. To demonstrate the difficulty in doing so, we cite two of these professionals: the recently retired Director, DIA and an imagery analyst who worked on the prison camp issue as a junior analyst in the 1970s.

The Director, DIA told us that, after meeting with Senator Smith in June 1997, he was convinced that the U.S. Government had not done enough. He said that he wanted to believe that American POWs had been left behind after Operation Homecoming. DIA senior staff officers confirmed that the Director was persistent, persuasive, and personally driven to ensure that analysis of the POW/MIA issue was correct. Ultimately, as Chief of the MIB, responsible for the analytical position of the entire military intelligence structure, he concluded that the facts demonstrated that he was "wrong in his heart." There was no credible evidence to support the position that live POWs had been left behind in Vietnam. Similarly, the then-junior imagery analyst told us he had wanted to find Americans alive after Operation Homecoming and that he never lost that personal focus during his nearly 30-year career. He never found evidence to support what his heart told him. The facts simply were otherwise.

Altogether we formally interviewed more than 80 individuals and contacted about 20 others who had relevant information. Without exception, we found dedicated professionals searching for the truth as best

they could. We found diligent Senate staff members who wanted the government and especially the IC to hide nothing. We found dedicated support personnel who held nothing from us. We found experienced intelligence operatives who had worked the POW/MIA issue their entire careers; they had asked the hard questions over and over again but had found no information to support the hypothesis that live American POWs remained in North Vietnam after Operation Homecoming. We found analysts committed to two sound analytical propositions—leaving no stone unturned and letting the facts speak for themselves. We found policymakers attempting as best they could to deal openly and in a straightforward manner with an emotional and difficult issue.

We had a unique platform from which to review the relevant policy and intelligence information. No document in its original form was withheld from us. No document in its entirety was refused us. No marginalia, desk note, sticky, or other scrap of information was excluded from files we asked for, to include those held by the SSCI.

We were not asked to determine whether there was a government conspiracy to cover up the contention that American POWs were abandoned in Vietnam after Operation Homecoming in 1973. Given the fact that there are those who continue to believe such a conspiracy exists, however, we emphasize that we found not one factual thread in all the thousands of pages of documentation we reviewed to indicate that such a conspiracy exists today or ever existed. To the contrary, we found no reason to challenge the finding reported by Congressman Sonny Montgomery to the Speaker of the House of Representatives nearly a quarter century ago:

...the results of the investigations and information gathered during its 15-month tenure have led this committee to the belief that no Americans are still being held alive as prisoners in Indochina, or elsewhere, as a result of the war in Indochina.

ANNEX A: Methodology

We used an historical research design, a methodology that seeks to reconstruct the past objectively and accurately. We augmented that approach with contrast and comparison, and quantitative and replication methodologies where appropriate. Our design had 12 components:

- ◆ Review all the research files of the drafter of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE);
- ◆ Identify and review previous studies, in particular those conducted by non-Executive Branch entities;
- ◆ Review other relevant document holdings, including those of Senator Smith and the CIA, the Directorate of Operations, to include construction of data bases;
- ◆ Interview persons with first-hand information or expert knowledge;
- ◆ Review contemporary literature. The Defense Technical Information Center conducted a tailored search of its various databases at our request to identify relevant documents and publications;
- ◆ Search the world wide web;
- ◆ Conduct our own analysis of the data collected because the drafters of the NIE and the *Critical Assessment* used fundamentally different and mutually exclusive approaches;
- ◆ Analyze and compare the content of each draft of the NIE to assess the impact or influence on the text of various readers;
- ◆ Evaluate a structured sample of official case assessments of persons unaccounted for in Southeast Asia as maintained by the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO);

- ◆ Conduct a zero-based review of a Missing in Action (MIA) case;
- ◆ Contrast and compare interviews and statements of Russian sources from the perspective of both the NIE and the *Critical Assessment*; and
- ◆ Retranslate from the Russian language portions of the 735 and 1205 documents relevant to the POW/MIA issue.

We used an iterative approach to synthesize the data and other information collected. Interviews were primarily open-ended narrative accounts with follow-on questions and sessions, if required. For example, we met three times with the drafter of the NIE and three times with Senator Smith's legislative assistant for the *Critical Assessment*. We met with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) staff point of contact on four different occasions, twice to review relevant documents. We reviewed on several occasions the material provided to us by the drafter of the NIE. We requested specific document searches by the Office of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the DPMO, various offices of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the Department of State (DoS), Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). To assimilate documents obtained from diverse sources, we created a master database and then constructed analytical files in two ways, one chronologically and one functionally. As a cross check, each agency (CIA and Department of Defense (DoD)) built its own functional files and performed parallel analysis of key issues. We reviewed over 20,000 pages of responsive information.

We interviewed more than 80 current and former officials of DoS and DoD, the National Security Council (NSC); the CIA, the DIA, the National Security Agency (NSA), the SSCI, and the office of Senator Smith. Specifically, we interviewed:

- ◆ **At DoS:** the current U.S. Ambassadors to Vietnam and Cambodia; the Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs; the Director, Office of East Asia Analysis, INR; and a former member of INR;
- ◆ **At DoD:** the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Assistant Secretary and the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

for International Security Affairs; two former and the current Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs; the Director, Indochina, Thailand, Burma, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs; and the Assistant Director for Polygraphs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence);

- ◆ **At CIA:** the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council; two former National Intelligence Officers for East Asia, and a former Deputy NIO for East Asia; former and current senior officials, reports officers, and analysts from the Directorates of Operations and Intelligence, the Office of Congressional Affairs, and the National Counterintelligence Center; and the drafter of NIE 98-03;
- ◆ **At DIA:** a former Director; a former and the current Director and the Vice Deputy Director, Policy Support; the Deputy Intelligence Officer for East Asia and Pacific; the former Director and former Deputy Director, Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs; the Chief, Security, Investigations and Polygraph Branch; and representatives from the Office of the Executive Secretariat;
- ◆ **At DPMO:** the Director; the Deputy Director; Chief of Staff; Chief, Plans and Policy; Director, Research and Analysis (RA) Directorate; the Chief, Joint Commission Support Directorate (JCSD); and senior officials and analysts within RA and JCSD;
- ◆ Former Presidential emissary to Vietnam and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
- ◆ The Chief, Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI), and other CILHI officials;
- ◆ The Chief, Special Projects, Joint Task Force-Full Accounting;
- ◆ The former Chairman of the U.S. side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs;
- ◆ The Chief, U.S. Air Force Polygraph Program;

- ◆ Representatives from NSA;
- ◆ Current and former staff members from the SSCI; and
- ◆ Senator Robert C. Smith's legislative assistant.

In addition, we met with Senator Smith to discuss his views on the issue.

ANNEX B: Summary of Selected Prior Reports

Since the conclusion of Operation Homecoming in 1973, the Prisoner of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA) issue has been the subject of numerous reports. Listed below, in chronological order, are those reports that were relevant to our research.

13 December 1976

Americans Missing in Southeast Asia—Final Report Together with Additional and Separate Views of the Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, 13 December 1976, U.S. House of Representatives (94th Congress, 2nd session, House Report No. 94-1764) (The report was reprinted on 5 August 1988, House Committee Print No. 15, 100th Congress, 2nd Session). This House Select Committee sought to conduct a full and complete investigation and study of the problem of United States servicemen still identified as missing in action and those known dead whose bodies have not been recovered. The report concludes that no Americans are still being held as prisoners and that a total accounting is not possible and should not be expected. Finally, the report suggests that a partial accounting is possible and that the most effective means of obtaining this accounting is through direct governmental discussions.

23 March 1977

Presidential Commission on Americans Missing and Unaccounted for in Southeast Asia Report on Trip to Vietnam and Laos March 16-20, 1977, 23 March 1977, Office of the White House Press Secretary. The Commission's mandate focuses on obtaining an accounting of missing Americans in Southeast Asia. The report concludes that the resumption of talks in Paris between U.S. and Vietnam officials and the normalization of relations are required in order to afford the best prospect for obtaining a fuller accounting of missing personnel.

27 May 1986

The Tighe Task Force Examination Review of DIA Intelligence Holdings Surrounding Unaccounted for United States Military Personnel in Southeast Asia, 27 May 1986. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) asked the Task Force to evaluate the evidence regarding unaccounted for U.S. military personnel in Southeast Asia and to provide an evaluation of DIA conclusions on the POW/MIA issue. The Task Force also reviewed pertinent files and the handling of those files, looking for any indication or "COVER-UP" [emphasis in original]. Among its conclusions, the Task Force found no evidence of a "cover-up" by DIA. The Task Force also concluded that:

- ◆ A large number of MIAs may never be properly accounted for and that ". . . false hope should not be offered to those seeking a total accounting of POW/MIAs;"
- ◆ DIA holds information that establishes a "strong possibility" of POWs being held in Laos and Vietnam; and
- ◆ The U.S. Government's handling of the POW/MIA issue is "constantly harassed by phonies and profiteers," which probably jeopardizes the lives of Americans.

September 1987

SNIE 14.3-87, Hanoi and the POW/MIA Issue, 1987, Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE). The resolution of the fate of the 2,413 American servicemen still unaccounted for in Indochina remains a priority humanitarian issue for the U.S. Government, which believes that the fate of the servicemen should be treated separately from other political and economic concerns. The report states that Vietnam publicly characterizes the accounting of servicemen as a humanitarian issue, but also uses the POW/MIA issue as a means to influence public opinion in the United States to achieve broader political objectives. The report concludes that Hanoi sees the solution to the POW/MIA issue to be in its greater long-term interest, but sees tactical benefits in manipulating the issue in the interim.

23 May 1991

An Examination of U.S. Policy Towards POW/MIAs by the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Republican Staff, 23 May 1991, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. The minority staff interim report concludes that the "internal policy" of the U.S. Government is to act upon the presumption that all MIAs are dead. The report charges that "any evidence" indicating a MIA might be alive is "uniformly and arbitrarily rejected." Furthermore, the report charges that all efforts are directed towards finding and identifying remains of dead personnel, even though U.S. Government techniques of identification are "inadequate and flawed."

February 1992

Vietnam: Adjusting Its Strategy on the POW/MIA Issue, EA 92-10004, February 1992, Directorate of Intelligence. This Central Intelligence Agency report examines Hanoi's evolving attitude toward the POW/MIA issue. The report concludes that, since 1988, Vietnam has become "more cooperative" in resolving questions concerning U.S. military personnel reported as possible POWs/MIAs during the Vietnam War.

13 January 1993

POW/MIAs, 13 January 1993, U.S. Senate, The Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs (103rd Congress First Session, Report No.103-1). The Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs wants the United States to meet its obligation to the missing and to the families of those yet to be accounted. The report details testimony and evidence regarding POW/MIA accountability issues involving World War II, the Korean Conflict, the Cold War, and Vietnam. The report states that the Committee's work helped to create the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting and the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission. The report stresses that the quest for the fullest possible accounting of Vietnam-era POW/MIAs must continue but to be effective and fair to families, these accounting efforts must go forward within the "context of reality, not fiction."

21 July 1993

Report to Ambassador Malcolm Toon, Chairman of the U.S. Side of the Joint U.S./Russian Commission on POW/MIAs from U.S. Senator Bob Smith, Commissioner, 21 July 1993, Office of U.S. Senator Bob Smith. The report is subtitled "An Interim Analysis of the 1972 Translation of a North Vietnamese Report Concerning U.S. POWs Discovered in 1993 in the Archives of the Former Soviet Union and Subsequently Provided to the U.S. Side of the Joint U.S./Russian Commission on POW/MIAs." This report asserts that North Vietnam "withheld the total [emphasis in original] number and identity of American POWs in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia over whom it had direct control." Furthermore, the report rejects Vietnam's claim that the Russian translation is "pure fabrication" and states the "U.S. Government should stop believing that it knows the fate of just about everybody." Finally the report asks the American public to study the facts, even if it means revisiting old issues.

24 January 1994

Recent Reports on American POWs in Indochina: An Assessment, is an unclassified, coordinated, interagency intelligence analysis of the 735, 1205, and Dang Tan Reports documents. The assessment concludes that the 1205 document, discovered in a Soviet archive by an American researcher, may be a "genuine" Russian document, but the accuracy of its rendering of the POW situation in 1972 is outweighed by errors, omissions, and propaganda. The 735 document, also discovered in another Soviet archive, asserts that there were 735 American fliers held in Hanoi in January 1971, and is also determined to be a genuine Russian document. As with the 1205 document, similar questions are raised regarding the accuracy of the 735 accounting. Furthermore, the 735 and the 1205 documents are inconsistent with each other. The Dang Tan Reports, which document the claims of a North Vietnamese defector that in late 1967 Hanoi held "more than 800" pilots as POWs, are assessed to be "embellished" with hearsay and rumor. In an overall statement, the assessment, in reviewing all three documents, encountered the same problems experienced since the beginning of the conflict in Vietnam—inaccuracies, inconsistencies, exaggerations, and fabrications.

13 November 1995

A Zero-Based Comprehensive Review of Cases Involving Unaccounted for Americans In Southeast Asia, 13 November 1995, Department of Defense. The report provides the results of a zero-based comprehensive review of all cases involving unaccounted for Americans in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia resulting from the Vietnam War. Leaving "no stone unturned," using evidence as well as Southeast Asian cultural and historical practices and operational realities, the report concludes that of the 2,202 cases under consideration 1,476 still have investigative leads to pursue. The report concludes that the acquired conclusions and judgments make it possible to develop a work plan comprised of the best steps to move cases toward resolution.

17 June 1996

Comprehensive Report of the U.S. Side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, 17 June 1996. Established on 26 March 1992, the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs focuses on determining:

- ◆ If any American POW/MIAs are still being held in the former Soviet Union against their will;
- ◆ The fate of unaccounted-for members of the U.S. Armed Forces who were located on the territory of the Soviet Union or about whom the Russian Government may have information; and
- ◆ Facts pertaining to Soviet personnel missing from the war in Afghanistan and from the Cold War-era loss incidents.

The report states that no U.S. citizens are currently being detained within the territory of the former USSR. This conclusion is based on a thorough analysis of all archival documents, interviews with witnesses, and on-site inspections of possible American housing sites.

October 1996

Vietnamese Storage of Remains of Unaccounted U.S. Personnel, ICA 96-05, October 1996, Intelligence Community Assessment. The report was prepared in conjunction with the declassification review for the 1987 SNIE on POW/MIA issues. The report reviews what was stated in the 1987 report and how the authors determined that Hanoi had collected and stored between 400 and 600 remains. The report concludes that although the Vietnamese Government collected and stored remains it is not possible to estimate the number of American remains involved. Furthermore, the range of 400-600 remains contained in the 1987 SNIE is not supported by subsequent evidence.

June 1999

Vietnam's Collection and Repatriation of American Remains, June 1999, Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office. The report provides an analysis of Vietnam's remains collection and repatriation process. The report examines questions such as, "How many remains did Vietnam collect?; How many remains has Vietnam repatriated?; and Are there any more remains still stored?" The report concludes that the Vietnamese authorities collected and stored approximately 300 remains, of which 270 to 280 have been repatriated. The report draws no conclusion regarding the "discrepancy" of 20 to 30 remains, but it does suggest that the discrepancy may be attributable to incomplete data used to formulate the storage of "approximately 300" remains.

ANNEX C: Methodology Used in Examining Charges in the *Critical Assessment*

We studied each of the 51 exceptions taken by the *Critical Assessment* to determine if we could identify actionable criticisms against the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), i.e., criticisms with enough clarity to be assessed. There was, however, no one-to-one correlation between each NIE statement at issue and criticism of that statement. Further, with minor exceptions, arguments against a specific NIE statement did not readily lead to actionable criticisms. For example, an argument against a particular NIE statement might contain no specific criticism or it might contain the thread of several criticisms. We decided that an approach based on specific criticisms by the *Critical Assessment* was insufficient. Next, we cross-walked, line-by-line, the NIE statements at issue in the *Critical Assessment* back to the NIE. Initially, we noted that the NIE statements selected for argument in the assessment appeared to lend themselves to grouping or categorization. This approach was not fruitful either, once again because there was no one-to-one correlation.

In pursuing our line-by-line comparison, however, we found that the *Critical Assessment* contained significant methodological shortcomings. Some of its arguments on their face have little merit, and nearly all of the NIE statements at issue had been taken out of context, which distorted their meaning. While these observations did not produce an effective evaluation approach, we believe it is important to document what we found. Following are examples of arguments that lack merit:

- ◆ "The NIE contains only two photographs, both provided by the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory (CILHI) in Hawaii . . ." The *Critical Assessment* questions why:

. . . we are treated to pictures which hardly seem directly germane to the estimate's terms of reference. I find such action by the NIC troubling, especially when there is no precedent for such action with respect to other NIEs.

We cannot comment. The inclusions (or exclusions) of such photographs are an author's prerogative. The second such argument is:

- ◆ "In some instances, Vietnamese on recovery teams have willingly worked beyond the terms of their contracts to successfully complete operations. Cultural reasons contribute to this record." And, ". . . for local officials, participation in joint field activities can be financially profitable. People in their villages can earn ***much*** [emphasis added by *Critical Assessment*] more by working on the activity than they could in their normal work." The *Critical Assessment* says that these statements conflict and questions why they are cited in the NIE as indicators of Vietnam's cooperative intentions. Again, we have no comment except to note that the emphasis on the word "much" was not in the NIE.

We selected one out-of-context argument as illustrative. [Note: One complete NIE section is provided; it includes the two *Critical Assessment* extracts at issue. One extract is ***bolded and italicized***; the other is **bolded and underlined**. Original NIE text not extracted by the *Critical Assessment* is not bolded, italicized, or underlined].

Moreover, although ***Vietnam's performance generally has improved with respect to the US POW/MIA issue, we think Hanoi has not been completely forthcoming on certain POW/MIA matters:***

- ◆ **In some instances, we believe full disclosure would prove embarrassing to the regime. For example, Hanoi continues to deny that US POWs were mistreated while in captivity in the North.**
- ◆ **We think Vietnam still has records it could make available to US investigators but which would discredit its denials of mistreatment.**

A few reports of transfers of US POWs to Russia and other countries are unexplained, and the books remain open.

Although 120 live-sighting investigations have been carried out by US teams, none has generated any credible evidence of American POWs left in Vietnam. Hanoi protests having to investigate such cases, but reports appear regularly and established procedures for resolving them continue to be in effect.

Although ***Vietnam's overall performance in dealing with the POW/MIA problem has been good in recent years***, the unresolved issues noted above suggest the need for continued close attention by the US Government.

This out-of-context extraction is so convoluted that it needs to be repeated for clarity. The two resultant statements in the *Critical Assessment* are:

... Vietnam's performance generally has improved with respect to the US POW/MIA issue Vietnam's overall performance in dealing with the POW/MIA problem has been good in recent year . . . " and

" . . . we think Hanoi has not been completely forthcoming on certain POW/MIA matters: In some instances, we believe full disclosure would prove embarrassing to the regime. For example, Hanoi continues to deny that US POWs were mistreated while in captivity in the North. We think Vietnam still has records it could make available to US investigators but which would discredit its denials of mistreatment. A few reports of transfers of US POWs to Russia and other countries are unexplained, and the books remain open."

The first out-of-context extract contains two qualified clauses that are prefaced with the word "although" in the original; the second extract is lifted from the NIE text between those two qualified clauses. We cannot address any argument that derives from that type of selective quotation. While we selected only one such example of an out-of-context quotation, similar methodology is used throughout the *Critical Assessment* and was noted as it applied to specific issues.

We considered several approaches based on sampling to evaluate the *Critical Assessment's* arguments against the NIE statements. We rejected a universal approach which would have involved evaluating each of the arguments against all 51 NIE statements; this would have been a

massive undertaking with the net result being "point-counterpoint," an approach already shunned by the National Foreign Intelligence Board and the Military Intelligence Board as counterproductive. Moreover, as previously discussed, the approach was not doable in any rigorous sense. We also rejected a random approach because we did not want to risk omitting important substantive issues.

In the end, we selected a structured approach that involved evaluating a subset of the arguments against the 51 NIE statements. To assist in defining that approach, we scanned the *Critical Assessment* and the NIE into databases that we could search. That step revealed an underlying structure to the *Critical Assessment* that we could evaluate effectively. The persistent, repetitive theme of the *Critical Assessment* is that its arguments are based on information provided to or made available to both the drafter of the NIE and the Intelligence Community. In three instances, the *Critical Assessment* makes footnote references to specific letters of transmittal of that information. For clarity, we referred to the persistent messages in the *Critical Assessment* and its footnotes as "thematic statements."

Overall, we identified thematic statements involving 27 of the 51 NIE statements at issue in the *Critical Assessment*. Even though there were no explicit thematic expressions related to the other 24 NIE statements at issue, the repetitive theme that the drafter did not review relevant documentation is implicit in the *Critical Assessment*'s language on those statements as well.

ANNEX D: Intelligence Community Publications Reviewed by National Intelligence Estimate Drafter

- ◆ Special National Intelligence Estimate 14.3.87, "Hanoi and the POW/MIA Issue," September 1987.

- ◆ Central Intelligence Study, "Vietnam: Adjusting Its Strategy on the POW/MIA Issue," February 1992.

- ◆ Senate Select Committee, POW/MIA Affairs Report, "POW/MIAs," 13 January 1993.

- ◆ Intelligence Community (IC) Assessment, "Recent Reports on American POWs in Indochina: An Assessment," 24 January 1994.

- ◆ A Zero-Based Comprehensive Review of Cases Involving "Unaccounted for Americans in Southeast Asia," 13 November 1995.

- ◆ IC Assessment ICA 96-05, "Vietnamese Storage of Remains of Unaccounted US Personnel," October 1996.

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ANNEX E: Recovery and Remains Documentation Reviewed by National Intelligence Estimate Drafter

- ◆ The February 1992 CIA Intelligence Assessment, "Vietnam: Adjusting Its Strategy on the Prisoner of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA) Issue.

- ◆ A 1993 Interagency Working Group on Vietnam policy review paper stating that cooperation on witness interviews, area searches and site excavations had increased dramatically since 1988 and that, since 1992, Vietnam had allowed expanded geographic coverage and frequency of joint field activities.

- ◆ The 1993 Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office assessments that conclude, "the return of remains from Vietnam, while increasing, has not kept up with U.S. expectations." However, overall, "when compared to the absence of progress that was the norm previously, Vietnam cooperation is to be commended."

- ◆ A 1993 National Security Council (NSC) Principals Committee meeting report.

- ◆ A 1995 letter from the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, House National Security Committee that states that during the first two years of the Clinton Administration, 204 sets of remains had been repatriated from Vietnam and Laos and 49 sets had been identified.

- ◆ The 13 November 1995 Department of Defense Zero-Based Comprehensive Review that mentions that Vietnam has shared the results of its own investigations; provided wartime records on POWs, aircraft downings, and other engagements in which Americans became unaccounted for; and turned over records of deaths and burials, and photographs.

- ◆ The Department of State input to the NSC for the 1998 Presidential Determination on Vietnamese cooperation stating that 28 joint field activities had been conducted that resulted in 221 sets of remains recovered. Twenty-two sets of remains were returned in 1997.

ANNEX F: Comments by Russian Sources

	Overall Access	735/1305 Valid			735/1305 Credits			Position / Function
		Yes	Unk	No	Yes	Unk	No	
	High		1			1		National Security Advisor to Russian President
	High		1				1	Ambassador to Vietnam (1974-86)
	High		1			1		KGB Central
	High	1			1			CPSU Central Committee Secretary Maintaining Ties to Socialist Countries (70s)
	High		1			1		Ambassador to Vietnam (1963-66)
	High	1				1		GRU Chief (1997-99)
	High	1				1		GRU Chief (1994-96)
	High	1				1		Consultant, Russian Defense Council, former head of the MFA Archives
	High	1				1		Deputy Foreign Minister (1977-95)
	High	1				1		KGB, FCD, Head Southeast Asia Dept (during the war)
	High		1				1	CPSU Central Committee Political Issues on Vietnam (1963-86)
	High	1			1			GRU in Embassy in Hanoi (1968-72)
Sub-Total	12	7	5	0	2	8	2	
	Med		1			1		Interpreter and Advisor Embassy in Hanoi (1973-80)
	Med	1					1	Political Counselor for Reporting on Vietnam Foreign Policy
	Med		1			1		Embassy in Hanoi (1962-63 - Junior Diplomat - and 1974-78 - Advisor to Ambassador)
	Med	1				1		CPSU Central Committee, Head International Dept Indo/SEA-Malaysia (1963-73)
	Med	1				1		CPSU Central Committee, International Dept Vietnam (1962-77); Embassy in Hanoi (1960-62; 77-83)
	Med	1						Previous GRU Representative on the USRJC
	Med	1						KGB Representative in Hanoi (1975-76)
	Med		1			1		Embassy in Hanoi (1972-76 and 1982-88 - 1st Secretary (and later Counselor)
	Med	1						KGB, FCD, Tracking CIA operatives worldwide (32 year veteran)
Sub-Total	9	6	3	0	3	5	1	
	Low		1			1		Prominent Military Journalist
	Low		1			1		Russian Author and Researcher
	Low		1			1		Air Defense Instructor (1973-74)
	Low		1			1		Engineer Advisor in Vietnam (1973-74)
	Low		1			1		Journalist in Vietnam (1972-76)
	Low		1			1		Air Defense Radar/Radar Engineer in Vietnam (1966-67)
	Low		1			1		Air Defense Advisor in Vietnam (1966-67)
	Low		1			1		Air Defense Technical Advisor and Researcher in North Vietnam (1968-69)
	Low		1			1		Journalist in Laos (1966), Vietnam for much of the 1970s
	Low		1			1		Air Defense Advisor (1966)
Sub-Total	10	0	10	0	0	10	0	
TOTAL	31	13	18	0	5	23	3	

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ANNEX G: Case Review Methodology

For each case answer the following questions Y (yes) N (no) or I (inconclusive):

- A. Is there evidence the individual survived the incident (e.g. aircraft loss, fire fight, or accident)?
- B. Is there evidence the individual could have been taken captive?
- C. Is there evidence the individual entered a prison system?
- D. Can any of three governments (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) account for the individual (e.g. documentary or physical evidence)?

Record responses on the attached spreadsheet by case [REFNO] and Name.

Case #	Last Name	YY MM	Country	A	B	C	D	Compelling Dec 92	Compelling Post 92	Aircrew

Case # - DPMO Reference Number.

Last Name -

YY MM - Year and Month of incident

Country - As specified in the case assessment

A - Question A

B - Question B

C - Question C

D - Question D

Compelling Dec 92 - Case considered compelling prior December 1992 Smith list.

Compelling Post Dec 92 - Case considered compelling after December 1992 Smith list.

