

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

1 March 2024

John H. Clarke
1629 K Street, NW
Suite 300
Washington, DC 20006
202-344-0776

Reference: F-2023-01619; Civil Action No. 23-cv-01124

Mr. Clarke:

This letter is in response to the 12 July 2023 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request submitted by your client, Michael Driggs, et al., and subsequent litigation, seeking information regarding:

Request 1

For the period of March 16, 1954, through 1961, all records of CIA's efforts in undertaking "clandestine and covert action to locate, identify, and recover those U.S. prisoners of war still in Communist custody."

Request 2

The subject of the attached, redacted, version of the January 5, 1952, *CIA Information Report*, is "Preparations for Exchange of United Nations Prisoners in Central and South China." It relates that, "on 18 December, 13 American and 8 British prisoners of war were transferred," that a source "gave names," that "another source referred to American prisoners in the former US consulate," that there is "another report referring to US prisoners in the Canton area," and there is "a recent report from yet another source" Please provide an unredacted copy of this Report, together with all intelligence material upon which it was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.

Request 3

The "main subject" of the attached July 15, 1952 *CIA Cross Reference Sheet* is "Location of Certain Soviet Transit Camps for POW from Korea, Classification Number 383.6 Korea." It reads:

Date of Basic Communication: 15 July 52 f/w

Date of Basic Document: 24 June 53

Brief Summary:

In December it was known that camps for POW captured by the Communists in Korea had been established, etc. 3-plc

CIA - March 1, 2024

000001

Classifier 488
Typist 488

Routed to: C.I. File
Date of Classifying 17 Aug 59

Cross Reference Numbers:
040 Central Intelligence Agency

Please produce the referenced:

- (a) July 15 1952 "Basic Communication;"
- (b) June 24, 1953 "Basic Document;"
- (c) Information described as "etcetera;"
- (d) POW information in, or otherwise "Routed to, C.I. File;"
- (e) POW information related to or bearing the "Cross Reference Number 040;"
and
- (e) POW information related to or bearing the "Classification Number 383.6 Korea."

Request 4

All records regarding the June 1, 1951 shoot down and capture over North Korea of the American F-51 piloted by U.S. Air Force Captain Harry Cecil Moore, born February 11, 1924, in Elm Grove, West Virginia, service number AO 711850, including information that he was "now a prisoner of war," and that he was held in the Soviet Union and interrogated there.

Request 5

All records Major Samuel Porter Logan Jr., shot down while piloting a B-29 Super Fortress over North Korea on September 9, 1950, declared missing-in action and presumed dead by the Air Force on March 31, 1954. Major Logan served in the 92nd Bomb Wing, Spokane AFB, 325th Bomb Squadron, 92nd Bomb Group, APO 328.

Request 6

All records concerning Ensign Dwight Clark Angell, USNR service number 552173, born August 17, 1928, who was serving aboard a Navy P2V-5, Squadron VP-22, when it was downed on January 18, 1953.

Request 7

All records concerning Aviation Machinist Mate 1st Class Lloyd Smith Jr., USN service number 6306390, born August 21, 1922. He served aboard a Navy P2V-5, Aviation Squadron VP-22, when the aircraft was downed on January 18, 1953.

Request 8

All records concerning Air Force 1st Lieutenant John Henry Zimmerlee, Jr., service number AOI998932, born on December 6, 1911. Lieutenant Zimmerlee served as navigator aboard a B26C (No. 44-34417) in the Air Force 730th Bomb Squadron, when it was downed on March 21, 1952.

Request 9

All records regarding Master Sergeant Robert Bibb, Army Company C, 3rd Engineer

Combat Battalion, 24th Infantry Division, service number RA- 19076631, born December 6, 1911, captured on July 20, 1950 in Tuejon, South Korea.

Request 10

All records regarding David Louis Hrdlicka, shot down and captured over Laos on May 18, 1965 while piloting an F-105, initially incarcerated in Sam Neua, Laos, at the Pathet Lao Headquarters, and held in Laos at least as late as 1989.

Request 11

All records regarding James Kelly Patterson, shot down and captured over North Vietnam on May 19, 1967, while serving as navigator of the American F-51 piloted by Captain Eugene McDaniel, including Patterson's incarceration, interrogation, and transportation from North Vietnam to the Soviet Union, where he was held as late as 1991.

Request 12

An unredacted version of the attached July 17, 1952, three-page *CIA Information Report*, the subject of which is "Prisoner-of-War Camps in North Korea and China," subtitled "War Prisoner Administrative Office and Camp Classification," together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.

Request 13

An unredacted copy of the attached December 31, 1953, *CIA Information Report*, regarding a USSR interrogation center in Korea, where, "after interrogation PWs were taken to the USSR," together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.

Request 14

An unredacted copy of the attached March 24, 1954, *CIA Information Report* relating that "some PWs listed as missing were in fact turned over to the Soviets," and "will never be released because they will have learned too much about Soviet PW handling techniques," together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.

Request 15

The unredacted, and complete, version of the attached April 23, 1954, *CIA Information Report*, "Subject Soviet Concentration Camps in the Vorkuta Area."

Request 16

The unredacted, and complete, version of the April 27, 1954, *CIA Information Report* relating "information regarding the presence of US prisoners captured during the Korean War" in camps in Komsomolsk, Magadan, Chita, and Irkutsk, USSR, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports. The first page of this three-page Report is enclosed.

Request 17

The unredacted, and complete, version of the attached December 8, 1955, *CIA Information Report*, "Subject Alleged American Held in Soviet Prison."

Request 18

On January 15, 1992, an individual who had been a KGB officer from 1974 to 1984 appeared at the US Embassy in Helsinki, Finland, and reported that, to "ease his conscience," he was reporting that "three Americans were still being held in the camps of Mordovia in July 1978." The source "added that if necessary, he can provide more detailed information." For reference, a copy of the January 23, 1992 cable from Embassy Helsinki to Secretary of State is attached. Please produce any and all information related to this Report.

Request 19

A complete, and unredacted version of the attached March 9, 1988, *CIA Memorandum to "US Army Chief, Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing-in-Action,"* referencing two 1980 sightings and one 1988 sighting of "31 Caucasians, possibly American prisoners from the Korean war, in the fall of 1979," together with all intelligence material upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.

Request 20

All records relating to any of the POW/MIAs named in the attached list.

Request 21

Any and all records relating that any POW/MIAs may have been held in the prisons identified in the attached list of Russian prison camps.

Request 22

By order issued on November 28, 1951, the *Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activity Korea*, or "CCRAK," was created. For your reference, two responsive CCRAK records are attached. *See also CIA Clandestine Services History Historical Paper No. 52, "The Secret War in Korea,"* written in 1964, and declassified 2007, at p. 78:

By the fall of 1951, CIA Headquarters recognized there were great opportunities if more experienced CIA officers were in Korea. Accordingly, three of the most competent senior clandestine services officers in the Agency were selected: one to be full-time CIA representative and Deputy of CCRAK, another as head of CCRAK's counterintelligence section and doubling as Chief of CIA's counterespionage staff, and the third as Chief of foreign intelligence activities.

For the period beginning June of 1951, and continuing to the present time, please produce all POW records provided to, or receive from, any office of any component of the Department of Defense, including but not limited to:

- (a) CCRAK.
- (b) *Air Force 6004 Air Intelligence Service Squadron* during the tenure of

- "Project American."
- (c) *Missing in Action Office*, including those provided in response to the attached February 12, 1997 letter from U.S. House of Representative James Talent seeking "intelligence pertaining to American prisoners who were taken to China and the Soviet Union during the war," as well as "(a) the 389 American service members who into the 1980s were listed as unaccounted prisoners of war by the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) and
 - (b) all US Air Force F-86 pilots who remain unrepatriated."
 - (d) *Air Force Office of Special Investigations*, or AFOSI.
 - (e) *Naval Criminal Investigative Service*, or NCIS.
 - (f) *Army Criminal Investigation Command*, or CID.
 - (g) *U.S. Army Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities Far East*, or CCRAFE.

Request 23

All POW records prepared by any officer, agent, or employee of the CIA, prepared for the Office of the President, including the *President's Daily Brief*, or PDB, that include information on the possibility of POWs being transferred to the Soviet Union or China.

Request 24

Any records reflecting communications with Members of Congress, or Congressional oversight committees concerning the capture of American airmen during the Korean conflict who may have been transported to the Soviet Union or China and their presumed fate.

Request 25

All records concerning POWs and KGB defector Yuri (or Yury) Rastvorov, who informed the United States Government that American military personnel were taken to the Soviet Union during the Korean conflict. This request includes an unredacted version of the attached page with the heading, "Terminology."

Request 26

All intelligence material (including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports) concerning statements made by former Czech general Jan Sejna and other former Czech officials concerning US POWs held, interrogated and experiment on by Czech and Soviet advisors, and thereafter transferred to China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and the Soviet Union.

Request 27

The withheld-in-full version of the CIA's February 2000 *Review of the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate on POW/MIA Issues and the Charges Levied by A Critical Assessment of the Estimate*.

Request 28

The redacted portions of the November 1998 *Critical Assessment of the 1998 National*

Intelligence Estimate [NIE] on Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue, by Senator Bob Smith.

We have completed a review of ninety-seven (97) documents, which can be released in segregable form with redactions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3) and (b)(6). We have identified additional material that must be withheld in its entirety based on FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3) and (b)(6). Exemption (b)(3) pertains to Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 3507, as amended, noted as exemption “(b)(3)CIAAct” on the enclosed documents, and/or Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C § 3024(i)(1), as amended, noted as exemption “(b)(3)NatSecAct” on the enclosed documents. Additionally, we have identified responsive material this is being coordinated with other agencies.

A final response will be provided to you on a later date.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Stephen Glenn', is written over a horizontal line.

Stephen Glenn
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosure (CD)

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY USSR
SUBJECT US Prisoners of War in USSR

REPORT NO. [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct

RESPONSIVE TO	
1	2
CU NO.	
OO/C NO.	
ORR NO.	
DAS NO.	
OCI NO.	

PLACE ACQUIRED (BY SOURCE) [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

DATE ACQUIRED (BY SOURCE) 11 Feb 54

DATE DISTR. 27 Apr 1954

DATE (OF INFO.) May 1952

NO. OF PAGES 3

NO. OF ENCLS.

SUPP. TO REPORT NO.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, OF THE U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS REPORT IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE A collector of information from many sources. This report was received through a contact from the above untested source of unknown reliability.

1. Source has been able to pick up [redacted] through an informant with wide contacts in the USSR, certain information regarding the presence of US prisoners (captured during the Korean War) on the territory of Asiatic USSR. Mostly they were in Komsomolsk (Amur River), Magadan (Bay of Nogaievo, Sea of Okhotsk), Chita, Irkutsk, Molotov, Gubakha (northwest of Molotov), Komi Permiak (Siberia), Kudymkar (northwest of Molotov), Cherepovets (on the Kama River, north of Molotov. There is nothing to indicate that any of them have ever been returned.).

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

2. Over a year ago, the Soviet authorities established camps for prisoners (not necessarily US) taken in Korea by the Sino-North Korean forces. These camps were located at:

- Komsomolsk, on the River Amur
- Magadan, on the bay of Nogaievo, Sea of Okhotsk
- Chita
- Irkutsk

Prisoners from both the US and the various cooperating European armies were alike known as Voenno-plenniyi Amerikantsi.

SEE LAST PAGE FOR SUBJECT & AREA CODES

U. S. Officials Only

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This report is for the use within the USA of the intelligence components of the Departments or Agencies indicated above. It is not to be transmitted overseas. Distribution outside of the originating Agency through the Assistant Director of the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA. All or parts of the contents, however, may be used by the above organizations in intelligence publications receiving official dissemination providing the publication bears the caveat "US OFFICIALS ONLY" and the citation, if made, refers only to "CIA Source".

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(b)(3) CIAAc

-2-

3. In Feb 1952, three hundred US prisoners of war were transported by rail from Chita to Molotov (in Soviet Russia, east of the Ural Mountains). At Chita, in Eastern Siberia, the prisoners were sorted out.
4. The prisoners were dressed in cotton mattress-cover cloth of the Soviet type. They wore no insignia. They traveled on a train of nine cars under strict MVD (Ministry Internal Affairs) guard. They made a long halt at the prison of the city of Gubakha and were not sent on to the prison at Molotov until 5 Apr 52. In Mar 1952 there were reports of other loads of prisoners being transported. These men spoke English among themselves. They were shipped, in groups of about fifty, every fifteen days, though it is not known how long this continued.
5. About this same time, another informant reported (not to our source, but to our source's informant) that a group of prisoners were being sent to Komi Permiak, in the northwestern part of Siberia. Their eventual destinations were Molotov, Gubakha (northwest of Molotov), Kudymkar' also northwest of Molotov), and Chermoz (on the Kama River, north of Molotov).
6. Still another report, dated Apr 1952, reported the presence of US prisoners. These were probably US officers. At Molotov this group of prisoners of war was designated, "American staff group." They were placed in an MVD building and completely isolated from the rest of the world.
7. The camps of Gubakha, Kudymkar and Chermoz were also isolated and were under control of the MVD. The political control was in charge of a man named Edovin, of the Communist Party organization at Komi-Permiak. The three camps were under direction of a well-known Soviet officer, under the name of Kalypin, rank unknown.
8. In another camp, near the railroad station of Gubakha, called Zapreshdelanki, there were 150 US prisoners. (Source has probably mixed up an "Entrance Forbidden" sign with the name of the camp. His Russian is mixed, but certainly "zapreshchat" means "to forbid.")
9. These prisoners were kept under constant surveillance by Soviet agents, who knew English perfectly. The Soviet authorities tried their best to build up a list of US prisoners who were not completely hostile to Soviet ideology or who were at least not inveterate foes of it. The US prisoners talked a good deal. In this way, the Soviet agents were able to pick out those men who might be willing to ameliorate their situation by taking an interest in courses of political instruction.
10. Every two or three days, an MVD officer called away one or two prisoners (the Soviet first choices for such instruction). These prisoners never came back to the camp.
11. Some prisoners were sent to the forced labor camps and used in the construction of a railway line. This camp was called Gaysk. These prisoners wore padded tunics of the Russian style and pantaloons. They wore a civilian headdress called "sibirki". Conditions were primitive. Sickness and death rates were high.

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CIA - March 1, 2024

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12. According to information covering the period Aug to Dec 1952, three hundred US prisoners were transported to the camps mentioned above. The total number of prisoners brought in the same direction reached six thousand.
13. According to information received from two different informants, the following facts may be regarded as established:
- a. Prisoners were taken by rail from the station of Poset (on the Chinese-Soviet boundary) over the line of the East Siberian Railway. They were taken to the eastern Urals.
 - b. Prisoners were also taken by boat from the ports of Bukhta, Okhotsk, and Magadan. They then went by rail or truck to Vaikarem [sic] (on the Sea of Chukot) to Ust Maisk (on the Aldan River) and to Yakutsk (on the Lena River.)
 - c. Transportation of prisoners to Vaikarem, or Vakairen, [sic] was followed by their distribution to a network of camps in the region of Nizhni Kolyask, on the East Siberian Sea. These camps were run by the MVD, under the command of an officer of unknown rank, named Sorochuk (probably an MVD major) and a civilian official named Chimbo.
 - d. At the highest possible estimate, there were no more than 12,000 of these prisoners. By Apr 1952, three hundred were dead and 400 had been taken to barracks, gravely ill.

- end -

LIBRARY SUBJECT & AREA CODES

179.13	9N(V)
239.4	449N
239.4	49N
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To OP 322HL

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY	Korea/Manchuria/China	REPORT NO.	(b)(3) CIAAct
SUBJECT	UN POW Camps (Camps and Conditions)	DATE DISTR.	18 January 1954
DATE OF INFO.	See attachment	NO. OF PAGES	19
PLACE ACQUIRED		REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
		REFERENCES	

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: As noted in attachment. Appraisal of Contents: As noted in attachment.

Forwarded herewith for your information and retention is the terminal report on "UN POW CAMPS - KOREA," dated 15 January 1954.

Enclosures: 1 Report (19 pages)
1 Map & Errata Sheet

Distribution: Air (8 copies) (Attn: PsyWarfare Div.)
Army (4 copies) (Attn: C&D Div, Op Br., Returnee Section)
Navy (1 copy) (Attn: OP 322 HL)

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(b)(3) CIAAct

ERRATA SHEET TO BE ATTACHED TO MAP

US POW CAMPS

#1 - OK

#2 Br. 2 further east, adjacent to Br. 1

#3 Br. 1 on map. Existence and location Br. 2 not known at time.

#4 - OK

#5 - OK

#9 mislocated. Location should be switched with that of #13.

#12 - OK

ROK POW CAMPS

#6 misnumbered #7. Location OK.

#7 and #8 - OK

#10 - OK

#11 - OK

#14 mislocated

TRANSIENT CAMPS

Hol Gol - OK

Kangdong - on map as old #11. Br. 3 marked Ipsong-ni on map.

Kaesong - below 38th, not shown.

Mining, Bean, etc. unreported at time map was plotted

UNREPORTED

Ch'osan on map.

Antung - no returnee information on same.

NOTE Movement of camps to north after January 1953.

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
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POW CAMPS

AUGUST 1953

LEGEND

- FROM RETURNEE INFORMATION - MAY/53
- ANNOUNCED OCT./52 - ELIMINATED MAR./53
- REDESIGNATED - MAR./53
- NEW CAMPS ANNOUNCED - MAR./53
- ANNOUNCED - OCT./52
- LOCATIONS NOT ANNOUNCED BY COMMUNISTS



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Visual Aids

Approved for Release: 2024/02/29 C00414770

Approved for Release: 2024/02/29 C00414770

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CIA - March 1, 2024

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UN POW CAMPS - KOREA

TERMINAL REPORT

15 January 1954

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CIA - March 1, 2024

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This project was begun as a quarterly report in November 1951 primarily for the purpose of collecting available information on POW camp locations and conditions. Since that time there have been seven supplementary issues, the last published 1 May 1953, on the eve of repatriation proceedings.

The purposes for which these reports were designed have, of course, now ceased to exist. It was thought useful, however, to publish a terminal issue on the basis of information gathered from US returnees, and from ROKs repatriated since April 1953, so that, through comparison with previous reports, some idea might be gained of relative accuracy and value of our earlier efforts.

Information is herewith presented first in a camp-by-camp breakdown, then as an over-all survey of POW treatment and organization, and of interrogation and indoctrination methods, including propaganda lines.

Attached to this report is a map plotted in July 1953, intended as an attachment to a projected August supplement. Operation Big Switch made publication unnecessary. Also attached is a map errata sheet, making corrections based on returnee information.

- 1 -

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CIA - March 1, 2024

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I. CAMPS FOR UN POWs OTHER THAN ROK

Camp 1

At Changson was first reported 18 December 1951 as Camp 5, which was deactivated January 1952 and reactivated (with POWs moved here from Kanggye in April 1952.) As of March 1952, camp personnel consisted of US, British and a few Turkish POWs. Since then camp had become known variously as #1, #2, branch 3, #3 (at nearby Kumjon-ni.) (#1 was originally for EM "incorrigibles" 160 of whom were moved S. to start #3.) Markers were set at XE 8779, 8690 and 8488 in October 1952.

Most complete report on this camp was in British Air Ministry A.I. 9/PW/Korea/1010, 4 June 1952, at which time 672 of the 947 British POWs were in #1. Report covers camp routine, accommodations, POW clothing, food, sports, security, medical treatment, political indoctrination, etc.

[redacted] 29 May 1953 [redacted] As of January 1953, Changson Camp in three villages at XE 8583, 8483, 8423. Interpreter from camp said 2,000 POWs there, but source saw only 800 Caucasians in three compounds.

A June 1953 interview with a Little Switch returnee who was sent to Changson in April 1951 reveals that the camp was formed in a village which had been emptied of civilians and fenced with barbed wire. Source said conditions were bad until the truce talks began. He received indoctrination through special Chinese commissars who spoke fluent English. In August 1952, source was moved to Wiwon (#4) with a number of other reactionary sergeants.

According to another returnee, reactionaries were mistreated at Changson. He himself spent a large part of his time there in jail, from which he emerged periodically when he wrote "self-criticisms." He also reports being subjected to cigarette-burn torture, four months of solitary confinement. According to his testimony, the Progressives were all in 1st Company, and "Rats" and Progressives were repatriated before the rest. There were several covert POW organizations here (including the "KKK") during his confinement.

Another returnee states there were approximately 35 Progressives in #1, and that 1,000 POWs died here of malnutrition in the winter of 1951-52.

From other Phase III debriefings, a 40-50 bed hospital in this camp; "Progressive" POWs allowed to write undictated letters three times a month; 1,200 - 1,700 POWs from all UN (except ROK) units here, scattered all through Changson.

General Information re #1

Changson a permanent camp. Peaceful Valley, Bean Camp, Mining Camp, or Death Valley and the Schoolhouse were normal stops on march to #1. Labor camps in general area of Changson. Camp near main supply points and subject to occasional bombings.

The Platoon and Company organizational setup was used at #1. Camp had no fences but was surrounded by ditch. 800 US and over 600 British POWs here.

- 2 -

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CIA - March 1, 2024

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Camp 1 had seven companies: Cos. 1, 2, 3, 4 were Caucasian US (approximately 1,000), Cos. 5, 6 and 7 were British (approximately 500).

POWs of higher rank and age soon removed to officers' camp (#2), and younger, uneducated men used as leaders, along with progressives. British POWs received better treatment in their compound, possibly because of a higher number of progressives. On the other hand, British POWs had an escape organization within their compound. Returnees had no details on same.

Camps 1 and 5 had an anti-Communist unit called KKK which attempted to keep progressives in line. They also contained such pro-Communist committees as the Peace Comm., at both camp and company levels, and a Camp Club, sponsored and approved by the ChiComs, at camp level.

POWs who were openly hostile were harshly treated, denied medical care. Men from broken or poor homes were prime indoctrination targets. Indoctrination possibilities separated for special treatment. All Negroes, officers and sergeants removed from camp in 1952. Compulsory lectures slacked off in mid-52, and only progressives continued studies. They were rewarded for informing, for being members of the Peace Committee, and for study with money, jobs, girls, no work details, medical aid.

On the other hand, "incorrigibles" (reactionary corporals and below for whom this camp was primarily designed) were punished for resistance by long hours at attention, hard labor outside camp, constant re-interrogation, the "dungeon", self-criticisms and confessions. There were even cases of maggots being placed in the ears of sick POWs. A Slave Labor Unit (SLU) detention camp for violent Reactionaries (who were kept in "cages") is reported to have been outside #1.

During interrogations, the Communists were interested in anything concerning US radio, in Alaska and Okinawa airfields, and in the life, financial conditions and education of the POWs in particular. The CCF interrogators finally realized these POWs were poor subjects with limited knowledge and that they could eventually be forced to answer yes to anything.

Territory around #1 was mountainous and full of enemy soldiers, capture was certain and escape past perimeter guards was seldom attempted.

CIA Rpt. for JIPB #4, 15 September 1953

Camp 2

Also at Changson (XE 8680), 7 mi. south of village near Song-ni, first reported in April 1952 as located in a school building and civilian houses on a river near a bridge, and in hilly terrain. Camp was originally known as #1, Branch 2 became officers camp when other POWs were segregated. Some civil political prisoners were also kept in this area. Sketch of Camp in (b)(3) CIA Act Attachment B, 30 January 1953. Camp marked October 1952 when still part of #1.

British Interrogation Rept. A.I. 9 (a) S/150/87 states this camp was organized in July 1951 (note conflict with report on #1) as part of #1. All sergeants were segregated in special squad as considered "bad influence." In August 1952 they were moved to #4, and Puerto Ricans were moved to #5.

- 3 -

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A Peace Committee was organized under the leadership of a British private until he was transferred to Wiwon. Security depended on guards, camp not wired. There were seven companies in camp, no communication between except during athletic meets which were run by "Progressives."

According to one Little Switch returnee, at the time of his confinement in #2, Branch 1 (from October 1951 to April 1953), the camp had three branches: Branch 1 at Pyongoe-dong, with 165 officers; Branch 2 at Pingchon-ni or Parundong with 170-180 men; Branch 3 at Chang-ni for "incorrigible" officers, who had fewer privileges than men in the other branches. Branch 3 originally listed at Changson, XE 7485 in Communist report October 1952.

Branches 1 and 2 were located side-by-side with a common ration center in tile-roofed buildings surrounded by barbed wire. POWs were divided into nine squads, with 17-18 officers in each squad. Billets were inadequately heated and POWs had no beds until Easter 1953. No indoctrination was given after November 1952. No forced labor, but POWs were paid if they worked.

POWs were guarded in proportion to their state of health. No leniency was shown hostile attitudes and while POWs were punished by a choice of informing on their fellow-prisoners or solitary, there were no mass punishments.

POWs were segregated from point of time, i.e. those interned in 1951, 1952 and 1953 were kept apart.

AIIR - 1A1 - 159-53, 15 June 1953

Officer internees in #2, Branch 1 built a radio which was disassembled when not in use. Returnee source received 20-30 letters in 1952 (none in 1951 or 1953) and noted a 3-4 month lapse between postmark and delivery dates. He stated that all men in camp except two got mail, some received as many as 150 letters. All mail was processed through Peking to Pyoktong and on to camps. POWs couldn't write for three months after capture, then allowed one letter every three weeks, the contents of which were sometimes dictated. POWs couldn't write if undergoing punishment. This letter-writing policy was begun by blanket authority in June 1951.

All POWs in this branch were approached frequently to make propaganda broadcasts. They were punished for refusal by food cut-offs, solitary, etc. 20-30% reluctantly made recordings and were given better food. All of broadcasts were dictated.

POWs forced to attend indoctrination classes for eighteen months, a minimum of six hours daily. The study program was "tortuous, arduous and mentally depressing." POWs forced to go along with the program or spend most of their time in solitary. Source didn't believe any officers were successfully indoctrinated, but thought that a number of enlisted men were. Indoctrinated POWs were placed in a preferential camp (#5) where food was much better than in #2. Indoctrination lecturers were civilians, all highly educated.

AIIR 1A1 - 141-53, 6 July 1953

Another returnee was interned in #2 from December 1951 to May 1953. He was interrogated six times but was given no indoctrination. He reported in his debriefing that there had been some atrocities committed against POWs when the

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NKA was guarding the camp. After the truce talks began, POWs were allowed mail and given recreation facilities, but were isolated from NK civilians. Five of the Bacteriological Warfare (BW) "confessors" captured in July 1950 were kept in a house outside #2 until they were removed to Pyoktong.

AIIR - RPO 4500-C, 17 August 1953

Other Phase III debriefings substantiate the above by saying that BW indoctrination sessions were held in this camp branch. Also that camp consisted of mud huts in a village which housed 750-800 POWs.

Only information obtainable on Camp 2, Branch 2 was that a mine operated near Camp 3 as an annex to Branch 2, #2, possibly a staging area. Called "Gold Mine Camp."

Camp 2, Branch 3 (XE 8779) was the "incorrigible" camp for the overflow from Camp 2, Branch 1. Returnee source said groups in camp were segregated into companies and not allowed to communicate. Branch had a dispensary hospital where medical treatment was adequate. POWs lived in Korean houses with civilians and other POWs. Punishment in this camp was solitary in 5' x 3' x 6' hole, or standing at attention for hours at a time. POWs here participated in inter-camp "Olympics".

AIIR - 1A1-137-53, 1 June 1953

Camp 3

At "Black Valley" was apparently organized in June 1951 when 160 British reactionaries were sent to build it. British were here until moved to #4 in July 1952. Camp was first reported in July 1952 as an enclosure for US Negro and ROK POWs. In October 1952, the camp was officially reported by the Communists as having two marked branches. Branch 1 at Sinp'yong (Kumjom-ni) XE 8588 and Branch 2 at Songp'yong-ni, XE 9795, 7 miles south of Changson. At first camp contained separate companies of officers and sergeants, then all officers were moved to #2 and all sergeants to #4. As of April 1953, only reactionary corporals and British EM remained.

British returnee source moved to Branch 1 in August 1952 and was told he had come "to further his studies" but received no indoctrination until September when he attended a BW lecture.

According to another British returnee, the camp was called "3rd Regiment Reactionary Camp." There was no POW administrative organization as the camp held relatively few internees (by April 1953 all POWs were those recently captured). The cook-house was the center of clandestine activity where those planning escape got supplies. Reason for the small number of POWs is unknown, except that all had refused political cooperation and personal data.

Mail had haphazard distribution and mail forms had to be requested. Source received 8 of 15 letters written to him, none of his went out.

Source transferred to this camp from #5 when escape plans discovered. Internees segregated by nationality, rank, color. Punishment for infractions: hard labor, "hole", self-criticism.

British Interrogation Rept, A.I. 9 (a)/S/150/87

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One US returnee said that approximately thirty-three Progressives were planted in #3.

Camp 4

At Wiwon (BA 4953) was reported in November 1951 by IntSum 3341, in May 1951 by Air FEAF (when camp also held ROK POWs), and officially by the Communists as marked camp #12 east of Unsanni in July 1952. In August 1952 #12 was apparently relocated at BA 7854 and its old site became #4, first reported by the Communists in October 1952 as Ku'up-tong. First photo coverage of camp was made in November 1952.

This camp was used for reactionary US POWs, mostly sergeants, Returnee information re #4: POWs at first not allowed mail because they refused to use "Against American Aggression" phrase on envelopes, but by the third Christmas there, lenient treatment policy in force and on repatriation trip to Panmunjom, POWs were lavishly treated. Camp was fully organized, published propaganda paper, and had many POW committees. The only indoctrination in #4 was in the form of BW lectures. Camp 4 was 60 miles east of Camp 5. Escape was impossible. Air raid shelters in and around camp.

British Interrogation Report A.I (a)/S/150/87: No political commissars in #4. When mail policy was relaxed, POWs received clippings, photos, gum, soap, cigarettes through mail. Some of British POWs cooperated with ChiComs and were rewarded by being sent to "Peace Fighters" school at Camp 12.

Camp 5

At Pyoktong (YE 0699) was originally reported as #4 and #5 in November 1951. Camp 4 was moved to Wiwon in October 1952 when the reactionary sergeants were segregated from the other POWs. Camp 5 had been in use since December 1950. Markers were posted at YE 059995 and YE 064991. #5 was the model camp and indoctrination "University", as well as the site of the ChiCom POW Camp General Command and NKA General HQ. The camp was for enlisted men (corporals and lower) many of them with little education and from backgrounds of poverty, whom the ChiComs considered good indoctrination material.

General Returnee Information: Whole city of Pyoktong was called #5 since the city ran down the middle of the compound, the compound itself consisted of approximately 200 mud houses of two and three rooms. The Camp was located on dammed lake (from backwaters of the Yalu), enclosed with barbed wire, and guarded by roving patrols. Telephone exchange and NKA HQ in south corner of compound. POWs were not allowed near these buildings. 1,400 - 1,500 POWs died here in the early days from exposure, poor food, lack of medicine. In the beginning, interrogators threatened POWs with "cage," rope treatment. In August 1952, the ChiComs took group of reactionary POWs to "Bad Camp," 80 miles NE Pyoktong in mountains between #4 and #5 (no number). After the camp came under ChiCom control and some of POWs had signed peace petition, food improved.

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Officers (two of whom tried to escape) were in separate company in #5 until October 1951 when they were moved to #2, Branch 1. Mail didn't go in or out of camp until 1952. All letters were censored and weren't allowed to go out unless they contained some favorable propaganda. All mail registered. POWs were allowed three outgoing letters per month.

Camp organization: #5 had six companies, 1 US Negro, 2 Turkish, 3 US Caucasian, 4 mixed UN (included Spanish-speaking US POWs), 5 British, 6 political training company located outside compound, deactivated at unknown date. Co. 1 (Negro) was reportedly favored by officials, got better treatment, not forced to attend lectures. From the foregoing, it can be seen that POWs were segregated by nationality and race. Peace Committee members were regular attendants at indoctrination classes. Men volunteering to work around camp also got preferential treatment. Companies were broken down into four platoons, platoons broken down into four to six squads, which were made up of roommates. POWs chose their own squad leaders with ChiCom OK. If anything went wrong, the squad leader was blamed and usually landed in jail. Assistant squad leaders were usually planted informers, called monitors.

There were several anti-Communist and anti-Progressive organizations in #5. The Black Diamond, Negro members, was mainly social but most of the members were either neutral or leaned toward reactionary. Golden Cross was purely fraternal but was disbanded by ChiComs as subversive. Ku Klux Klan used threats and force to keep "Pros" in line. Tattoo Club was originally formed to harrass ChiComs, but was infiltrated by Pros and was soon disbanded. Escape Committee (in both #1 and #5) was formed by British POWs, loosely organized but instrumental in planning a number of unsuccessful escapes. All groups failed to do much since organization was loose and soon infiltrated, disbanded and discipline applied to leaders.

Pro-Communist, Progressive group in #1 and #5 which had the ChiCom blessing was the Peace Committee at camp and company level (see p. 3.)

Indoctrination was rigid at first. In May 1951, POWs were given day-long lectures and were punished for lack of attention or objections to subject matter. Lectures were discontinued when peace talks began in 1952. Two British POWs defying indoctrination were sent to reactionary camp in September 1952. Even doctors in #5 hospital were used as political instructors. Indoctrination was accompanied by mental subjugation of POWs through self-criticism. Younger POWs were especially segregated for intensive indoctrination. In general, there seem to have been three phases of indoctrination in this and other camps: the death march, when POWs walked 35 miles nightly for two months to get from place of capture to camp and 30 POWs died daily; lenient policy through interrogation period when liquor and other bribes were offered for information; indoctrination period through lectures, movies and self-criticism.

One returnee estimated that, at the time he was there in the early period, there were approximately 65 progressives in camp. The number undoubtedly increased at a later date as the efficiency of the self-discipline, self-study, self-criticism routine over formal lectures proved itself and stress was placed on exploiting the individual POW in his autobiography.

All POWs in #5 appear to have been forced to collaborate to a greater or lesser extent through either writing or signing peace petitions, making propaganda broadcasts, writing articles for the camp newspaper, taking part in propaganda movies, or turning outright informer.

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Propaganda. As the model camp 5 was much used for propaganda purposes: POWs were allowed extensive Christmas celebrations, POWs there were main participants in inter-camp athletics, pictures were taken of staged pep meetings. In February 1951, 10 officers and 10 EM were sent from #5 to Pyongyang to make propaganda recordings. According to one returnee, indoctrination and propaganda had little effect on officers, but he felt that 10-15% of the younger EM had been affected.

Treatment. After ChiComs took over camp, treatment in general was not bad except when POWs were punished for rule violations by solitary confinement (two jails in compound), standing at attention for hours, writing self-criticisms, hard labor, withholding medical attention, etc. Medical care was adequate, though the drug supply was not. Clothes were adequate, bedding was not. Informers had special privileges, reportedly including women.

Security. Guards were uneducated, looked on POWs as criminals, unbribable, but it was easy to get out of camp and many escapes were attempted. However, due to terrain, lack of preparation, and civilian informers, all were recaptured. Guards themselves were jailed when escapes were made.

The BW interrogation center, where 24 USAF and 2 USMC officers were held preparatory to making "confessions" at one phase or another of the Korean war, was reported to be a village on the Yalu near Pyoktong.

Camp 9 and Camp 10

At Pongnyong-dong (BA 7367) was known as "Starvation Camp" and contained mostly reactionary British POWs. Ironically, it was located not far from #12, the progressive "luxury" camp where the "Peace Fighters" held forth. Both #9 and #12 were apparently originally parts of the Manpo Camp complex then known as the "infamous" camp where 536 of its original 750 POWs died in the early days of the war. Of this number, 72 were reportedly shot by guards. Manpo camp was first reported in November 1951 as located at BA 7259-7637, and was first used to hold ROK POWs, interspersed with a few US. The camp was apparently split into #9 and #12 after an air raid which killed 60 and wounded 80 POWs in Manpojin in March 1953. The ChiComs took over 100 small adobe houses in Pongnyong village, evicting inhabitants, and moved the remaining 280 POWs from Manpo on foot.

Camp was in a congested farm area at the foot of a mountain range. A road down the middle cut camp in half and the west half was sometimes called Camp 10. POWs in the two halves of the camp were forbidden to associate or ever to leave their own compounds. Camp was first reported by Communists in March 1953.

Treatment was generally bad. There was not enough food, clothes or bedding. No medical facilities. General conditions were below the level to sustain life. TB was prevalent.

POWs in camp were mainly violent reactionaries. There was an active underground known as "Revival of the Korean People," which pitted itself against the "Anti-American National Salvation Strife League," ChiCom-sponsored organization. As it was impossible for members of the underground to hold meetings, they substituted a system of secret messages.

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Indoctrination was mandatory, lectures were held which the healthy were forced to attend for three and one-half hours daily.

AIIRs 35-7-53, 29 July 1953; 178-7-53, 31 July 1953
British Int. Rept. A.I. 9 (a)/s/150/87, June 1953

Camp 12

Konha-dong at Manpo (BA 7854) has been partially discussed in connection with Camp 9 and Camp 10. This camp was apparently founded in 1950 and was first used for influential ROK prisoners, both military and civilian. The Chinese closed original #12 eighteen miles from Pyongyang in December 1951. Camp was first reported in November 1951 and again in new location in March 1952 as a camp for ROK POWs at the base of a mountain near Konha-dong. (b)(3) CIAAct First reference to camp as #12 in January 1953 (AIIR 164-7-53). Source said camp marked. Sketches of camp, hospital and administrative set-up are attached to this report.

US returnees reported #12 as headquarters of the "American-British POW Organization for Peace," which was headed by Ambrose Nugent and put out a regular news sheet. POWs in #12 also ordered to make propaganda broadcasts for which they were transported to Pyongyang in pairs. Those refusing were sent to "cave." POWs were billeted in civilian houses under 50-75 guards.

A British returnee claimed "progressive" POWs in camp cooperated because they were threatened with return to #9 (Starvation Camp). Also that #12 was under NKA jurisdiction and had been open as such since March 1951 when the original 12 British POWs were taken there. POWs in #12 were given intensive indoctrination under an English-speaking supervisor of political activities at the time returnee was there. British POWs were moved to #5 and #2, Branch 1 in December 1951.

II. CAMPS FOR ROK POWs

Camp 6

Uha Dong (YF 2506). First reported November 1951, officially listed at other coordinates December 1951, corrected to this site as #7 in January 1952, renumbered #6, same site, October 1952. Never reported abolished by Communists, but no intelligence reports on camp in over a year so probably not in existence at time of truce. This thought is based on ATIS KT 2814 report, reading as follows: Of the 2,000 ROK POWs originally reported in this camp, 1,000 were integrated into NKA units, 500-600 died of malnutrition, and the 400 remaining at the time source left in April 1951 were awaiting transfer to Chonma-dong (#8).

The camp may have held civilian prisoners at the time of the truce however. One US returnee reported such a camp northeast of the town of Uha Ri (YF 1603) complete with log-covered holes which were used as air-raid shelters.

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Pusang-ni (XE 6244) and Chonma-dong (XE 5644). #7 was originally reported by AIIR-33-52 in May 1952 and again in July 1952 by the Communists as Camp 16, which was, as of that date, renumbered #7. As of November 1952, #7 was reported to hold approximately 150 US and approximately 1,000 ROK POWs. #8 was originally reported by Communists as a ROK camp in December 1951, then numbered #10. It was reported closed in July 1952, reopened and corrected to present coordinates in October 1952. As of November 1952, intelligence reports listed 2,000 POWs in this camp, nationality unknown. For a short while after official reports, camps were known as Branches 1 and 2 of #7.

Pusang-ni #7. ROK returnee source interned here from October 1951 to April 1953 when repatriated. Stated camp in an E-W valley 6 kms. long and consisted of three separate compounds, billets in former miners' houses. Main camp was surrounded by wood fence and contained the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 6th POW Companies. Also had underground detention cells for resisters, and a hospital with 230 beds. There were originally over 1,000 ROK POWs here but half were transferred to Sinanju in August 1952, leaving the POWs who organized into these six companies. The 4th Co. contained reactionaries and the 5th Co., wounded.

There was a shortage of medicine in camp. Food rations were increased in 1953. Some mistreatment of POWs. 80% of POWs were members of underground movement, the "Save-the-Nation League." Camp was guarded by a personnel of 150, of whom 70 were officers.

AIIR 122-5-53, 15 May 1953

Chonma-dong #8. ROK returnee source interned in this camp from January to April 1953, said original POWs transferred here from Kangdong in January 1951. Before that time, camp buildings were used as non-military vehicle training school. There was an annex to #8 at XE 6587, in valley at Tangsang-ni, administered by 19 NKA officers and 6 NCO where susceptible POWs received indoctrination.

AIIR 387-6-53, 29 June 1953 (Sketches of camp attached)

Other ROK returnees reported billets as cement houses, barbed wire; receiving intensive indoctrination; forced labor; medicine insufficient; personnel of approximately 1,200 ROK POWs; 473 POWs dying of TB; of a mine E of camp where ROK officers were held; poor food; escapees being recaptured and put to work in surrounding rice fields; of 20 US POWs being here in April 1952; of progressive POWs being selected for Little Switch repatriation; of a mail situation where 60% of the POWs wrote home and only 3 ever received answers; and of generally bad living conditions.

AIIRs 142-5-53, 143, 178, 196, 258, 260, 275, 277 (Sketch attached)
278, 280, 337, and 9-6-53, 40, 93, 411, May and June 1953

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Camp 10

Chasong (CA 0392) was first reported in August 1951. ROK POWs had been seen in this area as early as May 1951. Camp was officially listed and marked in March 1953. Camp apparently at one time also held 1,800 US Negro and white POWs (as of February 1952 - SO 84492.) In April 1952, an NKA newspaper story told of UN planes bombing a POW camp at Chasong.

ROK returnee sources: Buildings formerly a school. Camp administered by NKA. POWs divided into two sections of six companies each, subdivided into four platoons of 40-50 each. POWs had NKA-approved Self-Government Committee and "League to Struggle for Liberty of Our Nation from the US" at camp and company levels, as of March 1953. As of April 1953, 20 of the 1,100 - 1,200 POWs in this camp were repatriated after swearing not to rejoin ROKs.

Indoctrination lectures were given 8:00 - 12:00 every morning. POWs were not mistreated but guards weren't friendly. All outgoing mail required to contain propaganda. No incoming mail. Food insufficient, no bathing facilities, medicine insufficient. Violations of rules reported by POW spies, punished by interrogations, cells, etc. No underground movement in camp though a number of POWs were anti-Communist.

AIIR 9-7-53, 22 July 1953

Camp 11

Original #11, the Pyongyang camp complex (YD 3822-4020 and vicinity) was reported eliminated by the Communists in March 1953. Branch 3 of the complex at Taesong-ni was at that time reported retained as a transient camp. The new Camp 11, with four branches (Branch 1 at Sampong, BA 9983, location of other three branches unknown) was first reported by the Communists in March 1953. It is probably the same camp as Kanggye (BA 9837) first reported in August 1951 as a camp for UN (other than ROK) POWs. Reports of the camp persisted through 1951. By November 1951, camp had apparently been transformed into a ROK enclosure (AIIR 537-4-52). One returnee reported the propaganda camp sheet "New Life" as being published in this camp.

Internees were all ROK POWs (760-80) who were billeted in a former primary school, converted to this use in January 1953 when a new building was added to be used as a food warehouse. PO RO marker was on side of this roof. ROK POW source interned here from January to April 1953 when repatriated. The camp site was surrounded by wire, with an electric guard post at the main gate. Compound contained a dirty and badly-equipped hospital. The POWs were organized into six companies, five in the main camp, one in the sub-camp, 400 m. to the south, and worked gathering wood under strict guard. POWs were given political indoctrination. There was some underground activity but no attempt at escape.

AIIR 205-5-53, 22 May 1953

Another source brought to #11 from Pyongyang in January 1953, stayed until repatriated in April 1953. Camp under NKA, camp officers lived in Sampong city.

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POWs had 700 gr. food allowance daily, no clean clothing or bedding issued, inadequate medical treatment, received indoctrination. Four POWs formed "Nation-Saving League" here, purportedly anti-Communist but actually an informer group.

AIIR 658-7-53, 31 July 1953 (Sketch of camp attached to this report)

Camp 14

Sijung-myon was first reported as a separate camp for ROK POWs in March 1953. Before this date it evidently had functioned as Branch 4 of #11 (see p. 11). According to three sourced interned in hospital here from March-April 1953, Branch 4 of #11 had been 4 km. NW (BA 8250) and they were transferred to #14 (BA 7949 - site marked) with 800 other POWs after a bombing raid. Branch 4 of #11 was unmarked when bombed, but NKA used incident for propaganda.

#14 was located in an area 350 m. x 300 m., enclosed by wire. There were no civilians in the vicinity. Camp had a self-government committee which was abolished in April 1953. Political indoctrination was given POWs but not stressed. Approximately 600 ROK POWs were in the main camp, 100 more in a small camp 300 m. N of main area. They were divided into six companies which were at times sent out for construction work. Food and clothing insufficient, medical treatment very poor, no recreation allowed. Poor relations existed between 160 guards and POWs. No escapes attempted while sources interned here.

AIIRs 281-5-53, 29 May 1953, 52-7-52, 4 July 1953 (Sketches attached)
FECOM IntSum 3858, 2 April 1953

III. TRANSIENT, LABOR AND INTERROGATION CAMPS

Transient camps were normally stops en route to the various permanent POW Camps (most of which were in the far north, near the Yalu River on the Manchurian border.) The majority of information about such camps comes from returnee sources as only a few, Hol Gol (BU 7803), Kangdong-Taesong (YD 5524), and Kaesong (BT8504), were ever announced by the Communists. After capture, POWs were evacuated to the rear area in groups of 50 - 100 during the night, and joined others at major collecting points where they were interrogated at regimental and division level. POWs were usually held at such points only a few days, after which they began their long marches to permanent camps, generally mustering in groups of approximately 110, guarded along the road by platoons armed with PPShs. Many POWs died during marches from time of capture to and beyond these camps, especially in the winter of 1950-1951. In general, POWs had little opportunity to judge conditions in these camps, but what they did find was "wanting in every detail."

Hol Gol

Hol Gol was first reported in July 1952 when markers were noted at two points. In December 1952 CCRAK reported 100-150 US, 50 Turkish, 180-200 ROK

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POWs were confined in Hol Gol. ROK POWs seemed to be permanently there and were used to work in the mines at Suan (BT 7186.) As of March 1953, Hol Gol was used as a screening center for POWs before assignment to permanent camps. ^{Camp} was very often crowded. [redacted] 29 May 1953) (b)(3) CIAAct

Kangdong (or Taesong)

Kangdong (or Taesong) camp was first reported in November 1951. Since that date, it served as a variously-numbered permanent camp (#8 and #9). In March 1953, it was officially redesignated as a transient camp by the Communists. As the POW Camp Control Bureau was in Pyongyang, it was obvious that a camp would be maintained nearby where POWs could be confined during the period of interrogation and assignment to permanent camps.

As of May 1953, the population of this camp was ROK. According to sources, the camp was separated into two wired compounds, one for the healthy, the other containing a hospital off the main road to Pyongyang for the sick where ten patients died daily. Healthy POWs farmed vegetables, underwent preliminary indoctrination, and lived in what were quarters for gold mine workers.

AIIRs 35-6-53, 93-6-53, 363-6-53

Kaesong

Kaesong was used as an exchange point for repatriates and as early as January 1952, reports indicated that the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang was making preparations to establish a political screening center there, using the facilities of the Soviet Red Cross Hospital, where treatment was planned for returning ROK and other UN POWs. English-speaking Russians, posing as doctors were to give US POWs political indoctrination immediately prior to exchange. New clothing was to be furnished returning POWs as part of program. (SO 92518, 17 July 1952.) (NB: It is interesting to note how closely, judging from returnee reports, this program was followed during Little and Big Switches.)

Unannounced Transient Camps

Unannounced transient camps, reported by returnees were: Mining Camp or Death Valley (so-called because approximately 1,200 POWs died there) was a stop-over for Camp 5 at Pyoktong, located 40 miles NW of Kohu-ri and 70 miles SW of Camp 5 (at approximately YE 1060). Camp consisted of five or six acres of land in a valley where POWs were billeted in 1/4 sq. mile of mud huts. 400 POWs were reported here in December 1950, 150 US POWs in January 1951, and as many as 1,200 in 1953. The normal contingent was 800-900 of mixed nationalities under NK guards. Only Turkish POWs were segregated.

Bean Camp

Bean Camp (YD 3545) 15 miles W of Pyongyang on a one-acre site was really more of a labor than a transient camp. From January - March 1951, approximately

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1,000 UN POWs were reportedly held here, British, Negro and white US being segregated. 600 POWs are reported to have died at Bean Camp.

Other Labor Camps

Five other labor camps for ROK POWs were reported in and around Pyongyang, located in school buildings in the vicinities of YD 3623, 3823, 3722, 4121 and 5423. Approximately 500 POWs, for the most part consistently anti-Communist, were held in each camp.

MISG INTER RPT KT 5028, 29 August 1953

Interrogation and Indoctrination Centers

Interrogation and indoctrination centers were reported by returnees as The Barn, in Pyongyang, Peaceful Valley and The Schoolhouse (locations unknown) and the infamous Pak's Palace 18 miles NE of Pyongyang near Yonsong (probably YD 4830) located in a former brickyard. It was at this interrogation center that POWs were tortured to extract information.

IV. UNREPORTED CAMP POSSIBLY STILL IN EXISTENCE

Chosan Camp

Chosan Camp (YF 3624) was first reported as located in Cholma, a small mining town in November 1951. Reports on the camp continued until December 1952, after which nothing was heard of it until the parents of a US corporal POW were notified by a New York paper in June 1953 that their son was reported on the unofficial lists of POWs in Chosan Camp. Said newspaper said it got the corporal's name from Corporal Raymond Medina.

GENERAL SURVEY

I. POW TREATMENT AND ORGANIZATION

A. On Capture The majority of returnees had been captured in 1950 and early 1951. Search on capture was cursory in most cases. Preliminary interrogation generally took place immediately. Evacuation to the rear took place within a few hours. All POWs marched to holding camps during the night and under guard, generally one guard to every 10-15 men. A number of escapes were made during this period. Due to the general confusion of withdrawal and lack of stringent security measures, escape was not difficult. Successful evasion and return to UN lines was another story. Most of the POWs were weak from inadequate food and forced marches. Korean civilians were either afraid to or unwilling to aid escapees; in many cases they reported escapes.

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POWs captured in the early part of the war report gross mistreatment by the NKA guards. During the "death marches" to permanent camps, between 7,500 and 8,000 POWs are believed to have died from short rations, long marches, improper clothes and shelter, abandoning of wounded along the roads, and complete lack of medical care, or in many cases, to have been deliberately killed by the guards.

The situation improved somewhat after the ChiComs entered the war in the spring of 1951. While there were many violations of Geneva Convention rules, in general the CCF was not markedly brutal.

B. In Camps Camp conditions improved greatly under CCF control. Medical care was still extremely inadequate and sanitation was primitive but there was some attempt at a clean-up movement, and diets increased. Conditions improved even more after the truce talks began, and treatment often reflected how well the talks were going. Reactionaries got the worst of it, being punished for rebellious or subversive acts by solitary confinement, exposure to cold, beatings, withholding medical attention, mental coercion and labor camps. However, those POWs who either went along, or pretended to go along the Party line received reasonably good treatment on the whole. The ChiComs were obviously more concerned with making converts than in vindictive breaking down of morale.

Medical care in most camps presents the blackest picture. Generally inadequate in quantity and quality, what there was, was reportedly used as a coercive device -- a "recruiting tool" which was the prerogative of the progressives and was withheld from reactionaries. During the first nine months of the war, there was not only almost no medical care, but the sick were mistreated as well. After this time, improvement was negligible. The only real addition was crude surgery. Thousands still died from freezing, starvation, and dysentery. It was not materially improved (except in a few camps) until the truce, when UN POWs were treated with Communist wounded before repatriation. Innoculations were given only favored POW groups or during BW propaganda campaigns in the various camps. Camp hospitals were either non-existent or were known as "morgues" or "death houses". Only progressive POWs got anything like adequate medical care. UN doctor POWs were not allowed to treat the sick. (DAIR 2880-53, 25 August 1953)

Outside of the foregoing, the majority of returnee atrocity stories (after the CCF took over UN [non-ROK] camps) center around Camp 1 where there was reported to be a separate confinement area where resistance was punished by enrolling resistors (POWs who tried escape, stole, spread rumors, attacked the guards, or smoked marijuana) in a slave labor unit (called SLU). There were rumors among the POWs of resistors' confinement in cages until "confessions" were written, when resistors were given from one month to three years at hard labor. Forms filled out by repatriates aboard the USNS General Hase in August 1953 indicate that 32 listed US POWs were not expected to be repatriated because of sentences imposed by enemy courts-martial. These men, and other MIA's whose names never appeared on Communist lists, could well be confined in similar slave labor camps.

Attempted escape of POWs while being marched to the rear has already been discussed. Once POWs reached permanent camps, it became evident (especially at

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CIA - March 1, 2024

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#5 that a POW could easily leave the compound unnoticed after dark. A number procured crude escape aids, sometimes through a central camp POW escape committee, but none were completely successful in escaping, due to isolated and mountainous terrain, POW informers, and reports by civilian population. Punishment for attempted escapes varied from jail sentences to writing of self-criticism.

Clandestine POW Organizations have already been discussed in connection with Camps 1 and 5. Leadership and organization of these groups is unknown and in general they were soon rendered ineffective through informant penetration. It is possible, however, that the KKK may have held kangaroo courts and have dealt out physical punishment to progressives and/or informers. In general, it appears the ChiComs spent a lot of time searching for organizations that existed in no more dangerous a form than that of a fraternal organization, or only as figments of imagination of POWs who wanted to heckle their captors.

All camps were organized along military lines: primarily in companies, with companies divided into platoons, and platoons divided into squads. Platoon, squad, and assistant squad leaders (who were usually stool pigeons) were appointed by the ChiComs. Each company had a Club to which members were elected by POWs. Club leaders were always progressives and appointed to their specific key positions by ChiComs after elections were held.

The Peace Committee and the Voluntary Self-Study Groups in various camps were almost entirely progressive in membership, although a few "sit-tights" joined as a method of self-protection.

Informant nets were apparently well-established in permanent camps. Information was extracted either voluntarily from progressives or under duress from other POWs. The ChiComs were evidently extremely clever in playing one interogatee against another by indicating they already were in possession of desired information but just wanted to further substantiate it.

II. INTERROGATION, INDOCTRINATION AND PROPAGANDA

On capture: First interrogation generally took place right after capture and was usually aimed at getting tactical information, personal backgrounds, economic and welfare conditions in US, etc. The enemy in many cases seemed already aware of the captured man's outfit. ROK POWs were asked about loyalty to their government and family background. Similar interrogations were held during POW evacuation to the rear and in holding camps where POWs were questioned from one to three hours on UN Force potential over a broad front. Interrogations weren't stressed by the NKA, but began in earnest with ChiCom entry into the war. There seemed to be no fixed policy regarding number of questions asked. Interrogators were English-speaking Chinese and North Koreans. A few POWs reported being questioned by men they suspected of being English-speaking Russians.

In permanent Camps: Questioning was both direct and indirect. POWs were required to write autobiographies covering their whole life histories after they had been in camp anywhere from two days to two weeks. POWs giving noticeably falsified or absurd information were required to rewrite these. Anyone refusing to answer questions in autobiography guide book was reinterrogated. There seem to have been few instances of reward promised or coercion used to obtain such information. In general it is believed that many of the POWs did not confine themselves to Geneva Convention rules -- many talked of their families, and it is

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also possible that they gave (wittingly or unwittingly) a good deal of valuable tactical information to the enemy. In all camps, each group of interrogators always began all over again. There was no real evidence that the groups exchanged information already gained, or were in any way systematic about interrogation, although they were often familiar with previous statements issued by POWs. Some returnees said they were repeatedly questioned about the US part in the Korean war, questions being slanted toward admission that America had started the war, and was waging biological warfare during it.

Indoctrination. All POWs were exposed to indoctrination in varying degrees. It was particularly emphasized at Camp 5. Degree of POW susceptibility was indicated by group designation -- "Progressives" readily accepted indoctrination and were used by the enemy as informers and collaborators. "Intermediates" (the majority of POWs) were passive; they did not overtly accept indoctrination but didn't fight it either. "Reactionaries" were openly against Communism, resisted indoctrination, fought control, and even sometimes abused guards and progressive POWs.

Indoctrination began right after capture and continued in the form of slanted interrogations enroute to camp. Methods varied, widest variance being in #5. Once in permanent camps, POWs were classified by rank and race. In this way, young and impressionable POWs who were separated from officers and older men were transformed into leaderless masses and racial groups played against each other were prevented from forming solid fronts.

Indoctrination was achieved by personal contact, lectures, reading, daily discussion groups, self-discipline, self-study, self-criticism (many POWs were required to keep diaries of daily thought and deed), written tests, propaganda sheets printed by progressive POWs themselves (ex. "Toward Truth and Peace," published at #5), movies, radio programs, and organized "Peace Commissions." Lectures were repeated if unsatisfactory progress was shown. Progressives were often segregated and given special instruction. Hopeless reactionaries were segregated and punished in various ways for their attitude.

In the majority of the camps, POWs apparently worked hard and got substantial indoctrination as well. In #5 there was little work done, and POWs were indoctrinated extensively. Lectures on UN Germ Warfare and the Geneva Convention were continuous until January 1953. Other lecture topics included race prejudice, the lot of the US share-cropper, and big city "skid rows." In the lectures, ChiComs were careful to emphasize that they were civilized and cultured people, shocked by US methods and conditions, and by officers' exploitation of GIs. According to one returnee, they "degraded all phases of US life, with the exception of Roosevelt, openly ridiculed the Geneva Convention, praised the USSR for its medical aid in China, bragged that the CCF would eventually control Formosa, and called themselves the 'People's Liberation Army'."

Library material available in the camps was reportedly most effective, since POWs reading to pass the time could not help but absorb some of the Marxist slant of the selected material.

The general returnee consensus was that it was very difficult to resist indoctrination because of difficulties encountered in running against the established mission of the camp officials. Only a few POWs seemed to have been really sold the party line. Some were impressed by different aspects of indoctrination propaganda (especially BW), and most were simply confused. POWs

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CIA - March 1, 2024

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definitely against indoctrination said little during lectures, and talked about home and food during compulsory study periods in their quarters. Many of the men who wrote "confessions" claimed they did so only to let their families know they were alive. Many who made taped broadcasts did so for the same reason and because, although the broadcast material was largely dictated, they could add short personal messages.

Mail was a great propadanda-indoctrination factor. Letters telling of good treatment, food, camp conditions, etc., had a good chance of passing the censor. Reactionaries were often punished by having mail privileges withheld. Mail was sometimes used as a bribe to induce POWs to sign various petitions and manifestos. Progressives who went along with indoctrination and took active part in programs had practically no restrictions on mail. All mail was apparently opened. Censorship usually consisted simply of confiscation of an unsatisfactory letter, coming or going. Some POWs got as few as two letters, others as many as three hundred during their confinement. Some received mail weekly, others went six months without a letter.

Propaganda. Use of taped POW broadcasts as a propaganda vehicle has already been mentioned. It is interesting to note that 30% of first day US Little Switch returnees (returned 20 April 1953), 16 had previously been named by the Peking radio as authors of messages attesting in varying degrees to the good treatment given them by their capturs. Nine of the 32 released the second day had made similar statements, but none of the 14 released the third day had been mentioned before. Of the 40 repatriated on the fifth day, 10 had written laudatory messages, most of them as far back as 1951. (FE Survey, Vol. IV, #9, 7 May 1953)

The "plea for peace" line was being used as late as May 1953 when the POWs not yet repatriated were still broadcasting their interest in getting home and working for world peace. (FBIS 14, 25, 27 May 1953)

Much was made propaganda-wise of POW repatriation. One of the themes stressed was good treatment given UN POWs during the exchange vs. bad treatment accorded Korean POWs at the same time. Wilfred Burchett (L'Humanite, 20 April 1953) said not even water was given Korean POWs, that they were poorly dressed and brutally treated, many of them came back in a crippled condition. On 26 May 1953, Alan Winnington broadcast that the US had returned 168 psycho-neurotic Korean POWs whose breakdowns were the result of bad treatment and being witness to compound massacres. In short, according to Communist commentators, "the US plan to get evidence regarding maltreatment of their POWs was a political plot intended as anti-Communist propaganda to cover brutalities perpetrated by the US itself."

Throughout the latter part of the war and during exchanges, Radio Pyoktong and Peking were used to hurl such brutality charges, and to stress Communist clemency in allowing certain POWs repatriation just before the exchange, despite admissions of waging BW, for which the "primary responsibility was not in themselves. After committing the crime, they have honestly confessed to it, therefore the General Political Bureau of the NKPA has decided to extend clemency and issued an order 1 September 1953 to exempt all of them from prosecution." (FeCom IntSum 4018, 9 September 1953)

On 27 July 1953, Winnington broadcast what could be considered a masterful summation of the Communist propaganda line, stating that the Korean war "has had

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many unique features," he named these as:

- 1) the first time war had been waged "under the stolen banner of an international organization aimed to preserve the peace;
- 2) the first time Asia had had to defend herself against imperial aggression;
- 3) the first time bacteriological warfare had ever been used -- unsuccessfully
- 4) the first time only one side had been willing to talk peace at a truce conference;
- 5) but "with all these obstacles, the strength of the Korean people and of the Chinese fighters, and the strength of the demand for peace kept the war from spreading and had finally brought it to an end." (FBIS)

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CIA - March 1, 2024

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Attachment to



(b)(3) CIAAct

To: Nancy

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FEB 1952

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECURITY INFORMATION

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. (b)(3) CIAAct

CD NO.

COUNTRY Korea

DATE DISTR. 30 January 1953

SUBJECT POW Camps in North Korea

NO. OF PAGES 2

DATE OF INFO.

[Redacted]

NO. OF ENCLS. 2
(LISTED BELOW)

PLACE ACQUIRED

[Redacted]

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, OF THE U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE

[Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

POW Camp for Air Force Personnel Near Chail-li¹

- In May 1952 a POW camp for air force personnel was at YD-267497, near Chail-li (125-37, 39-16) (YD-2649). The prisoners appeared to be undernourished. There were, on an average, three or four prisoners in the sick bay. The sick were treated by doctors from a nearby Chinese Communist ambulance unit. Inoculations were given the prisoners by three male nurses from this same unit. The prisoners were told that the inoculations were necessary to protect them against United Nations germ warfare. The inoculations caused a fever and the prisoners were suspicious of them. Recreation including volleyball and swimming was provided at irregular times and prisoners were encouraged by the guards to participate. The games were short and the few that participated did not play vigorously. Attendance at propaganda classes was compulsory and two or three of the prisoners were eager to study Communist ideology. Most of them were not interested although there were occasional heated discussions over some of the lecture questions. The prisoners were represented by a leader. Those caught attempting to escape were deprived of meals or forced to write a self-criticism as punishment. In case of a successful escape, the leader of the prisoners was to be severely punished. Beatings were not allowed. There was a roll call. The guards, who were regular North Korean army troops, treated the prisoners well. They made regular rounds of the camp and the buildings at night.

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CIA - March 1, 2024

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(b)(3) CIAAct

-2-

POW Camp Near Chail-li

2. Prior to June 1952 a POW camp with United States prisoners was in five large houses at YD-267497, near Chail-li.² The first house was at YD-272497, the second at YD-265487, the third at YD-273477, the fourth at YD-300503, and the fifth at YD-296508. In June 120 prisoners were moved to a POW camp at Kangdong (126-05, 39-09) (BU-4837).³ On 8 October the 56 North Korean army Evacuation Hospital was in the houses vacated by the POW's. One company of troops was at YD-374505, another company 600 meters north of Chail-li, and another company 2 miles south of Chail-li. The headquarters for these companies was at YD-374505.

POW Camp at Sungho-ri

3. In July 1952 a POW camp was at a former mine at YD-573201, near Sungho-ri (125-58, 38-59) (YD-5719). In June, 80 United States and 120 ROK prisoners were held in the 12 mine pits which made up the camp. There were about 20 men to each cave-like room and the Korean and United States prisoners were separated. Two meals were served per day with each man receiving 150 grams of corn and salt at each meal. Clothing or bedding had not been issued and the prisoners slept on boards and straw mats. There were no medical facilities at the camp. North Korean army surgeons made routine visits and gave only routine first aid treatment. An average of 10 prisoners died each month. The death rate was higher for the United States prisoners than for the Koreans. Three hours of Communist lectures and political indoctrination were given daily. Communist books and North Korean newspapers were used. The prisoners were screened several times a day during their first month at the camp. ROK soldiers who were converted were put in labor service teams and sent to rear areas. Prisoners were not allowed to leave the mine. The camp was guarded by members of the local armed self-defense unit.

POW Camp Near Ch'ang-ni

4. In early September a POW camp, with about 1,250 United Nations prisoners, was in six large barracks, 70 meters long, 5 meters wide, and 3 meters high, at XE-877796, southwest of Ch'ang-ni (125-12, 40-27) (XE-8780). Only United States prisoners were seen. The barracks had earthen walls and cement roofs. The prisoners lived four to a room. They were fed mostly bread and appeared underfed. Some of the prisoners wore their old uniforms and others wore blue fatigues. The camp was garrisoned by 150 Chinese Communist troops.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

1. [redacted] Comment. The information in paragraph 1 of this report supplements the information in paragraphs 1-11 of [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

2. [redacted] Comment. This camp is almost certainly the same as the one described in paragraph 1.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

3. [redacted] Comment. [redacted] from a different source, reported 80 Caucasian prisoners believed to be Americans and 150 ROK prisoners in Kangdong in late June 1952.

(b)(3) CIAAct

Enclosures: 2 charts

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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CIA - March 1, 2024



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ATTACHMENT A


DIAGRAM OF POW CAMP AT YD-267497*



- 1. 2 private houses used as mess hall
- 2. Guard room
- 3. Camp office and propaganda room
- 4. 3 poplar trees
- 5. Camp buildings
- 6. Guard posts
- 7. Private houses
- 8. Reservoir
- 9. Ambulance unit

* This diagram was made from an overlay which was made from air photo 14 W 67 RIS R11 97B 151RS 5 AF 22 July 1952.

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


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ATTACHMENT B

DIAGRAM OF POW CAMP AT XE-877796



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Central Intelligence Agency

OCA FILE: SSPOW

RECEIPT #: _____



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 5098-91

27 DEC 1991

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to your letter of December 12, 1991, concerning the possibility of US POWs/MIAs in the USSR, let me assure you that the Agency is actively pursuing this issue. A senior officer of the Interrepublic Security Service (ISS), the successor organization to the former KGB Second Chief Directorate, advised the Agency on 3 December that the ISS had undertaken "an exhaustive search of available information and resources, and had come up with no indication of such presence in the USSR past or present." On 6 December the ISS passed us a written "official" response. Following is a translation of that response:

"At our request, an investigation was conducted in Kazakhstan concerning the supposed presence of an American military pilot in the village of Saryshagan, Dzhezkazgan Oblast, as presented in the newspaper 'Kommersant' (no. 42, dated 4 November 1991). The pilot was reportedly taken prisoner during the period of war in Indochina.

As a result of the investigation, which included questioning long-time residents, no information was obtained about the presence in that region at any time of an American pilot.

On our part, we also do not have any information about American military personnel located on the territory of the USSR who were missing in action during the course of military activities in Indochina."

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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CIA - March 1, 2024

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~~SECRET~~

The Honorable John F. Kerry

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Regarding alleged statements by retired KGB General Oleg Kalugin, reported by Australian television, that he had been involved in the interrogation of Americans in Vietnam during the 1975-1978 period, we have tasked [redacted] Station to ask the ISS and the Russian Republic Federal Security Service to confirm the remarks attributed to Kalugin and provide details. The Station was also been directed to seek guidance from those services as to how a similar inquiry can be put to the military intelligence service, the GRU.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

The [redacted] liaison services have been asked for any information they may have on Soviet and/or East European incarceration or interrogation of POWs/MIAs from World War II, the Korean War, or the Vietnam War.

We will keep the Committee advised of any additional information that results from our discussions with the Russian and East European Services.

A copy of this letter is also being provided to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,



for Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

OCA Records

OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS

Routing Slip

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10. SECURITY		
11. SPECIAL ASSISTANT		X
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SUSPENSE

31 Dec 91
Date

Action Officer:	Bob Magner
Remarks:	

GP 18 Dec 91
Name/Date

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EDITION DATE 6-91

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15	DD/SA/OCA		X		(b)(6)
16	LEG/OCA 		X		
17	C/PCS/DO		X		
18					
19					
20					
21					
22					

SUSPENSE 31 Dec 91
Date

Remarks D/OCA will respond in consultation with the DO. Please provide ES with a drop copy of the response.

ER 91-4126

Executive Secretary
17 Dec 91
Date

Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Secretariat

17 Dec 71

D/OCA:

Stam -
Another fax that ^{we} will
process as an original for
time-savings. Please advise
as to how you will respond.

Styllis

Approved for Release: 2024/02/29 C06471815

ER 91-4126

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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

December 12, 1991

The Honorable Robert Gates
 Director
 Central Intelligence Agency
 Washington DC 20505

Dear Mr. Gates:

Reports continue to surface that Soviet officials have admittedly participated in the interrogation of American POWs after 1973. Most recently, former Soviet KGB and military personnel, interviewed by the Australian "60 Minutes" program, described interrogations and live sightings of American POWs as late as 1978. Among these sources is Oleg Kalugin, a retired general in the KGB, who reportedly said he personally headed an interrogation team in Vietnam in 1975-78, that interrogated Americans.

The Committee recognizes the inherent difficulties in pursuing these matters, given the current state of disarray in the former Soviet Union. However, these difficulties should not deter this government from undertaking a quick and active investigation of these reports. We urge you to take advantage of the apparent Soviet willingness to discuss these matters openly with the western press, and dedicate intelligence resources to follow these important leads.


In particular, the opportunity may exist to establish an ongoing dialogue with Soviet intelligence services on the issue of American POW/MIAs, not only those lost in Southeast Asia but those unaccounted for in Korea and World War II. Likewise, the Committee encourages you to ascertain if other former Warsaw Pact countries may also be willing to cooperate in this regard.

Your efforts in this regard are greatly appreciated, and we ask that you keep us posted as to developments.

Sincerely,



Bob Smith
 Vice Chairman



John F. Kerry
 Chairman

JFK/kb

Approved for Release: 2024/02/29 C06471815

John F. Kerry, Massachusetts, Chairman
Bob Smith, New Hampshire, Vice Chairman

Select Committee on

POW / MIA Affairs

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
United States Senate Washington, DC 20510-6500 (202) 224-2306

FAX COVER SHEET

File

TO: BOB MAGNER
FROM: FRANCES ZWENIG
DATE: 12.12.91
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USGPO: 1976 - 202-953 (40)

CIA - March 1, 2024

000045

SPEED LETTER	REPLY REQUESTED		DATE
	YES	NO	11 May 1978
			LETTER NO.

To : Office of Legislative Counsel FROM: DC/PCS/LSN/MIL BU-5 Amber
 BX-3 Green
 XXXX SUBJECT: Document Search - Corporal Roger A. Dumas

OLC #78-1943

Attached is a letter from Congressman Dodd.

1. Contrary to the congressman's understanding the search was not given low priority.
2. There is absolutely no information on Corporal Dumas in the DDO files.
3. Request you convey the foregoing to Congressman Dodd.

NOTE:

[Redacted] Major England described the two brothers as problems.

att.

[Redacted Signature]

Seymour R. Young DC/PCS/LSN/MIL

SIGNATURE

(b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(6)

REPLY	DATE
--------------	------

Orig -Addressee
 1 -PCS/LSN w/o
 1 -chrono w/

78-204 (230-78)

SIGNATURE

RETURN TO ORIGINATOR

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD
2D DISTRICT, CONNECTICUT

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
224 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-2076

DISTRICT OFFICE:
STANLEY ISRAELITE
SPECIAL ASSISTANT
1 THAMES PLAZA
NORWICH, CONNECTICUT 06360
(203) 886-0139

MIDDLETOWN OFFICE:
94 COURT STREET
MIDDLETOWN, CONNECTICUT 06457
(203) 348-1123

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

COMMITTEE ON RULES
—
SELECT COMMITTEE
ON ASSASSINATIONS
MAJORITY WHIP AT LARGE
—
BOARD OF VISITORS TO THE UNITED
STATES COAST GUARD ACADEMY

May 4, 1978

Mr. Seymour Young
Central Intelligence Agency
Headquarters Building
Room 2EO 308
Washington, D.C. 20505


Dear Mr. Young:

I am writing to you regarding the CIA's current documentation search for information pertaining to Corporal Roger A. Dumas, RA 21040481 (sic) RA 21 004 481, U.S. Army. A copy of Major W. L. England's letter dated March 21, 1978, to you on my behalf is enclosed for your reference.

Colonel W. J. Winter, Jr., Director, Personal Affairs, Department of the Army has informed me that the photographic analysis has been completed. However, it is my understanding that the documentation search has been given low priority. I am writing to officially request you to expedite the documentation search as this evidence is essential in an upcoming hearing before the Army Board for Correction of Military Records.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,



CHRISTOPHER J. DODD
Member of Congress

cc: Colonel W. J. Winter, Jr.
Mr. Robert Dumas
Mr. Clarence Dumas

CIA - March 1, 2024

000047

21 MAR 197

DAAG-PES

Mr. Seymour Young
Central Intelligence Agency
Headquarters Building, Room 2E0308
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Young:

The Adjutant General's Office is in receipt of an inquiry from Congressman Christopher J. Dodd in behalf of Messrs. Robert and Clarence Dumas regarding their brother, Corporal Roger A. Dumas, RA 21040481, US Army.

The Department of the Army records reflect that Corporal Dumas was reported missing in action Northeast of Anju, North Korea, on 4 November 1950. Under the provisions of the Missing Persons Act, a presumptive finding of death was made effective 26 February 1954. No remains have been recovered.

The Dumas brothers allege that Roger Dumas was and may still be a prisoner of war in North Korea or China. They maintain that the inclosed 8 x 10 inch photograph shows Roger Dumas as a prisoner of war. To enable this office to respond to Congressman Dodd's inquiry, request you review your files and provide any information you have pertaining to Roger Dumas. Also, request an analysis to determine if the individual in the alleged prisoner of war photograph and in the other eight inclosed photographs are one in the same.

Sincerely,

9 Incl
Photographs

W. L. ENGLAND
Major, GS
Chief, Status Determinations Division

CIA - March 1, 2024

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ACTION UNIT
FILE, [REDACTED]

131720Z OCT 78

DIRECTOR

130000 18397A

REF: [REDACTED] (M 179395)

1.

[REDACTED]

2. TAKE ALSO INTEREST IN THE CASE MENTIONED IN AMERICAN PRESS
CAPTAIN DAVID LOUIS HEGLIONA REPEAT HEGLIONA CAPTURED ALIVE AND
WELL BY PATHET LAO FOLLOWING BOMBING RAID 18 MAY 1968 IN REGION
SAMHEUA. DIRECTOR: PLS CALL ATTN TO APPROPRIATE HQS COMMAND.

3.

[REDACTED]

#49

(9)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE 27 JAN 1987

DENY THIS
Document
PAGE

The Associate Director of Central Intelligence
for Military Support
Washington, D.C. 20505

30 October 1998

Senator Richard Shelby
Chairman
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
211 Senate Hart Office Building
Washington, DC 20510-6470

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Director has asked me to respond to your 28 July 1998 letter (SSCI #98-2723) requesting the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) document the chronology of Intelligence Community (IC) activities with regard to Vietnam War pilots, Colonel David L. Hrdlicka and Major Robert F. Coady. We regret our tardiness, but wished to provide you a thorough and precise response.

After carefully considering your request with senior Intelligence Community managers, we have concluded that the IC does not have the data. We are confident that what small number of intelligence products exist reside with the Defense POW/Missing Persons Office (DPMO) which has the most complete collection of available data to undertake the study of your request. Should DPMO be tasked, the IC will cooperate with its analysts and will be prepared to review the results of their research.

In sum, the IC will fully cooperate with DPMO or any other agency assigned to undertake the Hrdlicka and Coady cases. But, I regret to say we are not in a position to take the lead on this project.

Respectfully, *[Signature]*

[Redacted Signature]
Roderick J. Isler
Brigadier General, USA

(b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct



1

The Associate Director of Central Intelligence
for Military Support
Washington, D.C. 20505

30 October 1998

Senator Robert Kerrey
Vice Chairman
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
211 Senate Hart Office Building
Washington, DC 20510-6470

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

The Director has asked me to respond to your 28 July 1998 letter (SSCI #98-2723) requesting the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) document the chronology of Intelligence Community (IC) activities with regard to Vietnam War pilots, Colonel David L. Hrdlicka and Major Robert F. Coady. We regret our tardiness, but wished to provide you a thorough and precise response.

After carefully considering your request with senior Intelligence Community managers, we have concluded that the IC does not have the data. We are confident that what small number of intelligence products exist reside with the Defense POW/Missing Persons Office (DPMO) which has the most complete collection of available data to undertake the study of your request. Should DPMO be tasked, the IC will cooperate with its analysts and will be prepared to review the results of their research.

In sum, the IC will fully cooperate with DPMO or any other agency assigned to undertake the Hrdlicka and Coady cases. But, I regret to say we are not in a position to take the lead on this project.

Respectfully

Roderick J. Isler
Brigadier General, USA V

(b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct

CIA - March 1, 2024

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Letters to Senators Shelby and Kerrey

O/ADCI/[redacted] (15 OCT 98) ER 98-3972

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Distribution:

Orig - Senator Shelby

Orig - Senator Kerrey

1 - [redacted]

1 - ADCI/MS Chrono

1 - Executive Registry

(b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

This Document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY	Korea	REPORT NO.	(b)(3) NatSecAct
SUBJECT	POW Camps in North Korea	DATE DISTR.	5 February 1953
		NO. OF PAGES	2
DATE OF INFO.	October - November 1952, except as stated	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
PLACE ACQUIRED	Korea	REFERENCES	

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE:

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

POW Camp at YD-121735

1. On 22 November 1952 a POW camp with approximately 500 ROK POW's was in civilian houses at YD-121735, near Naedong-ni (N 39-30, E 125-28) (YD-1275). This camp was established in late July 1952.

POW Camp at YD-353213

2. On 15 October 1952 a POW camp with 2,000 ROK POW's was in a three-story cement building at YD-353213, near Sosong-ni (N 39-01, E 125-43) (YD-3522).¹ This camp had been moved to its present location in early September 1952. POW's were moved in and out of the camp frequently. Four hop (1.2 pints) of rice and other cereals were rationed to each POW daily. POW's wore blue fatigue clothes and each was issued a blanket. Details of 30 to 40 POW's did reclamation work on bombed-out areas under the supervision of guards armed with PPSH's. The camp had 250 guards, 70 percent armed with PPSH's and 30 percent armed with Soviet rifles.

POW Camp at YD-557234

3. In mid-October 1952 a POW camp with approximately 200 ROK POW's was in a former Japanese army barracks at YD-557234, near Taesong-ni (N 39-02, E 125-57) (YD-5524).² There were four buildings 20 meters long, 6 meters wide, and 3 meters high, with cement walls and roofs. The two characters for POW, P'o Ro (2198/5712), were written on the roofs. There were 60 guards armed with PPSH's and Soviet rifles. A North Korean army lieutenant was in charge of the guard unit. Five hundred

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COMNAVS: FE#PHIL#7#PACFLT#; CINCFE#FEAF#5AF#; RYCOM#; TOKYO EMB#														

(Note: Washington Distribution Indicated By "X"; Field Distribution By "#".)

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

- 2 -

grams of grain, 30 percent rice and 70 percent other cereals, were rationed to each POW daily and each was issued a blanket. POW's were engaged in cutting logs in the forest, farming at government farms, and reclamation work on bombed-out areas. Medical facilities were very poor. POW's were given ideological indoctrination for 2 hours daily. Those who showed a possibility of being converted to Communism were given further indoctrination and received better treatment. Converted prisoners were moved out of the camp to other places for advanced training.³

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

1. Washington Comment. [redacted] on 21 September 1952 a POW camp with 2,000 ROK POWs was at YD-360220 in Sosong-ni.

2. Field Comment. For a previous report on this POW camp [redacted] see [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

3. [redacted] Comment. Some of the converted prisoners were believed to be infiltrated into South Korea as intelligence agents.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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FBIS Concatenated Daily Reports, 1992

Document 1 of 2

Page 1

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED Status: [STAT]
 Report Number: FBIS-SOV-92-036 UDC Number:

Headline: Status of Quest for U.S. MIA's Updated

Source Line: MK2202123092 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 22
 Feb 92 p 4

Subslug: [Vladimir Abarinov article: ``Investigation: Prisoners of War Have Own Archipelago. U.S. Prisoners in Former USSR Still Not Martyrology'']

FULL TEXT OF ARTICLE:

1. [Vladimir Abarinov article: ``Investigation: Prisoners of War Have Own Archipelago. U.S. Prisoners in Former USSR Still Not Martyrology'']
2. [Text] The search for U.S. servicemen who disappeared on USSR territory in various circumstances has been stepped recently. We would remind you that NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA first addressed this problem last August. Since then there has been virtually no progress. However, available information and experience of similar searches gives us every reason to expect success.
3. For starters I must repeat some figures, since those doing the rounds in our press are imprecise and do not differentiate between prisoners of war [POW's] and those missing in action [MIA's] and are often rounded up- presumably, for the writer's convenience.
4. During the Korean war the United States lost 8,177 MIA's and 954 people who it is known for certain were captured and did not return home alive or dead. After the war in Indochina the Americans were missing 2,273 men, of whom 1,678 disappeared in Vietnam, while none of the 500 or more airmen brought down over Laos were repatriated.
5. Air crews downed near the Soviet borders-there were 86 of them in the fifties and sixties-form a separate category of MIA's. Moreover, in most cases the entire crew disappeared.
6. A considerable proportion of the prisoners dating back to the Korean and Vietnam wars were evidently never held on USSR territory-the exception being people of some operational interest. Americans ``liberated'' by the Red Army from Nazi jails in the Balkans, in Poland, and East Germany (and incidentally from Japanese jails in Manchuria) are another matter. Some 20,000 of them failed to return home.
7. Last, officers abducted by the Soviet special services in Berlin,

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Date 01 MAR 1994

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Document 1 of 2

Page 2

Vienna, and certain other points in the Soviet occupied zone during the early postwar years form a special group of MIA's. There are 18 such people in my file.

8. So, where should we look for them?

9. The countless references to the Gulag are totally incorrect: This is quite a justifiable euphemism for U.S. journalists, but for national journalists it is a true indication of incompetence. There were never any POW's in the Gulag—they were dealt with by another main commissariat of the NKVD-MGB [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs—Ministry of State Security], namely the Main Directorate for POW and Internee Affairs, which had its own camps. People convicted of espionage and other real or imaginary crimes are another matter. They not only could have but should have ended up in the Gulag (which was until recently called the GUITU, now the GUID [expansions unknown]).

10. They dealt in the same way with people who did not agree to be recruited or to cooperate in other ways and also with those whose services were no longer needed. The story of Stanislaw Swianewicz is typical; he escaped execution in the Katyn forest in 1940 at the last moment owing to a request from the USSR NKVD Main Directorate for State Security. Sitting in the inner Lubyanka jail, he wrote a treatise on the economy of the Third Reich (Professor Swianewicz was an unsurpassed specialist in this field), after which he was convicted and sent to a camp. These people were often kept in special jails as a "special contingent"—for example, before being exchanged for Rulof Abel, Francis Gary Powers served time in Vladimir jail. What is more, a foreigner could be under investigation for as long as they liked. Prominent Wehrmacht and SS officers captured at the end of the war were only sentenced in 1951-1952. Throughout these six or seven years they were kept in the Lubyanka jail, often in solitary confinement, both before and after sentencing. The same thing happened if there were any special circumstances: That happened, for instance, to Raoul Wallenberg's cellmates and fellow defendants.

11. There are known cases of prisoners (under investigation) being summoned from their cell "with their things" and disappearing without trace. That was the fate that befell Brigade General Leopold Okulice, commander of the Krajowa Army, who was sentenced to 10 years in the camps in June 1945 by the military collegium of the Supreme Court. Okulice's personal prison file was declassified recently, revealing that he died as a result of a failed surgical operation.

12. There were cases of a prisoner liable to repatriation not returning home either. That was the fate of Lieutenant General Reiner Stagel, one of the butchers during the Warsaw uprising. Sentenced to

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Page 3

25 years in jail and then amnestied, he did not reach the fatherland: The last document in his file is a burial certificate from one of the transit camps. You only have to destroy this last document, and the disappearance of the repatriant would be shrouded in mystery forever.

13. Quite often on his release a prisoner would remain under open surveillance, have his movements restricted, and be given a Russian name. The example of the former Greek Communist Party General Secretary Nikos Zakhariadis, who lived in Surgut under the name Nikolay Nikolayevich Nikolayev and committed suicide in 1979, is not entirely typical: His party colleagues knew of his situation. More often a prisoner did not have an opportunity to make himself known and, when the opportunity did arise, he was already as a rule totally assimilated, had a family, and could not even imagine returning. The author knows of several people like that, including people who are currently prospering—admittedly not Americans.

14. Last, a prisoner might have been executed under Article 58 of the RSFSR Criminal Code (usually charged with espionage or terrorism) or under the decree of 19 April 1943 if the accused were Wehrmacht servicemen or an "accomplice" of the occupiers. I have already written about this hitherto secret act, which has presumably lost its legal validity, that made provision for death by hanging. As far as I am aware, the Belgian national Yermak Lukyanov [name as transliterated] was executed under the draconian decree in May 1984.

15. The idea that U.S. pilots could have fought in Korea and Vietnam under assumed names, as was the practice in our country, must be considered groundless. U.S. Army Field Regulation FM 21-76 ("Survival, Avoidance of Capture, and Escape from Jail") in the chapter "Conduct Under Interrogation" recommends that a prisoner give his true name, rank, number, and date of birth. That was how the surviving crew members from the RB-47 aircraft downed over the Barents Sea 1 July 1960 behaved. Their story could serve as a model of what did happen or might have happened to U.S. pilots brought down near Soviet borders.

16. Second pilot Bruce Olsted and navigator John Makkoun [surnames as transliterated] spent almost seven months in Lubyanka. The interrogation indicates that investigator Colonel Pankratov prepared the trial on the basis of the Powers trial. The pilots were freed right after John Kennedy's inauguration as a "goodwill gesture" but only because no confessions were extracted from them. So Americans most likely gave their real names, although prisoners were nearly always given different names in jails and camps.

17. There is another specific difficulty. People of German, Japanese, and Italian descent served in the U.S. Army. It is quite

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possible that these people could have gone to a camp on the basis of 'national allegiance,' especially since the Soviet Union never committed itself to complying with the Hague and Geneva conventions whereby military uniform is the crucial indication of citizenship.

18. In short, the practice of Soviet punitive organs illustrates that anything could have happened to prisoners. Yet there is nothing fantastic about the hope of finding Americans alive or at least traces of them.

19. The reports of Americans in Soviet camps and jails are specific enough to be able to start checking them out. There was a camp somewhere in Belarus in 1945 for black soldiers-nearby inhabitants would hardly have forgotten such an exotic detail. Colonel Gordon, arrested in Vienna in 1949, was seen in Lvov transit jail in 1953. An unnamed lieutenant and NCO [noncommissioned officer], participants in the Korean war, were seen at a phosphorus mine near Yakutsk (Camp No. 307) in 1960. Lieutenant Warren Sanderson was seen at Inte, and Pilot Joe Miller was seen at Karabas in March 1947-he had been brought down over Berlin in 1945. Colonel Jackson, arrested in Berlin, was seen in Dubrovlag (the report is dated mid-1953). The crew of a B-29 brought down over the Sea of Japan 13 July 1952 (13 men) were kept in Khabarovsk POW Camp No. 21 (October 1951), while one of the members of a crew brought down there 6 November 1951 was seen in a military hospital north of Magadan (1954). This pilot served 25 years for espionage. In both cases the reports have come from repatriated Japanese.

20. Dzhetskazgan, Magnitogorsk, Perm, Norilsk, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Pechora, Potma, Tayshet, Verkhneuralsk, Vladivostok, Vologda, Vrangell Island, Yavas, the renowned Vladimir Jail OD-1/st-2 [expansion unknown]-familiar names. Sometimes an American is cited by name, often not, but in these cases minimal additional information is given, for instance: date and place of capture, rank, category of troops. The most detailed information concerns the Vorkuta camps: Mine No. 40-William Bizet [surname as transliterated] from Korea, a lieutenant or NCO convicted under Article 58; Camp No. 6-Major Robert Shvarts [surname as transliterated], abducted in Kassel in 1949; Convalescent Camp-crew of a U.S. Navy Privateer aircraft brought down over the Baltic 8 April 1950 (10 men); Colonel Davison, abducted in Vienna in 1946, is also there.

21. Dmitriy Volkogonov has recently provided documentary confirmation once again that U.S. World War II prisoners were kept in Tambov's 'Rada' (No. 188) POW camp. The colonel general was clearly hasty in declaring his discovery a sensation: In this case it is a question of Americans who served in the German Army (there were at least 108 such people in the Tambov camp, according to 'special'

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Document 1 of 2

Page 5

archive figures).

22. I must particularly point out that documents concerning POW's and MIA's are still secret in the United States or have been only partially declassified. That is why in a number of cases we do not know the names of the Americans concerned or the source of the information- this information is carefully obliterated when the documents are declassified.

23. There is a great deal of shady business regarding the problem of POW's and MIA's. At one time NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA reported on a photograph that had caused a sensation in the West. It showed three U.S. pilots brought down over North Vietnam and Laos in 1966, 1969, and 1970. The photograph was dated May 1990. I remember a Pentagon spokesman saying that the photograph was a montage. The journal from which the falsifiers (''Cambodian opportunists'') cut the pictures- SOVETSKIY SOYUZ No. 1, 1990-was even named, and it was indicated that it had even been taken out of the Soviet Embassy library in Phnom Penh. It is hard to believe that the mother and the wives of the MIA's did not recognize their close relatives, but that is not the point: This journal is lying in front of me and there is nothing resembling the Cambodian photograph in it.

24. Late last year a KOMMERSANT report that one of the pilots brought down over Vietnam was still living in Kazakhstan caused a great deal of ballyhoo. The reporter for some reason decided not to disclose the pilot's name, however he gave the date that he was captured, from which it is easy to elucidate that he is Navy Lt. James Kelly Patterson, born 14 July 1940, who lived in Long Beach, California, before the war. I have something to say about Patterson. Patterson was a navigator in the crew under the command of Captain Eugene MacDaniel, now the prosperous founder and president of the U.S. Rehabilitation Institute, who spent six years in a Vietnamese jail. He said in an interview last year that he had once received a telephone call from the National Security Council asking him to stop making public statements about MIA's.

25. It is no wonder that the search has as yet had insignificant results.

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CIA - March 1, 2024

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This message is subject to correction.
Corrected copy will be forwarded upon receipt.

ACTION _____
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RFTU JAY RUWMGGA0529 1171649-UUUU--RUWTFJA.

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RR RUABSG RUABAC RUAUBAC RUECH RUECW RUWTFJA

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ZNR UUUUU

R 270725Z

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TO RUABSG/FBIS SAIGON

RUABAC/USFJ/J-2 FUCHU AIR STA JAPAN

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RUECH/BUPERS

RUECW/ONI WASH DC

RUWTFJA/USAFMPC

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MSC

BT
UNCLAS WA RUAP ABVA
T270725 FOR YOUR INFORMATION

TOKYO AKAHATA IN JAPANESE TWENTYSEVEN 27 APRIL CARRIED A PHOTO REPORTAGE ON THE MIYAMOTO-HEADED JCPHDELEGATION'S VISIT TO THANH HOA PROVINCE IN NORTH VIETNAM ON TWENTYFIVE 25 FEBRUARY SIXTYSIX 1966, INCLUDING A DESCRIPTION OF THE DELEGATION'S OBSERVATION OF THE OUTFIT OF ONE OF THE CAPTURED U.S. PILOTS IN THANH HOA PROVINCE, WHO WAS IDENTIFIED AS U.S. AIR FORCE CAPTAIN DAVID A. (P) CARDELLI. INCLUDED IN HIS OUTFIT, ACCORDING TO AKAHATA, WERE AN FFF-105-
DDO FLYING GUIDE, A LIFE BELT, AN OXYGEN MASK, A SMALL BOAT AND AIR

PAGE 2 RUAPBI 10 UNCLAS
PUMP, A HEAD MOSQUITO NET, A SMOKE BOMB, AND A VINYL BAG CONTAINING A MATCHBOX, A GUN, A DAGGER, A FISHING KIT, POMADE, AND CREAM.

AKAHATA REPORTED THAT HE ALSO HAD A PHOTOGRAPH OF HIMSELF RECEIVING MCNAMARA'S INSTRUCTIONS ON BOMBING THE NORTH, A PAMPHLET ENTITLED "FOR SURVIVAL," A BUNCH OF COLOR-PHOTO CARDS INDICATING EDIBLE AND NONEDIBLE PLANTS, AND AN OASK FOR HELPD DOCUMENT WRITTEN IN ENGLISH, FRENCH, DUTCH, AND TEN 10 ASIAN LANGUAGES.

AKAHATA ALSO CARRIED ONE PHOTOGRAPH OF THE FFF-105-DDO PILOT'S EQUIPMENT. (THERE WAS NO STATEMENT BY THE CAPTURED AIRMAN, NOR ANY EVIDENCE FROM THE ARTICLE THAT THE DELEGATION HAD SEEN OR TALKED WITH HIM. 27/0742Z APR

BT

*David L. Hrdlicka (only David at the time)
reads like a collection from many pilots*

M/R Captain Hrdlicka parachuted 8-10 miles from Thanh Hoa Providence.

*Only by the stretch of imagination
JHB*

NNNNz

Approved for Release: _____
Date JUN 1993

ATTN 4 COPY.

our file 306

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SECURITY INFORMATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT NO. [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY **China**

DATE DISTR. **18 Dec. 1951**

SUBJECT **UN Prisoners of War in the Canton Area**

NO. OF PAGES **1**

PLACE ACQUIRED [redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO. [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES. WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, OF THE U. S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE [redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

As of early November, there were no prisoners of war on Shameen in Canton.

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Class. Changed To:	TS S <i>Ⓟ</i>
Auth.:	HR 70-2
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By:	<i>oib</i>

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CIA - March 1, 2024

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

- 2 -

POW Camp at XE-874801

2. In late December 1952 a POW camp with approximately 500 white and colored United Nations POW's was in the vicinity of XE-874801, near Ch'ang-ni (N 40-27, E 125-12) (XE-8780).² The prisoners were housed in six wooden buildings with tile roofs. Each building was 10 meters long, 6 meters wide, and 3 meters high. The POW's arose at 6 a.m. They had breakfast at 6:30 a.m., lunch at 1 p.m., and dinner at 7 p.m. Their rations included rice, millet, bean curd, dried fish, and vegetables. They were given a physical examination approximately every 5 days. Approximately 50 Chinese Communist troops guarded this camp.

American POW's in the Hamhung Area

3. In late August 1952, approximately 100 American POW's were working in a tunnel in the Hamhung (N 39-54, E 127-32) (CV-7517) area.³ The prisoners, wearing old North Korean army uniforms, were loading rocks into hand-carts under the supervision of North Korean army guards. They appeared underfed and weak.

POW Camp at YD-355214

4. In October 1952 a POW camp with between 1,500 and 2,000 ROK POW's was at YD-355214, in the former Sosong-ni People's School in Sosong-ni (N 39-01, E 125-43) (YD-3522).⁴ This camp was in Kirim-ni (N 39-02, E 125-45) (YD-3824), P'yongyang, until July 1952.⁵ The camp was in a two-story, brick building and was surrounded by a barbed wire fence. The camp was guarded by approximately 40 North Korean army guards. One guard was posted at each corner of the fence and there were several roving guards in the camp. Contact of prisoners with the outside was strictly regulated and no civilian was allowed to enter the camp. Guarding within the camp was not strict and the POW's were not obedient to the guards. When the guards gave orders to the POW's the POW's pretended not to hear the orders. No disciplinary action was taken by the guards. The POW's were required to go outside the camp in groups of 20 to 30 to repair damage after an air raid. The work details were guarded by four or five soldiers. If a POW became thirsty when on a work detail, he was allowed to go to a villager's house for water, accompanied by a guard. When working outside the camp or on the streets, the prisoners were often given cigarettes or food by the villagers. These were the only outside contacts permitted by the guards.

POW Camp at YD-369233

5. On 8 December 1952 approximately 500 ROK POW's were being held in a former school building, approximately 70 meters long and 10 meters wide, at YD-369223, near P'yongyang.⁶ The prisoners worked in groups of 70 at a time in the vicinity of the building cleaning up the rubble after United Nations bombings. They wore blue pants, olive drab coats, and North Korean army caps without insignia.

POW Camp at Sunan (N 39-12, E 125-41) (YD-3242)

6. On 8 December 1952, approximately 600 ROK POW's were in a camp on the northern edge of Sunan.⁷ The prisoners were dressed similarly to those in the above mentioned POW camp at YD-369223, near P'yongyang. They repaired roads and collected bricks from destroyed buildings in the area.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

- 3 -

Movement of North Korean Prisoners to the Soviet Union

7. In mid-September 1952 by order of the North Korean Labor Party, an estimated 20,000 prisoners were moved from various prisons in North Korea to Unggi (N 42-21, E 130-24) (FB-1589). These prisoners included persons convicted of political crimes against the North Korean government, civilians who were kidnapped in South Korea during the North Korean occupation, and an estimated 6,000 ROK POW's. In early October these prisoners were sent to the Ural industrial area in the Soviet Union as laborers.

Field Comments

(b)(3) NatSecAct

1. See [] for another report on the POW camp at Pyoktong. According to FEC Intelligence Summary Number 3649, 5 September 1952, POW Camp Number 4 at YE-062995, Pyoktong, was listed among the names of POW camps in North Korea submitted by the Communist delegation to the United Nations Command Armistice Delegation on 17 July 1952. (b)(3) NatSecAct
2. This is possibly the same camp that [] reported at XE-877796, near Ch'ang-ni. Another American agency reported that on 4 November 1952 a POW camp with 800 white and colored United Nations POW's was in a wooden building at XE-874801. According to FEC Intelligence Summary Number 3649, 5 September 1952, POW Camp Number 1 at XE-87897, Ch'ang-ni, was listed among the names of POW camps in North Korea submitted by the Communist delegation to the United Nations Command Armistice Delegation on 17 July 1952. (b)(3) NatSecAct
3. See [] and [] for other reports on American POW's in the Hamhung area. (b)(3) NatSecAct
4. This is probably the same camp as the 5 Independent Inclosure of the No. 8 POW Camp reported in []. It is possibly the same camp reported at YD-353213, near Sosong-ni, in []. According to FEC Intelligence Summary Number 3649, 5 September 1952, POW Camp Number 11 in the same area was listed among the names of POW camps in North Korea submitted by the Communist delegation to the United Nations Command Armistice Delegation on 17 July 1952. (b)(3) NatSecAct
5. According to [], POW Camp Number 5, with 1,200 ROK POW's, was in the former Mirim-ni Primary School in Kirin-ni, P'yongyang, in mid-June 1952.
6. Another American agency reported that on 23 November 1952 a POW camp with 100 ROK prisoners was at YD-368222. This is probably the same camp.
7. [] reported that on 30 September 1952 a POW camp with 3,000 ROK prisoners was at YD-327412, east of Sunan. [] reported that in late July a POW Camp with 1,000 ROK POW's was at the site of the former Sunan High School. According to FEC Intelligence Summary Number 3649, 5 September 1952, POW Camp Number 13, Sunan, was listed among the names of POW Camps in North Korea submitted by the Communist delegation to the United Nations Command Armistice Delegation on 17 July 1952. (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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CIA - March 1, 2024

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Americans Known To Be Held Prisoners by the Red Chinese

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. JOHN W. McCORMACK

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 5, 1955

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I recently wrote Allyn C. Donaldson, Director, Office of Special Consular Services, Department of State, requesting information of the breakdown of Americans known to be held prisoners by the Red Chinese, as follows: (a) Servicemen, (b) civilians, and to let me know the number and the names of bishops and priests of the Catholic Church; ministers of the Protestant creeds; and any rabbis who are prisoners of the Red Chinese.

Under date of June 27 I received a letter from Mr. Donaldson in which he conveyed to me the information I sought, and which I include in my extension of remarks (a) letter of Mr. Donaldson; and (b) the names of Americans known to be prisoners of the Red Chinese, together with their breakdown, in accordance with my request:

JUNE 27, 1955.

The Honorable JOHN W. McCORMACK,
House of Representatives.

DEAR MR. McCORMACK: The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of June 15 in which you inquire concerning the number of American citizens known by the Department to be prisoners of the Chinese Communists.

The Department carries on its lists of American citizens held in Chinese Communist jails or held under house arrest in Communist China the names of 28 civilians and 11 Air Force personnel, whom the Chinese Communists admit holding. The enclosed copies of these lists indicate to the best of the Department's knowledge, in the cases of clergymen, their church affiliation and rank as you requested.

The Department has also been pressing the Chinese Communists for information concerning other Americans regarding whom they might possibly have information, such as the 6 Navy and 5 Coast Guard personnel (list attached) shot down off Swatow in 1953, and the large number of missing military personnel never accounted for in the Korean fighting.

In addition to the American civilians under formal and house arrest, there are approximately 10 American civilians who, while not under either arrest or house arrest, have applied to the Chinese Communists without success for exit permits. In this group there is one missionary, Eva Stella DuGay (Sister Theresa), a nun of the Carmelite Order.

Sincerely yours,

ALLYN C. DONALDSON,
Director, Office of Special Consular Services.

AMERICAN CIVILIANS UNDER ARREST IN COMMUNIST CHINA

Bradshaw, Dr. Homer V., Presbyterian missionary; Buol, Lawrence Robert, aviation company employee; Clifford, Rev. John William, Jesuit missionary; Downey, John Thomas, Army employee; Fecteau, Richard George, Army employee; Garvey, Rev. Justin, Passionist missionary; Gross, Rev. Fulgence, Franciscan missionary; Houle, Rev. John Alexander, Jesuit missionary; Kanady, Dilmus T., employee of cotton brokerage; Lovegren, Levi A., Conservative Baptist missionary; Mackensen, Paul J., Jr., Lutheran mis-

sionary; McCann, Robert, businessman; McCarthy, Rev. Charles Joseph, Jesuit missionary; McCormack, Very Rev. Joseph Patrick (prefect apostolic), Maryknoll missionary; Middleton, Dorothy, Presbyterian missionary; Mills, Harriet, Fulbright scholar; Perkins, Sarah, Presbyterian missionary; Phillips, Rev. Thomas Leonard, Jesuit missionary; Pinger, Bishop Ambrose H., Franciscan missionary; Proulx, Rev. Armand, Jesuit missionary; Redmond, Hugh Francis, import-export business; Rickett, W. A., Fulbright scholar; Rigney, Rev. Harold W., Society of Divine Word; Wagner, Rev. John Paul, Franciscan missionary; White, Rev. Marcellus, Passionist missionary.

AMERICAN CIVILIANS BELIEVED UNDER HOUSE ARREST

Gordon, Very Rev. Frederick D. (prefect apostolic), Dominican missionary; Hyde, Rev. Joseph Eugene, Dominican missionary; Joyce, Rev. James Gerald, Dominican missionary.

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PERSONNEL WHO WERE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND IN KOREA NOW HELD IN COMMUNIST CHINA

Arnold, John K., Jr., colonel, 1212A; Baumer, William J., major, AO733786; Benjamin, Harry M., airman, second class, AF-27345838; Brown, Howard W., technical sergeant, AF36809947; Brown, Wallace L., first lieutenant, AO2221928; Buck, John W., first lieutenant, AO787245; Kiba, Steve E., airman, first class, AF14526310; Llewellyn, Elmer P., captain, AO2072860; Schmidt, Daniel C., airman, second class, AF19391475; Thompson, John W., III, airman, second class, AF13361-709; Vaadi, Eugene J., captain, AO825008.

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD AND NAVY AIRMEN MISSING FOLLOWING SHOOTING DOWN OF UNITED STATES NAVY PLANE OFF COAST OF CHINA, JANUARY 18, 1953, AND CRASH OF UNITED STATES COAST GUARD PLANE AT SAME LOCATION DURING RESCUE OPERATIONS

From the Navy aircraft: Angell, Dwight C., ensign, USNR, 552173; Beahm, Ronald A., ALAN, USN., 4268297; Byars, Clifford R., ATAN, USN, 3618355; McClure, William F., Jr., PHI, USN, 5682573; Morley, Paul A., AT 3, USN, 4268438; Smith, Lloyd, Jr., RAD 2, USN, 6306390.

From the Coast Guard rescue plane: Stuart, Gerald William, lieutenant junior grade, USCGR, 39984; Bridge, Joseph Richard, AO-1, USCG, 208-836; Hammond, Winfield James, ALC, USCG, 203-380; Miller, Tracy Wesley, AD-3, USCG, 288-273; Tornell, Carl Raymond, AL-1, USCG, 251-723.

TOP SECRET

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted]
2 August 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Senator Conrad's Request for Information on
Possible Russian POW 1LT Warren J. Sanderson USAF

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1. On Monday, 25 July 1994, I received a call from [redacted] of Senator Kent Conrad's (D-ND) office requesting a meeting with the DCI to discuss getting the Intelligence Community's cooperation in retrieving data on the fate of subject Air Force officer, shot down in the Soviet Far East on 29 July, 1953. [redacted] claimed that there was evidence to support a belief on the part of Sanderson's heirs that the flier, who was on an electronics intelligence collection mission, had survived the crash of his RB-50 (modified B-29) and had been incarcerated in a Russian POW camp.

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2. The Senator's aide further explained that the Sanderson inquiry was being spearheaded by his son, [redacted] one of Conrad's constituents. Faust stressed that [redacted] was "playing by the rules" and had succeeded so far in getting good cooperation from DIA, NSA and the Air Force. [redacted] has also travelled to Moscow to discuss his case with the US/Russian Commission on Cold War POWs and has been invited to formally present the case before that body at the end of August 1994.

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3. While in Moscow, [redacted] said, [redacted] had met with former KGB officials who told him that 7 of the 9 members of the RB-50 crew had survived the crash in the waters off Vladivostok and had been picked up by NKVD patrol boats. From DoD [redacted] had previously learned that another crew member had been picked up by a US destroyer 22 hours after the crash but that he did not know the fate of his compatriots. [redacted] told [redacted] that US Ambassador Malcolm Toon and Russian General Volkogronov (sp?) of the POW Commission had agreed that this was the "priority case" among the Cold War POW incidents because of the availability of credible evidence.

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4. [redacted] said that what Conrad wanted on behalf of his constituent was discovery of whether [redacted] Sanderson had in any way been employed by CIA at the time he was lost, whether the Agency had in any way been involved in the planning or follow-up of the failed mission, and whether we

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SUBJECT: Senator Conrad's Request for Information on
Possible Russian POW 1LT Warren J. Sanderson USAF

had any information indicating that the flier had been incarcerated in a POW camp. I told [redacted] that those were all legitimate questions for us to address but suggested that a Conrad-Woolsey meeting was not necessarily the best way to go about it. I suggested that we could save the time of both our principals if he would settle for my making at least a preliminary survey of the lay of the land at the staff level rather than insisting on a meeting. [redacted] agreed on the condition I report back to him on Tuesday, noting that he wanted a "yes or no" answer on a meeting with the Director since [redacted] now in Washington, was returning to [redacted]

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5. I turned first for information to [redacted] Chief of the Agency History Staff. He said he knew of no one now in the Agency with direct knowledge of the issues [redacted] had raised. MacDonald added, however, that a retired CIA Officer, Donald Welzenbach, had been retained on contract by the History Staff to write two studies of the Agency's involvement in aerial reconnaissance, one focused on the U-2 missions and the other on the OXCART (SR-71) program. He said that in the course of this work Welzenbach had become knowledgeable about other US programs of this type and could be a useful source for [redacted]

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6. [redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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[redacted] He explained that, while DCI Dulles chaired the US Intelligence Activities Board (interagency commission that approved such missions), he preferred to leave such collection missions to Defense until the Agency could acquire its own airborne collector, i.e. the U-2. As a result, [redacted] said, he believed any search of CIA records would not turn up 1LT Sanderson. [redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct
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[redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

7. On [redacted] recommendation, I called Welzenbach [redacted] who proved to be a font of information about the period in question. [redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct
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(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted]

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: Senator Conrad's Request for Information on Possible Russian POW 1LT Warren J. Sanderson USAF

[Redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

8. Welzenbach said he would be pleased to talk with [Redacted] and provided two leads that he could pursue if he had not already done so. The first was a BBC television program called "Spies in the Sky" which was shown in the US on the A&E channel on 28 May 1994. He characterized it as a very professional and comprehensive video report and said

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[Redacted]

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9. Welzenbach also recommended two studies published by the RAND Corporation at the SECRET and TOP SECRET level which he claimed covered every one of the missions flown around the periphery of the Soviet Union from 1935 to 1954 in great detail. He said that he believed that these studies had been declassified or at least downgraded recently and would be a valuable source, directly or indirectly, [Redacted] Welzenbach added that the RAND studies showed that the Soviets had been fairly passive in reacting to intrusions of their airspace until 1949 but in the early fities became increasingly aggressive. Welzenbach said that he remembered the shutdown of the RB-50 on which Sanderson had been lost and recalled that by 1953 Russian interceptors were not only challenging intruders over the Sea of Japan but were pursuing them over Japanese territory.

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10. Welzenbach recommended that [Redacted] get in touch with a Mr. Cargill Hall at the Air Force Center for History. He said that since the death of BGEN Millard Lewis in 1993, the officer who had planned all the USAF missions of this type in the period 1950-54, Hall was the most informed person in the Air Force on this program. He added that Hall

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] Welzenbach said [Redacted] should use his name in introducing himself to Hall.

11. [Redacted]

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(b)(3) NatSecAct
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TOP SECRET

CIA - March 1, 2024

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SUBJECT: Senator Conrad's Request for Information on Possible Russian POW 1LT Warren J. Sanderson USAF

12. On Tuesday, 26 July, I reported back to [redacted] much of the information related above and said that we would proceed with a computer run of our employment records and should have an answer for him the next day. [redacted] expressed his gratitude and said that he would pass on the leads that [redacted] and Welzenbach had supplied. Later on the same day, [redacted] called back to say that [redacted] was already aware of the RAND reports and that Defense had previously put him in touch with Hall at the Air Force History Center. He also said that [redacted] had just called Welzenbach and had found that conversation helpful. [redacted] asked me if [redacted] could talk with me by telephone in lieu of a meeting. Since avoiding a meeting for the Director had been one of my objectives from the outset, I agreed--with the caveat that I had no substantive expertise on the matters in question. [redacted] said [redacted] just wanted to thank me for the Agency's efforts so far and to provide additional information that might assist our search.

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(b)(3) CIAAct
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13. [redacted] called shortly thereafter with data OS wanted on [redacted] date of birth, Social Security number and Air Force serial number. He also told me that 1LT Sanderson had been assigned to the 55th Reconnaissance Wing, 343rd Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron but was detailed to the 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, based in Yokota, Japan at the time of the crash. [redacted] added that he believed [redacted] had been imprisoned at the "Inta" camp near "Verkuta" in the Soviet Far East.

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14. [redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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15. [redacted] said he would like the CIA to search its records to determine the validity of these leads as well as to determine whether there were any intelligence overflights of the crash area immediately after the RB-50 was lost. He also had heard that a team of "Japanese nationals" had been inserted into the Vladivostok area after the crash to check on the whereabouts of the downed crew and he wondered whether the Agency's files would reveal anything about this effort.

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TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: Senator Conrad's Request for Information on Possible Russian POW 1LT Warren J. Sanderson USAF

16. Finally, [redacted] said that he would mail me a "package" of information documenting these leads more fully. I replied that we would consider addressing the package after we had found out the answer to his initial question, i.e. whether [redacted] was ever employed in any way by the Agency. [redacted] stressed the importance of a quick reaction by CIA since he needed to make the most complete case possible to the US/Russian POW Commission later this month.

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[redacted]

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17. [redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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but had no luck. I then reached [redacted] at Senator Conrad's office and told him what we had found. [redacted] said he would pass the news on to [redacted]. We agreed that the next step was to examine the package of documentary evidence [redacted] said he would deliver to this office and, if possible, to get [redacted] an answer before his trip to Moscow in late August. I agreed to keep [redacted] informed of our progress.

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[redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct
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Senate Liaison

[redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

Distribution:

- Original - OCA Records
- 1 - D/OCA
- 1 - DD/SA
- 1 - [redacted]

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CIA - March 1, 2024

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~~S E C R E T~~

SPOT REPORT

4 NOVEMBER 1992

UPDATE ON COMMITTEE REQUEST FOR NATIONAL WARNING FILES

Further to our Spot Report on 3 November, on 5 November NIO Officer for Warning Charlie Allen chaired a meeting with OCA and EA/ICOG to discuss the request from the Senate Select Committee for POW-MIA Affairs for access to information held in a vast array of Warning Center files. Mr. Allen described the joint nature of the Warning Center files (which are administered jointly for the DCI, but not as a purely CIA activity), the extreme sensitivity of many of the files, the fact that many of the items belong to other Government agencies, and the fact that the files contain no separate repository of POW-MIA information such as the Committee is seeking.

In short, Mr. Allen is most reluctant to afford the Committee untrammelled access to information contained in the Warning Center files. He proposed that the Warning Center chief and an NIO Warning Officer physically review the file holdings at the Joint Warning Center at the Pentagon, to ensure themselves that they are not holding any POW information of value to the Committee. By early next week we will have the results of their search. Unless the search develops something of specific value to the Committee, we plan to respond to the Committee to the effect that we have thoroughly reviewed our Warning files, but that our search has failed to uncover the type of information they are seeking.

The other part of the requirement, for all intelligence reports on American military prisoners held during the Korean War and all Cold War incidents, is being pursued through IMS and OIR, but neither element was especially hopeful about locating comprehensive reporting on those topics at this late date.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct~~S E C R E T~~

CIA - March 1, 2024

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EA/ICOG Spot Report - 4 November 1992

On 4 November Major General Loeffke, Chief of the Army's Task Force Russia, made an introductory visit to ICOG with his deputy, Col. Herrington, and a Russian analyst. CE Division POW referent [redacted] participated in the meeting. We (b)(3) CIAAct briefed the general on who does what here with regard to POW/MIA issues. Gen. Loeffke expressed complete satisfaction with the support he has received to date from CIA, and said he had no problems. C/ICOG pledged our continuing assistance via the ICOGPOW Branch and CE Division. The visitors reiterated the need to deliver requested information directly to them rather than via DIA, for greater efficiency; we promised to do so. (The DIA Chief of Staff has confirmed this arrangement via memorandum.) The general asked if we had any information supporting the sometimes heard allegation that American POW's were moved to the Soviet Union during the Korean War. We said we do not.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

[redacted] On reading the report, Gen. Loeffke was satisfied that he could testify accurately to the Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs concerning his knowledge of it.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

[redacted] promised to pass on immediately any additional pertinent information which we receive. The DO's working relationship with Task Force Russia is functioning smoothly.

(b)(3) CIAAct

Following this meeting, [redacted] told us that DC/CE had asked her to draft a memorandum recommending that an Agency-wide entity be established to handle the proliferation of POW-MIA questions which both EA and CE are constantly being asked to handle.

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CIA - March 1, 2024

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Other: We researched a number of items in response to requests made by the three DIA (PW-MIA) visitors of last week, and have prepared some replies for them. We also responded to several specific requests from the DoD CDO to declassify certain items; from DIA (PW-MIA) to review an FOIA request involving the Nhommarath detention facility and a new DIA study on American POW's in Laos; and to other requests from the DASD, the U.S.-Russian Joint Task Force, and the State Department. And the beat goes on.

Since three of our contract employees area away teaching our Branch has fluctuated in strength from two to four people over the past two weeks.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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CIA - March 1, 2024

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ICOGPOW Weekly Highlights - 5 November 1992

Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs: On 30 October two Committee investigators visited Headquarters to examine numerous intelligence reports and other documents we had located and assembled at their request, concerning several cases centering on Laos. The investigators' perusal of the documents led to their raising a number of further questions, which we have since been researching. They expressed their appreciation for our thoroughness and responsiveness.

On 30 October we received three additional requests from the Committee, all of which we researched and answered on 2 November. On 2 November we received another Committee request, this one an ambitious, sweeping requirement for access to numerous sensitive National Warning Center files, as well as for all intelligence reports on U.S. military POW's from the Korean and Cold wars. The NIO Warning Office is physically checking its file holdings, preparatory to our replying to the first part of the requirement. We have asked OIR and IMS to search for the intelligence reports, but neither was especially hopeful about being about to locate Cold War reports catalogued as such, or the quite dated Korean War reports.

For the third time, the Committee is asking the Director for full access to our [redacted] thick volumes of [redacted] (b)(1) operational files. The matter is now being discussed at the (b)(3) NatSecAct Directorate level. We prepared written reasons why we should not allow this, as well as proposed positions should the DCI decide to permit such access. The Committee will present its final report (reportedly in conflicting majority and minority versions) by 17 December, and expire on 2 January 1993. DIA expects the Committee will call for an investigation of DIA by the next Congress.

The Committee will depose former Czech defector Sejna this week, and he may be called to testify in an open Committee hearing on 11 November. [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(6)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Task Force Russia: On 4 November Major General Loeffke, his deputy, and an analyst from Task Force Russia paid an introductory visit to ICOG. The general said he is very pleased with the cooperation and support he is receiving from CIA (ICOG and CE Division). We pledged to continue to assist them. We discussed some specific cases of interest to the Task Force.

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CIA - March 1, 2024

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(Written For
C/EA)~~SECRET~~

4 November 1992

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

I. Reasons Not to Permit Senate Committee Staffers to Review Our [redacted] Operational Files

--They are full of "sources and methods"-type data;

--It sets a dangerous and irreversible precedent for the Agency and this Directorate to do so. Any Congressional Committee will henceforth demand the same kind of access.

--Committee members' threats of inevitable criticism of the Agency should not deter us from maintaining our standards of protecting sources and methods, or scare us into throwing away 45 years of strict and uncompromising standards for protecting DO documents;

--We can assure them that the FI contained in the files has already been extracted and declassified for the Library of Congress, and that the operational information in the files was pursued insofar as possible at the time, and will not now produce any new or different information;

--Some documents in the files came from other Government agencies (i.e., we are not authorized to pass them);

--Some items, such as memoranda from former NSC POW specialist Richard Childress, were clearly intended as privacy items between the Executive Branch and this Agency;

--Their search will inevitably lead to requests for other operational traffic and other files (e.g., on agents mentioned in these generic files), [redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted], as in widening ripples in a pond. Where would their search end? (b)(3) NatSecAct

--The Committee has a demonstrated propensity to leak sensitive data to the Washington Times [redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

--The fact that a sane investigator like Art Grant does the review does not prevent the information from getting into the hands of the more extreme investigators on the Committee staff, who are prone to leak it or lie about it;

--The Director has twice denied the Committee full access to the files. Why should he roll over now, just because it is their third try? The entire Agency is counting on the Director to hold his ground. Why? Because he is right.

II. If we Lose, our position should be:

--All of the declassifiable FI in the files has already been extracted and declassified, for passage to the Library of Congress via the DoD POW-MIA Central Documentation Office. (Some of the documents are still being processed prior to

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

passage, but the extraction and declassification steps have been done.) We have done this in response to the Executive Order. These amount to over 200 documents. Some (possibly 30) others were denied because of their sensitivity, [redacted] or gory descriptions of the deaths of servicemen which we did not want their next of kin to see. In other words, we are not holding back any factual information on POW-MIA matters. Would they be satisfied with seeing these items? (I doubt it. Unfortunately, it is not this information they are after, but the operational traffic, which seems to tantalize them.)

There is some misunderstanding on the part of Committee investigators Taylor and McCreary as to what the files contain in terms of operational (b)(1) information. They have seen examples of our [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct reports to run down the initial intelligence reports on [redacted] and seem to think that the files contain many other like items; i.e., that every intel report we received launched a major effort to corroborate it. Some did, and some didn't. The files contain many dead ends. Some efforts ended with no explanation, and we are unable to learn the reasons now. Vientiane Station, the source of some of the information of greatest interest to the investigators, no longer exists. This information cannot be pursued any farther at this late date. The information we acquired was pursued as far as possible, within the capabilities of the Stations, at that time. Our experience in trying to locate refugee sources of reports 20 and more years old (as one example) is that it is nearly always an impossible task. In other words, we see their search as rather quixotic and impractical, an academic exercise at best, and enormously time-consuming. If we are to open up the operational files, the Committee investigator must understand this, and not task us with a hundred new requests which will be impossible to satisfy these many years later [redacted] (b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

-If we lose, we must establish precise guidelines as to just how far the Committee's researches can take them. For example, will we put a time limit on it? We are dealing with an unlimited number of possibilities with regard to the questions they can raise after reviewing [redacted] thick files. Are we to accept tasking of this magnitude? It won't lead anywhere anyway. At the minimum, we would have to discuss the terms of the agreement before just rolling over and letting them task us ad infinitum. (The workload this might entail could be (b)(1) enormous.) (b)(3) NatSecAct

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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(b)(3) CIAAct

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. []

CD NO.

COUNTRY Korea/China

DATE DISTR. 17 July 1952

SUBJECT Prisoner-of-War Camps in North Korea and China

NO. OF PAGES 3

DATE OF INFO. []

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

PLACE ACQUIRED Korea

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO. (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
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SOURCE Paragraphs 1-7 : Chinese resident of Taiwan (b)(1)
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Paragraphs 8-10, 12: South Korean []
Paragraph 11 : Small businessman in South Korea []
Paragraph 13 : American-trained Korean investigator []

War Prisoner Administrative Office and Camp Classification

- In May 1952 the War Prisoner Administrative Office (Chan Fu Kuan Li Ch'u) (2069/0199/4619/3810/5710) in P'yongyang, under Colonel No-men-ch'i-fu (6179/7024/1148/1133), an intelligence officer attached to the general headquarters of the Soviet Far Eastern Military District, controlled prisoner of war camps in Manchuria and North Korea. The office, formerly in Mukden, employed 30 persons, several of whom were English-speaking Soviets. LIN Mai (2651/6701) and NAM IL (0589/2480) were deputy chairmen of the office.
- The office had developed three types of prisoner-of-war camps. Camps termed "peace camps," detaining persons who exhibited pro-Communist leanings, were characterized by considerate treatment of the prisoners and the staging within the camps of Communist rallies and meetings. The largest peace camp, which held two thousand prisoners, was at Chungchun. Peace camps were also at K'aiyuan Hsien (124-05, 42-36) and Pench'i (123-43, 41-20).
- Reform camps, all of which were in Manchuria, detained anti-Communist prisoners possessing certain technical skills. Emphasis at these camps was on reindoctrination of the prisoners.

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4. Normal prisoner-of-war camps, all of which were in North Korea, detained prisoners whom the Communists will exchange. Prisoners in the peace and reform camps will not be exchanged.
5. Officials of North Korean prisoner of war camps sent reports on individual prisoners to the War Prisoner Administrative Office. Cooperative prisoners were being transferred to peace camps. ROK army officers were being shot; ROK army soldiers were being reindoctrinated and assimilated into the North Korean army.

Kangdong Camp

6. In May the largest North Korean prisoner of war camp, detaining twelve hundred prisoners, was near T'ai Ling (1132/1545) mountain, six miles southeast of the Kangdong (126-05, 39-09) (BU-4837) railroad station.¹ The compound, divided with barbed wire and mud embankments into four partitions for American, English, and Turkish prisoners and prisoners of other nationalities, held 840 American, 100 English, 60 Turkish, and 200 hundred French, Dutch, and Canadian troops. Most of the United States prisoners were members of the 1 Cavalry Division and the 24 Infantry Division. General William Dean was moved from Harbin and Mukden to this camp in 1951.
7. The Kangdong camp, organized into study, management, sanitation, and finance sections, compelled the prisoners to study for three hours, to labor for four hours, and to discuss political problems for two hours.
- F-3 8. On 1 May nine thousand (sic) ROK army prisoners and fifty United Nations prisoners were in caves at the Kangdong camp, extending from approximately BU-492363 to BU-494368 in a valley at Adal-ni, Kangdong-myŏn (126-05, 39-09) (BU-4837).² Of the ROK army prisoners 10 percent were officers, 50 percent non-commissioned officers, and 40 percent privates. Of the United Nations prisoners 10 percent were Negroes. The prisoners, who received 600 grams of cereal and salt each day, were not required to work and spent only two hours each day out of the caves. An average of two prisoners were dying daily from malnutrition and eruptive typhus. The majority of prisoners at this camp were extremely anti-Communist in thinking. Three North Korean army guards, armed with PPSH's and rifles, were at the entrance of each cave.

Camp Number 106, Mirim

- F-3 9. On 1 May approximately sixteen hundred ROK army prisoners of war, including one hundred officers and five hundred non-commissioned officers, were at the North Korean prisoner of war camp number 106 at approximately YD-472214, 1.6 kilometers southwest of the Mirim railroad station (125-51, 39-01) (YD-4722). Prisoners held here, having been pressed through five ideological screenings, were believed to be potential converts to Communism. The prisoners believed that they were to be assimilated into the North Korean army. Members of political and security detachments maintained strict surveillance of the prisoners. The surveillance often was carried out by members of these bureaus who entered the camps disguised as prisoners.
- F-3 10. Each prisoner received 50 wu monthly, 1 kilogram of grain and 45 grams of soy bean oil, vegetables, salt, and soy bean paste daily. The prisoners were wearing North Korean army uniforms. The prisoners were constructing air raid shelters near the Mirim-ni airfield ten hours each day. Two hours of indoctrination lectures were also held daily. The prisoners had been organized into squads of ten men. Each of the camp's four battalions had three platoons and each platoon, four squads. A guard platoon, armed with M-1's, carbines, and PPSH's, was at the camp.

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Suan

F-3 11. On 5 May 200 ROK army prisoners and 110 prisoners from other United Nations armies including 80 Negroes, were at the North Korean prisoner of war camp at the site of the former Suan mine (126-23, 38-47) (BT-7396), ten kilometers north of Suan (126-22, 38-42) (BT-7186).³ Lieutenant Colonel KIM Kyu-hwan (6855/1145/3562) commanded the camp. Although other United Nations prisoners were not required to work, the ROK army prisoners constructed shelters and trenches throughout the entire day. The prisoners received only rice balls for food. Several of the other United Nations prisoners had obtained wheat paste from villagers in exchange for watches and other personal possessions. Thereafter the villagers were prohibited from entering the camp area. No sanitary facilities were offered to the prisoners. Approximately fifteen prisoners, including both ROK and United Nations personnel, were too ill to stand.

Sariwŏn

F-3 12. In late April approximately eight hundred United Nations prisoners were in a series of underground shelters at approximately YC-436673 in a valley between two hills four kilometers northeast of the Sariwŏn railroad station (125-46, 38-30) (YC-4064). On each side of the valley at the base of the two hills were 25 shelters. One shelter in every five accommodated the camp guards. Eight hundred Chinese Communist soldiers, armed with PPSH's and rifles, guarded the area. Dummy guards were also used at night. The majority of the guards were billeted in a nearby village of fifteen homes. The guard billets were easily visible from the air. Each prisoner received pork soup and 600 grams of cereal three times daily and a package of cigarettes each day. The prisoners were required to work for one hour and attend indoctrination meetings for two hours daily.

Mukden

13. On 6 January 1952 four hundred United States prisoners, including three hundred Negroes, were being detained in two buildings at Hsiao Nan Kuan Chieh, at the southeast corner of the intersection, in Mukden. One building, used as the police headquarters in Hsiao Nan Kuan during the Japanese occupation, was a two-story concrete structure, 30 meters long and 20 meters wide. The other building, one story high and constructed of gray brick, was behind the two-story building. Both buildings had tile roofs. All prisoners held here, with the exception of three second lieutenants, were enlisted personnel. The prisoners, dressed in Chinese Communist army uniforms, with a red arm band on the left arm, were not required to work. Two hours of indoctrination were conducted daily by staff members of the Northeast Army Command. Prisoners were permitted to play basketball in the courtyard. The attempt of three white prisoners to escape caused the withdrawal of permission for white prisoners to walk alone through streets in the vicinity of the camp. Two Chinese Communist soldiers guarded groups of white prisoners when such groups left the buildings. Negroes, however, could move outside the compound area freely and individually. Rice, noodles, and one vegetable were served daily to the prisoners in groups of 10 to 15 men. One platoon of Chinese Communist soldiers guarded the compound.

1. Field Comment. In late February 1952 two thousand prisoners, slightly inclined toward Communism, were being detained at the base of a mountain three kilometers west of Kangdong, according to [redacted] and referenced reports. (b)(3) CIAAct
2. Field Comment. This is presumably information on the same camp as that reported in paragraphs 6-7 above.
3. Field Comment. In March approximately 4,300 ROK prisoners, chiefly officers, were at the Suan camp, according to [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct

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HRDLICKA, David L.

001/ Capt

Air Force

Downed: 18 May 1965

Source {

- 1. Full Confession Written
Quar Doi Nhan Dan 22 Jul 1966 [REDACTED]
- 2. Limited Confession Written
Paris AFP 22 Jul 1966 [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
 10/20/68 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

(Handwritten signature/initials)

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1. 2.

1. Full Confession Written
Quan Doi Nhan Dan 22 Jul 1966 [REDACTED]

2. Limited Confession Written
Paris AFP 22 Jul 1966 [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED]

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DOC #1

S E C R E T

SECURITY INFORMATION

UN PRISONERS OF WAR
CAMPS AND CONDITIONS
IN
KOREA, MANCHURIA
AND CHINA

SUPPLEMENT V
20 October 1952

S E C R E T

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S E C R E T

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S E C R E T

1. Information about POW Camp locations and conditions has been extremely scanty during the quarter covered by this Supplement. The location of one new camp, No. 17 at Yul Ni (YD 415211), was submitted by Communist forces to UN armistice delegates. The Communists also gave pinpointed six-digit coordinates for all listed North Korean Camps in which UN POWs are interned. (Previously names and coordinates for these camps applied only to general areas and were of little value.) No information was given regarding the number of POWs in any of the listed camps.

The Communists also agreed to mark each camp with the Korean characters for Po-Ro (Prisoner of War) in white on red-backgrounded signs measuring 6 x 12m. An aerial survey has shown markers at all listed camps except at No. 15 (Yonghwan where there was no cover, and No. 16 (Pusang Ni), where no recent cover was noted. No. 14's (Anju or Ipsong Ni) marker was noted approximately one-half mile outside the pinpointed area, while No. 17's two markers were just outside its area. No. 11 (Sosong Ni) and Hol Gol Collection Camps each had two markers.

A suspected POW area (marked with Po-Ro symbols but not in area reported and pinpointed by the Communists as a POW Camp) was detected in West Pyongyang, (See page 8) (FECOM INTSUM 3649, 5 Sept./52. Intsum also contains map of POW Camp locations currently listed.)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

2. An unevaluated CIA report [redacted], 2 Sept./52) contains information obtained from an Iron Curtain refugee with a wide network of European contacts, who is now living in the U.S. This refugee learned from several MVD soldiers, and from a Trans-Siberian Railroad employee that not only ROK but US POWs captured in Korea passed through transit camps in Komsomolsk (on the Amur River), Magadan (on the Sea of Okhotsk), Chita and Irkutsk. The ROK POWs are believed to be interned in slave labor camps on the Chukotski Peninsula, and in the AMAA Region, between the Aldan and Lena Rivers. The US POWs are believed to have been transported via Trans-Siberian Railroad to Molotov (in European SR), from whence they are probably sent either to the isolated Gubakha labor camps north of Molotov, or to camps in the Archangel Oblast.

If this information is true, it could account for much of the approximate 9000 discrepancy between Defense Department MIA figures and POW lists submitted by the Communists.

3. This Supplement continues (insofar as possible) to classify POW Camps as Peace, Reform or Normal, in accordance with the types developed and controlled by the Pyongyang War Prisoner Administration office. (See 20 Aug./52 Supl. IV, p. 1).

4. The reputed camp at Harbin, filed in 20 Aug./52 Supplement as not having been heard from in six months, is opened for reconsideration here.

5. Only new camp listings and those camps about which there has been new information since publication of the 20 Aug./52 Supplement are considered herein. Sources of information and (whenever possible) evaluations of informant's reliability are given in each section below:

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S E C R E T

KOREAN POW CAMPS

New Listings

a. UN POW Personnel

(1) Hungdong-Ni (Reform) (BT 974946, nr. Koksan)

February 1952 source told by residents of Yonhwa-Ri (BT 973950) there were UN POWs in this location. Source saw approximately 130 Negro and 20 Caucasian POWs sitting in yard of civilian house, guarded by 10 NKA soldiers armed with SMG, PPSH-41, and 5 NKA police, each with pistol. POWs were billeted in 10 civilian houses in rear of yard; source estimated each bldg. could hold 20 men. POWs were undernourished and short of water; wore US OD pants and field jackets, leather shoes. No one smoking. All looked tired and thin; most had long hair and beards. Source was told POWs being taken to Suan gold mine (BT 735963) area. In March 1952, source was told by peddler who went to Suan weekly that there was a large number of UN POWs there, and that mine was also being used as an ammo dump. (ATIS KT 3438, 21 July 1952)

(2) Hwapung-Ni (Probably Peace) (CT 104758, 126-49, 38-37)

In March 1952 camp in civilian houses and warehouses at this location. Source heard that 200 ROK and 150 US POWs here, though while in camp he saw only 10 POWs. POWs given 3 meals a day each of 400 gr. of corn. POWs didn't work; treated well.

(3) D/I FEAF Comment: First report received of a POW Camp in this location. (AISS 98-4-52, 5 April 1952. Evaluation: F3)

(3) Following new listings possibly all the same camp, or parts of the Ki-Rim Ni camp complex (YD 384239, 125-45, 39-02), which was originally probably the old Communist-listed Camp 6, Toryon Dong.

(a) As of April 1952, POW camp with 200 ROKs was located at YD 385243. POWs health good, got ample food. POWs were dressed in NKA uniforms. Schedule: reveille at 6, brkfst. 8-9, indoctrination 9-12, lunch 12-1, PT 1-5, supper 5-6, taps 11. 8 NKA EM and 1 officer used as instructors. POWs took constant training; source believed they were to be enlisted in NKPA. (AISS 44-6-52, 4 June 1952)

(b) As of March 1952, POW Camp located near Kyonchang-Ri (YD 378225) where a Russian Advisory group (50 male, 20 female) was billeted in a former school bldg. Camp contained 250 ROK POWs dressed in NKA uniforms. POWs forced to repair roads during the night; also do farm labor. POWs seemed weak

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from malnutrition. Source said POWs were being indoctrinated by pamphlets and lectures on Communism. Camp guarded by 30 NKA armed with PPShs. (AISS 265-4-52, 14 April 1952. Eval: F3)

- (c) As of March 1952, there was a POW Camp containing 30 US and an unknown number of ROK POWs (both male and female) at Wasan-Ni (YD 392289). POWs were housed in 1 tile-roof building, 4 x 15 x 15m. with red earth walls. Building faced S; surrounded by barbed wire. Guard tower by W main gate. Both POWs and guards billeted in compound. There was a second-class highway 300m. W of compound; brick factory with high chimney 150m. SW of compound. (AISS 155-6-52, 11 June 1952, Eval: F3)
- (d) As of March 1952, there was a POW Camp at Kiri-Ri (YD 4020) containing 350 ROK POWs who got 600 gr. rice, 150 gr. corn and salty soup for their (one?) meal. Schedule: reveille 7:30, morning meeting 8, lunch 12, supper 6, reading meeting 9. (AISS 233-5-52, 14 May 1952. Eval: F6)
- (e) As of March 1952, a POW Camp containing 200 ROK POWs located at Sinhyangri (YD 4020). COMMENT: Identical food allowance, schedule, coordinates, indicate this undoubtedly same camp as above. (AISS 233-5-52, 14 May 1952. Eval: F6)
- (f) As of March 1952, there was a POW Camp at YD 422342 where 30 UN POWs were billeted in a 6-room house 4 x 4 x 25 m. A chimney 40m. high was located 10 m. SE of house. An unknown number of NKA armed with PPShs guard this camp. COMMENTS: AISS 449-4-52 reports a nearly identical location with the same number of POWs at YD 423343. In both cases, the location is within the area of alleged Camp 6, said to hold 2 US POWs (one of them reportedly Gen. Dean). D/I FEAF: This is the third report of a camp at YD 422342. All reports mention both UN and ROK POWs confined here. It is possible that this is a division of the main POW Camp pinpointed by the Communists as Camp 6 at YD 416377.

AISS 265-4-52, 14 April 1952, reports four camps in this immediate area (Pyongyang, Kirim-Ni and between these two points) in which existing conditions are similar. Accuracy of coordinates below is questionable:

AISS 141-2-52, 956 POWs at YD 389245
 AISS 466-3-52, 2 USAF POWs at YD 388236
 AISS " , 28 US POWs at YD 388236
 AISS " , 80 ROK POWs at YD 388236
 AISS 525-3-52, 200 POWs at YD 377141
 AISS " , 100 POWs at YD 385145

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(4) Namchon-Up (Reform) (BT 733467, 126-24, 38-20)

As of February 1952, an NKA POW Camp containing 80 UN POWs was at this location. POWs were billeted in unknown number air raid shelters 2 x 1.9 x 7 (length). POWs fed 600 gr. beans, millet, rice 3 times a day. Clothes: 1 winter uniform, 1 summer uniform, 1 pair cloth shoes. Worked on construction and repair of highways. Medical facilities were brought from Pyongyang during the night. 60 guards. Schedule: reveille 6, brkfst. 6:30, work on highways 7-12, indoctrination 1-3, work 5-6, taps 8. Area strictly off-limits to unauthorized personnel. (AISS 249-5-52, 13 May 1952, Eval: C3)

(5) Sogu (Peace) (YD 508271, NE Pyongyang)

(a) During source's internment (from October 1951 to February 1952) in the 37th Hospital at Nae-Ri (YD 489309) he observed 20 UN POWs make weekly visits to receive medical treatment from the 7th Chinese Team, IRC, who were quartered in this hospital. US POWs had no serious ills, were well clothed and clean shaven. Source noted cordiality between doctors and US POWs. Source heard a Japanese-speaking US POW talking with a Korean interpreter; learned he'd been stationed in Nagoya for two years and had been squadron leader of a US Arty. unit before his capture. This US POW told source that there was a US POW Camp containing 80 men (including 5 Negroes) in the vicinity of Sogu; said all POWs got same amount of food and type clothes as NKA. (MISG KT 3546, 31 July 1952, Eval: Reliable)

(b) As of 20 April 1952, a POW Camp containing a platoon of US POWs was located at YD 482259, near Nae-Ri Hospital. The POWs appeared very weak. (Note conflict with above report.) (AISS 97-6-52, 9 June 1952. Eval: F3)

(6) Yul Ni (No. 17, Normal) (YD 414207, 125-47, 39-00)

(a) As of March-April 1952, there was a UN POW Camp at Yul Ni, Pyongyang (YD 427204) (See also p. 8). Source entered camp twice. Area: irregularly shaped, approximately 500m. (E-W) x 300m. (N-S), enclosed by 3m. high barbed wire. Bldgs: stucco facings and tile gable roofs. Nearly all small, 10 x 5 x 6m. Admin: under CCF, including all guards and admin. personnel. Source told by CCF officer that there were approximately 2000 UN POWs here; source said majority appeared to be US and that he saw no ROK POWs. POWs didn't appear to be working. CCF officer told source that POW death rate was high -- while they were getting enough calories, diet wasn't suitable.

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Source saw Caucasian POWs in NKA and CCF uniforms working with Communist gun crews in Pyongyang area -- men observed adjusting sightings, directing fire, loading and firing guns. Men didn't seem to be under special surveillance. Their uniforms were unmarked. NKA MP told source men were US POWs. Source later heard of several POWs being decorated by NKA; heard of UN POWs being used as truck drivers but didn't see any. Source heard from GHQ officials that UN and ROK POWs had been used for bomb disposal work in connection with delayed action bombs and duds dropped by UN planes, but that this practice had been discontinued in February 1951.

All UN POWs except ex-ROKs were in CCF custody; ROKs taken over by NKA. The Cdr. of Mil. Police, GHQ, NKA was responsible for guarding and custody of all POWs in NKA hands. The majority of ex-ROKs had been impressed into NKA through Collection and Reassignment Centers. (ATIS KG 1122, 31 May 1952. Eval: Good reliability. P. 140 - sketch of Yul Ni Camp)

- (b) Yul Ni (within coordinates YD 419210, 423209, 424207, 422204, 416203, 414207, 415209) was reported and pinpointed by the Communists as Camp No. 17 in late August 1952. Markers have been noted at YD 415211 and YD 413211, just outside the area. COMMENT: This camp is near Camp No. 8 at Chiktong, Camp No. 11 at Sosongni, and Camp No. 15 at Yonghwa Ri. (FECOM INTSUM 3649, 5 September 1952. Map #M-1 enclosed this INTSUM)

b. ROK POW Personnel

- (1) Taesuri (Reform) (YD 553160, 125-57, 38-58)

As of May 1952, source saw 50 ROK POWs, wearing NKA uniforms, repairing road at Taesuri. According to an inhabitant, the 9th POW Camp of 4000 POWs located in this area. (NOTE: Camp No. 9, originally listed at Pyongyang, was reportedly abolished by the Communists in June 1952.) Source heard most of the POWs were from the 8th ROKA Div. All UN POWs were now under CCF jurisdiction, and had been moved to Manchuria and N. Korea. At different times POWs here were violent vs. captors because of harsh treatment.

COMMENT: Above could be camp reported at Koeam Ni (YD 556221) (AISS 84-7-52, 5 July 1952. Eval. by ROKA G2: D4)

- (2) Yongsan-Ni (Reform) (XE 563440, 124-49, 40-08)

As of June 1952, there was a POW Camp at this location containing 200 ROK POWs who were billeted in civilian houses in the village. POWs up at 6 and policed camp area. Communism lectures given by NKA officers. POWs prepared own meals; got 600 gr. mixed rice, wheat, beans, with greens, salt, bean oil daily. 60 gr. tobacco

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to each 10 men daily. POWs ill from hard work and lack of food; several dead. No medical facilities. POWs wore worn-out NKA uniforms and shoes. POWs worked in 2 groups of 2 platoons from 8:30 to 5, cutting trees and carrying them to an unknown location N of camp. Source heard guards told to treat POWs gently during work, to influence them toward Communism. POWs guarded by 90 men from 7th Co., 9th Bat., POW Security Corps; guards armed with unknown number PPSHs and rifles; billeted in village houses. Unit Cdr. was PAIK Yong Ho, NKPA, Jr. Capt., age 36. (AISS 132-7-52, 8 July 1952. Eval: C3)

New Confirmations, Old Listings

a. UN POW Personnel

- (1) Aechon-Ni (Reform) (YC 0338, 125-19, 38-16)

CCRAK #A 371-5-52, 2 June 1952 (Eval: F) reports 100 friendly guerrillas, plus UN POWs (reported by CCRACK #A 49-4-52) in camp at Aechon. AISS 371-5-52, 8 February 1952 (Eval: F6) source for CCRACK #A 371-5-52, says in addition when source arrived here in January, there were 30 POWs, but two groups of 40 or more arrived during month period. Also adds trench billets were being built for Polit. Sec. of 239th NKA unit at YC 048367.

- (2) Imsan Dong (Chang-Ni, Camp No. 1, Changsong) (Normal) (XE 869802, 125-12, 40-27)

AISS 52-59, 9 May 1952 (Eval: F6) gives an old (as of September 1951) but detailed report of conditions and physical surroundings at this camp. Source reported that, during that period, he heard POWs were well treated according to the rules of the Geneva Convention. Source describes buildings, medical care and supplies 3 sketches, 2 of camp's location re rivers, hilly terrain, bridge; 1 sketch of Middle School in which majority of POWs were billeted. COMMENT: AISS 446-4-52 confirms this report, but examination of photos fails to establish the location of cited buildings. Village and area coincide with Communist reported Camp No. 1 at Chang Ni. 2 Po-Ro markers are now visible at opposite ends of the settlement.

- (3) Kangdong (Chiktong, Camp No. 8) (Normal) (No. 8 pinpointed at YD 545238 (125-56, 39-02). Kangdong (old name for No. 8 at BU 4936. No mention in Communist reports of location change, so camp has probably been continued at Taesong Ri (YD 5524). For further discrepancy, see p. 14, para. 3 a., Winnington.)

- (a) Taesong Ri (127-57, 39-02) As of July-August 1952, UN POWs (probably ROK) at Kangdong Camp in Taesong Ri. These POWs considered reactionaries by NKA as they had refused to take

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Communist pledge in November 1951. Some POWs later yielded and volunteered for labor teams; not required to wear prison uniforms. This tendency to yield was noted and taken advantage of by NKA officers; led to 600 ROKs rioting in July 1952. Resulted in 6 NKA killed, 20 wounded, 4 ROK killed, 30 wounded. 5 ROK leaders executed. Rations reduced to 2 meals rice and corn a day. POWs could not wash or move about in compound. [redacted] 17 September 1952. Eval: F3) (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (b) As of 20 April 1952, a POW camp containing 1000 ROK and 50 US POWs reported at Kangdong City. POWs billeted in anti-air trenches around city. DI/TEAF COMMENT: Reported location in immediate vicinity of main Kangdong camp (BU 94368). Location listed in 12 previous reports. Camp reported as REFORM Camp for both UN and ROK POWs. (Note discrepancy: Camp No. 8 would be a Normal Camp). (AISS 97-6-52, 9 June 1952. Eval: F3)
- (c) As of June 1952, POW Camp at BU 490360, with 1400 ROK POWs billeted in 7 village houses and an unknown number of air raid trenches on the side of a hill. POWs treated very well, had plenty of food. Few medical facilities and number of POWs dead from unknown type of fever; 2 trenches used as hospital. POWs got 1 hour political indoctrination daily. Only work was digging trenches in camp. POWs guarded by 60 NKA armed with Russian rifles and PPSHs; 1 guard per trench. (AISS 220-6-52, 13 June 1952. Eval: F3)
COMMENT: Previous reports (AISS 169-4-52 and 195-5-52) indicate POW Camps possibly located at BU 490370 and BU 507355. Conclusive determination that these are all the same camp cannot be made on the basis of present information.
- (d) Source interned in Kangdong POW Camp during March-April 1951. During time there he saw a number of Caucasian POWs; told by NKA officer that there were more than 40 US officers in compound. (Report is an old one but contains sketch of compound, description of physical facilities, type of work.) Source states no indoctrination courses were given at the time of his internment. (AISS 52-122, 21 June 1952, Eval: F6)
COMMENT: AISS 195-5-52 states that a POW Camp of 500 ROKs at BU 490368; AISS 97-6-52 states a camp containing 59 US and 1000 ROK POWs at BU 490360. Above report brings total reports of alleged camps in this location to 15, including a previous report (not as detailed) by same source.

(4) Pusang Ni (Camp No. 16, Normal) (XE 627452, 125-54, 40-09)

As of 24 May 1952, aerial photos indicated a POW Camp at XE 524132 (adjacent to MSR running from Sonch'on (XE 6406) to Gharyongwan

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(XE 4513). The compound was rectangular, enclosed by fence. 5 buildings on W side, 93 x 12 ft. each, with shelter-type roofs sloping to ground, positioned 10 ft. apart. 2 gates to compound: one at N extremity, too small for any but foot traffic; other on E side opening on only road leading to compound. 8 possible sentry boxes, 2 deadfall cliffs in compound on S side. (Sketch attached to this report.) (FECOM INTSUM 3602, 20 July 1952.)

(5) Pyongyang (Complex contains Yul Ni, No. 17, possibly Sosong Ni, No. 11 (see p. 11) and Sungho-Ri (unacknowledged), and, evidently from following information, other unreported compounds.) (YD 3822-4020, 125-44, 39-01)

(a) ATIS KT 3500, 6 August 1952 (Eval: Fairly reliable) reports that in early April 1952, source saw 5-600 ROK POWs outside a school at YD 383239. On roofs of each of 3 school buildings were Po-Ro symbols and POW letters in white. Source thought the school had been used as a POW Camp since March 1952. FECOM INTSUM 3649, 5 September 1952 reports a suspected POW area in W. Pyongyang, approximately 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ mi. from Camp No. 11, 3 mi. from Camp No. 17. Po-Ro marker noted at YD 383239. (Note: this confirms foregoing report.)

(b) As of 7 May 1952, there was a POW enclosure in one 2-story red brick building 60 x 12 x 10m. at YD 380238, 700m. SE of the Pyongyang RR Station, containing 1400 POWs. POWs got 3 meals daily consisting of 700 gr. of grain. Health conditions below normal, clothes filthy and lice-ridden. Patients treated by 1 female doctor, 3 nurses from Home Affairs Dept., but no injections and only ineffective powdered medicines given. POWs worked 10 hours daily picking up bricks in city. One guard to every 10 POWs; all guards fanatic Communists. (AISS 519-6-52, 27 June 1952. Eval: F3)

As of 7 May 1952, POW enclosure at YD 380239, in 2 brick buildings 10 x 20 x 80 m., containing 300 ROK POWs. Worked from 9 to 6 carrying bricks. Got 700 gr. food daily. Guards friendly, but officers hostile to POWs. (AISS 23-6-52, 2 June 1952. Eval: F3)

AISS 394-5-52, 23 April 1952 (F3), source for foregoing, also states that this was a temporary camp, guarded by unknown number of NKA armed with PPShs and Russian rifles. Building has tile roof.

COMMENT: (a) and (b) above have approximately the same coordinates as POW enclosure reported in AISS 70-5-52, which report states that there were 3500 ROK POWs housed in 2-story building 200 x 30m.

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- (c) In mid-May 1952, source saw 10 US POWs in 2 trucks in Pyongyang City. Each truck had 1 driver, assistant driver, 1 NKA guard. POWs wore US fatigues or NKA uniforms; seemed to have been working with coal (covered with dust), and looked ill. (MISG KT 3547, 14 August 1952. Eval: Believed reliable)
- (d) As of 11 May 1952, 350 POWs (including 30 UN, 20 civilians, 300 ROK) were at Sungho-Ri district of Pyongyang (YD 3918, 125-44, 39-09) in 6 houses, each 4 x 7 x 10m. at 5m. intervals. Camp operated by 20 personnel. UN POWs got 600 gr. rice, millet, wheat flour daily; ROKS got same. All wore NKA clothing. Most of time after work used for "mental instruction" and indoctrination by NKA. POWs forced to work 10-11 hours a day constructing bunkers. Unknown number of guards armed with PPShs. (AISS 77-6-52, 5 July 1952. Eval: Reliable)
- (e) Other reports of POW enclosures in Pyongyang area:

AISS 394-5-52, 22 May 1952 (F3): As of 23 April 1952, POW enclosure at YD 367223 near Pyongyang RR Station in 30 x 40 x 80m. building with tile roof. 150 ROK POWs here; treated very well.

AISS 23-6-52, 2 June 1952 (F3): As of 7 May 1952, POW enclosure in middle school building at YD 368227. Building 8 x 15 x 80m. contained unknown number of POWs. (May be same enclosure as above.)

AISS 380-5-52, 21 May 1952 (F3): As of 5 January - 20 February 1952, POW Camp for 150 ROKs at YD 379242, 800 m. SE of W. Pyongyang RR Station in building 90 x 15 x 10m. with 5 guards, 1 at each corner of building, 1 at entrance. Truck transports unknown amount of supplies to camp every few days. POW treatment unknown.

AISS 23-6-52, 2 June 1952 (F3): As of 7 May 1952, POW enclosure at YD 381230 in building formerly a prison. Unknown number of POWs here.

AISS LR-35-52, 19 June 1952 (A2): A 13 June 1952 photo mission indicated a probable POW enclosure at YD 369223. Pictures also showed 2 POW markers. Compound rectangular, probably enclosed by wood fence with trenches inside. 3 connecting buildings extended from W to N corners of compound, a distance of approximately 432 x 36 ft. Only entrance to compound was a large opening in E side, with possible guard post S of entrance. Motor transport noted inside entrance. Packed appearance of field area in compound

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probably indicated heavy pedestrian activity. Area was approximately 430 ft. W. of double-track RR running from SW to NE sector of Pyongyang. (Sketch attached to this report.) COMMENT: It is improbable that this area could be claimed by Communists as Camp No. 9, which was reported to be in the immediate vicinity of YD 429212, on the E side of the Taedong R., approximately 3/4 mi. due E of this location.

- (6) Soktal-Ri (BU 785054, 126-28, 38-52) (Reform camp near Hol Gol Collection Camp. Hol Gol pinpointed by Communists at BU 785035; markers noted at BU 788055, 789055.)

Since September 1951, source had travelled to vicinity Soktal Ri twice a month to trade salt and rice. Source testified there was a POW enclosure approximately 500 m. E of 3-way road junction there, on S side of stream. Billets were in 2 buildings 25 x 10 x 7m. each, with tile gable roofs (hearsay from local residents). These buildings formerly dorms for workers of Hodong Gold Mine, located between two streams, with small hill to S. Buildings in area 60 x 20m., not enclosed by wire or fences. Camp guarded by CCF armed with SMGs; one guard at each of 4 corners of area. Source saw approximately 20 CCF and 30 NKA guards in center of town; thought there were more troops in surrounding valley. Source saw 4 Caucasians and approximately 30 ROK POWs wearing CCF uniforms without identifying insignia. Said camp didn't appear clean; only one well in front of buildings. No identifying marks on any buildings. Area declared off limits to civilians. (MISG KT 1257, 19 August 1952, Eval: Good rel.)

