

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

10 January 2025

John H. Clarke
1629 K Street, NW
Suite 300
Washington, DC 20006
202-344-0776

Reference: F-2023-01619; Civil Action No. 23-cv-01124

Mr. Clarke:

This letter is the Agency's final response to the 12 July 2023 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request submitted by your client, Michael Driggs, et al., and subsequent litigation, seeking information regarding 28 categories of Prisoner of War (POW)/Missing in Action (MIA) information from the Korean and Vietnam Wars (hereinafter, "Letter").

We have completed a review of six (6) additional documents for release. The six (6) documents, comprising 176 pages, can be released in segregable form with redactions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6). Exemption (b)(3) pertains to Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 3507, as amended, noted as exemption "(b)(3)CIAAct" on the enclosed documents; Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C § 3024(i)(1), as amended, noted as exemption "(b)(3)NatSecAct" on the enclosed documents; Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, 10 U.S.C. § 424, as amended, noted as exemption "(b)(3) 10 USC 424" on the enclosed documents; Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, 10 U.S.C. § 130c, as amended, noted as exemption "(b)(3) 10 USC 130c" on the enclosed documents; Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, 18 U.S.C. § 798, as amended, noted as exemption "(b)(3) 18 USC 798" on the enclosed documents; and/or Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 3605, as amended, noted as exemption "(b)(3) 50 USC 3605" on the enclosed documents.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Stephen Glenn".

Stephen Glenn
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosure (CD)

SECRET RODCA

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ROUTINE
R 301036Z APR 88
FM CIA/DDO

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SECRET (b)(3) 10 USC 424 (b)(1)
SECTION 1 OF 5 (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
CITE CIA/DDO 034763 (b)(6)

WMINTEL SECRET NOFORN RODCA COMMUNICATION-DOD HANDLE AS RODCA
MATERIAL PASS TO RODCA CONTROL OFFICER ONLY

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
SUBJECT: LAO, CAMBODIAN AND VIETNAMESE REFUGEE SOURCES ON THE U.S. MIA/POW ISSUE

REFS: NONE. (b)(3) 10 USC 424 (b)(3) NatSecAct

1. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES INFORMATION ON TEN LAO, CAMBODIAN AND VIETNAMESE REFUGEE SOURCES WHO HAVE COME TO OUR ATTENTION DURING THE JANUARY 1987-MARCH 1988 TIME FRAME ON THE U.S. MIA/POW ISSUE. VARIOUS WERE AWARE OF SEVEN OF THESE CASES. IN SEVERAL INSTANCES, THE OFFICES WERE ADVISED TO REPORT ALL SPECIFICS DIRECTLY THROUGH DOD CHANNELS TO DIA/VO-PW. ONE CASE WAS PASSED DIRECTLY TO JCRC HEADQUARTERS ON THE REQUEST OF VO-PW, AND ANOTHER WAS BEING FOLLOWED UP BY THE U.S. NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE (NIS) REPRESENTATIVE IN DALLAS. THE CASE WAS VERBALLY COORDINATED WITH DIA/VO-PW ANALYSIS BRANCH CHIEF AND MR. WICK TOURISON WHEN THE CASE DEVELOPED. NO REPORTS WERE FORMALLY DISSEMINATED ON ANY OF THESE CASES. YOU MAY USE THIS INFORMATION FOR WHATEVER FOLLOWUP ACTION YOU DEEM NECESSARY. THE CASES ARE AS FOLLOWS.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
AS OF 1 SEPTEMBER 1987, THE HAD RECEIVED A LETTER

FROM AND WAS IN TELEPHONIC CONTACT WITH VIETNAMESE REFUGEE WHO CLAIMED TO HAVE INFORMATION ON THE BURIAL LOCATION OF U.S. MIA'S IN VIETNAM.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) 10 USC 424
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

ACTION DIA/SPEC(10)

(M,C)

CLAIMED HE HAD TWO SETS OF U.S. REMAINS--ONE SET RECOVERED IN MILITARY REGION 4 (MR-4) IN THE NORTHERN SRV AND ONE SET RECOVERED IN BINH THONG PROVINCE IN THE SOUTHERN SRV. CLAIMED THAT DID NOT GIVE HIM ANY NAMES OF AMERICANS; DID NOT SHOW HIM ANY DOG TAGS BELONGING TO THE TWO REMAINS FINDS; AND DID NOT TELL HIM WHERE THE REMAINS WERE SPECIFICALLY BURIED AND/OR HELD.

C. DIA/VO-PW ADVISES THAT THIS IS ONE OF THE FEW INSTANCES WHICH HAD COME TO THEIR ATTENTION ABOUT U.S. REMAINS INFORMATION RELATING TO MR-4 IN THE NORTHERN SRV. DIA/VO-PW CONCLUDES THAT IS RELATED TO SRV OFFICIALS, WAS AT LEAST A HO CHI MINH COMMUNIST YOUTH GROUP (HCNCYG) MEMBER IN ORDER TO GRADUATE FROM COLLEGE AFTER 1975, AND THE SRV PUBLIC SECURITY SERVICE WAS AWARE OF HIS PLANNED BOAT ESCAPE.

D. IN THE EVENT NOW PROVIDES THE NAMES/DOG TAGS OF ANY AMERICAN, DIA/VO-PW ADVISES THAT WOULD HAVE MOST LIKELY OBTAINED THIS INFORMATION AFTER HIS ARRIVAL IN AND REQUESTS THAT PROVIDE FULL DETAILS ON ALL OF HIS SUBSOURCES OF INFORMATION. DIA/VO-PW ALSO CAUTIONS THAT MAY BE PROVIDING DISINFORMATION ON THE U.S. MIA/POW ISSUE WHICH IS BEING ORCHESTRATED BY THE SRV STATE SECURITY SERVICE--MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. DIA/VO-PW IS INTERESTED IN RECEIVING ALL INFORMATION OFFERED BY REQUESTS THAT BE INTERVIEWED ABOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE OF DETENTION FACILITIES, THE DONG NAI PROVINCE PUBLIC SECURITY OFFICE, FOREIGN NATIONALS IN THE BIEN HOA CITY AREA, AND INFORMATION ON AMERASIANS AND EURASIANS RESIDING IN OR NEAR BIEN HOA CITY.

E. DIA/VO-PW REQUESTS THAT ALL INFORMATION ON BE SENT THROUGH DAO OFFICE CHANNELS TO DIA/VO-PW. DIA/VO-PW IS NOT ABLE AT THIS POINT TO DETERMINE WHETHER IS A KNOWN FABRICATOR. THE CONTENT OF THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH DIA/VO-PW.