Aircrew - Yes or No

For each question the answer is "Y," "N," or "I." For example:

Case #	Last Name	YY MM	Country	A	B	C	D	Compelling Dec 92	Compelling Post 92	Aircrew
0001	Adams	6806	VN	I	N	N	Y	N	N	Y

There is inconclusive evidence that Adams, an aircrew member, survived a June 1968 combat incident and there is no evidence that he was taken captive or entered a prison system. Documentary evidence has been provided which establishes his fate prior to the December 1992 Smith list beyond a reasonable doubt, thus the case is not compelling.

ANNEX H: Results of Compelling Case Review

The results of the three independent reviews of the "compelling cases" are summarized in this annex. A case number can refer to more than one individual; accordingly there may be more than one entry per case number. For each case number, six areas of concern were addressed. For each area of concern, each reviewer's response was noted. "1" indicates a yes; "IN" indicates inconclusive, and a blank indicates no.

For each area of concern, the scoring was tabulated to determine whether there was a consensus "C" or a unanimous "U" response. A consensus required one of three reviewers to vote yes and at least one other reviewer to score the same factor either as a "yes" or as "inconclusive." A "U" required all three reviewers to vote "yes."

Case	Probably Reviewed Incident		Possibly Captured		Possibly In Police System		SEA Civil Inmate Inmate		Compelling in 1991		Compelling Today	
	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring
326	1	1	1	1			1	1				
333	1	1	1	1			1	1				
339									1	1		
340	IN		IN		IN				1	1	IN	
346	1	1					1	1				
349	1	1	IN				1	1				
354							1	1				
356							1	1				
358							1	1				
359							1	1				
364							1	1				
370	IN		IN		IN		1	1			IN	
372	1	1					1	1				
374	1	1					1	1				
381	IN		IN				1	1			IN	
385	1	1					1	1			IN	
425	1	1					1	1				
439							1	1				
439							1	1				
443	IN						1	1			IN	
453	1	1					1	1			IN	
459	IN						1	1				
471												
473												
483												
486												
493	IN										IN	
587												
587												
587												
590												
606												
607	1	1	1	1			1	1			IN	
609	1	1	IN				1	1				
611	1	1	1	1			1	1				
628												
646												
648												
648												
648												
647												
648												
677	IN		IN				1	1			IN	
678	1	1	1	1			1	1				
689	1	1	1	1			1	1				
691	1	1	IN				1	1				

Case	Probably Survived Incident:		Possibly Captured		Possibly in Prison System		SFA Goss have knowledge		Compiling in 1992		Compiling Today	
	Endrager	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring
703	N	I					I	I				
704												
706												
715	N	I	IN	I					I		IN	
728	I	I	I	I								
750	IN	IN	IN						IN		IN	
765	IN	IN										
811	I	I										
825												
829												
833												
859	IN	IN	IN				IN		IN		IN	
862	IN	IN							IN		IN	
867	IN	IN										
867	IN	IN										
872												
873												
903	IN	IN	IN									
906	IN	IN	IN									
906	IN	IN	IN									
928												
940	IN	IN	IN						IN		IN	
945	IN	I	IN						IN		IN	
952												
954	IN											
957												
957	I	I										
976	I	I										
977	IN	I										
984	IN	I	IN									
991												
997	I	I	IN				IN		IN		IN	
998	R								IN		IN	
1004												
1004	IN		IN	IN								
1026	IN	I										
1010	IN	I										
1040	IN	I										
1096												
1246												
1346												
1346												
1349	IN	IN										
1362	IN	IN	IN									
1363	IN	IN										
1363	I	I	I	I								
1363	I	I	IN									
1363	I	I										
1400	IN		IN									

Case	Probably Survived Incident		Point of Capture		Possibly in Prison System		SEA Gets base knowledge		Escaping in 1952		Completing Today	
	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring
144												
145												
146												
148												
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Case	Probably Survived Incident		Possibly Captured		Possibly in USIA System		SEA Geds have knowledge		Completing in 1962		Completing Today																			
	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring																		
198	IN	I																												
194	IN	I																												
204	IN																													
202	IN																													
203	IN																													
Total	73	57	803	65	41	15	73	26	24	14	12	9	3	9	6	197	4	123	120	25	26	14	21	20	1	0	14	1	3	1

ANNEX I: Captain McDonnell Case Review

We specifically selected Captain McDonnell's case for review because the Advocacy and Intelligence Index for Prisoners of War-Missing in Action (AII POW-MIA) posted its version of the case on the Internet concurrent with our review of the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) assessments of Senator Smith's compelling cases. That juxtaposition of events became the *raison d'être* for adding one case review to our methodology.

We initially understood that DPMO was established to be the "one-stop shop" for POW/MIA issues. The Deputy Director, DPMO, told us the Senate Select Committee issued a "definitive finding" in its 1993 report that the process for keeping the families informed was not adequately supported. The families had to query too many places to obtain information. The committee report recommended creation of a one-stop organization—DPMO.

The DPMO is chartered by the Department of Defense Directive 5110.10, "Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO)," dated 16 July 1993. Part of the DPMO mission is to "exercise policy, control and oversight of the entire process for investigation and recovery related to missing persons and to establish procedures to be followed by Department of Defense boards of inquiry and by officials reviewing the reports of such boards." DPMO functions include:

- ◆ Serving as the DoD focal point for POW/MIA matters;
- ◆ Assembling and analyzing information on U.S. military and civilian personnel who are, or were, prisoners of war or missing in action; and
- ◆ Maintaining data bases on U.S. military and civilian personnel who are, or were, prisoners of war or missing in action.

We found that DPMO is not a one-stop repository. Further, no one organization maintains a repository of information necessary to understand this particular case. We reviewed the files of three organizations—DPMO, Army Casualty Affairs Office, Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA)—and consulted three additional holdings before we understood the case sufficiently to write credibly about it.

The DPMO file only goes back to April 1969. Captain McDonnell was lost on 6 March 1969. The first item in the file is a report of interview with the executive officer of McDonnell's unit. That report established a misunderstanding that exists to this day—that McDonnell's seat belt was "neatly [sic] undone." We found that, with respect to the McDonnell case, the DPMO file primarily holds intelligence information and some administrative information; it lacks operational information.

The U.S. Army Casualty Affairs file holds two relevant folders. One folder contains relevant correspondence because the Army's appointed casualty assistance officer is the family's official point of contact for case matters. The second folder holds original operational information concerning the search to locate Captain McDonnell. That folder contains original sworn testimony taken by a Missing Person Board convened to determine Captain McDonnell's status. We found that, with respect to this case, the Army file holds primarily administrative information and original operational information; it lacks intelligence information.

The JTF-FA file is the most complete and includes a summary of information prepared for the June 1994 flag/general officer review of the McDonnell case. The following quoted information is relevant:

- ◆ **JTF-FA Level of Effort:** The case was investigated during four joint [U.S.-Vietnam] operations. The teams pursued all witnesses and archival leads identified by Headquarters JTF-FA and DPMO. They conducted 20 witness interviews and two excavations. The Oral History Program team interviewed two former Peoples' Army of Vietnam officers and two authors identified as possible sources for the case. Joint teams visited the Hue Military Museum three times in an attempt to determine the provenance of Captain McDonnell's military identification card;

- ◆ **13th Joint Field Activity:** Officers interviewed three witnesses who provided consistent, credible information concerning the capture of an injured American helicopter pilot in March 1969. The pilot later died while being evacuated to higher headquarters. The American's body was reportedly buried near a stream. One of the witnesses claimed to have participated in the burial; and
- ◆ **JTF-FA Recommendation:** Fate determined for Captain McDonnell.

We found two additional aspects of the JTF-FA files noteworthy. First was the summation of the interviews about Captain McDonnell's fate and the chain-of-custody of his identification card. Second was the inclusion of two documents updating information from individuals who had testified during the Missing Person Board in 1969. Neither document was found in the DPMO or Army files; both provide new perspective:

- ◆ In April 1990, the gunship pilot was re-interviewed. He said that "Captain McDonnell probably removed [him] from his seat and placed him next to the aircraft." Captain McDonnell was not present when the pilot woke up four or five hours later; and
- ◆ In January 1993, the pilot who coordinated the air search for McDonnell and who provided a sworn statement to the Missing Persons Board recalled that "[Captain McDonnell] had told me in safety briefings that he believed the best solution was to E&E [evade and escape] from a crash site. Our battery policy was to get away from the crash site." The pilot, now a general officer concluded that McDonnell "was a brave officer who I believe was killed by the enemy shortly after he was captured."

We found that, for this case, the JTF-FA file holds all operational and most intelligence information; it lacks administrative information.

The comprehensiveness of the JTF-FA files caused us to review the DPMO files a second time to ensure we had not overlooked information important to the McDonnell case. During that review, we examined color photographs of Captain McDonnell's identification card and determined

that the card in the Hue museum is *bona fide*. We also reconfirmed that no SIGINT reporting pertained to the case.

We examined three additional holdings. First, we reviewed the microfiche file maintained by the Library of Congress, a review which revealed that DPMO files were not sufficient to understand the McDonnell case. Second, because AII POW-MIA mentioned intelligence information reports that we had not previously seen, we reviewed the 15 volumes of uncorrelated intelligence reports held by the Pentagon library and found the referenced reports. Finally, we reviewed the CIA Directorate of Operations files for information on Viet Cong policy concerning the handling of POWs.

Information in the JTF-FA file supports the June 1994 decision to remove Captain McDonnell from the discrepancy list. Information in the DPMO files does not. We believe that explains why the Director, DPMO voted against his analysts' recommendation in the June 1994 review of the McDonnell case. The JTF-FA position was based on operational and intelligence files; the DPMO position was based primarily on intelligence files. We found the DPMO files not suitable for a complete and accurate understanding of the McDonnell case.

ANNEX J: Distribution List

Chairman and ranking minority member of each of the following congressional committees:

- Senate Appropriations Committee
- Senate Armed Services Committee
- Senate Foreign Relations Committee
- Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
- House Appropriations Committee
- House Armed Services Committee
- House International Relations Committee
- House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Office of the Secretary of Defense:

- Secretary of Defense
- Deputy Secretary of Defense
- Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
- Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence)
- Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
- Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)
- Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
- General Counsel of the Department of Defense
- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)
- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Affairs)
- Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense
- Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)

Secretary of the Army

- Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Secretary of the Navy

- Director of Naval Intelligence

Secretary of the Air Force

000256

Director of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance,
U.S. Air Force

Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff for C41, U.S. Marine Corps

Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command
Director of Intelligence, U.S. European Command

Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command
Director for Intelligence, U.S. Pacific Command
Commander, Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii
Commander, Joint Task Force-Full Accounting
Inspector General

Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces Command
Director of Intelligence, U.S. Forces Command

Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command
Director for Intelligence, U.S. Southern Command

Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command
Director of Intelligence, U.S. Central Command

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director Joint Staff
Director for Intelligence
Director for Command, Control, Communications and Computers,
Joint Staff
Inspector General

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Deputy Director for Policy Support
Director for Intelligence Operations
Chief, Stony Beach
Inspector General

Director, National Imagery and Mapping Agency

Director, National Reconnaissance Office
Inspector General

Director, National Security Agency
Inspector General

Director of Intelligence, U.S. Special Operations Command

Director of Intelligence, U.S. Space Command

Director of Intelligence, U.S. Strategic Command

Director of Intelligence, U.S. Transportation Command

Assistant Chief of Staff, J2, U.S. Forces Korea

Assistant Commandant for Operations, U.S. Coast Guard

Deputy Director of Operations, Defense Information Systems Agency

Central Intelligence Agency:

Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support

Chairman, National Intelligence Council

Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management

Executive Director

Deputy Executive Director

General Counsel

Director of Congressional Affairs

Director of Public Affairs

Deputy Director for Intelligence (DI)

Deputy Director for Operations (DO)

National Intelligence Officer, East Asia

Director of Asian Pacific and Latin American Analysis, DI

DI/ Politicization Ombudsman

Chief, Central Eurasia Division, DO

Chief, East Asia Division, DO

Department of State:

Secretary of State

Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

American Embassy, Bangkok

American Embassy, Hanoi

American Embassy, Moscow

American Embassy, Phnom Penh

American Embassy, Vientiane

Inspector General

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

SEP 27 2000

INSPECTOR GENERAL
2000-0923

Honorable Richard C. Shelby
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-6475

Dear Mr. Chairman:


Attached is a clarifying comment that should go with the unclassified version of our Joint Report entitled, "A Review of the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate on POW/MIA Issues and the Charges Levied by a Critical Assessment of the Estimate (1999-5974-IG) (00-OIR-04)," dated February 29, 2000.

Additionally, an earlier modification, with the attached clarification, will be sent to all recipients of the classified report through appropriate Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency secure channels. Your Committee is one such recipient.


This concludes our efforts on this issue requested by you on March 8, 1999.

A similar letter has been provided to Vice Chairman Bryan.

Sincerely,



L. Britt Snider
Inspector General
Central Intelligence Agency



Donald Mancuso
Acting Inspector General
Department of Defense

Attachment

000260

SEP 27 2000

Honorable Richard H. Bryan
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-6475

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:


Attached is a clarifying comment that should go with the unclassified version of our Joint Report entitled, "A Review of the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate on POW/MIA Issues and the Charges Levied by a Critical Assessment of the Estimate (1999-5974-IG) (00-OIR-04)," dated February 29, 2000.

Additionally, an earlier modification, with the attached clarification, will be sent to all recipients of the classified report through appropriate Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency secure channels. Your Committee is one such recipient.


This concludes our efforts on this issue requested by you on March 8, 1999.

A similar letter has been provided to Chairman Shelby.

Sincerely,



L. Britt Snider
Inspector General
Central Intelligence Agency



Donald Mancuso
Acting Inspector General
Department of Defense

Attachment

000261

Clarifying Comment

to

The **Unclassified** Version of

A JOINT REPORT
A REVIEW OF THE 1998 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON
POW/MIA ISSUES AND THE CHARGES LEVIED BY
A *CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE ESTIMATE*
(1999-5974-IG)
(00-0IR-04)
29 February 2000

THIS COMMENT PERTAINS TO THE SECTION "MEETING WITH DPMO ANALYSTS" AT PAGE 29 OF THE JOINT REPORT:

By way of clarification, the matter of a possible security violation was outside the scope of our review. It should be noted, however, that during the time that we were researching this report, we discovered no information that supports the perception that the Joint Commission or its support directorate within DPMO violated appropriate security regulations. Additionally, we did not consider the appropriateness of the relationship between the JCSD and the Joint Commission, created in 1992 by the United States and the Russian Federation, as it also was outside the scope of this review.

000262

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

16 September 2021

John Clarke, Esq.
1629 K Street, NW
Suite 300
Washington, DC, 20008

Reference: *Lois Moore, et al v. CIA*, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No: 1:20-cv-01027; F-2020-00473

Dear Mr. Clarke:

This is an interim response to your 25 November 2019 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request submitted by your client, Lois Moore, for the following:

1. From the period of March 16, 1954, through 1961, all records of the CIA's efforts in undertaking "clandestine and covert action to locate, identify, and recover those U.S. Prisoners of War still in Communist custody"
2. An unredacted copy of this report [January 5, 1952, *CIA Information Reports*] together with all intelligence material upon which it was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
3. Please produce the [following] referenced [in July 15, 1952, *CIA Cross Reference Sheet*]:
 - a. July 15, 1952 "Basic Communication"
 - b. June 24, 1953 "Basic Document"
 - c. Information described as "etcetera"
 - d. POW Information in, or otherwise "Router to, C.I. File"
 - e. POW information related to or bearing the "Cross Reference Number 040"
 - f. POW Information related to or bearing the "Classification Number 383.6 Korea."
4. All records regarding the June 1, 1951 shoot down and capture over North Korea of the American F-51 piloted by U.S. Air Force Captain Harry Cecil Moore, born February 11, 1924, in Elm Grove, West Virginia, service number AO 711850.
5. All records upon which the following statement from February 27, 1952 memo from Chief of Naval Personnel to Commanding General, Far East Air Force was

000263

based: "It is now believed that there is a possibility that Captain Moore survived and is now a Prisoner of War."

6. All records regarding Captain Moore's incarceration and transportation from North Korea to the Soviet Union, his locations in the Soviet Union, and all evidence that he "may have been interrogated by Soviet officials.
7. An unredacted copy of July 17, 1952, three page *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
8. An unredacted copy of December 31, 1953, *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
9. An unredacted copy of March 24, 1954, *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
10. An unredacted copy of April 23, 1954, *CIA Information Report*.
11. An unredacted copy of April 27, 1954, *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
12. An unredacted copy of December 8, 1954, *CIA Information Report*.
13. Any and all information relating to this Report [January 23, 1992 cable from Embassy Helsinki to Secretary of State]
14. An unredacted copy of March 9, 1988, CIA Memorandum to "US Army Chief, Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action," together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
15. All records relating to any of the POW/MIA's names in the attached list.
16. Any and all records relating that any POW/MIAs may have been held in the prisons identified in the attached list of Russian prison camps.
17. For the period beginning June of 1951, and continuing to the present time, please produce all POW records provided to, or receive from, any office of any component of the Department of Defense, including but not limited to:
 - a. CCRAK
 - b. Air Force 6004 Air Intelligence Service Squadron during the tenure of "Project American."
 - c. Missing in Action Office, including those provided in response to the attached February 12, 1997 letter from U.S. House of Representative James Talent seeking "Intelligence pertaining to American prisoners who were taken to China and the Soviet Union during the war" as well as:
 - i. The 389 American service members who into the 1980's were listed as unaccounted prisoners of war by the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) ii. All U.S. Air Force F-86 pilots who remain unrepatriated.
 - d. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, of AFOSI
 - e. Naval Criminal Investigative Service, or NCIS
 - f. Army Criminal Investigation Command, CID

- g. **U.S. Army Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities Far East, or CCRAFE.**
- 18. All POW records prepared by any officer, agent, or employee of the CIA, prepared for the Office of the President including the President's Daily Brief, or PDB, that include information on the possibility of POW's being transferred to the Soviet Union or China.**
 - 19. All records reflecting communications with Members of Congress, or Congressional Oversight committees concerning the capture of American airmen during the Korean conflict who may have been transported to the Soviet Union or China and their presumed fate.**
 - 20. All records concerning POW's and KGB defector Yuri (or Yury) Rastvorov, who informed the United States Government that American military personnel were taken to the Soviet Union during the Korean Conflict. This request includes an unredacted version of the attached page with the heading, "Terminology".**
 - 21. All intelligence material (including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports) concerning statements made by former Czech General Jan Sejna and other former Czech Officials concerning former US POWs held, interrogated and experiment on by Czech and Soviet advisors, and thereafter transferred to China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and the Soviet Union.**

We are processing your request in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.

We have identified thirteen (13) documents that are responsive to your request that may be released in segregable form with redactions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(5), and (b)(6). Exemption (b)(3) pertains to Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 3507, noted as exemption "(b)(3)CIAAct;" Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C § 3024(i)(1), noted as exemption "(b)(3)NatSecAct;" Section 424 of Title 10, noted as exemption "(b)(3) 10 USC 424;" Section 798 of Title 18, noted as "(b)(3) 18 USC 798;" and/or Section 3605 of Title 50, noted as exemption "(b)(3) 50 USC 3605." The releasable documents are on the enclosed CD.

A final response will be provided to you on a later date.

Sincerely,



Mark Lilly

Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

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~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

27 December 1991

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to your letter of December 12, 1991, concerning the possibility of US POWs/MIAs in the USSR, let me assure you that the Agency is actively pursuing this issue. A senior officer of the Interrepublic Security Service (ISS), the successor organization to the former KGB Second Chief Directorate, advised the Agency on 3 December that the ISS had undertaken "an exhaustive search of available information and resources, and had come up with no indication of such presence in the USSR past or present." On 6 December the ISS passed us a written "official" response. Following is a translation of that response:

"At our request, an investigation was conducted in Kazakhstan concerning the supposed presence of an American military pilot in the village of Saryshagan, Dzhezkazgan Oblast, as presented in the newspaper 'Kommersant' (no. 42, dated 4 November 1991). The pilot was reportedly taken prisoner during the period of war in Indochina.

As a result of the investigation, which included questioning long-time residents, no information was obtained about the presence in that region at any time of an American pilot.

On our part, we also do not have any information about American military personnel located on the territory of the USSR who were missing in action during the course of military activities in Indochina."

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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The Honorable John F. Kerry

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Regarding alleged statements by retired KGB General Oleg Kalugin, reported by Australian television, that he had been involved in the interrogation of Americans in Vietnam during the 1975-1978 period, we have tasked [redacted] to ask the ISS and the Russian Republic Federal Security Service to confirm the remarks attributed to Kalugin and provide details. [redacted] was also been directed to seek guidance from those services as to how a similar inquiry can be put to the military intelligence service, the GRU.

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] have been asked for any information they may have on Soviet and/or East European incarceration or interrogation of POWs/MIAs from World War II, the Korean War, or the Vietnam War.

We will keep the Committee advised of any additional information that results from our discussions with the Russian [redacted] and [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

A copy of this letter is also being provided to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

[Redacted signature box]

(b)(6)

Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

~~SECRET~~

TRANSMITTAL AND DOCUMENT RECEIPT

TO: Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Room 21, Senate Russell Bldg.

FROM: OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ROOM [redacted]
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505 (b)(3) CIAAct

RECEIPT:
DATE:

CONTROL NUMBER	DOC. DATE	SUBJECT (Unclassified preferred)	CLASS.
-----0	12/27	letters for Sens. Kerry and Smith <i>DATE OUT 12/27 2001</i>	S

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

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PLEASE SIGN AND RETURN WITHIN TEN (10) WORKING DAYS

RECEIPT

RETURN TO



OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ROOM [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

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FORM 3772B
12-89

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- 3 - PINA

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Action

REQUEST FOR THE DCI TO ATTEND A 1 OCTOBER 1996 CLOSED HEARING TO DISCUSS INTERAGENCY EFFORTS TO ACCOUNT FOR AMERICAN SERVICE PERSONNEL AND INTELLIGENCE OPERATIVES WHO REMAIN MISSING IN ACTION FROM THE KOREAN AND VIETNAM WARS

Document Number
OCA-014110-CNV

Date Received
09/25/1996

Task Instructions:

no value

Recipients

- DCI DEUTCH

Request Documents:

(b)(3) CIAAct

Additional Document Metadata

OPI		
Secondary OPI		
From		
Other Document Number		(b)(3) CIAAct
Comments		
File Code		
Media Type		
Codewords		
Attachments		
Keywords		
Copies		

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OCA 96-0390

BOB STUMP, ARIZONA
 PHILIP HUNTER, CALIFORNIA
 JOHN R. KASICH, OHIO
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 CURT WELDON, PENNSYLVANIA
 ROBERT K. DORNAN, CALIFORNIA
 JOEL HEFLEY, COLORADO
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 RANDY "DUKE" CUNNINGHAM, CALIFORNIA
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 PETER G. TORKILDMEN, MASSACHUSETTS
 TILLIE K. FOWLER, FLORIDA
 JOHN M. MCHUGH, NEW YORK
 JAMES TALENT, MISSOURI
 TERRY EVERETT, ALABAMA
 ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, MARYLAND
 HOWARD "BUCK" MCKEON, CALIFORNIA
 RON LEWIS, KENTUCKY
 J.C. WATTS, JR., OKLAHOMA
 MAC THORNBERRY, TEXAS
 JOHN N. HOSSETTLER, INDIANA
 SAXBY CHAMBLISS, GEORGIA
 VAN HILLEARY, TENNESSEE
 JOE SCARBOROUGH, FLORIDA
 WALTER B. JONES, JR., NORTH CAROLINA
 JAMES B. LONGLEY, JR., MAINE
 TODD TIAHRT, KANSAS
 RICHARD "DOC" HASTINGS, WASHINGTON

COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-6035

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

FLOYD D. SPENCE, SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN

September 25, 1996

RONALD V. DELLUMS, CALIFORNIA
 G.V. (SONNY) MONTGOMERY, MISSISSIPPI
 PATRICIA SCHROEDER, COLORADO
 IKE SKELTON, MISSOURI
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 JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., SOUTH CAROLINA
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 JOHN TANNER, TENNESSEE
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 NEIL ABERCROMBIE, HAWAII
 CHET EDWARDS, TEXAS
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 ROSA L. DeLAURO, CONNECTICUT
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 PATRICK J. KENNEDY, RHODE ISLAND

ANDREW K. ELLIS, STAFF DIRECTOR


Mr. John Deutch
 Director of Central Intelligence
 The Central Intelligence Agency
 Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Deutch:

As the Chairman of both the Subcommittee on Military Personnel of the House National Security Committee and the Subcommittee on Tactical and Technical Intelligence of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), I request your attendance at a closed meeting in Room H-405 of the Capitol (HPSCI hearing room) at 10:00 a.m. on Tuesday, October 1, 1996 to discuss interagency efforts to account for American service personnel and intelligence operatives who remain missing in action from the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

As you know, recent public hearings that I have conducted on POW/MIAs from the Korean War and their possible transfer to the Soviet Union have generated considerable media coverage. It is essential that all U.S. Government agencies coordinate efforts to resolve the fates of our missing heroes. I have learned that interagency rivalry has led to the derailment of recent efforts by Defense Department investigators to obtain important information. For example, an initiative to interview sources in Europe was allegedly sabotaged by a Russian defector working for your agency and a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee currently working at the Defense POW/MIA Office. I have also learned that important documents have been suppressed or remain inappropriately classified. This closed meeting will be an opportunity to candidly address the concerns of Congress regarding these issues and to expedite the accountability process.

If you cannot attend the meeting, I request that you please send a senior deputy to represent your interests. In addition, because I believe that the current coordination problems can best be overcome by sharing information between agencies in a session involving personnel from several levels of management, I would also request the attendance of the following people: Mr. Frederick P. Hitz, the Inspector General of the CIA; and CIA MROC



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(b)(3) CIAAct

Action

**5 MARCH 1999 SENATE MEMBER BRIEFING RE:
POW/MIA**

Document Number
OCA-019866-CNV

Date Received
03/05/1999

Task Instructions:

no value

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Recipients

- MFR

Request Documents:

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	<input type="text"/>	
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OCA Remarks
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

PRINTED: Wednesday, May 12, 1999
AT: 17:14

CODEWORDS:

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Memorandum for the Record

KEY: C/1999-00260

EVENT: MEMBER BRIEFING DATE: 03/05/1999 TIME: 9:00 STATUS: COMPLETED
PLACE: 407 SENATE
FOR: SEN
SUBJECT: POW/MIA

ATTENDEES:

<u>ASSOCIATION</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>ROLE</u>
	DZIATKIEWICZ, ELIZABETH ()	BRIEFER
	ELBERG, GRAEME ()	BRIEFER
	JANNOTTA, SHELLEY ()	BRIEFER
	MOORE, PATRICIA () (b)(3) CIAAct	BRIEFER
	SOTOS, MARY ANNE ()	BRIEFER
DCI/OCA	[Redacted]	SUPPORT
DCI/OCA	[Redacted]	SUPPORT
DOD	LAJOIE, MGEN, RONALD (DOD)	
SEN	SMITH, ROBERT (SEN)	

Executive Summary: (b)(3) NatSecAct

1) ~~(S)NF~~ [Redacted] The purpose of the briefing was to respond to the major points raised in the 26 January 1999 letter to the DCI from Senators Bob Smith and John Warner (Smith is the head of the Vietnam Working Group on the US/Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs; the commission is chaired by General Roland LaJoie) requesting the following:

1) Access to a September 1996 report cited in the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate on the Vietnam POW/MIA issue;

2) Access to an August 1998 Top Secret memorandum dissem report which dealt with the alleged transfer of U.S. POWs to the Soviet Union from Vietnam during the Vietnam War;

3) Justification for the discrepancy in classification levels between the 1996 and 1998 reports;

4) An e (b)(3) NatSecAct nearly two years elapsed before a follow-up report was generated on this matter.