- (7) Yonghwa-Ri or Suyok-Tong (Camp No. 15, Normal) (YD 515307, 125-54, 39-06)

(a) Source was a UN POW at Sangsu-Ri (YD 521265) in early December. Source said camp then in approximately 50 houses; all ROK POWs restricted to houses. Source saw 20 Caucasians washing hands in river. (ATIS KT 3442, 21 July 1952. Eval: Questionable reliability)

(b) In december 1951, source observed 50 US, 150 ROK POWs interned at Sangsu-Ri (YD 5226). Village guarded by NKA at 3 posts. Source didn't see any POW labor. Saw 20 unguarded POWs washing near river. No barbed wire. US POWs seemed free to roam at will. (ATIS KT 3465, 25 July 1952, Eval: Reliable)

COMMENT: Two reports above undoubtedly of same camp. Coordinates close enough to Yonghwa-Ri coordinates to indicate this camp possibly part of Camp No. 15 complex.

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b. ROK POW Personnel

(1) Pakchun Gol (Reform) (XC852509, 125-07, 38-23)

As of May 1952, source saw camp at this location where POWs billeted in 20 civilian houses, guarded by 30 NKA armed with PPShs and unknown number Russian rifles. Treatment severe. POWs forced to make straw rope. (AISS 20-5-52, 2 May 1952. Eval: C3)

(2) Sosong-Ni (Camp No. 11 near Pyongyang, Normal-Reform) (YD 363213, 125-43, 39-01; markers noted at YD 362212, 366222)

(a) From January - July 1952, camp in former People's school at this location. POWs questioned in January and found to be strong ROKs. Undernourished; no medical or sanitary facilities. Out of 1200 ROK POWs in January 1952, only 800 alive by end of June 1952. POWs refused indoctrination classes and to join Labor Party. Rioting broke out in all camp sections on 18 July 1952. Resulted in wounding of 10 rioters and restrictions similar to those at Kangdong.

Early August 1952, there was a POW enclosure with 1000 ROKs interned at Sosong-Ni primary school (YD 370222). POWs looked poorly fed and needed medical attention.

[redacted] 17 September 1952. Eval: F3)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b) Early April 1952, source saw ROK POW enclosure at YD 371222. Roofs of each of 3 buildings contained English letters PW in white. Source thought from 5-600 ROK POWs interned here. (ATIS KT 3500, 6 August 1952. Eval: Fairly rel.)

(c) As of 10 May 1952, a camp with 500 ROK POWs in 2-story building 100 x 10m. was at YD 371223. POWs worked from 8 to 6 taking bricks from factory to location 100m. SW of camp. Fed 900 gr. rice daily. POWs had new NKA uniforms, with white patch on right coat breast. Medical treatment inadequate. No atrocities and POWs got a few liberties. Good treatment probably started after POW exchange problem was brought up in truce talks. Camp guarded by 30 NKA armed with Russian rifles. Camp Cdr. was NKA Col. (AISS 537-6-52, 28 June 1952. Eval: F3)

(3) Tokchon (Peace or Reform?)(BV 6904, 126-18, 39-45)

(a) As of 29 March 1952, there were 8000 ROK POWs in a school building at this location. The camp was in 6 sections: educational branch, security, political, supply, instrument, provision. POW schedule: reveille 8, meeting 8:30, field

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work 9-12 and 1-5; entertainment 7-8:30. POWs got 450 gr. corn each meal with side dish salty soup; 1 sheet, 1 blanket, winter fatigues, 1 pair labor shoes. Camp guarded by 3-400 NKA. (AISS 233-5-52, 14 May 1952. Eval: F6)

- (b) As of March 1952, there was a POW camp at BV 673098 in 20 village houses each 20m. square. 200 ROK POWs here. Medical supplies very short but 2 CCF doctors visited camp every two days. Source saw 30 wounded. All luxury articles taken from POWs. 100 CCF armed with 99-type (Japanese-made) rifles guarded camp. One 10th Regt. Major, 2 1st Lts., 1 M/Sgt., 1 Tech./Sgt., 4 Sgts., 1 Corporal (all ROK) among POWs.

COMMENTS: No previous information of POW Camp at these exact coordinates, but near enough to be part of the Tokchon complex. Note difference in treatment within the two enclosures.

B. POW CAMPS, MANCHURIA-CHINA

I. New Listings

- a) Hsuchow, Kiangsu Prov., China (117-16, 34-18)
 b) Kaifong, China (114-21, 34-48)

For above, see ATIS KT 3228 comment under Tsinan, B, II, c. p. 11.

II. New Confirmations, Old Listings

- a. Antung-Sinuiju, Korea-Manchuria (approximately 124-18, 40-38)
 (Twin camps on either side of Yalu R.)

Source (Chinese defector, CO rank) spent one day (date unknown) at Sinuiju airfield and saw "one jet fighter take off with two men, one of whom was a Caucasian". Immediately following, several other jet fighters took off and followed the first-plane until it landed. Upon inquiry, the source was told by other officers that the man was one of a number of captured US pilots who were being utilized as instructors, and that jet fighters followed, fully armed, to prevent US instructors from escaping. When on ground, CCAF authorities "didn't particularly care whether or not the men tried to escape because they were quite confident they could never reach their lines alive". A CCAF flight cadet told source that US pilots were "also conducting classes on inspection and maintenance". Chinese authorities reportedly used political indoctrination and good treatment "to induce US POWs to volunteer to assist the CCF".

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COMMENT: There has been no previous report of the use of US pilots as instructors. However, the good treatment policy, attitude toward escape, and political indoctrination are all in line with known CCF methods of handling POWs. (G2 - CDOR, 16 September 1952, unevaluated.)

b. Harbin, Manchuria (124-10, 42-50)

In late April 1952, the 338th Regt. Commander told source and others in regt. not to fear Americans as "US soldiers couldn't march far" -- when an unknown number of US POWs were on their way to POW Camps in Harbin they "had to be trucked as they couldn't walk that far". Source also heard of US POWs captured by the 47th Army escaping on their way to camp and walking S to Mihoe Ri "where they surrendered to the 113th Div. and were treated well." (ATIS KT 3444, 21 July 1952. Eval: Information limited but reliable)

c. Tsinan (Chinan), Shantung Province, China (117-00, 36-40)

Source heard in meeting held mid-February 1952 (from one of squadron leaders who had recently arrived from China) that there were UN POW Camps in Hsuchow, Kiangsu Prov.; Tsinan, Shantung Prov.; Tientsin, and Kaifong. (ATIS KT 3228, 24 May 1952. Eval: Poor rel)

d. Tientsin, China (117-05, 39-08)

See Tsinan above.

SUMMARY OF POW CAMPS

(* - New Listings)

	Normal Camps	Peace Camps	Reform Camps	Unclassified and/or Mixed Complexes
KOREA	Imsan Dong #1 Chiktong #8 Sosong-Ni #11 Yonghwa-Ri #15 Yul-Ni #17 * Pusang-Ni #16	Hwapung-Ni * Sogu * Tokchon	Hungdong-Ni * Namchon-Up * Taesuri * Yongsan-Ni * Aechon-Ni Kangdong (Taesong-Ri) Sungho-Ri Soktal-Ri Pakchun Gol	Ki Rim Ni Pyongyang <u>Transient Camp</u> Hol Gol
MANCHURIA- CHINA				Hsuchow * Kaifong * Antung- Sinuiju Harbin Tsinan Tientsin

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(OPINION) TRENDS AND MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS

1. In Korea, the foregoing shows one new normal camp, two new peace camps, four new reform camps; six reconfirmed normal camps, one reconfirmed peace camp, five reconfirmed reform camps, two reconfirmed unclassified camps, and one reconfirmed transient or collection camp. In Manchuria-China the report covers two new and four reconfirmed unclassified camps.

2. Only one report on treatment of UN POWs has come to our attention through other than propaganda channels during this quarter: Source heard from a squad leader of the 14th Regt., 27th Div., on 14 July 1952 that a Turkish soldier had been captured by the Recon. Bn. of the 27th Div. in mid-June. The prisoner was wounded in both arm and legs, and refused to walk back to the NK lines. POW tried to escape en route but was unsuccessful and died of wounds on reaching the 27th Div. CP, where it was discovered that the POW had another bullet in his chest. Because of his death, the CO of the Recon. Bn. and the medical corpsman were disciplined. (MISG KT 3485, 31 July 1952. Eval: Fairly Rel.)

3. Propaganda during the quarter continued to stress the atrocity of POW Camp bombings and biological warfare. It introduced the new subject of mail tampering. Other war comment was low, dealing briefly with the Panmunjom recesses, UN mistreatment of POWs and poor quality of the ROK soldier.

- a. In a propaganda broadcast via Peking, 1 September 1952, Alan Winnington commented on the heinous bombing of Camp No. 8 at Kangdong (see Item 3, pp. 6-7) and mentions other raids on Camp No. 9.

3 September 1952, a special correspondent in Pyongyang wrote an article on the strafing of Camp No. 8 (which occurred 29 August 1952), saying the camp was clearly marked and the strafing "was a violation of international agreements and human virtue", resulting in a "protest rally of POWs of the puppet armed forces" (ROKs) on 31 August 1952.

- b. After 4 months of quiet on the subject of BW, the "International Scientific Commission" (meeting in Peking during June-July 1952 to investigate germ warfare) released a detailed brief on crimes in North Korea. Comment reached its highest level since late March. The Commission's effort to endow its report with scientific restraint and objectivity was supplemented by detailed depositions of two newly captured airmen (Floyd B. O'Neal and Paul Kniss), plus continuing comment on the subject by Enoch and Quinn.

This revival suggests an effort is being made to: (1) counter skepticism; (2) provide a legalistic brief for later war criminal indictments; (3) connect BW propaganda with the Asia Peace Conference. (Far East Survey, 25 September 1952, FBIS)

- c. 31 August 1952, Alan Winnington's broadcast **accused** the US of tampering with mail of British POWs, saying that an average of one letter every two weeks is handed over to the US liaison officers at Panmunjom. From 22 May - 8 August 1952, more than 3000 British POW letters had been

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delivered at Panmunjom, yet, according to the British War Ministry, only 942 have reached POWs' families.

The Daily Worker comments: "All mail leaving POW camps is obviously censored and much is probably destroyed by US authorities if it speaks the truth, the same being true of incoming mail."

- d. Other propaganda comment: (1) The Panmunjom recesses are meant to wreck the Peace Talks; (2) Mistreatment of POWs at Koje, etc.; (3) Depreciation of ROK military qualities probably indicate sensitivity to their increasing effectiveness. (Far East Survey, 25 September 1952, FBIS)

4. For possible new information on movement of POWs, see Item 2, p. 1 (Russian Camps).

5. POW strengths and casualty listings, reported by the Defense Department 15 October 1952:

21,377 dead
 90,114 wounded
 12,819 missing in action
 1,819 captured
 1,390 returned to service

127,519 Total

(This in an increase of 15,834 over Defense Department figures of 20 August 1952, quoted in Supplement IV.)

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10 November 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Committee's Request for Access to
National Indications Center (NIC) Archives

1. I attended a meeting on this subject this morning chaired by the NIO for Warning, Charlie Allen. Also present were Doug Bowman of this Office, [redacted] Scott Harris of the DO's East Asia Division and two lawyers enlisted by Allen to search the NIC files at the Pentagon in response to Senator Smith's request.

(b)(3)
CIAAct
(b)(6)

2. The two lawyers, possibly [redacted] reported that they had completed an intensive search of the files in question on Saturday, 7 November. They told us that their efforts yielded nothing of consequence on the POW/MIA issue. There was one unlabeled file that contained a few miscellaneous reports on POW/MIA matters but nothing that is not already in the Committee's possession.

(b)(3)
CIAAct
(b)(6)

3. To complete their search, the two lawyers have also made a request of the CIA Records Center to provide an index of all NIC files that have been retired [redacted] Allen [redacted] agreed the lawyers not to wait for the index but to go to [redacted] and conduct a personal examination of the files. It was agreed that they would go today.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

4. Allen suggested that, pending the results of the [redacted] search, the Agency should send a "firm response" to the Committee informing it of the results of our inspection and denying its request to receive the entire files of the NIC and its successor organization, the Strategic Warning Staff, for the period 1948 through 1975. Allen pointed out that the inspection results to date demonstrate that the Committee is in error if it believes that these records contain anything relevant to the POW/MIA investigation. Moreover, he characterized this latest request as another futile "fishing expedition" being made by a group of investigators who know that their legislative charter is about to expire. [redacted] agreed to prepare a draft response for review by the Deputy Director for Senate Affairs, John Breckenridge.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

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5. At today's meeting [] also tabled a Spot Report (attached) of a news conference which Senator Smith plans to hold today. The report states that Smith will announce that the Committee is in possession of documents allegedly showing that US prisoners were sent to the Soviet Union and that the CIA hid this information. Neither [] nor myself know what documents Smith could be referring to since, to the best of our knowledge, no CIA records on the subject of US prisoners in Russia have been sent to the Committee. We are aware, however, of one "highly unreliable" 1955 report (also attached) on this topic which the Committee requested last year. The request was denied on the grounds that the source, a Russian defector living in the US, had to be protected. The Spot Report speculates on how information in this report could still have reached the Committee.

(b)(3)
CIAAct
(b)(6)

(b)(3)
CIAAct
(b)(6)

6. On return from the meeting, I informed the D/OCA of Senator Smith's news conference and commenced the search for any Agency documents on US POWs in Russia, with the results described above.

Charles F. Turgeon
Senate Liaison

Distribution:

Original - D/OCA
1 - DD/SA
1 - OCA Records
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SPOT REPORT

10 NOVEMBER 1992

COMMITTEE PLANS TO CHARGE AGENCY

Shortly before 0900 hours on 10 November DASD/POW Affairs Alan Ptak telephoned C/EA/ICOGPOW to advise him that former Senate Select Committee for POW-MIA Affairs staffer Dino Carluccio (who lost his Committee clearance due to several security violations), a staff employee of Committee Vice Chairman Senator Smith, had reportedly gotten hold of "some classified Agency documents" stating that during the Korean War about ten American POW's were sent from Korea to Eastern Russia to a "Charm School". Mr. Ptak did not know which documents these were. Mr. Carluccio is believed to have obtained the documents "through his sources on Capitol Hill", according to Mr. Ptak.

Mr. Ptak said Sen. Smith plans to give a press conference at 1100 hours today at which he will announce the Committee's possession of documents showing that U.S. prisoners were sent to the Soviet Union, and that the CIA hid the information. Mr. Ptak is due to testify at 1400 hours today. He offered to defend the Agency, if we have any advice for him by then.

We believe the (single) report in question is the much-debated "Rastvorov Report", a report from Soviet defector Rastvorov in 1955 in which he reported hearsay information that American POW's held in Siberia would be screened by the Soviets and trained to be illegal residents in the U.S. or other countries where they could live as Americans.

This report (attached), which appears under its heading only in the Eisenhower Library, was the subject of an FOIA request to the Agency from Seattle journalist Mark Sauter. The Agency denied the report as source-indicative, a decision later appealed vehemently by Mr. Ptak. On 4 November, we showed this report to "Task Force Russia" commander Maj. Gen. Loeffke and two of his assistants when they visited ICOG, since the general raised it. Although the visitors did not take copies of the report, they could have memorized its brief contents.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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CIA - March 1, 2024

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Office Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : ~~EO - Mr. Starnes~~

DATE: 31 January 1955



FROM : ~~SFS - Dr. Craig~~

SUBJECT: Interview with ~~Rastvorov (former MVD)~~ concerning U.S. Prisoners of War in the USSR

FILE MR Case No. 29
Document No. 12

On Friday, 28 January 1955, a meeting was arranged between members of the Special Projects Staff and Mr. Rastvorov. General Dale O. Smith was also present. The interview was on the subject of U.S. prisoners of war being held by the Soviets.

Mr. Rastvorov made the following important points bearing upon the subject:

1. He was told by recent arrival (1950-1953) from the Soviet Union to the USSR's Tokyo mission that U.S. and other UN POW's were being held in Siberia.
2. The POW's will be screened by the Soviets and trained to be illegal residents in U.S. or other countries where they can live as Americans.
3. Selected POW's will be used in propaganda work.
4. Use will be made of the identities and biographies of dead POW's in preparing legends for new Soviet agents.
5. The mechanism for POW control in Korea was headed by the Soviets.
6. The sentencing of the eleven U.S. POW's charged with espionage by the Chinese Communists was conceived and directed by the Soviets. The release of other Americans in Europe was part of this plot.

DENY IN FULL

1.3(a)(4)

[OCB:SPSFJCorso:mas]

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NOTE TO: D/OCA

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Committee Request for Access to
NIO/Warning Archives, 1948-1975

We met on 4 November with Charlie Allen, who has command over the National Warning Staff, its files and archives. Allen described these files as containing highly sensitive material of all levels of classification relating to the country's major foreign policy crises and problems of the post-WWII era. POW/MIA staff member John McCreary worked in the Warning Center.

Allen objects strongly to giving the POW/MIA staff free ranging access to the Center's files and archives. I explained that the Director had personally pledged his support and cooperation with the Committee's work and described some of the efforts East Asia Division (represented at the meeting by C/EA/ICOG Scott Harrison and [redacted] had made to meet Committee demands.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Allen commissioned two of his officers [redacted] [redacted] to review the index specifically cited by the Committee, to review other indices and personally to examine the Center's files to identify any collection of paper or files directly related to the POW/MIA issue. (There was no such file listed on the document shown us, though there were files which probably contained reports which mention POW/MIA issues.) Allen said he will have a preliminary answer for us early next week, when we can decide how/whether to go further.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Allen said he will brief Fritz.

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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

October 20, 1992

Mr. John Breckenridge
Office of Congressional Affairs
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Breckenridge:

The Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs requests the Central Intelligence Agency provide to the Committee the files of the National Indications Center and of its successor organization, the Strategic Warning Staff, that cover the period 1948 through 1975. These files contain information relating to the losses of U.S. military personnel during the major crises and conflicts of the post-war period. This material is required to support a forthcoming hearing by this Committee.

These files are in the archives of the Central Intelligence Agency, filed variously. Some are listed under the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence; some are under the Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board, and some are logged under the National Intelligence Council. In addition, one five-drawer file cabinet located in the National Warning Staff contains a large number of post-war crisis management files that are related to the investigations of the Committee.

A large amount of this information can be declassified.

Ms. Linda Whitlow, Secretary for the National Intelligence Officer for Warning and the National Warning Staff, located in Room 1C925, The Pentagon, has a complete file of all materials archived by the National Indications Center and the Strategic Warning Staff. Please provide a copy of this master list to the Committee by 30 October.

CIA - March 1, 2024

000105

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OCA 3326-92
10 November 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Committee's Request for Access to
National Indications Center (NIC) Archives

1. I attended a meeting on this subject this morning chaired by the NIO for Warning, Charlie Allen. Also present were Doug Bowman of this Office, [redacted] Scott Harris of the DO's East Asia Division and two lawyers enlisted by Allen to search the NIC files at the Pentagon in response to Senator Smith's request.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

2. The two lawyers, possibly [redacted] reported that they had completed an intensive search of the files in question on Saturday, 7 November. They told us that their efforts yielded nothing of consequence on the POW/MIA issue. There was one unlabeled file that contained a few miscellaneous reports on POW/MIA matters but nothing that is not already in the Committee's possession.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

3. To complete their search, the two lawyers have also made a request of the CIA Records Center to provide an index of all NIC files that have been retired [redacted] Allen urged the lawyers not to wait for the index but to go to [redacted] and conduct a personal examination of the files.

(b)(1)

It was agreed that they would go today.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

4. Allen suggested that, pending the results of the [redacted] search, the Agency should send a "firm response" to the Committee informing it of the results of our inspection and denying its request to receive the entire files of the NIC and its successor organization, the Strategic Warning Staff, for the period 1948 through 1975. Allen pointed out that the inspection results to date demonstrate that the Committee is in error if it believes that these records contain anything relevant to the POW/MIA investigation. Moreover, he characterized this latest

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[redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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CIA - March 1, 2024

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SUBJECT: POW/MIA Committee's Request for Access to
National Indications Center (NIC) Archives

request as another futile "fishing expedition" being made by a group of investigators who know that their legislative charter is about to expire. [] agreed to prepare a draft response for review by the Deputy Director for Senate Affairs, John Breckenridge.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

5. At today's meeting [] also tabled a Spot Report of a news conference which Senator Smith plans to hold today. The report states that Smith will announce that the Committee is in possession of documents allegedly showing that US prisoners were sent to the Soviet Union and that the CIA hid this information. Neither [] nor myself know what documents Smith could be referring to since, to the best of our knowledge, no CIA records on the subject of US prisoners in Russia have been sent to the Committee. We are aware, however, of one "highly unreliable" 1955 report on this topic which the Committee requested last year. The request was denied on the grounds that the source, a Russian defector living in the US, had to be protected. The Spot Report speculates on how information in this report could still have reached the Committee.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

6. On return from the meeting, I informed the D/OCA of Senator Smith's news conference and commenced the search for any Agency documents on US POWs in Russia, with the results described above.

[]

(b)(6)

Charles F. Turgeon
Senate Liaison

OCA/Senate/CFTurgeon:jah/37974 (20 Nov 92)

Distribution:

Original - OCA Records
1 - D/OCA
1 - DD/SA
1 - CFTurgeon Chrono
1 - POW/MIA Subject File

SECRET


CIA - March 1, 2024

000107

(U) Soviet Defector Claims Soviets Holding US Korean War POWs

APRIL 10, 2018 BY DAVID FOY LEAVE A COMMENT (EDIT)

~~SECRET~~



President Dwight Eisenhower

(U) The topic was one that haunted Americans in the wake of Korean War and continues to do so more than six decades later. The most definitive information on the subject seemed to come from a document dated 31 Jan 1955, which stated that three days prior, former Soviet KGB LTC Yuri Aleksandrovich Rastvorov had had a private meeting with President Eisenhower and senior advisors. According to the document, Rastvorov had told the President the stunning news that American and United Nations' POWs had been turned over to the Soviet Union and had been held in camps in Siberia during the Korean War—and likely were still there, if they were still alive.



A rare photo of Rastvorov


~~(S)~~ Rastvorov had been thinking of defecting since the autumn of 1953, but it was early the next year before he approached a British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) officer and made his desires known. His initial choice of British intelligence was apparently motivated at least in part by a positive relationship with an elderly English woman who had taught him English in Japan. However, in January 1954, he ultimately cast his lot with CIA, which so informed MI6 on 5 February. From the get-go, some in the Agency had concerns about Rastvorov and his claims—an Agency report on defector handling procedures characterized the Soviet second secretary in Japan as an “ambitious, prestige-disappointed man.” A stark assessment of Rastvorov in a footnote in the report included this assessment: “That he was a [Stalin’s internal security chief Lavrenti] Beria man fearful of his future doubtless contributed to Rastvorov’s defection. His failure in a mission and subsequent flight were in character with a psychological assessment of him made after his arrival in the United States. The conclusion that he is an egotistical dilettante who cracked when the going became rough has been borne out by persistent characteristics of his behavior during the course of efforts to resettle him.”

(U) Despite such misgivings, however, Rastvorov’s claims regarding US POWs in Soviet hands afforded him instant credibility. A declassified Agency Information Report dated 24 March 1954 provided the following information:

1. The Soviet Intelligence Service is exploiting United Nations, particularly US, PWs in China and North Korea. Some PWs listed as missing were in fact turned over to the Soviets by the Chinese and North Koreans. These PWs will be screened by the Soviets, and those eventually selected will be trained to be illegal residents either in the US or in other countries where they can live as Americans.

2. Some selected PW personnel will also be used in propaganda work, especially as radio announcers because there is a shortage of this type of personnel.
3. Those PWs who are found to be unsuitable will never be released because they will have learned too much about Soviet PW handling techniques. Use will also be made of the identities and biographies of dead PWs in preparing legends of new Soviet agents.

It was this basic information that was included in the 31 Jan 1955 memo noted above, resulting from a meeting between members of the Special Projects Staff and Rastvorov, and including Gen. Dale Smith and, presumably, President Eisenhower. This later memo indicated that Rastvorov's information had come from "recent arrivals (1950-1953) from the Soviet Union to the USSR's Tokyo mission."



Rastvorov's passport

(U) His motivations for defecting were subject to some degree of speculation. CIA files indicated that his father, a Red Army officer, died in the famine that followed the collectivization of Soviet farms, prompting the Agency to conclude that painful memory prompted his defection. However, in his first press conference, on 13 Aug 1954, he simply said, "I wanted to live like a decent human being. I wanted to live decently and I wanted to be able to treat other people decently." A more complete answer may be connected to his January 1954 recall to Russia—fearful of returning, he resolved not to obey and contacted an American friend with whom he had previously shared his misgivings about the Soviet system. As another CIA study on defectors notes, his example "illustrate[s] the effectiveness of the combination of fear for personal safety and recall to Russia as a means of finally crystallizing a potential defector's latent thoughts of defection into immediate action."

(U) Rastvorov had been born on 11 July 1921 in Dmitrievsk, Russia. His father was a retired Army colonel, his mother a physician. In 1939, he was conscripted into the Russian Army and served in Latvia and Lithuania prior to his selection as a student at the Far Eastern Language Institute, where

he learned English and Japanese. By 1942, he had been commissioned as a lieutenant in military intelligence, trained in the use of psychological warfare against the Japanese. In 1943, he was transferred to the People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB) in Moscow and dispatched to the First Directorate School for Intelligence Training, graduating in June 1945. Promoted to Captain, he arrived in Tokyo in February 1946, ostensibly as a Foreign Office translator, actually as an NKGB (soon MGB) intelligence officer. He joined the Communist Party in 1947 and a year later was assigned to the screening of Japanese POWs, under Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) cover, to recruit agents from among the POWs. He returned to Moscow in August 1948 and was promoted to Major. He was reassigned to Tokyo in July 1950 and at the time of his defection was an MVD lieutenant colonel. When he left Tokyo, he also left his Russian ballerina wife and a young daughter.

(U) After understandably complex security arrangements, Rastvorov arrived in the United States on 20 Feb 1954. He signed an exclusive contract with LIFE magazine, for which he wrote a series of three articles on the Soviet Union in the post-Stalin era and was interviewed by Stewart Alsop for an article in the New York *Herald*. On 31 May 1955, his Agency-arranged name change became effective, and Yuri Aleksandrovich Rastvorov morphed into Martin F. SIMONS, employed as a technical writer by the Department of the Army and resettled in the United States.

(U) On Wednesday, 8 Feb 1956, Rastvorov testified before the Senate Internal Security subcommittee on the general subject of the scope of Soviet activities in the United States. As the hearing began, Idaho Senator Herman Welker requested that the press not take any pictures of Rastvorov, either in the hearing room or anywhere on Capitol Hill—at the witness's request. Rastvorov stated that he had been in the then-MVD from 1943 until he defected in 1954 and confirmed that his cover position in Tokyo was that of second secretary of the Soviet mission. In response to questions, he spoke at length about the structure of Soviet military and political intelligence, the Soviet officers operating under cover dispatched to the United States, and about the carefully-orchestrated 1944 tour of the USSR provided to 1948 Presidential candidate Henry Wallace, founder of the Progressive Party, a political entity of great interest to Soviet intelligence. He also confirmed that young MVD officers had been sent to seminaries and later became bishops/intelligence officers throughout the Soviet Union. However, his comments did not address the question of American POWs during the Korean War.

(U) Several months later, he married one of his Agency debriefers and was selected as a speaker at several USG Intelligence-related events. In April 1958, he was terminated as a source by the Agency and in March 1960 became a US citizen, complete with a Social Security number and a US passport. At some point thereafter, he was the proprietor of the "Captain's Table" restaurant in Georgetown, a venture which ultimately failed. Meanwhile, he and his new family were settling into the McLean neighborhood where they would stay for the next five decades, his two daughters attending the prestigious Holton-Arms School. An avid tennis player, Rastvorov/SIMONS was described by friends as "an ebullient, athletic, and fun-loving man who dressed well, drove

expensive cars and supported charitable causes. In a gesture that was apparently typical, Rastvorov wrote a letter of condolence to DCI Allen Dulles in July 1959 following the death of his brother, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Rastvorov wrote:

Dear Mr. Dulles, I am very sorry to hear of Mr. John Foster Dulles' death. My wife and I wish to send our deepest sympathy to you and your family.

The free world and people of this country have lost a man to whom they are much in debted [sic]. All of us will miss his courageous example and leadership in the days ahead.

Yours sincerely,

Yuri Rastvorov



Former CIC chief Paul Redmond

(U) Though some undoubtedly begrudged his lavish lifestyle, the Agency was quick to point out his value as an asset. A declassified document noted that his information provided 'background insights into the KGB and the Soviet government' and lauded him for being 'a mentor to very young CIA case officers, teaching them about the Russians and the KGB.' Retired Counterintelligence chief Paul Redmond characterized him as 'a wonderful, warm, energetic Russian [who] taught us that KGB officers were humans after all—not stereotypical ogres. This helped us immensely as we worked against them as case officers.'

(U) His supporters were no doubt dismayed by the results of an October 1996 interview that Rastvorov had with several OSD/DoD representatives. In that interview, he stated that he had "no knowledge of U.S. POWs being held in Siberia or transferred to the Soviet Union. He further stated that none of his colleagues had ever told him about U.S. or UN POWs having been transferred to the Soviet Union or having been held in Siberia." When shown a copy of the memo, he said it was "not accurate and that he never provided the information contained in it. He specifically disclaimed making any statement in reference to U.S. and other UN POWs held in Siberia." Furthermore, "anything he could say on the subject of Soviet involvement with U.S. POWs would be guesswork or

speculation as he had no direct knowledge on the subject.” Although he did not recall being interviewed on the subject in the 1950s, the interviewers described him as “cooperative and alert,” willing to provide detailed answers to questions when necessary. He was aware of recent media attention on the POW issue and on him personally and likely had spent some time in thought on the subject prior to the interview.

(U) The POW-MIA Office within the Pentagon consistently and doggedly pursues the fate of US POWs, especially those from the Cold War and the Korean War. The Department of Defense was privy to Rastvorov’s claims and the declassified 1955 memo since 1993; more significantly, DoD considers the memo credible. His testimony is also supported by other individuals, including Donald Jameson, who was a branch chief in the Soviet division in the Agency’s Operations Directorate in the 1950s. Jameson noted that Rastvorov ‘had a lot to say about relations between the Soviet Union and Korea,’ a statement included in an Associated Press story which described Rastvorov as “a reliable and valuable source [who] was one of the most important defectors during the Cold War.” With regard to the number of American POWs in question, Jameson said, ‘My impression is that it was a few–10 to 15; they were aviators mostly.’ But in a series of 1994-95 phone interviews, former NSC staffer Philip Corso, who said he was the one who arranged and conducted the interrogation described in the 1955 memo, claimed that Rastvorov told him that “several hundred Americans” had been sent to Siberia by rail during the Korean War. In answer to the burning question of why the Eisenhower Administration took no action based on Rastvorov’s information, Corso said it was because the US Government feared that any sort of confrontation over the issue might have led to all-out war.

(U) In 2002, Yuri Rastvorov/Martin SIMONS suffered a devastating stroke and never fully recovered. The defector who had come to the United States in 1954 died on 19 Jan 2004, only five days prior to the 50th anniversary of his defection. Meanwhile, the veracity of his claims about Korean War-era US POWs being in Soviet hands defies confirmation or refutation.

FILED UNDER: ASIA, CIA, COLD WAR, COMMUNISM, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, ESPIONAGE, HUMINT, INTELLIGENCE, SOVIET UNION, UNITED KINGDOM TAGGED WITH: CIA, DCI ALLEN DULLES, DONALD JAMESON, GEN. DALE SMITH, HENRY WALLACE, JAPAN, JOHN FOSTER DULLES, JOSEPH STALIN, KOREAN WAR, LAVRENTI BERIA, LIFE MAGAZINE, MARTIN F. SIMONS, MI6, MVD, NEW YORK HERALD, NKGB, PAUL REDMOND, PENTAGON, PHILIP CORSO, POW-MIA OFFICE, POWS, PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, PROGRESSIVE PARTY, SEN. HERMAN WELKER, STEWART ALSOP, UNITED NATIONS, YURI A. RASTVOROV

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED Status: [STAT]
 Report Number: FBIS-SOV-92-028 UDC Number:

Headline: Documents Reveal U.S. POWs Kept in GULAG

Source Line: 92UM0512A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Feb 92 Morning
 Edition p 3

Subslug: [Article by Valeriy Rudnev in the ``IZVESTIYA
 Investigations'' series: ``Where Are Robert Reynolds and
 His Friends? On 8 April 1950, American Pilots Were Downed
 Over the Baltics. Their Fate From Then on Is Unknown.'']

FULL TEXT OF ARTICLE:

1. [Article by Valeriy Rudnev in the ``IZVESTIYA Investigations''
 series: ``Where Are Robert Reynolds and His Friends? On 8 April 1950,
 American Pilots Were Downed Over the Baltics. Their Fate From Then on
 Is Unknown.'']

2. [Text] Following the fate of our countrymen previously concealed
 in the secret archives of the Soviet state, the curtain is now
 beginning to be lifted over the similar fate of foreigners. The truth
 about the Poles shot in Katyn is already known. Documents on hard
 labor in the Soviet Union for Japanese prisoners of war have been
 released. Access has been opened to the files of Italians who were
 taken prisoner during the Great Patriotic War. The American theme
 also belongs in this sphere. Much is written about it at present,
 mainly in conjunction with the secret operations of Soviet secret
 services involving the internment of American servicemen. IZVESTIYA
 is embarking on its own investigation of the problem.

3. Lieutenant Robert Reynolds, a U.S. Navy pilot, was downed over
 the Baltic Sea on 8 April 1950 while on a reconnaissance mission. At
 any rate, this is what his widow, Jane Reynolds-Howard, maintains in
 her letter to the head of Soviet State Security, dated 4 November
 1991. However, to this day neither she nor the families of other
 members of the crew-Frank Beckman, Joseph Barass, Tommy Burgess, Joe
 Denens, John Fett, William Homer, Edward Purcell, Howard Seasheff,
 and Jack Thomas [names as transliterated]-have received any definite
 information on their lot from either the American or the Soviet
 government.

4. Six months after the plane of Robert Reynolds was downed, his two
 girls, Christine and Caroline, were born. In another six months,
 Reynolds was officially declared dead. However, Jane hoped for the
 best. Despite things being very hard for her with two babies and
 without her husband, she started her own investigation, having
 abandoned hopes for assistance on the part of officials.

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5. It is known that America is very patriotic. Yuriy Smirnov, chairman of the Russian parliamentary subcommittee for the affairs of prisoners of war, who recently returned from the United States, testified: The unity of what appears to be a mixed and stratified society in its passionate, almost frenzied effort to find its soldiers who failed to return home from foreign lands, and to commemorate them, is striking. However, there are things which America cannot do.

6. At the end of last year, 92 American senators sent a letter to the president of Russia with a request to provide access to the archives of State Security and the GULAG [Main Directorate of Prison Camps] in order to come up with a clear-cut answer to a simple question: Are U.S. citizen prisoners held in Soviet camps or not? American journalists have requested assistance from their Soviet colleagues. Recently, one of the joint investigative reports about MIA's from the Vietnam War was shown in "The Fifth Wheel" on Russian TV. The American collector, Jim Atwood, is prepared to pay \$10,000 to anyone who will obtain documentary evidence concerning at least one fellow American held as a prisoner of war in the Union. If one succeeds in locating a live American prisoner of war the reward will be increased to \$1 million (!). A reward of \$100,000 is also offered for similar information from the American public organization "Accuracy in Media," which published its advertisement in one of the Moscow newspapers. Another public organization, the U.S. National Union of Prisoner of War Families, sent to the KGB a list of 120 names of servicemen, information on whom, as the Union of Families believes, is found in the special archives of the former USSR. The list includes World War II prisoners of war, violators of our airspace downed over our territory, and soldiers and officers missing in action in Laos, Vietnam, Korea, and other countries. The National Union of Families asks that the circumstances of the disappearance of specific individuals, including Robert Reynolds and his comrades, be checked out.

7. FROM A LETTER BY JANE REYNOLDS-HOWARD. "Bob and his comrades were seen in Camp No. 5 in the vicinity of Vorkuta in September 1950. Later, their tracks lead to the area of the Tayshet railroad station in Siberia (Camp No. 20) where an officer from Bob's crew died in one of the hospitals along the Tayshet-Bratsk line. There is information on the sightings of others in the Kolyma camps.

8. Why did we begin our investigation with a specific case? Would it not perhaps be much more important to examine the overall situation-the nature of our presence in Korea, Vietnam, and other hot spots on the planet? Or perhaps look for individuals who, as Russian officials maintain, deserted the U.S. Army in order to seek refuge in

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the territory of the USSR? Or try to unmask malicious schemes by our counterintelligence, and American counterintelligence as well? Of course, it is tempting for a journalist to work on such issues. However, let us not verify or denounce anybody for now. Let us just try to help a common American, Jane Reynolds-Howard, and her children, Christine and Caroline. Let us look at an episode which, by all signs, was typical of the "cold war" which (let us hope) is already past us. This was a war where no battles were fought openly, where enemy personnel were not taken prisoner or declared prisoners of war. Operations in the course of that war were conducted in secret, and people disappeared without a trace. However, it was not without a trace. The trace led to archives. This was where we began our search for Lieutenant Robert Reynolds and his comrades.

9. The Central State Special Archive. This is where the files of the Main Directorate for the Affairs of Prisoners of War and Internees are. Viktor Bondarev, director of the special archive, allowed IZVESTIYA staff to become familiar with some personal files of Americans classified "Top Secret." Of course, we did not find any genuine state secrets. At present, the materials of the special archive are quite accessible to researchers.

10. There were thin files in official looking covers. Registration file for prisoner of war Herman Sh. Camp No. 62, registration file No. 2744. Year and place of birth- 1923, Los Angeles. Property status of father-a house, 150 hectares of orchards. Date of arrival in camp-10 August 1944. The file was closed because of his death on 26 April 1945. Diagnosis-dystrophy. Buried at a public cemetery in Kiev.

11. Registration file of prisoner of war Charles G. Roy. Place of birth-New York. Taken prisoner in 1945. The file was closed on 12 February 1947 in conjunction with him being sent home.

12. V. Bondarev said: "According to data in the special archive as of today, during the entire Great Patriotic War, 108 American prisoners who fought on the side of Fascist Germany, ended up in our territory. After a short stay in Special Camp No. 188 in Tambov Oblast, 68 of them were freed and sent to their native country. Fourteen of them died, and the places of their burial have been determined. The fate of another 26 is not known for sure at present. At least as of 1947, they were entered in documents as being incarcerated in a camp. Probably, they were also handed over to the American side (in the main, the repatriation of Americans was over by 1950). We are now checking out the documentation based on this version. We are verifying the available lists."

13. [Rudnev] However, there are assertions in the press concerning

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thousands of American prisoners of war from the period of the Great Patriotic War.

14. [Bondarev] Apparently, this is about the thousands of our allies taken prisoner by the Germans, liberated by us, and sent to America through Odessa.

15. [Rudnev] What about the fate of U.S. citizens who could have ended up in GULAG camps after 1950?

16. [Bondarev] Our archive has materials concerning the prisoners of war of the Great Patriotic War only.

17. [Rudnev] Is this to say that you will not be able to clarify the fate of Robert Reynolds and his comrades who were downed over the Baltic Sea in April 1950?

18. [Bondarev] I cannot help you with this. Look for pertinent information in other archives.

19. We went to the addresses indicated.

20. Main Administration of Corrections. This militia establishment has information on those who are serving time for crimes committed in the territory of our country. Naturally, we approached them. After all, the R. Reynolds episode is somewhat reminiscent of another one, that of F. Powers who was downed in 1960, convicted for espionage, and for a while served time in a Soviet corrective labor facility.

21. The management of GUID [Main Administration of Corrections] knows about American servicemen who are supposedly held in Soviet camps from newspapers. According to the documents of the corrective labor facilities of our country, there are no American servicemen there at present. One of the GUID managers specified: "Not just servicemen, but other American citizens have not been held in our camps since at least 1970. There are Vietnamese, Arabs, Koreans, and citizens of other countries. The only citizen of Israel is serving time based on a court sentence. However, we do not have Americans. However, give us time and we will verify it. After all, we do not have any special secrets. People end up in our camps only on the basis of court sentences. Besides, the only camp for foreigners in our country is in the limelight. Dozens of delegations have already visited it."

22. Ministry of Defense, the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Armed Forces. There is a reason for our interest in the archives of the military establishment: Reynolds could only have been downed by the military; the exact date of this incident was known, and only

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details had to be established. However, it was not that easy. We could not even get into the Ministry of Defense: Everything came down to short conversations over the phone. Indeed, there is a problem..., we need to verify this and resolve the issue of declassifying certain documents..., of course, the public is entitled to know the truth..., however, I am not aware of this, you had better call N. So, yet another telephone number appeared in my notebook (by now there are 13). The telephone number of Chief of General Staff V. Samsonov became No. 13. As officers from the Ministry of Defense said, only he could authorize verification of the specific case involving Robert Reynolds. However, so far I have not succeeded in getting through to the general. This is why I will take advantage of this opportunity and write a short note to him: 'Esteemed Viktor Nikolayevich! Of course, we are interested in the opinion of the military on the topic of American prisoners of war which is being discussed in the press. We understand that a full search of the archives and the resolution of the issue of the classification of documents take time. This is why we are asking you to check out just one episode of the 'cold war': 8 April 1950, a U.S. Navy plane, the Baltic.'

23. FROM A LETTER BY JANE REYNOLDS-HOWARD. 'Bob and his comrades have long earned your forgiveness. The time has come to send American prisoners home. This action would initiate the healing of the wounds in the hearts of many Americans. I pray for you and your wife every day.'

24. Let us recall that Jane wrote this letter to the head of Soviet State Security, by now a former leader, who resolved to implement profound reforms in the KGB, and who took a step which is unusual in the practice of operations by special services: He handed over to the Americans monitoring equipment installed in the embassy building. How will the new leadership of state security behave?

25. Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation. This is how the former KGB is now called. However, we were greeted benevolently at the ministry, despite the fact that at present it is involved for the most part in restructuring and personnel reassignments. They even assigned an officer to help us.

26. I will admit that we were shown both the letter by Jane Reynolds-Howard and a picture of Lieutenant Reynolds at Lubyanka. At present, they believe that it is stupid to make secrets of such incidents because this gives rise to rumors, idle talk, or even false fabrications about the operation of Soviet special services. However, it is paradoxical that the formerly mighty establishment which held all the secrets of the state under its control has now disintegrated. The once joint archives are now in the jurisdiction of different chiefs. It is not all that easy even for the officers of State

UNCLASSIFIED
CIA - March 1, 2024

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UNCLASSIFIED

FBIS Concatenated Daily Reports, 1992

Document 10 of 13

Page 6

Security to respond now to a question about what transpired in the sky over the Baltic Sea on 8 April 1950. Even if the officers find this out they will not be able to reveal it: Many documents are classified ``Top Secret.``

27. Is there a way out? At Lubyanka, they believe that, in principle, the issue should be resolved with the participation of interested parties--the parliament, the government, the military, and the special services. This is also what the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Supreme Soviet, and the staff of the president believe. However, everything takes time.

28. Well, let us wait. Meanwhile, since we do not count on familiarizing ourselves with archival documents soon, let us turn to the memories of the people. Please let us know if you have any information about the incident involving Robert Reynolds or his fellow crew members, or if you can clarify the circumstances described in his wife's letter. Let us try to help at least several American families. It is our duty as people.

29. FROM A LETTER BY JANE REYNOLDS-HOWARD. ``I do not feel hostile toward the Soviet people. I understand the situation of Bob and his comrades which brought them to the Soviet GULAG. Of course, my data may seem unconvincing. This is why I ask for help in learning the whole truth about my husband and his comrades, no matter how sad it is...

30. In the picture: Lieutenant Robert Reynolds in 1950.

UNCLASSIFIED

CIA - March 1, 2024

000119

Action Number: DAC-03743-2007-REQUEST-1 **Action Status:** Closed

Tasked By: DIR_EXEC_ACTION (b)(3) CIAAct

Action POC: [redacted] **Action Type:** Request

Action Categories: **Reference Number:**

Internal Due Date: 07/31/2007 01:00 **Dissemination Date:**

External Due Date: 07/31/2007 01:00 **Created Date:** 07/09/2007 00:00

Internal POC: **Organization POC:**

Event Date From: **Event Date To:**

Organization/Subcomponents:

Subject:

Letter From US-Russia POW-MIA Joint Commission Co-Chairman General Foglesong

Assignees:

Info Only:

Task Lead:

Details:

Lotus note from David Robarge, CIA Chief Historian, Center for the Study of Intelligence, forwarding a letter from General Robert Foglesong, Co-Chairman of the US-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, to Stephen R. Kappes, DDCIA, requesting Agency assistance in records search and retrieval regarding Soviet Military losses in Afghanistan and Chechnya. A response is requested by 31 July 2007. CIA previously responded that we would support this effort.HR to take lead and coordinate with CIO for a response.

(A response copy should be provided to the DCI_DAC to close action. If tasking should be reassigned, please contact the Action Officer.)

Action Attachments:

0_0_1_DAC-03743-2007-REQUEST-1.pdf

Action Related Links:

None



(b)(3) CIAAct

Action Number: DAC-03743-2007-REQUEST-1

Response Status: Closed

Date Submitted:

Response from: DIR_EXEC_ACTION

Responding to:

Response Text:

No response has been saved.

Response Attachments:

None

Response Related Links:

None

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

**DIRECTORS ACTION CENTER
ROUTING SLIP**

Record Number	03743-2007	
Document Number	DAC-03743-2007-REQUEST-1	
Action Number	DAC-03743-2007-1	
File Code	PO PUBRE 08430 1002 , dd/cia official correspondence ,T	
Lead Office	HR	
Release Office		
Action	Coordination	Information
HR	CIO	DCIA
		DDCIA
		ADD/CIA
		AD/MA
		GC
		EXSEC
		DAC
Suspense Date	07/31/2007	
Action Officer	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Action Officer's Secure Phone	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Coordination and Routing	HR to take lead and coordinate with CIO for a response. (A response copy should be provided to the DCI_DAC to close action. If tasking should be reassigned, please contact the Action Officer.)	
Document Summary	Lotus note from David Robarge, CIA Chief Historian, Center for the Study of Intelligence, forwarding a letter from General Robert Foglesong, Co-Chairman of the US-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, to Stephen R. Kappes, DDCIA, requesting Agency assistance in records search and retrieval regarding Soviet Military losses in Afghanistan and Chechnya. A response is requested by 31 July 2007.	
Document Date	07/02/2007	
Date Received in DAC	07/09/2007	

(b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct

As of: 9 Jul 2007 02:51 PM

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

(b)(3) CIAAct

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ /

(b)(3) CIAAct



David S. *DR*
Robarge/STF/AGENCY

To Stephen R. Kappes/STF/AGENCY
cc
bcc
Subject Letter from US-Russia POW/MIA Joint Commission
co-chairman Gen. Foglesong

(b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct

CIA Chief Historian
Center for the Study of
Intelligence

07/02/2007 11:11 AM

Mr. Kappes,

Enclosed is a letter I received today addressed to you from Gen. Robert Foglesong, co-chairman of the US-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, requesting Agency assistance in records search and retrieval concerning Soviet military losses in Afghanistan and Chechnya. As the other enclosed documents indicate, during the past several months the History Staff and CIO/Information Management Services have been assisting the Commission in identifying archival material related to American MIAs involved with Cold War aerial reconnaissance missions. I am forwarding the General's letter to you at the request of one of his assistants with whom I have worked on previous Commission requests.

David Robarge

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ /

(b)(3) CIAAct

CIA - March 1, 2024

000123



U.S. - RUSSIA JOINT COMMISSION ON POW/MIAS
241 18TH STREET SOUTH, SUITE 800
ARLINGTON, VA 22202

U.S. CHAIRMAN

June 29, 2007

Mr. Stephen R. Kappes
Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Kappes:

In April of 2006, President Bush designated me to serve as Co-chairman of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs. In that role, I am responsible to the President and the families of missing American servicemen. As a bilateral humanitarian endeavor, the Commission seeks to assist in clarifying the fates of Russian MIAs, thereby bringing a sense of relief and comfort to Russian families and encouraging reciprocal gestures that may help us to account for our missing servicemen.

In January of this year, I wrote to General Hayden, requesting his assistance in locating historical CIA documents which could help us clarify the fates of Americans lost in or near the former Soviet Union. General Hayden responded enthusiastically, directing your Chief Historian, Mr. David Robarge, to assist us in our endeavor. In the weeks since then, we have received welcome cooperation from his office.

It is in this context that I request your assistance in identifying and releasing historical and current collection requirements directed at Soviet military losses in Afghanistan and Chechnya. Past assistance from the Central Intelligence Agency proved pivotal in demonstrating the mutually beneficial nature of our work. A similar gesture at this point would reinforce our current attempts to forge contacts with Russian veterans' organizations and rekindle interest at senior levels of government, which hold sway over our access to historical records.

Any assistance which you might offer us would be greatly appreciated. I have designated one of my representatives at the Pentagon, Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Tim Hall, to be my point of contact. Colonel Hall is available to assist your staff in identifying documents that would be of value to our program. He may be reached at (703) 699-1421.

Thanks again for your support.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "RFoglesong", written over a horizontal line.

Robert H. "Doc" Foglesong
General, USAF (Ret)



CIA - March 1, 2024

000124

Subject: Foglesong to Kappes Letter

From: "Hall, Timothy, LtCol, OSD-DPMO" <Timothy.Hall@osd.mil>

Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2007 15:20:47 -0400

To: <davidsr1@ucia.gov>

David,

On behalf of General Foglesong, please forward this letter to DDCIA/Mr. Kappes' office. Thank you.

V/R,

Tim <<Foglesong Kappes Letter.pdf>>

Timothy J. Hall, Lt Col, USAF

OSD/DPMO

Joint Commission Support Directorate

(703) 699-1421

Classified E-mail: pohaltj@dpmo.ic.gov



U.S. - RUSSIA JOINT COMMISSION ON POW/MIAS
241 18TH STREET SOUTH, SUITE 800
ARLINGTON, VA 22202

U.S. CHAIRMAN

General Michael V. Hayden
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear General Hayden,

In April of 2006, President Bush honored me by asking that I serve as the Chairman of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs. As you know, I am responsible to the President and families of American veterans lost as a result of Cold War military activity against the former Soviet Union like you. I take this responsibility seriously and with the knowledge that I can help these families get the fullest possible accounting of their loved ones.

It is in this context that I ask for your assistance in identifying and making available Cold-War-era documents that would shed light on the fates of our POW/MIAs and, in particular, allow us to validate a number of reports obtained by the Commission alleging that American servicemen were forcibly taken into the former Soviet Union and held in the vast prison-camp system or Gulag.

To establish the facts in a matter that has the attention of our leadership and the keen interest of many families of our missing service members, I have asked one of my representatives at the Pentagon, Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Tim Hall, to contact CIA and explore possible areas of cooperation. He has developed a series of search parameters that would assist us in this effort and has shared them with your Chief Historian, David Robarge. Colonel Hall is available to assist your staff in identifying and declassifying documents for our use. Those records whose sensitivity precludes declassification could be transferred to our TS-SCI facility for analysis.

I appreciate your support on this important, highly visible mission and would welcome the chance to meet with you to discuss the Commission and its work on one of my next visits to Washington.

Thanks again for your help.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. H. Foglesong", with a long horizontal line extending to the right.

Robert H. "Doc" Foglesong
General, USAF (Ret)



CIA - March 1, 2024

000126

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

1 March 2007

General Robert H. Foglesong, USAF (Ret)
Chairman U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs
241 18th Street South, Suite 800
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear ~~Joe~~ General:

I have received your letter of 2 February requesting the assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency in identifying and declassifying documents that would shed light on the fate of POW/MIAs that may have been held in the Soviet prison-camp system during the Cold War. The Agency is happy to support you in this important endeavor. I have asked Mr. David Robarge, Chief, CIA History Staff and Mr. Gary Reed-Chambers, Chief, Historical Review Branch in the Office of Information Management Services to lend whatever assistance is requested by Lieutenant Colonel Tim Hall of your staff.

I look forward to discussing the work of the Commission with you during one of your visits to Washington.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Mike H.", written in black ink.

Michael V. Hayden
General, USAF
Director

CIA - March 1, 2024

000127

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

This Document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.

~~SECRET~~

COUNTRY	USSR (Far East)	REPORT NO.	(b)(3) CIAAct
SUBJECT	Exploitation of Prisoners-of-War of the Soviets	DATE DISTR.	24 March 1954
		NO. OF PAGES	1
DATE OF INFO.	Prior to 1954	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
PLACE ACQUIRED	Germany	REFERENCES	
			614042

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

SOURCE:

1. Source feels sure that the Soviet Intelligence Service is exploiting United Nations, particularly US, PWs in China and North Korea. He believes that some PWs listed as missing were in fact turned over to the Soviets by the Chinese and North Koreans. These PWs will be screened by the Soviets, and those eventually selected will be trained to be illegal residents either in the US or in other countries where they can live as Americans.
2. Some selected PW personnel will also be used in propaganda work, especially as radio announcers because there is a shortage of this type of personnel.
3. Those PWs who are found to be unsuitable will never be released because they will have learned too much about Soviet PW handling techniques. Use will also be made of the identities and biographies of dead PWs in preparing legends of new Soviet agents.

~~SECRET~~

STATE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ARMY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NAVY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	AIR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FBI	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	AEC					
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(Note: Washington Distribution Indicated By "X"; Field Distribution By "#".)

SECRET

00/P 9476



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

ER 5-5837

16 March 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) U. S. Prisoners of War Remaining in Communist Custody After Termination of Exchange of Prisoners Under Terms of Korean Armistice Agreement

1. An unknown but apparently substantial number of U. S. military personnel captured in the course of the Korean War are still being held prisoners by the Communist Forces. These individuals will not necessarily be retained in North Korea or Manchuria, but may be held elsewhere within the Soviet orbit.

2. While it is possible that the release of some or all of these prisoners of war may eventually be effected through diplomatic negotiations, the fact that to this day apparently large numbers of German and Japanese prisoners of war from World War II are still in custody must be accepted as a Communist pattern. Today, for the first time, U. S. personnel in any quantity are coming into contact with this pattern. It is a fundamental obligation of the U. S. Government to vigorously pursue every authorized means to recover its fighting men being held hostage by anyone under any circumstances whatsoever.

3. The recovery of even a single individual in this category would have a salutary effect upon the morale of U. S. military personnel in contact with Communist Forces in the event of future hostilities, and would be of inestimable value in our National psychological program to expose for the world at large to see and understand the true nature of the Soviet-directed world Communist plot.

4. It is therefore requested that requirements be placed on appropriate operating organizations for clandestine and covert action to locate, identify, and recover those U. S. prisoners of war still in Communist custody. This action should take precedence over all other evasion and escape activities currently being planned or undertaken by the Agency in support of military requirements. It is further requested that any information collected pertaining to U. S. and other United Nations prisoners of war still in Communist custody be immediately forwarded to this Headquarters.

DOCUMENT NO. _____
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2011
AUTH: HR 78-2

W. F. Twining

DATE: 17 MAR 1954 REVIEWER: 064540

REQUIRED

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

The office of record for this document is Chief, Psychological Warfare Division, Directorate of Plans, DCS/Operations, Hq. USAF. Special handling of this paper is requested. Access should be limited to individuals requiring the information herein in order to carry out their official duties. Normal handling procedures are not applicable. Request replies or references be forwarded directly to or through the office of record.

SECRET

CIA - March 11, 2024

000129

Psy War 16

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Du es

PM, which has the carbon of this letter,
is preparing a reply for your signature which
will be here tomorrow, Wednesday, 24 March.


RWF

23 March 1954
(DATE)

Viewing an archived action from Extral Close

Action

**5 MARCH 1999 SENATE MEMBER BRIEFING RE:
POW/MIA**

Document Number
OCA-019866-CNV

Date Received
03/05/1999

Task Instructions:

no value

(b)(3) CIAAct

Recipients

- MFR

Request Documents:

Additional Document Metadata

OPI		
Secondary OPI		
From		(b)(3) CIAAct
Other Document Number		(b)(6)
Comments		
File Code		
Media Type		
Codewords		
Attachments		
Keywords		
Copies		

Viewing an archived action from Extral Close

(b)(3) NatSecAct

CIA - March 1, 2024

3/1/2013 000131

OCA Remarks
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

PRINTED: Wednesday, May 12, 1999
AT: 17:14

CODEWORDS:

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum for the Record

KEY: C/1999-00260

EVENT: MEMBER BRIEFING DATE: 03/05/1999 TIME: 9:00 STATUS: COMPLETED
PLACE: 407 SENATE
FOR: SEN
SUBJECT: POW/MIA

ATTENDEES:

ASSOCIATION

NAME

ROLE

DCI/OCA
DCI/OCA
DOD
SEN

[Redacted Name Box]

(b)(3) CIAAct

BRIEFER
BRIEFER
BRIEFER
BRIEFER
BRIEFER
SUPPORT
SUPPORT

Executive Summary: (b)(3) NatSecAct

1) ~~(S)NF~~ [Redacted] The purpose of the briefing was to respond to the major points raised in the 26 January 1999 letter to the DCI from Senators Bob Smith and John Warner (Smith is the head of the Vietnam Working Group on the US/Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs; the commission is chaired by General Roland LaJoie) requesting the following:

1) Access to a September 1996 report cited in the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate on the Vietnam POW/MIA issue;

2) Access to an August 1998 Top Secret memorandum dissem report which dealt with the alleged transfer of U.S. POWs to the Soviet Union from Vietnam during the Vietnam War;

3) Justification for the discrepancy in classification levels between the 1996 and 1998 reports;

4) An e (b)(3) NatSecAct nearly two years elapsed before a follow-up report was generated on this matter.

(b)(3) CIAAct

2) ~~(S)NF~~ [Redacted] A package of DO reports and ops cables were taken to the meeting for the Senator and General LaJoie to review on a read-and-return basis. The package included the following documents: 1) [Redacted] 10 October 1996, 2) [Redacted] 7 October 1996; 3) CIA [Redacted] 9 September 1998; and 4) DO Memorandum Intelligence Report [Redacted] 26 August 1998. Copies of these documents as well as the 26 January letter authored by Senators Rob Smith and John Warner are attached to this report.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

3) ~~(S)NF~~ [Redacted] As background, both the 1996 and the 1998 information originated from [Redacted]

[Redacted] The August 1998 report recounts stories in circulation among KGB officers over the years that, during the Vietnam War, the KGB transported US POWs clandestinely from North Vietnam to Russia, where they were interrogated and pitched. The stories allege the KGB succeeded in recruiting one American POW who was a member of an American military intelligence service [Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

B-103H

CIA - March 1, 2024

000132

(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] The [redacted] source had only indirect access to the information and no past reporting record on this issue. Efforts to flesh out the source's account resulted in limited additional details. A thorough review of EA, CE, and CIC records failed to identify any new information which corroborates the stories in the report. (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

4) ~~(S)NF~~ [redacted] As background, both the 1996 and the 1998 information originated from [redacted] The August 1998 report recounts stories in circulation among KGB officers over the years that, during the Vietnam War, the KGB transported US POWs clandestinely from North Vietnam to Russia, where they were interrogated and pitched. The stories allege the KGB succeeded in recruiting one American POW who was a member of an American military intelligence service who had been involved in US intelligence operations. [redacted]

(b)(6)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] The [redacted] source had only indirect access to the information and no past reporting record on this issue. Efforts to flesh out the source's account resulted in limited additional details. A thorough review of EA, CE, and CIC records failed to identify any new information which corroborates the stories in the report.

Summary Text: (b)(3) NatSecAct

5) ~~(S)NF~~ [redacted] As Senator Smith was delayed for approximately fifteen minutes, the briefers spent the time discussing a broad range of topics with General LaJoie. The General admitted he was not fully briefed on the subject of the meeting, but stated that he understood the core issue as being the transportation of US POWs captured during the Vietnam War to Russia for the purpose of being recruited as informants once they return to the United States. At this point, LaJoie is unconvinced that US POWs were sent to the Soviet Union during the Vietnam War. According to LaJoie, the Russians have admitted that a plan was drawn up between the Soviet and Vietnamese Governments to conduct such a program during the Vietnam War. To date, however, neither have the Russians provided any documentation detailing such a plan to the Commission nor has the Commission has found any evidence that would suggest such a program was carried out. (b)(3) NatSecAct

6) ~~(S)NF~~ [redacted] In the case of the Korean War, however, the General believes that it is highly likely that US POWs were transported to Russia. The General believes exploitation by the Russians of US POWs occurred during this period, largely due to Stalin and his policies. The Russians continue to deny such any such transfers took place during the Korean War and the issue has yet to be resolved. Discussions continue on this matter between US and Russian negotiators. (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)

7) ~~(S)NF~~ [redacted] Other topics discussed with the General was his tenure with the Agency. He stated he enjoyed working with the Agency, adding that the Agency culture was very much like the military with its "can-do" spirit. He also identified himself as one the of the first pioneers in improving the working relationship between the Agency and the military. DCEA, who was directly involved in supporting the military during her assignment [redacted] [redacted] discussed the Agency's evolving relationship with the military with the General until Senator Smith finally arrived for the meeting. (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

8) ~~(S)NF~~ [redacted] The Senator began the meeting by announcing the Agency refused to admit staff at this session, including Roger Schmacker, who had been specifically requested to participate by Senator Smith's personal office. Roger Schmacker is a DOD employee assigned to support the Commission, who, the Senator added, had the clearance level for this briefing (Top Secret) and had even had access to the two reports identified in his 26 January 1999 letter. [redacted] responded to the Senator by stating that in an effort to be as forthcoming as possible in this briefing, we had brought along a package of documentation for review. This package not only included the two reports but DO operational traffic related to this issue which neither Mr. Schmacker nor anyone else outside the Agency would normally have access. The Senator appeared to accept this explanation and began to review the four documents.

9) ~~(S)NF~~ (OC) Once the General and Senator had finished reviewing the documents, the briefing began with a discussion of the source information, [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)

[redacted] Details regarding the identities of the subsources or their access to the information provided in the 1996 and 1998 reports are not available. The briefers added that [redacted] was not personally involved in interrogating American POWs and did not have access to interrogation reports. The briefers further explained that the two reports represented two separate meetings with the source, one which took place in mid-1996 and another follow-up meeting in July 1998 to address additional tasking from DPMO generated from the original report. The Senator asked if it would be possible for the Commission to provide questions to present to the source during future meetings to which the briefers replied this would not be a problem.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

10) ~~(S) NF~~ [redacted] The Senator then asked why nearly two years elapsed before a follow-up report was generated on this matter. The briefers response was that the reasons for the long intervals between reports was due to the infrequency of the meetings with the source, [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

11) ~~(S) NF~~ [redacted] The Senator then asked for the rationale behind updating the classification level of the second report disseminated in 1998 to "Top Secret" when the original 1996 report was classified only as "Secret". The briefers explained that the reason the second report was classified "Top Secret" was due to source protection. [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

The upgrade of the classification level was because we wanted to be able to provide as detailed an account as possible of the source chain of the information, while still allowing adequate source protection.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

12) ~~(S) NF~~ [redacted] The discussion then jumped to a review of [redacted] agency career and experience as a POW during the Vietnam War as well as [redacted] connection with the Agency's [redacted] program ran in the 1950's. [redacted] agency career began in 1949. Weaver held a number of positions in the Agency, [redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct

That said, there is no information available which directly connects [redacted] to [redacted]

[redacted] In addition, after a considerable investigation [redacted] it was determined that [redacted] was never recruited or cooperated with any foreign intelligence service during the period that he was a POW during the Vietnam War.

(b)(6)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1)

13) ~~(S) NF~~ [redacted] CIC officer [redacted] described [redacted] incarceration by the Vietnamese as cruel and difficult. The Vietnamese were aware of [redacted] intelligence affiliation and consequently, [redacted] was often held in solitary confinement and treated very badly by the guards. In order to stay alive, [redacted] provided information to the Vietnamese on cases that he knew had been long terminated; however, when that was not possible he altered the information to make it misleading or incorrect. There is no indication in [redacted] files to show that he was ever [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] reported just after the POW's had been notified that they were to be released, he was dressed up and taken to a building in Hanoi for a meeting. In addition to several Vietnamese officers, a European-looking man was in attendance. He was not introduced, however [redacted] deduced over the next few hours that the individual was probably a Soviet intelligence officer. [redacted] stated that the meeting could be described as a rapport building session. He was not questioned about cases and did not volunteer any such information. When the group broke for lunch, and his captors told him he would be meeting this person again in the afternoon, [redacted] refused. This one brief meeting was the only session [redacted] had with the individual he believed might be a Soviet intelligence officer. While [redacted] was on extended leave following his release, the Soviets placed a postcard in [redacted] mailbox referring to the meeting in Hanoi and stating that if he knew what was good for him, he would follow their directions for a meeting. [redacted] reported the incident to the Agency immediately. He did not follow up on this contact.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

14) ~~(S) NF~~ [redacted] also advised that the Agency had no information on [redacted] current status as the Agency had no further contact with [redacted] once he retired from the Agency in 1976.

(b)(3) CIAAct

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

15) ~~(S/NF)~~ [redacted] Senator Smith specifically expressed an interest in pursuing the information provided in [redacted] paragraph 4 identifying the Khabarovsk or Vladivostok regions as sites where US POWs were reportedly taken within the Soviet Union during the Vietnam War. The Senator asked if it would be possible for him and his commission colleagues to follow-up on this information during their next trip to Russia. The briefers attempted to explain that, in order to protect the source of the information, the commission could act on this information only if it could show that it had received this collaborating information from other venues. General Lajoie, largely due to his ^{past Agency} experience, seemed to grasp this concept fairly quickly; however, the Senator appeared unconvinced.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1)

16) ~~(S/NF)~~ [redacted] The Senator also questioned the need for comments from [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] on the contents of the report, suggesting that such comments actually politicized DO reporting. In response, the briefers explained "comment procedures" on DO reporting, [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

17) ~~(S/NF)~~ [redacted] In closing, Senator Smith asked DCEA [redacted] if she had had an opportunity to review his assessment of the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Vietnamese intentions, capabilities, and performance concerning the POW/MIA issue and if so, what were her comments on his assessment. In response, DCEA advised that she understood the DCI responded to his concerns via a recent letter and she had no other comments to add to the DCI response.



Liaison Officer
Office of Congressional Affairs

(b)(3) CIAAct

DCI/OCA/CLG/NCBroadbent: pnr/37922(12 May 99)

Distribution:

Original - OCA Records

1 - D/OCA

1 - NCBroadbent Chrono

Follow-up Action Items:

Additional Information:

~~SECRET~~

CIA - March 1, 2024

000135

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

SUBJECT: Response to 12 December 1991 Letter from Senators Kerry and Smith for Information Concerning U.S. POWs/MIAs in the Former USSR

FROM:	C/ORMS/CCA 6U02 NHB	(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)	EXTENSION 75319	DATE SENT 24 Dec. 1991	REQUEST NUMBER DD/O <u>0025/138-91</u>
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	TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1.	DC/ORMS			JP	This revised at the request of Paul Stombaugh.
2.	C/ORMS			✓	
3.	SA/DDO 7E26 OHB		12-24	MS	
4.	ADDO				
5.	DDO			✓	
6.					
7.	Robert Wagner, C/OCA/S 7B00 OHB				
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					

SUSPENSE DATE: _____

RETURN TO: _____

FORM 8-87 4283

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

CL BY 060456
DECL OADR
DRV MIS 2-82

CIA - March 1, 2024

000136

~~SECRET~~

DD/O 0025/138-91

24 December 1991

Letter to Sen Kerry + Smith

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert W. Magner
Chief, Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

FROM:
Chief, Congressional and Covert Action Oversight
Group
Operations and Resource Management Staff

SUBJECT: Information Concerning U.S. POWs/MIAs in the
Former USSR

REFERENCE: Letter of 12 December 1991 from Senators John
Kerry and Bob Smith of the Select Committee on
POW/MIA Affairs to the DCI

*Let me assure you that
The Agency is actively
Reviewing the
ISSUE*

*Now Letter of 12 December
The possibility of*

1. In response to an inquiry concerning U.S. POWs/MIAs in the USSR, a senior officer of the Interrepublic Security Service (ISS), the successor organization to the former KGB Second Chief Directorate, advised the Agency on 3 December that the ISS had undertaken "an exhaustive search of available information and resources, and had come up with no indication of such presence in the USSR past or present." On 6 December the ISS passed us a written "official" response. Following is a translation of that response:

"At our request, an investigation was conducted in Kazakhstan concerning the supposed presence of an American military pilot in the village of Saryshagan, Dzhezkazgan Oblast, as presented in the newspaper 'Kommersant' (no. 42, dated 4 November 1991). The pilot was reportedly taken prisoner during the period of war in Indochina.

"As a result of the investigation, which included questioning long-time residents, no information was obtained about the presence in that region at any time of an American pilot.

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED



(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~

CIA - March 1, 2024

000137

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Information Concerning U.S. POWs/MIAs in the Former USSR

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

"On our part, we also do not have any information about American military personnel located on the territory of the USSR who were missing in action during the course of military activities in Indochina."

2. Regarding alleged statements by retired KGB General Oleg Kalugin, reported by Australian television, that he had been involved in the interrogation of Americans in Vietnam during the 1975-1978 period, [redacted] Station has been tasked with asking the ISS and the Russian Republic Federal Security Service to confirm the remarks attributed to Kalugin and provide details. The Station is also to seek instructions from those services as to how an inquiry might be put to the military intelligence service, the GRU. *we have pushed*

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

3. The [redacted] liaison services have been asked for any information they may have on the past or present whereabouts and on Soviet and/or East European interrogation of POWs/MIAs from the World War II, Korean or Vietnam Wars. We will advise the results of our enquiries to the East Europeans and our most recent enquiries to the Russians upon receipt of their replies.

similar

4. We will keep the Committee advised of any additional information that results from our discovery with the ~~to~~ Russian and East European services.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

*ACCORDING TO
WEBSTER, INQUIRY IS
THE PREFERRED SPELLING.
SUGGEST OCHAMAKE SEVERAL
EDITIONS CHANGES TO CLEAR UP
OBTUSE WORDING IN PARAS 2-3.
P. 11*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Information Concerning U.S. POWs/MIAs in the Former USSR

DO/ORMS/CCA sc/x75324

(24 December 1991)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)


Distribution:

- Original - C/OCA/Senate
- 1 - ORMS/CCA/Senate
- 1 - POW/MIA soft file

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 5098-91/1

27 DEC 1991

The Honorable Bob Smith
 Vice Chairman
 Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
 United States Senate
 Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

In response to your letter of December 12, 1991, concerning the possibility of US POWs/MIAs in the USSR, let me assure you that the Agency is actively pursuing this issue. A senior officer of the Interrepublic Security Service (ISS), the successor organization to the former KGB Second Chief Directorate, advised the Agency on 3 December that the ISS had undertaken "an exhaustive search of available information and resources, and had come up with no indication of such presence in the USSR past or present." On 6 December the ISS passed us a written "official" response. Following is a translation of that response:

"At our request, an investigation was conducted in Kazakhstan concerning the supposed presence of an American military pilot in the village of Saryshagan, Dzhezkazgan Oblast, as presented in the newspaper 'Kommersant' (no. 42, dated 4 November 1991). The pilot was reportedly taken prisoner during the period of war in Indochina.

As a result of the investigation, which included questioning long-time residents, no information was obtained about the presence in that region at any time of an American pilot.

On our part, we also do not have any information about American military personnel located on the territory of the USSR who were missing in action during the course of military activities in Indochina."

WARNING NOTICE
 INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
 OR METHODS INVOLVED

(b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~

CIA - March 1, 2024

000140

~~SECRET~~

The Honorable Bob Smith

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

Regarding alleged statements by retired KGB General Oleg Kalugin, reported by Australian television, that he had been involved in the interrogation of Americans in Vietnam during the 1975-1978 period, we have tasked [redacted] Station to ask the ISS and the Russian Republic Federal Security Service to confirm the remarks attributed to Kalugin and provide details. The Station has also been directed to seek guidance from those services as to how a similar inquiry can be put to the military intelligence service, the GRU.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

The [redacted] liaison services have been asked for any information they may have on Soviet and/or East European incarceration or interrogation of POWs/MIAs from World War II, the Korean War, or the Vietnam War.

We will keep the Committee advised of any additional information that results from our discussions with the Russian and East European Services.

A copy of this letter is also being provided to Chairman Kerry.

Sincerely,



for Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

~~SECRET~~

CIA - March 1, 2024

000141

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Letters to Senators Kerry and Smith re POWs/MIAs
in the USSR

OCA/Senate/RWMagner:jmk/37292 (26 December 1991)

Distribution (OCA 5098-91):

Original - Addressee
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ES
1 - ER (ER 91-4126)
1 - D/OCA
1 - OCA Records
1 - RWMagner Chron
1 - Subject File

~~SECRET~~

CIA - March 1, 2024

000142

DDO 0025/138-91

OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS
Routing Slip

	ACTION	INFO
1. D/OCA		X
2. DD/OCA		
3. D/Legislation		X
4. D/Senate Liaison	X	
5. D/House Liaison		X
6. D/Congressional Support	 	
7. Admin		
8. Constituent Inquiries Officer		
9. FOIA Officer		
10. SECURITY		
11. SPECIAL ASSISTANT		
12. ICID		X

SUSPENSE

_____ Date

Action Officer: BOB MAGNER
Remarks:

911216 CR

Name/Date

FORM 4422

EDITION DATE 6-91

CIA - March 1, 2024 000144

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

File POW

SUBJECT: Response to 12 December 1991 Letter from Senators Kerry and Smith for Information Concerning U.S. POWs/MIAs in the Former USSR

(b)(3) CIAAct

FROM:

C/ORMS/CCA
6U02 NHB

(b)(6)

EXTENSION

75319

DATE SENT

24 Dec.
1991

REQUEST NUMBER

DD/O 0025/138-91

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)

1.	DC/ORMS			<i>JP</i>
2.	C/ORMS			✓
3.	SA/DDO 7E26 OHB		12-24	<i>PHS</i>
4.	ADDO			
5.	DDO			✓
6.				
7.	Robert Magner, C/OCA/S 7B00 OHB			
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				

This revised at the request of
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

SUSPENSE DATE:

RETURN TO:

FORM 8-87 4283

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

CL BY 060456
DECL OADR
DRV MIS 2-82

CIA - March 1, 2024

000145

S E C R E T

DD/O 0025/138-91

24 December 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert W. Magner
 Chief, Senate Liaison Division
 Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(6)
 Chief, Congressional and Covert Action Oversight
 Group
 Operations and Resource Management Staff

SUBJECT: Information Concerning U.S. POWs/MIAs in the
 Former USSR

REFERENCE: Letter of 12 December 1991 from Senators John
 Kerry and Bob Smith of the Select Committee on
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"As a result of the investigation, which included questioning long-time residents, no information was obtained about the presence in that region at any time of an American pilot.

WARNING NOTICE
 INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
 OR METHODS INVOLVED



(b)(3)

S E C R E T

CIA - March 1, 2024

000146

S E C R E T

SUBJECT: Information Concerning U.S. POWs/MIAs in the Former USSR

"On our part, we also do not have any information about American military personnel located on the territory of the USSR who were missing in action during the course of military activities in Indochina."

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

2. Regarding alleged statements by retired KGB General Oleg Kalugin, reported by Australian television, that he had been involved in the interrogation of Americans in Vietnam during the 1975-1978 period, [redacted] Station has been tasked with asking the ISS and the Russian Republic Federal Security Service to confirm the remarks attributed to Kalugin and provide details. The Station is also to seek instructions from those services as to how an inquiry might be put to the military intelligence service, the GRU.

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(b)(3) CIAAct

2
S E C I
ACCORDING TO WEBSTER, INQUIRY IS THE PREFERRED SPELLING. SUGGEST OCA MAKE SEVERAL EDITORIAL CHANGES TO CLEAR UP OBSCURE WORDING IN PARA'S 2-3.
PAU

(b)(3)
(b)(6)

S E C R E T

SUBJECT: Information Concerning U.S. POWs/MIAs in the Former
USSR

(b)(3) CIAAct

DO/ORMS/CCA/ [redacted] (b)(6) / x75324

(24 December 1991)

Distribution:

- Original - C/OCA/Senate
- 1 - ORMS/CCA/Senate
- 1 - POW/MIA soft file

S E C R E T

PATTERSON, James K.



06610

PATTERSON,



06610

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE 1 MAY 1987

CIA - March 1, 2024

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UNCLAS 3BB/PMU LD/FAX SUP

*** BEGIN MESSAGE 14 ***

SERIAL=MK2202123292 UDN=V00(62291)
 CLASS=UNCLAS 3BB/PMU LD/FAX SUP
 ZCZCOLC0407
 PTTUZYUW RUDKMK8268 0531422-UUUU--RUETIAV.
 ZNR UUUUU ZYN
 P 221232Z FEB 92
 FM FBIS LONDON UK
 TO AIG 4621
 RUCKDDA/SECOND INTEL CO//ITU//
 RUDKMKB/FBIS LONDON UK//BBC//
 RUEATAC/CDR USAITAC WASH DC//IAAII-RW//
 ACCT FBLD-EWDK
 BT

UNCLAS 3BB/PMU LD/FAX SUP

SERIAL: MK2202123292
 PASS: COPY TO CD
 COUNTRY: CIS
 SUBJ: TAKE 2 OF 3 -- STATUS OF QUEST FOR U.S. MIA'S UUPDATED
 REF: MK2202123092 MOSCOW NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA RUSSIAN 22 FEB///
 IN MYSTERY FOREVER.

TEXT:

((TEXT)) QUITE OFTEN ON HIS RELEASE A PRISONER WOULD REMAIN UNDER OPEN SURVEILLANCE, HAVE HIS MOVEMENTS RESTRICTED, AND BE GIVEN A RUSSIAN NAME. THE EXAMPLE OF THE FORMER GREEK COMMUNIST PARTY GENERAL SECRETARY NIKOS ZAKHARIADIS, WHO LIVED IN SURGUT UNDER THE NAME NIKOLAY NIKOLAYEVICH NIKOLAYEV AND COMMITTED SUICIDE IN 1979, IS NOT ENTIRELY TYPICAL: HIS PARTY COLLEAGUES KNEW OF HIS SITUATION. MORE OFTEN A PRISONER DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE HIMSELF KNOWN AND, WHEN THE OPPORTUNITY DID ARISE, HE WAS ALREADY AS A RULE TOTALLY ASSIMILATED, HAD A FAMILY, AND COULD NOT EVEN IMAGINE RETURNING. THE AUTHOR KNOWS OF SEVERAL PEOPLE LIKE THAT, INCLUDING PEOPLE WHO ARE CURRENTLY PROSPERING -- ADMITTEDLY NOT AMERICANS.

LAST, A PRISONER MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXECUTED UNDER ARTICLE 58 OF THE RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST REPUBLIC CRIMINAL CODE (USUALLY CHARGED WITH ESPIONAGE OR TERRORISM) OR UNDER THE DECREE OF 19 APRIL 1943 IF THE ACCUSED WERE WEHRMACHT SERVICEMEN OR AN "ACCOMPLICE" OF THE OCCUPIERS. I HAVE ALREADY WRITTEN ABOUT THIS HITHERTO SECRET ACT, WHICH HAS PRESUMABLY LOST ITS LEGAL VALIDITY, THAT MADE PROVISION FOR DEATH BY HANGING. AS FAR AS I AM AWARE, THE BELGIAN NATIONAL YERMAK LUKYANOV ((NAME AS TRANSLITERATED)) WAS EXECUTED UNDER THE DRACONIAN DECREE IN MAY 1984.

THE IDEA THAT U.S. PILOTS COULD HAVE FOUGHT IN KOREA AND VIETNAM UNDER ASSUMED NAMES, AS WAS THE PRACTICE IN OUR COUNTRY, MUST BE CONSIDERED GROUNDLESS. U.S. ARMY FIELD REGULATION FM 21-76 ("SURVIVAL, AVOIDANCE OF CAPTURE, AND ESCAPE FROM JAIL") IN THE CHAPTER "CONDUCT UNDER INTERROGATION" RECOMMENDS THAT A PRISONER GIVE HIS TRUE NAME, RANK, NUMBER, AND DATE OF BIRTH. THAT WAS HOW THE SURVIVING CREW MEMBERS FROM THE RB-47 AIRCRAFT DOWNED OVER THE BARENTS SEA 1 JULY 1960 BEHAVED. THEIR STORY COULD SERVE AS A MODEL OF WHAT DID HAPPEN OR MIGHT HAVE HAPPENED TO U.S. PILOTS BROUGHT DOWN NEAR SOVIET BORDERS.

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3

UNCLAS 3BB/PMU LD/FAX SUP

SECOND PILOT BRUCE OLSTED AND NAVIGATOR JOHN MAKKOUN ((SURNAMES AS TRANSLITERATED)) SPENT ALMOST SEVEN MONTHS IN THE LUBYANKA. THE INTERROGATION INDICATES THAT INVESTIGATOR COLONEL PANKRATOV PREPARED THE TRIAL ON THE BASIS OF THE POWERS TRIAL. THE PILOTS WERE FREED RIGHT AFTER JOHN KENNEDY'S INAUGURATION AS A "GOOD WILL GESTURE," BUT ONLY BECAUSE NO CONFESSIONS WERE EXTRACTED FROM THEM. SO AMERICANS MOST LIKELY GAVE THEIR REAL NAMES, ALTHOUGH PRISONERS WERE NEARLY ALWAYS GIVEN DIFFERENT NAMES IN JAILS AND CAMPS.

THERE IS ANOTHER SPECIFIC DIFFICULTY. PEOPLE OF GERMAN, JAPANESE AND ITALIAN DESCENT SERVED IN THE U.S. ARMY. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THESE PEOPLE COULD HAVE GONE TO A CAMP ON THE BASIS OF "NATIONAL ALLEGIANCE," ESPECIALLY SINCE THE SOVIET UNION NEVER COMMITTED ITSELF TO COMPLYING WITH THE HAGUE AND GENEVA CONVENTIONS WHEREBY MILITARY UNIFORM IS THE CRUCIAL INDICATION OF CITIZENSHIP.

IN SHORT, THE PRACTICE OF SOVIET PUNITIVE ORGANS ILLUSTRATES THAT ANYTHING COULD HAVE HAPPENED TO PRISONERS. YET THERE IS NOTHING FANTASTIC ABOUT THE HOPE OF FINDING AMERICANS ALIVE OR AT LEAST TRACES OF THEM.

THE REPORTS OF AMERICANS IN SOVIET CAMPS AND JAILS ARE SPECIFIC ENOUGH TO BE ABLE TO START CHECKING THEM OUT. THERE WAS A CAMP SOMEWHERE IN BELORUSSIA IN 1945 FOR BLACK SOLDIERS -- NEARBY INHABITANTS WOULD HARDLY HAVE FORGOTTEN SUCH AN EXOTIC DETAIL. COLONEL GORDON, ARRESTED IN VIENNA IN 1949, WAS SEEN IN LVOV TRANSIT JAIL IN 1953. AN UNNAMED LIEUTENANT AND NCO, PARTICIPANTS IN THE KOREAN WAR, WERE SEEN AT A PHOSPHORUS MINE NEAR YAKUTSK (CAMP NO. 307) IN 1960. LIEUTENANT WARREN SANDERSON WAS SEEN AT INTE. AND PILOT JOE MILLER WAS SEEN AT KARABAS IN MARCH 1947 -- HE HAD BEEN BROUGHT DOWN OVER BERLIN IN 1945. COLONEL JACKSON, ARRESTED IN BERLIN, WAS SEEN IN DUBROVLAK (THE REPORT IS DATED MID-1953). THE CREW OF A B-29 BROUGHT DOWN OVER THE SEA OF JAPAN 13 JULY 1952 (13 MEN) WERE KEPT IN KHABAROVSK POW CAMP NO. 21 (OCTOBER 1951), WHILE ONE OF THE MEMBERS OF A CREW BROUGHT DOWN THERE 6 NOVEMBER 1951 WAS SEEN IN A MILITARY HOSPITAL NORTH OF MAGADAN (1954). THIS PILOT SERVED 25 YEARS FOR ESPIONAGE. IN BOTH CASES THE REPORTS HAVE COME FROM REPATRIATED JAPANESE.

DZHEZKAZGAN, MAGNITOGORSK, PERM, NORILSK, NOVOSIBIRSK, OMSK, PECHORA, POTMA, TAYSHET, VERKHNEURALS, VLADIVOSTOK, VOLOGDA, VRANGEL ISLAND, YAVAS, THE RENOWNED VLADIMIR JAIL OD-1/ST-2 ((EXPANSION UNKNOWN))... FAMILIAR NAMES. SOMETIMES AN AMERICAN IS CITED BY NAME, OFTEN NOT, BUT IN THESE CASES MINIMAL ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS GIVEN, FOR INSTANCE: DATE AND PLACE OF CAPTURE, RANK, CATEGORY OF TROOPS. THE MOST DETAILED INFORMATION CONCERNS THE VORKUTA CAMPS: MINE NO. 40 -- WILLIAM BIZET ((SURNAME AS TRANSLITERATED)) FROM KOREA, A LIEUTENANT OR NCO CONVICTED UNDER ARTICLE 58; CAMP NO. 6 -- MAJOR ROBERT (?) SHVARTS ((SURNAME AS TRANSLITERATED)), ABDUCTED IN KASSEL IN 1949; CONVALESCENT CAMP -- CREW OF A U.S. NAVY PRIVATEER AIRCRAFT BROUGHT DOWN OVER THE BALTIC 8 APRIL 1950 (10 MEN); COLONEL DAVISON, ABDUCTED IN VIENNA IN 1946, IS ALSO THERE.

DMITRIY VOLKOGONOV HAS RECENTLY PROVIDED DOCUMENTARY CONFIRMATION ONCE AGAIN THAT U.S. WORLD WAR II PRISONERS WERE KEPT IN TAMBOV'S "RADA" (NO. 188) POW CAMP. THE COLONEL GENERAL WAS CLEARLY HASTY IN DECLARING HIS DISCOVERY A SENSATION: IN THIS CASE IT IS A QUESTION

UNCLAS 3BB/PMU LD/FAX SUP

UNCLAS 3BB/PMU LD/FAX SUP
OF AMERICANS WHO SERVED IN THE GERMAN ARMY (THERE WERE AT LEAST 108
SUCH PEOPLE IN THE TAMBOV CAMP, ACCORDING TO "SPECIAL" ARCHIVE
FIGURES).

I MUST PARTICULARLY POINT OUT THAT DOCUMENTS CONCERNING POW'S AND
MIA'S ARE STILL SECRET IN THE UNITED STATES OR HAVE BEEN ONLY
PARTIALLY DECLASSIFIED. THAT IS WHY IN A NUMBER OF CASES WE DO NOT
KNOW THE NAMES OF THE AMERICANS CONCERNED OR THE SOURCE OF THE
INFORMATION -- THIS INFORMATION IS CAREFULLY OBLITERATED WHEN THE
DOCUMENTS ARE DECLASSIFIED.

(MORE) 22 FEB CH/████████████████████ROMO2202.08/JW 22/1408Z FEB

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UNCLAS 3BB/PMU LD/FAX SUP

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0-16538

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

This Document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY	Korea/Manchuria/China	REPORT NO.	(b)(3) CIAAct
SUBJECT	⁷⁴⁹ UN/Prisoners of War Camps and Conditions	DATE DISTR.	13 May 1953
DATE OF INFO.	See attachment	NO. OF PAGES	1
PLACE ACQUIRED		REQUIREMENT NO.	RD (S-1/R)
		REFERENCES	Jellman

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE: As noted in attachment. Appraisal of Contents: As noted in attachment.

Forwarded herewith for your information and retention is Supplement III of "UN Prisoners of War Camps and Conditions in Korea, Manchuria and China", dated 1 May 1953.

Enclosure: 1 report (18 pages)

Distributions: Air (8 copies)
Army (4 copies)
Navy (1 copy)
CGI (1 copy) ✓

OSI/B
2 19 PM '53

(OSI)
(1/R)
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Adj. Sec.

(b)(3) CIAAct

~~SECRET~~

(b)(3) CIAAct

102

STATE	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	FBI	AEC	OCD	*		
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(b)(3) CIAAct

~~SECRET~~
Security Information

UN PRISONERS OF WAR
CAMPS AND CONDITIONS
IN
KOREA, MANCHURIA
AND CHINA

SUPPLEMENT VII
1 May 1953

~~SECRET~~

CIA - March 1, 2024

000155

~~SECRET~~

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 MANCHURIA AND CHINA

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TRENDS AND MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS (OPINION)..... 14

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~~SECRET~~

1. The purportedly wounded and sick POWs exchanged last month were collected in three camps, Chon-Ma, #7 (by 1 Dec/52 CCRAK camp numbering); Pyoktong, #3; and Manpojin. All three camps lie along the Yalu River, on the Manchurian border. The existence of Manpojin, northernmost of the three, had not previously been acknowledged by the Communists, but had been carried on our maps until 20 Jan/53, when it was considered abolished as there had been no report on it since 15 Apr/52. Why the Communists should suddenly, and in this fashion, admit that there was a collection camp at Manpojin is a mystery. The coordinates for Manpojin are BA 7259; the nearest listed camp is at Kuup-tong (#4), at BA 4930, too great a distance away to be part of the same camp.

2. A number of single reports, all unconfirmed and all some months old, have come in on new camp locations at:

Changan-sa	DT 1974	Sosong-dong	YD 2151
Chinnapo	YC 0988	Sokkal	CT 0143
Chuk-chon	CU 5408	Sonam	BT 5115
Hoeyang	CT 7884	Songhwa	XC 8549
Kobang-san	YD 4715	Songnae-dong	XE 5644
Coal Mine		Song-ni	CU 3589
(Pyongyang)		Tangsong-ri	YD 3123
Musong-ni	YC 1198	Tonso-dong Area	YD 4222
Nae-dong	CU 3589	Umchon-dong	BT 6049
Pack'un-jang	CU 6499	Yongdae-ri	BU 5722
Pongnae-do	YD 3518	Yulmong-ri	YC 4078
Sanghung-dong	YD 3725	Yusong	EV 5295
Sanum-dong	YD 3433	Yongbong-ri	YD 3582

The majority of these reports indicated that the enclosures were small, possibly transient, and the majority of POWs were South Koreans. Details will not be included in this or future reports, unless further confirmation is forthcoming.

3. Since there have been no reports on the following camps since 1 Sept/52, they will be considered abolished for purposes of this report:

KOREAN CAMPS

Chasong	CA 0392	Namchon-up	BT 7346
Haeryang-ni	CU 4713	Pongung	CV 7714
Hungdong-ni	BT 9794	Sangaenggun	YC 0579
Hwangju	YC 4138	Sego-ri	YC 0438
Hwapung-ni	CT 1075	Sinyang	YC 4059
Kyongchang-ri	YD 3721	Taesu-ri	YD 5516
Mayul-ri	BT 6247	Um-dong	BU 5035
Nyohyang-san	BT 6532	Yanggu	DT 1171

} Possibly
} same camp

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MANCHURIA-CHINA

Antung	124-18, 40-38	Harbin	124-10, 42-50
Chekiang Prov.		K'aryun Shien	124-05, 42-36
Chungchun	125-20, 40-53	Pench'i	123-43, 41-02

4. Sources of information and (whenever possible) evaluations of source's reliability will be given in each section.

I. KOREAN POW CAMPS

A. Acknowledged Camps (arranged by camp number) (Only those camps about which there has been additional information since the 20 Jan/53 report will be listed.)

1. Imsan-ni (XE 8779): Camp #1 is 10 mi. ENE of Sakchu (Paengyong). (Comment: Sakchu was removed from listing as not having been heard from since Aug/51, but may now prove to be part of #1 complex.)
2. (Branch 2) Changson: In Sept/52 a camp with approximately 1,250 UN POWs housed in six large barracks (70 x 5 x 3 m) was at XE 8779, SW of Chang-ni (XE 8780). Only US POWs were seen in compound. Barracks had earth walls and cement roofs, POWs lived four to a room. Fed mostly bread, seemed undernourished. Some of POWs wore old uniforms, other blue fatigues. Camp was garrisoned by 150 CCE (Diagram of camp attached to cited report.)

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

5. Pyoktong (Kuksa-ri, YE 0699) - FBIS, Pyongyang, 4 Mar/53 broadcasts stated Enoch and Quinn were in Camp #5. One convoy of exchanged POWs collected at, or were already interned in Pyoktong, which has long been known as "The University" for indoctrination.
7. (a) Chon-na (XE 6448): One convoy of exchanged POWs collected at this camp.
- (b) Yongsan-ni (XE 5644): Unconfirmed report states there are 200 ROK POWs in this camp. Possibly Camp #7, Branch 1.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

8. Anju (YD 2887)

- (a) In Sept/52 source was sent to Anju to transport supplies. Observed 400 ROK in vicinity being compelled to repair roads. Wooden boxes strapped to each POWs back to hamper escape. Source heard camp for ROK POWs located $1\frac{1}{2}$ km. SW of Anju.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

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- (b) As of Sept/52, there were five independent enclosures in Camp #8 in and around a former primary school, approximately 300 m. W of Taet'aryong-ni gate (YD 3524). 1,000 ROK POWs slated to serve in NKA, but returned to POW status after peace talks began. POWs worked four hours a day, took three hours indoctrination per week. Most POWs didn't accept Communism, many planned escape and sang ROK songs while marching. POWs fed 600 gr. rice, kaoliang, soy oil a day; undernourished and diseased. Wore blue coveralls. PO-RO in red on camp roofs. Camp guarded with four light machine guns, posted at 10 m. intervals, during the night.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (c) Yongso-ri (YD 2688, vic. Anju) Unconfirmed report of 600 ROK POWs at this location.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

9. Chaedong-ni (Singchang-ni) (BU 6073)

- (a) As of Sept/52, there was a camp with 2,000 POWs at the foot of a hill near Singch'ang (BU 5265), established in June/52. Camp was 500 x 300 m., fenced with barbed wire. POWs worked six hours a day, given two hours indoctrination a day, screened once a month for potential agents to be used against the South Koreans.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (b) In Apr/52, source was in vicinity of Songhyon-ni (BU 5165; heard that thirty ROK POWs had escaped from nearby camp. June/52, in same vicinity, source saw a number of POWs getting firewood on hill. POWs in groups of three, guarded by two NKA. In Oct/52, source heard that the Political Commissar had told men they "must capture more prisoners", and to "treat them well".

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

10. Sunan (YD 3241)

- (a) As of Sept/52, there was a camp with 3,000 ROK POWs in sixteen dugout shelters at the foot of a hill E of Sunan. Camp had been established in early July/52. Camp was 2½ km. around, fenced with barbed wire. POWs worked six hours a day, given two hours indoctrination. Screened twice a month for potential agents vs. South Korea.

(Comment: According to SO 99143, a camp with 1,000 ROK POWs was at the site of the former Sunan High School, next to cemetery 1 km. NE

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of Sunan RR Station. This camp had been moved to Sunan from Kirim-ni 20 July/52 because of UN bombings. Field comment in this report states Camp #13 at Sunan was listed by the Communists 12 July/52.)

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

11. Pyongyang Complex

- (a) Huan-dong (YD 4333) As of 30 Nov/52, 24 USAF pilots were interned in Huan-dong. Camp in building 20 x 6 x 4 m. Guard posted in four phases of building. 50 personnel in charge of camp ops. POW schedule: up at 7; breakfast at 8, indoctrination 9:30-12; lunch 12:30; free from 7-8; supper 8:30, recreation 10; bed 10:30. Fed 600 gr. rice, vegetables, soy oil per day; weak, yellow complectioned from diet. No medical equipment in camp. Billets DDT sprayed once a week. POWs wore one-piece fatigues and USAF pilot jackets. POWs refused to listen to lectures, were homesick. Building surrounded by barbed wire, guarded by one squad of soldiers. Camp was moved here July/52 from Pyongyang area.

(Comment: Directorate had one previous report of camp with 20 UN pilots at YD 4136 [CCRAK #F-1589, 12 July/52].)

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b) Kirim-ni (YD 3823):

- (1) As of Oct/52, 2,000 ROK POWs were interned at YD 3832, probably Kirim-ni camp.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (2) As of 21 Sept/52, 1,500 ROK POWs were in a red brick, 2-story school building at YD 3824 in Kirim. POWs worked in groups of 25 repairing bomb damage. Daily ration of 700 gr. of corn or rice with salt and seaweed.

(Comment: Probably same camp as Sinsong-dong [See p. 7, item(e)], Hasokhwa-ri [See p. 6, item (b)].)

- (3) As of 13 Sept/52, the NK bureau supervising POW camps in NK HQs in semi-underground houses 10 x 3 x 2 m. at YD 3824 on NW edge of Moran-bong in Kirim-ni. POWs were brought here immediately after capture, sent to Kangdong after interrogation, and thence to other camps in North Korea.

(Field Comment: SO 103362 [See p. 6, item (a)] states there was an interrogation camp at YD 4234.)

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

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- (c) Mirim-ni (YD 4622) Branch 2: As of Sept/52, a camp with 2,000 ROK POWs was located in one wooden building and two one-story concrete buildings at YD 5524, approximately 8,500 m. E of Mirim-ni. POWs had worked at Mirim airfield from Apr/51 to Apr/52, when construction work stopped because of UN raid. Camp was operated by a company of NKA. POWs given daily three hour indoctrination. Allowed to walk within 200 m. radius of camp in groups of two or three with consent of guards.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (d) Namgyo-dong (YD 3526): As of Sept/52, source saw POW camp for ROKs in vicinity YD 3522. Source heard from another soldier that there were 1,000 ROK POWs in the camp. Camp administered by Pyongyang Security Regt. Located at former Parim People's School. PO-RO characters on roof of building.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (e) Namsa-ri (YD 4725): 12 US POWs reported at these coordinates. 18 Oct/52 photos neither confirm nor disprove.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (f) Pyongyang Area:

(1) CCRACK CR #140, 20 Aug/52 reported 500 ROK (NK anti-Communists) POWs at YD 3822 in five personnel shelters. 8 Nov/52 photos neither confirm nor disprove.

(2) As of late Sept/52, 50 UN POWs (30 ROK, 20 US) seen in Pyongyang. Appeared haggard and dirty, but clothes in fair condition. POWs being marched north.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

(3) Source saw 50 ROK POWs escorted to gate of Pyongyang camp for lunch by one-star NK officer and four NCOs. POWs in blue overalls. Source didn't know number of POWs in camp.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (g) Sosong-ni (YD 3622) Branch 1: Camp at YD 364214 photographed 8 Nov/52. 1,000 ROK POWs had been reported here. Camp probably Branch 1, Camp #11 as reported by Communists. Photos neither confirmed nor disproved.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

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- (h) Yongsong (YD 4033): As of Dec/52, a POW camp for USAF was located on a wooded hill in Yongsong-ni area (YD 4233) with 26 Caucasian, 8 Negro POWs. Camp approximately 100 m. in circumference, enclosed with barbed wire, guarded by platoon of NKA. POWs treated better than infantry POWs, no forced labor. Camp often visited by Soviet AF advisors.

(Comment: Other reports of camps in this general area: (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (i) Wasan-ni (YD 3928): This camp possibly closed in July-Aug/52 POW camp re-shuffle. CCRAK F-1979, 15 July/52 stated 20-50 UK POWs this location and numerous reports from March to mid-July/52 tend to confirm each other as to camp's existence during that period.

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The following are new camp listings in the Pyongyang area:

- (a) Hach'u-dong (YD 4234), Interrogation camp: As of Aug-Sept/53, UN and ROK POWs were interrogated in buildings of a former brick factory in this location. Camp attached to NKA General HQ, established in Mar/51. POWs from all parts of front interrogated here prior to assignment to other camps. 15 Aug/52 there were 150 ROK and 30 other UN POWs here. Number of POWs varied because of large turn-over, but averaged 150. Other UN POWs separated from ROKs and interrogated in English. When more POWs were to be interrogated than camp could accomodate, the excess was sent to other camps and English-speaking interrogators sent with them. Daily rice ration of 700 gr. with supplemental rations of vegetable soup and mackerel. ROK POWs had bread as main food (probably in lieu of rice.) All POWs wore blue fatigues and received regulation NK issue of beds and everyday articles. POWs did light work in camp area. Lt. Col. YI (fnu) was commanding officer, aged 38, graduate of English Literature at Nippon University, member SK Labor Party prior to war.

(Comment: Possibly same camp mentioned in paragraphs 1-3, (b)(3) NatSecAct from different source.)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (b) Hasokhwa-ri (YD 2538): As of 30 Sept/52, there was a camp holding 2,000 ROK POWs in 12 dug-out shelters near Hasokhwa-ri. Camp established Aug/52. Area 1½ km. circumference, fenced with barbed wire. POWs worked on nearby farms 8 hours a day, given 2 hours indoctrination daily. Screened three times monthly for potential agents to be used vs. South Koreans.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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- (c) Pyongsang Prison Area (YD 3721): 800 ROK POWs reported in this location in Pyongyang. Prison and schools in area had been virtually demolished but possible POWs were still in area. (Photos made 8 Nov/52.)

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (d) Sijong-myong (YD 4933), probably interrogation camp: Source observed 60 US POWs being taken to Sijong-myong office by NKA officer from NKA GHQ. Source said POWs lived in a number of civilian homes in area.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (e) Sinsong-dong (YD 2151): As of 30 Sept/52, a camp containing 3,700 ROK POWs was in 18 dug-out shelters at the foot of a hill this location. Camp 2 km. diameter and fenced with barbed wire. POWs worked 8 hours a day, given 2 hours indoctrination daily. Screened twice a month for potential agents to be used vs. South Koreans.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

12. Ch'ahwangch'on (YD 3538)

- (a) CCRAK A-208 places Soyang-ni (Hung-ni) at YD 3734, holding 2,500 ROK POWs. This may be incorrect reference to camp #12, but the number of POWs is excessive if so.

- (b) Camp #12 is headquarters for the "American-British POW Organization for Peace", which puts out a newspaper there. Ambrose Nugent is a POW in #12.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

21. Chail-li (YD 2649), Indoctrination Camp. POW camp for AF personnel at YD 2649. POWs undernourished, averaged 3-4 in sick bay, treated by doctors from nearby ChiCom ambulance unit. Innoculations given by three male nurses from unit; (POWs told inoculations necessary to protect from germ warfare, but caused fever and POWs suspicious of them.) Recreation: volleyball and swimming at irregular times -- games short and few who played didn't overdo. Compulsory indoctrination in camp. 2-3 POWs eager to learn but majority not interested. POWs represented by a leader. Those who tried to escape lost meal privileges and forced to write self-criticism. If escape successful, POW leader to be punished, but beatings now allowed. Roll call in camp. Guards regular NKA, treated POWs well, made regular rounds of camp at night. (Sketch of camp layout attached to cited report.)

(Comment: Prior to June/52, a camp housing US POWs was in five large buildings at YD 267497 near Chail-li--almost certainly same as above. First building at YD 272497, second at YD 265487, third at YD 273477, fourth at YD 300503, fifth at YD 296508. In June/52, 120 POWs moved to

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Kangdong camp (BU 4837.) [SO 96821 stated there were 80 Caucasian POWs (believed US) and 150 ROKs in Kangdong as of late June/52.] 8 Oct/52 56 NKA Evacuation Hospital was in houses vacated by POWs. One company of troops at YD 374505, another 600 m. N of Chail-li, another 2 mi. S of HQ at YD 374505.)

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

22. Tari-gol (Pukchin (YE 3732-3454)

- (a) A POW camp with 1,600 ROK and 400 other UN POWs located in two school buildings at YD 3353, W of Pukchin. ROK POWs in larger building (2-story brick, 80 x 90 x 12 m.) UN POWs in smaller building. (flat cement 25 x 20 x 8 m.) Daily ration of 600 gr. rice, 200 gr. sorghum often cut because of shortages. POWs wore NK uniforms, cloth shoes. Some worked transporting machine parts to Unsan gold mine (YE 3253), others worked in mine in two shifts of 12 hours each.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (b) As of 13 Sept/52, there was a POW camp containing 1,500 ROK and 600 US in caves formerly occupied by the Unsan gold mine at YE 3732, E of Maebong-dong (YE 3823). POWs given daily ration of 700 gr. of food (70% grain.) Many POWs were ill, wore ragged dirty NKA uniforms. US POWs rarely seen. ROK POWs made NKA uniforms on sewing machines and did other machine and tool work. Compulsory indoctrination three hours a week, plus periodic debate and criticism sessions, and occasional rallies denouncing SK and US governments. Camp had 120 guards armed with four light machine guns.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

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Manpojin (BA 7259): Camp never listed by the Communists; last information re its existence over a year old. One convoy of exchanged POWs nevertheless collected at this camp.

B. Unacknowledged Camps

1. New Listings

- (a) Kasong-ni (YD 3189): 400 ROK ex-POWs in NKA "Liberation Unit" this location (unconfirmed). [REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct
- (b) Kowon-gun (CU 5266): In June/52, 200 ROK, 30 Caucasian, 7 Negro POWs transferred by truck from South Hamgyong Province penitentiary to Kowon-gun where they were to repair damaged railroads. POWs chained together in groups of five. While traveling through Kungjon-ni

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district of Hamhung City (CV 7517), 5 US, 7 ROK POWs and 2 of 20 NK guards were killed in UN air raid. Guards said that POWs would be transferred to Musan area (EB 1875) to avoid future raids.

(Comment: Camp probably no longer in existence.)

[REDACTED]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(c) Kung-dong (YC 4268): Unconfirmed report of 600 ROK POWs this location.

[REDACTED]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(d) Naedong-ni (YD 1273): As of 22 Nov/52, camp housing approximately 500 ROK POWs located in civilian houses. Camp established late July/52.

[REDACTED]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(e) Oksang-dong Gold Mine (YD 3975): 1,000 ROK POWs reported confined this location. One report states old Camp #8 (Taesong-ni) might have moved here. Camp used to give newly captured POWs six month indoctrination course. Photos taken 26 Nov/52 neither confirm nor disprove.

[REDACTED]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(f) Powon-ni (YD 0667): An unconfirmed report states 200 POWs of unknown nationality lived in eight civilian houses and did farming in this area.

[REDACTED]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(g) Sinjong-ni (YC 2755): Unconfirmed report states 400 ROK POWs lived in 40 civilian houses this area. Worked repairing bridge at YC 2652.

(h) Sohang-ni (YD 2385):

(1) There have been sporadic reports over a long period of a camp at this location, containing 2,500 ROK POWs. Photos made 27 Sept/52 show possibility of camp location here.

[REDACTED]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(2) CCRAK F-5640, 2 & 3 Nov/52 lists another Sohng-ni at YD 5303, with unknown number of ROK POWs. States this camp is an indoctrination center.

(i) Song'nyong (CT 5191): A POW camp containing 100 US, 500 ROKs in a former school and nearby houses this location. POWs fed 500gr. grain a day. No clothes or bedding issued. US and ROK POWs given same

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treatment, including indoctrination. Converted ROK POWs taken into NKA, called "Liberated Soldiers".

(Comment: Possibly same camp reported by different source in SO 102998.)

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

CCRAK J-1223, July/52 reported 100 US, 500 ROK POWs this location. No photo coverage.

- (j) Sohwa Electric Factory (YE 0302): Single reports states some of the 700 US, 1,800 ROK POWs in camp near this location work in factory, remainder are being indoctrinated.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (k) Togwon-ni (BU 4455): 400 US, 70 ROK POWs reported this location. Kirim-ni camp said to have been moved here. (Photo coverage 25 Nov/52 neither confirms nor disproves.)

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

2. Old Listings, New Confirmations

- (a) Chosan (YF 3623) (Once considered abolished for report purposes, reinstated on basis of following information.): As of mid-Sept/52 a POW camp containing 300 ROKs was located in coal mine pits near Chosan. POWs mined coal on an average of 7 hours daily. Fed 700 gr. rice and 30 gr. other grain. Sick treated by NKA surgeons, but treatment inadequate. POWs were taught NKA regulations and basic military subjects, given 2-3 hours indoctrination daily. Camp guarded by platoon of NKA, who were forbidden contact with civilians. Most of the POWs had enlisted in the 22nd Brigade, NKA after capture but were discharged in Apr/52 and sent to Chosan to wait POW exchange.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (b) Kangdong (Chiktong camp, YD 5423)

(1) 180 US, 120 ROK POWs reported here. 130 of US POWs were Negroes, 50 were USAF. POWs lived in five houses 9 x 4 x 4 m. US POWs in three of houses ROKs in two. Barbed wire around camp. Camp guarded and operated by 60NKA. Camp commander a Major. POWs worked repairing roads. Fed 1,000 gr. food daily. Dressed in brown one-piece fatigues. Given haircut every two weeks, bath once weekly. Each POW wore white numbered tag by which he was identified. POWs got occasional package of cigarettes. Camp occasionally inspected by three Russians. Camp said to have been moved to this location Mar/52.

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(Comment: Directorate has had no other reports of Camp at these exact coordinates, but many reports of camp in general area.)

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (2) Photo coverage of 24 Oct/52 neither confirms nor disproves the many reports on Kangdong camp. Conflict because of confusion of this camp with Camp #11, Branch 3 (formerly Camp 8) where 180 UN Caucasians and 900 ROK POWs are said to be held.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (3) As of 13 Sept/52, Kangdong Camp #8, with 2,000 ROK POWs living in houses formerly occupied by Taeson Coal Mine (YD 5724) employees was at this location. POWs organized in four companies and transportation company; four platoons to a company and four squads to each platoon. POWs used as squad leaders and assistant platoon leaders. Fed 600 gr. (20% rice) per day. Wore ragged blue coveralls. Medical facilities poor, POWs unhealthy. Worked around camp 3-4 hours daily, had 2-3 hours indoctrination twice a week, discussion periods periodically (where truce talks not mentioned.) POWs hostile toward guards, some escaped (usually during air raids). Camp organization: Maj. head; Captains in charge of political, management, supply sections; medical section of four under a Jr. Lt.; approximately 30 additional personnel on total staff. Camp guarded by 150 NKA under command of Ministry Internal Affairs, armed with four light machine guns. Officers carried pistols, EM carried burp guns and Soviet rifles. PO-RO marker on roof of camp.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (c) Karvoju-ri (CT 2691): As of Sept/52, 500 ROK POWs reported this location. No confirmation or photo coverage.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (d) Koem-ni (YD 5622) (Once considered abolished, reinstated on following basis): As of Sept/52, a camp containing 300 ROK POWs was in a village at YD 558222, near Koem-ni. The village was formerly for employees of a nearby coal mine. POWs slept in a building 30 x 3 x 3 m., formerly the billet for male mine workers. Two hour indoctrination course given three times a week in a tile-roofed building 40 x 20 x 5 m, with eight windows on N and S sides, eight entrances. PO-RO marker on S side of roof. POWs mined coal eight hours a day, beginning work at 8 a.m. Three - four POWs shared one blanket, used hemp or rice bags as mattresses. POWs fed 500 gr. rice, 200 gr. soy or corn, with

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vegetable side dish. POWs in poor condition because of hard labor, poor food, lack of camp sanitation. Camp guarded by three platoon NKA armed with Soviet rifles and PPShs who patrolled area day and night.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (e) Pakchun-gol (XC 8550): 10,000 ROK POWs said to be located along valley 3 km. N of Pakchun. Source saw 1,000 of these POWs working on river bank construction project.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

II. MANCHURIA-CHINA

A. Old Listings, New Confirmations

1. Mukden (126-93, 46-05) (Considered abolished in former report, existence reconfirmed by following information): 14 politico-military cadres well versed in English and Korean were assigned 15 Nov/52 by the General Political Department, ChiCom Military Council to Mukden to form US and ROK POWs for thought reform and espionage training. POWs were divided into three categories:

- (a) Younger POWs from Company Officer up who were considered straightforward to be trained in thought reform and espionage;
- (b) POWs desultory in thought and accustomed to POW life were to be bribed by material inducements and set to gathering propaganda which would give them a good impression of the Communists. Their family correspondence would publicize "happy life" in camps and create US anti-war sentiment;
- (c) Stubborn POWs were to be segregated from categories (a) and (b), put to forced labor and refused correspondence.

The ChiCom Military Council selected Quinn, O'Neal and seven other AF men from Camp #2 as the first group to be trained in Mukden (phonetic names given by original agent.)

More than 80 ROK POWs were to be selected for three month training at Mukden. Those considered progressive thinkers to be either released or smuggled to South Korea for espionage work.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

2. Peiping (116-24, 39-36): General Dean refused to cooperate in promotion of BW campaign. Reported sent to Peiping.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

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SUMMARY OF POW CAMPS

	ACKNOWLEDGED CAMPS	UNACKNOWLEDGED CAMPS
KOREA	<u>No.</u>	
	1. Imsan-dong (Sakchu)	Chosan (back in)
	2. Changson (Br. 2)	Kangdong
	# 5. Pyoktong (Kuksa-ri)	Karyoju-ri
	# 7. Chon-ma (Yongsan-ni)	Kasong-ni*
	8. Anju	Koem-ni (back in)
	Taet'aryong-ni*	Kowan-gun*
	Yongso-ri	Kung-dong*
	9. Chaedong-ni	Naedong-ni*
	Singchang-ni	Oksang-dong Gold Mine*
	Songhyon-ni	Pakchun-gol
	10. Sunan	Powon-ni*
	11. Pyongyang Complex	Sinjong-ni*
	Huan-dong	Sohang-ni*
	Hachu-dong*	Sohwa Electric Factory*
	Hasokhwa-ri*	Sonp'yong*
	Kirim-ni	Togwon-ni*
	Mirim-ni (Br. 2)	
	Nangyo-dong	
	Namsa-ri	
	Pyongysang Prison Area*	
	Soson-ni (Br. 1)	
Sijon-myon*		
Sinsong-dong*		
Yongsong		
Wasan-ni ?		
12. Ch'ahwangch'on		
Soyang-ni		
21. Chail-li		
22. Tari-gol (Pukchin)		
- - - - -		
# Manpojin (back in)		
MANCHURIA- CHINA		Mukden (back in) Peiping

LEGEND: # Camps at which POWs collected for Apr/53 exchange
 * New Listings
 ? May have been abolished
 (back in) Camps believed abolished for lack of information.
 New reports reinstate existence.

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TRENDS AND MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS (OPINION)

1. In Korea, the foregoing shows twelve acknowledged, eleven numbered camps (#21 and #22 acknowledged by CCRAK only.) April exchange POWs collected at Camps #5 and #7, and the previously unacknowledged, unnumbered Manpojin (except for those POWs captured in Mar/53 and Apr/53.) It also shows sixteen unacknowledged camps, eleven of which are new listings, two of which have previously been considered abolished but which have been reinstated on the basis of new information. In Manchuria-China, there are two listings: General Dean reported in Peiping, and Mukden as a thought training and espionage center.

2. POW Control and Movement:

a. A POW General Command has reportedly been set up in the Pyongyang area at YD 825228 in ten caves of unknown size with four entrances. (See cited report, Ex. A #10 for location Ex. 10 for details of camp.) This Command believed to be governing all POW enclosures in NK. Source was told by civilian in vicinity that the POW registration section of this HQ was responsible for POW files, and all information re food, medical treatment, supplies. Area guarded by 150 NKA from the Home Ministry Guard Unit, armed with three heavy machine guns, six light machine guns, 100 PPShs. Area heavily wooded, naturally camouflaged. No civilians allowed to enter area.

[redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

b. According to an article in magazine Hsing-tao Chou-pao of Hong Kong, by a Seoul correspondent, all UN POWs under ChiCom control were being sent either to target areas or to China in large numbers. The first action had been instituted by the Koreans to decrease UN bombing activity; latter action was used by Chi-Coms as ammunition in further truce talks. Source said it was very possible the ChiComs would send all UN POWs to the Chinese mainland.

(Comment: There have been previous reports re evidence of POW movements in NK in vicinity of military targets and from NK in vicinity of military targets and from NK into China and Manchuria.)

[redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

3. POW Interrogation and Indoctrination:

a(1) Procurement and interrogation of UN POWs: Communist forces attempt to indoctrinate all troops to the value of capturing UN personnel, or inducing them to surrender. Troops to squad level given oral propaganda phrases to memorize, interrogation forms to be filled in by UN POWs immediately after capture, instructions for use in Chinese and English for front line units. Forms ask information and diagrams re strength and disposition of POWs' unit, artillery positions, supply dumps, ammo and other equipment reserves, etc. After front line interrogation Communists rely on shock and fear to get cooperation. Before POWs sent to rear, they're told of CCF good treatment policy, and that CCF thought "all capitalists their enemies." After first phases of capture, UN POWs' chances for survival are good: they are interrogated by "psychological persuasion", and POWs refusing to fill out interrogation forms are not punished.

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a(2) Indoctrination of UN POWs: The Communists' attempt to indoctrinate UN POWs on first contact, greeting them as "liberated brothers", telling them they have been misled and are "imperialist tools", not individually responsible for anti-Communist actions. They are also told they will see the error of their ways and learn the right of Communism. Only torture used was psychological--release hopes were alternately build up and dashed. Degree of indoctrination depended on eventual use planned for POWs.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

b. As of Dec/52, the Recon. Platoon of the 91st Regt. captured US POW in vicinity of Hill 601 (DT 3550) and brought him to Recon. Plat. CP. Here US POW was treated as a guest, given same food as NK troops. He was interrogated by a Sr. Lt. imported from 45th NK Div. CP. When he was released (for unknown reasons) he was accompanied by five members of the Recon. Plat. to UN MLR, and given a parting Christmas gift by the Sr. Lt.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

c. Five loose notebook sheets of a captured enemy document (printed in Chinese) sets forth these principles for indoctrination of US POWs:

(1) How we treat US POWs: don't kill or maltreat, don't take personal possessions, treat the wounded. Treat all POWs equally because "US capitalists are the real enemy and the majority of POWs were laborers who were forced to fight." If POWs lay down their arms, they are not the enemy. POWs must obey orders or they will be punished.

- (2) For whom are they fighting and why?
- (3) Who invaded whom?
- (4) Who won and who lost?
- (5) Who is enemy of the US people?

500th MISG Bul. Enemy Documents, #101, 22 Dec/53

4. Treatment of UN POWs:

a. Stories of POW treatment told by exchanged POWs vary widely. It is noteworthy that the prisoners in the first convoy (19 Apr/53) to be exchanged felt, on the whole, that the Reds "had done as well by us as they could." Ten of the POWs in this convoy, which collected at Chon-ma came from Pyoktong, known to be the largest of the NK indoctrination camps, and four of these ten are on the Communist-suspect "watch list", available from intelligence sources.

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While ten of the prisoners in the 20 Apr/53 convoy had been interned at Pyoktong, none of their names appear on the watch list, and several of them told reporters stories of atrocity and brutality to POWs, so apparently their indoctrination had not been successful. (In this connection, it must be noted that most of the reported atrocities occurred in late 1950 and early 1951.) The three watch list suspects from this group came from Changson camp, as did the three from the group repatriated 23 Apr/53.

Brutal treatment of sick, wounded, and undernourished POWs, according to one of the few officers exchanged to date, "improved or fell off according to progress at the truce talks...when the negotiations picked up, the Chinese had buddy buddy week with us." The officer, 1st Lt. Roy M. Jones, Minneapolis, also said indoctrination was stopped completely last year when "we saw in the Communists' paper that the Commies had objected at the truce talks to indoctrination of their prisoners. After that they stopped indoctrinating us."

POW exchange of the third day was of prisoners all but two of whom were captured in March, and who had thus never been in a rear-area camp. These men had little complaint of their treatment.

b. The prisoner exchange and several recent magazine articles have made the public more aware of the 3,000 plus discrepancy between the Defense Department MIA total and the US prisoners admittedly in Communist hands. 1950-51 atrocities, malnutrition, forced labor, resulting illness, etc., might account for many of this number, but not for all. Attention is called to three magazine articles, all published in April 1953:

- (1) "Unreported G.I.'s in Siberia," Nagorski, ESQUIRE, May issue, p. 51.
- (2) "Deal for US POWs in Korea," US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, April 24 issue, p. 35.
- (3) "I Saw Your Prisoner Sons," Yeh Min, PARADE, Sunday, April 5,

While none of these articles are based on confirmed information, all mention the possibility of unaccounted-for POWs being in Manchuria, China, and/or Russia. Released as they were at the time of the POW exchange, and coupled with stories of returning POWs themselves, they will undoubtedly influence general suspicion of Red motives and intentions in any possible future POW exchanges.

Regarding motives and intentions, the primary POW-returnee complaint was that much sicker men had been left behind in camp. Several were actually bewildered as to why they had been selected for exchange. It is always possible that the unforeseen immediacy of the exchange caught the Reds unaware and without the time for proper screening of sick and wounded POWs. However, viewing the geographic spread of the returnees'

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hometowns, it is more logical to believe that they had been carefully selected, and long in advance of the exchange, not for extent of wounds or illness, but for possible use to the Communist Party. Returnees will come back to homes concentrated along lines of communication and in the southern mountain coal mining area. In almost every case, the returnee's hometown is within easy distance of some strategic US defense area (Oak Ridge, Alamogordo, Rock Island Arsenal, several large air force bases, etc.) A top-heavy percentage comes from Puerto Rico.

Of the watch list returnees, one comes from a small town in southern Maine, not far from Boston; one each from New York City and Philadelphia with their shipyards; one from Oklahoma City and its oil supply; two from the southern coal mining area; one from Syracuse and the Great Lakes shipping system; and one from San Francisco.

5. Propaganda:

a. During February and March 1953, the BW campaign, which had continued with varying intensity since its inception in February 1952, was revived by the ChiComs.

(1) 20 Feb/53 Peiping broadcast (FBIS-monitored): "US planes dropped insects on Manchurian and North Korean towns during December."

(2) 22 & 24 Feb/53, Peiping broadcasts: "Two senior USMC 1st Marine Air Wing officers confirmed that the JCS directed planned BW, following reports of international investigating bodies. (Col. F. H. Schwable, Maj. R. H. Bley's depositions followed.)

(3) 5 Mar/53 broadcast: Peiping accused British Minister of State Selwyn Lloyd of "covering up" US BW by denying Alan Winnington's accusations of "a conspiracy of silence in Tokyo, Washington and London."

(4) 6 Mar/53 Pyongyang broadcast: POW Enoch (Camp #5) had sent a letter to The Congress of Peoples for Peace in Vienna during Dec/52 calling for an early solution to the war and a halt to BW. POW Quinn (also at Camp #5) had written a similar letter to the Congress. (NB: Both letters were introduced on the broadcast by identical wording in their forwards.)

b. Early April 1953 broadcasts concentrate on the latest effort to achieve a peaceful settlement of the prisoner issue; broadcasts made after the POW exchange had begun recite the "good treatment of POWs"-line.

The following elements characterize the current propaganda pattern:

(1) A drop in atrocity charges prior to the resumption of truce talks in 6 Apr/53 indicate a desire to avoid comment which might hinder a truce agreement. This is the first time attention has been given to an amenability phase of the Korean war rather than to the denunciation of US "aggression or bestiality."

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(2) Increased comment on recent military operations, which may stem from a desire to prove the Commies are negotiating from a position of strength. Propaganda-wise, Peiping seems to be setting the stage for a claim that their basic objectives in Korea have been attained.

(3) Repatriation of UN POWs: description of good treatment on convoys; POW comment on ending the war; claim that many of wounded POWs had been hurt in UN bombings of camps; description of farewells in camp; gratitude of POWs to captors for good treatment while interned; suggestion by various returnees that they would probably be "hospitalized" for quite awhile after their return--misgivings over prospects of the "screening and remodeling course" awaiting them on the other side.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY	Korea	REPORT NO.	(b)(3) CIAAct
SUBJECT	POW Camp for United States Air Force Personnel in the Yongsong-ni Area	DATE DISTR.	27 March 1953
DATE OF INFO.	[Redacted]	NO. OF PAGES	1
PLACE ACQUIRED	[Redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct	REFERENCE NO.	RD
		REFERENCES	371

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE: [Redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

On 23 December 1952 a POW camp for United States Air Force personnel was on a wooded hill in the Yongsong-ni (N 39-07, E 125-48) (YD-4233) area.¹ There were 26 white and 8 Negro United States Air Force personnel in the camp. The camp was about 100 meters in circumference, was enclosed with a barbed wire fence, and was guarded by a platoon of North Korean army soldiers. The POW's were treated better than infantry POW's and were not given labor assignments. The camp had been visited often by officials of the North Korean air force and Soviet air force advisers.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

1. [Redacted] Comment. For other reports on POW camps in this general area, see [Redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

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**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
AND
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**



A JOINT REPORT

**A REVIEW OF THE 1998 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON
POW/MIA ISSUES AND THE CHARGES LEVIED BY
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE ESTIMATE
(1999-5974-IG)
(00-OIR-04)**

29 February 2000

*Donald Mancuso
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Department of Defense*

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Inspector General
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Acronym

AG	Analytic Group (National Intelligence Council)
AII POW-MIA	Advocacy and Intelligence Index for Prisoners of War-Missing in Action
ASD (C³I)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CILHI	Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DDCI	Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
DI	Directorate of Intelligence (CIA)
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DO	Directorate of Operations (CIA)
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
DPMO	Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service
GRU	Soviet Military Intelligence
IC	Intelligence Community
IG	Inspector General
INR	Bureau of Intelligence and Research (DoS)
ISS	Interrepublic Security Service
JCRC	Joint Casualty Resolution Center
JCSJ	Joint Commission Support Directorate (DPMO)
JTF-FA	Joint Task Force-Full Accounting
KIA-BNR	Killed in Action-Body Not Recovered
KGB	Soviet Intelligence and Security Service
MIB	Military Intelligence Board
NFIB	National Foreign Intelligence Board
NIC	National Intelligence Council
NIE	National Intelligence Estimate
NIMA	National Imagery and Mapping Agency
NIO	National Intelligence Officer
NIO/EA	National Intelligence Officer for East Asia

NRO	National Reconnaissance Office
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
OCA	Office of Congressional Affairs (CIA)
OIA	Office of Imagery Analysis (CIA)
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PFOD	Presumptive Finding of Death
POW/MIA	Prisoner of War/Missing in Action
RA	Research and Analysis Division (DPMO)
SNIE	Special National Intelligence Estimate
SRV	Socialist Republic of Vietnam
SSCI	Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
TFR	Task Force Russia
TOR	Terms of Reference
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USPACOM	U.S. Pacific Command
VNOSMP	Vietnam Office for Seeking Missing Persons
VWWG	Vietnam War Working Group (U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

On 10 April 1997, the President's National Security Adviser indicated in a letter to the Senate Majority Leader that he would direct the Intelligence Community to prepare a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Vietnam's cooperation with the United States on Prisoner of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA) issues. Terms of Reference for the estimate were formulated by the National Intelligence Council and coordinated with members of the Intelligence Community and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The draft estimate was presented to the Military Intelligence Board and the National Foreign Intelligence Board for approval in April 1998, and NIE 98-03, "Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue," was published in May 1998.¹

Senator Robert C. Smith issued *A Critical Assessment* of the NIE in November 1998 and asked that the Military Intelligence Board and the National Foreign Intelligence Board retract the estimate for reasons cited in his assessment. In January 1999, the Director of Central Intelligence advised Senator Smith that both boards had voted unanimously to let the estimate stand, describing it as an accurate assessment of current knowledge and understanding of the POW/MIA issue. Senator Smith continued to demand that the estimate be retracted and, on 18 March 1999, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence requested that the Inspectors General of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense examine the estimate and the charges made in the *Critical Assessment*. We began a joint inquiry in mid-April 1999.

The Intelligence Community was asked to address two key issues in NIE 98-03 – the extent to which Vietnam has cooperated with the United States since 1987 to achieve the fullest possible accounting of American personnel missing in action during the Vietnam conflict and the credibility of the 735 and 1205 documents, acquired from Russian archives, which raised questions about whether all American prisoners of war were released

¹ The NIE has been declassified for release and is available on the CIA public website at <http://www.foia.ucia.gov> or by writing to Information and Privacy Coordinator, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. 20505.

by Vietnam in 1973.² The estimate stated that Vietnam has become more helpful in assisting U.S. efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting, but that unresolved issues suggest the need for continued close attention by the U.S. Government. It concluded that the 735 and 1205 documents probably had been acquired in Vietnam by Soviet military intelligence, but that many of the details in the documents are implausible, particularly those dealing with the numbers of prisoners of war allegedly held by Hanoi in the early 1970s.

Senator Smith's *Critical Assessment* challenged the estimate's conclusions on both key issues. On the subject of Vietnamese cooperation, it cited numerous instances where the estimate's analysis was "factually inaccurate, misleading, incomplete, shallow, and seriously flawed." With respect to the 735 and 1205 documents, the *Critical Assessment* stated that the estimate's judgment cannot be accepted because it is "replete with inaccurate and misleading statements, and lacks a reasonably thorough and objective foundation on which to base its judgment." The *Critical Assessment* urged Congress and the Intelligence Community to examine the role policymakers responsible for advancing the Clinton Administration's normalization agenda with Vietnam may have played in influencing judgments in the estimate.

Objective

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence asked us to examine the *Critical Assessment's* charges that the estimate reflected a premeditated effort to discredit relevant information, inadequate analysis, and possible politicization. Our objective was to assess the validity of those charges in order to evaluate the estimate's analytical vigor, objectivity, accuracy, and completeness.

² For a more detailed description of these documents, see page 21 of the report.

Results

Based on our review, we conclude that:

- ◆ The estimate drafter and members of the Intelligence Community who participated in the preparation of the estimate made no effort to discredit relevant information. The drafter had access to and reviewed relevant documentation.
- ◆ The estimate drafter is vulnerable to criticism that he did not pay sufficient attention to pre-1987 documentation, relying on finished intelligence products for analysis of pre-1987 data. The issue of the period of time the estimate would cover was never resolved.
- ◆ Delay in the completion of the Terms of Reference from July to October 1997; the Senate Select Committee's additional requirement that the estimate reassess the 735 and 1205 documents; and the introduction of both a new National Intelligence Officer for East Asia and a new drafter contributed to misunderstandings about estimate objectives.
- ◆ We searched for documentation as far back as the document trail allowed. None of the information we reviewed contradicted the conclusions or changed the judgments reached by the estimate.
- ◆ The overall quality of the estimate is high. The argumentation is vigorous and logical, and the conclusions are well-documented. At the same time:
 - ◆ The withdrawal of the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office from the estimate process inhibited analysis. While not a member of the Intelligence Community, that office possesses most of the U.S. Government's data and expertise on POW/MIA issues.

- ◆ Several analytical mistakes made in the estimate could have been prevented had the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office reviewed the draft estimate. None of these mistakes affected the conclusions or judgments of the estimate, however.
- ◆ The estimate's judgment that Vietnam's performance in dealing with POW/MIA issues has been good in recent years is properly cautious, particularly given the caveat that unresolved areas of Vietnamese cooperation warrant continued close attention by the U.S. Government.
- ◆ The Intelligence Community did not conduct an in-depth re-evaluation of the 735 and 1205 documents. The Intelligence Community also did not undertake an independent review of the numbers of prisoners of war held by the Vietnamese. Instead, the estimate accepted both the 1994 Intelligence Community position related to the legitimacy and accuracy of the documents and the U.S. Government analysis of the numbers of prisoners of war and missing in action. We reviewed both in considerable depth.
- ◆ We determined that the estimate's evaluation of the 735 and 1205 documents remains valid. The documents are genuine, but the information contained in them related to numbers of prisoners of war held by the Vietnamese is inaccurate.
- ◆ Our analysis of discrepancy or compelling cases for which verified remains have not been returned determined that, at most, three of the cases and, in all likelihood, none on a list of 324 provided by Senator Smith to the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs in 1992 remain compelling today.
- ◆ The estimate failed to capture the intricacies of the story of the mortician who worked on the remains of American prisoners of war in Vietnam. It mislabeled the mortician an unreliable source when in fact he was reliable with respect to remains he had actually worked on; his estimate of stored remains that he had not worked on was less accurate.

- ◆ The estimate overstated its case that there is no evidence the Vietnamese currently are storing the remains of American prisoners of war.
- ◆ The estimate did mention, however, that a Department of Defense study on the subject would provide additional information.
- ◆ That study, issued in June 1999, more than a year after publication of the estimate, concluded that there is strong evidence in two cases involving five remains that remains were collected and taken to Hanoi, but not repatriated. Investigation continues.
- ◆ We found no credible evidence to support the thesis that a second prison camp system for prisoners of war existed or that American prisoners of war were transported out of Vietnam to the former Soviet Union or elsewhere.
- ◆ We found no credible evidence that any member of the Clinton Administration tried to influence the estimate or that the Administration tried to influence intelligence reporting on POW/MIA issues related to the 735 and 1205 documents. On the contrary, the concern expressed by policymakers was that the Intelligence Community not appear to be dismissing or debunking information from those documents.
- ◆ Senator Smith and his staff did have an impact on the estimate. They played a role in framing the final Terms of Reference. Senator Smith expressed his opinion on issues to be addressed in the estimate to members of the Intelligence Community, and he said that he was not confident that the Clinton Administration would not interfere in the estimate process.

- ◆ Members of the Intelligence Community as well as outside readers of the draft estimate were keenly aware that the estimate would be criticized by those who believed the Vietnamese were not cooperating in good faith on POW/MIA matters and those who believed that American prisoners of war were left behind in Vietnam and elsewhere in 1973. At numerous stages in the production of the estimate, these intelligence officials and outside readers successfully urged a softening of the tone to placate those who might be critical. These interventions did not change the judgments of the estimate.

Finally, while we were not asked to address this issue, we did not find a single factual thread that supports a finding contrary to that reported to the Speaker of the House of Representatives by Congressman G. V. (Sonny) Montgomery in December 1976, following his Committee's investigation of POW/MIA issues. He conveyed the committee's belief that "no Americans are still being held alive as prisoners in Indochina, or elsewhere, as a result of the war in Indochina." Every U.S. Administration since 1976 has agreed with this conclusion, and we found nothing in the course of this inquiry that suggests otherwise.

PART I: INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

On 10 April 1997, in a letter to the Senate Majority Leader, the President's National Security Adviser indicated that he would direct the Intelligence Community (IC)³ to prepare a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)⁴ on Vietnam's cooperation with the United States on Prisoner of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA) issues.⁵ He said that the IC should "consult" with the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) on the estimate's Terms of Reference (TOR). The TOR were formulated by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and coordinated with the IC and the SSCI. The NIE draft report was presented to the Military Intelligence Board (MIB) and the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) for approval in April 1998. NIE 98-03, "Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue," dated April 1998, was issued in May 1998.

Senator Robert C. Smith published *A Critical Assessment* of NIE 98-03 in November 1998. In a letter accompanying the *Critical Assessment*, he requested the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to convene meetings of the NFIB and the MIB, respectively, to consider his request that the NIE be retracted for reasons cited in the *Critical Assessment*. The MIB met on 15 January 1999 to review the matter in detail and the NFIB convened four days later. The DCI advised Senator Smith that IC members had voted unanimously to let the estimate stand, describing it as an accurate assessment of current knowledge and understanding of the POW/MIA issue.

³ The IC is composed of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), and intelligence elements of the Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Energy, and the Military Services.

⁴ NIEs are produced by the NIC. They are prepared for the President and other senior policymakers on issues that have strategic implications for the United States. They are the most authoritative written assessments of the DCI and the IC because they present the coordinated views of senior officers of the IC.

⁵ POWs are persons known to be, or to have been, held by the enemy as live prisoners or last seen under enemy control. MIAs are persons removed from control of U.S. forces due to enemy action, but not known to be either prisoners of war or dead.

On 18 March 1999, the SSCI informed the Inspectors General (IG) of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of Defense (DoD) that Senator Smith "continues to assert that NIE 98-03 is a product of either 'shoddy' research or possible politicization, which may reflect a premeditated and deliberate effort to discredit relevant information." Further, the SSCI said, Senator Smith believes the NIE should be retracted and that policymakers should disregard the conclusions. The SSCI requested that the IGs conduct an inquiry to determine the NIE's "analytical vigor, objectivity, accuracy and completeness." A joint CIA/DoD inquiry began in mid-April 1999.

OBJECTIVE

Our objective was to examine NIE 98-03 and address the charges levied in the *Critical Assessment* that there had been:

- ◆ A premeditated effort to discredit relevant information;
- ◆ Inadequate analysis; or
- ◆ Possible politicization.

Our approach was to review the process of producing the estimate and assess the validity of the *Critical Assessment's* specific charges. By so doing, we could evaluate the NIE's analytical vigor, objectivity, accuracy, and completeness.

STRUCTURE OF REPORT

Our report is presented in six parts, including the Introduction (Part I). Part II provides an historical perspective of the Vietnam War POW/MIA issue. Part III describes the standard NIE process and the process followed for NIE 98-03. Part IV examines the specific, substantive charges levied in the *Critical Assessment*. Part V addresses the *Critical Assessment's* charges of politicization. In Part VI, we provide our conclusions. Annex A describes the methodology we used in preparing our report, and Annex B provides a summary of previous reports and reviews related to topics addressed in this report. Annex C describes our methodology in addressing the *Critical Assessment's* charges against the NIE. Annexes D and E list U.S. Government publications reviewed by the drafter of the NIE. Annex F summarizes the interviews of Russian officials

concerning the validity of the 735 and 1205 documents found in the archives of Soviet military intelligence (GRU) and the credibility of the information in those documents relating to numbers of POWs held by the Vietnamese. Annex G describes the methodology we used in conducting our review of selected discrepancy cases, and Annex H supplies the supporting matrix of information relating to that review. In Annex I, we detail the process used to examine a single case of a U.S. MIA. Annex J contains our distribution list. A list of commonly used acronyms is at the front of our report.

PART II: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

OPERATION HOMECOMING AND THE END OF THE WAR

During the period of U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia, nearly three million American military personnel served in-theater.⁶ More than 58,000 were killed and another 300,000 were wounded. At the time of Operation Homecoming in February/March 1973, 591 U.S. prisoners were repatriated. The fate of more than 2,500 service personnel, however, had not been determined. U.S. efforts to resolve cases involving those still missing have continued and have been the subject of considerable debate, ranging from high praise to strong criticism. The issue of the number of servicemen still unaccounted for also has remained controversial.⁷

On 27 January 1973, representatives from the United States, the Republic of Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam ("Viet Cong"), signed "The Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam," also known as the Paris Peace Accords. Article 8(b) of the Accord stated:

The parties shall help each other to get information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action, to determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the remains, and to take any such other measure as may be required to get information about those still considered missing in action.

The Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) was established in 1973 to help the Military Services:

... resolve the status of United States missing/body not recovered personnel through the conduct of operations to locate and investigate crash/grave sites and recover remains, as appropriate, throughout Southeast Asia

⁶ The Indochina War Era covers the period from 8 July 1959 through 15 May 1975.

⁷ The term "unaccounted for" is an all-inclusive term which includes Americans initially listed as POW/MIA, Killed in Action—Body Not Recovered (KIA-BNR), or as having a Presumptive Finding of Death (PFOD).

The JCRC formed a relationship with the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory, which was charged to examine and identify any remains recovered as a result of JCRC searches or unilateral repatriation of remains by the North Vietnamese. The JCRC and the Army Central Identification Laboratory moved to Hawaii in 1976; the latter became the Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI).

THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

In September 1975, the U.S. House of Representatives formed a Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, headed by Congressman G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery; the committee was tasked to conduct a full and complete investigation and study of:

- ◆ The problem of U.S. servicemen still identified as missing in action, as well as those known dead whose bodies have not been recovered, as a result of military operations in Indochina; and
- ◆ The need for additional international inspection teams to determine whether there are servicemen still held as prisoners of war or civilians held captive or unwillingly detained.

The committee conducted a comprehensive, 15-month investigation. Its final report, issued in December 1976, concluded that "no Americans are still being held alive as prisoners in Indochina, or elsewhere, as a result of the war in Indochina." Half of the ten committee members voiced displeasure with that conclusion as well as other judgments and recommendations in the report.

PROGRESS ON POW/MIA ISSUE

Carter Years (1977-1980)

Early in his Administration, President Carter created a Presidential Commission headed by Leonard Woodcock, the President of the United Auto Workers. The purpose of the Commission was ". . . to obtain the best possible accounting for MIAs and the return of the remains of our dead." The report of the Presidential Commission concluded, ". . . there is no evidence to indicate that any American POWs from the Indochina conflict

remain alive." The commission recommended that normalization of relations with the Vietnamese should be pursued through the resumption of talks in Paris. Several members of the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs strongly criticized the report in hearings conducted in March 1977.

Direct talks aimed at normalization between the United States and Vietnam took place in Paris in May 1977. Little progress on the issue of missing Americans was made, however. Several congressional delegations traveled to Hanoi and members of the JCRC visited Hanoi in 1980 for technical discussions with officials from the Vietnam Office for Seeking Missing Persons (VNOSMP), but the exchanges were largely unproductive. In January 1980, an interagency group was established "to review and assess current events and policies [and] to consider future direction/policy to resolve the POW/MIA problem." Members of the group included representatives from the Departments of State (DoS) and Defense, the National Security Council (NSC), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia.

Reagan Years (1981-1988)

In February 1982, after President Reagan designated the POW/MIA issue a matter of the highest national priority, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense led a delegation to Vietnam to discuss cooperation. Vietnamese officials indicated that there was a connection between their cooperation on the MIA issue and the U.S. attitude toward Vietnam. Between 1982 and 1986, several additional U.S. Government delegations visited Vietnam to discuss expanded cooperation, and technical meetings between JCRC, CILHI and the Vietnamese were conducted.

By 1987, nearly 15 years after Operation Homecoming, resolution of the POW/MIA issue remained a distant possibility. In an effort to energize the issue, President Reagan appointed General John W. Vessey, Jr. (USA Ret.) as his special emissary to Vietnam in February 1987. In August 1987, General Vessey met with the Vietnamese Foreign Minister for three days of talks in Hanoi. The Foreign Minister committed the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) to resuming efforts to resolve the MIA issue and agreed to address the most urgent cases, those in which the missing person was last known by the United States to be alive but who did not return during Operation Homecoming. These became known as the Vessey discrepancy

cases. Both parties also agreed to resume technical talks. The result was a series of technical meetings in Hanoi between JCRC/CILHI members and the VNOSMP to work on casualty resolution and other meetings to discuss the provision of prosthetics with SRV public health and social affairs officials. In June 1988, General Vessey met the SRV Foreign Minister in New York to review the progress made since their initial meeting in 1987. The level of cooperation improved to the extent that six technical meetings were conducted in Hanoi during 1988, and U.S. teams participated for the first time in joint investigative activity in Vietnam. In October 1989, General Vessey visited Hanoi a second time to discuss casualty resolution progress.

An "Inter-Agency Report of the Reagan Administration on the POW/MIA Issue in Southeast Asia," issued on 19 January 1989, concluded that "we have yet to find conclusive evidence of the existence of live prisoners, and returnees at Operation Homecoming in 1973 knew of no Americans who were left behind in captivity." The report went on to say that:

Nevertheless, based upon circumstances of loss and other information, we know of a few instances where Americans were captured and the governments involved acknowledge that some Americans died in captivity, but there has been no accounting of them.

Bush Years (1989-1992)

In an exchange of letters between General Vessey and the SRV Foreign Minister in July 1990, the General pointed out that, after some initial positive results regarding the POW/MIA issue, "progress has become painfully slow, in fact, almost non-existent," and that there was "a real need for progress." The Foreign Minister disputed the General's assessment. He stated that more than 20 years had elapsed since the war ended and that "Vietnam continues its efforts to solve this humanitarian issue, including the seeking of war-time records." The Foreign Minister invited General Vessey to return to Vietnam to clarify remaining issues. General Vessey did not return to Vietnam until April 1991, but that visit was noteworthy because agreement was reached to open a U.S. liaison office in Hanoi. The purpose of the office was to improve the coordination between SRV casualty resolution officials and the United States and to speed joint investigative fieldwork. The liaison office opened in May 1991.

The Road Map

As a result of U.S.-SRV meetings in April 1991, the Bush Administration adopted a policy of reciprocal U.S.-Vietnamese actions in accordance with a road map that had three major sets of U.S. objectives:

- ◆ Support for the United Nations peace process in Cambodia;
- ◆ Release of re-education camp detainees; and
- ◆ Assistance in achieving the fullest possible accounting of POW/MIAs.

At intermediate points along the "road," both parties would take specific actions, such as the lifting of U.S. restrictions on the travel of American business and veterans groups to Vietnam. Later, the U.S. trade embargo would be lifted and U.S. opposition to international lending to Vietnam would be halted. Vietnam would accelerate its efforts to account for missing U.S. personnel.

Senate Select Committee

On 2 August 1991, a Senate resolution established the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. The committee requested and received unprecedented access to the records of a wide range of U.S. Government agencies, including intelligence agencies and the White House. It solicited the sworn testimonies of "virtually every living U.S. military and civilian official or former official who has played a major role in POW/MIA affairs over the past 20 years." The committee reviewed procedures for accounting for POW/MIA and investigated U.S. intelligence activities in relation to these issues. Its report, issued on 13 January 1993, acknowledged that "there is no proof that U.S. POWs survived, but neither is there proof that all of those who did not return had died." The report suggested that there was evidence that indicated the possibility of survival, at least for a small number after Operation Homecoming.

Clinton Years (1993 to date)

Four Key Areas

Although the Clinton Administration does not use the term, its policy has been based on the road map developed by the Bush Administration. President Clinton asked General Vessey to conduct another mission to Vietnam in April 1993 to seek further progress. On 2 July 1993, President Clinton announced that:

Progress [on POW/MIA] to date is simply not sufficient to warrant any change in our trade embargo or any further steps toward normalization. Any further steps in U.S.-Vietnamese relations will strictly depend on further progress by the Vietnamese on the POW/MIA issue.

President Clinton's statement set out four key areas in which the United States expected to see greater efforts by Vietnam:

- ◆ Concrete results from efforts by Vietnam to recover and repatriate American remains;
- ◆ Continued resolution of the remaining discrepancy cases, and continued live sighting investigations and field activities;
- ◆ Further assistance in implementing trilateral investigations with the Lao of POW/MIA cases along the Lao-Vietnam border; and
- ◆ Accelerated efforts to provide all POW/MIA-related documents that will help lead to genuine answers.

Normalization

A Presidential delegation that visited Vietnam later in July 1993 reinforced the commitment to the fullest possible accounting for POW/MIAs and made it clear that the United States must see tangible progress in the four key areas. Vietnam representatives indicated that they were committed to helping the United States resolve the issue and pledged

to make every effort to achieve progress, but cautioned not to expect dramatic breakthroughs. In January 1994, the Senate approved a non-binding resolution urging the President to lift the trade embargo against Vietnam, a move supporters hoped would assist in getting a full accounting of Americans still listed as missing in the Vietnam War. On 3 February 1994, President Clinton announced the lifting of the trade embargo and, on 11 July 1995, he announced normalization of relations with Vietnam, saying that the time had come to move forward and bind up the wounds from the war. The U.S. Embassy in Hanoi was opened in August 1995. In April 1997, Congressman Douglas "Pete" Peterson, a former POW, was confirmed as the first U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam since the end of the war and the first to be posted to Hanoi.

Certification/Determination Of Cooperation

In 1996, Congress prohibited the use of appropriated funds to open a new U.S. diplomatic post in Vietnam or increase the number of personnel assigned to the mission beyond the level existing on 11 July 1995 unless the President certified within 60 days, based upon all information available to the United States Government, that the Government of the SRV was "cooperating in full faith" with the United States in the four areas related to achieving the fullest possible accounting for American POW/MIAs from the Vietnam War. The four areas were those laid out by President Clinton in 1993.⁸ In the 1998 iteration of that law, Congress changed the wording to certification that Vietnam is "fully cooperating in good faith."

President Clinton issued Presidential Determinations on 29 May 1996 and 3 December 1996 that Vietnam was cooperating "in full faith." Presidential Determinations of 4 March 1998, and 3 February 1999 declared that Vietnam was "fully cooperating in good faith." The President issued determinations in lieu of certifications, stating that the Department of Justice had advised him that it was unconstitutional for Congress to require him to certify because it "purports to use a condition on appropriations as a means to direct my execution of responsibilities that the Constitution commits exclusively to the President." The President

⁸ Title VI, Section 609, of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, as contained in the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-134), and the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 (Public Law 104-208).

stated that he had decided to issue the determinations not because he was legally required to do so but rather as a matter of inter-branch "comity."

The decision to certify or to determine that Vietnam is cooperating "in full faith" or "fully cooperating in good faith" on the four key issues related to POW/MIAs is a policy decision. While the IC does not participate in that decision, the responsible policy agencies have available to them all the relevant intelligence information. Two policy directorates, the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO), in coordination with the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA), and the DoS, Office of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, are the major contributors to the NSC on this issue. The DoS establishes the policy position for annual certification (determination), and the DPMO reviews the proposal for accuracy after consultation with JTF-FA. The Director for Indochina, Thailand, and Burma, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) also coordinates on the draft certification (determination) proposal. DoS, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), an IC member, reviews the draft proposal for accuracy only.

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CAPABILITY

CIA Turns to Department of Defense

In November 1985, the then-DCI sent a memorandum to the NFIB, stating that he was establishing an Interagency Committee on Vietnam POW/MIAs under the aegis of DIA. The purpose of the committee would be to:

... exhaust all intelligence within the Community regarding the location and identification of Americans who might be held or interned [sic] in Southeast Asia.

The DCI asked that the appropriate NFIB agencies nominate representatives to serve on the committee and that all intelligence "presently held within the Intelligence Community" be given to the committee. In the years that followed, the DCI memorandum was interpreted to mean that DIA had been designated the lead agency for POW/MIA affairs and that other agencies would play a supporting role in that effort.

Subsequently, the DIA Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs assumed a higher profile. The Special Office handled technical investigations or specific cases and debriefings of refugees and other sources; it collated the information, then disseminated reports. Other government agencies provided support.

In 1993, the DPMO was established as a separate office outside of DIA. DPMO was designed to consolidate POW/MIA issues (analytic, policy, and operations) under one umbrella. While this arrangement is unusual, it is not unique. DoS and DoD have both policy and operational missions, but they maintain elements that perform intelligence analysis. In that regard, elements of the IC that address the Vietnam POW/MIA issue include the analytical components of DPMO and analysts in other agencies who are experts on Vietnam and who have worked the issue in the past.

Intelligence Priorities and Standing Requirements

Presidential Decision Directive-35 (PDD-35), dated 2 March 1995, which provides overall guidance for the IC, does not explicitly include POW/MIA issues. The DCI Guidance on Intelligence Priorities, dated 10 February 1997, builds on PDD-35 by addressing worldwide priorities in the context of the President's guidance. POW/MIA issues are included under support to military operations, and the IC has standing requirements that cover POW/MIA issues.

EVOLUTION OF THE DEFENSE POW/MISSING PERSONNEL OFFICE

The Secretary of Defense established the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) in July 1993 to provide centralized management of POW/MIA affairs within the DoD. The DPMO was headed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Regional Security Affairs), now the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). Creation of the office brought together four disparate DoD offices that had been working POW/MIA issues:

- ◆ **Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (POW/MIA).** This office was established in 1991 within the office of the Secretary of

Defense to develop U.S. and DoD policies on POW/MIA issues. The Deputy Assistant Secretary continued as the Director, DPMO, reporting to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy;

- ◆ **DIA Special Office for POW/MIAs.** This office was established during the Vietnam conflict to support operational commanders by collecting information on American service members classified as POWs or MIAs;
- ◆ **Central Documentation Office.** This office was established by the Secretary of Defense in 1991 to review and declassify materials pertaining to American POWs and MIAs lost in Southeast Asia. The office reported to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence [ASD C³I]); and
- ◆ **Task Force Russia (TFR).** This office was established by the Army in 1992 to support the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs.

The 1996 Defense Authorization Act directed that DoD establish an office for missing persons. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Affairs was designated as the Director of the newly restructured and renamed Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO). The DPMO mission is to exercise policy, control and oversight within the DoD of the entire process for investigation and recovery related to missing persons (including matters related to search, rescue, escape and evasion); coordinate for the DoD with other departments and agencies of the United States on all matters concerning missing persons; and establish procedures to be followed by DoD boards of inquiry and by officials reviewing the reports of such boards. The DPMO maintains and gathers data on POW/MIA affairs for World War II, the Korean War, Vietnam, and the Cold War. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy provides authority, direction and control over the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense reports through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

International Security Affairs and serves as the principal assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for all prisoner of war and missing in action matters. The primary responsibility of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense is developing and coordinating policy on such matters and representing the DoD in interagency processes. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense also ensures that the DoD effectively conducts efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting for U.S. personnel not yet accounted for from the Vietnam conflict.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs is assigned the collateral responsibility to serve as the Director, DPMO. This was done to ensure that the activities of the DPMO are fully integrated with the Office of the Secretary of Defense POW/MIA policy direction. The Director serves as the DoD focal point for all POW/MIA matters including representing the DoD during negotiations with foreign governments. DPMO customers include the DoD, the Congress, POW/MIA families, and veterans organizations.

While the DPMO is not an intelligence organization, it incorporates intelligence reporting into its all-source analysis of POW/MIA issues and individual cases. DPMO systematically requests that CIA, DIA, NSA, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) provide required information. In fact, the National Defense Authorization Act for 1998 (Public Law 105-85), Section 934, states that:

The Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall provide intelligence analysis on matters concerning prisoners of war and missing persons . . . to all departments and agencies of the Federal Government involved in such matters.

Further, the Act directs the Secretary of Defense to:

. . . ensure that the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office takes into full account all intelligence regarding matters concerning . . . prisoners of war and missing persons . . . in analyzing cases involving such persons.

DoD AGENCIES SUPPORTING POW/MIA MISSION

Joint Task Force-Full Accounting

In January 1992, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) formed the JTF-FA, at Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii. The JTF-FA replaced the JCRC as the primary organization focused on full accounting for missing U.S. personnel. The JTF-FA mission is to resolve the cases of Americans still unaccounted for as a result of the Indochina War through investigations, archival research, and remains recovery operations. The JTF-FA is structured to conduct the wide range of operations necessary to obtain the fullest possible accounting in Southeast Asia. The JTF-FA has four permanently deployed detachments in Southeast Asia to support JTF-FA teams that perform investigations and recovery efforts: Detachment 1 in Thailand, Detachment 2 in Vietnam, Detachment 3 in Laos, and Detachment 4 in Cambodia.

Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii

The Department of the Army is designated as the executive agent for the Joint Mortuary Affairs Program. As the executive agent, the Army maintains a Central Mortuary Affairs Office and CILHI for processing remains from past conflicts. The CILHI mission is foremost humanitarian and requires deployment of its personnel throughout the world. CILHI supports the full accounting mission by providing the personnel who make up the remains recovery teams deploying to Southeast Asia and by conducting forensic analysis of recovered remains.