3. THE REFUSED TRACES ON VIETNAMESE REFUGEE THE RECENTLY RECEIVED A PHONE CALL FROM DESCRIBED HIMSELF AS CLAIMING

SAID HE HAD BEEN WORKING WITH RESETTLING SOUTHEAST ASIAN REFUGEES FOR OVER TEN YEARS SAID HE WAS IN CONTACT WITH VIETNAMESE REFUGEE WHO MIGHT HAVE INFORMATION ON MIA'S WAS ORIGINALLY FROM THE HUE AREA AND RESETTLED AFTER PASSING THROUGH THE

SECRET
SECTION 2 OF 5
CITE CIA/DDO 034763

WMINTEL SECRET NOFORN RODCA COMMUNICATION-DOD HANDLE AS RODCA
MATERIAL PASS TO RODCA CONTROL OFFICER ONLY

SUBJECT: LAO, CAMBODIAN AND VIETNAMESE REFUGEE SOURCES ON THE U.S. MIA/POW ISSUE

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
REFS: NONE.

4. ON 26 OCTOBER 1987, THE ADVISED THAT HE WAS APPROACHED BY A
(b)(1)
(b)(3) 10 USC 424
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

WHICH PUBLISHED "RESTRICTED INFORMATION" ON U.S. MIA/POW'S IN INDOCHINA. SUBJECT CLAIMED THAT THIS INFORMATION INCLUDED NAMES, LOCATIONS, ETC--HE TOLD THE HE WAS HAVING FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES AND WOULD BE WILLING TO SELL THIS INFORMATION FOR

*clerks TO VO, VO-PW Mr. Benedict
2/21/88
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vn

(b)(1)
(b)(3) 10 USC 424
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

SECRET RODCA

OJCS INFORMATION SERVICE CENTER

CLASSIFIED BY: [redacted]
DATE: [redacted]
PER: DAM/ONLY

COPY NUMBER-----

PRICE NEGOTIABLE. THE [redacted] ADVISED BY US THAT THE

[redacted] FURTHER ADVISED TO

REPORT EVERYTHING THROUGH THE [redacted]
5. [redacted] AS OF 23 JANUARY 1987. [redacted]
WAS ADVISED OF THE FOLLOWING [redacted] INFORMATION.
WHEN ADVISED THAT SOURCING WAS SENSITIVE, [redacted]
PREFERRED TO HAVE US HANDLE THIS MATTER WITH DIA. HOWEVER, WE
CAN FIND NO WRITTEN RECORD OF HOW THIS MATTER WAS HANDLED, AND
WE ARE PROVIDING IT TO YOU TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE INDEED
RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION. [redacted] HEARSAY
INFORMATION ABOUT A VIETNAMESE REFUGEE RESIDENT [redacted]
WHO HAD OBTAINED INFORMATION DURING DETENTION IN VIETNAM WHICH
LED HIM TO BELIEVE THAT THERE WERE U.S. MIA'S ALIVE IN
VIETNAM. THE [redacted] RESIDENT WAS [redacted]

*W/KNOW P/C
2 N.F.O*

[redacted] HAD BEEN DETAINED IN CAMPS ALONG THE
CHINESE BORDER UNTIL 1979 AND LATER IN CAMPS FURTHER SOUTH
UNTIL ABOUT 1981. HE LEFT VIETNAM UNDER THE U.S. ORDERLY
DEPARTURE PROGRAM AROUND 1982. [redacted]

NO

6. [redacted] AS OF FEBRUARY 1987, THE [redacted]
INTERVIEWED SRV PASSPORT HOLDER [redacted]
WHO CLAIMED TO HAVE INFORMATION ON AMERICAN MIA'S
IN VIETNAM. [redacted] PRESENTED THREE DOG TAGS WITH ANNOTATIONS OF:
ELORENE MCKENNA, USAID/ADPH, O. POS. CU CHI; THOMAS E. OAKLEY,
RA 11741752, O. METHODIST, PLEIKU; JIMMIE L. JERRELL, AF
14923641, AB POS, METHODIST. [redacted] ALSO PROVIDED THE NAMES OF
FIVE OTHERS WITH ANNOTATIONS: VIET.

NO

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) 10 USC 424
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) 10 USC 424
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

SECRET
SECTION 3 OF 5
CITE CIA/DDO 034763

WINTEL SECRET NOFORN RODCA COMMUNICATION-DOD HANDLE AS RODCA
MATERIAL PASS TO RODCA CONTROL OFFICER ONLY

SUBJECT: LAO, CAMBODIAN AND VIETNAMESE REFUGEE SOURCES ON THE
U.S. MIA/POW ISSUE

[redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) REFS: NONE.
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

*POW MIA 20
RAWAT*

8. [redacted] ON 15 MAY 1987, ETHNIC LAO NATURALIZED
WALKED INTO THE U.S.
EMBASSY [redacted] CLAIMING HE HAD INFORMATION OF INTEREST TO
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. [redacted] PROVIDED SKETCHY INFORMATION ABOUT
THE WHEREABOUTS OF U.S. POW'S IN LAOS, AND SAID HE WAS WILLING
TO HELP THE U.S. GOVERNMENT BECAUSE HE HAD HEARD THAT REWARD
MONEY WAS AVAILABLE FROM PRIVATE SOURCES IN THE U.S. FOR ANYONE
PROVIDING INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION OF POW CAMPS.
[redacted] CLAIMED THAT WHILE IN THE ROYAL LAO ARMY HE HAD FOUGHT IN THE
SAM NEUA AND XIENG KHOUANG AREAS IN LAOS. [redacted] CLAIMED HE
HAD ACCESS IN 1967 TO A POW CAMP BY WEARING A VIETNAMESE UNIFORM
WHICH HE SAID WAS READILY AVAILABLE FROM A WAREHOUSE.
ACCORDING TO [redacted] THE CAMP WAS LOCATED IN A CAVE IN A
MOUNTAINOUS AREA OF SAM NEUA. THE CAMP WAS LOCATED NEAR THE
NANSIN RIVER ABOUT 80 KILOMETERS FROM THE VIETNAMESE BORDER.
HE CLAIMED 23 AMERICANS WERE HELD IN THE CAMP, HAVING COUNTED
THE NUMBER OF AMERICANS PLAYING VOLLEYBALL IN FRONT OF THE
CAVE.

9. [redacted] SAID HE HAD RECENTLY VISITED THAILAND FROM 19
APRIL TO 7 MAY 1987. DURING HIS TRIP, HE CORRESPONDED WITH HIS
BROTHER [redacted] A FARMER WHO LIVED IN SAM NEUA. BROTHER
[redacted] INFORMED HIM THAT THE CAMP HAD BEEN MOVED TO ANOTHER
LOCATION IN SAM NEUA, ABOUT 50 KILOMETERS WEST OF THE
VIETNAMESE BORDER AND ABOUT FIVE KILOMETERS WEST OF THE SONG MA
RIVER. [redacted] SAID HIS BROTHER DID NOT KNOW THE PRECISE
LOCATION BUT MIGHT BE ABLE TO FIND OUT. [redacted] SAID HIS
BROTHER HAD SIMPLY OVERHEARD THE INFORMATION AND HAD NO
SPECIFIC SOURCES. [redacted] ALSO CLAIMED THAT HIS BROTHER'S SON
WAS IN THE LPA BUT DID NOT HAVE ACCESS TO INFORMATION ABOUT THE
ALLEGED CAMP. THE BROTHER DOES NOT KNOW WHEN THE CAMP WAS
MOVED, HOW MANY POW'S REMAINED, OR IF THE CAMP STILL EXISTED.