2) ~~(S)NF~~ [Redacted] A package of DO reports and [Redacted] were taken to the meeting for the Senator and General LaJoie to review on a read-and-return basis. The package included the following documents: 1) [Redacted] 10 October 1996, 2) [Redacted] 7 October 1996; 3) CIA [Redacted] 9 September 1998; and 4) DO Memorandum Intelligence Report [Redacted] 26 August 1998. Copies of these documents as well as the 26 January letter authored by Senators Rob Smith and John Warner are attached to this report.

(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1)

3) ~~(S)NF~~ [Redacted] As background, both the 1996 and the 1998 information originated from [Redacted] [Redacted] The August 1998 report recounts stories in circulation among KGB officers over the years that, during the Vietnam War, the KGB transported US POWs clandestinely from North Vietnam to Russia, where they were interrogated and pitched. The stories allege the KGB succeeded in recruiting one American POW who was a member of an American military intelligence service [Redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(1)

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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)

[redacted] The [redacted] source had only indirect access to the information and no past reporting record on this issue. Efforts to flesh out the source's account resulted in limited additional details. A thorough review of EA, CE, and CIC records failed to identify any new information which corroborates the stories in the report.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

4) ~~(S)NF~~ [redacted] As background, both the 1996 and the 1998 information originated from [redacted]

The August 1998 report recounts stories in circulation among KGB officers over the years that, during the Vietnam War, the KGB transported US POWs clandestinely from North Vietnam to Russia, where they were interrogated and pitched. The stories allege the KGB succeeded in recruiting one American POW who was a member of an American military intelligence service who had been involved in US intelligence operations [redacted]

(b)(6)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

The [redacted] source had only indirect access to the information and no past reporting record on this issue. Efforts to flesh out the source's account resulted in limited additional details. A thorough review of EA, CE, and CIC records failed to identify any new information which corroborates the stories in the report.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Summary Text:

5) ~~(S)NF~~ [redacted] As Senator Smith was delayed for approximately fifteen minutes, the briefers spent the time discussing a broad range of topics with General LaJoie. The General admitted he was not fully briefed on the subject of the meeting, but stated that he understood the core issue as being the transportation of US POWs captured during the Vietnam War to Russia for the purpose of being recruited as informants once they return to the United States. At this point, LaJoie is unconvinced that US POWs were sent to the Soviet Union during the Vietnam War. According to LaJoie, the Russians have admitted that a plan was drawn up between the Soviet and Vietnamese Governments to conduct such a program during the Vietnam War. To date, however, neither have the Russians provided any documentation detailing such a plan to the Commission nor has the Commission has found any evidence that would suggest such a program was carried out. (b)(3) NatSecAct

6) ~~(S)NF~~ [redacted] In the case of the Korean War, however, the General believes that it is highly likely that US POWs were transported to Russia. The General believes exploitation by the Russians of US POWs occurred during this period, largely due to Stalin and his policies. The Russians continue to deny such any such transfers took place during the Korean War and the issue has yet to be resolved. Discussions continue on this matter between US and Russian negotiators. (b)(3) NatSecAct

7) ~~(S)NF~~ [redacted] Other topics discussed with the General was his tenure with the Agency. He stated he enjoyed working with the Agency, adding that the Agency culture was very much like the military with its "can-do" spirit. He also identified himself as one the of the first pioneers in improving the working relationship between the Agency and the military. DCEA, who was directly involved in supporting the military during her assignment [redacted]

[redacted] discussed the Agency's evolving relationship with the military with the General until Senator Smith arrived for the meeting

(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

8) ~~(S)NF~~ [redacted] The Senator began the meeting by announcing the Agency refused to admit staff at this session, including Roger Schmaker, who had been specifically requested to participate by Senator Smith's personal office. Roger Schmaker is a DOD employee assigned to support the Commission, who, the Senator added, had the clearance level for this briefing (Top Secret) and had even had access to the two reports identified in his 26 January 1999 letter. [redacted] responded to the Senator by stating that in an effort to be as forthcoming as possible in this briefing, we had brought along a package of documentation for review. This package not only included the two reports but DO [redacted] related to this issue which neither Mr. Schmaker nor anyone else outside the Agency would have access. The Senator appeared to accept this explanation and began to review the four documents.

(b)(6)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

9) ~~(S)NF~~ (OC) Once the General and Senator had finished reviewing the documents, the briefing began with a discussion of the source information, [redacted]

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)

[redacted] Details regarding the identities of the subsources or their access to the information provided in the 1996 and 1998 reports are not available. The briefers added that [redacted] was not personally involved in interrogating American POWs and did not have access to interrogation reports. The briefers further explained that the two reports represented two separate meetings with the source, one which took place in mid-1996 and another follow-up meeting in July 1998 to address additional tasking from DPMO generated from the original report. The Senator asked if it would be possible for the Commission to provide questions to present to the source during future meetings to which the briefers replied this would not be a problem.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

10) ~~(S/NF)~~ [redacted] The Senator then asked why nearly two years elapsed before a follow-up report was generated on this matter. The briefers response was that the reasons for the long intervals between reports was due to the infrequency of the meetings with the source, [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

11) ~~(S/NF)~~ [redacted] The Senator then asked for the rationale behind updating the classification level of the second report disseminated in 1998 to "Top Secret" when the original 1996 report was classified only as "Secret". The briefers explained that the reason the second report was classified "Top Secret" was due to source protection. [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

The upgrade of the classification level was because we wanted to be able to provide as detailed an account as possible of the source chain of the information, while still allowing adequate source protection. [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

12) ~~(S/NF)~~ [redacted] The discussion then jumped to a review of [redacted] agency career and experience as a POW during the Vietnam War as well as [redacted] connection with the Agency's [redacted] program ran in the 1950's. [redacted] agency career began in 1949. [redacted] Weaver held a number of positions in the Agency, [redacted]

(b)(6)

That said, there is no information available which directly connects [redacted] to [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)

In addition, after a considerable investigation [redacted] it was determined that [redacted] was never recruited or cooperated with any foreign intelligence service during the period that he was a POW during the Vietnam War. [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

13) ~~(S/NF)~~ [redacted] CIC officer [redacted] described [redacted] incarceration by the Vietnamese as cruel and difficult. The Vietnamese were aware of [redacted] intelligence affiliation and consequently, [redacted] was often held in solitary confinement and treated very badly by the guards. In order to stay alive, [redacted] provided information to the Vietnamese on cases that he knew had been long terminated; however, when that was not possible he altered the information to make it misleading or incorrect. There is no indication in [redacted] files to show that he was ever [redacted]

(b)(1)

ted by the Vietnamese about [redacted] [redacted] also reported just after the POW's had been notified that they were to be released, he was dressed up and taken to a building in Hanoi for a meeting. In addition to several Vietnamese officers, a European-looking man was in attendance. He was not introduced, however [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

deduced over the next few hours that the individual was probably a Soviet intelligence officer. [redacted] stated that the meeting could be described as a rapport building session. He was not questioned about cases and did not volunteer any such information. When the group broke for lunch, and his captors told him he would be meeting this person again the afternoon, [redacted] refused. This one brief meeting was the only session [redacted] had with the individual he believed might be a Soviet intelligence officer. While [redacted] was on extended leave following his release, the Soviets placed a postcard in [redacted] mailbox referring to the meeting in Hanoi and stating that if he knew what was good for him, he would follow their directions for a meeting. [redacted] reported the incident to the Agency immediately. He did not follow-up on this contact.

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

14) ~~(S/NF)~~ [redacted] also advised that the Agency had no information on [redacted] current status as the Agency had no further contact with [redacted] once he retired from the Agency in 1976.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

15) ~~(S, NF)~~ [redacted] Senator Smith specifically expressed an interest in pursuing the information provided in [redacted] paragraph 4 identifying the Khabarovsk or Vladivostok regions as sites where US POWs were reportedly taken within the Soviet Union during the Vietnam War. The Senator asked if it would be possible for him and his commission colleagues to follow-up on this information during their next trip to Russia. The briefers attempted to explain that, in order to protect the source of the information, the commission could act on this information only if it could show that it had received this collaborating information from other venues. General Lajoie, largely due to his [redacted] Agency experience, seemed to grasp this concept fairly quickly; however, the Senator appeared un[redacted]ed.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

16) ~~(S, NF)~~ [redacted] The Senator also questioned the need for comments from [redacted] on the contents of the report, suggesting that such comments actually politicized DO reporting. In response, the briefers explained "comment procedures" on DO reporting, [redacted]

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct


17) ~~(S, NF)~~ [redacted] In closing, Senator Smith asked DCEA [redacted] if she had had an opportunity to review his assessment of the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Vietnamese intentions, capabilities, and performance concerning the POW/MIA issue and if so, what were her comments on his assessment. In response, DCEA advised that she understood the DCI responded to his concerns via a recent letter and she had no other comments to add to the DCI response.

(b)(3) CIAAct



Liaison Officer
Office of Congressional Affairs

DCI/OCA/CLG/NCB:broadbent:pnr/37922(12 May 99)



(b)(3) CIAAct

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000275

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

~~RICHARD J. KERR~~

APPEARANCE BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE

25 NOVEMBER 1991

000276

~~SECRET~~21 November 1991
OCA 4837-91

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Robert W. Magner
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs
Office of Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Closed Briefing 25 November 1991

1. You will be making a brief opening statement to the Committee. This will go a long way toward convincing the Committee of the Intelligence Community's commitment to support its work. We have included reference to sources and methods in your remarks because this will be one of the key issues as the Committee presses for full declassification of all materials related to POW/MIA matters.

2. Our understanding is that the Committee is interested primarily in an informal exchange of information with only limited structure. We do not anticipate that you will be asked any particular questions. Essentially the Committee wants a brief update on what the various agencies are doing in this area and then turn to questions. DIA's prepared talking points reflect that understanding as does the short statement prepared for ADDO Price. Both are in your briefing book. We anticipate having NSA's statement shortly.

3. There are likely to be several areas the Senators will want to explore. One is the whole issue of sources and methods and why sources of considerable vintage and not of central value must be protected. We have taken the position that while we are redacting all reporting to be shown to the Committee staff we will, upon request, show unredacted information to members or cleared staff on a case by case basis. This is an even more liberal policy than is our practice with the Oversight Committees. CIA and DIA have worked out agreed guidelines in this area, a copy of which is in the background material. These guidelines have been shown to Committee staff but not accepted by them.

4. A second issue concerns Laos. The Senators are likely to focus on the large number of unresolved cases in Laos. DIA and CIA will be prepared to respond in detail. There is also keen interest in the status of civilian intelligence operatives

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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SUBJECT: POW/MIA Closed Briefing 20 November 1991

missing in Laos. Again CIA and DIA will be prepared to address. [redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct
CIA will address these activities in detail.

5. There is also the issue of POW/MIA family members having access to classified materials. DOD is seeking to develop a policy in this area in response to Congressional pressure. DIA and CIA have some concerns but will be supportive so long as sources and methods are protected.

6. Overall we anticipate most of this meeting being an information gathering session with the Senators asking questions that they could not get answers to in the open session. Hopefully in this process two points will be made. One that there are strong reasons for keeping some of the materials relating to POW/MIA in classified form. Secondly, there is a need for the Committee to address classified issues in a closed forum. On the latter point, both Senator's Kerry and Smith pressed DIA to discuss code breaking in Laos in open session. NSA will address this issue in the closed session and other speakers will be supportive.

7. There is general agreement that there must be a positive and forthcoming attitude toward responding to the Committee's interests. Yet all agencies want to avoid carte blanche access to all information that includes data revealing sources and the methods of acquisition. Even more, they want to uphold the overall principal of such protections because of the larger equities involved.

[redacted signature box]

(b)(6)

Robert W. Magner

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000278

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DDCI Opening Remarks

ADDO Statement

NSA Statement

DIA Statement

Qs & As

Background Information

- 19 Sep 91 Letter from ADCI to Richard B. Cheney,
The Secretary of Defense
- 04 Oct 91 Categories for Review/Redaction with
Release of Classified POW/MIA Documents to
Appropriately SCI Cleared Staff of Temporary
Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
- 18 Nov 91 Memorandum for the Record re POW/MIA
Committee Hearing on 15 November
- 12 Nov 85 Memorandum for National Foreign Intelligence
Board re Interagency Committee on Vietnam MIA's/POW's
- 1986 Memorandum of Understanding between the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA)

000279

DDCI Opening Remarks

000280

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, I AM PLEASED TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU THIS AFTERNOON TO UNDERSCORE THE IMPORTANCE THAT I AND THE WHOLE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ATTACH TO YOUR EFFORTS TO WORK TOWARD A FINAL RESOLUTION OF LONGSTANDING CONCERNS ABOUT POWS AND MIAS FROM THE INDOCHINA WAR. I REGRET THAT MY SCHEDULE ALLOWS ONLY A BRIEF APPEARANCE TODAY. I HAVE, HOWEVER, BROUGHT WITH ME SENIOR MEMBERS FROM THE CONCERNED AGENCIES--AND THEIR RESPECTIVE EXPERTS--WHO ARE PREPARED TO BRIEF YOU ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THEIR AGENCIES AND RESPOND TO YOUR QUESTIONS. FROM THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY--THE LEAD AGENCY FOR THE COMMUNITY ON THIS ISSUE--IS ITS NEW DIRECTOR, GENERAL CLAPPER. FROM THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY IS ITS CHIEF OF STAFF, DONALD PARSONS, AND FROM CIA IS ASSOCIATE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS TED PRICE.

LET ME SAY EMPHATICALLY AT THE OUTSET THAT THE WORK OF YOUR NEW COMMITTEE HAS MY FULL SUPPORT AND THAT OF THE DCI. THE SUBJECT OF POW/MIAS IS A DIFFICULT AND HIGHLY EMOTIONAL ONE. I AM AWARE OF THE INTENSE INTEREST IN IT, AND OF THE IMPORTANT ROLE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS PLAYED AND CONTINUES TO PLAY IN DEVELOPING AND DISSEMINATING INFORMATION ON IT. I ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE STRONG VIEWS ABOUT

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INTELLIGENCE REPORTING AND ITS AVAILABILITY TO THOSE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE FATE OF INDIVIDUALS STILL MISSING IN INDOCHINA. I HOPE THAT THROUGH THIS PROCESS THOSE CONCERNS CAN BE PUT TO REST.

THE DCI HAS THE STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROTECTING INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS. I WANT TO ASSURE YOU, HOWEVER, THAT THE INTERAGENCY TEAM THAT HAS BEEN ASSEMBLED WILL BE AS RESPONSIVE AS POSSIBLE IN SETTING ITS GUIDELINES AND IN DEALING WITH THE COMMITTEE'S INTERESTS. ONLY WHEN IT IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR THE PROTECTION OF THOSE SOURCES AND METHODS WILL THERE BE ANY LIMITATIONS ON THE MATERIALS TO BE REVIEWED, AND ANY SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION WILL BE PROVIDED TO YOU.

THROUGHOUT THIS PROCESS I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE MAY WELL BE AREAS OF DIFFICULTY OR DISAGREEMENT, BUT I ASSURE YOU THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS COMMITTED TO WORKING WITH YOU TO REACH ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FULL SHARING OF INFORMATION. I ALSO CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THE COMMUNITY WILL CONTINUE TO ATTACH THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO COLLECTING AND DISSEMINATING INFORMATION ON THE POW/MIA ISSUE AND WILL DEVOTE SUBSTANTIAL RESOURCES WORLDWIDE TO THAT EFFORT. WE WANT TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE.

000282

LET ME NOW TURN TO THE AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES, EACH OF
WHOM HAS PREPARED REMARKS ADDRESSING THE ACTIVITIES OF
THEIR INDIVIDUAL AGENCIES.

THANK YOU.

000283

ADDO Statement

000284

Mr. Chairman, members of Committee, I welcome this opportunity to discuss CIA's role in resolving the status of prisoners-of-war (POW) and missing-in-action (MIA) from the war in Indochina.

- This issue has remained an important collection requirement since the beginning of U. S. involvement in the war in Indochina.

- CIA is committed to continue its intelligence collection program and provide whatever resources are necessary to resolve the status of Indochina War POW's and MIA's.

- As the DCI stated earlier, we are determined to cooperate with the lead Agency, DIA, in every way possible consistent with our statutory requirement to protect sources and methods, in making available to your Committee and to other appropriate recipients, materials bearing on this issue.

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-- Let me emphasize that in almost every instance, we believe we will be able to satisfy your legitimate informational needs on this matter.

To underscore our committment, I want to assure you that the first question our officers in the field ask [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] whom they believe might have access to information on this subject is what do they know about American POW's or MIA's.

-- We ask about the fate of MIA's, details on crash sites, grave locations, live sightings,

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted]

-- This is an important requirement for our [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct stations worldwide; last year, [redacted] in East Asia, Europe, and the U. S. forwarded reports on this issue.

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
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Once collected, we disseminate intelligence expeditiously to authorized customers for action.


-- Between 1973 and the present, we have (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct disseminated approximately on subjects such as the downing of U. S. aircraft, possible grave sites, sightings of U. S. servicemen, alleged discovery of remains and Hanoi's position on U. S. MIA's.

-- Some 6.5 linear feet of material covering reporting between 1964 and 1979 has been declassified in response to FOIA requests.



(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct



Mr. Chairman, we in CIA are committed to resolving the
POW-MIA matter, and our resources are turned to this purpose.

This concludes my statement.

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000289

DIA Statement

000290

NSA Statement

000291

TALKING POINTS FOR GEN CLAPPER

DIA'S PRIMARY MISSION IS LIVE PRISONER ISSUE -- COLLECTING (STONY BEACH), ANALYZING AND REPORTING ON ANY AMERICANS STILL HELD IN CAPTIVITY.

SECONDARY MISSIONS INVOLVE SUPPORT TO DC AREA POLICY OFFICIALS AND ANALYTIC SUPPORT TO CINCPAC/JCRC FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING EFFORTS.

BOTH MISSIONS INVOLVE HIGHLY SPECIALIZED ANALYSIS THAT USUALLY MUST RELY ON SKETCHY DETAIL. THIS ANALYSIS IS AN ARTFORM REQUIRING CONSIDERABLE OJT.

DIA POW-MIA OFFICE CONTINUOUSLY IN EXISTENCE SINCE VIETNAM WAR. REVIEW POW-MIA AND STONY BEACH RESOURCE NUMBERS ON REVERSE.

[Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[Redacted]

(b)(1)

TIMELY RESOLUTION OF PHOTO CASES AND OTHER HIGH VISIBILITY DISCREPANCY CASES HAS UNDERScoreD THE VALUE OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED BY OVERT FIELD INVESTIGATION.

[Redacted] EFFORTS IN-COUNTRY ARE A MAJOR NEW THRUST OF DIA'S EFFORTS (TALK

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

WHAT IS NOW CRITICAL IS GETTING VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIAN GOV'T APPROVAL OF A LIVE SIGHTING INVESTIGATION REGIME SIMILAR TO ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS HAMMERED OUT WITH THE SOVIETS -- NAMELY, NO NOTICE VISITATIONS TO SITES OF FIRST HAND SIGHTING REPORTS AND CERTAIN OTHER CAMPS AND PRISONS THAT COULD POTENTIALLY BE INVOLVED IN HOLDING AMERICAN PRISONERS.

DIA IS NOW WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE JOINT STAFF AND CINCPAC TO INTEGRATE OUR ANALYTIC AND COLLECTION EFFORTS WITH CINCPAC'S PROPOSED POW-MIA JOINT TASK FORCE. [Redacted]

(b)(1)

DIA'S BOTTOM LINE:

- o ISSUE RECEIVING APPROPRIATE PRIORITY WITHIN DIA
 - OFFICE REPORTS TO COMMAND ELEMENT
 - NECESSARY BILLETTS TAKEN OUT OF HIDE BEFORE ACTIVE CONG INTEREST
 - AGGRESSIVE, MOTIVATED AND KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONNEL ASSIGNED
- o OTHER INTEL AGENCIES PROVIDING STRONG SUPPORT
- o [Redacted] (b)(1)
- o DOD POLICY OFFICIALS NO LONGER RELYING ON DIA TO "CARRY THE WEIGHT"
- o DIA IS READY, WILLING AND ABLE TO FULLY SUPPORT THIS COMMITTEE AND THE WHAT HAS BECOME KNOWN AS THE GOVERNMENT'S "FULL COURT PRESS" OVER THE NEXT 2 OR 3 YEARS.

Qs & As

000293

QUESTION: Please explain why certain information in reports on POW-MIA's still remains protected.

ANSWER: The documents were initially classified to protect national security interests which includes the protection of the source of the information, the place and manner in which it was acquired, any foreign intelligence service involvement, references to other operational activity and administrative details [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted]
Source information continues to be classified despite the passage of time because of the continuing ramifications of protecting sources. [redacted]

[redacted]
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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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000294

QUESTION: What information has been declassified and released to the public via the FOIA?

ANSWER: Ann Mills Griffiths, Executive Director of the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia, filed an FOIA case in May 1979 requesting all documents and intelligence reports, not previously released, which originated or were held by CIA elements operating in Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia from May 1964-present (May 79) which relate to American POWs.

Six and one-half linear feet have been released to the public and DIA in response to this request. The information is compiled chronologically and it is contained in some twenty-two volumes representing periodic releases over a ten year period ending in 1989. A complete set is on file in Information Services Division, DDA in Ames Building.

These reports are in sanitized form, having details about sources and methods deleted from them. They may be passed, as is, in a body to a centrally controlled DIA reading room for access by the public. Privacy concerns of multiple American names in many reports have not been addressed and we defer to the DIA on this issue.

QUESTION: Is there any intelligence reporting to indicate the possible presence of POW-MIA's from the Indochina War being transferred to the Soviet Union or China?

ANSWER: We have neither substantive intelligence or fragmentary reporting which indicates that American POW's were transferred to the Soviet Union or China during the war. We are in the the process of querying the KGB on this issue. Because of the previous hostile environment in Moscow, collection on POW-MIA's was not a requirement [redacted] Considering the changes in recent months, we will reemphasize this requirement [redacted] in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

QUESTION: Are you familiar with the case of the mortician who claimed there were over 400 sets of remains of Americans from the Indochina War being warehoused in Hanoi?

ANSWER: [redacted], a Vietnamese refugee residing in a refugee camp [redacted] was interviewed by [redacted]

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NatSecAct

[redacted] in November 1979. During this interview, [redacted] asserted that he personally inspected the remains of

(b)(6)
(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] or 400 U.S. military personnel which were in secret storage

(b)(1) in Hanoi. The [redacted] requested [redacted]

(b)(1) [redacted] in an attempt to verify [redacted] claim. The results

(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] did not support [redacted] claims on either the 400 sets of remains or that he personally saw three alive American soldiers in Hanoi. A [redacted]

(b)(6)
(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] in [redacted]

(b)(1) the United States with results that [redacted] was telling the truth with regard to the remains and the live Americans. At the time, [redacted] conclusion was that [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] were incorrect as to the dates used in the test questions. We have not seen a copy of the [redacted] report to make an analysis.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

QUESTION: What can you tell us about the possible existence of POW-MIA's in Laos?

ANSWER: Over the years there have been continuing stories about the possible existence of POW's still being held in Laos. I spoke earlier of [redacted] [redacted] as well as the attempts to locate POW-MIA's via imagery. There were reports of alleged POW working in gold mines or held being held in caves. A report regarding a caucasian spotted bathing in a stream in north Laos was investigated and to the best of our knowledge was a Czech geologist working in the area. Our capabilities in Laos are somewhat limited but we do attempt to followup and verify substantive reporting on POW-MIA's. We have no reporting to support the claim that there may still be POW's or MIA's being held in Laos. In fact, in spite of all our efforts over a number of years, we have received no credible evidence that there are in fact American prisoners being held in Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
NatSecAct

With regard to pilots or crew members of Air America or Continental Air Service, there were nine individuals unaccounted as of mid-1973. All of these cases were turned over to the Department of Labor for resolution as the individuals were contract employees of the U.S. government.

Approved for Release: 2021/09/16 C06002566
~~SECRET~~

QUESTION: Why was source information given away to the Vietnamese and Cambodian authorities in July 91 while at the same time we continue to protect refugee sources?

BACKGROUND: In July 1991 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Ken Quinn, passed a list of names of individuals to Cambodian and Vietnamese authorities requesting access to talk with these individuals on POW-MIA matters. He did this while visiting Hanoi and Phnom Penh on POW-MIA matters.

ANSWER: The individuals in question were not sources of intelligence but were individuals thought by State or the families of POW-MIA's to have possible information. [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] We do not know what, if any followup there has been on this issue as we were not involved in this [redacted]

(b)(1)

QUESTION: Is it possible to provide the families of POW/MIA's access to a broader range of classified information?

ANSWER: We are willing to work in concert with DIA on this issue as they maintain the files on the individual POW or MIA's. Our concern is that sources and methods continue to be protected and we are hopeful that we can come up with a mutually beneficial solution. The files currently under review for this committee could possibly be made available to the families if properly controlled in a secure facility to which the families could be given access.

QUESTION: Are you familiar with the events surrounding the fall of Lima Site 85 in March 1968?

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

ANSWER: Lima Site 85 [redacted] located 25 kilometers from the North Vietnamese/Laotian border atop Phou Pha Thi mountain. The site was used to direct and control attacking jet fighters and bombers to their targets and to provide them with precise bomb release points, under radar control. [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
NatSecAct

[redacted] On 10 March 1968, the site began to receive heavy incoming mortar and artillery fire, and in the early morning hours that followed, 20 heavily armed infiltrators launched a surprise attack on the

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] Of the [redacted] Americans at the site, only five technicians [redacted] were extracted. [redacted] our officers was wounded, five of the six technicians were wounded, one of them being hit by fire while in the helicopter and he died in route. The [redacted] remaining Americans were presumed dead. [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

An enemy buildup had been underway for several months in the area prior to the attack and intelligence reporting indicated that the safety of the site was questionable after 10 March.