Stony Beach

In 1987, DIA supplemented the JCRC effort by assigning a small group of language-qualified personnel the task of gathering information related to possible live sightings of American POW/MIAs in Indochina. The Stony Beach program collects information and performs analyses on alleged live sightings of U.S. POW/MIAs. Stony Beach operations are conducted exclusively in support of the POW/MIA issue.

ROLE OF U.S.-RUSSIA JOINT COMMISSION ON POW/MIAS

The DPMO supports the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, established in 1992 by direction of the Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation. The commission serves as a forum through which both nations seek to determine the fates of their missing service personnel, Americans missing from the Vietnam, Korean and Cold Wars and Russians lost in Afghanistan. The commission consists of representatives from the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. and Russian Governments. The U.S. side of the commission includes members of Congress, senior DoS and DoD personnel, and a representative from the U.S. National Archives. Within the DPMO, the Joint Commission Support Directorate (JCSD) functions as the sole collection, research, analytical, and administrative support element to the U.S. side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission.

PRIVATE GROUPS

The wife of a POW held captive in North Vietnam formed the National League of Families of Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia in 1966. In 1970, the League was formally structured as a "tax-free, non-profit, nonpartisan, humanitarian organization." The League's bylaws specified that only family members of prisoners, missing, or killed-in-action personnel were eligible for membership. In the beginning, most leadership positions were held by wives of POWs and MIAs. Operation Homecoming changed the composition and character of the League. A new Executive Director liberalized membership requirements, and leadership evolved to parents away from the wives. The category of family members eligible for membership was expanded to include blood or lawful relatives of an American who was a prisoner or missing in Southeast Asia.

In 1979, the Executive Director of the League was given access to POW/MIA classified information. In 1982, for the first time, a League delegation traveled to Vietnam and Laos to meet with government officials. The Executive Director was made a full member of the U.S. interagency group that discussed POW/MIA issues. The Executive Director has testified before congressional committees and has been

included in numerous government proceedings with Southeast Asia government officials.

Traditional veterans' organizations have shared interest in the POW/MIA issue, including the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Disabled American Veterans, and the Vietnam Veterans of America. The 1990s brought the emergence of a new organization, the National Alliance of Families for the Return of America's Missing Servicemen, World War II-Korea-Cold War-Vietnam. It is the only organization representing U.S. servicemen from all wars and their families.

PART III: POW/MIA ESTIMATE PROCESS

A National Intelligence Estimate is a compendium of basic judgments, accompanied by some supporting detail, that represent the collective viewpoint of the Intelligence Community. It is not an exhaustive compendium of every conceivable alternative explanation on every point of detail, slanted to support a particular point of view. The operative word is "judgments," over which disagreements are common.

Senior DIA official

STANDARD NIE PROCESS

The National Intelligence Council (NIC) is an Intelligence Community (IC) entity, responsible for producing coordinated interagency papers. The NIC, which reports to the DCI in his capacity as head of the IC, consists of a Chairman, Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Officers (NIO), and several staffs and production committees. The NIOs interact regularly with senior intelligence consumers to assess and support their long-term needs. In addition, they actively consult with experts from academia, the corporate world, and think tanks in producing estimates and other coordinated IC products.

The NIC manages the IC's estimate process, bringing together expertise from inside and outside the government. The NIC is one of the few bodies which speaks authoritatively on substantive issues for the IC as a whole. National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) are prepared for the President and other senior policymakers on issues that have strategic implications for the United States. They are the most authoritative written assessments of the DCI and the IC because they present the coordinated views of the senior officers of the IC.

Typically, an NIO presents a proposal for an estimate to the Chairman of the NIC, who presents it to the DCI for approval. The NIO prepares Terms of Reference (TOR) that are reviewed by the NIC, coordinated with IC representatives, then submitted to the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) principals.⁹ The NIO may serve as the drafter for the estimate or may select a drafter from CIA or another IC

⁹ The NFIB principals are the DCI; the Deputy Director, CIA; Director, DIA; Director, DoS, INR; Director, NSA; Director, FBI; Director, NIMA; and Director, NRO.

member. The NIO and the drafter prepare an outline of the prospective NIE, meet to coordinate both the TOR and the outline with IC representatives, then send the final TOR to the NFIB principals. The drafter conducts research for the topic and drafts the report, frequently with support from members of the IC. The draft is then coordinated by IC representatives and sent to the NFIB for final approval.

Intelligence/Policy Nexus

To reduce the possibility that policy considerations will influence intelligence analysis, the estimate process is kept separate from its consumers in the policy community. Members of the policy community may request an estimate and may convey interest in having certain issues addressed; the drafter may even consult with the customer to ensure that all customer concerns are being addressed. During the research phase, policymakers may be asked to provide input in areas where they have specific knowledge or expertise. To ensure that they do not influence the judgments or conclusions of the estimate, policymakers do not have a role in coordinating either the TOR or the report itself. Permitting such close involvement would increase the risk of politicization of intelligence.

Interagency Participants

All IC agencies may be involved in the production and/or coordination of an estimate. In practice, agencies having no stake in the issue often withdraw from the process. On occasion, agencies outside the IC may be asked to participate in the process, either by contributing information or by attending coordination sessions as "back benchers" whose input is considered relevant and useful but who have no vote at the table.

REQUEST FOR POW/MIA ESTIMATE: POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

A number of aspects of the process followed in the production of the NIE addressing the Vietnamese POW/MIA issue were unusual, reflecting the political environment that spawned it. The estimate had its genesis in the policy debate concerning normalization of relations with Vietnam. President Clinton announced his intention to normalize relations in July 1995, and the U.S. Embassy in Hanoi opened the following month. In May and December 1996, the President issued "determinations" that the

Vietnamese were "cooperating in full faith" on POW/MIA matters. By so doing, the President opened the way for increasing the personnel assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Hanoi, including the appointment of an ambassador. He nominated Congressman Peterson for that post.

In March 1997, the SSCI asked the CIA to provide a copy of the IC assessment that had informed the Presidential determinations. CIA responded that, because the DPMO was responsible for intelligence bearing on the issue, other elements of the IC had not been formally involved in the process leading to the determinations. Several Senators, including the Majority Leader, indicated that they would hold up Congressman Peterson's confirmation unless the IC undertook its own, independent, analysis of Vietnamese cooperation on POW/MIA issues. In a letter to the Majority Leader on 10 April 1997, the President's National Security Adviser stated that he would direct the IC to prepare a special NIE on the subject. He also agreed to ask for an "updated assessment from the Intelligence Community" on the 735 and 1205 documents acquired from the Russian archives. The National Security Adviser went on to say that "we will consult" with the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the SSCI on the TOR for the estimate. He expressed hope that the Senate would confirm Congressman Peterson as soon as possible. Ambassador Peterson was confirmed the same day.

NEGOTIATION OF TERMS OF REFERENCE (APRIL-NOVEMBER 1997)

Initial Drafts

From the start, Senator Smith and his staff played a key role in shaping the TOR, using the SSCI to funnel requirements to the NIC. According to one of Senator Smith's legislative assistants, the Senator particularly wanted an updated assessment of the "Russian documents" because he did not believe the IC assessment of the documents, released in 1994, was thorough. The Senator wanted the IC to look at the 735 and 1205 documents and wanted that assessment to be part of the estimate. In a memorandum that he sent to an SSCI staff member on 24 April, Senator Smith's legislative assistant with responsibility for POW/MIA matters wrote that:

Per our discussion, I'm forwarding to you input to consider during the required consultation between SSCI and NSC and IC on tasking, which, as you know, was coordinated with Senator Smith.

The 735 and 1205 Documents

In 1993, the United States received copies of two documents discovered in the archives of Soviet military intelligence (GRU) in Moscow. The documents are Russian translations of purported policy speeches delivered by senior Vietnamese officials in the early 1970s. The original Vietnamese language documents have not been located. The two documents received a great deal of attention because they indicated that the number of American POWs held in North Vietnam was greater than the number officially acknowledged by Hanoi. The documents are known as the 735 and 1205 documents.

The 735 document, dating from late December 1970 or early January 1971, stated that the number of American pilots imprisoned in North Vietnam was 735, not the 368 acknowledged by the Vietnamese Government. The document implied that the unreported POWs would be used as leverage during peace negotiations with the United States. The 1205 document, dating from September 1972, stated that 1205 American POWs were being held in North Vietnam. The document indicated that the officially published list of 368 American pilots was part of the 1205 figure and stated that the "rest are not acknowledged."

The IC issued an assessment of the 735 and 1205 documents in 1994, discounting Hanoi's claims that the documents were fabrications and concluding that the documents appeared to be genuine. The assessment made the distinction between the documents being genuine (i.e., a GRU translation of a Vietnamese speech) and the information in those documents being accurate. The IC assessment stated that the numbers given in the 735 and 1205 documents were "inconsistent with our understanding of how many Americans would have survived the events in which they were lost to become captives."

At the time of its assessment, the IC had the entire 1205 document but only two pages of the 735 document—those that contained the references to U.S. POWs. Thus, the *Critical Assessment* stated that the remainder of the 735 report had "never been formally assessed by the Community."

The NIO for East Asia (NIO/EA), who served from July 1995 until August 1997, began work on the TOR after being notified by the Chairman of the NIC and the NSC about the agreement to produce an estimate. His draft TOR focused on the commitment of the Vietnamese leadership to cooperate with the United States to achieve the fullest possible accounting of American personnel missing in action and the extent to which Hanoi was able to deliver on its commitment. The NIO/EA envisioned separating Vietnamese cooperation from the issue of the Russian documents; he planned to ask a small group of Vietnam analysts to examine whether the IC conclusions reached on the documents in 1994 were still valid. The draft TOR dealt with the issue by posing the general question, "Has there been any change in the assessment of the so-called '735 document' and '1205 document' from the Russian archives?"

On 8 May, the NIO/EA took the draft TOR to a meeting that included the SSCI Staff Director and Minority Staff Director as well as majority and minority staff members. Agreement was reached that the SSCI staff would provide questions and comments for consideration by the NIO/EA in fulfillment of the agreement to consult with the SSCI. On 29 May, the SSCI suggested changes to the TOR, asking that the NIE address numerous additional points relating to the POW/MIA issue. The points raised were extensive and appeared to require more substantial research than did the original TOR.

The NIO/EA was concerned that the suggested changes would require months of detailed research as well as a review of the work done by DPMO and other agencies. He revised the TOR, then coordinated them with the NSA, INR, the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (DI), DPMO, and the DIA. The revised draft TOR were forwarded to the SSCI on 3 July 1997. The NIO/EA told the SSCI that he had tried "to accommodate as much as possible the suggestions in your letter of 29 May." He stated that he had expanded his original estimate question to include the issue of performance but that "it would be inappropriate" for an NIE to establish a standard for "the fullest possible accounting" against which to identify measures the SRV could take; he argued that that was a policy decision. He went on to say that he had collapsed the various questions on SRV personnel, records, and artifacts into two secondary questions in the TOR and expressed confidence that these questions would cover all the issues raised in the SSCI letter of 29 May.

SSCI Delays

Despite repeated requests by the NIO/EA, conveyed by the CIA's Office of Congressional Affairs (OCA), the SSCI did not provide its formal response to the draft TOR until late October 1997. OCA indicated that the initial delay was caused by the fact that the SSCI Chairman, who wanted to look at the TOR and discuss them with senior staff, had departed on a world tour and would not return until the end of August. The SSCI staff reported to OCA that it was working on the issue during September and October. During this period, NIO/EA research on the estimate was put on hold, pending approval of the TOR.

Changing Actors

Between July and November 1997, all of the major actors involved in the POW/MIA estimate at the CIA and the NIC changed. Both the NIO/EA and a DI analyst who was to have provided support in research and drafting departed in August. A new Chairman of the NIC arrived in October and was briefed on the background of the estimate by the Deputy NIO/EA, who had been designated to carry on the project; the deputy left in November.

The new participants in the process arrived with different backgrounds and perceptions. The newly appointed NIO/EA returned from the NSC in November 1997. As the Deputy NIO/EA in the early 1990s, he had been the drafter of the 1994 IC assessment of the 735 and 1205 documents. Senator Smith, who disagreed with that assessment, expressed his displeasure with the NIO/EA's involvement in the NIE during a meeting in November. No Deputy NIO/EA would be appointed during the drafting of the estimate, and the DI would not provide another analyst to support the project. In November 1997, the NIO/EA appointed a CIA East Asian specialist and veteran NIE drafter to draft the NIE.

SSCI Response and Final TOR

In its letter of 27 October responding to the TOR sent on 3 July, the SSCI requested an expansion of the TOR question, "Has there been any change in the assessment of the so-called '735 document' and '1205 document' from the Russian archives?" The SSCI suggested that the issue

be rephrased and added to the "Key Questions" portion of the TOR as follows: "What is the intelligence community assessment of the so-called '735' document and the '1205' document from the Russian archives?" The SSCI went on to say that:

... if the intelligence community judges these documents to be accurate ... in their characterization of the number of American POWs held by North Vietnam, then it should answer the following question: "What is the likely range of numbers of American POWs under the control of the communist side when the Paris Peace Accords were signed in January 1973?"

The SSCI's suggested change represented a significant shift in parameters for the estimate. The original task had been limited to determining if the IC had changed its assessment of the documents since 1994. The new phrasing required that the IC assess the documents (i.e., start from the beginning and evaluate their credibility). The SSCI then stipulated that, if the IC determined the documents to be accurate in assessing the numbers of POWs held in North Vietnam, the estimate should address the number of POWs held in Vietnam in 1973. These were the issues that the former NIO/EA originally had intended to assign to a separate group of analysts for in-depth research.

The CIA responded to the SSCI on 21 November 1997, enclosing the "final terms of reference" for the NIE. The draft TOR had been revised to reflect the SSCI suggestions, thus expanding the scope of the estimate. At the same time, the number of individuals supporting the project had decreased from two to one, and the time allocated to complete the estimate had remained the same (about 90 days). The final TOR were approved at a 26 November IC coordination meeting, and the NFIB concurred at its meeting on 19 December 1997.

This level of involvement in the estimate process by both the SSCI and a U.S. Senator, not a member of the SSCI, in the negotiation of the TOR is unprecedented. The SSCI was given coordination authority over the TOR, implicitly by the President's National Security Adviser and, *de facto*, by the NIC. The then-NIO/EA believed that he could not proceed with the estimate until the SSCI had responded to each version of his TOR, resulting in accumulated delays of almost six months. None of the more than 80 individuals we interviewed knew of an instance, other than this one, in

which coordination of a TOR by an organization not a member of the IC had occurred.

The Issue of Timing

The issue of the period of time the estimate would cover arose early in the process. The original TOR explicitly stated that the estimate would cover the period from 1987-1998, that is, the period since the most recent estimate on the subject (Special National Intelligence Estimate [SNIE]: "Hanoi and the POW/MIA Issue," published in September 1987). The original TOR had not included a re-evaluation of the Russian documents; rather, it had asked as a secondary question whether there had been any changes to the analysis of those documents. When a re-evaluation (as opposed to an updated evaluation) of the documents was included in the TOR, the parameters shifted because the documents dated from the early 1970s. At the TOR coordination session in November 1997, the INR representative suggested that a search for new materials might need to go back before 1987. The NIE drafter never focused on this shift.

The introduction to the estimate indicated that it would cover the period after 1987. In fact, the drafter used 1992 as the cut-off date, explaining that the period from 1987-1992 was covered extensively in a 1992 CIA study, "Vietnam: Adjusting Its Strategy on the POW/MIA Issue." The NIE drafter said that the IC "will be asked to accept that study as definitive." The IC would do as he asked, but the *Critical Assessment* would take him to task for not having covered the time period as defined in the TOR.

SENATOR SMITH MEETING WITH NIO/EA

Before the final approval of the TOR, Senator Smith met with the new NIO/EA on 7 November 1997. The purpose of the meeting was to have the NIO/EA provide an update on the NIE process to Senator Smith. According to notes taken at the meeting, Senator Smith expressed his views on POW/MIA issues. He criticized the Clinton Administration for its POW/MIA policy and for its failure to fully analyze the documents found in the Russian archives. He stated that the documents had surfaced at a time when they could have complicated policy and claimed that "we all know" the documents are legitimate. He accused the NIO/EA, who

had written the 1994 analysis of these documents, of having treated him poorly.

The NIO/EA assured Senator Smith that an analysis of the 735 and 1205 documents would be included in the estimate. He also stated that, because of his past service at the NSC and his previous work on POW/MIA issues, he would leave substantive responsibility for the NIE to the drafter so there would be no doubt about the integrity of the process. The NIO/EA said that he would not impose his views and would indicate his input in footnotes should he differ from the drafter. He pledged that the estimate would be "fair and honest." Senator Smith again emphasized his views of the Russian documents and said he was not confident that the Clinton Administration would not interfere in the estimate process.

Senator Smith suggested that it would help if the SSCI and other staff were involved in the estimate process. Senator Smith's legislative assistant urged the NIO/EA to "reach out" to the Senate, warning that the DPMO has a "mindset." The NIO/EA said that the analytic process needs distance from both the policy community and the Congress. The legislative assistant stated that the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs was also an "intelligence repository" and that the drafter should talk to the Senate as well as to DPMO. The SSCI majority staff member who attended the meeting told the NIO/EA that the SSCI planned to "review" the estimate.

RESEARCH, ANALYSIS, AND DRAFTING (NOVEMBER 1997-FEBRUARY 1998)

The NIC is not a repository of data. The drafter of an estimate must rely on other elements of the IC to provide information and analysis, and this was true in the case of the POW/MIA estimate. A considerable number of documents had been turned over to the former NIO/EA during the six-month period when the TOR were being negotiated. The CIA analyst assigned to help the NIO/EA had provided DI files, and DPMO had provided a package of material. At the 26 November 1997 IC coordination meeting, the consensus was that much of the material the NIE drafter would need was located in DPMO files. Other potential sources of information included the CIA; DoD organizations involved in POW/MIA matters (e.g., JTF-FA and CILHI); INR; NSA; DIA, to include Stony Beach; and policymakers dealing with Vietnam to resolve POW/MIA issues. In

addition, Senator Smith and the SSCI held documents that were relevant to the project.

Role of DPMO

Policy/Analytic Dichotomy

DPMO is the primary organization responsible for supporting policy on POW/MIA matters and is also the primary repository of information concerning POW/MIA matters. Analysts familiar with that information reside in DPMO, having moved there from DIA when DPMO was created in 1993. Because of this policy/analysis connection, critics question DPMO's analytic objectivity and argue that the IC should refocus on the POW/MIA issue in order to provide an independent view.

Within DPMO, JCSD functions as the sole collection, research, analytical, and administrative support element to the U.S. side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs. JCSD's position and responsibilities are unusual because it reports to two distinct organizations with two distinct missions. While JCSD is within the DoD chain of command, its officials respond to the requests and interests of the members of the commission, which focuses on collecting information in Russia on U.S. POWs and MIAs. This dichotomy has created tension between JCSD and the rest of the DPMO, particularly its Research and Analysis (RA) Division.

A major source of contention between JCSD and RA has been the analysis of the documents found in the Russian archives (the 735 and the 1205 documents) that refer to numbers of POWs held by North Vietnam before Operation Homecoming in 1973. RA has argued that, no matter what the validity of the documents, the numbers are wrong because they are far higher than the numbers of POWs that could have been held. JCSD has focused on trying to determine the credibility of the documents, arguing that, if the documents are valid, the numbers contained in them must be taken seriously and the RA analysis of the numbers should be reviewed.

Many critics of U.S. policy toward Vietnam argue that Vietnam may have continued to hold U.S. POWs after Operation Homecoming and that some may still be alive or may have been held alive for a number of years.

Some maintain that POWs may have been transferred to the former Soviet Union. These critics question the U.S. Government's assessments of the numbers of POWs held by the Vietnamese. Because DPMO, RA is the government organization responsible for these assessments, they question the reliability and objectivity of RA analysis. One of Senator Smith's objectives in seeking an intelligence estimate on the issue was to gain an independent IC review of the Russian documents, followed by an independent analysis of the numbers of POWs held by Vietnam. Neither the NIC nor other members of the IC conducted such an independent review and analysis. Instead, they accepted the IC assessment of 1994 as the basis of their review of the Russian documents, and they accepted DPMO's analysis of the numbers of POWs held by Vietnam.

DPMO Withdraws from Process

DPMO leadership decided that it would not participate formally in the estimate process because of challenges to its ability to produce objective analysis. When the estimate was proposed, the DIA official with responsibility for the issue told the Acting Director, DPMO that DPMO should draft the estimate because DIA did not have the capability. The Acting Director declined, arguing that, if DPMO were to take the lead, the issue would quickly become political. He said DPMO would cooperate by providing information and support as needed; by remaining uninvolved, he argued, DPMO would benefit from an outside, objective review that would test its analysis. Thus, the organization that was the repository for information on POW/MIA matters and had the main corps of analysts dedicated to the issue was removed from the formal NIE process.

Meetings with DPMO Analysts

The NIE drafter held a number of meetings with DPMO analysts, both in RA and in JCSD; he received briefings from both groups and collected a considerable amount of data. The meetings began in November 1997 and continued into February 1998, when the initial NIE draft was completed. During these sessions, the drafter encountered and had to deal with the commonly held perception within RA and the DPMO that JCSD may not have been abiding by applicable security procedures in providing classified information to the Joint Commission. The drafter experienced this problem first-hand. A JCSD analyst responsible for Vietnam matters insisted that he must report on meetings with the drafter to the Joint

Commission. The drafter disagreed, stating that JCSD should not be sharing discussions and information with outside parties, particularly before the estimate was finished. The JCSD analyst indicated that he would figure out a way to discharge his obligations to the commission without compromising sensitive information.

Examining the DO Files

The Directorate of Operations (DO) is the CIA component responsible for maintaining records of all clandestine foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities and operations conducted by the CIA involving human assets. In the early 1990s, in accordance with Executive Order 12812 ("Declassification and Release of Material Pertaining to Prisoners of War and Missing in Action," 22 July 1992) that ordered declassification of POW/MIA records, the DO conducted an unprecedented search of its files. It declassified and released most of the CIA holdings on POW/MIA issues in 1993. These documents were funneled through DPMO to the Library of Congress.

A number of documents were not declassified for a variety of reasons. The NIE drafter told us that he had reviewed these documents, and the DO continued to provide him with reports collected since 1993. According to the DO officers and managers we interviewed, the NIE drafter had access to all DO reporting on the POW/MIA issue. The drafter told us that he is confident he had access to all these documents. We reviewed the available material as well as the material in the drafter's possession at the time the estimate was drafted. We believe that the drafter did have access to the relevant DO documentation.

Other Contributors of Data

In the course of his research, the drafter visited organizations within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, DIA, DPMO, INR, and NSA and interviewed key officials associated with and knowledgeable of POW/MIA affairs. He also traveled to Hawaii and Southeast Asia, where he held discussions with U.S. officials.

REVIEW AND COORDINATION (FEBRUARY-MARCH 1998)

First and Second Drafts (6 and 20 February 1998)

The NIE drafter finished the first draft of the estimate in early February 1998. While he indicated that both the NIO/EA and the Chief of the NIC's Analytic Group (AG) had the draft for review, only the latter commented in writing. If the NIO/EA did review the first draft, his views either coincided with those of the Chief, AG or were not factored into the changes made to the second draft. Noting that he had read the draft from "the perspective of a hostile critic," the Chief, AG indicated that, "from that vantage point, there are some points of vulnerability" that should be addressed. These included assessments that appear to be inadequately supported by evidence and judgments that could give rise to suggestions that "we have been unjustifiably credulous" about the motivations behind Vietnamese actions. Each modification to the second draft introduced language that was more skeptical of Vietnam's motives and behavior. For example:

- ◆ Removal of "*humanitarian grounds*" as a driving factor in Hanoi's increasing cooperation with the United States on POW/MIA issues;
- ◆ Introduction of language conveying skepticism about Vietnam's explanations for instances of non-cooperation (e.g., less acceptance of "*sovereignty*" as a valid rationale); and
- ◆ Qualification of judgments. After stating that "our research suggests" that areas where Vietnam refuses to conduct joint field activities are genuine sensitive facilities, the new draft adds, "*We cannot be sure, however.*" Whereas the first draft had stated that, "We think Vietnam has *been fully cooperative* on these cases," the later version reads, "We think Vietnam has, *for the most part, been cooperative* on these cases."

On 20 February, the NIC sent the revised draft estimate to U.S. officials in Hawaii and Southeast Asia. The drafter then traveled to those locations, holding discussions with relevant officials and sending comments back to Washington for consideration in the next stage of drafting. The NIO/EA accompanied him on part of this trip.

Third Draft (17 March 1998)

Numerous changes were made to the next draft. Most were factual additions rather than modifications of data. While many of the changes are difficult to evaluate in terms of their impact on the tone of the NIE, a number served to further reinforce skepticism about Vietnamese cooperation. For example, in the section of the draft dealing with "Instances of Vietnamese Non-Cooperation:"

- ◆ The lead sentence had said that "We found *no* instances in which Vietnamese authorities have flatly refused US requests" The new version was changed to, "We found *few* instances . . . ;" and
- ◆ Sentences were added to a series of instances dealing with Vietnamese explanations for non-cooperation to the effect that "*We cannot ensure they have provided everything;*" and "*We cannot absolutely verify such claims;*" and "*We cannot verify this information.*"

Some changes tended to strengthen judgments challenging the credibility of the 735 and 1205 documents; the alleged transfers of POWs to the Soviet Union; and the alleged interrogation of POWs by Soviet officials. For example:

- ◆ The 20 February draft stated that, while the documents are probably authentic GRU-collected intelligence reports, "*We nevertheless also concluded that the documents were factually inaccurate.*" The 17 March draft states that they are probably authentic GRU-collected intelligence reports, "*but they are not what they purport to be. We concluded that the documents contain significant inaccuracies and anomalies;*"
- ◆ The original text stated that, "*In view of . . . contradictions, we cannot definitively conclude that US POWs were not interrogated by Soviets.*" The new language states, "*We doubt that American POWs were directly questioned by Russians;*" and

- ◆ The original text said that, "we have *equally* convincing reports that claim US POWs were not transferred out of Vietnam." The new language says that, "we have *more* convincing reports . . ."

The drafter met with the U.S. Ambassador to discuss the draft. In the section of the draft dealing with Vietnamese refusal to provide Politburo documents, a phrase indicated that Vietnam would not provide such documents, "*any more than foreign governments, such as the United States, would open their sensitive records to Vietnamese officials.*" A handwritten note by the drafter indicates that "the Ambassador wants this emphasized." Not only was the Ambassador's request rejected, the entire phrase eventually was deleted.

The NIO/EA showed the 17 March draft to the Acting Director, DPMO on 20 March. The drafter recalls that the Acting Director read the draft, disagreed with language in one section of the report, and provided written comments. The Acting Director recalls reading part of the draft at the request of the NIO/EA, but told us that he made no comments. The NIO/EA recalls that the Acting Director read part of the draft, but does not recall what his reaction was or whether he provided comments to the drafter. We found neither written comments nor an annotated draft attributable to the Acting Director, DPMO. No changes were made in the text of the section mentioned by the drafter.

Fourth Draft (23 March 1998)

The changes made to the 23 March version of the estimate are modest and do not move the tone of the draft in any consistent direction. In the "Key Judgments," the comparison of Vietnamese sensitivities to those of the United States (previously mentioned) is removed as is a sentence stating that, "*We think US high-level attention to the POW/MIA issue as one component of the overall relationship will be helpful.*" Changes in the "Discussion" section also are minimal:

- ◆ At several points dealing with Vietnamese non-compliance with U.S. requests for documents, a modifying phrase has been added that emphasizes the positive in terms of cooperation: "*Although Vietnam has provided thousands of documents to the US side. . .*" and "*Vietnam has provided over 28,000 documents to US officials. . .*;"

- ◆ In several places, language questioning Vietnamese claims that had been added to the 17 March version has been removed: "*We cannot absolutely verify such claims,*" and "*Again, we cannot absolutely verify this information;*"
- ◆ In one area, language has been toughened: rather than "some elements of Vietnam's bureaucracy *fell short of* a desire for full engagement," the text now reads, "some elements . . . *did not favor* full engagement;" and
- ◆ The much-changed language dealing with reports that POWs had not been transferred to the Soviet Union has been changed from, "we have *more convincing* reports . . ." to "we have *credible* reports"

These changes do not provide a clear indication of an effort to shift tone or judgment.

Outside Readers

The 23 March draft was sent to the IC representatives, with notification that a coordination meeting would be held on 27 March. At the same time, the draft was provided for comment to two outside readers: a former Deputy Chairman of the NIC and East Asia specialist and a former National Security Adviser, who had held that position in 1993, when the original analysis of the Russian documents was undertaken. We found written comments from the NIC Deputy Chairman, but not from the former National Security Adviser in the NIC files.

The primary concern expressed by the former Deputy Chairman of the NIC, who provided his comments on 24 March, was that the tone of the "Key Judgments" was "overly rosy." That created two problems, he said. The first was that, before having read the body of the estimate, those readers "who are already doubters will turn off." He said that some of the adjectives could be softened and the NIE would still carry the message that there has been improvement in Hanoi's performance. The second problem was that the draft identifies many cases of non-compliance, thus undercutting the "rosy hue" of the "Key Judgments." He went on to raise several other issues, particularly the degree to which Hanoi's senior leaders have delegated authority for POW/MIA issues. He said that, if true, this is

one of the chief changes for the better and should be in the "Key Judgments;" he noted, however, that this judgment rests on the testimony of one listed source. He also recommended that the draft highlight the fact that the principal cause of Vietnamese non-compliance is the regime's wish not to reveal past brutalities.

In responding to the comments of the outside readers, the NIE drafter referred to the recommendations of the former Deputy Chairman, NIC; these included changing adjectives throughout to say that Vietnam has become "*more*" cooperative rather than "*increasingly*" cooperative and putting more emphasis on the reasons why the Vietnamese have not cooperated more completely, such as "their sensitivity about the historical record on their handling of POWs." His only specific reference to comments made by the former National Security Adviser was to say that he was concerned that a list of SRV officials involved in the POW/MIA issue did not include any officials who were not cooperative.

IC Coordination Meeting

The IC representatives met on 27 and 30 March to coordinate the estimate, working with the 23 March version of the draft. In their reports of the sessions, they indicated that there was little disagreement and that no major problems had emerged. They noted that both the outside readers and DIA had argued that, in a few instances, the draft was "too apologetic" to the Vietnamese or "unduly charitable in rating Vietnam's performance." Therefore, a more circumspect, but still basically positive, appraisal had emerged from the coordination sessions. One representative stated that both outside readers had suggested that modifying the language would "make for a more persuasive paper" and "would not immediately set off critics of Vietnam's record of cooperation on this issue." Another indicated that the new language would stress that Vietnam cooperates mainly because to do so is in its larger interest, but that "long-standing secretiveness and suspicion of the United States will continue to limit its cooperation." The NIO/EA suggested several changes to the draft that reflected the suggestions of the former Deputy Chairman of the NIC and the recommendations of the IC representatives; these changes reinforced skepticism of Vietnam's motives and performance.

Fifth Draft (31 March 1998)

The 31 March draft reflected these suggestions. Vietnam's "*increasing cooperation*" was changed to "*more cooperative approach*" and showing "*increasing*" flexibility was changed to showing "*more*" flexibility. The conclusion that Vietnam's performance on the U.S. POW/MIA issue "*has improved significantly*" was changed to "*has definitely improved.*" A number of additional, but minor, changes served to further reduce the "overly rosy" tone criticized by the former Deputy Chairman of the NIC.

MIB AND NFIB MEETINGS (APRIL 1998)

The Director, DIA convenes the MIB to be certain that he is representing the coordinated military intelligence view when he attends an NFIB meeting to approve an estimate. On 26 March, the DIA Associate Director for Estimates suggested that the Director convene a MIB in this instance because of the "politically-charged nature of this particular estimate." He further recommended that, while DPMO should not be part of the coordination process, a DPMO official might attend the meeting to help "clarify issues" relating to POW/MIA matters. The background paper prepared for the Director, DIA noted that the estimate "will almost certainly be judged inadequate by some SSCI members and staff, Senator Smith, and POW/MIA activists." It also said that a DPMO official would attend the MIB session to address questions "on the POW/MIA issue as a whole, but not issues specifically related to the SNIE [sic]."

When the MIB met on 9 April, the Director, DIA began by mentioning that he had received a call two hours earlier from Senator Smith. The Senator asserted that he wanted the Director to be aware of his concerns, which were significant. Senator Smith charged that the IC had not done a good job of examining all the documents and attendant information on the POW/MIA issue. He claimed that there were 300 to 350 documents available at the SSCI, but that no one had come to review them. If the IC published the NIE without reviewing those documents, Senator Smith said, then "I can't believe in it." In addition, the Director said that he had received a fax from the Executive Director of the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia, in which she said that she looked "forward to reviewing the results" of the estimate and that the League was relying on him to ensure its "objectivity and thoroughness." The Director said that POW/MIA issues were

emotional, but that the important thing was to "deal as objectively as possible with the intelligence facts at hand." The MIB recommended approval of the estimate by the NFIB; all members concurred. The DPMO official said that, while he had not read the estimate, he had no problem with the major judgments as they had been presented. He said that it did seem that the IC was being a little hard on the Vietnamese on the issue of their cooperation with live sighting investigations.

The NFIB, chaired by the DCI, met on 13 April to discuss the estimate. The Chairman of the NIC reported that there were no major substantive differences within the IC on the NIE. The NIO/EA stated that he had removed himself from the process because of accusations that he had "politicized the 1993 [sic] report to which Senator Smith takes exception." He said that the IC had agreed to the main judgments of the estimate and there had been no controversies. After the Deputy Director, DIA raised the issue of Senator Smith and the documents, the DCI directed that a team visit the SSCI to read the documents before the estimate was published.

The NFIB members debated language concerning the alleged transfer of POWs to the USSR. The DCI did not like the use of the word "doubt;" he argued that, because the IC does not know whether these events occurred, it should not make the judgment that it doubted this had occurred. It should use language indicating that there are contradictory reports and that the matter requires further investigation. Both the NIO/EA and the drafter argued that evidence that transfers did not occur was persuasive. The principals agreed to change the language to, "*Although we doubt that POWs were transferred to the USSR, we also conclude that the books remain open on this.*" The net effect of the debate on these issues, initiated by the DCI, was to further modify the judgment made in the NIE on alleged transfers.

ANOTHER ROUND OF REVIEW

The SSCI Documents

In early December 1997, the SSCI had sent a letter to the CIA, OCA, offering to provide material for the estimate and listing the documents in its possession. In early January 1998, the NIE drafter noted that, while most of the material was already in the possession of the IC, he would like

copies of 17 of the documents; this request was passed to the SSCI. That was where this issue stood at the time of Senator Smith's call to the Director, DIA on 9 April and the DCI's directive on 13 April that a team review the SSCI holdings.

When the CIA, OCA contacted the SSCI majority staff member holding the documents on 14 April to set up an appointment to review the documents, the staff member asked that the NIE drafter call him personally. He subsequently told the drafter that he would give him access to specific documents but not to the entire collection which, he said, was not in a single location. He suggested that the drafter review the list again. After consulting with the DIA representative, the drafter added 18 documents to the original list of 17 he had requested in January 1998. In a memorandum for the record, he explained in detail why more documents had not been selected. On 17 April, the drafter and the DIA representative visited the SSCI to review the additional documents. In reporting back to the DCI on 23 April, the NIO/EA explained that the team had reviewed the documents and found that the vast majority of the documents in the SSCI files had been seen in other IC archives and that the review "did not uncover any new information bearing on judgments or analysis in the Estimate" (details of the SSCI document issue are discussed in Part IV, *Critical Assessment Charges: Substance*, under "Relevant Documentation").

Two More Outside Readers

Following the NFIB meeting, at the direction of the DCI, the NIC provided the draft to two more outside readers, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy and a former DCI. Both commended the draft and said they had no major problems with it; each had a few suggestions. The former Defense official recommended that the draft provide more quantitative data to demonstrate the improvement in Vietnam's performance; that it emphasize the weaknesses of GRU reporting and sourcing; and that it analyze what it would take to reverse the current positive trend in Vietnamese behavior. In the end, none of these suggestions was taken.

The former DCI said his suggestions were "intended to strengthen our case against the minority of readers who would be reflexively critical." He recommended that the estimate acknowledge that Vietnam's archival capabilities were probably not good; that the estimate speculate on the

origins of the Russian documents and why the Vietnamese prepared them; and that the drafter remedy the fact that the characterization of the Russian documents was different in the text and the annex. He said that the above points, if addressed, "would simply strengthen the text against criticism." In the end, the draft was revised to incorporate several of his revisions for clarity.

Neither of these readers made suggestions designed to alter the substance or judgments of the NIE draft. While the former DCI indicated that his comments would help deflect criticism, his suggestions were modest and probably not sufficient to have had an impact on the tone of the estimate or on reaction to it.

DCI Input

In early April, the NIC sent the DCI talking points on the NIE, laying out the key judgments: that the Vietnamese are cooperating to help the United States achieve full accounting of POW/MIAs and that the 735 and 1205 documents are neither accurate nor a good foundation for judging Vietnamese performance on the POW/MIA issue. The talking points indicated that the judgments would be politically controversial because some elements within DPMO believe that Vietnam is withholding material and believe the CIA is part of a U.S. Government cover-up on the POW/MIA issue. Furthermore, the talking points stated, Senator Smith probably will not like the conclusions because he and members of his staff have been strongly critical of U.S. Government handling of the issue.

After seeing a copy of the estimate on 17 April, the DCI indicated that he wanted to delete sentences that included the phrase, "We doubt...." He instructed the NIE drafter simply to state what we do and do not know. He also indicated that he wanted to see a revised draft that included the comments of the second set of readers. In his reaction to this note, the NIE drafter stated that, while the DCI was not remembering accurately what had been agreed to at the NFIB about language expressing doubt, it would be best to reword the language to say that "there is no persuasive evidence that POWs were transferred to Russia or other countries."

The NIC sent a revised copy of the draft to the DCI on 23 April, describing the comments made by the additional readers and explaining why most of their suggestions had not been adopted. In his response on

26 April, the DCI indicated that he did not necessarily agree that the suggestions of the outside readers should not be incorporated; he was particularly interested in the recommendations to add quantitative information and more speculation regarding the "inaccurate" Russian documents. In the end, however, he was persuaded that it was not advisable to add either. He did argue strongly and successfully, however, that the order of paragraphs in the "Key Judgments" be shifted; he wanted to put the relevant evidence first, rather than leading with the judgment that Vietnamese cooperation had improved. Neither the Deputy Chairman of the NIC nor the NIO/EA agreed with this change in the ordering, but both recommended accommodating the DCI.

In the draft that went back to the DCI on 28 April, the evidence was put first, followed by the judgment that the Vietnamese were cooperating. On 29 April, the DCI returned the "Key Judgments" to the NIC with a handwritten comment saying that the paragraph regarding Vietnamese cooperation should be removed because it was "too subjective." The paragraph read:

Consequently, we judge that Vietnam has become more helpful in assisting U.S. efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting of American personnel missing in action during the Vietnam conflict.

In the end, the DCI was persuaded that, because this paragraph specifically answered one of the two key questions in the TOR and was a key judgment of the estimate, it should remain. The effect of the change recommended by the DCI would have been to further modify the language of the "Key Judgments."

On 1 May 1998, the DCI approved the NIE. Although the date on the NIE is April 1998, it was not published and disseminated until early May. On 21 May, the NIE drafter met with members of the SSCI staff to brief them on the NIE. The SSCI majority staff member challenged the analytic techniques used by the drafter; he particularly wanted to know why the estimate had not analyzed the number of POWs held by the Vietnamese. The drafter responded that this had not been part of the TOR and that the IC does not have the resources or capability to conduct that analysis.

Criticism of Estimate

Senator Smith Meets With NIO/EA (June 1998)

NIE 98-03 was provided to the SSCI and then to Senator Smith's office in mid-May 1998. On 17 June 1998, the Chairman of the NIC and the NIO/EA were invited to speak about the estimate to members of the U.S. side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs; among the participants was Senator Smith. The Chairman of the NIC outlined the origins of the estimate, describing the NIE as "unconventional" because it looked to the past rather than the future and required a review of archival materials. The NIO/EA then provided a background briefing on the methodology used by the NIE drafter and the IC coordination process.

Senator Smith directed a series of questions to the NIO/EA, challenging the judgments of the estimate and indicating that it was not a credible intelligence product. He provided his own views, including the question, "so does that not mean that there are still 370 cases of Americans where we do not have evidence that they died in their incident?" As a result, he said, you cannot dismiss the 1205 document based on the numbers as "they are trying to do here in this estimate." He charged that the estimate was "totally misleading and frankly it is an effort to discredit the 1,205 number." Senator Smith went on to say that, "This is a terrible job and not an intelligence estimate at all It is full of erroneous information"

Release of Critical Assessment (November 1998)

Senator Smith issued his *Critical Assessment* in November 1998. He sent the assessment with an accompanying cover letter to members of the MIB and the NFIB, with a request that those boards meet to consider and approve his request that the NIE be retracted. He sent copies to Congressional leaders, with a request that oversight hearings concerning the NIE be conducted. In addition, he sent copies to officials:

. . . who may rely on the NIE, such as U.S. policy-makers with responsibility for U.S. relations with the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) and U.S. military officials with responsibility for POW/MIA accounting efforts in Southeast Asia with the admonition that they not rely on the judgments of the estimate for the reasons cited in the *Critical Assessment*.

The *Critical Assessment* took issue with all the major judgments of the estimate. It stated that, because the NIE had failed to distinguish between Vietnam's improved assistance with field operations and its stonewalling in providing full disclosure of documents, the judgment of an overall "good" SRV performance on the POW/MIA problem is not reliable. Moreover, it states:

... there are **numerous** [emphasis in original] instances, also detailed in this critical assessment, where the analysis in support of the NIE's judgments of SRV cooperation is factually inaccurate, misleading, incomplete, shallow, and seriously flawed.

The *Critical Assessment* states that:

... the NIE's judgment on the 1205/735 documents cannot be accepted with confidence because it is **replete** [emphasis in original] with inaccurate and misleading statements, and lacks a reasonably thorough and objective foundation on which to base its judgment. I further conclude, based on a review of relevant U.S. data, that many of the statements contained in the 1205/735 documents...are indeed supported or plausible. ...

Finally, with respect to the politicizing of intelligence, the *Critical Assessment* says that:

Congress and the leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) need to examine what role the White House, its National Security Council, and certain U.S. policymakers responsible for advancing the Administration's normalization agenda with Vietnam may have played in influencing or otherwise affecting the judgments of the IC as reflected in the NIE.

MIB AND NFIB MEETINGS (JANUARY 1999)

The DCI responded to Senator Smith's letter on 17 December 1998, stating that he had directed that the evaluation of the NIE be put on the NFIB agenda scheduled for January 1999. The MIB met on 15 January, before the NFIB, and recommended that:

- ◆ The IC stand by the NIE and reject the request for retraction;

- ◆ The DCI reject charges of "politicization;"
- ◆ The IC avoid point-by-point rebuttals of the *Critical Assessment*; and
- ◆ The IC be prepared for congressional hearings.

All MIB members concurred with the recommendations.¹⁰

The NFIB convened on 19 January 1999 to consider Senator Smith's criticism of the estimate and made several decisions:

- ◆ The Board would not engage in a point-by-point rebuttal of the critique;
- ◆ The DCI would respond to Senator Smith on behalf of the IC, stating that the NFIB principals stand firmly behind the NIE. He would acknowledge that there are "unresolved mysteries with respect to the POW/MIA issue and that the Intelligence Community will continue to work to resolve them." Finally, in his letter, the DCI would refute Senator Smith's claim that the NIE reflected "shoddy research" or a "pre-determined strategy to discredit relevant information;" and
- ◆ The Director, DIA, speaking on behalf of the uniformed military, would send a separate letter to Senator Smith in concert with the DCI letter.

¹⁰ The MIB consists of DIA; the Military Departments to include the Marine Corps; the Unified Commands; NSA; NIMA; NRO; Joint Staff; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence); U.S. Forces Korea; Coast Guard; Associate, DCI for Military Support; and Defense Information Systems Agency.

In his response to Senator Smith, dated 1 February 1999, the DCI reported that the NFIB had voted unanimously to let the estimate stand. He acknowledged critical gaps in intelligence and assured the Senator that NFIB members would provide any new information collected to those responsible for dealing with the POW/MIA issue. He stated that NFIB members had again commended the analyst who drafted the NIE and the "rigorous interagency process" that made the NIE an IC product, not the work of a single author. He said that he accepted the word of those who worked on the draft and coordinated it that "there was at no time any effort to distort judgments from outside or inside the Community."

PART IV: *CRITICAL ASSESSMENT* CHARGES: SUBSTANCE

We evaluated NIE 98-03 and the *Critical Assessment* using a comparative approach (see Annex C for discussion of the methodology used in this section). The *Critical Assessment* took issue with 51 NIE statements (excluding politicization issues). We examined the criticisms levied against the NIE and grouped them into specific topics for discussion as follows:

- ◆ Relevant Documentation;
- ◆ Vietnamese Cooperation;
- ◆ Mistreatment of POWs;
- ◆ Recovery and Repatriation of Remains;
- ◆ The Saga of the Mortician;
- ◆ Numbers of POW/MIA: the 735 and 1205 Documents;
- ◆ Assessment of Comments by Russian Sources on the 735 and 1205 Documents;
- ◆ Separate or Second Prison System; and
- ◆ Alleged Transfers of POWs from Vietnam to the USSR.

In addition to these topics, we reviewed two issues not specifically addressed in either the NIE or the *Critical Assessment*. We evaluated each of the cases of U.S. personnel listed by Senator Smith in 1992 for whom verified remains have not been returned by Vietnam. We undertook this task because, according to Senator Smith's legislative assistant, the Senator had expected the drafter of the NIE to do so and he did not; we agreed with Senator Smith that such a review is relevant to an analysis of the POW/MIA issue and that it should be conducted by independent analysts. In addition, we examined one particular MIA case, that of Captain John T.

McDonnell, U.S. Army, to demonstrate both the polarized nature of the MIA issue and the difficulty of making determinations of fate.

RELEVANT DOCUMENTATION

The *Critical Assessment* questions why any NIE:

... would make judgments in areas if there is no sizable body of intelligence reporting within the U.S. Intelligence Community

It goes on to say that:

... based on a listing of documents compiled by my [Senator Smith's] office, scanning [sic] thirty-plus years, there does, in fact, appear to be significant intelligence reporting.

The assessment repeatedly criticizes the NIE drafter for failing to use information made available to the IC and cites several letters that address "a listing of documents" that contain "significant intelligence reporting." We begin our discussion of the use of relevant documentation and the alleged discrediting of relevant information by the NIE drafter with an examination of those letters.

On 2 December 1997, Senator Smith, through his legislative assistant, transferred document holdings to the SSCI as a "complete response to meet his pledge to make any relevant information available to the drafter of the NIE, from his holdings and from the Senate Select Committee, POW/MIA." The next day, the SSCI Chairman and Vice Chairman forwarded a list of those holdings to the drafter of the NIE. That list consisted of 317 line items (the term "line items" is more accurate than the term "documents" since one line item may contain one or more documents) in two parts. The first part included 134 line items held in binders by the JCSD to assist its work in support of the VWWG of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission. Senator Smith chairs that working group. The second part included 183 line items that represented the contents of the growing files of Senator Smith as held for him by the SSCI as of 3 December. That list of 317 line items represents what the NIE drafter thought was the relevant material held by the SSCI.

On 6 February 1998, Senator Smith sent a letter to the Director, DIA, in which he stated:

I believe there are currently over 350 documents on the POW/MIA topic I hope you will not hesitate to ask SSCI to review any of this material that may not already be readily available to DIA.

Senator Smith is referring to an expanded list that included 80 line items passed directly to the NIE drafter by the JCSD during the course of several joint discussions and an additional 84 line items added to the growing Smith files during the period December 1997-January 1998.

On 9 April 1998, Senator Smith called the Director, DIA, and referred to "300-350 documents available at the SSCI for people that want to review them." Senator Smith stated that "no one has ever come to review these documents. If the IC published the NIE without having reviewed these documents, I can't believe in it." Senator Smith's call caused the DCI to halt the NIE process and direct the NIE drafter and a DIA representative to visit the SSCI to review documents of concern to Senator Smith.

The body of information Senator Smith referred to in his 9 April call differs from the body of information officially made available to the drafter of the NIE. Moreover, the body of information to which Senator Smith referred contained considerable information already reviewed by the drafter well before the Senator's call. By the time of Senator Smith's call, the drafter of the NIE had considered, at a minimum, 97 documents on Senator Smith's new list: the 80 passed to him by JCSD and 17 that he had selected from the list passed to him by the SSCI on 3 December 1997.

The *Critical Assessment* refers to a 15 April 1998 letter from Senator Smith to the Director, DIA, in which he refers to the documents held by the SSCI. We have been unable to locate this letter. According to Senator Smith's legislative assistant, there was a 15 April 1998 memorandum from him (the legislative assistant) to the Director, DIA, which a SSCI staff member was to deliver the next day. The legislative assistant gave us a copy of that memorandum. The SSCI staff member told us that he took the memorandum to DIA on or about 16 April 1998. Neither the Director, DIA's executive correspondence office nor his POW/MIA policy office has

a record of any correspondence from Senator Smith or his staff dated 15 April 1998.

The SSCI staff member did hand the updated document list, without a cover memorandum, to the drafter of the NIE and the DIA representative on 16 April 1998, during their document review visit to the SSCI. According to the NIE drafter, "on arrival, the staff assistant handed us a new list of documents in SSCI's possession that he said we should look at." We did not find a copy of the 15 April 1998 cover memorandum in the NIE drafter's files. Further, on 9 September 1999 we showed the drafter a copy of the memorandum and he stated that he had never seen it.

We reviewed the SSCI holdings related to the 3 December 1997 letter. We also reviewed the document holdings of the NIE drafter. The drafter's holdings, coupled with files provided to him by other organizations far exceeded the SSCI holdings. Moreover, the NIE drafter had extensive folders pertaining to specific topics. Not only did the drafter have access to relevant intelligence information but he also made multiple visits to DPMO, both RA and the JCSD, to acquire documents held by those two key offices. Further, he had an extensive network of informal sources including academia. We found that the NIE drafter considered relevant intelligence information from 1987 onwards, as specified in the TOR. Based on his reading of previous IC publications, however, he did not specifically review raw data dating from before 1987 (see Annex D for a listing of IC publications reviewed by the estimate drafter).

In our review of CIA, DO files, centrally gathered for the government-wide POW/MIA document declassification effort in the early 1990s, we found that relevant intelligence information concerning the POW/MIA issue prior to that time was available and that the NIE drafter had reviewed those files. Further, the DO manager responsible for those documents told us that he personally assisted the drafter, a process that included a review of the draft report. We also found that the drafter's boxes of information contained documentation going back to the 1950s. We believe that the NIE drafter considered relevant information but, by design, focused on the decade 1987 through 1997.

Senator Smith's legislative assistant told us that, given the emergence of a re-evaluation of the 735 and 1205 documents as a key

question, the TOR obligated the NIE drafter to consider information back to the 1960s. We cannot reconcile these two divergent points of view. We note, however, the delay in the completion of the TOR; the addition of the 735 and 1205 documents to the "Key Questions" of the TOR; and the introduction of a new NIO/EA and a new NIE drafter, neither of whom had been involved in the negotiations of the TOR. Whereas the former NIO/EA had intended to treat the 735 and 1205 documents as a separate project, the new NIO/EA and drafter accepted the final TOR with its expanded focus without changing the time frame on which the research should focus. In conducting this review of the NIE and the *Critical Assessment*, we found it necessary to search as far back as the document trail allowed.

VIETNAMESE COOPERATION

The *Critical Assessment* claims that the NIE did not consider information available to the IC in assessing Vietnamese cooperation on POW/MIA matters. At issue are the NIE statements that "Vietnam has become more helpful in assisting U.S. efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting of American personnel missing in action during the Vietnam conflict" and that Vietnam's overall performance in dealing with the POW/MIA issue "has been good in recent years." The *Critical Assessment* asserts that the NIE judgment of Vietnam performance as "good" is not reliable and argues that the judgments on cooperation are "factually inaccurate, misleading, incomplete, shallow, and seriously flawed."

For example, one of the key questions in the NIE TOR and "Scope Note" is:

To what extent since 1987 has the leadership of the SRV demonstrated a commitment to cooperating with the United States to achieve the fullest possible accounting of American prisoners missing in action during the Vietnam conflict?

The *Critical Assessment* claims that the NIE makes no mention of SRV leadership intentions, performance and capabilities on the POW/MIA issue between 1987 and the early 1990s, as required by the key question in the TOR. It is a fact that the "Key Judgments" of the NIE address only the period since the early 1990s, stating that, since the early 1990s, there has been evidence of increased Vietnamese cooperation in terms of strengthened

staffing, increased responsiveness, and growing professionalism. In its "Discussion" section, however, the NIE addresses the question of Vietnamese cooperation since 1987 in some detail. It includes highlights from the "Key Judgments" of the February 1992 CIA Assessment, "Vietnam: Adjusting Its Strategy on the POW/MIA Issue," that describe Vietnamese cooperative gestures during the period 1987 through 1991.

The *Critical Assessment* argues that the NIE "Key Judgments" "glaringly fails to define what constitutes progress on the POW/MIA issue from Hanoi's standpoint" The Vietnamese define progress on the POW/MIA issue almost solely in terms of progress in improving the political relationship between the United States and Vietnam and the amount of money the United States is investing in Vietnam. While the estimate does not say this in so direct a way, the "Key Judgments" state that ". . . better ties to the United States are in Vietnam's own security and economic development interests and that normalization requires progress on the POW/MIA issue." The "Discussion" asserts that Vietnam has become more cooperative for a variety of reasons, including a desire for engagement with Washington, particularly since the collapse of the Soviet Union, which had been a key ally of Vietnam. Further, the NIE contends that Vietnam considers cooperation with the United States essential to enhancement of its economic and security objectives, explaining that Vietnamese leaders recognize that Washington will be a key power in the region and that American business is a potential major source of investment. Also, the NIE mentions that the Vietnamese understand that cooperation on POW/MIA issues is likely to foster a better bilateral relationship with Washington.

The *Critical Assessment's* charges with respect to the NIE's treatment of Vietnam's cooperation on POW/MIA issues are not supported by the facts. The assessment asserts that the NIE does not deal with certain issues when it does, albeit not necessarily in the manner or in the terms preferred by the *Critical Assessment*.

A Question of Political Sensitivity

In another area related to Vietnamese cooperation, the *Critical Assessment* disputes the NIE claim that the POW/MIA issue no longer has the political sensitivity that it once had within the Vietnamese leadership. The assessment argues that, if anything, the issue has become more

politically sensitive, not less, because of intensified U.S. interest. The *Critical Assessment* indicates that the appointment of General Vessey as the Special Emissary to Hanoi, the establishment of a Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, and creation of the 1991 road map to normalization of relations demonstrate intense U.S. interest.

The February 1992 CIA assessment, cited in the NIE, argues that the Vietnamese were wrestling with their foreign policy in the early 1990s. The report states that there was a growing body of evidence that suggested Hanoi's leadership was debating the pace and scope of improving relations with the United States. Using the 1992 CIA assessment as a backdrop, the NIE drafter researched documentation and discussed Vietnamese political sensitivity with both members of the IC and operational entities that work POW/MIA issues on a regular basis. A senior U.S. military official stated that the President of Vietnam clearly understood that the POW/MIA issue remained a matter of high priority for the United States. Another senior official indicated that, as operations became more routine, the Vietnamese had become more comfortable with the United States. Thus, over time, a more trusting relationship developed between the two countries and the need for high-level interaction on POW/MIA issues diminished. The NIE drafter was told that operational POW/MIA issues have long been entrusted by the Vietnamese leadership to the VNOSMP and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The drafter of the estimate had sufficient evidence to conclude that the POW/MIA issue no longer has the political sensitivity it once had in the Vietnamese leadership.

Refusal to Cooperate

The *Critical Assessment* takes issue with the NIE regarding additional statements related to cooperation, including the NIE claim that incidents of outright Vietnamese refusal to cooperate with U.S. investigators have decreased and instances wherein the Vietnamese raise objections to POW/MIA activities have diminished. The NIE drafter reviewed DoS documents; the results and impending actions of the Presidential Special Emissary to Vietnam (General Vessey); FBIS reporting; DPMO records; and USPACOM, JTF-FA, CILHI, and Stony Beach documentation. He also conducted interviews with numerous government officials who had knowledge of Vietnamese cooperation on POW/MIA issues. Using the time frame mandated in the TOR, the NIE concludes that, even though instances of refusal to cooperate with U.S. investigators have decreased, the

Vietnamese continue to object to U.S. POW/MIA activities on occasion. The NIE explains that Vietnam's political system is secretive and distrustful of foreign influences and that Vietnamese officials fear that divulging information could undermine governmental authority. Also, according to the NIE, defending its sovereignty and protecting its secrets might be the major reasons why Vietnam has not been completely forthcoming with respect to POW/MIA issues.

Given that background, the NIE cites several "significant examples" where Vietnam has hindered activities, including refusing requests to see Politburo documents; denying interviews with some senior retired military officials; and refusing to allow joint field activities in "classified" military areas. Even though several documents reviewed by the NIE drafter and interviews he conducted revealed that significant progress had been made in Vietnamese cooperation, the NIE concludes that there are limits to what the United States could expect to achieve.

The NIE suggests that much remains to be accomplished in terms of Vietnamese cooperation on the POW/MIA issue. We believe that the NIE drafter appropriately used both relevant documentation and interviews with knowledgeable officials in reaching the conclusion that Vietnam's performance in dealing with the POW/MIA issue has been good in recent years and that incidents of refusal to cooperate have declined. That conclusion did not come easily, but, taken in the aggregate and coupled with the chronicle of continuing cases of uncooperative behavior, we believe the overall NIE judgment is sufficiently balanced and cautious, particularly given the caveat that the unresolved areas of Vietnamese cooperation "suggest the need for continued close attention by the U.S. Government."

MISTREATMENT OF POWS

The *Critical Assessment* discussed mistreatment of POWs as part of the record of Vietnamese cooperation; we treat it separately here because of its importance. The assessment claims that the NIE used a poor example of Vietnam's lack of forthrightness on certain POW/MIA issues by stating that Vietnam continues to deny that U.S. POWs were mistreated while in captivity and that full disclosure of that information would prove embarrassing to the regime. The *Critical Assessment* argues that other

embarrassing examples, such as "the holding back of any unacknowledged American POWs after Operation Homecoming in 1973," would have been more relevant. Use of the mistreatment example, according to the assessment, "is not only disappointing, but very misleading to the NIE reader concerning the scope of knowledge the SRV may still possess concerning unaccounted for POW/MIAs."

During the 17 June 1998 briefing on the NIE provided to the U.S. side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, Senator Smith posed a question to the NIO/EA: if the Vietnamese regime would be embarrassed to provide torture information, he asked, would it not be just as embarrassed to admit that American POWs were held back after the war? The response was "I suppose it would." The two issues are very different in nature, however.

There are countless, first-hand accounts of Vietnamese mistreatment of U.S. POWs. The U.S. Ambassador to Hanoi, a former POW, told the NIE drafter that during a discussion with a Vietnamese official he had described how he had been dragged around like a dog with a rope around his neck. The Vietnamese official denied that the incident occurred. Congressman Sam Johnson's 1992 book, Captive Warriors, and the 1998 book, Honor Bound - The History of American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia 1961-1973, prepared at the request of a former Deputy Secretary of Defense, graphically describe POW mistreatment at the hands of Vietnamese captors. The NIE states that Vietnam would never provide documents to the United States that reveal mistreatment of POWs because such disclosure would be extremely embarrassing. The DPMO has never raised the issue of mistreatment of POWs because that office considers the issue particularly sensitive; if the issue were raised, DPMO believes, it would "provoke a counterproductive Vietnamese reaction." The DPMO claims that the subject of mistreatment is irrelevant to "our accounting effort, and we have not requested documents that might bear directly on these matters." While requests for such information may not be relevant to the DPMO, the NIE raises the issue to advise the reader that Vietnam has not been forthcoming because divulgence would prove embarrassing to the regime.

While instances of torture are well documented, virtually all studies, dating back to the 1976 report of the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, conclude that there is no evidence to indicate that any American POWs from the Indochina conflict remain alive. The January 1993 Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs report concluded that there was no proof U.S. POWs had survived in North Vietnam after Operation Homecoming, while acknowledging that there also was no proof that all of those who did not return had died. The committee report indicated that it could not prove a negative, but concluded that there is "no compelling evidence that proves that any American remains alive in captivity in Southeast Asia."

The NIE indicates that 120 live sighting investigations have been conducted and none has generated any credible evidence of American POWs left in Vietnam. We confirmed this with U.S. officials who work with the refugee program. The Senate Select Committee report of 1993 suggests that, if efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting of Vietnam-era POW/MIAs are to be effective and fair to the families, "they must go forward within the context of reality, not fiction." The reality is that there is no credible evidence that American POWs remained behind in 1973. The alleged holding back of POWs is not an appropriate example of Vietnam's lack of forthrightness on POW/MIA issues.

RECOVERY AND REPATRIATION OF REMAINS

As with other topics discussed under cooperation, the *Critical Assessment*, in discussing repatriation, refers to information available to the IC that allegedly was not used. The assessment takes issue with the NIE judgment that Vietnamese cooperation on the recovery and repatriation of remains of U.S. personnel is excellent. Charging that the NIE judgment is based solely on information provided by a non-IC organization, the *Critical Assessment* contends that additional evidence was not factored into the judgment. The drafter of the NIE collected documentation on recovery and repatriation of remains and interviewed key officials in organizations involved in POW/MIA matters. While these organizations are not all members of the IC, they are consumers of information from the IC. The IC gathers and analyzes information from all sources, including non-intelligence entities to provide comprehensive assessments and judgments to decisionmakers. The JTF-FA and CILHI are the U.S. Government organizations most closely associated with recovery and repatriation of

remains and, even though not part of the IC, their documented experiences were of legitimate import to the NIE drafter.

In December 1997, the drafter of the NIE met with U.S. officials dealing directly with POW/MIA issues. During those sessions, participants stated that the Vietnamese had approached the issue of repatriation more seriously after 1992 and that Vietnamese cooperation in recovery and repatriation of remains since 1992 has been excellent. The NIE drafter took those views into consideration, balancing them with document holdings. In addition, he examined numerous publications that addressed recovery and repatriation of remains (see Annex E).

Manipulation of Witnesses

The *Critical Assessment* describes NIE judgments regarding recovery and repatriation of remains as "especially disturbing," because, it says, there is evidence that Vietnam has manipulated witnesses and evidence at crash sites and has recovered remains that have not been repatriated. The NIE drafter was told by knowledgeable U.S. officials that, in the past, an unknown number of witnesses had been coached, but that this no longer occurs. Similarly, other officials indicated that they were aware of only one where a witness was coached. We also conferred with these U.S. officials and learned that, between 1988 and 1992, the team leader for 18 of the first 20 joint field investigations saw no evidence of witness manipulation and did not see tampering with any crash site. The team leader told us that Vietnamese national level officials wanted to know what a witness would say before meeting the Americans because they did not want to be surprised, but in no way did Vietnamese officials interfere with the recovery process. The team leader said that, during early joint investigations, Vietnamese officials were suspicious of U.S. intentions because they believed the investigations were related to intelligence collection activities. After those initial suspicions were allayed, however, they became more supportive.

Repatriation of Remains

The NIE states that there is no evidence the Vietnamese "presently are storing remains of American dead." It indicates that the Vietnamese did collect and store remains during the war, but "we do not know how many." The *Critical Assessment* argues that it is misleading to say "categorically that there is no evidence" the Vietnamese are storing remains, citing discrepancies in numbers of collected and stored remains provided by DPMO and CILHI; a "review of evidence available to the IC;" and the testimony of the "mortician."

The NIE overstated its case that there is no evidence that the Vietnamese currently are storing the remains of American POWs. The DPMO's 1995 zero-based comprehensive review concluded that there had been some cases indicating that specific remains recovered by the Vietnamese Government had not been turned over. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs report, "Vietnam's Collection and Repatriation of American Remains," published in June 1999 and reviewed by knowledgeable senior analysts in the IC, concludes that, "Based on available information, it is not possible to confirm independently whether Vietnam has repatriated all the American remains it collected." According to the report, Vietnam last repatriated stored remains in September 1990. The 1999 report indicates that there is strong evidence in two cases involving five remains that the remains were collected and taken to Hanoi but not repatriated. Discussions on those cases with the Vietnamese Government continue. Furthermore, the report states that, on two occasions, Vietnamese officials provided information that it had remains that had not been repatriated. While the events cannot be refuted or confirmed, investigation continues.

The *Critical Assessment* mentions that, in September 1998 (the NIE is dated April 1998), CILHI reported that approximately 170 U.S. remains repatriated by Hanoi since the end of the war showed signs of storage. The assessment then concludes that, based on the DPMO estimate that "Vietnam collected and stored some 300 remains, vice the 400 to 600 asserted by the 1987 Special National Intelligence Estimate," the resulting discrepancy (170 versus 300) makes the NIE assertion that Vietnam's repatriation record is excellent "extremely inaccurate."

CILHI found that 219 remains, returned unilaterally by the Vietnamese, exhibited forensic evidence of storage. As of 1 April 1999, it had identified 172 of those and continued to analyze the others. Independent of the CILHI determination, DPMO identified 274 remains that had signs of storage. Of those, DPMO said that 249 had been identified and that CILHI was analyzing the others. The disparity in numbers is the result of the different criteria and methods used by DPMO and CILHI. While DPMO analyzes documentation, testimony, and other source reporting to reach its findings, CILHI bases its numbers on the examination of remains. In the 1999 remains study, CILHI states that, "the examination of skeletal remains can yield considerable information . . . but not as much as desired. There are real limitations to the data that can be obtained." Further, CILHI cautions that its judgments on storage are subjective and imprecise because there are no tests, measurements, or means of standardization to arrive at determinations.

The estimate mentioned that DPMO, in conjunction with CILHI, was investigating the question of Vietnamese storage of remains and that further conclusions had to await the results of that investigation. The 1999 remains report, issued more than one year after publication of the estimate, determined that a case-by-case analysis of all remains repatriated revealed that, between 1970 and 1993, Vietnamese central authorities had collected and stored 270 to 280 sets of remains. The report claims the disparity of 20 to 30 between that number and the number estimated to have been collected (300) is smaller than had been thought previously and that "we will continue to seek more data about the extent and limits of Vietnam's effort to collect American remains."

The NIE overstated its case on the lack of evidence regarding storage of American remains; it did not factor in the evidence suggesting that remains may not have been repatriated in two cases involving five remains. It did, however, indicate that an in-depth study on the issue was being prepared and that conclusions should await publication of that report.

THE SAGA OF THE MORTICIAN

The NIE makes no claim regarding the number of stored remains. It does report that the 1987 SNIE had suggested that there was evidence Vietnam was storing "about 400-600 sets of remains." That judgment was retracted in October 1996 by IC Assessment 96-05, "Vietnamese Storage of Remains of Unaccounted U.S. Personnel." The NIE states that the 1987 judgment was retracted by the 1996 Assessment because it was based on "the unsupported testimony of a single unreliable source," the mortician.

The *Critical Assessment* takes the NIE to task on the subject of the mortician, calling for "an accurate review of evidence available to the IC." The assessment argues that the NIE rationale regarding the 1996 IC Assessment retraction of a judgment made in the September 1987 SNIE about the storage of 400 to 600 sets of remains, is "egregious" and misrepresents the facts. While the NIE correctly cites the 1996 Assessment as the basis for the retraction, we do not agree with the NIE rationale that the retraction was made because the source of the information was unreliable and his testimony insupportable. Our judgment is based on a comprehensive examination of the source of the storage of remains issue, the mortician.

The mortician, an ethnic Chinese, Vietnamese citizen, worked in his family's funeral business in Hanoi. In the late 1950s, the government assigned mortuary personnel to public service and the mortician worked for the Director of Cemeteries, where he was responsible for grave digging as well as preparing and interring remains. Beginning in 1969, he was assigned the duties of preparing skeletal remains of Americans. In 1979, he was arrested and deported to Hong Kong. While residing in a refugee camp in Hong Kong, he attracted the attention of the U.S. Defense Liaison Office by alleging that he personally had inspected the remains of over 400 U.S. military personnel that were in secret storage in Hanoi.

The U.S. Government conducted a polygraph examination of the mortician prior to expediting his resettlement to the United States. His responses to the following three relevant questions resulted in an indication of deception:

- ◆ Between 1974 and 1977, did you inspect the remains of more than 400 Americans? – Yes;
- ◆ Did you make up the story about the remains of 400 Americans being stored in Hanoi? – No; and
- ◆ Did you personally see three live American soldiers in Hanoi after 1976? – Yes.

The U.S. Government adjudicated the results of the polygraph examination and determined that the examiner had made the “correct call.” The mortician was brought to Washington, where he was interviewed and given another polygraph examination, this time administered by a private company. We could not determine why a private examiner was hired to perform the second examination. The responses to the following three relevant questions in the second polygraph examination indicated no deception:

- ◆ When you left Hanoi, Vietnam, were skeletal remains of Americans being kept there?—Yes;
- ◆ At the time you left Vietnam, was the Vietnam Government keeping skeletal remains of U.S. military personnel at Hanoi like you say?—Yes; and
- ◆ Did the Vietnam Government force you to leave Vietnam like you say?—Yes.

The private company conducted a third polygraph examination. The relevant questions focused on whether the mortician had seen three Americans between 1974 and 1979 in Hanoi. He responded affirmatively and no deception was indicated.

The mortician's claim to have seen three Americans was investigated as a live sighting report. One of the individuals, always seen with a Vietnamese escort, was determined to be Robert Garwood.¹¹ The other two individuals, seen unescorted, were determined to be either journalists or Russian military advisers. In January 1984, the U.S. Government addressed the inconsistencies in the previous polygraph examinations of the mortician. Its assessment concluded that the polygraph examination results should not have been the sole or primary basis for assessing the mortician's story and that the mortician's story was true.

The number of remains of U.S. military personnel stored in Vietnam and the veracity of the mortician's statements remain subjects of continuing debate. During his June 1980 testimony before the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the mortician claimed to have processed "some 400, some 452 of these remains, that 26 were turned over to the United States; that leaves about 400 plus. I have seen them." Between 1980 and 1983, senior U.S. officials used the more than/over 400 figure in public statements. The 13 January 1993 report of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs states that, in 1980, the mortician testified that he had processed 452 sets of remains.

The 1987 SNIE addressed the storage of remains of U.S. military personnel. Without further explanation, it states that, "We estimate that the Vietnamese have already recovered and are warehousing between 400 and 600 remains." The 1996 IC Assessment mentions that IC participants in the 1987 SNIE deferred to the principal drafter on the number of warehoused remains because the drafter's agency (DIA) had the responsibility and expertise for assessing technical aspects of the remains issue. The drafter of the 1987 SNIE, since retired, told us that he could not recall using the 400 to 600 figure. He said that, while he was convinced that storage of remains had occurred, he was not certain there was sufficient evidence to determine the numbers involved. Both the Director and Deputy Director, Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs, DIA at the time, told us that they had no direct knowledge as to the rationale for using

¹¹ Marine Corps PFC Robert Garwood was first listed as a POW by U.S. authorities—but never by the Vietnamese — in 1965. He returned to the United States voluntarily in 1979. He was convicted of collaborating with the enemy.

the 400 to 600 figure in the 1987 SNIE. Both speculated that the numbers were extrapolated from the mortician's estimate on the number of boxes he believed he saw.

The 1996 IC Assessment states that the mortician:

... carefully differentiated between the sets of remains he *said* [emphasis in original] he worked on (280 to 310) and what he *believed* [emphasis in original] was the total number of boxes (400). He arrived at a figure of 426 by combining the 400 boxes he estimated in the room (warehouse) in 1977 and two other groups of remains (26 sets) that he worked on that could not have been in the room

These figures coincide with those in the detailed interview DIA conducted with the mortician in November 1979, just prior to the second polygraph examination. The 1996 Assessment concludes that the 1987 SNIE statement regarding warehousing 400 to 600 sets of remains was based on limited direct evidence whose reliability was open to question. It further concludes that the 400 figure was not "a precise point estimate" and the 600 figure was based on "uncorroborated hearsay evidence or . . . the result of questionable extrapolation."

The drafter of the 1998 NIE grappled with the differences of opinion on the mortician and discussed those differences at length during IC coordination sessions leading up to formulation of the draft report. IC participants agreed with the language that appeared in the NIE that the storage of 400 to 600 sets of remains was retracted from the 1987 SNIE by the 1996 IC Assessment because the information turned out to have been based on the "unsupported testimony of a single unreliable source." Many factors, including possible mistranslation of testimony and interviews; confusion on the part of the mortician and interviewers and translators; diverse polygraph examination questions; differences in what the mortician actually observed (remains he worked on) and what he speculated; and the drafter's contention that the information provided by the mortician that appeared in the 1987 SNIE was erroneous convinced the NIE drafter that the mortician and his information were unreliable. According to the drafter, the 1998 NIE did not discuss the numbers of warehoused remains because the mortician was considered an unreliable source. The 1996 IC Assessment did not discredit the mortician and his

information, however. It claimed that the 1987 SNIE numbers were based on limited direct evidence whose reliability was open to question.

In a 30 June 1998 memorandum for the Director, DIA, the DPMO argued that the 1996 Assessment characterized the evidence rather than the source as unreliable, describing the figures (400 to 600) as rough estimates not firm enough to serve as a baseline for U.S. policy. The DPMO found information provided by the mortician reliable, and, "dueling polygraphs aside," estimated that the number of remains collected and stored in Hanoi is "well within the range of acceptable error for the rough firsthand estimates provided by this source." DPMO analysts explained that the "range of acceptable error" was the 280 to 310 figure detailed in the 1996 Assessment. Those were the numbers that the mortician processed or worked on rather than the more than 400 he perceived or believed to have been stored. The DPMO concludes that Vietnam collected and stored some 300 U.S. remains rather than the 400 to 600 described in the 1987 SNIE.

We believe that the NIE language reflects misunderstanding of the meaning of the 1996 IC Assessment. That assessment outlined the rationale behind the decision to judge the 1987 SNIE statement that Hanoi had warehoused 400 to 600 sets of remains as based on "limited direct evidence whose reliability was open to question." We believe that the mortician was truthful in explaining his knowledge of warehoused remains, but that his information regarding the numbers of remains was not accurate. The second polygraph examination, in-depth interviews, a comprehensive post-polygraph investigation, and the U.S. Government's conclusion in January 1984 concerning the mortician's truthfulness provide ample evidence and justification for our position. Had the DPMO been involved in coordinating the 1998 NIE, the "unreliable" and "unsupported" language might have been challenged and the statement on the mortician might have been explained more fully.

We cannot explain why the U.S. Government contracted for two private commercial polygraph examinations of the mortician. Nor can we explain why the U.S. Government believed additional polygraph examinations of the mortician were necessary. We are confident that the 1984 acceptance of comprehensive post-polygraph investigation of the

mortician are sufficient justification to conclude that he was truthful, but not completely accurate in his assessment of the number of remains in question. We agree with the 1996 IC Assessment claim that the mortician "carefully differentiated between the sets of remains he *said* he worked on and what he *believed* was the total number of boxes."

The NIE incorrectly claimed that the 1996 IC Assessment retracted the statement in the 1987 SNIE that Vietnam was storing 400 to 600 sets of remains because the information was based on the unsupported testimony of a single unreliable source, the mortician. The misreading of the 1996 IC Assessment on the mortician does not change the basic thrust or key judgments of the NIE nor does the misread make the NIE statement regarding the source of stored remains an "egregious and unsupported misrepresentation of facts . . ." as claimed by the *Critical Assessment*.

NUMBERS OF POW/MIA: THE 735 AND 1205 DOCUMENTS

Two Distinct Methodologies

On the issue of numbers of American POWs in Vietnam, the *Critical Assessment* claims that the IC has not reviewed all relevant documentation. In addition, it asserts that, "It is simply unacceptable that a detailed analysis of the numbers is not presented in the NIE." Before we address the issue of the numbers specifically, it is important to understand that two different accounting methodologies have been used to support arguments that there either are or are not U.S. MIAs still alive in Southeast Asia. Since Operation Homecoming in 1973, the U.S. Government has based its accounting on the cases of individuals who were expected to be repatriated, but were not. Over the years, these have been termed discrepancy or priority cases. The Senate Select Committee summarized 135 of those as the "Vessey Discrepancy Cases." The 35-year, DoD accounting history has focused on these discrepancy cases in the remains recovery effort; as of August 1999, the cases DoD considered to be still unresolved had been reduced to 43.

The alternate methodology, which has run parallel to the DoD accounting system in at least rudimentary form since Operation

Homecoming, considers all MIA, regardless of sub-category (e.g., Killed in Action-Body not Recovered (KIA-BNR),¹² over water, non-hostile) to be potentially alive, unless "fullest possible accounting" has occurred. Fullest possible accounting is defined as either verified repatriation of remains or return of a live person. Based on that approach there remain over 2,000 persons not accounted for, all potentially live MIA. Supporters of this methodology do, however, tend to accept the U.S. Government's KIA-BNR accounting. Accepting KIA-BNR reduces the number of potential MIA to 1,172 as of December 1992.

The 1993 Senate Select Committee POW/MIA report stated that Senator Smith had compiled a list of "compelling" cases, reducing the number of MIA from 1,172 to "324 still unaccounted for U.S. personnel from the Vietnam conflict." Senator Smith did not describe his methodology but did say that he considered his list "a working document" and "at best conservative." Based on verified remains returned of those on his list of 324, the list has been reduced to 289 names.

The dichotomy between the two methodologies was not resolved during the work of the Senate Select Committee, POW/MIA Affairs. In its final report, the Committee created an "Appendix of Case Summaries," and simply reported two lists of cases, the government's discrepancy list and Senator Smith's list of compelling cases.

The U. S. Government's case methodology factors out both those cases that the DoD determined to be KIA-BNR and those cases in which there was evidence of death. The methodology also factors out cases that are considered to be over water or off-the-scope.¹³ The total number is reduced as remains are recovered and identified or when individuals are released.¹⁴ The methodology considers only the remaining cases to be MIA. There is no POW category in this methodology because the U.S. Government believes there are no remaining POWs.

¹² KIA-BNR refers to persons known to have been killed in action, but body or remains not recovered by U.S. forces, e.g., an aircraft exploding in midair or crashing, or a person with unquestionably terminal wounds and not recovered due to enemy action, or being lost at sea.

¹³ Off-the-scope is a term used to refer to aircraft losses in Southeast Asia, primarily in Laos, where the aircraft loss occurred outside of radar coverage and the location is unknown.

¹⁴ Since 1973, only one U.S. military member, Robert Garwood, has returned alive from Vietnam.

The alternate methodology considers the above methodology to be flawed and bases its accounting on total numbers. While it also factors out KIA-BNR, returnees, and remains recovered and identified, it includes cases in which there is evidence of death, over water cases, and off-the-scope cases. The methodology considers all remaining cases to be potential POW as well as MIA and uses the terminology POW/MIA.

Apart from consistent treatment of KIA-BNR and remains recovered and identified, the two methodologies have different evidentiary bases. The discrepancy-based methodology relies on real-time incident reporting; results of search and rescue efforts; chain-of-command actions; the Presumptive Finding of Death (PFOD), which is a Military Services and DoD process;¹⁵ and the ongoing work of JTF-FA. It is driven by operational reporting.

The total numbers-based methodology is also based on real-time incident reporting and results of search and rescue efforts. It discounts chain-of-command actions and PFOD determinations, however. It is driven by single-source intelligence, interviews, and other one-time reports. In order to account for its numbers of missing personnel, it hypothesizes a second prison system and the transfer of individuals to the former Soviet Union. Since the work of the Senate Select Committee in 1992, it has relied heavily on the two Russian archival documents, the 735 and 1205 documents, which were acquired after the Select Committee finished its work.

We opted neither to compare the two methodologies further nor to accept one over the other. Instead, we went back to an unfinished thread in the 1994 IC report, "Recent Reports on American POWs in Indochina: An Assessment." That assessment contained the following statement, without amplification:

¹⁵ PFOD is an administrative finding by the appropriate Military Service Secretary, after statutory review procedures, that there is no current evidence to indicate that a person previously listed as MIA or POW could still be alive.

Finally, analysts noted that the "735 Document" and the "1205 Document" are inconsistent with each other by any accounting. To have had 1,205 US pilots in captivity by late 1972, Hanoi would have to have held far more than 735 by early 1971.

That incomplete analysis, combined with the Senate Select Committee's decision not to take a position on the two methodologies, persuaded us to evaluate those sections of the 735 and 1205 documents dealing with numbers of U.S. POWs.

The Documents

We compared the 735 and 1205 documents to each other using the Fulbright/Kennedy and Vessey lists as a basis (the lists will be described as discussed). We focused on those sections of the documents that address the number of POWs held by the Vietnamese because it is those sections that are relevant to the POW/MIA issue. This methodology allowed us to proceed without questioning either the authenticity of the documents or the accuracy of those sections in each document that are not relevant to the POW issue. This approach precludes questions concerning the *bona fides* of either purported author, his location and position at the time of each report, or the intended audience. It also sets aside consideration of South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia and focuses solely on the North Vietnamese prison system. A close examination of the portions of the 735 and 1205 documents that address the POW issue reveals that both cannot be true. They are mutually exclusive—as the 1994 IC assessment concluded. The relevant portion of at least one of these documents, if not both, is demonstrably false.

Historical Setting of the 735 Document

On 22 December 1970, a U.S. official representing Senators William Fulbright and Edward Kennedy was handed a list: "Hanoi, November 15, 1970." The cover sheet was headed, Ministry of National Defense, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and titled, "US Pilots Captured in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam from August 5, 1964, to November 15, 1970." The list totaled 368 names: 339 in the North Vietnamese prison system, 20 deceased and nine released.

We can assume that senior Vietnamese officials familiar with the issue would have been aware of both the numbers provided to the United States in the Fulbright/Kennedy list and the breakdown of those numbers (i.e., 339 living POWs and 29 individuals who had died or had been released). Both the 735 and the 1205 documents are attributed to senior Vietnamese officials. Both documents, in referring to the number of living American POWs that the Vietnamese had "acknowledged" to be in captivity, used the number 368. This was not the true number of live POWs, and these officials would have known it.

In late 1970 or early 1971, a Vietnamese agricultural official purportedly authored a primarily agricultural report that was found in GRU archives in the summer of 1993. That report became known as the 735 document. The GRU-acquired document indicates that the Vietnamese official briefly addressed the POW issue twice in the report. In a section titled "Situation in the Vietnamese Workers' Party," the report states that, "... we published the names of 368 American pilots who were shot down and taken captive in the territory of the D.R.V." Later, in a section titled, "Situation in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia," the report states that:

The overall number of American pilots imprisoned in the D.R.V. is 735. As I already stated, we published the names of 368 pilots. This is our diplomatic move. If the Americans agree to withdraw their troops from South Vietnam, as a start we will return these 368 men to them.

If the reporting official (or any other senior Vietnamese official) had been in a position to give an authoritative report on this subject and to use the number 368, he also would have known that 29 of the men whose names were on the published list could not be returned to the United States because they had either been released previously or died in captivity. The acknowledged number of live POWs who could have been returned was 339.

In the meantime, however, U.S. officials were unintentionally institutionalizing the incorrect number. On 2 September 1971, the Secretary of Defense forwarded the Fulbright/Kennedy list in a memorandum, "December 1970 PW List from NVN" to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. In the text, the Secretary referred to "a list of 368 servicemen who are or have been prisoners of war." In his 1995 book,

Imprisoned or Missing in Vietnam, Lewis M. Stern, commenting on the 735 document stated, "The document, which stated that Vietnam held 735 U.S. aviators as POWs in 1971 instead of the 368 whose names the Vietnamese had publicly released" Stern has been involved with DoD policymaking on the POW/MIA issue since September 1989 and accompanied General Vessey to Hanoi five times. Currently he is the Director for Indochina, Thailand and Burma, International Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense. He did not question the 368 figure in the 735 document when we interviewed him.

On the other hand, the figure cited by the Vietnamese in 1970 has been accurately reported, implicitly if not explicitly, at least five times: twice in the POW/MIA literature, twice by Senator Smith, and once by the IC. In his 1976 book, P.O.W., A Definitive History of the American Prisoner-of-War Experience in Vietnam, 1964-1973, John G. Hubbell stated, "In mid-December, 1970, members of Hanoi's delegation to the Paris Peace talks handed over to representatives of Senators William Fulbright and Edward Kennedy a list of 339 American POWs in North Vietnam." In his 1993 book, M.I.A. or Mythmaking in America, (expanded and updated edition) H. Bruce Franklin stated that, "The following month [December] North Vietnam . . . provided what it officially certified as the 'full and complete' list of all 339 prisoners it held"

Senator Smith has accurately referred to the number of living POWs cited in the Fulbright/Kennedy document on two occasions. In his 21 July 1993, "An Interim Analysis of the 1972 Translation of [the 1205 document]," he stated, "On December 22, 1970, the North Vietnamese delegate to the Paris Peace talks, Mai Van Bo, released to representatives of U.S. Senators Kennedy and Fulbright a list of the names of 368 POWs, 20 of whom were listed as having died, and nine of whom had previously been released." Senator Smith repeated that same information later in his analysis.

In the *Critical Assessment*, Senator Smith stated, "The 368 list itself consisted of 339 Air Force and Navy pilots and crew members currently in captivity, 9 such personnel previously released, and 20 such personnel listed as dead." He went on to say that, "The status of the 339 men listed as captives was already known to the Pentagon . . . , although this was the first 'official' acknowledgment of their status by Hanoi." He repeated the

information again in a *Critical Assessment* footnote (180), over 100 pages later.

In the *Critical Assessment*, Senator Smith hypothesized that only one of two conclusions could be drawn; either the Vietnamese had made a full accounting or they had decided not to make a full accounting, as the 735 document alleges. Senator Smith referred back to The Secretary of Defense's memorandum and stated that, "I do not accept it [the 368 list] as a complete list of all the prisoners held in North Vietnam."

In 1993, the IC was on the verge of focusing on the Vietnamese figure of 339 living POWs and the implications of that number, but missed the opportunity. In a 13 September 1993 DoS memorandum, "Vietnam-
INR Comment on the '735' Document," the Acting Chief, INR stated:

The report says Hanoi had "published the names of 368 fliers shot down and captured on the territory of the DRV" and that these would be returned "as a start" when the US "agreed" to withdraw. There . . . are inconsistencies in this statement. True, in December 1970, Hanoi passed to Senators Fulbright and Kennedy a list—the first ever—of 368 names purporting to be all the airmen captured over Vietnam. But only 339 were still living prisoners—20 were deceased, and 9 had been released years earlier. [The author's] purported statement that once the US had agreed to withdraw "we will, as a start, return to them these 368 people" is curious since only 339 prisoners remained.

Finally, handwritten notes taken during an IC discussion (DoS, DIA, Task Force Russia, CIA, NIO) after the surfacing of the 735 document contain two illuminating comments. First, "INR—. . . Number is peculiar," and second, "DIA—. . . Numbers 735 and 1205 can't both be right." There is no evidence that these INR and DIA comments were ever pursued. Neither the drafter of the 1994 IC assessment nor the drafter of NIE 98-03 picked up on this discrepancy.

The 368 figure cited in the second relevant section of the 735 document cannot be an informed North Vietnamese statement. For internal consumption, the figure had to be 339 because the Vietnamese knew that 29 of the 368 servicemen they were referring to had either died or been released. For external consumption, the figure could accurately have been no more than 359 (368 less the nine known by the world to have

been released). Based on the actual makeup of the "368" list as known to both the U.S. and North Vietnamese Governments in December 1970, the second paragraph in the 735 document relating to American POWs provides a false number.

Historical Setting of the 1205 Document

On 31 March 1968, a U.S. bombing halt north of the 20th parallel went into effect. On 31 October 1968, a complete bombing halt was ordered. That halt, excepting sporadic retaliatory strikes in 1969 and 1970 and again from February to September 1971, remained in effect until authorization was given for attacks on southern North Vietnam MiG bases on 7-8 November 1971. Operation Linebacker, including mining of North Vietnamese ports, began on 8 May 1972 and lasted until October 1972.

Accounting of U.S. Military Personnel Lost in Southeast Asia

1 January 1971-September 1972

Two sets of statistics provide comprehensive lists of U.S. military personnel lost in Southeast Asia by date of loss. One is a chronological name list that was maintained by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), based on information provided by the military services. The other is a chronological reference document maintained by DPMO. The January 1975 Comptroller's list and the May 1997 DPMO list provide a range of all possible U.S. losses in Southeast Asia between the dates of the 735 and 1205 documents, the end of December 1970 and 15 September 1972 respectively. The Comptroller's list is limited to military personnel unaccounted for in specific categories, such as KIA-BNR, while the DPMO list accounts for every loss regardless of category and includes returnees. We deleted foreign nationals and U.S. civilians from the DPMO list to maintain consistency with both the Comptroller's list and the contents of the 735 and 1205 documents.

The January 1975 Comptroller list includes 131 military personnel who were either captured or missing in Southeast Asia during the period from 1 January 1971 through 15 September 1972. Based on these figures, the 735 and 1205 documents cannot both be accurate; the addition of 131 names is far less than the 470 difference between the 735 and the 1205 numbers.

A higher figure is provided in the May 1997 DPMO list which includes 455 military personnel whose date of incident/loss occurred during the period from 1 January 1971 to 15 September 1972. Assuming that the 735 document is accurate and given the impossibility that all 455 personnel became POWs,¹⁶ the highest possible POW total at the time of the 1205 document would have been 1190. Conversely, assuming that the 1205 document is accurate, the lowest possible total at the time of the 735 document would have been 750.

¹⁶ The United States unilaterally recovered the bodies of 16 personnel, 11 of those in 1972.

Thus, opportunities for the U.S. pilot population in the North Vietnam prison system to grow were limited between the release of the 368 list in December 1970 and the purported 15 September 1972 date of the 1205 report.

The U.S. Government, just prior to the surfacing of the 1205 document in February 1993, acknowledged the detailed makeup of the 368 names on the Fulbright/Kennedy list and its relationship to what the United States knew. In its final report, released in January 1993, the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs stated that:

By September 1970, the number of confirmed American prisoners had risen to 335 [three months before the 735 speech]. On December 22, 1970, North Vietnam provided Senator Edward Kennedy with a list of 368 In mid-1972, the [Japanese news Agency] released a list of 390 U.S. POWs. DIA analysis found that 339 of the names on this list had been acknowledged previously as POWs by the DRV, 9 were individuals already released, 20 were servicemen the DRV had reported earlier as dead, and 22 were new names, all airmen lost over North Vietnam between December 1970 and May 1972 By the fall of 1972 [the time of the 1205 document], the list of confirmed U.S. POWs held by North Vietnam had risen to more than 400.

The Vessey documents are germane at this point. The Vietnamese provided General Vessey seven documents in 1993. Two of those documents are lists of American prisoners. The first of these is a copy of a handwritten spreadsheet in the Vietnamese language that accounts for American accessions into the North Vietnamese prison system since the capture of Lieutenant Everett Alvarez, U.S. Navy, who was shot down over North Vietnam in August 1964 and became the first entry on the list. The second document is a listing in English that is probably a continuation of the list of 368 names provided to Senators Fulbright and Kennedy in December 1970. The Vessey documents provide a way to extrapolate the number of Americans in the North Vietnamese prison system relevant to the 1205 document, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Status of U.S. Personnel Once in the North Vietnamese Prison System

Category	December 1970	December 1971	September 1972
POW	339	345	404
Deceased	20	20	22
Released	9	9	12
Total	368	374	438

Source: Fulbright/Kennedy list of December 1970 and Vessey Documents

The list of 368 Americans who the North Vietnamese claimed had entered their prison system remained static until December 1971, when six additional U.S. prisoners entered the system. Beginning on 16 February 1972, the list increased rapidly, reaching a figure of 438 by the date of the 1205 document. During that time, however, three more prisoners were released and two more died. Therefore, the figure relevant to the 1205 document of U.S. prisoners in the North Vietnam prison system was 404 (438 minus 22 deceased and 12 returnees), not 368. That is the figure that knowledgeable North Vietnamese would have used for internal consumption.

Concerning the number 368, the 1205 document states:

The 1205 American POWs kept in the prisons of North Vietnam represent a large number. For now, we have officially published a list of only 368 POWs. The rest are not acknowledged.

As discussed earlier, the figure of living U.S. POWs cited by a senior Vietnamese official to his leadership at this time should have been either 339 for consistency with the 735 document or 404 to be consistent with the numbers in the Vessey documents—because at least 29 POWs had either died or been released. Therefore, the reference in the 1205 document to 368 POWs is inaccurate. The 1205 document also notes that, "The work with American prisoners of war has always been within the field of vision of the Politburo and has been reflected in its decisions." If that is true, then the Politburo would have been aware of the increases and attrition cited previously.

Further, the 1205 document states, "We have captured 624 aviators in North Vietnam." That figure directly contradicts the 735 figure. By September 1972, the 735 figure would have increased to at least 805 (735 plus the 70-name increase to the 368 list, including deceased and released names). In sum, the 1205 document does not track with the 735 document, and it perpetuates a static 368 figure that knowledgeable Vietnamese would have known was inaccurate. Therefore, in our judgment, the POW/MIA section of the 1205 document is also false.

The Russian position on the numbers in the 1205 document has been communicated to the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on at least two occasions. In a 30 June 1994 letter to Senator Smith, the Chief of the GRU stated that, "We cannot confirm the correctness of the number of American prisoners (1205) mentioned in the report, inasmuch as this data was not relevant for us and was not rechecked." On 1 July 1997, the new Chief of the GRU repeated that statement to Senators Smith and Shelby and Representative Johnson during a Joint Commission meeting at the Russian Ministry of Defense. He concluded by saying that, "I do not have anything more to add concerning what [my predecessor] said."

A DoS analysis of the 1205 document in April 1993 raised two additional points that should have been addressed by the author of the 1205 document but were not. DoS argued that the document should have referred to a decision made two weeks earlier by the Vietnamese to release three additional pilots whose families were due in Hanoi on 16 September 1972. Secondly, DoS noted that the 1205 document did not address the increased number of prisoners as a result of the heavy U.S. bombing campaign of May-October 1972 and the resultant Vietnamese propaganda exploitation of POWs.

The JCSD files support the assessment that Vietnamese leaders would have been accurately informed about the numbers of American POWs being held. Those files contain a TFR (JCSD's predecessor) undated assessment, "Vis-a-vis the Russians: Analysis of the 1205 Document." In reference to the author of the 1205 document, the TFR document states that, he "cited the continued interest of the Politburo in the question of American prisoners of war." His speech strongly suggested ongoing discussion and debate within the Politburo regarding the disposition of American POWs.

Therefore, updated information on the number and disposition of POWs must have been discussed by the Vietnamese Politburo within the time frame of the 1205 document. The TFR analysis also states that:

Given the many inconsistencies and contradictions of the 1205 document, this type of analysis will allow the burden of proof to be placed on those who are holding back information, i.e., the Russians and Vietnamese. This may alleviate the need for the U.S. Government to derive a definitive truth from a partial piece of evidence—we do not have enough information to know what the 1205 document really means.

The *Critical Assessment* supports the view that accurate information would have been provided to the Vietnamese Politburo by senior Vietnamese officials. In addressing the NIE statement that "none of the Russians claimed that the figure of 1205 POWs was accurate," the assessment cites a GRU officer (as of October 1977) as stating during an interview that:

... the Vietnamese would not have deceived themselves at a closed Politburo session; they might have provided inaccurate information in press releases on their negotiations with the Americans, but they would have no reason to do so within closed sessions of their political leadership.

A Point of Logic

It does not matter whether the 735 and 1205 documents are genuine GRU documents or whether the contents not dealing with POW numbers are accurate. An analysis of the statements in the *Critical Assessment* devoted to proving that, because the documents are genuine and elsewhere accurate, the sections about POW matters are accurate as well is not warranted. It does not necessarily follow that because a document is genuine and two of its three parts are plausible that the third part is also plausible. Conversely, because one of three parts of a document is not plausible does not necessarily mean that the other two parts are also not plausible or that the document itself is not genuine.

Much effort has been expended to prove the *bona fides* of the 735 and 1205 documents and their respective authors. The pursuit thus far has been fruitless. As one member of the JCSD team conducting interviews

with Russians on the documents told us, "the process is more important than the results because there are no results." Nor does it matter. We accept the authenticity of the two documents, and we accept the accuracy of some of the contents of the documents. We do not accept references in the documents to the numbers of POWs held by the Vietnamese.

Nevertheless, because so much has been made of the testimony of and interviews with Russian sources, we reviewed the statements of Russian sources who have been interviewed by JCSD, including those mentioned in both the NIE and the *Critical Assessment*, to determine their opinions of the 735 and 1205 documents.

ASSESSMENT OF COMMENTS BY RUSSIAN SOURCES ON THE 735 AND 1205 DOCUMENTS

The NIE uses the results of five Russian interviews in its discussion of the IC's assessment of the 735 and 1205 documents. Based in part on those interviews, which the NIE categorizes as "new information," the NIE concludes that "none of the new information helps to confirm the accuracy of the 1205 report" and that the IC assessment of the 735 and 1205 documents released in January 1994 "remains valid."

A large portion of the *Critical Assessment* is a detailed analysis of the NIE's assessment of the 735 and 1205 documents. The *Critical Assessment* refers to four of the five Russian sources cited in the NIE and concludes that:

... the NIE's judgment on the 1205/735 documents cannot be accepted with confidence because it is **replete** [emphasis in original] with inaccurate and misleading statements and lacks a reasonably thorough and objective analytical foundation on which to base its judgment.

Our Approach

Both the NIE and the *Critical Assessment* refer to Russian sources, but cite them differently. We reviewed statements of 31 Russians made during interviews with JCSD analysts or in meetings with U.S. personnel. To assess the statements, we first defined the level of access that each individual had. We established three levels of access based on the

individual's level of responsibility and the nature of his assignments as follows:

- ◆ High—Reasonable expectation that the official had knowledge of policy and could have had access to documentation;
- ◆ Medium—Some expectation that the official had knowledge of policy and could have had access to documentation; and
- ◆ Low—Limited or no expectation that the official had knowledge of policy and could have had access to documentation.

We next reviewed the statements to establish how each Russian source rated the validity of the 735 and 1205 documents as genuine GRU acquisitions and the credibility of the information in each document concerning POW numbers.

Validity and Credibility

Thirteen of the 31 Russian sources (42 percent) considered the documents valid. Further, when only medium and high access levels are considered, 13 of 21 (62 percent) considered the documents valid. None of the Russian sources considered them not valid, and some had no opinion.

Five of the 31 Russian sources (16 percent) considered the documents credible. Three (10 percent) considered them not credible. Thus, 23 of 31 (74 percent) made no judgment. Only two of 12 individuals with a high level of access believed that the information in the 735 and 1205 documents was credible. One individual based his judgment on his belief that the GRU had the means to collect such information—not on validation of the information by other means. The other said that, if the Vietnamese claimed they held 735 American POWs, that was more than the Soviets had estimated. Three of nine individuals with medium access thought the information was credible. One, a Navy Captain in the GRU who had no direct knowledge of the 735 and 1205 documents, stated that the numbers cited in them could not be confirmed; he believed that Russia had no interest in having these numbers confirmed. The second individual, a 32-year veteran of the Soviet intelligence and security service (KGB), had no direct

knowledge of the documentation and said he never saw any information indicating POWs were detained after the Vietnam War. The third individual, the sole KGB representative to the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi between 1975 and 1979, commented that the documents confirmed his personal opinion that not all POWs were released. Not one of the five Russians who found the information credible had any independent means of verification.

Two Russian sources with high access believed the information was not credible. The Russian Ambassador in Hanoi between 1974 and 1986 questioned the credibility of the information because at no time during his tenure as Ambassador did he learn of any American POWs being held after the war. Another highly placed diplomat who worked on political issues concerning Vietnam at the Central Committee between 1963 and 1986 never saw or was made aware of the existence of the 735 and 1205 documents. One source with medium access who served in the Russian Embassy in Hanoi when the two documents surfaced stated that the 1205 document could be in error due to inaccurate GRU reporting, translation errors, or mistakes by the purported author and his staff.

Previously, we stated that we accept that the 735 and 1205 documents were genuine acquisitions. Statements made by Russian sources reinforce that acceptance. Furthermore, we found that one section of the 735 document and the section of the 1205 document pertaining to POW numbers were both false. Based on the statements made by 31 Russian sources, that finding stands. No estimate of credibility concerning numbers of U.S. POWs cited in the 735 and 1205 documents can be made based on the 31 Russian sources.

The *Critical Assessment* claims that the NIE statement that the new information from the Russian interviews does not help to confirm the accuracy of the 735 and 1205 documents is "factually inaccurate." The assessment indicates that the information provided by a number of GRU officers helps to confirm that the 1205 document was "an accurate representation of the political military situation in North Vietnam in 1972." Further, the assessment states that, "since 1994, the GRU has expressed its confidence in both the authenticity and the reliability of the information in the 1205 report." We reviewed the statements made by the GRU officials and found that none of them supports the POW-related contents of the 1205 document.

The Navy Captain claimed that the GRU had no interest in the POW issue nor did it perform an analysis of the 1205 document. In his opinion, the only value in the 735 and 1205 documents was the description of North Vietnam's internal political situation. Another GRU officer claimed that the Soviet estimate of the number of U.S. POWs in Southeast Asia in 1972 was far short of the purported figure in the 1205 document. JCSD concluded that, "the Soviet assessment supports the POW-related content of neither the 735 nor the 1205 document." The former Chief of the GRU said that the GRU could not confirm the accuracy of the number of American POWs in the 1205 document because the information "was not essential" to the Soviets. His successor said that he had nothing more to add to that statement.

The *Critical Assessment* claims that the GRU "has expressed its confidence in both the authenticity and the reliability of the information on the 1205 report." It does not mention, however, that the GRU sources do not support the POW-related content of the documents.

SEPARATE OR SECOND PRISON SYSTEM

The NIE stated that, if there were additional POWs, the IC would have known of them unless Vietnam maintained a separate prison unknown to the POWs who returned in 1973. The estimate concluded that, "we have uncovered no reliable evidence that a separate prison system existed for certain POWs; nor do we have such indicators as plausible site locations."

Concerning the issue of a separate or second prison system, the *Critical Assessment* refers to "substantial information and evaluations originated by or made available to the U.S. Intelligence Community both during and/or after the Vietnam War." The assessment asserts that, based on the 735 and 1205 documents, the large number of POWs not repatriated had to have been held in a separate or second prison system. Included in the evidence cited in the *Critical Assessment* is a reference to a CIA study in

early 1976 that concluded, "the possibility of a second prison system for the detention of American POWs in North Vietnam cannot be disregarded."

A more expansive quotation from the so-called CIA study appeared in a 1998 book, Code-Name Bright Light, The Untold Story of U.S. POW Rescue Efforts During the Vietnam War, by George Veith:

An analysis of 19 camps not known to have contained Americans revealed inconsistencies in the various camps' reaction to the Son Tay raid Some camps reacted defensively to the raid, others did not Only selected camps reacted initially to the raid The reason for this inconsistency in the various camps' reactions to the raid is not known. Because of this inconsistency . . . the possibility of a second prison system for the detention of American POWs cannot be disregarded.

In an end note, Veith sourced his quote to the:

Senate *Congressional Record*, January 26, 1994, p. S-163, Senator Bob Smith of New Hampshire is quoting from a just-declassified CIA photographic study of selected prison facilities in North Vietnam. The study was done in 1976.

We obtained a copy of the CIA prison camp study referred to by the *Critical Assessment* from the SSCI's holdings. The "study" is an untitled, undated, handwritten draft, apparently contained in a file folder titled "CIA PW Camp Study." The draft somehow survived the archival process and was included as a line item on page 119 of a 130-page transmittal record dated 4 May 1984, forwarded by the DIA POW/MIA Office to the Federal Archives and Records Center. An extract of the transmittal record and a copy of the handwritten draft were forwarded to Senator Smith on 12 November 1993 by the Acting Deputy Director, DPMO.

We located a second copy of the handwritten draft in the archives of the DIA Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs. Included with that undated draft marked "Working Paper" was a six-page, undated DIA informal review of the draft. The DIA conclusion was that:

None of the finding [sic] presented in this study provide [sic] any evidence to support the presence of U.S. PWs in the "Other Camps" or that a second prison system was maintained in North Vietnam for the purpose of holding U.S. PWs not released at Homecoming.

DPMO analysts told us that, in the 1980s, DIA pursued the possibility of a second prison system, ruling out the possibility for three reasons:

- ◆ Returned POWs did not describe a system of collection and evacuation that would split a segment of the POW flow from the North Vietnamese prison system;
- ◆ Extensive source reporting in the 1970s and 1980s did not validate a second prison system; and
- ◆ Reporting from former South Vietnamese commando returnees asked about contact with or observation of American POWs in the prison system in which they were held. There was no such contact or observation.

We found work relevant to the draft "study" in the holdings of CIA's DO-held POW/MIA-related information. Two folders in that collection contained documents associated with the search for POW camp information. None of the documents we reviewed drew a conclusion about the presence of American POWs at a particular camp based on imagery alone. For example, a typical document entry was, "Imagery alone cannot determine camp schedules, patterns of activity and nationality and dress of prisoners and guards." Positive identification of the presence of American POWs was made only when human source information was also factored in. Typically, the imagery analytical conclusion was either, "there is no sign of any activity indicating [that] the buildings are being used to house American POWs," or "There is no sign of any activity that could be associated with a POW detention camp."

The DO documents revealed that CIA, Office of Imagery Analysis (OIA) had systematically searched for POW camp information since at least 12 September 1966. Beginning in at least 1966, a formal standing requirement was levied each year, worded, "Identification of Installations in Southeast Asia Which May Contain American Prisoners."

Relevant work for the CIA prison camp study mentioned in the *Critical Assessment* was done by three individuals whose signatures were on several project-related memoranda. We interviewed the action officer for the study; he verified that he was the author of the handwritten draft that survived the archival process. He could not confirm which draft (first, second, final) had been archived because his practice had been to rewrite by hand each draft after management review. He said the task had been based on the premise that we "knew about the 'known camps'," (i.e., the camps that held Americans) and had identified a number of detention facilities not known to hold Americans. The requirement was to determine, using imagery, additional camps that might hold Americans. The methodology was to use the aftermath of the November 1970 Son Tay raid to determine what changes in security had taken place at the camps not known to hold Americans. Having determined those changes, the analytical question became, "could we use that change to provide evidence of American presence?" Although he drafted the wording quoted by the *Critical Assessment*, the action officer said that:

there was no way I could prove it; the change as determined from imagery was in itself not proof. There were no other sources of information.

The Director, OIA provided a status report on the study in a late December 1976 memorandum to the CIA, Deputy Director for Intelligence, that stated:

... we have performed a study of 25 prisons/POW Camps in northern Vietnam in an attempt to identify some method of analysis or signature to indicate the presence of U.S. POWs. Our study consisted of a comparative analysis of six confirmed American POW camps and 19 other prisons using photography dated prior to and after the 21 November 1970 raid on Son Tay. We found that all six of the known POW camps and 14 of the 19 prisons had new defenses added between

November 1970 and December 1972. Although this may be a possible indicator, it is not conclusive evidence of an American presence.

The Chief, Land Forces Division signed the completed study as a CIA internal memorandum on 7 February 1977. The study was based solely on imagery and focused primarily on the presence or absence of defensive positions. The handwritten draft which the *Critical Assessment* cited contained the following statement, in context:

This inconsistency [different patterns of post-reaction to the Son Tay raid] and the fact that several reports have been received recently stating that Americans are still being held in North Vietnam, the possibility of a second prison system for the detention of American POWs cannot be disregarded.

That statement did not survive the CIA review process. The final assessment made in the CIA internal memorandum was:

Although these may be possible indicators, it is not conclusive evidence of an American presence. We searched the official DoD files on the 19 prisons to correlate any reporting of an American presence with our photographic analysis. No correlation could be made.

In other words, the CIA, OIA, in the aggregate, followed the same logic it had used for individual camp assessments. Imagery alone (without all-source reporting, in this case the addition of human source information) cannot be used as a determinant.

In critiquing the original language, the Deputy Division Chief, OIA asked the imagery analyst if he was trying to sway the reader to a certain conclusion, perhaps not supported by the evidence. The analyst told us that, "maybe I wanted to find some new camps," and in consultation with the supervisor he recalled that perhaps he had not been "standing back and taking an unbiased look." He said he was a junior analyst at the time and might have been off the analytical track. He summarized by saying that, "I will have to say that [his] work, based solely on imagery, is even today, inconclusive." With one exception he never saw anything in his entire career that supported the statement he had made in the draft of the memorandum. The one exception was that he thought at one time there

"might be something" at a camp called Dong Ha that he recalled was in the Haiphong area. Nothing was ever substantiated. The imagery analyst was shown the signed internal memorandum; he said it accurately reflected his unbiased analysis.

We interviewed the CIA, DO counterintelligence analyst responsible for evaluation of the North Vietnamese security services and the North Vietnamese prison system. He held that analytical account continuously from 1965 to 1992, the first seven of those years working for the Chief of Station in Saigon. He stated that he was constantly attuned to the thesis that there might be a separate or second prison system, and he continuously looked for such a system. He never found any evidence of the existence of such a system.

In sum, there never was an all-source CIA "Prison Camp Study." Instead, the CIA, OIA provided an internal, imagery-based assessment to the DO. The coordination of a handwritten draft of that assessment with DIA resulted in the archiving of the handwritten draft by the DoD. That archived draft was assumed, erroneously, by researchers in the 1990s to be an IC product. It was neither an IC product nor a CIA product; it was the preliminary work of a junior imagery analyst that stated that the evidence from imagery was inconclusive.

ALLEGED TRANSFERS OF POWS FROM VIETNAM TO THE USSR

On the issue of the alleged transfers of POWs to Russia or elsewhere, the *Critical Assessment* states that:

... the books must definitely remain open on the transfer issue based on more pressing information previously made available to the IC but inexplicably not referenced in the NIE under the heading of unresolved transfer reports

The assessment differs with the NIE, particularly with respect to statements made by a late Russian General, who served as a military adviser to President Yeltsin and was the Co-Chairman of the Russian side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, and a former USSR Central

Committee Secretary. The *Critical Assessment* claims that the NIE accounts of information provided by the two officials are "inaccurate or lacking in important detail." We reviewed the statements made by those individuals and other Russian officials, and we examined evidence associated with the possible existence of a second prison camp system. We agree with the NIE assertion that, because of a lack of conclusive evidence disproving transfers, the "books should remain open" on the issue. To date, however, most, if not all, reporting avenues have been explored with negative results. Our review of the transfer issue, with particular emphasis on the comments of the late Russian General and the former Central Committee Secretary, follows.

The Russian General

The NIE states that the General told the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs that his delegation had uncovered no evidence that U.S. prisoners had been transported from Vietnam to the USSR. The *Critical Assessment* argues that the fact that the General did not uncover evidence of transfer does not constitute proof that such an event did not occur. The assessment cites as evidence a statement the General made to the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs on 11 November 1992, in which he said, "Hypothetically, we cannot dismiss the possibility that several individual American servicemen were taken to the Soviet Union from Vietnam." The *Critical Assessment* does not mention, however, that, in concluding that thought, the General said, "But, again, we have no precise information about such cases. It can only be called a possibility and I believe not a very strong possibility." In the same testimony, he claimed that there were no archives in Russia that he did not have access to and added:

No U.S. citizens are currently being detained within the territory of the former USSR. The conclusion is based on a thorough analysis of all archival documents, interviews with witnesses, and on-site inspections of possible American housing sites.

We examined several documents issued prior to this testimony that support the General's statement that no U.S. citizens were being detained. On 3 December 1991, the Interrepublic Security Service, successor to the former KGB Second Chief Directorate, told the U.S. Government that it had undertaken "an exhaustive search of available information and resources,

and had come up with no indication of such presence in the USSR past or present." On 6 December 1991, the Interrepublic Security Service advised the U.S. Government that, "On our part, we also do not have any information about American military personnel located on the territory of the USSR who were missing in action during the course of military activities in Indochina." Finally, in a 20 May 1992 letter to President Yeltsin, the Russian Minister of Security said that:

The Security Ministry, the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Russian Communist Party Archive do not have materials about the retention of American POWs on the territory of the former USSR. An analogous response was received from the Ministry of Defense and the GRU of the General Staff, OVS (Unified Armed Forces), SNG (Commonwealth of Independent States).

In spite of that, when asked in a 16 June 1992 "Dateline" interview about rumors that American POWs from the Vietnam War were transferred to the former Soviet Union, President Yeltsin responded that:

Our archives have shown that this is true. Some of them were transferred to the former Soviet Union and were kept in labor camps. We don't have complete data and can only surmise that some of them may still be alive. That is why our investigations are continuing. Some of them may have ended up in psychiatric asylums.

President Yeltsin's statement contradicts information provided to him by his Minister of Security barely one month prior to his "Dateline" interview. In late June 1992, the U.S. Co-Chairman of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission said that President Yeltsin "misspoke" when he said U.S. POWs might still be in the former Soviet Union. And, on 30 June 1992, following a meeting with President Bush, the Co-Chairman said that he had found no evidence in Moscow that any living American POW was being held against his will in the former Soviet Union.

In a July 1992 interview with the Russian newspaper, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, the General said that President Yeltsin had been mistaken and that archives showed no sign of any such prisoners ever being held in the former Soviet Union. During November 1992 hearings before the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, a letter signed by President

Yeltsin was entered into the record. The letter mentions evidence of Americans "staying in camps and prisoners of the former USSR," and says that some had been executed by the Stalin regime (1924-1953) and that others may still reside in the former Soviet Union. Yeltsin concluded that there were no Americans being held against their will in Russia. The IC has no information to support the claim made by President Yeltsin that U.S. POWs from the Vietnam War were held in Soviet prison camps; certainly, none was executed during the regime of Stalin, who died in 1953.

The *Critical Assessment* asserts that, after his November 1992 testimony before the Senate Select Committee, the Russian General said in an August 1994 autobiographical sketch that he had received a "very serious indication" that a transfer of U.S. POWs to the USSR may have taken place in the late 1960s. The *Critical Assessment* does not mention, however, that he goes on to say that, after discovering the "sensational document" about such a transfer, he immediately brought it to the attention of the Director of Foreign Intelligence. The Director's staff searched for any indication that the plan referred to in the document had been implemented. The General then said, "As I expected, they did not find the indications. They said the mission was not carried out." The autobiographical sketch concludes by stating, "The regime (Soviet) was such at the time that it was possible to contemplate the wildest scenarios."

The Central Committee Secretary

The NIE uses a former Central Committee Secretary for Maintaining Ties with Other Socialist Countries as an example of an official who served in Vietnam during the war and would have reason to know whether U.S. POWs were transferred to the USSR. The NIE reports that the Secretary served in Vietnam and told interviewers that he would have known if transfers had occurred; he believed no such transfers had taken place.

The *Critical Assessment* asserts that, although the Secretary traveled to Hanoi once to negotiate an agreement with North Vietnam, he did not serve in Vietnam. We found no information suggesting that the Secretary served in Vietnam. The *Critical Assessment* also states that the U.S. side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission frequently hears the claim, "I would have known" during routine interviews with former Soviet officials who display

an inflated view of their importance. We agree. We found several statements by former Soviet officials who claimed to be in a position to know about certain events, but whose claims we cannot prove or disprove without more evidence.

The NIE used the interview with the Secretary to point out that certain former Soviet officials did not believe that transfers of POWs to the USSR had occurred. The Secretary was just one of several possible examples. The NIE could have used a better example than the Secretary. For example, one official served in Vietnam from 1960-1962 and again from 1977-1983, when he was an adviser to the Soviet Ambassador; he worked for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the International Department dealing exclusively with Vietnamese issues from 1962-1977. In a March 1997 interview, the official stated that such transfers would not have taken place without the Politburo's knowledge and consent, and that if such a decision had been made, he would have known about it. The NIE also could have cited a career GRU Colonel who served in Hanoi from 1968-1972. During a December 1996 interview, the Colonel, commenting on the credibility of reports of transfers, said, "I will tell you quite frankly that the staff of the military attaché was not involved in such a thing. I do not know of a single incident." He added, "I never heard of this during my four years there. I also knew people in other services, and they would have told me."

Despite the statements of Soviet officials who had served in Vietnam, which the NIE drafter might have cited, the lack of conclusive evidence disproving transfers led to the NIE's conclusion that "the books should remain open on this issue" and, that "until some of the reporting . . . is clarified, we cannot say definitively that no POWs were transferred from Vietnam." The 17 June 1996 "Comprehensive Report of the U.S. Side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs" bolsters the argument that while the "books should remain open" on the issue, most, if not all, avenues have been explored with negative results. The report states that:

A four-year investigation into the activities of Soviet officials in Southeast Asia during the years of the Vietnam War has found no first-hand, substantiated evidence that American prisoners of war were taken from Southeast Asia to the Former Soviet Union.

The 1996 report reveals that the American side of the commission had been told "in definitive terms" that the Soviets "did not at any time" transfer American POWs to the Soviet Union. The report went on to state that the commission had interviewed more than 200 Soviets who had served in Southeast Asia during the war and that:

... every witness, without exception, stated that he had not known or heard of any operation to transport American prisoners to the Soviet Union.

According to the report, every senior Soviet official interviewed said that, if transfers had occurred, he "would have known about it." The report also mentions that, during debriefings of the nearly 600 returned POWs, none suggested that American POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union. Finally, among the documents collected by the commission, none contained information on transfers of American POWs to the Soviet Union.

CASE ASSESSMENTS

The final TOR for NIE 98-03 stipulated that:

... if the intelligence community judges these documents [the 735 and 1205 documents] to be accurate ... in their characterization of the number of American POWs held by North Vietnam, then it should answer the following question: "What is the likely range of numbers of American POWs under the control of the communist side when the Paris Peace Accords were signed in January 1973?"

The IC determined that the 735 and 1205 documents were not accurate in their characterization of the number of POWs held by North Vietnam and therefore did not pursue the issue of numbers of POWs held by North Vietnam at the time of Operation Homecoming. Senator Smith and staff members of the SSCI had anticipated that NIE 98-03 would address the issue of the number of POWs held by the Vietnamese at the time of Operation Homecoming and that it would look at the related issue of MIAs still unaccounted for from the war in Southeast Asia. It did not do so.

The 1993 report of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs left the issue of the discrepancy cases unresolved. Senator Smith

had continuing questions about the cases and developed a listing of 324 names which he titled, "U.S. POW/MIAs Who May Have Survived in Captivity," dated 1 December 1992. Repatriated remains reduced the number of names to 289 as of our review. In the 1995 time frame, DPMO prepared case assessments (two- to four-page summaries) of each missing person file.

Senator Smith's legislative assistant told us he had expected that the drafter of the NIE would review the case assessments pertaining to Senator Smith's compelling cases. No one reviewed those cases. DPMO confirmed that the drafter of the NIE did not review the case assessments and no one—other than DPMO—has validated or attempted to validate Senator Smith's list. We obtained from DPMO the case assessments for the 289 cases on Senator Smith's list of 324 names for which verified remains have not been returned. We undertook the task of reviewing these cases, and we have provided a framework that others can use to assess them (see Annex G for a discussion of our case assessment methodology).

Our Methodology

We believe that these cases are at the heart of the controversy over POWs in Vietnam and that an effort to evaluate them is essential. We therefore conducted our own assessment of the cases in a manner that can be replicated. Each member of our three-person review team independently evaluated the 289 cases without consultation or collaboration. The team was unconstrained in the time required to make an informed assessment and score each of the cases (see Annex H for results of our compelling case review). The six factors evaluated were:

- ◆ Is there evidence the individual survived the incident?
- ◆ Is there evidence the individual could have been taken captive?
- ◆ Is there evidence the individual entered a prison system?
- ◆ Can any of three governments (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) account for the individual?

- ◆ Was the case compelling prior to December 1992 (date of Senator Smith list) based on information available at that time?
- ◆ Is the case compelling today based on information received since December 1992?

Other than to simply make "yes," "no" or "inconclusive" entries in each of the six columns for each case, no further scoring was done until the three individual assessments were completed. We judged "compelling" twice, because the files available to us contained updated information since the publication of Senator Smith's list in December 1992. The word "compelling" needs to be clarified because it was undefined by Senator Smith. We accepted the term as being similar to the term "discrepancy" as used in the Vessey cases.¹⁷ For our purposes, compelling meant that there was something more to be known about the fate of the individual.

We decided to present the data in a way that provides the strongest possible support for Senator Smith's list of U.S. POWs who may have survived in captivity. We extended the range of each of the six factors listed above by scoring the data as follows:

- ◆ If all three reviewers scored a factor "yes" for a given case, we counted that as a unanimous group response; and
- ◆ If one reviewer scored a factor "yes" and at least one other reviewer scored that same factor either "yes" or "inconclusive" we counted that as a consensus group response.

Based on that two-fold scoring, the results for the first four factors of our independent review of 289 cases listed as compelling by Senator Smith are:

- ◆ At least 40 and as many as 91 of the 289 individuals could have survived the incident of loss;

¹⁷ General Vessey's discrepancy cases are those POWs who were expected to be repatriated, but were not. In August 1992, that number was 135; as of August 1999, the cases still not resolved had been reduced to 43. Senator Smith's list of cases has been referred to as "compelling" by Advocacy and Intelligence Index for Prisoners of War-Missing in Action (AII POW-MIA), and we use it here to distinguish it from the Vessey list. Based on verified remains recovery, the compelling case list had been reduced to 289 names at the time of our review.

- ◆ At least 13 and as many as 34 of those individuals could have been captured;
- ◆ At least six and as many as nine of those individuals could have entered a prison system; and
- ◆ One of the current Southeast Asia governments may be able to account for at least 25 and as many as 114 of the 289 individuals.

Further, concerning the "compelling" factor both in 1992 and today, the results of our independent review of the 289 cases are:

- ◆ At least one and as many as 19 of the 289 cases was compelling based on information available in late 1992; and
- ◆ At most, three cases are compelling today, none unanimously. None of these losses occurred in Cambodia, Laos, or North Vietnam; all occurred in South Vietnam.

Each member of the review team evaluated the files for each of these cases and made independent evaluations. These evaluations are intuitive, but the methodology can be replicated by others. We describe one particular case, that of Captain John McDonnell, that illustrates the difficulty of making such evaluations.

The McDonnell Case

The case of U.S. Army Captain John T. McDonnell (Case 1402) is complicated and has been reviewed repeatedly since his helicopter went down in 1969. The case reflects the polarization that exists concerning the MIA issue. A detailed discussion of our rationale for selecting the case and the steps we took to understand it is in Annex I.

The 1993 Senate Select Committee POW/MIA report portrayed the McDonnell case as follows:

On March 6, 1969, Captain McDonnell was the pilot [sic] of an AH-1G Cobra helicopter hit and downed by hostile fire in Thua Thien Province.

His crew member, a First Lieutenant, was rescued alive on March 7, but was unable to provide any information on the fate of Captain McDonnell. A search mission was also unsuccessful.

Captain McDonnell was declared missing and, in February 1977, was declared dead/body not recovered. Returning U.S. POWs were unable to shed any light on his fate.

U.S. investigators in Vietnam during January 1991 interviewed witnesses who described the capture of an American pilot in the area where Captain McDonnell disappeared. They reported he had a broken and bleeding arm when taken prisoner and brought to a People's Army of Vietnam regimental headquarters which received instructions to transport him to the Tri Thien Hue Military Region Headquarters. He died en route, was buried, and the U.S. field team was shown his purported burial site. The site was excavated but no remains were located.

A different story was contained in a 12 September 1999 posting on the Internet by the Advocacy and Intelligence Index for Prisoners of War-Missing in Action (AII POW-MIA). An article entitled, "Captain John T. McDonnell United States Army, ONE OF THE MEN WE LEFT BEHIND," began:

The next time someone asks you to name one American serviceman left behind in Southeast Asia, name just one Look them straight in the eye and say Capt. John T. McDonnell, United States Army, last known duty station Vietnamese Prison Camp Location Ba To, Quang Ngai Province, South Vietnam. Last seen in mid to late February 1973.

The AII POW-MIA analysis observed that:

- ◆ Examination of the downed helicopter revealed that Capt. [sic] McDonnell's seat belt and harness were open and placed neatly on the seat;
- ◆ On 16 February 1973 a North Vietnamese rallier reported that he observed two U.S. Prisoners of War with the North Vietnamese Army in Laos on three different occasions, between May and July 1971;

- ◆ On 10 April 1973 a North Vietnamese defector reported that in 1972 he saw an American Captain at the MR-5 PW Camp who was "a captured American artillery officer;" and
- ◆ A Project X study concluded there is a possibility that as many as 57 Americans could be alive. Captain McDonnell is included among the 57.

Facts

There are only two verifiable facts concerning this case. First, Captain McDonnell was last seen alive on 6 March 1969 entering aircraft 845, a Cobra AH-IG helicopter. Second, on 17 May 1992, Captain McDonnell's military identification card was located in the Hue Military Museum. All other information related to determining his fate is contained in the results of interviews. No intelligence information or other official reporting factually correlates to Captain McDonnell.

Circumstances of Loss

Sworn testimony taken by a Missing Person Board convened shortly after the loss revealed that Captain McDonnell was the team leader of a flight of two helicopter gunships, the Aircraft Commander of his gunship, and sat in the gunner's position on the day of his incident. He was not the pilot that day. His pilot executed a rocket run from which he could not recover and the gunship crashed into the side of a mountain. There was initial confusion as to whether the loss was due to hostile fire. The pilot of the other gunship reported no hostile fire. In an unsigned statement, Captain McDonnell's pilot reported hostile fire.

According to a certified extract of the Official Log, 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), the wreckage was found on 8 March 1969 and appeared not to have been disturbed. The front seat and safety harness were intact. An officer of the ground troops conducting the search reported that the wreckage had not been disturbed by the enemy. The position of the seat belts and safety harness indicated that the gunner [McDonnell] unbuckled himself and left the wreckage.

Additional sworn testimony taken by the board indicated that Captain McDonnell's commanding officer thoroughly searched the wreckage and the immediate area. The gunner's compartment was completely open with no evidence of damage to the seat. (According to the 1969 edition of Jane's All The World's Aircraft, the gunner's position of an AH-1G Cobra helicopter is located in the front, lower compartment. The aircraft is flyable from both positions, however). The shoulder harness was not broken and the seat belt was unlatched. The commanding officer said that:

... it was not possible to establish that the helicopter had been hit by ground fire. Although portions of the tail boom and main body showed no evidence of being penetrated, so much damage was inflicted by the crash that a positive determination could not be made.

The Vietnamese Account

JTF-FA reports of interviews with Vietnamese indicate that Captain McDonnell survived the crash and, while attempting to evade the enemy, was shot in the arm and captured. He was taken to the command post of the People's Army of Vietnam 4th Regiment. The regiment contacted the region headquarters for instructions and was directed to evacuate Captain McDonnell to the region hospital. Captain McDonnell did not survive the evacuation. The regimental commander forwarded Captain McDonnell's identification card to higher headquarters with a report concerning his capture and death. A senior district party official received the report and the identification card and forwarded them to province authorities. A Hue museum curator stated that Captain McDonnell's identification card was turned over to him by the senior district party official sometime after 30 April 1975.

Captain McDonnell's Status Changes

Initially, the Missing Person Board determined that Captain McDonnell was missing, not missing in action. The board apparently did not consider the helicopter pilot's unsigned statement about hostile fire persuasive. In a later signed statement, the pilot said that:

I broke left, we received fire and simultaneously entered the low clouds. The cyclic went limp and I could not turn the helicopter. I remember pulling pitch, then awoke laying [sic] on the ground on my chest protector.

Based on that statement, Captain McDonnell's status was changed from missing to missing in action.

In late 1976, Captain McDonnell's next of kin petitioned the Department of the Army to issue a death certificate. On 18 February 1977, the Army's Adjutant General found Captain McDonnell "to be dead." On 6 June 1994, a flag/general officer-level review convened by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs, assisted by two DPMO analysts and the Intelligence Officer, JTF-FA, voted 3-0 for a "confirmation of fate." The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense voted for the confirmation, despite advice from DPMO analysts to the contrary, and the case was removed from the discrepancy list.

Three Times a Discrepancy Case

The 1994 removal of Captain McDonnell from the discrepancy list culminated a near 20-year history of that case having been singled out three times as unresolved.

- ◆ **PROJECT X:** PROJECT X was a study initiated in August 1975 by the Commanding Officer, JCRC to "evaluate the possibility of any of the unaccounted for being alive." Captain McDonnell was included in the resultant list of 57 individuals. The Commanding Officer concluded that, "There is a possibility that as many as 57 Americans could be alive, although it is highly probable that the number is much smaller, possibly zero;"

- ◆ **Discrepancy Case:** Because Captain McDonnell was last seen alive—sworn testimony included in the Missing Person Board review confirmed that he entered the gunship the day of the incident—his case became a discrepancy case, consistent with the U.S. Government’s methodology; and
- ◆ **Compelling Case:** Because Captain McDonnell was allegedly correlated to two separate live sighting intelligence reports, his case became a compelling case, consistent with the full accounting methodology.

Our Assessment

Viet Cong policy, based on U.S. POW returnee experience and information in CIA files, was that any American who survived his immediate capture and transport would have entered the prison system or, if wounded, the hospital system. The report of the evacuation of Captain McDonnell is consistent with that policy. Intelligence reports from at least 1966 consistently state that Viet Cong policy concerning American captives was to evacuate them expeditiously to higher headquarters. While an evacuation of Captain McDonnell was ordered, he was never seen in the Vietnamese detention system.

AII POW-MIA argues that two live sighting reports—one filed with a JCRC tag line that “records indicate the source probably observed CAPT John T. McDonnell, USA,”—document Captain McDonnell’s status as POW/MIA. The other report was possibly correlated to Captain McDonnell or one other individual, but no JCRC determination was made. There is no reason to link either of the two reports to Captain McDonnell. Both reports describe an American in collaborative circumstances. None of the files we reviewed suggest that Captain McDonnell was a collaborator. He was a multiple-tour, decorated Vietnam veteran, *post-facto* promoted to the rank of Major.

We believe there is no factual information to support the contention that Captain McDonnell was left behind alive in Southeast Asia. There is, however, circumstantial evidence of his fate (see Annex I). Because that evidence is circumstantial, the case is likely to remain controversial—a continuing example of the polarization that has consumed the POW/MIA

issue. The DoD believes that all POWs are accounted for. All POW-MIA does not.

The McDonnell case is typical of several that we reviewed. Despite 30 years of continuous effort, there is no independently verifiable evidence of Captain McDonnell's fate. The information that has been collected, however, supports the conclusion that Captain McDonnell died in Vietnam after his capture.

PART V: CRITICAL ASSESSMENT CHARGES: POLITICIZATION

In addressing assertions of possible politicization made in the *Critical Assessment*, we have examined both the assessment's specific charges and its overarching implication that political pressure was applied to the estimate process by the Clinton Administration. The general charge of politicization is the more serious allegation because such a charge, even if vague and unsubstantiated, tends to gain credibility if it is repeated frequently. Indeed, the fact that many within the community of POW/MIA families believe that politicization exists is reflected in letters and memoranda written to government officials by the Executive Director of the National League of Families of Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia.¹⁸ This perception has been fed over the years by accusations of a government conspiracy to cover up the contention that American POWs were abandoned in Vietnam after Operation Homecoming in 1973.

We have examined each phase of the production of NIE 98-03, from the time it was requested in April 1997 through its publication in May 1998, to determine whether parties outside the IC attempted to influence the estimate's substance, judgments, or tone and, if they did, to what extent they succeeded. Because the *Critical Assessment* also implies that there was politicization of a prior IC publication (the 1994 assessment of the 735 and 1205 documents), we have reviewed the process of producing and releasing that document, looking for similar evidence of political pressure.

Attempts by policymakers to influence intelligence analysis are risky because they contradict the stated mission of intelligence and the professional ethic of the intelligence officer. Intelligence managers and analysts may react strongly if they believe that they are being pressured to slant or repress intelligence. We have made the assumption that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a policymaker to exert influence on the IC over a period of time without producing, at the very least, resistance and resentment by those intelligence analysts and managers whose analysis was being manipulated. For that reason, in our

¹⁸ In a letter to the DCI on 29 July 1997, the Executive Director said that the product of DPMO analysts had been "spun, covered with political documents, distorted in public statements and unconscionably delayed due to political considerations related to normalization of relations with Vietnam. This is all documentable and well known." The Executive Director urged the DCI to produce another NIE that is "clear, objective, and does not pull punches."

interviews with those involved in the production of NIE 98-03, we raised both the question of political pressure and the issue of the integrity of the process and the product.

The general reference to possible politicization made by Senator Smith in the *Critical Assessment* is that:

Congress and the leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) need to examine what role the White House, its National Security Council, and certain US policymakers responsible for advancing the Administration's normalization agenda with Vietnam may have played in influencing or otherwise affecting the judgments of the IC as reflected in the NIE.

The assessment states that, if improper communication or influence took place, immediate steps should be taken "to determine how this could have occurred." Such a review is critical, it says, to ensure "that the IC is providing objective and independent analysis to its customers." Our review will look first at the specific charges made in the assessment to support this general allegation, then return to a discussion of the broader assertion of politicization of NIE 98-03.

SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZATION

DoD Testimony (March and June 1998)

The *Critical Assessment* connects the timing of the NIE's preparation and publication and the Clinton Administration's determination in March 1998 that Vietnam was "fully cooperating in good faith" with the United States on the POW/MIA issue. President Clinton, it says, told Senator Smith that the results of the NIE "would be taken into account as we continue to advance our agenda with Vietnam." But, the assessment states, the President issued his 1998 determination that Vietnam was fully cooperating in good faith on 4 March 1998—"one month *prior* to the NIE's official dissemination."

Having established a juxtaposition of events, the *Critical Assessment* describes several incidents that imply that political influence was exerted on the estimate process through the DoD. This presumed chain of influence runs from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs through his Principal Deputy through DPMO to the NIC. The evidence supporting the

implication involves congressional testimony given by the Under Secretary on 5 March 1998, the day after the President issued his determination, and by the Principal Deputy on 17 June 1998. The assessment states that the testimony of the Principal Deputy undermined assurances provided by the Under Secretary and casts doubts on assurances from the DCI that "at no stage was there higher level or other intervention to change or shape the body or judgments of the NIE."

On 5 March, the Under Secretary appeared before the Senate Committee on Armed Services (of which Senator Smith is a member). In response to questions posed by Senator Smith, the Under Secretary said that he was aware that the POW/MIA estimate was being prepared, but that he was "not in a position to comment on what information was obtained from the IC in connection with the determination." In his interview with us, the Under Secretary re-confirmed his testimony. He said that he had had no association with the NIE—that he never saw it in draft, was never asked to comment on it, and never talked with anyone about it. He reaffirmed that he did not know what information the DoD may have provided the President on the issue of certification. Furthermore, he stated, his testimony on 5 March had nothing to do with POW/MIA affairs; rather, Senator Smith had "branched off" into that subject.¹⁹

In his appearance before the House Committee on International Relations on 17 June to testify on POW/MIA matters, the Principal Deputy was asked by the Chairman of the Committee what role the DoD had played in the Presidential determination. When the Principal Deputy responded that the Department had indicated that Vietnam was fully cooperating, the Chairman asked whether the Principal Deputy had before him the NIE on POW/MIA affairs at that time. The latter responded that, "We were actually working on it at the same time, because we were working with the Central Intelligence Agency on that issue, and so it was concurrent, simultaneous." He went on to say that the estimate was not issued until April 1998 and that, while he did not have the final estimate before him in March, "we certainly knew what was in it, and we were involved in the preparation of the estimate." The Chairman then asked him

¹⁹ The Under Secretary was testifying before the Committee on Armed Services; the subject was "The Role of the Department of Defense in Countering the Transnational Threats to the 21st Century, Including Terrorism, Narco-Trafficking, and Weapons of Mass Destruction."

if "he would have had the occasion to see what the report said at the time you made your decision;" the Principal Deputy responded, "Yes."

The Principal Deputy's testimony reveals that he did have knowledge of the contents of the draft NIE by early March 1998. In our interview with him, however, he indicated that he had not actually seen the estimate prior to its publication in April 1998 and that his positive response to the question of his having seen it had been "hasty." He stated that he was not directly involved in the estimate, but knew that the process was ongoing and that the NIC was working with DPMO. When he testified that "we" were working on the NIE, he meant that DoD analysts were working with the drafter. He stated that the Acting Director, DPMO kept him advised of the progress being made; when the certification issue came up in March, he asked the Acting Director, DPMO if the developing NIE was consistent with certification and was told that it was. He said he thought he would have known what the key judgments were going to be and what the findings might be, although he did not see them in the drafting phase.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, to whom the Principal Deputy reports, does not remember being involved in the estimate process. He was aware the NIE was being done and remembers seeing it when it was finished, but he is positive that he did not see it in draft. He told us that DPMO would almost certainly have helped prepare both the Under Secretary and the Principal Deputy for testimony that involved POW/MIA issues. As noted previously, however, the Under Secretary had not expected to be testifying about POW/MIA issues before the Senate Committee on Armed Services.

The *Critical Assessment* asserts that the testimony of the Principal Deputy casts doubt on the reliability of assurances that there was no higher level intervention to change the substance or judgments of the NIE. In fact, the testimony does not imply that there was intervention to shape the judgments of the NIE. At the most, it reveals that the Principal Deputy had knowledge of the contents of the estimate before it was published. It is very likely and hardly surprising that he did have such knowledge and that his information came from the DPMO, as he explains. The first draft of the estimate had been completed by early February, and the drafter had been communicating with DPMO analysts since the beginning of the process. Furthermore, the draft had been sent to organizations that work

closely with the DPMO. There is little doubt that DPMO had knowledge of the basic judgments of the draft estimate by early March. The draft report was not forwarded to the DPMO, however. We believe that the draft estimate was seen for the first time by a DPMO official on 20 March, when the Acting Director was shown a copy by the NIO/EA. We found no information suggesting that the draft was seen by DoD policymakers in DoD before it was released. Nor did we find information to support the charge that any intervention was made on the part of DoD policymakers to influence the estimate.

The *Critical Assessment* makes one more assertion of a linkage between the DoD and the preparation of the NIE. It states that the NIO/EA, in his briefing to the U.S. side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, and the Principal Deputy, in his testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, both of which occurred on 17 June, used the same phrase to characterize Vietnamese cooperation on POW/MIA matters. Both indicated that there had been "improved cooperation." Because this "exact phraseology" is not found in the NIE, the assessment charges, and because these two individuals used the same language "on the same day in response to the same question," this raises "more questions about additional collaboration between the National Intelligence Council and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy." The phrase "improved cooperation" is commonly used phrasing, however, and is so close to other language used to define Vietnam's performance ("more" cooperation or "increased" cooperation) that the *Critical Assessment* charge is unconvincing.

Outside Readers

The *Critical Assessment* states that the NIC selected four individuals from outside the IC "with expertise on the Vietnam POW/MIA issue" to review the draft and provide commentary. The assessment cites as its source the briefing provided by the NIC to the U.S. side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs on 17 June 1998. In that briefing, the NIO/EA stated that the NIC had reached out to people outside the IC who had expertise "in this area." Of the four outside readers, two had expertise in Southeast Asia issues ; none had specific expertise on the Vietnam POW/MIA issue; and two had no expertise in either Southeast Asia or the POW/MIA issue.

The *Critical Assessment* asks whether one or more of these individuals may have been employed in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, which includes DPMO—an "office which supports U.S. policy that Vietnam is fully cooperating in good faith on the POW/MIA issue." None of the four outside readers was from DPMO or from any other DoD office, although one had served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy during the Bush Administration. The draft estimate was shown to a fifth "outside" reader, however, the Acting Director, DPMO.

To determine what impact the outside readers may have had on the substance, judgments, and tone of the NIE, we examined annotated copies of draft reports as well as messages and memoranda addressing the comments and suggestions of various readers. In addition, we reviewed the draft reports, comparing them for changes that affected substance, judgments, or tone. Because the assessment expressed particular concern that DPMO may have influenced the NIE, we have included an analysis of the changes made to the draft after the Acting Director, DPMO reviewed it.

The NIO/EA showed a copy of the 17 March draft estimate to the Acting Director, DPMO on 20 March. The Acting Director was not one of the four outside readers; rather, he was shown the draft because of his background knowledge of the POW/MIA issue. The Acting Director reportedly expressed an opinion on the draft's language concerning Vietnamese mistreatment of POWs. As indicated previously, the DPMO position on this issue differed from that reflected in the NIE. No changes were made in the text on this subject. Changes made to the 23 March version of the estimate are modest and do not move the estimate in any consistent direction. There is no indication that the review by the Acting Director, DPMO resulted in any changes to the draft.

The 23 March NIE draft was provided for comment to two outside readers. The suggestion of the first, a former Deputy Chairman of the NIC, was to soften the tone of the estimate, which he called "overly rosy," in order to avoid antagonizing those "who are already doubters." We have some concern about the selection of the second reader, both because he had been National Security Adviser in 1993, when the original IC analysis of the 735 and 1205 documents was undertaken, and because he had been involved in the Clinton Administration's policy of normalizing relations with Vietnam. He had little comment on the draft, however; he did

express concern that the box listing SRV officials involved in the POW/MIA issue did not include any officials who were not cooperative.

There was little disagreement at the IC coordination sessions, held in late March. According to the accounts of representatives to the meetings, the first two outside readers and DIA had indicated that, in a few instances, the draft was "too apologetic" to the Vietnamese or "unduly charitable in rating Vietnam's performance." Both outside readers had suggested that making the language more modest would "make for a more persuasive paper" and "would not immediately set off critics of Vietnam's record of cooperation on this issue." As a result, a more circumspect, but still basically positive, appraisal of Vietnam's performance emerged from the coordination sessions.

Following the NFIB meeting on 13 April 1998, at the request of the DCI, the NIC provided the draft to two more outside readers. In his comments, the former DCI said his suggestions were "intended to strengthen our case against the minority of readers who would be reflexively critical." The suggestions he made included adding data and analysis to bolster judgments made in the estimate. In the end, however, the suggestions of these readers were not reflected in the draft.

The *Critical Assessment's* implication that the outside readers influenced either the body or judgments of the NIE is unfounded. None of the outside readers made suggestions designed to alter either. Several readers did, however, recommend changes designed to modify the tone of the language to deflect the anticipated negative reaction of those who were critical of Vietnam's record of cooperation on the POW/MIA issue.

Policy Contacts

The *Critical Assessment* emphasizes that, in the course of preparing the estimate, the NIE drafter interviewed the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam and the Director for Indochina, Thailand, and Burma, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The assessment describes these two men as the Clinton Administration's "biggest advocates for continued expansion of US relations with Hanoi." The implication is that these two officials may have influenced the views of the drafter and the judgments in the NIE.

The drafter met with the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam in February 1998. The only clear indication of a point the Ambassador wanted to make occurred in the section of the NIE draft dealing with Vietnamese refusal to provide Politburo documents. A phrase in the 20 February draft that was reviewed by the Ambassador indicated that Vietnam would not provide such documents "*any more than foreign governments, such as the United States, would open their sensitive records to Vietnamese officials.*" A handwritten note by the drafter states that "the Ambassador wants this emphasized." While the Ambassador did try to influence the draft in this instance, his request was rejected; in fact, the entire phrase was deleted from the estimate. The 17 March version of the estimate, which would have reflected the Ambassador's views, showed no change in language that could be considered more supportive of Administration policy; in fact, the changes tended to reinforce skepticism about Vietnamese cooperation.

The drafter met with the Director for Indochina, Thailand, and Burma, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs early in the research phase of the process. The Director told us that they discussed the early history of the issue; key decision points for both the Vietnamese and U.S. leadership; specific questions concerning the 735 and 1205 documents; and the structure of Vietnamese organizations dealing with the POW/MIA issue. Other than providing background information and suggesting documents that the drafter should read, the Director stated that he had no contact with the drafter and did not contribute to the NIE; nor did he see the estimate until it was released. Interviewing policymakers who have specific knowledge or expertise is neither unusual nor out of line during the research phase of an estimate. In the case of this estimate, the drafter makes it clear that he consulted with U.S. policymakers in order to gather information on Vietnamese cooperation.

Charges of Politicization in 1993/94

The *Critical Assessment* maintains that the questions it has raised about the politicizing of intelligence with respect to the NIE are relevant in view of "indications suggesting that such actions took place during the current Administration on the same issues being reviewed in the current NIE." It then makes a number of assertions about the events leading up to the DoD release in January 1994 of an unclassified interagency intelligence analysis of the 735 and 1205 documents.

NSC Tasking

The *Critical Assessment* states that, on 12 February 1993, the then-Deputy National Security Adviser, having been briefed on the discovery of the 1205 document, tasked the IC to analyze the implications of the following hypothetical scenario:

Assume that a document from a senior North Vietnamese Army official established that on September 15, 1972, the North Vietnamese were holding 1205 American prisoners of war . . . ; the North Vietnamese were deliberately concealing the true number of prisoners they were holding from the outside world; the fate of these prisoners was under consideration by the Hanoi Politburo . . . if such a document were deemed reliable . . . what are the implications of this information generally, what are the implications in light of Vietnam's obligations under the Paris Peace Agreement?

The assessment goes on to say that:

. . . the phrasing of this White House tasking, i.e., if such a document were deemed reliable, what are the implications . . . , can be interpreted as politicizing of intelligence, because it opens the door for an Administration judgment that a document is *not* reliable if it is deemed to have *negative* implications for planned U.S. policy toward Vietnamese if it is judged to *be* [emphases in original] reliable.

By omitting a key portion of the tasking (in bold below) and creating a false continuous sentence, the *Critical Assessment* has created an out-of-context quotation that distorts the meaning of the language. In fact, the tasking listed the various conditions of the document (i.e., the North Vietnamese were holding 1205 American POWs, concealing the true numbers, and deliberating their fate). The tasking then began a new paragraph which asked:

If such a document were deemed reliable, **how would this information conform with our existing knowledge of American POWs?** [emphasis added] What are the implications of this information generally? What are the implications in light of Vietnam's obligations under the Paris Peace Agreement?

While the wording of the tasking may be awkward, it is not asking what the implications are for U.S. policy as the *Critical Assessment* implies. It

does not appear to be pre-judging the conclusions of the analysis it is requesting. Nor does it imply that the Administration plans to judge the document as *not reliable* if it is deemed to have *negative* implications for planned U.S. policy. The tasking appears to be raising questions of legitimate interest and concern to policymakers, particularly during a period when the Clinton Administration was trying to establish its policy toward Vietnam. In any event, it is the prerogative of policymakers both to task the IC and then to do what they want with the information and analysis they receive.

In its response to the tasking, the DIA Office for POW/MIA (the predecessor to DPMO) discussed the implications of such a claim, i.e., that the North Vietnamese were holding 1205 American POWs in September 1972. As cited in the *Critical Assessment*, the DIA response provides hypothetical conditions such a fact might imply (e.g., that the Vietnamese would have been holding 665 more POWs than we were aware of at that time; that these POWs would have to have been spirited away from the point of capture and placed in a completely separate prison camp; and that some of these men would have survived to the present). In addition, the DIA response analyzes these hypotheses and conditions, concluding that, "the undisputed evidence provided by 30 years of intelligence collection refutes the hypothesis."

IC Analysis: Timing of Release

The *Critical Assessment* states that the interagency analysis of the 735 and 1205 documents was disseminated to the media on 24 January 1994, "three days prior to a U.S. Senate vote on whether to urge the lifting of the U.S. trade embargo on Hanoi, and one week prior to the President's announcement of his determination to lift the embargo." It terms the timing of the release suspicious, because the study had been prepared and forwarded to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in an unclassified format seven months earlier and because the President had stated on 10 December 1993 that he intended to release the analysis as soon as possible. According to the *Critical Assessment*:

Clearly, the release of this unclassified document of information prepared with major input by elements of the Intelligence Community, had been delayed for political purposes in order to obtain maximum effect on decisions being made and/or announced within the Congress and the White House.

The *Critical Assessment* is correct in asserting that there was an unexplained delay in the release of the report and that it may have occurred for political reasons. The delay was not as long as the assessment implies, however. On 21 May 1993, the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs requested that an interagency study of the 1205 document be prepared; he noted that several agencies had done analyses of the document and published initial findings, but that the findings should be combined into a coordinated document. He noted that the outcome of the meeting would be a final paper that DoD could release and that would serve as a position paper for testimony, media inquiry, and other scrutiny. The Deputy NIO/EA agreed to chair an IC panel to assess the 1205 document.

Much of the work for the interagency study already had been done. DIA, INR, and the Deputy NIO/EA (drawing on both the DI and the DO) had analyzed the 1205 document separately. Each had concluded independently that, while it probably was a valid GRU document, the information it contained on American POWs was not valid. The Deputy NIO/EA prepared a draft and sent it to the IC representatives in early June 1993. The draft's "bottom line judgment" was that "the document is not what it claims to be, and the information suggesting more than 600 additional POWs were held in Vietnam is not accurate." This judgment would not be disputed by any IC member and would be the judgment of the paper released to the public in January 1994 by the DoD. Two coordination meetings were held to discuss the study, and minor changes were made.

The coordinated study was sent to the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs in late June 1993. He did not release it publicly at that time. The Acting Deputy told us that he thought the assessment was fair and straightforward, but that he knew it would draw criticism because it had political implications. He said that politics might have been a consideration in his reluctance to release it to the public.

On 2 September 1993, portions of the second GRU document, the 735, were made public, and DoD again requested an IC assessment. The Deputy NIO/EA gathered the same interagency group and updated the original study to include an analysis of the available portions of the 735 document. The study was sent to the Acting Deputy, who "again chose not

to release it," according to the Deputy NIO/EA, who went on to say that the Acting Deputy "had complained that some of the points were a bit to [sic] sharp....

The study also raised concerns in the NSC. The Acting Deputy was not alone in arguing that the analysis of the documents was too sharp. According to several accounts, the National Security Adviser indicated that he wanted the analysis "flattened" in the study that was going to be released to the public. A member of the NSC staff confirmed that the National Security Adviser considered the study "too dismissive" of the 735 and 1205 documents and wanted the drafter to state that the books would not be closed on these reports. The Deputy NIO/EA wrote on 19 January 1994 that:

... the White House is perhaps oversensitive to charges that we are "debunking" these reports (the 735 and 1205) and appears to want to hold out at least the possibility that they may be valid.

According to the Deputy NIO/EA, the Acting Deputy believed that "we have to call them as we see them." In addition, the Acting Deputy indicated that DPMO analysts were resisting the changes that "flattened" the language and might insist that they be restored. The Deputy NIO/EA would have had no problem restoring the original language; he argued that the critics are going to "dive bomb the Administration no matter what and cannot be assuaged with word-noodling." The political issue that held up release of the unclassified study, at least at this stage, appears to have been pressure from the National Security Adviser to "flatten" the tone of the language to make it more palatable to those who accepted the validity of the 735 and 1205 information, combined with reluctance on the part of the Acting Deputy to release a study that would be attacked by critics of Administration policy. We found no evidence that the delay was linked to a decision on lifting the trade embargo as the *Critical Assessment* alleges.

The unclassified interagency analysis of the Russian documents was released by the DoD on 24 January 1994. The analysis and conclusions were the same as those in the separate DIA, INR, and Deputy NIO/EA studies as well as those in the coordinated draft studies. The tone of the study, however, is somewhat more conciliatory; the door is open to new information that may shed more light on the validity of the information in the documents. While the drafter of the IC study did not feel political

pressure from the Clinton Administration to change judgments, he did feel pressure to soften the tone of the report to make it more compatible with the views of those who believed that the 735 and 1205 documents contained valid information on the number of American POWs held by the Vietnamese in 1972.

Charges of Improper Direction

At the end of its section on politicization of the 1993/94 process, the *Critical Assessment* implies that, on several occasions, improper comments were made or directions given that constituted politicization. The first is said to have occurred at a White House meeting with the President, Vice-President, National Security Adviser, and two other DoD and DoS officials involved with POW/MIA accounting efforts. The assessment indicates that this meeting occurred before the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy formally requested that an assessment of the 1205 document be prepared for release to the public (the DoD request was made in May 1993). During the meeting, according to the *Critical Assessment*, the President reportedly stated that he "did not want the 1205 document to get in the way of normalization of relations with Vietnam." The implication is that the President's statement precipitated a decision to produce and release to the public a politicized study that would dismiss the 1205 document.

We interviewed two senior officials who met with President Clinton on 15 April 1993 to discuss the POW/MIA issue. One indicated that he had heard the President utter the statement exactly as quoted above, but that it would be inappropriate for him to comment further about the meeting. The other senior official, read the following excerpt from his notes of the meeting:

He [the President] wanted to move forward [with normalization], but Vietnam had to take the initiative with the fullest possible accounting of MIAs; must have tangible progress to resolve the 1205 document [sic].

This official said that he did not recall the President saying anything about not letting the 1205 document get in the way of normalization or any words to that effect.

In the aftermath of the meeting of 15 April, the President's Special Emissary to Vietnam, General John Vessey, traveled to Hanoi. Both his talking points in preparation for the trip and his news briefing after the trip

indicate that resolution of questions related to the 1205 document was a major issue during his trip. At his news briefing on 21 April, General Vessey stated that he had come away from meetings with the President before his trip and after his return from Vietnam with the view that, "the fullest possible accounting for missing Americans is a high priority issue." He said that the President had "made it clear to me before I went to Vietnam, he made it clear to me today [sic]." A senior official who served on the NSC during this period told us that, while there was natural concern that the 1205 document would have an impact on policy, there was never any indication that we should not do everything necessary to follow up on it.

In the months that followed, the Clinton Administration reaffirmed its commitment to the fullest possible accounting for POW/MIAs and continued the trade embargo against Vietnam pending further progress on POW/MIA accounting. President Clinton announced the lifting of the trade embargo in February 1994, after the Senate approved a non-binding resolution urging that he do so. In July 1995 (more than two years after his alleged comments on the 1205 document), President Clinton announced the normalization of relations with Vietnam.