10. [redacted] SAID HIS SUDDEN INTEREST IN THE POW CAMP WAS
PROMPTED BY A NEWSPAPER AD WHICH APPEARED RECENTLY IN THE LAO
NEWSPAPER [redacted] STATING THAT ANYONE IN INDOCHINA
WITH INFORMATION LEADING TO THE WHEREABOUTS OF AMERICAN POW'S
WOULD RECEIVE U.S. \$1,000,000. HE SHOWED A CLIPPING OF THE AD
ACCOMPANIED BY A PICTURE OF A GROUP OF MEN STANDING IN FRONT OF
A TABLE FILLED HIGH WITH MONEY. [redacted] SAID HIS
INFORMATION BE GIVEN TO THE MEN IN THE PICTURE TO DETERMINE IF
THEY WERE INTERESTED.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) 10 USC 424
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

SECRET RODCA

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COPY NUMBER-----

PRICE NEGOTIABLE. THE [REDACTED] ADVISED BY US THAT THE [REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

FURTHER ADVISED TO

REPORT EVERYTHING THROUGH THE [REDACTED]
5. [REDACTED] AS OF 23 JANUARY 1987, [REDACTED] WAS ADVISED OF THE FOLLOWING [REDACTED] INFORMATION. WHEN ADVISED THAT SOURCING WAS SENSITIVE, [REDACTED] PREFERRED TO HAVE US HANDLE THIS MATTER WITH DIA. HOWEVER, WE CAN FIND NO WRITTEN RECORD OF HOW THIS MATTER WAS HANDLED, AND WE ARE PROVIDING IT TO YOU TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE INDEED RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION. [REDACTED] HEARSAY INFORMATION ABOUT A VIETNAMESE REFUGEE RESIDENT [REDACTED] WHO HAD OBTAINED INFORMATION DURING DETENTION IN VIETNAM WHICH LED HIM TO BELIEVE THAT THERE WERE U.S. MIA'S ALIVE IN VIETNAM. THE [REDACTED] RESIDENT WAS [REDACTED]

SECRET
SECTION 3 OF 5
CITE CIA/DDO 034763

WINTEL SECRET NOFORN RODCA COMMUNICATION-DOO HANDLE AS RODCA MATERIAL PASS TO RODCA CONTROL OFFICER ONLY

SUBJECT: LAO, CAMBODIAN AND VIETNAMESE REFUGEE SOURCES ON THE U.S. MIA/POW ISSUE

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

REFS: NONE.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[REDACTED] HAD BEEN DETAINED IN CAMPS ALONG THE CHINESE BORDER UNTIL 1979 AND LATER IN CAMPS FURTHER SOUTH UNTIL ABOUT 1981. HE LEFT VIETNAM UNDER THE U.S. ORDERLY DEPARTURE PROGRAM AROUND 1982. [REDACTED]

6. [REDACTED] AS OF FEBRUARY 1987, THE [REDACTED] INTERVIEWED SRV PASSPORT HOLDER [REDACTED] WHO CLAIMED TO HAVE INFORMATION ON AMERICAN MIA'S IN VIETNAM. [REDACTED] PRESENTED THREE DOG TAGS WITH ANNOTATIONS OF: FLORENE MCKENNA, USAID/ADPH, O POS, CU CHI; THOMAS E. OAKLEY, RA 11741752, O, METHODIST, PLEIKU; JIMMIE L. JERRELL, AF 14923641, AB POS, METHODIST. [REDACTED] ALSO PROVIDED THE NAMES OF FIVE OTHERS WITH ANNOTATIONS: VITO. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) 10 USC 424
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

8. [REDACTED] ON 15 MAY 1987 ETHNIC LAO NATURALIZED [REDACTED] WALKED INTO THE U.S. EMBASSY [REDACTED] CLAIMING HE HAD INFORMATION OF INTEREST TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. [REDACTED] PROVIDED SKETCHY INFORMATION ABOUT THE WHEREABOUTS OF U.S. POW'S IN LAOS, AND SAID HE WAS WILLING TO HELP THE U.S. GOVERNMENT BECAUSE HE HAD HEARD THAT REWARD MONEY WAS AVAILABLE FROM PRIVATE SOURCES IN THE U.S. FOR ANYONE PROVIDING INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION OF POW CAMPS. [REDACTED] CLAIMED THAT WHILE IN THE ROYAL LAO ARMY HE HAD FOUGHT IN THE SAM NEUA AND XIENG KHOUANG AREAS IN LAOS. [REDACTED] CLAIMED HE HAD ACCESS IN 1967 TO A POW CAMP BY WEARING A VIETNAMESE UNIFORM WHICH HE SAID WAS READILY AVAILABLE FROM A WAREHOUSE. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] THE CAMP WAS LOCATED IN A CAVE IN A MOUNTAINOUS AREA OF SAM NEUA. THE CAMP WAS LOCATED NEAR THE NAMSIN RIVER ABOUT 80 KILOMETERS FROM THE VIETNAMESE BORDER. HE CLAIMED 23 AMERICANS WERE HELD IN THE CAMP, HAVING COUNTED THE NUMBER OF AMERICANS PLAYING VOLLEYBALL IN FRONT OF THE CAVE.

9. [REDACTED] SAID HE HAD RECENTLY VISITED THAILAND FROM 19 APRIL TO 7 MAY 1987. DURING HIS TRIP, HE CORRESPONDED WITH HIS BROTHER [REDACTED] A FARMER WHO LIVED IN SAM NEUA. BROTHER [REDACTED] INFORMED HIM THAT THE CAMP HAD BEEN MOVED TO ANOTHER LOCATION IN SAM NEUA, ABOUT 50 KILOMETERS WEST OF THE VIETNAMESE BORDER AND ABOUT FIVE KILOMETERS WEST OF THE SONG MA RIVER. [REDACTED] SAID HIS BROTHER DID NOT KNOW THE PRECISE LOCATION BUT MIGHT BE ABLE TO FIND OUT. [REDACTED] SAID HIS BROTHER HAD SIMPLY OVERHEARD THE INFORMATION AND HAD NO SPECIFIC SOURCES. [REDACTED] ALSO CLAIMED THAT HIS BROTHER'S SON WAS IN THE LPA BUT DID NOT HAVE ACCESS TO INFORMATION ABOUT THE ALLEGED CAMP. THE BROTHER DOES NOT KNOW WHEN THE CAMP WAS MOVED, HOW MANY POW'S REMAINED, OR IF THE CAMP STILL EXISTED.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