Background Information

000302

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

19 SEP 1991

The Honorable Richard B. Cheney
The Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Agency has been contacted by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence Duane P. Andrews concerning Senate Resolution 82 which creates a temporary Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. It is my understanding that this Committee will request access to Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) files, some of which contain CIA-generated classified information. Assistant Secretary Andrews has asked that the Agency work with the Department of Defense (DoD) to develop guidelines concerning Committee access to these files.

In response to Secretary Andrews' request for assistance, Agency officers are working with the newly-created POW/MIA Data Release Office to review DIA files. Once these officers have determined the scope and sensitivity of the CIA-originated information in the files, we will be able to develop appropriate guidelines for use with the Committee. In addition, I have designated a senior attorney in the Office of General Counsel to work with DoD attorneys to negotiate with the Select Committee concerning access to classified information in the files. I want to assure you that the Agency will cooperate fully with the Committee, and I am confident that guidelines can be developed that will ensure full compliance with the spirit of Senate Resolution 82 while at the same time meeting our statutory duty to protect intelligence sources and methods.

I have designated Chief, Policy and Coordination Staff as the Agency's point of contact on this matter.

(b)(3) CIAAct

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Richard J. Kerr".

Richard J. Kerr
Acting Director of Central Intelligence

000303

~~SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL~~

4 OCT 91

(b)(1)
(b)(3) 50 USC 3605
(b)(3) NatSecAct

CATEGORIES FOR REVIEW/REDACTION WITH RELEASE OF
CLASSIFIED POW/MIA DOCUMENTS TO APPROPRIATELY
SCI CLEARED STAFF OF TEMPORARY SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS.

REPORT ORIGINATOR

REDACT

RATIONALE

DoD HUMINT

STONY BEACH team members' names

Compromise the safety and mission of US collection personnel

Detailed source data/biographic reports/source numbers

Jeopardize safety of sources

Ongoing clandestine operational data

Reveal extent and involvement of US intelligence operations; cause extreme embarrassment to the Thai or other foreign governments

NSA

[Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) 50 USC 3605
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) 50 USC 3605
(b)(3) NatSecAct

When SIGINT reporting related to [Redacted] is received, it will be reviewed to ensure [Redacted] would not be jeopardized or collection methods compromised. Content that would reveal [Redacted] or other intelligence sources will be protected.

Not applicable

Historical SIGINT can be released at the Secret SCI level

~~SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL~~

000304


Approved for Release: 2021/09/16 C06002566

Approved for Release: 2021/09/16 C06002566

~~SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL~~

STATE	U.S. Government policies under negotiation		Would compromise ongoing US foreign policy positions and interests
ASD/ISA	Not applicable	(b)(1)	Classified cables can be released
OVERHEAD IMAGERY	Not applicable	(b)(3) CIAAct	Images can be released at the SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL level
DEBRIEFS	Not releasable	(b)(3) NatSecAct	Executive Order 11652 dated 8 Mar 72; ASD/ISA memo I-86/19832, dated 3 Jan 87; release of this information would violate confidentiality agreements with returned POWS.

CIA




~~SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL~~

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Approved for Release: 2021/09/16 C06002566

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~~SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL~~




(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

NOTES:

1. Although material has been redacted based on guidelines established above, all the documents retain their original classification.
2. Material extracted from the file will be noted on the file index (e.g., "source biographic sheet is not included").
3. Information that has been extracted or redacted from original file can be reviewed by committee members. Staff will be allowed to review the original files on a case-by-case basis.
4. All classified material requires handling and protection in accordance with Senate Resolution 400 as adopted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

~~SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL~~

~~SECRET~~



(b)(3) CIAAct



(b)(1)
(b)(6)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~OCA 4821-91
18 November 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Committee Hearing on 15 November


1. I attended a portion of the above-mentioned open Hearing (list of members attached). This was an opportunity for the Administration in the persons of Bob Sheetz of DIA, Ken Quinn from State and Carl Ford from DOD/ISA to address some of the charges made by other witnesses before the Committee the previous week. Ford's Statement is attached.

2. During the questions period, several areas of inquiry developed which could bear on the closed briefing now scheduled for 1430 on 20 November in S407. Agency participants at that briefing should be prepared to deal with some if not all of these issues.

3. Although unrelated to the actual focus of the investigation, there was considerable interest in the possible presence of POW/MIAs in the Soviet Union given the recent press article on that possibility. The Senators asked specifically if there had been contact with the KGB to inquire about this. State noted the diplomatic efforts. The Agency rep could be asked about contact with the KGB.

4. Ken Quinn was asked repeatedly about a list of individuals in Indochina who allegedly had information about POW/MIAs which he had given to the Vietnamese and Cambodian authorities in July 1991. Senators Smith and Grassley in particular asked if, in effect, he was not passing source information. They went on to ask why the Administration would give away one type of source information while vigorously guarding the refugee reporting sources. Quinn explained the difference between people who are in fact intelligence sources and those we believe have information and with whom we wanted to be in contact. Smith and/or Grassley can be counted on to raise the same issue at the closed briefing.

5. Carl Ford raised the issue of providing POW/MIA family members access to a broader range of classified information, saying that he is wrestling with how to arrange such access.



(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Committee Hearing on 15 November

(In an earlier conversation Keith Hall told me that this is something that Defense is pushing and will eventually need an Agency input relative to the inclusion of CIA material in the DOD holdings.) The Agency rep should be prepared with some form of response if this issue comes up. Senator Robb was particularly interested in this aspect of the discussion.

6. Senator Kerry wanted information on those unaccounted for in the "secret war" in Laos. He wanted to know if they were in the overall 2,000 plus figure carried as POW/MIA. Ford said that it was only in the late 70's that those clandestine operatives were included in the overall count. Up to that time, there had been a secret list of such POW/MIAs. This bothered Kerry a great deal, and he can be certain to ask the Agency representative for more information.

7. Kerry asked about code breaking in Laos in 1968-1973. Witnesses declined to respond in open testimony and pointed to the absence of an NSA representative. This issue is certain to arise in the closed briefing. Senator Smith also asked specifically if there had been any operations into Laos in the period after 1973. Ford said he didn't know, and Smith was incredulous. Quinn said that he had recently learned from another witness-

(b)(6)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)

None of the witness had any personal knowledge of such operations. The Agency representative should be prepared to address this issue NatSecActetail.

8. Overall there was a very heavy emphasis on the Laotian situation throughout the Q and A period reflecting an apparent belief on the part of some Committee members that there is far less accountability for POW/MIAs in Laos and more evidence of their possible presence there after Operation Homecoming in 1973. Agency representatives should be prepared to deal especially with reporting on Laos and operational activity there related to POW/MIA matters.

[Redacted Signature]

(b)(6)

Robert W. Magner
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs
Office of Congressional Affairs

Attachment

OCA 4821-91

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Committee Hearing on 15 November

OCA/Senate/RWMagner (18 Nov 91)



(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE OF POW-MIA

Offices: 705 Senate Hart Office Building
Main Office Number: (202) 224-2038
Majority Staff Director Frances Zwenig: 202-224-2038
Minority Staff Director Al Ptak: 202-224-2306

MAJORITY:

Chairman John Kerry, Mass.

Thomas Daschle, S.D.

Harry Reid, Nev.

Charles Robb, Va.

Robert Kerry, Neb.

Herb Kohl, Wisc.

MINORITY:

Vice Chairman Robert
Smith, N.H.

John McCain, Ariz.

Jesse Helms, N.C.

Nancy Kassebaum, Kan.

Charles Grassley, Iowa

Hank Brown, Colo.

TESTIMONY AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY

BY

**PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

CARL W. FORD, JR.

**BEFORE
THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS**

NOVEMBER 15, 1991

**TESTIMONY
AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY
BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS**

Carl W. Ford, Jr.

**Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)**

November 15, 1991

Mr. Chairman, Senator Smith, members of the Committee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to return to comment on issues that have arisen during the three days of historic hearings that you convened last week on the POW/MIA issue.

First, I would like to clarify a point that came up in last Thursday's testimony concerning the "last known alive" discrepancy cases. The definition of a discrepancy case is:

A case about which the USG has convincing evidence that the Governments of Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia should have specific knowledge.

The term "discrepancy case" includes not only individuals who were "last known alive, but also individuals who were known dead, but for whom the Indochinese Governments should be able to provide information or remains. As you can see, the definition is broad. Within this broad definition, we have identified three subcategories of cases. We did this because over the years a great deal of confusion has developed over what

000313

precisely we were talking about--the terms "discrepancy case," "compelling case," "last known alive case," "Vessey case," all meant different things to different people.

The three subcategories of discrepancy cases are:

LAST KNOWN ALIVE: Those cases in which the US has information that the individual survived the loss incident and fell into enemy hands. In the case of air incidents, this includes cases in which the crew members are believed to have successfully exited their aircraft and to have been alive on the ground. In the case of ground incidents, this includes cases in which the individuals were last known alive, were not gravely wounded, and were in proximity to enemy forces who should have specific knowledge of the incident.

POW AT HOMECOMING: A specific group of individuals who, during the Vietnam War, were classified by their commanding officers and Service Secretaries as POWs but did not return during Operation Homecoming. These cases are also known to many families as "last known alive" due to their POW status. There were 97 individuals so listed. Subsequently, 42 "listed POWs" have been accounted for through unilateral SRV repatriation. The remainder are still unaccounted for.

000314

KNOWLEDGE OF THE INCIDENT:

Circumstances of loss or subsequent information is convincing that Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia should have knowledge of the incident. In some of these cases, there is convincing evidence that the individual did not survive the incident of loss. In many cases, there is convincing evidence that Vietnam also has remains.

With this background, now I will shift to the 119 individuals who have been discussed in the testimony here, called variously "Vessey cases" and the "Vessey discrepancy cases." The first point to make is that, from the beginning, the list was not meant to be all-encompassing. In 1988, DIA, JCRC, General Vessey and the Office of the Secretary of Defense worked together to develop a list of most compelling last known alive cases, as well as other discrepancy cases, i.e., cases of individuals for whom the Vietnamese should have knowledge of the fate of the individual and remains if the individual is dead. *The list was not exhaustive, merely illustrative.* The primary purpose was to shed light on the live prisoner issue by asking the Vietnamese to help us solve cases in which there was either hard evidence or a strong possibility that the individual survived the incident of loss, but did not return at Operation Homecoming, and for whom, as of 1987, there had been no accounting. So far, despite our investigative efforts, we have not returned any live Americans or uncovered proof that unaccounted for Americans are alive in Vietnam.

There are additional cases, beyond the 119 individuals, which fit into the discrepancy case definition. Again, not all of the "Vessey" discrepancy

cases involve individuals who were last known alive. Some of them involve individuals who are known dead—but the Vietnamese should be able to provide information or remains.

In addition to the 119 individuals whose cases were presented to the Vietnamese by General Vessey, we determined that there are 64 other individuals who meet the "last known alive" definition as well as 13 individuals who were classified by their respective Service Secretary as a POW at Operation Homecoming in 1973, and who are not included in the "Vessey" cases who are otherwise not accounted for. This group of cases will be the focus of the full time efforts of the Hanoi Office under the USCINCPAC Joint Task Force earlier described to this committee by General Christmas. They will all be investigated within Phase I of the USCINCPAC plan.

DIA as Family Outreach Organization

Next, I would like to address an issue that has been implicit in the testimony you have heard from many family members regarding DIA. The issue of family members and DIA analysts meeting directly to discuss individual cases has proved problematic. DIA is an intelligence collection and analysis agency. Their personnel are not trained for family outreach and the function of family outreach is not an appropriate one for that agency. The families' primary point of contact for discussion of their cases is the designated Service Casualty Affairs Office. Those offices are staffed with personnel trained to perform the family outreach role. In the case where a

000316

family is dissatisfied with the service received from the Service Casualty Affairs Office, the proper place to redress that problem is with my office.

The problems experienced within DIA that resulted in the changes made by the Secretary's Management Inquiry related to functions assumed by the PW-MIA Office that were not within their mission. Those functions have been removed and placed within my office.

Allegations by Dr. O'Grady

We certainly understand the grief felt by Dr. O'Grady over her family's loss. We have reviewed the O'Grady case file and we believe that Dr. O'Grady's family has been properly served by our casualty affairs process. The O'Grady case is one in which we believe that the family has been promptly and accurately notified about investigative activity and information relating to the case.

Dr. O'Grady's sweeping allegations of Government nonfeasance, malfeasance and misfeasance are without factual basis. For example, Dr. O'Grady states that her family was advised from the time that her father became missing that he was dead. That statement is quite simply wrong. From immediately after his incident of loss, the Air Force believed there was a good possibility he survived. He was seen to eject from his aircraft. He was seen with a good parachute, and his chute was seen on the ground, but he was not in it. All indications were that he survived his ejection.

000317

Colonel O'Grady was carried in a missing in action status until 1977 when his status was reviewed, at the express request of his wife, and his status changed to deceased and a Presumptive Finding of Death was entered in his case.

A second, most serious allegation was made by Dr. O'Grady which requires discussion. She alleged in her testimony that "identifications were made with teeth and teeth fragments but when independent forensic anthropologists were consulted, there were no dental records to be compared to. Again, this is absolutely false. There has never been a dental identification rendered by the U. S. Army Central Identification Laboratory without benefit of dental records. In every case, either a ante-mortem dental X-ray or a dental chart was available to provide the factual predicate for the dental identification. No other forensic laboratory in the world has as many independent procedural safeguards as has the Central Identification Laboratory. Should you have any further questions on this point, I have the Commander, U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory available to respond.

I have a detailed written response to the other allegations made by Dr. O'Grady in her testimony that I would like to submit for the record.

 **Stevens and Lundy Response**

(b)(6)
(b)(3) 10 USC 424

As dissatisfied with the Department's performance as the families clearly are, the Department of Defense has vigorously pursued the

investigation of the photo. I have personally made myself available to the families to answer their questions and respond to their concerns, as has my staff and the Director of the DIA Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs. We have been unable to either confirm or disprove the identifications of the subjects of the photo made by the family members. We are continuing to investigate the photograph. Any intimation by the families that there has been less than an honest effort to investigate and locate the source of the photo is disingenuous. The facts establish otherwise. We have requested assistance from the Vietnamese at the highest levels of Government. We have sent three separate investigative teams to Cambodia to follow-up information and attempt to locate the source of the photograph. We have requested all of our [redacted] world-wide to search for the photo in Eastern-bloc magazines. We have tasked national technical means to obtain information on reports associated with the photographs and have established all-source collection requirements to obtain additional information about the photo, the individuals or the associated reporting. We are continuing to investigate vigorously, however, without some new leads, we may not be able to solve the mystery of this photo.

(b)(3) 10 USC 424
(b)(6)
(b)(3) 10 USC 424

Finally, and this is an important point, [redacted] case is not closed. It is still under active investigation and any preliminary judgements made have been set aside pending further investigative activity and information.

I would like to submit a brief written response to the specific allegations contained within the testimony of the families for the record.

Donohue Allegations

Mr. Donohue stated in previous testimony that he has information about his brother, Captain Morgan Donohue, lost in Laos on 13 December 1968, and relates the fact that the presence in intelligence reporting of his father's zip code is proof that his brother is still alive in Laos, because only his brother could know the postal zip code of his father. In fact, the postal zip code of Major Donohue's father was contained within a widely circulated flyer that the family prepared and distributed throughout Southeast Asia. It is not unusual that information contained in such flyers later shows up in intelligence reports about American POWs.

Lost Records

There have been allegations made that fingerprint and other records have "mysteriously" disappeared from DoD files. There is no conspiracy to purge records. The Department of Defense does not maintain fingerprint records. The FBI is the sole agency with that responsibility. I request that this letter, from FBI Director Sessions to Congressman Solarz explaining "lost" or purged fingerprint records be entered in the record.

To prevent a recurrence of this problem in the future, I have tasked the Service Secretaries to examine possible alternatives to establish a redundant, independent source for military fingerprints separate from the FBI records. I will report to the Committee and to the families when we have implemented a solution to this problem.

000320

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Minority Staff Report

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Tracy Usry of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Minority staff came before this Committee to defend the minority staff report, An Examination of U. S. Policy Toward POW/MIAs, authored in large measure by himself. That report is replete with factual errors. I would like to take just a moment to discuss a few of the most glaring examples of poor research and error.

On page 5-8 of the Report, the staff states:

"In fact, only 591 U.S. POWs were repatriated by the North Vietnamese during Operation HOMECOMING, which is 12% of the figure of 5,000 U.S. POWs held by the North Vietnamese reported by the *New York Times*.

The original New York Times article, the primary source material, appeared on the front page of the 6 March 1973 issue. The number "5,000" appeared only once in the entire article—quoting an American source who stated at a meeting of the Joint Military Commission the previous day, North Vietnam had demanded the release of 5,000 Communist prisoners held by Saigon.

This 5,000 number cited incorrectly in the report has been oft-quoted by POW activists and is used within the report to lend

credence to the allegation that 85 % of American prisoners of war were withheld by Hanoi after Operation Homecoming.

A second glaring inaccuracy is found in the Prologue to Part II, page *i*. The report states:

"In spite of 1,400 unresolved reports of first hand live-sightings, the Department of Defense, remarkably, still believes it has "no credible evidence." How does it dismiss these reports?

In fact, there are numerous inaccuracies in just that simple statement. First, while there have been cumulatively over 1,400 first-hand live sighting reports, only approximately 100 are unresolved. Second, live-sighting reports have not been dismissed. In over 75 percent of the first-hand live sightings received, DIA (b)(3) 10 USC 424 have been able to establish that the report is true. These reports involve POWs who returned at Operation Homecoming, or have been correlated to other Americans or Westerners, such as missionaries or individuals stranded in South Vietnam when the Communists took control. Almost three hundred relate to Private Garwood, who returned from Vietnam in 1979.

There are numerous other factual inaccuracies throughout the report. To catalogue the inaccuracies would require a document of equal length and would be beyond the scope of my testimony here today. Further, to do so would require diverting manpower from

000322

more important tasks related to the function of investigating POW/MIA cases.

A more important issue that this Committee should address of Mr. Usry is why he and other staff members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff have withheld from the Department of Defense information relevant to the investigation of the Stevens case and the Borah case. Not only has Mr. Usry withheld information that would have assisted the Department of Defense in more expeditiously investigating these cases, but he has stood by while Senate staff members directed sources not to provide their information to members of my staff, the DIA, or others within the Department of Defense investigating these cases.

I am personally outraged by the obstruction that Mr. Usry has presented to the DoD investigations of these cases. That any American would withhold relevant information or otherwise not cooperate with an on-going DoD POW/MIA investigation is shocking and should not be tolerated by you--his employers--the Members of the United States Senate. The families of the two individuals deserve better treatment than that.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that you will question Mr. Usry about how long he had the Borah information before July 1991. When the Department of Defense finally received the information, we resolved the case in less than 2 months.

Response to Judge Gayden's Allegations

The Borah and Carr families have been the losers as a result of the allegations made by a number of individuals before this Committee. Family confidence in their Government has been further eroded by the unsubstantiated and specious claims of Government conspiracy. Mr. Sheetz will later discuss the Carr case in detail, however, I would like to spend a moment on the Borah case and the allegations made by Judge Gayden before this Committee.

Judge Gayden's allegation that the Department of Defense would knowingly provide to the family, the Congress and the American people altered photographs of the meeting between our investigator, Bill Gadoury, and the individual is ludicrous. Even more disturbing is the fact that Judge Gayden, an officer of a court, would allege that he had obtained a photo analysis of the photos of the meeting and then assert that the DoD photos are frauds. This Committee can not stand by and let these gross distortions of fact go unnoticed. If Judge Gayden's photo experts believe the DoD photos are a fraud, he should produce their reports, or their testimony, or an affidavit or other suitable evidence.

Our investigators, with the help of the Lao, found the individual photographed in Laos and identified as Lieutenant Borah. The individual is not Lieutenant Borah. The Borah family has been convinced by Judge Gayden's bailiff, Khambang Sibounheuang, that the individual is Lieutenant Borah, and Khambang has accompanied the two Borah sons to Laos. Khambang's blood relative in Laos passed the roll of film containing

the Borah photos to Khambang in the United States. Khambang has a long history of providing POW related materials, from as early as 1985; and none— not one— of his leads has ever proven valid.

I have a fact sheet on Khambang that I would request be entered into the record. The Judge Gayden/Khambang connection needs to be thoroughly investigated. I hope that this Committee will undertake that task.

Bailey Cooperation

Finally, I would like to clarify a point raised by Lieutenant Colonel Bailey in his testimony. Lieutenant Colonel Bailey suggested that the Secretary of Defense may have misspoken in his testimony before this Committee. Lieutenant Colonel Bailey suggested that the Secretary was mistaken in his recitation of what Bailey agreed to provide to the Department of Defense in Thailand and that he was further mistaken in attributing to Bailey a comment that the "Carr" photograph "may have been" taken in Thailand or Burma. I would like to make clear for the record that the Secretary of Defense did not misspeak nor was he mistaken in any of the testimony he provided to this committee relative to Lieutenant Colonel Bailey.

Bailey's promises of cooperation were made to the Secretary of Defense in the presence of myself, and Congressmen McCloskey and Visclosky in the Secretary's office. The Secretary's testimony correctly reflected who and

what Bailey stated he would make available to our investigators. It also correctly reflected what Bailey told our investigators in Bangkok about where the photograph may have been taken. We have a chronology of our conversations with Bailey which I would like to make a part of the record. I have with me the individuals who were involved in the Carr investigation with Colonel Bailey and who will provide you the facts about their investigation. Mr. Bob Sheetz, the Chief of the Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs will address the specifics of the conduct of the Carr investigation of which Bailey was a part.

Thank you Mr. Chairman and Senator Smith. I am prepared now to respond to your questions.

000326

Executive Registry
88- 4384

Washington, D.C. 20505

12 NOV 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Interagency Committee on Vietnam MIA's/POW's

1. I hereby establish an Interagency Committee on Vietnam MIA's/POW's under the chairmanship of Brigadier General James Shufelt (DIA). The purpose of the Committee is to exhaust all intelligence within the Community regarding the location and identification of Americans who might be held or interned in Southeast Asia.

2. I request that the appropriate NFIB agencies nominate representatives to serve on the Committee under Brigadier General Shufelt's chairmanship. Representatives will also be responsible for ensuring that any intelligence information presently held within the Intelligence Community is proffered to the Committee.

3. I am asking Lieutenant General Leonard Perroots, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, to oversee this activity on my behalf.

William J. Casey

William J. Casey

Distribution:

- Orig - Addressee
- 1 - DCI Chrono
- 1 - DDCI Chrono
- 1 - ER

DCI
EXEC
RF

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CL BY 0057189

000327 *[Signature]*

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

between the

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA)

and the

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SERVICE INTELLIGENCE REPRESENTATIVES

on

PARTICIPATION AT INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INDOCHINA PW/MIAS MEETINGS

A. PURPOSE

This memorandum of understanding clarifies the roles and responsibilities of each organization during participation in Interagency Committee on Indochina PW/MIAs meetings on the collection, oversight and coordination of intelligence relating to American servicemen and civilians who remain unaccounted for as a result of the war in Indochina (1961-1975).

B. BACKGROUND

Resolution of the PW/MIA issue is a matter of personal interest to the President of the United States, who has pledged that it is a matter of the highest national priority within his Administration. In implementation of this priority the purpose of the committee will be to formulate, coordinate, and manage new collection initiatives to ensure that all intelligence disciplines are sensitized to the issue. It will provide a clearing house for the exchange of PW intelligence and a forum for the discussion and resolution of related collection problems and requirements. The committee will make aggressive use of appropriate resources of specialized components of the intelligence community to identify, augment or supplement, confirm, or otherwise qualify intelligence information relating to U.S. PW/MIAs.

C. ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT

1. DIA shall provide the chairmanship and staff and administrative support for the committee.

2. The committee shall be comprised of one principal general-flag officer or equivalent civilian level representative of the following U.S. Government components: Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central

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Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and Service Intelligence representatives. The DIA representative at the committee meetings will also be the principal Joint Chiefs of Staff representative. All members and other attendees shall have TOP SECRET and SI/TK clearances.

3. Responsibilities of member representatives pertaining to the collection of PW/MIA related intelligence shall be consistent with the charter of the parent Department, Agency or Bureau.

4. The committee shall meet at the call of the Chairman but not less than quarterly.

D. IMPLEMENTATION AND TERMINATION

This memorandum of understanding shall become binding and enter into force upon signature by all parties. It shall remain in effect until revised or terminated and will be reviewed annually.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

JAMES W. SHUFFLETT / BG USA

Defense Intelligence Agency

Date: 28 Mar 86



Deputy Chief, Policy and
Coordination Staff
Central Intelligence Agency

Date: 3/28/86


EDWARD W. RUDOLPH
Chief, Operations Directorate B5
National Security Agency


Date: 28 Mar 86

JAMES H. GEER
Assistant Director, Intelligence
Division
Federal Bureau of investigation

Date: 4/15/86


(b)(6)
(b)(3) 10 USC 424



JOHN J. TAYLOR
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Coordination
Bureau of Intelligence & Research
Department of State



Date: April 17, 1986

Date: 2 APR 1986



RICHARD J. POWERS, JR., COL, USA
Director, Intelligence Systems
Office of the Assistant Chief of
Staff Army Intelligence
Department of the Army




(b)(6)
(b)(3) 10 USC 424

Date: 28 March 1986

Date: 24 April 86


DONALD W. MCFADYEN, Colonel, USAF
Director, Joint Services Support
Directorate
Department of the Air Force


F. J. BRETH, Brig Gen, USMC
Director of Intelligence
Headquarters
United States Marine Corps

Date: 28 MAR 86

Date: 3 April 86

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE OF POW-MIA

Offices: 705 Senate Hart Office Building
Main Office Number: (202) 224-2038
Majority Staff Director Frances Zwenig: 202-224-2038
Minority Staff Director Al Ptak: 202-224-2306

MAJORITY:

Chairman John Kerry (D-MA)

Thomas Daschle (D-SD)
Harry Reid (D-NV)
Charles Robb (D-VA)
Robert Kerry (D-NB)
Herb Kohl (D-WS)

MINORITY:

Vice Chairman Robert
Smith (R-NH)

John McCain (R-AZ)
Jesse Helms (R-NC)
Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS)
Charles Grassley (R-IA)
Hank Brown (R-CO)

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1. Senator Kerry, Senator Smith, it is a privilege for me to appear here today. We all recognize the importance of your endeavor and I am here to emphasize the commitment of NSA to supportg your efforts. For years, NSA has been actively involved on this issue primarily with the Defense Intelligence Agency, but also with individual Congressman and Congressional Committees. As we have done with these organizations in the past, we will make available to you all the data that can assist you in your investigation.