We found no credible evidence that the Clinton Administration tried to pressure the IC to ignore or dismiss the 1205 document in 1993. Rather, the evidence available to us suggests that the Administration's political concern was just the opposite—that it not appear to be dismissing or debunking the 1205 document; this concern would be expressed again in 1998 as NIE 98-03 was being prepared.

The final allegation in the *Critical Assessment* is that, at the first meeting to discuss preparation of the 1994 assessment of the 1205 document, the Deputy NIO/EA:

... reportedly announced to those gathered that the 1205 was not reliable with respect to U.S. POWs, and that was the operating assumption under which the 1993/94 DoD-released product was consequently prepared.

This charge is not supported by the facts. The first meeting to discuss the interagency study was held on 4 June 1993, after the Deputy NIO/EA had disseminated his rough draft which included the analysis that the 1205 document was not reliable with respect to numbers of U.S. POWs and after each of the participating agencies had disseminated separate reports that

independently arrived at the same conclusion on POWs. All participants had reached the conclusion that the information on POWs in the 1205 document was not reliable before coming to the interagency meeting; it was not a conclusion dictated to them by the Deputy NIO/EA.

The *Critical Assessment* acknowledges that the evidence brought to bear on specific charges of politicization is "circumstantial." We found only one incident raised by the *Critical Assessment* that is supported by our evidence and that suggests political considerations affected intelligence reporting on the POW/MIA issue; that instance is the DoD delay in releasing the unclassified interagency study on the 735 and 1205 documents in 1993-94. While it is not the right of the policymaker to change the substance or judgments of an intelligence product, it is the prerogative of a policymaker to request that an intelligence product be declassified for release and to decide whether and when to release such a product. While the decision of the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs to delay publication probably was influenced by political considerations, it was within his authority to make. The handling of the matter did not affect the findings of the intelligence product.

GENERAL CHARGE OF POLITICIZATION

The general allegation that the Clinton Administration has politicized intelligence on the POW/MIA issue and specifically on NIE 98-03 certainly will persist. It stems from the belief that the U.S. Government is covering up the fact that American POWs were abandoned in Vietnam after Operation Homecoming in 1973. In this section, we will address the allegation that NIE 98-03 was politicized by reviewing instances of attempted influence on the process.

We interviewed more than 80 individuals in the IC and the policy side of the Executive Branch to understand the steps involved in the process of preparing, coordinating, and approving NIE 98-03. These interviews uncovered no instances of pressure from the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government to influence the body or judgments of the estimate. The National Security Adviser requested that the NIC produce the estimate and that the TOR be coordinated with the SSCI. After that, neither he nor any other member of the NSC played any role in the production of the NIE. The DoD's involvement included the data and

analysis from DPMO, CILHI, Stony Beach, and JTF-FA and draft coordination by DIA and the members of the MIB. At no time did any DoD policymaker attempt to influence the body or substance of the estimate. At the DoS, the INR analyst played a role in coordinating the draft estimate. Aside from the request by the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam that a point in the draft estimate be emphasized, there was no attempt by DoS policymakers to influence the body or substance of the estimate. Similarly, in its meeting to approve the NIE, the NFIB, which is made up of the most senior members of the IC, made no attempt to influence the body or substance of the estimate.

We found unusual interest and involvement in the estimate process by parties outside the IC, however. Both the SSCI and Senator Smith had an impact on the estimate process, beginning with the negotiation of the TOR. The NIO/EA believed that he could not proceed until the SSCI had responded to each version of his TOR. This resulted in accumulated delays of almost six months. It also resulted in some confusion about the actual scope of the estimate and the time frame it would cover. None of the individuals we interviewed knew of an instance, other than this one, in which coordination of TOR by a non-IC organization had occurred.

Senator Smith and his staff also played a key role in shaping the TOR. The NIO/EA at the time the TOR were being negotiated intended that a re-evaluation of the 735 and 1205 documents would be a separate research study. Senator Smith wanted the re-evaluation to be part of the NIE and this view was conveyed to the SSCI staff; the SSCI suggested changes to the TOR in late October 1997 that included a re-evaluation of the 735 and 1205 documents as one of the two key questions to be addressed in the estimate.

In his November 1997 meeting with the NIO/EA, Senator Smith went further, telling the NIO/EA what conclusions he thought the NIE should reach. He expressed his views about the key issues involved, particularly on the subject of the 735 and 1205 documents, and he said that he was not confident that the Clinton Administration would not interfere in the estimate process. His legislative assistant offered to participate in the estimate process itself.

On the eve of the MIB and NFIB meetings of April 1998, Senator Smith raised the issue of the documents held at the SSCI, stating that no

one had reviewed them and that, if the IC published the NIE without such a review, he could not "believe in it." His concern resulted in a delay in publication of the estimate. The DCI directed that a team visit the SSCI to read the documents and that two more outside readers review the draft NIE. In addition, the DCI became more involved in questioning the language of the estimate.

While we found no evidence that any member of the Clinton Administration made any effort to influence the substance, conclusions, or judgments of NIE 98-03, members of the IC as well as outside readers of the estimate were keenly aware that the NIE would be criticized by those who believed that the Vietnamese were not cooperating in good faith on POW/MIA matters and those who believed that American POWs were left behind in 1973. At numerous stages in the production of the estimate, readers urged that the tone of the estimate, but not its fundamental conclusions, be softened to placate potential critics. The result was an estimate which softened its language on issues involving Vietnamese cooperation; the alleged transfer of American POWs to the USSR; the assessment of the 735 and 1205 documents; and the charge that American POWs were left behind following Operation Homecoming.

From the beginning, Senator Smith had an impact on the estimate process:

- ◆ The TOR process was delayed;
- ◆ Confusion over the scope of the estimate and the time frame it would cover was never fully resolved;
- ◆ Both DPMO and the NIO/EA, who had been criticized by Senator Smith, withdrew from formal participation in the preparation of the estimate. These decisions weakened the substantive and analytic expertise brought to bear on the subject; and
- ◆ Senator Smith's insistence that the SSCI documents be reviewed delayed final NFIB approval and release of the NIE.

In addition, while Senator Smith's interventions did not directly affect the substance or fundamental judgments of the estimate, concern about his

reaction and that of other Administration critics did have an impact on the tone of the report. The language of the estimate was repeatedly modified, thus conveying less confidence about certain issues than the IC actually had.

If politicization of NIE 98-03 occurred, it was in softening the tone of the NIE to placate likely critics, rather than in supporting the foreign policy objectives of the Clinton Administration. The IC responded to Senator Smith's expressions of his position and to the cumulative advice from members of the IC, including the DCI, and from outside readers to modify the language of the estimate to avoid criticism. The body and the fundamental judgments did not change, but repeated modifications of language did soften the tone of the NIE.

PART VI: CONCLUSIONS

We have studied NIE 98-03 and its production to determine whether the drafter of the NIE failed to use all relevant documentation, sought to discredit relevant information, or engaged in faulty analysis. We have examined the process of producing the estimate to determine whether politicization occurred or was attempted. Finally, we have analyzed the specific charges made in the *Critical Assessment*, cross-walking those charges to the relevant NIE statements in order to assess their validity. These approaches have enabled us to assess the NIE's analytical vigor, objectivity, accuracy, and completeness, as requested by the SSCI.

We conclude that:

- ◆ The drafter had access to and reviewed relevant documentation;
- ◆ There was no attempt to discredit relevant information;
- ◆ The drafter used appropriate methodology and sound analysis in producing the estimate;
- ◆ No official of the Clinton Administration put pressure on either the drafter or other members of the IC to influence the substance or fundamental judgments of the estimate;
- ◆ Senator Smith and his staff had an influence on the tone of the estimate:
 - ◆ Members of the IC reacted to their perception that Senator Smith and other critics of Administration policy would be critical of the NIE. Concerned that the estimate might appear to be dismissive of the concerns of critics, reviewers at all levels recommended modifying the language of the NIE;
 - ◆ These modifications produced softer language than the NIE drafter and the IC originally had proposed;
 - ◆ The fundamental substantive judgments of the NIE were not altered;

- ◆ Overall, the NIE demonstrates analytical vigor, objectivity, accuracy, and completeness; and
- ◆ Several decisions made by the NIC and the NIE drafter created openings for criticism, and some of the analysis in the NIE is flawed. Neither these decisions nor the analytic shortcomings affected the judgments of the estimate.

RELEVANT DOCUMENTATION

No effort was made by either the NIE drafter or other members of the IC to discredit relevant information, and no repository of information was overlooked. On the contrary, the NIE drafter pursued relevant information and was given complete access to that information. This included documents and/or complete lists of documents from DPMO, both RA and JCSD; CIA; organizations within the Office of the Secretary of Defense; DoS; DIA; NSA; JTF-FA; and CILHI. In addition, the drafter met with knowledgeable officials to review the information and make sure he was not missing anything. Given the amount of time he had to complete the estimate, the NIE drafter did a credible job of reviewing available information held by the IC, in particular, and the U.S. Government, in general.

The NIE drafter is vulnerable, however, to criticism that he did not pay attention to pre-1987 documentation. The issue of the period of time the estimate would cover arose early in the process and was never resolved. The drafter made it clear to us that his understanding of the tasking and the TOR was that he should cover the period since 1987. In addition, he and the IC agreed to accept a 1992 CIA study as having covered the period from 1987 to 1992 in its analysis. While the original TOR explicitly stated that the estimate would cover the period since 1987, they did not include a re-evaluation of the 735 and 1205 documents. When re-evaluation, as opposed to an update of the 1994 assessment of the documents, was included in the TOR, the parameters shifted. Senator Smith's legislative assistant told us that re-evaluation of the 735 and 1205 documents as a key question for the NIE obligated the drafter to search as far back as the document trail allowed.

We have not attempted to reconcile these two divergent points of view, which reflect a legitimate disagreement based on differing perceptions of the tasking. We note, however, the delay in the completion of the TOR (the SSCI held the draft TOR from early July 1997 until the end of October 1997); the addition of the 735 and 1205 documents to the "Key Questions" of the TOR; and the introduction of a new NIO/EA and a new NIE drafter, neither of whom had been involved in the negotiations of the TOR. The former NIO/EA had intended to treat the 735 and 1205 documents as a separate research project. The new NIO/EA and the NIE drafter accepted the final TOR with their expanded focus without changing the time allocated to complete the NIE, the time frame on which the research would focus, or their perception of the scope of the project.

In our review of the NIE and the *Critical Assessment*, we did find it necessary to search for documentation as far back as the document trail allowed. The information we reviewed provided new insights into many of the issues treated in the NIE and the *Critical Assessment*. None of this information contradicted the conclusions or changed the judgments reached by the NIE drafter and the IC.

QUALITY OF NIE ANALYSIS

We found the overall quality of analysis in the NIE to be good. The argumentation is vigorous and logical, and the conclusions are balanced and well-documented. On the subject of Vietnamese cooperation on POW/MIA matters, the drafter used relevant information and interviews with knowledgeable officials in reaching the conclusion that Vietnam's performance in dealing with the POW/MIA issue has been good in recent years. The NIE judgment is properly cautious, particularly given the caveat that unresolved areas of Vietnamese cooperation warrant continued close attention by the U.S. Government.

On the subject of the NIE's re-evaluation of the 735 and 1205 documents, a basic misunderstanding developed about what the NIE was to accomplish. Whereas the former NIO/EA planned to address the 735 and 1205 documents in a separate research study, Senator Smith wanted these issues addressed in the NIE; according to his legislative assistant, he wanted an independent review of the 735 and 1205 documents as well as an independent analysis of the numbers of POWs held by Vietnam.

Whereas Senator Smith expected an in-depth analysis of the 735 and 1205 documents and related issues, the assumptions of the NIC, the NIE drafter, and the IC were quite different. They assumed that the NIE would reflect the best judgments of the IC as developed by knowledgeable analysts; they did not plan to undertake basic research and analysis. As a result of his perception of the task, the drafter of the NIE did not undertake an in-depth re-evaluation of the 735 and 1205 documents. Instead, he accepted the IC position on the legitimacy and accuracy of the documents as well as the U.S. Government's position on the basic question of numbers of POWs held by the Vietnamese. The combination of this acceptance of previous positions and the limited time allocated to completing the project prevented the NIE drafter from taking a fresh look at a number of contentious issues.

The NIE did not come to grips with the issue of the numbers of POW/MIAs not accounted for and the impact of the 735 and 1205 documents on that issue. No organization or person felt compelled to do the research and analysis necessary to illuminate and challenge the polarized interpretations that have developed over the years. We took on that task, an unusual undertaking for statutory oversight organizations, because we wanted to determine whether there was evidence that might have affected the NIE if it had been taken into account. It took us nearly three months of research and analysis to understand that neither of the mutually-exclusive accounting methodologies was sufficient. That being said, the NIE's judgments on this issue remain valid; the 735 and 1205 documents are genuine GRU documents, but the information contained in them related to numbers of POWs held by the Vietnamese cannot be relied upon. The two documents are mutually inconsistent in that regard.

As a result of our analysis, we can conclude with far greater confidence than did the NIE that the numbers of POWs reported in the 735 and 1205 documents are inaccurate. We accept that the documents are genuine and that other information contained in them is valid. But the information on the numbers cannot be accurate.

Because of the existence of competing methodologies and polarized positions, we also undertook an independent analysis of the discrepancy or compelling cases. This issue had been avoided by the Senate Select Committee in 1993, and only DPMO had analyzed the cases. Senator Smith's legislative assistant told us that he had assumed that the NIE

drafter would conduct such an analysis, but he did not. Once again, we believed that it was our responsibility to determine whether relevant information existed that might have affected the judgments of the NIE. We obtained the case assessments for the 289 cases on Senator Smith's list of 324 names for which verified remains have not been returned. Our review suggests that, at most, three of the cases (and, in all likelihood, none) remain compelling today. We do not claim to have resolved any of these cases. We believe, however, that our methodology can be replicated and that a far better understanding of the remaining number of compelling cases might be achieved.

The withdrawal of DPMO from the estimate process inhibited analysis of POW/MIA issues. Several of the mistakes made by the drafter could have been prevented had DPMO analysts been more closely involved in coordinating the estimate. While not a member of the IC, DPMO possesses most of the U.S. Government's data and analytic expertise on POW/MIA issues. NIE deliberations frequently include the participation of non-IC members who are particularly knowledgeable as "back benchers." In our view, the decision by DPMO management, accepted by the IC, to exclude DPMO was unfortunate.

One of the mistakes DPMO could have prevented was the NIE's characterization of the mortician and his information. The NIE failed to capture the intricacies of the mortician's story and its implications. Since that story was a major point of disagreement between the SNIE of 1987 and the NIE of 1998, the story had to be told accurately and completely. The NIE did not do that and exacerbated the issue by not taking into account the conclusion reached in the 1996 IC Assessment. The IC Assessment did not discredit the mortician. It claimed that the numbers in the 1987 SNIE were based on limited direct evidence whose reliability was open to question. The NIE mislabeled the mortician an unreliable source. The DPMO argues that the mortician was reliable with respect to the remains he had actually worked on, but that his estimate of stored remains that he did not work on was less accurate. We agree with the conclusions of the 1996 IC study and the DPMO.

Another area in which DPMO might have helped the NIE drafter is on the issue of Vietnamese mistreatment of POWs. The NIE's approach to this issue is limited and does not directly address the problem the issue causes for both Vietnamese and U.S. policymakers. There is substantial

evidence that mistreatment occurred; there also is substantial evidence that the Vietnamese will not admit that mistreatment occurred. U.S. policymakers are concerned that emphasizing this point to the Vietnamese can only undermine efforts to achieve full accounting.

The NIE overstated its case that there is no evidence that the Vietnamese currently are storing the remains of American POWs. The NIE did indicate, however, that the DPMO in conjunction with CILHI was investigating the question and that further conclusions had to await publication of that study. The DPMO remains report was issued in June 1999, more than one year after the NIE was published. The study concludes that remains may not have been repatriated in two cases involving five sets of remains. That conclusion was not factored into the NIE, but those preparing the remains study may not have made that determination by the time the NIE was published. In addition, the DPMO's 1995 zero-based comprehensive review concluded that there were some cases where the Vietnamese Government did not turn over recovered remains. That conclusion also was not factored into the NIE.

The *Critical Assessment* challenges the NIE's judgments with respect to the possible existence of a separate prison camp and/or the possible transfer of U.S. POWs to the former Soviet Union. The assessment cites a 1976 CIA "study" that concluded that the possibility of a second prison system "cannot be disregarded." We found the alleged study and determined that it was an internal CIA draft based solely on the preliminary work of a junior imagery analyst. The junior analyst hoped to find evidence of live POWs and a second prison camp system, but that hope was not realized. The CIA desk officer who had responsibility for evaluating the North Vietnamese prison system from 1965 to 1992 never found credible evidence of the existence of such a system. In our review of documents and statements made by Russian officials and others, we found no credible evidence to support either the existence of a second prison camp system or the transfer of American POWs from Vietnam to the former Soviet Union or elsewhere.

None of our criticisms of the estimate affects its basic substance and judgments; these stood up to rigorous examination. We found that the IC understanding of the issues was sound and that the NIE judgments were accurate.

POLITICIZATION

We found no indication that any member of the Clinton Administration attempted to influence the NIE in any way. Nor did we find support for charges that the Clinton Administration tried to influence intelligence reporting on issues relating to POW/MIA during 1993-1994, when the first IC analysis of the 735 and 1205 documents occurred, with the exception of the efforts of some to make the tone more acceptable to anticipated critics. The concern expressed by Administration policymakers was that the IC not appear to be dismissing or debunking the information contained in those documents.

We did find that Senator Smith had an impact on the estimate process and the tone of the estimate. He played a role in framing the final TOR, ensuring that a re-evaluation of the 735 and 1205 documents was included as one of the key questions. In his meeting with the NIO/EA in early November 1997, he expressed his opinion on issues to be addressed in the estimate and implied that any differing conclusion would be the result of pressure from the Clinton Administration. He and his legislative assistant tried to insert themselves into the estimate process. Senator Smith called the Director, DIA before the MIB meeting of April 1998, stating that the NIE drafter had failed to review documents held by the SSCI and indicating that he could not accept the estimate if the documents were not reviewed.

Members of the IC, as well as outside readers of the estimate, were aware that the NIE would be criticized by those who believed that the Vietnamese were not cooperating in good faith on POW/MIA matters and those who believed that American POWs were left behind in 1973. At numerous stages in the production of the estimate, they urged that the tone of the estimate be softened to placate those who might be critical. The result was an estimate with modified language on issues relating to Vietnamese cooperation and to the 735 and 1205 documents.

A FINAL NOTE

We are concerned by the *Critical Assessment's* overarching implication that political pressure has been applied to the intelligence process by the Clinton Administration. Such a charge, even if vague and unsubstantiated, tends to gain credibility if it is repeated. Many in the community of POW/MIA families have come to believe that politicization exists. This perception has been fed by persistent accusations of a government conspiracy to cover up the contention that American POWs were abandoned in Vietnam after Operation Homecoming in 1973. No such conspiracy exists.

We found caring and sensitive people working on the POW/MIA issue at all levels of the government. Addressing the issue is especially difficult for those who must put emotion and personal considerations aside in pursuit of factual information. To demonstrate the difficulty in doing so, we cite two of these professionals: the recently retired Director, DIA and an imagery analyst who worked on the prison camp issue as a junior analyst in the 1970s.

The Director, DIA told us that, after meeting with Senator Smith in June 1997, he was convinced that the U.S. Government had not done enough. He said that he wanted to believe that American POWs had been left behind after Operation Homecoming. DIA senior staff officers confirmed that the Director was persistent, persuasive, and personally driven to ensure that analysis of the POW/MIA issue was correct. Ultimately, as Chief of the MIB, responsible for the analytical position of the entire military intelligence structure, he concluded that the facts demonstrated that he was "wrong in his heart." There was no credible evidence to support the position that live POWs had been left behind in Vietnam. Similarly, the then-junior imagery analyst told us he had wanted to find Americans alive after Operation Homecoming and that he never lost that personal focus during his nearly 30-year career. He never found evidence to support what his heart told him. The facts simply were otherwise.

Altogether we formally interviewed more than 80 individuals and contacted about 20 others who had relevant information. Without exception, we found dedicated professionals searching for the truth as best

they could. We found diligent Senate staff members who wanted the government and especially the IC to hide nothing. We found dedicated support personnel who held nothing from us. We found experienced intelligence operatives who had worked the POW/MIA issue their entire careers; they had asked the hard questions over and over again but had found no information to support the hypothesis that live American POWs remained in North Vietnam after Operation Homecoming. We found analysts committed to two sound analytical propositions—leaving no stone unturned and letting the facts speak for themselves. We found policymakers attempting as best they could to deal openly and in a straightforward manner with an emotional and difficult issue.

We had a unique platform from which to review the relevant policy and intelligence information. No document in its original form was withheld from us. No document in its entirety was refused us. No marginalia, desk note, sticky, or other scrap of information was excluded from files we asked for, to include those held by the SSCI.

We were not asked to determine whether there was a government conspiracy to cover up the contention that American POWs were abandoned in Vietnam after Operation Homecoming in 1973. Given the fact that there are those who continue to believe such a conspiracy exists, however, we emphasize that we found not one factual thread in all the thousands of pages of documentation we reviewed to indicate that such a conspiracy exists today or ever existed. To the contrary, we found no reason to challenge the finding reported by Congressman Sonny Montgomery to the Speaker of the House of Representatives nearly a quarter century ago:

...the results of the investigations and information gathered during its 15-month tenure have led this committee to the belief that no Americans are still being held alive as prisoners in Indochina, or elsewhere, as a result of the war in Indochina.

ANNEX A: Methodology

We used an historical research design, a methodology that seeks to reconstruct the past objectively and accurately. We augmented that approach with contrast and comparison, and quantitative and replication methodologies where appropriate. Our design had 12 components:

- ◆ Review all the research files of the drafter of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE);
- ◆ Identify and review previous studies, in particular those conducted by non-Executive Branch entities;
- ◆ Review other relevant document holdings, including those of Senator Smith and the CIA, the Directorate of Operations, to include construction of data bases;
- ◆ Interview persons with first-hand information or expert knowledge;
- ◆ Review contemporary literature. The Defense Technical Information Center conducted a tailored search of its various databases at our request to identify relevant documents and publications;
- ◆ Search the world wide web;
- ◆ Conduct our own analysis of the data collected because the drafters of the NIE and the *Critical Assessment* used fundamentally different and mutually exclusive approaches;
- ◆ Analyze and compare the content of each draft of the NIE to assess the impact or influence on the text of various readers;
- ◆ Evaluate a structured sample of official case assessments of persons unaccounted for in Southeast Asia as maintained by the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO);

- ◆ Conduct a zero-based review of a Missing in Action (MIA) case;
- ◆ Contrast and compare interviews and statements of Russian sources from the perspective of both the NIE and the *Critical Assessment*; and
- ◆ Retranslate from the Russian language portions of the 735 and 1205 documents relevant to the POW/MIA issue.

We used an iterative approach to synthesize the data and other information collected. Interviews were primarily open-ended narrative accounts with follow-on questions and sessions, if required. For example, we met three times with the drafter of the NIE and three times with Senator Smith's legislative assistant for the *Critical Assessment*. We met with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) staff point of contact on four different occasions, twice to review relevant documents. We reviewed on several occasions the material provided to us by the drafter of the NIE. We requested specific document searches by the Office of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the DPMO, various offices of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the Department of State (DoS), Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). To assimilate documents obtained from diverse sources, we created a master database and then constructed analytical files in two ways, one chronologically and one functionally. As a cross check, each agency (CIA and Department of Defense (DoD)) built its own functional files and performed parallel analysis of key issues. We reviewed over 20,000 pages of responsive information.

We interviewed more than 80 current and former officials of DoS and DoD, the National Security Council (NSC); the CIA, the DIA, the National Security Agency (NSA), the SSCI, and the office of Senator Smith. Specifically, we interviewed:

- ◆ **At DoS:** the current U.S. Ambassadors to Vietnam and Cambodia; the Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs; the Director, Office of East Asia Analysis, INR; and a former member of INR;
- ◆ **At DoD:** the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Assistant Secretary and the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

for International Security Affairs; two former and the current Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs; the Director, Indochina, Thailand, Burma, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs; and the Assistant Director for Polygraphs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence);

- ◆ **At CIA:** the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council; two former National Intelligence Officers for East Asia, and a former Deputy NIO for East Asia; former and current senior officials, reports officers, and analysts from the Directorates of Operations and Intelligence, the Office of Congressional Affairs, and the National Counterintelligence Center; and the drafter of NIE 98-03;
- ◆ **At DIA:** a former Director; a former and the current Director and the Vice Deputy Director, Policy Support; the Deputy Intelligence Officer for East Asia and Pacific; the former Director and former Deputy Director, Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs; the Chief, Security, Investigations and Polygraph Branch; and representatives from the Office of the Executive Secretariat;
- ◆ **At DPMO:** the Director; the Deputy Director; Chief of Staff; Chief, Plans and Policy; Director, Research and Analysis (RA) Directorate; the Chief, Joint Commission Support Directorate (JCSD); and senior officials and analysts within RA and JCSD;
- ◆ Former Presidential emissary to Vietnam and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
- ◆ The Chief, Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI), and other CILHI officials;
- ◆ The Chief, Special Projects, Joint Task Force–Full Accounting;
- ◆ The former Chairman of the U.S. side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs;
- ◆ The Chief, U.S. Air Force Polygraph Program;

- ◆ Representatives from NSA;
- ◆ Current and former staff members from the SSCI; and
- ◆ Senator Robert C. Smith's legislative assistant.

In addition, we met with Senator Smith to discuss his views on the issue.

ANNEX B: Summary of Selected Prior Reports

Since the conclusion of Operation Homecoming in 1973, the Prisoner of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA) issue has been the subject of numerous reports. Listed below, in chronological order, are those reports that were relevant to our research.

13 December 1976

Americans Missing in Southeast Asia—Final Report Together with Additional and Separate Views of the Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, 13 December 1976, U.S. House of Representatives (94th Congress, 2nd session, House Report No. 94-1764) (The report was reprinted on 5 August 1988, House Committee Print No. 15, 100th Congress, 2nd Session). This House Select Committee sought to conduct a full and complete investigation and study of the problem of United States servicemen still identified as missing in action and those known dead whose bodies have not been recovered. The report concludes that no Americans are still being held as prisoners and that a total accounting is not possible and should not be expected. Finally, the report suggests that a partial accounting is possible and that the most effective means of obtaining this accounting is through direct governmental discussions.

23 March 1977

Presidential Commission on Americans Missing and Unaccounted for in Southeast Asia Report on Trip to Vietnam and Laos March 16-20, 1977, 23 March 1977, Office of the White House Press Secretary. The Commission's mandate focuses on obtaining an accounting of missing Americans in Southeast Asia. The report concludes that the resumption of talks in Paris between U.S. and Vietnam officials and the normalization of relations are required in order to afford the best prospect for obtaining a fuller accounting of missing personnel.

27 May 1986

The Tighe Task Force Examination Review of DIA Intelligence Holdings Surrounding Unaccounted for United States Military Personnel in Southeast Asia, 27 May 1986. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) asked the Task Force to evaluate the evidence regarding unaccounted for U.S. military personnel in Southeast Asia and to provide an evaluation of DIA conclusions on the POW/MIA issue. The Task Force also reviewed pertinent files and the handling of those files, looking for any indication or "COVER-UP" [emphasis in original]. Among its conclusions, the Task Force found no evidence of a "cover-up" by DIA. The Task Force also concluded that:

- ◆ A large number of MIAs may never be properly accounted for and that ". . . false hope should not be offered to those seeking a total accounting of POW/MIAs;"
- ◆ DIA holds information that establishes a "strong possibility" of POWs being held in Laos and Vietnam; and
- ◆ The U.S. Government's handling of the POW/MIA issue is "constantly harassed by phonies and profiteers," which probably jeopardizes the lives of Americans.

September 1987

SNIE 14.3-87, Hanoi and the POW/MIA Issue, 1987, Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE). The resolution of the fate of the 2,413 American servicemen still unaccounted for in Indochina remains a priority humanitarian issue for the U.S. Government, which believes that the fate of the servicemen should be treated separately from other political and economic concerns. The report states that Vietnam publicly characterizes the accounting of servicemen as a humanitarian issue, but also uses the POW/MIA issue as a means to influence public opinion in the United States to achieve broader political objectives. The report concludes that Hanoi sees the solution to the POW/MIA issue to be in its greater long-term interest, but sees tactical benefits in manipulating the issue in the interim.

23 May 1991

An Examination of U.S. Policy Towards POW/MIAs by the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Republican Staff, 23 May 1991, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. The minority staff interim report concludes that the "internal policy" of the U.S. Government is to act upon the presumption that all MIAs are dead. The report charges that "any evidence" indicating a MIA might be alive is "uniformly and arbitrarily rejected." Furthermore, the report charges that all efforts are directed towards finding and identifying remains of dead personnel, even though U.S. Government techniques of identification are "inadequate and flawed."

February 1992

Vietnam: Adjusting Its Strategy on the POW/MIA Issue, EA 92-10004, February 1992, Directorate of Intelligence. This Central Intelligence Agency report examines Hanoi's evolving attitude toward the POW/MIA issue. The report concludes that, since 1988, Vietnam has become "more cooperative" in resolving questions concerning U.S. military personnel reported as possible POWs/MIAs during the Vietnam War.

13 January 1993

POW/MIAs, 13 January 1993, U.S. Senate, The Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs (103rd Congress First Session, Report No.103-1). The Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs wants the United States to meet its obligation to the missing and to the families of those yet to be accounted. The report details testimony and evidence regarding POW/MIA accountability issues involving World War II, the Korean Conflict, the Cold War, and Vietnam. The report states that the Committee's work helped to create the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting and the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission. The report stresses that the quest for the fullest possible accounting of Vietnam-era POW/MIAs must continue but to be effective and fair to families, these accounting efforts must go forward within the "context of reality, not fiction."

21 July 1993

Report to Ambassador Malcolm Toon, Chairman of the U.S. Side of the Joint U.S./Russian Commission on POW/MIAs from U.S. Senator Bob Smith, Commissioner, 21 July 1993, Office of U.S. Senator Bob Smith. The report is subtitled "An Interim Analysis of the 1972 Translation of a North Vietnamese Report Concerning U.S. POWs Discovered in 1993 in the Archives of the Former Soviet Union and Subsequently Provided to the U.S. Side of the Joint U.S./Russian Commission on POW/MIAs." This report asserts that North Vietnam "withheld the total [emphasis in original] number and identity of American POWs in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia over whom it had direct control." Furthermore, the report rejects Vietnam's claim that the Russian translation is "pure fabrication" and states the "U.S. Government should stop believing that it knows the fate of just about everybody." Finally the report asks the American public to study the facts, even if it means revisiting old issues.

24 January 1994

Recent Reports on American POWs in Indochina: An Assessment, is an unclassified, coordinated, interagency intelligence analysis of the 735, 1205, and Dang Tan Reports documents. The assessment concludes that the 1205 document, discovered in a Soviet archive by an American researcher, may be a "genuine" Russian document, but the accuracy of its rendering of the POW situation in 1972 is outweighed by errors, omissions, and propaganda. The 735 document, also discovered in another Soviet archive, asserts that there were 735 American fliers held in Hanoi in January 1971, and is also determined to be a genuine Russian document. As with the 1205 document, similar questions are raised regarding the accuracy of the 735 accounting. Furthermore, the 735 and the 1205 documents are inconsistent with each other. The Dang Tan Reports, which document the claims of a North Vietnamese defector that in late 1967 Hanoi held "more than 800" pilots as POWs, are assessed to be "embellished" with hearsay and rumor. In an overall statement, the assessment, in reviewing all three documents, encountered the same problems experienced since the beginning of the conflict in Vietnam—inaccuracies, inconsistencies, exaggerations, and fabrications.

13 November 1995

A Zero-Based Comprehensive Review of Cases Involving Unaccounted for Americans In Southeast Asia, 13 November 1995, Department of Defense. The report provides the results of a zero-based comprehensive review of all cases involving unaccounted for Americans in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia resulting from the Vietnam War. Leaving "no stone unturned," using evidence as well as Southeast Asian cultural and historical practices and operational realities, the report concludes that of the 2,202 cases under consideration 1,476 still have investigative leads to pursue. The report concludes that the acquired conclusions and judgments make it possible to develop a work plan comprised of the best steps to move cases toward resolution.

17 June 1996

Comprehensive Report of the U.S. Side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, 17 June 1996. Established on 26 March 1992, the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs focuses on determining:

- ◆ If any American POW/MIAs are still being held in the former Soviet Union against their will;
- ◆ The fate of unaccounted-for members of the U.S. Armed Forces who were located on the territory of the Soviet Union or about whom the Russian Government may have information; and
- ◆ Facts pertaining to Soviet personnel missing from the war in Afghanistan and from the Cold War-era loss incidents.

The report states that no U.S. citizens are currently being detained within the territory of the former USSR. This conclusion is based on a thorough analysis of all archival documents, interviews with witnesses, and on-site inspections of possible American housing sites.

October 1996

Vietnamese Storage of Remains of Unaccounted U.S. Personnel, ICA 96-05, October 1996, Intelligence Community Assessment. The report was prepared in conjunction with the declassification review for the 1987 SNIE on POW/MIA issues. The report reviews what was stated in the 1987 report and how the authors determined that Hanoi had collected and stored between 400 and 600 remains. The report concludes that although the Vietnamese Government collected and stored remains it is not possible to estimate the number of American remains involved. Furthermore, the range of 400-600 remains contained in the 1987 SNIE is not supported by subsequent evidence.

June 1999

Vietnam's Collection and Repatriation of American Remains, June 1999, Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office. The report provides an analysis of Vietnam's remains collection and repatriation process. The report examines questions such as, "How many remains did Vietnam collect?; How many remains has Vietnam repatriated?; and Are there any more remains still stored?" The report concludes that the Vietnamese authorities collected and stored approximately 300 remains, of which 270 to 280 have been repatriated. The report draws no conclusion regarding the "discrepancy" of 20 to 30 remains, but it does suggest that the discrepancy may be attributable to incomplete data used to formulate the storage of "approximately 300" remains.

ANNEX C: Methodology Used in Examining Charges in the *Critical Assessment*

We studied each of the 51 exceptions taken by the *Critical Assessment* to determine if we could identify actionable criticisms against the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), i.e., criticisms with enough clarity to be assessed. There was, however, no one-to-one correlation between each NIE statement at issue and criticism of that statement. Further, with minor exceptions, arguments against a specific NIE statement did not readily lead to actionable criticisms. For example, an argument against a particular NIE statement might contain no specific criticism or it might contain the thread of several criticisms. We decided that an approach based on specific criticisms by the *Critical Assessment* was insufficient. Next, we cross-walked, line-by-line, the NIE statements at issue in the *Critical Assessment* back to the NIE. Initially, we noted that the NIE statements selected for argument in the assessment appeared to lend themselves to grouping or categorization. This approach was not fruitful either, once again because there was no one-to-one correlation.

In pursuing our line-by-line comparison, however, we found that the *Critical Assessment* contained significant methodological shortcomings. Some of its arguments on their face have little merit, and nearly all of the NIE statements at issue had been taken out of context, which distorted their meaning. While these observations did not produce an effective evaluation approach, we believe it is important to document what we found. Following are examples of arguments that lack merit:

- ◆ "*The NIE contains only two photographs, both provided by the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory (CILHI) in Hawaii . . .*" The *Critical Assessment* questions why:

. . . we are treated to pictures which hardly seem directly germane to the estimate's terms of reference. I find such action by the NIC troubling, especially when there is no precedent for such action with respect to other NIEs.

We cannot comment. The inclusions (or exclusions) of such photographs are an author's prerogative. The second such argument is:

- ◆ *"In some instances, Vietnamese on recovery teams have willingly worked beyond the terms of their contracts to successfully complete operations. Cultural reasons contribute to this record." And, ". . . for local officials, participation in joint field activities can be financially profitable. People in their villages can earn **much** [emphasis added by Critical Assessment] more by working on the activity than they could in their normal work." The Critical Assessment says that these statements conflict and questions why they are cited in the NIE as indicators of Vietnam's cooperative intentions. Again, we have no comment except to note that the emphasis on the word "much" was not in the NIE.*

We selected one out-of-context argument as illustrative. [Note: One complete NIE section is provided; it includes the two *Critical Assessment* extracts at issue. One extract is ***bolded and italicized***; the other is **bolded and underlined**. Original NIE text not extracted by the *Critical Assessment* is not bolded, italicized, or underlined].

Moreover, although *Vietnam's performance generally has improved with respect to the US POW/MIA issue, we think Hanoi has not been completely forthcoming on certain POW/MIA matters:*

- ◆ **In some instances, we believe full disclosure would prove embarrassing to the regime. For example, Hanoi continues to deny that US POWs were mistreated while in captivity in the North.**
- ◆ **We think Vietnam still has records it could make available to US investigators but which would discredit its denials of mistreatment.**

A few reports of transfers of US POWs to Russia and other countries are unexplained, and the books remain open.

Although 120 live-sighting investigations have been carried out by US teams, none has generated any credible evidence of American POWs left in Vietnam. Hanoi protests having to investigate such cases, but reports appear regularly and established procedures for resolving them continue to be in effect.

Although ***Vietnam's overall performance in dealing with the POW/MIA problem has been good in recent years***, the unresolved issues noted above suggest the need for continued close attention by the US Government.

This out-of-context extraction is so convoluted that it needs to be repeated for clarity. The two resultant statements in the *Critical Assessment* are:

... Vietnam's performance generally has improved with respect to the US POW/MIA issue Vietnam's overall performance in dealing with the POW/MIA problem has been good in recent year . . ." and

" . . . we think Hanoi has not been completely forthcoming on certain POW/MIA matters: In some instances, we believe full disclosure would prove embarrassing to the regime. For example, Hanoi continues to deny that US POWs were mistreated while in captivity in the North. We think Vietnam still has records it could make available to US investigators but which would discredit its denials of mistreatment. A few reports of transfers of US POWs to Russia and other countries are unexplained, and the books remain open."

The first out-of-context extract contains two qualified clauses that are prefaced with the word "although" in the original; the second extract is lifted from the NIE text between those two qualified clauses. We cannot address any argument that derives from that type of selective quotation. While we selected only one such example of an out-of-context quotation, similar methodology is used throughout the *Critical Assessment* and was noted as it applied to specific issues.

We considered several approaches based on sampling to evaluate the *Critical Assessment's* arguments against the NIE statements. We rejected a universal approach which would have involved evaluating each of the arguments against all 51 NIE statements; this would have been a

massive undertaking with the net result being "point-counterpoint," an approach already shunned by the National Foreign Intelligence Board and the Military Intelligence Board as counterproductive. Moreover, as previously discussed, the approach was not doable in any rigorous sense. We also rejected a random approach because we did not want to risk omitting important substantive issues.

In the end, we selected a structured approach that involved evaluating a subset of the arguments against the 51 NIE statements. To assist in defining that approach, we scanned the *Critical Assessment* and the NIE into databases that we could search. That step revealed an underlying structure to the *Critical Assessment* that we could evaluate effectively. The persistent, repetitive theme of the *Critical Assessment* is that its arguments are based on information provided to or made available to both the drafter of the NIE and the Intelligence Community. In three instances, the *Critical Assessment* makes footnote references to specific letters of transmittal of that information. For clarity, we referred to the persistent messages in the *Critical Assessment* and its footnotes as "thematic statements."

Overall, we identified thematic statements involving 27 of the 51 NIE statements at issue in the *Critical Assessment*. Even though there were no explicit thematic expressions related to the other 24 NIE statements at issue, the repetitive theme that the drafter did not review relevant documentation is implicit in the *Critical Assessment's* language on those statements as well.

ANNEX D: Intelligence Community Publications Reviewed by National Intelligence Estimate Drafter

- ◆ Special National Intelligence Estimate 14.3.87, "Hanoi and the POW/MIA Issue," September 1987.
- ◆ Central Intelligence Study, "Vietnam: Adjusting Its Strategy on the POW/MIA Issue," February 1992.
- ◆ Senate Select Committee, POW/MIA Affairs Report, "POW/MIAs," 13 January 1993.
- ◆ Intelligence Community (IC) Assessment, "Recent Reports on American POWs in Indochina: An Assessment," 24 January 1994.
- ◆ A Zero-Based Comprehensive Review of Cases Involving "Unaccounted for Americans in Southeast Asia," 13 November 1995.
- ◆ IC Assessment ICA 96-05, "Vietnamese Storage of Remains of Unaccounted US Personnel," October 1996.

ANNEX E: Recovery and Remains Documentation Reviewed by National Intelligence Estimate Drafter

- ◆ The February 1992 CIA Intelligence Assessment, "Vietnam: Adjusting Its Strategy on the Prisoner of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA) Issue.

- ◆ A 1993 Interagency Working Group on Vietnam policy review paper stating that cooperation on witness interviews, area searches and site excavations had increased dramatically since 1988 and that, since 1992, Vietnam had allowed expanded geographic coverage and frequency of joint field activities.

- ◆ The 1993 Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office assessments that conclude, "the return of remains from Vietnam, while increasing, has not kept up with U.S. expectations." However, overall, "when compared to the absence of progress that was the norm previously, Vietnam cooperation is to be commended."

- ◆ A 1993 National Security Council (NSC) Principals Committee meeting report.

- ◆ A 1995 letter from the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman, House National Security Committee that states that during the first two years of the Clinton Administration, 204 sets of remains had been repatriated from Vietnam and Laos and 49 sets had been identified.

- ◆ The 13 November 1995 Department of Defense Zero-Based Comprehensive Review that mentions that Vietnam has shared the results of its own investigations; provided wartime records on POWs, aircraft downings, and other engagements in which Americans became unaccounted for; and turned over records of deaths and burials, and photographs.

- ◆ The Department of State input to the NSC for the 1998 Presidential Determination on Vietnamese cooperation stating that 28 joint field activities had been conducted that resulted in 221 sets of remains recovered. Twenty-two sets of remains were returned in 1997.

ANNEX F: Comments by Russian Sources

Overall Access	735/1305 Valid			735/1305 Credible			Position / Function
	Yes	Unk	No	Yes	Unk	No	
High		1			1		National Security Advisor to Russian President
High		1				1	Ambassador to Vietnam (1974-86)
High		1			1		KGB Central
High	1			1			CPSU Central Committee Secretary Maintaining Ties w Socialist Countries (70s)
High		1			1		Ambassador to Vietnam (1960-66)
High	1				1		GRU Chief (1997-99)
High	1				1		GRU Chief (1984-86)
High	1				1		Consultant, Russian Defense Council, former head of the MFA Archives
High	1				1		Deputy Foreign Minister (1977-95)
High	1				1		KGB, FOD, Head Southeast Asia Dept (during the war)
High		1				1	CPSU Central Committee Political Issues on Vietnam (1963-86)
High	1			1			GRU in Embassy in Hanoi (1968-72)
Sub-Total	12	7	5	0	2	8	2
Med		1			1		Interpreter and Advisor Embassy in Hanoi (1973-80)
Med	1					1	Political Counselor for Reporting on Vietnam Foreign Policy
Med		1			1		Embassy in Hanoi (1962-65 - Junior Diplomat - and 1974-78 - Advisor to Ambassador)
Med	1				1		CPSU Central Committee, Head International Dept Indonesia-Malaysia (1965-73)
Med	1				1		CPSU Central Committee, International Dept Vietnam (1962-77); Embassy in Hanoi (1960-62; 77-83)
Med	1				1		Previous GRU Representative on the USSRJC
Med	1				1		KGB Representative in Hanoi (1975-78)
Med	1	1			1		Embassy in Hanoi (1972-76 and 1982-88 - 1st Secretary (and later Counselor)
Med	1				1		KGB, FOD, Tracking CIA operatives worldwide (32 year veteran)
Sub-Total	9	6	3	0	3	5	1
Low		1			1		Prominent Military Journalist
Low		1			1		Russian Author and Researcher
Low		1			1		Air Defense Instructor (1973-74)
Low		1			1		Engineer Advisor in Vietnam (1973-74)
Low		1			1		Journalist in Vietnam (1972-76)
Low		1			1		Air Defense Radio Radar Engineer, in Vietnam (1966-67)
Low		1			1		Air Defense Advisor in Vietnam (1966-67)
Low		1			1		Air Defense Technical Advisor and Researcher in North Vietnam (1968-69)
Low		1			1		Journalist in Laos (1966), Vietnam for much of the 1970s
Low		1			1		Air Defense Advisor (1966)
Sub-Total	10	0	10	0	0	10	0
TOTAL	31	13	18	0	5	23	3

ANNEX G: Case Review Methodology

For each case answer the following questions Y (yes) N (no) or I (inconclusive):

- A. Is there evidence the individual survived the incident (e.g. aircraft loss, fire fight, or accident)?
- B. Is there evidence the individual could have been taken captive?
- C. Is there evidence the individual entered a prison system?
- D. Can any of three governments (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) account for the individual (e.g. documentary or physical evidence)?

Record responses on the attached spreadsheet by case [REFNO] and Name.

Case #	Last Name	YY MM	Country	A	B	C	D	Compelling Dec 92	Compelling Post 92	Aircrew

Case # - DPMO Reference Number.

Last Name -

YY MM - Year and Month of incident

Country - As specified in the case assessment

A - Question A

B - Question B

C - Question C

D - Question D

Compelling Dec 92 - Case considered compelling prior December 1992 Smith list.

Compelling Post Dec 92 - Case considered compelling after December 1992 Smith list.

Aircrew - Yes or No

For each question the answer is "Y," "N," or "I." For example:

Case #	Last Name	YY MM	Country	A	B	C	D	Compelling Dec 92	Compelling Post 92	Aircrew
0001	Adams	6806	VN	I	N	N	Y	N	N	Y

There is inconclusive evidence that Adams, an aircrew member, survived a June 1968 combat incident and there is no evidence that he was taken captive or entered a prison system. Documentary evidence has been provided which establishes his fate prior to the December 1992 Smith list beyond a reasonable doubt, thus the case is not compelling.

ANNEX H: Results of Compelling Case Review

The results of the three independent reviews of the "compelling cases" are summarized in this annex. A case number can refer to more than one individual; accordingly there may be more than one entry per case number. For each case number, six areas of concern were addressed. For each area of concern, each reviewer's response was noted. "1" indicates a yes; "IN" indicates inconclusive, and a blank indicates no.

For each area of concern, the scoring was tabulated to determine whether there was a consensus "C" or a unanimous "U" response. A consensus required one of three reviewers to vote yes and at least one other reviewer to score the same factor either as a "yes" or as "inconclusive." A "U" required all three reviewers to vote "yes."

CASC	Probably Suffered Incident		Possibly Captured		Possibly in Prison System		SEA Gets Base Knowledge		Compelling in 1952		Compelling Today	
	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring
1403	I	1	RE									
1408	I	1	RE									
1412	I	1	IN	1	IN	1					IN	1
1413	IN	1										
1414	IN	1										
1415	IN	1	IN									
1416	IN	1										
1417	IN	1										
1418	I	1										
1419	IN	1										
1420	IN	1										
1421	IN	1										
1422	IN	1										
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1500												

Case	Probably Solved Incident		Post My Capture		Totally in Prison System		SEA Grade based Knowledge		Crossing in 1952		Compacting Today	
	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring
144												
145												
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Case	Probably Shown Incident		Easily Captured		Possibly in Public System		3rd Party Knowledge		Crossing in 1997		Compelling Today	
	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring
1729	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1730	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1731	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1732	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1733	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1734	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1735	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1736	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1737	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1738	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1739	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1740	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1741	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1742	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1743	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1744	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1745	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1746	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1747	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1748	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1749	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1750	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1751	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1752	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1753	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1754	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1755	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1756	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1757	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1758	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1759	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1760	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1761	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1762	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1763	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1764	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1765	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1766	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1767	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1768	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1769	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1770	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1771	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1772	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1773	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1774	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1775	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1776	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	
1777	1	1	IN	1					IN	1	IN	

CASE	Probably Survived Incident		Possibly Captured		Possibly in U.S. Prison		SEA Guds have knowledge		Completing in 1952		Completing Today																			
	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring	Reviewer	Scoring																		
194	IN	1	IN	1																										
194	IN	1	I	1																										
204	IN																													
205	IN																													
205	IN		IN	1																										
Total	75	57	103	65	41	33	23	26	26	14	12	9	3	9	6	157	45	123	120	25	56	14	21	20	1	0	14	1	3	6

ANNEX I: Captain McDonnell Case Review

We specifically selected Captain McDonnell's case for review because the Advocacy and Intelligence Index for Prisoners of War-Missing in Action (AII POW-MIA) posted its version of the case on the Internet concurrent with our review of the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) assessments of Senator Smith's compelling cases. That juxtaposition of events became the *raison d'être* for adding one case review to our methodology.

We initially understood that DPMO was established to be the "one-stop shop" for POW/MIA issues. The Deputy Director, DPMO, told us the Senate Select Committee issued a "definitive finding" in its 1993 report that the process for keeping the families informed was not adequately supported. The families had to query too many places to obtain information. The committee report recommended creation of a one-stop organization—DPMO.

The DPMO is chartered by the Department of Defense Directive 5110.10, "Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO)," dated 16 July 1993. Part of the DPMO mission is to "exercise policy, control and oversight of the entire process for investigation and recovery related to missing persons and to establish procedures to be followed by Department of Defense boards of inquiry and by officials reviewing the reports of such boards." DPMO functions include:

- ◆ Serving as the DoD focal point for POW/MIA matters;
- ◆ Assembling and analyzing information on U.S. military and civilian personnel who are, or were, prisoners of war or missing in action; and
- ◆ Maintaining data bases on U.S. military and civilian personnel who are, or were, prisoners of war or missing in action.

We found that DPMO is not a one-stop repository. Further, no one organization maintains a repository of information necessary to understand this particular case. We reviewed the files of three organizations—DPMO, Army Casualty Affairs Office, Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA)—and consulted three additional holdings before we understood the case sufficiently to write credibly about it.

The DPMO file only goes back to April 1969. Captain McDonnell was lost on 6 March 1969. The first item in the file is a report of interview with the executive officer of McDonnell's unit. That report established a misunderstanding that exists to this day—that McDonnell's seat belt was "neatly [sic] undone." We found that, with respect to the McDonnell case, the DPMO file primarily holds intelligence information and some administrative information; it lacks operational information.

The U.S. Army Casualty Affairs file holds two relevant folders. One folder contains relevant correspondence because the Army's appointed casualty assistance officer is the family's official point of contact for case matters. The second folder holds original operational information concerning the search to locate Captain McDonnell. That folder contains original sworn testimony taken by a Missing Person Board convened to determine Captain McDonnell's status. We found that, with respect to this case, the Army file holds primarily administrative information and original operational information; it lacks intelligence information.

The JTF-FA file is the most complete and includes a summary of information prepared for the June 1994 flag/general officer review of the McDonnell case. The following quoted information is relevant:

- ◆ **JTF-FA Level of Effort:** The case was investigated during four joint [U.S.-Vietnam] operations. The teams pursued all witnesses and archival leads identified by Headquarters JTF-FA and DPMO. They conducted 20 witness interviews and two excavations. The Oral History Program team interviewed two former Peoples' Army of Vietnam officers and two authors identified as possible sources for the case. Joint teams visited the Hue Military Museum three times in an attempt to determine the provenance of Captain McDonnell's military identification card;

- ◆ **13th Joint Field Activity:** Officers interviewed three witnesses who provided consistent, credible information concerning the capture of an injured American helicopter pilot in March 1969. The pilot later died while being evacuated to higher headquarters. The American's body was reportedly buried near a stream. One of the witnesses claimed to have participated in the burial; and
- ◆ **JTF-FA Recommendation:** Fate determined for Captain McDonnell.

We found two additional aspects of the JTF-FA files noteworthy. First was the summation of the interviews about Captain McDonnell's fate and the chain-of-custody of his identification card. Second was the inclusion of two documents updating information from individuals who had testified during the Missing Person Board in 1969. Neither document was found in the DPMO or Army files; both provide new perspective:

- ◆ In April 1990, the gunship pilot was re-interviewed. He said that "Captain McDonnell probably removed [him] from his seat and placed him next to the aircraft." Captain McDonnell was not present when the pilot woke up four or five hours later; and
- ◆ In January 1993, the pilot who coordinated the air search for McDonnell and who provided a sworn statement to the Missing Persons Board recalled that "[Captain McDonnell] had told me in safety briefings that he believed the best solution was to E&E [evade and escape] from a crash site. Our battery policy was to get away from the crash site." The pilot, now a general officer concluded that McDonnell "was a brave officer who I believe was killed by the enemy shortly after he was captured."

We found that, for this case, the JTF-FA file holds all operational and most intelligence information; it lacks administrative information.

The comprehensiveness of the JTF-FA files caused us to review the DPMO files a second time to ensure we had not overlooked information important to the McDonnell case. During that review, we examined color photographs of Captain McDonnell's identification card and determined

that the card in the Hue museum is *bona fide*. We also reconfirmed that no SIGINT reporting pertained to the case.

We examined three additional holdings. First, we reviewed the microfiche file maintained by the Library of Congress, a review which revealed that DPMO files were not sufficient to understand the McDonnell case. Second, because AII POW-MIA mentioned intelligence information reports that we had not previously seen, we reviewed the 15 volumes of uncorrelated intelligence reports held by the Pentagon library and found the referenced reports. Finally, we reviewed the CIA Directorate of Operations files for information on Viet Cong policy concerning the handling of POWs.

Information in the JTF-FA file supports the June 1994 decision to remove Captain McDonnell from the discrepancy list. Information in the DPMO files does not. We believe that explains why the Director, DPMO voted against his analysts' recommendation in the June 1994 review of the McDonnell case. The JTF-FA position was based on operational and intelligence files; the DPMO position was based primarily on intelligence files. We found the DPMO files not suitable for a complete and accurate understanding of the McDonnell case.

ANNEX J: Distribution List

Chairman and ranking minority member of each of the following congressional committees:

- Senate Appropriations Committee
- Senate Armed Services Committee
- Senate Foreign Relations Committee
- Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
- House Appropriations Committee
- House Armed Services Committee
- House International Relations Committee
- House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Office of the Secretary of Defense:

- Secretary of Defense
- Deputy Secretary of Defense
- Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
- Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence)
- Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
- Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)
- Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
- General Counsel of the Department of Defense
- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)
- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Affairs)
- Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense
- Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)

Secretary of the Army

Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Secretary of the Navy

Director of Naval Intelligence

Secretary of the Air Force

Director of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance,
U.S. Air Force

Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff for C41, U.S. Marine Corps

Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command
Director of Intelligence, U.S. European Command

Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command
Director for Intelligence, U.S. Pacific Command
Commander, Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii
Commander, Joint Task Force-Full Accounting
Inspector General

Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces Command
Director of Intelligence, U.S. Forces Command

Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command
Director for Intelligence, U.S. Southern Command

Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command
Director of Intelligence, U.S. Central Command

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director Joint Staff
Director for Intelligence
Director for Command, Control, Communications and Computers,
Joint Staff
Inspector General

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Deputy Director for Policy Support
Director for Intelligence Operations
Chief, Stony Beach
Inspector General

Director, National Imagery and Mapping Agency

Director, National Reconnaissance Office
Inspector General

Director, National Security Agency
Inspector General

Director of Intelligence, U.S. Special Operations Command

Director of Intelligence, U.S. Space Command

Director of Intelligence, U.S. Strategic Command

Director of Intelligence, U.S. Transportation Command

Assistant Chief of Staff, J2, U.S. Forces Korea

Assistant Commandant for Operations, U.S. Coast Guard

Deputy Director of Operations, Defense Information Systems Agency

Central Intelligence Agency:

Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support

Chairman, National Intelligence Council

Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management

Executive Director

Deputy Executive Director

General Counsel

Director of Congressional Affairs

Director of Public Affairs

Deputy Director for Intelligence (DI)

Deputy Director for Operations (DO)

National Intelligence Officer, East Asia

Director of Asian Pacific and Latin American Analysis, DI

DI/ Politicization Ombudsman

Chief, Central Eurasia Division, DO

Chief, East Asia Division, DO

Department of State:

Secretary of State

Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

American Embassy, Bangkok

American Embassy, Hanoi

American Embassy, Moscow

American Embassy, Phnom Penh

American Embassy, Vientiane

Inspector General

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

SEP 27 1999

INSPECTOR GENERAL
2000-0923

Honorable Richard C. Shelby
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-6475

Dear Mr. Chairman:


Attached is a clarifying comment that should go with the unclassified version of our Joint Report entitled, "A Review of the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate on POW/MIA Issues and the Charges Levied by a Critical Assessment of the Estimate (1999-5974-IG) (00-OIR-04)," dated February 29, 2000.

Additionally, an earlier modification, with the attached clarification, will be sent to all recipients of the classified report through appropriate Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency secure channels. Your Committee is one such recipient.


This concludes our efforts on this issue requested by you on March 8, 1999.

A similar letter has been provided to Vice Chairman Bryan.

Sincerely,



L. Britt Snider
Inspector General
Central Intelligence Agency



Donald Mancuso
Acting Inspector General
Department of Defense

Attachment

CIA - March 1, 2024

000351

SEP 27 2000

Honorable Richard H. Bryan
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-6475

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:


Attached is a clarifying comment that should go with the unclassified version of our Joint Report entitled, "A Review of the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate on POW/MIA Issues and the Charges Levied by a *Critical Assessment of the Estimate (1999-5974-IG) (00-OIR-04)*," dated February 29, 2000.

Additionally, an earlier modification, with the attached clarification, will be sent to all recipients of the classified report through appropriate Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency secure channels. Your Committee is one such recipient.


This concludes our efforts on this issue requested by you on March 8, 1999.

A similar letter has been provided to Chairman Shelby.

Sincerely,



L. Britt Snider
Inspector General
Central Intelligence Agency



Donald Mancuso
Acting Inspector General
Department of Defense

Attachment

CIA - March 1, 2024

000352

Clarifying Comment

to

The *Unclassified* Version of

A JOINT REPORT
A REVIEW OF THE 1998 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON
POW/MIA ISSUES AND THE CHARGES LEVIED BY
A *CRITICAL ASSESSMENT* OF THE ESTIMATE
(1999-5974-IG)
(00-0IR-04)
29 February 2000

THIS COMMENT PERTAINS TO THE SECTION "MEETING WITH DPMO ANALYSTS" AT PAGE 29 OF THE JOINT REPORT:

By way of clarification, the matter of a possible security violation was outside the scope of our review. It should be noted, however, that during the time that we were researching this report, we discovered no information that supports the perception that the Joint Commission or its support directorate within DPMO violated appropriate security regulations. Additionally, we did not consider the appropriateness of the relationship between the JCSD and the Joint Commission, created in 1992 by the United States and the Russian Federation, as it also was outside the scope of this review.

memo to NAVY

I I

Date of Report: 15 Jan 1971

PHOTO COMPARISON ANALYSIS RESULTS: Christmas 1969 NO. 41442

H [redacted] CASE: 17,516

1. (U) Summary of request: (Date received: 9.12.70)

yes

a. Please compare the attached 9 pre-capture photographs of PATERSON, JAMES with the Christmas 1969 film obtained by Representative Zion, especially prints numbered DIA USAF 911

b. See attached overlay for exact location of image to be compared.

2. (U) Summary of comparison performed:

a. The following frames were chosen for comparison with the photographs submitted: F 6536, 6544, 65

b. 2 technicians working independently of each other analyzed the identifiable features listed below.

I

3. [redacted] Results of analysis:

a. (U) Quality of pre-capture photographs submitted: Adequate/inadequate for analysis of recognizable features.

b. (U) Quality of frames in Christmas film: Adequate/inadequate for analysis of recognizable features.

c. [redacted] The following features were considered similar

I

(1) Car lot and street - away behind

(2) _____

(3) _____

(4) _____

I

[redacted]

21008

1. (U) Summary of request: (Date received: 9.12.70)

yes a. Please compare the attached 9 pre-capture photographs of PATERSON, JAMES with the Christmas 1969 film obtained by Representative Zion, especially prints numbered DIA _____ USN 914 USAF _____.

b. See attached overlay for exact location of image to be compared.

2. (U) Summary of comparison performed:

a. The following frames were chosen for comparison with the photographs submitted: F 6536, 6544, 65

b. 2 technicians working independently of each other analyzed the identifiable features listed below.

3. I [redacted] Results of analysis:

a. (U) Quality of pre-capture photographs submitted: Adequate inadequate for analysis of recognizable features.

b. (U) Quality of frames in Christmas film: Adequate inadequate for analysis of recognizable features.

c. I [redacted] The following features were considered similar:

- (1) Car set and stand-away building
- (2) _____
- (3) _____
- (4) _____

I [redacted]

21008

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE 1 MAY 1987

CIA - March 1, 2024

2
000355

I [REDACTED]

- (5) _____
- (6) _____
- (7) _____
- (8) _____
- (9) _____

d. [REDACTED] The following features were considered dissimilar:

- (1) Orbital shape
- (2) Zygomatic structure
- (3) lack of detail
- (4) _____
- (5) _____

e. [REDACTED] Conclusion:

- (1) In view of the similarity in general appearance and significant number of similar features, _____ could be the subject of the questioned photographs.
- (2) In view of the significant number of differences in distinguishable features, PAHERSON probably is not the subject of the questioned photographs.
- (3) In view of the quality of photography and the small number of distinguishable features which could be compared, no conclusion can be reached.

f. (U) The same image has been compared with pre-capture photographs of _____ Air Force, _____ Navy, _____ Marine, _____ Army, and _____ civilian personnel.

I [REDACTED]

(9)

d. [redacted] The following features were considered dissimilar:

- (1) Orninal shape
- (2) Zygomatic structure
- (3) facial details
- (4) _____
- (5) _____

e. [redacted] Conclusion:

- (1) In view of the similarity in general appearance and significant number of similar features, _____ could be the subject of the questioned photographs.
- (2) In view of the significant number of differences in distinguishable features, RAHERSON probably is not the subject of the questioned photographs.
- (3) In view of the quality of photography and the small number of distinguishable features which could be compared, no conclusion can be reached.

f. (U) The same image has been compared with pre-capture photographs of _____ Air Force, _____ Navy, _____ Marine, _____ Army, and _____ civilian personnel.

[redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE 1 MAY 1987

4. [REDACTED]

WARNING: This photo comparison analysis was performed utilizing the best available techniques, however, the quality of the photographs in question precluded positive identification. There may be other overriding factors concerning the individual's case which could confirm or invalidate the photo comparison analysis.

Attachments:

- (a) Overlay or questioned photo
- (b) Precapture photo 9

Viewing an archived action from Extral Close

U

Action

**REQUEST FOR THE DCI TO ATTEND A 1
OCTOBER 1996 CLOSED HEARING TO DISCUSS
INTERAGENCY EFFORTS TO ACCOUNT FOR
AMERICAN SERVICE PERSONNEL AND
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIVES WHO REMAIN
MISSING IN ACTION FROM THE KOREAN AND
VIETNAM WARS**

Document Number
OCA-014110-CNV

Date Received
09/25/1996

Task Instructions:

no value

Recipients

- DCI DEUTCH

Request Documents:

(b)(3) CIAAct

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	
Secondary OPI	
From	
Other Document Number	
Comments	
File Code	
Media Type	
Codewords	
Attachments	
Keywords	
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(b)(3) CIAAct

U

Viewing an archived action from Extral Close

CIA - March 1, 2024

(b)(3) CIAAct
000359

CUA 96-0390

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 VAN HILLEARY, TENNESSEE
 JOE SCARBOROUGH, FLORIDA
 WALTER B. JONES, JR., NORTH CAROLINA
 JAMES B. LONGLEY, JR., MAINE
 TODD TIAHRT, KANSAS
 RICHARD "DOC" HASTINGS, WASHINGTON

COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-6035

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

FLOYD D. SPENCE, SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN

September 25, 1996

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 G.V. (SONNY) MONTGOMERY, MISSISSIPPI
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 IKE SKELTON, MISSOURI
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ANDREW K. ELLIS, STAFF DIRECTOR


Mr. John Deutch
 Director of Central Intelligence
 The Central Intelligence Agency
 Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Deutch:

As the Chairman of both the Subcommittee on Military Personnel of the House National Security Committee and the Subcommittee on Tactical and Technical Intelligence of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), I request your attendance at a closed meeting in Room H-405 of the Capitol (HPSCI hearing room) at 10:00 a.m. on Tuesday, October 1, 1996 to discuss interagency efforts to account for American service personnel and intelligence operatives who remain missing in action from the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

As you know, recent public hearings that I have conducted on POW/MIAs from the Korean War and their possible transfer to the Soviet Union have generated considerable media coverage. It is essential that all U.S. Government agencies coordinate efforts to resolve the fates of our missing heroes. I have learned that interagency rivalry has led to the derailment of recent efforts by Defense Department investigators to obtain important information. For example, an initiative to interview sources in Europe was allegedly sabotaged by a Russian defector working for your agency and a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee currently working at the Defense POW/MIA Office. I have also learned that important documents have been suppressed or remain inappropriately classified. This closed meeting will be an opportunity to candidly address the concerns of Congress regarding these issues and to expedite the accountability process.

If you cannot attend the meeting, I request that you please send a senior deputy to represent your interests. In addition, because I believe that the current coordination problems can best be overcome by sharing information between agencies in a session involving personnel from several levels of management, I would also request the attendance of the following people: Mr. Frederick P. Hitz, the Inspector General of the CIA; and CIA MROC



CIA - March 1, 2024

000360

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~SECRET~~

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

COUNTRY	USSR	REPORT NO.	[REDACTED]
SUBJECT	Information on Personalities Held in Soviet Prisons	DATE DISTR.	26 Feb
		NO. OF PAGES	1
DATE OF INFO.	1951-1953	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
PLACE ACQUIRED	[REDACTED]	REFERENCES	
DATE ACQUIRED			

BY CABLE

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: [REDACTED] (b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

- Cohn (fnu), a British subject formerly employed as an editor by the British Embassy in Moscow, was imprisoned at Verkhne-Uralsk (N 53-53, E 59-13) in 1952. His daughter was married to a British officer.
- Mac (sic, probably Max) Bruegger, a Swiss national, was seen in Chelyubinsk and Magnitogorsk in the spring of 1953.
- Elena Romanova Hintzman, who claimed to have married a U.S. official, (fnu) Hintzman, in Berlin in 1949 or 1950, was in Zndirskaya (sic) prison in 1951.
- Mella Hirschfeld, wife of an employee of the American Embassy in Moscow, was in Lubyanka prison, Moscow, in late 1951 and early 1952.¹

- [REDACTED] from another source, which reported that an American named Mary Hirschfeld was transferred in February 1954 from Butyrskiy prison, Moscow, to an unidentified location.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[REDACTED]

(16)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~

STATE	X#	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	FBI		AEC				
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(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#")

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

MSGNO 179 (PCXX) *12/31/86* *00:11:59.9.7*
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 ZNY SSSSS
 R 310325Z DEC 86
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
 RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
 RUEABOL/HQ AFOSI BOLLING AFB DC
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 310233Z DEC 86
 FM CIA

TO RUETIAA/DIRNSA
 RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE//FOR INR
 RUEKJCS/DIA
 RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT
 RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
 ZEN/CIA OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS
 RUHQQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
 RUHHMA/CDRWESTCOM FT SHAFTER HI
 RUHQQA/COMIPAC HONOLULU HI
 RHMBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
 RUHVAAA/CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
 RUJMAJ/FOSIF/WESTPAC
 RUHGOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT
 BT
 EZ1 JCS WASHINGTON DC
~~SECRET~~ NOFORN NOCONTRACT WMINTEL SECTION 1 OF 3
 EZ2
 CITE: CIA 227340
 SERIAL: [REDACTED]
 PASS: NSA FOR ZKZK OO DLS DE (FOR NSOC).

RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 310233Z DEC 86

 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
 REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ WMINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT
 DIST: 30 DECEMBER 1986
 COUNTRY: LAOS
 SUBJ: POW-MIA: ABSENCE OF AMERICAN PRISONERS IN LAO
 REEDUCATION CAMPS IN PHONG SALLY, LUANG PRABANG
 AND XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCES, LAOS FROM 1975-SEPTEMBER
 1986; LOCATION AND OPERATIONS OF LAO REEDUCATION CAMPS
 ONE, THREE AND 515
 DOI: 1975 - EARLY SEPTEMBER 1986
 SOURCE: [REDACTED]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUMMARY: ACCORDING [REDACTED] THERE WERE NO AMERICAN PRISONERS-OF-WAR HELD IN PHONG SALLY, LUANG PRABANG OR XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCES REEDUCATION CAMPS BETWEEN 1975 AND EARLY SEPTEMBER 1986. THE LPDR GOVERNMENT SEMINAR CAMP NUMBER ONE WAS LOCATED AT SOP KAI VILLAGE, KHOUA DISTRICT. CAMP ONE CLOSED IN DECEMBER 1976, AFTER WHICH, 150 INMATES WERE RELOCATED TO PAK NAM HOI VILLAGE, CAMP THREE, MAI DISTRICT CAMP TWO AND PHONG SALLY DISTRICT CONSTRUCTION CAMP. IN EARLY DECEMBER 1978, WHEN RELATIONS BECAME STRAINED BETWEEN THE CHINESE AND THE LAO AND VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENTS, THE REEDUCATION INMATES WERE TRANSFERRED AWAY FROM THE BORDER WITH CHINA. ONE GROUP OF RELOCATED PRISONERS WAS TRANSFERRED TO CAMP 515 LOCATED AT THE SITE OF DESERTED PHA KANG NANG VILLAGE, PEK DISTRICT.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT: 1. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED], THERE WERE NO AMERICAN PRISONERS-OF-WAR (POW) HELD IN PHONG SALLY, LUANG PRABANG OR XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCES REEDUCATION CAMPS BETWEEN 1975 AND EARLY SEPTEMBER 1986. [REDACTED] STATED THAT HE HAD NOT HEARD RUMORS OF POWS BEING HELD. THE LPDR GOVERNMENT'S SEMINAR CAMP NUMBER ONE WAS LOCATED AT SOP KAI (TJ3529) VILLAGE, KHOUA DISTRICT. ON 2 AUGUST 1975, APPROXIMATELY 200 POLICE AND MILITARY OFFICERS BETWEEN THE RANKS OF SECOND LIEUTENANT AND COLONEL WERE TRANSPORTED IN ABOUT 20 BOATS FROM LUANG PRABANG (THO202) TOWN TO PAKBENG (QC 2400) DISTRICT, OUDOMSAI PROVINCE. ARRIVING AT PAKBENG ON 5 AUGUST, THE OFFICERS WERE TRANSPORTED BY CHINESE CA-53 TRUCKS, APPROXIMATELY 30 PERSONS AND A SMALL AMOUNT OF PERSONAL EFFECTS PER TRUCK. OFFICERS AT THE MAJOR THROUGH COLONEL RANKS WERE SENT TO OUDOMSAI PROVINCE. THE JUNIOR OFFICERS WERE SENT TO SEMINAR CAMP ONE LOCATED AT KILOMETER-91 ALONG ROUTE FOUR IN THE VICINITY OF TJ 3529, ABOUT TEN KILOMETERS SOUTHWEST OF KHOUA DISTRICT TOWN. THE CAMP WAS SITUATED ON THE EAST SIDE OF THE ROAD RUNNING ALONG THE PAK RIVER AND WAS THE FORMER CHINA ROUTE FOUR CONSTRUCTION CAMP.

(b)(1)
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2. THE REEDUCATION INMATES WERE KEPT IN EIGHT TEN X 50 METER STRUCTURES. THE SLEEPING FLOORS WERE CONSTRUCTED FROM BAMBOO MADE INTO SHEETS AND EACH STRUCTURE HELD 50 INMATES. A TOTAL OF 370 DETAINEES ARRIVED AT THE CAMP AFTER THE REFUGEE'S GROUP. THE CAMP GUARDS HAD FOUR BUILDINGS AND APPROXIMATELY 20 ARMED MEN. THE CAMP COMMANDER AND HEAD OF THE COMMITTEE WAS ((BOUNYANG)) (LNU), AN ETHNIC LUE FROM MUANG YO (QD 9580), PHONG SALLY PROVINCE. OTHER COMMITTEE MEMBERS PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED TO THE CAMP INCLUDED ((SINGKEO)) (LNU), AN ETHNIC PHOU NOI; ((MAIKEO)) (LNU), AN ETHNIC LUE; AND, ((THONGSET)) (LNU), AN ETHNIC LAO THOENG. THE CAMP COMPRISED ABOUT 1,500 SQUARE METERS FENCED BY BAMBOO WHICH WAS BUILT BY THE INMATES. DURING THE FIRST FIVE MONTHS THE CAMP WAS IN OPERATION, THE LPDR AUTHORITIES PROVIDED THE INMATES WITH FRESH MEAT. AFTER THE FIRST FIVE MONTHS, THE INMATES WERE GIVEN CANNED FOOD. TWO MEALS PER DAY WERE SERVED, AT 1200 HOURS AND AT 1700 HOURS. ABOUT 700 GRAMS OF WHITE RICE WERE PROVIDED DAILY TO EACH PRISONER. BLANKETS WERE ALSO PROVIDED TO THE INMATES.

3. POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION STRESSING THE IDEALISM OF COMMUNISM AND LAO HISTORY WAS HELD DAILY FROM 0700 UNTIL 1200 HOURS, AND FROM 1400 TO 1700 HOURS, MONDAY THROUGH FRIDAY FOR THE FIRST THREE MONTHS. AFTER THE FIRST THREE MONTHS, THE PRISONERS WERE

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REQUIRED TO REPAIR ROADS, HARVEST TIMBER AS DIRECTED BY PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES, RAISE LIVESTOCK, GROW VEGETABLES, WORK AT CONSTRUCTION AND FARM RICE. ONLY FIRST AID WAS AVAILABLE TO THE INMATES. PREVALENT ILLNESSES INCLUDED JUANDICE, HEPATITIS, AND HEMORRHAGIC FEVER. THE INMATES WERE REQUIRED TO ORGANIZE A SIX-MEMBER SECURITY UNIT. TWO SECURITY POSTS WERE ESTABLISHED, ONE AT THE NORTH END OF THE CAMP FACING KHOUA TOWN AND THE OTHER AT THE SOUTH END FACING SOP KAI VILLAGE. EACH POST WAS OCCUPIED BY ONE ARMED GUARD AT ALL TIMES. THE GUARDS ESCORTED THE PRISONERS ON WORK DETAILS, BUT DID NOT CLOSELY WATCH THEM. THE GUARDS WOULD CALL A PRISONER WHO STRAYED FROM THE WORK AREA BACK TO THE MAIN GROUP. SEVEN PRISONERS ATTEMPTED TO ESCAPE DURING THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF BEING DETAINED, FOUR WERE SUCCESSFUL AND THREE WERE RECAPTURED. MORALE AMONG THE INMATES WAS VERY LOW BECAUSE THEY REALIZED THAT THEY WERE ACTUALLY PRISONERS AND NOT JUST IN A SEMINAR CAMP. ONE SECOND LIEUTENANT COMMITTED SUICIDE BY JUMPING INTO THE NAM PAK RIVER BECAUSE OF DEPRESSION.

4. AFTER THE CAMP HAD BEEN OPERATING FOR ABOUT ONE MONTH, LPDR AUTHORITIES ALLOWED FAMILY MEMBERS TO JOIN THE DETAINEES AND ENCOURAGED SPOUSES TO REMAIN AT THE CAMP WHICH WAS BELIEVED TO DISCOURAGE ESCAPE ATTEMPTS. ONLY FAMILY MEMBERS WHO COULD NOT AFFORD TO REMAIN AT THEIR HOME VILLAGES STAYED AT THE CAMP. WHEN FAMILY MEMBERS ARRIVED AT THE CAMP, A SHACK WAS CONSTRUCTED FOR THEM. FAMILY MEMBERS WERE REQUIRED TO ATTEND THE POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION SESSIONS ALONG WITH THE INMATES. FOOD ALLOWANCES WERE BASED ON ATTENDANCE AT THE POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION SEMINARS. SEMINAR CAMP ONE WAS CLOSED AT THE END OF DECEMBER 1976, WHEN THE PRISONERS RAN OUT OF WORK TO DO IN THE AREA. THE CAMP SITE WAS USED FOR PROVINCIAL CONSTRUCTION AFTER THE CAMP CLOSED.

5. WHEN CAMP ONE CLOSED, 150 INMATES WERE RELOCATED TO PAK NAM HOI (POSSIBLY QD 9880) CAMP THREE. FAMILY MEMBERS FOLLOWED AFTER THREE MONTHS. ABOUT 50 INMATES WERE RELOCATED TO MAI (TJ 6942) DISTRICT CAMP TWO TO PERFORM WORK IN THAT AREA. ABOUT 100 INMATES WERE RELOCATED TO CAMP THREE WERE TRANSPORTED BY BOAT ALONG THE NAM OU RIVER TO HATSA (TK 1006) VILLAGE, AND IN FIVE TRUCKS THROUGH PHONG SALLY DISTRICT TOWN TO MUANG YO LOCATED AT KILOMETER-64 VILLAGE WHERE THEY LEFT THE TRUCKS AND WALKED THE REMAINING FIVE TO SIX KILOMETERS, ARRIVING 31 DECEMBER 1976. CAMP THREE HAD BEEN PREPARED BY THE MAJOR-COLONEL RANK PRISONERS FROM CAMP FOUR ABOUT SIX MONTHS PREVIOUSLY.

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4. AFTER THE CAMP HAD BEEN OPERATING FOR A MONTH, LPDR AUTHORITIES ALLOWED FAMILY MEMBERS TO JOIN THE DETAINEES AND ENCOURAGED SPOUSES TO REMAIN AT THE CAMP WHICH WAS BELIEVED TO DISCOURAGE ESCAPE ATTEMPTS. ONLY FAMILY MEMBERS WHO COULD NOT AFFORD TO REMAIN AT THEIR HOME VILLAGES STAYED AT THE CAMP. WHEN FAMILY MEMBERS ARRIVED AT THE CAMP, A SHACK WAS CONSTRUCTED FOR THEM. FAMILY MEMBERS WERE REQUIRED TO ATTEND THE POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION SESSIONS ALONG WITH THE INMATES. FOOD ALLOWANCES WERE BASED ON ATTENDANCE AT THE POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION SEMINARS. SEMINAR CAMP ONE WAS CLOSED AT THE END OF DECEMBER 1976, WHEN THE PRISONERS RAN OUT OF WORK TO DO IN THE AREA. THE CAMP SITE WAS USED FOR PROVINCIAL CONSTRUCTION AFTER THE CAMP CLOSED.

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 ZCZC 05:10:47Z (PC)
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 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
 RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
 RUEABOL/HQ AFOSI BOLLING AFB DC
 RUEALGX/SAFE
 R 310233Z DEC 86
 FM CIA

TO RUETIAA/DIRNSA
 RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE//FOR INR
 RUEKJCS/DIA
 RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT
 RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
 ZEN/CIA OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS
 RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
 RUHHHMA/CDRWESTCOM FT SHAFTER HI
 RUHQHQA/COMIPAC HONOLULU HI
 RHEMBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
 RUHVAAA/CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
 RUAJMAB/FOSIF/WESTPAC
 RUHGOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT

BT
 EZ1: JCS WASHINGTON DC
 S E C R E T NOFORN NOCONTRACT WMINTEL SECTION 2 OF 3
 EZ2: JCS WASHINGTON DC
 CITE: CIA 227386
 SERIAL: [REDACTED]
 PASS: NSA FOR ZKZK OO DLS DE (FOR NSOC).

(b)(3) CIAAct

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 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
 6. THONGSET AND MAIKEO FROM THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE FOR
 OVERSEEING THE CAMP RELOCATED WITH THE INMATES TO CAMP THREE.
 ((OUNKHAM)) (LNU), AN ETHNIC LUE, WAS A MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE AT
 CAMP THREE. THE CAMP WAS GUARDED BY APPROXIMATELY 20 SECURITY GUARDS
 DIVIDED INTO TWO SQUADS. THE GUARDS WERE AUGMENTED BY LAO PEOPLE'S
 ARMY (LPA) TROOPS FROM BOUN NEUA (RD 0095) DISTRICT AND BY MUANG YO
 MILITIA. POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION STRESSED LABOR, UNDERSTANDING ITS
 VALUES, LIVES OF LABORERS, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF ROAD CONSTRUCTION,
 WHICH THE CAMP INMATES WERE REQUIRED TO PERFORM. THE INMATES WERE
 USED TO CONSTRUCT A ROAD BEGINNING AT MUANG YO AND WERE OCCUPIED AT
 THAT TASK FOR TWO YEARS DURING WHICH SIX KILOMETERS OF ROAD WERE

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CONSTRUCTED BY HUMAN LABOR AUGMENTED ONLY BY TWO SMALL CHINESE BULLDOZERS. MOST PRISONERS USED HOES AND KNIVES WHICH HAD BEEN ACQUIRED.

7. IN EARLY 1977, ABOUT 100 POLICE AND MILITARY ENLISTED PERSONNEL JOINED CAMP THREE, BEING TRANSFERRED FROM A CAMP IN MAI DISTRICT. BY THE END OF 1978, THE CAMP POPULATION HAD GROWN TO ABOUT 244 INMATES AND BETWEEN 35 AND 50 FAMILIES. IN EARLY 1977 A FIRST LIEUTENANT ATTEMPTED TO ESCAPE WHILE GATHERING FIREWOOD ON SATURDAY. THE GUARDS CHASED THE PRISONER FOR ABOUT TEN KILOMETERS BEFORE CATCHING HIM. THE PRISONER WAS SHOT TO DEATH. THE LPDR AUTHORITIES CLAIMED THAT INMATES ATTEMPTING TO ESCAPE WERE COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY AND NOT ACCEPTING OF THE GOVERNMENT'S IDEALISM. ANOTHER PRISONER DIED OF INTESTINAL DISEASE IN EARLY 1977. FOOD AT CAMP THREE WAS POOR DUE TO A LACK OF VILLAGERS IN THE SURROUNDING AREA. THE RICE QUOTA AT CAMP THREE WAS THE SAME AS AT CAMP ONE. MEALS WERE PREPARED BY THE INMATES, OR BY FAMILY MEMBERS. CAMP THREE WAS CLOSED WHEN TENSIONS AROSE BETWEEN THE CHINESE AND LPDR GOVERNMENTS. THE REEDUCATION CAMPS LOCATED NEAR THE SINO-LAO BORDER WERE ABANDONED WITHIN THREE DAYS AFTER TRANSFER OF THE PRISONERS BEGAN. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE INMATES WERE WORKING ON CONSTRUCTION OF A 120 KILOMETER LENGTH OF ROAD. THE POLICE OFFICIAL SAID THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT HE WOULD HAVE SURVIVED THE CAMP BECAUSE OF THE EXTREME HARD-LABOR WORKING CONDITIONS HAD NOT TENSIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND LAOS CAUSED EVACUATION OF THE CAMPS.)

8. IN EARLY DECEMBER 1978, WHEN RELATIONS BECAME STRAINED BETWEEN THE LAO AND VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENTS AND THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT, CHINA WITHDREW ALL OF ITS PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN ROAD CONSTRUCTION FROM OUDOMSAI PROVINCE TO NAM BAC (TH 3585) VILLAGE, AND ON TO LUANG PRABANG PROVINCE; AND FROM NAM BAC THROUGH MUANG HIAM (UH 3021) TO XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCE. REEDUCATION CAMP INMATES FROM THE AFFECTED AREAS, INCLUDING THE CAMP FOUR MAJOR AND COLONEL RANKED OFFICERS, LOCATED AT KILOMETER 65 ON THE ROAD TO THE CHINESE BORDER, MUANG YO VILLAGE, BOUN NEUA (RD 0095) DISTRICT, CAMP THREE AND SOP KINE (TJ 6208) VILLAGE WERE RELOCATED ALONG WITH POLITICAL PRISONERS TO FORMER SEMINAR CAMP ONE. SEVERAL HUNDRED PRISONERS WERE INVOLVED IN THE RELOCATION. IN MID-DECEMBER 1978, LPDR AUTHORITIES TRANSPORTED ALL FORMER RLG MAJOR AND COLONEL RANKED OFFICERS AND 17 OFFICERS FROM SECOND LIEUTENANT AND CAPTAIN RANKS FROM PAK NAM HOI CAMP THREE BY HELICOPTER TO VIENGSAY (VH 1957) DISTRICT, HOUA PHAN PROVINCE. THE REMAINING INMATES WERE GRADUALLY TRANSPORTED BY TRUCK TO PAK BENG (QC 2302) AND THEN TO PAK XUANG (TH 1110) ABOUT 25 KMS NORTHEAST OF LUANG PRABANG PROVINCE TOWN. FROM PAK XUANG, THE INMATES WERE TRANSPORTED IN TWO C-47 AND C-123 AIRCRAFT TO VARIOUS LOCATIONS INCLUDING PHON SAVAN (UG 1253), XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCE, SEPON (XD 2748), AND ATTOPEU (XB 9738).

9. ON 1 JANUARY 1979, A GROUP OF 30 PRISONERS WAS FLOWN TO PHON SAVAN, A 30-MINUTE FLIGHT. THE GROUP WAS TRANSPORTED IN 6X6 TRUCKS TO NAFENG (UG 1550) VILLAGE RECEPTION CENTER, ABOUT SIX KILOMETERS EAST OF THE THONG HAI HIN (UG 0651) AIRFIELD. FROM NAFENG, THE INMATES WERE TRANSPORTED BY TRUCK ALONG ROUTE SEVEN THROUGH NABONG VILLAGE TO NONG KANG (POSSIBLY UG 0353) CAMP. SEVERAL HUNDRED INMATES AND FAMILY MEMBERS WERE LOCATED AT THE CAMP. THE NEW GROUP

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CIA - March 1, 2024

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OF ARRIVING PRISONERS WAS REQUIRED TO CUT WOOD AND GATHER ELEPHANT GRASS TO CONSTRUCT SHELTERS. THE PRISONERS WERE ALSO TO FORAGE FOR FOOD, VEGETABLES AND FIREWOOD. CONDITIONS IN THE CAMP WERE IN TURMOIL AND WERE DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF HEAVY THICK GRASS, TREES AND OTHER VEGETATION. WINDS WERE STRONG AND COLD. THE SHELTERS WERE FLOORED, ROOFED AND WALLED WITH "SACCHRUM SPONTANEUM" GRASS. (SOURCE COMMENT: SACCHRUM SPONTANEUM GRASS WAS TRADITIONALLY USED IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF PIGSTIES.) CAMP INMATES SUFFERED FROM INFLUENZA, COUGHS, CHEST PAINS AND OTHER AILMENTS. THE SEVERE CLIMATE, HARD LABOR, INSUFFICIENT FOOD SUPPLIES OF ONLY NATURAL WILD GROWING VEGETABLES CONTRIBUTED TO THE POOR STATE OF THE PRISONERS HEALTH. FRESH MEAT, FISH AND CANNED FOODS WERE VERY SCARCE. THE CAMP WAS LOCATED AWAY FROM NEARBY VILLAGES. LOCAL AREA VILLAGERS HAD FLED TO VIENTIANE DURING THE ARMED FIGHTING FOR CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY. AFTER THE LPDR GOVERNMENT HAD SEIZED CONTROL OF LAOS, THE AREA VILLAGERS HAD BEEN RETURNED TO THEIR VILLAGES AND FORCED TO LARGELY SUPPORT THEMSELVES.

10. THE PRISONERS WERE REQUIRED TO CUT WOOD AND CONSTRUCT SHELTERS TO HOUSE ABOUT 200 FAMILIES. EACH SHELTER WAS FOUR BY SIX OR EIGHT METERS, WALLED WITH CLAY AND ROOFED WITH ELEPHANT GRASS. THE FLOORS OF THE SHELTERS WERE RAISED ABOVE GROUND LEVEL. THE PRISONERS WERE ALSO REQUIRED TO CONSTRUCT QUARTERS FOR THE CAMP AUTHORITIES. AFTER THE CONSTRUCTION HAD BEEN COMPLETED, SOME OF THE PRISONERS WERE TRANSFERRED TO CAMPS 515, 518, 523 AND OTHER UNSPECIFIED CAMPS DURING LATE FEBRUARY - EARLY MARCH 1979. ONE GROUP OF PRISONERS WAS TRANSFERRED TO CAMP 515 LOCATED AT THE SITE OF DESERTED PHA PANG NANG (POSSIBLY TG 6558) VILLAGE, PEK DISTRICT, IN THREE "HINO" TRUCKS. THE CAMP WAS LOCATED ALONG ROUTE SEVEN APPROXIMATELY 100 KILOMETERS EAST OF PHOU KHOON (TG 3051) JUNCTION AND ABOUT 20 KILOMETERS WEST OF MOUNG SOU (TG 7860) VILLAGE, AT THE FOOT OF A HIGH HILL. THE PRISONERS WERE REQUIRED TO DIG A WELL FOR WATER. THE MAJORITY OF THE PRISONERS SENT TO CAMP 515 WERE FORMERLY ASSIGNED TO THE RLG 5TH MILITARY REGION AT VIENTIANE AND HAD BEEN INCARCERATED IN THE VANGVIENG (TG 3293) AREA. THE INMATES AT CAMP 515 WERE USED TO MAINTAIN AND REPAIR ROUTE SEVEN, KEEPING THE ROAD OPEN YEAR AROUND, AND WERE USED AS A LABOR FORCE TO CONSTRUCT BRIDGES OVER THE NAM CHAT (TG 6155) AND OTHER RIVERS.

11. CAMP 515 WAS COMMANDED BY MAJOR ((BOUNLI)) (LNU); MAJOR ((BOUNLAM)) (LNU) WAS THE DEPUTY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS; AND MAJOR ((KHAMDONG)) (LNU) WAS DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF. CAMP 515 WAS DIVIDED INTO FOUR COMPANIES COMPRISED OF INMATES AND A 30-MEMBER SECURITY GUARD FORCE, COMMANDED BY SECOND LIEUTENANT ((KHAMPHAO)) (LNU). THE 1ST COMPANY, COMMANDED BY SECOND LIEUTENANT ((THONGPAN)) (LNU), WAS A SERVICE COMPANY FOR THE ENTIRE CAMP; THE 2ND COMPANY, COMMANDED BY SECOND LIEUTENANT ((KHAMSOUBIN)) (LNU), PRODUCED ROCK USED IN ROAD CONSTRUCTION AND PAVING; THE 3RD COMPANY, COMMANDED BY SECOND

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MSGNO 180 (PCXX) *12/31/86* *00:12:00.1.5*
ZCZC 05:10:47Z (PC)
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ZNY SSSSS
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FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OGSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUEABOL/HQ AFOSI BOLLING AFB DC
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 310233Z DEC 86
FM CIA

TO RUETIAA/DIRNSA
RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE//FOR INR
RUEKJCS/DIA
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
ZEN/CIA OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS
RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUHHMA/CDRWESTCOM FT SHAFTER HI
RUHQHQA/COMIPAC HONOLULU HI
RHIMBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RUHVAAA/CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
RUAJMAF/FOSIF/WESTPAC
RUHGOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT

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EZ1: JCS WASHINGTON DC
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EZ2: CNO WASHINGTON DC
CITE: CIA 227216
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RUEALGX/SAFE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
12 DEC 86

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
LIEUTENANT ((SA)) PHOUVONG, WAS FURTHER DIVIDED INTO ONE TRANSPORTATION PLATOON AND TWO ROAD REPAIR LABOR PLATOONS; AND, THE 4TH COMPANY, COMMANDED BY SECOND LIEUTENANT ((OUNKHAM)) (LNU), PERFORMED BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION. CAMP 515 PRISONERS WHO WERE ELDERLY OR TOO ILL FOR HARD LABOR WERE SENT TO HAT (POSSIBLY TG 6657) SETTLEMENT WHERE THEY RAISED VEGETABLES AND LIVESTOCK. HAT SETTLEMENT WAS LOCATED ABOUT TWO KILOMETERS EAST OF CAMP 515 ALONG ROUTE SEVEN AND CONTAINED APPROXIMATELY 20 INMATES. TYPICAL ROAD REPAIR INCLUDED RECONSTRUCTING DANGEROUS SECTIONS OF ROAD, REPAIRING CULVERTS, BRIDGES, BLASTING ROCK FOR GRAVEL TO FILL HOLES AND GENERAL REPAIRS.

12. THERE WERE NUMEROUS ESCAPE ATTEMPTS FROM CAMP 515 DURING

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1985, WHEN THE PRISONERS TOOK ADVANTAGE OF PERSONNEL MOVEMENTS. RECAPTURED PRISONERS WERE REEDUCATED IF THEY WERE LOWER RANKED FORMER MEMBERS OF THE RLG. RECAPTURED FORMER SENIOR RLG OFFICIALS WERE SENT TO PHONSAVAN-LONGKAI (UG 5566) PRISONS. SERIOUS ILLNESSES AMONG THE INMATES WERE TREATED AT THE XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCE HOSPITAL AND, RARELY, IN VIENTIANE. PRISONERS WERE EXPECTED TO TREAT MINOR MEDICAL PROBLEMS BY THEMSELVES. CAMP INMATES RECEIVED VIETNAMESE WHITE RICE IN THE AMOUNT OF 650 GRAMS PER DAY EACH AND 200 GRAMS OF SALT EACH PER MONTH. MEAT WAS SCARCE ALTHOUGH CANNED MEAT WAS PROVIDED OCCASIONALLY. PRISONERS RECEIVED A SUBSISTANCE ALLOWANCE OF FOUR KIP PER DAY. (FIELD COMMENT: 35 KIP EQUALS U.S.\$1.00 AT THE OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE.) ONCE EVERY THREE MONTHS, BOUNLI AND ((SIPHON)) (LNU), AND ((PHONSAVAN)) (LNU), PRISONER QUARTERMASTERS, TRAVELED TO XIENG KHOUANG TOWN TO PICK UP THE SUBSISTANCE ALLOWANCE. THE ALLOWANCE WAS USED TO PURCHASE FOOD FROM THE AREA VILLAGERS. UNUSED FUNDS WERE RESERVED. PRISONERS BEHAVIOR INSIDE THE CAMP WAS CONTROLLED BY THE PRISONERS. THE OUTSIDE PERIMETER WAS GUARDED BY THE LPDR AUTHORITIES WHO ONLY ALLOWED THE PRISONERS ACCESS TO A LIMITED AREA AT NIGHT. THERE WAS NOT POLICY FOR RELEASING THE PRISONERS BECAUSE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S NEED FOR LABOR. ONLY PRISONERS WHO WERE IN POOR HEALTH WERE RELEASED.

13. IN EARLY 1986, LPDR AUTHORITIES TRANSFERRED SOME OF THE (b)(1) CAMP 515 INMATES TO WORK AT THE LPA JOINT SCHOOL AT PAEN (TG 9869(b)(3) NatSecAct VILLAGE. EACH PRISONER COMPANY ROTATED WORKING AT THE SCHOOL. IN AUGUST 1986, THE ENTIRE CAMP WAS MOVED TO THE VICINITY OF THE JOINT SCHOOL BECAUSE OF TRANSPORTATION DIFFICULTIES. AS OF SEPTEMBER, ONLY APPROXIMATELY 50 PRISONERS REMAINED AT CAMP 515.

ACQ: [REDACTED] (NOVEMBER 1986) FIELD NO. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

DISSEM: FIELD: EMBASSY, [REDACTED] SENT TO USCINCPAC, IPAC, WESTCOM, PACFLT, PACAF, COMSEVENTHFLT, FOSIF/WESTPAC.

WARNING: REPORT CLASS ~~S E C R E T~~ --WARNING NOTICE-INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-- NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS.

DECL: OADR DRV [REDACTED] BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

BT
#4659 ((PHONSAVAN)) (LNU), PRISONER QUARTERMASTERS
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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5. IN EARLY 1986, LPDR AUTHORITIES TRANSFERRED SOME OF THE CAMP 515 INMATES TO WORK AT THE LPA JOINT SCHOOL AT PAEN (TG 9869) VILLAGE. EACH PRISONER COMPANY ROTATED WORKING AT THE SCHOOL. IN AUGUST 1986, THE ENTIRE CAMP WAS MOVED TO THE VICINITY OF THE JOINT SCHOOL BECAUSE OF TRANSPORTATION DIFFICULTIES. AS OF SEPTEMBER, ONLY APPROXIMATELY 50 PRISONERS REMAINED AT CAMP 515.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT NO.

(b)(3) CIAAct

INFORMATION REPORT

22 JUN 1953

Extracted By ASC

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12 Mar 52

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SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

COUNTRY Korea

SUBJECT UN and ROK Prisoners of War in North Korea

PLACE ACQUIRED Korea

DATE OF INFO. See below

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, OF THE U. S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. THIS REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

* See below

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Paragraph 1:

(b)(1)

Paragraph 2:

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Paragraph 3:

(b)(3) NatSecAct

2. In early July there was selected from United Nations and ROK prisoners of war those technicians familiar with the production and repair of machine guns and tanks captured from the United Nations and ROK forces, and dispatching these prisoners to military training bases in China instead of POW camps.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

3. In mid-October 1951, South Koreans² taken north by the Communists when they first retreated from the ROK were being held in a prison camp in the Hakp'o Mine (129-20, 110-55) (EA-2829) area. Because of heavy United Nations air strikes, about 250 persons in the camp were killed, and the remaining 1,800 prisoners were moved to other areas, one of them being Kirin, Manchuria. Some were forced to work on the building of roads and the repair of mines. Those prisoners not regarded as dangerous by the Ministry of Social Security were taken to mining areas at Unsan (125-48, 39-58) (YE-3927) and Ch'ongsong-dong (125-11, 39-52) (NE-9115), where their living conditions in November 1951 were poor. Meals consisted of only two hops³ of mixed grains from Manchuria, and water was very scarce. Deaths from malnutrition or suicide were frequent.

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL

STATE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NAVY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NSRB	DISTRIBUTION CTRCT#	FEAF#	COMNAVTE#	COMFLT#
ARMY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AIR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FBI	COM7FL#	CINCPACFLT#	COMNAVPHIL#	

001171-doc 128

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

(b)(3) CIAAct

-2-

1. Field Comment. In August 1951 the single runway of the airfield, approximately one kilometer north of Mirim-ni, ran southeast to northwest, according to a report from another governmental agency
2. Field Comment. The source does not state clearly whether these prisoners are civilian or military; the date when they were picked up suggests the former but the camps at the mines are referred to by the source as "prisoner of war" camps.
3. Field Comment. Two hops is slightly more than half a pint.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CIA - March 1, 2024

001171

000371

Action Number: DAC-00570-2007-RESPONSE-1 **Action Status:** Closed

Tasked By: DIR_EXEC_ACTION

Action POC:

Action Type:

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Action Categories:

Reference Number:

Internal Due Date:

Dissemination Date:

Created Date:

02/27/2007 00:00

Internal POC:

Organization POC:

Event Date From:

Event Date To:

Organization/Subcomponents:

Subject:

Letter from Robert Foglesong to General Hayden re: the US-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA's

Assignees:

Info Only:

Task Lead:

Details:

Letter from Robert Foglesong, Chairman of the U.S.- Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA's, requesting assistance in identifying and making available Cold-War-era documents that would shed light on the fates of the POW/MIA's.

Action Attachments:

0_0_1_DAC-00570-2007-RESPONSE-1.pdf

Action Related Links:

None

(b)(3) CIAAct

Action Number: DAC-00570-2007-RESPONSE-1

Response Status: Closed

Date Submitted:

Response from: DIR_EXEC_ACTION

Responding to:

Response Text:

No response has been saved.

Response Attachments:

None

Response Related Links:

None

UNCLASSIFIED

US Classification//Non US//SCI//Codeword//FGI//Dissem Controls//Non-Intell//Declass (as appropriate)

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING SHEET

1. Origination Office Information Management Services/CIO		2. Date	
3. FROM: Name Edmund Cohen	Room No. and Building 2H11 IP	Phone x31215	
4. Subject Response to Letter from General Robert Foglesong, USAF (Ret)			
5. Originating Office Control # CIO/IMS 0486-07	5a. Response to DAC # (Originating Office to Complete) DAC-00570-2007-1	5b. DAC Control # (DAC Use Only) DAC-00570-2007	
6. Justification / Summary (Required for Immediate and Priority Actions)			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Routine <input type="checkbox"/> Priority <input type="checkbox"/> Immediate			
7. Coordination CSI/HS			

NOTE: All correspondence sent to DCI must be sent via ExDir and DDCI

DATE IN	ROUTE TO	ACTION (Check a Box)	NONCONCUR REASON	DATE OUT
2/23/07	TITLE: CIO SIGNATURE: <i>AC</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FYI		2/23
FEB 27 2007	TITLE: DAC SIGNATURE: <i>[Signature]</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FYI		FEB 27 2007
FEB 27 2007	TITLE: ADD SIGNATURE: <i>[Signature]</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FYI		2/27/07
FEB 28 2007	TITLE: DD/CIA SIGNATURE: <i>[Signature]</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FYI		FEB 28 2007
3/1/07	TITLE: DD/CIA SIGNATURE: <i>[Signature]</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE <input type="checkbox"/> CONCUR <input type="checkbox"/> FYI		3/1
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UNCLASSIFIED
CIA - March 1, 2024

CIO/IMS 0486-07
22 February 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence Agency

VIA: Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Associate Deputy Director
Chief Information Officer

FROM: Edmund Cohen
Chief, Information Management Services, CIO

SUBJECT: Response to Letter from General Robert
Foglesong, USAF (Ret)

REFERENCE: Ltr for D/CIA fr Robert H. Foglesong, dtd 2
Feb 07, Same Subject

1. Action: It is requested you sign the attached letter to General Robert Foglesong, USAF (Ret).

2. Background: Attached is the response to General Foglesong's letter of 2 February 2007 requesting archival and declassification assistance from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in support of his work as the Chairman of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA's. The letter concurs in providing such support as requested by his representative, Lieutenant Colonel Tim Hall. The CIA History Staff has already contacted Colonel Hall, and we will work in conjunction with them to address his questions.

3. Recommendation: It is recommended you sign the attached letter to General Robert Foglesong, USAF (Ret).



Edmund Cohen
Chief, Information Management Services

(b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct

Attachment:
Ltr to General Foglesong

CIA - March 1, 2024

000375

Subject: Response to Letter from Robert Foglesong,
General, USAF (Ret)

CIO/IMS [redacted] (21 Feb 07) CIO/Info/OCH/Front Office (b)(6)
Corresp/2007/CvrMemo to Hayden.Fogelsong.doc (b)(3) CIAAct

Distribution:

- Orig - Return to Originator
- 1 - D/CIA
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- 1 - CSI/History Staff
- 3 - C/IMS/CIO
- 1 - C/IRRG/IMS
- 1 - EXO/IMS

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

1 March 2007

General Robert H. Foglesong, USAF (Ret)
Chairman U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs
241 18th Street South, Suite 800
Arlington, VA 22202

Joe
Dear General:

I have received your letter of 2 February requesting the assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency in identifying and declassifying documents that would shed light on the fate of POW/MIAs that may have been held in the Soviet prison-camp system during the Cold War. The Agency is happy to support you in this important endeavor. I have asked Mr. David Robarge, Chief, CIA History Staff and Mr. Gary Reed-Chambers, Chief, Historical Review Branch in the Office of Information Management Services to lend whatever assistance is requested by Lieutenant Colonel Tim Hall of your staff.

I look forward to discussing the work of the Commission with you during one of your visits to Washington.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Mike H.", with a period at the end.

Michael V. Hayden
General, USAF
Director

CIA - March 1, 2024

000377

General Robert H. Foglesong (b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

[Redacted] (21 Feb 07) [Redacted]

[Redacted] /2007/POWMIA Response Letter to
Foglesong.doc

(b)(3) CIAAct

Distribution:

Orig - D/CIA

- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 3 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct

ZNR UUUUU

P 260815Z ZYTI JUL 66

FM FBIS SAIGON

TO RUAFED/FBIS OKINAWA

RUHLE/CINCPACFLT HAWAII

RUHJHQ/CINCPAC HAWAII

RUHLS/CINCPAC HAWAII

RUHLM/PACAF HICKAM AFB

RUHLP/COMNAVFORPHIL

RUHLYS/AMEMB VIENTIANE

RUHMDK/AMEMB BANGKOK

RUHMBJ/W ADIV DIPS

RUHEDH/BUPEERS

RUHECW/ONI WASHDC

RUHTEJA/USAF MIL PERS CTR

RUHECEM/COE DNA

RUHSHA/COMUSMACV



A-J2
X-PO
X-SOG
X-CIIB
X-6 P94 UP

MSC
4411
7/26/66
July

66
Jul

11/16

Approved for Release
Date

RADIO PATHET LAO (CLANDESTINE) IN LAO TO LAOS 2415 GMT .

26 JULY 1966--S

(TEXT) HERE IS A REPORT ABOUT A VOICE RECORDING MADE BY
CAPTAIN DAVID LOUIS HRDLICKA, A U.S. AGGRESSOR PILOT, WHOSE
PLANE WAS SHOT DOWN AND WHO WAS CAPTURED ON EIGHTEEN 18
MAY NINETEEN SIXTYFIVE 1965. HE ASKS HIS HIGHNESS PRINCE A
SOUPHANOUVONG TO FREE HIM.

(RECORDING IN AMERICAN-ACCENTED ENGLISH FOLLOWS--ED.)

PRINCE SOUPHANOUVONG, PRESIDENT OF THE NEW LAO HAK KAT AND
VICE PREMIER OF THE LAOTIAN NATIONAL COALITION GOVERNMENT:

M29/6

THE MISTAKEN IMPRESSION THAT I WAS CUTTING OFF THE FLOW OF
MEN AND SUPPLIES TO SOUTH VIETNAM. HOWEVER, NOW I CAN SEE THE
SOUTH VIETNAM NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT FOR LIBERATION
IS REALLY WITH THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM FIGHTING FOR THEIR
LIBERATION AND FREEDOM, AS IS THE NEO LAO HAK XAT. (END OF
ENGLISH-LANGUAGE VOICE RECORDING. TRANSLATION IN LAO
FOLLOWS--ED.)

HE SAID: I REQUEST HIS HIGHNESS PRINCE SOUPHANOUVONG,
PRESIDENT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE NEO LAO HAK XAT
AND VICE PREMIER OF THE TRIPARTITE NATIONAL COALITION
GOVERNMENT, TO UNDERSTAND THAT I HAVE HAD TIME TO THINK
CAREFULLY AND TO REALIZE MY CRIMINAL ACTIONS AGAINST YOUR PEOPLE.

19 30/6

B

ON EIGHTEEN 18 MAY NINETEEN SIXTYFIVE 1965 I LEFT THE
TA KHLI AIRBASE, THAILAND, AND AFTERWARD MY PLANE WAS SHOT
DOWN BY THE LAOTIAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMED FORCES OF THE
NEO LAO HAK XAT AS I WAS BOMBING A CERTAIN AREA IN THE REGIONS
CONTROLLED BY THE NEO LAO HAK XAT. AS I WAS BOMBING,
I MISTAKENLY THOUGHT THAT I WAS DOING IT TO CUT OFF THE FLOW
OF ARMS SUPPLIES AND TROOPS TO SOUTH VIETNAM. HOWEVER, I
HAVE NOW RECOGNIZED THAT THE LIBERATION FRONT OF SOUTH VIETNAM
IS REALLY THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM, WHO ARE WAGING A STRUGGLE
TO LIBERATE THEIR NATION AND TO WIN FREEDOM. THE LIBERATION
FRONT OF SOUTH VIETNAM IS LIKE THE NEO LAO HAK XAT.

NOW I HAVE UNDERSTOOD AND HAVE BECOME FAMILIAR WITH
EVERYTHING ABOUT THE NEO LAO HAK XAT OF YOUR HIGHNESS IN ITS
FIGHT TO PRESERVE THE PEACE, NEUTRALITY, SOVEREIGNTY,
INDEPENDENCE, UNITY, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LAOS.
THE NEO LAO HAK XAT HAS TRIED TO SAFEGUARD THE GENEVA ACCORDS
OF NINETEEN SIXTYTWO 1962 ON LAOS; WHEREAS, THE UNITED STATES
AND THAILAND, WHICH SIGNED THE NINETEEN SIXTYTWO 1962
GENEVA ACCORDS ON LAOS, ARE TRAMPLING UPON THESE ACCORDS.
FORMATIONS OF U.S. JETS FROM THEIR AIRBASES IN THAILAND,
HAVE UNLEASHED ATTACKS ON THE FREE AREAS OF LAOS.

194/6

OVERHEAD TO BOMB THE FREE AREAS OF LAOS DAY AND NIGHT. THROUGHOUT HISTORY MILITARY AGGRESSORS HAVE NEVER BEEN ABLE TO CONQUER GERRILLAS. OUR NATION WILL HAVE TO REALIZE THIS, FOR THIS HAS SHOWN THAT YOUR COUNTRY IS FIGHTING A BATTLE FOR ITS INDEPENDENCE. THE LAOTIAN PROBLEM MUST BE RESOLVED BY YOUR PEOPLE BY MEANS OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES CONCERNED.

FOR THE PAST YEAR I HAVE ALWAYS MET WITH GOOD TREATMENT FROM YOUR PEOPLE. YOU NURSES HAVE TAKEN CARE OF ME AND HAVE SAVED MY LIFE. THEY HAVE GIVEN ME MEDICINE AND SPECIAL FOODS. AS A CHILD I WANTED TO BE A PILOT, AND WHEN I GREW UP I BECAME A PILOT. NOW I REGRET THAT I USED MY STRENGTH TO WAGE AN AGGRESSIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE WAR. WHAT MAKES ME VERY SAD IS THAT I AM VERY FAR FROM MY DEAR WIFE AND MY THREE LITTLE CHILDREN. I HAVE ALWAYS HOPED TO RETURN TO MY FAMILY AND LIVE WITH MY WIFE AND MY CHILDREN. SURELY I WILL BE ABLE TO TELL MY WIFE THE STORY OF A FAMOUS MAN NAMED "PRINCE SOUPHANOUVONG," WHO FORGAVE ME SO MUCH.

1950/6

BEG YOUR HIGHNESS TO BE STILL MORE KIND AND TO FREE ME,
SO THAT I CAN REJOIN MY WIFE AND CHILDREN. EVEN IF I HAVE
COMMITTED CRIMINAL ACTIONS AGAINST THE LAOTIAN PEOPLE OF YOUR
HIGHNESS, I ASK YOU ONCE MORE TO PARDON ME AND FREE ME,
SO THAT I MAY GO BACK TO MY CHILDREN, MY WIFE, AND MY FAMILY.
I OPPOSE AND PROTEST THE AGGRESSIVE WAR POLICY OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT IN INDOSINA, ESPECIALLY ON THE TERRITORY OF YOUR
COUNTRY. 260415 [REDACTED] 260900Z JULY

BT

1960/6

~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

27 December 1991

The Honorable Bob Smith
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

In response to your letter of December 12, 1991, concerning the possibility of US POWs/MIAs in the USSR, let me assure you that the Agency is actively pursuing this issue. A senior officer of the Interrepublic Security Service (ISS), the successor organization to the former KGB Second Chief Directorate, advised the Agency on 3 December that the ISS had undertaken "an exhaustive search of available information and resources, and had come up with no indication of such presence in the USSR past or present." On 6 December the ISS passed us a written "official" response. Following is a translation of that response:

"At our request, an investigation was conducted in Kazakhstan concerning the supposed presence of an American military pilot in the village of Saryshagan, Dzheshkazgan Oblast, as presented in the newspaper 'Kommersant' (no. 42, dated 4 November 1991). The pilot was reportedly taken prisoner during the period of war in Indochina.

As a result of the investigation, which included questioning long-time residents, no information was obtained about the presence in that region at any time of an American pilot.

On our part, we also do not have any information about American military personnel located on the territory of the USSR who were missing in action during the course of military activities in Indochina."

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED

CIA-911227-640

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

CIA - March 1, 2024

~~SECRET~~

NND 98200038559

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~~SECRET~~

The Honorable Bob Smith

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Regarding alleged statements by retired KGB General Oleg Kalugin, reported by Australian television, that he had been involved in the interrogation of Americans in Vietnam during the 1975-1978 period, we have tasked [redacted] Station to ask the ISS and the Russian Republic Federal Security Service to confirm the remarks attributed to Kalugin and provide details. The Station has also been directed to seek guidance from those services as to how a similar inquiry can be put to the military intelligence service, the GRU.


(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

The [redacted] liaison services have been asked for any information they may have on Soviet and/or East European incarceration or interrogation of POWs/MIAs from World War II, the Korean War, or the Vietnam War.

We will keep the Committee advised of any additional information that results from our discussions with the Russian and East European Services.

A copy of this letter is also being provided to Chairman Kerry.

Sincerely,


Robert M. Gates

Director of Central Intelligence

~~SECRET~~

(b)(3) CIAAct

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

9 March 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Joseph A. Schlatter, US Army
Chief, Special Office for Prisoners of War
and Missing in Action

SUBJECT: Alleged Sightings of American POWs in
North Korea from 1975 to 1982 ~~(S-NF)~~

REFERENCE: Memo for the DDI fm Colonel Schlatter,
dtd 19 Feb 88, Same Subject

1. In response to your request, we have searched our internal files and the Agency's extensive bibliographic holdings for all information on the presence of American POWs in North Korea during the period 1975-82. We have uncovered three separate reports of such sightings, which are attached:

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct o The first report, dated April 1980, indicates that a [redacted] [redacted] sighted two Americans in August 1986, [redacted] on the outskirts of P'yongyang.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] about 10 military pilots captured in North Vietnam were brought to North Korea.

(b)(3) CIAAct o The second report, also dated in April 1980, apparently describes the same incident as related during a debriefing of an official [redacted] who surrendered [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAAct o In the third report, dated March 1988, [redacted] whose account was appended to your memorandum and whose reporting is of undetermined reliability, indicated sig[redacted] as many as 11 Caucasians, possibly American prisoners from the Korean war, in the fall of 1979 on a collective farm north of P'yongyang. ~~(S-NF)~~

[redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

2. We cannot verify the reliability of the sources or add other information that would throw light on the plausibility of these sightings. ~~(S-NF)~~



(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Northeast Asia Division
Office of East Asian Analysis

Attachments:
As stated

SUBJECT: Alleged Sightings of American POWs in North
Korea from 1975 to 1982 ~~(S NF)~~

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

C/OEA/NEA/ [redacted] (9 Mar 88)

Distribution

Orig - Addressee (w/atts)

1 - DDI

1 - D/OEA

1 - C/NEA/STI

1 - NEA files

CONTROL NO.
Date 10/1/68
FORWARDED TO

68 JAN 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT: (1) James K. Patterson

REFERENCE: A. DIA/AP 365-2-68-INT
"Unidentified U.S. PWS in Southeast Asia"

1. It is requested that technical comparison be made of photograph number 31 in Reference A with attached photographs of subject. Please return photographs and supporting material when comparison has been made.

2. Special comments: None

Attachments: 5 Photographs

RESULTS OF PHOTO COMPARISON:

Case 9969

It is our opinion that POW #31 is probably not Patterson. Their skull formations are slightly different -- the POW's appears more rounded across the top of his head over the crown and Patterson's more flat-topped with a less rounded crown area. Patterson's temporal recession appears to extend further back than the POW's. The other features seem similar though the poor POW photo precludes further comment.

[Redacted]

I

Approved for Release

04063

v. 44

105

v. 44

CIA - March 1, 2024

000390

CONTROL NO.
Date 10/1/68
FORWARDED TO

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT

REFERENCE

1. 1
number 45
return photo

2. 1

Attachments

RESULTS OF

The f
compare fa
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blunt nose
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be Col. Gr

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

FOY 8781

DATE: APR 24 1974


13 DECEMBER 1965

CTL NO: SCPC-0633-74

REC NO:

CY NO: 01 CF 01

PG NO: 01 OF 02



REPORT CLASS SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

FOY 8781

Regraded CONFIDENTIAL by authority of [redacted] on 11/29/78

13B 27

LAOS

SUBJECT: PATHET LAO ACCOUNT OF HIS WITNESSING THE CAPTURE OF TWO DOWNED AMERICAN PILOTS

DOI: APRIL-JUNE 1965 PADA: LAOS VIENTIANE 6 AND 10 DECEMBER 1965

SOURCE:

[REDACTED SOURCE INFORMATION]

1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

1. [REDACTED] PATHET LAO [REDACTED] SOURCE, WHO WAS STATIONED IN HOUA PHAN (SAM NEUA) PROVINCE UNTIL JUNE 1965, CLAIMED THAT HE HAD WITNESSED THE ARREST OF AN AMERICAN PILOT ON 29 APRIL 1965 SHORTLY AFTER HIS CAPTURE BY THE PATHET LAO. THE FIRST PILOT WORE A COVERALL-TYPE FLIGHT SUIT AND HAD A HELMET WITH A HOSE ATTACHED. (FIELD COMMENT: APPARENTLY THE FIRST PILOT WAS CHARLES SHELTON WHO WAS DOWNED AND CAPTURED ON 29 APRIL 1965.) SC, WHO SAW THE PILOT ONLY SHORTLY AFTER HIS CAPTURE, WROTE THE DATE IN HIS DIARY.

2. ACCORDING TO SC, HE WITNESSED THE CAPTURE OF A SECOND PILOT ON 19 MAY 1965 AND ENTERED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON THE PILOT IN HIS DIARY: NAME: DAVID L. HRDLICKA; BORN 30 DECEMBER 1931; SERVICE NO. 72,541. HRDLICKA WORE A FLIGHT SUIT SIMILAR TO THAT WORN BY THE FIRST PILOT, BUT HAD NO HELMET. SC DID NOT NOTE ANY INJURIES BUT HEARD THAT HRDLICKA COMPLAINED OF A SORE BACK. DID NOT TALK WITH EITHER PILOT.

3. SC SAID THAT THE TWO PILOTS WERE INTERNED SEPARATELY IN CAVES 800 METERS NORTHWEST OF BAN NA KAY TAY, ABOUT 28 KILOMETERS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

5/15/78

88P (PT-P) 0079-1-01
84P (PT-P) 0084-5-01

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

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-606

000391

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE

NORTHEAST OF SAM NEUA. THEY WERE VISITED DAILY BY A MEDIC AND GIVEN LAO FOOD AND RICE IN SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES. A LAO OFFICIAL FROM A RADIO STATION AT BAN BAC, ONE KILOMETER SOUTH OF BAN AN KAY TAY; A VIETNAMESE OFFICER FROM NORTH VIETNAM; AND A LAO OFFICER FROM THE INTELLIGENCE SECTION OF PATHET LAO HEADQUARTERS AT BAN AN KAY NEUA, EAST OF SAM NEUA, INTERROGATED THE TWO AMERICANS. SOURCE SAID THAT THE PATHET LAO DID NOT TORTURE THEIR PRISONERS OR USE BRAIN-WASHING TECHNIQUES; ALSO, THE PATHET LAO DID NOT KILL PRISONERS AFTER INTERROGATION AND PROPAGANDA PLAY.

4. WHEN SOURCE LEFT HOUA PHAN PROVINCE IN JUNE, HE BELIEVED THE PILOTS WERE STILL BEING HELD IN THE CAVES IN THE BAN NA KAY TAY AREA. HE HAD NO SUBSEQUENT INFORMATION ON THEM.

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY AIR USAID CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC USMACV-SAIGON 2ND AIR DIVISION-SAIGON

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified
Review on

DATE:	APR 24 1974
CTL NO:	SCRC-0633-74
REC NO:	
CY NO:	OLCFOL
PG NO:	09 OF 02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE

042045-607

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

ROUTINE
R 031041Z JUN 86
FM CIA

ZYUW RUEAIIA5397 1541041

DISSEM: [REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct
WARNING: REPORT CLASS C O N F I D E N T I A L--WARNING
NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE
TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
DECL: OADR DRV HUM 4-82 BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL
PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.
BT

TO DIRNSA DEPT OF STATE
DIA TREASURY DEPT
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DOEHQ
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF
ZEN/CIA OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOFORN WNIINTEL

CITE: CIA 899753
SERIAL: TDFIR-K-314/00459-86
PASS: NSA FOR ZKZK OO DLS DE (FOR NSOC); STATE FOR INR.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
REPORT CLASS C O N F I D E N T I A L--WNIINTEL--NOFORN
DIST: 3 JUNE 1986

COUNTRY: NORTH KOREA

SUBJ: POSSIBLE LOCATION OF REMAINS OF U.S. SOLDIERS WHO DIED
DURING THE KOREAN WAR; PRISONERS OF WAR ALLEGEDLY STILL
LIVING IN NORTH KOREA

DOI: SPRING 1985 - FEBRUARY 1986

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

A D D E N D U M

TEXT: 1. AN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE WITH THE ABOVE
HEADING AND NUMBER WAS ISSUED ON 4 APRIL 1986. THE SOURCE HAS
PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN RESPONSE TO
FURTHER REQUIREMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT.

2 IN FEBRUARY 1986 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] LEARNED OF THE DISCOVERY OF
HUMAN REMAINS IN THE CH'ANGJIN-HO AREA OF NORTH KOREA FROM
TUK-NAM, A DIRECTOR IN CHARGE OF FILMS IN THE KOREAN WORKERS'

(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[REDACTED] THE REMAINS OF FEWER THAN TEN
INDIVIDUALS WERE UNEARTHED FIVE YEARS AGO; MANY HAD DOG TAGS.
AFTER DISCOVERY THE REMAINS WERE LEFT IN THE SAME PLACE AND
COVERED OVER.

3. PRISONERS OF WAR (POW) HAVE NOT APPEARED IN ANY
FILMS OTHER THAN THE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED "NAMELESS HEROES."

4. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: SOURCE DID NOT KNOW THE
EXACT NUMBER OF DOG TAGS RECOVERED WITH THE REMAINS. HE HAD NO
INFORMATION ON THE DISCOVERY OF ANY OTHER REMAINS OF U.S. OR
THIRD-COUNTRY PERSONNEL IN NORTH KOREA. HE WAS AWARE OF NO POW
BEING HELD IN NORTH KOREA OTHER THAN THE INDIVIDUAL WHO REPORTDLY
PLAYED A ROLE IN THE FILM "NAMELESS HEROES." HE HAD NO
INFORMATION ON WHERE POWS WERE HELD.)

ACQ: (LATE MAY 1986).

ACTION DIA(1) (U,6,7)
INFO CJCS(4) NIDS(1) JS(2) SECDEF(9) USDP(11) C3I:TP&S(3)
ASD:PA&E(1) USDP:DSAA(4) DR(1) DD(1) ED(1) DI-1(1)
NMIC(1) RTS 2B(1) RTS-2D2(1) NWS(1) JSI-3C(1) AT(1)
AT-3(2) DIO-GA(1) DIO(1) DE-2(1) DB-2(1) DB-2D(1)
DB-4D(1) DX-5D2(1) DX-6C(1) DT-1(1) DT-5(1)
DC-4A3(1) D900(1)
+OCSA WASHINGTON DC
+CNO WASHINGTON DC
+CSAF WASHINGTON DC
+CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
+CMC WASHINGTON DC
+HQ AFOSI BOLLING AFB DC
+SAFE

MCN=86154/02916 TOR=86154/1040Z TAD=86154/1040Z

CDSN=MAJ962
PAGE 1 OF 1
031041Z JUN 86

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CIA - March 1, 2024

000393

*** Document 188 of 343 for CUST ***

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 TO TO RHAKAAA/17SOS KADENA AB JA//OGOOI//
 RHAKAAA/18WG KADENA AB JA//CC//
 RHAKAAA/18WG KADENA AB JA//PA//
 RUHHPDA/31SOS OSAN AB KOR//OGOOI//
 RHAKAAA/353OSS KADENA AB JA//IN//
 RUYLKAD/390IS OKINAWA JA//DOT//
 RUALEAJ/611AIF ELMENDORF AFB AK
 RUEDBKA/612AIS DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB AZ//INTA//
 RUEDADA/AFISA AMHS BOLLING AFB DC
 RUQVKEN/AFIWC KELLY AFB TX//OSKC//
 RUWSMXI/AMC INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//INO//
 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING
 RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN GE
 RUERZCA/CDR 500TH MIBDE CP ZAMA JA//IAGPD-OS//
 RUEANBA/CDR DPTMS FT BELVOIR//ANSB-OPS//
 RUATTBU/CDR ORA USA CIDC TORII STA JA//CIRG-ZA//
 RUATTBU/CDR ORA USA CIDC TORII STATION JA//APAJ-GOC-D//
 RUATTBU/CDR ORA USA CIDC TORII STATION JA//APAJ-GOC-PA//
 RUATTBU/CDR ORA USA CIDC TORII STATION JA//APAJ-GOC//
 RUATTBU/CDR ORA USA CIDC TORII STATION JA//APAJ-GOS-SPO//
 RUATTBU/CDR ORA USA CIDC TORII STATION JA//APAJ-GOS//
 RUEPPOG/CDR PSYOPGP FT BRAGG NC//ASOF-POG-SB//
 RUATJHU/CDR17THASG CP ZAMA JP//APAJ-GH-PT-S//
 RUATTBU/CDR1STBN1STSFQA TORII STA JA//SSO//
 RUEPPOG/CDR4THPSYOPGP FT BRAGG NC//AACP-POG-SB//
 RUACACE/CDR501STACE
 RUAGMIB/CDR501STMIBDE SEOUL KOR//IADK-OP-0//
 RUAGMIB/CDR524TH MI BN SEOUL KOR//IADK-CE-PC//
 RUATCPJ/CDR751ST MI BN PYONGTAEK KOR//IABDK-FS-0//
 RUAGYIN/CDRCSCTTHREE YONGIN KOR//EACT-T-I//
 RUEAFDC/CDRICORPS FT LEWIS WA//AFZH-GS//
 RUEOAYA/CDRNGIC CHARLOTTESVILLE VA
 RUATJHU/CDRUSARJ9THTAACOM CP ZAMA JA//AJAJ-GC//
 RUATJHU/CDRUSARJ9THTAACOM CP ZAMA JA//APAJ-GE//
 RUHBABA/CG III MEF//G-2//
 RUHBBEA/CG THIRD FSSG CAMP KINSER JA//G2//
 RUHBABA/CG THIRD MARDIV//G-2//
 RUAGAMS/CINC UNC CFC SEOUL KOR//UNCMAC//
 RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J-2//
 RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR//FKJ2//
 RUAGAMS/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//FKJ2-IS-H//
 RUAGAMS/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//PAJ//
 RUEPWDC/DA AMHS WASHINGTON DC
 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
 RAYWBBK/DIO CANBERRA AS
 RUCXNIS/DIRNAVCRIMINVSERV WASHINGTON DC
 RUYLBAH/DODSPECREP OKINAWA JA
 RUEABND/DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN HQ WASHINGTON DC//POL//
 RUESDJ/FBIS OKINAWA JA
 RUEPMAX/GISA FT BRAGG NC
 RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
 RHEFJWC/JWAC DAHLGREN VA
 RUACMXI/KAIS 7AF OSAN AB KOR//INO/INOI//
 RUACMXI/KAIS 7AF OSAN AB KOR//INOI//
 RUCXQAN/MARCORINTACT QUANTICO VA
 RUEDAFA/NAIC WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB OH
 RUHDNCR/NCR KOR SEOUL KOR
 RUETIAA/NSACSS FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
 RAYWBFA/DNA CANBERRA ACT AS
 RUCXONI/ONI WASHINGTON DC//2140//
 RHHJDHA/PACAF IDHS PEARL HARBOR HI
 RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
 RUAGAMS/SACINCUNC SEOUL KOR
 RUATNRM/SAICCODET WAEGWAN KOR//IADK-CE-L-CRO//
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//INR//
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//INRPD//
 RUESLG/SEOUL
 RUEAII/STORAGE CENTER FBIS RESTON VA
 RUDWLAK/SUSLAK SONGNAM KOR
 RUFQBBA/US SURVEY DIV SHAPE BE
 RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
 RUWSMXI/USCINTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//J2-0/J2-J//
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WARN WARNING: FTS_DOC_ID: FTS20000130000068

524

CIA - March 1, 2024

000394

WARNING: TOPIC: INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL, MILITARY

SERI SERIAL: SK3001045700

COUN*~~COUNTRY~~: SOUTH KOREA, NORTH KOREA, UNITED STATES
SUBJ SUBJ: DPRK OFFERS RETURN OF 400 US MIA REMAINSREF REF: 1. SK2901015500 SEOUL YONHAP IN ENGLISH 0055 GMT 29 JAN
00 -- YONHAP VIEWS US-DPRK 28 JAN AGREEMENT TO
HIGH-LEVEL TALKS
2. SK2801233400 SEOUL YONHAP IN ENGLISH 2315 GMT 28 JAN
00 -- US, NK AGREE TO HIGH-LEVEL TALKS ON SIXTH DAY OF
TALKS
3. SK2801120700 SEOUL THE KOREA HERALD (INTERNET
VERSION) IN ENGLISH 29 JAN 00 -- ROK OFFICIALS
'CAUTIOUS' OVER US-DPRK BERLIN TALKSSOUR SOURCE: SEOUL YONHAP (INTERNET VERSION) IN KOREAN 0249 GMT 29
JAN 00

TEXT TEXT:

[AP-YONHAP REPORT FROM WASHINGTON. FOLLOWING ITEM HAS NOT
BEEN CARRIED BY SEOUL YONHAP IN ENGLISH]

[FBIS TRANSLATED TEXT]

* ON 28 JANUARY, YI KUN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NORTH KOREA'S MISSION TO THE UN, REVEALED THE FINDING OF 400 CORPSES PRESUMED TO BE THAT OF US MILITARY SERVICEMEN KILLED DURING THE KOREAN WAR, AND OFFERED THEIR UNCONDITIONAL RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES. DURING A PHONE INTERVIEW WITH THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, DEPUTY CHIEF YI KUN STRESSED THAT THE US GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE QUICK ACTION IN RESPONSE TO THIS PROPOSAL BECAUSE THE REGION WHERE THE US SERVICEMEN'S REMAINS WERE FOUND SINCE DECEMBER 1999 UNTIL THIS JANUARY IS BEING TRANSFORMED INTO A FARMING AREA.

REGARDING THIS, SPOKESMAN LARRY GREER OF THE DEFENSE PRISONER OF WAR/MISSING PERSONNEL OFFICE [DPMO] UNDER THE US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONFIRMED THAT NORTH KOREA HAD NOTIFIED THE DEPARTMENT OF THE DISCOVERY OF THE US SERVICEMEN'S REMAINS THIS WEEK. HE SAID THAT HE HAD REQUESTED NORTH KOREA PROVIDE MORE DETAILED INFORMATION.

SPOKESMAN GREER STRESSED THAT THE US DEFENSE DEPARTMENT IS WARY OF THE ARBITRARY RETURN OF REMAINS BECAUSE THE US SERVICEMEN'S REMAINS FOUND SO FAR HAVE LACKED THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL EVIDENCE NECESSARY FOR IDENTIFICATION.

* DEPUTY CHIEF YI KUN SAID THAT NORTH KOREA HAS FOUND 415 SETS OF REMAINS SO FAR AND HE THINKS MORE REMAINS WILL BE UNCOVERED IN THE FUTURE. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE REGION WHERE THE REMAINS WERE FOUND, WHICH IS NORTH OF PYONGYANG, IS CURRENTLY BEING TRANSFORMED INTO A FARMING AREA.

AROUND 8,200 US SERVICEMEN WERE CATEGORIZED AS KOREAN WAR MIAS, AND THE US DEFENSE DEPARTMENT BELIEVES THAT THOUSANDS OF REMAINS COULD BE RECOVERED IN NORTH KOREA.

HOWEVER, ONLY 42 SETS OF REMAINS HAVE BEEN UNCOVERED BY THE NORTH-US JOINT EXCAVATION OPERATIONS OVER THE YEARS. ALSO, THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR FINE-TUNING THIS YEAR'S JOINT EXCAVATION OPERATIONS WERE RUPTURED IN DECEMBER 1999 BECAUSE NORTH KOREA ASKED THE UNITED STATES TO SUPPORT CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT FOR BUILDING A CHILDREN'S CLOTHES MANUFACTURING PLANT IN THE NORTH.

PRIOR TO THIS, ON 26 DECEMBER 1999, THE NORTH'S MISSION TO THE UN SENT LETTERS, WHICH SAID "THE REMAINS OF US SOLDIERS WHO DIED IN THE KOREAN WAR WERE DISCOVERED THROUGH EXCAVATION WORK WITH BULLDOZERS," TO A COUPLE OF US VETERANS' ORGANIZATIONS.

* AT THAT TIME, THE NORTH KOREAN MISSION SAID IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO CONTINUE THE EXCAVATION WORK BECAUSE THE FARMING AREA TRANSFORMATION WORK IN SOHAN WAS IN ITS LAST STAGES AND BECAUSE PRESERVATION OF THE REGION WHERE THE REMAINS WERE FOUND, WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT. HOWEVER, THE LETTER DID NOT MENTION THE NUMBER "400."

NEVERTHELESS, ON 28 JANUARY, FRANK MATERSKY [NAME AS TRANSLITERATED], WHO SURVIVED THE COMBAT AT LAKE CHANGJIN DURING THE KOREA WAR, REMARKED THAT HE DOES NOT TRUST NORTH KOREA. HE SAID, "WE BELIEVE THAT THIS IS A NORTH KOREAN CONSPIRACY TO MAKE THE US DEFENSE DEPARTMENT INCREASE HUMANITARIAN AID TO THE NORTH IN RETURN FOR THE RETURN OF THE REMAINS. WE DO NOT WANT THE GOVERNMENT TO PAY COMPENSATION FOR THE REMAINS."

REGARDING THE ABOVE, DEPUTY CHIEF YI KUN STRESSED THAT ALTHOUGH NORTH KOREA EXPECTED US SUPPORT IN BUILDING THE CHILDREN'S CLOTHES MANUFACTURING PLANT AS A PRICE FOR NORTH KOREA'S COOPERATION IN THE REMAINS' EXCAVATION OPERATIONS, IT WAS NOT DIRECTLY DEMANDING US SUPPORT.

[DESCRIPTION OF SOURCE: SEOUL YONHAP (INTERNET VERSION) IN KOREAN -- WWW HOME PAGE OF SEMIOFFICIAL NEWS AGENCY OF THE ROK.]

ROOT URL ON FILING DATE: HTTP://WWW.YONHAPNEWS.CO.KR]
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Capt. David Louis HRDLIC.

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CAPTURE OF US PILOT -- Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 22 Jul 66, p 4.

[Full translation] Capt. David Louis Hrdlicka, American pilot, serial no. 72541A, is one of the men captured by the Lao People's Liberation Army after his jet plane was shot down by the Lao People's Army on 18 May 1965.

He said, "After being shot down by the guns of the Lao People's Liberation Army I was immediately captured and ever since then I have received very humane treatment. Before my capture I could not understand that the warfare of the people of Laos was for sovereignty, independence, neutrality, and the unification of Laos. But now I clearly understand why the soldiers of the Lao People's Liberation Army are so enthusiastic in fighting for their cause."

He denounced the US authorities with these words: "It is because of the aggressive policy of the US Government that my plane was shot down and my back was injured, and I am very homesick for my three children and my dear wife. My heart is sick and miserable for loneliness when I think of them. But this matter is making my heart angry and displeased because while I have to sit in prison here the people devising their war policy are sitting at home safe with their families... [omission indicated in Vietnamese text]. Together with the people of the world I beg permission to raise my voice of protest against the policy which the Johnson administration is daily carrying out through its air force attacks against Lao territory."

Finally he expressed his thanks to the people of Laos and asked forgiveness for having taken part in the US war of aggression in Laos.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 30 SEP 71

CASENO-0385 #20

HANDLING

MIA # 07660

Approved for Release
Date 3 APR 84

~~SECRET~~

1.628

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

DATE: 26 May 1954

FROM : HARRIS B. HULL, AC/PM

SUBJECT: U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR REMAINING IN COMMUNIST CUSTODY

In compliance with your request, the letter to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force in regard to the recovery of Air Force personnel now held as prisoners has been rewritten.

The new letter to the Air Force is attached.

Harris B. Hull
ACPM

DOCUMENT NO. _____
HC ESCAPE TO CLASS.
 UNCLASSIFIED
CLASS. BY: _____ DATE: 02011
AUTH: _____
DATE: 17 MAR 1981 REVIEWER: 064540

CIA - March 1, 2024

~~SECRET~~

000398

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1-625a

5-58371A

MAY 29 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff
United States Air Force

SUBJECT: United States Prisoners of War remaining in
Communist Custody after termination of Exchange
of Prisoners under Korean Armistice Agreement
Terms.

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 16 March on the
above subject, requesting that this Agency take action to locate,
identify and recover U.S. POWs in Communist custody.

2. I agree with you fully that any accomplishment in this
field would unquestionably have a salutary effect upon morale and
would be of significant value in our national psychological program.
At the same time I feel certain that you realize the inherent
difficulties involved in operations of this type, particularly in
the very territories where U.S. POWs are likely to be held.

3. This Agency has had a continuing requirement for the
development of information on the location of U.S. POWs, and will
continue to endeavor to obtain any possible intelligence in this
regard. Any information produced on this subject will be promptly
conveyed and discussed with Headquarters, United States Air Force.
Should the Air Force receive any "leads" deemed worthy of exploration,
it will be appreciated if you will make these available to us. CIA
will then be in a position to determine what steps, if any, can be
appropriately undertaken towards affecting the release of the POWs
involved.

DOCUMENT NO. _____
NO CHANGE TO CLASS.
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CLASS. AUTHORITY: _____
NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____
AUTHORITY: _____
DATE: 17 MAR 1981 REVIEWER: 064540

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ER file

000399

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4. You may be sure that CIA will do everything practicable to comply with your request and will maintain appropriate contact with your Headquarters concerning this subject.

SIGNED

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

Rewritten

PM/OPS/RC August 1954
26 May 1954

See Concurrences attached

Dist:

Orig + 1 - Addressee

- 2 - DCI*
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SECURITY INFORMATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT []

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO. (b)(3) CIAAct

COUNTRY China

DATE DISTR. 25 Oct 51

SUBJECT United Nations Prisoners of War in Communist China

NO. OF PAGES 2

PLACE ACQUIRED Hong Kong

REFERENCE COPY

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

DATE OF INFO. 13 September - early October 1951

DO NOT CIRCULATE

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT OF U. S. C., 51 AND 52, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

SOURCE

[]

1. On 13 September CHAO Erh-lu (趙爾陸), a staff member of the Central and South China Military Area headquarters, after inspecting a camp for American and British prisoners of war at 52 Fu Hsing (復興) Road, Shameen, Canton, issued an order prohibiting prisoners from speaking to people outside the compound.¹

2. Names of some of the prisoners in this camp from the United States Eighth Army, the British Gloucester Regiment, and the British Argyll Battalion are as follows:

a. United States Eighth Army: Mai-chia-fo (麥加佛)² (?Metcalf),³ 1st lieutenant.

Li-k'o-erh (李克爾)², warrant officer.

Hu-chi (卜吉)² (?Booth),³ warrant officer.

Lo-szu (羅斯)² (?Ross),³ enlisted.

Po-szu (波斯), enlisted.

Hua-erh-tzu (華爾滋) (?Wertz),³ enlisted.

Hua-lai-te-shih (華萊德士) (?Wright),³ enlisted.

Po-tun (波頓) (?Borden),³ enlisted.

Chia-hua-shih (嘉華士) (?Jarvis),³ enlisted.

Po-szu-ku (波斯谷) (?Box),³ enlisted.

Li-wei (李威) (?Levy),³ enlisted.

si -ko-lan (蕭格蘭), enlisted.

(b)(3) CIAAct

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ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI	

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(b)(3) CIAAct

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

-2-

- b. British Gloucester Regiment: Ko-szu (葛斯), tank driver.
 Hsi-pi-shih (希必士), warrant officer.
 Tsun-ch'en (尊臣), enlisted.
 Li-sen (羅森), enlisted.
- c. British Argyle Battalion: Meng-chia-fu (孟加夫), warrant officer.
 Ko-ling-hung (葛令洪) (?Cunningham),³ enlisted.
 Chia-hua-kao (嘉華高), enlisted.
 Lo (羅) (?Lowe),³ enlisted. (b)(1)
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
1. Washington Comment. [redacted] about 170 United States prisoners of war arrived in Canton on 3 October, and were taken to the former American consulate building on Shameen. No pedestrian was permitted to approach closer than 50 meters to the compound. [redacted]
 (b)(1)
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
2. Washington Comment. The report also contained the following information: Mai-chia-fo was also reported as 2nd lieutenant Mrcaf. Li-k'o-erh was also reported as Warrant Officer Lehareer. Pu-chi was also reported as Warrant Officer Botje. [redacted]
 (b)(1)
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
3. Washington Comment. These interpretations were supplied by the field.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY	USSR	(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct	REPORT NO.	(b)(3) CIAAct
SUBJECT	American Prisoners-of-War Held in the USSR		DATE DISTR.	31 December 1953
DATE OF INFO.		(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct	NO. OF PAGES	1
PLACE ACQUIRED			REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
			REFERENCES	(b)(3) CIAAct

BY CABLE

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE:

The following information on American prisoners-of-war held by the Soviets

- a. As of 1951 the USSR had an interrogation center for United States POWs in the Chang-pai Shan area on the upper Yalu River. Most of the inmates were U. S. airmen, and the interrogation was done by Soviet commissars.
- b. When the North Korean forces were pushed north in Korea, the center reportedly was moved to An-t'u (N 42-34, E 128-22). [redacted] heard from natives that the interrogatees passed through Mutanchiang (N 44-35, E 129-37), were brought down the Sungari River by boat, and after interrogation were taken to the USSR.
- c. Natives of the area said they had seen a group of about seven persons, reportedly "US Army spies", including US Nisei soldiers, brought to the An-t'u center in the spring of 1952.

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CIA - March 1, 2024

32-118122-000403

This list is all MIA/POW
1960-1993

I checked Vietnam MIA/POW
+ also incidences where Pueblo
mentioned because POW was
mentioned + occurred in Vietnam
era.

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
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	DCI	
JC	DA	52849/2-7407
TIM	DS&T	54162/2-3510

VIDEO
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Videophile Listing

III MIA/POW Vietnam

Topic: VIDEOPHILE LISTING
ON MIA'S & POW'S
(194 HITS)

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Page: 1

Record: 20997

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CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH UMATIC
RUN TIME/MINUTES 020
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 93
COUNTRIES VIETNAM; UNITED STATES
PROGRAM TITLE VIETNAM AND THE UNITED STATES
DESCRIPTION PROFILE OF ROBERT GARWOOD, A FORMER PRISONER OF WAR DURING THE VIETNAM WAR, WHO SAYS HE SAW OTHER AMERICANS WHILE HE WAS IMPRISONED IN VIETNAM WHO HAVE YET TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR; GARWOOD WAS COURTMARTIALED AFTER THE VIETNAM WAR FOR AIDING THE ENEMY; AUTHORITIES IN BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM HAVE ACCUSED GARWOOD OF LYING ABOUT AMERICAN PRISONERS THAT WERE LEFT BEHIND; EXCERPTS FROM A 1979 INTERVIEW WITH GARWOOD; INTERVIEW WITH A RETIRED VIETNAMESE MILITARY OFFICER WHO COUNTERS GARWOOD'S STORY; GARWOOD'S TESTIMONY ABOUT AMERICAN MIA'S LEFT BEHIND IN VIETNAM; INTERVIEW WITH A FORMER VIETNAMESE MORTICIAN WHO CLAIMS THERE ARE STILL AMERICANS HELD PRISONER IN VIETNAM; FOOTAGE OF GARWOOD'S RETURN VISITS TO VIETNAM TO SEARCH FOR PRISONERS, IN ONE CASE ACCOMPANIED BY SENATOR ROBERT SMITH; TOUR OF A SITE THAT GARWOOD CLAIMS ONCE HELD AMERICAN PRISONERS.

Record: 20970

FILM NUMBER 930054901
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH UMATIC
RUN TIME/MINUTES 054
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 92
COUNTRIES YUGOSLAVIA; BOSNIA; UNITED NATIONS; CROATIA; UNITED KINGDOM; GREECE
PROGRAM TITLE YUGOSLAVIA #6
DESCRIPTION (DATES: 9 AUGUST-1 SEPTEMBER 1992) 1. BARS & TONE; 2. ETHNIC CLEANSING, DETENTION CAMPS FOR MOSLEMS, GENOCIDE, MALNURISHED PRISONERS, MOSLEM POWS, SERB PROPAGANDA THAT PRISONERS WELL TREATED, SERB CONCENTRATION CAMP, MOSLEM REFUGEES FORCED TO LEAVE; 3. SERBIAN DETENTION CAMP IN BOSNIA, POWS LIVING IN CATTLE BARNs, VISIT CAMP WITH PRIME MINISTER PANIC, INSIDE CONCENTRATION CAMP, POWS BEING FED, POWS IN BUNKBEDS; 4. MORE EVIDENCE OF ATROCITIES AT SERBIAN RUN DETENTION CAMPS, BRIEF BACKGROUND HISTORY ON AREA AND ETHNIC HATRED CARRIED ON IN EACH GENERATION, BREAK UP OF YUGOSLAVIA, RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES; 5. UNEXPECTED TO AUTHORIZE FORCE TO SAFEGUARD EMERGENCY SUPPLIES TO BOSNIA, SERBIAN SNIPERS IN BUILDINGS SHOOT AT

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ANYONE, UN VEHICLES AND TROOPS PATROL STREET, KOSOVO STREET SCENES AND SERB DOMINANCE; 6. UN SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE ON USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN BOSNIA, SARAJEVO CASUALTIES, UN CONVOY AMBUSHED, UN SOLDIERS BUILD SANDBAG BUNKER, ROCKET FIRE FROM HILLS, BOSNIAN SITUATION GRIM; 7. SITUATION IN SARAJEVO, BREAD LINES FROM LAST WORKING BAKERY, SHORTAGE OF SUPPLIES AND FUEL; 8. CROATIAN DETENTION CAMP HOLDING 400 SERB PRISONERS, PRISONERS SEATED ON FLOOR OF HIGH SCHOOL, PRISONER SLIPS CAMERA CREW A NOTE, RED CROSS VISITS, FORCED LABOR OF PRISONERS, PRISONER FOOD LINE IN ZAGREB PRISON; 9. CROATIAN DETENTION CAMP KERESTINC VISITED, SERB PRISONERS RECEIVE CHEESE AND BREAD, EXERCISE YARD, PRISON UNIFORM, SERB PRISONERS FEAR REPATRIATION AND RETURN TO FRONT; 10. SERB CAMPS IMPROVING CONDITIONS, PROFILE OF CAMP AND ENACIATED PRISONERS NEAR TRNO POLJE, REFUGEES FLEE VILLAGES AFTER BEING BURNED OUT, RED CROSS REFUGEE CENTER, MEDICAL FACILITIES AT CAMP, DESTROYED MOSLEM VILLAGE; 11. STRANDED MOSLEM REFUGEES BETWEEN BOSNIA AND CROATIA IN BOSANSKA GRADISKA, UN BORDER TROOPS AID REFUGEES, SERBIAN TANKS READY TO TAKE MORE BOSNIAN LAND, SERB FUNERAL, ORPHANED CHILDREN; 12. CONFERENCE TO BEGIN ON BOSNIA, COMMENTS BY BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER HURD AND BOSNIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SILAJDZIC, SERBIAN PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC VISITS LONDON, LORD CARRINGTON COMMENTS ON HIS RESIGNATION; 13. LONDON PEACE CONFERENCE, FIGHTING CONTINUES IN SARAJEVO, BUILDINGS BURN, SERB AND MOSLEM DEMONSTRATORS PICKET CONFERENCE, UN SECRETARY GENERAL GHALI AND BRITISH PRIME MINISTER MAJOR SPEAK AT CONFERENCE, BOSNIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SILAJDZIC CALLS FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION; 14. REPORT ON DAY ONE OF LONDON PEACE CONFERENCE, DEMONSTRATIONS OUTSIDE CONFERENCE HALL, ATTENDEES, PRIME MINISTER MAJOR WARNS SERBIA, BOSNIAN SERB LEADER KARADZIC COMPLAINS HE WAS SHUT OUT FROM CONFERENCE, CONCENTRATION CAMP SURVIVORS ATTEND CONFERENCE, MILAN PANIC SPEAKS AT CONFERENCE; 15. BOSNIA TURNING INTO VAST GRAVEYARD, CROSSES SEEN ALL OVER CITY, FURNITURE FACTORY TURNED INTO COFFIN AND CROSS PRODUCTION, MOSLEM MORTUARY, MOSLEM FUNERAL; 16. ETHNIC CLEANSING, TERRORIZED REFUGEES DRIVEN FROM THEIR HOMES, SERB MAYOR CLAIMS REFUGEES WANTED TO LEAVE, SERBS TAKE OVER MOSLEM HOUSES, GHOST TOWNS LEFT AND RANSACKED, REFUGEES IN CAMPS FIGHT FOR FOOD HANDOUTS; 17. EVIDENCE THAT MOSLEMS COMMITTING ATROCITIES AS WELL, SHELLS FIRED INTO MOSLEM CEREMONY AT SARAJEVO CEMETERY, MASSACRE OF PEOPLE AT SARAJEVO BREAD LINE, MOSLEMS SACRIFICE OWN PEOPLE TO GAIN SYMPATHY FOR THEIR OWN CAUSE, COMMENTS BY BRITISH LIBERAL DEMOCRAT PADDY ASHDOWN; 18. PEACE CONFERENCE RESULTS AS COVERED BY MACEDONIA TV, VIDEO AND INFORMATION ON MACEDONIAN DELEGATION AT CONFERENCE, MACEDONIAN PASSPORT SHOWN, MACEDONIAN PRESIDENT SHAKES PRIME MINISTER MAJOR'S HAND, MACEDONIA WANTS RECOGNITION, GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER GIVES A PRESS CONFERENCE.

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FILM NUMBER 930045101
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH UMATIC
RUN TIME/MINUTES 060
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 90
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES; RUSSIA; UNITED KINGDOM; BULGARIA; FRANCE;
GERMANY; PHILIPPINES; ISRAEL; NETHERLANDS
PROGRAM TITLE COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE #3
DESCRIPTION (6/13/90 - 5/4/93) 2. REENACTMENT OF A
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATION BY FRENCH AUTHORITIES; 3.
INTERVIEW WITH WRITER RONALD KESSLER ABOUT THE CASE OF
NAVY OFFICER GLENN MICHAEL SOUTHER, WHO SOLD US NUCLEAR
WAR PLANS TO THE USSR; LATER, AFTER ESCAPING TO RUSSIA,
SOUTHER COMMITTED SUICIDE; EXCERPT FROM A SOVIET
TELEVISION APPEARANCE BY SOUTHER; COMPARISON TO KIM
PHILBY; 4. INTERVIEW WITH CONVICTED SOVIET SPY GEORGE
BLAKE; BIOGRAPHY OF BLAKE'S CAREER AND HIS WORK ON BEHALF
OF THE KGB; 5. REPORT ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY USE
OF SPY SATELLITES FOR RECONNAISSANCE PURPOSES; USE OF
AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY BY THE WESTERN ALLIES DURING THE
PERSIAN GULF WAR; DIFFERENT TYPES OF SPY SATELLITES;
DISCUSSION ABOUT THE WORK OF NPIC; 6. REPORT ON THE
MOVEMENT TO RELEASE CONVICTED SPY JONATHAN POLLARD,
IMPRISONED FOR SELLING US SECRETS TO ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE,
FROM PRISON; COMMENTS FROM POLLARD'S LAWYER, SISTER;
ISRAEL AS A US INTELLIGENCE TARGET; 7. REPORT ON THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE USSR AND BULGARIA DURING THE COLD
WAR; ARCHIVAL FOOTAGE OF LEONID BREZHNEV AND TODOR
ZHIVKOV; THE MARKOV ASSASSINATION IS RECOUNTED, WITH
COMMENTS FROM MARKOV'S WIDOW; COMMENTS FROM KGB DEFECTOR
OLEG GORDIEVSKY ABOUT THE MARKOV MURDER; FOOTAGE OF
ZHIVKOV IN HIS PRISON CELL, AWAITING TRIAL FOR CORRUPTION;
8. INTERVIEW WITH A FORMER KGB AGENT WHO GREW
DISILLUSIONED ABOUT DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE AND BEGAN
ALERTING DISSIDENTS WHO WERE TARGETS OF THE KGB; CONTACTS
WITH YURI ORLOV AND SCHARANSKY; OREKHOV; 9. REPORTS THAT
THE DUTCH SECRET SERVICE HARASSES ASYLUM-SEEKERS TO WORK
AS SPIES; COMMENTS FROM PARLIAMENT MEMBER PIET STOFFELEN;
INTERVIEW WITH NICOLAS H.E. VAN HELTEN, HEAD OF THE DUTCH
SECURITY SERVICE; 10. FORMER KGB OFFICER OLEG KALUGIN
MEETS WITH US LAWMAKERS TO DISCUSS HIS CLAIM THAT THE KGB
INTERVIEWED US PRISONERS IN VIETNAM AS LATE AS 1973; POW,
MIA; INTERVIEW WITH KALUGIN AND WITH FORMER KGB OFFICIAL
OLEG NECHIPORENKO, WHO REFUTES KALUGIN; 11. PROFILE AND
INTERVIEW WITH A FORMER KGB OFFICER IMPRISONED FOR SELLING
SECRETS TO THE US FBI; FOOTAGE OF PERM-35, THE LABOR CAMP
WHERE THE OFFICER WAS IMPRISONED; 12. PROFILE OF VICTOR
NORRIS HAMILTON, AN AMERICAN WHO DEFECTED TO THE SOVIET
UNION, THEN SPENT THIRTY YEARS IN A PSYCHIATRIC
PRISON/HOSPITAL; HAMILTON HAD WORKED FOR THE NSA UNTIL HE
WAS DISMISSED DUE TO MENTAL ILLNESS, WHICH LED TO HIS

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DEFECTION; INTERVIEW WITH HAMILTON'S WIFE AND THE INVESTIGATOR WHO UNCOVERED HAMILTON'S WHEREABOUTS; 13. RUSSIAN GENERAL DMITRI VOLKOGONOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE ARCHIVES, REPORTS THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT ALGER HISS COLLABORATED WITH THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF THE SOVIET UNION; ARCHIVAL FOOTAGE AND PHOTOGRAPHS RELATING TO THE HISS CASE; FOOTAGE OF A PRESS CONFERENCE WHERE ALGER HISS CELEBRATES HIS VINDICATION; 14. CONTROVERSEY IN GREAT BRITAIN OVER ALLEGATIONS OF ILLEGAL ARMS SALES TO IRAQ PRIOR TO THE PERSIAN GULF WAR; 15. THE ARREST OF JOSEPH GARFIELD BROWN ON CHARGES OF PASSING CLASSIFIED CIA DOCUMENTS TO THE PHILIPPINES GOVERNMENT; 16. BALTIMORE SUN REPORTER WILL ENGLUND UNDERGOES QUESTIONING BY RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE OVER HIS WRITING ABOUT RUSSIA'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM; INTERVIEW WITH ENGLUND, WHO IS SHOWN OUTSIDE LEFORTOVO PRISON PRIOR TO HIS QUESTIONING; COMPARISON TO THE 1986 DANILOFF ARREST; 17. TRIAL OF MARCUS WOLF, HEAD OF THE EAST GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, GETS UNDERWAY IN GERMANY; FOOTAGE OF WOLF IN THE COURTROOM, BEING TRIED FOR TREASON

Record: 20708 ✓

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	930031201
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	055
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	93
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	WORLDWIDE
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	VIDEO NEWS SUMMARY #177
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	VNS FOR 12-20 APRIL 1993. 12 APRIL: BOSNIA: PEACE NEGOTIATIONS TO RESUME? SOUTH AFRICA: ANC LEADER HANI ASSASSINATED. LITHUANIA: RUSSIAN MILITARY WITHDRAWAL STALLS. RUSSIA: TOMSK-7 COVERUP ALLEGED. UK: IRA TERRORISTS CAPTURED. PRC: ELECTRONICS EXPOSITION HELD IN BEIJING. 13 APRIL: BOSNIA: OPERATION DENY FLIGHT. JAPAN: FEWER RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS FROM RUSSIA. ARMENIA: WEEKEND ADVANCES INTO AZERBAIJAN. VIETNAM: LEGITIMACY OF POW LETTER QUESTIONED. CAMBODIA: FEARS OF ETHNIC CLEANSING. 14 APRIL: JAPAN: G-7 MEETING BEGINS. RUSSIA: TRAIL OF COUP PLOTTERS BEGINS. RUSSIA: YEL'TSIN CAMPAIGNS FOR SUPPORT. RSA: AFTERMATH OF THE HANI MURDER. 15 APRIL: JAPAN: G-7 ANNOUNCES AID PACKAGE FOR RUSSIA. EGYPT: MUBARAK MEETS WITH RABIN. ITALY: ANDREOTTI ACCUSED OF MAFIA COLLABORATION. BOSNIA: IMPLICATIONS OF LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO. 16 APRIL: BOSNIA: SREBRENICA UNDER SIEGE. COLOMBIA: MEDELLIN CARTEL BLAMED FOR CAR BOMBING. ISRAEL: TERRORIST ROUNDUP. ITALY: WEEKEND ELECTION PREVIEW. US: MIYAZAWA ARRIVES FOR SUMMIT. 19 APRIL: BOSNIA: THE FALL OF SREBRENICA. PAKISTAN: GOVERNMENT TURMOIL. SOUTH AFRICA: FUNERAL FOR HANI. VIETNAM: POW TALKS RESUME. ISRAEL: DEPORTEES PROTEST PEACE TALKS. 20 APRIL: BOSNIA:

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Record: 20708(continued)

SREBRENICA UPDATE. ITALY: REFERENDUM RESULTS. JAPAN: YEN SOARS TO NEW HIGH. US: KHRUSHCHEV GRANTED RESIDENCY.