10. [REDACTED] SAID HIS SUDDEN INTEREST IN THE POW CAMP WAS PROMPTED BY A NEWSPAPER AD WHICH APPEARED RECENTLY IN THE LAO NEWSPAPER [REDACTED] STATING THAT ANYONE IN INDOCHINA WITH INFORMATION LEADING TO THE WHEREABOUTS OF AMERICAN POW'S WOULD RECEIVE U.S. \$1,000,000. HE SHOWED A CLIPPING OF THE AD ACCOMPANIED BY A PICTURE OF A GROUP OF MEN STANDING IN FRONT OF A TABLE. [REDACTED] SAID HE HAD INFORMATION BE GIVEN TO THE MEN IN THE PICTURE TO DETERMINE IF THEY WERE INTERESTED. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) 10 USC 424
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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Jan 10, 2025

(b)(1)
(b)(3) 10 USC 424
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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COPY NUMBER-----

PRICE NEGOTIABLE. THE [REDACTED] ADVISED BY US THAT THE

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(b)(6)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) 10 USC 424
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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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SECTION 3 OF 5
CITE CIA/DDO 034763

WINTEL SECRET MOFORM RODCA COMMUNICATION-DOO HANDLE AS RODCA
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REFS: NONE.

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Jan 10, 2025

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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

12. AS OF 18 MAY 1967, [REDACTED] WAS PASSED TO THE [REDACTED] WE CANNOT DETERMINE IF THIS CASE WAS EITHER FOLLOWED UP OR REPORTED THROUGH DOD CHANNELS TO DIA.

13. [REDACTED] ON 2 FEBRUARY 1988, VIETNAMESE *No* NATURALIZED [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] STATING HE HAD MIA/POW INFORMATION TO PASS ON BEHALF OF [REDACTED] (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

INFORMATION ON THIS CASE WAS PASSED TO THE [REDACTED] ON 4 FEBRUARY 1988.

14. [REDACTED] WERE INTERVIEWED ON 2 FEBRUARY 1988 [REDACTED] THEY BEGAN THEIR STORY BY STATING THAT TWO DAYS EARLIER THE FATHER [REDACTED] HAD RECEIVED A LETTER FROM VIETNAM WHICH PROVIDED INFORMATION ABOUT THREE AMERICANS, ONE DEAD AND TWO LIVING NEAR PLEIKU. THE LETTER WAS WRITTEN BY A FEMALE NEIGHBOR (NAME REQUESTED BUT NOT GIVEN) [REDACTED] IN HER LETTER, THE WOMAN ASKED [REDACTED] TO PASS HER INFORMATION TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. THE WOMAN WORKED IN A BAR/NIGHTCLUB BEFORE 1975. THE INFORMATION WHICH WAS PRESENTED DURING THE INTERVIEW WAS BASED ON [REDACTED] HANDWRITTEN NOTES FROM THE LETTER HIS FATHER RECEIVED.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] THE LETTER CONTAINED [REDACTED] BUT:

- A. WARD STEVENE (POSSIBLY STEVEN WARD): U.S. PILOT WHO DIED IN VIETNAM (UNKNOWN WHEN--WHERE OR HOW). THE LETTER GAVE THREE POSSIBLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS: RA 18985581; FG 23;28; OPOS 531505325; ROMAN CATHOLIC.
- B. JAMES EASY (POSSIBLE JULES BLASSEY), IDENTIFICATION NUMBER H 053495420, ROMAN CATHOLIC, BEING HELD AGAINST HIS WILL NEAR PLEIKU.
- C. PAUL LINDER (POSSIBLE PAUL LINDNER), IDENTIFICATION [REDACTED]

SECRET
SECTION 4 OF 5
CITE CIA/DDO 034763

WHINTEL SECRET NOFORN RODCA COMMUNICATION-DOD HANDLE AS RODCA MATERIAL PASS TO RODCA CONTROL OFFICER ONLY

SUBJECT: LAO, CAMBODIAN AND VIETNAMESE REFUGEE SOURCES ON THE U.S. MIA/POW ISSUE

[REDACTED] (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
REFS: NONE.

NUMBER CCA CIP, PROTESTANT, FORMER USAID EMPLOYEE BEING HELD AGAINST HIS WILL NEAR PLEIKU.

15. [REDACTED] DJCS HEADQUARTERS WAS PASSED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ACTION AT DIA/NO-PW'S REQUEST ON 3 JUNE 1987. ON 28 MAY 1987 [REDACTED] COMMENTED ON U.S. MIA/POW'S IN VIETNAM (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

REEDUCATION CAMP IN THE TRANG LON AREA OF TAY NINH PROVINCE FOR SEVEN MONTHS BEFORE BEING TRANSFERRED TO AN AREA NORTHWEST OF TAN LAP, A FEW KILOMETERS SOUTH OF XA MAT IN TAY NINH PROVINCE. WHILE CUTTING LOGS AROUND SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1977 IN THE DAC O AREA ALONG THE CAMBODIA BORDER, HE NOTICED ENGLISH NAMES CARVED INTO THE BARK OF SEVERAL LARGE TREES. SOME OF THE CARVINGS WERE DARK AND APPEARED OLD BUT TO HIS SURPRISE SOME WERE NEWLY CARVED. HE RECALLED SEEING THE NAMES JOHN, JIM, RICHARD, AND SMITHCH. IN EARLY OCTOBER 1977, THREE OF [REDACTED] CAMP MATES TOLD HIM THAT THEY HAD SEEN A TALL, THIN, BEARDED PERSON CUTTING LOGS, THAT THIS PERSON APPEARED TO BE A CAUCASIAN, AND THAT THEY HAD ASSUMED HE MIGHT BE AN AMERICAN POW. [REDACTED] HIMSELF SAW THE TALL THIN CAUCASIAN FROM A DISTANCE IN THE FOREST AND SAW TWO OTHER SHORTER CAUCASIAN-LOOKING MALES WITH HIM. [REDACTED] ONE OF HIS GUARDS ABOUT THE MEN AND WAS TOLD "THEY ARE AMERICAN PRISONERS." [REDACTED] NEVER SAW THEM AGAIN.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

[REDACTED] WHERE THEY HAVE SINCE RESIDED. [REDACTED] SAID HE HAD NEVER BEEN QUESTIONED BY ANY U.S. GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL ABOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE OF POW SIGHTINGS.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

19. [REDACTED]

AFTER RECEIVING A CALL FROM SUBJECT [REDACTED] WANTED TO TALK WITH SOMEONE CONCERNING INFORMATION SHE HAD ABOUT AMERICAN SERVICEMEN IN LAOS. SUBJECT SAID SHE HAD CALLED THE [REDACTED] BECAUSE IT WAS THE ONLY NUMBER OF A MILITARY INSTALLATION SHE COULD FIND IN THE TELEPHONE BOOK SHE RESIDED [REDACTED]