2. To ensure we would be prepared to be responsive to the committee we have again conducted a comprehensive review of SIGINT holdings for the period 1965 to the present. This review included:

a. manually scanning all SIGINT material which might contain any reference to POW/MIAs during or after the war.

b. interviewing selected analysts and managers who served at NSA Headquarters or in the field,

c. reconstructing and evaluating the SIGINT process used during the war.

Additionally, we attempted to uncover any material which might be related to recent allegations and to review any new information that has come to light since our last complete review in 1987.

3. I would like to take a few minutes and explain how NSA has conducted its business in regard to the POW/MIA task. During the Vietnam War, our ability to access the communications of Southeast Asian

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Communist Forces was very good. Over seventy (70) ground-based collection sites, no fewer than twelve (12) types of airborne collection platforms, and numerous shipborne collectors worked 24-hours a day against the full range of target communications. Thousands of people, primarily uniformed military personnel, were involved in this massive signals intelligence effort. The SIGINT system had an excellent capability to collect information on aircraft shootdowns and on downed fliers. We intercepted information that some crew members did not survive the shootdown. In other cases, we were able to detect initial capture and subsequent movement of prisoners by the capturing unit to either a holding location or to a place designated as a camp. We were aware of the existence of more permanent prison camps from non-SIGINT sources, but in spite of our vast collection resources, we never heard any communications emanating from these camps.

4. The enormous amount of data collection during the war had to be processed manually. Because of this we did not always process everything, but we did process everything related to downed fliers or captured Americans. This was our highest priority mission. Intercept operators were trained to recognize critical information, and were instructed to notify supervisors immediately when information on downed fliers or captured servicemen was intercepted. This information was processed immediately and reported in the most expeditious manner to tactical units to aid in search and rescue operations.

5. Our information can be divided into two categories. We have a total of 1530 "incident" reports which are based on military

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communications and relate to specific losses. We have approximately 500 "non-incident" reports which are associated with the general topic of POW/MIAs. We reported both tactical and strategic information. Tactical reporting included information on such subjects as shootdowns of aircraft and locations of enemy forces. A special reporting series, called SONGBIRD Reports, was established for information pertaining to prisoners, prisoner locations, movement of prisoners, shootdown of aircraft, or any other information relating to the fate of U.S. servicemen. Strategic reporting included such activities as North Vietnamese infiltration and resupply. This information came from communications serving the network of roads, transportation units, and rest stops known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail and from communications serving military elements in Northern Vietnam.

6. We understand that the committee is especially concerned about the fate of American MIAs captured in Laos. Laotian codes were broken during the war and the communications of Pathet Lao Headquarters were intercepted. Regretably, while we had voluminous intercept of Laotian communications, they do not provide any new information on the fate of our men lost in Laos.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct 7. Also, no SIGINT evidence is available to either confirm or deny investigations of [redacted] involvement with American POWs. NSA has completed a review of pertinent [redacted] material. As with our study of Vietnamese communications, there is no evidence to indicate that [redacted] involved POWs. Our search of [redacted] communications that may be related to the POW/MIA issue continues, but

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as with our efforts in researching Vietnamese communications, we have yet to find any SIGINT evidence of [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

8. NSA currently holds approximately 2000 SIGINT reports, dating from 1965 to the present, relating to the loss, capture, and status of U.S. personnel in Southeast Asia. To illustrate the challenge of following individual POWs, of all the POW/MIA related incidents reported in SIGINT during the war, less than 100 names of captured Americans are contained in our reporting. The majority of these people were subsequently accounted for. All of this information was reported in our normal system and made available during previous investigations. Let me emphasize however, that none of our data contains evidence that American service personnel remain in Vietnam today or were left behind after Operation HOMECOMING.

9. We spent many years after the war searching for communications that could reveal evidence that U.S. personnel were held in Vietnam but were not successful. The only collection, reflecting POW/MIA matters we

[redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) 50 USC 3605 (b)(3) 18 USC 798 general

POW/MIA issues.

On the question of releasing intelligence data, there are good reasons why even after 20-25 years, some intelligence information relating to POW/MIAs is, and should remain, classified. For example, similar sources and methods are used today by NSA against other targets, particularly [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct Moreover, some of these sources and methods are associated directly with [redacted]

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[redacted]

We recognize the concerns of POW/MIA families, and we want to explore methods for them to gain access to data associated with their kin while at the same time protecting our sources and methods. I would like to caution everyone, however, that what we hold as described above only applies to a very few families and even that involves not more than one or two SIGINT reports per family.

On the other hand, for you and/or your cleared staff, we stand ready to show our entire SIGINT POW/MIA-related reports and to help interpret them as necessary for you and respond to any of your questions.

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QUESTION: Please explain why it is necessary to protect the sources of information on POW's and MIA's.

ANSWER: In the intelligence collection process, whether it be on POW's and MIA's or other requirements, we have a statutory responsibility under the National Security Act of 1947 and E.O. 12356 to protect the source of the information, the place and manner in which it was acquired, any foreign intelligence service involvement, references to other operational activity and administrative details such as cryptonyms, field report numbers, source and field comments.

If we were unable to guarantee this protection, it would impact on our ability to collect intelligence. Other sources would be wary of cooperating with us if information were released which pinpoints its origin without consideration of the effect this information might have on the source, and his heirs, survivors or colleagues. It is important to understand that in many cases, especially with regard to information

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) 10 USC 424

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
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


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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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SPOT REPORT

6 DECEMBER 1991

UPDATE ON PW-MIA ACTIVITIES

1. FILES AT DIA: A total of 496 "live-sighting" files in the Prisoner of War-Missing in Action (PW-MIA) Task Force for Intelligence Data Release have been reviewed and sanitized at the Pentagon.

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(b)(3) CIAAct

The files reviewed were from the 1,500 live-sighting files of which only 496 contained Agency reporting. The agreed-upon Inter-Agency guidelines were used in deleting identification of sources, names of Agency personnel, place acquired, liaison involvement, and methods of acquisition. DIA PW-MIA appreciated our Agency's cooperation and [redacted] effort is particularly noteworthy.

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2. Response to the Committee's letter: During ADDO'S 4 December one-on-one with DCEA, the wording of the response letter to the Committee was raised. You should be receiving the draft of this letter [redacted] in-part reads "It has be(b)(3) CIAAct agency practice to provide all information on PW-MIA's to DIA and this information should be available in their files. In response to your request, we are undertaking a review of all files held by the Agency which bear on this issue to ensure that all pertinent data has been passed to DIA."

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

3. [redacted] PW-MIA: This component is being formed with [redacted] the Chief to review our files on PW-MIA's and ensure that all the reporting on this issue has been forwarded to DIA. All archived files on the subject are being retrieved and will be reviewed. We will also look at substantive issues such as programs in Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia associated with our operational and collection activities on PW-MIA's. [redacted]

[redacted] will be [redacted] We have discussed with [redacted] the need for additional funding for [redacted] to assist with this project. [redacted] the [redacted] provide administrative assistance as required and [redacted] are working on locating office space for the group. We are receiving excellent cooperation from all concerned and [redacted] has been particularly helpful with several aspects of the program.

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) 10 USC 424

4. The KGB Connection: [redacted] met with former KGB General Oleg Kalugin on 29 November to discuss PW-MIA issues. Kalugin made it clear he was not intimately familiar with the subject and those statements he did make were not supported by facts. See the attached cable for further details. Also attached is a 1982 CIA report [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)

[redacted] heard from KGB General Grigoriyev that 2,000 POW's from the Vietnam war had been incarcerated in the Soviet Union for "ideological retraining." [redacted] comment was included in this report which in part said that CIA records contain no information that Grigoriyev held a leading position in the KGB and that the report merits little if any credence from analysts.

5. Call to Security Duty Officer on Alleged POW's: The PW-MIA Office at the Pentagon is investigating the call made to our Security Duty Officer on 2 December by an alleged Navy Seal reporting a sighting of MIA's in Cambodia. [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] talked with anyone on this subject as claimed in the report and DIA PW-MIA has not been able to identify the individual who claimed to be Lt. Demarco. They are going to follow this up with the Seal Team in Coronado, California, and will advise when further details are obtained.

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PW-MIA File Pow MIA

JOINT STAFF INFO SERVICE CENTER +++EXCLUSIVE+++

IMMEDIATE ZLYV RUEHMCA4410 3361956
C 021958Z DEC 91
FM [redacted] (b)(3) 10 USC 424
TO DIA WASHDC
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC/ [redacted]

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02

SECRET

S-1438-91

SUBJECT: POW-MIA ISSUES (U)

1. (C) ON FRIDAY EVENING 29 NOVEMBER 1991 [redacted] MET WITH FORMER [redacted] TO DISCUSS ONGOING POW/MIA ISSUES. FROM THE VERY START [redacted] MADE IT CLEAR THAT ALTHOUGH HE WAS MENTIONED IN THE PRESS, HE WAS NOT INTIMATELY FAMILIAR WITH SUBJECT AND COULD NOT PROVIDE ANYTHING MORE THAN AN OVERVIEW OF EVENTS AS HE REMEMBERS THEM. (b)(1)

2. (S) [redacted] INVOLVEMENT IN POW INTERROGATION WAS MINIMAL. UNTIL AN AGREEMENT ON THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WAS SIGNED BY THE KGB AND ITS VIETNAMESE COUNTERPART--ABOUT 1977 OR 1978--HE WAS NOT SURE OF THE EXACT YEAR--CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES WAS VIRTUALLY NON-EXISTENT. AFTER THE AGREEMENT WAS IN PLACE. THE VIETNAMESE REQUESTED KGB ASSISTANCE IN "DISMANTLING" THE U.S. EMBASSY IN SAIGON, WHICH THE KGB WAS HAPPY TO DO. AFTER THIS EVENT, THE KGB IN A LOW KEY MANNER, REQUESTED AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO A FEW U.S. POWS THAT MAY STILL HAVE BEEN HELD IN VIETNAM. (NOTE: KALUGIN STATED THAT AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF AMERICAN POWS IN 1977-1978 WERE KEPT BY THE VIETNAMESE, BUT DID NOT KNOW FOR WHAT PURPOSE.) REASON FOR THE REQUEST WAS TO ASSESS SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT EFFECTIVENESS AND IN TURN, FAMILIARIZE THEMSELVES WITH U.S. DOCTRINE. A THREE (OR POSSIBLY) FOUR MAN TEAM WAS DISPATCHED TO VIETNAM--LOCATION UNKNOWN--AND A LIST OF U.S. POWS WAS PROVIDED TO THE SOVIET SIDE--NUMBER OR NAMES UNKNOWN--FROM WHICH THE KGB TEAM PICKED THREE INDIVIDUALS: ONE WAS A "SENIOR" NAVAL OFFICER--RANK UNKNOWN--AN AIR FORCE PILOT, AND A SUSPECTED CIA-RELATED PERSON. AN EFFORT TO TURN THESE INDIVIDUALS WAS MADE AT THAT TIME. KALUGIN DID MENTION, HOWEVER, THAT AN ATTEMPT TO CONTACT THE THREE AMERICANS IN THE UNITED STATES A FEW YEARS LATER WAS UNSUCCESSFUL.

[Large redacted block]

3. (S) IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT GENERAL KALUGIN IS NOT IN THE MAINSTREAM OF POW ISSUES, NOR DOES HE BELIEVE, FROM A KGB PERSPECTIVE, THAT THE ISSUE IS BONA FIDE AND NOT A FABRICATION. FIRST HE FEELS THAT DURING THE 1970'S BREZHNEV (AND BY ASSOCIATION, ANDROPOV) WAS VERY CAREFUL

ACTION: MR. SASEK/DIA (b)(3) 10 USC 424

ACTION [redacted]

(M,C)

MCN=91336/05887

TOR=91336/2044Z

TAD=91336/2315Z

CDSN=MIA530

+++EXDIS+++++

SECRET SPECAT

PAGE 1 OF 1
021958Z DEC 91
C2 SECT MSG

TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES. SECONDLY, HE NOTES THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE HAVE BEEN VERY PRO-AMERICAN ALL ALONG. NOT JUST AFTER PERESTROIKA: IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO HIDE A U.S. POW, UNLESS IN VERY CONFINED AREAS, BUT FOR WHAT PURPOSE? THIRDLY, TRUTH IS BREAKING OUT ALL OVER. NO ONE CAN KEEP A SECRET AND THERE ARE MANY THAT WOULD STOP AT NOTHING TO DISCREDIT THE FORMER REGIME BY GOING PUBLIC IF IN FACT AMERICAN POW WERE IN THE USSR.

4. (S) [redacted] DID GO OUT OF HIS WAY TO STATE THAT AMERICANS COULD BE RESIDING IN THE USSR, BUT ADDED THAT THIS HAS TO BE LOOKED AT ON A CASE-TO-CASE BASIS. FOR EXAMPLE: AN AMERICAN POW COULD HAVE MET AND MARRIED A RUSSIAN WOMAN AND RETURNED WITH HER TO THE SOVIET UNION. HERE HE CITED THAT THIS MIGHT BE THE CASE OF SOMEONE LIKE THE AMERICAN SUPPOSEDLY LIVING IN SARYSHAGAN, QUICKLY ADDING THAT HE PERSONALLY DOES NOT BELIEVE THE STORY. AT THIS POINT [redacted] SURPRISED ALUSNA BY STATING BT
SECRET SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 34410

THAT ALTHOUGH HE UNDERSTOOD CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST, ESPECIALLY IN AN ELECTION YEAR, HE COULD NOT QUITE UNDERSTAND THE SUDDEN AND ALMOST INTENSE INTEREST THAT THE U.S. WAS SHOWING ON THE POW ISSUE, STATING THAT WE HAD MANY MORE POW/MIAS DURING THE KOREAN WAR WITHOUT TODAY'S FERVOR. RO SUMMARIY EXPLAINED THAT CIRCUMSTANCES WERE IN FACT, NOT SIMILAR.

5. (C) [redacted] IS AN INTERESTING CASE STUDY. HE IS VERY WESTERN IN HIS DRESS AND MANNERISMS--LIVED IN THE U.S. FOR FIVE YEARS, SPEAKS EXCELLENT ENGLISH (AMERICAN)--STUDIED AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN 1958, IS URBANE, POLISHED AND VERY CONGENIAL. HE IS A FORMER USSR PEOPLES' DEPUTY; HE CONTINUES TO BE ENGAGED IN GOVERNMENT BUT AS A CONSULTANT. HE APPEARS TO BE, HOWEVER, ON THE MARGINS CONCERNING THE POW/MIA QUESTION AND HAS PROBABLY EXHAUSTED HIS OWN KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT.

6.(C) BECAUSE OF THE POTENTIALLY DAMAGING INFORMATION ADDRESSED IN PARAGRAPH TWO ABOVE, EMBASSY IS TREATING THIS AS A SPECAT/EXDIS MATTER.

7.(C) EMBASSY INTER-AGENCY GROUP WOULD APPRECIATE ANALYSIS AND ANY FEEDBACK ON INFORMATION PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH TWO, BUT WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED IN LEARNING MORE ABOUT THE GRU CONNECTION AND HOW THIS COULD BE FURTHER PURSUED.

8.(C) NEXT STEP: AWAIT KALUGIN'S CALL TO SEE IF FORMER SUBORDINATE AND SOVIET TEAM CHIEF WOULD BE WILLING TO TALK TO US.
DECL: OADR BT

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NatSecAct

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NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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Foreign Intelligence Information Report

(b)(3) NatSecAct

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

REPORT CLASS. ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L - W I N I N T E L~~ REPORT NO. [redacted]
~~NOFORN~~

COUNTRY USSR

DATE DISTR.

12 March 1982

(b)(3) CIAAct

SUBJECT Alleged Soviet Incarceration of U.S. Vietnam Prisoners of War (DOI: 1970)

REFERENCES [redacted]

SOURCE

(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
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SUMMARY: According to KGB Lieutenant General Petr Ivanovich Grigoriyev, specially selected U.S. prisoners of war were being received into the Soviet Union circa 1970 for long term or lifetime incarceration and "ideological retraining." He implied the number involved to be about 2,000. The goal of the program was indefinite, but involved intensive psychological investigation of the prisoners and retraining to make them available as required to serve the needs of the Soviet Union. Grigoriyev made the comment [redacted]

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

1. [redacted] This report should be read with caution. [redacted]

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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[Redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(3) CIAAct

[Redacted]

the USSR, much less that 2,000 such individuals are leading "reasonably normal lives" in the same region where numerous Soviet political prisoners have resided in exile.

(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)

[Redacted]

[Redacted] from analysts. However, in light of continuing high interest in the question of U.S. personnel still listed as missing in action in Southeast Asia, this report is being disseminated with appropriate caveats to concerned members of the U.S. Intelligence Community.)

2. [Redacted] which was held circa 1970, KGB Lieutenant General Petr Ivanovich ((Grigoriyev)) stated that many specially selected U.S. prisoners of war were being received from North Vietnam for long term or lifetime custody and "ideological re-training" in the Soviet Union. [Redacted] Grigoriyev did not state specifically the number of prisoners involved. The term he used was "v poryadke neskol'kikh tysyach v nas tozhe yest'" which translates as "on the order of several thousand," implying the number to be about 2,000). The prisoners were destined for confinement at a facility near Perm. Grigoriyev, who learned of the program from an unnamed high level KGB colleague, understood that Soviets rather than North Vietnamese were involved in the initial selection process and that participants were to be continually assessed for suitability. He implied that individuals determined to be unsuitable would be eliminated and replaced with other [Redacted] Grigoriyev made his comment while serving as a political ideologist and personnel officer at the All-Union Scientific-Technical Information Center of the State Committee for Science and Technology in Moscow. He had previously served as Chief of the KGB's Personnel Directorate and in that capacity would have very likely made contacts among KGB officials subsequently responsible for organizing any such prisoner program.)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

3. According to Grigoriyev, the goals of the U.S. prisoner program were indefinite but involved intensive psychological studies of the individuals and utilization of them as required to serve the needs of the Soviet Union. Grigoriyev understood that the detention facility was not a standard prison, but rather one in which inmates could lead reasonably normal lives. [Redacted] Grigoriyev recalled that precedents existed for such a program in the Soviet Union and cited similar previous efforts with Spanish, Japanese, and Chinese nationals. He stated that in past programs, participants were encouraged to marry Soviet women.

(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct


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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT
TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

(b)(3)
CIAAct


~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~



(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

5. Grigoriyev volunteered the information regarding the Vietnam prisoners [redacted] during the late 1960's and early 1970's. His duties were not particularly demanding after his years as an administrator in the KGB. He was often finished with his work in the early afternoon and, rather than go home or engaged in outside interests, held informal discussions in his office. [redacted]



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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

FORM 2291 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONTINUATION SHEET

000351

[Redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

[Redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct

6. Grigoriyev was trained as a professional military officer and served in the tank troops during World War II. After the war he was assigned to the Party Central Committee as an army representative. In the period 1953-1954 he became KGB Deputy Chief for Personnel. He subsequently became critical of the recruitment policies of KGB head Vladimir Yefimovich ((Semichastnyy)) and was transferred from his position to that of KGB Security Chief for Soviet Bloc nations. Soon thereafter he developed a heart ailment and retired. In the late 1960's he accepted the position at the Information Center.

7. General Skrynnik joined the Russian cavalry in 1917 and subsequently entered the Odessa artillery school. Upon graduation he was assigned to the Zhitomir military district. In 1931 he entered the Frunze Military Academy. He advanced rapidly and in the 1933-1934 period was sent to China as Deputy Military Attache. He joined Mao's long march and began to establish intelligence agent networks for the Soviet Union. He remained in China until 1942 except for a brief return in 1939 to establish an intelligence school in Moscow for China operations. In the spring of 1942 he was recalled from China to become chief of intelligence on the northwestern front, where he remained for the duration of the war. After the war he was assigned as Soviet representative to the Berlin Joint Commission for Repatriation. After serving in Berlin from 1945 to 1949 he returned to Moscow as either chief or deputy chief for intelligence at the Frunze Academy. He then served as Deputy Intelligence Chief of the Far Eastern Military District. He retired from the military in 1953. Skrynnik was subsequently recalled to duty to re-establish agent networks in China after the China-USSR split but refused to leave retirement.

[Redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

REPORT CLASS C O N F I D E N T I A L

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[Redacted]

ALL

PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

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OCA Record

~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency

OCA FILE: SSPOW
RECEIPT #: _____

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 5098-91

27 DEC 1991

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to your letter of December 12, 1991, concerning the possibility of US POWs/MIAs in the USSR, let me assure you that the Agency is actively pursuing this issue. A senior officer of the Interrepublic Security Service (ISS), the successor organization to the former KGB Second Chief Directorate, advised the Agency on 3 December that the ISS had undertaken "an exhaustive search of available information and resources, and had come up with no indication of such presence in the USSR past or present." On 6 December the ISS passed us a written "official" response. Following is a translation of that response:

"At our request, an investigation was conducted in Kazakhstan concerning the supposed presence of an American military pilot in the village of Saryshagan, Dzhezkazgan Oblast, as presented in the newspaper 'Kommersant' (no. 42, dated 4 November 1991). The pilot was reportedly taken prisoner during the period of war in Indochina.

As a result of the investigation, which included questioning long-time residents, no information was obtained about the presence in that region at any time of an American pilot.

On our part, we also do not have any information about American military personnel located on the territory of the USSR who were missing in action during the course of military activities in Indochina."

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~

000353

~~SECRET~~

The Honorable John F. Kerry

Regarding alleged statements by retired KGB General Oleg Kalugin, reported by Australian television, that he had been involved in the interrogation of Americans in Vietnam during the 1975-1978 period, we have tasked [redacted] to ask the ISS and the Russian Republic Federal Security Service to confirm the remarks attributed to Kalugin and provide details. [redacted] was also been directed to seek guidance from those services as to how a similar inquiry can be put to the military (b)(1)elligence service, the GRU. (b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] have been asked for any information they may have on Soviet and/or East European incarceration or interrogation of POWs/MIAs from World War II, the Korean War, or the Vietnam War.

We will keep the Committee advised of any additional information that results from our discussions with the Russian [redacted]

A copy of this letter is also being provided to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

[Redacted signature box]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

for
Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

~~SECRET~~

000354

~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 5098-91/1

27 DEC 1991

The Honorable Bob Smith
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

In response to your letter of December 12, 1991, concerning the possibility of US POWs/MIAs in the USSR, let me assure you that the Agency is actively pursuing this issue. A senior officer of the Interrepublic Security Service (ISS), the successor organization to the former KGB Second Chief Directorate, advised the Agency on 3 December that the ISS had undertaken "an exhaustive search of available information and resources, and had come up with no indication of such presence in the USSR past or present." On 6 December the ISS passed us a written "official" response. Following is a translation of that response:

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

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On our part, we also do not have any information about American military personnel located on the territory of the USSR who were missing in action during the course of military activities in Indochina."

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct



~~SECRET~~

000355

SECRET

The Honorable Bob Smith

(b)(1) Regarding alleged statements by retired KGB General Oleg
(b)(3) NatSecAct Kalugin, reported by Australian television, that he had been
involved in the interrogation of Americans in Vietnam during the
1955-1978 period, we have tasked [redacted] to ask the ISS
and the Russian Republic Federal Security Service to confirm the
remarks attributed to Kalugin and provide details. [redacted]
has also been directed to seek guidance from those services as to
how a similar inquiry can be put to the military intelligence
service, the GRU. (b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] have been asked for any
information they may have on Soviet and/or East European
incarceration or interrogation of POWs/MIAs from World War II,
the Korean War, or the Vietnam War.

(b)(1) We will keep the Committee advised of any additional
(b)(3) NatSecAct information that results from our discussions with the Russian

A copy of this letter is also being provided to Chairman
Kerry.

Sincerely,

[redacted signature box]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

for Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

SECRET

000356

SECRET

SUBJECT: Letters to Senators Kerry and Smith re POWs/MIAs
in the USSR



(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

SECRET

000357

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Letters to Senator Kerry and Senator Smith-
re US POWs/MIAs in the USSR


FROM: Stanley M. Moskowitz Director of Congressional Affairs	EXTENSION	NO.: OCA 5098-91
		DATE: 26 December 1991

(b)(3) CIAAct

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. Executive Registry	26 DEC 1991		<i>[Signature]</i>	This has been coordinated with DO/C/ORMS and SA/DDO.
2.				
3. Deputy Director of Central Intelligence		12/27	<i>[Signature]</i>	
4.				
5. Director of Central Intelligence				
6.				
7. Director of Congressional Affairs				
8.				
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10.				
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13.				
14.				

Signed [Signature]



OCA Records

OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS

Routing Slip

OCA FILE: SSPOW
RECEIPT #:

	ACTION	INFO
1. D/OCA		X
2. DD/OCA		
3. D/Legislation		X
4. D/Senate Liaison	X	
5. D/House Liaison		X
6. D/Congressional Support		X
7. Admin		
8. Constituent Inquiries Officer		
9. FOIA Officer		
10. SECURITY		
11. SPECIAL ASSISTANT		X
12. DD/ICID		X

SUSPENSE

31 Dec 91
Date

Action Officer:

[Redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Remarks:

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

18 Dec 91
Name/Date

FORM 4422
EDITION DATE 6-91

000359

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
	1	DCI	X		
	2	DDCI	X		
	3	D/ICS	X		
	4	DDA			
	5	DDI			
	6	DDO	X		
	7	DDP&C			
	8	DDS&T			
	9	IG			
	10	COMPT			
	11	D/OCA	X		
	12	GC			
	13	Chm/NIC			
	14	D/PAO			
	15	DD/SA/OCA	X		
	16	LEG/OCA	X		
	17	C/PCS/DO	X		
	18				
	19				
	20				
	21				
	22				
	SUSPENSE		31 Dec 91		
			Date		

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Remarks D/OCA will respond in consultation with the DO. Please provide ES with a drop copy of the response.

ER 91-4126

Executive Secretary
17 Dec 91

Date

3637 (10-81)

000360

~~SECRET~~

SPOT REPORT

4 NOVEMBER 1992

UPDATE ON COMMITTEE REQUEST FOR NATIONAL WARNING FILES

Further to our Spot Report on 3 November, on 5 November NIO Officer for Warning Charlie Allen chaired a meeting with OCA and EA/ICOG to discuss the request from the Senate Select Committee for POW-MIA Affairs for access to information held in a vast array of Warning Center files. Mr. Allen described the joint nature of the Warning Center files (which are administered jointly for the DCI, but not as a purely CIA activity), the extreme sensitivity of many of the files, the fact that many of the items belong to other Government agencies, and the fact that the files contain no separate repository of POW-MIA information such as the Committee is seeking.