Record: 20744 ✓

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	930028901
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	VHS
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	011
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	93
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	UNITED STATES; VIETNAM
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	VITAL SIGNS?
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	JON SCOTT REPORT. SIGNALS FROM MIA'S OR NOT. "WALKING K" PHOTO, WAS IT A DISTRESS SIGNAL OR NOT. NEW INTELLIGENCE ON MISSING AMERICANS. 3 MONTHS AGO, CONGRESS CONCLUDED "A FEW" AMERICANS WERE PROBABLY LEFT BEHIND, BUT NO COMPELLING EVIDENCE THAT ANY ARE STILL ALIVE. WAS SOMEONE SENDING TOP SECRET DISTRESS CODES OUT OF NORTHERN VIETNAM AS RECENTLY AS LAST YEAR? US SOLDIER KISSES GROUND UPON RETURN TO US. PHOTO FROM 1973 ON THE PLAIN OF JARS IN LAOS, WHERE SOMEONE HAD TRAMPED OUT A CODE. EACH PILOT HAD A SECRET "AUTHENTICATOR CODE". SECOND RECON PHOTO IN JULY SHOWS CODE STILL VISIBLE. SENATOR BOB SMITH, VICE CHAIRMAN OF SENATE POW/MIA COMMITTEE REMARKS. US INTELLIGENCE STOPPED LOOKING FOR AUTHENTICATOR CODES AFTER VIETNAM WAR ENDED. CIA ADMITTED THEY DIDN'T KNOW DISTRESS CODES EXISTED. PENTAGON LOST LIST OF CODES OF NAVY, ARMY, AND MARINE PILOTS. COLONEL LARRY BURROWS, RETIRED AIR FORCE OFFICE WHO RECEIVED HIGHEST MEDAL FOR INTELLIGENCE WORK. HE SAW A PHOTO IN 1992 OF CODE IN RICE FIELD. CODE SEEN NEAR HAIPHONG. CIA SAYS PRISON ROOF TILES ARRANGED IN MORSE CODE DISTRESS SIGNAL. CARROLL LUCAS, FORMER CIA PHOTO INTERPRETER. BURROWS AND LUCAS DISAGREE ON PHOTO INTERPRETATION...THE PHOTO IS NOT NOW AND PROBABLY WON'T BE RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC. SIX OTHER ANALYSTS HAVE EXAMINED THE PHOTO...THEY DIDN'T BELIEVE THE PHOTO SHOWED A DISTRESS SIGNAL. GX2527 (WITH "WALKING X"), THE CODE, IS A LEGITIMATE AUTHENTICATOR CODE FOR AN MIA PILOT WHO WAS NOT IDENTIFIED IN THIS STORY.

Record: 20563 ✓

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	930018201
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	060
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	93

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Record: 20563 (continued)COUNTRIES
PROGRAM TITLE
DESCRIPTION

RUSSIA
 YELTSIN #5
 (DATES: 16 JUN 92-11 MAR 93) 2. PRESIDENT BUSH AND BORIS YELTSIN SPEAKING AT PRESS CONFERENCE ON WHITE HOUSE LAWN CONCERNING AGREEMENT ON ICBM'S. SS-18 LAUNCH. US SEA-LAUNCHED MISSILE. BUSH AND YELTSIN SHAKING HANDS. 3. YELTSIN AND WIFE AT WHITE HOUSE STATE DINNER. 4. YELTSIN SPEECH TO US CONGRESS. YELTSIN SPEAKING AT PRESS CONFERENCE. 5. YELTSIN SPEECH TO US CONGRESS. YELTSIN AND BUSH ON BOAT. B/W FOOTAGE OF US POW'S IN VIETNAM AND RUSSIA. ANDREI KORTUNOV. B/W FOOTAGE OF U-2 WRECKAGE. 6. YELTSIN SPEAKING TO FARMERS IN KANSAS. YELTSIN DRIVING COMBINE. 7. YELTSIN AT G-7 ECONOMIC SUMMIT DINNER IN MUNICH. ALEKSANDR RUTSKOY. 8. FARMERS IN LESHKOVA. YELTSIN ADDRESS TO RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT. YEGOR GAYDAR. 9. YELTSIN ALLOWS GORBACHEV TO VISIT GERMANY. GORBACHEV COMMENTS. 10. B/W FOOTAGE OF MASSACRED BODIES OF POLES DURING 1943. NOVESTI FOOTAGE OF LECH WALESA ACCEPTING DOCUMENTS. YELTSIN'S ACCUSATIONS AGAINST GORBACHEV. GORBACHEV. 11. (BAD AUDIO). RUTSKOY ENTERING BUILDING. POLICEMEN TRAINING. 12. YELTSIN SHAKING HANDS WITH JOHN MAJOR. RUSSIAN FACTORY. 13. YELTSIN SPEECH TO BRITISH PARLIAMENT. YELTSIN WITH QUEEN ELISABETH. YELTSIN REVIEWING BRITISH TROOPS. 14. YELTSIN ADDRESS TO BRITISH PARLIAMENT. YELTSIN AND QUEEN. 15. YELTSIN LEAVING PLANE. YELTSIN GIVING DOCUMENTS TO SOUTH KOREAN OFFICIAL. 16. COMMUNIST PROTESTERS. PLACARD DEMANDING OUST OF YELTSIN SUPPORTERS FROM PARLIAMENT. CONGRESS SESSION. 17. CONGRESS OF PEOPLES DEPUTIES. PROTESTERS. 18. CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DECISION UPHOLDING BAN OF COMMUNIST PARTY. 19. YEGOR GAYDAR AT PODIUM. ANTI-YELTSIN POSTER. DEMONSTRATORS. 20. YELTSIN SUPPORTERS PROTESTING. VALERY ZORKIN, CHIEF JUSTICE. 21. YELTSIN APPOINTS VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN AS PRIME MINISTER. CONGRESS SESSION. 22. CHERNOMYRDIN. GAYDAR. 23. HELMUT KOHL ARRIVING IN RUSSIA. CONGRESS. 24. PRO-YELTSIN DEMONSTRATION. YELTSIN ATOP TANK. POLICE RAID. HARDLINERS RALLYING. SHOVING MATCH IN CONGRESS. EXPLOSION AT DIAMOND MINE IN SIBERIA. DIAMONDS. YELTSIN MEETING WITH MILITARY OFFICERS. 25. YELTSIN SURROUNDED BY REPORTERS. 26. YELTSIN AT PODIUM. MEMBERS VOTING. VIKTOR GERASHCHENKO. RUBLES BEING PRINTED.

Record: 20564

FILM NUMBER
CLASSIFICATION
DISSEM1
DISSEM2
NUMBER OF TAPES
TAPE WIDTH
RUN TIME/MINUTES
LANGUAGE
YEAR PRODUCED
COUNTRIES

930014501
 UNCLASSIFIED
 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
 1
 VHS
 017
 ENGLISH
 93
 KUWAIT

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Record: 20564(continued)PROGRAM TITLE
DESCRIPTION

A LOOK AT POST-WAR KUWAIT
KUWAIT SINCE THE GULF WAR. AERIAL SHOT OF KUWAIT CITY.
SADDAM HUSAYN PATTING YOUNG BOY ON HEAD; NIGHT TIME TRACER
FIRE; LIBERATION OF KUWAIT AND THE CELEBRATION. STREET
SCENES; WAR MEMORIALS; CAPTURED IRAQI WEAPONS; LUXURY CARS
IN STREETS; BURNING OIL WELLS; NEW OIL RIGS. REMARKS BY
HANI AL GHAWAS, FORMER PRISONER. STORIES OF BRUTALITIY,
RAPE, TORTURE, MURDER THAT TOOK PLACE DURING OCCUPATION.
MANY STILL MISSING. BILLBOARDS COMMEMORATE MISSING.
DAMAGED HOUSE STANDS AS TRIBUTE TO 17 MEN WHO STOOD OFF
MANY IRAQIS; MEN CELEBRATED AS MARTYRS. ORPHANAGE FOR
CHILDREN CONCEIVED IN RAPE. VICTIM OF LAND MINE IN
HOSPITAL. BURNING OIL WELLS. INSTALLING NEW OIL RIGS.
FATHER OF SON TAKEN BY IRAQI SOLDIERS AND NEVER RETURNED
GOES TO WAR MEMORIAL OF CAPTURED WEAPONS. NATHANIEL
HOWELL, FORMER US AMBASSADOR TO KUWAIT. AERIAL OF US
EMBASSY, WHERE MANY TOOK REFUGE DURING OCCUPATION. OTHER
AMERICANS BEING GREETED AT THE AIRPOTT AFTER THEY'D BEEN
RELEASED. AIR FORCE PILOT, FORMER POW, REMARKS. MAJOR
MARIE ROSSI, US ARMY PILOT, FIRST FEMALE COMMANDER TO FLY
INTO COMBAT, KILLED IN HELICOPTER CRASH ONE DAY AFTER THE
CEASEFIRE. CHARLES JACO, CNN REPORTER, REMARKS ABOUT
COVERING THE WAR LIVE. CLINTON TAKES OATH OF OFFICE.
RETURNING US SOLDIERS. KUWAITI FLAG FLIES IN FROMT OF
SIGN THAT SAYS "THANK U ALL."

Record: 20511 ✓

FILM NUMBER
CLASSIFICATION
DISSEM1
DISSEM2
NUMBER OF TAPES
TAPE WIDTH
RUN TIME/MINUTES
LANGUAGE
YEAR PRODUCED
COUNTRIES
PROGRAM TITLE
DESCRIPTION

930010801
UNCLASSIFIED
OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
1
UMATIC
060
ENGLISH
92
PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA; UNITED STATES; IRAQ; BOSNIA
CIA IN THE MEDIA #9
1. REPORT ON A CIA UNDERCOVER OPERATION CALLED "OPERATION
LAUNDRY", DESIGNED TO FLOOD IRAQ WITH COUNTERFEIT MONEY
IN ORDER TO DESTABILIZE THE ECONOMY; COVERT ACTION;
FOOTAGE OF THE PLANT IN GREAT BRITAIN WHERE IRAQ HAS ITS
CURRENCY PRINTED; DEMONSTRATION OF HOW EASY IT IS TO
COUNTERFEIT IRAQI CURRENCY; INDICATIONS THAT IRAQI
INFLATION HAS INCREASED DRAMATICALLY AS A RESULT OF THE
OPERATION; 2. DCI ROBERT GATES TESTIFIES BEFORE THE
SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ABOUT IRAQ, SADDAM HUSSEIN'S
REGIME, AND THE IRAQI CBW PROGRAM; 3. US BUSINESSES AND
BUSINESSMEN ARE INCREASINGLY TARGETTED BY FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES; ECONOMIC THEFT AND ESPIONAGE;
EXCERPTS FROM A SPEECH BY DCI ROBERT GATES ON THIS
SUBJECT; THE REORIENTATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
TOWARDS ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES; 4. PREVIEW OF
THE MOVIE "PATRIOT GAMES", PORTIONS OF WHICH WERE FILMED

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AT CIA OR ON SETS DESIGNED FOLLOWING A TOUR OF CIA HEADQUARTERS; EXPLANATION OF HOW THE OVERHEAD IMAGERY CREATED FOR THE FILM WAS ACCOMPLISHED; 5. REPORT ON THE DEDICATION OF A MEMORIAL TO WILLIAM DONOVAN AT CIA HEADQUARTERS ON THE OCCASION OF THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OSS; OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES; EXCERPTS FROM REMARKS BY DCI ROBERT GATES; COMMENTS FROM OSS VETERANS ALBERT MATERAZZI AND BETTY MCINTOSH; CIA HISTORIAN LINDA MCCARTHY DISCUSSES THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF BALLPLAYER MOE BERG TO THE OSS; 6. CLOSING ARGUMENTS GIVEN IN THE TRIAL OF FORMER CIA OFFICIAL CLAIR GEORGE; ACCUSED OF LYING TO CONGRESS REGARDING THE IRAN-CONTRA SCANDAL; 7. SCANDAL DEVELOPS OVER ILLEGAL BANK LOANS BY BNL TO IRAQ, ALLEGEDLY WITH THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE US GOVERNMENT; 8. REPORT THAT WHEN THE TIANAMEN SQUARE MASSACRE IN CHINA TOOK PLACE THE CIA STATION CHIEF WAS OUT OF THE COUNTRY ON TDY BACK TO CIA HEADQUARTERS; THE STATION CHIEF HAD REPORTED THAT THE CHINESE MILITARY WOULD NOT MOVE AGAINST THE PROTESTERS; 9. UPDATE ON CIA DEFECTOR EDWARD LEE HOWARD, CURRENTLY IN RUSSIA FOLLOWING A SOJOURN IN SWEDEN; 10. ALLEGATIONS THAT AMERICAN POW'S WERE LEFT BEHIND FOLLOWING THE US WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM; EXCERPTS FROM TESTIMONY BY FORMER DCI JAMES SCHLESINGER SUPPORTING THIS THESIS; FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MELVIN LAIRD REFUTES THESE CHARGES; 11. A LETTER FROM DCI ROBERT GATES TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS INDICATES THAT THE US INTELLIGENCE BUDGET IS ROUGHLY \$20 BILLION A YEAR; 12. EXCERPTS FROM THE TESTIMONY BY HENRY KISSINGER BEFORE A SENATE COMMITTEE REGARDING AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR LEFT BEHIND FOLLOWING THE US WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM; 13. ANOTHER REPORT ABOUT HENRY KISSINGER'S TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON POWS; FILE FOOTAGE OF AMERICAN PRISONERS HELD BY NORTH VIETNAM; 14. UPDATE ON REPORTS THAT THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AIDED IRAQ WITH ILLEGAL LOANS; CIA BEGINS AN INDEPENDANT INVESTIGATION INTO THE CHARGE; AERIAL FOOTAGE OF CIA HEADQUARTERS; FILE FOOTAGE SHOWING COMPUTER FACILITIES INSIDE THE HEADQUARTERS BUILDING; 15. UPDATE ON THE CONFLICT BETWEEN AZERBAIJAN AND ARMENIA; FOOTAGE OF THE DAMAGE AND WOUNDED RESULTING FROM THE CONFLICT; 16. CIA OFFICIALS CHANGED THEIR TESTIMONY BEFORE CONGRESS REGARDING THE WITHHOLDING OF INFORMATION ABOUT US LOANS TO IRAQ; 17. ALLEGATIONS THAT THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION ATTEMPTED TO CONCEAL ITS SUPPORT FOR IRAQ PRIOR TO THE GULF CONFLICT, ASKING THE CIA TO WITHOLD INFORMATION FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; 18. FBI INVESTIGATES THE WITHHOLDING OF INFORMATION REGARDING US SUPPORT FOR IRAQ FROM CONGRESS; CIA AND JUSTICE ACCUSE EACH OTHER OF DECEIT; 19. MORE ON THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE CIA AND JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OVER WITHHOLDING INFORMATION REGARDING BNL LOANS TO IRAQ; INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS ARE UNDERWAY WITHIN BOTH AGENCIES; 20. THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE CIA AND THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OVER WITHHOLDING INFORMATION REGARDING BNL LOANS TO IRAQ MAY HAVE BEEN A RESULT OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION CONCEALING INFORMATION ABOUT US RELATIONS WITH IRAQ PRIOR TO THE GULF WAR; 21. MORE ON

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THE PUBLIC SHOUTING MATCH BETWEEN THE CIA AND JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OVER BNL LOANS TO IRAQ; 22. SENATOR BOREN ASKS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO NAME AN INDEPENDANT PROSECUTOR TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBLE MISDEEDS BY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AND CIA REGARDING BNL LOANS TO IRAQ; 23. SENATOR BOREN CALLS FOR AN INDEPENDANT PROSECUTOR TO INVESTIGATE THE IRAQI LOANS SCANDAL; 24. SPECIAL INVESTIGATOR NAMED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO STUDY THE BNL LOANS SCANDAL AND POSSIBLE OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE BY THE CIA AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; EXCERPTS FROM THE PRESS CONFERENCE CONDUCTED BY ATTORNEY GENERAL BARR; 25. SPECIAL INVESTIGATOR NAMED TO STUDY THE ILLEGAL LOANS SCANDAL AND POSSIBLE OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE BY THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION; 26. OPENING STATEMENTS GIVEN IN THE SECOND TRIAL OF FORMER CIA OFFICIAL CLAIR GEORGE OVER HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE IRAN CONTRA SCANDAL; 27. SENATE BANKING COMMITTEE HOLDS HEARINGS OVER LOANS TO IRAQ, RELEASING DOCUMENTS INDICATING THE CIA WAS CLOSELY FOLLOWING THE SALE OF WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY TO IRAQ PRIOR TO THE GULF CONFLICT; 28. INTERVIEW WITH MARK PERRY, WRITER OF THE BOOK "ECLIPSE: THE LAST DAYS OF THE CIA"; DISCUSSES THE RADICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE CIA RESULTING FROM THE END OF THE COLD WAR; PROSPECTS FOR THE CIA UNDER PRESIDENT CLINTON; 29. CIA HAS PREPARED A DRAFT REPORT PREDICTING IRAN WILL HAVE A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY BY THE END OF THE DECADE; 30. JUDGE REFUSES TO ACCEPT A PARTIAL VERDICT IN THE TRIAL OF FORMER CIA OFFICIAL CLAIR GEORGE; 31. CIA OFFICIAL CLAIR GEORGE CONVICTED OF LYING TO CONGRESS ABOUT THE IRAN-CONTRA SCANDAL; SPECIAL INVESTIGATOR REPORTS NO EVIDENCE OF CORRUPTION OR POLITICAL AGENDAS IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATIONS HANDLING OF THE BNL SCANDAL; 32. SECRETARY OF STATE LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER ASKS THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL TO AUTHORIZE THE US OF FORCE IN BOSNIA; EXCERPTS FROM A SPEECH GIVEN BY DCI ROBERT GATES REGARDING THE SITUATION IN THE BALKANS

Record: 20345

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	920078901
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	045
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	92
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	BOSNIA
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	BOSNIA: HIDDEN HORRORS
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	PART 1: CLINTON'S REMARKS; REMARKS BY SURVIVORS, EYEWITNESSES TO "ETHNIC CLEANSING". SIREN SOUNDS, PEOPLE RUN THROUGH THE STREETS OF SARAJEVO; FIGHTER FLIES; SOUNDS OF SHOTS, BOMBINGS; THE DEAD, THE INJURED, THE SURVIVORS; BURNING BUILDINGS. TALES OF ATROCITIES, TERRIBLE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. KOZARAC, FORMER MUSLIM TOWN, NOW IN RUINS,

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Record: 20345(continued)

ALL MUSLIMS ARE GONE. UN REFUGEE CENTER; MEN TALK ABOUT MASS SLAUGHTERS. WESTERN JOURNALISTS VISIT ALLEGED PRISON CAMP, REAL KARATERM (SP?) SITE IDENTIFIED BY SURVIVORS WHO TELL OF MASSACRE IN JULY. EMACIATED PRISON CAMP VICTIMS. INTERVIEW WITH ELIE WIESEL. PART 2: FORMER TRNOPOLJE PRISON CAMP DOCTOR TALKS ABOUT CONDITIONS IN CAMP. PHOTOS OF BATTERED BODIES; REMARKS BY SURVIVORS. SURVIVOR TALKS ABOUT SLAUGHTER AT VLASIC MT. BALLISTIC EXPERT EXAMINE BULLETS RECOVERED FROM SCENE. OMARSKA PRISON CAMP USED A INTERROGATION CENTER, EXTERIORS, INTERIORS. SURVIVORS TELL OF BRUTAL INTERROGATIONS. MEN IN POW CAMP, NOT GOOD, BUT BETTER THAN OMARSKA. TRNOPOLJE TODAY, LIVING CONDITIONS. INTERVIEW WITH ELIE WIESEL CONTINUES. SAYS BUSH SHOULD DO SOMETHING IMAGINATIVE IN HIS LAST DAYS AS PRESIDENT TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN BOSNIA.

Record: 20277

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	920074201
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	047
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	92
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	UNITED STATES; VIETNAM
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	MISSING IN ACTION
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	PROGRAM DEDICATED TO THE EFFORTS AND CONTINUING SEARCH FOR US SERVICEMEN WHO MAY HAVE BEEN LEFT IN VIETNAM AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE WAR; SEARCH IN A FORMER VIETNAM DETECTION CAMP FOR ONE LAST MIA; THE SAGA OF A PHOTO SHOWING WHAT APPEARS TO BE THREE US MILITARY MEN IN A DETENTION CAMP; EFFORTS BY DIA TO REFUTE THE CLAIM; DIA PROVIDES PROOF THAT THE PHOTO MAY BE A FAKE; THE SEN. JOHN KERRY COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING THE POW/MIA SITUATION; INTERVIEW WITH THE DIA LIVE-SIGHTING INVESTIGATOR STATIONED IN VIETNAM WHO DISCUSSES HE HAS SEEN NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THAT ANY AMERICANS WERE LEFT BEHIND AGAINST THEIR WILL; PROFILE OF ONE WIFE OF A FORMER POW WHO REMARRIED BASED ON PENTAGON REPORTS THAT HER HUSBAND WAS KILLED IN ACTION; THE MISSION OF LOOKING FOR REMAINS OF MIA'S; PIX OF THE HELICOPTER PAD AT THE US EMBASSY TODAY; PIX OF THE INSIDE OF THE EMBASSY NOW USED BY VIET PETRO; PIX OF THE CENTRAL IDENTIFICATION LAB IN HAWAII; THE LAST POW OFFICIALLY LISTED BY THE PENTAGON AND ITS IMPACT ON ONE FAMILY.

Record: 20248 ✓

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	920073001
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL

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Record: 20248(continued)

<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	024
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	92
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	VIETNAM
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	A NEW VIETNAM
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	BACKGROUND ON THE NEW VIETNAM SINCE THE WAR; PROFILE OF STREET MARKETS AND HAPPY SHOPPERS; PEOPLE MAKING ATTEMPTS TO LIVE IN PEACE AND HARMONY; MOTORBIKES ARE NOW THE MAJOR MODE OF TRANSPORTATION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY; AVERAGE SALARY IS \$200. A YEAR; COMMUNISTS STILL IN POWER AND MAKING ATTEMPTS TO JUMP START THE LAGGING ECONOMY; COMMENTS BY PRIME MINISTER VO VAN KIET; ECONOMIC EMBARGO REMAINS THE MAJOR OBSTACLE; POW/MIA'S STILL MAJOR ISSUE; PIX OF THE TOMB OF HO CHI MINH; COMMENTS BY HO SI TOANG, DIRECTOR OF PETRO VIETNAM; PROFILE OF THE OLD HANOI; US TASK FORCE IN THE COUNTRY SEEKING INFO ON POW/MIA'S; LIVING CONDITIONS IN HANOI; RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS AND CHANGES IN THE CITY; ARTIST AND NEPHEW OF HO CHI MINH AND PAINTINGS OF HIS UNCLE.

Record: 20184

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	920068201
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	VHS
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	016
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	80
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	UNITED STATES
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	POW-WOW!
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	DOCUMENTARY ON NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURE, IN PARTICULAR DANCE AND CEREMONY; THE LINKS BETWEEN RELIGION AND CULTURE; DEMONSTRATIONS OF TRADITIONAL DANCES, WITH AN EXPLANATION OF THEIR MEANING;

Record: 20244

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	920067301
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	060
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	RUSSIAN
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	92
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES; RUSSIA; UNITED STATES; SOUTH AFRICA; FRANCE
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	VELTSIN ATT #4

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Record: 20244(continued)DESCRIPTION

1. BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION, FAMILY MEMBERS, YELTSIN AS A YOUNG MAN AND CAMPAIGNING FOR PRESIDENT; 2. YELTSIN MISSES PARLIAMENT SESSION BECAUSE OF ILLNESS; 3. YELTSIN ADDRESSES PARLIAMENT FOR SWEEPING NEW POWERS BECAUSE OF ECONOMIC CRISIS, NEW ECONOMIC PLAN; 4. YELTSIN'S RADICAL ECONOMIC PROPOSAL TO PARLIAMENT, OPEN MARKET ECONOMY PROPOSED AND TOUGH TIMES AHEAD; 5. DAYS NUMBERED FOR GORBACHEV AS PRESIDENT, YELTSIN COMMENTS ON IMPENDING RESIGNATION BY GORBACHEV, YELTSIN'S PLANE WITH INSIGNIA SAYING ROSSIYA INSTEAD OF AEROFLOT AND RUSSIA FLAG NOT HAMMER AND SICKLE; 6. RINGWING LEADER COL. VIKTOR ALKSNIS PREDICTS YELTSIN DOWNFALL AND VIOLENCE AND BLOODSHED, OPPOSITION RALLY, BEGGARS ON MOSCOW STREETS; 7. RUSSIAN FLAG HOISTED ABOVE KREMLIN, INTERVIEW WITH YELTSIN ON NEW COMMONWEALTH, BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION, PLAYING TENNIS AND IN HOT SPRING; 8. INTERNAL ECONOMIC TURMOIL AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY; BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION OF YELTSIN INCLUDING BAZAAR BEHAVIOR AT JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY AND QUITTING COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP; GORBACHEV-YELTSIN RIVALRY, GEORGIY ARBATOV COMMENTS; 9. YELTSIN'S PROPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS REDUCTIONS, VIDEO OF RUSSIAN WEAPONS, MISSILES, SILOS, BOMBERS, AND SUBMARINES; 10. YELTSIN'S SELF-IMAGE, APPEARING STATESMAN-LIKE BUT HAS PLAYFUL NATURE, VISITING BLACK SEA FLEET, SPECULATION ON HIS HEALTH AND DRINKING; 11. YELTSIN RESPONDS TO BUSH ADMINISTRATION NUCLEAR ARMS CUTS, REQUESTS AID FOR ECONOMIC AID, YELTSIN'S TELEVISION ADDRESS AND BBC INTERVIEW ON TARGETED CITIES; 12. YELTSIN IN LONDON WITH WIFE, MEETING JOHN MAJOR, REBUFFS STATEMENT BY BUSH THAT US WON COLD WAR; 13. YELTSIN IN FRANCE REQUESTING AID, AT DINNER WITH CRESSON, SIGNING AGREEMENT; 14. DIVISION OF MILITARY POWER IN COMMONWEALTH, YELTSIN SIGNS DECREE FOR SEPARATE RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, MILITARY TRAINING, NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER JOINT CONTROL OF COMMONWEALTH STATES; 15. YELTSIN IN TASHKENT AT CIS MEETING, COMMENTS BY PRESIDENT OF BELARUS S.S. SHUSHKEVICH, KAZAKHSTAN PRESIDENT N.A. NAZARBAYEV; 16. YELTSIN AT TASHKENT AIRPORT, POSSIBLY SLIGHTLY DRUNK; 17. TROUBLED CIS SUMMIT IN TASHKENT, MINOR ACCORDS SIGNED BUT NOTHING ON MILITARY OR ECONOMY, YELTSIN COMMENTS ON BEING ACCUSED OF ARRIVING AT SUMMIT DRUNK; 18. YELTSIN AND WIFE MEET SOUTH AFRICAN DE KLERK AT KREMLIN, WREATH LAYING, WALK IN RED SQUARE; 19. GORBACHEV AND YELTSIN CONTINUE FEUD, YELTSIN TAKES AWAY GORBACHEV'S LIMO AND SAYS GORBACHEV GOING BACK ON PROMISE NOT TO RETURN TO POLITICS, GORBACHEV COMMENTS; 20. YELTSIN TRYING TO KEEP POLITICAL CONTROL, FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF HIS ELECTION AS RUSSIAN PRESIDENT, ANTI-YELTSIN RALLY; 21. YELTSIN AND WIFE BOARDING PLANE FOR US SUMMIT MEETING, PRIOR TO LEAVING MOSCOW MEETS WITH CHURCH OFFICIALS, POPULARITY DECREASING AND INFLATION RISING, EMPTY GASOLINE STATIONS, THREATENS TO SELL STATE-OWNED BUSINESSES IF THEY CAN'T PAY BACK DEBTS; 22. YELTSIN ARRIVES IN WASHINGTON, US CONGRESSIONAL HESITATION IN GIVING RUSSIA FINANCIAL AID, YELTSIN INTERVIEWED ON PLANE TRAVELING TO US AND COMMENTS ON VIETNAM POWS WHO MAY

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HAVE BEEN KEPT IN SOVIET LABOR CAMPS. (DATES: 30 AUGUST 1991-15 JUNE 1992)

Record: 20179 ✓

FILM NUMBER 920065001
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH VHS
RUN TIME/MINUTES 057
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 92
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES; VIETNAM
PROGRAM TITLE PRISONERS IN HANOI HILTON
DESCRIPTION B/W FOOTAGE OF SOME OF THE 575 US PILOTS WHO WERE CAPTURED ALIVE AFTER BEING SHOT DOWN IN VIETNAM. THE ARRIVAL OF SOME AT HANOI HILTON. COLONEL HUYEN VAN PHUONG, FORMERLY OF NORTH VIETNAM ARMY, WHO WORKED WITH US POWS, INTERVIEWED IN CELL OF FORMER HANOI HILTON. B/W FOOTAGE OF BOMBING RAID AND AFTERMATH. GENERAL TRAN CONG MAN REMARKS. B/W FOOTAGE OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN'S DOWNED PLANE, HIM IN HOSPITAL. REMARKS BY SURVIVOR OF BOMBINGS. PRISON KNOWN AS "THE PLANTATION". STAFF HQ OF NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY. B/W ARCHIVAL FOOTAGE FILMED BY NORTH VIETNAM, PREVIOUSLY UNRELEASED, NEVER SEEN EVEN BY PRISONERS. VIETNAMESE JOURNALIST RECOUNTS THE US PILOTS BEING PARADED THROUGH THE STREETS OF HANOI IN 1967. GENERAL VO NGUYEN GIAP REMARKS, THEN AND NOW. FORMER POW, LYNN RICHARD BEENS, WATCHES HIS POW VIDEO; REMARKS. PILOTS TAKEN ON TOUR OF BOMBED OUT AREAS OF HANOI. BEENS HOLDS MODEL OF B-52 AS HE TALKS ABOUT MISSION ON WHICH HE WAS SHOT DOWN. B/W SHOTS OF CAPTURED PILOTS BEING SURROUNDED BY ANGRY PEASANTS. B/W FOOTAGE OF LIBERATION OF PILOTS IN 1973. HARRY EWELL, FORMER POW, SEES HANOI HILTON FOOTAGE FOR THE FIRST TIME; REMARKS. B/W FILM OF JOAN BAEZ SINGING TO PRISONERS. JANE FONDA ON HER HANOI TRIP. VIETNAM VETERANS. PHUONG RESPONDS TO QUESTION ABOUT POSSIBLE SURVIVING MIAS. BEENS AND EWELL'S FEELINGS ABOUT SURVIVING MIAS EXPRESSED. VETERANS RETURN TO VIETNAM. VIETNAM MEMORIAL IN WASHINGTON, DC.

Record: 13513

FILM NUMBER 920054801
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH UMATIC
RUN TIME/MINUTES 049
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 92

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Record: 13513(continued)COUNTRIESCOMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES; TAJIKISTAN; RUSSIA;
KAZAKHSTAN; ARMENIA; AZERBAIJAN; MOLDOVA; GEORGIA;
LITHUANIA; UNITED STATESPROGRAM TITLE
DESCRIPTIONSOVIET OPENNESS #33
(DATES: 7 MAY-30 JUL 92) 1. ARMED REBELS CONTROL CITY OF
DUSHANBE, TAJIKISTAN, APC ON STREET, DESIRE FOR ISLAMIC
STATE; 2. FIGHTING IN TAJIKISTAN, MUSLIMS AT PRAYER,
ANTI-COMMUNIST DEMONSTRATIONS; 3. RUSSIAN NUCLEAR
WARHEADS, BICKERING AMONG REPUBLICS FOR CONTROL OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, CIA DIRECTOR GATES COMMENTS, TOMSK PLUTONIUM
PLANT; 4. KAZAKHSTAN PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV VISITS US,
NUCLEAR POWER IN KAZAKHSTAN, MISSILE SILO, SECRETARY BAKER
IN KAZAKHSTAN; 5. ANCIENT FREUD BETWEEN ARMENIA AND
AZERBAIJAN, FIGHTING IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH, FOOD CONVOY INTO
STEPANERKERT, BURNED VILLAGES; 6. PRIVATIZATION OF RUSSIAN
BUSINESSES, RUSSIAN AVIATION PLANT, PROBLEMS WITH
PRIVATIZATION; 7. US EMBASSY IN DUSHANBE LOCATED IN SIX
ROOMS OF OLD HOTEL, RUSSIAN RECEPTIONIST, STATE DEPARTMENT
OFFICERS DO DISHES IN BATHTUB; 8. SEARCH FOR US PRISONERS,
RUSSIAN-US TEAM TRAVELS TO PECHORA FOR CLUES OF KOREAN WAR
VETERAN, PECHORA LABOR CAMP; 9. FIGHTING IN MOLDOVA,
RUSSIAN SEPARATISTS, YELTSIN AND PLEDGE TO FIND MISSING US
POWS, PECHORA LABOR CAMP PRISONER COMMENTS; 10. VIOLENCE
IN GEORGIA AND MOLDOVA, REFUGEES FLEE MOLDOVA; 11. ETHNIC
FIGHTING AND FOILED COUP ATTEMPT IN GEORGIA, YELTSIN WITH
RUTSKOY, FIGHTING IN MOLDOVA, HARDLINERS PRESSURE YELTSIN;
12. GROWING RUSSIAN IMPERIALIST TENDENCY, RUSSIAN MILITARY
BASE IN LITHUANIA, LITHUANIAN DEFENSE FORCE TRAINS; 13.
LOSS OF FINANCIAL PRIVILEGES BY ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS,
RUSSIAN SCIENTISTS LURED ABROAD, NUCLEAR PHYSICS
INSTITUTE, PROFESSOR WORKS ON FIBER OPTICS FOR AT&T; 14.
GEOGRAPHY OF FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS, NOTHING IN COMMON
WITH RUSSIAN CULTURE, MUSLIM STATES IN CENTRAL ASIA NOW
INDEPENDENT, RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE, INFLUENCE
FROM SURROUNDING COUNTRIES.Record: 19998FILM NUMBER

920049701

CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

DISSEM1

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)

DISSEM2

NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL

NUMBER OF TAPES

1

TAPE WIDTH

VHS

RUN TIME/MINUTES

077

LANGUAGE

ENGLISH

YEAR PRODUCED

91

COUNTRIES

IRAQ; PERSIAN GULF

PROGRAM TITLE

DESERT STORM: THE WAR BEGINS

DESCRIPTIONTHIS CNN CHRONICLE OF THE GULF WAR FEATURES A COMPILATION
OF CNN GULF WAR FOOTAGE NARRATED BY BERNARD SHAW. FOOTAGE:
CNN NEWSROOM. GULF WAR SCENES. SADDAM WAVING TO CROWD.
PRESIDENT BUSH AND GORBACHEV SHAKING HANDS. US FORCES.
SOLDIER WEARING GAS MASK. FOOTAGE OF MEDIA EVENTS THAT
PREOCCUPIED AMERICANS ON 8/2/90 PRIOR TO IRAQI INVASION OF

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Record: 19998 (continued)

KUWAIT. VIEW OF WHITE HOUSE. CNN ANCHOR ANNOUNCING INVASION. IRAQI TANKS ENTERING KUWAIT. VOICES OF CNN REPORTERS ANNOUNCING UPDATES. SADDAM RIDING HORSE UNDER CROSSED SWORDS. BACKGROUND REPORT ON KUWAIT, ITS ARMY AND RICHES. CHRONICLE OF EVENTS 3 MONTHS PRIOR TO INVASION. GRAPHIC SHOWING BOARDERS BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT. SADDAM'S WEAPONS. US DEPARTMENT OF STATE. AERIAL OF CIA. MARGARET TUTWILER. APRIL GLASBY MEETING WITH HUSAYN. CIA'S FOREWARNING ABOUT INVASION. OIL REFINERY. KUWAITI CITIZENS TESTIFYING ABOUT IRAQI ATROCITIES. PICTURES OF TORTURE VICTIMS. MARGARET THATCHER. PHOTOS OF BUSH WITH CABINET IN OVAL OFFICE. BUSH AND DCI GATES WALKING ACROSS LAWN. SADDAM PETTING HEAD OF BRITISH CHILD. B/W SCENE OF HITLER. IRAQI REFUGEES. SYRIAN COOPERATION. VIDEO OF ALLIED POWS. OIL SOAKED BIRD. BACKGROUND REPORT ON SADDAM HUSAYN: CHILDHOOD PHOTOS, NASSER, GASSED KURDS. IRAQI VIDEO SHOWING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS BEING LEAD OUT OF ROOM TO BE SHOT. POSTERS OF SADDAM ON WALL. DEPLOYMENT OF US TROOPS INTO SAUDI ARABIA. GEN SCHWARZKOPF, GEN POWELL, AND CHENEY WITH TROOPS. ALLIED MISSILES FIRING. AMERICAN PEOPLE SHOWING SUPPORT FOR TROOPS. PRESIDENT BUSH WITH TROOPS IN SAUDI ARABIA. US CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE. UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. AERIAL OF US EMBASSY IN KUWAIT. JAMES BAKER AND TARIQ AZIZ MEETING FOR TALKS IN GENEVA. PEREZ DE CUELLAR. SCUD MISSILE DAMAGE.

Record: 4672

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	920046301
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	012
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	92
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	RUSSIA
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	INTERVIEW WITH BORIS YELTSIN
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	STONE PHILLIP'S INTERVIEW WITH BORIS YELTSIN DURING YELTSIN'S 10-HOUR FLIGHT TO THE US. YELTSIN WAVES GOODBYE AT DOOR OF PLANE. INTERIOR OF RUSSIA'S ANSWER TO AIR FORCE ONE. YELTSIN'S STAFF AND BODYGUARDS IN COACH SEATING. TWO USAF OFFICERS ON BOARD. CAPTAIN BRIAN GREENSHIELDS REMARKS THAT THEY ENSURE THAT THE PLANE GETS TO ANDREWS AFB; LAST GUARANTEE OF SAFETY. HAND WAVES AT WINDOW, THE PRESIDENTIAL PLANE CALLED "RUSSIA" TAKES OFF. AERIAL OF RUSSIAN LANDSCAPE. YELTSIN BRIEFED BY "BRAIN TRUST," DEFENSE MINISTER, PAVAL GRACHEV; FOREIGN MINISTER, ANDREY KOZYREV; YEGAR GAIDAR, NEWLY PROMOTED TO ACTING PRIME MINISTER. GAIDAR'S REMARKS ABOUT HIS PROMOTION. LUNCH IS SERVED TO PASSENGERS. VYACHESLAV KOSTIKOV, PRESS SECRETARY, BRIEFS PHILLIPS ON WHAT KIND OF QUESTIONS TO ASK YELTSIN...POLITICAL NOT PERSONAL. YELTSIN'S PRIVATE QUARTERS WHERE INTERVIEW TOOK PLACE. QUESTIONS ABOUT

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POPULARITY, THE SUMMIT WITH BUSH. COCKPIT PERSONNEL TALK WITH ANDREWS PERSONNEL. YELTSIN AND HIS WIFE HAVING TEA. HER REMARKS ABOUT THE PUTSCH; SHE FEARED FOR HIS LIFE. QUESTION ABOUT US POWS FROM VIETNAM WAR BEING HELD IN RUSSIA AND YELTSIN'S RESPONSE...IT'S POSSIBLE. VISIT WITH ONE FAMILY WHO'S SON MAY BE ONE OF THE POWS IN RUSSIA. PHOTO OF JAMES KELLY PATTERSON. REMARKS BY HIS PARENTS. PHOTO OF TWO PARACHUTES FLOATING TO EARTH AFTER HIS PLANE WAS SHOT DOWN. REMARKS BY EUGENE MCDANIEL, WHO WAS SHOT DOWN WITH HIM. REPORTS FROM SOVIET UNION OF AMERICAN FLYER WHO HAD BEEN TRANSFERRED TO SOVIET AUTHORITIES FOR QUESTIONING. REMARKS BY PATTERSON'S BROTHER. PATTERSON'S OLD CAR STILL KEPT IN CASE HE RETURNS. HIS NAME ENGRAVED ON VIETNAM MEMORIAL.

Record: 19965

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	920045301
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	VHS
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	055
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	91
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	IRAQ; UNITED STATES
<u>SERIES TITLE</u>	THE PERSIAN GULF: IMAGES OF A CONFLICT
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	SADDAM HUSSAYN VS. THE COALITION: BEHIND THE MILITARY STRATEGIES
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	PART 3 OF 4, THIS DOCUMENTARY IS AN ANALYSIS EXPLAINING THE METHODOLOGY AND BATTLEFIELD STRATEGY USED TO WAGE THE PERSIAN GULF WAR. FOOTAGE: ABC POST-WAR NEWS CLIPS SHOWING HOW WEAPONRY WAS USED IN GULF WAR. USE OF AWACS AND RECONNAISSANCE PLANES. GRAPHICS SHOWING HOW F-16'S AND PRECISION WEAPONS WERE USED. F-117 STEALTH. TANKS IN DESERT. S/11, ALCNRADAR PLANES. IRAQI TRENCH. BARBED WIRE. GULF WAR SCENES. USE OF THERMAL SITE WEAPONRY. AERIAL OF BOMB DAMAGE. BULLDOZER PUSHING RUBBLE OF TANK. BURNED OUT SOVIET TANK. IRAQI POW'S SURRENDERING AND KISSING HANDS OF US SOLDIERS. WEAK SPOTS OF THE ALLIED MILITARY CAMPAIGN. M1 TANKS BEING UNLOADED FROM SHIP. PLANE TAKING OFF FROM CARRIER. MILITARY FUNERAL, FOLDING OF FLAG. LARGE NUMBER OF FRIENDLY FIRE CASUALTIES. FAILURE OF US INTELLIGENCE TO GIVE WARNING OF IRAQ'S INVASION. SENATOR BOREN COMMENTS ON NEED FOR MORE HUMINT INTELLIGENCE. IRAQI TV FOOTAGE OF SADDAM WITH SOLDIERS. AERIAL OF SHIPS IN PERSIAN GULF. AMATEUR VIDEO OF IRAQI TANKS INVADING KUWAIT ON 2 AUG. SADDAM'S FORCES. TONY CORDESMAN USING MAP TO SHOW LOCATION OF IRAQI FORCES. CORDESMAN ANALYSING SHORTCOMINGS OF IRAQI FORCES. ALLIED USE OF F-4 WILD WEASELS, EF-111 RADAR JAMMERS, F-15, TR-1. SOLDIERS WEARING GAS MASKS. FOOTAGE OF GASSED KURDS. MAP SHOWING LOCATIONS OF IRAQI MISSILE SITES. KUWAITIS

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Record: 19965(continued)

CELEBRATING FREEDOM. REPORT ANALYSING HOW GULF WAR WAS DIFFERENT FROM VIETNAM.

Record: 4833

FILM NUMBER 920045201
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH VHS
RUN TIME/MINUTES 140
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 91
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES; IRAQ; PERSIAN GULF
SERIES TITLE THE PERSIAN GULF: IMAGES OF A CONFLICT
PROGRAM TITLE THE ALLIES STRIKE
DESCRIPTION PART 2 OF 4, THIS DOCUMENTARY IS A COMPILATION OF ABC NEWS STORIES WHICH COVERED THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR, JANUARY 16 1991 TO THE END OF THE GROUND BATTLE. FOOTAGE: MARLON FITZWATER AND PRESIDENT BUSH ANNOUNCING START OF WAR. SCHWARZKOPF GIVING PENTAGON BRIEFING. SATELLITE FOOTAGE OF BOMBS HITTING TARGETS. ANTHONY CORDESMAN. ISRAELIS WEARING GAS MASKS. IRAQI VIDEOTAPE OF US POW'S. OIL SLICK IN GULF. CHENEY AND POWELL COMMENT AT BRIEFING. BOMB DAMAGE IN BAGHDAD. WOUNDED BEING PULLED FROM RUBBLE. ANTI-WAR PROTESTS IN THE US. DEAD IRAQI SOLDIERS ON HIGHWAY. BODIES BEING PULLED FROM RUBBLE OF BOMBED SHELTER. AIRRAID SIRENS. DEMONSTRATORS IN AMMAN, JORDAN. KING HUSSEIN. ALLIED WAR ROOM. ATTACK HELICOPTER. OFFSHORE SHELLING. FA-18'S. F-4'S. FUEL AIR AND GATOR BOMBS. A-6 INTRUDER. POWELL AND SCHWARZKOPF SPEAKING TO TROOPS. BUSH WALKING WITH ROBERT GATES. TANKS DISPENSING SMOKE. APACHE HELICOPTER. SADDAM HUSAYN AT CABINET MEETING. OIL WELL FIRES. MISSILES BEING FIRED. M1-A1 TANK. BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE. BIG BEN CLOCK IN LONDON. BUSH STEPPING FROM HELICOPTER. BUSH ANNOUNCING BEGINNING OF GROUND WAR. CONVOY OF SAUDI TANKS. WOUNDED IRAQI SOLDIERS. WHITE FLAG. LINE OF CAPTURED IRAQIS. POSTER OF SADDAM RIDDLED WITH BULLET HOLES. US, BRITISH, EGYPTIAN, AND SAUDI TROOPS IN FIELD. MINEFIELD. AFTERMATH OF SCUD ATTACK ON ALLIED BARRACKS IN DHAHRAN. ABDUL AMIR AL-ANBARI. IRAQ/KUWAIT HIGHWAY LITTERED WITH DESTROYED IRAQI TANKS, DEAD BODIES. ALLIED TROOPS ARRIVING IN KUWAIT. KUWAITIS CELEBRATING. IRAQI SOLDIERS IN MEDEVAC UNIT. US TROOPS RETURNING HOME. VIETNAM VETERANS.

Record: 6863

FILM NUMBER 920045101
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH VHS

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Record: 6863(continued)

RUN TIME/MINUTES 140
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 91
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES; IRAQ
SERIES TITLE THE PERSIAN GULF: IMAGES OF A CONFLICT
PROGRAM TITLE PRELUDE TO WAR
DESCRIPTION PART 1 OF 4, THIS DOCUMENTARY IS A COMPILATION OF ABC NEWS CLIPS OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE PERSIAN GULF WAR. FOOTAGE: GULF WAR SCENES. IRAQI POW'S. PHOTOS OF SADDAM HUSAYN. CLIP FROM DIANE SAWYER INTERVIEW WITH HUSAYN. PRESIDENT BUSH AND MARGARET THATCHER. THOMAS PICKERING AT UN SESSION. PRESIDENT BUSH STANDING WITH DCI WEBSTER AND DDCI KERR. BUSH SPEAKING FROM OVAL OFFICE ANNOUCING HIS DECISION TO SEND US TROOPS TO SAUDI ARABIA. CLIPS OF ABC NEWS UPDATES. IRAQI TV ANNOUNCER. HOSNI MUBARAK. ASSAD. TARIQ AZIZ. ARAB LEAGUE MEETING. FRANCOIS MITTERRAND. PLANES TAKING OFF. NIGHTTIME AIRSTRIKES. SADDAM HUSAYN IN A RARE INTERVIEW CONDUCTED BY DIANE SAWYER WEEKS BEFOR THE INVASION OF KUWAIT. CLIP OF TED KOPPEL INTERVIEW WITH TARIQ AZIZ. ANTI-US PROTESTERS IN FRONT OF US EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD. MOHAMAD AL-MASHAT. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CHENEY. US TROOPS. SADDAM PATTING HEAD OF BRITISH CHILD. KING HUSSEIN. SCHWARZKOPF IN DESERT WITH TROOPS. AMBASSADOR NATHANIEL HOWELL AND JESSE JACKSON. BUSH WITH GORBACHEV IN HELSINKI. BUSH SITTING WITH KUWAITI EMIR. SADDAM VISITS IRAQI SOLDIERS IN THE FIELD. ISRAELIS RECEIVING GAS MASKS. MOSLEM WORSHIPERS. MOSQUE. PROTESTERS IN FRONT OF WHITE HOUSE. CLIP OF PETER JENNINGS INTERVIEW WITH HUSAYN. CHRISTMAS DECORATIONS FOR US TROOPS IN DESERT. BAKER AND AZIZ AT GENEVA HOTAL. CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING LARGE PROPORTION OF BLACKS IN MILITARY.

Record: 18671

FILM NUMBER 920034001
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH VHS
RUN TIME/MINUTES 045
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 70
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES
SERIES TITLE THE FABULOUS SIXTIES
PROGRAM TITLE 1969 - THE EAGLE HAS LANDED
DESCRIPTION NIXON TAKES OATH OF OFFICE. WOODSTOCK. INAUGURAL BALL. SPIRO AGNEW. ANTI-WAR PROTESTS. VETERANS' DAY PARADE. TRISHA NIXON'S REMARKS RE THE PROTESTERS. HO CHI MINH. US POWS IN HANOI. NIXON VISITS VETERANS IN HOSPITAL; ON TOUR AROUND THE WORLD. JOHN LENNON AND YOKO LIE-IN. CHARLES BECOMES PRINCE OF WALES. SQUATTERS IN LONDON. ART LINKLETTER'S REMARKS ON TOP 40 LYRICS. NEW YORK METS WIN THE WORLD SERIES. NEW YORK JETS WIN THE SUPER BOWL. JOE NAMATH. NEW YORK MAYOR JOHN LINDSEY. AFFLUENCE,

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FASHIONS, HOLLYWOOD DREAM FACTORY. PERMISSIVE SOCIETY; BOOKS, VIDEOS, PICTURES. EMERGING NEW MORALITY BASED ON THE BIRTH CONTROL PILL. AFRICAN CHILDREN. INDIA SCENES OF OVERCROWDING. CHINA'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION. STUDENT UPRISING IN CHINA. STILL SHOTS AND HOME VIDEO OF JFK. STILL PHOTOS OF SOME OF THE ILLUMINARIES WHO DIED DURING THE 60'S. EISENHOWER'S FUNERAL. STUDENT RIOTS IN JAPAN; RIOT POLICE CHARGE. SUMMARY OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIVITIES DURING THE 60'S. LIFTOFF OF APOLLO 11; FIRST MAN ON THE MOON.

Record: 19894

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	920024301
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEM CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	057
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	92
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	WORLDWIDE
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	VIDEO NEWS SUMMARY #137
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	VNS FOR 13-20 APRIL 1992. 13 APRIL: LIBYA: STANDOFF CONTINUES. IRAQ: UN TEAM READY TO BLOW UP NUCLEAR PLANT. ISRAEL: THE UNRECOGNIZED ARAB VILLAGES. UK: LABOR LEADER KINNOCK TO ANNOUNCE RESIGNATION. ASIA: REGIONAL NEWS. 14 APRIL: RUSSIA: CABINET WALKS OUT. BOSNIA: RESUMING SLIDE INTO CIVIL WAR. PERU: CAR BOMB EXPLODES AT POLICE STATION NEAR LIMA. ECON NEWS. 15 APRIL: RUSSIA: PROCEEDING WITH YEL'TSIN'S ECONOMIC REFORMS. LIBYA: UN SANCTIONS GO INTO EFFECT. IRAQ: MAJOR PART OF NUCLEAR PLANT DESTROYED. ASIA: REGIONAL NEWS. JAPAN: LEARNING ECONOMIC LESSONS OF THE 1990'S. 16 APRIL: CIS: DEMONSTRATIONS IN TAJIKISTAN'S CAPITAL. LIBYA: QADHAFI OPENLY DEFIANT OF UN EMBARGO. UK: NEW CABINET MEETS. SOUTH AFRICA: WINNIE MANDELA QUILTS ANC POST. BULGARIA: AGREES TO CLOSE TWO POWER PLANT REACTORS. ECON NEWS. 17 APRIL: AFGHANISTAN: NAJIBULLAH OUSTED FROM POWER. LIBYA: LOCKERBIE SUSPECTS READY TO STAND TRIAL. IRAQ: EASING MILITARY BUILDUP IN THE NORTH. UK-HONG KONG: TORY PARTY CHIEF OFFERED GOVERNORSHIP. ECON NEWS. 20 APRIL: AFGHANISTAN: PEACEFUL TAKEOVER OF POWER POSSIBLE. BOSNIA: A STRAIN ON PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS. US-INDOCHINA: SENATE TRIP ON POW-MIA ISSUE. ECON NEWS.

Record: 19769 ✓

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	920022201
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	060

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<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	91
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	UNITED STATES
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	CIA IN THE MEDIA ATT #8
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	1. SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT SEGMENT ON A SUPER SECRET US GOVERNMENT AGENCY THAT CONTROLS SURVIVING A NUCLEAR ATTACK; DOOMSDAY PLAN INVOLVES THE CIA; 2. DCI GATES TESTIFYING ON THE HILL REGARDING THE DISINTERGRATING OF THE SOVIET ARMY; 3. BOB GATES ON THE HILL TESTIFYING ABOUT POSSIBLE CALAMITY IN THE USSR; 4. GATES AT A CONGRESSIONAL HEARING DISCUSSING A VERY UNSTABLE SOVIET UNION; 5. A CBS SPOOF ON THE CIA CREATING ITS OWN 24 HOUR TELEVISION CHANNEL; EXTRACTS OF GATES PROPOSING ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE; SECNARIO OF WHAT A CIA TV SHOW WOULD LOOK LIKE; 6. INTERVIEW WITH OLEG KALUGIN, FORMER HEAD OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FOR THE KGB, ALLEDGING THAT VIETNAM STILL HOLDS AMERICAN POW'S; 7. INTERVIEW WITH KALUGIN ON THE US POW SITUATION IN VIETNAM AND THAT KGB OFFICERS INTERVIEWED A CIA OFFICER IN 1978; 8. MORE ON THE POW'S IN VIETNAM; 9. CIA BEGINS TO RETHINK ITS FUTURE ROLE; GATES PROPOSES MORE OPENNESS AND MORE DECLASSIFYING OF DOCUMENTS; 10. SEN. DAVID BOREN GIVES PRESS CONFERENCE ON PROPOSAL FOR A MORE LEANER AND EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY; 11. RESULTS OF A CALL-IN ON OPINION ON WHO KILLED JFK; CIA IS WINNER WITH 51%; 12. REPORT THAT THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MARYLAND WAS A CIA FRONT; FORMER BANK EMPLOYEE DISCUSSES SOME OF THE CIA TRANSACTIONS; 13. SEGMENT ON THE RECENTLY RELEASED BOOK 'DOUBLE CROSSED' WHICH ALLEGES THE MAFIA AND CIA WERE INVOLVED IN THE DEATHS OF JFK AND MARILYN MONROE; 14. SEN. BOREN DRAFTS A RESOLUTION TO OPEN CIA FILES ON THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION; 15. INTERVIEW WITH SAM GIANCANA'S NEPHEW, CO-AUTHOR OF 'DOUBLE CROSSED' WHO TALKS ABOUT THE CIA AND MAIFIA IN JFK'S AND MARILYN MONROE'S DEATH; 16. INTERVIEW WIT CONGRESSMAN DAVE MCURDY WHO FOCUSES ON A REORGANIZATION AND RESTRUCTURING OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. (BROADCAST DATES: 11 NOV 91 - 5 MAR 92)

Record: 20389 ✓

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	920018601
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	VHS
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	015
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	92
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	UNITED STATES
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	US MIA'S IN VIETNAM
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	(18.42-33.30) SGT. PETER CRESSMAN WRITES TO HIS CONGRESSMAN THAT HE AND HIS UNIT WERE IN VIOLATION OF THE VIETNAM CEASEFIRE. CRESSMAN AND 7 OTHERS BOARDED AN EC-47Q SURVEILLANCE PLANE; FLIGHT PLAN FROM UBON AFB IN

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THAILAND TO MONITOR NORTH VIETNAMESE TANK MOVEMENTS ON HO CHI MINH TRAIL. PLANE CRASHED IN LAOS; 6 MEN DECLARED MIA, INCLUDING JOSEPH MATEJOV AND CRESSMAN. MATEJOV'S MOTHER RECALLS BEING INFORMED HER SON WAS MISSING. LATER INFORMED HE WAS DEAD; CRESSMAN'S MOTHER GOT THE SAME INFORMATION. CRESSMAN'S PARENTS GOT THE LETTER HE WAS WRITING. B/W PHOTO OF CRASH SITE. TERRELL MINARCIN DECODED MESSAGE ABOUT 4 PILOTS IN 1973. REENACTMENT OF VIETNAMESE LEADING CAPTURED PILOTS THROUGH JUNGLE. EVIDENCE THAT MISSING PILOTS HAD BEEN CAPTURED. DIA POSITION. STILL PHOTO OF CAPITOL BUILDING. RETIRED INTELLIGENCE ANALYST'S TESTIMONY SAYS CRESSMAN AND MATEJOV HAD BEEN TRANSPORTED TO THE SOVIET UNION. MINARCIN HAD INFORMATION THAT THEY WERE FLOWN TO THE SOKOL AREA. PARIS PEACE TALKS; KISSINGER AND OTHERS SIGN AGREEMENT. CHANGING OF STATUS FROM MIA TO KIA A RESULT OF PEACE TALKS, MRS. MATAJOV MAINTAINS. OFFICIAL REPORT RECOUNTED. 7 OF THE 8 LISTED AS MISSING IN ACTION ON THE VIETNAM MEMORIAL.

Record: 19697

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	920015901
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	046
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	92
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	UNITED STATES; IRAQ; KUWAIT; SAUDI ARABIA
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	GULF CRISIS: THE ROAD TO WAR
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	PART 3 OF 3, THIS DOCUMENTARY EXPLORES THE BEGINNING OF THE FIGHTING IN THE GULF WAR. CHARLES WHEELER LEADS PANEL DISCUSSION. PANELISTS ARE VARIOUS STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS. COMMENTS BY SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER, COLIN POWELL, DICK CHENEY, ROBERT GATES. FOOTAGE: BAKER AT NEGOTIATING TABLE WITH TARIQ AZIZ. BAKER AND AZIZ MAKING ANNOUNCEMENTS. MARLIN FITZWATER AT CNN PRESS CONFERENCE. EON ANNOUNCING BEGINNING OF GULF WAR. SIREN SOUNDING IN ISRAEL. MOSHE ARENS. PATRIOT HITTING SCUD. PATRIOT MISSILE BATTERIES. BOMBED IRAQI BUNKER. COVERED BODIES ON GROUND. IRAQIS FIRING GUNS IN AIR. MIKHAIL GORBACHEV MEETING WITH TARIQ AZIZ. OIL WELL FIRES. YEVGENY PRIMAKOV. GROUND BATTLE SCENES. DEAD IRAQI SOLDIERS, EQUIPMENT LITTERING DESERT. BUSH ANNOUNCING END OF WAR. SCHWARZKOPF MEETING WITH IRAQI COMMANDERS. KURDISH REFUGEES. IRAQI POW'S.

Record: 19640 ✓

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	920008401
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)

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<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	VHS
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	020
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	92
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	RUSSIA
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	BORIS YELTSIN
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	BARBARA WALTERS INTERVIEWS RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN; FILE VIDEO AND PROFILE OF YELTSIN; BACKGROUND ON YELTSIN'S ECONOMIC REFORMS; YELTSIN'S TRAVELS THROUGHOUT RUSSIA TO REASSURE THE PEOPLE ON THE RESTABLIZATION EFFORT; YELTSIN DISCUSSES HIS COURAGE, THE NEED FOR PRIVATIZATION, FEAR OF HIS GRANDCHILDREN BEING KIDNAPPED, NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONTROL, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, NUCLEAR BRAIN DRAIN, VIETNAM-MIA ISSUE, INFORMATION ON LEE HARVEY OSWALD, YELTSIN-GORBACHEV RELATIONSHIP, HIS FAMILY POSITION, DRINKING AND PHYSICAL FITNESS; YELTSIN ENDS WITH A MESSAGE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE; WALTERS COMMENTS ON MRS. YELTSIN.

Record: 19584 ✓

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	920006901
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	VHS
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	135
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	92
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	SOVIET UNION
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	SOVIET INTERROGATION OF AMERICAN POW'S
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	✓ THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS HEARS TESTIMONY FROM OLEG KALUGIN TESTIFYING ON HIS ALLEGATIONS OF SOVIET INTERROGATION OF AMERICAN POW'S IN VIETNAM DURING THE 1970'S.

Record: 19575

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	920006201
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	VHS
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	060
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	92
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	UNITED STATES; IRAQ; KUWAIT
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	OPERATION DESERT STORM: ONE YEAR LATER
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	CNN SPECIAL PROGRAM ON A RETROSPECTIVE OF OPERATION DESERT STORM; 17 JANUARY 1991; US ATTACKS BAGHDAD; VARIOUS CNN CORRESPONDENTS EXAMINE THE CONFLICT; VIDEO ON EACH STAGE

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OF THE WAR; INTERVIEWS WITH STEALTH PILOT, DICK CHENEY, COLIN POWELL; BERNARD SHAW, PETER ARNETT, AND JOHN HOLLIMAN DISCUSS THE FIRST NIGHTS BOMBING AND THE SERVICE THEY PERFORMED THROUGHTOUT THE WAR TO TV JOURNALISM; INTERVIEW WITH AIR FORCE COL. DAVID EBERLY, FORMER POW IN IRAQ ON HIS CAPTIVITY; INTERVIEWS WITH MAJ. GEN. PERRY SMITH, JAMES BLACKWELL FORMER ADVISORS TO CNN ON THE WAR AND IT'S OUTCOME.

Record: 19701 ✓

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	910098701
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEM CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	057
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	91
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	WORLDWIDE
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	VIDEO NEWS SUMMARY #123
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	VNS FOR 24 DEC 1991-2 JAN 1992. 24 DEC 91: EX USSR: FURTHER FIGHTING IN GEORGIA. YUGOSLAVIA: GERMANY RECOGNIZES CROATIA, SLOVENIA. ASIA: REGIONAL NEWS. 26 DEC: EX-USSR: GORBACHEV RESIGNS. ALGERIA: ISLAMIC SALVATION FRONT AND TODAY'S ELECTION. ASIA: REGIONAL NEWS. 27 DEC: GEORGIA: RENEWED FIGHTING IN TBILISI. UKRAINE: MILITARY AMBITIONS. LEBANON: BUCKLEY'S BODY RELEASED IN BEIRUT. ALGERIA: THREE PARTIES SHARE MAJORITY VOTE. 30 DEC: CIS: LEADERS TO MEET TODAY IN MINSK. ASIA: REGIONAL NEWS. 31 DEC: CIS: THREE REPUBLICS TO HAVE THEIR OWN ARMIES. LEBANON: CAR BOMB EXPLODES IN WEST BEIRUT. ISRAEL: EXTREMISTS TRY TO SABOTAGE PEACE PROCESS. US: HIGGINS, BUCKLEY LAID TO REST. 2 JAN 1992: RUSSIA: PRICE CONTROLS LIFTED. EL SALVADOR: PEACE ACCORD. ASIA: REGIONAL NEWS.---AGENCY NEWS--- PLANS FOR CIA TV SHOW----LATE ITEM: VIETNAM-USSR: KALUGIN TALKS ABOUT US POW'S.

Record: 19304 ✓

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	910095201
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	3
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	VHS
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	420
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	91
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	UNITED STATES; VIETNAM
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE HEARINGS ON VIETNAM POW/MIA'S; 7-8 NOVEMBER 1991; APPROX 7 HOURS IN LENGTH.

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Record: 19128

FILM NUMBER 910080101
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH VHS
RUN TIME/MINUTES 060
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 90
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES
SERIES TITLE MODERN WAR
PROGRAM TITLE ARMORED ASSAULT; OPERATION JUST CAUSE: THE INVASION OF PANAMA
DESCRIPTION PART 1 OF A 6-PART SERIES. THIS TAPE EXAMINES ALL ASPECTS OF MODERN ARMORED WARFARE AND TAKES A LOOK AT THE MOST AWESOME AND LETHAL BATTLE TANKS IN EXISTANCE. ACTION CLIPS OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF TANKS FIRING, CLIMBING HILLS, CROSSING RIVERS AND DITCHES. FOOTAGE: M-60; GERMAN LEOPARD I; TRAINING SIMULATOR; BRITISH CHIEFTAN; 3-I; VMF-5; SWEDISH S TANK FIRING GUN; AUTOMATIC TANK LOADER; FRENCH AMX-30; TURET TRIGGER BEING PUSHED; MARK 7 WITH TURET SPINNING; BRITISH CHALLENGER; TANKS ROLLING OVER CARS; LEOPARD II; AMX-40; TANK ON FIRE; TANK UNDER WATER; SOVIET T-72; US M-1 ABRAMS; US ARMY TEST FOOTAGE OF ABRAMS FIRING AT TARGETS. 3574- END COUNTER: OPERATION JUST CAUSE: THE INVASION OF PANAMA. RECOUNTING OF PANAMA INVASION; STEALTH FIGHTERS; BOMBING OF NORIEGA'S QUARTERS; NIGHT FOOTAGE OF BUILDINGS ON FIRE; US TROOPS LANDING; CONFISCATION OF NORIEGA'S HIDEAWAY WITH VOODOO OBJECTS; PANAMENIAN POW'S; PANAMENIANS RUNNING FOR COVER; REFUGEE CENTER; DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD; COFFINS OF US SERVICEMEN; VATICAN EMBASSY SURROUNDED BY US TROOPS; NIGHT PIX OF NORIEGA IN CUSTODY OF DEA AGENTS; PRESIDENT BUSH ANNOUNCING END OF INVASION.

Record: 18998

FILM NUMBER 910076601
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH VHS
RUN TIME/MINUTES 110
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 88
COUNTRIES UNITED KINGDOM; ARGENTINA; FALKLAND ISLANDS
PROGRAM TITLE BATTLE FOR THE FALKLANDS
DESCRIPTION THIS DOCUMENTARY IS A VISUAL RECORD OF THE BATTLE FOR THE FALKLANDS AND IS COMPILED FROM THE BEST NEWS COVERAGE OF THE WAR. FOOTAGE: BRITISH FIGHTER JETS; SHIPS; TROOPS; MASH UNIT; SHIP ON FIRE; GROUND COMBAT; AIRCRAFT CARRIER HERMES LEAVING ENGLAND FOR THE FALKLANDS; HARRIER JETS; SAILORS AT ATTENTION; SPECTATORS WAVING TO DEPARTING TROOPS; MILITARY BAND; AERIAL OF BRITISH PORT; CONVOY OF

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Record: 18998 (continued)

SHIPS; TANKS; MARINES LOADING UP SUPPLIES; DON'T CRY FOR ME ARGENTINA T-SHIRTS; NIGHT VIEW OF PASSENGER SHIP; AERIAL OF FALKLAND ISLANDS; HISTORY OF ISLAND; BRITISH FLAG; PUB; SHEEP BEING SHEARED; MILITARY PARADE; SOVIET PATROL SHIP; STILL PIX OF CAPTURED BRITISH SOLDIERS; DOWNED ARGENTINE HELICOPTER; RALLY IN BUENO AIRES; PRESIDENT GALTIERI AMIDST CROWD; UN VOTING SESSION; LORD CARRINGTON; BRITISH TASK FORCE SHIP; MISSILE TESTING; MILITARY BRIEFING; GALTIERI VISITING ARGENTINE TROOPS; WARPLANES LANDING AT STANLEY AIRPORT; ALEXANDER HAIG MEETING WITH MARGARET THATCHER; FIRING OF LONG-RANGE MORTARS; BRITISH TROOPS EXERCISING; BARGE LOADED WITH TANKS; ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILE SYSTEM; RECAPTURE OF SOUTH GEORGIA; B/W PIX OF ARGENTINE POW'S; HAIG ANNOUNCES SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA; FRANCIS PIM; BOMBING OF AIRFIELD; LYNX HELICOPTERS; BOMBED ARGENTINE SHIP; BURNING BRITISH SHIP; CARE FOR WOUNDED; GR-3'S; BRITISH TROOPS LANDING ON FALKLAND'S SHORE; DIGGING OF TRENCHES; ARGENTINE TELEVISION FOOTAGE WITH SUBTITLES; SINKING SHIP; DEAD ARGENTINE SOLDIERS AT GOOSE GREEN; SURGEONS TREATING ENEMY SOLDIERS; MASS GRAVE; MEMORIAL; CAPTURE OF FORT STANLEY; BRITISH TROOPS RETURNING HOME; VICTORY CELEBRATION.

Record: 19071

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	910070501
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	060
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	91
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	LEBANON; SYRIA; ISRAEL; UNITED STATES
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	HOSTAGES #10
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	1. BARS & COPYRIGHT. 2. FREED HOSTAGES FRANK REED AND ROBERT POLEHILL AT BRUNCH. REED WITH GOLF CLUB. REED ADDRESSING REPORTERS TELLS OF TORTURE. POLEHILL SPEAKS. REED SINGING. 3. PHOTO OF BRIAN KEENAN. KEENAN'S SISTER. EARTHQUAKE DISTRUCTION IN IRAN. RELIEF PLANE. HEZBALLAH TROOPS MARCHING. PHOTOS OF WAITE, MCCARTHY, AND MANN. 4. KEENAN REJOINS FAMILY. KEENAN WALKING AMONG REPORTERS. 5. KEENAN BACK IN DUBLIN. KEENAN PRESS CONFERENCE. PHOTO OF HOSTAGES SUTHERLAND, ANDERSON, WAITE AND MANN AS KEENAN MENTIONS EACH OF THEM. 6. SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER ARRIVING IN SYRIA. DOUGLAS HOGG APPEALING TO IRAN. PIX OF HOSTAGES COOPER, WAITE, MCCARTHY, AND ANDERSON. 7. FREED HOSTAGE ROGER COOPER ARRIVING IN LONDON. COOPER SPEAKS. COOPER EATING MEAL ON PLANE. FILE PIX OF ANTI-US IRANIAN PROTESTERS. IRANIAN TV FOOTAGE OF COOPER'S CONFESSION. PRISON CELL. 8. DOUGLAS HOGG IN LEBANON APPEALING FOR HOSTAGE RELEASE. JACKIE MANN'S WIFE. BOMBED BUILDINGS IN BEIRUT. SHIA PROTESTERS. 9.

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Record: 19071(continued)

PHOTO OF ALLEN STEEN. 10. RELEASED PHOTOS OF STEEN AND TURNER. 11. VIETNAM COMBAT FOOTAGE. MIA'S CO-PILOT SPEAKS. PHOTO OF MIA. MYSTERY PHOTO OF MIA'S. CHENEY. US CONGRESSMAN. RELATIVE OF MIA COMMENTS. 12. PRESIDENT BUSH COMMENTS. PEGGY SAY. PHOTO OF ANDERSON. FOOTAGE OF ANDERSON. SUTHERLAND'S DAUGHTER. BOOK SHOWING PHOTO AND LENGTH OF CAPTIVITY OF SEVERAL HOSTAGES. PEREZ DE CUELLAR. SYRIAN TROOPS. ASAD SITTING WITH BAKER. BAKER WITH SHAMIR. SHIITE PROTESTERS. RAFSANJANI. ISRAELI-HELD SHIITE PRISONERS. FOOTAGE OF SHEIK OBEID. 13. ISLAMIC JIHAD RELEASES LETTER AND PHOTO OF ANDERSON. PEREZ DE CUELLAR. PEGGY SAY. BUSH. 14. PHOTO OF KIDNAPPED FRENCH DOCTOR. MCCARTY'S RELEASE. DE CUELLAR. ISRAELI-HELD PRISONERS. BOMBED BEIRUT BUILDING. SHEIK FADLALLAH. 15. SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY BUILDING. MCCARTHY ADDRESSING REPORTERS. 16. A PROFILE ON TERRY ANDERSON. ISLAMIC JIHAD MARCHING. ANDERSON ON VIDEOTAPE. ANDERSON'S DAUGHTER. ANNUAL CEREMONY MARKING CAPTURE. 17. COVERAGE OF TRACY'S RELEASE. SYRIAN OFFICIAL SPEAKS AT PRESS CONFERENCE. TRACY SPEAKS. 18. PHOTO OF TRACY. PRESS CONFERENCE. TRACY INTERVIEW ON SYRIAN TV. RELEASE FRENCH DOCTOR. CICIPPIO'S WIFE. TRACY RAISING FISTS IN VICTORY SIGN. SPECTATORS CHEERING. PEREZ DE CUELLAR RECEIVING LETTER FROM MCCARTHY. DOUGLAS HOGG. 19. TRACY BEING HANDED OVER TO SYRIANS. SYRIAN TV INTERVIEW. PHOTO OF CICIPPIO. LEBANESE AND SYRIAN POLICE SEARCHING FOR KIDNAPPED FRENCH DOCTOR. HEZBALLAH PROTESTERS. TRACY GETTING IN CAR. TRACY ARRIVES IN GERMANY. TEAM OF DOCTORS AND PSYCHIATRISTS WHO EXAMINE FREED US HOSTAGES. PSYCHOLOGIST SPEAKS. 20. TRACY BEING TURNED OVER TO US DIPLOMATS. SYRIAN TV INTERVIEW. VIDEOTAPE OF CICIPPIO. TRACY'S MOTHER SPEAKS. FRENCH DOCTOR'S RELEASE. MCCARTHY HANDING OVER LETTER TO DE CUELLAR. 21. FREED FRENCH DOCTOR ARRIVES IN NICE. MCCARTY DELIVERS LETTER. 22. JIM LAURIE REPORTS ON CONTENT OF ISLAMIC JIHAD LETTER VIA TELEPHONE. PEREZ DE CUELLAR. (DATES: 6 MAY 1990 - 12 AUG 1991)

Record: 19028 ✓

<u>FIILM NUMBER</u>	910069901
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	016
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	91
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	VIETNAM
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	RETURN TO VIETNAM #1
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	1. HANOI MARKETPLACE. VIETNAMESE PEOPLE COMMENT. PHAN HIEN, VIETNAMESE JUSTICE MINISTER. VIETNAM WAR COMBAT FOOTAGE. SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER SHAKING HANDS WITH VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL. MILITARY PARADE. US SOLDIERS

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Record: 19028(continued)

CARRYING COFFIN OF MIA. DANG NGHIEN BAI, FOREIGN MINISTER COMMENTS. HOTEL HOUSING US MIA MISSION. NGUYEN CO THACH, FOREIGN MINISTER. 2. RICE PADDY FIELD IN HO CHI MINH CITY. PEASANT FARMERS. OX PULLING PLOW. CONSTRUCTION WORKERS. PRIVATELY OWNED BUSINESSES. MARKETPLACE. PHAN HIEN. 3. AMERASIAN CHILDREN. PEOPLE AWAITING VISAS TO LEAVE COUNTRY. CHILDREN WHO WANT TO FIND THEIR FATHERS. 4. STREET SCENES. INVESTMENT OFFICIAL. FRONTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT COMPANIES. MANAGER OF SAIGON HOTEL COMMENTS ON BUREAUCRACY. FACTORY WORKERS. EFFECTS OF EMBARGO. 5. VIETNAMESE STREETS SCENES. POVERTY SCENES. VENDORS. PHAM THE DUJET, MAYOR OF HANOI. WOMAN PLOWING. MARKETPLACE. YOUNG PEOPLE RIDING HONDAS. PARLIAMENT SESSION. (DATES: 5 AUG-9 AUG 1991)

Record: 6825

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	910044701
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	006
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	90
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	IRAN; IRAQ; UNITED STATES
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	IRAN, IRAQ, AND THE US
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	MIKE WALLACE REPORTS ON IRANIAN ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT. CEMETERY OF THE MARTYRS, WAR DEAD OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. ANTI-AMERICAN FEELING OF MOTHERS EXPRESSED. IRANIAN POWS IN HOSPITAL, BLAME US, NOT IRAQ FOR THEIR INJURIES. US AND IRAQ IN COHOOTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF, STUDENTS REMARKS.

Record: 18544

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	910043501
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	060
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	91
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	KUWAIT; IRAQ
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	GULF ENVIRONMENT #1
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	1. BARS & TONE; 2. EVIDENCE SHOWING THE TORCHING OF KUWAIT'S OIL INDUSTRY; PIX OF OIL WELL FIREBALL AND VOLUMINOUS SMOKE; 3. PIX OF OILWELL FIRES; 4. ABC SCIENCE EDITOR MIIKE GULLEN ANALYZES DAMAGE TO THE ENVIRONMENT IN KUWAIT; 5. GULLEN IN KUWAIT CITY COMMENTS ON TRIP TO SAUDIA ARABIA AND POLLUTION FROM KUWAIT'S OILWELL FIRES; 6. BURNING OIL WELL FIRES IN KUWAIT; IRAQ RELEASES POW'S; 7. OILWELL FIRES, ABANDONED TANKS, THICK BLACK SMOKE, CAR

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Record: 18544(continued)

DRIVING THRU A PUDDLE OF OIL, RED ADAIR COMPANY ON THEIR WAY TO HELP PUT OUT FIRES; 8. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF KUWAIT OILWELL FIRES; NBC OBTAINED TRANSCRIPT WHEN HUSAYN ORDER THE DESTRUCTION KUWAIT'S OIL INDUSTRY; 9. SCENES OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE IN KUWAIT; OILWELL FIRES, OIL SLICKS, AIR POLLUTION; 10. ITN REPORT ON THE SERIOUS EFFECTS OF BURNING OIL WELLS; CROP DAMAGE, FEARS THAT POLLUTION WILL CAUSE CANCER BY RELEASING CARCINOGENS IN THE AIR; 11. ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE IN KUWAIT; SMOKE, SOOT, OILWELLS BLAZING AWAY; 12. NEW THREAT OF SIX WELLS THAT WERE BLEW UP AND BUT DID NOT CATCH FIRE, COMMENTS FROM KUWAITI OIL MINISTER RASHEED AL-AMIRI ON THE SITUATION, OIL LAKES NOW SPREADING INTO POPULATION AREAS; HEALTH PROBLEMS FROM BLACK SMOKE AND CLOUDS; 13. PIX OF OIL WELL FIRES, MEN WORKING ON A GUSHING OIL WELL INSTALLING A NEW VALVE; 14. FIGHTING OIL WELL FIRES, MEN WORKING ON A LEAKING WELL USING A HEAT SHIELD TO GET CLOSE TO A BURNING WELL; 15. REPORTS INDICATE THAT IT MAY BE MUCH LONGER TO PUT OUT ALL THE WELL FIRES, COMMENTS FROM OIL WELL FIREFIGHTERS ON MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM, OIL IS SEEPING INTO THE GROUND CONTAMINATING GROUND WATER; 16. ENVIRONMENTAL TEAM BEGINS INSPECTION OF DAMAGE CREATED BY OIL WELL FIRES; 17. RECONSTRUCTION IN KUWAIT BEGINS, PIX OF OIL WELL FIRES, SMOKE BLOCKING THE SUN, CRITICISM OF FIREFIGHTERS THAT THEY ARE MOVING TOO SLOW, MCDONALDS OPENED FOR BUSINESS; 18. BURNING OIL WELLS AND AIR POLLUTION, TOXIC SMOKE IS NOW AFFECTING THE FOOD CHAIN, ENTIRE ECO SYSTEM BEING CHANGED BY THE POLLUTION.
(BROADCAST DATES: 1 MARCH - 17 MAY 1991)

Record: 18778

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	910033401
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	031
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	91
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	IRAQ
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	A DREAM BETRAYED
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	DOCUMENTARY ON THE PLIGHT OF THE KURDS IN NORTHERN IRAQ; STORY BY BRITISH JOURNALIST QUINN ROBERTS; PIX OF KURDISH GUERRILLAS AFTER THE WAR; PIX OF THE FIRST DAY OF THE KURDISH RETURN AFTER THE WAR; IRAQI POW'S KEPT IN THE LOCAL MOSQUE; PIX OF A MEETING OF THE KURDISH LEADERSHIP THAT CONTROLS OVER 250,000 GUERRILLAS; POLITICAL RALLY FOR A KURDISH LEADER; EUPHORIA ABOUNDS; PIX OF THREE IRAQI SOLDIERS SURRENDING TO THE CAMERA CREW AND SAYING OTHERS HAVE LOST THE WILL TO FIGHT; CORPSES OF DEAD IRAQI SECRET POLICE IN KIRKUK; KURDS FIND FILES ON THE IRAQI NETWORK OF AGENTS; EVIDENCE OF A FIREFIGHT IN THE BUILDING; STILL PIX OF THE TORTURE PERFORMED BY THE REPUBLICAN GUARD; THE

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Record: 18778(continued)

KURDS WATCHING A BANNED VIDEO OF THE MARCH 1988 CHEMICAL ATTACK; ONE MAN RELATES THE LOSS OF 88 RELATIVES DURING THE GAS ATTACK; PIX OF HUSAYN'S COUSIN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GASSING; PIX OF DAMAGED AIRCRAFT WEST OF KIRKUK; INJURIES FROM THE AIR ATTACK ON KIRKUK; PIX OF THE IRAQI OFFENSIVE TO RETAKE KIRKUK WITH HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS; KURDS BEGIN THE FLIGHT TO THE NORTH BY ANY MEANS TERRIFIED BY HUYSAN'S REVENGE; FLIGHT TO IRANIAN BORDERS; THE UPRISING COLLAPSES; THE KURDS ONCE AGAIN ARE AT THE MERCY OF HUYSAN.

Record: 18756

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	910028701
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	006
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	91
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	UNITED STATES; UNITED STATES
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	US AIRMEN, POWS IN IRAQ
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	7 CAPTIVES, INCLUDING 3 US PILOTS WERE SHOWN ON IRAQI TV. THEIR STATEMENTS. JEFFREY ZAUN, GUY HUNTER, CLIFF ACREE. ALSO SEEN, A BRITISH PILOT AND AN ITALIAN PILOT. RICHARD CHENEY'S REMARKS.

Record: 18691

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	910027401
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	VHS
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	058
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	91
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	UNITED STATES
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	DAVID FROST INTERVIEWS GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	DAVID FROST INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF; 27 MARCH 1991; MAJOR FOCUS ON HUSAYN, CONDUCT OF OPERATION DESERT STORM, OBJECTIVES OF THE WAR; PLANNING FOR THE OPERATION; MILITARY TACTICS USED AGAINST HUSAYN; ROLE OF ISRAEL; SCHWARZKOPF'S REACTION TO THE VIDEO OF THE FIRST POW'S, ROLE OF CNN, ACCOMPLISHMENT OF US MILITARY OBJECTIVES, PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO STOP THE OFFENSIVE AND SCHWARZKOPF'S RECOMMENDATION TO CONTINUE ON TO BAGHDAD, IRAQ'S POST-WAR USE OF HELICOPTERS TO FIGHT THE REBELS, MAKING HUSAYN RESPONSIBLE FOR WAR DAMAGE TO KUWAIT AND OTHER NATIONS, GREATEST LESSON SCHWARZKOPF LEARNED FROM THE WAR. (INTERVIEW ENDS WITH A LISTING OF ARMED FORCES WHO DIED IN ACTION)

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Record: 18700

FILM NUMBER 910026201
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH VHS
RUN TIME/MINUTES 023
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 91
COUNTRIES KUWAIT; IRAQ
PROGRAM TITLE KUWAITI ROYAL FAMILY/IRAQI DISSIDENT
DESCRIPTION 1. ABC NIGHTLINE 4 MARCH 1991. TED KOPPEL INVESTIGATES CHARGES THAT KUWAIT'S RULING FAMILY IS HIRING HIT SQUADS TO ASSASSINATE MEMBERS OF DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION. ABDUL AZIZ SULTAN, KUWAITI BANK OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON VALIDITY OF CHARGES. IBN SINA HOSPITAL. ABDULWAHAB ALFOUZAN, KUWAITI MINISTER OF HEALTH COMMENTS ON CONDITION OF OPPOSITION LEADER WHO WAS SHOT. RESISTANCE MEMBERS WITH GUNS STAND GUARD AT HOSPITAL ROOM. VICTIM SPEAKS FROM HOSPITAL BED. SHEIKH SAUD NASIR AL-SABAH, KUWAITI AMBASSADOR TO THE US, REFUTES CHARGES. KUWAITI CROWN PRINCE ALIGHTS FROM PLANE. KUWAITI SOLDIER SEARCHING CITIZEN. AHMED BISHARA, KUWAIT UNIVERSITY. FOOTAGE OF EMIR SPEAKING BEFORE KUWAITIS IN EXILE. REPORTER INTERVIEWS KUWAITI CITIZENS. WORKERS AT PITA BREAD FACTORY. LINES FOR FOOD. WOMEN CARRYING BREAD. RESISTANCE LEADERS WITH FACES PARTIALLY COVERED. KUWAITI SOLDIER SLAPS AND KICKS MAN THOUGHT TO BE A COLLABORATOR. SOLDIER WITH GUN AT CHECKPOINT. KOPPEL REPORTS THAT IRAQ WILL SOON RELEASE REMAINING POW'S. 2. NBC TODAY SHOW, 5 MARCH 1991. BRYANT GUMBEL REPORTS ON POLITICAL UNREST IN IRAQ. MAP. LAITH KUBBA, IRAQI DISSIDENT COMMENTS ON FIGHTING. GRAPHIC SHOWING BREAKDOWN OF FACTIONS. DR KEITH MCLACHLAN, IRAN EXPERT.

Record: 18692

FILM NUMBER 910026101
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH VHS
RUN TIME/MINUTES 060
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 91
COUNTRIES IRAQ
PROGRAM TITLE SADDAM: PORTRAIT OF A MADMAN?
DESCRIPTION GERALDO RIVERA'S GUESTS DISCUSS SADDAM HUSAYN'S PERSONALITY AND WHETHER HE IS INDEED A MADMAN. HUSAYN COMPARED TO OTHER VICIOUS DICTATORS. PRESIDENT BUSH. FOOTAGE OF DEAD IRAQIS. OIL SLICK. SADDAM AT INTERVIEW WITH DAN RATHER. PEOPLE KISSING SADDAM'S HAND. B/W PHOTO OF THE IRAQI RULER SADDAM REPORTEDLY HAD ASSASSINATED. B/W PIX OF SADDAM WITH FAMILY MEMBERS. SADDAM ENTERING ROOM OF SUPPORTERS. GERALDO INTRODUCES GUESTS: RITA

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Record: 18692(continued)

JENRETTE, REPORTER FOR FOX NEWS; ANDREA REYNOLDS, REPORTER; DR FARID KHAVARI, MIDDLE EAST HISTORIAN; LORI MYLROIE, AUTHOR; AND DR KEN MAGID, PSYCHOLOGIST; REYNOLD'S COMMENTS ON HER INTERVIEW WITH SADDAM. KHAVARI DISCUSSES SADDAM'S OBSESSION WITH POWER. MYLROIE COMMENTS ON SADDAM'S MULTIPERSONALITIES AND ABUSE HE SUFFERED DURING CHILDHOOD. "A CURRENT AFFAIR" FOOTAGE OF JENRETTE'S INTERVIEW WITH KARIM AL-JABOURRI, SADDAM'S FORMER BODYGUARD. JABOURRI TALKS OF SADDAM'S INVOLVEMENT IN TORTURE. MAGID DISCUSSES IRAQ'S POSSIBLE TREATMENT OF POW'S. JENRETTE SAYS BODYGUARD SHE INTERVIEWED CLAIMS TO HAVE OVERHEARD APRIL GLASPIE TELL SADDAM THAT US WOULD NOT INTERVENE IN A WAR BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT. REYNOLD'S RELATES STORY OF HOW SADDAM'S SON KILLED A BODYGUARD.

Record: 7082

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	910022701
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	025
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	91
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	IRAQ; UNITED STATES
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	US HOSTAGES IN IRAQ #2
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	(DATES: 10 DEC 90-14 MAR 91) 2. AMERICANS FLY IN FROM FRANKFURT, GERMANY TO ANDREWS AFB; PASSENGERS DISEMBARKING; THEIR REACTIONS. KUWAIT CITY, TRAFFIC, STREET SCENES; VOA MESSAGE. HOW THEY SURVIVED; TALES OF KUWAITIS BEING MURDERED, RAPED. INTERVIEW WITH ED WERNER, FORMER HOSTAGE. 3. THANKS GIVEN FOR THE RETURN OF THE HOSTAGES. ONE MAN REMEMBERS A FAMILY DYING; OTHER RECOLLECTIONS OF FEAR, BOREDOM. 4. AMATEUR VIDEO OF THE INITIAL INVASION OF KUWAIT. IRAQIS BREAKING INTO CARS, TANK IN THE STREET. AMATUER VIDEO OF MAN HIDING IN ROOF. REMARKS BY FORMER HOSTAGE CAPTURED BY IRAQIS. 5. MORE POWS RELEASED. BAGHDAD STREET SCENES, CALM, QUIET, RUINED BUILDINGS. AMERICAN POWS ARRIVE IN BAHRAIN. 6. NAVY LT. JEFFREY ZAHN SAYS SOME OF HIS FACIAL WOUNDS WERE SELF-INFLICTED. REMARKS BY GENERAL ROBERT POEL ON TREATMENT OF POWS. WOMAN WITH BROKEN ARM REFUSED IRAQI TREATMENT. 7. FREED PRISONERS TALK ABOUT THEIR TREATMENT WHILE CAPTIVES OF THE IRAQIS. JEFFREY ZAHN, DURING AND AFTER HIS CAPTURE. ZAHN'S REMARKS. USN LAWRENCE SLADE; MARINE GUY HUNTER; MARINE CLIFFORD ACREE; MARINE MICHAEL BERRYMAN; MARINE RUSSELL SANBORN. US PILOTS THEN TELL ABOUT THEIR CAPTIVITY. ROBERT SWEET; JEFFREY TICE; DAVID EBERLY.

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Record: 13669

FILM NUMBER 910016501
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEM CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH UMATIC
RUN TIME/MINUTES 056
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 91
COUNTRIES WORLDWIDE
PROGRAM TITLE VIDEO NEWS SUMMARY #91
DESCRIPTION VNS FROM 4-11 MARCH 1991. 4 MARCH--GULF NEWS: IRAQ: RELEASES SOME ALLIED POWS. IRAQ: REFUGEES TELL OF ANARCHY IN BASRA. ---WORLD NEWS--USSR: ESTONIA, LATVIA VOTE FOR INDEPENDENCE. 5 MARCH: GULF NEWS: IRAQ: CIVIL UNREST REPORTED IN SOUTH. KUWAIT: OIL FIRES. KUWAIT: TURMOIL IN THE CAPITAL. --ECONOMIC NEWS. 6 MARCH--GULF NEWS: IRAQ: ALLIED POWS TO LEAVE TODAY. KUWAIT:FEAR FOR HOSTAGES' FATE. --WORLD NEWS: UK-USSR: PRIME MINISTER MEETS WITH GORBACHEV. AFRICA: FAMINE. 7 MARCH--GULF NEWS: IRAQ: INTERNAL ADJUSTMENTS. SYRIA: MEETING ON ARAB PEACEKEEPING FORCE. KUWAIT: LEFTOVER AMMO. MIDDLE EAST: ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF OIL FIRES. ---ECONOMIC NEWS. 8 MARCH--WORLD NEWS. ISRAEL: REACTION TO PEACE PROPOSAL. ALBANIA: THOUSANDS FLEE. UK: TORIES LOSE LOCAL BYELECTION. C: DELORS URGES COMMON DEFENSE POLICY---- ECONOMIC NEWS. 11 MARCH--WORLD NEWS. USSR: PRO-YEL'TSIN RALLY. YUGOSLAVIA: BELGRADE UNREST. ISRAEL: ARAB KILLS FOUR WOMEN IN JERUSALEM. MIDDLE EAST: ANTI-SADDAM CONFERENCE IN BEIRUT. ---ECONOMIC NEWS.

Record: 18584

FILM NUMBER 910015701
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH UMATIC
RUN TIME/MINUTES 009
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 91
COUNTRIES IRAQ; UNITED STATES; IRAN; ISRAEL; SAUDI ARABIA
PROGRAM TITLE NOW, WHAT ABOUT SADDAM?
DESCRIPTION DIANE SAWYER REPORTS ON POSSIBLE FATE OF SADDAM HUSAYN NOW THAT WAR IS OVER. RESULTS OF PRIMETIME POLL. OVERTHROW ATTEMPT FAILS. B/W PHOTO OF SADDAM AND WIFE ON COUCH. SADDAM HOLDING GUN. REVIEWING OF TROOPS. HENRY KISSINGER, FORMER US SECRETARY OF STATE. IRAQI POW'S. B/W FOOTAGE OF WORLD WAR II LEADERS. EXPERTS COMMENT ON POSSIBILITY OF TRYING HUSAYN FOR WAR CRIMES. SADDAM STANDING BEFORE CROWDS OF SUPPORTERS. WILLIAM COLBY, FORMER HEAD OF CIA COMMENTS ON CIA INVOLVEMENT IN ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS. SCENES FROM COUP IN IRAN. ISRAELI SOLDIERS. LEADERS WHO HAVE GONE INTO EXILE: EDI

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Record: 18584(continued)

AMIN (SP?), "BABY DOC" DUVALIER. SADDAM WORSHIPING. US TROOPS AND ARTILLERY IN GULF. SADDAM WITH KING FAHD OF SAUDI ARABIA. INTERPOL. POSSIBILITY OF WANTED POSTER.

Record: 18579

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	910014901
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	060
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	91
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	IRAQ; KUWAIT; JORDAN
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	IRAQ-KUWAIT #14
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	1. BARS AND COPYRIGHT. 2. ALLIED ARMORED VEHICLES SHOOTING IN KUWAIT. MEN IN BAGHDAD GATHERED AROUND CAR LISTEN TO THE RADIO. MEN IN CAFE LISTEN TO RADIO. US FACILITY IN SAUDI ARABIA DESTROYED BY IRAQI SCUD. EMERGENCY VEHICLES. 3. KUWAITI FLAG RAISED IN KUWAIT CITY. ARAB SOLDIERS CELEBRATE IN KUWAIT CITY. ARMORED VEHICLES. LOOTED CARS AND BURNED OUT IRAQI TANKS ON HIGHWAY. VISIBLE MINE IN SAND. 4. KUWAITI CITIZENS TALK IN KUWAIT CITY. KUWAITI FLAG RAISED. FRENCH TROOPS FIGHTING WEST OF KUWAIT IN IRAQ. IRAQI TANK ON FIRE. SOLDIER THROWS THE BLAKET OFF A BUNKER AND POINTS HIS RIFLE INSIDE. AERIAL OF CAMPS FOR IRAQI POW'S. INTERVIEW WITH CROWN PRINCE HASSAN OF JORDAN. 5. SAM GROUND TO AIR MISSILES NOT YET SET UP IN KUWAIT CITY. WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION IN THE FORMER LIVING QUARTERS OF THE IRAQI SOLDIERS NEAR THE KUWAITI COAST. AMMUNITION LAYING AROUND IRAQI BEACH TRENCHES AT NIGHT. 6. PEOPLE CELEBRATING IN KUWAIT CITY. MARINES OUTSIDE THE US AMBASSY. LARGE MAP OF SAND SHOWS PLANNED IRAQI DEFENSE OF KUWAIT CITY. BARBED WIRE ON KUWAITI BEACH. KUWAITI CHILDREN PLAY ON IRAQI TANK AND BUNKER. TRENCHES. BELONGINGS LEFT BEHIND BY IRAQI SOLDIERS, INCLUDING PICTURE OF MARILYNN MONROE. 7. F-16 DROPS CLUSTER BOMB, BOMB IMPACTS. ALLIED ARTILLERY IN DESERT. T-72 TANK ON FIRE. IRAQI POW'S SITTING IN ROWS ON GROUND. 8. RADIO ANNOUNCEMENT SAYS IRAQ WILL LEAVE KUWAIT. 9. PEOPLE CELEBRATING IN KUWAIT CITY. US MARINES DROP FROM A HELICOPTER INTO THE US EMBASSY COMPOUND. PEOPLE EXPRESS THANKS TO THE US AND TELL ABOUT ATROCITIES. BODIES IN MORGUE. BRITISH AMBASSADOR RAISES BRITISH FLAG AT BRITISH EMBASSY. 10. HUSSEIN AND HUSAYN DEMONSTRATION IN JORDAN. JORDANIAN OIL TRUCKS ON IRAQI HIGHWAY ON FIRE. IRAQI SOLDIERS LAY FACE DOWN ON THE GROUND. HUSAYN MEETING WITH OTHER LEADERS. 11. KUWAITIS RUSH BUILDING THOUGHT TO CONTAIN IRAQIS. IRAQI SOLDIERS IN KUWAITI JAIL. LOOTED CARS. SAUDI TANKS. INJURED. TORTURE PICTURES. DAMAGED HOUSES. BRICKED UP WINDOWS. PIÉCES OF BRITISH AIRWAYS JET. 12. US AMBASSADOR RAISES US FLAG. BODIES IN MORGUE. 13. UN

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Record: 18579(continued)

SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. IRAQI PARLIAMENT. IRAQI UN AMBASSADOR TALKS. 14. CRATES OF WEAPONS IN KUWAIT WITH JORDAN MARKINGS. HUSSEIN GIVES SPEECH. 15. DAMAGE IN KUWAIT CITY. 16. US AMBASSADOR RAISES US FLAG. PEOPLE CELEBRATE IN KUWAIT CITY. IRAQI SOLDIERS CAPTURED AT ROAD BLOCK. INJURED IN HOSPITAL. PEOPLE TELL ABOUT ATROCITIES. CEMETERY WITH FRESH GRAVES. 17. CONVOYS OF ALLIED FORCES IN DESERT. IRAQI SOLDIERS WALK ON HIGHWAY. INJURED IRAQI SOLDIERS HELPED BY US SOLDIERS. IRAQI EQUIPMENT ON FIRE. DAMAGE IN BAGHDAD. TELECOMMUNICATIONS BUILDING DESTROYED. DAMAGED VETERINARY EQUIPMENT. CHILDREN RUN WHEN THEY HEAR GUN FIRE. 18. US AMBASSADOR IN KUWAIT, EDWARD GNEHM, RAISES US FLAG AND TALKS. KUWAITI RESISTANCE FIGHTERS GO DOOR TO DOOR LOOKING FOR IRAQIS AND PALESTINIANS. THEY TAKE SOME. IRAQI SOLDIERS IN HOSPITAL. BURNED BODY IN MORQUE. GRAVEYARD OF IRAQI VEHICLES DESTROYED BY ALLIED BOMBING NORTH OF KUWAIT CITY. 19. GRAVEYARD OF IRAQI VEHICLES DESTROYED BY ALLIED BOMBING NORTH OF KUWAIT CITY. BURNED BODIES. CANADIAN AMBASSADOR IN KUWAIT CITY OPENS THE AMBASSY. CANADIAN SOLDIER GIVES AUTOGRAPH. AMBASSADOR RAISES CANADIAN FLAG. 20. IRAQI AMBASSADOR TO THE UN TALKS. ALLIED TROOPS IN SAFWAN AIRFIELD, IRAQ. SCHWARZKOPF. SCHWARZKOPF, SAUDI COMMANDER, AND TWO IRAQI LIEUTENANT GENERALS SEATED AT TABLE. SOLDIERS DIG OUT MINES ON KUWAITI BEACH. CIVILIANS FLEE BASRA. 21. HUSAYN MEETING WITH IRAQI OFFICIALS. HUSAYN SEATED AT HEAD OF TABLE OF REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL MEETING. BAGHDAD STREET SCENES. 22. ALLIED POW'S GET OFF BUS IN BAGHDAD. FORMER ALLIED POW'S SEATED AT TABLE. HUSAYN AT MEETING. ALLIED JETS OVER BAGHDAD. 23. FORMER ALLIED POW'S WALK TOWARD THE CAMERA IN BAGHDAD. ARRESTED IRAQIS AND PALESTINIANS IN KUWAIT CITY. UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. 24. REFUGEES CARRYING THEIR BELONGINGS WALK TOWARD KUWAIT. BAGHDAD STREET SCENES. HUSAYN. (DATES: 26 FEBRUARY - 4 MARCH 1991)

Record: 18559

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	910014201
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	060
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	91
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	IRAQ; KUWAIT; UNITED KINGDOM; GERMANY; FRANCE; SOVIET UNION; JORDAN; SAUDI ARABIA
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	IRAQ-KUWAIT #13
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	1. BRITISH PRIME MINISTER MAJOR TALKS. GENSCHER SPEAKS TO THE GERMAN PARLIAMENT. FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER DUMAS TALKS TO REPORTERS. 2. BESSMERTNYKH AND AZIZ WALK TOWARD THE CAMERA SURROUND BY OTHER MEN. AZIZ WALKS DOWN

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Record: 18559(continued)

STEPS FROM PLANE IN MOSCOW. GORBACHEV GREETES AZIZ. GORBACHEV AND AZIZ SEATED ACROSS TABLE FROM EACH OTHER WITH ADVISORS. SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN CHURKIN TALKS. DESTROYED BUILDINGS IN BAGHDAD. BAGHDAD STREET SCENES. BRITISH TANKS FIRING IN THE DESERT. 3. PALESTINIAN DEMONSTRATION. KING HUSSEIN TALKS. HUSAYN AND ARAFAT HUG AND KISS ON 17 JAN. PALESTINIAN MEN IN A CAFE LISTEN TO HUSAYN SPEECH ON TV. MANY JORDANIANS PRAYING AT LARGE MOSQUE. JORDANIANS DONATING MONEY FOR IRAQ. HUSAYN PRAYS. 4. OIL WELL FIRE AND SMOKE ON THE HORIZON. VARIOUS SHOTS OF SMOKEY SKIES. SATELLITE PHOTOGRAPHY SHOWS BLACK AREA OVER KUWAIT. US SOLDIER INSERTS NAPALM FUSE IN BOMB. 5. KARBALA, IRAQ STREET SCENES. NO DAMAGE APPARENT. MOSQUE. CASKET BEING CARRIED. OPEN AIR MARKET. TAIL PIECE OF MISSILE WITH ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN WRITING. TWO FUEL TANKS DROPPED BY FRENCH PLANE. INJURED IN HOSPITAL BEDS, BUT ALSO MANY EMPTY BEDS. 6. BESSMERTNYKH AND AZIZ WALK TOWARD THE CAMERA. BESSMERTNYKH, AZIZ, AND OTHERS SEATED AT TABLE. CLOSEUP OF AZIZ, THEN BESSMERTNYKH. CHURKIN TALKS. AZIZ, GORBACHEV FACE EACH OTHER AND TALK. RED SQUARE. KREMLIN SPOKESMAN GRIGORIEV TALKS. 7. MODELS OF IRAQI BUNKERS. FIGHTING DURING IRAQ/IRAQ WAR, IRAQI BUNKERS. 8. OIL WELL FIRE IN KUWAIT. SMOKEY SKY. FIRE ON THE HORIZON AT NIGHT. US SOLDIERS PREPARE NAPALM BOMBS. 9. ALLIED FORCES IN THE KUWAITI DESERT. EGYPTIAN SOLDIERS PRAY. IRAQI SOLDIERS SURRENDER AS SEEN THROUGH NIGHT VISION LENS. 10. ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE IN BAGHDAD AT NIGHT. MEN LISTEN TO RADIO. BAGHDAD STREET SCENES. NEWSPAPER HEADLINES SAY IRAQ IS DOING WELL. BLACK FOG. 11. EGYPTIAN AND SAUDI TANKS AND APC'S IN THE DESERT. CLOSEUP OF SMILING IRAQI POW. LINE OF IRAQI POW'S SEATED ON GROUND. ROWS OF IRAQI POW'S SEATED ON GROUND. INTERPRETER FOR IRAQI POW TALKS. 12. BURNED OUT IRAQI TANKS IN KUWAIT. MINES EXPLODE. OIL WELL BURNS. BURNED OUT IRAQI TANKS AND VEHICLES. ALLIED TROOPS IN KUWAITI DESERT. IRAQI POW'S-ONE HOLDS OUT A LEAFLET DROPPED BY THE ALLIES, ONE IS INJURED. LONG LINE OF IRAQI POW'S WALK IN THE DISTANCE. ALLIED INJURED IN HOSPITAL. MAN IN BAGHDAD BARBER SHOP LISTENS TO RADIO. BAGHDAD STREET SCENES. BRENT SCOWCROFT TALKS. 13. DAMAGED DORA (SP?) THERMAL POWER STATION IN BAGHDAD. DESTROYED TAHJI (SP?) ELECTRICAL POWER STATION. PEOPLE IN BAGHDAD BUY KEROSENE COOKERS. ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE OVER BAGHDAD AT NIGHT. 14. LOOTED CARS AND BURNED OUT TRUCK ON HIGHWAY TO KUWAIT. US ARTILLERY FIRING. SOLDIER HITS GOLF BALL. BURNED OUT IRAQI TANKS AND APC'S. UNCOVERED MINES. IRAQI BUNKERS. IRAQI POW TALKS THROUGH INTERPRETER. TWO IRAQI SOLDIERS IN THE DISTANCE WALK TOWARD THE CAMERA WITH HANDS UP. LONG LINE OF IRAQI POW'S. ALLIED SOLDIER GIVES IRAQI POW BOTTLE OF WATER. CLOSEUP OF FACES OF IRAQI POW'S ON BUS. 15. US MILITARY BUILDING IN SAUDI ARABIA DESTROYED BY IRAQI SCUD MISSILE. RESCUE VEHICLES. INJURED. IRAQI SCUD FALLS TO EARTH, THEN EXPLOSION. 16. DEBRIS OF US MILITARY FACILITY IN SAUDI ARABIA. 17. FOG IN BAGHDAD. VEGETABLE MARKET.

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Record: 18559(continued)DESTROYED CEMENT FACTORY SOUTH OF BAGHDAD. (DATES: 22-25
FEBRUARY 1991)Record: 18520

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	910009901
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	060
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	91
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	IRAQ; KUWAIT; SAUDI ARABIA; ISRAEL; AUSTRALIA; GERMANY; JORDAN
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	IRAQ-KUWAIT #11
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	1. TWO KUWAITI SOLDIERS UNFOLD THE KUWAITI FLAG ON THE ISLAND OF QURAH OR KURAH (SP?). 2. US OIL SPILL EXPERTS ARRIVE IN SAUDI ARABIA. COCKPIT VIDEO OF ALLIED BOMBING OF CONTROL TERMINALS AT THE AL AHMADI OIL FACILITY, KUWAIT. BLACK SMOKE RISES FROM SEA ISLAND TERMINAL, KUWAIT. 3. TOP SECRET NARUNGA (SP?) SATELLITE STATION IN AUSTRALIAN DESERT. US AND AUSTRALIAN PERSONNEL ON BASE. 4. BLACK AND WHITE STILLs OF HUSAYN IN BOAT WITH HIS CHILDREN, IN A SWIMSUIT, PLAYING IN THE WATER WITH HIS CHILDREN, FAMILY PHOTO, STANDING WITH HIS SON, HUSAYN'S MOTHER, HUSAYN IN HAVANA WITH CASTRO. HIS PERSONAL BIOGRAPHER TALKS THROUGH A TRANSLATER. 5. GERMAN NEWSPAPER HEADLINES AND CARTOONS HAZE THE GOVERNMENT FOR NOT BEING MORE INVOLVED IN THE PERSIAN GULF WAR. ANTI-WAR PROTEST. PRESIDENT WEIZSACKER VISITS US WIVES AT US BASE, TALKS. THOMAS KIELINGER, EDITOR OF THE RHEINSCHE MERKUR, TALKS. 6. MAP SHOWS WHERE IRAQI FORCES MOVED INTO SAUDI ARABIA. US ARTILLERY FIRED IN THE DESERT. US MARINES PUT ON GAS MASKS AND GO INTO BUNKERS AS SEEN THROUGH A NIGHT VISION LENS. 7. JORDANIAN OIL TANKER TRUCKS ON FIRE INSIDE IRAQ. HUSSEIN VISITS INJURED IN HOSPITAL. ANTI-AMERICAN AND PRO-HUSAYN MARCH IN JORDAN. US AND ISRAELI FLAGS ARE BURNED. TEHRAN STREET SCENES. ANCHORMAN ON IRANIAN TV. CONVOY OF SOVIET DIPLOMATS CROSS THE BORDER FROM IRAQ TO IRAN. 8. COCKPIT VIDEO OF ALLIED BOMBING. US SATELLITE PHOTO INTERPRETATION FACILITY. AWACS PLANE. REPUBLICAN GUARD TANK SHELTERS. HUSAYN GOES INTO BUNKER, TALKS ON PHONE. SATELLITE PHOTO. HUSAYN IN BUNKER WITH ADVISORS. SCUD MISSILES ON PARADE. 9. US TROOPS SHOOT AT KHAFJI. QATARI TANKS. SAUDI APC'S. 10. TROOPS AND ARMORED VEHICLES IN KHAFJI AS SEEN THROUGH NIGHT VISION LENS. DEAD IRAQI SOLDIER. DESTROYED IRAQI APC. SAUDI GENERAL KHALID BEN SULTAN TALKS. 11. BOMB DAMAGE IN IRAQ. 12. EXTERIOR AND INTERIOR DAMAGED HOSPITAL IN BASRA. BOMB DAMAGE IN VILLAGE. HUSAYN MEETS WITH REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL. 13. LEAFLETS DROPPED IN KUWAIT. 14. CNN SPECIAL TALKS ABOUT PERSIAN GULF WAR DISINFORMATION. BOMBED OUT BUILDING

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Record: 18520(continued)

THAT IRAQ CLAIMED WAS A BABY FORMULA FACTORY. CAMELS AND TANKS IN DESERT. FAX FROM INTERFAX. 15. DESTROYED "MILK FACTORY". BOMB DAMAGE IN IRAQ. CRUISE MISSILES IN FLIGHT OVERHEAD. INJURED. AN IRAQI WOMAN YELLS AT REPORTERS IN ENGLISH. 16. AERIAL OF OIL SLICK IN PERSIAN GULF. BIRDS COVERED WITH OIL. SAUDI PRINCE ABDULLAH IBN TURKI TALKS. SAUDI DESALINATION PLANT. BOOMS IN OCEAN. 17. ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE IN BAGHDAD. BOMB DAMAGE IN IRAQ. INTERIOR DAMAGED MOSQUE. DAMAGED TRUCKS ON ROAD FROM BAGHDAD TO JORDAN. 18. BATTLESHIP USS MISSOURI IN PERSIAN GULF. US B-52 LANDS IN BRITAIN. 19. OVERHEAD PHOTOS OF REPUBLICAN GUARD POSITIONS. US B-52'S IN BRITAIN. COCKPIT VIDEO OF BRITISH HIT ON AN IRAQI BRIDGE. 20. SKETCHES AND BLUEPRINTS OF HUSAYN'S UNDERGROUND BUNKERS. 21. BEIJING STREET SCENES. LETTERS SENT TO THE US EMBASSY IN BEIJING EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR THE ALLIES AND OFFERING MONEY. 22. CAMP WHERE IRAQI POW PROCESSING BEGINS. HOLDING AREAS. 23. BOMB DAMAGE AND INJURED IN IRAQ. DEAD BODIES. (DATES: 28 JANUARY - 7 FEBRUARY 1990)

Record: 18470

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	910005401
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	060
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	91
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	IRAQ; KUWAIT; SAUDI ARABIA; WORLDWIDE
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	IRAQ-KUWAIT #10
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	2. HUSAYN PRAYS, WALKS AMONG CHEERING TROOPS. GORBACHEV TALKS ABOUT THE WAR. PRIMAKOV TALKS TO HUSAYN. SOVIET COUPLE WATCHES NEWS ABOUT THE GULF WAR ON TV IN APARTMENT. SOVIET TANKS AND TROOPS LEAVING AFGHANISTAN. SOVIET TROOPS IN LITHUANIA. ANTI-WAR DEMONSTRATION IN BERLIN. AWOL SOLDIER. GERMAN PARLIAMENT. KOHL TALKS TO PARLIAMENT. ANTI-WAR DEMONSTRATION IN TOYKO. KAIFU TALKS. 3. COCKPIT VIDEOS OF BOMBING ON IRAQ. SCUD MISSILE DAMAGE IN TEL AVIV. ISRAELI JETS IN FLIGHT. 4. CANADIAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTER, JOE CLARKE (SP?) TALKS TO REPORTERS. MULRONEY TALKS TO HOUSE OF COMMONS. 5. PATRIOT MISSILE IN NIGHT SKY OVER DHAHRAN. PEOPLE WEARING GAS MASKS IN BOMB SHELTER. CRUISE MISSILES FIRED FROM USS BATTLESHIP WISCONSIN. 6. PATRIOT MISSILE IMPACTS WITH SCUD MISSILE IN NIGHT SKY OVER DHAHRAN. DEBRIS FALLS TO EARTH. 7. ALLIED POW'S. 8. HUSAYN MEETS WITH OFFICERS. ALLIED JET TAKES OFF FROM AIRCRAFT CARRIER. TWO ALLIED POW'S. ANTI-US DEMONSTRATION OUTSIDE US EMBASSY IN AMMAN. 9. US FORCES IN SAUDI ARABIA. 10. ALLIED POW. PEOPLE IN BAGHDAD EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR HUSAYN. BUSES, LUGGAGE, REFUGEES IN JORDAN. 11. DESERTED GUARD HOUSE ON

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Record: 18470(continued)

KUWAIT/SAUDI BORDER. 12. WILHELM DIETL, GERMAN JOURNALIST, TALKS ABOUT HUSAYN'S BOMB PROOF BUNKER. STILL OF BUNKER DOOR AND ROOM. LAYOUT OF HUSAYN'S BUNKER. 13. DRAWINGS OF BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT DONE ON VARIOUS BUILDINGS. SATELLITES IN SPACE. INFRARED PIX FROM US WEATHER SATELLITE SHOWS FIRES IN BAGHDAD. PIX OF SOVIET AIRCRAFT CARRIER UNDER CONSTRUCTION BY PENTAGON SATELLITE. AERIAL PHOTO OF KUWAITI OILFIELD FIRE. 14. COCKPIT VIDEO OF BOMBING. SKETCH OF IRAQI BUNKER. BAGHDAD STREET SCENES. BUNKER DOOR. STILL OF IRAQI BASE. SKETCH OF HUSAYN'S BUNKER. 15. PLASTIC DECOY PLANE. INFLATED DECOY TANK. SCHWARZKOPF TALKS. 16. TAIL SECTION OF US F-16. COCKPIT VIDEO AND AUDIO OF SAUDI FIGHTER SHOOTING DOWN TWO IRAQI JETS. SAUDI PILOT TALKS. 17. HUSAYN MEETS WITH OFFICERS IN BUNKER. THREE US POW'S. REFUGEES AND LUGGAGE AT THE IRAQ/IRAN BORDER. 18. DESTROYED HOUSES IN AL-DOUR. HUSAYN TALKS TO SOLDIERS. DAMAGED BUILDING CLAIMED BY IRAQ TO BE A BABY FORMULA FACTORY. 19. HUSAYN, OFFICERS LOOK AT MAP. CIA HEADQUARTERS. US AIRBORNE TRACKING UNITS. 20. GENSCHER VIEWS SCUD MISSILE DAMAGE IN ISRAEL. ANTI-WAR PROTEST IN GERMANY. 21. PATRIOT MISSILE IMPACTS WITH SCUD MISSILE IN NIGHT SKY OVER RIYADH. DEBRIS FALLS TO GROUND. EMERGENCY TEAMS AND VEHICLES. INJURED PUT IN AMBULANCE. (DATES: 17 - 26 JANUARY 1991)

Record: 18425

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	910000201
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	VHS
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	052
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	81
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	AFRICA; GERMANY; UNITED KINGDOM
<u>SERIES TITLE</u>	THE WORLD AT WAR
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	DESERT - THE WAR IN NORTH AFRICA
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	VOLUME 8. B/W FOOTAGE: MUSSOLINI DECLARES WAR. ITALIAN TROOPS MOVED TO LIBYA AND ETHIOPIA; MUSSOLINI HAD HIS EYES ON EGYPT. BRITISH TROOPS IN EGYPT. BRITISH TANK TROOPS IN THE DESERT. ITALIAN DEFEAT. ITALIAN POW'S. GERMAN AFRIKA KORPS SAIL TO TRIPOLI. IRWIN ROMMEL, THE DESERT FOX. REMARKS BY FORMER AFRIKA KORPS MEMBERS. AFRIKA KORPS MOVES IN CONVOY TO THE FRONT; BRITISH POW'S. TOBRUK IN BRITISH HANDS; SIEGE PREPARATIONS, LUFTWAFFE BOMBING. TORPEDO SINKS SHIPS. BATTLE FOR TOBRUK. BATTLE FOR BENGAZI. UK TROOPS AT PLAY, EATING. JERRY CANS. FLIES AS PESTS, CARRIERS OF DISEASE. SANDSTORM. BATTLE FOR GAZALA. TOBRUK SURRENDERS TO ROMMEL. CHURCHILL VISITS 8TH ARMY; MONTGOMERY MADE COMMANDER, THE LAST OF A LONG LINE OF CHANGES OF COMMANDERS. MALTA UNDER LUFTWAFFE ATTACK; MALTA HELD OUT. THE SONG "LILI MARLENE". BRITISH ON LEAVE

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Record: 18425(continued)

IN CAIRO. OPERATION LIGHTFOOT, MINE REMOVAL. ARTILLERY FIRE AT NIGHT, BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN. TANK BATTLE IN DESERT. BURNING TANKS, FOLLOWING THE BATTLE. PARADE THROUGH TRIPOLI. ROWS OF TOMBSTONES, MILITARY CEMETERY.

Record: 18329

Korea

FILM NUMBER 900129401
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH VHS
RUN TIME/MINUTES 060
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 90
COUNTRIES NORTH KOREA; SOUTH KOREA
SERIES TITLE KOREA - THE UNKNOWN WAR
PROGRAM TITLE THE BATTLE FOR MINDS
DESCRIPTION THIS EPISODE CHRONICLES THE START OF THE STALEMATE DURING THE KOREAN WAR. TOPICS INCLUDE PROPAGANDA, TREATMENT OF PRISONERS AND PEACE TALKS. FOOTAGE: HELICOPTERS; PRISONERS; COMMENTS BY VARIOUS FORMER OFFICIALS; PANMUNJOM; ARTILLERY FIRES; DEAD SOLDIERS; BOMBS ARE DROPPED; DESTROYED HOUSES; CAVES ARE BUILT; BOMB SHELTERS; KIM IL SUNG; TUNNEL SYSTEMS; AIRCRAFT; ATROCITIES; POW CAMPS; COMMUNIST PRISONERS; PRISON VIOLENCE; COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZERS DISCUSS ALLEGATIONS OF US GERM WARFARE; RIOT IN PRISON CAMP.

Record: 18371

FILM NUMBER 900128001
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 2
TAPE WIDTH UMATIC
RUN TIME/MINUTES 075
LANGUAGE VARIOUS
YEAR PRODUCED 90
COUNTRIES WORLDWIDE
PROGRAM TITLE VISNEWS STOCK FOOTAGE
DESCRIPTION TAPE 1: KEYNA: CAMEL RACE. FRANCE: SCHOOL STUDENTS DEMONSTRATE. OBJECTS THROWN. POLICE BARRICADE. DAMAGE. PAKISTAN: SHARIF, GHULAM ISHAQ KHAN WALK TO TABLE. SHARIF TAKES OATH OF OFFICE. FRENCH POLYNESIA: MURORO A ATOLL SHORELINE. FILE OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. TEST SITE. DROLLET TALKS. INTERIOR FRENCH LAB. GILLIS, HIRSHON TALKS. CANOE IN WATER. SWITZERLAND: ENVIRONMENTAL CONFERENCE. THATCHER, HUSSEIN TALK, POSE FOR PICTURES. INDIA: GANDHI, CHANDRA ENTER GANDHI'S HOME. GANDHI TALKS. HINDUS CHANT OUTSIDE TEMPLE. TROOPS SEARCH HINDUS. REPUBLIC OF IRELAND: LENIHAN VOTES, TALKS. ROBINSON, CURRIE AT POLLING STATION. HILLERY VOTES. SOVIET UNION:

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Record: 18371(continued)

GORBACHEV TALKS FROM LENIN'S TOMB. GORBACHEV, YELTSIN,
 OTHERS LEAD PARADE IN RED SQUARE. MAN ARRESTED AFTER
 SHOOTING. TROOPS, TANKS, SS-25'S IN PARADE.
 DEMONSTRATION AT SAKHAROV'S HOUSE. YELTSIN, POPOV SHAKE
 HANDS. YELTSIN TALKS. PRIESTS, OTHERS AT RELIGIOUS
 DEMONSTRATION. LENIN PICTURE CROSSED OUT. YOUTHS TRAMPLE
 SOVIET FLAG. DEMONSTRATION IN GORKY STREET. UNITED
 KINGDOM: QUEEN TALKS TO PARLIAMENT. GERMANY: SOVIET
 SOLDIERS IN GERMANY. INDIA: EXTERIOR PRESIDENTIAL
 PALACE. CHANDRA ARRIVES, TALKS. GANDHI, SINGH TALK.
 EXTERIOR PARLIAMENT BUILDING. BANGLADESH: SOLDIERS
 OUTSIDE TV STATION. DEMONSTRATION. POLICE ROADBLOCK.
 MIR SHAWKAT ALI, BEGUM KHALEDA ZIA TALK. TAIWAN:
 DEPUTIES IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHOUT, SHOVE. ISRAEL:
 KAHANE FUNERAL. GERMANY: MAZOWIECKI, KOHL ENTER ROOM,
 STAND, SIT. SAUDI ARABIA: F-18'S REFUEL FROM C-130 IN
 MID-AIR. COBRA HELICOPTERS IN FLIGHT, TAKE OFF. SAUDI
 TORNADO FIGHTER BOMBERS ON GROUND. AUSTRALIA: SOLAR
 CAR. ISRAEL: WOUNDED, AMBULANCE, CAPTURED WEAPONS IN
 WEST BANK. SHAMIR LAYS WREATH, TALKS IN REHOVOT. EMPTY
 STREETS IN EAST JERUSALEM, WEST BANK. JAPAN: FORMER
 JAPANESE HOSTAGES IN IRAQ ARRIVE IN TOYKO. INDIA:
 SINGH. GANDHI TALKS. CHANDRA. STUDENTS CELEBRATE.
 JORDAN: HASSAN INTERVIEW. SOUTH AFRICA: IN RANDBURG
 PEOPLE VOTE. VAN SCHALKWYK HOISTED ON SHOULDERS.
 TREUERNICHT TALKS. EGYPT: EXTERIOR PRESIDENTIAL PALACE.
 QIAN QICHEN, MUBARAK AT TALKS. QIAN TALKS. GERMANY:
 EXTERIOR BUNDESRAT. BIEDENKOPF, MOMPER ARRIVE.
 POLITICIANS POSE FOR PICTURE. LAFONTAINE, VOSCHERAU TALK.
 GERMANY: GENSCHER GREET'S GORBACHEV, WIFE. VIETNAM:
 US DELEGATION AND VIETNAMESE AT MIA TALKS. COFFINS
 CONTAINING SERVICEMEN REMAINS. AMERICANS AND VIETNAMESE
 SEARCHING FOR REMAINS IN JUNGLE. RECONSTRUCTED PHOTO OF
 DEAD SERVICEMAN. NICARAGUA: SOLDIERS LOAD FIELD CANNON.
 UMBERTO ORTEGA TALKS. UNITED KINGDOM: YUSUF ISLAM
 TALKS. UNITED KINGDOM: BAKER GREETED. BAKER, HURD
 SEATED. THATCHER, BAKER, HURD POSE. THATCHER, BAKER TALK.
 TAPE 2: UNITED NATIONS: SECURITY COUNCIL WATCHES
 PLO TAPE ON MONITOR. CUELLAR, PICKERING, ISRAELI
 DELEGATION WATCHES. PLO REPRESENTATIVE NASSER AL KIDWA
 TALKS. GERMANY: FORMER GERMAN HOSTAGES IN IRAQ RETURN
 HOME. BRANDT GETS OFF PLANE. LANGE TALKS WITH REPORTERS
 AT AMMAN AIRPORT. IRELAND: ROBINSON MAKES INAUGURAL
 SPEECH. BANGLADESH: STUDENTS MARCH, CONFRONT LINES OF
 POLICE. TEAR GAS FIRED. STUDENTS SET CAR ON FIRE. FIRE
 ENGINE. FRANCE: FAN ZENG NEWS CONFERENCE. HIJACKED PLANE
 ON TARMAC. HIJACKER TALKS. HIJACKERS' LETTER. SOUTH
 AFRICA: IN ATTERIDGEVILLE, DEBRIS ON ROAD. BURNING
 BARRICADE. POLICE HELICOPTER IN FLIGHT. BURNING BUS.
 ARMORED TRUCK. MANDELA TALKS. PERSIAN GULF: BRITISH
 WAR SHIPS. TOM KING ON SHIPS IN GULF. GUATEMALA:
 PEOPLE IN LINE TO VOTE. MONTT ARRIVES. CARPIO, SERRANO
 VOTE. CEREZO GREET'S VOTERS. COLOMBIA: DEAD BODIES.
 BULLET HOLES IN POLICE STATION. BURNED OUT BUILDING.
 MACHINE GUNS, GRENADE, AMMUNITION. FINGER PRINTS TAKEN

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Record: 18371(continued)

FROM DEAD BODIES. JAPAN: EMPEROR AKHITO'S ENTHRONEMENT. PROTESTERS CLASH WITH POLICE. DAMAGE AT TABATA SHRINE. PERSIAN GULF: BRITISH WARSHIPS IN GULF. JAPAN: EMPEROR AKHITO'S ENTHRONEMENT. AERIAL OF DAMAGE AT US CONSUL-GENERAL RESIDENCE. GEMANY: GORBACHEV GREET'S WAIGEL. SHEVARDNADZE GREET'S GENSCHER. KOHL, GORBACHEV WALK. FRANCE: STUDENTS PROTEST. TEAR GAS. LOOTING.

Record: 18203 ✓

Korea
PoWs

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	900120101
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	2
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	075
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	90
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	UNITED KINGDOM; SOVIET UNION
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	INTERVIEW WITH MI-6 DEFECTOR GEORGE BLAKE
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	INTERVIEW WITH GEORGE BLAKE AND HOW HIS AFFILIATION WITH THE KGB, WHILE WORKING AS AN MI-6 AGENT FOR ENGLAND, ALLOWED HIM TO BETRAY AT LEAST 40 BRITISH AGENTS AND HIS COUNTRY; BLAKE DESCRIBES HIS DEALINGS WITH BRITISH ROYAL NAVY AND KGB AS AN MI-6 AGENT AS WELL AS HIS ESCAPE FROM PRISON AND RETURN TO THE SOVIET UNION; PROGRAM ALSO INCLUDES INTERVIEWS WITH CHARLES SEYMORE, HEAD OF THE MI-6 WHEN BLAKE WAS WORKING FOR THEM, SIR JAMES EASTON, FORMER MI-6 DEPUTY CHIEF, AND CHARLES WHEELER, FORMER HEAD OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE OPERATION; INTERVIEWS WITH COLLEAGUES AND FRIENDS: MAJOR C.W.A. CORTICE, A PAST AQUAINTANCE OF BLAKE'S, COMMANDER VIKTOR MALYAVIN FROM THE KGB, JOE EVANS, A RETIRED CIA OFFICER, AND JEAN MEADMORE, FORMER FRENCH DIPLOMAT LIVING WITH BLAKE IN SEOUL, KOREA; ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS ARE WITH FORMER CIA DIRECTOR RICHARD HELMS, VASILY DOZDALYOV, KENNETH DE COURCY, MICHAEL RANDLE AND SEAN BOURKE; BLAKE'S CURRENT HOME AND RUSSIAN WIFE; SCENES FROM LONDON, BERLIN, AND HAMBURG; FILE FOOTAGE OF SOUTH KOREAN ARMY AND PEOPLE, AMERICAN POW'S IN KOREA AND KOREAN GEOGRAPHY, AMERICAN BOMBERS BOMBING KOREA, EAST BERLIN UNDERGROUND TELEPHONE TAPPING NETWORK AND THE ITS DISCOVERY BY THE SOVIETS; VARIOUS BRITISH NEWSREEL COVERAGES.

Record: 18198

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	900116201
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	057
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH

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000446

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Record: 18198(continued)YEAR PRODUCED
COUNTRIES
PROGRAM TITLE
DESCRIPTION

90
BURMA
BURMA #2
(DATES: 24 NOV 89-28 OCT 92) 2. LEADING DISSIDENT, SU CHI; MINISTER OF FINANCE, COLONEL DAVID ABEL; ELECTORAL TRAINING, KYWE MAUNG, OPPOSITION LEADER; STREET SCENES; PUPPET SHOW; VOTING. 3. STREET SCENES; COUNTRYSIDE; MEN WITH RIFLES; SOE AUNG, STUDENT DEMOCRATIC FRONT; HOMEMADE LANDMINE DETONATED; PATROL IN JUNGLE; BUDDHIST MONKS; 4. ACTIVIST MONKS OF BURMA; IMAGE OF BUDDIST MONK; RAID ON MONASTARY BY MILITARY; PROTESTING MONK BURNS HIMSELF TO DEATH; RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AND KILLING OF MONKS AT BUDDIST TEMPLE; 5. REFUGEES FLEEING TO BANGLADESH FROM BURMA TO ESCAPE OPPRESSION; REFUGEE CAMPS; BURMESE ARMY ON EASTERN BORDER TRYING TO CRUSH REBEL FORCES; 6. BURMA'S PERSECUTION OF MUSLIMS; 7. KAREN REBELS; BURMESE ARMY GAINING GROUND; REFUGEE CAMPS; 8. CRISIS FACING THE KAREN; REBELS FIGHTING WITH CHINESE ARMS; CASUALTIES; SMUGGLING. 9. MEETING BETWEEN MCDANIEL AND BAILEY TO RAISE \$20,000 TO LOCATE POW'S. TAPED CONVERSATION; BAILEY WANTS TO BUY ASSAULT RIFLES, GIVE THEM TO KHUN SA, BURMA'S DRUG LORD, IN EXCHANGE FOR HIS HELP IN FREEING AMERICAN PRISONERS. MCDANEIL HEADS AMERICAN DEFENSE INSTITUTE; RAISES \$2 MILLION A YEAR BY ANNOUNCING IMMINENT RELEASE OF POW'S. REMARKS BY SISTER OF POW...HASN'T SEEN ANY RESULTS. FAKE PHOTOS. 10. WOMEN MARCHING IN REGIMENTAL FASHION; TRAINING FOR MEN AND WOMEN IN THE MEDICAL PROFESSION; IN CLASSROOM; OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE STATE; PARTICIPANTS QUESTIONED BY ITN, ANSWERS RECORDED BY OFFICIALS. RANGOON STREET SCENES; PEOPLE SUBDUED. OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT FILM OF STUDENTS AT UNIVERSITY. THAN SHWE GETS OUT OF CAR. 11. BURMA AMONG POOREST COUNTRIES IN WORLD; PEOPLE RIDING IN OX CARTS; RICE PADDIES; DECLINE OF THEIR ECONOMY RECOUNTED. RANGOON MARKET, JEWELRY AND GOLD FOR SALE. BUDDHIST TEMPLES. BUILDING CONSTRUCTION SITE. BRIGADIER-GENERAL DAVID ABEL, MINISTER OF FINANCE AND TRADE. BOATS ON IRRAWADDY RIVER; PEOPLE BATHING. 12. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. WOMAN GETS CHILDREN OUT OF PRISON. FILE PIX OF IMPRISONED DISSIDENT SUU KYI. KAREN REBEL BASE; REFUGEES.

Record: 18067

FILM NUMBER 900103401
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 2
TAPE WIDTH UMATIC
RUN TIME/MINUTES 083
LANGUAGE VARIOUS
YEAR PRODUCED 90
COUNTRIES WORLDWIDE
PROGRAM TITLE VISNEWS STOCK FOOTAGE

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000447

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Record: 18067(continued)DESCRIPTION

TAPE 1: CZECHOSLOVAKIA: EXTERIOR CHURCH. SKATEBOARD WEDDING. CANADA: TUTU GREETED AT AIRPORT. OLD BUILDINGS ON INDIAN RESERVATION. TUTU ARRIVES RESERVATION. MAN THROWS STONES AT RIOT POLICE. AMBULANCE. POLICE CLUB PROTESTER. MASKED MOHAWKS. MOHAWK FLAG. PAKISTAN: TRUMPETEERS. JATOI ENTERS CEREMONY, RAISES FLAG. PEOPLE CELEBRATING, MARCHING. CAR PAINTED LIKE FLAG. BARIQ TALKS. SOUTH KOREA: DEMONSTRATION OUTSIDE ARMY BASE. ARRESTS. FORCED INTO BUS. MAN CUTS BARBED WIRE, WALKS INTO DMZ, ARGUES WITH GUARDS. SYRIA/SAUDI ARABIA: JOHN KELLY MEETING ASSAD IN DAMASCUS. KELLY LEAVES FOREIGN MINISTRY, TALKS. KELLY AND KUWAIT SHEIKH JABER AL-AHMED AL-SABAH SEATED, TALKING. JAPAN: INTERIOR NIGHT CLUB. PEOPLE BUY RECORDS. FURCE TALKS. DRUGS ON TABLE. OFFICER EXAMINES BAG OF WHITE POWDER. EAST GERMANY: ROLLING STONES CONCERT. SWITZERLAND/LEBANON: ERRIQUEZ WALKS DOWN AIRCRAFT STEPS. HUGS. RED CROSS WORKERS IN BEIRUT CELEBRATE WITH CHAMPAGNE. JORDAN/IRAQ: HUSSEIN BOARDS PLANE IN AMMAN. PRO-HUSAYN DEMONSTRATION IN BAGHDAD. MIDDLE EAST: PEOPLE QUEUEING TO CROSS FROM KUWAIT TO SAUDI ARABIA. ESCAPEES TALK. HADJ TALKS IN AMMAN. CZECH, THAI, FILIPPINO BUSES ARRIVE IN JORDAN. ARABS ENCAMPED ON BORDER. PERU: PROTESTERS THROW MISSILES. POLICE FIRE TEAR GAS, KICK DOWN DOOR, ARREST STUDENTS. BURNING CAR. MADAGASCAR: DE KLERK, WIFE GREETED BY RATSIRAKA. WELCOMING CROWD. PRESIDENTIAL PALACE. RATSIRAKA TALKS. BOTHA SHAKES HANDS WITH MADAGASCAN MINISTER, THEY SIGN AGREEMENT. DE KLERK TALKS. SAUDI ARABIA: JEDDAH. ARNST TALKS. THOMPSON TALKS. SOVIET UNION: CHELYABINSK-65. EXTERIOR MUSEUM. PARKS, GARDENS, LAKE. STATUE OF IGOR KURCHATOV. INTERIOR PLUTONIUM PLANT, CONTROL ROOM. JAPANESE SCIENTISTS. SOUTH KOREA: STUDENTS DEMONSTRATE. RIOT POLICE AT CAMPUS GATES. STUDENTS BATTER POLICE WITH CLUBS. FIRE BOMBS. ROH-TAE-WOO TALKS. RIOT POLICE AT BORDER. DEMONSTRATION. SOUTH AFRICA: BLACKS ARMED WITH KNIVES RUNNING, SHOUTING. POLICE FIRE TEAR GAS. ARMY VEHICLE FIRES TEAR GAS. INJURED. BURNING BUILDINGS. MANDELA, WIFE UNVEIL ANC PLAQUE. MANDELA TALKS. POLICE BREAK INTO HOSTEL, SEARCH WEAPONS. CONFISCATED WEAPONS. POLICE GUARD SUSPECTS. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: BALAGUER TALKS. SOLDIERS CHASE STRIKERS. BURNING TIRE. CAPTURED YOUTHES LED AWAY. UNION LEADER CAPTURED, LED AWAY, STRUCK. TEAR GAS. STREET FIRES. ARRESTS. JAPAN: EMPEROR, EMPRESS AT MEMORIAL CEREMONY. KAIFU. JAMES HARRIS, IWASA TALK. AKIHITO AND ROH TAE-WOO. DEMONSTRATION. JORDAN: PHOTOS OF HUSAYN, HUSSEIN. MEN VOLUNTEERING TO FIGHT FOR IRAQ. BUS CONVOY. BORDER REFUGEE CAMPS. PRO-IRAQI DEMONSTRATION. SHIPS IN PORT. GARDENS. SOUTH AFRICA: BLACKS ARMED WITH MACHETES, AXES. RAILWAY STATION PLATFORM. YOUTH WITH GASOLINE BOMB. RUNNING. TEAR GAS. CORPSE BURNING. POLICE SEARCH HOSTEL. INJURED. HOMELESS. DONALD WOODS ARRIVES PRESS CONFERENCE, TALKS. IRAQ: ANNOUNCER MAKES STATEMENT ON TV WITH ENGLISH SUBTITLES. HUSAYN PINS MEDALS SOLDIER. HUSAYN AT ARMY COUNCIL

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000448

Record: 18067(continued)

MEETING. JORDAN: SHIPS UNLOADING. EC MINISTERS MEET HASSAN. HASSAN TALKS. ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER GIANNI DE MICHELIS TALKS. REFUGEE BORDER CAMP. IRINA JOLTESMAN TALKS. LINES OF REFUGEE CARS. HOSTEL. SOUTH KOREA: CATHOLIC MASS. PRAYING. NUNS. POLICE AND STUDENTS CLASH NEAR BORDER. VENEZUELA: IRAQI AMBASSADOR MAJID AL SAMARRA'L TALKS AT PRESS CONFERENCE. PERU: PROTEST. WATER CANNON, RIOT POLICE, TEAR GAS. DETAINED MEN. BEGGAR. JAPAN: NAKAYAMA LEAVES NARITA AIRPORT. STOCK EXCHANGE. PAKISTAN: BUS CONVOYS. FAISAL MOSQUE. PRAYING. POSTER OF ZIA AND SON. PICKING UP PETALS. MOSQUE WITH BANNER. JORDAN/ISRAEL/AQABA GULF: HUSSEIN ARRIVES IN JORDAN. CARGO BOATS. WATER SKIING. YACHT. ISRAELI PATROL BOAT. IRAQI FLIGHT ARRIVES AMMAN AIRPORT. PEOPLE CROSS FROM IRAQ TO JORDAN. PRAYERS. DEMONSTRATION. PERSIAN GULF: USS REID. MERCHANT VESSEL AMERICAN CORMORANT. BRITISH NAVAL HELICOPTER IN FLIGHT. EGYPTIAN TROOPS BOARD AIRCRAFT. UNITED KINGDOM/KUWAIT. ESCAPED BRITONS AT HEATHROW AIRPORT. KUWAITI DESERT AND STREET SCENES. IRANIAN PRISONERS IN IRAQ BOARD BUS, LEAVE. AYATOLLAH ABDOLKARIM MOUSAVI ARDEBLILE TALKS. TAPE 2: NICARAGUA: PEOPLE SURROUND, DIG UP GRAVE. SKULL. BOX WITH REMAINS. UNITED STATES: DEMONSTRATION AT WHITE HOUSE. JORDAN/SOVIET UNION: RUSSIANS, POLES CROSS IRAQI\JORDANIAN BORDER IN BUS. INTERIOR BUS. PEOPLE BOARD BUS. PLANE ARRIVES IN MOSCOW, PEOPLE DEPART. PERSIAN GULF: USS REID, HELICOPTER. IRAQI TANKER ALKARAMAH. BRITISH SHIP ORANGELEAF. BRITISH FRIGATE JUPITER AT QUAYSIDE. USS WISCONSIN, FRENCH CARRIER CLEMENCEAU IN SUEZ CANAL. CZECHOSLOVAKIA: ROLLING STONES MEET HAVAL. STONES POSTERS. FANS BUYING TICKETS. JORDAN: PRO-IRAQI DEMONSTRATION. BBC CAMERA CREW HARRASSED. AUSTRALIAN REPORTER SURROUNDED. AUSTRALIA: JOAN SUTERLAND RECITAL. IRAN: IRANIAN POW'S ARRIVE BY BUS FROM IRAQ. SOUTH AFRICA: TROOPS. FIGHTING. AMBULANCE. CHEERING EUGENE TERRE BLANCHE. MARCH. IRAQ: STATEMENT READ ON IRAQI TV WITH ENGLISH SUBTITLES. HUSAYN WATCHES CHILDREN'S DANCE. IRAQ: HUSAYN AT MEETING OF REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL AND BA'ATH SOCIALIST PARTY. HUSAYN STATEMENT READ ON IRAQI TV WITH ENGLISH SUBTITLES. PERSIAN GULF: USS REID. BRITISH BATTLESHIP HMS BATTLEAXE. US AIRCRAFT CARRIER, PLANES LANDING. PLANES IN FLIGHT. CHENEY EXAMINES MAP, TALKS IN SAUDI ARABIA. IRAQI SHIP AT DOCK IN AQABA. ZAMBIA: DEMONSTRATION. VERNON MWAANGA, LEVI MWAWAGA, FREDERICK CHILUBA BEING CARRIED BY SUPPORTERS. CHILUBA SINGING ANTHEM WITH PARTY LEADERS. KUWAIT: AMATEUR VIDEO OF IRAQI SOLDIERS IN VAN. BURNING BUILDING. TANKS. CAR PACKED WITH GOODS. SOUTH AFRICA: MAN WITH MACHETE. CORPSE. BLACKS RUNNING. BURNING BUILDING. ARMORED VEHICLE. INJURED. SISULU (?) TALKS. IRAQ: IRAQI POW'S FROM IRAN GETTING OFF BUS. MAN ON CRUTCHES. UNITED NATIONS: DELEGATES VOTING. PICKERING TALKS. BRITISH DELEGATE TICKELL TALKS.

ANNIE on 10/18/93 at 10:59:14

Page: 45

Record: 17441

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	900041501
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	052
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	90
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	IRAN; IRAQ
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	IRAN-IRAQ WAR #4
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	1. ARTILLERY FIRING; ROCKET LAUNCHERS; DEBT COSTS RECOUNTED; BURNING OFFSHORE OIL RIG; COST OF LOST OIL REVENUES; FIRE FIGHTING ON BURNING OIL RIG; BURNING OIL TANKER. TANKER WAR COSTS. REBUILDING COSTS. DESTRUCTION CAUSED BY 8 YEARS OF FIGHTING. 2. ARTILLERY ON THE EDGE OF BAGHDAD; MOSQUE; CALL TO PRAYER, CEASEFIRE AT DAWN. PEACEKEEPING FORCES MOVE IN, WALKING THE AREA. TANKERS IN PERSIAN GULF; JAPANESE FLAG FLYING; LIFEBOATS AT THE READY; SANDBAGS STACKED ON DECK AS PRECAUTION. US FRIGATE ON PATROL. IRAN TV VIDEO OF SHIPS IN GULF. HELICOPTER FLIES BEHIND US SHIP. IRANIAN GUNBOAT. US AEGIS CRUISER, MOBILE BAY. 3. CEASEFIRE TALKS IN GENEVA. IRAN, WOMEN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARD, COMBAT VOLUNTEERS, MARTYRS MEMORIALS, INDOCTRINATION OF THE YOUNG. SADDAM HUSAYN, OLIVER NORTH. BURNING OIL RIG, USS ROBERTS WITH MISSILE HOLE; VICTIMS OF IRANAIR SHOOTDOWN. IRANIAN EXILES FIGHTING FOR IRAQ; CW VICTIMS. 4. IRAQ PRISONER OF WAR CAMP #7; PRISONERS, PRISON CONDITIONS. WHEREABOUTS OF MANY PRISONERS UNKNOWN. PRISONERS SINGING, STANDING IN YELLOW PRISON GARB, LOOKING HAPPY. 5. KURDISH REFUGEES FLEE TO TURKEY. US STATE DEPT STATEMENT ON IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. SAADOUN HAMMADI, IRAQI MINISTER OF STATE, DENIES ALLEGATIONS. REFUGEE CAMP, POISON GAS VICTIMS. 6. BAGHDAD PROTEST AGAINST US SANCTIONS. SADDAM HUSAYN WATCHES. 7. KURDISH REFUGEES CAMPED IN TURKEY. POISON GAS VICTIMS. SADDAM HUSAYN WALKING WITH AIDES. SCARS ON REFUGEES. 9. BANKS OF TIGRIS RIVER, KURDISH REFUGEE CAMPS. KURDS FIGHTING WITH IRAN. 10. NORTHERN IRAQ VILLAGE REMAINS, SIGNS OF SCORCHED EARTH POLICY AGAINST KURDS. CW VICTIMS. IRAQ DEFENSE MINISTER, ADNAN KHAIR ALLAH, AT PRESS CONFERENCE. FLIGHT OVER HEART OF KURDISTAN; AERIAL SHOTS. KURDS AMNESTY CENTER. NO EVIDENCE OF CW ATTACK, JUST SCORCHED EARTH. SETTLEMENTS RAZED BY THE ARMY; TREES KILLED BY HEAT OF FIRES; AERIAL SHOTS OF KURDISTAN SCORCHED EARTH. 11. UN PEACEKEEPING TROOPS CELEBRATE WINNING THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE. LT. COLONEL JOSE ECHIVARRIA REMARKS ON FORCES. OBSERVERS LIVING IN WHAT WAS AN IRANIAN FORWARD FIELD HOSPITAL. VIDEO FROM IRANIAN FRONT; DESTROYED BUILDINGS, EQUIPMENT. TEAM PATROLLING MARSH AREAS IN BOAT; CLIMBING OBSERVER TOWER BUILT IN MARSH. 12. PEREZ DE CUELLAR. UN PEACEKEEPING FORCES ON PATROL; IRAN AND IRAQ AT NEGOTIATING TABLE. SHAT AL ARAB WATERWAY A BONE OF CONTENTION. POW EXCHANGE; FAMILIES GREET THEIR MEN. USS

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RODNEY M. DAVIS EXTERIOR AND INTERIOR. TANKER CONVOY IN PERSIAN GULF. USS VINCENNES IN DOCK. 13. IRISH AER LINGUS ACCUSED OF ILLEGALLY DELIVERING C-130 SPARE PARTS TO IRAN. AER LINGUS 747 BEING LOADED WITH CARGO. OISIN O'SIOCHRU, AER LINGUS SPOKESMAN. C-130 IN FLIGHT, ON THE GROUND. 14. KURDISH REFUGEES FLEE TO TURKEY. GROUP LIVING IN CAVE WERE ALLEGEDLY KILLED BY POISON GAS-AMATEUR VIDEO OF GROUP 3 DAYS BEFORE THEIR DEATHS. KURDISH GUERRILLAS FOUGHT FOR IRAN DURING WAR. NAIEL HASSAN, IRAQI PRESS OFFICER, DENIES CHARGES. IRANIAN ARMY VIDEO OF POSSIBLE IRAQI CW ATTACK. TESTS DONE OF SOIL IN AFFECTED AREA. 15. KHAMENEI TOURS OIL FACILITY, TALKS TO WORKERS. REFINERY SHOTS. 16. CEASEFIRE ONE YEAR LATER. IRAQI ARCH OF TRIUMPH, HUGE CROSSED SWORDS OVER THE STREET. SADDAM HUSAYN BEING CHEERED BY THOUSANDS. REBUILDING CITIES IN IRAQ; CHILDREN PLAYING IN THE RUBBLE. DESTRUCTION ON THE FAW PENINSULA. TOTALLY DESTROYED TOWN. UNDERGROUND BUNKER USED AS IRANIAN HOSPITAL; SCORCH MARKS LEFT BY FLAME THROWERS. STATUES OF 99 IRAQI GENERALS POINTING FINGERS TOWARD IRAN, WAR MEMORIAL. 17. FARZAD BAZOFT HANGED IN IRAQ; FILE PHOTOS OF BAZOFT FOLLOWING HIS ARREST; THATCHER SEEN SPEAKING TO HOUSE OF COMMONS, CO-WORKERS AT "LONDON OBSERVER" HELD A PRAYER FOR EXECUTED REPORTER. SEGMENT ON WHETHER US SHOULD RENEW SELLING INDUSTRIAL FURNACES TO IRAQ; PIX OF HUSAYN, IRAQ MILITARY PARADE, AND PIX OF TERRORISTS NIDAL AND ABBAS. (BROADCAST DATES: 9 AUGUST 1988-16 JULY 1990)

Record: 17306

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	900031401
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	009
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	90
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	UNITED STATES
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	JIM GRACE STORY
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	✓ SEGMENT ON MIA JIM GRACE; STORY RECOUNTED BY HIS WIFE NOW LILLIAN BICKNELL; GRACE GIVEN UP FOR DEAD; WIFE RECOUNTS HOW SHE RECEIVED A POSTCARD WITH POSSIBLE EVIDENCE THAT HE WAS ALIVE IN 1982; WANTS US GOVERNMENT TO BRING HIM BACK.

Record: 16994

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	900003201
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	VHS
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	056

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Record: 16994(continued)

<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	89
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	WORLDWIDE
<u>SERIES TITLE</u>	REACHING FOR THE SKIES
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	FIGHTERS
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	US F-16 IN FLIGHT. P-51 MUSTANG. WWII AERIAL COMBAT. UK TYPHOON USED FOR GROUND ATTACKS. GERMAN DORNIER DO-335. ME-163 COMET. ME-262 FIRST JET FIGHTER TO SEE ACTION. UK GLOUCESTER METEOR. US F-86 SABRE USED IN KOREAN WAR. SOVIET MIG-15. AWACS. NATO SCRAMBLE; UK TORNADO. ISRAELI AIR STRIKE DURING 1967 WAR. US AIR STRIKES IN VIETNAM WAR. US PHANTOM F-4. US POWS IN VIETNAM. SIDEWINDER LAUNCH. US AGGRESSOR SQUADRON FLIES AND FIGHTS LIKE A SOVIET FIGHTER SQUADRON. PILOT TRAINING; COMBAT SIMULATION. REMARKS BY FORMER FIGHTER PILOTS RE THE RIGORS OF COMBAT. UK HARRIER JUMP JET.