ENGLISH, RELATED THE FOLLOWING. HER BROTHER HAD JUST RETURNED FROM A VISIT TO LAOS WHERE HE WAS GIVEN FINGERPRINTS, DOG TAGS AND INFORMATION ON SEVERAL U.S. SERVICEMEN BY A FRIEND (NFI). APPARENTLY ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING WERE REPORTEDLY STILL ALIVE: (A) GATT MORGAN, BORN 2 MAY 1944, USAF SERVICE NUMBER 3195519; (B) (FNU) PANI, USAF SERVICE NUMBER 627 (GARBLED), AIRCRAFT TAIL NUMBER 398, SHOT DOWN ON 3 FEBRUARY OR 2 MARCH 1970; WIFE LIVES IN BOSTON; AND (C) JEFFERSON DONAHUE (NFI). THEY WERE LOCATED IN OR NEAR SEPON, LAOS. TONY FALTERER, U.S. MARINE CORPS SERIAL NUMBER 2384608, WAS LOCATED IN OR NEAR CHIENG KHOUANG, LAOS. OUR OFFICE WAS SHORTLY AFTERWARDS CONTACTED BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE U.S. NIS WHO SAID THEY HAD ALSO BEEN CALLED [REDACTED] THE NIS REPRESENTATIVE SAID HIS OFFICE WOULD PERSONALLY INTERVIEW SUBJECT AND WOULD REPORT THE RESULTS UP THROUGH THEIR CHAIN OF COMMAND TO THE PROPER MIA/POW GROUP IN THE PENTAGON.

SECRET RODCA

DJCS INFORMATION SERVICE CENTER

COPY NUMBER-----

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

12. AS OF 18 MAY 1987, [REDACTED] WAS PASSED TO THE DAO. WE CANNOT DETERMINE IF THIS CASE WAS EITHER FOLLOWED UP OR REPORTED THROUGH DOD CHANNELS TO DIA.

13. [REDACTED] ON 2 FEBRUARY 1988. VIETNAMESE *No* NATURALIZED [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HAD MIA/POW INFORMATION TO PASS ON BEHALF OF (b)(1) STATING HE (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6)

[REDACTED] INFORMATION ON THIS CASE WAS PASSED TO THE [REDACTED] ON 4 FEBRUARY 1988.

14. [REDACTED] WERE INTERVIEWED ON 2 FEBRUARY 1988. [REDACTED] BEGAN THEIR STORY BY STATING THAT TWO DAYS EARLIER THE FATHER [REDACTED] HAD RECEIVED A LETTER FROM VIETNAM WHICH PROVIDED INFORMATION ABOUT THREE AMERICANS, ONE DEAD AND TWO LIVING NEAR PLEIKU. THE LETTER WAS WRITTEN BY A FEMALE NEIGHBOR (NAME REQUESTED BUT NOT GIVEN) IN HER LETTER, THE WOMAN ASKED [REDACTED] TO PASS HER INFORMATION TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. THE WOMAN WORKED IN A BAR/NIGHTCLUB BEFORE 1975. THE INFORMATION WHICH WAS PRESENTED DURING THE INTERVIEW WAS BASED ON [REDACTED] HANDWRITTEN NOTES FROM THE LETTER HIS FATHER RECEIVED.

(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] THE LETTER CONTAINED ABOUT:

- A. WARD STEVENE (POSSIBLY STEVEN WARD): U.S. PILOT WHO DIED IN VIETNAM (UNKNOWN WHEN, WHERE OR HOW). THE LETTER GAVE THREE POSSIBLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS: RA 18985581; FG 23;28; OPOS 531505325; ROMAN CATHOLIC.
- B. JAMES EASY (POSSIBLE JULES BLASSEY), IDENTIFICATION NUMBER H 053495420, ROMAN CATHOLIC, BEING HELD AGAINST HIS WILL NEAR PLEIKU.
- C. PAUL LINDER (POSSIBLE PAUL LINDNER), IDENTIFICATION [REDACTED]

SECRET
SECTION 4 OF 5
CITE CIA/DDO 034763

WINTEL SECRET NOFORN RODCA COMMUNICATION-DOD HANDLE AS RODCA MATERIAL PASS TO RODCA CONTROL OFFICER ONLY

SUBJECT: LAO, CAMBODIAN AND VIETNAMESE REFUGEE SOURCES ON THE U.S. MIA/POW ISSUE

[REDACTED] (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

REFS: NONE.

NUMBER CCA CIP, PROTESTANT, FORMER USAID EMPLOYEE BEING HELD AGAINST HIS WILL NEAR PLEIKU.

16. [REDACTED] DDPD HEADQUARTERS WAS PASSED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ACTION AT DIA/DPD-PW'S REQUEST ON 3 JUNE 1987. ON 28 MAY 1987 [REDACTED] COMMENTED ON U.S. MIA/POW'S IN VIETNAM.

[REDACTED] (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

vskb
REEDUCATION CAMP IN THE TRANG LON AREA OF TAY NINH PROVINCE FOR SEVEN MONTHS BEFORE BEING TRANSFERRED TO AN AREA NORTHWEST OF TAN LAP, A FEW KILOMETERS SOUTH OF XA MAT IN TAY NINH PROVINCE. WHILE CUTTING LOGS AROUND SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1977 IN THE DAC O AREA ALONG THE CAMBODIA BORDER, HE NOTICED ENGLISH NAMES CARVED INTO THE BARK OF SEVERAL LARGE TREES. SOME OF THE CARVINGS WERE DARK AND APPEARED OLD BUT TO HIS SURPRISE SOME WERE NEWLY CARVED. HE RECALLED SEEING THE NAMES JOHN, JIM, RICHARD, AND SMITH. IN EARLY OCTOBER 1977, THREE OF [REDACTED] CAMP MATES TOLD HIM THAT THEY HAD SEEN A TALL, THIN, BEARDED PERSON CUTTING LOGS, THAT THIS PERSON APPEARED TO BE A CAUCASIAN, AND THAT THEY HAD ASSUMED HE MIGHT BE AN AMERICAN POW. [REDACTED] HIMSELF SAW THE TALL THIN CAUCASIAN FROM A DISTANCE IN THE FOREST AND SAW TWO OTHER SHORTER CAUCASIAN-LOOKING MALES WITH HIM. [REDACTED] ONE OF HIS GUARDS ABOUT THE MEN AND WAS TOLD "THEY ARE AMERICAN PRISONERS." [REDACTED] NEVER SAW THEM AGAIN.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

[REDACTED] WHERE THEY HAVE SINCE RESIDED. [REDACTED] SAID HE HAD NEVER BEEN QUESTIONED BY ANY U.S. GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL ABOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE OF POW SIGHTINGS.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

19. [REDACTED]