In short, Mr. Allen is most reluctant to afford the Committee untrammelled access to information contained in the Warning Center files. He proposed that the Warning Center chief and an NIO Warning Officer physically review the file holdings at the Joint Warning Center at the Pentagon, to ensure themselves that they are not holding any POW information of value to the Committee. By early next week we will have the results of their search. Unless the search develops something of specific value to the Committee, we plan to respond to the Committee to the effect that we have thoroughly reviewed our Warning files, but that our search has failed to uncover the type of information they are seeking.

The other part of the requirement, for all intelligence reports on American military prisoners held during the Korean War and all Cold War incidents, is being pursued through IMS and OIR, but neither element was especially hopeful about locating comprehensive reporting on those topics at this late date.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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000361

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EA/ICOG Spot Report - 4 November 1992

On 4 November Major General Loeffke, Chief of the Army's Task Force Russia, made an introductory visit to ICOG with his deputy, Col. Herrington, and a Russian analyst. CE Division POW referent [redacted] participated in the meeting. We (b)(3) CIAAct briefed the general on who does what here with regard to POW/MIA issues. Gen. Loeffke expressed complete satisfaction with the support he has received to date from CIA, and said he had no problems. C/ICOG pledged our continuing assistance via the ICOGPOW Branch and CE Division. The visitors reiterated the need to deliver requested information directly to them rather than via DIA, for greater efficiency; we promised to do so. (The DIA Chief of Staff has confirmed this arrangement via memorandum.) The general asked if we had any information supporting the sometimes heard allegation that American POW's were moved to the Soviet Union during the Korean War. We said we do not. [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(6)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] On reading the report, Gen. Loeffke was satisfied that he could testify accurately to the Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs concerning his knowledge of it. [redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct promised to pass on immediately any additional pertinent information which we receive. The DO's working relationship with Task Force Russia is functioning smoothly.

(b)(3) CIAAct

Following this meeting, [redacted] told us that DC/CE had asked her to draft a memorandum recommending that an Agency-wide entity be established to handle the proliferation of POW-MIA questions which both EA and CE are constantly being asked to handle.

~~SECRET~~

000362

~~S E C R E T~~

Other: We researched a number of items in response to requests made by the three DIA (PW-MIA) visitors of last week, and have prepared some replies for them. We also responded to several specific requests from the DoD CDO to declassify certain items; from DIA (PW-MIA) to review an FOIA request involving the Nhommarath detention facility and a new DIA study on American POW's in Laos; and to other requests from the DASD, the U.S.-Russian Joint Task Force, and the State Department. And the beat goes on.

Since three of our contract employees area away teaching our Branch has fluctuated in strength from two to four people over the past two weeks.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

~~S E C R E T~~

000363

~~SECRET~~

ICOGPOW Weekly Highlights - 5 November 1992

Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs: On 30 October two Committee investigators visited Headquarters to examine numerous intelligence reports and other documents we had located and assembled at their request, concerning several cases centering on Laos. The investigators' perusal of the documents led to their raising a number of further questions, which we have since been researching. They expressed their appreciation for our thoroughness and responsiveness.

On 30 October we received three additional requests from the Committee, all of which we researched and answered on 2 November. On 2 November we received another Committee request, this one an ambitious, sweeping requirement for access to numerous sensitive National Warning Center files, as well as for all intelligence reports on U.S. military POW's from the Korean and Cold wars. The NIO Warning Office is physically checking its file holdings, preparatory to our replying to the first part of the requirement. We have asked OIR and IMS to search for the intelligence reports, but neither was especially hopeful about being about to locate Cold War reports catalogued as such, or the quite dated Korean War reports.

For the third time, the Committee is asking the Director for full access to our [redacted] thick volumes of [redacted] (b)(1) operational files. The matter is now being discussed at (b)(3) NatSecAct Directorate level. We prepared written reasons why we should not allow this, as well as proposed positions should the DCI decide to permit such access. The Committee will present its final report (reportedly in conflicting majority and minority versions) by 17 December, and expire on 2 January 1993. DIA expects the Committee will call for an investigation of DIA by the next Congress.

The Committee will depose former Czech defector Sejna this week, and he may be called to testify in an open Committee hearing on 11 November. [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(6)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Task Force Russia: On 4 November Major General Loeffke, his deputy, and an analyst from Task Force Russia paid an introductory visit to ICOG. The general said he is very pleased with the cooperation and support he is receiving from CIA (ICOG and CE Division). We pledged to continue to assist them. We discussed some specific cases of interest to the Task Force.

~~SECRET~~

000364

(Written for CEA)

~~SECRET~~

4 November 1992

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

I. Reasons Not to Permit Senate Committee Staffers to Review Our [redacted] Operational Files

- They are full of "sources and methods"-type data;
- It sets a dangerous and irreversible precedent for the Agency and this Directorate to do so. Any Congressional Committee will henceforth demand the same kind of access.
- Committee members' threats of inevitable criticism of the Agency should not deter us from maintaining our standards of protecting sources and methods, or scare us into throwing away 45 years of strict and uncompromising standards for protecting DO documents;
- We can assure them that the FI contained in the files has already been extracted and declassified for the Library of Congress, and that the operational information in the files was pursued insofar as possible at the time, and will not now produce any new or different information;
- Some documents in the files came from other Government agencies (i.e., we are not authorized to pass them);
- Some items, such as memoranda from former NSC POW specialist Richard Childress, were clearly intended as privacy items between the Executive Branch and this Agency;
- Their search will inevitably lead to requests for other operational traffic and other files (e.g., on agents mentioned in these generic files), [redacted]

[redacted] (b)(1) Where would the (b)(3) NatSecAct search end?

--The Committee has a demonstrated propensity to leak sensitive data to the Washington Times [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

- The fact that a sane investigator like Art Grant does the review does not prevent the information from getting into the hands of the more extreme investigators on the Committee staff, who are prone to leak it or lie about it;
- The Director has twice denied the Committee full access to the files. Why should he roll over now, just because it is their third try? The entire Agency is counting on the Director to hold his ground. Why? Because he is right.

II. If we Lose, our position should be:

-All of the declassifiable FI in the files has already been extracted and declassified, for passage to the Library of Congress via the DoD POW-MIA Central Documentation Office. (Some of the documents are still being processed prior to

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000365

~~SECRET~~(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

passage, but the extraction and declassification steps have been done.) We have done this in response to the Executive Order. These amount to over 200 documents. Some (possibly 30) others were denied because of their sensitivity, [redacted] or gory descriptions of the deaths of servicemen which we did not want their next of kin to see. In other words, we are not holding back any factual information on POW-MIA matters. Would they be satisfied with seeing these items? (I doubt it. Unfortunately, it is not this information they are after, but the operational traffic, which seems to tantalize them.)

There is some misunderstanding on the part of Committee investigators Taylor and McCreary as to what the files contain in terms of operational (b)(1) information. They have seen examples of our [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] parts to run down the initial intelligence reports on [redacted] and seem to think that the files contain many other like items; i.e., that every intel report we received launched a major effort to corroborate it. Some did, and some didn't. The files contain many dead ends. Some efforts ended with no explanation, and we are unable to learn the reasons now. Vientiane Station, the source of some of the information of greatest interest to the investigators, no longer exists. This information cannot be pursued any farther at this late date. The information we acquired was pursued as far as possible, within the capabilities of the Stations, at that time. Our experience in trying to locate refugee sources of reports 20 and more years old (as one example) is that it is nearly always an impossible task. In other words, we see their search as rather quixotic and impractical, an academic exercise at best, and enormously time-consuming. If we are to open up the operational files, the Committee investigator must understand this, and not task us with a hundred new requests which will be impossible to satisfy these many years later [redacted] (b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

-If we lose, we must establish precise guidelines as to just how far the Committee's researches can take them. For example, will we put a time limit on it? We are dealing with an unlimited number of possibilities with regard to the questions they can raise after reviewing [redacted] thick files. Are we to accept tasking of this magnitude? It won't lead anywhere anyway. At the minimum, we would have to discuss the terms of the agreement before just rolling over and letting them task us ad infinitum. (The workload this might entail could be [redacted] (b)(1) enormous.) (b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~

000366

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 3306-92.

17 November 1992

Ms. Frances Zwenig
Staff Director
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Ms. Zwenig:

We are sending as an enclosure to this letter a memorandum classified SECRET which responds in detail to the Committee's questions about [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct statements on POWs.

[redacted] recollection of information he (b)(3) NatSecAct supplied in the past is not supported by the record. While we ask that the details of the debriefing remain classified, the substance of the report is that at no time before 1992 did [redacted] provide information to this (b)(3) NatSecAct Agency on POWs in or from Korea or Indochina.

Let me know if I may be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

[redacted signature]

(b)(6)

John L. Breckenridge
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

Enclosure

Downgrade to UNCLASSIFIED
When Separated From Enclosure

[redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~

000367

OCA 3306-92

SUBJECT: Letter to Frances Zwenig, POW/MIA Affairs Cmte
re [redacted] Debriefing Statements

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] (17 Nov 92)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

Distribution:

- Original - Addressee (w/encl)
- 1 - C/EA/ICOG (w/o encl)
- 1 - C/ORMS [redacted] (w/o encl)
- 1 - OCA Records (w/encl)
- 1 - POW/MIA Subject File (w/encl)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

000369

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

000370

~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

SUBJECT: Information for Passage to the Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs Regarding [redacted] Information about POWs (b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM:	(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)	EXTENSION	DATE SENT	REQUEST NUMBER
			5 Nov 92	0025/293-92

	TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1.	DC/ORMS [redacted]	5	[initials]		[Large empty comment box]
2.	DC/ORMS (b)(3) CIAAct	5 NOV	1992		
3.	C/ORMS	6 NOV	1992		
4.	SA/DDO		[initials]		
5.	ADDO		11.6		
6.	DDO			✓	
7.	OCA/Senate			(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)	
8.				(b)(1)	
9.				(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5)	
10.					
11.					
12.					

SUSPENSE DATE: [redacted]

RETURN TO: [redacted]

To [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
[redacted] [redacted] info (b)(3) CIAAct
[redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

FORM 8-87 4283

~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

000371

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

SUBJECT: Responses to 20 October Requests from Senate Select Committee for POW/MIA Affair (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)

FROM: [redacted] C/EA/ICOG (b)(3) CIAAct [redacted]
EXTENSION: [redacted]
DATE SENT: 24 Nov 92
REQUEST NUMBER: 0025/309-92

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) **DATE** **OFFICER'S INITIALS** **COMMENTS** (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)

1.	TO	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1.	(b)(3) CIAAct		11/25		(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)
2.	Chief, FA (b)(3) CIAAct				
3.	C/ORMS [redacted]		30/11/92		
4.	DC/ORMS		01 DEC 1992		
5.	C/ORMS		01 DEC 1992		
6.	SA/DDO [redacted]		2/12		
7.	ADDO (b)(3) CIAAct		12.3		
8.	DDO			✓	
9.	O/OCA/S [redacted]		03 DEC 1992		
10.	(b)(3) CIAAct				
11.					
12.					

SUSPENSE DATE: [redacted]

RETURN TO: [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

FORM 9-87 4283

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

000372

~~S E C R E T~~

23 November 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Breckenridge
Chief, Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director of Operations

FROM: (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

SUBJECT: Responses to 20 October Requests
from Senate Select Committee for
POW/MIA Affairs

REFERENCE: Committee letter of 20 October 1992

1. The following are our responses to the two separate requests made in the Committee's letter of 20 October 1992.

2. With regard to information contained in the classified files of the National Warning Staff (NWS) and the Office of the NIO for Warning which might be of value to the Committee, a thorough review of all NWS and NIO/Warning classified files was undertaken. On 7 November two NWS officers examined the contents of NWS classified files. All the files were inventoried and searched. Other files of potential interest were also searched for possible POW-MIA information, such as files on Vietnam, China and Korea. On 20 November one of the two officers completed a search of a file drawer that had been overlooked during the first search.

3. On 12 November an NWS officer requested an inventory of all NWS and NIO/Warning archived materials. Two officers examined the entire archive file and determined that two files, one identified as Vietnam and one as Korea, might hold information of interest to the Committee. Both files were received on 13 November, and each document in them was examined by both officers. However, neither file contained any information within the scope of the reference request.

4. The NWS files contained several documents, both classified intelligence disseminations and open press reports, which related to POW-MIA issues. These were closely examined. Both of the CIA-originated classified reports had already been disseminated among the intelligence community

~~S E C R E T~~

000373

~~SECRET~~

some time ago.

[Redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[Redacted] an October 1991 report on normalization of relations with Vietnam.

5. The search did not turn up any separate files specific to POW-MIA issues, nor were any independent research papers on the POW-MIA topic located in the files.

6. As a result of this exhaustive search, the Office of the NIO for Warning is satisfied that the NWS and NIO/Warning files do not contain any documents which would be of value to the Committee as stated in its request.

7. With regard to the second part of the 20 October request, for CIA intelligence disseminations pertaining to American POW's held during the Korean and Cold Wars, we initiated an automated search for documents in those categories. This revealed a number of documents, many of which had originated with other U.S. Government agencies. Once we obtain the CIA documents from our archives, we will forward them to you. In the meantime, we have located four CIA reports from 1954 and 1955 which pertain to American POW's in North Korea, Russia and China, which are attached. We are also passing copies of these reports to Task Force Russia.

[Redacted]

Attachments: Four reports

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~

000374

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

22 November 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Review of National Warning Staff and NIO/Warning files and Archived Materials

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

1. On 7 November 1992, National Warning Staff (NWS) members [redacted] inventoried the contents of NWS classified files. The search was systematic and thorough; all file drawers were searched, an inventory was developed, and all materials that were either loose or in unmarked files were individually examined. Additionally, any files that indicated any potential for interest, such as all files on Vietnam, China, and Korea, were individually searched for possible information. On 20 November, [redacted] informed [redacted] that one additional file drawer was unintentionally overlooked. [redacted] completed a search of the remaining files on that same day.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

2. [redacted] requested an inventory of all NWS and NIO/Warning archived materials from [redacted] of the DDI Registry on 12 November. [redacted] examined the entire archive file list and determined that two files, one identified as Vietnam and the other as Korea, could potentially hold information relevant to a Congressional request. Both files arrived at CIA Headquarters on 13 November and each document was examined by both [redacted]. Neither file contained information within the scope of the inquiry.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

3. Within the NWS files there were several documents, clandestine reports and open press reports, that were identified as relating to POW/MIA issues. A file was developed and forwarded to [redacted] DO/EA. There were no specific files located in the search that related to POW/MIA issues, nor were there any independent research papers on the topic in the files.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

4. [redacted] is writing a formal response to the Congressional inquiry for the Office of Congressional Affairs, CIA. He is planning to draw on information provided in this memorandum for the record.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

000375

JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS,
Chairman
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, SOUTH DAKOTA
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Vice Chairman
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JESSE HELMS, NORTH CAROLINA

FRANCES A. ZWENIG, STAFF DIRECTOR
J. WILLIAM CODINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

October 20, 1992

Mr. John Breckenridge
Office of Congressional Affairs
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Breckenridge:

The Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs requests the Central Intelligence Agency provide to the Committee the files of the National Indications Center and of its successor organization, the Strategic Warning Staff, that cover the period 1948 through 1975. These files contain information relating to the losses of U.S. military personnel during the major crises and conflicts of the post-war period. This material is required to support a forthcoming hearing by this Committee.

These files are in the archives of the Central Intelligence Agency, filed variously. Some are listed under the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence; some are under the Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board, and some are logged under the National Intelligence Council. In addition, one five-drawer file cabinet located in the National Warning Staff contains a large number of post-war crisis management files that are related to the investigations of the Committee.

A large amount of this information can be declassified.


Ms. Linda Whitlow, Secretary for the National Intelligence Officer for Warning and the National Warning Staff, located in Room 1C925, The Pentagon, has a complete file of all materials archived by the National Indications Center and the Strategic Warning Staff. Please provide a copy of this master list to the Committee by 30 October.

*MASTER LIST
SUMM.*

000376

Mr. Breckenridge
Page Two

Additionally, as a part of this request, please provide copies of any and all intelligence reports issued by your organization that relate to or discuss the fate of U.S. military personnel captured during the Korean War and captured during the various crises during the cold war, after World War II.

Sincerely, 



J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel

(b)(6)

JWC/kb/wl

000377

REPORT
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REPORT
2

000386

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as amended. The transmission or revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.

INFORMATION REPORT

~~SECRET~~

COUNTRY	USSR (Far East)	REPORT NO.	(b)(3) NatSecAct
SUBJECT	Exploitation of Prisoners-of-War of the Soviets	DATE DISTR.	24 March 1954
DATE OF INFO.	[Redacted]	NO. OF PAGES	1
PLACE ACQUIRED	[Redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1)	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
		REFERENCES	

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
 THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
 (FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE:

[Redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

1. [Redacted] the Soviet Intelligence Service is exploiting United Nations, particularly US, PWs in China and North Korea. He believes that some PWs listed as missing were in fact turned over to the Soviets by the Chinese and North Koreans. These PWs will be screened by the Soviets, and those eventually selected will be trained to be illegal residents either in the US or in other countries where they can live as Americans.
2. Some selected PW personnel will also be used in propaganda work, especially as radio announcers because there is a shortage of that type of personnel.
3. Those PWs who are found to be unsuitable will never be released because they will have learned too much about Soviet PW handling techniques. Use will also be made of the identities and biographies of dead PWs in preparing legends of new Soviet agents.

REPORT
3

000388

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 INFORMATION REPORT

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~SECRET~~

COUNTRY	USSR/Communist China	REPORT NO.	(b)(3) NatSecAct
SUBJECT	Probable Communist Course of Action Regarding American Prisoners in Communist China	DATE DISTR.	20 December 1954
		NO. OF PAGES	2
DATE OF INFO.	12 December 1954	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
		REFERENCES	

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
 THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
 (FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

PD-32C

1. The future handling of the 13 American prisoners by Peiping, and, therefore, Moscow, will be based on a fairly simple strategy. The surfacing of the 13 men by Peiping has been designed thus far, in source's opinion, to arouse the anger of the American public, whose only recourse under the present circumstances is to appeal to the UN.
2. The Communist leaders in Peiping, undoubtedly in direct consultation with Moscow, calculated that the US would have sufficient strength at the UN to succeed in having the UN take up the US plea for UN good offices to intercede with the Chinese Communists. Such intercession would be welcomed by both Peiping and Moscow because it is, in effect, a de facto recognition of Communist China by the US. After the first UN approaches have been spurned, Communist China's Foreign Office will accept overtures for negotiations.
3. The Chinese Communists will thereupon show their "humaneness" by releasing at least the airmen, who have already been "proved" to be spies of the "warmongering American imperialists", and let them return home, possibly even in time for Christmas.
4. The cumulative result of this will be favorable world opinion for the Chinese Communists, who will be credited only with what is normally expected of a free-

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

-2-

world state, and a stronger de facto recognition of the Chinese Communist Government which has the power, independence, and sovereignty to prosecute illegal violators of its borders.

~~SECRET~~

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REPORT
4

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M

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law

~~SECRET~~

COUNTRY	USSR	REPORT NO.	(b)(3) NatSecAct
SUBJECT	RIS Interrogation and Indoctrination of PWs	DATE DISTR.	19 August 1955
DATE OF INFO	(b)(3) NatSecAct	NO. OF PAGES	2
		REQUIREMENT NO.	(b)(3) NatSecAct
		REFERENCES	

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE:

1. The Soviets have no special PW interrogation centers. It is much simpler to send an interrogator to a PW camp than it is to transfer a PW to another interrogation site, which requires planning and transportation for the prisoner and his escort. If the prisoner is someone of importance, he is brought to Moscow and placed in either the Butyrskiy prison or Lefortovo prison during interrogation. PWs selected as agent prospects are also transferred to a prison in Moscow and are housed in comfortable accommodations after recruitment.

2. Not every PW is subjected to detailed interrogation; the prisoner's importance is the determining factor. Among those considered important and subjected to detailed interrogation were German intelligence personnel, SS officers, and Germans who had held important civilian jobs in Germany.

3. (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
However, rumors circulating among MVD circles indicated that conditions were fairly decent and perhaps better than in prisons for Soviet citizens. The PWs did not gain weight in Soviet camps, but they did stay alive.

4. Interrogators were given no special training, but before being assigned to an interrogation they were instructed on the information required.

5. (b)(3) NatSecAct
Soviet interrogation techniques other than the planting of informers in prison cells. From an informer the prisoner's true identity can be learned and his importance established.

~~SECRET~~

4. 2

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NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

-2-

6. All PWs are subjected to indoctrination in Communism. Committees for a free Germany were set up among the German PWs; periodic lectures on Communism and discussions on the differences between Nazism and Leninism are also given. During interrogations, PWs are always subjected to preachings about Communism. Source could not say whether the results of these indoctrinations are successful.

000393

ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	D/ICS		X		
4	DDA				
5	DDI				
6	DDO		X		
7	DDP&C				
8	DDS&T				
9	IG				
10	COMPT				
11	D/OCA	X			
12	GC				
13	Chm/NIC				
14	D/PAO				
15	DD/SA/OCA		X		
16	LEG/OCA		X		(b)(3) CIAAct
17	C/PCS/DO		X		(b)(6)
18					
19					
20					(b)(3) CIAAct
21					(b)(6)
22					

LOOSE
18 DEC 1991
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(6)

SUSPENSE 31 Dec 91
 Date

Remarks D/OCA will respond in consultation with the DO. Please provide ES with a drop copy of the response.

ER 91-4126

Executive Secretary
17 Dec 91
 Date

3637 (10-81)

LIA 12-SR

Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Secretariat

17 Dec 71

D/OCA:

Stan -
Another fax that ^{we} will
process as an original for
time-savings. Please advise
as to how you will respond.

Styllis

000395

JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS,
Chairman
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, SOUTH DAKOTA
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ALAN C. PTAK, DEPUTY STAFF DIRECTOR
J. WILLIAM CODINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

December 12, 1991

The Honorable Robert Gates
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington DC 20505

Dear Mr. Gates:

Reports continue to surface that Soviet officials have admittedly participated in the interrogation of American POWs after 1973. Most recently, former Soviet KGB and military personnel, interviewed by the Australian "60 Minutes" program, described interrogations and live sightings of American POWs as late as 1978. Among these sources is Oleg Kalugin, a retired general in the KGB, who reportedly said he personally headed an interrogation team in Vietnam in 1975-78, that interrogated Americans.

The Committee recognizes the inherent difficulties in pursuing these matters, given the current state of disarray in the former Soviet Union. However, these difficulties should not deter this government from undertaking a quick and active investigation of these reports. We urge you to take advantage of the apparent Soviet willingness to discuss these matters openly with the western press, and dedicate intelligence resources to follow these important leads.


In particular, the opportunity may exist to establish an ongoing dialogue with Soviet intelligence services on the issue of American POW/MIAs, not only those lost in Southeast Asia but those unaccounted for in Korea and World War II. Likewise, the Committee encourages you to ascertain if other former Warsaw Pact countries may also be willing to cooperate in this regard.

Your efforts in this regard are greatly appreciated, and we ask that you keep us posted as to developments.

Sincerely,



Bob Smith
Vice Chairman



John F. Kerry
Chairman

JFK/kb

000396

Select Committee on POW / MIA Affairs

Tom Daschle, South Dakota
Harry Reid, Nevada
Charles Robb, Virginia
Bob Kerrey, Nebraska
Herb Kohl, Wisconsin

John McCain, Arizona
Hank Brown, Colorado
Charles Grassley, Iowa
Nancy Landon Kassebaum, Kansas
Jesse Helms, North Carolina

Frances A. Zwenig, Staff Director
Alan C. Ptak, Deputy Staff Director
J. William Codinha, General Counsel

United States Senate Washington, DC 20510-6500 (202) 224-2306

FAX COVER SHEET

File

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

TO:

FROM: FRANCES ZWENIG

DATE: 12.12.91

TOTAL PAGES: 2 (Including cover sheet)

=====

000397

Central Intelligence Agency

15

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA FILE: SSPDW
RECEIPT #: _____

OCA 5081-91
24 DEC 1991

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

We are in receipt of your letters dated December 12, 1991 and December 13, 1991 to Director Gates. We are in discussion with Committee staff relative to a response, which will be forthcoming shortly.

A copy of this letter is also being provided to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

/s/ Stanley M. Moskowitz

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

000398

OCA 5081-91

SUBJECT: Interim Response to Sen Simon re illegal arms shipments to South Africa

OCA/Senate [redacted] ds/37292 (23 Dec 91)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

1 - ES

1 - D/OCA

1 - OCA Records (ER 4126-91 and ER 4127-91)

1 - [redacted] Chrono

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 5081-91/1
24 DEC 1991

The Honorable Bob Smith
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

We are in receipt of your letters dated December 12, 1991 and December 13, 1991 to Director Gates. We are in discussion with Committee staff relative to a response, which will be forthcoming shortly.



A copy of this letter is also being provided to Chairman Kerry.

Sincerely,

/s/ Stanley M. Moskowitz

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

000400

TO : D/OCA	CONTROL # OCA 5081-91	DATE OF REQUEST 23 Dec 91
FROM : DD/SA 	SUSPENSE DATE	
SUBJECT : Interim Response to Sen Kerry re POW/MIA		
NOTES		
COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices)		
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
ACTION REQUIRED BY D/OCA		
For your signature 		

JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS,
Chairman
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, SOUTH DAKOTA
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Vice Chairman
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FRANCES A. ZWENIG, STAFF DIRECTOR
ALAN C. PTAK, DEPUTY STAFF DIRECTOR
J. WILLIAM CODINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

December 13, 1991

The Honorable Robert Gates
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505


Dear Director Gates:


As you are well aware, there have been numerous reports recently concerning the possible interrogation of American POWs by Soviet intelligence officers during the Vietnam War as well as the possible transfer of POWs to the Soviet Union during both the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

Although the Committee realizes that the investigation of these reports is ongoing, we would nevertheless appreciate receiving as soon as possible whatever documentation of these reports of a Soviet connection exists, including the recent debriefing of former KGB General Oleg Kalugin by the Defense Attache's Office of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and the 1955 document labeled "Re U.S. POWs in USSR." which National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft withheld this year from public release.

Please contact Frances Zwenig, Staff Director of the Select Committee, if you have any questions.

Sincerely,


Bob Smith
Vice Chairman


John F. Kerry
Chairman

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

December 12, 1991

The Honorable Robert Gates
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington DC 20505

Dear Mr. Gates:

Reports continue to surface that Soviet officials have admittedly participated in the interrogation of American POWs after 1973. Most recently, former Soviet KGB and military personnel, interviewed by the Australian "60 Minutes" program, described interrogations and live sightings of American POWs as late as 1978. Among these sources is Oleg Kalugin, a retired general in the KGB, who reportedly said he personally headed an interrogation team in Vietnam in 1975-78, that interrogated Americans.