Record: 16861

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	890141001
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	VHS
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	120
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	RUSSIAN
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	89
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	SOVIET UNION; UNITED STATES; MALTA
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	MALTA SUMMIT COVERAGE
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	SATURDAY 2 DEC 89 VREMYA (BEGINNING AT COUNTER 660) - 1. GORBACHEV ARRIVES IN MALTA WITH RAISA; AT MALTA AIRPORT; WITH MALTESE PRESIDENT; 2. GORBACHEV AND RAISA MEETING MALTESE PRIME MINISTER FENECH ADAMI; CROWDS NEAR PALACE; RAGING STORM AND SEA; US PRESIDENT BUSH ARRIVING ABOARD THE SLAVA AND MEETING WITH GORBACHEV; YAKOVLEV AND SHEVARDNADZE PRESENT; GORBACHEV AND BUSH GIVE INTERVIEWS (AUDIO POOR); 3. GORBACHEV AND BUSH SEATED AT TABLE; BAKER AND SHEVARDNADZE GIVE PRESS CONFERENCE; 4. VLADIMIR POZNER ANNOUNCES TALKS SUSPENDED BECAUSE OF BAD WEATHER; SUNDAY 3 DEC 89 SEVEN DAYS (BEGINNING AT COUNTER 5086) - 1. SUMMIT MEETINGS IN ITALY AND OFF THE SHORES OF MALTA; 2. ROUNDUP OF PAST WEEK'S EVENTS AT SUPREME SOVIET; 3. ROUNDUP OF GORBACHEV VISIT TO ITALY; 4. SHEVARDNADZE MEETING WITH ZAHIR SHAH; 5. SOVIET POW'S RETURN HOME; 6. LITHUANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY PLENUM; 7. VORKUTA MINE GOES BACK TO WORK; 8. EXPLOSION AT FACTORY IN KRASNOYARSK KRAY AS RESULT OF BOMB; 9. REFUGEES FROM CONFLICT IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH; 10. SUPREME SOVIET DECISION ON NKAO STATUS; 11. CONFLICT IN KOSOVO, YUGOSLAVIA; 12. HUSAK GREET'S NEW MEMBERS OF CZECH GOVERNMENT; 13. EAST GERMAN CENTRAL COMMITTEE RESIGNS, DEMONSTRATIONS, ARRESTS OF GDR PARTY LEADERS ANNOUNCED; 14. UPDATE ON PHILIPPINE SITUATION; 15. ELECTIONS IN INDIA; 16. LAUNCHING OF KVANT MODULE, COSMONAUTS IN MIR STATION; 17. REVIEW OF GORBACHEV VISIT TO ITALY, SIGNING

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DOCUMENTS, GORBACHEV SPEECH, GORBACHEV RECEIVES PEACE PRIZE, GORBACHEV MEETS WITH POPE JOHN PAUL, VISIT TO MILAN; 18. REPORT FROM MALTA, BUSH AND GORBACHEV TALK TO JOURNALISTS; 19. GORBACHEV INTERVIEWED ON TALKS WITH BUSH; 20. CONCLUSION OF SUMMIT MEETING, BUSH, GORBACHEV AND SOVIET DELEGATION LEAVING MALTA; 21. REPORT ON BAD WEATHER IN MALTA; 22. INTERVIEW WITH COMMANDER AND CREW MEMBER OF US SUMMIT SHIP; 23. SOVIET FROGMEN ENGAGE IN SECURITY MEASURES AROUND MAKSIM GORKIY, INTERVIEWS WITH SOVIET AND US SECURITY OFFICIALS. (DATES: 2-3 DECEMBER 1989)

Record: 16377

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	890103801
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	028
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	89
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	ISRAEL; UNITED STATES; LEBANON
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	US HOSTAGE DILEMMA
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	INTERVIEWS OF RICHARD MURPHY, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, & ISRAELI DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BENJAMIN NETANYAHU; NETANYAHU COMMENTS THAT THE WESTERN HOSTAGES MUST BE A PART OF THE EXCHANGE FOR SHEIK OBEID; REMARKS THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WILL LEAVE NO STONE UNTURNED IN TRYING TO GET THE RELEASE OF ITS POWS; REPEATS ISRAELI LINE THAT THE CAPTURE OF OBEID WAS NOT A MISTAKE; ALSO, DISCUSSION WITH SEN. WILLIAM COHEN ON OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE US; GARRICK UTLEY COMMENTS ON DIFFERENCES IN WESTERN AND ISLAMIC CULTURES

Record: 16332

most likely Soviet

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	890099401 <i>POW's</i>
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	029
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	89
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	SOVIET UNION
<u>SERIES TITLE</u>	SOVIET TELEVISION HIGHLIGHT TAPES
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	IMPACT OF PERESTROYKA #24-89
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	CLIPS ON THE IMPACT OF PERESTROYKA ON SOVIET LIFE FROM SOVIET NEWS PROGRAMS DURING 9-14 JULY 1989, DUBBED IN ENGLISH; (RR2722) PUBLIC OPINION POLLS; REACTION TO THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES; (RR2723) THE GROUP FOR ESTABLISHING TRUST BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR; INFORMAL GROUPS IN THE USSR; DISSIDENCE; HUMAN RIGHTS;

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CONSCIENCIOUS OBJECTORS TO MILITARY SERVICE; (RR2724)
 SOVIET PRISONERS OF WAR IN AFGHANISTAN; POWS; (RR2725)
 METHODS USED BY INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES TO DEAL WITH
 DOMESTIC DISTURBANCES; WEAPONS USED, TRAINING OF ATTACK
 DOGS; (RR2726) INTERVIEW WITH A SELF-CONFESSED
 'PROFITEER'; FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE; (RR2727) HOUSING
 PROBLEMS FACED BY RELEASED PRISONERS; UNEMPLOYMENT

Record: 16153 ✓

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	890080601
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	053
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	89
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	VIETNAM; LEBANON; UNITED STATES
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	PRISONERS OF WAR AND LEBANON HOSTAGES
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	PHIL DONAHUE PROGRAM ON THE LACK OF US ATTEMPTS OF GETTING VIETNAM WAR MIA'S AND US HOSTAGES OUT OF LEBANON; MIA FAMILY MEMBERS GIVE PRESENTATIONS ON THEIR SITUATIONS; REFERENCE TO US INTELLIGENCE ON MIA'S; MANY REFERENCES TO THE ROLE OF US INTELLIGENCE OR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY; MOST FAMILY MEMBERS DISPLAY DOCUMENTS, TAPES OR PHOTOGRAPHS CONCERNING THE CAPTURED MEN; TERRY ANDERSON VIDEO OF OCTOBER 31, 1989; PHOTOS OF THE PRESENT AMERICAN HOSTAGES; COMMENTS FROM CAPTAIN "RED" MCDANIEL, FORMER POW; REMARKS BY BILL HENDON, CHAIRMAN, POW PUBLICITY FUND AND BILL FOLEY, JOURNALIST COMMITTEE TO FREE TERRY ANDERSON; HENDON REMARKS ABOUT AN AUGUST 1986 MEETING WITH BILL CASEY AND ROBERT GATES WHERE CASEY REMARKS ABOUT "NOT BUYING OUT THE HOSTAGES WITHOUT PUBLIC SUPPORT"; ONE WOMAN ASSERTS THAT SHE HAD INFORMATION FROM A SECRET DOCUMENT THAT PROVES THE GOVERNMENT IS LYING TO THE FAMILIES RE VIETNAMESE PULLING OUT OF CAMBODIA; COMMENTS FROM JOURNALIST DONNA LONG WHO WAS A FORMER HOSTAGE IN LAOS; SHE ALSO ASSERTS THAT FAMILIES SHOULD NOT DEPEND ON THE US GOVERNMENT TO GAIN THEIR LOVED ONE'S RELEASE; GRAPHIC SHOWING DOD FIGURES ON THOSE MISSING-IN-ACTION DURING WWII, KOREA, AND VIET NAM; POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE PAST ATTEMPTS TO GAIN THE HOSTAGES RELEASED. (FIRST 7 MINUTES OF THE PROGRAM NOT RECORDED)

Record: 16016 ✓

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	890068801
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	029

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Record: 16016(continued)

<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	89
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	SOVIET UNION; AFGHANISTAN
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN #2
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	1. WINTER ARRIVES AS SOVIET TROOPS BEGIN TO DEPART; CLOSING OF FOREIGN EMMBASSIES; DANGERS TO FOREIGN DIPLOMATS; AFGHAN TROOPS IN TRAINING; INTERVIEW WITH ZALMAY KHALIZAD AND ROBERT NEUMAN ON THE PROSPECTS OF THE COUNTRY; 2. MOSCOW REPORTS THE LAST OF THE TROOPS HAVE LEFT; PIX OF PRESIDENT NAJIBULLAH DRESSED IN MILITARY FATIGUES ADDRESSES A POLITICAL RALLY; PIX OF BHUTTO REMARKING THAT THE REBELS WILL FIGHT ON; IRANIAN TV DEPICTS AFGHAN REBELS AT A THERAN MEETING WHERE THEY SIGNED A UNITY PACT; 3. ETHIOPIAN AIRLINER WILL FERRY IN FOOD AND SUPPLIES; SOVIET FORCES DETERMINED TO KEEP KABUL AIRPORT OPEN; PIX OF THE LAST SOVIETS TO LEAVE; PIX OF MI-24 HELICOPTERS PROVIDING COVER FOR SOVIET AIRLINERS BRINGING IN SUPPLIES; 4. NAJIBULLAH ACCUSES PAKISTAN OF TRYING TO INVADE AFGHANISTAN; SOVIET DOCUMENTARY DEPICTING THE HARDSHIPS OF SOVIET VETS RETURNING FROM AFGHANISTAN; 5. SOVIET SOLDIERS LEAVING AFGHANISTAN AND ARRIVING BACK IN THE SOVIET UNION; EXCERPTS FROM A SOVIET DOCUMENTARY ON WOUNDED TROOPS; 6. PIX OF TROOPS CROSSING THE BORDER AT TERMEZ; 7. PIX OF MOSCOW PARK AND A MEMORIAL TO SOVIET VETERANS; COMPARISONS MADE TO VIETNAM; ANGRY MOTHERS OF 300 POW'S FEEL THE DEFENSE MINISTRY IS NOT DOING ENOUGH TO LOCATE THEIR SONS. (DATES: 27 JAN 1989 - 15 FEB 1989)

Record: 15592

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	890028001
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	057
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	89
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	UNITED STATES
<u>SERIES TITLE</u>	SECRET INTELLIGENCE
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	PART 2: INTERVENTION
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	FRONT GATE OF CIA. HOW CIA BECAME US SECRET ARMY OF INTERVENTION. FORMER CIA OFFICERS REMARKS THROUGHOUT FILM. CIA ESTABLISHED IN 1947. ROLE CHANGES TO MEET EUROPEAN CHALLENGE. HISTORY OF CIA COVERT OPERATIONS WHICH BEGAN IN ITALY 1948. BEDELL SMITH, CIA DIRECTOR. HISTORIC FOOTAGE FROM THE "RED SCARE" ERA OF THE EARLY 1950S. EISENHOWER'S LEGACY OF COVERT OPERATIONS. BURNING UNCLE SAM IN EFFIGY IN IRAN WHERE US TROUBLES BEGAN IN 50S. OPERATION AJAX-THE OVERTHROW OF MOSSADEGH; FIRST COUP THE CIA ENGINEERED. GUATEMALA OPERATION IN 50S. INDONESIAN OPERATION; SUKARNO. PHILIPPINES; MARGSAYSAY. TELEPHONE TAP UNDERNEATH EAST-WEST GERMAN BORDER. U-2. ASSASSINATION PLOTS: PATRICE LUMUMBA; RAFAEL TRUILLO; ABDUL KASIM; FIDEL CASTRO. CUBAN

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OPERATION. BAY OF PIGS; REMARKS BY SOME OF THE PARTICIPANTS. BRIGADE 2506. B/W FILM OF THE ATTACK ON CUBAN AIR FORCE THAT PRECEDED BAY OF PIGS INVASION. CUBAN POWS FOLLOWING INVASION.

Record: 15296

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	890000401
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	057
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	88
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	LIBYA
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	QADHAFI #4
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	QADHAFI CELEBRATES 17 YEARS ON POWER; REVIEWING A MILITARY PARADE; DISPLAY OF HELMETS OF US PILOTS SHOT DOWN DURING ATTACK ON TRIPOLI; IN CAMOUFLAGE UNIFORM, WALKING THROUGH STREETS. HARARE, ZIMBABWE NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT MEETING, QADHAFI ATTENDANCE. FEMALE BODY GUARDS LEAD CHANT AT NON-ALIGNED MEETING. MEDIA COVERAGE RESTRICTIONS; LIMITATIONS ON EVENTS THAT CAN BE COVERED; CENSORSHIP. REPORTS OF QADHAFI'S RAMBLING SPEECH AT NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT-NO PIX. MILITARY TROOPS, MILITARY EQUIPMENT; WAR WITH CHAD STRAINS LIBYAN MILITARY AND ECONOMY. REPORT OF QADHAFI FIRING HIS CHIEF AIDE, SALAAM-JALU (SP?) AND REPLACING HIM WITH A RELATIVE-NO PIX. INTERVIEW INSIDE BEDOUIN TENT; MEETING WITH PALESTINIANS; THREATS TO PUT SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LIBYA. DEFEAT IN CHAD; ABANDONED MILITARY EQUIPMENT. LIBYAN POWS IN CHAD; LIBYANS CELEBRATE US FAILURE TO KILL QADHAFI IN RAID ON TRIPOLI. LIBYAN VICTORY CELEBRATION AGAINST US IMPERIALISM; AMERICAN INDIANS JOIN CELEBRATION; US BLACK MUSLIMS MARCHING. F1 HAND GRENADES RECOVERED IN CHAD ARE LINKED TO FIVE TERRORIST ATTACKS IN EUROPE; QADHAFI SUPPLIED WEAPONS TO ABU NIDAL. REPORT ON QADHAFI'S REMARKS THAT ARAB WORLD SHOULD GET AN ATOM BOMB AND DROP IT ON ANYONE WHO THREATENS ARAB EXISTENCE-NO PIX. CARGO SHIP EKSUND UNLOADED IN BREST, FRANCE; 200 TONS OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION; IRA- LIBYAN LINK. QADHAFI BULLDOZES DOWN A CUSTOMS INSTALLATION ON THE TUNISIAN BORDER; QADHAFI WITH TUNISIAN MINISTERS; INTERVIEW. QADHAFI PLAYING SOCCER WITH HIS SOLDIERS; BULLDOZING DOWN A PRISON; RETURN TO PRIVATE ENTERPRISE; SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF ATTACK ON TRIPOLI; HIS DESTROYED BARRACKS ARE NOW A SHRINE; INTERVIEW RE REAGAN; WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE. QADHAFI AT ARAB SUMMIT IN ALGIERS. PRO-LIBYAN ACTIVISTS IN US FREED, ALTHOUGH IT IS CLAIMED THEY WERE PLANNING TO ASSASSINATE OLIVER NORTH; SKETCHES OF TRIAL. CHEMICAL PLANT THAT MAY BE USED TO PRODUCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS BEING BUILT IN RABTA. QADHAFI SENDS HIS OWN VIDEO TO CNN/LONDON; HIS REMARKS RE US PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES. CW USE IN IRAN-IRAQ WAR; WILLIAM WEBSTER, DCI,

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Record: 15296(continued)

CITED IN REPORT ON RABTA CW PLANT; REAGAN'S REMARKS RE QUESTION ON TAKING OUT THE SUSPECT PLANT. INTERIOR OF CHEMICAL PLANT; WEST GERMAN IMHAUSEN CHEMIE PLANT INVESTIGATED. (DATES: 1 SEP 86-3 JAN 89)

Record: 15239

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	880123501
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	012
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	88
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	SOVIET UNION; AFGHANISTAN
<u>SERIES TITLE</u>	SOVIET TELEVISION HIGHLIGHT TAPES
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	AFGHANISTAN #45
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	COVERAGE OF SOVIET RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN FROM SOVIET NEWS PROGRAMS DURING 5-11 DECEMBER 1988, DUBBED INTO ENGLISH; (RR1994) TRADE BETWEEN THE USSR AND AFGHANISTAN; ECONOMY; (RR1995) SOVIET POWS IN AFGHANISTAN; OFFER OF HELP FROM MOTHER TERESA; MIAS; PRISONERS OF WAR; (RR1996) DISINFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA; SUBVERSION; (RR1997) NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR ENDING THE CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN; CEASEFIRE PROPOSED; INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE; UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT; (RR1998) BOVIN COMMENTARY ON GORBACHEV'S CONCENTRATION WITH THE AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT

Record: 15237

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	880123401
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	016
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	88
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	SOVIET UNION; AFGHANISTAN
<u>SERIES TITLE</u>	SOVIET TELEVISION HIGHLIGHT TAPES
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	AFGHANISTAN #44
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	COVERAGE OF SOVIET RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN FROM SOVIET NEWS PROGRAMS DURING 30 NOVEMBER TO 4 DECEMBER 1988, DUBBED INTO ENGLISH; (RR1964) POWS; PRISONERS OF WAR IN AFGHANISTAN; MIAS; THE SOVIET PUBLIC COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR THE RELEASE OF SOVIET SERVICEMEN WHO ARE LISTED AS MISSING IN AFGHANISTAN; (RR1965) GIFTS FOR ORPHANS OF WAR DELIVERED TO KABUL; (RR1966) US MILITARY ADVISOR KILLED; (RR1967) SOVIET MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS RELEASES A STATEMENT SUPPORTING NAJIBULLAH'S CALL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN; (RR1968) MORE ON THE PROPOSAL FOR A UNITED NATIONS - SPONSORED

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Record: 15237(continued)

CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN; (RR1969) SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO AFGHANISTAN VORONTSOV MEETING WITH AFGHAN OPPOSITION REPRESENTATIVE RABBANI

Record: 13707

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	880120801
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	030
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	88
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	SOVIET UNION
<u>SERIES TITLE</u>	SOVIET TELEVISION HIGHLIGHT TAPES
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	IMPACT OF PERESTROYKA #9
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	COVERAGE OF THE IMPACT OF PERESTROYKA ON SOVIET LIFE FROM SOVIET NEWS PROGRAMS DURING 18 NOVEMBER TO 2 DECEMBER 1988, DUBBED INTO ENGLISH; RESTRUCTURING; ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORM; (RR1924) JOURNALISM AND NEWSPAPERS; INTERVIEW WITH THE EDITOR OF LE MONDE; (RR1925) MEDICAL CARE OF AFGHAN VETERANS; HOSPITALS; MILITARY INJURIES; (RR1977) OBEDIENCE TO PARTY DIRECTIVES; AGITATION; (RR1978) SECRECY OF SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN LEADS TO POOR COVERAGE IN THE MEDIA; (RR1979) ANTI-SOVIETISM; SOVIET PRISONERS OF WAR; POWS; (RR1980) THE DRAFT VS. A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY; RECRUITS AND CONSCRIPTS; (RR1981) PRICE INCREASES PLANNED AND DEBATED; PRICE FORMATION; ECONOMY; (RR1982) MORE ON PRICING

Record: 15150

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	880116101
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	060
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	88
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	SOVIET UNION; EAST GERMANY; UNITED STATES; LUXEMBOURG; LAOS; PAKISTAN
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	SOVIET UNION LEADERSHIP APPEARANCES
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	28 SEP: GORBACHEV, VOROTNIKOV, GROMYKO, ZAYKOV, RYZHKOV, SLYUNKOV, SOLOMENTSEV, CHEBRIKOV, YAKOVLEV, DOLGIKH, MASLYUKOV, TALYZIN, BAKLANOV, BIRYUKOVA, DOBRYNIN, LUKYANOV, MEDVEDEV, KAPITONOV ACCOMPANY HONECKER TO EAST GERMAN EXHIBITION IN MOSCOW; 28 SEP: SHEVARDNADZE ADDRESSES UNGA; 28 SEP: GORBACHEV RECEIVES HONECKER IN THE KREMLIN; 28 SEP: GORBACHEV, SLYUNKOV, MEDVEDEV HOLD TALKS WITH HONECKER; 28 SEP: LONGER VERSION OF GORBACHEV, VOROTNIKOV, GROMYKO, ZAYKOV, RYZHKOV, SLYUNKOV,

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SOLOMENTSEV, CHEBRIKOV, YAKOVLEV, DOLGIKH, MASLYUKOV, TALYZIN, BAKLANOV, BIRYUKOVA, DOBRYNIN, LUKYANOV, MEDVEDEV, KAPITONOV VISIT EAST GERMAN EXHIBITION IN MOSCOW; 28 SEP: GROMYKO RECEIVES LUXEMBOURG'S THORN; 28 SEP: YAKOVLEV ADDRESSES SOVIET-US INFORMATION MEETING IN MOSCOW; 29 SEP: SLYUNKOV, MEDVEDEV SEE OFF HONECKER; 29 SEP: BAKLANOV ACCOMPANIES HONECKER ON TOUR OF SPACE FLIGHT CONTROL CENTER; 29 SEP: VOROTNIKOV, MEDVEDEV SEE OFF KAYSONE PHOMVIHAN; 29 SEP: SHEVARDNADZE MET BY ZAYKOV ON HIS RETURN TO MOSCOW; 29 SEP: SHEVARDNADZE MEETS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE DUKAKIS; 29 SEP: SHEVARDNADZE MEETS MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE FOR SAVING SOVIET POW'S IN PAKISTAN; 30 SEP: MEDVEDEV PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWING POLITBURO CHANGES; 30 SEP: BIRYUKOVA ATTENDS TEACHER'S DAY MEETING; 1 OCT: GORBACHEV, VOROTNIKOV, ZAYKOV, LIGACHEV, MEDVEDEV, NIKONOV, RYZHKOV, SLYUNKOV, CHEBRIKOV, SHEVARDNADZE, SHCHERBITSKIY, YAKOVLEV, BIRYUKOVA, VLASOV, LUKYANOV, MASLYUKOV, RAZUMOVSKIY, SOLOVYEV, TALYZIN, YAZOV, BAKLANOV ATTEND SUPREME SOVIET SESSION. (28 SEPTEMBER - 1 OCTOBER 1988)

Record: 15146

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	880113501
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	026
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	88
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	SOVIET UNION; AFGHANISTAN
<u>SERIES TITLE</u>	SOVIET TELEVISION HIGHLIGHT TAPES
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	AFGHANISTAN #43
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	COVERAGE OF SOVIET RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN FROM SOVIET NEWS PROGRAMS DURING 21-27 NOVEMBER 1988, DUBBED INTO ENGLISH; (RR1935) NAJIBULLAH SPEECH BEFORE PARLIAMENT; DISCUSSES COMPLIANCE WITH THE GENEVA ACCORDS; (RR1936) THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR RESCUING SOVIET POWS RETURNS TO MOSCOW FROM NEW YORK; INVOLVEMENT OF SOVIET VETERANS; (RR1937) AN AN26 AFGHAN TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN BY REBEL FORCES; (RR1938) MEETING OF RELATIVES OF SOVIET PRISONERS-OF-WAR; (RR1929) WEAPONS CAPTURED FROM REBEL POSITIONS IN KANDIHAR PROVINCE, INCLUDING STINGER WEAPONS; (RR1940) COUP D'ETAT ATTEMPTED IN KANDIHAR BY MILITARY LEADERS AND EXTREMISTS; (RR1941) REBEL FORCES TAKE REFUGE IN GAZIABAD IN AN ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE JALALABAD; (RR1942) INVESTIGATIVE REPORT ON SOVIET POW'S; COMMENTS BY RELATIVES; (RR1943) COUNCIL ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION MEETS IN KABUL; (RR1944) TORQHAM, A CHECKPOINT OF THE AFGHAN-PAKISTAN BORDER

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Record: 15145

FILM NUMBER 880113401
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH UMATIC
RUN TIME/MINUTES 020
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 88
COUNTRIES SOVIET UNION; AFGHANISTAN
SERIES TITLE SOVIET TELEVISION HIGHLIGHT TAPES
PROGRAM TITLE AFGHANISTAN #42.
DESCRIPTION COVERAGE OF SOVIET RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN FROM SOVIET NEWS PROGRAMS DURING 14-20 NOVEMBER 1988, DUBBED INTO ENGLISH; (RR1909) ROAD BETWEEN JALALABAD AND TOROKHAM CLEARED OF REBELS; (RR1910) MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS STATEMENT REGARDING THE REBEL ATTACK ON KABUL INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT; (RR1911) MEETING BETWEEN SHEVARDNADZE AND AFGHAN AMBASSADOR TO THE USSR GULABZOI; (RR1912) REBEL ATTACKS ON JOURNALISTS NEAR THE AFGHAN-PAKISTAN BORDER; ATTEMPTS TO RECAPTURE JALALABAD; (RR1913) REBEL ATTACK ON KABUL AIRPORT; FUNERAL CEREMONY FOR THOSE KILLED IN THE ATTACK; (RR1914) A DELEGATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE ON SOVIET POWS DEPARTS NEW YORK FOR MOSCOW; PRISONERS-OF-WAR; (RR1915) REBEL ATTACKS ON THE ROAD FROM JALALABAD; SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ROAD

Record: 15109

FILM NUMBER 880111601
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH UMATIC
RUN TIME/MINUTES 058
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 88
COUNTRIES SOVIET UNION
SERIES TITLE SOVIET TELEVISION HIGHLIGHT TAPES
PROGRAM TITLE I SERVE THE SOVIET UNION
DESCRIPTION PROGRAM IS DEVOTED TO EFFORTS TO FIND AND IDENTIFY THE REMAINS OF SOVIET SOLDIERS KILLED DURING WORLD WAR II; MIA'S; FOOTAGE OF YOUNG PEOPLE WORKING IN REGIONS WHICH HAD HEAVY FIGHTING DURING WWII; FOOTAGE OF DISCOVERED REMAINS, MUSEUMS; INTERVIEWS WITH WWII VETERANS

Record: 15006

FILM NUMBER 880103001
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH UMATIC

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000460

ANNIE on 10/18/93 at 10:59:14

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Record: 15006(continued)

<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	012
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	88
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	AFGHANISTAN; SOVIET UNION
<u>SERIES TITLE</u>	SOVIET TELEVISION HIGHLIGHT TAPES
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	AFGHANISTAN #38
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	COMPILATION OF CLIPS ON SOVIET RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN FROM SOVIET NEWS PROGRAMS DURING 17-23 OCTOBER 1988, DUBBED INTO ENGLISH; (RR1766) SOVIET AMBASSADOR VORONTSOV PRESENTS HIS CREDENTIALS TO PRESIDENT NAJIBULLAH IN KABUL; (RR1767) PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR SAVING SOVIET POWS IN AFGHANISTAN; SOVIET PRISONERS IN PAKISTAN; (RR1768) REBEL ROCKET ATTACK ON KABUL; (RR1769) REBEL ATTACKS ON TRUCK CONVOYS; (RR1770) ISLAMIC CONFERENCE HELD IN KABUL; (RR1771) INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF MUSLIMS CONTINUES

Record: 14952

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	880097601
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	018
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	88
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	AFGHANISTAN; SOVIET UNION
<u>SERIES TITLE</u>	SOVIET TELEVISION HIGHLIGHT TAPES
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	AFGHANISTAN #35
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	CLIPS ON SOVIET RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN FROM SOVIET NEWS PROGRAMS DURING 26-30 SEPTEMBER 1988, DUBBED INTO ENGLISH; (RR1661) COSMONAUTS FROM THE LAST SPACE MISSION, INCLUDING THE AFGHAN PARTICIPANT, VISIT KABUL; (RR1662) ACTIVITIES OF THE SOVIET-AFGHAN SPACECREW DURING THEIR VISIT TO KABUL; REBEL MISSILE ATTACKS DURING THE VISIT; (RR1663) SHEVARDNADZE MEETING WITH INTERNATIONAL OFFICIALS IN NEW YORK REGARDING SOVIET PRISONERS-OF-WAR IN PAKISTAN; POW; (RR1664) AFGHAN MFA CONTACTS THE UN OBSERVOR FORCE REGARDING PAKISTAN ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE REBELS; (RR1665) EXPERIENCES OF SOVIET MEDICAL PERSONNEL IN AFGHANISTAN, INCLUDING WOMEN; (RR1680) COSMONAUTS VISIT NAJIBULLAH WHILE IN KABUL; (RR1681) THE INTERIM TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT CREATED BY THE AFGHAN OPPOSITION APPEALS TO THE UN FOR RECOGNITION)

Record: 14954

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	880097201
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC

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Record: 14954(continued)

RUN TIME/MINUTES 037
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 88
COUNTRIES SOVIET UNION
SERIES TITLE SOVIET TELEVISION HIGHLIGHT TAPES
PROGRAM TITLE HIGHLIGHT TAPE 23-88
DESCRIPTION HIGHLIGHTS FROM SOVIET NEWS PROGRAMS DURING 3-6 JULY 1988, DUBBED INTO ENGLISH; (RR1421) RIVER TRANSPORT WORKERS GIVE THEIR IMPRESSIONS OF THE 19TH PARTY CONFERENCE; (RR1422) ELEKTRON BEGINS PRODUCTION OF A NEW FIREPROOF TELEVISION SET; (RR1423) IRANIAN AIRLINER SHOT DOWN BY US COMBAT VESSELS; (RR1424) PRESS CONFERENCE HELD AT A CHEMICAL WARFARE CENTER IN SHIKHANY; BRITISH EXPERTS INSPECT SOVIET INSTALLATIONS; (RR1425) UPDATE ON THE SHOOTDOWN OF AN IRANIAN AIRLINER FROM A US MILITARY SHIP; GERASIMOV STATEMENT AT THE SOVIET MFA; (RR1438) USSR PROCURATOR GENERAL BRIEFS ON THE FATE OF SOVIET POWS IN PAKISTAN; (RR1426) BRITISH EXPERTS TOUR SOVIET MILITARY FACILITIES; (RR1427) RUPTURE OF A TANK CAR RELEASES HERBICIDES INTO A CLOUD; (RR1428) MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF WARSAW PACT DEFENSE MINISTERS; (RR1429) SOVIET INF INSPECTORS TOUR THE FRG; WEST GERMANY; (RR1430) BIOGRAPHY OF PROTON MISSIONS TO DATE; FOOTAGE OF THE ROCKET FROM SEVERAL ANGLES; PREPARATIONS FOR THE LAUNCH OF PHOBOS INTERPLANETARY SATELLITES; (RR1444) PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DURING A SPACEWALK AT THE MIR SPACE STATION; (RR 1445) ASSEMBLY OF THE PROTON AND PHOBOS SPACECRAFT; BAYKONUR SPACEDROME; (RR1446) GENERAL STAFF CHIEF AHKROMEYEV ARRIVES FOR A VISIT TO THE US; WELCOMING CEREMONY HEADED BY ADMIRAL CROWE; (RR1447) UPDATE ON THE SHOOTDOWN OF THE IRANIAN AIRLINER BY US NAVAL VESSELS; (RR1405) AFGHAN REBELS PLANT A TRUCK BOMB IN KABUL; (RR1448) DEMONSTRATIONS AT THEATER SQUARE IN YEREVAN; NATIONALITY STRUGGLE

Record: 14841

FILM NUMBER 880089201
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 3
TAPE WIDTH UMATIC
RUN TIME/MINUTES 146
LANGUAGE VARIOUS
YEAR PRODUCED 88
COUNTRIES WORLDWIDE
PROGRAM TITLE VISNEWS STOCK FOOTAGE
DESCRIPTION PERU: PRES GARCIA TOURS COCA REGION; COCAINE PRODUCTION. SOUTH KOREA/HONG KONG: TRADE IN FAKE BRAND NAME GOODS. LUXEMBOURG: BALLOON CHAMPIONSHIPS. JORDAN: HUSSEIN REMARKS ABOUT PALESTINIANS. US: PROTESTS AGAINST CLOSING PARK. NICARAGUA: US VISITORS TELL OF ATTACK BY CONTRA REBELS. VIETNAM: BOAT PEOPLE CRISIS. KENYA: ORPHANED ELEPHANTS. HONG KONG: HUNGER STRIKERS END FAST. UNITED KINGDOM: SEABIRDS FAIL TO BREED; SEA SEALS TESTED FOR MYSTERY

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Record: 14841(continued)

VIRUS. LEBANON: LIFE GOES ON DESPITE WAR. AFGHANISTAN: SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL. SOUTH AFRICA: ANNIVERSARY OF 1955 MARCH. CHINA: FLOODING AFTER THE TYPHOON. INDIA: CHOLERA EPIDEMIC FEARED AS FLOODING CONTINUES. SOUTH AFRICA: PIK BOTHA DELCARES THAT A CEASIFIRE HAS BEEN REACHED IN ANGOLAN WAR. ITALY: FOREST FIRES ON ADRIATIC COAST. SWITZERLAND: ANGOLAN PEACE TALKS. US: REAGAN SAYS FAREWELL TO JAMES BAKER. HONG KONG: TOPPING OUT CEREMONY AT THE BANK OF CHINA BUILDING. SOVIET UNION: LIGACHEV REMARKS ON ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION. THAILAND: THATCHER VISITS REFUGEE CAMP. SINGAPORE: 8/8/88 CELEBRATIONS. UNITED NATIONS: PEREZ DE CUELLAR ANNOUNCES DATE FOR IRAN/IRAQ CEASEFIRE. GREECE: FERRY STRIKE. CHINA: FLASH FLOODS IN EASTERN PROVINCE. COLOMBIA: SOLDIERS KILLED IN ANTI-DRUG OPERATION. AFGHANISTAN: SHEVARDNADZE MAKES VISIT TO KABUL. TURKEY: CARLUCCI VISIT TO TURKEY. WEST BANK: PALESTINIAN HOMES DESTROYED. CANADA: SANCTIONS AGAINST APARTHEID. UNITED KINGDOM: QUEEN MOTHER CELEBRATES 88TH BIRTHDAY. UNITED STATES: VICE PRESIDENT BUSH AND THE REPUBLICAN CONVENTION. SWITZERLAND: OPEC PRICING MEETING ENDS. SOVIET UNION: CARLUCCI ENDS VISIT; SEES SOVIET NAVY CRUISER. SOUTH AFRICA/NAMBIA: REACTIONS TO NAMIBIA'S PROPOSAL FOR INDEPENDENCE. IRAN: POW'S REUNITED WITH FAMILIES. PERSIAN GULF: NORWEIGIAN TANKER IS DAMAGED. AUSTRALIA: THATCHER INTERVIEW CUT SHORT. SWITZERLAND: SOUTHERN AFRICAN PEACE TALKS CONTINUE; ANGOLA AND CUBA REJECT CEASEFIRE OFFER. SOVIET UNION/WEST GERMANY: RUST IS FREED FROM PRISON. UNITED KINGDOM: NATALIA MAKAROVA REUNITED WITH KIROV BALLET. CANADA: SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. INDIA: SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS SENTENCES AGAINST TWO SIKHS; CHOLERA OUTBREAK KILLS 215. IRAN: RALLY SUPPORTS CEASEFIRE DECISION. IRAQ: ARAB LEAGUE BACKS CALL FOR DIRECT PEACE TALKS. SWITZERLAND: OPEC PRICE COMMITTEE MEETS. SOUTH AFRICA: WHITES REFUSE MILITARY SERVICE. AUSTRALIA: PROTESTS MAR THATCHER VISIT. UNITED KINGDOM: GROUP CONDEMS MEDICAL BREAKTHROUGH IN TRANSPLANTS. LEBANON: PALESTINIANS DEPORTED BY ISRAELIS. GAZA STRIP/WEST BANK: TROOPS AND PROTESTORS CLASH. SWITZERLAND: FURTHER TALKS ON WITHDRAWAL TIME TABLE. SOVIET UNION: CARLUCCI VIEW ADVANCED SOVIET JET-BLACKJACK BOMBER. CHINA: FLOODING DEATHS. AFGHANISTAN: SOVIET REGIMENT LEAVES AFGHANISTAN. ITALY: KIDNAPPED BOY RELEASED. GUATEMALA: SHULTZ ARRIVES TO ELICIT GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR CONTRAS.

Record: 14719

MIA issue

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	880075001
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	060
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	88

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Record: 14719(continued)COUNTRIES
PROGRAM TITLE
DESCRIPTION

WORLDWIDE
 VIDEO NEWS SUMMARY #8
 VNS FOR 18-29 JULY 1988. POLAND: WARSAW PACT MEETING.
 US: NICARAGUAN AMBASSADOR DEPARTS. LIBYAN INTELLIGENCE
 RING. MEXICO: ELECTION OPPOSITION INCREASES. SOUTH
 AFRICA: MANDELA CELEBRATION BANNED. BLACK ACTIVIST'S
 HOME DESTROYED. IRAN: CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION ACCEPTED.
 ACCEPTANCE OF CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION. IRAQ: RENEWED
 HOSTILITIES AGAINST IRAN. SOVIET UNION: ARMENIAN
 PROTEST. ISRAELI DELEGATION ARRIVES IN MOSCOW. PERSIAN
 GULF: US ESCORT OPERATIONS TO CONTINUE. ISRAEL:
 PALESTINIANS CLASH WITH ISRAELI POLICE. MORE VIOLENCE IN
 OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. PALESTINIAN PROTEST RESURGENCE.
 SOVIET UNION: US NAVY OFFICER DEFECTS.
 PHILIPPINES-VIETNAM: US NAVY PILOTS RESCUED. IRAN-IRAQ:
 UN TEAM TO PLAN CEASEFIRE. MAJOR IRAQI OFFENSIVE
 COMPLETED. UN NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE. LULL IN CEASEFIRE
 TALKS. ANGOLA: TROOP WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT. VIETNAM-US:
 WIDER COOPERATION ON US MIAS. NICARAGUA: HOPES FOR
 RENEWED CONTRA AID. BOLIVIA: KEY DRUG LORD ARRESTED.
 AFGHANISTAN: REBELS STEP UP ATTACKS. IRAN-IRAQ-US:
 SITUATION REPORT. MOVES TOWARD PEACE. PHILIPPINES: US
 SERVICEMAN KILLED. COMMUNIST REBEL THREAT INTENSIFIES.
 CUBA: PRESENCE IN ANGOLA. PANAMA: US COVERT ACTION
 AUTHORIZED. CAMBODIA: STRUGGLING FOR SURVIVAL. HUNGARY:
 VISIT OF PREMIER GROSZ. CAMBODIA-VIETNAM: PEACE TALKS
 CONCLUDED. PERU: US MILITARY ASSISTANT SOUGHT.

Record: 7326FILM NUMBER
CLASSIFICATION
DISSEM1
DISSEM2
NUMBER OF TAPES
TAPE WIDTH
RUN TIME/MINUTES
LANGUAGE
YEAR PRODUCED
COUNTRIES
PROGRAM TITLE
DESCRIPTION

880058601
 UNCLASSIFIED
 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
 1
 UMATIC
 013
 ENGLISH
 88
 UNITED STATES
 PRISONER OF WAR CEREMONY AT THE WHITE HOUSE
 PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ADDRESS; POW'S; AWARDING OF A NEW MEDAL
 TO SELECTED POW'S IN EACH WAR; JUNE 24, 1988.

Record: 7321FILM NUMBER
CLASSIFICATION
DISSEM1
DISSEM2
NUMBER OF TAPES
TAPE WIDTH
RUN TIME/MINUTES
LANGUAGE
YEAR PRODUCED

880058401
 UNCLASSIFIED
 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
 1
 UMATIC
 006
 ENGLISH
 88

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000464

Record: 7321(continued)

COUNTRIES
PROGRAM TITLE
DESCRIPTION

VIETNAM
VIETNAM PRISONER INTERVIEW
UPDATE ON VIETNAMESE ARMY MAJOR, A FORMER POW, WHO WAS INTERVIEWED BACK IN 1985; PRISON CONDITIONS; LACK OF EMPLOYMENT; VIETNAM BLACK MARKET; VISA REQUESTING PROCEDURE.

Record: 11799

MIA issue

FILM NUMBER
CLASSIFICATION
DISSEM1
DISSEM2
NUMBER OF TAPES
TAPE WIDTH
RUN TIME/MINUTES
LANGUAGE
YEAR PRODUCED
COUNTRIES
PROGRAM TITLE
DESCRIPTION

880036001
UNCLASSIFIED
OFFICIAL USE ONLY (INCL GOV'T USE ONLY)
NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
1
UMATIC
015
ENGLISH
88
UNITED STATES
THE CHAIRMAN
ADMIRAL WILLIAM CROWE, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; SHOWING HAT COLLECTION TO SOVIET MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV; AKHROMEYEV MEETING WITH OTHER CHIEFS OF THE US ARMED FORCES; CROWE'S VIEWS ON AHKROMEYEV; DO MIAS EXIST?

Record: 14135 ✓

MIA issue

FILM NUMBER
CLASSIFICATION
DISSEM1
DISSEM2
NUMBER OF TAPES
TAPE WIDTH
RUN TIME/MINUTES
LANGUAGE
YEAR PRODUCED
COUNTRIES
SERIES TITLE
PROGRAM TITLE
DESCRIPTION

880021701
UNCLASSIFIED
OFFICIAL USE ONLY (INCL GOV'T USE ONLY)
NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
1
VHS
060
ENGLISH
83
VIETNAM
VIETNAM: A TELEVISION HISTORY
LEGACIES
PART 13-HELICOPTER EVACUATION FROM US EMBASSY, SAIGON IN APRIL 1975; VIETNAMESE REFUGEES TO US; US MIA ISSUE; US-CHINA RELATIONS END US-VIETNAMESE NEGOTIATIONS ON DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION; AMNESTY FOR US WAR OBJECTERS; VIETNAMESE INVADE CAMBODIA; BOAT PEOPLE; POST-WAR LEGACY TO US AND VIETNAM VETERANS COMMENTED ON; REACTION OF US VETERANS TO HOMECOMING CELEBRATION FOR TEHRAN, IRAN EMBASSY HOSTAGES; AGENT ORANGE BEING SPRAYED; VIETNAM MEMORIAL

Record: 14136

FILM NUMBER
CLASSIFICATION
DISSEM1
DISSEM2

880021601
UNCLASSIFIED
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NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL

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Record: 14136(continued)

NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH VHS
RUN TIME/MINUTES 120
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 83
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
SERIES TITLE VIETNAM: A TELEVISION HISTORY
PROGRAM TITLE HOMEFRONT USA; THE END OF THE TUNNEL, 1973-1975
DESCRIPTION PART 11-US PUBLIC OPINION ON VIETNAM WAR; US ANTI-WAR DEMONSTRATIONS; US CLERGY PRO-WAR AND ANTI-WAR STANCES; US CIVIL RIGHTS LEADERS; US SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE HEARINGS; US ANTI-WAR ORGANIZERS; 1968 US DEMOCRATIC CAMPAIGN RHETORIC; REACTION OF MCCARTHY CAMPAIGN WORKERS TO ROBERT KENNEDY'S ASSASSINATION; 1968 DEOMCRATIC CONVENTION IN CHICAGO CONFRONTATION BETWEEN POLICE AND WAR PROTESTERS; STUDENT PROTESTS; VETERANS OPPOSED TO THE WAR; PART 12-SOUTH VIETNAM ANGER AT TREATY; US POWS RETURN HOME; WATERGATE HEARINGS; FORMER CIA ANALYST REMARKS; US CONGRESS ON THE OFFENSIVE RE NIXON AND WATERGATE; CORRUPTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM; NORTH VIETNAM TROOPS ON HO CHI MINH TRAIL TOWARD SAIGON; REFUGEES IN PLEIKU, DANANG; FAMILY REUNIFICATIONS AS NORTH MOVES SOUTH; THIEU'S ARMY CRUMBLES; SAIGON FALLS; HELICOPTER EVACUATIONS, NORTH VIETNAM TANKS ENTER SAIGON

Record: 14270 ✓

FILM NUMBER 880021501
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (INCL GOV'T USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH VHS
RUN TIME/MINUTES 120
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 83
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
SERIES TITLE VIETNAM: A TELEVISION HISTORY
PROGRAM TITLE CAMBODIA AND LAOS; PEACE IS AT HAND, 1968-1973
DESCRIPTION PART 9-US SPECIAL FORCES TO LAOS IN 1961; FORMER CIA EMPLOYEE WHO WORKED IN LAOS; LAOS GUERRILLAS; BOMBING OF HO CHI MINH TRAIL IN LAOS; PATHET LAO; SIHANOUK; KHMER ROUGE BRUTALITY; LON NOL; VIETNAMESE RAIDS INTO CAMBODIA; US TROOPS IN CAMBODIA AND LAOS; NIXON DOCTRINE; US AID; POL POT; COMBAT CASUALTIES; CAMBODIAN REFUGEES IN PHNOM PENH; THE KILLING FIELDS; PART 10-PARIS PEACE TALKS; CEASEFIRE; HO CHI MINH'S FUNERAL; NIXON TRIP TO CHINA; US BOMBS HANOI ON CHRISTMAS 1972; US MARINES IN VIETNAM; VIETNAMIZATION POLICY; PHAM VAN DONG; US ANTI-WAR DEMONSTRATORS; FORMER US POW REMARKS; B-52 DROPPING BOMBS; REMARKS BY SURVIVORS OF HANOI BOMBING; TREATY SIGNING; US POWS LEAVING HANOI HILTON; RELEASE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE POWS

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Record: 14284

FILM NUMBER 880021401
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (INCL GOV'T USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH VHS
RUN TIME/MINUTES 120
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 83
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
SERIES TITLE VIETNAM: A TELEVISION HISTORY
PROGRAM TITLE TET, 1968; VIETNAMIZING THE WAR, 1969-1973
DESCRIPTION PART 7-TET OFFENSIVE; VIETCONG; US EMBASSY IN SAIGON UNDE
ATTACK; HUE; REMARKS BY FORMER VIETCONG, US MILITARY AND
POLITICAL LEADERS, SOUTH VIETNAMESE; REFUGEES; US ANTI-WAR
DEMONSTRATIONS. PART 8-US TROOP REDUCTION; VIETNAMIZATION;
PHOENIX PROGRAM; BOB HOPE USO SHOW; THIEU; BLACK MARKET;
PROSTITUTES; GI NARCOTICS ABUSE; VIETNAMESE POWS; TORTURE;
QUANG TRI; NAPALM VICTIMS; COMBAT; SOUTH VIETNAM GROUND
OFFENSIVE; QUANG TRI RUINS; NGUYEN CAO KY; HAIPHONG

Record: 14197 ✓

FILM NUMBER 880021301
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (INCL GOV'T USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH VHS
RUN TIME/MINUTES 120
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 83
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
SERIES TITLE VIETNAM: A TELEVISION HISTORY
PROGRAM TITLE AMERICA TAKES CHARGE, 1965-1967; AMERICA'S ENEMY,
1954-1967
DESCRIPTION PART 5-US INVOLVED IN DIRECT FIGHTING; OPERATION CEDAR
FALLS, A SEARCH AND DESTROY MISSION; FORMER US SOLDIERS
RECALL THEIR SERVICE IN VIETNAM; COMBAT; VIETNAMESE POWS;
MINE SWEEPING; SEABEES; PART 6-VIETMINH SUCCESS OVER
FRENCH IN 1954; GENEVA ACCORDS; PEOPLES COURT AGAINST
LANDLORDS; FORMER US POW RECOLLECTIONS; NORTH VIETNAMESE
AS LIBERATORS RATHER THAN INVADERS OF SOUTH VIETNAM;
VILLAGERS SET BOOBY-TRAPS; NAPALM; AIR STRIKES; OPERATION
ROLLING THUNDER; ANTI-US PROPAGANDA

Record: 14148 ✓

FILM NUMBER 880017201
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (INCL GOV'T USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH VHS
RUN TIME/MINUTES 053

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Record: 14148(continued)

<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	85
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	UNITED KINGDOM; ITALY; WEST GERMANY; WESTERN EUROPE; EAST GERMANY; JAPAN; UNITED STATES; SOVIET UNION
<u>SERIES TITLE</u>	THE TRIUMPH OF THE WEST
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	THE DECLINE OF THE WEST
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	PART 12 OF A 13-PART SERIES ON THE ROLE OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION IN WORLD HISTORY; THE DECLINE OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY; NAZIISM AND WORLD WAR II; POW AND CONCENTRATION CAMPS; ABANDONMENT OF CONVENTION IN ART AND LITERATURE; CULTURE; WORLD WAR I; ARCHIVAL FOOTAGE; US INVOLVEMENT IN THE WORLD WARS; THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND AMERICAN ISOLATIONISM; EUROPEAN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS; THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION; LENIN; THE BRITISH EMPIRE AFTER WORLD WAR I; OSWALD SPENGLER'S THE DECLINE OF THE WEST; ALBERT EINSTEIN AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF SCIENCE; THE BIRTH OF NUCLEAR PHYSICS; SIGMUND FREUD; MODERN ART; THE DECLINE OF LIBERALISM AND THE RISE OF FASCISM; MUSSOLINI IN ITALY; ADOLF HITLER; THE COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE AND RAPID INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE SOVIET UNION; JOSEF STALIN; ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL; OPERATION BARBAROSSA; WINSTON CHURCHILL AND THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL; GENOCIDE; JAPAN AND WWII; THE CREATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS; EASTERN EUROPE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WARSAW PACT; COMMUNISM; THE VIETNAM WAR; DEVELOPMENT IN JAPAN

Record: 14303 ✓

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	880011601
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (INCL GOV'T USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	025
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	88
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	VIETNAM; UNITED STATES
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	THE US AND VIETNAM: A NEW START?
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	DOCUMENTARY ON INCREASING VIETNAMESE OVERTURES TOWARDS THE US; COMPARISON OF THE OPENING OF TIES BETWEEN THE US AND THE PRC - COULD IT HAPPEN AGAIN?; THE FILM "ALONE TOGETHER" - US SOLDIER BEHIND ENEMY LINES VIEWED COMPASSIONATELY; NO GRUDGES; ENGLISH PREFERRED OVER RUSSIAN AS A SECOND LANGUAGE; LOOKING FOR FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID FROM THE US; US VETERANS OF THE VIETNAM WAR PERMITTED TO TRAVEL IN VIETNAM TODAY; COMMENTS BY ECONOMIC PLANNER NGUYEN XUAN OANH; US TRADE EMBARGO WITH VIETNAM; LEGACY OF THE VIETNAM WAR; 2400 MIA'S STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR; COMMENTS BY RICHARD CHILDRESS OF THE NSC; ALLEGED US INTELLIGENCE EVIDENCE THAT VIETNAM IS STORING THE REMAINS OF HUNDREDS OF THE MIA'S TO USE AS BARGAINING CHIPS; THE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM; WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS; ARCHIVAL FOOTAGE; THE VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION OF CAMBODIA; THE

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Record: 14303(continued)

VIETNAMESE AND CAMBODIAN MILITARY; FOOTAGE OF A CUBAN MILITARY ATTACHE VIEWING AN ARMY DEMONSTRATION; SIHANOUK; THE ORDERLY DEPARTURE PROGRAM; EMIGRATION; AMERASIAN CHILDREN

Record: 14492

FILM NUMBER 870086701
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (INCL GOV'T USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH VHS
RUN TIME/MINUTES 060
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 85
COUNTRIES WORLDWIDE
SERIES TITLE SOLDIERS: A HISTORY OF MEN IN BATTLE
PROGRAM TITLE THE FACE OF BATTLE
DESCRIPTION THE LION'S MOUND AT WATERLOO; REASONS WHY MEN BECOME SOLDIERS; PRE-BATTLE FEARS; ARTILLERY; MILITARY; WWI; REENACTMENT OF THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO; US IN VIETNAM; HAND TO HAND COMBAT; HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS IN 'NAM; CASUALTIES; CAPTURE; WWII POWS

Record: 14498

FILM NUMBER 870086201
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (INCL GOV'T USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH VHS
RUN TIME/MINUTES 060
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 85
COUNTRIES WORLDWIDE
SERIES TITLE SOLDIERS: A HISTORY OF MEN IN BATTLE
PROGRAM TITLE CASUALTY
DESCRIPTION CEMETERY IN BELGIUM WHERE 12,000 ARE BURIED; THE HUMAN PRICE OF WAR; CASUALTIES; VIETNAM, WWI, WWII; VETERANS RECALL THE HORRORS OF DEATHS OF THEIR COMRADES, THEIR OWN WOUNDS; WOUNDED; MILITARY MEDICINE THROUGH THE AGES; FIELD AMBULANCES; FIELD HOSPITALS; WWI GAS; SHELL SHOCK; PSYCHIATRIC CASUALTIES; MEDICS; FALKLANDS SELF-AID; GENEVA CONVENTION AND TREATMENT OF POWS; TORTURE; KOREAN WAR; IRANIAN CW VICTIMS

Record: 13367 ✓

FILM NUMBER 870037901
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (INCL GOV'T USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1

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Record: 13367(continued)

<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	VHS
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	060
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	87
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	UNITED STATES
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	THE BLOODS OF NAM
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	EXPERIENCES OF BLACK SOLDIERS DURING THE VIETNAM WAR, RACIAL ASPECTS, POW'S, PROTESTS, SOLDIERS RETURNING TO SOCIETY, SOME GRAPHIC VIDEO OF THE VIETNAM WAR.

*Korea POW*Record: 13325

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	870035001
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (INCL GOV'T USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	038
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	66
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	SOUTH KOREA; NORTH KOREA; UNITED STATES; SOVIET UNION
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	THAT WAR IN KOREA
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	PART II: USSR JOINS FIGHT; AIR COMBAT; MACARTHUR RELIEVED OF COMMAND; KOREAN POW UPRISING AT KOGI ISLAND; US POWS BRAINWASHING, TORTURE, USED FOR PROPAGANDA; ROSENBERGS, McCARTHY; PEACE; DMZ. KOREAN WAR.

Record: 13286

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	870032101
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (INCL GOV'T USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	VHS
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	098
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	80
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	VIETNAM; UNITED STATES
<u>SERIES TITLE</u>	VIETNAM: THE TEN THOUSAND DAY WAR
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	9. SOLDIERING ON 10. THE VILLAGE WAR
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	9. MORALE AND BATTLEFIELD CONDITIONS OF THE US SOLDIER IN VIETNAM. POWS. ANTI-WAR PROTESTS. DRUGS, RACISM, MUTINY, MY LAI MASSACRE, DISCIPLINE, WITHDRAWAL. 10. BEGINNING OF VIETNAMIZATION. FOREIGN POLICY. STRUGGLE TO CONTROL SOUTH VIETNAMESE VILLAGES.

Record: 13289

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	870031901
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (INCL GOV'T USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1

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Record: 13289(continued)

TAPE WIDTH VHS
RUN TIME/MINUTES 098
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 80
COUNTRIES VIETNAM; UNITED STATES
SERIES TITLE VIETNAM: THE TEN THOUSAND DAY WAR
PROGRAM TITLE 5. THE TRAIL 6. FIREPOWER
DESCRIPTION 5. HO CHI MINH TRAIL; GUERRILLA SOCIETY. 6. US STRATEGY;
 AIRSTRIKES; LOGISTICS; DEFOLIATION; US PILOTS; POWS; B-52;
 HELICOPTER; CASUALTIES; M-16; WEAPONS; ORDNANCE;
 ANTI-PERSONNEL.

Record: 13167

FILM NUMBER 870024801
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (INCL GOV'T USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH VHS
RUN TIME/MINUTES 049
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 79
COUNTRIES VIETNAM; FRANCE
PROGRAM TITLE BATTLE FOR DIEN BIEN PHU
DESCRIPTION ✓ EARLY HISTORY; FRENCH COLONIZATION; JAPAN OCCUPATION;
 VIETMINH; FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY; FRENCH BUILDUP; TACTICS;
 FIRST HO CHI MINH TRAIL; GIAP; DEKASTRI; CASUALTIES;
 POWS; NAVARE; INDEPENDENCE. COMBAT, INDOCHINA.

Record: 14093 ✓

FILM NUMBER 870009101
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH VHS
RUN TIME/MINUTES 093
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 86
COUNTRIES ✓ UNITED STATES; VIETNAM; NORTH KOREA; WEST GERMANY; JAPAN
PROGRAM TITLE POW: AMERICANS IN ENEMY HANDS
DESCRIPTION CAPTURE, TORTURE, ESCAPE, SURVIVAL; WWII, BATAAN, KOREA,
 VIETNAM; WAITING FAMILIES, GOING HOME; MIA LEFT BEHIND IN
 'NAM; VETERAN SUPPORT GROUPS; WHAT FREEDOM MEANS.

Record: 13130

FILM NUMBER 870009001
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 ✓ OFFICIAL USE ONLY (INCL GOV'T USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 2
TAPE WIDTH UMATIC

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Record: 13130(continued)

RUN TIME/MINUTES 120
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 87
COUNTRIES VIETNAM; UNITED STATES
PROGRAM TITLE WE CAN KEEP YOU FOREVER
DESCRIPTION MIAS, DEAD OR ALIVE, COVERUP, DISINFORMATION; LEFT BEHIND, POWS TORTURE, PROPAGANDA; OPERATION HOMECOMING; PANEL DISCUSSION, FAMILIES OF MIAS, VIETNAM, LAOS, THAILAND.

Record: 12661 ✓

FILM NUMBER 860080601FOP
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH UMATIC
RUN TIME/MINUTES 060
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 86
COUNTRIES VIETNAM; UNITED STATES
DESCRIPTION ✓ MIAS: THE STORY THAT WILL NOT DIE (ARE THERE STILL AMERICANS ALIVE IN VIETNAM-FAMILIES SEARCH-PRIVATE GROUPS US GOVERNMENT MEASURES-MISIDENTIFICATION OF REMAINS-BOAT PEOPLE BARWOOD-CONGRESS-ABC 20/20 29 MAY 86) MIA , POW , VIETNAM , HOANG BICH SON , BONES , IDENTIFICATION , OPERATION RESCUE , VETERANS , GARWOOD , DIA

Record: 11682

FILM NUMBER 860049301
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH UMATIC
RUN TIME/MINUTES 010
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 86
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES
PROGRAM TITLE POW SCHOOL
DESCRIPTION EXTENSIVE TRAINING TECHNIQUES ARE TAUGHT TO SOLDIERS IN CASE OF CAPTURE AND ESCAPE. TRAINING IN JUNGLES OF PANAMA. SURVIVAL TRAINING, MILITARY WARFARE. (DATES:14-15 MAY 86)

Record: 4812

FILM NUMBER 834409801
STATUS LOST
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH UMATIC

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Record: 4812(continued)

RUN TIME/MINUTES 060
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 82
COUNTRIES AFGHANISTAN; PAKISTAN; SOVIET UNION
PROGRAM TITLE AFGHANISTAN, THE FORGOTTEN WAR
DESCRIPTION IMPACT OF WAR ON PAKISTAN - INFLUX OF REFUGEES; ECONOMIC AND OTHER INTERNAL PROBLEMS INTENSIFY; DOCTOR DISCUSSES NERVE GAS EFFECTS; WEAPONS SHORTAGES; POW TREATMENT BY MUJAHEDDIN; SIEGE OF SOVIET POSITION; POW'S; SOVIET , INCURSION , REFUGEES , CHEMICAL , WARFARE , MORTARS.

Record: 4810

FILM NUMBER 834409701
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH UMATIC
RUN TIME/MINUTES 060
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 82
COUNTRIES AFGHANISTAN; SOVIET UNION
PROGRAM TITLE AFGHANISTAN: BEHIND RUSSIAN LINES
DESCRIPTION A REPORTING TEAM ENTERS AFGHANISTAN TO INTERVIEW REBEL LEADER MASSOUD, THEY ENDURE AIR ATTACK, QUESTION DESERTERS FROM GOVERNMENT TROOPS; TREATMENT OF POW'S BY REBELS; HIT AND-RUN ANTI-TANK OPERATION. MUJAHEDDIN, GRENADE LAUNCHERS, SOVIET INVASION, GUERRILLA WARFARE, PANJSHIR VALLEY, RESISTANCE GROUP LEADER.

Record: 4171

FILM NUMBER 824460901
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 4
TAPE WIDTH UMATIC
RUN TIME/MINUTES 210
LANGUAGE ARABIC
YEAR PRODUCED 81
COUNTRIES IRAQ; IRAN
PROGRAM TITLE IRAN-IRAQ WAR
DESCRIPTION BATTLES, IRANIAN POW'S, MILITARY HARDWARE, TREATMENT OF WOUNDED, URBAN FIGHTING IN KHORRAMSHAHAR, TANKS MOVING ON ROUGH TERRAIN. SOVIET T-72 TANKS, ARTILLERY, HELICOPTERS, MI-24, ROCKET LAUNCHER, AIRCRAFT, ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS, ZPU-4, GRENADE LAUNCHERS.

Record: 4407

FILM NUMBER 824444701
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)

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Record: 4407(continued)

<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	UMATIC
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	030
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	82
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	AFGHANISTAN; SOVIET UNION
<u>PROGRAM TITLE</u>	AFGANISTAN
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	AMERICAN INTERESTS - AFGHANISTAN (THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN - THE ONSET, ADEQUACY OF THE U.S. RESPONSE, CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION, AID NEEDED BY THE INSURGENTS, CLAIMS OF CHEMICAL WARFARE) SOVIET , INCURSION , CHEMICAL , WARFARE , PURPORTED , COUNTERINSURGENCY , MOJAHEDIN , POW'S , SOVIET , DESERTERS , SOVIET , GUERRILLA , WARFARE

Record: 2501

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	773312101FOP
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	16MM
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	028
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	SPANISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	48
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	UNITED STATES
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	PRISONER OF WAR FOR INTELLIGENCE (VALUABLE INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM POW'S THROUGH PROPER INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES) INTELLIGENCE , INFORMATION , INTERROGATION , TECHNIQUES , POW'S

Record: 1633

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	743304501FOP
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	6
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	35MM
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	307
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	67
<u>ARCHIVE NUMBER</u>	ARC22-162-169 46B1
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	VIETNAM; UNITED STATES
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	PILOTS IN PAJAMAS POW'S , U , S

Record: 1649

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	743300501FOP
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	16MM

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Record: 1649(continued)

RUN TIME/MINUTES 028
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 73
ARCHIVE NUMBER R8300651-049 46C1
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES
DESCRIPTION IN THE PRESENCE OF MINE ENEMIES POW , RELIGION , SURVIVAL
, ETHICS

Record: 9218

FILM NUMBER 743254401F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 022
YEAR PRODUCED 67
ARCHIVE NUMBER 85-00473R-0023 46C1
COUNTRIES VIETNAM; UNITED STATES
DESCRIPTION PILOTS IN PAJAMAS UNIDENTIFIED POW'S POW'S , U , S

Record: 11415

FILM NUMBER 733303201
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 2
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 110
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 72
ARCHIVE NUMBER 85-00880R-0011 46C2
COUNTRIES VIETNAM; UNITED STATES
PROGRAM TITLE POW INTERVIEWS AND PHOTOS
DESCRIPTION POW INTERVIEWS AND PHOTOS TODAY SHOW (POW'S , US),

Record: 790

FILM NUMBER 725202401F0N
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 008
LANGUAGE JAPANESE
YEAR PRODUCED 72
ARCHIVE NUMBER ARC23-096 46B1
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION POW'S APPEAR AT HANOI PRESS CONFERENCE 1971 POW'S , U , S
, GUENTHER , INJURED , HOFFMAN , WELLS , HILDEBRAND ,
VAUGHN , JOHNSON , HANOI

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Record: 8917

FILM NUMBER 723260801
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 019
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 72
ARCHIVE NUMBER 85-00473R-0011 46C1
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
PROGRAM TITLE INTEVIEW WITH US POW
DESCRIPTION EVERETT ALVAREZ; INTERVIEW WITH FAMILY.

Record: 7900

FILM NUMBER 723218301F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 006
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 72
ARCHIVE NUMBER 84-00833R-0014 46C2
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION NORTH VIETNAM RELEASE OF PILOTS POW'S , U , S , RELEASE , CHARLES , GARTLEY , ELIAS , PRESS , CONFERENCE , FAMILIES , ATTEND

Record: 7711

FILM NUMBER 723203201F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 001
YEAR PRODUCED 72
ARCHIVE NUMBER 84-00833R-0013 46C2
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION POW LT. LYNN L. GUENTHER POW'S , U , S , HANOI , HOSPITAL , GUENTHER , INJURED

Record: 7712

FILM NUMBER 723203001
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 003

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Record: 7712(continued)

LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 72
ARCHIVE NUMBER 84-00833R-0013 46C2
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
PROGRAM TITLE NVN AIR FORCE USES SOVIET MIG'S
DESCRIPTION POW'S; US GUENTHER INJURED; MIG-21; FLIGHT LINE; AIR DEFENSE GUIDED MISSILES; AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES.

Record: 9872

FILM NUMBER 723201401
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 002
YEAR PRODUCED 71
ARCHIVE NUMBER 85-00472R-0011 46B2
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
PROGRAM TITLE NORTH VIETNAM: FOUR AMERICAN PILOTS
DESCRIPTION 15424/71 US POW'S, WELLS, HILDEBRAND, VAUGHN, JOHNSON, PRESS CONFERENCE.

Record: 13941

FILM NUMBER 723200401
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (INCL GOV'T USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 002
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 72
ARCHIVE NUMBER A7901076-006 46C2
COUNTRIES VIETNAM; UNITED STATES
PROGRAM TITLE AMERICAN PRISONERS - HANOI
DESCRIPTION AMERICAN PRISONERS - HANOI (POW'S , US , WELLS , HILDEBRAND , VAUGHN , JOHNSON , PRESS , CONFERENCE)

Record: 13769

FILM NUMBER 713306301
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (INCL GOV'T USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 031
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 68
ARCHIVE NUMBER 85-00880R-0007 46C2
COUNTRIES NORTH KOREA
PROGRAM TITLE PUEBLO FILMS

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Record: 13769(continued)

DESCRIPTION PUEBLO FILMS (SHORT CLIPS - PUEBLO NEWS STORIES) PUEBLO ,
CAPTURE , POW'S , US , BUCHER , STATEMENT , CREW ,
STATEMENTS

Record: 512

FILM NUMBER 713303101F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 3
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 055
YEAR PRODUCED 71
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION

✓

MICHAEL MACLEAR'S TRAVELS IN NORTH VIETNAM - NBC 'FIRST
TUESDAY' POLITICAL , ECONOMIC , PLANNING , CONSTRUCTION ,
REBUILDING , CAVE-BASED , INDUSTRIES , HANOI , MILITARY ,
DRILLS , PHAM , VAN , DONG , POW'S , U , S , HANOI ,
HILTON

Record: 563

FILM NUMBER 713250201
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 017
YEAR PRODUCED 70
ARCHIVE NUMBER ARC23-078 46C2
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES
PROGRAM TITLE POW INTERVIEW, CHRISTMAS 1970 - NVN
DESCRIPTION US POW'S, HANOI HILTON, PHAM VAN DONG INTERVIEW.

✓

Record: 72

FILM NUMBER 713204302F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 001
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 68
ARCHIVE NUMBER A7901076-006 46C2
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION POW STORY - CBS NEWS, 9 FEB. 1971 VIET-CONG , FIGHTERS ,
HUE , TET , OFFENSIVE , POW , U , S , UNIDENTIFIED

✓

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Record: 9919

FILM NUMBER 713203401
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 004
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 71
ARCHIVE NUMBER 85-00472R-0002 46B2
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
PROGRAM TITLE ✓ POW'S COMMENT, 1 FEB 1971
DESCRIPTION US POWS, RUMBLE, HEGDAHL, TREATMENT, HANOI.

Record: 9920

FILM NUMBER 713203301
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 008
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 70
ARCHIVE NUMBER ✓ 85-00472R-0002 46B2
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
PROGRAM TITLE LIFE IN HANOI HILTON
DESCRIPTION US POWS; MAYHEW, GARTLEY, CHRISTMAS 1970.

Record: 8713

FILM NUMBER 703253501F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 017
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 68
ARCHIVE NUMBER ✓ 85-00473R-0002 46C1
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION HERE THERE ARE TIGERS - EXCERPT POW , INTERROGATION ,
 POLITICAL , OFFICER , TRADECRAFT

Record: 11448

FILM NUMBER 703213601
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES ✓ 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 007

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Record: 11448(continued)

YEAR PRODUCED 69
ARCHIVE NUMBER 85-00473R-0003 46C1
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
PROGRAM TITLE US POWS, CHRISTMAS 1969
DESCRIPTION POW 1969-CHRISTMAS (US)

Record: 146

FILM NUMBER 703206501
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 003
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 70
ARCHIVE NUMBER ✓ ARC22-151 46C2
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
PROGRAM TITLE TIGER CAGE
DESCRIPTION CON SON TIGER CAGE, PRISONERS TREATMENT, POWS.

Record: 8631

FILM NUMBER 703205901F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 002
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED ✓ 70
ARCHIVE NUMBER 84-00833R-0002 46C2
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION POW JOHN SWEENEY POW , DESERTER , SWEENEY , PFC , JOHN

Record: 115

FILM NUMBER 703205001F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 011
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 70
ARCHIVE NUMBER ✓ ARC22-149 46C2
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES
DESCRIPTION POW STORIES POW , FAMILIES , POLITICAL , ACTIVITIES , MAYHEW , HARTLEY

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Record: 8390

FILM NUMBER 693627901FOP
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 002
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 69
ARCHIVE NUMBER 84-00833R-0098 46C2
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION ✓ POW RELEASE HANOI HANOI , POW'S , U , S , FRISHMAN ,
 HEGDAHL , D , RUMBLE , RELEASE , NEGOTIATIONS , RISNER ,
 INGVALSON , ANDREWS

Record: 6517

FILM NUMBER 693627401FOP
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 005
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 69
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION ✓ U.S. POW RELEASE, 5-6 AUGUST 1969 POW'S , U , S , HEGDAHL
 , D , FRISHMAN , RUMBLE , RELEASED , TREATMENT , DESCRIBED
 , INTERVIEWS

Record: 8228

FILM NUMBER 693604701FOP
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 008
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 69
ARCHIVE NUMBER 84-00833R-0098 46C2
COUNTRIES VIETNAM; UNITED STATES
DESCRIPTION ✓ U.S. POW'S CHRISTMAS IN NORTH VIETNAM POW'S , U , S ,
 TANGEMAN , HEGDAHL , D , SHIVELY , J , CRECCA , ABBOT ,
 TORKELESON , ANDREWS , FRISHMAN , INGVALSON , RUMBLE ,
 STRATTON , LCDR , R , STAFFORD , BERGER , RINGSDORF ,
 PRISON , ACTIVITIES

Record: 12261

FILM NUMBER 685618803FOP
CLASSIFICATION ✓ UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)

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Record: 12261(continued)

<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	2
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	16MM
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	063
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	68
<u>ARCHIVE NUMBER</u>	85-00876R-0062 46B2
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	VIETNAM
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	PILOTS IN PAJAMAS - EDITED VERSION (EAST GERMAN INTERROGATOR ATTEMPTS TO DETERMINE FROM QUESTIONING SOME CAPTURED PILOTS THE PERSONALITY TYPES AND MOTIVATIONS OF THOSE WHO FLY BOMBING MISSIONS OVER NORTH VIETNAM) POW'S , PILOTS , INTERROGATED

Record: 6226

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	685618201F0N
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	6
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	16MM
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	313
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	ENGLISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	67
<u>ARCHIVE NUMBER</u>	ARC23-081 46B1
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	UNITED STATES; VIETNAM
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	PILOTS IN PAJAMAS (EAST GERMAN INTERROGATOR ATTEMPTS TO DETERMINE FROM QUESTIONING SOME CAPTURED PILOTS THE PERSONALITY TYPES AND MOTIVATIONS OF THOSE WHO FLY BOMBING MISSIONS OVER NORTH VIETNAM) POW'S , PROPAGANDA , COMMUNIST , PERSONALITY , ASSESSMENT

Record: 6258

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	685614301F0N
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED
<u>DISSEM1</u>	OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
<u>DISSEM2</u>	NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
<u>NUMBER OF TAPES</u>	1
<u>TAPE WIDTH</u>	16MM
<u>RUN TIME/MINUTES</u>	009
<u>LANGUAGE</u>	SPANISH
<u>YEAR PRODUCED</u>	68
<u>ARCHIVE NUMBER</u>	ARC23-080 46B1
<u>COUNTRIES</u>	VIETNAM
<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	U.S. POW'S IN NORTH VIETNAM (POW'S ARE RELUCTANT GUESTS AT THE HANOI HILTON) POW'S , U , S , HANOI , HILTON , FLYNN , COL , JOHN , P , BLACK , CAPT , JOHN , D , INTERROGATION

Record: 8219

<u>FILM NUMBER</u>	683652301F0P
<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	UNCLASSIFIED

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Record: 8219(continued)

DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 002
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 68
ARCHIVE NUMBER 84-00833R-0089 46C2
COUNTRIES CAMBODIA; UNITED STATES
DESCRIPTION CAMBODIA PRISONERS POW'S , U , S , PHNOM , PENH ,
 CHEVALIER , SGT , J , SIHANOUK , SPEAKS

Record: 6164

FILM NUMBER 683651101F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 001
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 68
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION ✓ CAPTURED U.S. PILOTS, HA-TINH BOMBING , RAID , AIR ,
 DEFENSE , POW'S , U , S

Record: 9752

FILM NUMBER 683641201F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 004
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 68
ARCHIVE NUMBER ✓ 85-00473R-0106 46C1
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES
DESCRIPTION PUEBLO STORY, SEPT 1968 (POWS , US , PUEBLO , CREW ,
 ANTI-US , SPEECHES , BUCHER , PRESS , CONFERENCE , MISSION
 , DESCRIPTION)

Record: 9702

FILM NUMBER 683635601F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 ✓ NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 001
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 68

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Record: 9702(continued)

ARCHIVE NUMBER 85-00473R-0110 46C1
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION POW RELEASE - INGVALSON AND PARROTT (POWS , US , PRESS ,
CONFERENCE , STATEMENT ON TREATMENT)

Record: 9701

FILM NUMBER 683635401F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 001
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 68
ARCHIVE NUMBER ✓ 85-00473R-0110 46C1
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION POW RELEASE - LOW, CARPENTER, THOMPSON PRE-RELEASE ,
BRIEFING , POW'S , U , S , LOW , CARPENTER , THOMPSON

Record: 9700

FILM NUMBER 683635301F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 001
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 68
ARCHIVE NUMBER ✓ 85-00473R-0110 46C1
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION POW INTERVIEW-INGVALSON & PARROTT IN HANOI POW'S , U , S ,
INGVALSON , PARROTT , PRESS , CONFERENCE

Record: 9763

FILM NUMBER 683617401
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 007
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 68
ARCHIVE NUMBER ✓ 85-00473R-0110 46C1
COUNTRIES NORTH KOREA; UNITED STATES
PROGRAM TITLE PUEBLO PRISONERS - EXCERPTS
DESCRIPTION US POW'S. PUEBLO CREW, PRESS CONFERENCE, TREATMENT
RECEIVED.

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Record: 9765

FILM NUMBER 683615701F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 006
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 68
ARCHIVE NUMBER 85-00473R-0107 46C1
COUNTRIES NORTH KOREA; UNITED STATES
DESCRIPTION ✓ PUEBLO STORY POW'S , U , S , PUEBLO , CREW , BUCHER ,
 ESPIONAGE , CONFESSION

Record: 6259

FILM NUMBER 683614001
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 3
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 118
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 67
COUNTRIES ✓ UNITED STATES
PROGRAM TITLE CODE OF CONDUCT
DESCRIPTION POW TREATMENT AND CONDUCT, ANTI-US PROPAGANDA, PURPOSE OF
 TREATMENT, DISCIPLINE, IMPORTANCE.

Record: 9694

FILM NUMBER 683604701F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 004
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 67
ARCHIVE NUMBER 85-00473R-0108 46C1
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION ✓ U.S. POW'S CELEBRATE CHRISTMAS AT HANOI HILTON POW'S , U ,
 S , HANOI , HILTON , CHRISTMAS , HEGDAHL , D , BLACK ,
 STRATTON , LCDR , R , STAFFORD , POLLOCK , PARROTT ,
 SHIVELY , J , ABBOTT

Record: 10259

FILM NUMBER 683600001F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 ✓ OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1

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Record: 10259(continued)

TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 005
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 67
ARCHIVE NUMBER 85-00472R-0071 46B2
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION HUNTLEY-BRINKLEY POW'S (US , SHANKEL , JONES , PLUMB ,
 ALVAREZ , EVERETT , LOCKHART , DUTTON , ANDREWS , STIRM ,
 CROWD , TREATMENT)

Record: 6052

FILM NUMBER 673674701FOP
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 002
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 67
ARCHIVE NUMBER ✓ ARC22-130 46C2
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION COL. FLYNN - POW POW , U , S , FLYNN , COL , J , HANOI ,
 HOSPITAL , TREATMENT , DISCUSSED

Record: 11445

FILM NUMBER 673671501
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 001
YEAR PRODUCED 67
ARCHIVE NUMBER ARC22-135 46C2
COUNTRIES VIETNAM; UNITED STATES
PROGRAM TITLE AMERICAN PEACE COMMITTEE MEETS POWS
DESCRIPTION ✓ AMERICAN PEACE COMMITTEE METS POW'S (US , BAKER , CARRIGAN
 , HEGDAHL , HOSPITAL)

Record: 6034

FILM NUMBER 673666401FOP
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES ✓ 002
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 67
ARCHIVE NUMBER ARC22-136 46C2
COUNTRIES VIETNAM

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Record: 6034(continued)DESCRIPTIONREV. JOHN BROWN AND POW'S POW'S , U , S , BAKER , MAJ , E
, CARRIGAN , CAPT , L , HEGDAHL , DRecord: 6025FILM NUMBER

673664401F0P

CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

DISSEM1

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (INCL GOV'T USE ONLY)

DISSEM2

NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL

NUMBER OF TAPES

1

TAPE WIDTH

16MM

RUN TIME/MINUTES

004

YEAR PRODUCED

67

ARCHIVE NUMBER

ARC22-136 46C1

COUNTRIES

UNITED STATES; VIETNAM

DESCRIPTIONINTERVIEW OF U.S. POW HUGHES BY SCHOENBRUN POW , U , S ,
HUGHES , COL , J , L , INTERVIEW , PHAM , VAN , DONGRecord: 6015FILM NUMBER

673662801F0P

CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

DISSEM1

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)

DISSEM2

NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL

NUMBER OF TAPES

1

TAPE WIDTH

16MM

RUN TIME/MINUTES

014

LANGUAGE

ENGLISH

YEAR PRODUCED

67

ARCHIVE NUMBER

ARC22-136 46C2

COUNTRIES

VIETNAM

DESCRIPTIONFELIX GREENE INTERVIEWS POW'S POW'S , U , S , HITESHEW ,
MAJ , J , E , RINGSDORF , CAPT , H , INTERVIEW , VIEWS ,
ON , WARRecord: 6013FILM NUMBER

673662101F0P

CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

DISSEM1

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)

DISSEM2

NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL

NUMBER OF TAPES

1

TAPE WIDTH

16MM

RUN TIME/MINUTES

010

LANGUAGE

ENGLISH

YEAR PRODUCED

67

ARCHIVE NUMBER

ARC22-135 46C2

COUNTRIES

UNITED STATES; VIETNAM

DESCRIPTIONPOW STORY - LONG VERSION POW'S , U , S , STRATTON , LCDR ,
R , HEGDAHL , D , HATCHER , GALANTI , RUSSELL , PRISON ,
COMPLEX , DAILY , ACTIVITIES , HANOI , HILTON

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Record: 6011

FILM NUMBER 673661801F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 006
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 67
ARCHIVE NUMBER ARC22-137 46C2
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES; VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION ✓ POW STORY POW'S , U , S , PRISON , COMPLEX , DAILY ,
 ACTIVITIES , STRATTON , LCDR , R , HEGDAHL , D , GALANTI ,
 HANOI , HILTON , RUSSELL , HATCHER , AIR , RAID , SHELTERS

Record: 13829

FILM NUMBER 673660101
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (INCL GOV'T USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 031
YEAR PRODUCED 67
ARCHIVE NUMBER ARC22-137 46C2
COUNTRIES ✓ VIETNAM; UNITED STATES
PROGRAM TITLE US POWS, NORTH VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION U.S. POW'S, NORTH VIETNAM (POW'S , US , GALANTI , HEGDAHL
 , STRATTON , PRISON , COMPLEX , DAILY , ACTIVITIES)

Record: 6001

FILM NUMBER 673657901F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 001
LANGUAGE ✓ ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 67
ARCHIVE NUMBER ARC22-134 46C2
COUNTRIES PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
DESCRIPTION FLYNN STORY POW , U , S , FLYNN , R , J , VICTORY , RALLY
 , ZHOU , ENLAI , CHEN , BODA , JIANG , QING

Record: 5991

FILM NUMBER 673655901F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 ✓ OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM

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Record: 5991(continued)

RUN TIME/MINUTES 003
YEAR PRODUCED 67
ARCHIVE NUMBER ARC22-134 46C2
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION POW STRATTON WITH JAPAN INVESTIGATORS POW , U , S ,
 STRATTON , LCDR , R , INTERVIEW

Record: 5990

FILM NUMBER 673655801F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 003
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 67
ARCHIVE NUMBER ✓ ARC22-134 46C2
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES; VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION HANOI RAID, 19 MAY '67; POW G. L. ANDERSON POW , U , S ,
 ANDERSON , G , L , BOMB , DAMAGE

Record: 5989

FILM NUMBER 673655701F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 003
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 67
ARCHIVE NUMBER ✓ ARC22-134 46C2
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES; VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION POW WM. M. HARDMAN INTERVIEW POW , U , S , HARDMAN , LTC ,
 WM , INTERVIEW , BOMB , DAMAGE

Record: 5981

FILM NUMBER 673651401F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH ✓ 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 001
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 67
ARCHIVE NUMBER ARC22-135 46C2
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION POW MAJOR DAVID EVERSON STATEMENT POW , U , S , EVERSON ,
 MAJ , D , INTERROGATION

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Record: 5962

FILM NUMBER 673642701FOP
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 002
YEAR PRODUCED 66
ARCHIVE NUMBER ARC22-135 46B1
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION ✓ POW'S PARADE THROUGH HANOI POW'S , U , S , MANACLED , HANOI

Record: 6108

FILM NUMBER 673631901FOP
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 003
YEAR PRODUCED 67
ARCHIVE NUMBER ARC22-133 46C2
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION ✓ U.S. POW'S HUGHES, LARSON AND SHIVELY IN HANOI HANOI , POW'S , U , S , HUGHES , COL , J , L , SHIVELY , J , LARSON , INJURED , PRESS , CONFERENCE

Record: 6120

FILM NUMBER 673623101FOP
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 004
LANGUAGE ✓ ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 67
ARCHIVE NUMBER ARC22-132 46C2
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES; VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION ✓ POW'S TANNER AND TERRY POW'S , U , S , HANOI , TANNER , C , TERRY , R , PRESS , CONFERENCE

Record: 6084

FILM NUMBER 673601801FOP
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES ✓ 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 002
YEAR PRODUCED 66

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Record: 6084(continued)

ARCHIVE NUMBER ARC22-132 46C2
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES; VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION DAMAGE FROM U.S. BOMBING RAID NEAR HANOI PERSONAL ,
EFFECTS , TREATMENT , OF , WOUNDED , AIRCRAFT , SALVAGE ,
BOMB , DAMAGE , POW , U , S

Record: 6085

FILM NUMBER 673601701F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 002 ✓
YEAR PRODUCED 66
ARCHIVE NUMBER ARC22-133 46C2
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES; VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION AMERICAN PILOT AT HANOI NEWS CONFERENCE HANOI , POW , U ,
S , REHMANN , D , PRESS , CONFERENCE

Record: 5849

FILM NUMBER 663680602F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 002 ✓
YEAR PRODUCED 66
ARCHIVE NUMBER ARC22-134 46C2
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES; VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION NAVY POW REHMANN - TODAY SHOW POW , U , S , REHMANN , D ,
PRESS , CONFERENCE

Record: 9630

FILM NUMBER 663663201F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 036
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 66 ✓
ARCHIVE NUMBER 85-00473R-0089 46C1
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES
DESCRIPTION HANDLING OF PRISONERS OF WAR, PT.1 - GENEVA CONVENTION POW
, HANDLING , GENEVA , CONFERENCE , MILITARY , POLICE ,
RESPONSIBILITY , PROCESSING , PROCEDURES

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Record: 5806

FILM NUMBER 663663001F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 003
YEAR PRODUCED 66
ARCHIVE NUMBER ARC22-138 46C2
COUNTRIES ✓ UNITED STATES; VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION MAJOR J.H. KASLER IN HOSPITAL POW , U , S , KASLER , MAJ ,
 J , H , MEDICAL , TREATMENT , HOSPITAL , EQUIPMENT

Record: 5795

FILM NUMBER 663658001F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 001
YEAR PRODUCED 66
ARCHIVE NUMBER ✓ ARC22-129 46C2
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES; VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION CAPTURE OF LT. WILLIAM SHANKELL POW , U , S , AIR , SHOW ,
 ANTI-AIRCRAFT , FIRE , SHANKELL , LT , W

Record: 5793

FILM NUMBER 663656501F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 002
YEAR PRODUCED 66
ARCHIVE NUMBER ARC22-131 46C2
COUNTRIES ✓ UNITED STATES; VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION U.S. PRISONER M.N. JONES POW , U , S , JONES , M , N ,
 HANOI , PLANE , WRECKAGE , PRESS , CONFERENCE , CROWD ,
 DEMONSTRATIONS

Record: 5792

FILM NUMBER 663656401F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES ✓ 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 001
YEAR PRODUCED 66
ARCHIVE NUMBER ARC22-131 46C2

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Record: 5792(continued)COUNTRIES
DESCRIPTIONUNITED STATES; VIETNAM
CAPTAIN JONES IN HANOI POW , U , S , JONES , M , N , PRESS
, CONFERENCERecord: 5779FILM NUMBER
CLASSIFICATION
DISSEM1
DISSEM2
NUMBER OF TAPES
TAPE WIDTH
RUN TIME/MINUTES
YEAR PRODUCED
ARCHIVE NUMBER
COUNTRIES
DESCRIPTION663652201FON
UNCLASSIFIED
NO DISSEM ABROAD
NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL3
16MM
005
66

ARC23-074 46C2

UNITED STATES; VIETNAM

U.S. PILOTS MARCH THROUGH HANOI (POW'S , U , S , JONES , M
, N , DENTON , JEREMIAH , CROWD , DEMONSTRATIONS , PLANE ,
WRECKAGE)Record: 5893FILM NUMBER
CLASSIFICATION
DISSEM1
DISSEM2
NUMBER OF TAPES
TAPE WIDTH
RUN TIME/MINUTES
YEAR PRODUCED
ARCHIVE NUMBER
COUNTRIES
DESCRIPTION663646301FOP
UNCLASSIFIED
OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL1
16MM
001
66

ARC22-129 46C2

VIETNAM; UNITED STATES

POW'S IN STREETS OF HANOI POW'S , U , S , DEMONSTRATING ,
CROWDSRecord: 11598FILM NUMBER
CLASSIFICATION
DISSEM1
DISSEM2
NUMBER OF TAPES
TAPE WIDTH
RUN TIME/MINUTES
YEAR PRODUCED
ARCHIVE NUMBER
COUNTRIES
PROGRAM TITLE
DESCRIPTION663642001
UNCLASSIFIED
OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL1
16MM
001
66

ARC22-131 46C2

UNITED STATES; VIETNAM

BOMBING OF HANOI

BOMBING OF HANOI (POW , US , JONES , BOMB , DAMAGE ,
ANTI-US , DEMONSTRATION)Record: 8356FILM NUMBER
CLASSIFICATION663633401FOP
UNCLASSIFIED

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Record: 8356(continued)

DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 026
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 66
ARCHIVE NUMBER 84-00833R-0080 46C2
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES; VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION INSIDE NORTH VIETNAM - THE VIETNAM WAR, XVI AIR , DEFENSE
, ANTI-AIRCRAFT , BATTERIES , BOMBING , ACCURACY , POW'S ,
U , S , ALVAREZ , EVERETT , LOCKHART , VOHDEN , LCDR ,
RAYMOND , GUARINO

Record: 9491

FILM NUMBER 663631201F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 003
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 66
ARCHIVE NUMBER ✓ 85-00473R-0090 46C1
COUNTRIES VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION INTERVIEW WITH LCDR. RAYMOND A. VOHDEN POW'S , U , S ,
VOHDEN , LCDR , RAYMOND , INTERVIEW , POW , TREATMENT

Record: 5648

FILM NUMBER 653684201F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (INCL GOV'T USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 025
LANGUAGE ✓ ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 65
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES; SOUTH KOREA; VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION NAME, RANK, AND SERVICE NUMBER (MENTAL , STRESSES ,
PHYSICAL , ABUSE , HEALTH , MAINTENANCE , POW , PRISONER ,
OF , WAR , RESISTANCE , INTERROGATION , HEALTH ,
MAINTENANCE , TRADECRAFT)

Record: 8343

FILM NUMBER 653624601F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 ✓ OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM

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Record: 8343(continued)

RUN TIME/MINUTES 003
YEAR PRODUCED 65
ARCHIVE NUMBER 84-00833R-0078 46C2
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES; VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION VIETCONG INTERROGATES CAPTURED U.S. FLIER LOCKHART POW'S ,
 U , S , LOCKHART , ANTI-U , S , PROPAGANDA , INTERROGATION

Record: 5467

FILM NUMBER 643624701FOP
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 025
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 63
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES
DESCRIPTION PRISONERS OF WAR FOR INTELLIGENCE - REVISED HYPOTHETICAL ,
 SITUATION , POW , COLLECTIONS , CENTER , INTERROGATION ,
 HANDLING , POW'S , DISCIPLINE , TACTICS , INFORMATION ,
 ANALYSIS

Record: 10478

FILM NUMBER 623617601FOP
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 028
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 61
ARCHIVE NUMBER 85-00472R-0048 46B2
COUNTRIES PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
DESCRIPTION ULTIMATE WEAPONS, THE MINDS OF FREE MEN BRAINWASHING ,
 PSYCHOLOGICAL , PRESSURES , POW , TREATMENT , POLITICAL ,
 INDOCTRINATION , SELF-CRITICISM

Record: 11444

FILM NUMBER 617699001FOP
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 011
YEAR PRODUCED 61
ARCHIVE NUMBER 84-00833R-0063 46C2
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES; VIETNAM
DESCRIPTION VIETNAMESE POW INTERROGATION INTERROGATION , TECHNIQUES ,
 MILITARY , TRAINING , PATROLLING

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Record: 9434

FILM NUMBER 593606902F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 030
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 58
ARCHIVE NUMBER 85-00473R-0056 46C1
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES
DESCRIPTION RESIST INTERROGATION , TECHNIQUES , COMMUNISM ,
 INDOCTRINATION , METHODS , POW'S , TRADecraft

Record: 3065

FILM NUMBER 583608301F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 056
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 57
ARCHIVE NUMBER A7901076-022 46C2
COUNTRIES PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA; NORTH KOREA; CZECHOSLOVAKIA
DESCRIPTION BRAINWASHING ANTI-COMMUNISM , BRAINWASHING , PSYCHOLOGICAL
 , PRESSURES , SURVIVORS , SPEAK , BONE , DR , EDITH , OTIS
 , WILLIAM , KOREA , POW'S , IDEOLOGICAL , CONVERSION ,
 POLITICAL

Record: 2701

FILM NUMBER 563730201F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 35MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 003
YEAR PRODUCED 56
ARCHIVE NUMBER ARC22-001 46C2
COUNTRIES ISRAEL; EGYPT
DESCRIPTION ISRAEL - ARAB PRISONERS, OCT. 1956 TANKS , DESTROYED ,
 CAPTURED , EQUIPMENT , SMALL , ARMS , POW'S , ARAB

Record: 2195

FILM NUMBER 557607701F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM

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Record: 2195(continued)

RUN TIME/MINUTES 009
YEAR PRODUCED 54
ARCHIVE NUMBER ARC22-043 46B1
COUNTRIES PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA; UNITED STATES
DESCRIPTION AMERICAN PRISONERS IN CHINA (POW'S , US , KOREAN , WAR ,
 PRC-CAPTURED , MEDICAL , TREATMENT)

Record: 2311

FILM NUMBER 553646001FON
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 019
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 55
ARCHIVE NUMBER ARC23-007 46A
COUNTRIES PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
DESCRIPTION BRAINWASHED AMERICANS - INTERVIEWS WITH ADELE RICKETT AND
 MALCOLM BERSOHN CHINA , PRC-HELD , POWS , RELEASED ,
 BRAINWASHING , VICTIMS , BERSOHN , MALCOLM , RICKETT ,
 ADELE

Record: 2023

FILM NUMBER 547734901
STATUS ZZZ
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 005
LANGUAGE GERMAN
YEAR PRODUCED 41
ARCHIVE NUMBER R7901781-059 46B2
COUNTRIES WEST GERMANY; SOVIET UNION
PROGRAM TITLE GERMAN WORLD WAR II FOOTAGE
DESCRIPTION WWII GERMAN MILITARY, ARTILLERY FIRE, EQUIPMENT, DESTROYED
 TANKS, SOVIET RIGA, SOVIET POW'S.

Record: 9142

FILM NUMBER 547701501FOP
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 019
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 53
ARCHIVE NUMBER 85-00473R-0030 46C1

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Record: 9142(continued)

COUNTRIES UNITED STATES; PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA; NORTH KOREA;
SOUTH KOREA

DESCRIPTION MEN AT THE CROSSROADS KOREAN , WAR , POW'S , CHINESE , N ,
KOREAN , REPATRIATION , REFUSED , GENEVA , CONVENTION ,
PRISONER , TREATMENT , POW , EXCHANGE

Record: 1732

FILM NUMBER 533712802F0P

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)

DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL

NUMBER OF TAPES 1

TAPE WIDTH 16MM

RUN TIME/MINUTES 041

LANGUAGE ENGLISH

YEAR PRODUCED 53

ARCHIVE NUMBER R8300651-089 46C1

COUNTRIES PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA; JAPAN; UNITED STATES

DESCRIPTION CONDUCT OF U.S. POW'S IN KOREA POW'S , RETURN , KOREAN ,
WAR , CAPTIVES , TREATMENT , WHILE , CONFINED

Record: 1860

FILM NUMBER 533645101F0P

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)

DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL

NUMBER OF TAPES 1

TAPE WIDTH 16MM

RUN TIME/MINUTES 002

LANGUAGE ENGLISH

YEAR PRODUCED 53

ARCHIVE NUMBER ARC22-023 46C2

COUNTRIES UNITED STATES; PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA; NORTH KOREA

DESCRIPTION EXECUTIVE SESSION OF THE SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE ON
PRISONER OF WAR ATROCITIES KOREAN , WAR , ATROCITY ,
HEARINGS , POW , TREATMENT

Record: 1781

FILM NUMBER 533627601F0N

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)

DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL

NUMBER OF TAPES 1

TAPE WIDTH 16MM

RUN TIME/MINUTES 016

LANGUAGE ENGLISH

YEAR PRODUCED 53

ARCHIVE NUMBER ARC23-001 46B1

COUNTRIES PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA

DESCRIPTION OPERATION STONEWALL - EXCERPTS FROM BACTERIOLOGICAL FILMS
ANTI-U , S , PROPAGANDA , BACTERIOLOGICAL , WARFARE ,

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Record: 1781(continued)ACCUSATIONS , DECONTAMINATION , PROCEDURES , POW ,
STATEMENT**Record: 1790**

FILM NUMBER 533618102F0P
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 016
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 50
ARCHIVE NUMBER R8300651-016 46C1
COUNTRIES PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA; NORTH KOREA; SOUTH KOREA;
 UNITED STATES
DESCRIPTION COMBAT BULLETIN #105 KOREAN , WAR , EVACUATION , FROM ,
 HUNGNAM , AIRDROP , SUPPLIES , INTERROGATION , OF , POW'S

Record: 14014

FILM NUMBER 533617001
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (INCL GOV'T USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 035
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 42
ARCHIVE NUMBER 85-00880R-0020
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES
PROGRAM TITLE ENEMY INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS
DESCRIPTION INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES, POWS, TRUTH SERUM, ELICITATION
 TACTICS.

Record: 966

FILM NUMBER 513624501F0N
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
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NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 006
LANGUAGE SPANISH
YEAR PRODUCED 45
ARCHIVE NUMBER ARC23-009 46C2
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES; WEST GERMANY; SOVIET UNION; FRANCE
DESCRIPTION AERONOTICIAS DEL DIA - NEWS OF THE DAY, VOL 16, ISSUE 32
 WWII , GERMANY , SURRENDERS , POW'S , YALTA , CONFERENCE ,
 WAR'S , ENGAGEMENTS , RECALLED , VICTORY , CELEBRATION

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Page: 95

Record: 5

FILM NUMBER 499992801
STATUS RETIRED
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (INCL GOV'T USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 045
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 43
ARCHIVE NUMBER R8300651-060 46C1
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES; UNITED KINGDOM; TUNISIA; WEST GERMANY;
FRANCE
PROGRAM TITLE AT THE FRONT IN NORTH AFRICA
DESCRIPTION WWII, ALGIERS, SIDI, BEL ABBES, TROOP REVIEW, PARATROOPS,
TANK FORCES, ARTILLERY, POWS, CARE OF WOUNDED.

Record: 17

FILM NUMBER 499913510
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (INCL GOV'T USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 2
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 060
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 44
COUNTRIES UNITED STATES
PROGRAM TITLE RESITING ENEMY INTERROGATION
DESCRIPTION POWS , INTERROGATION , TRADECRAFT , WWII , CAPTURED , AIR
, CREW

Record: 30

FILM NUMBER 499904503
STATUS RETIRED
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
DISSEM1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (GOVT USE ONLY)
DISSEM2 NO DISSEMINATION CONTROL
NUMBER OF TAPES 1
TAPE WIDTH 16MM
RUN TIME/MINUTES 011
LANGUAGE ENGLISH
YEAR PRODUCED 42
ARCHIVE NUMBER R8300651-003 46C1
COUNTRIES GREECE; WEST GERMANY
PROGRAM TITLE INVASION OF CRETE BY THE GERMAN ARMY
DESCRIPTION WWII, GERMAN ARMY OPERATIONS, CRETE INVASION, AIRFIELD
PREPARATION, BOMBING RAIDS, PARACHUTE DROPS, POW CAMPS,
MILITARY TACTICS

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ER 93-5170

Office of the Director

Executive Secretariat

27 September 1993

NOTE FOR: SA/DDO

SUBJECT: American POWS in USSR--AP News Story

[Redacted]

EA/DCI [Redacted] asks whether we have the report mentioned in this article, and what the article is based on.

Please check to see what you have and provide a written response by COB Tuesday, 28 September.

Thanks.

[Redacted]

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P9056

Mon Sep 27 06:47:26 1993

AP--rw PM-USPOWS

Story: a0429

Time: 09-27-93 0015EDT

Ref:

PM-US POWs, Bjt, 980

U.S. Claims Hundreds Of American POWs From Korea Were Taken To USSR

By ROBERT BURNS

Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) — The U.S. government says it has "broad and convincing" evidence that the Soviet Union secretly and illegally moved hundreds of U.S. Korean War prisoners to its territory in the early 1950s and never released them.

It is by far the most dramatic and comprehensive assertion by Washington on a Soviet connection to missing U.S. servicemen since the Korean fighting ended in 1953.

The allegation was made in a detailed presentation by a senior State Department official at a meeting with Russian officials in Moscow earlier this month.

The evidence is detailed in a 77-page report titled "The Transfer of U.S. Korean War POWs to the Soviet Union." It was given to the Russians at the Moscow meeting but the Clinton administration has refused to publicly release it.

A copy of the report was obtained by The Associated Press.

"The Soviets transferred several hundred U.S. Korean War POWs to the USSR and did not repatriate them," the report said. "This transfer was mainly politically motivated with the intent of holding them as political hostages, subjects for intelligence exploitation and skilled labor within the camp system."

It asserted that the evidence gave a "consistent and mutually reinforcing description" of Soviet intelligence services forcibly moving U.S. POWs to the USSR at a time when Soviet forces, including anti-aircraft units, were active in North Korea.

It did not assess how long the American servicemen — mostly Air Force aviators — may have lived, or whether any might still be alive in the former Soviet Union.

Just last year the U.S. government said it had no evidence of such transfers. Washington has known, though, since the end of the war that some evidence existed that U.S. POWs from Korea had been taken to the Soviet Union. It asked Moscow for information on this in May 1954 and again in July 1956. Both times the Soviet government denied any knowledge of U.S. POWs on its soil.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin said last year that Soviet records showed 59 captured U.S. servicemen in Korea were interrogated by Soviet officials, and that 12 crew members of U.S. aircraft shot down in reconnaissance missions unrelated to the Korea war were transferred to Soviet territory. But the Yeltsin government has yet to concede that Americans were taken from Korea.

In the three years of fighting in Korea, in which the United States led a U.N. force on the side of South Korea against communist North Korea, 54,246 Americans were killed. The government lists 8,140 as unaccounted for, although the number of missing for which there is no direct evidence of death is estimated at 2,195. Many of the "unaccounted for" were not recovered because they were buried in battlefield graves in North Korea or died in POW

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camps.

The U.S. report on U.S. Korean War prisoners taken to the Soviet Union gave no specific figure but the analysis seemed to indicate it is fewer than 600.

It identified by name 31 missing Air Force F-86 fighter pilots who are among the most likely identifiable servicemen to have been taken by the Soviets for their knowledge of the plane's capabilities, plus six other Air Force aviators about whom the U.S. government believes Russia has additional information.

The report describes a top-secret program of the Soviet MGB (predecessor to the KGB) to capture American fliers and other U.S. and allied troops in Korea, interrogate them, and then transfer them into Joseph Stalin's notorious Gulag system of slave labor camps in Siberia and other parts of the Soviet Union.

"The range of eyewitness testimony as to the presence of U.S. Korean War POWs in the Gulag is so broad and convincing that we cannot dismiss it," the report said, adding that the prisoners probably were forced to assume new identities.

Since the report was written, a retired Russian colonel has come forward and told investigators for the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission for POWs-MIAs that a man he saw twice at a Siberian prison in the mid-1960s was described to him by the prison commander as an American brought there from the Gulag system.

The Russian colonel, Vladimir Malinin, said the man in the prison bore a convincing resemblance to Marine Corps Sgt. Philip Vincent Mandra, who disappeared on the northern Korean battlefield in August 1952 after an encounter with Chinese troops. U.S. officials view Malinin's testimony as credible, though not conclusive, evidence that Mandra was in the Siberian prison.

The report given to the Russians this month is based on a variety of sources: U.S. government records dating to the beginning of the Korean conflict in 1950, documents made available by Moscow since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and recent interviews by U.S. investigators with former Soviet officials, including retired officers who said they participated in the transfers.

The report said the Soviet intelligence apparatus had gained extensive experience with using POWs in the Gulag during World War II, and that when Stalin ordered the invasion of South Korea in June 1950 it simply expanded the practice.

"By the middle of 1950, the Soviet Union had at hand a vast, well-practiced, efficiently operating and profitable system for the collection, incarceration and exploitation of POWs" — American, South Korean and others, it said.

One hub of the Soviet operation against allied POWs was Khabarovsk, in extreme southeastern Russia, the report said. Prisoners were taken there from Korea, interrogated by military intelligence agents and then shipped off to labor camps in the Soviet interior. It said at least one American was taken to Moscow.

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SECURITY INFORMATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT NO.

(b)(3) CIAAct

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY China

DATE DISTR. 5 Jan 1952

SUBJECT Preparations for Exchange of United Nations Prisoners in Central and South China.

NO. OF PAGES 1

PLACE ACQUIRED China

NO. OF ENCLS. LISTED BELOW

DATE OF INFO. (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

NOT CIRCULATE

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

(b)(1)
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REFERENCE COPY

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Well-educated Canton merchant, from Canton

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THIS INFORMATION WAS PREVIOUSLY DISSEMINATED AS CIA PRELIMINARY SO DISSEMINATION NUMBERED PD# 874

- Chinese Communist authorities ordered all United Nations prisoners of war in Central and South China sent to Hankow prior to 23 December 1951 for subsequent transfer to the Northeast to await exchange.
- On 13 November, 105 Republic of Korea prisoners of war were transferred to the Northeast via the Hankow-Canton railway. On 18 December, 13 American and 8 British prisoners of war who were formerly in a building at 52 Fu Hsing Road,¹ Shameen were transferred by rail to Hankow. The Americans and British were escorted to Hankow by a company of Public Security troops under the command of LI Kuo-liang (李國良).

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- Washington Comment. [redacted] from the same source, gave names of American prisoners of war allegedly at 52 Fu Hsing Road, Shameen, Canton. [redacted] from another source, referred to American prisoners of war who were being kept in the former US consulate on Shameen. Another report referring to US prisoners in the Canton area is [redacted] which stated that US prisoners were performing hard labor on airfields in the Canton area. A recent report from yet another source, [redacted] states that as of early November 1951 there were no prisoners of war on Shameen.

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ARMY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AIR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FBI

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

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COUNTRY	USSR	REPORT NO.	[REDACTED]
SUBJECT	1. Political Prisons in Moscow	DATE DISTR.	16 July 1956
	2. Vorkuta and Dubrava Prison Camps	NO. OF PAGES	1
	3. Soviet Morale and Public Opinion		
DATE OF INFO.	[REDACTED]	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
PLACE ACQUIRED	[REDACTED]	REFERENCES	(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
DATE ACQUIRED			

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A Russian emigre arrested [REDACTED] in Berlin in 1947 and imprisoned in the USSR until his release in late 1955 (F). [REDACTED]

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Two reports, consisting of 107 pages of general information on political prisons in Moscow, prison camps in the Vorkuta and Dubrava areas, and morale and public opinion in the USSR, have been deposited in the CIA Library, and can be obtained on loan. These reports are double-spaced translations from Russian to English.

Distribution of Attachment:

OCR
CIA Library: For retention

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~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

STATE	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	FBI		AEC				
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(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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[Translator's note: This document was in a number of places totally illegible. Furthermore, the style and grammatical structure employed by the author were generally so poor as to render his meaning obscure in a good many places. In other places a series of dots (e.g.,.....) appear in the original document, apparently in indication of some omission. In the translation these were reproduced, and where they appear, the sentences in which they are contained will not be found to be complete ones. In certain places, where the author's intention, for reasons mentioned above, is not clear, a literal, though apparently meaningless, translation is rendered, followed by a question-mark in brackets [?]].

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When you ^{are} first driveⁿ up to the Lubyanka, proper, you do not ~~not~~ ^{at first} have any idea of ^{the place to which} ~~where~~ you are going. You are driven to the gates, the car stops, you hear the clank of bolts. From this clanging you ascertain that there are two gates which are not made of solid iron; although several different courtyards lead from the Lubyanka to the inner courtyards of the Ministry of ^{State} Security, there are certain gates through which prisoners are always brought. They do not consist of solid metal plates but of separate steel bars. ~~the~~ ^{are} the vehicle proceeds. You ^{are} driveⁿ into the inner court yard. You hear someone approach your driver; a conversation takes place in a low tone, which you usually do not hear; you know only that a transfer is taking place. You, upon receipt, are handed over to the proper prison official, who at the same time collects your accompanying papers and goes with them to the office under which you are listed and which summoned you to the Ministry of Security in Moscow. A certain official, dressed in the usual uniform of a prison overseer ^[nadziratel'], approaches you and in a low voice asks your first and family names, and leads you down the stairs into a basement room. This is the so-called reception-detention room. It is very brilliantly lit; there, a certain official, clad in a white coat, asks you to undress. You undress, take off all your clothes. The stock question is asked whether you have any stabbing or cutting objects - this means do you have any knives or razors; ordinarily, a prisoner, of course, does not have these, but any prisoner, before arriving here, goes through 10 extremely detailed and thorough searches. Then they take away all your clothes. You are stripped to the skin; sometimes this can be very unpleasant because the reception-detention room is cold. Your clothes are thoroughly examined, especially the thick places such as cotton linings, etc.; seams are ripped up with a knife in order that it should be impossible to hide anything in this way and that it should be hard and difficult to carry any kind of notes or anything on your person. Then, all your things are gathered up and placed in a special bag to which a tag is attached, and sent to be disinfected.

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You then receive the standard uniform consisting of a neatly-laundered ~~shirt~~^{tunic}, trousers, high shoes, cap, and sometimes an overcoat or something else. Then you are sent to the so-called "box". What is the box? The box is a small room. "Box" is English for "korobka". It is actually a box made of wood. It is of very small dimensions, a small cabinet; sometimes less than a square meter; sometimes ~~an~~^{with} an area of a square meter, ~~a~~^{with} normal room height; the width is sometimes a meter and less, ~~the~~^{[if less] with a} length of two or three meters. The boxes are quite varied. You are seated in this box, which sometimes has a bench for sitting, sometimes not; at this time the prison doctor appears, a woman from Central Asia, who examines you fairly thoroughly and asks what ailments or complaints you have. Then the person who commanded your convoy and brought you to the Lubyanka from some other city or oblast usually enters the box. He usually asks whether you have any complaints about the convoy. This is a routine, meaningless question, and whether you say you have or not, your fate and circumstances are not altered.

That's how it was with me. After all these formalities, I was taken to the baths. This is obligatory. You are washed, and, if you have hair, it is cropped close; after this; you are now a fully privileged prisoner, if it is possible to use such an expression, and have arrived, so to speak, in prison. You really have no rights-except one, it is true, to obey.

After my bath, I was put back in the box. This time the overseer appeared. People speak there in low tones. If you inadvertently speak loudly, then you are told that one must speak softly here, the more softly the better. They are afraid that another prisoner might hear you and discover from your voice that prisoner so-and-so had arrived here. You are asked in a low voice your full name and year of birth. When you have answered all this, you are told what is desired of you. I was told in this case at the interrogation. This was very rapid and unexpected.

In the interrogation, as in every prison, you are handled in a standard procedure, which is observed in all prisons of the Soviet Union. Namely you are obliged to keep your hands behind your back; to let one's hands

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hang loosely is not ~~the custom~~ ^{permitted.} The guard on duty who accompanies you holds you by the right arm. In the other hand he usually holds the key to the box or the cell where you are located. According to the rules of all inter-
 rogation ^(sledstvennyye) prisons of the Soviet Union, no prisoner is permitted to meet another prisoner. Thus it was that after having spent a total of two and a half years in prisons, I never saw a single prisoner. Prisoners with whom I had served also said that they, too, had never managed to see anyone.

This is the way you are handled! You are led to a corner and told: Stand with your face to the wall. You stand there. Then the guard on duty glances around the corner to prevent the possibility of another prisoner being brought into your presence. If anyone is being brought there, he gives a peculiar signal - i.e. - he strikes his belt-buckle with the key or makes very unpleasant sounds like the croaking of a frog. After this, the one coming into your presence is placed in a box. The boxes are distributed at specified distances along all corridors and all rooms of both the Ministry of State Security and the interior prison. Then you are led past. You are brought to the ~~cell~~ ^{office} where you had been called. Later I found out that the greatest hatred among the prisoners is reserved for the so-called prison overseers. They usually wear gray-khaki uniforms, very unpresentable generally, rough military boots and blue ^U shoulder ~~straps~~ ^{+boards.} This signifies that they are staff employees of the Ministry of State Security, formerly the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In prison jargon, the prisoners call the guards "vertukhai". This is derived from the slang expression, "ne vertukhat'sya", that is, "do not turn around," stand quietly, which they often use. The common criminals call the guards by the still more contemptuous nickname of "musor" [rubbish]. One might say, for example, that when [I did such and such] "the musor fouged me and I got 5 days in the lock-up." This is a common expression. Well, this particular "vertukhai" leads you along the corridors. First of all, you reach the so-called boundary. This is the boundary between the Ministry of State Security and the prison. The internal prison at the Lubyanka, the so-called Lubyanka 2,

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where I ^{was} located, is, like all prisons, under the administrative authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and not the Ministry of State Security. Well, you reach the boundary. The boundary is a large room between two stairways; here a clock hangs and here, on a table, lies the so-called "iron book". This is an ordinary book, more accurately, a magazine, rather large and jacketed in metal. In the metal are two openings - on the left is the larger opening; on the right, the smaller one. Taking care of the book while I was there was a woman, who was well known and had been doing this work for a very long time, about 50 years old, with an unpleasant, tired face. When you are brought there, you are told, "Stand with your face to the wall." You stand. She asks: name and surname - i.e., first name, patronymic, and surname, and year of birth. She records this in the large opening. Then she looks at the clock. This means the time that you left the inner prison, i.e., left the authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and have now come under the authority and territory of the Ministry of State Security. After this, in the small opening, you place your signature.

Now you have passed into the Ministry of State Security and the "vertukhai" leads you on further. You are placed on an elevator. There are 2 elevators, one of which moves in the prison from the top floor down; the other is in the Ministry. The elevator in the Ministry is very elaborate, paneled with red wood. You are stood against the wall in the elevator. He presses the appropriate button and [the elevator] rises straight to the proper floor. He goes out. I was paying my first visit to room 694 on the 6th floor.

Now I would like to say a few words concerning what the Ministry of State Security represents. The Ministry of State Security, if it may be so expressed, is a government within a government according to its organization. The building is a veritable castle. Thus do the Germans call it - Hochburg [fortress]. This is really a peculiar building. In the first place, it is

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not connected in any way with other buildings. It has its own electrical power supply, its own water supply, its own telephone station, radio station and incinerator. This building is the building of the former "Rossiya" Insurance Company, which, if I am not mistaken, was four-storied. Subsequently, two stories were added, then, I believe, one more. Later the lateral wings were added. The construction of the additions went on during the entire period of the Soviet regime and ultimately, after the war, [was continued] by German war prisoners. A huge building was built, with its façade, in so far as it is possible to speak of a façade, facing so-called Marshlevskaya Street (?). This structure is 10 [~~12~~] stories high, built in modern style. All Muskovites know very well that in the so-called Lubyanka, the lights never go out day or night. It is the watchful eye of the revolution. It houses the brain of the country which protects the power of the rulers from the wrath of the people. It is said that every 24-hour period from four to six thousand people work in the Ministry of State Security. In spite of the vast dimensions of the building, the endless number of rooms, halls, etc., there is not enough room. There are four or five workers in almost every room. The private offices have only the highest workers, and only those who by the nature of the work are totally indispensable. Let us say that someone has to hold long conversations or negotiations with someone, during which no one under any circumstances must be present.

And so I was brought into the office of the official who had summoned me; you don't usually know at the beginning who it was who had summoned you. The delivery is carried out in the following manner: The guard who has escorted you - the vertukhay - knocks on the door. He is given permission to enter. He leads you in, enters with you. In no event does he leave you in the corridor. Then the one who had summoned you writes out a small note containing your full name and year of birth, signs it,

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and hands it over to your escorting official. This means that the official has delivered you and is no longer responsible for you. This is done so that if anything should happen to you either during an escape attempt or anything of the sort, it will be clear later who had the responsibility for you at that particular time.

And so, the interrogation begins, as follows:

It is necessary to repeat that, as a rule, prisoners are always summoned for interrogation at night. At night the ability of the individual to resist is reduced, the person is more nervous, and a word might slip out of him that may eventually ruin him or have some extremely valuable significance for the organs. Interrogations take place at night. It is necessary to say that if the interests of the interrogation or interests of the conversation with you require it, the interrogators will not shrink from any means. Ordinarily, no one tries to intimidate you at first. When I entered the office, I had a peculiar experience. I expected anything but what actually happened. I entered, and fell into an embrace. A certain medium-sized man, dressed in a ~~pretty~~ rather dissheveled civilian suit, of obviously Oriental features, as later turned out, an Azerbaydzhani, had simply grabbed me in an embrace, seated ^{me} in a sofa, and said, "Dear Georgiy don't be alarmed, don't resent us, we have only done our duty, but you too have fulfilled your duty, and all this is fine. He literally wept and there were tears in his eyes. With my inherent actor's mimicry, I too shed a tear and at first did not grasp a thing, but then became very frightened because I was now experienced enough to know that the better you are treated, the worse your situation is. I was seated on the sofa and a conversation was begun on how I had arrived, what complaints I had, whether I was sick, why I was so thin, why life had treated me so poorly, how was my mother feeling. He just about asked how the canary in the apartment that I used to have was doing. Just then a so-called waitress appeared, a young girl, rather pretty, in a white coat, white neckerchief,

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carrying a magnificent, so-called ministerial, dinner of pork chops. There was also brynza [cheese], I'll have you know, several slices of orange, coffee and sugar, and sour milk, - everything that I, who ^{was} starved in my tracks, and hardly able to stand on my feet from hunger, ate literally with ecstasy. Afterwards I started on the second such meal. The interrogator was earnestly afraid that I would gorge myself and get sick.

The conversation continued for several hours. This was a very pleasant conversation, and gave the impression that this was not the Lubyanka or a secret police interrogation, but simply a Sunday After this, he dialed the proper telephone number, and in a few minutes the guard appeared and said to me, go, rest, sleep, you must spend a few days in the box until we have selected your room, everything will be fine, etc, etc, etc. He gave me a stack of paper and a pencil in order that I might write any statements if I decided to say anything to him. He said to me, "Do not worry, Georgiy your life has now taken a different course. You will live, in any case, much better than you lived before." I must say that he really kept his promise. My life took a different course - this was the first half [of the promise], but the second half—that I would live much better—was alas, not fulfilled.

Then I went back the same way, observing the same formalities. Again I reached the iron book, again the time of my return from the Ministry of State Security to the interior Lubyanka prison was supplied. I signed, passed on, and looked at the woman standing at the boundary as at an old acquaintance. After having, so to speak, landed in the box, I saw that my supper had already been brought. The food was very bad. There was an iron tureen of soup, in which were approximately 2 potatoes, a little fat and some groats. Secondly, there were about 150 grams of foul kasha with a slight suspicion of fat and two lumps of sugar. It was explained to me that I was allotted, if I am not mistaken, 14 grams of sugar per day. Why precisely 14, instead of 15 or 17, no one, of course, can say clearly.

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I stayed in the box approximately two days. I was allowed to rest, and afterwards I was suddenly told: get your things together. I knew that this meant I was being transferred to another place. And, indeed, I was transferred to a ^{cell,} ~~room~~ which henceforth was to be my home. This was a room on the fifth floor of the interior prison of the Lubyanka, in the so-called "nobleman's department". The prison has six floors. The first four floors, are considered the floors for commoners [sic], the top upper two floors, the fifth and sixth, the nobleman's floors, because here usually are kept the prisoners who are considered the most important. On the sixth floor are the soft rooms. These are so-called rooms with soft [i.e., upholstered] furniture and are furnished in comparative luxury. But only the most important political prisoners land here. Here were quartered a few captured German generals and various persons. Also here, I believe, was the former commander of the Russian Liberation Army, General Vlasov. Also here were von Paulus and people generally on the highest scale. A common criminal, even the most notorious, is, of course, never under any circumstances found there.

I was given cell 82. There are 118 cells in Lubyanka. When you enter the 5th floor, which is a throughway and is divided from the 6th floor by only a steel net, to discourage prisoners from committing suicide and throwing themselves into the stairway from the 6th floor and shattering themselves on the floor of the fifth floor, you see to your left, upon entering, a door and, going down a few steps towards the 5th floor, cell No 118, to the left above in a corner. This is the last cell. The cells in the Lubyanka are of different sizes. They range from cells that barely hold 2 people to cells in which can be placed 5, 6, or 7 people if the occasion warrants, but not more. These are the former hotel rooms of the "Rossiya" Insurance Company. I found myself in cell No 82, and immediately noticed that there was a rather nice young fellow there. This was a certain (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
I believe, a student radioman at the Moscow State University, formerly a

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prisoner in Germany. Fairly soon, in approximately a few hours, I saw perfectly that I was dealing with a so-called "nasedka" [trusty]. He asked me a few questions which certainly could not have been casual ones, although he was an individual with a sufficient amount of skill and conducted himself very precisely. Similar information that he was a "nasedka" was later confirmed. He was known pretty well in the prison. What is a "nasedka"? A "nasedka" is, as a rule, in prison jargon, a prisoner who has been in prison for a long time, in some manner enjoys the confidence of the authorities, and for the purpose of improving his own material welfare or situation, consents to work for the interrogation organs and the prison administration. He is planted next to a new inexperienced prisoner, with whom he becomes friendly and talks. Usually the secret police arrange it so ^{that} he receives packages, i.e., the most remarkable things, ostensibly from relatives, are brought into his cell, such as oranges, fruit, chocolate, and various other things. He tells you that relatives sent him those. Usually this is simply given to him by the interrogator. He shares this with you. Naturally, you are starved, you are very grateful to him for this, you begin to confide, to talk, and sometimes the secret police succeed in finding out what they could not wring out of you in any interrogation.

And now, you are in the cell. First of all, there is a window in each cell. In winter, this window is closed. Only a small vent is open. In summer, the windows are opened. In spite of this, summer in the cell is terribly oppressive. The prison, shaped like the letter "H", is in one of the courtyards of the Ministry. Around you are high stone buildings heated by the sun, and that is why a terrible heat and stuffiness prevail. Persons with heart ailments often feel ill and sometimes, on particularly hot days, they even suffer heart attacks. Naturally, every prisoner would like to know who his fellow-sufferers and next-door neighbors are. Everyone wishes somehow to communicate. The thought of bribing an overseer or guard or any one else is absolutely hopeless. No one has ever claimed that he managed to get, say, a guard to pass a note into the next cell. This is too dangerous and the

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unpleasant consequences to which it exposes the guard are too great. Instead, prisoners try to communicate by tapping, although this too is noted by the prison administration. Tapping is extremely difficult and almost impossible. In the first place, they watch for this and in the event that you are caught in this deed, the lock-up threatens you - often a cold lock-up. For an emaciated, sick, and hungry prisoner, which every prisoner, as a rule is, this is a very severe punishment and can sometimes lead to diseases and severe complications. Besides this, the walls are arranged in such a way that sawdust^{vs} spread in the hollow spaces so that you hear absolutely nothing. I, who have generally good hearing, by applying my ear when the guard did not notice, heard vague speech in the neighboring cell and then, only in one. And then I would hear German speech. To make out the words was totally impossible. Tapping also was very difficult and very long. You were continually watched. A prisoner, according to prison regulations, had a number of privileges and duties. He also has privileges and something which is forbidden to him. For example, and in the first place: the day begins at 5:30 AM. A scurrying about is heard: they get you up. You take a so-called kadka [bucket] which you use to satisfy your physical needs. In the cells proper, of course, there are no bathrooms nor facilities to take the place of a bathroom. You take this bucket and go with it into the lavatory. There you wash it, disinfect it, then wash yourself, and in a short while come back. The guard goes to the place where you have relieved yourself and washed up and looks to see whether you have written anything on the walls. If it is noticed that you have, let us say, written your name with a wet finger, it is a very serious matter. You do not have the right to do this, and it can lead to very serious consequences and penalties. Then you go into the cell. After this you are served breakfast. Breakfast consists of a small quantity of kasha and coffee. Besides this, you get your ration of bread. The prison bread ration is 650 grams of black bread of very moist, foul dough, containing, according to exact chemical analysis, no less than 40 percent water.

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So begins your day. Then begins the rounds. Your "koridornyy," i.e. the guard who watches over your corridor, comes in and looks to see what the prisoners are doing. He is accompanied by the starshina [Forman]. This is not a "dezhurnyy" [regular guard], but a so-called koridornyy, who commands the 2 or 3 "dezhurnyye" who take care of all the cells in a given corridor. He arrives and asks: "Any questions?" And at this time you may ask questions. You may, first, ask for a sheet of paper in order to write a statement. In my time you could write a statement to anyone, from the President of the United States and Josef Vissarionovich Stalin down to the "koridornyy," or a doctor or anyone you wanted. The question, is however, - what would be the result of the written statement? You may write a complaint, you may write a statement to the prosecutor. ^{himself.} ~~somebody~~. After you have expressed a desire during the rounds, ^{and} expect, after some time the guard comes in and asks, "Are you going for a walk?" You can go for a walk or you need not. By rights, you are supposed to have a 15-minute walk. Counting the time spent traveling up and down in the elevator and on the stairs, or going the wrong way, you walk no longer than 10-12 minutes. This is all that you are given. If I am not mistaken, there are five exercise yards in the Lubyanka. I personally know three of them. Two of these are located on the roof of the Ministry - not the prison, but the Ministry - a large yard and a small yard. They are separated from one another by an impenetrable fence and, in addition, are surrounded by a high fence with barbed wire, so that you can not see anything that goes on in the street. You see only the topmost part of the ministry and the few floors attached to these exercise yards themselves, where some officials work. According to rumors, one of the numerous radio stations of the Lubyanka is located here. In the exercise yard you do not have the right to stand or talk with prisoners; it is feared that your voice will be heard in the neighboring exercise yard. You have to place your hands behind your back and walk continuously in a circle. Running is not permitted. At a slow or fast pace, as you wish. The guard who has

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escorted you remains in the exercise yard with you and watches what you are doing. That is the first one [i.e., guard]. In addition, a second guard, who stands on a tower, simultaneously watches what is going on in both courtyards. Always on call in the prison is such a thing as a special operational team. Thus, in the event that you begin to brawl, fight with anyone, or organize something of the sort, 5 or 6 burly ^{fellows} ~~persons~~ appear, who very quickly straighten you out. In extreme cases they will even slip a straight-jacket on you.

Then you have used up the fifteen minutes allotted you; the door is opened and the guard says politely: "Enter." And you go downstairs, the same way, sit in the elevator, and go to your floor. The elevator, the usual elevator, is of ancient construction and divided into 2 sections. The rear section which has 2 metal walls, is where you are placed and locked in, and it has a small glass window through which the guard observes what you are doing. You are packed in very tightly. Two people can be accommodated with difficulty. Three can not be accommodated at all and they are taken on foot. In the forward section stands the guard, who observes you and operates the elevator. Then you have arrived below and you are usually also searched. You are searched, it is true, superficially, for the sake of form, and after this you are again taken to your cell. The time for dinner arrives. Dinner is very scanty and poor. After living in prison without sustenance for a year or 2, you contract dystrophy under normal conditions; after 4 or 5 years [even] the most seasoned and unexacting organism is threatened with serious health disorders and, eventually, possibly even death.

At about 7 or 8 o'clock you are brought supper. Besides this in your cell you have games. For example, you can play dominoes. You can play chess. Of course, games of chance and cards are forbidden. Books are brought to you in your cell. There is a fairly wide selection of rather good books at the Lubyanka ^{and} from the point of view of the secret police, often rather strange literature. For example, I came across a beautiful edition of Marx, and the pre-revolutionary "The Demons" by Dostoyevsky. I sometimes came across books which were forbidden on the outside. These were

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books which had been taken from arrested persons or from confiscated libraries. They are brought to the Lubyanka, so that, strange as it seems, in the inner prison at the Lubyanka you may read quasi-counterrevolutionary or in any event, undesirable - for the Soviet regime - literature, as for example, Dostoyevsky's famous novel "The Demons".

At 10:30 comes retreat. The signal for retreat is given by blinking. In the cell the electric lights blink three times briefly. This means that you have the right to go to sleep. Your day is ended. The day is ended, but the night is begun. The vast majority of the prisoners has hardly had time to lie in bed when the cursed tinkling of the lock is heard, the guard comes in, asks your name in a low voice, and says, "Get ready for questioning." And so, cursing everything and everyone, you dress and are usually gone for the whole night. One more night is wasted for you. During the day sleeping is forbidden. This is closely watched. You not only have no right to sleep, but even to lean against the wall. You must sit upright with the hands down. You can stroll about the cell, you may walk, you may speak softly with your cellmate, but you must sit constantly facing the peephole so that your face will be visible and, in an extreme case, to turn the face sideways. As soon as you close your eyes, you hear the warning shout: "No sleeping" or "No drowsing". If you do this 2 or 3 times, the guard comes in to your cell, reprimands you, sometimes in a rather rough manner. If you fall asleep, you can be punished again and sent to the lock-up, but usually this shout, "No sleeping, no drowsing," is so unnerving that even if you do not fear the consequences of reprisal, you cannot sleep anyway. No one is allowed to sleep. Sometimes, it is ^{true} ~~true~~, prisoners, upon the permission of the interrogator, are allowed to sleep in the daytime.

I wish to say a few words further about the organization of the prison. The prison has 6 floors. It has the shape of the letter "H" and is enclosed in one of the courtyards of the Ministry of State Security. On the first floor, as a rule, are confined the women. There the cells are larger. All

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the other cells are occupied by men. The first floor, if it may be so called, i.e., it is not the first, but the semi-basement, houses technical equipment, primarily, steam baths and showers. The bath^{house} is a small room. There are, of course, no bathtubs there. However, there is one tub used especially for sick people. You come here to the baths and can wash up. Cut into the door is a small glass window, through which the guard watches you constantly while you are washing. You can wash for 15-20 minutes. When you come, you go into ^{the} baths; you come here every week, you take with you all the bed-clothes, and you also take your underwear. You turn in your pillow case, sheet, undershirt, and drawers. And you receive all clean ones. After this, you are given a tiny cake of soap and a clean towel. You turn in the old, dirty one. You wash up, and dry yourself after this. If necessary, you are given a so-called "sanobrabotka," [hygienic treatment] i.e., hair-covered places are shaved. After this, you are returned to your cell by the same route. Also located in the semi-basement is the so-called "kleborezka" [bread cutter]. This is a small room outside facing the downstairs exercise yard; I have mentioned only the two exercise yards on the roof. There is a 3rd exercise yard downstairs, very unpleasant, uncomfortable, and small, and much worse than those upstairs. And next to it is the room where the spare iron beds are stored. This room is full of bedbugs. Thus it is that strange as it seems, despite all measures, the bedbugs customarily begin to eat you up miserably when the bed is brought in. By means of lighted matches I would busy myself, despite the protests of the guard, in driving away these bedbugs, of which, thanks to time, there were many, and in crushing them, a deed which almost landed us in the lockup because the entire floor was soiled with the stains of these crushed bedbugs.

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I would like to say a few words further about the arrangement of the ministry proper. The ministry has seven floors in some places. A new part of the Ministry, constructed after the war, has ten floors. ~~Besides~~ ^{Further-} ~~this, they say insistently~~ ^{more, rumor persists} that it has a semi-basement and three basements [podval'nyye pomeshcheniya]. The lowest one is supposed to contain some kinds of laboratories and a sealed storeroom of arms, in case they are needed for defense of the ministry or for any special purposes. On the second floor are located, supposedly, chambers [kamery] in which nobody has ever been (I personally have not been there), which are used for some special and, supposedly, frightful purposes; and finally, there is the third floor, counting from the bottom floor, which is under the semi-basement, where are located cells, a club [room], and one of several buffets found in the Ministry, and some special cells. Once, almost at the end of my stay in the Lubyanka (I was there for eleven months), one of the interrogators became angry with me about something and said, "Look here, now, they'll take you on a tour." And they really did. I was taken through a certain corridor and handed over under receipt to a guard (nadzirtel'). I saw only that these guards who looked after the basement corridor were far better dressed than those upstairs, far healthier, and with a far more unpleasant and unsympathetic appearance. They said to me, "Look here!" They opened the peephole of a certain cell. This was a basement cell, painted a blinding white and lit by a very strong light. It could have been of three or four hundred candlepower. The whole cell was flooded with blinding light, so that it was painful even to look at it. In this cell I did not notice a thing except one stool, on which sat an elderly person, about 50, evidently German; at least, he was dressed in a German military jacket without any distinctive markings. He had a very thin, emaciated and unhappy face, and he looked gloomily and fixedly at the peephole, as if he had been

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ordered to do this. After this, my accompanying guard said to me:

"Well, what did you see? This will happen to you, too." But, ~~however,~~
^{however,} nothing happened to me. They took me back the same way I had come and returned me under receipt to my regular guards (dezhurnyye), who took me back to my cell.

After I had stayed approximately eleven months in prison, one night, when I least expected it, a guard appeared and said, "What's your name?" first to someone else, then to me. I called it out. He said: "To the interrogation." I thought that I was again being taken for an interrogation, but instead of leading me to the right, he placed me in the box at the left. In about five minutes my things, which were very few, were brought in. This is usually done in order that no one in the cell will notice that a man has been removed from the cell for good and whom you will perhaps never meet again. My effects, so to speak, were brought to me, and I began the entire procedure. I realized that they were sending me either to another cell or to another place. As it turned out later, I went through the entire procedure, and I was led, after its completion, to the door, again through the detention-reception room and seated in a Black Maria. I knew that I was being taken somewhere. I was taken quite a long way, then again some bolt resounded, some iron gates were opened, and I entered some place again.

I went through the same procedure that I had undergone eleven months before in the Lubyanka. I was led away and found myself in prison. From the description of the prisoners, I realized that I had been brought to the so-called Lefortovskaya, a military regimented prison. This prison was a much more disorderly place than the inner prison of the Ministry of State Security. This was the building of an insurance company hotel, and it had not been rebuilt for prison purposes. This prison had been erected approximately 100 years ago, in the middle of the 19th century. It is built in the shape of a "K" and has three floors.

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The floors were continuous so that you could see from the top to the very bottom. Along the cells extend metal gangways approximately 75 centimeters wide. Floors are separated from each other by steel nets, so that the prisoners cannot jump and commit suicide. I would like to stipulate that the stairways at the Ministry of State Security, even those on which prisoners are never taken, as well as all the landing-stages, were enclosed in wire cages to preclude all possibility of suicide.

Lefortovskaya prison has an evil reputation. It is said that in the past, punishments were carried out in its vast cellars. It is really extremely somber, particularly the underground rooms. The cells are dark, but they have their advantages. In the first place, the cells have running water, which is a great convenience for the prisoners. On hot, stuffy, summer days you can strip to the waist, bathe, and sponge off. This is very important to you. Secondly, a flush toilet was provided. You, therefore, did not have to go out anywhere to a bathroom. This was the second advantage. Of the negative features I shall mention the fact that located in the rear is an aeronautics institute, called, I think, the TsAKI, [^{letter}typographical error for TsAGI(?)]. There is a so-called wind tunnel there in which research on model aircraft is conducted. This makes a terrible racket and in especially the cells facing this direction there is no quiet, day or night. The noise is so bad that it rattles the windows. The air vents open by themselves, and it is very difficult to sleep under this condition, keeping in mind also that the blinding light in the cells is usually not turned off during the day or night.

It is interesting that the internal prison in the Lubyanka is a prison intended for interrogations. Lefortovskaya prison is also a prison for criminals under investigation. It is shaped like the letter "K" and surrounded by interrogation buildings added later in the shape of the /Russian/ [^{letter}"K" P], as though the prison itself were inscribed in the

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interior courtyard. There were also exercise courts here, far larger than those at the Lubyanka. Here you can actually breathe fresh air. Unlike the 15-minute walks at the Lubyanka, where there was clearly not enough time, here the walks were 15-20 minutes, and sometimes the guard would allow 25 minutes--in any case, you got to breathe fresh air a little longer. The routine here was exactly the same. You got up at 0530. However, bedtime was a little earlier, at 2200, which was a great relief for the prisoners. Every half-hour of sleep was important. For that reason, when they wished, to put it mildly, to subject some prisoner to the repressive measures of interrogation, then he usually would be taken to the Lefortovskaya prison. Thus I was somewhat frightened, for physical means of action, for example, beatings, were almost never employed at the Lubyanka. Even so, the Ministry resounded with cries, wails, and this.....But if they wished to employ such methods, they usually sent you to Lefortovskaya prison, which had a very evil reputation. Here there were a larger number of more spacious offices and various devices were available. The doors in these offices, unlike those in the Lubyanka, were padded and sometimes even double. The food in the Lefortovskaya prison was exactly the same as in the inner prison. However, it sometimes happened that food was left over, and the servers would give seconds on their own initiative, a practice, which was, of course, a great help because all the prisoners were suffering from dystrophy and starvation. There it is openly declared that this is not the ministry, and the work is not conducted so efficiently. It is true that here, too, prisoners are watched very strictly so that one prisoner might not meet another. Signaling is done by flags. Because of the fact that the entire prison is a passageway, a special guard with a red and white flag is stationed in it. When your cell is opened and you are taken out, he raises a red flag in the corridor from which your cell is visible. This is a signal for the guard not to open the cells

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and take anyone else out. When you are being escorted and the danger that you will be seen has passed, he raises a white flag. This operation is performed very efficiently. I was there almost an entire year, and not once did I meet a single prisoner, and later, when in the camps and meeting others who had been there, I did not see a single one who said that he at any time and at any place in the corridors, either at the Lubyanka or in Lefortov prison, had met any prisoner.

Also taken to Lefortov Prison, as a rule, were all those prisoners who behaved badly during interrogations, i.e., in some way quarreled with the interrogator, refused to answer or talk, or, on the other hand, behaved, as they say, unstably: going on hunger strikes, writing too many declarations, brawling with other prisoners or with the guards, the personnel, or the interrogator. There are special penal cells for such prisoners at Lefortov Prison. These are rooms in the central part of the building, without windows or doors, with a cot which is screwed to the wall and retracted in the daytime, and only after retreat does the prisoner come and lower it with a key. Thus all day you are forced to stand or to sit on a stool, which is screwed to the floor. You can not read there, because they will not give you books. In the other cells, however, books are given. The cellars of Lefortov Prison enjoy a particularly fearsome reputation, because it is said that in both the past and present times executions have taken place there. Once, I managed, by accident, to see stretchers being carried out of there on which lay several sheets completely soaked with blood. As I learned afterwards, in spite of all precautions, suicide attempts still occur in the prisons rather frequently. It is amazing that some prisoners, despite the absence of any objects with which they could inflict some injury to themselves, managed nevertheless to commit suicide. I know, for example, of one prisoner's dying of heart failure. He committed suicide by holding his breath until he had a heart stroke.

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The fact that I was transferred to Lefortov Prison was a sign that I was no longer a privileged, but an especially dangerous and interesting prisoner. At the same time, however, I expected all kinds of punishments for myself. It must be mentioned that at Lefortov Prison my interrogations were stricter than at the Lubyanka. I spent many unpleasant days and hours. I was there approximately an entire year. One fine day after this I was taken from my cell, went through the entire formal procedure, and was escorted to the baths; everything was taken away from me, the things which were in storage were collected; I had a few trifles there--neckties, belt, everything which had been taken away from me and which I was not permitted to have in the cell, but what remained was my personal belongings. All these things were returned to me, afterwards, according to my personal folder; a prisoner is always accompanied by a folder containing his personal prison file; in it is checked his name and surname, year of birth, citizenship, etc., etc. After this, I was placed in a Black Maria and was driven somewhere. No one knew where, of course, When we arrived, one of the prisoners who had at one time worked on the road--there were about 15 prisoners from different cells riding with me--said that we had arrived at Butyrskaya prison.

Butyrskaya prison is one of the largest prisons in the Soviet Union. It contains an average of at least 20,000 prisoners. It is a whole conglomeration of structures and buildings, from the famous Pugachev tower, which was built during the reign of Catharine the Great and in which the famous Yemel'yan Pugachev sat and awaited his execution, to the completely modern structures with large and small cells, and there is also an interrogation building in Butyrskaya Prison. There is also even a building there for common criminals. On the average there are from 20,000 to 25,000 prisoners there. It is said that larger than Butyrskaya Prison is the famous prison in Kharkov, located, I believe, on Kholodnaya

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Gora /mountain, hill/, and the famous Tashkent Prison, which serves all Central Asia and usually contains an average of almost forty or fifty thousand prisoners.

Butyrskaya Prison has a good reputation. Here the regimen is more lenient than at Lefortov or the Lubyanka. I landed at once in a large cell, No. 102, if I am not mistaken, the Special Fourth Interrogation Building, as it is called. There were about seventy people there. This was a great delight for me. I immediately made the acquaintance of a number of people, including intellectuals. There were even former party members. There were also two Germans, here, etc., etc. At once everyone began questioning one another, exchanging impressions and discussions about interrogators, about who had met whom, who had seen whom, and several days passed by almost unnoticed. I was beginning to see clearly that my case was finally coming to an end. ^{In} Butyrkam I was hardly questioned at all. A few times I was summoned for interrogation and brought again to the Ministry. The questions put to me were of a technical nature: Do you know such-and-such, such-and-such, and such-and-such? I, of course, did not know some of them, but the ones about which I did know, I tried to say I had forgotten. No one especially insisted upon it. This was simply the ending to my case. Also there ⁱⁿ Butyrkam my file concerning the termination of the investigation was shown to me. I signed ~~the~~ Article 95 of the Constitution of the USSR concerning the termination of the investigation. This procedure is as follows: The interrogator summons you to him and says that your case has been closed. It should be specified that I had had many interrogators, about twelve. The ^{last} _{of} my interrogators was a certain Senior Lieutenant Shatle, a Russified Latvian, and he left me my entire file. This file contained all the documents concerning me collected during interrogation, all statements containing my signature, as well as statements of other

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individuals who had had any relations with me. This file does not contain only operational documents, i. e. denunciations and reports which workers of the operational organs of the USSR had made about me prior and even subsequent to my arrest, so that I would not be able to take any action against them. This was standard operating procedure for the Ministry of State Security. You have the right to read your file for as long as you wish. The interrogator has no right to limit your time. You may read for one, two, three days. I devoted comparatively little time to reading my case--five or six hours--because there was very little of interest therein. It was clear who had arrested me, who had obtained my arrest. I found out something. I saw also the testimony of many of my comrades. This testimony was valuable in that it now told me who had fallen into the hands of the Soviet organs and who had not. I did not read the interrogations. Everyone knows quite well that such interrogations of prisoners take place in prisons. This is a very long, drawn-out, and disorderly account of your testimony. The interrogation is usually written up in the way that the interrogator writes it, and you can either sign it or not. As a rule, the interrogator does not put on paper anything which might lighten your position. However, ~~the~~ the purpose of the interrogation is only to squeeze everything possible out of you in order to be able to start further work on the case and in order to give the Soviet organs some kind of informant interesting to them. This has no bearing upon your fate. If you have been arrested by the Soviet organs under Article 58, then this means that your sentence has already been decided. Throughout the entire existence of the Soviet regime, some 38 years, no one arrested on a political article has ever been released. Even if an individual is arrested by mistake--let us say that they wished to arrest one Ivan Petrov, and by mistake they arrested another Ivan Petrov, a namesake of his--~~this~~ latter individual, ^{nevertheless,} ~~all the same~~ will not be freed. No one ever apologizes to him and he receives a term of some

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sort, a very short one, perhaps, and is subsequently amnest^{ed} perhaps, but in any event he will actually be sentenced. Not for nothing do the chekists at the Lubyanka say, "He who is not in prison will be, and he who has been in prison will never forget it."

The basic system of interrogations, speaking of interrogations in general, consists in holding the prisoners constantly in a state of nervous tension. Even the strongest individuals reach a state after which they must be treated in a psychiatric hospital. The following incident shows to what extent people become nervous: In my cell was an elderly prisoner, a Jew, and a very nice person,^{to} whom another prisoner before leaving our cell said, "You saw that pipe which protrudes from the wall down below in the exercise yard." This was a rusty iron pipe which came out of the "Khleborezka" [bread-cutting room(?)] simply to ventilate the room. "Well," he told him, "during the walks, you know, the chekists usually shoot their victims through this tube. They carry out the so-called silent sentence." We, of course, all laughed. No one believed^{it}, because everyone knew perfectly well that no such sentences^{ever} are, of course, carried out. However, at the next walk this poor man took the matter seriously and kept glancing back at the pipe, while begging us---there were four of us at the time---to allow him to walk in the first pair. No matter how we tried to convince him that he was in no danger, he, for a period of approximately two weeks, until he was removed from our cell, subsequently refused to walk in the rear.

After I had signed Article 95, i.e. my case was closed, I returned to my former cell, said that.....oh, before that. I was taken to the prosecutor. I was taken to the prosecutor in the Ministry of State Security or the seventh floor. There sat a few ordinary officials of the Ministry of State Security, employees of the Prosecutor's office. The prosecutor's office is located in rooms on the seventh floor, bearing No. 793, in any case, in the seven-hundreds (770 or simply 700). There

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sat a certain Colonel Boyarinov, one of the administrative workers of the prosecutor's office. Also located there is the famous military prosecutor Kotov, or simply, as the prisoners call him in their slang-- everyone knows him very well; many have had contacts with him-- "Sukin Kot." [closest English equivalent: "S.O.B."].

It should be mentioned that in the course of the two years that my case was being handled, even more than two years until I signed Article 95, I had occasion to come into contact with and to be under the jurisdiction of three different ^{organs of the} apparatus. First, the purely, so to speak, operational organ. Some time later or even before then, I found myself in the hands of counter-intelligence. It should be said that employees of the Soviet counter-intelligence, in regard to their activity and intelligence capacity, stand head and shoulders above all other officials. And they are far more clever and better-educated than the workers of the interrogation apparatus. The workers of the operational organs stand a head higher. There is in them neither ^{that} haughtiness nor, if such may be said, ^{that feeling} ~~of~~ of responsibility and importance, such as workers of the Soviet intelligence have. These people, as is apparent, are accustomed to commanding and afraid of almost nothing. They are very well dressed, receive a magnificent salary, and in any event, they obviously are people whom the Soviet regime has given a vast amount of authority. Concerning the workers of the operational section, they stand a head higher and apparently have no special liking for their colleagues in the intelligence and counter-intelligence organs. Later I landed in the hands of the interrogation organs, the interrogation apparatus. Interrogators are people who stand comparatively very low. They are very coarse, They are very often uncultured. They try to extract ^{/information/} by all sorts of crude methods. Actually they are totally unable to conduct a keen, psychological analysis of the individual who has fallen into their hands.

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They lack even a general education. For example, ~~himself~~^{when I} once said that as a very young man, I had gone to spend a vacation in Denmark, the interrogator shouted at me threateningly for a long time that I should confess what I had done in Denmark. He could not understand that in Europe people with an ordinary passport could, without any ~~work~~^{mission} or difficulties, go abroad, let us say, to spend a vacation or for the sake of their health, and come back afterwards.

In a few weeks I had signed Article 95, if I am not mistaken, a month and a half or two passed by, and I was suddenly removed from the cell with my things. I was taken to a cell where there were many different people; their personal belongings were also there. They were all speaking. I, of course, began to inquire ^{as} who had already been convicted and who had been told his sentence. It was said that our sentences had not yet been announced, but we all had signed Article 95. I immediately realized that I was located in the cell from which I would probably ^{be} summoned for the announcement of my sentence. I was very much interested in who would sentence me, how, and to what. Then the summoning began. I, true to my principle, remained last. But no one came back to the cell. They had been summoned and taken away. At last they called me, too. This was to a small office in Butyrskaya prison, where I had been once before and where papers were filled out in regard to my arrival. Present here was a man, ~~well-~~well-dressed, stout, chubby, rather unpleasant, about 60, with an unattractive bald crown and a certain sly expression on his face. He had a yellow, rather crumpled briefcase. He asked me my name, and I, of course, gave it; he asked me to sit down and began to read me some sort of stupid lecture to the effect that "you, together with the rest of you Germans, ~~went into the East~~^{marched eastward} in order to turn us into your slaves." But by this time I had long since ceased to be afraid. I declared whether it made any difference in the final analysis to be slaves of the Soviet regime or the Germans, of Hitler or Stalin? He said to me, "Don't be insolent, or else you will land immediately in the lock-up. Do you

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know why you are here?" I, of course, knew, I suspected, but feigned innocence: "I do not have the honor to know." "Your sentence is being announced to you, and thank God you are in a democratic country. In any other country you would be shot." After this, he made a gesture with his hands that I was to rise. I, of course, stood up. He reached for a small leaflet of paper and said: "In accordance with the decision of a special committee of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR, you are hereby sentenced to 25 years in a corrective labor camp. You have been convicted on the basis of Article 58/4, which pertains to the promotion of world bourgeoisie or collaboration with the world bourgeoisie; 8 through 19, 11--this is an attempt to commit group terror." At the bottom there appeared a strange, totally fictitious post script: "and for other crimes against the Soviet regime." From a formal point of view, I immediately declared my protest. "Please tell me what 'other crimes against the Soviet regime' means--that, I perhaps robbed a bank in Moscow or something? This immediately brought me three days in the lock-up. It is true, the lock-up was very pleasant. I got a nice guard, was fed immediately that same day, when I was brought a full bowl of Kasha; the lock-up was warm. Afterwards I was taken from the lock-up very fast. Before the lock-up I spent several hours in the box before I was assigned here immediately after leaving the man who had announced my sentence. In this same box were all those sentenced to 25 years.

After the lock-up I was sent to the so-called death cell. The death cell, in view of the lack of capital punishment, is used for persons who have received over 25 years, i.e., the strictest penalty. This cell is fastened with five locks. Three locks are built into the door, and two are padlocks. The door has a very menacing and dangerous appearance. There were 15 of us there, an intelligent and very restrained group. We immediately became acquainted with one another. The peephole was never

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closed; the guard, it was apparent, was watching us, afraid of what we might do. No one dropped in on us. Food, i.e. the bread ration, and dinner as well, was served through a so-called trough. The food trough was a small aperture in the door, 30 centimeters long^{and} 15-20 centimeters high, which was opened from the outside, but could not be opened from the inside, and at the same time formed a small shelf. When this lid, the little door, is opened, your bread is placed upon it, the bowls of soup are served, and the feeding of the prisoners proceeds. All this time, it was apparent that ^(it was) guard who had served and laid down the bread and then ^{had} moved off to the side. He was afraid that we would do something to him through the opening, grab his hand or something else. However, nothing of the sort happened, of course. When it was seen that we were a peaceful folk.....the "starshina" [senior guard(?)] came to us. Timidly, he stopped near the door and asked us to move off to another corner of the room. We, naturally moved and then began to chat. For a half hour a rather peaceful conversation took place as to whether it was not possible to open the window in the cell a little more often or go for a walk a little longer, and generally speaking the "starshina" saw that there was nothing frightening or dangerous about us despite our 25-year sentences, and after that, normal relations were established. I had not remained in the cell long, namely about eight days, when suddenly together with a few other prisoners, I was taken to the so-called "vokzal" /station/. This station, in prison jargon, is a special cell, from which you go on to the "etap" [halting-place]. I went through a whole procedure. I was bathed. The opportunity is given to rinse one's underclothes. Then I went through a sanitation process; this means that I was shaved again. Then I again underwent a search, and just as during my entry into the prison, was again searched in a most detailed manner-- several seams in my only article of warm clothing, namely my overcoat, were ripped apart, so that it completely lost all ^{its} natural appearance. After

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this, we were sent with our belongings to another room. Here appeared an official with our file and called us by our surname, first name, and patronym. Shoes were also issued to some. I, too, tried to get a pair of shoes, but because of my large feet, no shoes of my size were available. I had there some rather shabby slippers which did not stay on my feet. After this, 15 other persons and I were placed in a so-called Black Maria and driven somewhere. The escorting guards behaved very harshly. They were, as it later turned out, Moscow Komsomols. They were dressed in splendid sheep-skin coats of high quality, white "valenki" [a kind of felt boot], or more accurately, "chesanki", also with galoshes, or in other words, very splendidly, also fur caps. The people were all tall and healthy. In their hands they held Nagant revolvers, and after removing us from the Black Maria, they began to drive us along the railroad tracks. There were also women among us-- about 70 to 80 individuals in all, who were taken out of several other prison vehicles which had arrived. They drove us very roughly until several persons, who had more baggage, and several women, fell. They shouted, "Get up or we'll shoot." However, an official, who rather coarsely.... said, "Where are you chasing them to? Don't you see that these people cannot walk?" A rather hostile discussion with the use of unprintable expressions ensued. After this they moved us on rather quietly. We saw a railroad car standing on one of the sidings. This one was an ordinary passenger car--in this instance it was even a Pullman car--with wire screens on the windows and with separate compartments, made into a so-called "Stolypin" car, i.e. the wall in the compartment.....an instead of it, there is a wire screen. Here they parceled us out, about 12 to 15 persons per compartment. It must be said that such ^{journeys} ~~stipments~~ in Stolypin cars are a terror for all prisoners. It is most miserable. Sick or nervous persons, particularly persons suffering from heart ailments, cannot endure it. There were frequent instances of injury or death. Why? So many people would usually be

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crammed into the Stolypin car that it was often simply impossible to breathe. Fortunately, there was one experienced individual, a rather suspicious lad, who said to me: "You know, Georgiy, let's not climb up on top. Let us stay below." I was rather cold, and I wanted to climb up on top, where it was the warmest. I did not know that in two or three hours there would be a terrible stuffiness in this same compartment. We were all brought here, seated, and locked up. After this we lived in this same car for two more days, ^{received} ~~reached~~ the so-called travel rations, which at all "etaps" always consisted for some reason of salted fish, which we ate. After this salted fish we would be extremely thirsty, but there would not be any water, and the people suffered and were tormented. I personally, knowing this, simply ^{exercised} ~~used~~ self-control and did not eat the salted fish.

In the Stolypin car, I traveled northward. At first, we could not determine the direction in which we were going. Later, someone succeeded in looking through the grill through the window, and we saw that we were traveling due north, if I am not mistaken, along the Yaroslav Railroad. I remember passing ~~through~~ a suburb of Moscow which bore the name Losinoostrovskaya. It took us an even 14 days to reach Vorkuta. It was very agonizing. It was almost the most agonizing of all my prison experiences. The ^{car} ~~wagon~~ was jam-packed. There were women. Also on board were some suspicious characters who called themselves "Banderists," but who apparently belonged to the criminal element. There was an average of 15 persons in each compartment. It was hot and stuffy; we were fed herring, and there was nothing to drink. The train went very slowly. Sometimes it stayed over in stations for an entire 24 hours. We were, as it later turned out, coupled to various freight trains, usually empty ones en route to Vorkuta for coal.

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Finally, after a series of ordeals, after 14 days had passed by, on the fifteenth day, namely 1 February 1950, we arrived someplace where from the bustle of the convoy personnel, it was evident that we were to be unloaded. One man took a look and observed some two-story buildings. He said, "They have brought us to Vorkuta." The unloading began, a very chaotic, unpleasant, and humiliating procedure. An escort detail/with dogs immediately met us. They were the so-called "Krasnopogonniki," wearing red shoulderboards [krasniye pogony, in Russian], i.e., troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. We were surrounded on all sides by the convoy and for the first time I heard the famous formula: "Do not get out of ranks. One step to the right or left is considered escape, and the convoy will use guns without warning." And the following command: "Forward, march!" We marched. First of all, we arrived rather soon in the so-called transfer camp (peresyl'nyy lager', in Russian) in Vorkuta. This was a camp consisting of very bad barracks. The food there was poor. In addition, the common criminal or "blatnyy" [sic] element was represented there to a considerable degree. Just the day before, a horrible knifing had occurred, several persons were slain, and others taken to the central hospital for operations and treatment.