AFTER RECEIVING A CALL FROM SUBJECT [REDACTED] SC NO [REDACTED] WANTED TO TALK WITH SOMEONE CONCERNING INFORMATION SHE HAD ABOUT AMERICAN SERVICEMEN IN LAOS. SUBJECT SAID SHE HAD CALLED THE [REDACTED] BECAUSE IT WAS THE ONLY NUMBER OF A MILITARY INSTALLATION SHE COULD FIND IN THE TELEPHONE BOOK. SHE RESIDED [REDACTED]

ENGLISH, RELATED THE FOLLOWING. HER BROTHER HAD JUST RETURNED FROM A VISIT TO LAOS WHERE HE WAS GIVEN FINGERPRINTS, DOG TAGS AND INFORMATION ON SEVERAL U.S. SERVICEMEN BY A FRIEND (NFI). APPARENTLY ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING WERE REPORTEDLY STILL ALIVE: (A) GATT MORGAN, BORN 2 MAY 1944, USAF SERVICE NUMBER 3195519; (B) (FNU) PANI, USAF SERVICE NUMBER 627 (GARBLED), AIRCRAFT TAIL NUMBER 398, SHOT DOWN ON 3 FEBRUARY OR 2 MARCH 1970, WIFE LIVES IN BOSTON; AND (C) JEFFERSON DONAHUE (NFI), THEY WERE LOCATED IN OR NEAR SEPON, LAOS. TOMY FALTERSER, U.S. MARINE CORPS SERIAL NUMBER 2384608, WAS LOCATED IN OR NEAR CHIENG KHOUANG, LAOS. OUR OFFICE WAS SHORTLY AFTERWARDS CONTACTED BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE U.S. NIS WHO SAID THEY HAD ALSO BEEN CALLED [REDACTED] THE NIS REPRESENTATIVE SAID HIS OFFICE WOULD PERSONALLY INTERVIEW SUBJECT AND WOULD REPORT THE RESULTS UP THROUGH THEIR CHAIN OF COMMAND TO THE PROPER MIA/POW GROUP IN THE PENTAGON.



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(b)(3) NatSecAct

National Intelligence Estimate

**Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities,
and Performance Concerning the
POW/MIA Issue (U)**

Produced by the National Intelligence Council

REGISTRY < 538 - 417 >
AUTHOR
VIA OFFICE PRODUCTION STAFF

~~Secret~~

NIE 98-03
April 1998

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Jan 10, 2025

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[Redacted]

(b)(3)
NatSecAct

NIE 98-03

Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue (U)

**This Estimate was approved for publication by the
National Foreign Intelligence Board under the
authority of the Director of Central Intelligence.** [Redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

*This National Intelligence Estimate was prepared
under the auspices of Robert Suettinger, National
Intelligence Officer for East Asia. Inquiries may be
directed to the NIO/EA* [Redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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April 1998

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

Scope Note

Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue (U)

This National Intelligence Estimate was requested by Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in conjunction with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. It addresses two key questions:

- Since 1987, to what extent has the leadership of the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) demonstrated a commitment to cooperating with the United States to achieve the fullest possible accounting of American personnel missing in action during the Vietnam conflict?
- What is the Intelligence Community's assessment of the so-called "1205" and "735" documents from the Russian archives? (These two intelligence reports raised troubling questions about whether all American prisoners of war (POWs) were released during "Operation Homecoming" in 1973 by citing substantially higher numbers of live American prisoners in Hanoi than were ultimately released.) [Redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

This NIE differs from standard estimative papers in that it has an historical focus rather than projecting forward to the future. Some of the judgments it reaches are based upon assessments made by experienced American officials rather than upon a sizable body of intelligence reporting. In some cases we had to consider intelligence reporting that is as much as 25 years old [Redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

For these and other reasons, there are important gaps in our knowledge of these sensitive issues, and our judgments must therefore be cautious. Accordingly, the Estimate contains a lengthy annex on methodology that describes available information, intelligence gaps, and how the judgments were reached. [Redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Scope Note	1
Key Judgments (b)(3) NatSecAct	5
Discussion	9
Part I: The Question of Vietnamese Cooperation	9
Responding To US Government Accounting Efforts	11
Recent Vietnamese Intentions	11
Instances of Vietnamese Noncooperation	13
Vietnam’s Bureaucracy: Responsiveness and Resistance	16
The Record of SRV Responsiveness	16
The SRV’s Dedication of Resources to the POW/MIA Issue	22
Were POWs Interrogated by Russians?	22
Were Some POWs Transferred to Russia or Elsewhere?	23
Improving Accounting	24
Overall SRV Performance	25
Part II: Intelligence Community Assessment of the “1205” and “735” Documents	26
Current Assessment (b)(3) NatSecAct	26
“1205” Document	26
“735” Document	28
Annex	
Methodology	33
	33
	33
	35
	35
	37
	39
	40
	40
	42

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Key Judgments

Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Since the early 1990s, we have seen evidence for increased Vietnamese cooperation on the POW/MIA issue in the strengthened staffing, increased responsiveness, and growing professionalization of the Vietnamese organizations that deal with this issue:

- In our view, Hanoi judges that better ties to the United States are in Vietnam's own security and economic development interests and that normalization requires progress on the POW/MIA issue.
- US financial support for cooperative action and willingness to agree to reciprocity on Vietnamese humanitarian concerns also encourage cooperation.

Consequently, we judge that Vietnam has become more helpful in assisting US efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting of American personnel missing in action during the Vietnam conflict. On the issue of recovering and repatriating remains of US personnel, we rate Vietnamese cooperation as excellent. Cooperation also has been good on assisting with trilateral investigations and providing documents (see table on page 7).

(b)(3) NatSecAct

We think Hanoi's decision to be more cooperative with the United States on POW/MIA accounting has not come easily to the Vietnamese leaders. Longstanding ideological distrust, animosity lingering from the war, suspicion of American motives, and fear of intelligence exploitation all have operated at times to limit Vietnam's willingness to cooperate on recovering or accounting for US MIAs. But our reporting suggests that the POW/MIA issue no longer has the political sensitivity it once had.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Incidents of outright refusal to cooperate with US investigators have decreased, but there are still instances in which the Vietnamese raise objections to POW/MIA activities. In most cases, the Vietnamese cite considerations of sovereignty—for example, in refusing to make internal Politburo documents accessible to US investigators; security, such as not allowing US officials to enter classified locations and facilities; or technical

[redacted]
(b)(3) NatSecAct

problems, such as difficulty in locating documents or records. Occasionally the Vietnamese state that local villagers are concerned about the intrusive nature of investigations and recovery activities. [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

Moreover, although Vietnam's performance generally has improved with respect to the US POW/MIA issue, we think Hanoi has not been completely forthcoming on certain POW/MIA matters:

- In some instances, we believe full disclosure would prove embarrassing to the regime. For example, Hanoi continues to deny that US POWs were mistreated while in captivity in the North.
- We think Vietnam still has records it could make available to US investigators but which would discredit its denials of mistreatment.
- A few reports of transfers of US POWs to Russia and other countries are unexplained, and the books remain open. [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