The Committee recognizes the inherent difficulties in pursuing these matters, given the current state of disarray in the former Soviet Union. However, these difficulties should not deter this government from undertaking a quick and active investigation of these reports. We urge you to take advantage of the apparent Soviet willingness to discuss these matters openly with the western press, and dedicate intelligence resources to follow these important leads.


In particular, the opportunity may exist to establish an ongoing dialogue with Soviet intelligence services on the issue of American POW/MIAs, not only those lost in Southeast Asia but those unaccounted for in Korea and World War II. Likewise, the Committee encourages you to ascertain if other former Warsaw Pact countries may also be willing to cooperate in this regard.

Your efforts in this regard are greatly appreciated, and we ask that you keep us posted as to developments.

Sincerely,



Bob Smith
Vice Chairman



John F. Kerry
Chairman

JFK/kb

~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency

OCA FILE: SSPOW
RECEIPT #: _____



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 5098-91

27 DEC 1991

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to your letter of December 12, 1991, concerning the possibility of US POWs/MIAs in the USSR, let me assure you that the Agency is actively pursuing this issue. A senior officer of the Interrepublic Security Service (ISS), the successor organization to the former KGB Second Chief Directorate, advised the Agency on 3 December that the ISS had undertaken "an exhaustive search of available information and resources, and had come up with no indication of such presence in the USSR past or present." On 6 December the ISS passed us a written "official" response. Following is a translation of that response:

"At our request, an investigation was conducted in Kazakhstan concerning the supposed presence of an American military pilot in the village of Saryshagan, Dzhezkazgan Oblast, as presented in the newspaper 'Kommersant' (no. 42, dated 4 November 1991). The pilot was reportedly taken prisoner during the period of war in Indochina.

As a result of the investigation, which included questioning long-time residents, no information was obtained about the presence in that region at any time of an American pilot.

On our part, we also do not have any information about American military personnel located on the territory of the USSR who were missing in action during the course of military activities in Indochina."

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~

000404

~~SECRET~~

The Honorable John F. Kerry

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Regarding alleged statements by retired KGB General Oleg Kalugin, reported by Australian television, that he had been involved in the interrogation of Americans in Vietnam during the 1975-1978 period, we have tasked [redacted] to ask the ISS and the Russian Republic Federal Security Service to confirm the remarks attributed to Kalugin and provide details. [redacted] was also been directed to seek guidance from those services as to how a similar inquiry can be put to the military intelligence service, the GRU.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

The [redacted] have been asked for any information they may have on Soviet and/or East European incarceration or interrogation of POWs/MIAs from World War II, the Korean War, or the Vietnam War.

We will keep the Committee advised of any additional information that results from our discussions with the Russian and East European Services.

A copy of this letter is also being provided to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

[redacted signature box]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

~~SECRET~~

000405

OCA Records

OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS

Routing Slip

OCA FILE: SSPOW
RECEIPT #: _____

	ACTION	INFO
1. D/OCA		X
2. DD/OCA		
3. D/Legislation		X
4. D/Senate Liaison	X	
5. D/House Liaison		X
6. D/Congressional Support		X
7. Admin		
8. Constituent Inquiries Officer		
9. FOIA Officer		
10. SECURITY		
11. SPECIAL ASSISTANT		X
12. DD/ICID		X

SUSPENSE

31 Dec 91
Date

Action Officer:	<input type="text"/>	(b)(3) CIAAct
Remarks:		(b)(6)

GP 18 Dec 91
Name/Date

FORM 4422
EDITION DATE 6-91

000406

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
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2	DDCI		X		
3	D/ICS		X		
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8	DDS&T				
9	IG				
10	COMPT				
11	D/OCA	X			
12	GC				
13	Chm/NIC				
14	D/PAO				(b)(3) CIAAct
15	DD/SA/OCA		X		(b)(6)
16	LEG/OCA		X		
17	C/PCS/DO		X		
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SUSPENSE		31 Dec 91			
		Date			

Remarks D/OCA will respond in consultation with the DO. Please provide ES with a drop copy of the response.

ER 91-4126

Executive Secretary
 17 Dec 91

Date

3637 (10-81)

Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Secretariat

17 Dec 91

D/OCA:

Stan -
Another fax that ^{we} will
process as an original for
time-savings. Please advise
as to how you will respond.

Styllis

000408

JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS,
 Chairman
 THOMAS A. DASCHLE, SOUTH DAKOTA
 HARRY REID, NEVADA
 CHARLES S. ROBB, VIRGINIA
 J. ROBERT KERREY, NEBRASKA
 HERBERT H. KOHL, WISCONSIN

BOB SMITH, NEW HAMPSHIRE,
 Vice Chairman
 JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA
 HANK BROWN, COLORADO
 CHUCK GRASSLEY, IOWA
 NANCY LONDON KASGEBaum, KANSAS
 JESSE HELMS, NORTH CAROLINA

FRANCES A. ZWENIG, STAFF DIRECTOR
 ALAN C. PTAK, DEPUTY STAFF DIRECTOR
 J. WILLIAM CODINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

December 12, 1991

The Honorable Robert Gates
 Director
 Central Intelligence Agency
 Washington DC 20505

Dear Mr. Gates:


Reports continue to surface that Soviet officials have admittedly participated in the interrogation of American POWs after 1973. Most recently, former Soviet KGB and military personnel, interviewed by the Australian "60 Minutes" program, described interrogations and live sightings of American POWs as late as 1978. Among these sources is Oleg Kalugin, a retired general in the KGB, who reportedly said he personally headed an interrogation team in Vietnam in 1975-78, that interrogated Americans.


The Committee recognizes the inherent difficulties in pursuing these matters, given the current state of disarray in the former Soviet Union. However, these difficulties should not deter this government from undertaking a quick and active investigation of these reports. We urge you to take advantage of the apparent Soviet willingness to discuss these matters openly with the western press, and dedicate intelligence resources to follow these important leads.

In particular, the opportunity may exist to establish an ongoing dialogue with Soviet intelligence services on the issue of American POW/MIAs, not only those lost in Southeast Asia but those unaccounted for in Korea and World War II. Likewise, the Committee encourages you to ascertain if other former Warsaw Pact countries may also be willing to cooperate in this regard.

Your efforts in this regard are greatly appreciated, and we ask that you keep us posted as to developments.

Sincerely,


 Bob Smith
 Vice Chairman


 John F. Kerry
 Chairman

JFK/kb

John F. Kerry, Massachusetts, Chairman
Bob Smith, New Hampshire, Vice Chairman

Select Committee on

POW / MIA Affairs

Tom Daschle, South Dakota
Harry Reid, Nevada
Charles Robb, Virginia
Bob Kerrey, Nebraska
Herb Kohl, Wisconsin

John McCain, Arizona
Hank Brown, Colorado
Charles Grassley, Iowa
Nancy Landon Kassebaum, Kansas
Jesse Helms, North Carolina

Frances A. Zwenig, Staff Director
Alan C. Plak, Deputy Staff Director
J. William Codinha, General Counsel

United States Senate Washington, DC 20510-6500 (202) 224-2306

FAX COVER SHEET

File

TO:

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

FROM: FRANCES ZWENIG

DATE: 12.12.91

TOTAL PAGES: 2 (including cover sheet)

=====

000410

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

SUBJECT: Response to 12 December 1991 Letter from Senators Kerry and Smith for Information Concerning U.S. POWs/MIAs in the Former USSR

FROM: C/ORMS/CCA 6U02 NHB	(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)	EXTENSION 75319	DATE SENT 24 Dec. 1991	REQUEST NUMBER DD/O 0025/138-91
----------------------------------------	-------------------------	---------------------------	-------------------------------------	-------------------------------------------

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. DC/ORMS			JP	This revised at the request of Paul Stombaugh.
2. C/ORMS			✓	
3. SA/DDO 7E26 OHB		12-24	MS	
4. ADDO				
5. DDO (b)(3) CIAAct			✓	
6. (b)(6)				
7. [] C/OCA/S 7B00 OHB				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				

SUSPENSE DATE: []

RETURN TO: []

FORM 8-87 4283

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

CL BY 060456
DECL OADR
DTN MIS-2-82

000411

~~SECRET~~

DD/O 0025/138-91

24 December 1991

Letter to Sen Kerry + Smith

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[Redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Chief, Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA:

Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

FROM:

[Redacted]

Chief, Congressional and Covert Action Oversight
Group
Operations and Resource Management Staff

SUBJECT:

Information Concerning U.S. POWs/MIAs in the
Former USSR

REFERENCE:

Letter of 12 December 1991 from Senators John
Kerry and Bob Smith of the Select Committee on
POW/MIA Affairs to the DCI

*Let me assure you that
The Agency is actively
Pursuing the
ISSUE*

*Now Letter of 12 December
The possibility of*

1. In response to an inquiry concerning U.S. POWs/MIAs in the USSR, a senior officer of the Interpublic Security Service (ISS), the successor organization to the former KGB Second Chief Directorate, advised the Agency on 3 December that the ISS had undertaken "an exhaustive search of available information and resources, and had come up with no indication of such presence in the USSR past or present." On 6 December the ISS passed us a written "official" response. Following is a translation of that response:

"At our request, an investigation was conducted in Kazakhstan concerning the supposed presence of an American military pilot in the village of Saryshagan, Dzhezkazgan Oblast, as presented in the newspaper 'Kommersant' (no. 42, dated 4 November 1991). The pilot was reportedly taken prisoner during the period of war in Indochina.

"As a result of the investigation, which included questioning long-time residents, no information was obtained about the presence in that region at any time of an American pilot.

[Redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~

000412

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Information Concerning U.S. POWs/MIAs in the Former USSR

"On our part, we also do not have any information about American military personnel located on the territory of the USSR who were missing in action during the course of military activities in Indochina."

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

4. We will keep the Committee advised of any additional information that results from our discovery with the ~~to~~ Russian and East European sources.

ACCORDING TO WEBSTER, INQUIRY IS THE PREFERRED SPEAKING. SUGGEST CHAIRMAN MAKE SEVERAL EDITORIAL CHANGES TO CLEAR UP OBSCURE WORDING IN PAA'S 2-3.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

~~SECRET~~

000413

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Information Concerning U.S. POWs/MIAs in the Former USSR

DO/ORMS/CCA sc/x75324

(24 December 1991)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Distribution:

Original - C/OCA/Senate

1 - ORMS/CCA/Senate

1 - POW/MIA soft file

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 5098-91/1

27 DEC 1991

The Honorable Bob Smith
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

In response to your letter of December 12, 1991, concerning the possibility of US POWs/MIAs in the USSR, let me assure you that the Agency is actively pursuing this issue. A senior officer of the Interrepublic Security Service (ISS), the successor organization to the former KGB Second Chief Directorate, advised the Agency on 3 December that the ISS had undertaken "an exhaustive search of available information and resources, and had come up with no indication of such presence in the USSR past or present." On 6 December the ISS passed us a written "official" response. Following is a translation of that response:

"At our request, an investigation was conducted in Kazakhstan concerning the supposed presence of an American military pilot in the village of Saryshagan, Dzhezkazgan Oblast, as presented in the newspaper 'Kommersant' (no. 42, dated 4 November 1991). The pilot was reportedly taken prisoner during the period of war in Indochina.

As a result of the investigation, which included questioning long-time residents, no information was obtained about the presence in that region at any time of an American pilot.

On our part, we also do not have any information about American military personnel located on the territory of the USSR who were missing in action during the course of military activities in Indochina."

[Redacted area]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~

000415

~~SECRET~~

The Honorable Bob Smith

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Regarding alleged statements by retired KGB General Oleg Kalugin, reported by Australian television, that he had been involved in the interrogation of Americans in Vietnam during the 1975-1978 period, we have tasked [redacted] to ask the ISS and the Russian Republic Federal Security Service to confirm the remarks attributed to Kalugin and provide details. [redacted] has also been directed to seek guidance from those services as to how a similar inquiry can be put to the military intelligence service, the GRU.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] have been asked for any information they may have on Soviet and/or East European incarceration or interrogation of POWs/MIAs from World War II, the Korean War, or the Vietnam War.

We will keep the Committee advised of any additional information that results from our discussions with the Russian [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

A copy of this letter is also being provided to Chairman Kerry.

Sincerely,



for Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

~~SECRET~~

000416

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Letters to Senators Kerry and Smith re POWs/MIAs
in the USSR

OCA/Senate, [redacted]; jmk/37292 (26 December 1991)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Distribution (OCA 5098-91):

Original - Addressee

1 - DCI

1 - DDCI

1 - ES

1 - ER (ER 91-4126)

1 - D/OCA

1 - OCA Records

1 - [redacted] Chron

(b)(3) CIAAct

1 - Subject File

(b)(6)

~~SECRET~~

000417

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Letters to Senator Kerry and Senator Smith
re US POWs/MIAs in the USSR

FROM: Stanley M. Moskowitz Director of Congressional Affairs	EXTENSION 37605	NO. OCA 5098-91
		DATE 26 December 1991

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Executive Registry	26 DEC 1991	<i>[Signature]</i>	This has been coordinated with DO/C/ORMS and SA/DDO.
2.			
3. Deputy Director of Central Intelligence	12/27	<i>[Signature]</i>	
4.			
5. Director of Central Intelligence			
6.			
7. Director of Congressional Affairs			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

Signed [Signature]



Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 98-0134/1
24 July 1998

The Honorable Jesse A. Helms
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-3301

Dear Senator Helms:

(b)(6) This is in response to a 7 May 1998 inquiry sent to the (b)(6)
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) via facsimile by
(b)(6) of your staff. (b)(6) attached copies of
two letters from (b)(6) one of your constituents.

(b)(6) (b)(6) wrote to you (as well as to the Department of
Defense, Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Office (DPMO)), with
respect to the recovery of the remains of (b)(6)
Norman A. Schwartz, and Robert C. Snoddy, both of whom were
killed on 29 November 1952 when the plane they were flying
crashed in Kirin Province, located in eastern Manchuria, China.

The CIA is very sympathetic to (b)(6) request, and (b)(6)
would like to assist his efforts in any appropriate way. The
Agency is, nevertheless, not itself in a position to induce the
government of the People's Republic of China to cooperate in
locating and recovering Korean War era remains. We are hopeful
that redoubled US diplomatic efforts to ascertain the precise
fate of Messrs. Schwartz and Snoddy will eventually bear fruit.


To that end, we have worked with DPMO in seeking any
information China may have concerning the remains of
Messrs. Schwartz and Snoddy. I am enclosing a copy of a
19 June 1998 DPMO cable soliciting American Embassy, Beijing,
intervention with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on a
range of Korean War POW/MIA issues, including that concerning
Messrs. Schwartz and Snoddy. We very much hope that the State
Department's diplomatic efforts will enable the eventual
recovery of their remains. Meanwhile, you--(b)(6)
may rest assured that the CIA does not forget those who have made
the ultimate sacrifice in its service.

000419

The Honorable Jesse A. Helms

While the necessary US diplomatic efforts are in process, we are ready to assist in any way possible.

Sincerely,

A rectangular box with a black border, used to redact the signature of John H. Moseman.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

John H. Moseman
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

~~SECRET~~

7 February 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[Redacted]

Chief, Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

VIA:

Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM:

[Redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

SUBJECT:

Request for CIA Reporting Pertaining to Soviet
or Chinese Contact with American POWs

REFERENCE:

Letter of 22 January 1992 from Senators Kerry
and Smith of the Select Committee on POW/MIA
Affairs to the DCI

1. This is in reply to the letter of 22 January 1992 which requested intelligence information, assessments or monographs pertaining to Soviet or Chinese contact with American POWs or the movement of these POWs to the Soviet Union or China.

2. As previously reported to the Committee, an Agency officer captured during the Tet offensive in January 1968 and released in March 1973 said he was interrogated by a man he presumed was a Soviet. A copy of the relevant transcript of our debriefing of the officer on this subject is available for review at CIA Headquarters by appropriately cleared and designated Committee personnel.

3. The Deputy Director for Operations and Senator Kerry also met privately for a discussion on this subject.

4. In regard to the possible movement of American POWs in Indochina to the Soviet Union, we have been able to identify one report that falls into this category. We also located the requested [Redacted] report. These reports are available for review by appropriately cleared and designated Committee personnel.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[Redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct


~~SECRET~~

000421

~~S E C R E T~~

SUBJECT: Request for CIA Reporting Pertaining to Soviet
or Chinese Contact with American POW's

5. We have been unable to identify any intelligence assessments/monographs, NID reports, or intelligence briefings relating to Soviet or Chinese contact with American POW's during the Indochina War. We are continuing our search and will advise the Committee if we are able to locate any such material.



(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

~~S E C R E T~~

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

13 October 2021

John Clarke, Esq.
1629 K Street, NW
Suite 300
Washington, DC, 20008

Reference: *Lois Moore, et al v. CIA*, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No: 1:20-cv-01027; F-2020-00473

Dear Mr. Clarke:

This is a final response to your 25 November 2019 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request submitted by your client, Lois Moore, for the following:

1. From the period of March 16, 1954, through 1961, all records of the CIA's efforts in undertaking "clandestine and covert action to locate, identify, and recover those U.S. Prisoners of War still in Communist custody"
2. An unredacted copy of this report [January 5, 1952, *CIA Information Reports*] together with all intelligence material upon which it was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
3. Please produce the [following] referenced [in July 15, 1952, *CIA Cross Reference Sheet*]:
 - a. July 15, 1952 "Basic Communication"
 - b. June 24, 1953 "Basic Document"
 - c. Information described as "etcetera"
 - d. POW Information in, or otherwise "Router to, C.I. File"
 - e. POW information related to or bearing the "Cross Reference Number 040"
 - f. POW Information related to or bearing the "Classification Number 383.6 Korea."
4. All records regarding the June 1, 1951 shoot down and capture over North Korea of the American F-51 piloted by U.S. Air Force Captain Harry Cecil Moore, born February 11, 1924, in Elm Grove, West Virginia, service number AO 711850.
5. All records upon which the following statement from February 27, 1952 memo from Chief of Naval Personnel to Commanding General, Far East Air Force was based: "It is now believed that there is a possibility that Captain Moore survived and is now a Prisoner of War."
6. All records regarding Captain Moore's incarceration and transportation from North Korea to the Soviet Union, his locations in the Soviet Union, and all evidence that he "may have been interrogated by Soviet officials."

000423

7. An unredacted copy of July 17, 1952, three page CIA *Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
8. An unredacted copy of December 31, 1953, CIA *Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
9. An unredacted copy of March 24, 1954, CIA *Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
10. An unredacted copy of April 23, 1954, CIA *Information Report*.
11. An unredacted copy of April 27, 1954, CIA *Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
12. An unredacted copy of December 8, 1954, CIA *Information Report*.
13. Any and all information relating to this Report [January 23, 1992 cable from Embassy Helsinki to Secretary of State]
14. An unredacted copy of March 9, 1988, CIA Memorandum to "US Army Chief, Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action," together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
15. All records relating to any of the POW/MIA's names in the attached list.
16. Any and all records relating that any POW/MIAs may have been held in the prisons identified in the attached list of Russian prison camps.
17. For the period beginning June of 1951, and continuing to the present time, please produce all POW records provided to, or receive from, any office of any component of the Department of Defense, including but not limited to:
 - a. CCRAK
 - b. Air Force 6004 Air Intelligence Service Squadron during the tenure of "Project American."
 - c. Missing in Action Office, including those provided in response to the attached February 12, 1997 letter from U.S. House of Representative James Talent seeking "Intelligence pertaining to American prisoners who were taken to China and the Soviet Union during the war" as well as:
 - i. The 389 American service members who into the 1980's were listed as unaccounted prisoners of war by the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) ii. All U.S. Air Force F-86 pilots who remain unrepatriated.
 - d. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, of AFOSI
 - e. Naval Criminal Investigative Service, or NCIS
 - f. Army Criminal Investigation Command, CID
 - g. U.S. Army Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities Far East, or CCRAFE.
18. All POW records prepared by any officer, agent, or employee of the CIA, prepared for the Office of the President including the President's Daily Brief, or PDB, that include information on the possibility of POW's being transferred to the Soviet Union or China.
19. All records reflecting communications with Members of Congress, or Congressional Oversight committees concerning the capture of American airmen during the Korean

conflict who may have been transported to the Soviet Union or China and their presumed fate.

- 20. All records concerning POW's and KGB defector Yuri (or Yury) Rastvorov, who informed the United States Government that American military personnel were taken to the Soviet Union during the Korean Conflict. This request includes an unredacted version of the attached page with the heading, "Terminology".**
- 21. All intelligence material (including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports) concerning statements made by former Czech General Jan Sejna and other former Czech Officials concerning former US POWs held, interrogated and experiment on by Czech and Soviet advisors, and thereafter transferred to China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and the Soviet Union.**

We processed your request in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.

We have identified two (2) additional documents that are responsive to your request. One (1) document is being released in full. One (1) document may be released in segregable form with redactions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6). Exemption (b)(3) pertains to Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 3507, noted as exemption "(b)(3)CIAAct" on the enclosed documents, and/or Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C § 3024(i)(1), noted as exemption "(b)(3)NatSecAct" on the enclosed documents. The releaseable documents are on the enclosed CD.

With respect to request nos. 1, 5-6, 13, 16-17, and 21 above, in accordance with Section 3.6(a) of Executive Order 13526, as amended, the CIA can neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of records responsive to those requests. The fact of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself currently and properly classified and relates to intelligence sources and methods information protected from disclosure by Section 6 of the CIA Act of 1949, as amended, and Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

Request no. 4 above is identical to plaintiffs' request no. 1 in F-2017-02391. That request was addressed in our 28 March 2018 correspondence.

This completes our response to the above referenced case.

Sincerely,



Mark Lilly
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

000425

~~SECRET~~

10 November 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Committee's Request for Access to
National Indications Center (NIC) Archives

1. I attended a meeting on this subject this morning chaired by the NIO for Warning, Charlie Allen. Also present were Doug Bowman of this Office, [redacted] Scott Harris of the DO's East Asia Division and two lawyers enlisted by Allen to search the NIC files at the Pentagon in response to Senator Smith's request.

(b)(3)
CIAAct
(b)(6)

2. The two lawyers, possibly [redacted] reported that they had completed an intensive search of the files in question on Saturday, 7 November. They told us that their efforts yielded nothing of consequence on the POW/MIA issue. There was one unlabeled file that contained a few miscellaneous reports on POW/MIA matters but nothing that is not already in the Committee's possession.

(b)(3)
CIAAct
(b)(6)

3. To complete their search, the two lawyers have also made a request of the CIA Records Center to provide an index of all NIC files that have been retired [redacted] Allen [redacted] urged the lawyers not to wait for the index but to go to [redacted] and conduct a personal examination of the files. It was agreed that they would go today.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

4. Allen suggested that, pending the results of the [redacted] search, the Agency should send a "firm response" to the Committee informing it of the results of our inspection and denying its request to receive the entire files of the NIC and its successor organization, the Strategic Warning Staff, for the period 1948 through 1975. Allen pointed out that the inspection results to date demonstrate that the Committee is in error if it believes that these records contain anything relevant to the POW/MIA investigation. Moreover, he characterized this latest request as another futile "fishing expedition" being made by a group of investigators who know that their legislative charter is about to expire. [redacted] agreed to prepare a draft response for review by the Deputy Director for Senate Affairs, John Breckenridge.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

000426


5. At today's meeting [redacted] also tabled a Spot Report (attached) of a news conference which Senator Smith plans to hold today. The report states that Smith will announce that the Committee is in possession of documents allegedly showing that US prisoners were sent to the Soviet Union and that the CIA hid this information. Neither [redacted] nor myself know what documents Smith could be referring to since, to the best of our knowledge, no CIA records on the subject of US prisoners in Russia have been sent to the Committee. We are aware, however, of one "highly unreliable" 1955 report (also attached) on this topic which the Committee requested last year. The request was denied on the grounds that the source, a Russian defector living in the US, had to be protected. The Spot Report speculates on how information in this report could still have reached the Committee.

(b)(3)
CIAAct
(b)(6)

(b)(3)
CIAAct
(b)(6)

6. On return from the meeting, I informed the D/OCA of Senator Smith's news conference and commenced the search for any Agency documents on US POWs in Russia, with the results described above.

Charles F. Turgeon
Senate Liaison



(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

000427

~~SECRET~~

SPOT REPORT

10 NOVEMBER 1992

COMMITTEE PLANS TO CHARGE AGENCY

Shortly before 0900 hours on 10 November DASD/POW Affairs Alan Ptak telephoned C/EA/ICOGPOW to advise him that former Senate Select Committee for POW-MIA Affairs staffer Dino Carluccio (who lost his Committee clearance due to several security violations), a staff employee of Committee Vice Chairman Senator Smith, had reportedly gotten hold of "some classified Agency documents" stating that during the Korean War about ten American POW's were sent from Korea to Eastern Russia to a "Charm School". Mr. Ptak did not know which documents these were. Mr. Carluccio is believed to have obtained the documents "through his sources on Capitol Hill", according to Mr. Ptak.

Mr. Ptak said Sen. Smith plans to give a press conference at 1100 hours today at which he will announce the Committee's possession of documents showing that U.S. prisoners were sent to the Soviet Union, and that the CIA hid the information. Mr. Ptak is due to testify at 1400 hours today. He offered to defend the Agency, if we have any advice for him by then.

We believe the (single) report in question is the much-debated "Rastvorov Report", a report from Soviet defector Rastvorov in 1955 in which he reported hearsay information that American POW's held in Siberia would be screened by the Soviets and trained to be illegal residents in the U.S. or other countries where they could live as Americans.

This report (attached), which appears under its heading only in the Eisenhower Library, was the subject of an FOIA request to the Agency from Seattle journalist Mark Sauter. The Agency denied the report as source-indicative, a decision later appealed vehemently by Mr. Ptak. On 4 November, we showed this report to "Task Force Russia" commander Maj. Gen. Loeffke and two of his assistants when they visited ICOG, since the general raised it. Although the visitors did not take copies of the report, they could have memorized its brief contents.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~

000428

Office Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

FILE WAR Case No. 26
12
Document No.

TO : ~~EO - Mr. Stagg~~

DATE: 31 January 1955



FROM : ~~SPS - Dr. Craig~~

SUBJECT: Interview with ~~Rastvorov (former MVD)~~ concerning U.S. Prisoners of War in the USSR

On Friday, 28 January 1955, a meeting was arranged between members of the Special Projects Staff and Mr. Rastvorov. General Dale O. Smith was also present. The interview was on the subject of U.S. prisoners of war being held by the Soviets.