There were about 80 of us. At the very outset we were met at the gates by some suspicious characters; and when we arrived in the barracks, it turned out that everything valuable in our possession had been taken into account. They began to run up to us asking to buy various articles in exchange for a ration of bread. Most [of us] were so depressed, so emaciated, and were in such dire physical and mental straits that without any resistance we gave up these articles, which, of course, had considerable value. Then we were issued clothing. There were 20°-30° below zero [Centigrade?]. Each of us was issued warm quilted trousers, a warm second-hand sleeveless jacket,

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a "bushlyat" (a kind of wadded, quilted coat), also second-hand, patched up, and rather soiled, and so-called "chyuli." The latter, of course, are not "valenki" [felt boots]—the transfer point did not, nor wish to, issue us valenki—they were simply warm, quilted stockings over which galoshes made out of kersey [kind of woolen cloth] or rubberized material, were put on and fastened to the feet with cord. They looked very awkward and unpresentable, but at the beginning helped [to protect] from the cold. Then we were assigned to the various barracks.

We were immediately taken to the so-called auxiliary jobs. Finally came ~~the~~ ^{that} dreaded feature called the "kolesovka." We were "broken on the wheel," i.e., we were subjected to a medical examination. I was at that time in a serious state of dystrophy, which was quite advanced. It was difficult for me to walk. I wrote a request that I be given additional nourishment. I was turned down and instead advised to take more walks. Walking was very difficult for me, although the camp was not large. I walked, strolled, breathed the fresh air, and, generally speaking, hardly remained on my legs. Here the first categories were established. The categories in Vorkuta at this time were the following: first of all, Category 1; Category 1 underground and Category 1 surface, i.e., all prisoners were divided into those destined to work on the surface and those destined to work underground.

What do the terms "surface" and "underground" mean? We did not even know which was better. At present, these two categories, surface and underground, are further subdivided within themselves, e.g., there is Category 1 underground, pertaining to those who perform the heaviest work; for example, loading and piling. [There are also] Categories 2 and 3 underground. There is also Category 1 surface, which pertains to ^{the} most arduous ^{labor}, and Categories 2 and 3. In addition, there is the

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so-called light, individual work, which in practice, however, is included with the so-called mine surface. I immediately received light individual work. Despite this, however, I had to work very hard on the surface. Furthermore, there were the incapacitated, i.e., those who were considered unfit for work. They were immediately assigned to a special brigade for the incapacitated. Those of us who were seriously ill, i.e., really gravely ill, were ultimately sent to a so-called statsionar [hospital] for medical treatment. To get into a statsionar, especially in Vorkuta, the transfer point, or anywhere else, is considered paradise. In camp slang the statsionar is called "God's Kingdom." If you get there, that means you have entered the Kingdom of God, for truly, when you land in a statsionar, where you lie down and no one shouts at you, where you are treated and fed relatively well, and not driven to work, than you have finally attained salvation. As the saying goes, "one month in the statsionar is a year of life."

Cutright slave-trading began in this transfer point, i.e., people would even say here: "Has anyone come to buy you?" It was an actual fact that so-called "buyers" would come from all the mines. Who were these buyers? They were the representatives of the civilian staff, the mine administration, from the chief of the mine himself down to his subordinates, specialists in the various fields of activity, who, having learned that a new contingent was at the transfer point and that the "kolesovka" [medical examinations] had already taken place, or even before then, would attempt to determine just which specialists they were short of. Let us say, about 40 miners, 20 carpenters, several cabinet-makers, etc., are needed. Then they visit the transfer point and select for themselves the 20 miners. Then they say: "I need a skilled cabinet-maker or a skilled carpenter, two medical assistants, and one doctor, etc."; i.e., a regular slave-trade would

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occur. They say that even this transaction cannot get by without some drinking and sometimes, bribery, behind the scenes. For instance, someone wishes to take 20 healthy miners, but someone else says, "Boy, you're a sly one! Look, I come from mine No. 5, which needs 40 [miners]. Well, Ivan Ivanovich, let us make some kind of a deal." The matter ends with the transfer of several hundred rubles into the hands and pockets of the chief of the transfer point or, more accurately, of the chief of personnel. Thereupon he gives his kind permission to this individual to take, let us say, 20 miners.

I spent ten days at the transfer point. No one, of course, bought me, because I was suffering from dystrophy and was almost totally incapacitated. However, in some way I got into trouble. I really do not know how or who had squealed on me; probably, in looking through my file, someone for some reason had assessed me as an especially important criminal. I was relegated to solitary confinement, where several hooligans were serving time for fighting. From solitary confinement I was sent in a special detail accompanied by three escort guards with a dog--this was the procedure of the "etap" even for a single prisoner--to the so-called "Capital Pit" or Pit No. 1. When I arrived here, I was immediately examined and placed in the stationar [camp hospital] as a person suffering seriously from dystrophy and totally unfit for work. I lay in the hospital exactly four hours. Upon orders of the "operupol'nomochenny" [operational authorized agent], Capt. Voronin, a very energetic man and very determined where prisoners were concerned, I was immediately placed in the so-called BUR. This was an intensive regimen barracks. [barak usilennogo rezhima, or BUR]. Here were quartered all those individuals about whom for some reason--because of their danger or some other reasons--the following is written into the regulations: "for considerations of regimen, not to be allowed free in camp." In the

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"bur" were several men who had refused to work and several common criminals. From here we were marched to work in a special column with a special escort and were employed in jobs inside the camp. We were separated from all the others.

From the bur I was again, for about a day, put into solitary confinement. Upon leaving the bur, I was again examined and it was decided to assign me to a brigade. The system in the camps is as follows: all the prisoners are divided into brigades. No prisoner could say that he worked outside of any brigade. There are brigades of bricklayers, cooks, paperhangers, construction specialists, helpers, and finally fire brigades. Every profession and every person who belonged to any particular calling was embraced by an appropriate brigade. There are, it is true, professions which are totally unnecessary in a camp, for instance, journalists, writers, and in general most of the intelligentsia. In addition, there is usually no use even for engineers. There are too many of them. Sometimes they have to work at a new line of work. If you fail to land a job in your own field, say as a bookkeeper, because all the bookkeeper jobs are already taken, then you have to go to a brigade to which you are assigned or in which you wish to work. True, it is ^{not so} difficult to transfer from one brigade to another. Of course, it is always very easy to land a job in a brigade where the work is long and arduous. On the other hand, it is very difficult to transfer from brigades with hard work to one with lighter work. As a dystrophy-sufferer who was not even permitted to leave the camp for work, I obtained a job at first as an orderly. This was the person who kept the barracks in order.

Every barracks in Vorkuta has three sections. In this particular section the plank beds on which the prisoners slept were arranged in two rows. Each such section--the sections are numbered 1, 2, and 3--

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has its own orderly. The first and second sections are for the hard workers. The third section, as always, is the aristocratic section. Here live the bookkeepers, brigade leaders, and in general all the persons who are called the camp aristocracy or, in the camp slang, simply "pridurki" /literally, "half-wits"/. The authorities sincerely believed, apparently, that the work of an orderly was light. Certainly, this was not the work of a miner nor the arduous labor of loading and stacking logs in the lumber depot, but, just the same, you were kept going all day like a mouse in a revolving drum. You had to clean, sweep, keep the prisoners satisfied, carry water, etc., and perform a thousand other duties. For me the work was extremely taxing.

Soon, however, I landed in the stationar. I had developed a severe inflammation of the leg blood vessels and was subsequently, as totally unfit for work, sent to the hospital, where I was operated upon.

Every camp is nothing more than a copy of the Soviet system. It is a state within a state. The camp is, so to speak, a miniature copy of the Soviet Union, only with far worse living conditions. How is the camp organized? In the camp there are two categories of individuals who populate it, or more accurately, belong to it. There ^{is} ~~was~~, first of all, the civilian labor force--civilian employees--and then the prisoners. First of all we shall mention the civilian employees. These were all employees of the so-called Ministry of Internal Affairs, i.e., simply the MVD, because all camps come under the jurisdiction of the MVD. The MVD has a special organ, called GULAG, i.e., Main Administration of Camps, which supervises the camps. So, all the civilian workers in the camp belong among the so-called MVD employees. There are military MVD employees. To this class belong all those who wear uniforms and are authorized to wear them. One such person, first of all, is the camp commander. Another is his deputy. Sometimes there are two deputy commanders of a camp point.

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The individual third in importance is the so-called "operupol'nomochenny" or more precisely, "operativnyy upol'nomochenny" [operational authorized agent] of the MVD. His task is to watch to see that nothing directed against, first of all, the Soviet regime, and secondly, against the camp administration itself, takes place in the camp. The camp, furthermore, contains a so-called "spetschast" [special unit] commander. He is also an officer and a Ministry of Internal Affairs employee, who controls all the case files. All your documents, personal papers, dates of release, "etaps," are in his hands. He handles all the files of the prisoners who are located in the camp. It should be mentioned that your investigation file, itself, is in the city in which your case had been conducted and in which your sentence had been passed. Sent with you to camp is the so-called personal file, i.e., the accompanying file case with all the necessary data concerning you, with notation as to how to confine you, that you should be in a regimented camp, etc. Well, these files are handled by the so-called special unit. In addition there is a "planchast" [planning unit]^{too,}. At the head of this, is an officer. The planning unit performs the planning of the labor force. All matters concerning the employment of prisoners for labor are handled by the planning unit. Also attached to the camp is a so-called KBCh, i.e., kommunal'no-bytovaya chast' [here, roughly, maintenance unit], which, it is true, does not exist in every camp. It manages all maintenance work in the camp, i.e., repair of barracks, paving of roads, maintaining of other buildings in order. Subordinate to it are especially assigned repair brigades. It directs the cart transport parking lot in the camp and all those other camp activities which, like maintenance, can be employed in the interests of the camp itself. That is the KBCh. There is also an institution which bears the name KVCh. This is the so-called kulturno-vospitatel'naya

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chest' [cultural and educational unit]. This is nothing more than a camp ministry of propaganda. It is engaged in the education of all camp inmates in the spirit in which the Soviet government believes all persons sentenced under the political or even criminal articles should be educated. The KVCh contains, first of all, a library, which the camp inmates may use. When I was at the Capital Pit, there were a few dozen books, in all, there. A library was practically non-existent. In addition, the KVCh manages the so-called amateur activities of the camp inmates themselves, the cultural amateur activities, i.e., the camp inmates have the privilege of forming choruses, which sing songs, form theatrical troupes, put on shows, organize so-called theatrical performances, concerts, and engage in sports in their free time.

So all these things are handled by the KVCh. It should be stipulated that, as a rule, the really hard-working camp inmates, or as they are called in camp slang, "rabotyagi," make very little use of these cultural facilities and institutions of the Soviet regime. They usually have neither the time nor ^{the} energy for this. Athletics, soccer games, the organization of shows, and all amateur cultural performances are conducted by the so-called non-working prisoners, who belong in the category of what in camp slang are called "pridurki" [previously explained]. It should also be mentioned that there is a so-called accounting office in the camp. The bookkeeping and accounting section is headed by a chief bookkeeper, also an officer, who handles the accounts of all the activities of the camp itself. In the camp there is, furthermore, an institution designated as the ChIS, i.e., food commissary unit. This is the agency which handles the camp food and produce supply. It is headed by a very important individual. The chief of the ChIS is usually a quartermaster [intendant, in Russian] by profession or, in any event, a commissary [intendatura] worker

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who has been entrusted with almost the most important sector of work, namely, the feeding of the camp population, itself. Subordinate to these individuals, who are present in all these agencies, is a number of civilian workers, who are not officers, i.e., do not wear uniforms. The people working here are simply civilians, sometimes even ex-prisoners who have served their terms. In this group belong assistants of all kinds, secretaries, bookkeepers, assistant bookkeepers, medical workers, civilian nurses, civilian doctors, the chief (male or female) of the medical unit--all these people. It should be mentioned that at the Capital Pit, at which there were about 4,500 or even 5,000 prisoners, there were approximately 500 camp civilian workers. The staffs were heavily overmanned. People talked about this condition. They [the staffs] would often be reduced, but nothing came of it. It should be mentioned, however, that, generally speaking, the quality of work of the civilians was not very high. Everything was done by the prisoners. The civilians virtually only filled up space, received high salaries, and lived quite well. Not one of them, if he had quit working in the camp system, could have obtained such a good job anywhere else. The civilians themselves, of course, lived outside of camp. To get into the camp, a special pass was required. You possessed a pass. There were passes for one-time use and permanent passes, the latter issued for a specific period of time, sometimes for even a whole year. In passing the guardpost, where there was a check, you displayed your pass and then passed inside. You left the pass at the guard post; thus, inside the camp itself you were without documents. This was done so that you could not lose it [the pass] and some prisoner could not appropriate it. When, as a civilian, you left the camp, you gave your name, or, if you did not want anyone to hear it, you gave [only the initial], let us say, the letter "B." After this..... [at this point the apparently irrelevant notation "they remember the pass(?)" is written above the line] and there, let us say, your name

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is Baronov and they give it to you and inquire, "Is this the correct pass?" If it is your pass, you say, "Yes." You take it and then leave the confines of the camp. Such was the organization among the civilian personnel. All of them, of course, were strictly subordinate to the chief of the camp division [Lagot Deleniye], who was the absolute ruler of the entire camp. The only individual who in practice was not subordinate to him, and to whom he himself was in practice subordinate, was the operational authorized agent. It should be mentioned that sometimes there would also be a special authorized agent in the camp, not of the MVD, however, but of the MGB, i.e., Ministry of State Security. This person had absolutely nothing to do with the prisoners; he watched over all the staff workers of the NKVD to see that there was no, shall we say, relations between prisoners and any civilian women. He was, so to speak, the police organ for the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the eye of the Ministry of State Security.

Now I should like to say a few words about the prisoners. Prisoners represent the second category of individuals, by far the more numerous. How are they classified? These are all those sentenced under the 58th or the criminal articles. It is true, there are camps where there are almost no prisoners sentenced under the criminal articles. At the Capital Pit there were 20 of these. They were unescorted and they performed all the jobs for which it was necessary to leave the confines of the camp continuously, for instance, conveying grain, produce, and very many other things into the area. As I have previously mentioned, all the prisoners are divided up into brigades. The structure is as follows: Heading the brigade is the brigade leader. Just what is a brigade leader? He is a reliable individual in a particular field of work and capable of leading people during work. Brigade leaders may or may not be specialists. The brigade leader does not work but is responsible for the volume of work produced by the brigade and for the

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proper performance of the brigade. He looks to see that output is constantly increased. He is responsible for this. The brigade leader is, so to speak, the low driving belt of the masses, as they say in camp slang. He is usually on poor and strained terms with the brigade. Then he is a good brigade leader and is recognized as such by the authorities. The brigade leader has a deputy. The brigade leader writes a report of the work. He specifies what percentage of the particular task has been fulfilled. In connection with this report a calculation of what [compensation?] the brigade has a right to expect is made in the accounting office. When I was there, there were no wages. Instead, you received an appropriate "kotel" [diet, bill of fare, type of meal, cuisine, etc.] depending upon the work. For underground miners there were first, second, and third kotels. The first was the worst, the second a little better, and the third the best of all for the underground miners. For the surface there were also first, second, and third kotels. There was also a special kotel "2A" for engineers and workers doing special engineering work. It was very good and totally inaccessible for the ordinary camp inmate. In addition to this, there was a number of hospital kotels. Thus, the mess chief in the camp had to cook food and apportion it among an aggregate of almost 20 different kotels. This complicated the book-keeping of the kitchen incredibly. There was a mass of bookkeepers and computers there; this whole matter was terribly complicated. And it terribly complicated the preparation of the food, because the specific kotel to which you were assigned depended upon your output. If your output fell below a certain percentage, you would get the so-called disciplinary kotel. This was 300 grams of bread per day and one bowl of soup. If your work is still worse or you refuse to work at all, you would land in solitary confinement, where you are given 300 grams of bread per day and a hot meal every third day for health considerations. It should be stated that the kotel system is totally different in different camps.

Now a few words concerning the organization of the work day:

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Reveille is at five o'clock both winter and summer. You sleep in a section. The light in the section is never switched off at night. Reveille is at five o'clock. You wash, get dressed, and go for breakfast. You eat breakfast according to a ticket. The ticket is issued to you for the appropriate kotel. After you turn in your ticket for breakfast, a special part is [detached] from it. The ticket is divided into three parts. The breakfast section is detached. After this you eat breakfast. You eat very hastily. Capital Pit was terribly overworked, there were not enough tables, and the dining room was very small. Consequently, no sooner had you elbowed your way to a seat when you had to bolt down your food. We were fed in the following manner: You sit four persons to a table of the appropriate kotel. Your ticket is collected from you and then the waiter immediately serves all four of you the appropriate meal. You eat up and vacate the table at once. After this the next party sits down. After breakfast you go to the barracks. Here the brigade leader tells what job you are going on and where you are going, if you had not already been so informed on the previous day. If you are going outside the camp, you assemble at the guard post. If you go to the industrial zone at the mine, you go to the guard post which controls the mine. The industrial zone of the mine is separated by the guardpost and no one without authorization or without a special pass is allowed to pass through to the mine. If you are going into town, you go by way of the so-called city guardpost. You go out. The brigade leader calls the roll. After this, an escort of guards with dogs stands on the other side of the camp. The brigade goes out to work. If the brigade goes out separately from the other brigades, you will get your own escort, which consists of several men. Again the famous formula is uttered: not to break ranks, that a step to the left or right is

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considered escape, and that in such an event the escort will use weapons without warning. Sometimes [you] are forced to take one another by the arm so that no one will escape from the other, or hold your arms behind your back. In the winter taking each other by the arm along an icy rough road is simply torture. The ranks become uneven and fall, the people curse among themselves, and step on one another. It is still more difficult, of course, to walk with one's arms behind one's back. Everyone knows what it means to walk on a slippery road without the opportunity to maintain balance with the arms. You are taken out to work and brought to the proper place. Around the objective, if it is, for example, a building, is a "forbidden zone," i.e., pickets on which is nailed [the notice] "Forbidden Zone" or else simply: "Halt, will shoot!" The escort guard begins to walk around. The job lasts ten hours. At the end of the job the brigade, after being counted all over again on the spot in exactly the same manner -- let us say there had been 28 men, then there must [again] be 28 men -- returns. After taking a count, the convoy turns you over to the guards, i.e, the overseers, who, as in the prison, wear blue shoulderboards. The overseers conduct a search to see that you have not brought any contraband from the city, such as alcoholic beverages, money, which at that time it was forbidden to have on your person, or anything else. After this you enter the zone and can go have dinner. Your working day has ended and you may do anything that you please. [You may] visit barracks, although this, too, is somewhat frowned upon, generally speaking; as a rule, you are to stay in your own barracks and not visit too many friends. Subsequently, in the spring of 1952, all the barracks were locked up by special order. The taking [of prisoners] out to the industrial zone and the mine is carried out in absolutely the same manner. You are again counted and

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admitted into the industrial zone. After this you are lowered into the shaft. With another count you are assigned with the appropriate brigades to the pit sections. An inmate of a regimented camp works, as a rule, 10 hours. Including arrival and departure time, 12 hours of your time are consumed. At the mines it is the same thing. Going out to the pits, changing into working clothes, descending, working, and ascending, departure, and then washing up, also consumed 12 hours. If you are located too far from camp and return very late, then hot food is brought to you or it is cooked on the spot, for example, at the construction sites. There was no returning for dinner. This state of affairs was regarded by all the camp inmates as a true misfortune.

Now I should like to say a few words about what Vorkuta is like. Vorkuta is a city located above the Arctic Circle on the 69th Parallel about 110 kilometers from the Arctic Ocean, more precisely, from the so-called Karskiye Voroty, and 40-50 kilometers west of the northern Urals. On a clear day and from an elevated location, say, the heaps [terakonniki] of the pits, the Ural Mountains are visible. Vorkuta, itself, has a total population of about 180,000-200,000. Of these, about 130,000-140,000 are prisoners. There are two camp systems in Vorkuta. One is the so-called "Vorkutlag," where there are about 80,000 or even 90,000 prisoners. This is a system of permanent camps, partially serving the mines and partially serving other enterprises, as for example, certain plants, a stone quarry, etc. The prisoners in Vorkutlag are almost exclusively those who either had no association with Article 58, i.e., sentenced under the common criminal statutes, or were so sentenced but to minimum terms. The other system of Vorkuta camps is the so-called "Richlag", i.e., MVD River Camp. This a system of regimented camps, of which there are, if I am not mistaken, fifteen,

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and in which are confined 40,000 or 50,000 prisoners. Naturally, it is very difficult to ascertain the exact figure, but it is doubtful whether the number exceeds 50,000. What is this regimented camp like? This is a camp with a stricter regimen. The prisoners in it have far more limited privileges. The regimen is far stricter. In the first place, from a non-regimented camp, such as Vorkutlag, you have the privilege of writing home as often as you please. From a regimented camp you can write only every six months. In the second place, in a non-regimented camp you work eight hours. No one is authorized to make you work longer. In a regimented camp you work 10 hours, but in actual fact, of course, considerably longer. In addition to this, in a non-regimented camp you have the privilege of receiving visits from relatives, i.e., meetings are allowed. A wife can visit her husband and a husband can visit his wife. In a regimented camp such visits are completely forbidden. In regard to internal searches, daily routine, and a number of other things, conditions in a regimented camp are far more vexing, not omitting the fact also that you are searched far more frequently. For the slightest infraction you are subjected to far more severe punishment.

I should also like to say a few words concerning relations between prisoners and civilians. As a rule, the administrative orders of the appropriate Soviet authorities, the camp administration, and the administration of the "Vorkutugol" Combine, itself, all are directed toward the prevention, if possible, of all contact between civilians and prisoners. Of course, this is not fully possible. People work together, sit for whole hours in the same room, and under such conditions personal relations must inevitably be established. The civilians, however, are terrified that they will be suspected of contact with prisoners or possibly

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even be punished. For example, a female civilian receives 10 years for relations with a male prisoner and she herself becomes a prisoner. Exactly the same condition holds true in the case of a male civilian and a female prisoner. Civilians are not permitted to talk about anything or maintain any relations with prisoners outside the circle of their immediate duties. For example, I knew a German working in the bookkeeping office who spoke Russian well. She [sic] was authorized to speak to him only on matters pertaining to work. Once she somehow began to ask him questions about, for example, life in Berlin and many other things. This conversation happened to be overheard by our officer, and I know that there were some very unpleasant consequences for this civilian woman. Civilian personnel are strictly forbidden, for example, to transmit anything for prisoners; even, for example to buy articles, but this practice is regarded indulgently. Especially severe is [the penalty for] the delivery of newspapers and books without the knowledge of the camp administration. Even more severely penalized and prosecuted is the transmittal of anything from prisoners to the outside, for example, letters to relatives or friends. This is a criminal and prosecutable offense. A civilian, if proof has been obtained that he, let us say, transmitted a letter or simply dropped it in a mailbox, is subject to immediate prosecution and may even be sentenced to a term; in any event he will be severely censured and lose his job. It should be said that civilians do this very rarely and very reluctantly. Why? Because, for one thing, there is a prevalence of so-called trusted people among the civilians in the camps. These are not ordinary Soviet citizens. The percentage of party and Komsomol members among them is very high. In addition to this, any person who has some sort of spot, or as they say in camp slang, "khvostik" [literally, "tail"] on his

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record as a Soviet person, is never accepted for work in the camps and is not allowed to associate with prisoners. Yet, in spite of this, I must say that I personally know of several instances of completely cordial and excellent relations between civilians and prisoners. As a rule, the civilians, of course, formally hold themselves very aloof, for this is necessitated by cold calculation and, so to speak, the tone of all life in the camps and particularly in Vorkuta. In reality, however, the civilians never feel any genuine animosity ~~for~~ ^{toward} the prisoners. This is conditioned by the fact that when they enter a camp, they are always told by Soviet propaganda that the camps contain incredible murderers, fascists, and beasts, not humans. When they arrive there, they discover very soon that they [the inmates] are usually a very courteous and intelligent folk [who had been convicted under] Article 58 -- and that no one abuses them [the civilians] or does anything, and there are no brawls. Despite their ^[the prisoners'] oppressive circumstances, a large number of them deport themselves with nobility, as decent and honorable persons. Well-known for instance, is one such case: a certain civilian woman bookkeeper, who was walking out of the camp in Vorkuta one day, was stopped about a kilometer (?) from the camp by three knife-welding drunks, who demanded, "Hand over your money or we will stab you!" They took 1,800 rubles from her. She came sobbing into camp, walking and weeping. By chance she was met right in front of the guard post [by someone?], was directed to the administration to report this misfortune; it seems that even more had been taken -- 2,200 rubles -- a huge sum for her. She would have to pay it, might even be taken to court, and be fired. He [?] asked her, "What are you crying for, madame?" Sobbing she related what had happened. "So what are you crying for?", he said. (At that time, the prisoners were paid

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money.) "Now," he said, "everything will be all right, do not go anywhere; sit down a while in our bookkeeping [office?]." She sat down. He ran around to the camps and barracks and each of the prisoners contributed three to five rubles. As it turned out, 400 rubles more were collected. Within two hours, this entire sum was brought to her in paper bags, superficially counted again, and she departed with several paper bags stuffed with money. Later she said, "They gave 400 rubles more." It is true, she was severely scolded for this by the administration. A long stubborn search was made for the initiators of this collection for the unfortunate bookkeeper. There were miners there, who earned well; the three or five rubles in this urgent case meant nothing, strictly speaking, to anyone.

It should be mentioned that just as there existed among the camp inmates so-called "stukachi," i.e., a network of agents subordinate to the "operupol'nomochenny," which works and reports on everything taking place in the camp, and an agent network of a most diverse character, ranging from agents who watch to see whether the prisoners possess knives or cutting and stabbing implements to those who especially catch individuals who, say, are preparing uprisings or escape attempts or forming in camp anti-Soviet groups or any affiliates of political parties existing on the outside, so, too, among the civilians there exist these stukachi, i.e., the same system which exists among the prisoners is fully duplicated. However, in Vorkuta there lives a large number of people who had previously been prisoners themselves, either some place else or right there in Vorkuta, had been released, and ordered to reside in Vorkuta itself. These people are particularly courteous in their treatment of the prisoners. They regard the latter as their own. Despite the fact that they have been freed, they say,

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"We are hardly different from you." Everywhere they emphatically try to protect the prisoners. If some, let us say, escorting guard is driving a column in front of him and is treating it roughly, people -- and I have personally heard this -- will break out into indignant shouts, whistles, jeers, etc. Once I was working at the digging of a ditch in one of the main streets of Vorkuta when I saw a woman passing by. A guard shouted something coarsely to a prisoner and told them [the prisoners] not to climb out of the ditch, sit down, or rest, although he had no right to order this. It was not his concern to supervise the work; for that there was a brigade leader. This woman assaulted the guard with abusive cursing and deliberately walked through the restricted zone past the prisoners. Several times the guard shouted, "Halt, or I will shoot," Nevertheless, he decided, of course, not to shoot. Such marks of sympathy among freed prisoners are openly visible. Among the people belonging to another camp, i.e., the chekists who inhabit Vorkuta, and the employees of those countless existing institutions which service both mine and camp, the attitude is, of course, different. It is one of coolness. Hatred, however, especially among the women, is totally unknown. I once took part in the repair of a stove belonging to the wife of a certain colonel, an important chekist, whose name I had heard earlier. She was a very young and intelligent woman. Her husband said something rather important to us and then left. As soon as he had gone, she opened the door and said, "Has my husband left?" -- "Yes, he has." -- "My husband has invited you in to dine on some canned meat, but since it would be inconvenient for him to be present and sit with you personally, he went away. So, please," she said, "Sit down and eat." Such incidents do occur.

The entire prisoner population in the camp is, of course, divided into a vast number of very diverse individuals and groups, and simply

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friends. Finally, there are small groups which pursue very specific aims. For example, there exist secret groups which prepare escapes. At the Capital Pit such a group among Latvians was revealed to me. They were supplied with five pairs of home-made skis, knapsacks with grease, and many other things. The people were clearly planning escape. There are groups which conduct, let us say, ideological and political activities among themselves, conduct lectures for one another. I personally participated in two such groups, simply political and self-educational. These were not political parties, but we aimed to raise our general level of political education. Also taking part in this group were even people who did not really belong to us, i.e., camp Communists and those who considered themselves such. Thus, we exchanged opinions and held very friendly discussions. Each one gave a speech and then stated how this appeared from the Marxist viewpoint and how it appeared from a completely different viewpoint. The Communists were very much interested in learning what Western ideology pictured them to be, and we, on the other hand, were extremely interested in learning the thoughts of members of the Communist Party, though they ~~be~~ ^{be} convicts who had not yet renounced the ideology of the party.

Furthermore, it should be mentioned that in all camps there exist affiliates of political parties whose members have landed behind wires. Among the Ukrainians can be encountered representatives of the Ukrainian party known by the name of the Bendera [sic; Bandera?] party. In camp they are simply called Benderists [Banderists]. There are also representatives of another Ukrainian political faction, the followers of the political movement of a certain Mel'nik. I also encountered a few -- very few, it is true -- monarchist advocates, who now are dying out, of course, and followers of Skoropadskiy.

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Also represented were political parties among the non-Russian groups, for example, the Baltic peoples. I know that among the Estonians there were in the camp a large number of political groups, not very noticeable, it is true, for Estonian, generally speaking, is a difficult language. The Estonians behave in a very friendly manner. There are not many "stukachi" and "seksots" [kinds of informers] among them, but one Estonian, who was very friendly with me and, so to speak, trusted me, told me that we [sic] had small meetings of an Estonian quasi-Social Democratic party and said, "Right in the next barracks live our political opponents regarding Estonia." There are exactly the same political parties among the Latvians and Lithuanians. They were especially busy among the Lithuanians for, as is quite well known both in the camps and throughout the Soviet Union, the Lithuanians are ^a people who until the last day never ceased their armed warfare against the Soviet regime.

When I was enroute to Vorkuta, a group of students, some from Moscow and some from other cities, was traveling with me. This group of students, who had become disillusioned with the Soviet regime -- many of them had been philosophy faculty students engaged in the serious study of Marxism -- had arrived at the conclusion that Marxism was a false doctrine, which offered nothing to humanity and was extremely harmful to the Russian people, in particular, Their next step was the formation of a small anti-Soviet group. In their opinion, there were a great many of these anti-Soviet groups. Well known are the alarming reports which reach the Soviet authorities and severely distress the Communists that ~~the~~ academic youths of the large centers stand at the forefront in the formation of anti-Soviet groups.

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Strongly represented among youth in the camps, furthermore, is the element of so-called "true Leninists," as they term themselves. These are people who did not depart from Marxist-Soviet ideology. They merely believe that Marxism had been incorrectly interpreted by Stalin but correctly interpreted by Lenin and, therefore, they believe that to combat all the defects existing in the present-day Soviet government, it is necessary to travel under the banner of Lenin and not to adhere to the course so incorrectly taken by Stalin and the entire Communist Party, which followed him in slavish stubbornness.

There are also groups in the camps which have long broken with Marxism and believe that Russia should be transformed into a national state without Communists.

There are also small groups which are supposedly simply directed against certain minorities; for example, antisemites.

I also had occasions to meet separatists among the Central Asiatic and Caucasian peoples. It is very important here to distinguish two types: one type of people, who identify communism with Russia, i.e., believe that Communism and all its consequent detrimental effects were introduced into their country by the Russians; and the other type, which says that the Russian people, in reality, are also suffering from Communism and are also struggling against it jointly [with us]. In order to overthrow Communism, we must fight together with the Russian people, because each of us separately could not liberate ourselves from the Communists. Liberation from the Communists can be achieved only on a general scale throughout the Soviet Union. Some of them picture a formation of national, totally independent states following the overthrow of Communism, believing that it will be necessary to break off completely and forever with the Russian people. The first paragraph to be inserted in the constitution of this nation will read that all affiliations with Russia are forever revoked. Others, on the other hand, say that this is totally unnecessary and that political and

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cultural autonomy is fully sufficient, for the general trend of events in the world today does not tend toward the creation of tiny destitute states with limited economies but, on the contrary, toward the creation of federations and federal governments. Such tendencies also exist. Of whom are these representatives of the various national groups composed? A great many are former members of the German army who had been in the West, Georgians, Armenians, mountain peoples, Azerbaydzhanis, and Central Asiatics who had been in the West and had come into contact with those of their fellow-countrymen who had long lived in exile and had organized several anti-Soviet and national-independent centers to fight for national liberation of their people from foreign domination or, as sometimes even said, from the domination of the Communist party of chekists. I myself have heard such expressions.

In the camps, there are also various religious groupings. These are mainly sectarians. Strangely enough, the majority of them originate from the North Caucasus, Southern Ukraine, and Siberia, and fewer, strictly speaking, from the European part of Russia proper. The sectarians present are extremely diverse. I know as many as ten different sects. In this regard mention should be made, first of all, of the so-called "Jehovah's Witnesses." They are very numerous and active. Secondly, mention should be made here of the so-called "Seventh-Day Adventists." In third place, are the "Evangelical Christians." Then come the "True-Believing Christians," and the Baptists. In addition, there are the so-called "Baptist Adventists," apparently, a very tiny religious group, for in one camp I met only three individuals and I never heard anything more about them. Also represented in the camps, of course, are all the traditional religions, which, strictly speaking, should not be related to the so-called sectarian movement. This, of

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course, refers primarily to the Moslems, who in general are very numerous. I do not say this because the number of Moslems is so large but because there are very few non-devout Moslems. They are without exception all believers and adhere very firmly to their rituals.

Mention must also be made of the principal group of religious believers represented in the Soviet Union despite all the losses which this group had suffered. I am speaking, in particular, of the [Russian] Orthodox Christians. Generally speaking, there are very many believers in the camps, although there are not so many priests. The difference between the Orthodox and the representatives of the small, tiny sectarian groupings is that the latter are very active, conduct endless religious meetings, and preserve secret copies of bibles and various religious books. As for the Orthodox, they behave more passively, though very firmly. They pray but do not hold special gatherings and do not behave as the sectarians do. The number of believers in the camps is very great. It should be mentioned that, as a rule, even many who are non-devout, when they find themselves in the camp system, become so. The sectarians in their propaganda usually lodge the accusation at the Orthodox that the Orthodox Church has ceased to be a church but has been converted into an arm of the State, i.e., they say, "How strange it is that, strictly speaking, your patriarch even in his does not say a single word about God, or says very little, but always talks mainly about only the authorities and about subordination to the State authorities. The Orthodox believers deny this point of view but almost all agree that, of course, the official Church, as such, has capitulated to the regime, does not think of opposing the regime in any way, and has long since been transformed, strictly speaking, into an organ which, by means of religious authority, trains the people into

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obedience to the authorities, passiveness, support of the Soviet regime, and into the proper unquestioning attitude toward it. Nothing very nice is expressed concerning the patriarch. In general, he is not very well regarded. People say that he is ^{not} really a spiritual leader but almost, strictly speaking, an official of the Soviet regime for church affairs. People often also speak ill of many other Orthodox leaders, who are openly accused of being connected with State Security organs and it is derisively said that they are nothing but chekists who, with Nagant revolvers in their pockets, have pasted beards on themselves for the sake of form. Whereas the official church of the leaders does not enjoy confidence, the low, rank-and-file priests and devout believers, who hold themselves very steadfast, enjoy great confidence and respect. I know of the case of an Orthodox priest who refused to go out to work, maintaining that this contradicted his beliefs and debased his dignity as a priest; he was held in custody for a long time and, according to rumors, not confirmed, it is true, this unfortunate was finally shot. Here and there in the camps an Orthodox service is held. In 1955, in a camp where the majority [of the inmates] were Germans, I personally attended an Easter service in a separate building which contained the so-called "Chinese kitchen," i.e., a kitchen in which prisoners had the privilege of cooking things with their own food products. Naturally, these things were not allowed to be cooked in the big kitchen. Here [in the "Chinese kitchen"] was conducted the entire Easter morning service, for which a great many people had come. Because space here was comparatively very limited, many were unable to enter this tiny building and stood outside. When a guard, a foreman [starshina], I believe, the chief of the camp regimen, appeared and tried to enter, he was simply rather rudely driven away, the door was not opened, and

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he was told to leave, that there was freedom of religion, and that he had no business here. In general, the Orthodox love and respect their Church very much, regard it as a martyr Church, and go far from identifying the true believers and the lower Orthodox clergy with those leaders who for one reason or another are, of course, accomplices of the Soviet regime itself.

I should like to say a few more words about Vorkuta. The civilian population of Vorkuta is a strange conglomeration. As everyone says, this is a city of both ex^yprisoners and chekists. Nowhere else and hardly anywhere in the USSR will one find such a city where the percentage of chekists and, at the same time, ex-prisoners, is so high. People who are not former prisoners and/or do not belong to the chekists are, strictly speaking, very rare in Vorkuta. This creates a special type of relationship. All the ex-prisoners take the part of the not yet liberated prisoners, while the chekists, on the other hand, represent a special caste. However, Vorkuta is a country still far from being mastered by the Soviet regime. Of course, sometime before my arrival I heard a rumor of the ~~mutiny~~^{mutiny} of so-called Gen. Belyayev. I was also informed of one other mutiny, which took place south of Vorkuta, somewhere on the Pechora, among former Vlasovite soldiers. Unfortunately, I no longer know the details.

I should like to say a few more words concerning relations between the administration and prisoners, in particular, about the use of the latter as a labor force. As is known, every prisoner, by law and according to camp procedure, must perform only such labor as is stipulated by his labor category, i.e., labor which is not beyond his strength and which will not result in injury to him. That is the way it is officially. In reality, the situation is quite different. The camp administration

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always tends to give you a higher labor category. Say, you have light, individual labor; then you are simply given labor Category 2. Several times, I personally found myself suddenly and unexpectedly in labor Category 2. You do not see your personal papers and do not know what is ordered for you at the medical examination. You are examined and written about [?] at the medical examination, then are suddenly told, "You are transferring to Brigade No 47." "Why, please? That, you know, is heavy surface work, unloading at the lumber depot." So, you are told that you have Category 2 surface labor. You begin to protest. You write a statement, and take it to the medical examination. You are told, "Wait a little while, there will be a new medical examination, see, one month, two, three will go by, and you work there until you make a fuss or are discharged from there." Of course, the tendency is always to drive the prisoners to heavy work. In 1950, when I arrived in Vorkuta, the so-called Gorev brigade, a brigade for those unfit for work, was there. In it at the time were 147 men. Three years later, when I left Vorkuta, this brigade, despite, numbered about 420 disabled persons. Thus, the camps are constantly being littered -- if it is possible to use such an expression -- with the incapacitated and for that reason workers constantly arrive in the camps and the prisoners lose their fitness for work. In comparison with the years 1944, 1945, 1946, and even 1947, when nightmares and mass extinction virtually prevailed in the camps -- everyone talked about this and medical help was very poorly organized -- in 1948 and in 1948 there began a considerable improvement.

Concern is shown for the health of the prisoners. The concern is identical, say, to that shown by a veterinarian over the health of a work-animal. In Vorkuta there are medical establishments. This is the

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so-called "sanchast'" [medical section], headed by the sanchast' chief, usually a serviceman of the medical service, sometimes male, sometimes female, to whom a number of civilian medical workers is subordinate, usually very few. Then came medical workers composed of prisoners. The trend, it is true, is always to fill all positions of, let us say, doctors allotted to the staff of a given camp -- if I am not mistaken, according to the regulations one doctor is required for every 400 camp inmates -- by civilian doctors, who receive handsome salaries. Sometimes these positions are not filled by doctors at all, but by "fel'dshers" [medical assistants] or even nurses, who by law receive the salary of a doctor, and attached to whom, filling the position of a fel'dsher, even of a hospital orderly [sanitar, in Russian] is a real doctor, who performs all their work for them.

Doctors in the camps constitute a privileged class. They command respect, because there is a large number of very fine doctors, but primarily because doctors, in general, are in short supply. As a rule, there are not enough doctors and for that reason a doctor can take many a liberty for which someone else might simply be "written off", i.e., sent to common labor. A doctor is permitted many a liberty because, in the second place, there are excellent doctors, especially the foreigners, and many are better than the local doctors. [Sense of this sentence not ^{too} clear.] As is known, almost all the civilian personnel, as a rule, also all civilians able to enter the camp and simply free people are treated or try to be treated by the camp doctors. I personally had occasion to meet a large number of very outstanding doctors, famous German professors, and several Hungarian and Soviet professors. For example, the famous Ukrainian gynecologist, Prof. Khokhlov, was in camp.

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In all, I spent from 1 February 1950 to 15 December 1952 in Vorkuta, when suddenly and unexpectedly, I was taken to an "etap". I was thoroughly convinced that I was being taken to Moscow for renewed interrogation but, instead, I travelled a short while in another direction. Again the Black Maria to Vorkuta and the Stolypin railroad car. True, I was now travelling under better conditions: not so many people were taken away from Vorkuta as were brought to Vorkuta. I rode four days as far as Kirov, where there was a layover for two days [for changing trains]. This afforded an opportunity for resting in camp. Then off for Gorkiy, from there to Ruzayevka Station, and from there to Pot'ma.

Pot'ma is the terminal of my journey. In short, I had arrived in Mordovia, the Mordvinian SSR [sic], ⁱⁿ the system of regimented camps of the so-called Dubrava camp. This system completely corresponds to the river camp in Vorkuta in its organization, structure, and traditions. Everything is absolutely the same. The population of the Dubravy camp at the time was also about 35,000-40,000, but the line of work was completely different. Whereas in Vorkuta everything revolves around the extraction of coal and the mines; in Mordovia there are no mines; there the work is forestry, peat mining, or work in various manufacturing operations and woodprocessing factories. For instance, in the eleventh camp division, where I subsequently was, there was a furniture factory.

Dubravya camp has borne this name only since World War II. Until then this system of camps was called the Temnikovskiye camps. Besides this there are in Mordovia two other camp systems, the names of which I do not know. And one camp system in which some kind of strategic constructions are produced, but there were absolutely no foreigners there; virtually only Russians with 25-year sentences

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work there. Information is very meager. It is known that some type of underground plants requiring a considerable amount of pipes is being built there.

The MVD Dubravna camp system embraced about 20 different camps. They all are located along the railroad siding which branches out from the main magistral and from the siding from Saransk to Ryazan'. It extends in a northwesterly direction for a distance of 60 kilometers. And over these entire 60 kilometers -- this region is considered restricted -- lies the so-called Dubravna camp system. This also is a regimented system, but somewhat different. Life in Mordovia is considerably better for the camp inmates than in Vorkuta. In the first place, it is a different climate. The climate is moderate. Absent is the terrible, severe, ferocious Vorkuta winter, which begins in mid-September and stretches out to the end of May. In Vorkuta, besides the specific jobs assigned to them, the camp inmates are worn out by the so-called "snow struggle," i.e., you could work 10 or 12 hours, return to the barracks, and go to sleep. During this time a snowstorm would cover your barracks with snow. In the morning, whether you wanted to or not, you had to get up earlier and shovel away the snow for two hours. In the MVD Dubravna camp, there were somewhat different circumstances. In the first place, the work there was easier. In composition, the camp inmate contingent was exactly the same as in Vorkuta, i.e., mainly Article 58 convicts, although there were also some camps in which common criminal prisoners were represented, i.e., those sentenced other than under Article 58. For that reason, the personal and physical condition of the people inhabiting these camps was considerably weaker, i.e., the percentage of sick and disabled was considerably higher. It may essentially be said that

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in the Dubravna camp there were almost no Category 1 workers, of which there were a great many in Vorkuta. Hence a great many were incapacitated, both because of unfitness for work and advanced age. Here the mood was completely different. It should be said that in the Dubravna camp sentiments were not at all so radical as in Vorkuta. This is explained by the fact, as I later learned, that within a year after my departure a wave of military (?) uprisings had spread all over the northern part of the Soviet Union, including Vorkuta. There were no such uprisings in the Dubravna camp. However, when our transport was leaving, many Russian prisoners said that they were only waiting for us foreigners to leave, and then they would raise a commotion here that would be more orderly than in Vorkuta. But these were the words just of prisoners who had arrived in the camp from Vorkuta.

With respect to proportions, the proportion of foreign prisoners in the Dubravna camp was, generally speaking, higher than in Vorkuta. In Vorkuta, it should be stated, the foreigners -- I am counting both foreigners and inhabitants of the people's democracies, but I am not counting those from, say, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, which were formally annexed to the Soviet Union -- constituted approximately five percent [of the camp population], no more. In the Dubravna camp the percentage of foreigners was higher: about 10-12 percent, and for some time -- for example, the 11th camp division, where I was -- it was, generally speaking, reserved for foreigners, i.e., 80 percent of its inmates were not Soviet citizens, but mainly Germans, Hungarians, Rumanians, Turks, Frenchmen, and representatives of a few other minorities, of whom there were not very many.

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When I was in the Dubravna system I, because of the deteriorated state of my health, was placed in the ninth camp division, the so-called central hospital. Here in Dubravna people were saying rather openly that some camp reforms were being prepared. Such talk occurred even before the death of Stalin. When, then, in the spring of 1953 Stalin died, everyone unanimously began to say that great changes were now to be expected, both in world politics and in the Soviet Union, and, of course, first of all in the camp system. And, as a matter of fact, changes were not long in coming. First of all, an amnesty was proclaimed, a Supreme Soviet ukase pardoning those convicted under the criminal statutes with the exception, I believe, of those serving especially long terms and those convicted for murder or something similar. The mass of these prisoners poured out into freedom. The result, according to information transmitted from the outside, was most undesirable. Nowhere in a railroad station is it possible to leave a suitcase; in an instant it is stolen. The people were a little disillusioned. Later, an amnesty for those sentenced under Article 58 to terms of three years or less was proclaimed. This amnesty brought nothing but the most profound disillusionment. As everyone knows perfectly well, the proportion of people sentenced under Article 58 to terms of three years or less cannot be more than one in a thousand. For example, during all my eight years [imprisonment], I believe that I actually encountered only one such person. Even that was not certain. Thus, the result of this was practically nothing. Then came silence, though persistent rumors circulated that there was to be more leniency in the camps. On the heels of these, indeed, came the downfall of Beriya, in June 1953. The following incident took place in our camp division: a convoy guard ordered a brigade

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going out to work to fall into columns of fours. One place remained vacant. Then he said, "Anybody, fill in this place!" One of the prisoners turned around to him and said, smilingly, that we were saving this place especially for Beriya. Holy terror was mirrored in the face of this guard, as though some sacrilege had been uttered. "All right," the guard said, "Just wait; I'll fix you right now." And he ran back to the guard post to report this. Someone came out of there and began to shout. Then the prisoners rather maliciously said to him, "Pardon us for saying so, commander, sir, but you do not listen very carefully to the radio." Just at this time the latest news, which came on at 0730, began to be broadcast, and the confused guards, in view of the circumstances, went back without taking any repressive measures. The majority of camp inmates, however, reacted rather skeptically toward the fall of Beriya. They simply said, "One fiend has eaten another." In reality, nothing good was expected. Everyone was glad that the man who had, without question, spilled an ocean of blood had been punished and destroyed, but in reality, most of the camp inmates, with their inherent skepticism, believed that no substantial changes would or could come. However, everyone expected something to happen. Subsequently, there came an amnesty for the so-called "maloletki," i.e., individuals who had committed their crimes before the age of maturity, age twenty-one. Their convictions were set aside and they were allowed to return home. This was an amnesty solely for Soviet citizens. In the summer of 1953, however, foreigners began to be assembled, particularly the Germans. We [?] found out about this. The first transports left for the West. I believe that a transport of 1,500 Germans departed from Dubrava camp. Following these came transports of Hungarians, Rumanians, and other nationalities. Liberated most of all and on several occasions were the Poles.

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It should be said that in Pot'ma the attitude of the population was also very good, though not the same as in Vorkuta. Former prisoners [in Vorkuta], they considered themselves 50 percent camp inmates and simply caused disturbances for the administration, guards, and military personnel. The attitude in Pot'ma, and, generally speaking, in Mordovia, in the villages located near the camps was somewhat different. Here there were very few people who had served time in camps, but all around, instead, were a poor kolkhoz and sovkhos population and railroad workers who earned very poorly. The camp inmates noted a very good and truly cordial attitude toward them on the part of this entire populace. It should be mentioned that none of the surrounding population could, of course, help the camp inmates, since Mordovia was in general one of the poorer autonomous republics of the Soviet Union and the majority of the people were hardly any better off than the camp inmates. For instance, it was known quite well that at one time bread was not portioned out but was left over. Everyone was entitled to receive 700 grams of bread, yet there was bread left over. Therefore, a large tray simply lay in the dining hall, on which was placed some sliced-up bread and everyone coming for breakfast, dinner, or supper would take as much as he needed. Some even fed horses and pigeons there, for which they were prosecuted [?] ... Thus, it is known that a large number of civilians, such as nurses [?], and many others, would simply come with bags and take bread out of the camp; they would be very satisfied. Having the personal opportunity to obtain material at the furniture factory, the gauze [marlya, in Russian] with which sofas were upholstered, simply rags, I frequently gave away the rags to free people, including guards, to be used as foot cloths. Here, they say, after all, foot cloths don't lie on

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the streets, you have to buy them, they cost something. Just the same, here they are obtained for nothing.

The populace was dressed very poorly. Often I was asked by many people, since I worked at the time in a laundry, to, say, wash their linens for them for nothing. I would ask, "But, why, don't you have a laundry?" They would say that they had to wash things themselves, for there was no laundry. Besides that, soap costs something, and you manage somehow. See, you save another ruble. Just as a favor. For this, a civilian would buy fats, which were not available in the camp store, for me. It should be said that he could not buy much for me, because the store in the village of Pot'ma was really not much better in goods than the camp store, i.e., it contained just those things which no one needed: magnificent perfumes, eau de cologne, and elastic suspenders; a suit for 1,800 rubles could be bought, but butter, sugar, fats, and white bread were nowhere at all.

I should like to add a few words concerning relations among the nationalities. In camp the situation was generally as follows: in camp there is only one enemy -- the Soviet regime. Everyone considers himself equally victimized and outcast. This was especially so, of course, in the Stalin period. I saw the most unbelievable friendly companies, where two Jews, former inmates of German concentration camps, were on amiable and intimate terms and ate [?] together with two former SS-men and with one Frenchman, who turned up by chance in camp. They were bosom friends. In camp the situation was such that if there was a necessity to clear up some problem, it would always be possible to ask the appropriate expert. For example, say you are interested in the situation in German concentration camps, how Jews were treated there by the Germans.

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You immediately call an appropriate Jew, who you know had been there, and a German, and a discussion ensues. If you do not know how guards in the concentration camps treated people, then you call some former SS-man who had served as a guard, and, in a completely friendly manner, while sipping tea, they sit down together and thrash out this matter. There is almost no animosity. They criticize, but do not hate, one another. For example, almost everyone agreed that the policies of, let us say, Germany during the war and particularly of Hitler, himself, had been wrong, but no one sees an evil design. A man's prestige rises in proportion to the extent that he has damaged the Soviet Union. The more he has done this, the more authority he enjoys in camp. There is, of course, no national antagonism or enmity. The only clash that may occur is in personal interests. For example, there were several Afghans there who built themselves a musical instrument right in the barracks and for hours on end would strum plaintive melodies on it. This, of course, acts somewhat upon the nerves. Sometimes a clash would occur, for example, if someone wanted to read while others wanted to sleep and put out the light. There are these things, but national discord, as such, does not exist. It must be said that the representatives of the various nationalities who have been in camps inspired one another with deep respect, and a cultural influence was even notable. I, for example, saw with my own eyes many Germans studying Russian and learning a great many things of which they had previously been unaware. ^{Conversely} ~~On the other side~~, the same thing was true with the Russians and Ukrainians. A cultured person who wished to occupy himself in something in camp could always engage in anything he wished, even in the study of Chinese. I worked together with Koreans and knew a German who studied Korean diligently for a year and, I believe, learned it rather well.

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Please give your general impressions concerning feelings in the concentration camps of the Soviet Union.

In the first place, my feelings and my impressions concerning concentration camps of the Soviet Union are purely subjective, because I was in two camp systems altogether; specifically, in two systems of strictly regimented camps, first in Vorkuta in the so-called system^{of} regimented camps of the river camp, and then in Mordoviya near the station of Pod'^Tma [?] in the system of the strictly regimented camps of the so-called Dubravnyy [?] MVD Camp.

The general impressions and feelings in the camps now can be described by one word: disillusionment. After the death of the head of the government of the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin, everyone instinctively felt that the entire Soviet nation would be faced with very important and, in the present circumstance, perfectly unavoidable, reforms. These reforms were to have un^aavoidably affected the camps, especially since rumors had been circulating that within the Soviet government there were many who were highly dissatisfied with the state of affairs of these vast masses of prisoners. And indeed, the first thing that occurred was an amnesty for prisoners, the so-called common criminals, that is, persons convicted for [non-political] criminal offences. Then followed a reform of amnesty of Article 58; namely, of persons sentenced up to three years according to Article 58; nothing was given to anyone, since the number of such people was quite negligible, perhaps even less, let us say, than one percent, or about one person in one thousand [sic], because under Article 58, as a rule, a sentence of less than 10 years is never given. Then further relaxations ensued. The regimen was eased. Then occurred the release from the camp of so-called juveniles; that is, persons convicted under Article 58 when they were under 21 years of age; that is, when they

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had not yet attained their legal majority. A certain number of people fell under this category, but only a portion of them were sent home, in spite of the fact that the ukase said that all of them had to be sent home; such was the order of the Soviet government. Many of them were sent to the East, to exile in Krasnoyarskiy Kray, and in regard to this it was said quite clearly that this was an arbitrariness on the part of the lower, local, camp administration. Then followed further indulgences in the camps, in particular, the amnesty or release of invalids; that is, disabled persons. Medical examinations, called "kontsovki" in the camp language, took place. The intention of the administration was clearly manifested: to limit the number of invalids. A number of totally disabled persons, who obviously, that is, if everything had proceeded in accordance with the law, had the right to be invalids and who could have been sent home, were not recognized as invalids. The case was even more complicated with the invalids than with the persons who had been amnestied previously; and indeed, some invalids were not allowed to return home at all. This happened in instances where the family or rayon refused to accept the invalids as such. They were then sent to so-called invalid homes, which were nothing but the very same barracks or building put up..... comparatively well. A resident of an invalid home has the right to move approximately to the rayon of the given village. There they live in common rooms; that is, so to speak, the same as barracks; they do not have their own rooms, but it is, of course, better than in the camp. Generally speaking, the invalid home, because of its mild features, represents a golden cage. Of course, it does not suit the majority of people, because everyone wants to have full freedom, or at least to live with his own family. The war invalids as such had already been sent to the East,

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namely to Krasnoyarskiy Kray or even to the virgin lands, in spite of the fact that they had protested in the summer. Here the administration of the given camp system was usually the deciding authority, and the invalids being released felt quite clearly that they essentially were being subjected to arbitrary rule; that is, that anything could be done with them. It is perfectly inexplicable why some were sent home to their place of residence or to their own family, and others were sent elsewhere. While the initial period of the new government was linked with great expectations, and everyone said that things could not be worse than they had been under the government of Stalin - especially did spirits rise after the exposure of the Beriya plot - all these reforms, which embraced a very small number of persons and which, moreover, were carried out quite disgracefully, even from the organizational and bureaucratic point of view -- all these reforms led to the greatest disillusionment for all the prisoners in the camps. All things considered, not more than 10 percent of the camp inmates were affected by these reforms of Article 58. It is true that a rather large number of people were released from the camps; these were people who had been arrested approximately in the period of 1943, 1944, and 1945; that is, when the Soviet Army advanced after the sudden change on the front and after the Stalingrad victory. These people, as a rule, had not received more than 10 years, and in about '54 and '55 they finished their sentences and went their normal way, namely, Krasnoyarskiy Kray, and part of them went to Irkutsk... to eastern Kazakhstan, or finally to the regions of the virgin and unfallowed lands. As for the current condition in the camps, in regard to the Fall of '55, that is, the period when I was still there, one should note a quite distinct tendency of extremely deep disappointment. Morale had distinctly fallen. No one counts on anything anymore. In September, 1955, a further reform took place, namely the amnesty of

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prisoners who had collaborated with the German authorities or with the allies of so-called Fascist Germany during the [second] world war; that is, from 1941 to 1945. The convictions of all of these persons were to be revoked with the exception of certain paragraphs of Article 58, namely: 58-8, that is, terror. If I am not mistaken, it seems to be under both the paragraph of diversion and paragraph 13. Strange as it may seem, it is under the sixth paragraph, which is, I think, the most severe; but in this whole ukase of the Supreme Soviet the stipulation is made that the persons who were implicated or had personally taken part or done something in respect to the abuse and torture of Soviet citizens, are not subject to the reform. It is perfectly well-known to everyone however, that in regard to every person who had collaborated with the Germans, that is, who had worked either in German organs of civil administration, in organs of the police administration, or finally with the German Army, they usually write in any investigation that he had insulted someone, struck someone, or put someone in prison. And this is interpretable expressly as torture of Soviet citizens. The people who ^{are} completely unprejudiced, well-informed and ^{not} pessimists say that on the basis of this reform not more than five per cent would leave the camps, e.g., in the camp where I was, namely the second camp division ^{of} the Dubravnyy MVD Camp in the Mordovskaya RSSR, of the 1,500 persons staying in this camp, approximately 50-70 persons or a maximum of 100 would go free on the basis of this reform. Everyone is waiting in the camps. Nevertheless there is disillusionment in the camps; everyone sees that within the Soviet government two schools are clearly struggling: on the one hand, the Soviet government understands perfectly well the impossibility of the further existence of the camps. For example, the

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maximum figure cited to me for people in the camps was 42 million persons; the minimum, 25 million. I never heard less than the latter nor more than the former figures.

These figures were cited to me by all camp inmates and prisoners of the most diverse views, from people who, despite their confinement, still considered themselves supporters of the Communist regime, ~~and~~ to the so-called hardened Fascists, who considered themselves sworn and implacable foes of the Soviet regime.

It is also said that during this period prior to 1955 the number of persons arrested under Article 58 fell sharply. The great wave of arrests surged throughout the country only after the downfall of Beriya and of his, so to speak, supporters. The number of persons executed was estimated at several hundred, and the number of persons arrested, allegedly numbering 5000 to 7000, were placed in special camps. Not a single supporter of Beriya, that is, a person arrested in connection with the Beriya case, has been discovered either in the general camps, in the exile settlements, or in the closed prisons. They are kept somewhere in special places. These people simply do not appear. Moreover, according to certain information, a whole network of new camps is springing up, namely in the extreme north of Siberia, on the coast of the Arctic Ocean. This conforms fully with the Soviet camp system; it is a known fact that from the very inception of the Soviet government, the camps have been continuously advancing toward the north. While camps were established in Korea, for example, or in the Solovkas 25 years ago, there are no camps there now. In the last 15 to 20 years camps have begun to spring up in Vorkuta. Already the Vorkuta camp system and the whole northern, central, and southern Urals, which are completely covered with camps, belong to a system

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of outdated camps. The land has already been conquered, and according to unconfirmed rumors, it is true, subsequent new camps are springing up in northern Siberia, mainly along the coast of the Arctic Ocean, in the Vrangeli Islands, in the Novosibirsk Islands, etc. It is vigorously stated that not only are prisoners convicted according to Article 58, being brought here but also common criminals, that is, the so-called camp "blatnyy" element, people who have long been accustomed to camps and continue to carry on criminal activities in the camps.

Question: Of the prisoners whom you have met, do a large percentage of those convicted under Article 58 consider themselves enemies of the present regime?

As a rule, almost all of them consider themselves enemies of the present regime in some form or another. There are very few people convicted under Article 58 who still consider themselves supporters of the present regime and who believe that, as they say, a legal or organizational error had simply occurred. The number of such people is insignificantly small. Usually they are former members of the party and many of them are among those who were, let us say, unjustly arrested by individuals who today have been exposed by the Soviet regime, namely Beriya and Abakumov. Did you not have occasion to meet one or two persons convicted in the so-called Leningrad case, who later were rehabilitated? Yes, that is quite true. These people, as before, remained loyal to the Soviet regime. There are many people, it is true, who harbor a grudge and pretend in camp to be Soviet patriots, hoping to improve their condition. But insofar as we are speaking of genuine feelings, certainly the shortcomings, negative qualities, and the essence of the Soviet regime are completely clear to them.

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Question: What approximate percentage do the political prisoners constitute in the Soviet concentration camps?

Political criminals, if the general mass of all prisoners is taken, that is, of all those people in the camps, including the strictly regimented, the not strictly regimented, and the concentration camps, that is, if the total range of all the people is taken, from the most severe to the most lenient regimes, then we must estimate an approximate percentage of 50 to 60 percent, or, one might say, one-half. Approximately 40 percent belong to those convicted under the ordinary articles, which, however, may very easily be added in with Article 58, because in the Soviet Union a violation of the criminal laws is also a special type of act of aggression against the Soviet government. It should be mentioned that the most common criminals whom I met in the exile settlements, that is, the clearly criminal element, for example, thieves, murderers, housebreakers and burglars - all say frankly that the Soviet government does not let them alone. "It took everything from me; my father was a victim of the collectivization program, and I have no other way or possibility of fighting the Soviet regime. They took everything from me, and I am going to take what I can from them." That, in general, is the theme of those convicted under the ordinary articles. It is true that there are certain others among them who say that it makes no difference to us what sort of government prevails. Any government will imprison us, and of course we will not stop engaging in criminal offences under any government.

But those, generally speaking, are in the minority. The majority of criminal offenders believe that they fell beneath the wheel of criminal elements of the regime and that none of them would have been a thief or a criminal, and would not be serving time if the situation in the country were not completely abnormal.

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Question: Did you meet any people in the camps who had been convicted for active opposition to the ^{present} ~~existing~~ regime, opposition of a political nature?

Unquestionably. It is, of course, rather difficult to answer this question, because first we must agree upon what is meant by "active opposition". In the period of the dictatorship of Stalin, it was enough to have spoken a few words about some person, or simply to displease someone or merely to allow oneself some trick against a higherup, and one was convicted under Article 58. And this, from the point of view of the Soviet regime, was considered active opposition. Nevertheless, these people cannot, of course, be considered direct convicts; they simply fell under the wheel of the political machine.

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But there are other individuals; for example, in the camps there is a very numerous element of, first of all, those who collaborated during World War II with the German authorities. The majority of these people collaborated completely from the ideological point of view and not at all from considerations of personal or material advantages, so much the more so since personal and material advantage was very insignificant. A large number of people after the end of the war began to oppose the Soviet regime ideologically. Strange as it seems, these often were people who were Soviet soldiers and officers during World War II, i.e., they had quite sincerely defended their homeland, i.e., they considered it their primary duty to defeat the external enemy in order that the Russian state as such ^{might} be preserved in general, even the red dictatorship of Stalin. Then they proceeded to fulfill their next aspirations and desires, namely, to achieve domestic reforms and modifications of those reforms which the Soviet regime had so generously promised during the World War. Strangely enough, I had occasion to meet people who had received the highest orders and awards, Soviet soldiers and officers who literally had reached Berlin triumphantly.

QUESTION: Were there many Soviet army servicemen?

Very many. The percentage of servicemen during the World War II period was extremely high. The number of regular army soldiers and officers was, strange as it seems, particularly large. It was these regulars, i.e., individuals on whom lay the general burden of World War II, who saw that victory had not brought the people liberation or fulfillment of their hopes, who believed that these were different times, began to protest in one way or another, and sometimes simply resorted to openly counterrevolutionary ^{tactics,} ~~tricks.~~

After the war, the Soviet Union was covered with a large number of the most diverse anti-Soviet organizations. The majority of them, in

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regard to conspiratory and revolutionary matters, were not up to par, i.e., they were established by inexperienced people and very frequently failed. It is absolutely necessary to mention the sharp and deep antagonism remaining to this day within the regular army, and among the police organs, i.e., the MGB organs, Ministry of State Security, and Ministry of Internal Affairs. I know a considerable number of anecdotes, for example, of a certain lieutenant colonel who was the repairing machine authorized for the operations of a certain motorized corps and despite his high rank as commander of this corps, was literally scolded half-jokingly in his office for repairing his own machine. When he said, "I beg your pardon, but the order was given and signed by you; I cannot help but repair it." Using some strong expressions, the other said, "Don't you know what to do in such a case? Simply say that no spare parts are available and nothing can be repaired. Let it be repaired as you wish. Now we must obtain spare parts."

Such occurrences are very frequent. The army is not very fond of the police apparatus. This is evident in the entire regular army.

QUESTION: Did you have instances of personal encounters with leaders of the various anti-Soviet organizations created after the war in the Soviet Union?

First, I should like to say a few words about organizations going under the all-Russian flag, i.e., of Russian organizations. When I went to Vorkuta in 1950, a group of students of Moscow State University imeni Lomonosov went with me. This group consisted of young demobilized officers. There were a few soldiers. They had formed a small counter-revolutionary group without even a special name, with a very simple objective: to overthrow the Soviet regime. They no longer considered themselves Marxists. They wanted the conversion of the Soviet Union into a national state.

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QUESTION: Overthrow it by what means?

By revolutionary and combat means. This was a purely conspirative military group with all the attributes and characteristic features of such. Unfortunately it did not have adequate skill in regard to conspiracy. Finally, a traitor was found. Everyone received 25 years each and departed.

QUESTION: Was this group large?

I saw a few of them. As far as I know this group contained a few dozen men. Generally, there were a great many such groups. One thing in general was evident after the war: this was an ideological recoil and departure of Soviet academic youth from under the influence of the Communist Party. The rising academic generation has broken away or is attempting to break away from Marxism. This is especially strong among students of the philosophy faculties.

QUESTION: And what are their ideological aims?

These aims, it is necessary to say, are rather hazy. It is very difficult to speak of a developed ideology, so much the more so since I found them in the exile settlements in very difficult straits. But they all had one aspiration: the preservation of the unity of the Soviet Union, but on democratic principles, in order that the people might really have a genuine opportunity to govern themselves and to take some part in the government; transition to a lawful state; and, finally, the introduction of a number of reforms. Despite all differences, everything narrows down to ^{one} aim: the liquidation of the kolkhoz system, which they consider ^{to be} the basic evil of the Soviet State; and second^{ly}, to get rid, finally, of state capitalism in the economic field, i.e. to give an opportunity to private initiative, within limits, of course.

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In regard to the concentration camps, they all, naturally, aim at complete liquidation of the latter. They feel that the concentration camps may be retained for a certain time only for the strongly pronounced criminal element. In the Soviet Union, unfortunately, this element, which is in no way reeducatable, is absolutely enormous. There is a vast number of professional criminals whom it is simply impossible to set free. As for the conviction, as a matter of principle, of all political enemies, all these individuals were opposed to it. It must be stated, of course, that in the Soviet Union there exist small opposition and even revolutionary groups which still have not broken with Marxism. These groups are encountered chiefly in student circles.

QUESTION: Of which cities?

In Moscow, in Leningrad, and in university towns of Siberia. To my personal knowledge, there are less of them in the Ukraine, where other groupings prevail. These people have not yet broken with Marxism. They believe that the world actually is progressing according to the Marxist theory, that the laws of changing formations, which Marx discovered, are unshakable and correct, and that Lenin carried out the correct policy, but with his death the predatory lawless Stalin regime distorted this line, and therefore, the entire task consisted in returning to the Leninist course. It is true that they have certain doubts. They do not picture Marxism at all as it is officially interpreted in the Soviet Union. Besides these small groups there are innumerable groups which have definitely broken with Marxism. This element is the most literate and most intellectual youth, often of the philosophy faculties, which simply had formally completed a course in logic, and from the point of view of logical construction and preparation, had proceeded to a criticism of Marx. It saw that what was written in this allegedly unshakable doctrine not only was ^{not} absolutely correct, and was not an unshakable

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law, but often contradicted the most common elementary human logic. A criticism of Marxism developed in them. It is true their own ideological equipment is weak, because it is very difficult in the Soviet Union to fashion an ideology. It is impossible to print or write anything or to publish a single printed work in which the ideology of a given group is set forth. Nevertheless such clandestine works exist, and, as I was told, not only political ones. There allegedly exists unprinted in the Soviet Union a considerable amount of fictional literature, quite frequently by young authors, which simply cannot be printed because no publishing house will accept it. They go into the hands of [word illegible]... or simply they are kept hidden. There are a considerable number of unpublished poets, for example, who are far more talented than the official Soviet luminaries, not excluding Konstantin Simonov and others. The same situation prevails with political ideology. Nevertheless, the ideological equipment of all of these small groups is rather weak. These groups are usually transitory. They are broken up, convicted, and sent away to camps. But in spite of this, it must be said, they are not discouraged. The morale of all of them, especially the youth, is exceptionally cheerful and optimistic. They all believe that they will not be in confinement for long and during interrogations and under questioning they act very heroically and far more stably than the so-called older generation.

QUESTION: What is the attitude of both these imprisoned groups and the general mass of prisoners toward the idea of revolution and forcible overthrow of the present regime?

Youth and anti-Soviet groupings which do not belong to the category of those sailing under the Marxist flag believe that the overthrow of the Soviet regime can be accomplished only by means of force. They do not believe either in evolution or in gradual change. They know Soviet

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reality too well for this. Concerning Leninists, the Leninists often, I shall not undertake to state a general... they still believe in the possibility of preserving the Soviet regime and in particular in the possibility of reforms and evolutionary change. They frequently lay emphasis upon certain circles in the top echelon, ~~base~~ of the Soviet government, base themselves sometimes on Marshal Zhukov, sometimes on Molotov, sometimes on someone else, believing that these people will begin from above to effect a change in the Soviet regime in the direction necessary for them. As for those groups which have broken with Marxism, they generally take a sober view of things and they do not in any event count upon any help from above.

QUESTION: Did you or your friends encounter anti-Soviet literature there in the concentration camps?

No.

QUESTION: [How about] lists of any kind, leaflets, proclamations?

I heard of them, but I did not personally see any. I saw one man who told me rather vaguely that -- this was in 1954, approximately one year before, that is, about in 1953 -- he had come across an anti-Soviet leaflet. He was at that time still free. He was lying sick in the hospital. Exactly what was in the leaflet, he was unable to tell me. But doubtlessly such leaflets turn up, although in rather small numbers. However, I cannot say, for the Soviet people are very secretive and very disciplined in this regard; so I cannot say anything here.

QUESTION: What do you know of uprisings in the concentration camps of Vorkuta, Noril'sk, ^(P) and other places? What do they say about this in the camps?

I personally did not participate in uprisings because I [left?] Vorkuta [remainder of sentence not reproduced on photostat].

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I was suddenly taken to an "etap" [halting-place], and I thought I was going to an interrogation in Moscow; but I turned up here in the Mordovskaya system of camps of the river camp. Then soon after this came the death of Stalin. And after this there was a very ~~strained~~^{tense} atmosphere in the camp. It is necessary to say that during 1951-52 the situation in the camps in Vorkuta, as everywhere in general, became very much worse. Not only labor camp prisoners, who always wore numbers, but also ZK [?] prisoners, who previously had worn the designation of the given camp system, -- for example, as a prisoner of the MVD river camp in Vorkuta, I wore a letter "R" [in Russian, "P"] approximately ten centimeters in size on my left sleeve -- received numbers. This of course strongly embittered and discouraged everybody. They began to revert to what had been changed in about '44-'45-'46, namely, to lock up the barracks. Naturally, this was a terrible thing. The barracks were overcrowded with people and, as a rule, there is no bathroom in the barracks. To satisfy physical needs, a chamber-pot box is installed. There was a stench in the camp and in general this was a condition which weighed terribly against the everyday life of the prisoners. It was forbidden, when the barracks were unlocked, [to go] from one barracks to another, a restriction which, of course, strongly embittered the prisoners. All of these things brought about the ~~strained~~^{tense} atmosphere in the camps. Later, of course, the camp administration permitted itself a number of other measures, and at this time, beginning with 1951, wages for labor had been introduced, but they started to act very arbitrarily with the payments, i.e., they raised the norm so that in essence you earn and work but get nothing to show for it. Then, about 1953, as far as I know from eye-witnesses, a wave of uprisings broke out in Vorkuta and other places throughout the north. Properly speaking, the uprisings had not been prepared. The aim was only to demand that the [camp ^{administration}] allow

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the prisoners to live as genuine human beings and that the letter of the law be observed. In view of the protest they at first stopped going to work; they formed committees, called in camp jargon, "po-khoroshemu" ["in a friendly way"], and wanted to talk with the administration. They began to request that representatives be sent from Moscow. The camp authorities at first became frightened; they tried to act as always by deception; by persuasion: "go to work," "don't worry", "disperse", "surrender the instigators and all the rest of you will be satisfied." Having already been tricked many times, the prisoners did not believe this. They ceased work and the mines actually stopped. Then reprisals began to be applied. A large number of mines were surrounded by troops. Machine guns and mortars were set up; in particular, such was the case at Mine 29... They opened fire. The total number killed in the northern part of European Russia who perished in the camps during this uprising is computed at 1500-2000 men. Approximately two or three times as many were wounded. The usual measures for suppression were applied beginning with shooting and ending in one camp, if I am not mistaken, in Camp 6 of the MVD river camp in Vorkuta. The camp was surrounded by a cordon of troops, about two battalions. There was no shooting; they suddenly cut the wire and from all sides stormed into the camp armed with hard objects and butt-stocks; i.e., they were armed but did not shoot, only beat up the prisoners unmercifully. Nearby was located the camp ^{for} common criminals; those sentenced for criminal [i.e., non-political] crimes. They all went to the fence and watched what was happening. Then the Article 58 prisoners shouted, "What is the matter with you scoundrels?" with stronger expressions, "they beat us and you watch?" The common criminals broke the fence, overturned it, burst into the camp, and attacked the wounded soldiers. Several scores of soldiers

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were wounded so that the battle ended not at all successfully for the troops, because shooting was apparently forbidden. In other camps as a result of such slaughters, very many people were killed. Because of the butt-stocks people remained with broken bones and broken skulls. After this it is necessary to tell of reprisals. Many people were sent to penal camps and other places. Where they are is not precisely known. Many were sent to closed prisons. A small percentage was executed, the so-called instigators.

QUESTION: Do you know of a repetition of the uprisings and disturbances in the camp system in 1954 and 1955?

Yes, disturbances have been going on since then, flaring up periodically in different places. They ended in Vorkuta; later uprisings took place in camps of the so-called... although they were less intensive, and generally throughout the entire system of regimented camps and even the unregimented ones located along this very Vorkuta-Kirov railroad magistral in the so-called Komi ASSR, which is full of camp systems. These uprisings occurred also in Siberia, in the north. One Lettish physician, after his release told about them. These uprisings occurred in the North, if I am not mistaken, of the Obskaya Guba [Bay], in the north of the Yenisey, even further beyond the Arctic Circle than Vorkuta. There also was shooting here and many were killed. The authorities effected a number of reforms: numerals were abolished, the practice of locking the barracks was discontinued, prisoners were permitted outside the limits of the camp, a system of so-called "bezkonvoyniki" [unescorted prisoners] which had existed earlier in broader form, was instituted; their number was increased, and many prisoners were simply granted the privilege of living outside the limits of the camp, merely showing up to register, if I am not mistaken, at a police station or designated

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place; i.e., the authorities exhibited a tendency toward distinctly placating the prisoners. Since that time, uprisings in the camps have not ended but go on incessantly. The most recent uprisings of which I heard were in the summer of 1955, about May and June. I witnessed one somewhere in Siberia and another in the northern part of the Komi ASSR. On what scale, I cannot say exactly, because the number of people who had arrived from outside into the camps where I was, was very large. But in any case, uprisings occur continuously.

QUESTION: Please tell us of the hierarchial system which exists in the concentration camps. You mentioned prisoners of the Ts. K. [Central Committee?]. How do they differ, and in general, how is the administrative system as well as the distribution of prisoners according to the articles of the criminal code and organized, in general what is the system of these....

As it is known, the Soviet Union is a nation of camps. The system is extremely large. In the first place, there are three [sic] categories of camps: regimented camps and unregimented camps. People sentenced under Article 58 for longer than a certain term, longer than ten years, go, as a rule, to the so-called regimented camps. There the routine is more strict. If a certain prisoner had made some slip, then he goes to the so-called double-regimented camp. There the routine is still stricter, with a large number of other drawbacks for the prisoner. If the prisoner in some way here, too... for example, committed some murder or periodically violates camp discipline and especially indulges in acts of violence [word illegible] upon prisoners but upon the camp administrative staff, then he may land in the so-called penal chain gangs. Such camps exist where prisoners go around all day long in shackles and upon whose personnel files appears the notation: "in case of slightest infraction, execute."

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I personally saw one such prisoner upon whose file this appeared. He saw it himself. He succeeded in getting out of it. Camps exist which are enveloped in complete silence. People sent to these camps do not have the right to correspond; they are simply crossed out of life. Materially, they do not live very badly in these camps, I believe. However, they do not work. These are small camps containing usually a few hundred men, but not more than 500. Where they are located, no one knows, for, while people serve time there, hardly anyone ever comes back. Then in another direction: from regimented camps it is possible to transfer to the unregimented. In a non-regimented camp, discipline is considerably more lax. Seeing relatives is permitted, i.e., your wife can come to visit you, and you can live with her for a certain period of time if you have been fulfilling the norms and are generally on good terms with the camp administration in regard to discipline. In such camps a special little house is built, the so-called "hotel" or "guest house." Of course, there are many other, unprintable, names [for it] in the camp. Some of them are not badly laid out, with tiny, separate cabins. Others, on the contrary, are very poorly laid out, where you and your wife have to live under the eyes of five or six other couples, which, of course, is very difficult and very unpleasant. Then there are camps with lax regimens. In these camps there is a very large percentage of so-called "bezkonvoynnye" ["unescorted"], who are privileged to go outside the camp to work without escort. There is a considerable number of other leniencies there. For example, very often volunteer artists visit there. From there permission is very simply given to live outside the borders of the camp. In some such camps there does not even exist a tower guard made up of service troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but a so-called "samokhrana" ["self-defense"], made up of the prisoners

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themselves, keeps guard. It is true that this is by no means a pleasant thing, for quite often a very undesirable criminal element turns up in the guard.

"Katorzhane" are individuals sentenced.....If I am not mistaken, *the* ukaze concerning the introduction of penal servitude for especially hardened criminals was issued in 1942. It began to be applied in 1943, when the Soviet army, as a result of the general change in defensive *operations* ~~operations~~, began to advance westward. At that time a great many penal laborers were made, and there was a general tendency to condemn to penal servitude individuals involved in crimes against the Soviet people, which consisted in murder, chastisement, and torture of Soviet citizens, i.e. military employees of police detachments under the authority of the German command, punitive organs, i.e., all persons whose activities, as a rule, were connected with the bloodshed of Soviet citizens. Of course, a vast number of the penal labor convicts had had no connection with murders, either directly or indirectly. A great many were condemned to penal servitude in '43-'44-'45 until '46-'47, when this type of sentence completely disappeared. The overall number of labor convicts initially amounted to 500,000-600,000 people. At the beginning their plight was severe as compared to the present time. A vast majority of them perished. These were the outcasts among all the prisoners. They were taken out to work with handcuffs on and taken away also with handcuffs; even worse for ~~them~~ were the food, the most brutal regimen, and the emphatically harsh and cruel treatment inflicted by the authorities and the guards. Today the situation of the labor convicts, in connection with the general leniency, is considerably ameliorated. Some have even had their sentences reduced. It is possible to be sentenced to hard labor only for 20 or 15 years. As far as I know, there is no other sentence. This, then, is the maximum. Labor convicts wear a

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number on their backs, caps, and right knees, which they are never allowed to remove. I know of a case of a convict--a certain sick convict traveled with me--who was being treated in connection with his obviously poor state of health and had arrived with me in the Mordovian system of camps of the Dubrava camp. Simply to amuse me, he threw his cap, with the number on the front, out of the train; and in two days the cap was delivered to him in Gorkiy.....It had been found and picked up. His identity was traced through the number, and the cap was brought to him; the name of convict so-and-so had already been recorded, so that everything was done in order to..... the possible escape of prisoners. I [would not have believed] this, but I saw it with my own eyes.

QUESTION: How were the prisoners classified socially?

In regard to classes....It must be said that if we take the camp system as a state within a state in the Soviet Union, then the proportion of intellectuals in the camp is higher than on the outside. It is especially high, of course, in the labor and regimented camps, i.e. in the stricter camps, excluding, of course, the chain-gangs, where only criminals land, so it is very high. Thus, the more severe the penalty and the stricter the camp, the higher the number of intellectuals. Especially irreconcilable intellectuals, who had actually been involved in large scale crimes (political) or actual leaders of political parties are not sent to a camp but are kept in closed prisons or solitary confinement, if these are Soviet people. It is known, for example, that Sulinskiy and many others are in solitary confinement, but some are treated with special strictness--this is little known to anyone here--they are locked up in psychiatric hospitals. There are two of the latter: the psychiatric prison hospital in the city of Kazan', and a similar one in Kiev. As far as I know, these are the only two in the entire USSR. Here are sent political offenders who

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are really sick, although not all by far. I met several individuals who had been there; there had not been a single common criminal there, only political ones, and among the latter only the important ones. The mentally-ill political prisoners of minor importance are kept in the hospitals which exist in every camp system. The important people are confined in Kiev and Kazan', especially Kazan'. The former president of the Estonian republic, now probably dead, once was imprisoned there. Unfortunately, I have forgotten his name. Several Japanese generals, perfectly normal people, were confined there, I know; so were some German professors and in general people whom the Soviet regime considered important.

QUESTION: Are these people perfectly normal who are sent specially to the psychiatric hospitals?

If ^{they wish to send} a person ~~wants to be sent~~ here, he can be sent simply to hide him. Of course, any prisoner, after having undergone suffering, is ⁱⁿ a very nervous state; therefore, grounds practically always exist. In Moscow there is the so-called Institute imeni Serbskiy, to which all prisoners suspected of mental disease were sent for what is called in camp jargon, "komisovka," or simply a medical examination. Ordinarily the following Solomon's decision is made: "sick, but responsible for his own acts," i.e., if necessary, he can be placed in a psychiatric hospital as a sick person, but he is to answer for his own actions. I personally knew a German professor, with whom I was in a cell for three months, who had been in Kazan', and he related all this to me in detail.

A few additional words concerning psychiatric hospitals in Kazan': This is the place about which one high officer who had arrived here remarked, "It is very difficult to get into a prison psychiatric hospital in Kazan', but it is still more difficult to leave there." A man seldom

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leaves less than two years after his arrival. And it is necessary to say that a considerable number of prisoners, who were not mentally ill, virtually became so when they landed here. Everyone knows what it means for a sane person and what happens to him to be in the company of the mentally ill. In 1949 I served time in the Regimented Lefortovskaya prison in Moscow in cell 72 with a certain German Professor Schueleinern. He had earlier been involved in some kind of Bavarian separatist undertaking. In addition, he was a half-Jew, and after a long odyssey he crossed over to ^{the} Soviet demarcation zone in Poland in 1940. He received eight years for illegally crossing the border, and despite the fact that he openly announced that he was a half-Jew and that he had been oppressed by the Hitler regime and was coming over as a refugee, he was sent to Pechora, and something happened to his nerves. So he was sent to the psychiatric hospital in Kazan', where he spent the entire war between the Soviet Union and Germany; in 1949 he arrived in Moscow for the solution and investigation, i.e. reinvestigation, of certain problems. He told me of this most dreadful institution in which a large number of sane prisoners go out of their minds. In particular, there was a tendency there to place the sane and insane together. Even this professor Schueler [sic] had himself been in a difficult situation. He related a case he knew of some individuals who had lost their minds in this hospital. In this hospital, it is true, there is one privilege; everyone there has the right to say what he thinks. It is possible there, for example, to deliver anti-Soviet lectures. A man who is mentally ill is for that reason not liable to any punishment or repressions. True, a definite feature is introduced into the appropriate statements, according to which it follows that it is still impossible to discharge a certain person. There are occasional instances of persons being released from the hospital, but they are very rare. The death rate there is comparatively high, despite the fact that material conditions

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are not bad. People are kept there whom for some reason it is necessary to hide.

As for the system of closed prisons, rumors came into the camp that beginning in 1950 intensive construction of closed prisons took place throughout the Soviet Union. A great many of these were put up. The following individuals are kept in closed prisons: the most important political criminals, ideologically dangerous; leaders of anti-Soviet groupings and parties are usually kept permanently in central prisons right in Moscow, later in the so-called "Big House on the Mokhovaya" Street, and in others. There they live until they end their earthly existence, for to live a long time in a closed prison, even if so-called "good conditions" are created for you, is beyond human power. It is much harder than the camps. People of minor importance are not kept in central prisons; they are sent to closed prisons. Especially well-known among closed prisons is (1) the former Aleksandrovskiy central in Irkutsk; (2) the Vladimirovskaya prison; (3) the Tambovskaya prison; and several others. Also sent to the closed prisons are people who had committed serious crimes, i.e. a man commits ^acamp crimes, not of a minor category, such as, let us say, absence from work or breach of discipline, but he commits a camp murder. At the present time the penalty for camp murder, pursuant to the ukaze of 16 January 1953, is supposed to be, as for any murder, execution. Rarely, however, do executions for the murder of a camp prisoner take place. Sometimes executions are reported over the radio as a warning to prisoners, but anyone aware of how many murders are committed ⁱⁿ camps knows that about ten percent, no more, are executed; and the remainder are sent for a certain ^{period of} time to closed prisons. The term is from one to five years. There are three categories in the closed prisons: One is kept in solitary confinement and is not sent out to work. This is most oppressive and terrible. One or two years is usually quite enough to break the physical or mental

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strength of even a very strong prisoner. The second category consists of those who are kept in a solitary confinement cell but who go out to work. The third and final category of prisoners is ^{applied to} those who live in common cells and who go out to work.

Besides closed prisons there also exist prisons for special prisoners. For example, in the Soviet Union there is a large number of servicemen not of the Soviet army, for instance, military personnel of the American army who had been serving in Germany and were abducted from here; also British and French. Almost no one ever sees these people anywhere. There are many rumors that they are in the interrogation prison at the Lyubyanka. One has been in a cell with someone; then his case has ended, and the man completely disappears. He should have landed in a camp, but he goes to another place somewhere. It is suspected that there are some special prisons for such abducted individuals and for unabduted foreigners.

QUESTION: Did you meet any Russians or Ukrainians from the Soviet Union who had been abducted here after the war?.....

Personally, I did not meet such people, if my memory does not deceive me. Later, however, I think that I may ^{be able to} fill this gap. But right now, frankly speaking, I cannot remember.

QUESTION: What do you think of the use in the future of concentration camps as a kind of base for an armed uprising for revolution?

The concentration camps are, of course, the Achilles' heel of the Soviet regime. The representatives themselves agree in this. Because, of course, this is an attempt to diminish the volume of concentration camps, it is determined by two factors: (1) The economic unfeasibility of concentration camps; despite the fact that many people believe that this is a cheap labor power, ~~but~~ there is a considerable number of precedent factors. Then, according to information of people totally unbiased and versed in this case--at one time I had ^{met} persons who until the time of their imprisonment had worked in the GULAG ^{Main Administration}

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of Camps⁷ system--for every five prisoners, one employee is required from the moment that a person has been arrested, counting workers of the prosecutor's office, guards, etc. The guarding of the camps undoubtedly uses the million-man army of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. But everyone well knows that these troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs receive higher wages than the soldiers of the regular army. In spite of this, it is a known fact that in case of war the police troops always exhibit very low combat efficiency; because it is one thing to escort, guard, and watch prisoners, ^{and} quite another thing, of course, to go under ~~the~~ enemy machine guns. The Soviet soldier is well aware that where any sort of military action is concerned, the MVD troops ~~are~~ ^{make} very weak support. In addition to this, many of them fall under the influence of the prisoners. Unlike the camp guards, who, as a rule, oppose and hostilely treat the prisoners, the convoy guards merely say: "Behave yourselves properly at work, do not try to escape, do not violate what it says in our rules, and do what you wish--we are not your enemies." I was often in a position, because of the fact that I worked in a laundry, where those poor soldiers, for a package of makhorka or a ruble or anything of small value, sometimes simply brought me something to wash, which, let us say, they could not get washed free, for which it was necessary to pay. I, of course, always fulfilled these requests and chatted with many of them. There was nothing hostile in their attitude toward the prisoners. On the contrary, they are all oppressed by their work and then even say that a manifestly hostile attitude ^{which exists} toward them on the part of girls and women of the villages is appreciable. One even expressed this in the following humorous sentence: "As long as I serve in the NKVD troops, I cannot approach a girl on any kind of a goat." That is exactly the way it was said.

They were oppressed by their status. They sense their inferiority in relation to soldiers of the regular army. So it is perfectly obvious that the concentration camps are the Achilles' heel of the Soviet system. In

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the event of serious military activities, it will be necessary to tighten up the system in the camps to such an extent and to dispatch such a huge number of people to guard them that a great amount of military and labor power will be dissipated. If, on the other hand, this is weakened, the fact is clear that chaos will ensue in the camps. In time of war, I know this from an informed source, it is possible, of course, to expect a great uprising in the camps. In the camps, generally speaking, sentiment is very radical, and many inmates say that at the first actual military shot starting another great war, ~~Russia~~, we, of course, would do everything possible. Words are just words, but in any event this sentiment exists.

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QUESTION: Does information concerning events in the Soviet Union penetrate into the camps?

Undoubtedly. The vast majority of prisoners are still in contact with relatives. It is true, letters are subject to censorship, but they are written quite openly. Sometimes in the letters rather free remarks at the expense of the regime are permitted. It is true, not at the expense of the regime--this is prohibited, it is a legal offense--but at the expense of individual representatives of the regime. For example, any local follower of Beriya not yet arrested is abused. Of course, this is not a Beriya follower but simply an ordinary Soviet roughneck; but it is insurance. In the camp everyone is very well informed of what goes on all over the Soviet Union. They are informed splendidly--even better than on the outside.

QUESTION: What was said concerning the dismissal of Malenkov?

The dismissal of Malenkov had been expected for a long time, and it was said that this, properly speaking, was an act of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. Between them, it was alleged, were hostile feelings. It is true, ideas were vague concerning who represented what course. Some said that this was only personal enmity or a struggle for power. Others, however, said that Malenkov stood on a more moderate and liberal course. It was also said that Malenkov was hostile to Kaganovich, that he was an anti-Semite, and that in this respect he was a great friend of Marshal Zhukov and many others. Speaking of the reaction to the dismissal of Malenkov, I must say that in the camps people are seasoned and very skeptically disposed. No one believes everything entirely, and they say that if anything good is done for us, it is not for the sake of our looks or for humanity's sake, but because this is the way of things. The Soviet regime does not pardon anything and does not forget anything. Concerning the dismissal of Malenkov, it is said only that this indicates first a weakness of the regime, and then that it doubtlessly makes for a corresponding impression abroad. This testifies at least that the dictatorship is beginning to crack to some degree and that the same thing that happened after the death of V. I. Lenin is beginning. It is undoubtedly

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the developer of internal party strife. Truthfully speaking, just as little was expected from ~~Bulgaria~~ as from ~~Malenkov~~. And nothing is expected these days. Far more is expected from the West. That is, when Dr. Adenauer arrived, everyone said that the situation of the Germans would certainly improve. And when it was said that the Soviet regime had ~~already~~ decided to release all Germans, no one believed it.

Conditions outside the camp, of course, interest everybody, because to leave the camp for freedom and to begin a normal life and routine is, of course, the dream of every camp inmate. Therefore inside the camp conditions on the other side of the barbed wire are highly interesting. The vast majority of prisoners are especially interested in the situation in the kolkhozes, for a large percentage of the prisoners belong to that class of the population which works and which worked in the kolkhozes prior to confinement. It should be said that after the death of Stalin the new government widely publicized a program for improving the situation in the kolkhozes. A whole series of these measures of the Soviet regime was drawn up and even begun to be put into operation. In particular, there began a period of colonizing and cultivating virgin and reclaimed lands. However, in spite of this, the situation in the kolkhozes remained absolutely unchanged. Not only does no one ⁱwithin the Soviet government discuss or think about the liquidation of kolkhozes, but there is even a tendency toward the curtailment of private plots. In particular, it was established that somehow private plots periodically swelled, just slightly, of course, at the expense of the kolkhoz lands. And then extremely stern telegrams and circulars were sent from the centers to the local areas to see whether these personal plots of kolkhoz workers actually conformed to the dimensions which they should have had according to the law. In the kolkhozes the conditions, of course, did not change. It should even be said, on the contrary, that the situation on the food front, generally speaking, became worse. It was established by the Government that the food base of the population of the Soviet Union had not yet attained the level

to which, properly speaking, it was supposed to correspond. For this reason, there was begun a whole series of campaigns for ~~the~~ increasing the productivity of kolkhoz production. This was reflected by the fact that--this news reached the camp--the kolkhoz members had to work even harder. A large number of authorized representatives of all kinds were sent to the kolkhozes. There even appeared cartoons in the Soviet periodicals of about 20 authorized representatives on a truck who, after having issued a whole mass of all kinds of orders, are leaving the kolkhoz, and at the time are singing the well-known song, "Live Richly, and We Will Leave for Home, for Home." In the kolkhozes, the situation did not change.

As for the situation of the ordinary people in factories and plants, it is just the same there as in the past. Employees, and especially the workers, are constantly harassed by all sorts of labor watches: a watch in honor of the November holidays, a watch in honor of Artillery Day, etc. A plant worker must, in addition, work off a great deal of the time, on a voluntary-compulsory basis.

QUESTION: Didn't the people begin to act and speak somewhat more freely after the war?

At the beginning, about from 1945 to 1947, the people did speak very freely, as, perhaps, never since the birth of the Soviet regime. But in 1948 there began [last three words of sentence illegible] A wave of arrests occurred, and everyone saw that everything was as it had been in the past and that it was necessary to hold his tongue. After the death of Stalin, people began to talk again. However, today in 1955, the intention is evident and the tendency already exists, as it is said in camp jargon, to "tighten the screws." There is no doubt that in recent times the number of arrested persons has again been growing. I spoke with some, and they indeed said that a wave of arrests [word illegible] as before. After the death of Stalin, people began to speak more freely, but only in a certain plane. Strictly speaking, it is not so necessary to eulogize a dictator no longer alive. But any criticism, of course, of measures of the government--I speak of an actual criticism--is absolutely impossible. Everywhere in the papers

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it is written that criticism is suppressed and that it is not permissible to criticize. But by criticism is meant only the case where, behind the scenes, appropriate documents are given to a person and he is told, "Here, you must criticize this one and that one."

No one, of course, dares to come out personally with a genuine and serious criticism. The question, of course, is of self-criticism. They do not criticize but vituperate. That's the way things are. I know, for example, that a large number of officers from our camp engaged in the camp administration,.....the chief of the regime [sic] was subjected, at the railroad station of the village of Yavyas near our camp, to harsh criticism for maltreatment of prisoners. It was said here that the Beriya times had not ended. In general, both prisoners and outsiders make use of the name of Beriya. "Listen you, these are not Beriya times; they are over." A prevalent expression is "soon you will get the Order of Beriya." This means you will either be executed or be exiled somewhere to serve a sentence. Well, that is the situation.

QUESTION: When you were returning to the West, were you able to meet any of the free people?

Yes, at the time that our train traveled for six days^{to Germany}, we mingled with the people. First they told us that we on the outside of the camp were now free people. We went out. A buffet was set up. Everyone immediately rushed to drink and chat. The populace was not afraid to chat with us. Apparently there were no special injunctions. We came closer and talked. As we went along, badly dressed women and children approached our train at many stations and begged us to give them a piece of bread, since the majority of us were [well-] supplied. The militia stood by and said nothing. The majority of us were supplied with articles from packages received from Germany. I personally was monitor of the car, and therefore all the bread for about 50 men was at my disposal. I consulted with my comrades about how much could be given. They said: Well, give it all! ^{So,} ~~Well,~~ each one cut off several slices for himself. That's the way the bread was distributed, generally speaking, in every station.

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QUESTION: Did you meet many of these begging women and children?

Not so very many, but not too few. In any case they were everywhere. Poorly dressed. And everywhere the population would run up to sell something.

QUESTION: How were the people dressed?

The people are dressed rather unpresentably.....apples and so forth [apparently an expression of some sort] If, for example, you pay them, let us say a ruble, they thank you sincerely. It is evident that a ruble has great importance for them.

QUESTION: What do they bring out to sell on the market?

They usually bring to the market to sell what grows on their private plots, or that which belongs directly in their homes, such as fruit. Milk I did not see. They often bring hard-boiled eggs. Milk, I, generally speaking, did not see in a single station. But I saw fruits, pears, apples, often of rather fine quality. They are usually rather expensive. Good apples cost five rubles a kilogram. This, of course, is very expensive.

QUESTION: Didn't you have occasion to go into any of the Soviet stores and shops?

Yes, when our train traveled around Moscow. Then I went into a small shop. There, generally speaking, everything sells at the usual prices. It is true that such articles as, for example, butter, were very quickly snapped up, because customers upon whom no one counted, had arrived; that is, a trainload of several hundred people, who were rushing to buy up everything. In general, in every store in the Soviet Union, as a rule, there is always a shortage of something. For example, if there is butter, there is no sugar. If there is sugar, there is no butter, but there is a fat mixture. So, from this circumstance it would not happen apparently in a single ^{community} ~~store~~ that there would be white bread, butter, fuel oil, fat mixture, and sugar, at the same time. Such a combination occurs very rarely.

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In general, the food situation, in spite of all attempts to raise the productivity of agriculture, is not improving. All kinds of rumors circulate. They say that great transports go into China and other places, and that great reserves are being created in case of a military clash.

QUESTION: How do the Soviet citizens evaluate the present period of smiles, the "Geneva Spirit," and the period of coexistence?

Soviet citizens are skeptical. Those who sympathize with the Soviet regime say: "Our leaders are doing a good job and are leading the Westerners by the nose." Those who do not sympathize say: "Here, fools, what they don't understand in the West is that they are simply being led by the nose and deceived." And with some fears they say: "Nevertheless, it is clever the way our leaders are conducting their policies." No one in the Soviet Union, neither the intelligent, nor the stupid, nor the old, nor the young, believes in honorable intentions. Only a few speak of this deception with enthusiasm, so to speak; others speak with indignation or anger, depending on their political leanings.

QUESTION: Did you have occasion en route west to meet people who wished to tell you something in parting?

When our train stopped on a siding of Byelorussian Station in Moscow, I, with all the Germans, of course, rushed to explore Moscow. It is true, the leader of our train, a very humane officer, apparently of the regular army, who treated us very well, said: "Don't go far. At two o'clock the train leaves." But apparently the order had already been given or an agreement was reached with the administration of the station and with all police precincts that Germans dressed in burshlag, in camp jackets, distinguishable from all, could be allowed everywhere. They let us pass onto the platform; the people approached and chatted in German. Those who knew Russian spoke. Everyone expressed regret that there was no war, but one little old man, perhaps a little drunk, declared, "Yes, yes, sure, he says, they are going to the West. Soon they will come with machine-guns to the East." I remembered this sentence. I, I must say, was even a little frightened. After this, he disappeared.

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QUESTION: What do you know of the possibility of a military clash between the Soviet Union and the West?

When I was arrested and found myself in prison, in the MGB's so-called interior prison on Dzerzhinskiy Square or simply the Lyubanka, everyone in this sad plight, of course, hoped for war, as a drowning man clutches at a straw. For example, the small bulbs in the ministry suddenly began to be painted blue. This was, of course, interpreted as: "Look, look, the war is starting." This was eight years ago. Subsequently, when we landed in the camps, all the camp inmates, naturally, ^{seeing} the complete futility of counting on anything and of hoping for anything, counted upon war, especially during the lifetime of Stalin. But everyone said that.....

real basis. Everyone in the camps well knew that in the Soviet Union a vast armaments program was being carried out, and that everything is being done for war. People talked about ^{this.} Newly arrived ex-soldiers, recently arrested civilians, spoke. For example, they said that the Soviet regime was developing a very special system for waging warfare, ^{and that} in particular, ~~that~~ strange as it seems, a military doctrine personally defended by Stalin and Voroshilov themselves prevailed among organs responsible for preparations, namely, the doctrine of partisan warfare; on the assumption that huge masses of the enemy would invade the Soviet Union, it would therefore be necessary for saving the apparatus to flee into the forests. They said that great reserves of food and weapons had been compiled in wooded regions, especially in the Siberian taiga; and that in every region bases were being created to which all reliable people would flee in the event of an enemy break-through in this area, in order to fight from there with the same methods with which they fought the Germans and precisely because the hostile military unit which is victorious in this region will undoubtedly step on the toes of the population, will undoubtedly disappoint it, and will undoubtedly create dissatisfaction, and that these malcontents will have a center in which to operate. They said that the critical food situation was caused by the huge reserves that were being

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compiled. The great constant shortage of fuel in which the kolkhozes found themselves was explained by the fact that everywhere through^{out} the country depots of fuel, food, ~~and~~ grain, and medicines were being created, according to an entire fixed system. Let us say the capture of some areas by enemy armed forces does in no way denote a loss of these areas for the Soviet Union. Preparation for war went on constantly. Everyone said that if Stalin had not died, there would have been war either by 1953 or by the end of 1954, and that the Soviet Government did not want to give in and was going to war directly. At the same time, they spoke of a grandiose [word illegible] blow at the West.

Now they say that the new government takes a more sober view of things and is of the opinion that the Soviet Union is incapable of waging war. It would be too dangerous. The Soviet Union realizes quite well that it does not have the sympathy of the great bulk of the people and that if war broke out, the Soviet Union would have to wage it against a powerful coalition. This will not be against Germany, which with several allies was pounced upon by the coalition of world powers. In this case, the Soviet Union will be surrounded on all sides by enemies. The only salvation for us here is the support of the population.

QUESTION: What about China?

The sentiment of the satellites is thoroughly defined. There is talk of extremely anti-Soviet sentiment in Poland. When our train passed through Poland, it was rather strange. Many Poles waved and talked of several things. The Poles were quite courteous to the Germans.

It is necessary to say that China is not, of course, a war power. Secondly, two Chinese worked with me, who spoke simply; I became friendly with them. They were very decent people. One of them was a very cultured man. They said that in China all whites were disliked, and, in particular, the Russians, and that even Mao Tse-tung was not much of a russophile. He wants to use the Soviet Union and if a world revolution is to be achieved under red banners, let the center of the world revolution be in Peking and in no event in Moscow.

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QUESTION: What in the minds of the camp inmates was the most detestable feature in the Soviet Union?

The feature most detested by the Soviet population was of course the fact that the entire country, speaking figuratively, was being crushed by the boots of the police, this terrible, all-knowing police regime, distrustful of everyone, evoking thereby the most colossal hypocrisy, where a person was not safe from denunciations even in his own family. There was a famous case where a man was subjected to repression and only later did he find out that his own wife, who had taken offense at him for something or for nothing, had denounced him. In general until very recently, the entire Soviet Union was ruled by the political apparatus. No one ~~was~~ ^{takes} the risk of falling out with the State Security Committee, as it has since been called, following the downfall of Beriya. A large factor is the fact that a vast majority of the most well-known women in the Soviet Union, such as movie actresses, athletes, etc., have all married high officials of the former Ministry of State Security. In this regard well-informed people living in Moscow and moving in these circles, say that not one dared to refuse because no one dared to quarrel with.....the police apparatus. Police domination was the first condition hated by the people; the second, of course, was the fact that the people were in a state of subjugation. Everyone must do what he is compelled to, always necessarily bad for him. But all the time the sword of Damocles of some campaign is hanging over you. Expeditions to the virgin lands, transfers to other work--all this is done very politely, sometimes even in a civilized manner, frequently even with the observation of material interests, but done just the same. So go to Chukotka, go to.....that is, you are not free. One has to be clever somehow.

In the field of economics, everyone sees that the Soviet Union lives worse than the West. Much worse. Reports arrived, for example, of the striking prosperity of West Germany. Somehow this is known. Where there were Germans in camps, where packages arrived, and

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were partially placed on sale, at which time it was explained ~~for~~ what a chocolate bar really cost in kopeks, Everyone was completely astonished and said, "How is that?" A country which had fought the entire world for six years, totally devastated, transformed by us into a heap of rubble, suddenly after only ten years has gone so far as to become the richest state in Europe? How could this have happened? Why are we in such a critical economic plight?

QUESTION: How do the prisoners regard the limit of existence [of the Soviet regime]? How long do they think this will continue and what limiting concessions can the Soviet regime make?

The prisoners all believe that the limit of existence of the Soviet regime will be a great war. That's what all the prisoners believe. As for concessions, they all boil down to the fact that concessions will be directly proportional to the pressure which will be exerted tomorrow. The greater the squeeze, the more they will be inclined to make concessions, so that if the West actually starts to exert serious pressure, the Soviet regime will make every concession.

QUESTION: Is it true that in recent times there have begun to be fewer informers in concentration camps? And are the prisoners taking measures of physical action?

The camps are always permeated with a so-called subordinate network of operupolnomochnyye [operational authorized agents(?)], or so-called camp "Stukachi" of all ranks. Methods of physical action upon them always were employed and are employed now in, of course, a lesser degree. Execution for camp murder was introduced, but this did not stop "seksots" from being murdered, and does not stop it to this day. Of course, this does not occur on the same scale as, for example, 1944-5-6-7-8. As for their reduction, that is noticeable only in camps under special conditions. In particular, in the camp where I was, there was a great number of foreigners who were being repatriated. Here they [i.e. seksots]

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were not needed, because the camp operational authorized agent is totally uninterested in the thoughts of a German, who in any event would be outside the borders of the Soviet Union within a week. However, "stukach"^{system} did not disappear but still goes on. Particularly interesting, of course, are the attitudes of Soviet citizens in the camps and especially the preparations for such things as, for example, camp uprisings, escapes, etc.

QUESTION: You mean people escape from the camps?

They do. But not many Article 58 prisoners escape. Only those convicted for common offenses escape in large number, because they are helped by an organization of "blatnyye" [roughly "outlaws"], embracing the entire Soviet Union. They have allies in every city, where they can find shelter. To escape without the aid of any organization is almost hopeless. For foreigners, of course, this is particularly difficult.

QUESTION: Please tell us about the religious feelings of the Soviet people in concentration camps.

In the camps there are very many religious believers, undoubtedly as many as on the outside. Besides the Orthodox, there are in the camps also representatives of other religious sects, for example, Baptists, so-called Seventh Day Adventists, True Christians, later Evangelists, and many others. There are also Methodists. I even encountered one lone Stundist. This is quite rare. These people are very intensive believers possessed of the typical traits of small religious groups, sticking close, helping one another out, holding themselves aloof from the general mass, and steadfastly adhering to their views. It is necessary to say that representatives of the Orthodox clergy, and of Soviet citizenship, who have been sentenced to camp, adhere to their views with special staunchness. There are not too many of these. In general, the clergy as a class of society has strongly decreased in number in the Soviet Union. It is characteristic, however, for those who land in prison to behave more or less individually; while the sectarians constitute^a very expressed political organization, the representatives of the Orthodox clergy act

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alone with extraordinary steadfastness and heroism. Many from the ranks of the representatives of the sects, when a matter comes to a serious clash with the camp administration, usually acquiesce at the end. Materially they live very well. They help themselves. But I know of several instances of perfectly inflexible conduct on the part of the Orthodox clergy; in particular, on the part of one priest whose name I do not know, who did not go ~~and not go~~ to work and was ultimately shot.

QUESTION: Tell about the attitude of the nonreligious segment of the prisoners toward the believers.

It is of two types. There is no hostile attitude. There is no malice or indignation. Nonreligious people as, for example, the representatives of the Communists regard them as an undesirable anachronism. Oh, they are ignorant people; they don't know anything; they navigate under old sails. But there are no bad ones among them. They even make interesting conversation. Indifferent people are treated indifferently. As for the basic mass, when a pious man appeared, he was treated with respect in camp and became the subject of intensive inquiries.

QUESTION: From what age groups are the religious-minded composed?

Believers are from every group. It is necessary to say that there are many religious-minded youths in the camps, but they believe in a manner completely different from the older people. Whereas the older generation believes more in ritual and dogma--they pray and cross themselves considerably and conduct frequent religious services, as for example, Easter services. I myself attended an Easter service this year, during which the doors were locked and no guards were allowed in until it was over; everyone went away so as not to cause a scene--the youth believes less dogmatically, prays less, but more philosophically and consciously, i.e. the philosophical and methodic side of religion interests them more than the ritual side.

QUESTION: Were there many prisoners at the service this Easter?

Many were not able to be. They stood inside. This was done in a so-called "Chinese Kitchen." In camp jargon a "Chinese kitchen" is a kitchen where prisoners have the right to cook their own products. This was a small building located off the regular kitchen. There is a stove

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and a man to keep the place in order, and there you can cook for yourself what you want from your own products. So that is where the Easter service was held at night. Many stood outside. Even foreigners attended, Yes, there were many.

QUESTION: What is this KGB--State Security Committee? What is its role? What is the structure of its organs? Are there KGB representatives in local areas? Is there a low-level network, or is this only a committee which regulates the whole system of state security, troops, KGB, etc.?

The State Security Committee in my opinion is merely a title given to the former Ministry of State Security, if I am not mistaken. It has simply been revived. Frankly, the people who know say that nothing has changed. The Ministry of State Security simply received a new label. It has ceased to be a separate ministry. Work in the camps [word illegible] the same as on the outside. Absolutely all types of work are available. Everything that is done on the outside is also done in the camp, the only difference being that in the regimented camps they work longer, usually ten hours, while in the nonregimented camps, eight hours, and under one pretext or another, it is less well-paid. The prisoners have fewer rights. The nature of the work depends on where the camp is located. In Vorkuta a vast number of the prisoners work, for example, in mines, because this is a coal region. Another part works on the surface. These are types of work which [remainder of sentence illegible]. There is very intensive building activity in Vorkuta. This is perhaps the hardest type of work. [Remainder of ^{paragraph} ~~sentence~~ almost entirely illegible]

QUESTION: Let us return once more to the political enemies of the Soviet regime in concentration camps. Are they distinguishable in any way among the general mass of prisoners? What sustains them--what idea--what belief? Are they bound to one another more closely than the common criminals, and do they have discussions with one another on political topics, arguments

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of a theological or philosophical nature, and do they abandon or defend their own opinions before those with contrary opinions, etc? And also tell about those people -- without names -- whom you met and who had been here abroad and also about those who landed directly from the Soviet Union into prison.

It is necessary to say that in the camps they speak far more freely than they do on the outside. Frankly, they are far less afraid. Say a man has 25 years; that is the limit. What more can be done to him? He can, for example, be sent away to a closed prison, but if everyone who says something is sent away, soon the entire population of the camps would be enclosed in prisons. What is necessary is only to avoid making big scenes. For example, it is impossible to assemble a meeting, as one abnormal old man did, and to begin to chant the old anthem "God Save the Tsar." After this he, of course, disappeared from the camp. But generally speaking, groups of people who trust one another gather and talk about all subjects. It should be mentioned that, strange as it seems, I completed my studies in the camps. For, no matter what you were interested in, you were able to learn everything. You could take a university course in any field, although in raw form. You could, for example, almost acquire a knowledge of engineering as long as there was the desire. It is very hard and difficult, but with a certain amount of tenacity, will-power, and persistence, it is fully possible. Arguments on ideological subjects are held very, very intensively. And they are held not only by those who belong to the various political groups but by absolutely everyone. There are also camp propagandists -- people who belong to political groups, no matter which ones, they always try to drag the other prisoners into their circle. Thus, purely ideological battles frequently took place. In the camp this is very simple. Let us say the discussion concerned German concentration camps, then immediately

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it is recalled who among the Germans here had been a concentration camp overseer. He is summoned here. Then, let's say, a Jew who had been imprisoned in this concentration camp is summoned. And they peacefully drink tea on a bunk and we all listen as they discuss what had happened in the camps -- one from the point of view of a prisoner doomed to death and the other from the point of view of an overseer. They chat quite peacefully, without any malice, for all hatred is manifested, of course, against those who are keeping them in the present camp. Strange as it seems, the relations between Germans, former members of the Nazi Party, and Jews is generally very good. Arguments are held. For example, attempts often occur in the camps to find a middle neutral course. Representatives of the various anti-Soviet groups attempt to fashion some kind of ideology in the camp. Everyone has plenty of time; there is no hurry; they are serving a very long time, they figure that if in five or ten years you will be released by some sort of amnesty, you will go out more or less politically learned and equipped. Great interest is shown in camp to people of intelligence, to the politically learned and interested, and to those who know something. No intelligent camp inmate can complain that he has no audience. This, of course, is somewhat dangerous, because frequently questions are broached which, since they are posed by simple people, are completely naive but usually very difficult to answer. The politically-minded prisoners do not discontinue their work in the camps. On the contrary, they conduct it far more intensively and with far less danger than on the outside. There is nothing more to lose, and ^{the} audience is far more grateful. Particularly heated battles occur between opponents of the regime and those in camp who continue to support it. I am speaking, of course, of that self-seeking element which pretends that it is loyal to the Soviet regime in order to obtain some nice little position, such as, let's say, that of

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bookkeeper, supply clerk, a clerk, etc. I am speaking of those who actually defend the Soviet regime sincerely -- there are such persons. This was usually a very unfortunate scorned element, pitied by all, of old ideological Communists of whom there was a very large percentage in the camps -- from the old Lenin guard and so-called Lenin set of the NEP period. There are a specially large number of them. They had spent their entire lives in the struggle for Communism, and, of course, do not possess the mental strength to judge values, to acknowledge that what they had struggled for and defended was in the end worth nothing, that all the blood spilled and their own crippled lives had really been sacrificed for nothing and that the price of their blood was negligible. For that reason they cling to their old ideology. But these are tragicomical characters; for example, the argument ends on the note that "you are 20 years behind the times." An ideological struggle, of course, takes place. But everyone realizes that this element of old ideological Communists was completely harmless. They were an anachronism, a bygone element. Far more dangerous are the silent self-seekers who in reality are not Communists but opportunists. They were opportunists both on the outside and inside the camps. In general camp life is a complete copy of life on the outside, except that everything is far poorer, stricter, and more limited.

QUESTION: Did you not attempt to test the idea of solidarism among your fellow prisoners?

I spoke to the prisoners on the idea of solidarism, as much as I know of it, of course, in approximately the condition it was ten years ago. It is necessary to say that it evoked the manifest interest of the prisoners. But the fact is that, like anyone not possessed of materials and cut off from the surrounding world, I was deprived of my stature because I alone did not possess the power to promote the idea of solidarism

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by myself. Concerning the development and advances which it made during my absence, I of course knew nothing. Many are sympathetic to our idea and say directly that the idea of this compulsory collectivism should really be replaced by the idea of voluntary solidarism. With several persons whom I could trust, I endeavoured to set forth briefly the program of labor solidarism from the aspect of its practical application. For example, the idea of replacing the compulsory kolkhozes which are now being simply converted into state agricultural dominions, for the process of expanding the kolkhozes, begun during the time of Stalin and not halted to this day, goes on continuously. Later the kolkhoz workers are deprived of any opportunity to participate in the administration of the kolkhozes. Of course, since the time that several secondary schools were created for training kolkhoz chairman, i.e., a kolkhoz chairman is transformed simply into an academically-educated bureaucrat, he loses all ties with the kolkhoz members. I spoke on this subject and also of the fact that a replacement of kolkhozes is contemplated, juridical permission to leave the kolkhoz; the kolkhoz simply.... in normal state, and beyond this the people themselves must decide voluntarily. He who wants to cultivate the land collectively has the right to establish, together with those who want this, a type of agricultural cooperative, but on fully voluntary principles, and from the view point of benefit to the coop member rather than for the benefit of the government alone. The idea of dividing up the kolkhoz into, let us say, farmsteads, meets with great support. Many say, however, that most kolkhoz youth have grown out of the habit of cultivating the land by themselves and that it is no longer so simple now. The older generation is still able to do so. But the modern kolkhoz youth has become used to considering himself a kolkhoz worker, not a landowner.

And in regard to industry, everyone fully realizes that factories and plants belonging to the workers have been converted into nothing

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but enormous, state-political enterprises, which are directed by bureaucrats, and the lion's share of the profits, which do not, of course, fall into the hands of the workers but go in far greater and sharper form than in capitalistic states for the benefit of the State, that is, in outrageous quantities....into the hands of the dozen individuals who control the entire country. The idea of the possibility of turning over part of the enterprises and plants to interested people on a concession basis meets with great interest, especially the authorization of private enterprise in order that, for example, every person might have the opportunity to establish and personally manage his own private business. It is asked, "Well, that's fine, but where will the funds be taken from?" When you say that, of course, the State will simply mutually allocate the appropriate funds out of State funds and that at least all light industry must be turned over to private hands; that competition must be established in order to reduce prices; and to create that state of affairs in which economic crises are so successfully overcome in the West, i.e., private and personal ^{interest} before everything, with the retention of the most important key enterprises of heavy industry in the hands of the future national state. [above not complete sentences in original Russian]

QUESTION: Can you tell us anything of the counterrevolution^{ary} -- in Soviet terminology - of the revolution^{ary} from our point of view -- organizations in the army?

No. Unfortunately, I cannot say anything.

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Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA FILE: SSPOW
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OCA 5081-91
24 DEC 1991

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

We are in receipt of your letters dated December 12, 1991 and December 13, 1991 to Director Gates. We are in discussion with Committee staff relative to a response, which will be forthcoming shortly.

A copy of this letter is also being provided to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

/s/ Stanley M. Moskowitz

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

OCA 5081-91

SUBJECT: Interim Response to Sen Simon re illegal arms
shipments to South Africa

OCA/Senate/RWMagner:ds/37292 (23 Dec 91)

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Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 5081-91/1
24 DEC 1991

The Honorable Bob Smith
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:



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Sincerely,

/s/ Stanley M. Moskowitz

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

TO : D/OCA		CONTROL # OCA 5081-91	DATE OF REQUEST 23 Dec 91
FROM : DD/SA 		SUSPENSE DATE	
SUBJECT : Interim Response to Sen Kerry re POW/MIA			
NOTES			
COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices)			
NAME		OFFICE	DATE
NAME		OFFICE	DATE
NAME		OFFICE	DATE
NAME		OFFICE	DATE
ACTION REQUIRED BY D/OCA			
For your signature			

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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

December 13, 1991

The Honorable Robert Gates
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505


Dear Director Gates:

As you are well aware, there have been numerous reports recently concerning the possible interrogation of American POWs by Soviet intelligence officers during the Vietnam War as well as the possible transfer of POWs to the Soviet Union during both the Korean and Vietnam Wars.


Although the Committee realizes that the investigation of these reports is ongoing, we would nevertheless appreciate receiving as soon as possible whatever documentation of these reports of a Soviet connection exists, including the recent debriefing of former KGB General Oleg Kalugin by the Defense Attache's Office of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and the 1955 document labeled "Re U.S. POWs in USSR." which National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft withheld this year from public release.

Please contact Frances Zwenig, Staff Director of the Select Committee, if you have any questions.

Sincerely,



Bob Smith
Vice Chairman



John F. Kerry
Chairman

MASSACHUSETTS,

BOB SMITH, NEW HAMPSHIRE,

Approved for Release: 2024/02/29 C06471810

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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

FRANCES A. ZWENIG, STAFF DIRECTOR

ALAN C. PTAK, DEPUTY STAFF DIRECTOR

J. WILLIAM CODINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL

December 12, 1991

The Honorable Robert Gates
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington DC 20505

Dear Mr. Gates:

Reports continue to surface that Soviet officials have admittedly participated in the interrogation of American POWs after 1973. Most recently, former Soviet KGB and military personnel, interviewed by the Australian "60 Minutes" program, described interrogations and live sightings of American POWs as late as 1978. Among these sources is Oleg Kalugin, a retired general in the KGB, who reportedly said he personally headed an interrogation team in Vietnam in 1975-78, that interrogated Americans.

The Committee recognizes the inherent difficulties in pursuing these matters, given the current state of disarray in the former Soviet Union. However, these difficulties should not deter this government from undertaking a quick and active investigation of these reports. We urge you to take advantage of the apparent Soviet willingness to discuss these matters openly with the western press, and dedicate intelligence resources to follow these important leads.


In particular, the opportunity may exist to establish an ongoing dialogue with Soviet intelligence services on the issue of American POW/MIAs, not only those lost in Southeast Asia but those unaccounted for in Korea and World War II. Likewise, the Committee encourages you to ascertain if other former Warsaw Pact countries may also be willing to cooperate in this regard.

Your efforts in this regard are greatly appreciated, and we ask that you keep us posted as to developments.

Sincerely,



Bob Smith
Vice Chairman



John F. Kerry
Chairman

JFK/kb

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~ NOFORN NOCONTRACT WNINTEL SECTION 1 OF 2

EZ2:
 CITE: CIA 209761
 SERIAL:
 PASS: NSA FOR ZKZK OO DLS DE (FOR NSOC).

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 (b)(3)
 CIAAct

 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
 REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT
 DIST: 17 DECEMBER 1986
 COUNTRY: LAOS
 SUBJ: ABSENCE OF AMERICANS IN THE SAM
 NEUA AREA OF HOUA PHAN PROVINCE, LAOS; LOCATION OF
 REEDUCATION CAMPS IN HOUA PHAN PROVINCE; REGULATIONS
 GOVERNING BEHAVIOR OF INMATES
 DOI: 1975 - AUGUST 1986

SOURCE:

(b)(1)
 (b)(3)
 NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~

0004

NW 982007 - 262

~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
NatSecAct

SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO A

THERE WERE NO AMERICAN POW'S BEING HELD IN THE REEDUCATION CAMPS. EACH REEDUCATION CAMP CONTAINED HAND AND FOOT CHAINS MADE OF STEEL AND WOOD FOR USE ON PRISONERS WHO HAD BEEN ARRESTED AND WHO WERE SUBJECTED TO TORTURE. CAMP TWO HELD A TOTAL OF 53 PRISONERS, ALL OF WHOM WERE RESIDENTS OF VIENTIANE PROVINCE. CAMP SEVEN WAS THE PRIMARY AND COMMANDING CAMP. CAMP SEVEN PROMULGATED 17 REGULATIONS WHICH THE PRISONERS WERE REQUIRED TO ABIDE BY AND WHICH ALSO APPLIED TO CAMPS ONE AND TWO.

TEXT: 1. ACCORDING TO

(b)(1)
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NatSecAct

THERE WERE NO AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR (POW'S) BEING HELD IN THESE REEDUCATION CAMPS FROM LATE 1975 TO 1986. THE REFUGEE SAID THAT REEDUCATION CAMPS WERE IN THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS:

- A: CAMP ONE WAS LOCATED AT NA KA NEUA (VH 441737) VILLAGE. CAMP ONE DETAINED FORMER RLG POLITICIANS, MILITARY OFFICERS AND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS.
- B: CAMP TWO WAS LOCATED AT HOUEI NONG TAO (VH 463704) VILLAGE. CAMP TWO HELD VARIOUS FORMER RLG EMPLOYEES.
- C: CAMP THREE WAS ALSO LOCATED AT HOUEI NONG TAO, VH 467702. CAMP THREE CONTAINED SEMI-PRISONERS WHO WERE USED AS LABORERS. CAMP THREE INMATES DID NOT RECEIVE REPRESSIVE TREATMENT AND NO TORTURE OCCURRED.
- D: CAMP FOUR WAS LOCATED IN THE VICINITY OF MUONG HET (UJ 9301) VILLAGE. CAMP FOUR WAS A REFORMATORY CAMP FOR FORMER RLG PERSONEEL.
- E: CAMP FIVE WAS LOCATED AT SAM TAI (VH 6210) VILLAGE. CAMP FIVE WAS A REFORMATORY CAMP FOR FORMER RLG PERSONNEL.
- F: CAMP SIX WAS LOCATED AT MOUNG HET (UJ 9602) VILLAGE. THE CAMP WAS A REFORMATORY CAMP FOR FORMER RLG PERSONNEL.
- G: CAMP SEVEN WAS LOCATED AT VH 422752. CAMP SEVEN WAS USED TO DETAIN A MIXED POPULATION COMPRISED OF BOTH RLG AND FORMER LPDR GOVERNMENT MILITARY PERSONNEL. THE CAMP WAS LARGE AND ITS REGULATIONS WERE THE STRICTEST OF THE LPDR REEDUCATION CAMPS.
- H. THAM PHA DEMG (POSSIBLY VH 2355) CAMP WAS UTILIZED FOR LPDR GOVERNMENT PRISONERS.

2. EACH REEDUCATION CAMP CONTAINED HAND AND FOOT CHAINS MADE OF STEEL AND WOOD FOR USE ON PRISONERS WHO HAD BEEN ARRESTED AND WHO WERE SUBJECT TO TORTURE. ONE NECK CHAIN IN USE BY THE LPDR GOVERNMENT WEIGHED NINE KILOGRAMS. FORMER RLG OFFICIALS REFERRED TO THE REEDUCATION CAMPS AS "SEMINAR CAMPS" WHILE THE LPDR GOVERNMENT REFERRED TO THEM AS "REFORMATORY CAMPS". SEMINAR CAMPS WERE DIFFERENTIATED FROM PRISONS. CAMP SEVEN WAS DISSOLVED IN 1977 AND

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PAGE 00

THE FORMER MILITARY OFFICERS FROM THE RANK OF SECOND LIEUTENANT TO COLONEL WERE TRANSFERRED TO CAMP SIX. THE LOWER RANKS WERE USED FOR ROAD AND BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION LABORERS. THOSE PRISONERS WHO WERE DISABLED OR "USELESS" WERE RETURNED TO THEIR FAMILIES. IN 1978, CAMP FOUR WAS DISSOLVED AND RELOCATED TO THE SAME AREA OCCUPIED BY CAMP SIX. COMMENT: THE MEANING OF USELESS PRISONERS BEING RETURNED TO THEIR FAMILIES WAS NOT SPECIFIED.)

3. CAMP TWO HELD A TOTAL OF 53 PRISONERS, ALL OF WHOM WERE RESIDENTS OF VIENTIANE PROVINCE. THESE PRISONERS WERE NOT ALLOWED TO MIX WITH PRISONERS FROM OTHER PROVINCES. THE PRISONERS HAD BEEN CHARGED WITH ATTEMPTING TO STAGE A COUP D'ETAT IN 1977, IN VIENTIANE. THE PRISONERS HAD BEEN SENTENCED TO A MINIMUM OF TEN YEARS AND A MAXIMUM OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT. SIX OF THE VIENTIANE PRISONERS HAD RECEIVED LIFE IMPRISONMENT SENTENCES; 13 PRISONERS, CHAINED AT THE FOOT AND WRIST, HAD RECEIVED 20 YEAR SENTENCES; AND THE BALANCE HAD RECEIVED SENTENCES OF NOT LESS THAN TEN YEARS.

4. CAMP SEVEN WAS THE PRIMARY AND COMMANDING CAMP. CAMP SEVEN PROMULGATED 17 REGULATIONS WHICH THE PRISONERS WERE REQUIRED TO ABIDE BY. THE REGULATIONS ALSO APPLIED TO CAMPS ONE AND TWO. PRISONERS CAUGHT VIOLATING ANY OF THE REGULATIONS WERE SUBJECT TO HAVING THE LENGTH OF THEIR REEUCATION EXTENDED DEPENDING ON THE INDIVIDUAL SITUATION. THE REGULATIONS INCLUDED:

A: WHOSEVER WAS ARRESTED BY THE STATE AND PEOPLE AND INCARCERATED IN THE CAMP HAD HIS LAO CITIZENSHIP REVOKED AND WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A RESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATE IN HIS NATIVE VILLAGE. PRISONERS WERE SUBJECT TO THE CAMP REGULATIONS AND WERE REQUIRED TO CORRECT THEIR INBORN TRAITS WHICH LED TO THEIR BEING SENT TO THE CAMP AND WERE REQUIRED TO REPORT THEIR MISCONDUCT TO THE AUTHORITIES, INCLUDING MISCONDUCT FOR THE PREVIOUS EIGHT YEARS. INMATES WERE REQUIRED TO REFER TO THE GUARDS AS "THANZ KAH", A TERM OF RESPECT APPLIED TO A SENIOR) AND TO THEMSELVES AS "KHA NOI" (A SUBMISSIVE TERM). INMATES WERE TO REFER TO THEMSELVES AND EACH OTHER AS "I" AND "YOU"; USE OF TRADITIONAL TERMS SUCH AS FATHER, MOTHER, UNCLE, AUNT, ELDER BROTHER, YOUNGER BROTHER, ETC., WERE STRICTLY PROHIBITED.

B: PRIOR TO SPEAKING TO THE GUARDS OR OTHER AUTHORITIES, INMATES WERE REQUIRED TO SIT DOWN, REMOVE THEIR HATS AND REPORT TO THE OFFICIAL. DIRECT EYE CONTACT WITH THE GUARDS WAS PROHIBITED.

C: INMATES WERE REQUIRED TO FOLLOW THE ABOVE PROCEDURES WHEN

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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INFORMATION REPORT

~~SECRET/CONTROL - US OFFICIALS ONLY~~

018521

COUNTRY	USSR (Tyumen Oblast)	REPORT NO.	(b)(3) CIAAct
SUBJECT	Soviet Concentration Camps in the Vorkuta Area	DATE DISTR.	23 April 1954
DATE OF INFO.	(b)(1)	NO. OF PAGES	3
PLACE ACQUIRED	(b)(3) NatSecAct	REFERENCE NO.	RD
		REFERENCES	

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

SOURCE: [redacted] from two young [redacted] who were incarcerated in two concentration camps in the Vorkuta area (F). [redacted]

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1. The commander of the concentration camp complex in the Vorkuta (N 66-22, E 70-08) area is an MVD officer, Major General Deravyankin. The political officer at Camp No. 14 is Senior Lieutenant Kech. The following are among the camp personnel at Camp No. 2:

- Major Malikov, Camp Commander
- Major Dikhtyaryov, Assistant Camp Commander
- Captain Makhalov, Supply Officer
- Captain Pokhomov, MVD Representative (Upolnomochenny MVD)
- Senior Lieutenant Prokhorov, MVD Representative
- Senior Lieutenant Kalikin, Administrative Officer
- Sergeant Major Mishinko, Assistant to the MVD Representatives
- Sergeant Major Kirilova (female), Head of the Medical Unit.

2. Sources knew nothing of the size and description of Soviet military units in the Vorkuta area. They were unable to give the number of guards in their respective camps. Apparently, single guard units were responsible for guarding more than one camp, since many camps were located within a few kilometers of each other.

3. The city of Vorkuta has a population of approximately 60,000 people. Vorkuta has numerous new cultural buildings. The city is ringed with concentration camps, the prisoners being employed principally in coal mines. There are, however, also other enterprises such as brickyards, sawmills, and a cement factory, which also employ prisoners of the area. The camp numbers known to sources ranged from 1 to 60. Sources were able, specifically, to name Camp Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 14, 29, 30, 55, and 60; and possibly some of these camps are in an area other than the Vorkuta area. (See sketch of the Vorkuta camp area on page 3.)

4. Camp No. 2 is located approximately 20 kilometers north of Vorkuta on a single-track railroad line. The camp is for political prisoners only. In December 1953 there were 2,700 prisoners at this camp. This camp operated one mine shaft, No. 7. The prisoners worked in the mine 12 hours a day, although the official work-day was nine hours. Crude mining methods were employed.

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CIA - March 1, 2024

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- 2 -

5. The following nationalities were represented among the prisoners at Camp No. 2: Western Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Russians, Germans (including Volga Germans), Moldavians, Chechens, Georgians, Armenians, Jews, Komi, Finns, Turkomens, Hungarians, Poles, Japanese, and Chinese. Of the Germans, 120 were from Germany as opposed to the Volga Germans. Ten of the 120 Germans were repatriated with sources. There were approximately 100 Russians in the camp. The Western Ukrainians and the Lithuanians were by far the largest two national groups at this camp. There were no Koreans at this camp.
6. There were among the prisoners at Camp No. 2 many who had been sentenced for collaboration with or service in the German Army during World War II. There were, however, no Vlassovites at this camp. Except for the Western Ukrainians, who were called Zapadniki (Westerners) in camp, the various Soviet nationalities got along well together. There was, however, some discrimination against the Germans by the Soviet nationalities, particularly from former collaborators who claimed that the Germans had let them down. The Western Ukrainians were clannish and nasty to all other nationalities. There were a great number of informers among the Western Ukrainians.
7. From the beginning of 1952, the prisoners began to receive pay for their work and their rations were improved. Until August 1953, they received 100 rubles per month in cash and another 100 rubles were credited to their account. This money could be spent in the camp canteen. After August 1953, as the result of a strike (covered below) the prisoners' pay was raised to 150 rubles per month in cash and an equal amount was credited to their account.
8. The daily food ration at this camp for the prisoners was as follows:
 - 200 grams of oat meal,
 - 650 grams of soup,
 - 23 grams of meat,
 - 27 grams of sugar,
 - 800 grams of bread,
 - 50 grams of white rolls, and
 - 20 to 25 grams of fat.

The above ration was know as the "northern ration" (severnnyy payok) and was much larger than the rations in concentration camps farther to the south. It was also more substantial than the average daily food consumed on many kolkhozy. Persons who refused to work had their daily ration reduced to 350 grams of bread and soup.
9. Motion pictures were occasionally shown to the prisoners. The frequency with which movies were shown depended upon the prisoners' achievement of production norms. There were loudspeakers in all barracks buildings. Newspapers and books were also available to the prisoners.
10. The guard personnel wore red shoulder boards with blue piping. Some troops with dark blue shoulder boards occasionally appeared for special checks. The interior guard consisted of middle-aged guards who were friendly to the prisoners. The exterior guard personnel were much younger and unpleasant.
11. There were 5,000 prisoners at Camp No. 14. One of the prisoners was an old Trotskyite who had been a prisoner since 1932. This camp contained a power plant. All particulars on this camp such as food rations, pay, attitude of Western Ukrainians, recreational facilities, etc., are similar to those at Camp No. 2.
12. There was no sign of organized anti-Soviet activity in the prison camp. On the basis of observations made at Camp No. 2 it is clear that prisoners were afraid to discuss politics because of the existence of informers among the prisoners. There were probably groups of friends among the prisoners who trusted each other and perhaps discussed political subjects. There were two young Russian prisoners in Camp No. 2 who had been sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment for distributing anti-Soviet leaflets in Moscow. It is not known whether these men belonged to any organization and what sort of leaflets they had distributed.


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(b)(3) CIAAct

- 3 -

13. Stalin's death did not bring about any improvements in the prison camps, judging from observations in Camp No. 2. Actually, the guards became worse. Improvements had been introduced a year earlier. Judging from extremely limited political conversations, nothing good was expected from Malenkov by the prisoners. The post-Stalin amnesty affected prisoners with five-year terms only, but it did include political prisoners in this category. In general, prisoners who were released had to remain in the Vorkuta area, but some released prisoners with families were sent to free exile settlements in Siberia and Central Asia. The prisoners learned of the 17 June riots in East Germany through Soviet newspapers and loudspeakers in July. Some of the prisoners expected immediate war and thought that arms would be dropped to them by the Americans.
14. As a result of Beriya's arrest a general strike by the prisoners in the Vorkuta area took place, lasting from 22 July to 1 August 1953. Camps No. 2, 3, 14, 29, 30, and possibly others were involved in the strike. The strikers insisted that, since Beriya had been denounced as a traitor and a foreign agent, they were being held illegally, as they had been arrested by Beriya. Soviet citizens demanded immediate release or transfer to free exile areas. Foreigners demanded repatriation or transfer to PW camps. Major General Derevyankin as well as another high MVD official came to Camp No. 2 and probably other camps to talk to the prisoners. The result of the strike was a cutting down of the work-day to nine hours, the removal of numbers from uniforms, higher pay (see paragraph 7), and the removal of certain restrictions. In some camps there was violence on the part of the guards who tried to force the prisoners to go back to work, but this was not the case at Camp No. 2. The strike was viewed as a great success for the prisoners.
15. There was a person at Camp No. 1 who claimed to be an American flyer. He had been held by the Soviets since 1948. Source was unable to give the name or a meaningful description of this man.
16. Sources were released long before the expiration of their prison terms. Sources had no idea why they and other Germans were released before the completion of their sentences. They were repatriated to Germany by train traveling a somewhat circuitous route. Leaving Vorkuta, the train proceeded through Enta, Ukhta (N 63-34, E 53-42), Kotlas (N 61-16, E 46-35), Voroshilovgrad (N 48-34, E 39-20), and then west to Brest-Litovsk (N 52-07, E 23-42). In the early part of the journey they traveled on a separate prison train; later, through Brest-Litovsk and Poland, their car was hitched on to regular passenger trains.

Diagram of Camp Area Known to Sources~~SECRET/CONTROL - US OFFICIALS ONLY~~

CIA - March 1, 2024

000628

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY	USSR	REPORT NO.	(b)(3) NatSecAct
SUBJECT	Alleged American Held in Soviet Prison	DATE DISTR.	8 December 1955
DATE OF INFO.	(b)(1)	NO. OF PAGES	1
PLACE ACQUIRED	(b)(3) NatSecAct	REFERENCE NO.	RD
DATE ACQUIRED		REFERENCES	BY CABLE

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOJRC: [Redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

PD-848, 1 December 1955

In 1948 in Inta prison, source met an alleged American citizen, who had Polish documents in the name of (fnu) Fawitsky or (fnu) Favelski. The latter refused to reveal his true name. He spoke German, Russian, French, and English fluently. The Soviets had a photograph of him in the uniform of an American enlisted man. Source last saw him in Lubyanka Prison in 1951.

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~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

STATE	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	FBI		AEC				
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(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#")

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

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Office of Legislative Counsel

OLC #78-1943/a

16 MAY 1978

*Dept of
Army*

Honorable Christopher J. Dodd
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. Dodd:

Thank you for your letter to Mr. Seymour Young, dated 4 May 1978, in which you requested information on Corporal Roger A. Dumas, RA 21040481, who was missing in action in Korea and declared dead on 26 February 1954.

As we mentioned to Patricia Kane, of your staff, we gave prompt attention to the request from the Department of Army, Adjutant General's Office, for photographic and documentation assistance. We found no information on Corporal Dumas in our files. Our reply on the matter was made directly to Major W. L. England, Chief, Status Determinations Division.

I trust this information will be helpful in responding to your constituent.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Lyle L. Miller
Acting Legislative Counsel

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CIA - March 1, 2024

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J. RDLICKA

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UNCLAS RUEP

(FOLLOWING IS ZDK RUABSG 12F 1430730--CAPTURED U.S. PILOT STATEMENT) S230654 RADIO OF THE PATRIOTIC NEUTRALIST FORCES (CLANDESTINE) IN LAO TO LAOS 2315 GMT 22 MAY 1966--S (FIRST OF TWO TAKES--CAPTURED UKS. PILOT STATEMENT) (TEXT) ON EIGHTEEN 18 MAY, THE SECRETARIAT OF THE NLHX CENTRAL COMMITTEE ISSUED A STATEMENT IN WHICH IT REVEALED THAT ON EIGHTEEN 18 MAY NINETEEN SIXTYFIVE 1965, THE ARMED FORCES AND LAOTIAN INHABITANTS CAPTURED A U.S. PILOT WHEN HE WAS BOMBING AND STRAFING THE LIBERATED AREAS OF LAOS. THIS PILOT, A CAPTAIN NAMED (DAVID LOUIS TEFLEKA--PHONETIC),

PAGE 2 RUABSG 12F UNCLAS
SERIAL NUMBER 6254 SIX TWO FIVE FOUR OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE, HAD TAKEN OFF FROM THE U.S. AIRBASE OF (PAK LY--PHONETIC) IN THAILAND. ON TWENTYFOUR 24 APRIL NINETEEN SIXTYSIX 1966, THIS AMERICAN PILOT WAS AUTHORIZED TOCROWE A LETTER TO PRINCE SOUPHANOUVONG, NLHX CHAIRMAN AND VICE PREMIER OF THE TRIPARTITE NATIONAL COALITION GOVERNMENT OF LAOS.

THE FOLLOWING ARE SOME IMPORTANT PASSAGES OF THIS LETTER:
YOUR HIGHNESS, I HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED AND TAKE THIS GOOD OCCASION TO WRITE THIS LETTER TO YOUR HIGHNESS TO CNFORM YOU THAT I AM ONE OF THE AMERICAN PILOTS WHONHAVE FLOWN JET PLANES TO CARRY OUT BOMBING MISSIONS IN ORDER TO COMMIT CRIMINAL ACTS AGAINST THE INNOCENT LAOTIAN PEOPLE. HOWEVER, MY CRIMINAL ACTS HAVE BEEN PARDONED BY YOUR HIGHNESS AND THE LAOTIAN PEOPLE. I TOOK OFF FROM THE AIR BASE OF (PAK LY) IN THAILAND TO BOMB THE LIBERATED AREAS OF THE LAOTIAN PATRIOTIC FORCES. MY PLANE WAS HIT BY THE ARMED FORCES AND LAOTIAN PEOPLD. I PARACHUTED FROM HE PLANE AND WAS CAPTURED BY THE ARMED FORCES ANDMB7,20, 039013.0

THE LETTER CONTINUED: DURING TME PAST YEAR, I HAVE SEEN CLEARLY THE SITUATION OFNTHE STRUGGLE OF THE LAOTIAN

PAGE 3 RUABSG 12F UNCLAS
PEOPLE. I AM NOW AWARE THAT THE LAOTIAN PEOPLE ARE STRUGGLING FOR PEACE AND INDEPENDENCE AND THAT THIS

Approved for Release: 2024/02/29 C00045942

CIA - March 1, 2024

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STRUGGLE IS JUST AN HUMAN. THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS AND THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION, HER HAND, HAVE CARRIED OUT OPEN AND BRAZEN INTERVENTION AND AGGRESSION IN LAOS. THE LAOTIAN PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY LOVE PEACE AND TRANQUILLITY. HOWEKN UJISRBS. IMPERIALISTS LOVE TO CREATE WAR.

THE LETTER OF THIS AMERICAN ULAUCD98,538 978: DURING THE PAST YEAR, I HAVE BEEN SICK. HOWEVER, I HAVE BEEN WELL

TAKEN CARE OF BY LAOTIAN PHYSICIANS, BY MEN AND WOMEN, BY EVERYONE--WHO HAVE GIVEN ME EVERY MEDICAL ATTENTION TO ENABLE ME TO RECOVER FROM MY ILLNESS. I WOULD LIKE TO AFFIRM SINCERELY THAT DURING OCTOBER NINETEEN SIXTYFIVE 1965 I HAD AN ATTACK OF A DISEASE CAUSED BY CONSTIPATION AFTER HAVING EATEN DIFFERENT KINDS OF FOOD. THE LAOTIAN DOCTORS AND NURSES TOOK GOOD CARE OF ME AND TREATED ME WITH VERY EFFECTIVE MEDICINE. THEY ALSO GAVE ME SPECIAL FOOD. AS A RESULT, I WAS ABLE TO RECOVER QUICKLY. I WISH TO EXPRESS MY GRATITUDE TO THE ARMED FORCES AND LAOTIAN PEOPLE.

THE LETTER WENT ON: YOUR HIGHNESS, THE EFFORTS THAT YOUR

PAGE 4 RUABSG 12F UNCLA

YOUR HIGHNESS AND PEOPLE ARE EXERTING TO BUILD YOUR NATION INTO AN INDEPENDENT AND PROSPEROUS NATION REMINDS OF THE TIME I WAS A LITTLE BOY DREAMING OF BECOMING A PILOT. WHEN I SAW THE PLANES LANDING ON THE AIRFIELDS, I THOUGHT THAT EVERYONE COULD BECOME A PILOT, BUT AFTER I BECAME A PILOT I WAS SENT BY THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS, WHO ARE ONLY SEEKING TO CARRY OUT EVIL ACTS TO KILL HUMAN BEINGS, TO COMMIT CRIMINAL ACTS OF AGGRESSION. AT PRESENT, MY THOUGHTS ALWAYS TURN TO MY WIFE AND CHILDREN, FORMERLY, I LIVED VERY CLOSE TO MY FAMILY. I WAAUJHJISJI
X MY WIFE AYLZWLGSY((

2

ALWAYS TENDRLY EMBRACED BY CHILDREN AND MY WIFE. NOW I AM VERY EAGER TO SEE MY WIFE AND CHILDREN. I WANT TO LIVE AS A FATHER AND HUSBAND TOGETHER WITH MY CHILDREN AND MY WIFE. IF I COULD FULFILL MY DESIRE, I WOULD NEVER FORGET MY GRATITUDE OF YOUR HIGHNESS. I CAN SAY HERE THAT THE NLHX PARTY UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF YOUR HIGHNESS IS WAGING A STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL RECOVERY IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE PEACE AND INDEPENDENCE ON THE BASIS OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS AND THE AGREEMENTS SIGNED BY THE THREE PARTIES. AT THE SAME TIME, THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION HAS DESTROYED THESE AGREEMENTS AND THE COALITION GOVERNMENT.

22315 [REDACTED] 230813Z MAY

T

NN#

COPY

Approved for Release: 2024/02/29 C06444587

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	D/ICS		X		
4	DDA				
5	DDI				
6	DDO		X		
7	DDP&C				
8	DDS&T				
9	IG				
10	COMPT				
11	D/OCA	X			
12	GC				
13	Chm/NIC				
14	D/PAO	(b)(3) CIAAct			
15	DD/SA/OCA	(b)(6)	X		
16	LEG/OCA		X		
17	C/PCS/DO		X		
18					
19					
20					
21					
22					
	SUSPENSE	31 Dec 91			
		Date			

LOOSER
 18 DEC 1991
 IG STAFF
Cad

Remarks D/OCA will respond in consultation with the DO. Please provide ES with a drop copy of the response.

ER 91-4126

Executive Secretary
17 Dec 91

Date

3637 (10-81)

CIA - March 1, 2024 000633

Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Secretariat

17 Dec 71

D/OCA:

Stan -
Another fax that ^{we} will
process as an original for
time-savings. Please advise
as to how you will respond.

Stylio

JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS,
 Chairman
 THOMAS A. DASCHLE, SOUTH DAKOTA
 HARRY REID, NEVADA
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 ALAN C. PTAK, DEPUTY STAFF DIRECTOR
 J. WILLIAM CODINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

December 12, 1991

The Honorable Robert Gates
 Director
 Central Intelligence Agency
 Washington DC 20505

Dear Mr. Gates:

Reports continue to surface that Soviet officials have admittedly participated in the interrogation of American POWs after 1973. Most recently, former Soviet KGB and military personnel, interviewed by the Australian "60 Minutes" program, described interrogations and live sightings of American POWs as late as 1978. Among these sources is Oleg Kalugin, a retired general in the KGB, who reportedly said he personally headed an interrogation team in Vietnam in 1975-78, that interrogated Americans.

The Committee recognizes the inherent difficulties in pursuing these matters, given the current state of disarray in the former Soviet Union. However, these difficulties should not deter this government from undertaking a quick and active investigation of these reports. We urge you to take advantage of the apparent Soviet willingness to discuss these matters openly with the western press, and dedicate intelligence resources to follow these important leads.


In particular, the opportunity may exist to establish an ongoing dialogue with Soviet intelligence services on the issue of American POW/MIAs, not only those lost in Southeast Asia but those unaccounted for in Korea and World War II. Likewise, the Committee encourages you to ascertain if other former Warsaw Pact countries may also be willing to cooperate in this regard.

Your efforts in this regard are greatly appreciated, and we ask that you keep us posted as to developments.

Sincerely,



Bob Smith
 Vice Chairman



John F. Kerry
 Chairman

JFK/kb

Select Committee on POW / MIA Affairs

Tom Daschle, South Dakota
Harry Reid, Nevada
Charles Robb, Virginia
Bob Kerrey, Nebraska
Herb Kohl, Wisconsin

John McCain, Arizona
Hank Brown, Colorado
Charles Grassley, Iowa
Nancy Landon Kassebaum, Kansas
Jesse Helms, North Carolina

Frances A. Zwenig, Staff Director
Alan C. Ptak, Deputy Staff Director
J. William Codinha, General Counsel

United States Senate Washington, DC 20510-6500 (202) 224-2306

FAX COVER SHEET

File

TO: BOB MAGNER

FROM: FRANCES ZWENIG

DATE: 12.12.91

TOTAL PAGES: 2 (Including cover sheet)

=====

RASTVOROV TERMINOLOGY

Zakenservirovannyye agentury- literally deep frozen networks, or canned or preserved nets. Deep Cover nets. [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

Legalnaya rezidentura- Legal residency [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

gruppovedy- principal agents. [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

Trenirovechnoye raspisaniye- Signal Plan [redacted] for period contacts (b)(3) NatSecAct

Veyevoye Raspisaniye- Signal plan for use after W/T agent has been activated [redacted]

Operativny Upolnomocheny (OPERUPOLNOMOCHENY)-Case officer [redacted]

Starshy operativny upolnomocheny-Senior case officer(DR-19-495) (b)(3) NatSecAct

Pomoshchnik Operupolnomochenogo-Junior(sic) case officer. [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~

33

PAGE 000

*Ref/Info
Korea*

MSGNO 98 (PCXX) *11/04/88* *11:05:14.8.0*

ZCZC 16:03:56Z (PC)

EMI DTG : 88110410351504

PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS5691 3091527-SSSS--RUEALGX.

ZNY SSSSS

P 041527Z NOV 88

FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC

RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC

RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC

RUEABOA/HQ AFOSI BOLLING AFB DC

RUEALGX/SAFE

RUDMNOP/NAVOPINTCEN SUITLAND MD//CAT//

P 041522Z NOV 88

FM CIA

TO RUEAIBU/NPIC

RUETIAA/DIRNSA

RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE FOR INR

RUEKJCS/DIA

RUEATRS TREASURY DEPT

RUEHFB FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

RHEBAAA/DOFHQ DAS

RUEADWW WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

ZEN/CIA OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS

RUFLMMA/CDR USA SCIENTIFIC PROJECTS GP MUNICH GE

RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

RUHHHMA/CDRWESTCOM FT SHAFTER HI

RUHQIPA/COMIPAC HONOLULU HI

RHHMBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI

RUHHDHA/HQ PACAF IDHS HICKAM AFB HI

RUAJMAB/FOSIF/WESTPAC

RUHGOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUAGAAA/COMUSKOREA SECUL KOR//SA

RUAGAAA/CINC UNC SEOUL KOR//SA

BT

EZ1:

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON WMINTEL

EZ2:

CITE CIA 339190

SERIAL: [REDACTED]

PASS: NSA FOR ZKZK OO DLS DE (FOR NSOC).

(b)(3) CIAAct

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~--WMINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

DIST: 04 NOVEMBER 1988

COUNTRY: NORTH KOREA

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: POW/MIA:
ABSENCE OF U.S. POWS IN NORTH KOREA
DOI: 1965-EARLY MARCH 1988

SOURCE:

[Redacted Source Information]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT: 1. [Redacted] COMMENT: THE FOLLOWING IS A PERSONAL OBSERVATION OF THE SOURCE. HE HAD NOT DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT WITH ANY NORTH KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL, BUT BELIEVES OTHER MILITARY OFFICERS OF HIS RANK OR HIGHER IN P'YONGYANG WOULD HAVE SIMILAR VIEWS.)

2. THE SOURCE HAD NOT HEARD OF OR SEEN AMERICAN KOREAN WARERA PRISONERS-OF-WAR (POWS) IN NORTH KOREA. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THERE WERE ANY LIVING U.S. POWS IN NORTH KOREA. HE STATED THAT EVEN IF THERE HAD BEEN U.S. PRISONERS AT THE END OF THE KOREAN WAR. THEY WOULD NOT HAVE RECEIVED ANY SPECIAL OR DIFFERENT TREATMENT THAN OTHER PRISONERS. THEY WOULD NOT HAVE HAD SPECIAL DESIGNATIONS SUCH AS "POW," FOR EXAMPLE, AND IF THEY DIED, THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN BURIED AS ANY OTHER PRISONER WAS BURIED. THIS TYPE OF TREATMENT WOULD BE NORMAL NORTH KOREAN CULTURAL PRACTICE FOR SOMEONE CONSIDERED TO BE AT THE SOCIAL LEVEL OF A PRISONER.

ACQ: (MID-OCTOBER 1988)

DISSEM: [Redacted] JSCINCPAC, IPAC, PACAF, PACFLT, WESTCOM, COMSEVENTHFLT, FOSIP/WESTPAC, USFK.

WARNING: REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE-INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS CONSULTANTS --DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR .

DECL: OADR DRV [Redacted] BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

BT

#5691

NNMN

NNDD

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

OCA 3306-92

17 November 1992

Ms. Frances Zwenig
Staff Director
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Ms. Zwenig:

We are sending as an enclosure to this letter a memorandum classified SECRET which responds in detail to the Committee's questions about [redacted] statements on POWs.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] recollection of information he supplied in the past is not supported by the record. While we ask that the details of the debriefing remain classified, the substance of the report is that at no time before 1992 did [redacted] provide information to this Agency on POWs in or from Korea or Indochina.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Let me know if I may be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

[redacted signature]

(b)(6)

John L. Breckenridge
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

Enclosure

Downgrade to UNCLASSIFIED
When Separated From Enclosure

[redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

SECRET

CIA - March 1, 2024

000640

OCA 3306-92

SUBJECT: Letter to Frances Zwenig, POW/MIA Affairs Cmte
re [redacted] Debriefing Statements

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) CIAAct

OCA/Senate [redacted]:jah/39063 (17 Nov 92)

Distribution:

- Original - Addressee (w/encl)
- 1 - C/EA/ICOG (w/o encl)
- 1 - C/ORMS/CCA (w/o encl)
- 1 - OCA Records (w/encl)
- 1 - POW/MIA Subject File (w/encl)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

CIA - March 1, 2024

000642

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

CIA - March 1, 2024

000643

~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

SUBJECT: Information for Passage to the Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs Regarding [redacted] Information about POWs
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)

FROM: [redacted] **EXTENSION:** [redacted] **DATE SENT:** 5 Nov 92 **REQUEST NUMBER:** [redacted] 0025/293-92
(b)(3) CIAAct C/ORMS/CCA

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) **DATE:** RECEIVED FORWARDED **OFFICER'S INITIALS:** **COMMENTS:** (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)

1.	DC/ORMS/CCA	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED	
2.	DC/ORMS	5	[initials]	(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)
3.	C/ORMS	6 NOV 1992		
4.	SA/DDO	6/11		
5.	ADDO	11.6		
6.	DDO			✓
7.	OCA/Senate			
8.				
9.				(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
10.				
11.				
12.				