Although 120 live-sighting investigations have been carried out by US teams, none has generated any credible evidence of American POWs left in Vietnam. Hanoi protests having to investigate such cases, but reports appear regularly—most recently on five POWs possibly being held in Laos—and established procedures for resolving them continue to be in effect. [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

Although Vietnam's overall performance in dealing with the POW/MIA problem has been good in recent years, the unresolved issues noted above suggest the need for continued close attention by the US Government. [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

We assess continued progress in POW/MIA accounting will require overcoming two types of obstacles:

- Technical problems, such as difficulty in retrieving archival materials, contacting leads, and conducting field activities by the Joint Task Force—Full Accounting (JTF-FA), are more amenable to resolution than political obstacles. Not all can be overcome—the passage of time and geographic change increase the difficulty of recovery operations—but some can be overcome through improving technology, maintaining US financial commitment, and supporting continued professionalization on the Vietnamese side.

Figure 1
Summary Evaluation: Vietnamese Cooperation (b)(3) NatSecAct
With the United States on POW/MIA Accounting [Redacted]

Element	Level of Cooperation	Comments
Joint field activities; recovery and repatriation of remains	Excellent	Has been improving since early 1990s; increasing professionalism on part of Vietnamese.
Assisting with trilateral investigations	Good	Vietnamese work hard to obtain Laotian cooperation in recovery efforts.
Providing documents, personal artifacts, and equipment	Good	Vietnamese have willingly provided numerous documents but probably are holding out on those that would embarrass the government.
Making officials available for interviews	Fair to good	Some retired officials may resist interviews.
Live-sighting	Reluctant, but cooperation still reasonably good	Vietnamese resent live-sighting investigations and question their utility.
Transfer of POWs to Soviet Union	Uncertain	Vietnamese say none were transferred, but issue remains open.

Source: US officials responsible for carrying out research, investigation, and joint recovery operations of American POW/MIAs.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[Redacted]

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- Overcoming political obstacles—such as Vietnam’s sensitivities about infringements on its sovereignty and obstructionist tendencies on archival research and live-sighting reports—will be more difficult. In the past, Vietnam has reacted best to straightforwardness combined with respect and US acknowledgment of Hanoi’s own MIA accounting efforts. [Redacted]

(b)(3)
NatSecAct

We have reviewed the so-called “1205” and “735” documents, which purport—falsely in our view—to be reports to the party leadership containing statements that Hanoi held large numbers of US POWs above those acknowledged to the United States. We believe the judgments in the 1993 Intelligence Community assessment released by the Department of Defense (DOD) remain valid: that the documents are probably authentic

[REDACTED]
(b)(3) NatSecAct

GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence)—collected documents. But many of the details of the documents, including dates and other facts, are implausible or inconsistent with reliable evidence. In particular, the numbers of POWs allegedly held by Hanoi at the times mentioned are inconsistent with reliable US Government statistics and far outnumber the actual total of open cases. We believe that neither document provides a factual foundation upon which to judge Vietnamese performance on the POW/MIA question. [REDACTED]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Discussion

Part I: The Question of Vietnamese Cooperation [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

Since 1987, Vietnam's attitude and overall approach toward cooperation with the United States on prisoners of war or missing in action (POW/MIA) issues have improved. [redacted]

First and foremost is the improved staff professionalism and efficiency of the Vietnamese agencies that deal with US POW/MIA issues.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted]

Over the last 10 years this situation has changed substantially. [redacted]

[redacted] Officials are increasingly professional and are upwardly mobile in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of the Interior. Many Foreign Ministry junior personnel receive training there. According to US officials, many Vietnamese officials who work POW/MIA issues have demonstrated skill and initiative. [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Hanoi has been moving toward better cooperation since that time for a variety of reasons, but particularly since 1992—when the United States began seriously to discuss easing trade

restrictions and normalizing relations—Vietnam has become more cooperative in assisting the United States locate and recover the remains of MIAs. Also, the easing of bilateral tensions after the Paris Agreement on Cambodia in 1991 (which ended Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia) created a climate more conducive to Vietnamese cooperation. We assess that Vietnam has become more cooperative for these reasons:

- Hanoi wants engagement with Washington, especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union, which had been Vietnam's key ally and supporter. Vietnam now perceives cooperative relations with the United States to be essential for furthering its economic and security objectives. Vietnamese leaders recognize that Washington will be a key power in the region, and American business is a potential major source of investment. They recognize that better cooperation on the POW/MIA issue is central to Washington's ability to forge a better bilateral relationship. Normalization of relations has generally reinforced Vietnam's willingness to improve cooperation.
- The effort does not place any great demand on Vietnam's own limited resources. The United States provides financial backing for cooperative endeavors to account for MIAs—about \$9.5 million annually to underwrite

(b)(3) NatSecAct

The 1992 CIA Study [redacted]

Some of the highlights of the Key Judgments of the CIA Study, Vietnam: Adjusting Its Strategy on the POW/MIA Issue, of January 1992, include:

During the past four years, Vietnam has become more cooperative in resolving questions concerning US military personnel reported as possible prisoners of war or missing in action (POWs/MIAs) in the Vietnam war. The government has made several important gestures since 1988, including turning over more remains and material evidence than during the preceding 13 years; participating, for the first time, in joint investigations of sites where American planes crashed or missing US servicemen were last seen; and, beginning in 1990, giving US experts limited access to military museums and archives containing records detailing Vietnamese investigations of American losses.

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) 10 USC 130c

Even under the best of circumstances, there are limits to what the United States could expect to achieve. The fact that more than 400 servicemen were lost over water and the complete destruction of some airplane crash sites, for example, make it impossible to account for all missing US personnel.

[redacted]

joint recovery efforts in Vietnam. Most of this goes to Vietnam to fund the five joint field activities held annually.¹ [redacted]

(b)(3)
NatSecAct

Vietnam's more cooperative approach was observed by CIA analysts in the early 1990s (see inset). Since then, reciprocal actions by the US and Vietnamese Governments have fostered an even better climate for approaching the POW/MIA issue:

- The US "Hanoi Office" (US MIA Office) was opened in June 1991.
- In March 1992, Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam told the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific that Vietnam would expand cooperation with the United States on POW/MIA issues. The two sides agreed on a 24-month recovery/repatriation program, a mechanism to investigate live-sighting reports, and a process for providing US humanitarian aid to Vietnam.
- In July 1993, Vietnam received the highest level US delegation since the end of the Vietnam war and agreed to allow US State Department officials to be stationed in Hanoi to assist JTF-FA activities.
- In May 1994, Vietnam agreed to opening a US liaison office in Hanoi to facilitate progress on POW/MIA accounting and as a prelude to diplomatic relations. US officials arrived in August, and the office formally opened in January 1995. [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

¹ According to JTF-FA estimates, since FY 1995 each field recovery activity in Vietnam has cost about US \$1.6 million.