Mr. Rastvorov made the following important points bearing upon the subject:

1. He was told by recent arrival (1950-1953) from the Soviet Union to the USSR's Tokyo mission that U.S. and other UN POW's were being held in Siberia.
2. The POW's will be screened by the Soviets and trained to be illegal residents in U.S. or other countries where they can live as Americans.
3. Selected POW's will be used in propaganda work.
4. Use will be made of the identities and biographies of dead POW's in preparing legends for new Soviet agents.
5. The mechanism for POW control in Korea was headed by the Soviets.
6. The sentencing of the eleven U.S. POW's charged with espionage by the Chinese Communists was conceived and directed by the Soviets. The release of other Americans in Europe was part of this plot.

DENY IN FULL

1.3(a)(4)

[OCB:SPSFJCorso:mas]

SECRET

000429

NOTE TO: D/OCA
SUBJECT: POW/MIA Committee Request for Access to NIO/Warning Archives, 1948-1975

We met on 4 November with Charlie Allen, who has command over the National Warning Staff, its files and archives. Allen described these files as containing highly sensitive material of all levels of classification relating to the country's major foreign policy crises and problems of the post-WWII era. POW/MIA staff member John McCreary worked in the Warning Center.

Allen objects strongly to giving the POW/MIA staff free ranging access to the Center's files and archives. I explained that the Director had personally pledged his support and cooperation with the Committee's work and described some of the efforts East Asia Division (represented at the meeting by C/EA/ICOG Scott Harrison and [redacted] had made to meet Committee demands.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Allen commissioned two of his officers [redacted] to review the index specifically cited by the Committee, to review other indices and personally to examine the Center's files to identify any collection of paper or files directly related to the POW/MIA issue. (There was no such file listed on the document shown us, though there were files which probably contained reports which mention POW/MIA issues.) Allen said he will have a preliminary answer for us early next week, when we can decide how/whether to go further.

Allen said he will brief Fritz.

JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS,
Chairman
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, SOUTH DAKOTA
HARRY REID, NEVADA
CHARLES S. ROBB, VIRGINIA
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FRANCES A. ZWENIG, STAFF DIRECTOR
J. WILLIAM CODINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

October 20, 1992

Mr. John Breckenridge
Office of Congressional Affairs
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Breckenridge:

The Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs requests the Central Intelligence Agency provide to the Committee the files of the National Indications Center and of its successor organization, the Strategic Warning Staff, that cover the period 1948 through 1975. These files contain information relating to the losses of U.S. military personnel during the major crises and conflicts of the post-war period. This material is required to support a forthcoming hearing by this Committee.

These files are in the archives of the Central Intelligence Agency, filed variously. Some are listed under the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence; some are under the Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board, and some are logged under the National Intelligence Council. In addition, one five-drawer file cabinet located in the National Warning Staff contains a large number of post-war crisis management files that are related to the investigations of the Committee.

A large amount of this information can be declassified.

Ms. Linda Whitlow, Secretary for the National Intelligence Officer for Warning and the National Warning Staff, located in Room 1C925, The Pentagon, has a complete file of all materials archived by the National Indications Center and the Strategic Warning Staff. Please provide a copy of this master list to the Committee by 30 October.

~~SECRET~~

OCA 3326-92
10 November 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Committee's Request for Access to
National Indications Center (NIC) Archives

1. I attended a meeting on this subject this morning chaired by the NIO for Warning, Charlie Allen. Also present were Doug Bowman of this Office, [redacted] Scott Harris of the DO's East Asia Division and two lawyers enlisted by Allen to search the NIC files at the Pentagon in response to Senator Smith's request.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

2. The two lawyers, possibly [redacted] reported that they had completed an intensive search of the files in question on Saturday, 7 November. They told us that their efforts yielded nothing of consequence on the POW/MIA issue. There was one unlabeled file that contained a few miscellaneous reports on POW/MIA matters but nothing that is not already in the Committee's possession.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

3. To complete their search, the two lawyers have also made a request of the CIA Records Center to provide an index of all NIC files that have been retired [redacted] Allen urged the lawyers not to wait for the index but to go to [redacted] and conduct a personal examination of the files.

(b)(1)

It was agreed that they would go today.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

4. Allen suggested that, pending the results of the [redacted] search, the Agency should send a "firm response" to the Committee informing it of the results of our inspection and denying its request to receive the entire files of the NIC and its successor organization, the Strategic Warning Staff, for the period 1948 through 1975. Allen pointed out that the inspection results to date demonstrate that the Committee is in error if it believes that these records contain anything relevant to the POW/MIA investigation. Moreover, he characterized this latest

ALL PORTIONS CLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~

000432

SECRET

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Committee's Request for Access to National Indications Center (NIC) Archives

request as another futile "fishing expedition" being made by a group of investigators who know that their legislative charter is about to expire. [redacted] agreed to prepare a draft response for review by the Deputy Director for Senate Affairs, John Breckenridge.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

5. At today's meeting [redacted] also tabled a Spot Report of a news conference which Senator Smith plans to hold today. The report states that Smith will announce that the Committee is in possession of documents allegedly showing that US prisoners were sent to the Soviet Union and that the CIA hid this information. Neither [redacted] nor myself know what documents Smith could be referring to since, to the best of our knowledge, no CIA records on the subject of US prisoners in Russia have been sent to the Committee. We are aware, however, of one "highly unreliable" 1955 report on this topic which the Committee requested last year. The request was denied on the grounds that the source, a Russian defector living in the US, had to be protected. The Spot Report speculates on how information in this report could still have reached the Committee.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

6. On return from the meeting, I informed the D/OCA of Senator Smith's news conference and commenced the search for any Agency documents on US POWs in Russia, with the results described above.

[redacted signature box]

(b)(6)

Charles F. Turgeon
Senate Liaison

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted content box]


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000433

(U) Soviet Defector Claims Soviets Holding US Korean War POWs

APRIL 10, 2018 BY DAVID FOY LEAVE A COMMENT (EDIT)

~~SECRET~~



President Dwight Eisenhower

(U) The topic was one that haunted Americans in the wake of Korean War and continues to do so more than six decades later. The most definitive information on the subject seemed to come from a document dated 31 Jan 1955, which stated that three days prior, former Soviet KGB LTC Yuri Aleksandrovich Rastvorov had had a private meeting with President Eisenhower and senior advisors. According to the document, Rastvorov had told the President the stunning news that American and United Nations' POWs had been turned over to the Soviet Union and had been held in camps in Siberia during the Korean War—and likely were still there, if they were still alive.



A rare photo of Rastvorov

(S) Rastvorov had been thinking of defecting since the autumn of 1953, but it was early the next year before he approached a British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) officer and made his desires known. His initial choice of British intelligence was apparently motivated at least in part by a positive relationship with an elderly English woman who had taught him English in Japan. However, in January 1954, he ultimately cast his lot with CIA, which so informed MI6 on 5 February. From the get-go, some in the Agency had concerns about Rastvorov and his claims—an Agency report on defector handling procedures characterized the Soviet second secretary in Japan as an “ambitious, prestige-disappointed man.” A stark assessment of Rastvorov in a footnote in the report included this assessment: “That he was a [Stalin’s internal security chief Lavrenti] Beria man fearful of his future doubtless contributed to Rastvorov’s defection. His failure in a mission and subsequent flight were in character with a psychological assessment of him made after his arrival in the United States. The conclusion that he is an egotistical dilettante who cracked when the going became rough has been borne out by persistent characteristics of his behavior during the course of efforts to resettle him.”


(U) Despite such misgivings, however, Rastvorov’s claims regarding US POWs in Soviet hands afforded him instant credibility. A declassified Agency Information Report dated 24 March 1954 provided the following information:

1. The Soviet Intelligence Service is exploiting United Nations, particularly US, PWs in China and North Korea. Some PWs listed as missing were in fact turned over to the Soviets by the Chinese and North Koreans. These PWs will be screened by the Soviets, and those eventually selected will be trained to be illegal residents either in the US or in other countries where they can live as Americans.

000435

2. Some selected PW personnel will also be used in propaganda work, especially as radio announcers because there is a shortage of this type of personnel.
3. Those PWs who are found to be unsuitable will never be released because they will have learned too much about Soviet PW handling techniques. Use will also be made of the identities and biographies of dead PWs in preparing legends of new Soviet agents.

It was this basic information that was included in the 31 Jan 1955 memo noted above, resulting from a meeting between members of the Special Projects Staff and Rastvorov, and including Gen. Dale Smith and, presumably, President Eisenhower. This later memo indicated that Rastvorov's information had come from "recent arrivals (1950-1953) from the Soviet Union to the USSR's Tokyo mission."



Rastvorov's passport

(U) His motivations for defecting were subject to some degree of speculation. CIA files indicated that his father, a Red Army officer, died in the famine that followed the collectivization of Soviet farms, prompting the Agency to conclude that painful memory prompted his defection. However, in his first press conference, on 13 Aug 1954, he simply said, "I wanted to live like a decent human being. I wanted to live decently and I wanted to be able to treat other people decently." A more complete answer may be connected to his January 1954 recall to Russia—fearful of returning, he resolved not to obey and contacted an American friend with whom he had previously shared his misgivings about the Soviet system. As another CIA study on defectors notes, his example "illustrate[s] the effectiveness of the combination of fear for personal safety and recall to Russia as a means of finally crystallizing a potential defector's latent thoughts of defection into immediate action."

(U) Rastvorov had been born on 11 July 1921 in Dmitrievsk, Russia. His father was a retired Army colonel, his mother a physician. In 1939, he was conscripted into the Russian Army and served in Latvia and Lithuania prior to his selection as a student at the Far Eastern Language Institute, where

000436

he learned English and Japanese. By 1942, he had been commissioned as a lieutenant in military intelligence, trained in the use of psychological warfare against the Japanese. In 1943, he was transferred to the People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB) in Moscow and dispatched to the First Directorate School for Intelligence Training, graduating in June 1945. Promoted to Captain, he arrived in Tokyo in February 1946, ostensibly as a Foreign Office translator, actually as an NKGB (soon MGB) intelligence officer. He joined the Communist Party in 1947 and a year later was assigned to the screening of Japanese POWs, under Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) cover, to recruit agents from among the POWs. He returned to Moscow in August 1948 and was promoted to Major. He was reassigned to Tokyo in July 1950 and at the time of his defection was an MVD lieutenant colonel. When he left Tokyo, he also left his Russian ballerina wife and a young daughter.

(U) After understandably complex security arrangements, Rastvorov arrived in the United States on 20 Feb 1954. He signed an exclusive contract with LIFE magazine, for which he wrote a series of three articles on the Soviet Union in the post-Stalin era and was interviewed by Stewart Alsop for an article in the New York *Herald*. On 31 May 1955, his Agency-arranged name change became effective, and Yuri Aleksandrovich Rastvorov morphed into Martin F. SIMONS, employed as a technical writer by the Department of the Army and resettled in the United States.

(U) On Wednesday, 8 Feb 1956, Rastvorov testified before the Senate Internal Security subcommittee on the general subject of the scope of Soviet activities in the United States. As the hearing began, Idaho Senator Herman Welker requested that the press not take any pictures of Rastvorov, either in the hearing room or anywhere on Capitol Hill—at the witness's request. Rastvorov stated that he had been in the then-MVD from 1943 until he defected in 1954 and confirmed that his cover position in Tokyo was that of second secretary of the Soviet mission. In response to questions, he spoke at length about the structure of Soviet military and political intelligence, the Soviet officers operating under cover dispatched to the United States, and about the carefully-orchestrated 1944 tour of the USSR provided to 1948 Presidential candidate Henry Wallace, founder of the Progressive Party, a political entity of great interest to Soviet intelligence. He also confirmed that young MVD officers had been sent to seminaries and later became bishops/intelligence officers throughout the Soviet Union. However, his comments did not address the question of American POWs during the Korean War.

(U) Several months later, he married one of his Agency debriefers and was selected as a speaker at several USG Intelligence-related events. In April 1958, he was terminated as a source by the Agency and in March 1960 became a US citizen, complete with a Social Security number and a US passport. At some point thereafter, he was the proprietor of the "Captain's Table" restaurant in Georgetown, a venture which ultimately failed. Meanwhile, he and his new family were settling into the McLean neighborhood where they would stay for the next five decades, his two daughters attending the prestigious Holton-Arms School. An avid tennis player, Rastvorov/SIMONS was described by friends as "an ebullient, athletic, and fun-loving man who dressed well, drove

000437

expensive cars and supported charitable causes. In a gesture that was apparently typical, Rastvorov wrote a letter of condolence to DCI Allen Dulles in July 1959 following the death of his brother, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Rastvorov wrote:

Dear Mr. Dulles, I am very sorry to hear of Mr. John Foster Dulles' death. My wife and I wish to send our deepest sympathy to you and your family.

The free world and people of this country have lost a man to whom they are much in debted [sic]. All of us will miss his courageous example and leadership in the days ahead.

Yours sincerely,

Yuri Rastvorov



Former CIC chief Paul Redmond

(U) Though some undoubtedly begrudged his lavish lifestyle, the Agency was quick to point out his value as an asset. A declassified document noted that his information provided 'background insights into the KGB and the Soviet government' and lauded him for being 'a mentor to very young CIA case officers, teaching them about the Russians and the KGB.' Retired Counterintelligence chief Paul Redmond characterized him as 'a wonderful, warm, energetic Russian [who] taught us that KGB officers were humans after all—not stereotypical ogres. This helped us immensely as we worked against them as case officers.'

(U) His supporters were no doubt dismayed by the results of an October 1996 interview that Rastvorov had with several OSD/DoD representatives. In that interview, he stated that he had "no knowledge of U.S. POWs being held in Siberia or transferred to the Soviet Union. He further stated that none of his colleagues had ever told him about U.S. or UN POWs having been transferred to the Soviet Union or having been held in Siberia." When shown a copy of the memo, he said it was "not accurate and that he never provided the information contained in it. He specifically disclaimed making any statement in reference to U.S. and other UN POWs held in Siberia." Furthermore, "anything he could say on the subject of Soviet involvement with U.S. POWs would be guesswork or

speculation as he had no direct knowledge on the subject.” Although he did not recall being interviewed on the subject in the 1950s, the interviewers described him as “cooperative and alert,” willing to provide detailed answers to questions when necessary. He was aware of recent media attention on the POW issue and on him personally and likely had spent some time in thought on the subject prior to the interview.

(U) The POW-MIA Office within the Pentagon consistently and doggedly pursues the fate of US POWs, especially those from the Cold War and the Korean War. The Department of Defense was privy to Rastvorov’s claims and the declassified 1955 memo since 1993; more significantly, DoD considers the memo credible. His testimony is also supported by other individuals, including Donald Jameson, who was a branch chief in the Soviet division in the Agency’s Operations Directorate in the 1950s. Jameson noted that Rastvorov ‘had a lot to say about relations between the Soviet Union and Korea,’ a statement included in an Associated Press story which described Rastvorov as “a reliable and valuable source [who] was one of the most important defectors during the Cold War.” With regard to the number of American POWs in question, Jameson said, ‘My impression is that it was a few—10 to 15; they were aviators mostly.’ But in a series of 1994-95 phone interviews, former NSC staffer Philip Corso, who said he was the one who arranged and conducted the interrogation described in the 1955 memo, claimed that Rastvorov told him that “several hundred Americans” had been sent to Siberia by rail during the Korean War. In answer to the burning question of why the Eisenhower Administration took no action based on Rastvorov’s information, Corso said it was because the US Government feared that any sort of confrontation over the issue might have led to all-out war.

(U) In 2002, Yuri Rastvorov/Martin SIMONS suffered a devastating stroke and never fully recovered. The defector who had come to the United States in 1954 died on 19 Jan 2004, only five days prior to the 50th anniversary of his defection. Meanwhile, the veracity of his claims about Korean War-era US POWs being in Soviet hands defies confirmation or refutation.

FILED UNDER: ASIA, CIA, COLD WAR, COMMUNISM, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, ESPIONAGE, HUMINT, INTELLIGENCE, SOVIET UNION, UNITED KINGDOM TAGGED WITH: CIA, DCI ALLEN DULLES, DONALD JAMESON, GEN. DALE SMITH, HENRY WALLACE, JAPAN, JOHN FOSTER DULLES, JOSEPH STALIN, KOREAN WAR, LAVRENTI BERIA, LIFE MAGAZINE, MARTIN F. SIMONS, MI6, MVD, NEW YORK HERALD, NKGB, PAUL REDMOND, PENTAGON, PHILIP CORSO, POW-MIA OFFICE, POWS, PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, PROGRESSIVE PARTY, SEN. HERMAN WELKER, STEWART ALSOP, UNITED NATIONS, YURI A. RASTVOROV

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ORIGIN ID:BCBA (000) 000-0000
CIA

1000 COLONIAL FARM ROAD
GATE 5
WASHINGTON, DC 20505
UNITED STATES US

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ACTWGT: 0.50 LB
CAD: 6993756/SSFE2220

BILL THIRD PARTY

Part # 156297-435 RRDB EXP 02/22
56312/2106/27035

TO **JOHN CLARKE**

1629 K STREET NW SUITE 300

WASHINGTON DC 20008


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
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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

16 November 2021

John Clarke, Esq.
1629 K Street, NW
Suite 300
Washington, DC, 20008

Reference: *Lois Moore, et al. v. CIA*, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No: 1:20-cv-01027; F-2020-00473

Dear Mr. Clarke:

This is a supplemental final response to your 25 November 2019 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request submitted by your client, Lois Moore, for the following:

1. **From the period of March 16, 1954, through 1961, all records of the CIA's efforts in undertaking "clandestine and covert action to locate, identify, and recover those U.S. Prisoners of War still in Communist custody"**
2. **An unredacted copy of this report [January 5, 1952, *CIA Information Reports*] together with all intelligence material upon which it was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.**
3. **Please produce the [following] referenced [in July 15, 1952, *CIA Cross Reference Sheet*]:**
 - a. **July 15, 1952 "Basic Communication"**
 - b. **June 24, 1953 "Basic Document"**
 - c. **Information described as "etcetera"**
 - d. **POW Information in, or otherwise "Router to, C.I. File"**
 - e. **POW information related to or bearing the "Cross Reference Number 040"**
 - f. **POW Information related to or bearing the "Classification Number 383.6 Korea."**
4. **All records regarding the June 1, 1951 shoot down and capture over North Korea of the American F-51 piloted by U.S. Air Force Captain Harry Cecil Moore, born February 11, 1924, in Elm Grove, West Virginia, service number AO 711850.**
5. **All records upon which the following statement from February 27, 1952 memo from Chief of Naval Personnel to Commanding General, Far East Air Force was based: "It is now believed that there is a possibility that Captain Moore survived and is now a Prisoner of War."**
6. **All records regarding Captain Moore's incarceration and transportation from North Korea to the Soviet Union, his locations in the Soviet Union, and all evidence that he "may have been interrogated by Soviet officials.**

000441

7. An unredacted copy of July 17, 1952, three page *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
8. An unredacted copy of December 31, 1953, *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
9. An unredacted copy of March 24, 1954, *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
10. An unredacted copy of April 23, 1954, *CIA Information Report*.
11. An unredacted copy of April 27, 1954, *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
12. An unredacted copy of December 8, 1954, *CIA Information Report*.
13. Any and all information relating to this Report [January 23, 1992 cable from Embassy Helsinki to Secretary of State]
14. An unredacted copy of March 9, 1988, CIA Memorandum to "US Army Chief, Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action," together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
15. All records relating to any of the POW/MIA's names in the attached list.
16. Any and all records relating that any POW/MIAs may have been held in the prisons identified in the attached list of Russian prison camps.
17. For the period beginning June of 1951, and continuing to the present time, please produce all POW records provided to, or receive from, any office of any component of the Department of Defense, including but not limited to:
 - a. CCRAK
 - b. Air Force 6004 Air Intelligence Service Squadron during the tenure of "Project American."
 - c. Missing in Action Office, including those provided in response to the attached February 12, 1997 letter from U.S. House of Representative James Talent seeking "Intelligence pertaining to American prisoners who were taken to China and the Soviet Union during the war" as well as:
 - i. The 389 American service members who into the 1980's were listed as unaccounted prisoners of war by the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) ii. All U.S. Air Force F-86 pilots who remain unrepatriated.
 - d. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, of AFOSI
 - e. Naval Criminal Investigative Service, or NCIS
 - f. Army Criminal Investigation Command, CID
 - g. U.S. Army Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities Far East, or CCRAFE.
18. All POW records prepared by any officer, agent, or employee of the CIA, prepared for the Office of the President including the President's Daily Brief, or PDB, that include information on the possibility of POW's being transferred to the Soviet Union or China.
19. All records reflecting communications with Members of Congress, or Congressional Oversight committees concerning the capture of American airmen during the Korean

conflict who may have been transported to the Soviet Union or China and their presumed fate.

- 20. All records concerning POW's and KGB defector Yuri (or Yury) Rastvorov, who informed the United States Government that American military personnel were taken to the Soviet Union during the Korean Conflict. This request includes an unredacted version of the attached page with the heading, "Terminology".**
- 21. All intelligence material (including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports) concerning statements made by former Czech General Jan Sejna and other former Czech Officials concerning former US POWs held, interrogated and experiment on by Czech and Soviet advisors, and thereafter transferred to China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and the Soviet Union.**

We processed your request in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.

For one (1) document previously produced (C00465476), we are no longer relying on the FOIA exemption (b)(5) for our redactions and additional information is releasable. The document is still releasable in segregable form with redactions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(3) and (b)(6). Exemption (b)(3) pertains to Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 3507, noted as exemption "(b)(3)CIAAct" on the enclosed documents, and/or Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C § 3024(i)(1), noted as exemption "(b)(3)NatSecAct" on the enclosed documents. The new version of the released document is on the enclosed CD.

This completes our response to the above referenced case.

Sincerely,



Mark Lilly
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

000443



ER 93-5170

Office of the Director

Executive Secretariat

27 September 1993

NOTE FOR: SA/DDO

SUBJECT: American POWS in USSR--AP News Story

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

EA/DCI [Redacted] asks whether we have the report mentioned in this article, and what the article is based on.

Please check to see what you have and provide a written response by COB Tuesday, 28 September.

Thanks.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

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300444-IR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

P9056

Mon Sep 27 06:47:26 1993

AP--rw PM-USPOWS

Story: a0429

Time: 09-27-93 0015EDT

Ref:

PM-US POWs, Bjt, 980

U.S. Claims Hundreds Of American POWs From Korea Were Taken To USSR

By ROBERT BURNS

Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) — The U.S. government says it has "broad and convincing" evidence that the Soviet Union secretly and illegally moved hundreds of U.S. Korean War prisoners to its territory in the early 1950s and never released them.

It is by far the most dramatic and comprehensive assertion by Washington on a Soviet connection to missing U.S. servicemen since the Korean fighting ended in 1953.

The allegation was made in a detailed presentation by a senior State Department official at a meeting with Russian officials in Moscow earlier this month.

The evidence is detailed in a 77-page report titled "The Transfer of U.S. Korean War POWs to the Soviet Union." It was given to the Russians at the Moscow meeting but the Clinton administration has refused to publicly release it.

A copy of the report was obtained by The Associated Press.

"The Soviets transferred several hundred U.S. Korean War POWs to the USSR and did not repatriate them," the report said. "This transfer was mainly politically motivated with the intent of holding them as political hostages, subjects for intelligence exploitation and skilled labor within the camp system."

It asserted that the evidence gave a "consistent and mutually reinforcing description" of Soviet intelligence services forcibly moving U.S. POWs to the USSR at a time when Soviet forces, including anti-aircraft units, were active in North Korea.

It did not assess how long the American servicemen — mostly Air Force aviators — may have lived, or whether any might still be alive in the former Soviet Union.

Just last year the U.S. government said it had no evidence of such transfers. Washington has known, though, since the end of the war that some evidence existed that U.S. POWs from Korea had been taken to the Soviet Union. It asked Moscow for information on this in May 1954 and again in July 1956. Both times the Soviet government denied any knowledge of U.S. POWs on its soil.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin said last year that Soviet records showed 59 captured U.S. servicemen in Korea were interrogated by Soviet officials, and that 12 crew members of U.S. aircraft shot down in reconnaissance missions unrelated to the Korea war were transferred to Soviet territory. But the Yeltsin government has yet to concede that Americans were taken from Korea.

In the three years of fighting in Korea, in which the United States led a U.N. force on the side of South Korea against communist North Korea, 54,246 Americans were killed. The government lists 8,140 as unaccounted for, although the number of missing for which there is no direct evidence of death is estimated at 2,195. Many of the "unaccounted for" were not recovered because they were buried in battlefield graves in North Korea or died in POW

P9056

Mon Sep 27 06:47:26 1993

Page 2

camps.

The U.S. report on U.S. Korean War prisoners taken to the Soviet Union gave no specific figure but the analysis seemed to indicate it is fewer than 600.

It identified by name 31 missing Air Force F-86 fighter pilots who are among the most likely identifiable servicemen to have been taken by the Soviets for their knowledge of the plane's capabilities, plus six other Air Force aviators about whom the U.S. government believes Russia has additional information.

The report describes a top-secret program of the Soviet MGB (predecessor to the KGB) to capture American fliers and other U.S. and allied troops in Korea, interrogate them, and then transfer them into Joseph Stalin's notorious Gulag system of slave labor camps in Siberia and other parts of the Soviet Union.

"The range of eyewitness testimony as to the presence of U.S. Korean War POWs in the Gulag is so broad and convincing that we cannot dismiss it," the report said, adding that the prisoners probably were forced to assume new identities.

Since the report was written, a retired Russian colonel has come forward and told investigators for the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission for POWs-MIAs that a man he saw twice at a Siberian prison in the mid-1960s was described to him by the prison commander as an American brought there from the Gulag system.

The Russian colonel, Vladimir Malinin, said the man in the prison bore a convincing resemblance to Marine Corps Sgt. Philip Vincent Mandra, who disappeared on the northern Korean battlefield in August 1952 after an encounter with Chinese troops. U.S. officials view Malinin's testimony as credible, though not conclusive, evidence that Mandra was in the Siberian prison.

The report given to the Russians this month is based on a variety of sources: U.S. government records dating to the beginning of the Korean conflict in 1950, documents made available by Moscow since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and recent interviews by U.S. investigators with former Soviet officials, including retired officers who said they participated in the transfers.

The report said the Soviet intelligence apparatus had gained extensive experience with using POWs in the Gulag during World War II, and that when Stalin ordered the invasion of South Korea in June 1950 it simply expanded the practice.

"By the middle of 1950, the Soviet Union had at hand a vast, well-practiced, efficiently operating and profitable system for the collection, incarceration and exploitation of POWs" — American, South Korean and others, it said.

One hub of the Soviet operation against allied POWs was Khabarovsk, in extreme southeastern Russia, the report said. Prisoners were taken there from Korea, interrogated by military intelligence agents and then shipped off to labor camps in the Soviet interior. It said at least one American was taken to Moscow.