SUSPENSE DATE: [redacted]

RETURN TO: [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

FORM 8-87 4283

~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

SUBJECT: Responses to 20 October Requests from Senate Select Committee for POW/MIA Affair (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)

FROM: C/EA/ICOG (b)(3) CIAAct	EXTENSION	DATE SENT 24Nov92	REQUEST NUMBER 0025/309-92
--	------------------	-----------------------------	--------------------------------------

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		

1.	(b)(3) CIAAct		11/25	
2.	Chief, EA			
3.	C/ORMS/CCA		30/11/92	
4.	DC/ORMS		01 DEC 1992	
5.	C/ORMS		01 DEC 1992	
6.	SA/DDO		1/12	
7.	ADDO (b)(3) CIAAct		12.3	
8.	DDO			✓
9.	O/OCA/S		03 DEC 1992	
10.	(b)(3) CIAAct			
11.				
12.				

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

SUSPENSE DATE:

RETURN TO: (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~S E C R E T~~

23 November 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Breckenridge
Chief, Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director of Operations

FROM:

SUBJECT: Responses to 20 October Requests
from Senate Select Committee for
POW/MIA Affairs

REFERENCE: Committee letter of 20 October 1992

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

1. The following are our responses to the two separate requests made in the Committee's letter of 20 October 1992.
2. With regard to information contained in the classified files of the National Warning Staff (NWS) and the Office of the NIO for Warning which might be of value to the Committee, a thorough review of all NWS and NIO/Warning classified files was undertaken. On 7 November two NWS officers examined the contents of NWS classified files. All the files were inventoried and searched. Other files of potential interest were also searched for possible POW-MIA information, such as files on Vietnam, China and Korea. On 20 November one of the two officers completed a search of a file drawer that had been overlooked during the first search.
3. On 12 November an NWS officer requested an inventory of all NWS and NIO/Warning archived materials. Two officers examined the entire archive file and determined that two files, one identified as Vietnam and one as Korea, might hold information of interest to the Committee. Both files were received on 13 November, and each document in them was examined by both officers. However, neither file contained any information within the scope of the reference request.
4. The NWS files contained several documents, both classified intelligence disseminations and open press reports, which related to POW-MIA issues. These were closely examined. Both of the CIA-originated classified reports had already been disseminated among the intelligence community

~~S E C R E T~~

CIA - March 1, 2024

000646

~~SECRET~~

some time ago.

[Redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[Redacted] an October 1991 report on normalization of relations with Vietnam.

5. The search did not turn up any separate files specific to POW-MIA issues, nor were any independent research papers on the POW-MIA topic located in the files.

6. As a result of this exhaustive search, the Office of the NIO for Warning is satisfied that the NWS and NIO/Warning files do not contain any documents which would be of value to the Committee as stated in its request.

7. With regard to the second part of the 20 October request, for CIA intelligence disseminations pertaining to American POW's held during the Korean and Cold Wars, we initiated an automated search for documents in those categories. This revealed a number of documents, many of which had originated with other U.S. Government agencies. Once we obtain the CIA documents from our archives, we will forward them to you. In the meantime, we have located four CIA reports from 1954 and 1955 which pertain to American POW's in North Korea, Russia and China, which are attached. We are also passing copies of these reports to Task Force Russia.

[Redacted]

Attachments: Four reports

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

22 November 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Review of National Warning Staff and NIO/Warning files and Archived Materials

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

1. On 7 November 1992, National Warning Staff (NWS) members [redacted] inventoried the contents of NWS classified files. The search was systematic and thorough; all file drawers were searched, an inventory was developed, and all materials that were either loose or in unmarked files were individually examined. Additionally, any files that indicated any potential for interest, such as all files on Vietnam, China, and Korea, were individually searched for possible information. On 20 November, [redacted] informed [redacted] that one additional file drawer was unintentionally overlooked. [redacted] completed a search of the remaining files on that same day.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

2. [redacted] requested an inventory of all NWS and NIO/Warning archived materials from [redacted] of the DDI Registry on 12 November. [redacted] examined the entire archive file list and determined that two files, one identified as Vietnam and the other as Korea, could potentially hold information relevant to a Congressional request. Both files arrived at CIA Headquarters on 13 November and each document was examined by both [redacted]. Neither file contained information within the scope of the inquiry.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)


3. Within the NWS files there were several documents, clandestine reports and open press reports, that were identified as relating to POW/MIA issues. A file was developed and forwarded to [redacted] DO/EA. There were no specific files located in the search that related to POW/MIA issues, nor were there any independent research papers on the topic in the files.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

4. [redacted] is writing a formal response to the Congressional inquiry for the Office of Congressional Affairs, CIA. He is planning to draw on information provided in this memorandum for the record.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)



~~SECRET NOFORN~~

CIA - March 1, 2024

000648

JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS,
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FRANCES A. ZWENIG, STAFF DIRECTOR
J. WILLIAM CODINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

October 20, 1992

Mr. John Breckenridge
Office of Congressional Affairs
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Breckenridge:

The Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs requests the Central Intelligence Agency provide to the Committee the files of the National Indications Center and of its successor organization, the Strategic Warning Staff, that cover the period 1948 through 1975. These files contain information relating to the losses of U.S. military personnel during the major crises and conflicts of the post-war period. This material is required to support a forthcoming hearing by this Committee.

These files are in the archives of the Central Intelligence Agency, filed variously. Some are listed under the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence; some are under the Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board, and some are logged under the National Intelligence Council. In addition, one five-drawer file cabinet located in the National Warning Staff contains a large number of post-war crisis management files that are related to the investigations of the Committee.


A large amount of this information can be declassified.

Ms. Linda Whitlow, Secretary for the National Intelligence Officer for Warning and the National Warning Staff, located in Room 1C925, The Pentagon, has a complete file of all materials archived by the National Indications Center and the Strategic Warning Staff. Please provide a copy of this master list to the Committee by 30 October.

— MASTER LIST
SUMM.

Mr. Breckenridge
Page Two

Additionally, as a part of this request, please provide copies of any and all intelligence reports issued by your organization that relate to or discuss the fate of U.S. military personnel captured during the Korean War and captured during the various crises during the cold war, after World War II.

Sincerely, 



(b)(6)

J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel



JWC/kb/wl

REPORT
1

5

2

CIA - March 1, 2024

000654 5

CIA - March 1, 2024

000655

CIA - March 1, 2024

000656

REPORT
2

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as amended. The transmission or revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. The reproduction of this data is prohibited.

INFORMATION REPORT

~~SECRET~~

COUNTRY	USSR (Far East)	REPORT NO.	(b)(3) NatSecAct
SUBJECT	Exploitation of Prisoners-of-War of the Soviets	DATE DISTR.	24 March 1954
DATE OF INFO.	Prior to 1954	NO. OF PAGES	1
PLACE ACQUIRED	Germany	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
		REFERENCES	

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE:

[Redacted Source Information]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

1. Source feels sure that the Soviet Intelligence Service is exploiting United Nations, particularly US, PWs in China and North Korea. He believes that some PWs listed as missing were in fact turned over to the Soviets by the Chinese and North Koreans. These PWs will be screened by the Soviets, and those eventually selected will be trained to be illegal residents either in the US or in other countries where they can live as Americans.
2. Some selected PW personnel will also be used in propaganda work, especially as radio announcers because there is a shortage of that type of personnel.
3. Those PWs who are found to be unsuitable will never be released because they will have learned too much about Soviet PW handling techniques. Use will also be made of the identities and biographies of dead PWs in preparing legends of new Soviet agents.

REPORT
3

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 INFORMATION REPORT

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~SECRET~~

COUNTRY	USSR/Communist China	REPORT NO.	(b)(3) NatSecAct
SUBJECT	Probable Communist Course of Action Regarding American Prisoners in Communist China	DATE DISTR.	20 December 1954
		NO. OF PAGES	2
DATE OF INFO.	12 December 1954	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
		REFERENCES	

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
 THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
 (FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

PD-32C

1. The future handling of the 13 American prisoners by Peiping, and, therefore, Moscow, will be based on a fairly simple strategy. The surfacing of the 13 men by Peiping has been designed thus far, in source's opinion, to arouse the anger of the American public, whose only recourse under the present circumstances is to appeal to the UN.
2. The Communist leaders in Peiping, undoubtedly in direct consultation with Moscow, calculated that the US would have sufficient strength at the UN to succeed in having the UN take up the US plea for UN good offices to intercede with the Chinese Communists. Such intercession would be welcomed by both Peiping and Moscow because it is, in effect, a de facto recognition of Communist China by the US. After the first UN approaches have been spurned, Communist China's Foreign Office will accept overtures for negotiations.
3. The Chinese Communists will thereupon show their "humaneness" by releasing at least the airmen, who have already been "proved" to be spies of the "warmongering American imperialists", and let them return home, possibly even in time for Christmas.
4. The cumulative result of this will be favorable world opinion for the Chinese Communists, who will be credited only with what is normally expected of a free-

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CIA - March 1, 2024

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[Redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

-2-

world state, and a stronger de facto recognition of the Chinese Communist Government which has the power, independence, and sovereignty to prosecute illegal violators of its borders.

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REPORT
4

M -

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law

~~SECRET~~

COUNTRY	USSR	REPORT NO.	(b)(3) NatSecAct
SUBJECT	RIS Interrogation and Indoctrination of PWs	DATE DISTR.	19 August 1955
DATE OF INFO.	1953	NO. OF PAGES	2
		REQUIREMENT NO.	(b)(3) NatSecAct
		REFERENCES	

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE:

1. The Soviets have no special PW interrogation centers. It is much simpler to send an interrogator to a PW camp than it is to transfer a PW to another interrogation site, which requires planning and transportation for the prisoner and his escort. If the prisoner is someone of importance, he is brought to Moscow and placed in either the Butyrskiy prison or Lefortovo prison during interrogation. PWs selected as agent prospects are also transferred to a prison in Moscow and are housed in comfortable accommodations after recruitment.
2. Not every PW is subjected to detailed interrogation; the prisoner's importance is the determining factor. Among those considered important and subjected to detailed interrogation were German intelligence personnel, SS officers, and Germans who had held important civilian jobs in Germany.

3. [Redacted] (b)(1)
[Redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct
However, rumors circulating among MVD circles indicated that conditions were fairly decent and perhaps better than in prisons for Soviet citizens.. The PWs did not gain weight in Soviet camps, but they did stay alive.

4. Interrogators were given no special training, but before being assigned to an interrogation they were instructed on the information required.

5. [Redacted] Soviet interrogation techniques other than the planting of informers in prison cells. From an informer the prisoner's true identity can be learned and his importance established. (b)(3) NatSecAct

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CIA - March 1, 2024

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

-2-

6. All PWs are subjected to indoctrination in Communism. Committees for a free Germany were set up among the German PWs; periodic lectures on Communism and discussions on the differences between Nazism and Leninism are also given. During interrogations, PWs are always subjected to preachings about Communism. Source could not say whether the results of these indoctrinations are successful.

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(When Filled In)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

4699-123

COUNTRY

LAOS

TDCS DB-315/04216-65

DATE OF INFO.

APRIL - JUNE 1965

DISTR. 28 DECEMBER 1965

SUBJECT

PATHET LAO DEFECTOR'S SUBSEQUENT ACCOUNT OF HIS WITNESSING THE INTERROGATION OF A DOWNED AMERICAN PILOT.

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

LAOS, VIENTIANE (24 AND 28 DECEMBER 1965)

REF

IN 22129

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:

FIELD REPORT NO. FOV-8815

AMERICAN-TRAINED INTERROGATORS WHO DEBRIEFED FORMER PATHET LAO CAPTAIN [REDACTED]. THIS REPORT IS BASED ON FURTHER INTERROGATION AND THUS ADDS AND CHANGES PRELIMINARY INTERROGATIONS. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

1. FORMER PATHET LAO (PL) CAPTAIN [REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

WHO WAS STATIONED IN HOUA PHAN (SAM NEUA) PROVINCE UNTIL JUNE 1965

CLAIMED DAVID L. HRDLICKA SPENT THE FIRST NIGHT OF HIS CAPTIVITY AT

A PL HEADQUARTERS IN THE VICINITY OF BAN BAN (VH 1858), 18 KILOMETERS

(KM) EAST OF SAM NEUA, AT APPROXIMATELY VH 195559. THE NEXT DAY,

BEFORE BEING TAKEN TO CAVES WHERE PRISONERS WERE HELD, HRDLICKA

WAS INTERROGATED IN FRONT OF A PL SCHOOL IN THE VICINITY OF VH

195548 THAT WAS IN SESSION. (FIELD COMMENT: FOV 8781 (TDCSDB-315/04026-65)

GAVE THE PRELIMINARY INTERROGATION [REDACTED] ON HRDLICKA AND CHARLES

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CIB GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

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STATE/INR · DIA ARMY/ACSI · NAVY AIR JCS · SECDEF NSA NIC ~~AD/ASST~~ OCI ONE OCR ~~XXXXXX~~

CIA/NMCC

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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IN 22129

SECRET

TDCSDB-315/04216-65 PAGE 2

SHELTON'S CAPTURE AND INTERNMENT. IN LATER INTERROGATION [redacted] (b)(1)
 IDENTIFIED A PHOTOGRAPH OF HRDLICKA AS ONE OF THE TWO PILOTS (b)(3) NatSecAct
 UNDER ARREST IN THE NUONG NGA (VH 1559) AREA. FOV 8160, cs-311/01444-65,
 PARAGRAPH 4, [redacted] REPORTED A PL SCHOOL AT PHOU KHE, ONE (b)(1)
 FROM XIENG SU (VH 1953). THE LOCATION OF THIS SCHOOL REPORTED (b)(3) NatSecAct
 BY [redacted] IS APPROXIMATELY TWO KM NORTH OF XIENG SU. THE TWO
 SCHOOLS ARE PROBABLY IDENTICAL.) (b)(1)
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

2. ACCORDING TO [redacted] A FRIEND OF HIS, INVITED
 HIM TO GO TO THE SCHOOL AND [redacted] WAS PRESENT FOR THIS INTER-
 ROGATION OF HRDLICKA. [redacted] (b)(1)
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] (b)(1)
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] (b)(1)
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] INTERROGATED HRDLICKA IN ENGLISH
 AND GAVE HIS INTERPRETATIONS TO [redacted]. MOST OF THE QUESTIONS
 WERE OF A POLITICAL/PROPAGANDA NATURE AND HRDLICKA ANSWERED ONLY
 THAT HE KNEW NOTHING ABOUT POLITICS. QUESTIONING LASTED ABOUT AN
 HOUR. (b)(1)
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

3. [redacted] SAW SHELTON ON TWO OR THREE OCCASIONS BY LOOKING (b)(1)
 IN HIS CAVE. (FOV 8781/ REPORTED THE CAVES WHERE PRISONERS WERE (b)(3) NatSecAct
 HELD AT APPROXIMATELY 800 METERS NORTHWEST OF BAN NA KAY TAY (VH
 1955), 18 KM SOUTHEAST OF SAM NEUA. ANOTHER PL DEFECTOR INTERROGATED

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IN 22129

SECRET

TDCSDB-315/04216- PAGE 3

123 65

ON 25 DECEMBER REPORTED THAT THE ENEMY HAD A COMMAND POST IN A CAVE AT VH 1915556, 500 METERS NORTH OF BAN NA KAY TEU AND THAT AMERICAN PILOTS WERE HELD IN REAR OF A CAVE NEAR THIS COMMAND POST. ON AMS 1:50,000 SCALE MAPS THERE IS LESS THAN ONE KM DIFFERENCE IN THE LOCATION OF THE CAVES WHERE PRISONERS WERE HELD, SO IT IS PROBABLY THAT BOTH ARE IDENTICAL. THE COMMAND POST IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL TO PL HEADQUARTERS MENTIONED IN PARA ONE ABOVE.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY AIR USAID CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC USMACV-SAIGON 2ND AIR DIVISION-SAIGON (ALSO SENT BANGKOK)

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

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DAVID L. HEDLICKA, USAR, shot down in P-105 and captured May 18,
1965. (3, 8, 10) CIA 1143943

9

File
VW Intelligence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

- Asked for overhead - ~~not~~
- Checked - nothing on ground to match story / disruption of terrain.

-47-

Nov 1 4 29 PM '84

OPERATIONS CENTER

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LDM MESSAGE RECEIPT

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SITUATION ROOM

(Class. Office Extension)

DDO/EA/VKL/R

DCEA/SE

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Identification of Possible U.S. Prisoners of War Camp In Saravane Province,
Lao People's Democratic Republic

(b)(3) CIAAct

SECRET--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

NUMBER OF PAGES

4

DELIVER TO	EXTENSION	ROOM NUMBER
TELEAP VKL B Lyall Breckon	632-3132	5206 State
51 F P. Herrick	688-6438	3W140 Ft. Meade
33 G P. Dimodical/Maj. Raphael/F. Vasko	695-0030	1C938B Pentagon
1 G Capt. R. Burnham/T. Graham	373-2507	DIAC Bolling AFB
6 G Cmdr. Reynolds, USN	695-7188	2D921 Pentagon
15A/PW/M/G Gerald Venanzi, Lt., USAF	697-7348	4C389 Pentagon
602 G B. Destatte/M. Burns/C. Trowbridge	695-7923	2E200 Pentagon
WH C/R R. Childress	395-3576	392 MOB

2-THOMPSON
3-RSC/S

47-

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Vice Director For Collection Management
Department of Defense
Principal Advisor For Prisoner of War Missing In Action Affairs (International Security Affairs)
Director, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Identification of Possible U.S. Prisoners of War Camp in Saravane Province, Lao People's Democratic Republic

NO HARD COPY FOLLOWS



(b)(3) CIAAct

CL BY 0089512

DECL: OADR

DRV

ALL SECRET

(b)(3) CIAAct

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CIA - March 1, 2024

000673

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1. Attached as of possible interest to you is a report

[Redacted]

from the debriefing and subsequent inconclusive technical examinations of a Lao refugee who obtained the information while working in southern Laos. The refugee observed an apparent detention camp in Saravane Province, Laos, which a local village militia chief told him contained 23 American Prisoners of War.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
NatSecAct

2. This very sensitive information is for your background use only. There will be no further distribution of this report and additional dissemination or extraction of this information requires prior approval from this Agency. DIA is authorized to pass this information to the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) and its representatives in Bangkok.

[Redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Clair E. George
Deputy Director For Operations

- cc: DCI
- DDCI
- EXEC DIR
- STATE/EAP
- DIA
- NIO/EAP
- NSA
- NSC

Attachment: Report as stated

[Redacted]

(b)(3)
CIAAct

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OIA - March 1, 2024

000674

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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

SUBJECT: Identification of Possible U.S. Prisoner of War Camp in Saravane Province, Lao People's Democratic Republic

TEXT: 1. Circa March 1983, ((MEUT)) (NLN), militia chief of Kadon Village (YB 1195), Saravane Province, Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR), claimed that there is a Prisoner of War (POW) Camp located at the foot of Ngou Mountain (NCA), approximately 25 kilometers south of Kadon Village. According to Meut there were 23 American prisoners of war (POW's) detained in the camp. Prior to 1975 the camp contained 25 American POW's, but two had since died. Meut said that Kadon Village is responsible for growing food for the camp and insisted that he had personally seen the POW's on numerous occasions while escorting food convoys to the camp. Meut added that the militia forces of Chavan Village (YB 2197) were actually responsible for security at the camp.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

2. Comment: The above information was obtained from the debriefing and subsequent technical examination of a Lao refugee ((KHAMTAN)) Noumala, DPOB, January 1924 in Saravane Province. Khamtan joined the French Foreign Legion in 1948 and subsequently served in the Royal Lao Army (PAR), attaining the rank of Lt. Colonel in 1960. He was elected to the Royal Lao Government National Assembly in 1972. Khamtan was arrested and sent to a Phongsaly Province Reeducation Camp in 1975, released in 1980 and attached to the joint Lao/Vietnamese mobile medical team where he served until defecting to Thailand in April 1984. He is currently residing in NAPHO refugee camp. The results of the technical examination of Khamtan were inconclusive. Khamtan said he obtained this information directly from Meut, an ethnic Lao Theung of the Alak tribe, while he was serving as an interpreter for a joint Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV)/LPDR mobile herbal medicine team whose mission was to provide aid to Lao People's Army (LPA)/People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) forces in the southern LPDR. Khamtan said Meut

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CIA - March 1, 2024

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escorted him to the top of Ngoua Mountain and pointed out the camp to him. According to Khamtan, the camp consisted of four buildings and was surrounded by a fence and a canal. Khamtan did not claim to see any of the POW's. Both Chavan and Kadon Villages have been under the influence/control of the Communist Pathet Lao since circa 1954.)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

3. [redacted] Comment: Khamtan's account is the first believable story on the possibility of live American POW's in the LPDR that has been heard since 1975.) [redacted]

[redacted] Comment: The source is experienced Lao and has developed a healthy degree of skepticism during the years in receiving and evaluating information on the LPDR.)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct

WARNING--REPORT CLASS: SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR.

(b)(3) CIAAct

DECL OADR DRV [redacted] BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

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S E C R E T

7 February 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert W. Magner
 Chief, Senate Liaison Division
 Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: (b)(3) NatSecAct
 Chief, Indochina Operations Group (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Request for CIA Reporting Pertaining to Soviet
 or Chinese Contact with American POWs

REFERENCE: Letter of 22 January 1992 from Senators Kerry
 and Smith of the Select Committee on POW/MIA
 Affairs to the DCI

1. This is in reply to the letter of 22 January 1992 which requested intelligence information, assessments or monographs pertaining to Soviet or Chinese contact with American POWs or the movement of these POWs to the Soviet Union or China.

2. As previously reported to the Committee, an Agency officer captured during the Tet offensive in January 1968 and released in March 1973 said he was interrogated by a man he presumed was a Soviet. A copy of the relevant transcript of our debriefing of the officer on this subject is available for review at CIA Headquarters by appropriately cleared and designated Committee personnel.

3. The Deputy Director for Operations and Senator Kerry also met privately for a discussion on this subject.

4. In regard to the possible movement of American POWs in Indochina to the Soviet Union, we have been able to identify one report that falls into this category. We also located the requested report. These reports are available (b)(3) CIAAct for review by appropriately cleared and designated Committee personnel.


WARNING NOTICE
 INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
 OR METHODS INVOLVED

(b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

S E C R E T

SUBJECT: Request for CIA Reporting Pertaining to Soviet
or Chinese Contact with American POW's

5. We have been unable to identify any intelligence assessments/monographs, NID reports, or intelligence briefings relating to Soviet or Chinese contact with American POW's during the Indochina War. We are continuing our search and will advise the Committee if we are able to locate any such material.



(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

S E C R E T

CIA - March 1, 2024

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17 FEB 1971
DATE: 15 Jan 71

NAVY

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : Results of Photo Comparison,
Case NO. [Redacted] M12,516

REFERENCE : Request from NOK of PATTERSON

1. Transmitted herewith are results of photo comparison analysis between the Christmas 1969 film of American PWs in North Vietnam and photographs submitted with reference.

2. The evidence cited in the attached report does not constitute definitive proof of the status or identity of individuals portrayed in the questioned photographs. Therefore, the report is not sufficient evidence for basing legal or administrative action involving rights of missing or captured personnel, or their next of kin. This Agency will accept no responsibility for any such action based on this evidence.

3. All materials received from your office in connection with subject request are returned herewith.

FOR THE CHIEF: _____

Attachments:

- (1) Christmas 1969 comparison NO. _____
- (2) Materials submitted with request
 - (a) Overlay
 - (b) 9 precapture photos
 - (c) Other: _____

I
[Redacted]

21007

NVN Policy

TPM 6 - Attn: Dave, Ellis 1.31a(4)



Control and file

28 July 1968

510-21

501-09(6)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD


SUBJECT: Northward Movement of U.S. Civilian and Military Personnel Captured in South Vietnam

Summary: This review of 45 reports, most of which were received during late 1967 and the first half of 1968, suggests that the North Vietnamese Government, during the period May 1967 to July 1968, moved from fifty to several hundred American personnel captured in South Vietnam northward along established lines of infiltration and transport through Cambodia, Laos and across the DMZ. The North Vietnamese Government, however, did not acknowledge or allow public reference to or photography of any American prisoner in North Vietnam who had been captured in South Vietnam or Laos. In view of these facts, the population of American prisoners in NVN could be considerably larger than the number of American pilots considered captured or MIA over NVN alone. There is also some reason to assume the existence of prison camps outside the Hanoi area.

1. General remarks about infiltration routes: The reports listed in Attachment A indicate that the northward movement of American prisoners followed routes established for the infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam. The same roads, footpaths, guides, vehicles and systematically numbered way stations were utilized -- southward for the infiltration of NVA troops and supplies, northward for transfer of American prisoners and NVA wounded to NVN. Guard duties fell mainly to NVA soldiers; several reports mentioned NVA troops returning to NVN for medical reasons and at the same time escorting American POWs. Some reports indicated that VC and Pathet Lao troops were also used as escorts, or to man temporary detention facilities.

2. Northward movement from RVN First Corps along the Ho Chi Minh trail:


a. Americans captured in or near Hue during 1968 Tet offensive:



Approved for Release Date 8 April 1992

1.31a(4)

1.3(a)(4)




(1) Reliable reports indicate that approximately 25 Americans captured in or near Hue during the 1968 Tet offensive were led south or southeast from Hue, then westward through the mountains to a holding area; there two escaped and two were released. The remainder were probably led through the A SHAU Valley, and into the pattern of infiltration roads and trails in Laos leading towards NVN. Information on the 25 POWs was reported by seven escapees (two intelligence-trained Americans, one ARVN officer and four ARVN soldiers) and two American women released by the NVA forces. The route, as reported, is shown in purple on the attached map (Attachment C). Debriefings of escaped Lactian soldiers, and a captured calendar notebook fit in with, but could not be said to confirm, the conclusion that the Tet captives were taken into NVN.

(2) The two American escapees reported that their group of 25 persons was held at "Base Camp", YD7605, about 20km due south of Hue, from 4 to 19 February. The two American escapees broke away from the group on 23 February in the vicinity of YD676000, while marching westward from Base Camp. This location was very close to the first holding area reported by the four ARVN soldier escapees.

(3) The ARVN officer who escaped stated that he was held in Hue with ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~, and traveled in their group to a reception area where they were all held for one month. His chronology agrees in adequate detail with the ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ chronology. This source provided no additional information of importance. It is interesting to note that about 25 February he was told, incorrectly in part, that 10 U.S. male PWs, the two female PWs and one Filipino PW had all been taken to NVN for subsequent release and that one U.S. PW had been left behind because of health. When subject was transferred from this camp about 10 March, four U.S. PWs and one Filipino PW started out with the group but fell behind the line of march and were lost to his sight. The officer escaped on 16 March after overpowering a guard; he waved to an AirCav helicopter and was picked up, inside RVN.

(4) The ARVN soldier escapees were not part of the group of 25. They were taken through the A SHAU Valley into Laos, toward the MU GIA Pass, and did not see any



1.3(a)(4)

1.3(a)(4)

American PEs; their only information about American PWs was received from guards at Way Station No. 4, YC9394, about 30km southeast of Hue. There they heard that an American radio operator captured in Hue had recently passed through the station enroute to Laos.

(5) The two women who were part of the group of 25, [redacted], together with three men from the group, were split off on the 25th of February and held not far from "Base Camp." The two women were released on 31 March, arriving at an RVN control point on 1 April 1968, within easy bus ride of Hue. One additional American PW, a helicopter pilot, was encountered at the last camp. Guards told Dr. Nelson that the helicopter pilot and two of the American men were being sent to rejoin the larger group and would be taken to NVN. [redacted] were asked if they would like to go to NVN, but were not in fact given the opportunity.

b. Other Americans captured in Laos and RVN First Corps from May 1967 to July 1968:

(1) In addition to the above reports dealing with transfer of 25 American prisoners taken during the Tet offensive at Hue, seven reports covering the period May 1967 to July 1968 mentioned or implied use of the Laos network of roads and trails to transfer captured Americans from RVN First Corps to NVN; fourteen Americans were reported seen on these trails -- 8 by escapees, one by a rallier and three by captured NVA infiltrators. A captured diary, with entries from 9 January to 25 May 1968, stated that the owner, apparently an infiltrating NVA soldier, while in Laos on 19 April 1968, observed a camp for captured Americans.

(2) Eight escaped soldiers of the Royal Laotian Army stated that during their detention by the Pathet Lao, January to June 1968, in the vicinity of BAN NATION (XD232557) they observed NVA wounded returning to NVN via the infiltration trails; on another occasion, about 15 May 1968, one of the eight PAA soldiers saw four captive Americans at XD335582 being escorted north by 50 to 60 NVA troops.

- 2 -

1.3(a)(4)

1.3(a)(4)

(3) A Laotian sergeant from Volunteer Battalion (BV) 33, captured when LANG VBI was overrun on 4 February 1968, reported seeing one American PW at XD939282 on 4 February; he learned from this PW that a second American was held at the same site. He saw two additional American PWs at XD887157 on 9 February. He heard that the latter two men escaped; the first two were incapacitated by wounds. The BV-33 sergeant escaped on 13 April 1968 from a prison camp at WD989271; his interrogation report implies that one of the first two American PWs may also have been held at this camp.

(4) A Laotian guerrilla fighter escaped from a Pathet Lao prison at UG1552 in June 1967; he said that two American jet pilots, downed near PHOU KOUT (TG0983), were brought to the camp shortly before his escape, held three days, and sent onto NVN.

(5) An NVA rallier stated that his unit captured an American on Hill 832 (XD878446) and held him there from 17 to 22 January 1968; the rallier believed the soldier was sent to NVN.

(6) A captured NVA soldier stated that while infiltrating through Laos, about June 1967, he had seen one U.S. PW being escorted by about 20 armed Vietnamese; the Vietnamese escorts were led by a man with Southern accent, presumably a VC. The guards said the PW had been captured in late May 1967 when the VC overran his position.

(7) Another captive NVA soldier stated he saw two Americans on a trail in Laos in July 1967, escorted by about 30 NVA soldiers, ten of whom appeared to be sick or wounded; the source heard that the guards were going back to NVN for treatment.

3. Northward movement of captured Americans across the DMZ.

a. No definite route across the DMZ could be determined from reports received; the evidence was substantial enough, however, to conclude that some of the Americans captured in First Corps of RVN were being moved into NVN across the DMZ. Nine reports and two NVN radio broadcasts mentioned a total of about 180 American POWs.

1.3(a)(4)

b. A captured NVA soldier mentioned passing 15 U.S. PWs, who were walking in a northerly direction, five km north of VINH LINH Village in the VINH LINH Special Zone. Another mentioned meeting and talking to a U.S. PW in the vicinity of VINH LINH; guards stated the man had been captured on Route 9 in RVN. A third report mentioned passing a group of possibly 100 U.S. POWs in southeastern QUANG BINH. Date of information for the three reports was September to November 1967.

c. Six reports of interrogation of captured NVA soldiers mentioned American POWs still held in RVN but headed for NVN, probably via the DMZ. A captive mentioned hearing prior to May 1967, that six U.S. POWs in CAM LO District (approx. YD1259) were to be sent to the VINH LINH Special Zone and on to Hanoi. Another mentioned seeing in November 1967 two U.S. POWs in HAI LONG District (approx. YD39), walking in a northerly direction. Another mentioned seeing, in January 1968, 2 U.S. POWs bathing in a stream in PHONG DIEN District, (possibly near YD4525). A VC guard said there were five POWs in all, and that all five would be sent to NVN "to meet Uncle Ho to ask to be returned to their country." Another mentioned seeing, in late January 1968, five U.S. POWs approximately 2km from the BEN HAI River and walking north. Another source claimed to have seen, on 30 January 1968, 12 U.S. POWs in a cage in a market town of TRIEU PHONG District, QUANG TRI Province (possibly vicinity YD25); they were being guarded and fed by an armed man in NVA uniform. Another captive claimed to have seen two captive Americans on stretchers just south of the BEN HAI River in late January 1968, and then to have seen them again in the VINH LINH Special Zone on 7 February 1968. A captured NVA soldier said that on 16 April 1968 he saw five captured American officers, in THUA THIEN Province, being taken north; the officers were captured around HUE during the Tet offensive. The report says the men were sighted 20km north of XD806288, heading east under guard to be taken north by truck. (The locations and directions given in the report were contradictory, largely discrediting the report.)

d. Disallowing the last mentioned report, the above information from captured NVA soldiers mentions four groups of POWs in NVN, totaling possibly 111, and five groups in SVN totaling possibly 32. The first four reports seen

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reasonable and definitely point to use of the DMZ for transfer of captured Americans to NVN; the latter group of reports is more vague, but also points to use of the DMZ.

a. Two radio broadcasts, one from Liberation Radio (clandestine) on 5 July 1967 and one from Hanoi domestic service on 7 July 1968, stated that Liberation Armed Forces mauled five Marine companies in a battle near the DMZ (vicinity of YD1074) on 2 July 1967 and captured "nearly" 40 U.S. Marines. An NVA soldier captured on 3 July in the same area stated that after the battle he saw captive Marines led away and was told by one of the NVA escort soldiers that 23 Marines had been captured. (Since the battle took place practically on the southern border of the DMZ, it is reasonable to assume that they were being taken to the north through the DMZ.) The monitored radio broadcasts stated that U.S. bombs fell on the captured Marines on the day of the battle, killing them. The interrogator who worked with the captured NVA soldier included a comment to the effect that the Marines had in fact lost 34 MIA in the 2 July battle; after the battle a search was made of the battlefield, and 29 bodies recovered, leaving 5 MIA. It is possible that the remaining MIA were captives taken to NVN across the DMZ. This incident is of note because it is the closest that the NVN Government has come to admitting taking PWs from South Vietnam to North Vietnam.

4. Northward movement by sea from First Corps to NVN:

There are no specific reports that such movement took place. , however, stated to a debriefer that VOA employee Willis was marched first to the sea coast, for movement to NVN by ship, and then marched back to Base Camp One (YD7605).

5. Northward movement via Laos from Second Corps:

a. Only one report was noted covering the period July 1967 to July 1968. A captured NVA senior sergeant said that while infiltrating via QUANG BINH Province, approximately August or September 1967, he had seen an American POW with a bandaged hand and swollen feet. The guards said he had been captured in a clash with the VC in KONTUM Province;

[REDACTED]

he was the sole survivor of a team of ten men, helilifted into an area of KONTUM Province. When seen, the prisoner was enroute to Hanoi.

b. Five earlier reports are worth noting briefly. Two reports mention air lift of captured Americans to NVN. The first reports that an NVA soldier captured in January 1968 said he was told by truck drivers, whom he queried in Cambodia in 1966, that they were taking captured Americans to a nearby airfield for transport to NVN, and he was told in July 1966 by a friend that some 20 American officers captured in the vicinity of TUY HOA were being taken by foot and truck to Cambodia for air transport to Hanoi. The second report from a different source says that the source saw an American PW three days walk southwest of TUY HOA, and heard that the American would be taken by truck to DAR LAC Province, where he would be put aboard a plane to NVN. Three reports with information dated 1965 indicate the sources, captured NVA soldiers, thought American prisoners were being sent via Laos to NVN. A report dating back to 1965 indicates that the source thought a downed helicopter pilot whom he had seen in captivity at YA930050 would be sent to Hanoi.

4. Northward movement via Cambodia from Fourth Corps:

a. Two reports for the period July 1967 through July 1968 mentioned transfer of captured Americans from Fourth Corps to Hanoi, and two additional reports mentioned transfer out of Fourth Corps to Cambodia. A total of 74 American PWs was allegedly involved.

b. A captured VC soldier said he saw in August 1967 one U.S. POW in DINH TUONG Province; source's battalion commander said the PW was being taken to the vicinity of XS315535 in DINH TUONG Province and would then be taken to Hanoi.

c. A captured NVA soldier said he saw on 29 January 1968 one U.S. POW at XS035156; the guards were probably VC. One guard said the man had been captured a long time ago and was enroute to Cambodia by way of VINH BINH Province.

d. A report from a "prospective source" of 525th MI Group, received in April 1968, said five officers captured at Tan Son Nhut Air Base were transported to Hanoi. The

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report implied that they had been held at a prison camp in BINH DUONG Province at XT710488, with 42 other American POWs. A similar report received about the same time claimed 30 American POWs were held by the VC in CAN THO Province and would be moved to Cambodia before 10 May 1968, then transferred to other Communist countries and released.

7. Northward movement from RVN probable or implied:

a. Two reports, one a captured VC magazine dated April 1968, and the other sourced to a captured VC lieutenant, stated that 6 crewmen of an Air Cavalry Division helicopter were captured in HAI LANG District of QUANG TRI Province; the document said they were downed on 8 February and the VC lieutenant said they were held at YD224294 as of 7 February 1968. From examination of the map, it appears that from this location the POWs could be taken either southward to the A SHAU Valley and then into Laos, or northward across the DMZ to NVN.

b. A captured NVA soldier said that in December 1967, while infiltrating, his unit passed 20 U.S. POWs "somewhere in the jungle of NVN." From the context of the report it appears that the location was not far north of the DMZ.

c. Another captured NVA soldier said that in late October 1967 he saw two U.S. POWs walking north in the northern part of QUANG BINH Province. The captives were dressed in one-piece uniforms and their guards stated that they were pilots shot down nearby. This report is mentioned because there is no information as to American pilots shot down in the area about that date; therefore, if the POWs were actually sighted, they might have come from RVN or Laos via the MU GIA Pass.

8. Additional evidence of NVA/VC policy toward captured Americans:

a. A number of captured documents, and reports of interrogation of captured NVA or VC personnel, have provided a reliable picture of NVA/VC policy toward captured American personnel. Two of these reports mention movement to North Vietnam.

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1.3(a)(4)

b. An NVA soldier captured in GIO LINH District of QUANG TRI Province in July 1967 stated that his unit was instructed in VC/NVA policy towards American POWs by a lieutenant from the Military Propaganda section of the 90th Regiment. The lieutenant told the NVA unit that U.S. POWs should be well fed and well treated and sent to regiment for interrogation. The men were also told that U.S. pilots shot down in the RVN were to be forwarded to NVN after reaching regimental headquarters.

c. Another NVA soldier captured in November 1967 stated that he had formerly given a weekly talk on POW policy to his VC unit; he received information concerning these policies from COSVN. The report states that "if an American were captured, he would be taken directly to regiment and interrogated, (then) sent to division to be reinterrogated. . . . After interrogation at division level was concluded . . . the prisoner would be conducted to NVN. . . . The prisoner was sent to the North because the captors had neither adequate facilities nor food for an American prisoner in the South." Source was told that American prisoners were to be used in later POW exchanges. An NVA soldier captured in August 1968 made a similar statement, omitting reference to POW exchange.

9. Historical note: There is some historical precedent for movement of captured non-Vietnamese personnel from south to north for detention. [REDACTED], writing in the MILITARY REVIEW for December 1958, stated that French officers and men captured in a battle near Seno in southern Laos (vicinity WD0050) were marched northward, the officers a distance of approximately 900 kilometers to a prison camp northwest of Hanoi (near WK1020), and the men a distance of 500 kilometers to camps around VINH (vicinity WF76).

10. Conclusion: Although the above evidence points strongly toward the conclusion that some Americans captured in South Vietnam have been moved to NVN, there is still a possibility that the NVN authorities have found it more convenient to hold some prisoners in the Laos-Cambodia-Vietnam tri-border region, where all countries involved can


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deny responsibility. The fact that Hanoi and the Viet Cong are making an effort to conceal transfer of American prisoners to North Vietnam makes it essential that further examination be made of all reports bearing not only on transfer of captured American personnel to NVN, but also possible transfer and holding in Laos and Cambodia.



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1.3(a)(4)

ATTACHMENT A

List of reports used in Memorandum for the Record, 26 July 1968
 Movement of U.S. Civilian and Military Personnel Captured in
 South Vietnam.

<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Report</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Source</u>
1.	---		
3.a.(1)	---		
2.a.(2)	IR 6028-4512-68	2 Mar 68	Escaped American IO
	IR 6028-4513-68	2 Mar 68	Escaped American IO
2.a.(3)	IR 6026-2031-68	2 May 68	Escaped ARVN Officer
2.a.(4)	[redacted]	7 Jun 68	Escaped ARVN soldiers 1.3(a)(4)
2.a.(5)	RECAP - PAC RE 625th MI Group	[redacted] Undated, circa	Released American civ 3 Apr 68
	RECAP - PAC RE 625th MI Group	[redacted] Undated, circa	Released American civ 3 Apr 68
2.b.(1)	COMUSMACV MSG 16646	10 Jun 68	Captured document
2.b.(2)	[redacted]	24 Jun 68	Escaped Lao FAR soldie
	[redacted]	1 Jul 68	Escaped Lao FAR soldie
2.b.(3)	[redacted]	15 May 68	Escaped Lao BV-33 sergeant 1.3(a)(4)
2.b.(4)	[redacted]	17 Oct 67	Escaped Lao guerrilla
2.b.(5)	IR 6028-0907-68	6 Mar 68	Hallied NVA soldier
2.b.(6)	IR 6028-0479-68	30 Jan 68	Captured NVA soldier
2.b.(7)	IR 6028-0262-68	19 Jan 68	Captured NVA soldier
3.a	---		
3.b	IR 6028-2108-68	28 May 68	Captured NVA soldier
	[redacted]	14 Nov 68	Captured NVA soldier
	IR 6028-0773-68	29 Feb 68	Captured NVA soldier
	[redacted]		

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3.c.	IR 6026-1078-67	15 May 67	Captured NVA soldier
	IR 6028-1612-68	20 Apr 68	Captured NVA soldier
	NIC REP 685/68	4 May 68	Captured NVA soldier
	IR 6028-2142-68	20 May 68	Captured NVA soldier
	IR 6028-0886-68	6 Mar 68	Captured NVA soldier
	IR 6028-1417-68	4 Apr 68	Captured NVA soldier
3.d.	---		
3.e.	FBIS Daily Report Asia & Pacific, Radio Hanoi	7 Jul 67	
		10 Jul 68	
	FBIS DR, A&P	11 Jul 67	Liberation Radio 5 Jul
	IR 6027-3456-67	12 Aug 67	Captured NVA soldier
4.	Same as 2.a.(5)		
5.a.	NIC REP 142/68	7 Feb 68	Rallied NVA sergeant
5.b.	IR 6028-1072-68	15 Mar 68	Captured NVA soldier
	IR 6028-1105-68	16 Mar 68	Captured NVA soldier
	IR 6027-1776-67	19 Jul 67	Captured NVA soldier
		22 Jun 67	Captured NVA soldier
	NIC REP 531/68	19 Apr 68	Captured NVA soldier
	NIC REP 273/67	27 Mar 67	Captured NVA soldier
6.a.	---		
6.b.	IR 6028-1849-68	9 May 68	Captured VC soldier
6.c.	IR 6028-1467-68	9 Apr 68	Captured NVA soldier
6.d.	IR 6026-0965-68	4 Apr 68	Prospective source of 525th MI Group
	IR 6026-1272-68	5 Apr 68	Prospective source of ARVN MI
7.a.	COMUSMACV MSG 11990 DTG 280454Z Apr 68, summarizing transl. of THONG NHAT, Issue No. 15, early April 1968		Captured VC magazine, TRI-THIEN-HUE Region
	IR 6028-2158-68	31 May 68	Captured VC Lieutenant
7.b.	IR 6028-0615-68	18 Feb 68	Captured NVA soldier


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7.c.	IR 6028-1916-68	17 May 68	Captured NVA soldier
8.a.	---		
8.b.	IR 6027-3456-67	12 Aug 67	Captured NVA soldier (same as 3.c.)
8.c.	IR 6028-1932-68	18 May 68	Captured NVA soldier
	NIC REP 267/67	24 Apr 67	Captured NVA soldier
9.	MILITARY REVIEW	Dec 58	
	Article by [REDACTED]		"Communist POW Treatment in Indochina."

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RUABAB/824TH COMBAT SUPPORT GCP

RUABAB/CO 1 8TH TFW

RUABAB/CO 498TH TFW

RUABBS/CHIEF JSPC OKINAWA

RUABFM/CGMARIYIS

RUABGK/CO 51ST FFW

RUABSG/FBIS SAIGON

RUHLKL/CINCPACFLT HAWAII

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC HAWAII

RUHLHS/CINCUSARPAC HAWAII

RUHLKM/PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII

RUHJAN/MAGT J-2

RUHJAN/OSI DIST. 51 THAILAND

RUHBDK/DET 3, 15TH TFW KORAT AB THAILAND

RUHJTK/AMEMB AND USIS BANGKOK THAILAND

RUHJFS/AMEMB AND USIS VIENTIANE LAOS

RUHSHA/COMUSMACV

RUHANC/CGEUSA SECON

RUHANC/COMUSKOREA

RUHUAZ/5AF FUCHU AIRSTA JAPAN

RUHUSUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

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NEO LAO HAK XAT DEROUNCES U.S. IMPERIALISTS' CRIMES IN LAOS)
(TEXT) HANOI, 1 ONE JUNE--THE LAOTIAN PEOPLE ARE FULLY ENTITLED
TO CALL FOR EVERY AID, INCLUDING MATERIAL AID, TO STRENGTHEN
THEIR SELF-DEFENSE FORCES, SAID THE SPOKSMAN B

F THE NEOLAO

HAK XAT CENTRAL COMMITTEE AT A PRESS CONFERENCE HELD IN KHANG
LEAM:ONPQSDTQZSCARTHEAY, ACCORDING OYSVNAW

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TOWN.

AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE, THE SPOKESMAN DENOUNCED THE NEW AND DANGEROUS STEPS OF WAR ESCALATION TAKEN BY THE U.S. AGGRESSORS IN LAOS AND STRONGLY CONDEMNED THEM FOR USING B-52S AND B-52S AND SPRAYING TOXIC CHEMICALS TO MASSACRE THE LAOTIAN PEOPLES.

HE SAID: B-52 AND B-52 AIRCRAFT OR ANY OTHER MODERN WAR MEANS CANNOT SAVE THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS FROM THEIR DEFEAT IN LAOS AND INDOCHINA. THE U.S. AIR FORCE, HOWEVER FIERCE ITS ACTIVITIES, CANNOT CHECK THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE PUPPET ARMY WHOSE MORALE IS SINKING IN FACE OF THE FIRM FIGHTING SPIRIT OF THE LAOTIAN PATRIOTIC FORCES AND PEOPLE.

HE SAID THE LAOTIAN PATRIOTIC FORCES AND PEOPLE HAD WON A GREAT VICTORY BY SHOOTING DOWN MORE THAN 380 THREEEIGHTZERO U.S. AIRCRAFT AND CAPTURING MANY AMERICAN AIR PIRATES.

THE SPOKESMAN ALSO SHOWED MATERIAL EVIDENCE OF THE AMERICAN AIR PIRATE DAVID LOUIS HARDLIKA WHO, TAKING OFF FROM THAILAND, WAS SHOT DOWN IN SAM NEUA ON 18 ONEEIGHT MAY. IN A TAPE RECORDED STATEMENT, HARDLIKA CONDEMNED THE U.S. RULING CIRCLES FOR HAVING ORDERED HIM TO BOMB AND KILL LAOTIAN PEOPLE. 010218 [REDACTED]

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 The New York Times _____
 The Los Angeles Times _____
 The Wall Street Journal _____
 The Washington Times A-8
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 UPI _____
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Date 2 Dec 1994

Persistent women get answers on MIA fathers

Soviet files shed light on spy plane shot down

By Robert Burns
ASSOCIATED PRESS

FORT WORTH, Texas — On Dec. 5, 1950, the day after Capt. Charles E. McDonough was shot down in his Korean War spy plane, an Air Force telegram arrived in Glen Rose, Texas. With official regret and a note of haunting finality it informed his wife, Mary Jo, that the plane had disappeared.

"All possible search completed," it said.

He was gone, silently swallowed up in a war that would keep many grim secrets.

The search, though, was anything but completed. In a sense, it had not yet begun.

Nearly 44 years after the Air Force gave up on Capt. McDonough and the three other Americans aboard his silvery RB-45 reconnaissance bomber, new information has come to light — evidence that points to Soviet involvement not only in the downing, but also in exploiting Capt. McDonough after his capture.

The evidence, not yet publicly disclosed by the U.S. government, contradicts recent denials by Moscow that the Soviet Union had played any role.

The loss of the RB-45 and its crew on Dec. 4, 1950, isn't even mentioned in the Air Force's official history of the Korean War, although it notes that two planes of that type flew in the war. (The unmentioned McDonough plane, tail number 8-015, made three.)

Capt. McDonough, of New London, Conn., was commander of the three-plane detachment that flew missions mainly over North Korea from Yokota Air Base, Japan. At 31, this was his second war; he flew bombers in Europe in World War II.

The RB-45, well before the U-2 and now an artifact of the Cold War, was no ordinary plane. It was converted from a jet bomber as the most advanced photo reconnaissance plane in the world, and this was its first wartime use. The Air Force knew the RB-45 was a target of Soviet intelligence.

Moscow was aware that U.S. Air Force planes were flying over its territory throughout the 1950s, but it didn't become an international issue until the Soviets shot down Francis Gary Powers in a CIA-operated U-2 spy plane on May 1, 1960.

This story of the RB-45 is based on interviews with relatives of two of the four crewmen, officers who knew them, and retired Korean War RB-45 pilots, as well as declassified war records and other government documents. It is the first published account of what the Air Force called simply a "mission over enemy territory."

Persistent daughters

Leading the effort to unravel the case are Jeanne Dear, the only child of Charles and Mary Jo McDonough, and Nancy Dean, the daughter of Col. John R. Lovell, a top Air Force intelligence officer who was based at the Pentagon but happened to be aboard the plane for reasons that may never be fully known.

Mrs. Dear, 44, of Fort Worth, was 6 months old at the time. Because she never knew her father, she says, the pain of sifting through his past doesn't sting as badly. But her voice makes it clear that the emotional armor she wears is not impenetrable.

"It's hard," she says. "It's a commitment I feel to my mother."

For her and Mrs. Dean the search has been complicated by the secret nature of the RB-45.

Although never officially acknowledged by Washington, men who flew this plane in Korea say their top-secret missions sometimes took them deep into Chinese and Soviet airspace. More routinely, it flew photo reconnaissance over North Korea.

Records that could shed light on Capt. McDonough's mission that fateful day have not been found.

CONTINUED

Louis Carrington of Tyler, Texas, one of the two other pilots in Capt. McDonough's unit, recalls that "Mac" and his crew, attired in blue flight suits, took off into clear skies from Yokota Air Base at about lunch time on Dec. 4. He remembers Capt. McDonough, 6-foot-3 and blue-eyed, as a likable, accomplished, robust man.

"He could do anything," Mr. Carrington says.

The last word from the RB-45 crew was a routine radio contact 100 minutes after takeoff, signaling their entry into North Korean airspace. Then, everlasting silence. The crash site was never pinpointed. No bodies were recovered.

The McDonough and Lovell daughters haven't lived on hope that their fathers are alive.

"I can't get sucked into the emotional quagmire," said Mrs. Dean, 62, who was a freshman at the College of William and Mary when her father was listed as missing. "My father would not have wanted that."

Yet she's convinced there is more to the story than the Air Force admits.

Unraveling mysteries

John "Jack" Lovell, then 46, worked directly for the head of Air Force intelligence, Maj. Gen. Charles P. Cabell. Col. Lovell's daughter recently found in the National Archives a declassified report, stamped top secret, that was signed by Gen. Cabell and included a proposal for using the RB-45 for reconnaissance over the Soviet Union. It was dated Oct. 5, 1950.

Col. Lovell's presence on the plane is a mystery. He was not a regular crew member, but Mrs. Dean believes he had a hand in overseeing the RB-45's spy role.

Howard Barkey, who worked with Col. Lovell in Army intelligence during World War II, says an officer with as much knowledge of secret U.S. war plans as Col. Lovell normally would not be allowed to fly over enemy-held territory.

"He was a leader, and the qualities of leadership require sometimes taking risks," Mr. Barkey says. He figures Col. Lovell had responsibility for the RB-45 program and therefore wanted to see firsthand what risks its crews were facing.

Mrs. Dean recalls helping her father pack his bags on Nov. 23, Thanksgiving Day. He left that

night, saying only that he was headed to the Far East.

Since then there have been only two hints of his fate:

- His name was mentioned in an "enemy broadcast" picked up by U.S. intelligence in China on May 21, 1951, which suggested he had been captured in Korea.

- His was among 71 names of Americans listed by the U.S. Far East Command as "men positively identified as remaining in the hands of the Communists" after the final exchange of Allied and Communist POWs in September 1953. Yet he never was officially listed as a POW. Mrs. Dean recently obtained the list from a declassified Dec. 14, 1954, report in the files of the U.S. Far East Command.

Nearly a year earlier, on Feb. 28, 1954, the government had declared Col. Lovell dead. He was from Ottumwa, Iowa, a graduate of West Point (class of '27), a former U.S. Olympic boxing team coach and a veteran of Cold War espionage.

The two other men on board were co-pilot Capt. Jules E. Young, 29, of East Rochester, N.Y., and 1st Lt. James J. Picucci, 32, of New York City, the navigator.

Off-limits records

When the daughters of Col. Lovell and Capt. McDonough started researching the incident in detail in 1992, both were surprised to learn that many records from that period are lost; many are still classified secret, off-limits to most citizens.

Mrs. Dear began her quest in earnest in 1992 when, at the prodding of an aunt, she called the Air Force casualty office at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, to ask for the file on her father. Her family had been told before that his service records had burned in a records center fire in St. Louis in the 1970s, but this time the casualty official said she would check and call back.

The return call was a bombshell: Her father's name was on a list of U.S. airmen provided by the Russian government.

"I was absolutely stunned," Mrs. Dear recalls. But no one could tell her what the list was, whether she should think her father had been taken by the Russians.

"They didn't have a clue," she said. The Russian list indicates

that Capt. McDonough and other U.S. POWs were interrogated by Soviet officers. Indeed, the Russians later released a copy of a McDonough interrogation that says a Soviet "prepared the questions" and "a Chinese comrade translated" the answers.

Still, Moscow denies it ever had contact with the RB-45 crew.

Mrs. Dear began digging. She attended congressional hearings in Washington and searched Air Force archives at Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., and at the National Archives in Washington and Suitland. She pored over historical records at the Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, collected books on the Korean War and the Air Force, and tracked down anyone who might be of help.

She found Nancy Dean, who coincidentally had begun her own research. Mrs. Dean, helped by her husband, Dick, fired off letters, organized documents and plotted her search strategy from a basement "war room" in her Wheaton home.

Many questions about the RB-45 case went unanswered in the years after the last American POWs returned from Korea, but the one that mattered most to each crew member's family was: Did he, in fact, die?

No idle hope

Mary Jo McDonough stayed in Glen Rose after her husband was listed as missing. She never changed houses, never married again.

But she didn't wait idly. She sought out her husband's colleagues when they returned after the war. She wrote to families of other missing airmen and urged them to press for a full accounting. In a letter to President Eisenhower on Jan. 5, 1954, Mrs. McDonough wrote: "This matter is more important to me and to the thousands in my position than anything else. And we're not going to forget it."

She got no answers. Hope wore away with the passage of time.

Then, thanks to her daughter's persistence, and quite apart from the government's own efforts, an answer came in October 1993: Capt. McDonough died about two weeks after his plane was shot down. Not all details are known, and the body has not been recovered.

CONTINUED

"My mother had been waiting for 40 years," Mrs. Dear says. "For us it's like a miracle" to know for sure he died, and to complete their grieving.

Mrs. Dear plans to hold a memorial service for her father Dec. 18 in Fort Worth.

Of the hundreds of relatives of Korean War MIAs, Mrs. Dear apparently is the first to have confirmed a death through her own research and a network of contacts in the United States and abroad.

Ironically, the clinching evidence came not from U.S. government files, but from Russia, whose MiG fighters shot down Capt. McDonough's plane near the Yalu River, which separates North Korea from China. Capt. McDonough parachuted from the plane.

The one-page document, which said Capt. McDonough had died, was found in Russian archives by Paul Cole of the research firm Defense Forecasts Inc., who has extensively studied Soviet links to Korean War MIA cases. Mrs. Dear got a copy.

It was dated Dec. 18, 1950 — exactly two weeks after the downing — but did not indicate the exact date or cause of death. Routing notations on the document indicate it circulated at the highest levels of the Soviet military staff in Moscow.

"I am informing you that the pilot from the shot-down B-45 aircraft died en route and the interrogation was not finished," said the note in Russian. It was signed by Marshal Stepan Krasovskii, the senior Soviet military adviser to China, and addressed to Marshal Pavel Batitskii, chief of the General Staff in Moscow.

This fits with recollections of the only American known to have talked to Capt. McDonough after he was shot down. Retired Air Force pilot Hamilton B. Shawe Jr., of Reno, Nev., said he spent about three days with Capt. McDonough as a POW in a bombed-out prison in Sinuiju, in northern Korea, starting about Dec. 14. He says he last saw Capt. McDonough being taken away from the prison in an ox cart, and that he was in such bad condition that it seemed unlikely he could live much longer.

Mr. Shawe said Capt. McDonough told him he had parachuted from the burning wreckage of the RB-45. He later suffered severe frostbite while trying to evade

capture in the frozen wilds. When he sought food at an isolated Korean house, the occupants turned him in to the military. The exact time sequence is still not clear.

Mr. Shawe reported his contact with Capt. McDonough to the Air Force in 1953 when he was released from captivity. On the basis of his information, and the lack of other news, the Air Force issued a presumptive finding of death on March 1, 1954.

Unanswered questions

Although the McDonough family members accept the Russian document as evidence that he died, they realize it raises other questions. Where were they taking him when he died? What did the Soviets want from him? What was done with the body?

A second Russian document obtained by Mr. Cole this year makes the Soviet link even clearer. It says the RB-45 was shot down about 45 miles east of Andung, China, just across the border from Sinuiju, North Korea. The report summarizes what Capt. McDonough said under a Soviet-controlled interrogation and asks that Russian "advisers" in Korea help retrieve downed American aircraft and "details."

This document was dated Dec. 17, 1950, and was signed by the Soviet commander of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps, which headed Soviet air operations in Korea. The note was addressed to top military officers in the Kremlin.

In November 1994, Mrs. Dear learned more painful details through a confidential source who interviewed the MiG pilot, A.F. Andrianov, who is credited with shooting down the RB-45. Mr. Andrianov recalled being told by the Soviet officer who interrogated Capt. McDonough that while the American was being moved from Sinuiju, apparently on Dec. 18, a sign was hung on him, "U.S. War Criminal."

A crowd of North Koreans gathered around the defiant American and beat him to death, Mrs. Dear said. For that final injustice, she and her mother hold both the North Koreans and the former Soviet Union responsible, though she strongly doubts the American government will ever seek any sort of apology.

Because Mr. Andrianov said he saw only one parachute emerge from the RB-45, Mrs. Dean now accepts that her father, Col. Lovell the intelligence officer, died in the crash. Her search, too, is ended, though she still wonders why her father was there.

Whether or not the mystery of the RB-45 is ever fully unraveled, Mary Jo McDonough will always remember the good days before her husband left for Korea, and wonder about a cryptic departing remark on the sensitivity of his mission.

"I remember he said, 'There is something I wish I could tell you, but I can't.'"

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(b)(3) CIAAct

- 2 -

several other guards patrolled the camp. The prisoners received good treatment and favored prisoners received extra food and cigarettes. Prisoners caught while attempting to escape were tortured. The entire area had been off limits to all civilians since the camp moved to this location in May 1952. The prisoners wore old North Korean army uniforms, shoes, and wrapped their feet in cotton cloth. One mattress and one blanket was issued to every two men. Each prisoner received a daily ration of 300 grams of cereals and 400 grams of rice. The cooking utensils were boiled once a week, and the mattresses and blankets were washed with creosol soap once every 4 days. Although the POW's appeared to be healthy, many of them had attacks of dyspepsia and dysentery. Two medical technicians attended the sick and the more serious cases were sent to some other camp. Medical supplies included anodyne made in Hungary, digestive medicines, and penicillin. The daily routine was as follows: reveille at 0600 hours, breakfast at 0800 hours, lunch at 1200 hours, repair work from 1300 to 1700 hours, rest from 1700 to 1800 hours, supper at 1800, political indoctrination from 1900 to 2030 hours, entertainment from 2030 to 2100, and taps at 2100. Only one third of the prisoners worked in the afternoon, and the groups rotated each day.

3. In February 1953 Prisoner of War Camp Number 37,² with 300 ROK POW's, was at YD-556278 near Masan-ni. The camp was moved to this location from P'yongyang in March 1952. Twenty-five North Korean army troops, armed with one Soviet light machine gun, PPSH's, and automatic rifles, guarded the camp. There were three guard posts in the camp; the first post was manned by three guards who were armed with automatic rifles, the second post was manned by three guards armed with a light machine gun, and the third post was manned by three guards armed with one rifle and two PPSH's. Three guards patrolled the camp every three hours at night. The prisoners received a daily ration of 700 grams of grain which included 500 grams of rice, salt, soy bean paste, and vegetables. One North Korean army winter uniform, one summer uniform, one set of underwear, and two pairs of sneakers were issued each year. There were no medical facilities available for the prisoners. The prisoners arose at 0600 hours and went to bed at 2100 hours. Three hours were spent each day for ideological training, and North Korean songs were taught during the recreation period. The prisoners take an examination every two months, and those converted to Communism were to be enrolled into North Korean army units. No prisoners had been converted to Communism since the camp moved to its present location.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

1. Comment. A prisoner of war camp, with 300 United Nations POW's, was listed in this area on 10 March 1953, according to [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct
2. Comment. Prisoner of War Camp Number 15, a transient camp with 300 ROK prisoners, was listed at YD-553233 and YD-555234, which is in this area.
Washington Comment. [redacted] stated that on 25 February 1953 POW Camp Number 37 was at YD-555277 in Masan-ni.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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CIA - March 1, 2024

000702

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July 28, 1998

SSCI# 98-2723

The Honorable George J. Tenet
 Director of Central Intelligence
 Central Intelligence Agency
 Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Director Tenet:

As noted in our initial request of January 5, 1998, the Committee is looking into intelligence information on the January 1991 loss of a Navy F-18 pilot, POW/MIA Lieutenant Commander Michael Scott Speicher, in response to concerns expressed by Senators Bob Smith and Rod Grams in December 1997. The Committee's March 5, 1998, follow-up letter reiterated the need for your full assistance in obtaining a community-wide response. In that we still are not in receipt of this report, due March 1, 1998, we would appreciate obtaining it as soon as possible.

Also, we take this opportunity to request two additional POW/MIA reports, by October 16, 1998, similar in format to the Speicher report, that document the chronology of the Intelligence Community's activities on the below POW cases:

-- Vietnam War fighter pilot Colonel David L. Hrdlicka, shot down in his F-105 aircraft on May 18, 1965, and captured in San Neua, Laos. In February 1990 his wife, Mrs. Carol Hrdlicka, received a letter from Defense Intelligence Agency that indicated that David had escaped in 1989 but had been recaptured shortly thereafter.

-- Vietnam War pilot Major Robert F. Coady, who was shot down over Laos on January 18, 1969 while on a search and rescue mission to recover another downed pilot. On June 30, 1998, Senator Shelby responded to Major Coady's sister who had expressed many concerns and assured her he would push for full accounting by our government with regard to her brother's case.

The Honorable George J. Tenet
July 24, 1998
Page Two


In providing these two additional reports, please:

- indicate which components of the Intelligence Community had responsibility for collecting and analyzing intelligence regarding these and similar cases;
- specify how the collection requirements were generated and the priority attached to those requirements in these and similar cases;
- provide all intelligence collected in regards to these two cases, to include any computer-based files, hard copy documents, memoranda, raw reports, operational messages and computer tapes from both wartime and post-war periods from active and archives/storage.


We also request that you include, as appendices, any all-source products produced with regard to Colonel Hrdlicka and Major Coady's fate after their respective planes were shot down or more recent analysis of their cases.

If you have any questions, please contact Pete Dorn of our staff at 202-224-1700.

Sincerely,



Richard C. Shelby
Chairman



J. Robert Kerrey
Vice Chairman

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. (b)(3) CIAAct

CD NO. 495

DATE DISTR. 23 Oct. 51

NO. OF PAGES 1

COUNTRY China

SUBJECT United Nations Prisoners of War in Canton

PLACE ACQUIRED

DATE OF INFO. (b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

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SOURCE

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

On 3 October, about 170 United Nations prisoners of war arrived in Canton by train from Hankow. They were taken to the former American consulate building on Shameen. Two squads of Public Security guards were posted around the building, and no pedestrian was permitted to approach closer than 50 meters.

Document No. _____

No Change In Class.

Declassified

Class. Changed To: TS S **C**

Auth.: HR 70-2

Date: 15 AUG 1978 By: 27

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CIA - March 1, 2024

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~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY China (b)(3) CIAAct

SUBJECT Information on Non-repatriate Prisoners of War from the United States
 DATE DISTR. 29 February 1960
 NO. PAGES 1
 REFERENCES RD

DATE OF INFO. Late 1959 (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

PLACE & DATE ACQ. China, (Early January 1960) (b)(3) NatSecAct

FIELD REPORT NO.

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE:

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

1. Captain Morris,¹ an American prisoner of the Korean War, was studying the Chinese language at Peiping University.
 2. Two other American prisoners of war were employed in Shanghai as English teachers.
 3. Two more American prisoners of war, one of whom is a Negro, were in Wuhan studying the technology of water conservancy.
 4. In addition to the American prisoner of war studying at Peiping University, there was also an American Negro studying the Chinese language. This individual left the United States on a trip to England some time ago. While in London, he managed to obtain a visa from the Chinese Communist Embassy there and subsequently traveled to China.
1. Headquarters Comment. Reference is probably being made to Morris R. Wills, formerly a corporal in the United States Army.

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

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CIA - March 1, 2024

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REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET--WNINTEL--NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON~~

DIST: 29 SEPTEMBER 1987

COUNTRY: LAOS/THAILAND

SUBJ: POW/MIA: REPORTED CROSSING OF AMERICANS INTO LAOS
FROM THAILAND TO MEET AN ALLEGED AMERICAN POW
PREVIOUSLY DETAINED IN THE SRV.

DOI: JUNE - 7 SEPTEMBER 1987

SOURCE: PARAGRAPHS 1-2: A SOURCE WHOSE PAST REPORTING
HAS NOT BEEN SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH RELIABILITY.
HE OBTAINED THE INFORMATION FROM A LAO RESIDENT
OF UNPROVEN RELIABILITY.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

~~MR~~

~~WNINTEL, ORCON, NOCONTRACT, NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

CIA - March 1, 2024

~~SECRET~~

~~NOINTEL, ORCON, NOCONTRACT, NOFORN~~

~~MR~~

TEXT: 1. ACCORDING TO A LAO CITIZEN WITH CONTACTS AMONG THE LAO RESISTANCE FORCE OF ((PHOUMANO)) NOSAVAN, ON 7 SEPTEMBER 1987, A GROUP OF 20 RESISTANCE SOLDIERS ASSOCIATED WITH PHOUMANO ACCOMPANIED FOUR UNIDENTIFIED U.S. CITIZENS FROM THAILAND TO LAOS FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONTACTING A U.S. PRISONER OF WAR (POW) WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN DETAINED IN THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SRV). THE GROUP, LEAD BY ((SOUCHIAM)) (LNU), DEPARTED THAILAND FROM KHEMARAT DISTRICT, UBON RACHATHANI PROVINCE, CROSSED THE MEKONG RIVER AND ENTERED LAOS THROUGH SOUTHERN SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE.

2. THE GROUP LEAD BY SOUCHIAM WAS REPORTEDLY TO LINK UP WITH AN ELEMENT OF THE RESISTANCE FORCES ALREADY IN LAOS. THE FOUR UNIDENTIFIED U.S. CITIZENS WERE EXPECTING TO RENDEZVOUS WITH THE U.S. POW WHO WAS BEING BROUGHT TO LAOS FROM THE SRV. THE RENDEZVOUS POINT IS ALLEGEDLY SOMEWHERE IN THE VICINITY OF BAN TANGVAY (WD 7014), SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE. (SOURCE COMMENT: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE IDENTITY OF THE POW, WHERE HE WAS DETAINED IN THE SRV OR HOW HE ALLEGEDLY MADE HIS WAY TO LAOS WAS NOT PROVIDED.)

3. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] IN JUNE 1987 THERE WERE THREE UNIDENTIFIED PERSONS BELIEVED TO BE U.S. CITIZENS WHO WERE TEMPORARILY STAYING IN A HOUSE RENTED BY PHOUMANO IN MUKDAHAN CITY, MUKDAHAN PROVINCE. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] ONE OF THE UNIDENTIFIED PERSONS TELEPHONED AN ASSOCIATE IN BANGKOK IN JUNE TO DISCUSS MATTERS RELATED TO "PRISONERS." (SOURCE COMMENT: THERE WAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE DISCUSSION OR THE PERSONS INVOLVED.)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

4. ALSO ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] SOMETIME IN AUGUST, PERSONS SUSPECTED OF BEING ASSOCIATED WITH PHOUMANO NOSAVAN WERE ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH A LAO REFUGEE NAMED [REDACTED] WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY REPORTED INFORMATION PERTAINING TO POWS LOCATED IN SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
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(b)(3) CIAAct

ACQ: [REDACTED] (25 SEPTEMBER 1987). FIELD NO. [REDACTED]

DISSEM: FIELD: EMBASSY, DAO AT BANGKOK. SENT TO USCINCPAC, IPAC, WESTCOM, PACAF, PACFLT, COMSEVENTHFLT, FOSIF/WESTPAC.

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CIA - March 1, 2024

~~SECRET~~OCA 3232-92
29 October 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: 29 October Meeting with Frances Zwenig,
POW/MIA Committee

1. I met with Frances Zwenig in her office on 29 October to review where we stand on matters affecting the POW/MIA Committee. The good news is that, at least so Ms Zwenig professes, the Committee's mandate ends 2 January 1993 and is unlikely to be renewed, though she granted that Senator Smith is sure to seek a new mandate for the group from the new Congress.

2. General Sejna: I informed Frances that General Sejna is still on an Agency annuity of \$1,200/month. She said she had been aware of the fact but not of the amount. I asked that she ensure Senators Kerry and Smith knew this fact before (and if) Sejna is called to testify.

3. Sejna-bis: She had two further questions, which CE Division can answer: whether Sejna made statements about POWs when he was first debriefed by the Agency or in any contemporaneous reporting? Also, do we know whether Sejna has been involved with the private POW groups? I said the first question certainly has an answer; the second may not as Sejna is a private US citizen and may consort with whom-ever he wishes. (ORMS checked: the answer to the first is "not that anyone has found but CE is double-checking the original reporting;" and "no information.")

4. Access to Ops Files: Frances said that Senators Kerry and Smith intend to call the DCI this week or next to make a pitch for Committee access to the Ops files held by EA on POWs. I referred her to the 20 October letter which the DDCI signed in the Director's absence, restating the DCI's position of last June when Kerry asked the same question. Zwenig made it clear that the Agency will come under heavy and public criticism from the Committee if it does not make operational files accessible, opining CIA does not need such criticism in the current environment. See separate note to D/OCA and the DCI on this issue.

5. Committee Plans: Two sets of hearings are planned for the months ahead: in November on Soviet aspects of the POW issue; in December on DIA's overall management of the POW/MIA issue.

(b)(3)
CIAAct~~SECRET~~

CIA - March 1, 2024

000710

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: 29 October Meeting with Frances Zwenig,
POW/MIA Committee

Frances said CIA is not needed, as of today, in the November hearings--unless we come up with information on Soviet handling of POWs, of course. She amended the statement to say that we may need to send someone to put the Sejna testimony in context if Sejna testifies; and Art Grant's quest for someone to take responsibility for the Soviet end of things is still to be resolved.

The December hearings will be different--and would seem likely a snakepit (my description, not hers). The issue will be how well DIA handled the whole account. It will begin with a panel of "experts" who have critiqued DIA's stewardship of the POW account. On 2 December, the Committee wants to have someone to testify on how CIA handled reporting on POW issues. In this formulation we are not cast in the role of excoriating DIA, but we'll have to watch this agenda closely as it develops. I asked Frances to send us something in writing setting out what the Committee wants of us in December. These hearings will end with a review of private endeavors to free POWs and finally a panel to allow the families of POW/MIAs to comment on the quality of support they received from DIA. Sounds like fun.

Frances added, of course if the Committee has not been given access to the Ops files they've requested, this issue will arise in the December hearings.

And in the Committee's report, which is to be published on 17 December.

6. Frances said she hopes to move on and out after 2 January, when this version of the Committee will end. She had undisguised contempt for most of the people she works with on the Committee and said she is further disappointed by government as a whole in its handling of these sorts of issues and its cooperation. She wants to get involved in export/import business in Southeast Asia but added she hasn't quite got anything set up yet.

Oddment: She said McCreary has a contract and teaches analytical methods here at CIA??? Her point was that the standards of objectivity and intellectual rigor demonstrated by McCreary on the Committee makes her wonder for the future of analysis in the CIA.

(b)(6)

(b)(3) CIAAct

John L. Breckenridge
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

~~SECRET~~

CIA - March 1, 2024

000711

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SUBJECT: 29 October Meeting with Frances Zwenig,
POW/MIA Committee

OCA/Senate/JLBreckenridge: [redacted] (2 Nov 92)

(b)(3) CIAAct

Distribution: OCA 3232-92

- Original - OCA Records
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- 1 - [redacted]
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- 1 - POW/MIA Subject File

(b)(3)
CIAAct

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 SECURITY INFORMATION
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]
 CD NO. 77243

COUNTRY China
 SUBJECT United Nations Prisoners of War in Canton Area
 PLACE ACQUIRED Taiwan, Taipei
 DATE OF INFO. Late October 1951

DATE DISTR. 20 Nov. 1951
 NO. OF PAGES 1
 NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)
 SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

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SOURCE High-ranking Nationalist military official, from contact in Canton.

In late October, 300 United Nations prisoners of war were doing hard labor at Chinese Communist airfields in the Canton area. They were all under close supervision by senior Chinese Communist cadres, and were forbidden to converse with any other persons.

Document No. 7
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 Auth: HR 73-2
 Date: 30 AUG 1978 By: 29

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USA

STATUS: POW

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H [REDACTED] DATE OF BIRTH	17 Feb 71	
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ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:

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for 1/11/87*

<SUBJ>SUBJ: POW/MIA: POSSIBILITY OF EXISTENCE OF AMERICAN POWS
IN SOUTHERN VIETNAM

<TEXT>BT

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CITE CIA 751682

SERIAL: [REDACTED]

PASS: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM; (b)(3) CIAAct
NSA FOR ZKZK OO ZRL DE (EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, NSA);
STATE EXCLUSIVE FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INR; DIA
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THIS INFORMATION TO THE JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTERS IN
PAGE 2 RUEAIIA 1122 ~~SECRET~~
BANGKOK AND BARBERS POINT, HAWAII, FOR COMMANDERS ONLY).

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON
DIST: 10 NOVEMBER 1987

E SIVE DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED AT END OF REPORT (b)(1)
----- (b)(3) NatSecAct

COUNTRY: VIETNAM
SUBJ: POW/MIA: POSSIBILITY OF EXISTENCE OF AMERICAN POWS
IN SOUTHERN VIETNAM

DOI: AUGUST 1987
PAGE 3 RUEAIIA 1122 ~~SECRET~~
SOURCE: [REDACTED]

*Intell - VN
for 1/11/87
by [unclear]*

TEXT: 1. [REDACTED] COMMENTED
IN PRIVATE IN LATE OCTOBER 1987 THAT HE IS CERTAIN THAT THERE ARE
AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR (POW) STILL BEING HELD IN REMOTE AREAS OF
SOUTHERN VIETNAM BY PRIVATE MILITANT GROUPS ACTING WITHOUT THE
KNOWLEDGE OF THE SRV LEADERSHIP. ACCORDING TO THIS OFFICIAL, THESE
GROUPS ARE ANTI-COMMUNIST MEMBERS OF THE FORMER SOUTH VIETNAMESE
GOVERNMENT WHOSE MOTIVATION IS FINANCIAL. THIS OFFICIAL COMMENTED
THAT DURING THE VIETNAM WAR, THE VIET CONG MAINTAINED THEIR MILITARY
UNITS IN THE JUNGLES AND TUNNELS FOR YEARS WITHOUT BEING DISCOVERED,
SO IT SHOULD BE NO SURPRISE THAT POW COULD STILL BE HIDDEN.

2. THIS OFFICIAL RECEIVED HIS INFORMATION ON THE EXISTENCE OF
THE POW'S FROM A MEDICAL DOCTOR ACTIVE IN TREATING INDIVIDUALS
WITHOUT IDENTIFICATION PAPERS WHO HAVE BEEN AVOIDING SRV GOVERNMENT
DETENTION SINCE THE FALL OF SAIGON.

ACQ: (LATE OCTOBER 1987)
PAGE 4 RUEAIIA 1122 ~~SECRET~~
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ROOM

TO STATE: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INR
TO DIA: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, DIA
TO NSA: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, NSA

WARNING: REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ --WARNING NOTICE-INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT
R' SABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS --DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION
O1 FORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR .

DECL: OADR DRV [REDACTED] BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS
CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT. (b)(3) NatSecAct

BT

#1122

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 1122 <TOR> 871110181934 MSG000184875574

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 RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
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EZ1:
~~SECRET~~

EZ2:
 CITE CIA 771175
 WARNING NOTICE--SECRET--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SUBJECT: INFORMATION ON [redacted] POW REPORT (b)(3) CIAAct

<><> [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct
 REF: [redacted], 10217Z NOV 87

1. REGARDING THE REQUEST OF MR. RICHARD CHILDRESS FOR INFORMATION ON [redacted] REPORT, [redacted]

[Large redacted block]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

2. WE REQUEST THAT WHEN THE ABOVE INFORMATION [redacted] IS SENT TO MR. CHILDRESS, AN EVALUATION OF THE INFORMATION REGARDING POW 'S BEING HELD BY PRIVATE MILITANT GROUPS BE INCLUDED.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

3. NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

4. DECL OADP DRV [redacted]

BT

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel
Tuesday - 16 May 1978

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct



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CIA - March 1, 2024

000719

INTERNAL USE ONLY

Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel
Tuesday - 16 May 1978

Page 5

Mat Furr

24. (Unclassified - RJK) LIAISON Called Pat Kane, in the office of Representative Christopher J. Dodd (D., Conn.), in response to his letter on behalf of Corporal Roger Dumas, RA 21040481. Dumas was missing in action in Korea and declared presumed dead in February 1954. Dumas' brothers have requested the Adjutant General of the Army to review his case because they suspect that he may still be alive. The Adjutant General in turn had requested assistance from the Agency. We provided this directly to that office and I explained this to Ms. Kane. Ms. Kane requested that we send the Congressman a letter outlining our actions in the case and I said we would be happy to do so.

✓ 25. (Unclassified - MG) FBIS Received a call from Mark Licht, in the office of Representative Clarence D. Long (D., Md.), who requested a copy of the FBIS Daily Report on Latin America, dated 17 March. This had been requested and forwarded previously, but Licht said it got misplaced and asked if I could send another copy. FBIS Liaison will forward the publication directly to Licht.

✓ 26. (Unclassified - ELS) LIAISON Delivered a letter from the Director to Chairman John C. Stennis (D., Miss.), Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, to Jim Fellenbaum, of the Committee staff. This was a further explanation of a sensitive activity. I also delivered one copy of the Secret version of the Director's annual report on the Intelligence Community. Fellenbaum indicated that the Committee would not want to act on IC Staff reorganization until the authorization committees had done so. He also indicated that he personally would not be favorable toward putting four positions into the Resource Management Staff for legal and legislative functions unless there was a corresponding decrease in the CIA functions.

27. (Unclassified - ELS) LIAISON Met with Charles Snodgrass, House Appropriations Committee staff, who said he had no problem with the general concept of the IC Staff reorganization but felt the numbers and grades were too rich. He said the Committee will not act on this request until the authorization committees do.

28. (Unclassified - ELS) LIAISON Talked to Dan Childs, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff, about the procedure for processing the IC Staff budget amendment. Dan said that if his Committee acts favorably on the request, they will probably have to amend their own bill when it comes up for Senate vote.

#26 Kennen

CIA - March 1, 2024

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
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240035Z CORRECTION (ANSWERING WELZENBACH'S 231315)

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(CLANDESTINE) LAO LAOS 222315 (U.S. PILOT STATEMENT) PAGE ~~4~~ ^{FIVE} UR
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CHILDREN. I ALWAYS TENDERLY EMBRACED MY CHILDREN AND MY WIFE.

NOW I AM XXX (CHANGING WAS TO SAW, BY TO MY)

PAGE FOUR LINE FOURTEEN READ XXX FORGET MY GRATITUDE TO
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CORRECTION TO MAF 508 HELIX FU 1122

Approved for Release: [REDACTED]
Date: JUN 1966

~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency

OCA FILE: SSPOW
RECEIPT #: _____

IS

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 5098-91

27 DEC 1991

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to your letter of December 12, 1991, concerning the possibility of US POWs/MIAs in the USSR, let me assure you that the Agency is actively pursuing this issue. A senior officer of the Interrepublic Security Service (ISS), the successor organization to the former KGB Second Chief Directorate, advised the Agency on 3 December that the ISS had undertaken "an exhaustive search of available information and resources, and had come up with no indication of such presence in the USSR past or present." On 6 December the ISS passed us a written "official" response. Following is a translation of that response:

"At our request, an investigation was conducted in Kazakhstan concerning the supposed presence of an American military pilot in the village of Saryshagan, Dzhezkazgan Oblast, as presented in the newspaper 'Kommersant' (no. 42, dated 4 November 1991). The pilot was reportedly taken prisoner during the period of war in Indochina.

As a result of the investigation, which included questioning long-time residents, no information was obtained about the presence in that region at any time of an American pilot.

On our part, we also do not have any information about American military personnel located on the territory of the USSR who were missing in action during the course of military activities in Indochina."

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

CIA - March 1, 2024

000722

~~SECRET~~

The Honorable John F. Kerry


(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct Regarding alleged statements by retired KGB General Oleg Kalugin, reported by Australian television, that he had been involved in the interrogation of Americans in Vietnam during the 1975-1978 period, we have tasked [redacted] Station to ask the ISS and the Russian Republic Federal Security Service to confirm the remarks attributed to Kalugin and provide details. The Station was also been directed to seek guidance from those services as to how a similar inquiry can be put to the military intelligence service, the GRU.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct The [redacted] liaison services have been asked for any information they may have on Soviet and/or East European incarceration or interrogation of POWs/MIAs from World War II, the Korean War, or the Vietnam War.

We will keep the Committee advised of any additional information that results from our discussions with the Russian and East European Services.

A copy of this letter is also being provided to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,



to Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D. C. 20505

OCA 5098-91/1

27 DEC 1991

The Honorable Bob Smith
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED

CIA - March 1, 2024

000724

The Honorable Bob Smith

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct 5-1978 Regarding alleged statements by retired KGB General Oleg Kalugin, reported by Australian television, that he had been involved in the interrogation of Americans in Vietnam during the period, we have tasked [redacted] Station to ask the ISS and the Russian Republic Federal Security Service to confirm the remarks attributed to Kalugin and provide details. The Station has also been directed to seek guidance from those services as to how a similar inquiry can be put to the military intelligence service, the GRU.

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A copy of this letter is also being provided to Chairman Kerry.

Sincerely,



for Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Letters to Senators Kerry and Smith re POWs/MIAs
in the USSR

OCA/Senate/RWMagner:jmk/37292 (26 December 1991)

Distribution (OCA 5098-91):

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OCA Records

OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS

Routing Slip

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9. FOIA Officer		
10. SECURITY		
11. SPECIAL ASSISTANT		X
12. DD/ICID		X

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31 Dec 91
Date

Action Officer:	Bob Wagner
Remarks:	

GP 18 Dec 91
Name/Date

FORM 4422
EDITION DATE 6-91

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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	8	DDS&T			
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	10	COMPT			
	11	D/OCA	X		
	12	GC			
	13	Chm/NIC			
	14	D/PAO			
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	SUSPENSE		31 Dec 91		
			Date		

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Remarks D/OCA will respond in consultation with the DO. Please provide ES with a drop copy of the response.

ER 91-4126

Executive Secretary
17 Dec 91

Date

3637 (10-81)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

This Document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY	Korea	REPORT NO.	(b)(3) CIAAct
SUBJECT	POW Camps in North Korea	DATE DISTR.	31 March 1953
DATE OF INFO.	[Redacted]	NO. OF PAGES	2
PLACE ACQUIRED	[Redacted]	REFERENCE NO.	RD
		REFERENCES	(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

500

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE: [Redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

POW Camp at YC-4652

1. In early December 1952 an estimated 300 ROK POW's were being held in three large, one-story buildings at YC-4652, near Ongjom-dong (N 38-24, E 125-49) (YC-4654). These prisoners were captured shortly after the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950. The camp was guarded by 16 North Korean soldiers under the command of Lieutenant SO Tok-ch'ae (1776/1795/1371). There was much sickness among the prisoners because of the poor diet, inadequate clothing, and lack of medical care. An average of one prisoner died in the camp each week. In early December the prisoners were still dressed in summer clothes. The prisoners repaired roads in the area between 9 a.m. and 4 p.m. From 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. they were given indoctrination courses in Communist ideology and a summary of current news. The prisoners had been told that after 2 years of education at the camp they would be allowed to enter the North Korean army.

POW Camp at YD-552233

2. On 11 December 1952 a POW Camp with 300 ROK POW's was at YD-552233, near Hwang-gyong-dong (N 39-02, E 125-58) (YD-5724), in about 30 houses. Each house was surrounded by a cement wall. The camp included an area 300 meters by 250 meters which was enclosed by a fence. There were ruins of many destroyed buildings inside the camp. The POW's were moved to this camp by truck about 1 January 1952. North Korean soldiers disguised as POW's kept watch among the prisoners. One squad of North Korean soldiers guarded the camp. Civilians were forbidden to approach the camp. Medical treatment was provided by one North Korean army surgeon and four nurses. The POW's daily ration was 200 grams of polished rice,

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STATE	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	FBI		AEC				
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COMNAVS: FE#PHIL#7#PACFLT#; CINCPAC#FEAT#5AT#; RYCOM#; (b)(3) CIAAct

(Note: Washington Distribution Indicated By "X", Field Distribution By "#")

CIA - March 1, 2024

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SECRET

- 2 -

400 grams of grain, and vegetables. Both North Korean army and ROK army uniforms were worn by the prisoners. A newspaper printed in North Korea was distributed regularly to the POW's and was used as lesson material. Several North Korean army officers lectured on the history of the Communist Party, ROK and United States policy, and Soviet and North Korean governmental policy. Some prisoners professed to support the North Korean government. There was an average of two escaped prisoners per month (b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

1. [redacted] Comment. This is possibly the same POW camp at Taesong-ni (N 39-02, E 125-57) (YD-5524) reported in [redacted]. It is also possibly the same camp as POW Camp Number 8 at YD-553232 in Mandal-myon (N 30-00 E 125-59) (YD-5821) reported in [redacted]. [redacted] POW Camp Number 8 at YD-545238, near Chik-tong (N 39-02, E 125-56) (YD-5424), was listed among the names of POW camps in North Korea submitted by the Communist delegation to the United Nations Command Armistice Delegation on 17 July 1952.

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

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INTELLOFAX 16

Handwritten signature and date: 1/14/54

Handwritten number: 20

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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~~SECRET~~

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

COUNTRY	Japan/USSR	REPORT NO.	<input type="text"/>
SUBJECT	Ural Kai Discussion of Prisoners of War in the USSR	DATE DISTR.	16 February 1954
DATE OF INFO.	8 January 1954	NO. OF PAGES	2
PLACE ACQUIRED	Japan, Tokyo (9 January 1954)	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
		REFERENCES	

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE:

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

1. The first meeting of the Ural Kai (Ural Association)¹ in 1954 was held from 1700 to 2000 hours on 8 January at the Tokyo office of the Continental Problems Research Institute (Tairiku Mondai Kenkyu Sho) (CPRI). About 40 people were present to hear talks by MAEDA Naoki former Navy captain and resident officer at Harbin who was repatriated from the USSR in December 1953; and NISHIHARA Yukio , an official of the Demobilization Bureau.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

2. MAEDA recounted his experiences as a prisoner of war in the USSR. When the war ended in August 1945 he was interned in the Voroshilov Prisoner of War Camp until February 1947, when he was transferred to the Lubyanka Prison and the Rehoruto (sic) Prison, both in Moscow. In 1948 he was tried and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment and sent to the Vladimir Prison. In June 1953 he was suddenly notified to be ready for repatriation and was subsequently repatriated in December.

3. Speaking of the Vladimir Prison, MAEDA stated that besides the Soviet prisoners, there were foreign prisoners, many of whom were former German general officers. There was also one American prisoner. The majority of the Soviet prisoners were Ukrainians, mostly from the Western Ukraine. One Ukrainian prisoner told MAEDA that they were all very strongly anti-Soviet and also anti-German. The prison authorities held strong feelings against the German prisoners and did not permit the latter to write to their families. A Marshal von Kuraisuto (sic), about 70 years old, asked permission to write to his 90-year old mother but was refused. In order to watch the activities of the prisoners, prisoner-spies were placed in the cells. These spies received a small monthly salary of from 30 to 50 Rubles.

4. NISHIHARA spoke on the records of the trials of the White Russians held in August 1946 in Moscow.³

5. DOI Akio head of CPRI, announced that plans are being made to hold a meeting to bring together as many of the approximately 40 former

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(Note: Washington Distribution Indicated By "X"; Field Distribution By "#")

CIA - March 1, 2024

000733



WARNING.—Material on the reverse of this sheet may carry a classification of CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Date of Info.—The date or dates on which, or between which, the events described in the report occurred or the conditions described existed.

Place Acquired.—The place where the information was first acquired by a controlled individual. A date following in parentheses indicates when the information was acquired.

Source Description.—A description of the individual from whom, and, when pertinent, of any other individual through whom the information was received.

	(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
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~~SECRET~~

(b)(3) CIAAct

- 2 -

Harbin Tokuma Kikan members who have been repatriated from the USSR, about 15 of whom are now living in Tokyo, to hear their stories and to hold services for former Kikan members who have died. The tentative date for the meeting is 11 February.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

1. [redacted] Comment. This organization has been referred to in previous reports as the Nanoka Kai (Seventh Club), its official name insofar as available information is concerned; but members of the association [redacted] continue to refer to it as the Ural Kai, its original name.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] Comment. For previous reports on the Nanoka Kai meetings, see [redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct

2. [redacted] Comment. NISHIHARA Yukio is a former Army colonel, a graduate of the Military Academy (1925) and the War College, a former member of the Harbin Tokumu Kikan (1943-1944), and a former staff officer of the 11th Division. He returned to Japan with the Division before the war ended. Since the end of the war, he has been employed in the Demobilization Bureau. He is the chief of the Zentsuji (Shikoku) Branch of the Bureau and is now in Tokyo on temporary duty with the Bureau working on the historical records of the demobilization of the Japanese Army.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

3. [redacted] Comment. These records were on open sale in Tokyo at the time and were not difficult to obtain.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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Out file
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. [redacted] 338
CD NO. (b)(3) CIAAct

COUNTRY China/Korea

DATE DISTR. 10 January 1952

SUBJECT United Nations Prisoners of War Camp in Mukden

NO. OF PAGES 1

PLACE ACQUIRED [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, OF THE U. S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Between May and September 1951 there was a United Nations prisoners of war camp in Mukden. It was west of the Mukden rail line on the site of the former Japanese bicycle factory. There were about 200 American prisoners of war at the camp, and the local populace was banned from the area.

1. Washington Comment. See [redacted] for an earlier reference to prisoner of war camps in Manchuria.

(b)(3) CIAAct

Document No. 008
No Change in Class.
 Declassified
Class. Changed To: TS S C
Auth: EB 76-2
Date: 29 Aug 78 By: [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATION

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
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STA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FDB		FDS		FDZ	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	TRD		
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(b)(3) CIAAct
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CIA - March 1, 2024

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180805Z

CITE TDCS -314/14916-69

DST 18 OCTOBER 1969

COUNTRY LAOS

DOI 10 OCTOBER 1969, AND AS STATED

SUBJECT ESTIMATED ENEMY PRISON ORDER OF BATTLE FOR LAOS

ACQ LAOS, VIENTIANE/15 OCTOBER 1969/

(b)(1)

SOURCE

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- AS OF 10 OCTOBER 1969 THERE WERE 32 CONFIRMED ENEMY PRISONS OR PRISONER OF WAR /POW/ CAMPS IN LAOS. AN ESTIMATED 500 ENEMY PERSONNEL WERE COMMITTED TO GUARDING, ESCORTING AND PROVIDING SUPPORT FOR POWS. THESE PERSONNEL ARE REFLECTED AS A PORTION OF COMMAND SUPPORT PERSONNEL FOR LAOS, AS REPORTED IN THE SUMMARY OF ESTIMATED ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE FOR LAOS AS OF 15 SEPTEMBER. /FIELD COMMENT. SEE [REDACTED] (TDCS-314/13762-69)
- LIVING CONDITIONS - FORMER POWS HAVE COMPLAINED

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

THAT THEY HAD RECEIVED INHUMANE TREATMENT OR WERE SUBJECTED TO VARIOUS INDIGNITIES, BUT IN GENERAL, BY ASIAN STANDARDS, POWS ARE BELIEVE TO RECEIVE HUMANE TREATMENT. ALTHOUGH FOOD IS REPORTED AS MINIMAL, UNCLEAN, UNSEASONED AND LACKING PROTEIN, IT IS SUFFICIENT FOR EXISTENCE. MEDICAL TREATMENT IS NORMALLY AVAILABLE IN PRIMITIVE FORM. POW CAMPS USUALLY ARE REPORTED AS CROWDED. DISEASE CAUSED BY UNBALANCED DIET, CROWDED CONDITIONS, AND POOR SANITATION CLAIM A LARGE NUMBER OF POWS.

3. POW CAMPS - POWS ARE CONFINED TO A CAVE OR STOCKADE TYPE STRUCTURE DURING THE NIGHT, BUT NORMALLY ARE PERMITTED TO GO OUTSIDE SOMETIME DURING THE DAY FOR EXERCISE. IN SOME CASES, ALL OR PART OF THE POWS ARE ALLOWED BEYOND THE PRISON CONFINES UNDER LIGHT GUARD TO FORAGE FOR JUNGLE FOODS. PRISON GUARD FORCES USUALLY ARE MADE UP OF PERSONNEL WHO, DUE TO THEIR AGE OR PHYSICAL CONDITION, ARE UNFIT FOR REGULAR MILITARY DUTY. PATHET LAO SOLDIERS NORMALLY MAKE UP ESCORT AND GUARD FORCES. MANY POW CAMPS HAVE FULL OR PART-TIME NORTH VIETNAMESE ADVISORS. OCCASIONALLY POWS ARE QUESTIONED BY NORTH

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(dissem controls)

VIETNAMESE INTERROGATIONS. POW CAMP LOCATIONS ARE CHANGED FREQUENTLY TO PROVIDE BETTER SECURITY.

4. POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION - THE ENEMY MAKES A CONCERTED EFFORT TO INDOCTRINATE POWS TO THE COMMUNIST CAUSE THROUGH LONG PERIODS OF POLITICAL TRAINING /"BRAIN WASHING"/. IF AND WHEN A POW SHOWS FAVORABLE PROGRESS, HE IS RELEASED INTO A REAR SERVICE UNIT, OR BECOMES A FARMER OR EVEN A PROPAGANDIST.

5. POLITICAL PRISONERS AND CRIMINALS - THE ENEMY APPEARS TO HAVE LITTLE SYMPATHY FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS AND CRIMINALS FROM THEIR OWN RANKS. THESE PERSONNEL ARE OFTEN CONFINED IN THE SAME CAMP AS POWS, BUT USUALLY ARE SEPARATED AND RECEIVE POORER TREATMENT.

6. AMERICAN POWS - OTHER THAN THE BAN NAKAY NEUA /VH 1956/ PRISON COMPLEX, AMERICAN POWS ARE NOT BELIEVED TO BE PERMANENTLY INCARCERATED IN LAOS. AMERICAN PERSONNEL CAPTURED IN LAOS ARE ESCORTED TO THE BAN NAKAY NEUA PRISON COMPLEX OR INTO NORTH VIETNAM THROUGH EXISTING INFILTRATION ROUTES. AMERICAN POWS ARE BELIEVED TO RECEIVE BETTER TREATMENT THAN INDIGENOUS POWS, BUT OCCASIONALLY ARE

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DISPLAYED FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES. AMERICAN POWS IN THE BAN NAKAY NEUA SECTOR ARE REPORTED TO RECEIVE MILK AND BREAD WITH THEIR MEALS.

7. ON 10 OCTOBER 1969, ENEMY PRISON FACILITIES WERE CARRIED AT THE LOCATIONS LISTED BELOW. THE MOST RECENT DATE OF INFORMATION IS GIVEN FOR EACH FACILITY:

LOCATION	REMARKS	DOI
PHONG SALY (TK 0102)	DISTRICT PRISON, 400 PRISONERS, POSSIBLY ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS.	JUNE 69
MUONG SING (QD 2344)	POW CAMP AND A SEPARATE PRISON FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS.	SEP 69
NAM THA (QD 5019)	POW CAMP AND A SEPARATE PRISON FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS.	AUG 69
QD 6455 (CHINA)	UNIDENTIFIED (U/I) PRISON. (FIELD COMMENT: THIS AREA APPEARS TO BE INHABITED BY LAO, THERE	AUG 69

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IS ALSO A LAO HOSPITAL AT THE SAME LOCATION.)

BOTENE
(QD 7744)

DETENTION CENTER IN CONNECTION WITH SINO-LAO BORDER CHECK POINT.

AUG 69

NAM NOA
(TJ 0134)

U/I PRISON

MAY 69

HOUAY KANG
(TJ 7350)

POW CAMP COMPLEX
(FIELD COMMENT: SEVERAL HUNDRED PRO-GOVERNMENT TROOPS CAPTURED AT NAM BAN (TH 3583) IN JANUARY 1969 WERE INCARCERATED IN THIS COMPLEX. MOST OF THESE PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN RELEASED INTO REAR SERVICE UNITS, INTEGRATED INTO PRO-COMMUNIST TACTICAL UNITS OR ESCAPED.)

SEP 69

VJ 1101
MUONG TWAI

U/I PRISON
POLITICAL PRISON, 200-500

FEB 69
APR 69

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RC 1291) PRISONERS REPORTED.
 MUONG NGOI POW CAMP WITH 30 POWS IN CAVE, JUL 69
 (TH 5891) SEPARATE CAMP FOR POLITICAL
 PRISONERS.
 SAM NEUA POLITICAL PRISON, AMERICAN APR 69
 (VH 0157) POW REPORTED IN APRIL 1969.
 (FIELD COMMENT: AMERICAN
 POW WAS POSSIBLY BEING
 ESCORTED TO BAN NAKAY NEUA.)
 BAN NAKAY NEUA PRISON COMPLEX
 BAN NAKAY NEUA FOUR TO FIVE AMERICAN POW'S FEB 69
 (VH 1956) PERMANENTLY INCARCERATED IN
 CAVE. TWO AMERICAN POW'S WERE
 POSSIBLY TRANSFERRED TO HANOI
 (WJ 8925) IN JUNE 1968.
 HANG LONG THREE TO FOUR AMERICAN POW'S AUG 69
 (VH 1362) IN A CAVE, PRO-GOVERNMENT TROOPS,
 POSSIBLY THAI, CAPTURED AT
 NA KHANG (UH 4110) IN MARCH
 1969 WERE MOVED TO THE POW

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

CAMP.

VH 2048

POW CAMP, AMERICAN, THAI, AND
PHILIPPINE POW'S REPORTED IN
LATE 1967

DEC 68

PLAINE DES JARRES

FIELD COMMENT : PRO-GOVERNMENT
FORCES OCCUPIED THE PLAINE DES
IN JULY 1969, MANY OF THE POW'S
INCARCERATED IN THE REGION WERE
EVACUATED BY PRO-COMMUNIST
FORCES PRIOR TO PRO-GOVERNMENT
OCCUPATION. THE REMAINDER OF THE
POW'S ESCAPED OR WERE RELEASED
BY PRO-GOVERNMENT FORCES.)

JUL 69

NONG HET
(UG 9555)

POW CAMP, OVER 100 POW'S WERE
MOVED FROM THE PLAINE DES
JARRES TO NONG HET IN SEPTEMBER
1969. AMERICAN POW'S REPORTED
IN JANUARY 1969.

SEP 69

WF 0823

POW CAMP, 37 POW'S GUARDED
BY 20 PATHET LAO POLICEMEN.

AUG 69

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MAHAXAI (WE 2126)	POSSIBLY POW CAMP.	JUL 69
WE 2639	U/I PRISON GUARDED BY ONE PATHET LAO GUERRILLA COMPANY.	JUL 69
PHA LABO (WE 4301)	POW'S SCREENED	MAY 69
NATHAN (WE 3931)	POW CAMP IN CAVE, 50 TO 90 POW'S REPORTED.	AUG 69
NADENE (WE 4333)	POLITICAL PRISON, APPROXIMATELY 80 PRISONERS, AMERICAN REPORTED ESCORTED THROUGH THE AREA IN MARCH 1968.	MAY 69
WE 8705	POW CAMP, 10 AMERICAN, THAI AND FILIPINO POW'S IN CAVE.	JUL 69

(FIELD COMMENT: INFORMATION

DATED 26 JULY 1969 INDICATED

THAT THERE WERE NO AMERICANS

IN THIS POW CAMP.)

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WD 7884	U/I PRISON IN CAVE.	MAR 69
WD 8089	POW CAMP	MAR 69
WD 8282	POW CAMP	MAY 69
WD 8582	POW CAMP IN CAVE	MAR 69
MUONG PHINE (QD 0927)	(FIELD COMMENT: PRO-GOVERNMENT FORCES OCCUPIED THE MUONG PHINE SECTOR IN SEPTEMBER 1969, MANY OF POW'S INCARCERATED IN THE REGION WERE EVACUATED BY PRO-COMMUNIST FORCES PRIOR TO PRO-GOVERNMENT OCCUPATION. THE REMAINDER OF THE POW'S ESCAPED OR RELEASED BY PRO-GOVERNMENT FORCES.)	SEP 69
XD 2179	POW CAMP, 39 TO 60 POW'S REPORTED.	SEP 69
XD 3047	POW CAMP	FEB 69
XD 3244	POW CAMP	JUN 69
XD 3457	POW CAMP, FOUR AMERICANS WERE ESCORTED THROUGH THE AREA IN	JUN 69

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JUNE 1968.

XD 3350	POW CAMP	FEB 69
XD 3658	POW CAMP	FEB 69
XB 8405	POW CAMP	JUL 69

8. FIELD COMMENT: THIS REPORT IS INCOMPLETE AND SUBJECT TO AUGMENTATION. THE TECHNIQUES OF COMPILATION APPLIED INSURE THAT ENEMY PRISON FACILITIES WERE PROBABLY IN THE AREAS SPECIFIED. ITEMS OF INFORMATION ARE LIMITED TO THOSE REPORTED BY TWO OR MORE INDEPENDENT SOURCES. IN AREAS THAT ARE DENIED TO PRO-GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ELEMENTS, DUE PRIMARILY TO ENEMY CONCENTRATION AND/OR A HOSTILE POPULATION, ONLY SPORADIC REPORTING IS AVAILABLE. THESE AREAS INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

- A. PHONG SALY PROVINCE
- B. NORTHERN LUANG PRABANG PROVINCE
- C. NORTHEASTERN HOUA PHAN PROVINCE
- D. SOUTHEASTERN KHAMMOUANE PROVINCE
- E. EASTERN SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE
- F. EASTERN SARAVANE PROVINCE
- G. EASTERN ATTOPEU PROVINCE

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ADDITIONAL ENEMY PRISON FACILITIES PROBABLY WERE LOCATED IN THESE AREAS, BUT AVAILABLE INFORMATION DOES NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR LISTING IN THIS REPORT.

9. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY AIR USAID USMACV JPRC 7TH AIR FORCE IFA/NKP CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT /ALSO SENT

SAIGON/

(b)(1)

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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EZ2:

CITE CIA 406065

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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REPORT CLASS ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L W/INTEL NOFORN~~

DIST: 16 APRIL 1987

COUNTRY: VIETNAM

SUBJ: POW/MIA: ABSENCE OF AMERICANS AT AND DESCRIPTION
OF REEDUCATION CAMP-2 IN HOANG LIEN SON PROVINCE,
NORTHERN VIETNAM

DOI: 1 JULY 1976 - SEPTEMBER 1978

SOURCE:

[Redacted Source Information]

~~SECRET~~ *N/P W/N*

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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[REDACTED] (b)(1)
 TEXT: 1. FROM 1 JULY 1976 TO SEPTEMBER 1978 THERE WERE NO AMERICANS (b)(3) NatSecAct
 AT REEDUCATION CAMP-2 IN HOANG LIEN SON PROVINCE, NORTHERN VIETNAM.
 CAMP-2 WAS LOCATED IN TICH COC HAMLET, CAM VAN VILLAGE, HAM YEN
 DISTRICT, HOANG LIEN SON, ABOUT 30 KILOMETERS (KMS), DIRECTION [REDACTED] (b)(1)
 UNKNOWN FROM YEN BAI CITY. (FIELD COMMENT: CAMP-2 WAS BUILT [REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct
 [REDACTED] IN AN UNINHABITED MOUNTAINOUS-JUNGLE AR (b)(3) NatSecAct
 OF HOANG LIEN SON.)

2. AN UNIDENTIFIED ELEMENT OF THE 776TH PEOPLE'S ARMY OF (b)(1)
 VIETNAM (PAVN) GROUP ADMINISTERED CAMP-2. PAVN SENIOR CAPTAIN ANH (b)(3) NatSecAct
 SAU (BROTHER SIX) WAS CAMP COMMANDER; THE DEPUTY COMMANDER AND
 CONCURRENTLY POLITICAL OFFICER WAS PAVN SENIOR LIEUTENANT (SR LT) ANH
 HAI (BROTHER TWO); THE REAR SERVICES CHIEF WAS SR LT ((BANG)). THE
 AMP STAFF INCLUDED ABOUT 50 OFFICERS AND MEN FROM VARIOUS PAVN
 INFANTRY, ENGINEER, SPECIAL ACTION AND AIR FORCE UNITS.

3. PRISONERS WERE DIVIDED INTO FOUR UNITS LOCATED ABOUT FIVE
 KMS APART. UNITS ONE THROUGH THREE, CONSISTING OF ABOUT 80 MEN EACH,
 WERE DIVIDED INTO FOUR CELLS EACH, AND WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR CLEARING
 JUNGLE, PREPARING THE LAND FOR CULTIVATION AND GROWING FOOD CROPS.
 UNIT FOUR HANDLED MESS HALL DUTY, WOOD CUTTING AND LIVESTOCK RAISING.
 UNIT FOUR CONSISTED OF ABOUT 110 MEN.

4. ALL PRISONERS AT THIS FACILITY WERE FORMER ARMY OF THE
 REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) CAPTAINS. AMONG THEM ABOUT 30 OFFICERS
 WERE PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO ARVN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OR MILITARY
 SECURITY UNITS. ABOUT 10 OF THESE MEN WERE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
 OFFICERS AND ALL THE OTHERS WERE FROM ARVN INFANTRY, ARTILLERY OR
 ARMOR UNITS. THERE WERE NO COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES AT REEDUCATION
 CAMP-2.

5 THE FOLLOWING ARVN OFFICERS COOPERATED WITH AND RECEIVED
 SPECIAL PRIVILEGES FROM THE CAMP ADMINISTRATION:

A. CAPTAIN DINH THANH ((TUAN)), A FORMER AIRBORNE
 ARTILLERY OFFICER. THE CAMP STAFF FREQUENTLY TOOK TUAN TO THE 776TH
 GROUP HEADQUARTERS WHERE HE RECEIVED PRAISE, HAD HIS PICTURE TAKEN
 AND WAS ALLOWED TO WRITE HOME TO HIS FAMILY. TUAN ALSO RECEIVED MORE
 AND BETTER FOOD RATIONS THAN DID MOST OF HIS FELLOW PRISONERS.

B. CAPTAIN NGUYEN VAN ((THUAN)), A FORMER ARTILLERY
 UNIT OFFICER. THUAN RECEIVED PRIVILEGES SIMILAR TO TUAN.

C. CAPTAIN TRUONG DINH ((HANH)), A FORMER MILITARY
 INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FROM 4TH CORPS AND SAIGON. HANH WAS CAMP MEDIC.
 HE DECIDED WHO, AMONG THE OTHER PRISONERS, WOULD BE EXCUSED FROM CAMP
 LABOR DETAILS DUE TO ILLNESS. HE ALSO DECIDED WHO WOULD RECEIVE
 MEDICINE. THE ABOVE OFFICERS REPORTED ON THE ATTITUDES AND
 ACTIVITIES OF THE OTHER PRISONERS AT THE CAMP, AND IN EXCHANGE THEY
 RECEIVED BETTER FOOD RATIONS, LIVING CONDITIONS AND WERE NOT ASSIGNED
 TO HARD LABOR.

6.

[REDACTED]

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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CITE: CIA 015122

SERIAL: [REDACTED]

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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EXCLUSIVE DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED AT END OF REPORT

DIST: 16 AUGUST 1986
COUNTRY: VIETNAM

SUBJECT: POW/MIA: ABSENCE OF ANY REPORTS OF U.S. POW'S OR
OTHER AMERICANS BEING HELD IN VIETNAM POST-1973

DOI: MID-1986

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. A PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM (PAVN) FIELD GRADE
OFFICER WITH EXCELLENT CONTACTS AMONG SENIOR SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
OF VIETNAM (SRV) MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING
GENERAL GRADE OFFICERS AND COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE
MEMBERS, SAID PRIVATELY IN MID-1986 THAT NONE OF HIS COLLEAGUES
OR ACQUAINTANCES HAD HEARD REPORTS OR RUMORS OF U.S. PRISONERS
ORCON WVINTEL
OF WAR OR OTHER AMERICANS BEING HELD IN THE SRV FOLLOWING THE
1973 EXCHANGE OF POWS WITH THE U.S. THE OFFICER STATED THAT
HE BELIEVED THERE WERE NO U.S. PRISONERS CURRENTLY BEING HELD
IN THE SRV.

2. THE PAVN OFFICER STATED THAT PRIOR TO THE 1973 POW
EXCHANGE, HE HAD HEARD RUMORS FROM OTHER PAVN OFFICERS,
INCLUDING SOME SENIOR OFFICERS, THAT "SPECIAL" PRISONERS WERE
BEING HELD AT THE PRISON AT THE SO INTERSECTION (MGA TU SO) IN
HANOI. THESE "SPECIAL" PRISONERS WERE SAID TO BE EITHER SENIOR
U.S. MILITARY OFFICERS OR THE SONS OF SENIOR OFFICERS, U.S.
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, OR "WEALTHY CAPITALISTS". THESE
SPECIAL PRISONERS WERE CONSIDERED TO BE SEPARATE CASES FROM
THE OTHER POW'S, AND THE SRV GOVERNMENT WAS SAID TO BE PLANNING
TO USE THESE PRISONERS AS BARGAINING CHIPS TO RECEIVE "RANSOM,"
OR WAR "REPARATIONS," FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. NO RUMORS OF
SPECIAL PRISONERS BEING HELD WAS EVER HEARD AFTER 1973, AND
THE PAVN OFFICER SAID HE BELIEVED THESE "SPECIAL" PRISONERS HAD
BEEN RELEASED IN 1973. COMMENT: THE PRISON AT
THE SO INTERSECTION IN HANOI REFERRED TO BY THE OFFICER IS
ORCON WVINTEL
BELIEVED TO BE HANOI POW DETENTION INSTALLATION CU LOC N-53,
WHICH WAS REFERRED TO BY U.S. POW INMATES AS THE "ZOO," "BOQ,"
AND "CAMP AMERICA.")

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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ACQ: [REDACTED]

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Team Chief, Team 4

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MSGNO 105 (PCXX) *04/16/87* *14:02:39.8.2*
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 RTTSZYUW RUEKJCS5824 1061718-SSSS--RUEALGX.
 ZNY SSSSS
 R 161718Z APR 87
 FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
 INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
 RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
 RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
 RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
 RUEABOA/HQ AFOSI BOLLING AFB DC
 RUEALGX/SAFE

<> R <><>161450Z<><> APR 87
 <> <><>FM CIA<><>

TO RUETIAA/DIRNSA
 RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE//FOR INR
 RUEKJCS/DIA
 RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT
 RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
 ZEN/CIA OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS
 RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
 RUHHHMA/CDRWESTCOM FT SHAFTER HI
 RUHQHQA/COMIPAC HONOLULU HI
 RHHMBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
 RUHVAAA/CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
 RUAJMAB/FOSIF/WESTPAC
 RUHGOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT

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 EZ1:
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EZ2:
 SECTION 1 OF 2
 CITE CIA 405895

SERIAL: [REDACTED]
 PASS: NSA FOR ZKZK OO DLS DE (FOR NSOC).

 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
 REPORT CLASS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~--WNINTEL--NOFORN

DIST: 16 APRIL 1987
 COUNTRY: VIETNAM
 SUBJ: POW/MIA: ABSENCE OF AMERICANS AT AND DESCRIPTION
 OF THE HA TAY REEDUCATION IN HA SON BINH PROVINCE,
 NORTHERN VIETNAM

DOI: SEPTEMBER 1978 - 1 NOVEMBER 1982

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

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(b)(3) CIAAct

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NatSecAct

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PAGE 0001

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NatSecAc

[REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. FROM SEPTEMBER 1978 TO 1 NOVEMBER 1982 THERE WERE NO AMERICANS AT THE HA TAY REEDUCATION IN HA SON BINH PROVINCE, NORTHERN VIETNAM. THE HA TAY CAMP WAS LOCATED ABOUT 23 KILOMETERS (KMS) NORTHWEST OF HANOI IN THANH DAI DISTRICT, HA SON BINH PROVINCE.

2. THE HA TAY REEDUCATION CAMP IS DIRECTLY SUBORDINATE TO THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (BNV). BNV MAJOR NGUYEN VAN ((DUY)) WAS CAMP COMMANDER UNTIL EARLY 1982 WHEN HE WAS BITTEN BY A RABID DOG AND DIED. BNV LIEUTENANT COLONEL NGUYEN VAN ((MO)) REPLACED DUY. TWO BNV SENIOR CAPTAINS (NAMES FORGOTTEN) WERE THE CAMP DEPUTIES. THE THOUGHT REFORM BRANCH (KHOI QUAN GIAO) WAS HEADED BY BNV SENIOR LIEUTENANT (SR LT) ((BON)); THE SECURITY BRANCH - SR LT ((TU)); THE REAR SERVICES SECTION - 2ND LT ((DO)); THE CAMP DUTY SECTION (BAN TRUC TRAI) - BNV WARRANT OFFICER ((TU)) AND SERGEANT ((BAO)); THE VISITATION-SUPPORT SECTION - SR LT ((PHAN)), AND CHIEF OF THE LITERATURE AND ARTS SECTION (BAN VAN NGHE) WAS UNKNOWN.

3. THE STAFF AT THIS CAMP INCLUDED ABOUT 200 BNV OFFICERS AND MEN. THE CAMP WAS EQUIPPED WITH TELEPHONES AND PROBABLY HAD A RADIO TRANSMITTER SINCE A SYSTEM OF ANTENNAS WAS LOCATED ON THE ROOF OF A BUILDING IN THE CADRE HOUSING AREA. TELEPHONE COMMUNICATORS COULD BE HEARD CALLING IN TO HANOI DAILY REPORTS ON THE NUMBER OF PRISONERS AND FOOD AND CLOTHING

REQUIREMENTS. THERE WAS ALSO SOME UNIDENTIFIED TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT IN THE AFOREMENTIONED CADRE HOUSING AREA BUILDING. TWO CADRE, A BNV MAJOR AND LT. COLONEL WERE OBSERVED AT THE CAMP ABOUT TWO OR THREE TIMES WEEKLY, TO OPERATE THE ABOVE EQUIPMENT. A FIELD GENERATOR NEXT TO THAT BUILDING WAS IN FREQUENT USE. THE ABOVE BUILDING WAS OFF LIMITS. ANYONE OTHER THAN AUTHORIZED BNV STAFF FACED DISCIPLINARY ACTION IF CAUGHT NEAR THAT BUILDING.

4 THE HA TAY REEDUCATION CAMP PRISON POPULATION AVERAGED ABOUT 1,000 INMATES. WHENEVER A GROUP OF PRISONERS WAS RELEASED OR SENT SOUTH, ANOTHER GROUP WAS SENT TO THE CAMP. THE CAMP WAS ORGANIZED INTO ZONES A, B AND F. ZONE A DETAINED ABOUT 850 PRISONERS FROM THE RANKS OF ENLISTED MEN TO FULL COLONELS. THERE WAS A GROUP OF ABOUT 80 PRIESTS TRANSFERRED TO HA TAY AROUND SEPTEMBER 1982. VERY LITTLE WAS KNOWN ABOUT THIS GROUP SINCE THEY WERE HELD IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN THE MAXIMUM SECURITY AREA (ROOM SEVEN) OF ZONE A. ZONE B HELD ABOUT 200 NORTH VIETNAMESE CRIMINALS, INCLUDING PAVN DESERTERS, THIEVES AND PERSONS ARRESTED FOR CORRUPTION. ZONE F, A MAXIMUM SECURITY AREA, DETAINED FORMER ARVN GENERAL AND FIELD GRADE OFFICERS AND SENIOR SOUTH VIETNAMESE POLITICAL PARTY MEMBERS AS WELL AS SENATORS AND REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FORMER NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. THERE WAS A TOTAL OF ABOUT 30 HIGH RANKING OFFICERS AND CIVILIANS IN ZONE F.

5. THE FULL COLONELS IN ZONE A WERE DIVIDED INTO TWO GROUPS; LABORERS AND STUDY GROUP MEMBERS. THE LATTER GROUP WAS REQUIRED TO SIT AND DISCUSS BATTLEFIELD EXPERIENCES AMONG ARVN INFANTRY, ARMOR, HELICOPTER AIR SUPPORT, AND NAVAL AND AIR FORCE ARTILLERY UNITS. ALL OF THEIR INFORMATION WAS CAREFULLY RECORDED ON PAPER. BNV REPRESENTATIVES FROM HANOI CAME BY REGULARLY TO PICK IT UP. THERE

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CIA - March 1, 2024

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PAGE 0008

WERE ALSO TRANSLATION CELLS WHOSE JOB IT WAS TO TRANSLATE FOREIGN LANGUAGE DOCUMENTS INTO VIETNAMESE.

6. THERE WAS ONE CATHOLIC PRIEST AT HA TAY WHO HAD BEEN IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT FOR FIVE CONSECUTIVE YEARS, AS OF NOVEMBER 1982. THE PRIEST HAD BEEN IMPRISONED FOR WRITING DEROGATORY EDITORIALS AGAINST THE COMMUNIST STYLE OF CATHOLICISM. THE PRISON AUTHORITIES TOLD THE PRIEST HE MERELY HAD TO RETRACT HIS EARLIER EDITORIALS TO GAIN HIS FREEDOM. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE AFOREMENTIONED PRIEST WAS STILL BELIEVED TO BE IN PRISON AS OF NOVEMBER 1986.)

7. (FIELD COMMENT: [REDACTED])

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[REDACTED] THE BNV INSTALLED 20 METER-HIGH CEMENT PILLARS AT FIFTY METER INTERVALS AROUND THE CAMP PERIMETER. THE PILLARS WERE SECURED IN TWO-METER-DEEP HOLES WITH CONCRETE. EACH PILLAR REQUIRED

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PAGE 0009

MSGNO 106 (PCXX) *04/16/87* *14:02:39.9.6*
ZCZC 19:01:27Z (PC)
EMI DTG : 87041613240374
RTTSZYUW RUEKJCS5825 1061718-SSSS--RUEALGX.
ZNY SSSSS

R 161718Z APR 87
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUEABOA/HQ AFOSI BOLLING AFB DC
RUEALGX/SAFE
<> R <><>161450Z<><> APR 87
<> <><>FM CIA<><>
TO RUETIAA/DIRNSA
RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE//FOR INR
RUEKJCS/DIA
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
ZEN/CIA OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS
RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUHHMA/CDRWESTCOM FT SHAFTER HI
RUHQHQA/COMIPAC HONOLULU HI
RHMBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RUHVAAA/CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
RUAJMAB/FOSIF/WESTPAC
RUHGOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT

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EZ1:
~~SECRET~~ NOFORN WNINTEL

EZ2:
FINAL SECTION OF 2
CITE CIA 405895
SERIAL: [REDACTED]
PASS: NSA FOR ZKZK OO DLS DE (FOR NSOC).

(b)(3) CIAAct

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
FIVE BAGS OF CEMENT. ACCORDING TO BNV GUARDS AT HA TAY, THESE
PILLARS WERE INSTALLED TO GUARD AGAINST POSSIBLE HELICOPTER RESCUE
ATTEMPTS BY HOSTILE FORCES.)

8 [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED]

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

C1PT2S

PAGE 0011

[Redacted]

ACO: [Redacted] (MARCH 1987). FIELD NO.

DISSEM: [Redacted] USCINCPAC, IPAC, WESTCOM,
PACAF, PACFLT, COMSEVENTHFLT, FOSIF/WESTPAC.

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CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

27 December 1991

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:


In response to your letter of December 12, 1991, concerning the possibility of US POWs/MIAs in the USSR, let me assure you that the Agency is actively pursuing this issue. A senior officer of the Interrepublic Security Service (ISS), the successor organization to the former KGB Second Chief Directorate, advised the Agency on 3 December that the ISS had undertaken "an exhaustive search of available information and resources, and had come up with no indication of such presence in the USSR past or present." On 6 December the ISS passed us a written "official" response. Following is a translation of that response:

"At our request, an investigation was conducted in Kazakhstan concerning the supposed presence of an American military pilot in the village of Saryshagan, Dzhezkazgan Oblast, as presented in the newspaper 'Kommersant' (no. 42, dated 4 November 1991). The pilot was reportedly taken prisoner during the period of war in Indochina.

As a result of the investigation, which included questioning long-time residents, no information was obtained about the presence in that region at any time of an American pilot.

On our part, we also do not have any information about American military personnel located on the territory of the USSR who were missing in action during the course of military activities in Indochina."

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct



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CIA - March 1, 2024

NND 98201 000757 / 1

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The Honorable John F. Kerry

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

Regarding alleged statements by retired KGB General Oleg Kalugin, reported by Australian television, that he had been involved in the interrogation of Americans in Vietnam during the 1975-1978 period, we have tasked [redacted] Station to ask the ISS and the Russian Republic Federal Security Service to confirm the remarks attributed to Kalugin and provide details. The Station was also been directed to seek guidance from those services as to how a similar inquiry can be put to the military intelligence service, the GRU.

(b)(1)


(b)(3) NatSecAct

The [redacted] liaison services have been asked for any information they may have on Soviet and/or East European incarceration or interrogation of POWs/MIAs from World War II, the Korean War, or the Vietnam War.

We will keep the Committee advised of any additional information that results from our discussions with the Russian and East European Services.

A copy of this letter is also being provided to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,


Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

~~SECRET~~

CIA - March 1, 2024

NND 982001-000758 67

TRANSMITTAL AND DOCUMENT RECEIPT

TO: Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Room 21, Senate Russell Bldg.

FROM: OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ROOM ~~XXX~~ 7B-20
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

RECEIPT:
DATE:

CONTROL NUMBER	DOC. DATE	SUBJECT (Unclassified preferred)	CLASS.
-----0	12/27	letters for Sens. Kerry and Smith <i>DELIVER 12/27 FOR SEN. KERRY AND SEN. SMITH</i>	S

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(b)(6)

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ROOM 7 B 24
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FORM 12-89 3772B

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- 1 - WHITE, RETURN COPY
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 - 3 - PINK
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CIA - March 1, 2024

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MSGNO 161 (PCXX) *10/30/86* *18:25:29.2.8*

ZCZC 23:24:10Z (PC)

RTTSZYUW RUEKJCS2070 3032033-SSSS--RUEALGX.

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FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEACHS/CHS-GRID/OCJCS

RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC

RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC

RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC

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RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC

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RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT

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RUHQHQA/COMIPAC HONOLULU HI

RHHMBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI

RUHVAAA/CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI

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EZ2:

CITE: CIA 133293

SERIAL: [REDACTED]

PASS: NSA FOR ZKZK OO DLS DE (FOR NSOC).

(b)(3) CIAAct

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

REPORT CLASS C O N F I D E N T I A L--WNINTEL--NOFORN

DIST: 30 OCTOBER 1986

COUNTRY: LAOS

SUBJ: ABSENCE OF AMERICAN POWS, AT HAT CHAM REEDUCATION CAMPT
IN LUANG PRABANG PROVINCE, LAOS; ITS LOCATION AND OPERATION

DOI: 1975-1985

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct PAGE

TEXT: 1.

[REDACTED] STATED THAT HE HAD NEVER SEEN OR HEARD ABOUT ANY AMERICAN POWS WHILE IN REEDUCATION. HE FURTHER STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT ANYONE WHO SAID THAT THEY HAD SEEN AN AMERICAN POW WHILE IN REEDUCATION WAS LYING BECAUSE THE REEDUCATION CAMP INMATES WERE STRICTLY CONTROLLED.

2. HAT CHAM REEDUCATION CAMP WAS LOCATED ON THE EAST BANK OF THE NAM OU RIVER. IT WAS BORDERED ON THE SOUTH BY THE NAM KONG RIVER AND ON THE NORTH BY THE NGOY RIVER. THE WESTERN BOUNDARY WAS THE ROAD TO MUANG NGOY. THERE WERE ABOUT 15 BUILDINGS IN THE CAMP, INCLUDING FOUR BARRACKS FOR PRISONERS LOCATED AT THE NORTH END OF THE CAMP. THE SECURITY OFFICE, CLUB, AND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE WERE LOCATED AT THE SOUTH END OF THE CAMP, AND A WAREHOUSE, KITCHEN, DISPENSARY AND GUARD BARRACKS WERE LOCATED AT THE WEST END OF THE CAMP. THE CAMP ALSO CONTAINED A RICE MILL AND LUMBER YARD. THE GUARD FORCE CONSISTED OF 25 SOLDIERS OF THE LAO PEOPLE'S ARMY (LPA) COMMANDED BY ((PHOUMI)) PAGNASAVAT. THE LPA GUARDS HAD TWO BOATS WITH 125 HORSEPOWER ENGINES USED FOR TRANSPORTATION. THE NEAREST VILLAGE WAS SOP KHAN (TH 5687) LOCATED ABOUT TWO KILOMETERS SOUTH OF THE CAMP. ON THE WEST SIDE OF THE CAMP ACROSS THE NAM OU RIVER, WAS THE PHA KEO CAVE. THE FAMILIES OF THE INMATES LIVED NEAR THE CAMP ON THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY.

3. THE CAMP WAS OPENED IN AUGUST 1975 AND CONTAINED FORMER RLG OFFICIALS FROM LUANG PRABANG AND XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCES. THE CAMP CONTAINED ABOUT 750 PERSONNEL, INCLUDING 400 REEDUCATION INMATES AND 350 FAMILY MEMBERS. THE CAMP WAS DIVIDED INTO FOUR COMPANIES: THE FIRST COMPANY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING THE PERSONNEL RECORDS, MEDICAL TREATMENT, AND CAMP MAINTENANCE; THE SECOND COMPANY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR PLANNING, CONSTRUCTION, EDUCATION AND CLASSES; THE THIRD COMPANY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR CROP CULTIVATION, ANIMAL HUSBANDRY AND FISHING; AND THE FOURTH COMPANY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR WOOD CUTTING, BOAT BUILDING AND METAL WORKING. THE INMATES WERE SENTENCED TO THE CAMP FOR FIVE YEARS AFTER WHICH THEIR CASES WOULD BE REVIEWED AND EACH PERSON WOULD BE PLACED INTO ONE OF THREE CATEGORIES: THE FIRST CATEGORY WAS COMPRISED OF PERSONS WHO WERE TO BE RELEASED FROM REEDUCATION; THE SECOND CATEGORY WERE THOSE WHO WERE TO REMAIN IN REEDUCATION AS SECURITY/GUARD PERSONNEL; AND THE THIRD CATEGORY WERE THOSE TO BE SENTENCED TO FURTHER REEDUCATION. THE CAMP WAS CLOSED IN 1980 BECAUSE OF BORDER PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE LAO AND CHINESE GOVERNMENTS AND THE INMATES WERE EITHER RELEASED OR SENT TO REEDUCATION CAMPS IN XIENG KHOUANG OR ATTOPEU PROVINCES. SOME LPA PERSONNEL REMAINED AT THE CAMP AND SOME INMATES WERE KEPT AT THE CAMP TO TEND THE GARDENS AND WORK FOR THE LPA.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

ACQ: [REDACTED] (SEPTEMBER 1986) FIELD NO. [REDACTED]
DISSEM: FIELD: EMBASSY. [REDACTED] SENT TO
USCINCPAC, IPAC, WESTCOM, PACAF, PACFLT, COMSEVENTHFLT, FOSIF/
WESTPAC.

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CIA - March 1, 2024

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THIS TAKE FROM 0900 SEPT 2 TO 0900 SEPT 5

FILE: 0084-0-01

SUMMARY:

- 1. MOSCOW 31/8 - SCHCHEDROV REPORT
- 2. MOSCOW 30/8 - ARTICLE BY SOVIET CORRESPONDENT KONSTANTIN ATIMONIV--
PHONETIC
- 3. NONA 4/8 - LAOTIAN RADIO EXPOSES KONG LE'S CONSPIRACY WITH U.S.
AND LAOTIAN RIGHTWING TROOPS

- 1. MOSCOW 31 ^{AUG} 66

(Report by IVAN SCHCHEDROV, Pravda's special correspondent), Dear listeners, the United States has always refused to admit that U.S. military forces have participated in the military operations in Laos. Even the White House and Pentagon have stated that such an accusation does not conform to the truth. They say that U.S. planes are merely conducting observation flights in the Western part of central and Southern Laos. White House spokesman MCCLOSKEY said he was not aware of U.S. airstrikes against the territories of Laos. The leaders of the rightist faction--the pro-American faction in Laos--have even congratulated Washington for this sort of statement.

For example, Thao MA, commander in Chief of the Air Force of the reactionary rightist faction, said that only his planes have bombed the liberated areas, while U.S. planes have merely conducted observation flights. As for Prince PHOUA, Premier of the National Coalition Government, he said that he and his government have not appealed to the United States to stop its air activities against the Pathet Lao and neutralist forces. The truth is that from May, 1964 to the present, the United States has carried out armed intervention in the affairs of Laos aimed at transforming Laos into a war-front and a third strategic military base in the Indochinese peninsula after South Vietnam and the DRV. As in South Vietnam, U.S. armed intervention in Laos is designed to destroy the patriotic forces and to set up a base of operations and strategic positions in Laos so as to forestall war against the Laotian Nation.

Recently, we had a talk with a skinny, tall American named (CARL DARDJE--
Phonetic), a talk that lasted 24 hours. He said: in July 1965, acting on the orders of the U.S. air force, he took off with a squadron of jet bombers bearing the marks of the U.S. airforce from Takhli airbase on a bombing mission. On the map, the bombing targets were marked Northern Laos and Saravoua province. Before taking off, he learned that President JOHNSON had personally ordered the air attack. After a few days, the U.S. 23rd squadron received orders to bomb and strafe the territories of the DRV. During his fourth flight, pilot (JOHN PABOZAN--Phonetic) did not RPT not return to his base. His F-25 F-105 bearing the number AU-2033-02 was shot down near Hanoi, he was arrested. He recognized his mistake and that he had been forced to participate in this war of banditry. The plane of American pilot Lieutenant (PIS A--PHONETIC) was shot down on 6 June 1964 near Xieng Khouang in the Plaine des Jarres region. This pilot said he had received orders from

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Date _____
JUN 1966

- 2 -

his high command to bomb and destroy the various military units of the Patriotic Forces. This pilot wrote a letter which he signed himself Lieutenant (PISIAM), pilot, serial number 585747. There were several documents belonging to another American pilot NJANI (HUELON--PHONETIC) whose plane was shot down on 18 May 1965 in Sam Neua province.

Another pilot named DAVID LEWIS HANLITOKA arrived at Ta Kili air base with his comrades in April 1965. After having bombed with his comrades the road and bridges and the various installations in the liberated areas of Laos, he received new orders to bomb the (Think Doc May--Phonetic) region in Phong Saly province, Northern Laos. He had contacts with a West German pilot whose plane was shot down in Northern Laos during the month of May (? 1965). This German pilot admitted that the bombing of peaceful villages of Laos was carried out in response to the orders of the U.S. command.

All the aforementioned proofs and documents were seized from pilot Lieutenant (DON HARVIK--Phonetic), serial number (? 75411TK) whose plane was shot down in October 1965 in Northern Laos, from another U.S. pilot named (PORKA'SIK--Phonetic), serial number 414573, and from some other pilots.

2. 10507W 30 AUG 66

A Soviet Journalist named (KONSTANTIN ATIONIVJEA --Phonetic) recently returned from a visit to the countries in the Indochinese Peninsula. (words indistinct) he wrote several articles including one dealing with his visit to Laos. The following is what he wrote about his visit to Laos:

The Laotian people are a persevering and hardworking people who have self-respect and want to enjoy an easy life. I visited the cities and villages and the countryside. I saw gardens planted with coffee and tea. All gardens and plantations are well guarded. However, during the visit I was able to see that the Laotian people have been unable to enjoy a peaceful and happy life, in Laos, it is rare to find a village which has not been bombed and burned. Planes come daily to bomb and strafe the houses and villages of the inhabitants, causing heavy material loss to the population one can clearly see the distinguishing marks of the intruding planes showing that these planes belong to the U.S. air force.

In Laos, the Americans have sought every means to hide themselves from the public, just as they have been doing in Thailand. One rarely sees U.S. militarymen on the roads and streets of the cities; they are nearly invisible. However, everyone is aware of their presence and their plans. In the airfields, U.S. planes are well camouflaged and kept from view. The Laotian people cannot see these planes. But it is impossible to camouflage the flights of these planes which take off daily from the airfields.

During the visit, I learned that a number of village youths living nearby had been recruited by the Americans to work in the airfields. Two Laotian youths who had worked for some time at Pakse airfield were asked to load bombs onto a U.S. plane. Later this plane took off in an unknown direction. After work, the two youths returned to their village close to the airfield. They saw that the same plane, flying at a low altitude, bombed and strafed their village and then disappeared. They were frightened. Like many other Laotian youths, they were able to realize that the Americans have carried out cruel and original acts against the Laotian nation and people.

4 no

5 yes

6 yes

7 no

8 no

- 3 -

These two youths left their village to take up arms in the forest in order to safeguard the territorial integrity of their fatherland.

During my visit to Laos, I learned of an incident involving the Americans. Some time ago, a Jeep carrying many American was fired at as it was passing through a village. Following this incident, all Americans received orders to shoot at any suspicious persons loitering on the roads. The chief of that village told me that he had fought side by side with the guerrillas against the Americans who entered his village. He said: "Now the Americans dare not enter the village." I met him in Luang Prabang and we had a long talk. This man is fully aware of the U.S. aggression in Laos. He is also aware of the dangerous consequences if the Americans intensify their war of aggression against Laos.

I asked him the following question: "Why is there no reconciliation among the three important forces of the country, that is, the patriotic forces, the forces of the rightist faction, and the neutralist forces when they are fully aware that the most important problem is to build a peaceful, neutral, and prosperous Laos, a problem mentioned in the common declaration of the three parties at the time of the formation of the tripartite national coalition government?"

In reply, he said: "I know that this is the first and most important condition for checking U.S. aggression and intervention. Unfortunately, there are people in the rightist faction who are collaborating with the Americans and who only see their own interests and not the interests of the nation and people. These reactionaries only want Laos to become a U.S. base for aggression. And they want the Americans to enslave the Laotian people and to restore a colonialist regime in the country. These reactionaries of the rightist faction have received considerable economic aid from the Americans. They have not used this aid for the benefit of the nation and people as they promised in the past.

"The Americans have also given much money to feed the traitors of the nation and people, especially to PHOU MI NOSAVAN who was sentenced to death following his abortive coup d'etat. People say that (words indistinct) spent much money for the construction of a large villa as a summer resort for PHOU MI NOSAVAN in Song Kra in Southern Thailand. Everyone knows that PHOU MI NOSAVAN has kept in close contact with his subordinates in carrying out acts of sabotage against the Laotian nation. At present, the Americans and their lackeys are seeking a favorable occasion to carry out a new war plan against Laos."

3. Peking News 4 SEPT 64

"The voice of Laos" in a recent commentary revealed that KONG LE is plotting further concerted action with the U.S. and the Laotian rightwing troops and making intensive preparations to attack the Laotian liberated areas.

KONGLE and Prince SOUVANNA PHUMMA lately moved several battalions from Vang Vieng to Muong Hin, and secretly allowed (words indistinct) the Laotian rightwing troops to enter the Muong Hin area, said the radio. KONG LE's troops collaborated with the rightwing troops in attacking the liberated areas in the Southeastern part of Xieng Khouang province and in the nearby regions. Their special agents have infiltrated into the liberated areas for

subversive and harassing purposes.

KONG LE and Prince PHOUA connived at the extensive bombings of the Laotian liberated areas by U.S. marauding planes, the radio continued. In Muong Hin, U.S. and Thai officers were training and directing KONG LE's troops, there were now 30 U.S. advisers there. Thailand's artillery has been augmented from one to three battalions.

(Words indistinct) warned KONG LE and Prince PHOUA against their new large scale attacks on the Laotian liberated areas and demanded (word indistinct) end to all attacks.

ZNR UUUUU

P 260815Z ZYTI JUL 66

FM FBIS SAIGON

TO RUEAED/FBIS OKINAWA

RUHLE/CINCUSPACFLT HAWAII

RUH1HQ/CINCPAC HAWAII

RUM1HS/CINCUSARPAC HAWAII

RUM1M/PACAF SIGRAM AFB

RUM1N/COMNAVFORPHIL

RUM1S/AMEMB VIENTIANE

RUM1BK/AMEMB BANGKOK

RUM1SBJ/W ADIV DIP S

RUM1ECH/BU PERS


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APPROVED FOR RELEASE

5/15/98

CIA - March 1, 2024

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220815 COPY TO LIAISON

RADIO PATHET LAO (CLANDESTINE) IN LAO TO LAOS 2415 GMT

26 JULY 1966--S

(TEXT) HERE IS A REPORT ABOUT A VOICE RECORDING MADE BY
CAPTAIN DAVID LOUIS MRDLICKA, A U.S. AGGRESSOR PILOT, WHOSE
PLANE WAS SHOT DOWN AND WHO WAS CAPTURED ON EIGHTEEN 18
MAY NINETEEN SIXTYFIVE 1965. HE ASKS HIS HIGHNESS PRINCE A
SOUPHAMOUVONG TO FREE HIM.

(RECORDING IN AMERICAN-ACCENTED ENGLISH FOLLOWS--ED.)

PRINCE SOUPHANOUVONG, PRESIDENT OF THE NEW LAO HAK KAT AND
VICE PREMIER OF THE LAOTIAN NATIONAL COALITION GOVERNMENT:

1729/6

INDISTINCT) LAOTIAN... IZENS THE... THE PRIVILEGE... WRITING
TO YOU. FOR A YEAR NOW I HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO THINK ABOUT
MY CRIMES AGAINST THE LAOTIANS, AND THEY DON'T DRAW A VERY
PRETTY PICTURE IN MY MIND. ON MAY EIGHTEENTH 18TH NINETEEN
SIXTYFIVE 1965 I TOOK OFF FROM TA KHLI RPT TA KHLI AIRBASE
IN THAILAND AND WAS SHOT DOWN BY THE LAOTIAN PEOPLE'S
LIBERATION ARMY OF THE NEO LAO HAK KAT FOR BOMBING THE LIBERATED
ZONE CONTROLLED BY THE NEO LAO HAK KAT. AS I BOMBED I WAS UNDER
THE MISTAKEN IMPRESSION THAT I WAS CUTTING OFF THE FLOW OF
MEN AND SUPPLIES TO SOUTH VIETNAM. HOWEVER, NOW I CAN SEE THE
SOUTH VIETNAM NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT FOR LIBERATION
IS REALLY WITH THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM FIGHTING FOR THEIR
LIBERATION AND FREEDOM, AS IS THE NEO LAO HAK KAT. (END OF
ENGLISH-LANGUAGE VOICE RECORDING. TRANSLATION IN LAO
FOLLOWS--Etc.)

HE SAID: I REQUEST HIS HIGHNESS PRINCE SOUPHANOUVONG,
PRESIDENT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE NEO LAO HAK KAT
AND VICE PREMIER OF THE TRIPARTITE NATIONAL COALITION
GOVERNMENT, TO UNDERSTAND THAT I HAVE HAD TIME TO THINK
CAREFULLY AND TO REALIZE MY CRIMINAL ACTIONS AGAINST YOUR PEOPLE.

M 30/6

B

ON EIGHTEEN 18 MAY NINETEEN SIXTYFIVE 1965 I LEFT THE
TA KHLI AIRBASE, THAILAND, AND AFTERWARD MY PLANE WAS SHOT
DOWN BY THE LAOTIAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMED FORCES OF THE
NED LAO HAK XAT AS I WAS BOMBING A CERTAIN AREA IN THE REGIONS
CONTROLLED BY THE NED LAO HAK XAT. AS I WAS BOMBING,
I MISTAKENLY THOUGHT THAT I WAS DOING IT TO CUT OFF THE FLOW
OF ARMS SUPPLIES AND TROOPS TO SOUTH VIETNAM. HOWEVER, I
HAVE NOW RECOGNIZED THAT THE LIBERATION FRONT OF SOUTH VIETNAM
IS REALLY THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM, WHO ARE WAGING A STRUGGLE
TO LIBERATE THEIR NATION AND TO WIN FREEDOM. THE LIBERATION
FRONT OF SOUTH VIETNAM IS LIKE THE NED LAO HAK XAT.

NOW I HAVE UNDERSTOOD AND HAVE BECOME FAMILIAR WITH
EVERYTHING ABOUT THE NED LAO HAK XAT OF YOUR HIGHNESS IN ITS
FIGHT TO PRESERVE THE PEACE, NEUTRALITY, SOVEREIGNTY,
INDEPENDENCE, UNITY, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LAOS.
THE NED LAO HAK XAT HAS TRIED TO SAFEGUARD THE GENEVA ACCORDS
OF NINETEEN SIXTYTWO 1962 ON LAOS; WHEREAS, THE UNITED STATES
AND THAILAND, WHICH SIGNED THE NINETEEN SIXTYTWO 1962
GENEVA ACCORDS ON LAOS, ARE TRAMPLING UPON THESE ACCORDS.
FORMATIONS OF U.S. JETS FROM THEIR AIRBASES IN THAILAND,
HAVE UNLEASHED ATTACKS ON THE FREE AREAS OF LAOS.

194/6

B

PAGE 04 PRINCE 145 145

"AS I SIT HERE REQUESTING YOU TO FREE ME, U.S. PLANES FLY OVERHEAD TO BOMB THE FREE AREAS OF LACS DAY AND NIGHT. THROUGHOUT HISTORY MILITARY AGGRESSORS HAVE NEVER BEEN ABLE TO CONQUER GERRILLAS. OUR NATION WILL HAVE TO REALIZE THIS, FOR THIS HAS SHOWN THAT YOUR COUNTRY IS FIGHTING A BATTLE FOR ITS INDEPENDENCE. THE LAOTIAN PROBLEM MUST BE RESOLVED BY YOUR PEOPLE BY MEANS OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES CONCERNED.

FOR THE PAST YEAR I HAVE ALWAYS MET WITH GOOD TREATMENT FROM YOUR PEOPLE. YOU NURSES HAVE TAKEN CARE OF ME AND HAVE SAVED MY LIFE. THEY HAVE GIVEN ME MEDICINE AND SPECIAL FOOD. AS A CHILD I WANTED TO BE A PILOT, AND WHEN I GREW UP I BECAME A PILOT. NOW I REGRET THAT I USED MY STRENGTH TO WAGE AN AGGRESSIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE WAR. WHAT MAKES ME VERY SAD IS THAT I AM VERY FAR FROM MY DEAR WIFE AND MY THREE LITTLE CHILDREN. I HAVE ALWAYS HOPED TO RETURN TO MY FAMILY AND LIVE WITH MY WIFE AND MY CHILDREN. SURELY I WILL BE ABLE TO TELL MY WIFE THE STORY OF A FAMOUS MAN NAMED "PRINCE SOUPHANUVONG," WHO FORGAVE ME SO MUCH.

1950/6

B.

9551

MAR 24 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

THROUGH: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: U. S. Prisoners of War Remaining in Communist Custody.

REFERENCES: a. Memo fm C/S, USAF, dtd 16 Mar '54, Subj. as above.

b. Memo fm Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, D/A, dtd 14 Aug '53, Subj. "Post Korean Armistice Planning for Covert, Clandestine, and Related Activities."

1. Reference a. contains a request from Chief of Staff, USAF that CIA undertake to locate, identify, and recover U.S. Prisoners of War still in Communist custody.

2. This request is in most respects identical with reference b., which was received last August from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, D/A.

3. The FI Staff has had a long standing requirement for information of this type, but so far has not obtained any worthwhile intelligence in this regard.

4. It is believed, as you are no doubt aware, that CIA has little or no operational capability to recover personnel from those areas in which POW's are being held in Manchuria, China, or the Soviet Union. In almost all such areas the priority of CIA effort is on the collection of early warning and order of battle information.

5. It is the opinion of this Staff that this Agency has no significant capabilities along the lines requested by the USAF.

6. It is therefore recommended that you sign the attached memorandum to Chief of Staff, USAF.

DOCUMENT NO. _____
 NO CHANGE IN CLASS.

 CLASSIFIED BY: _____
 AUTHORITY: _____
 DATE: 17 MAR 1981
 REVIEWER: 064540

John Weckerling
 for
 JOHN WICKERLING
 Chief, Paramilitary Operations Staff

9537a

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff
United States Air Force

SUBJECT: United States Prisoners of War Remaining
in Communist Custody After Termination of
Exchange of Prisoners Under Korean
Armistice Agreement Terms.

1. Receipt is acknowledged of your memorandum dated 16 March 1954 on the above subject, asking Central Intelligence Agency to take action to locate, identify and recover U.S. POW's in Communist custody.

2. I agree with you fully that any accomplishment in this field would unquestionably have a salutary effect upon morale and would be of significant value in our national psychological program.

3. This Agency has had a continuing requirement for the development of information on the location of U.S. POW's. Any intelligence developed on this subject will be discussed promptly with Headquarters, United States Air Force. CIA then will consider in each case what steps, if any, can be taken to effect the release of the POW's involved. The inherent operational difficulties which would surround such an undertaking are clearly apparent, I am sure, to you.

4. The undertaking of any such action is predicated upon the availability of adequate operational intelligence. This agency does not have at the present time such adequate operational intelligence on which to base plans for liberating POW's under Communist control. Nor is it anticipated

Reuri Hew

that CIA will have significant capabilities along these lines so long as operating conditions continue to follow the present pattern.

5. In compliance with your request, CIA will continue to endeavor to develop the required intelligence on POW's in Communist hands and will maintain appropriate contact with your headquarters on this subject.

Recursion

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

FM/OPS/RCAugustine/am

24 March 1954

James Hull -
PM

Richard Helms
DDIP

Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - Addressee
- 2 - DCI
- 1 - DD/P
- 1 - G/PM
- 1 - G/PM/OPS
- 1 - GRS/Chrono
- 1 - RI

Concur
etc
DDCI
29 May

Attachment: 1 - as stated in
par. 6 above

COORDINATED:

George C. Amund
Chief, FE Div.

P. A. Macmillan
D Chief FI

PM/OPS/RCAugustine/lbc

23 March 1954

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - DCI
1 - DD/P
1 - C/PM
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1 - OPS/Chrono
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CONFIDENTIAL

USSR SURVEY
28 NOVEMBER 1952

- 1 -

Korea

T W O C A M P S

KOREAN WAR

Moscow Stresses Repatriation Principle: The consistent Communist emphasis on the principle of repatriation of all prisoners of war and denunciation of the U.S. advocacy of no forced repatriation remain the dominant elements in Moscow comment on the U.N. debates on Korea. The Soviet position is made explicit in the Vishinsky speech on 24 November in which the Indian draft resolution is denounced. Communist objection to the 17 November resolution became evident in a 20 November TASS review of the proposal reporting the similarity between the Indian resolution and the U.S. position. TASS reports the "uneasiness" of other delegations as a result of the Menon speech, but there is no emphasis on Western disunity.

More explicit Communist opposition to the resolution was contained in a commentary on 22 November which "rumored" that the U.S. "has decided to take a favorable stand on this draft resolution." This broadcast charges that the resolution "is based on the principle of forcible screening and detention of war prisoners" and declares that the functions of the proposed repatriation commission would consist "of running the concentration camps where the war prisoners would languish." The "doom" awaiting these war prisoners is likened to the "tragic fate of the displaced persons who, after the second world war were forcibly detained ... and then became the slaves of landowners and capitalists." This may be an attempt by Moscow to discredit the position of the West in granting political asylum to war prisoners. Previous Moscow comment has rejected the concept of asylum for POWs and has insisted that the prisoners were being detained to provide cannonfodder for the armies of Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee.

Attention to Communist-Proposed Commission Fades: Comment on the Communist-proposed Korean Commission--which had been touted as making possible peaceful settlement of the Korean question--disappears as the Indian proposal comes under attack. The 10 November Vishinsky speech endorsing and elaborating on this commission was broadcast 87 times, compared to the 167 and 101 devoted to his first two U.N. speeches. A commentary by Romanov on 16 November--broadcast to the UK only--continued the trend toward greater specificity on this proposed commission and seemed to indicate the importance placed upon it by the Communists. Romanov called for "action" as opposed to the "talk of principles," for "only action can advance the Korean truce talks." He also suggested that "the only way to continue the (truce) talks is to transfer them to a higher level," presumably the Korean commission. The importance of a resumption of the truce talks is emphasized by Romanov's statement that "it will not be possible to make another step toward ending this...war until the truce talks are resumed." No explanation of how final agreement can be achieved is made however.

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USSR SURVEY
28 NOVEMBER 1952

- 2 -

That this commentary was intended to prompt favorable British attention to the Communist proposal seems indicated by the following: (1) the British U.N. delegation was taken to task for dismissing the Vishinsky proposal for a Korean commission "without taking the trouble to examine it at all impartially;" and (2) the favorable response evoked by the proposal, even from those "who certainly cannot be suspected of leaning toward the Soviet viewpoint" was cited. However, Moscow has not directed a similar commentary to any other nations which might be considered especially receptive to a compromise settlement of the Korean issue.

Self-Strength Subject of Explicit Comment: Recent Moscow comment has become more specific concerning the strength of the Chinese and Korean forces. A rare review of military events in Korea by Col. Tolchenov-- broadcast to the home audience only--refers in unusually specific terms to the improved technical equipment, especially artillery, to the powerful fortifications and strong "joint defense system" established across Korea, to the plentitude of weapons and ammunition and to the generally improved capabilities of the Korean and Chinese troops. The theme is echoed by TASS correspondent Tkachenko in Pyongyang who quotes a downed U.S. pilot, Captain Robert Henry, as admitting the growing difficulties faced by the U.S. Air Force since "the Koreans and Chinese have now acquired a great many anti-aircraft batteries and planes." This specificity, unusual in Moscow comment to date, has been foreshadowed by Peking comment on recent military events. Reference to the increased military and air capabilities has not been broadcast to the Koreans however.

New Threats Minimized By Inherent Weaknesses: The Soviet home and Korean audiences hear of the continued threat raised by U.S. aggressiveness. The home audience is told that despite our "disgraceful military failures" in Korea, a campaign is now in progress in the United States calling for increased military pressure on Korea, the bombing of Manchuria, the blockade of China and the use of the A-bomb. The blackmail which this campaign represents however is termed "the weapon of the weak against the cowards" and Moscow--in its first reaction to the announcement of hydrogen bomb experiments--implies that "hydrogen blackmail" will be no more successful than was atomic blackmail.

Moscow reports to its Korean listeners that inasmuch as the United States has failed to get sufficient troops from its satellites and is unwilling to provide more itself, South Koreans are to be armed in increasing numbers. Listeners are reassured however that the South Koreans hate their "oppressors" and are considered "unreliable" as military allies by the United States, while other comment reviews the record of South Korean resistance operations. At the same time a warning is extended to the United States that if it persists in its plan for mobilization of the South Koreans, much the same result can be expected as took place in China when wholesale desertions weakened the conscripted Chiang army.

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KOREAN WAR: Intransigence on POW Issue Continues*Korea*

Comment on the United Nations debate on Korea reflects the continuing Communist intransigence on the POW repatriation issue. The following points sum up the Communist position:

1. The real issue is the forcing of prisoners to refuse to go home, not forcing the prisoners to go home as the United States claims.
2. The Geneva Convention does not recognize any choice on the part of prisoners regarding repatriation, hence discussion of "political asylum" in this context by America and its allies confuses the real issue. *14 Nov 52*
3. The compromise proposals of Peru and Mexico are contrary to international law since they predicate the right of prisoners to deny repatriation.

This position is made clear in Moscow comment on the speeches of Soviet delegates as well as in criticism of the speeches supporting the U.S. position. The United States is charged with "dodging the issue in an endeavor to whitewash itself in the eyes of public opinion," while those delegates who supported the U.S. stand on repatriation are accused of being "tedious and boring."

Peaceful Settlement Through New Commission Stressed: Originally proposed by Poland as part of its omnibus resolution on 17 October, the commission plan received no attention from Moscow until specifically endorsed by Vishinsky on 29 October. Comment during the past week, as well as the Vishinsky address of 10 November--which has been broadcast 54 times to date--states that the new commission should extend "assistance to the repatriation of all prisoners of war" but there is no explanation of how this "assistance" would be facilitated or on what principles it would be based. At the same time, Moscow drops all reference to the compromise proposals offered at Panmunjom on 8 October by the Communist delegation and ignores recent Peking hints that repatriation covers some form of reclassification.

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