[redacted]

(b)(3)
NatSecAct

Responding To US Government Accounting Efforts

Since 1992, Hanoi also has become much more cooperative in allowing US officials to meet and interview Vietnamese citizens who could be knowledgeable of MIA information

[Redacted]

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

A good indicator of Vietnamese intentions is the degree to which Vietnamese officials have undertaken unilateral efforts—that is, efforts without direct participation by the JTF-FA—to assist in locating remains of US MIAs. Interviews with US officials at JTF-FA suggest to us that the Vietnamese side has worked energetically to follow up leads and schedule field activities to locate and recover remains. In some instances, Vietnamese on recovery teams have willingly worked beyond the terms of their contracts to successfully complete operations (see inset on page 17).

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Recent Vietnamese Intentions

[Redacted]

[Redacted] assessment that Vietnam has made a clear decision to be more cooperative with the United States on POW/MIA accounting. This decision has not come easily to the Hanoi Government, in our view. Longstanding ideological distrust, animosity lingering from the war, suspicion of American motives, and fear of intelligence exploitation all have operated at times to limit Vietnam's willingness to cooperate on recovering or accounting for US MIAs. Vietnamese officials frequently point to the disparity between their work to recover missing American soldiers and efforts to account for their own, which number more than 300,000. They must also overcome interbureaucratic rivalries and central-local disputes to maximize their cooperation. But our reporting indicates to us that the POW/MIA issue no longer has the political sensitivity it once had. (S)

Cultural reasons, in addition to official policy, contributes to this record. Families are of great importance to the Vietnamese. Vietnamese workers who participate in the field recovery efforts frequently express respect for US efforts to recover remains of American dead

[Redacted]

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For local officials, participation in joint field activities can be financially profitable. People in their villages can earn much more by

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

***The Vietnam Office
for Seeking Missing
Persons (VNOSMP)***

. . . responsible for coordinating Hanoi's efforts on the US POW/MIA issue . . . established in 1973 but not really functional until late 1980s . . . composed of officials from three ministries: Foreign Affairs (MFA), National Defense (MND), and Interior (MOI)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

working on the activity than they could in their normal work. Local officials usually seek to parcel out work force assignments based on kinship ties and other traditional connections.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) 10 USC 130c

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Instances of Vietnamese Noncooperation
Vietnam's Marxist-Leninist political system is habitually secretive and distrustful of foreign influences, fearful that any information it

divulges may be used to undermine its authority, punish its past behavior, or embarrass it politically. In our view, it is adept at defending

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

its sovereignty and protecting its secrets. That said, there have been few instances in which Vietnamese authorities have flatly refused US requests concerning an accounting for MIAs. Vietnamese tend to avoid direct refusals. Rather, they indirectly decline US requests by asserting that Vietnam will undertake unilateral

measures to achieve the accounting the US seeks. Among the most significant examples:

- Although Vietnam has provided thousands of documents to the US side, US requests to see Politburo documents pertaining to US POW/

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

MIA issues have been turned aside. The Vietnamese insist that these records are sensitive and can not be directly viewed by foreigners. Vietnamese authorities have said they will research the records and provide relevant

POW/MIA information

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

- Vietnamese authorities have not facilitated interviews with some senior retired military officers whom US officials think could provide POW/MIA information. Vietnamese authorities claim that these retirees do not wish to be interviewed by US officials and in some instances lack knowledge.
- Vietnam does not allow joint field activities in "classified" military areas. Vietnam offers to undertake unilateral searches in these areas when detailed and credible leads are provided. In a few instances, the Vietnamese have been able to provide remains from these locations to US authorities.

[Redacted]

At the working level, Vietnamese officials are not always amenable to US requests [Redacted]

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Vietnam's Bureaucracy: Responsiveness and Resistance

Our review of the past decade suggests that some key elements of Vietnam's government initially were reluctant to assist the United States in resolving POW/MIA issues. Such

opposition was lessened by Politburo decisions in the early 1990s

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In 1994, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) set up a special office to better coordinate work on this issue with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI). A special MOI office to undertake unilateral investigations was also set up in 1994

[Redacted]

We occasionally see some hints of continuing dissatisfaction, however. For example, in March 1996 the Army Newspaper *Quan Doi Nhan Dan* warned that the United States was taking advantage of MIA searches to "grasp and exploit many of our secrets." The tone of the article was that cooperation with the United States could threaten Vietnam's interests.

Although this statement [Redacted]

[Redacted] did not lead to a disruption in cooperation, it did suggest that some elements of Vietnam's bureaucracy did not favor full engagement with the United States on POW/MIA issues. Consequently, for cooperation to continue, Vietnamese leaders and VNOSMP officials probably will continue to have to maintain pressure on all elements of the bureaucracy.

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**The Record of SRV Responsiveness (b)(3) NatSecAct
 Recovery and Repatriation of Remains.**

Vietnamese responsiveness on the recovery and repatriation issue is currently described by JTF-FA officials as excellent. According to Vietnamese figures, since the end of the war, Hanoi

Vietnamese Initiative in Recovery Operations: Recent Examples

Case 1364

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On 22 January 1969, SP5 Douglas Alan Ross was killed during a combat operation in South Vietnam. His unit was forced to take cover. Other dead and wounded were recovered in an extensive search the next day, but the body of SP5 Ross was not found. He eventually became Case 1364.

In January 1994, a joint US-Vietnamese team investigated Case 1364 in La Mo Nong Village, Chu Pa District, Gia Lai Province. The team searched a 600-square-meter area and questioned local residents but found no information.

In early July 1997, two Vietnamese villagers reported to Gia Lai Province officials that, while using a metal detector to search for scrap aluminum, they had found the grave of an American. They produced identification tags reading: Ross, Douglas, US 56719861, A, Lutheran. Provincial authorities notified the central government, which then informed the JFT-FA detachment in Hanoi. A joint team was dispatched to Pleiku township on 6 July to question local witnesses and retrieve the remains. These were repatriated in September 1997 and approved for identification by the Armed Forces Identification Review Board on 18 February 1998.

Case 1927

On 24 September 1972, Lt. Daniel Borah's aircraft was hit by antiaircraft fire and

crashed into the jungle in North Vietnam. Two other aircraft saw a parachute and heard voice radio transmissions while the parachute was in the air. After the parachute landed in the trees, an emergency beacon was heard for a short time, then silence. Other aircrew saw the parachute pulled down through the trees. Large concentrations of PAVN forces in the area precluded a ground search. Three days of air search and rescue efforts failed to locate any sign of Lt. Borah.

In 1991, photographs purporting to be of Lt. Borah and his Lao guard surfaced in Southeast Asia. Borah family members stated that the man in the photos was indeed Lt. Borah. The world press cited this as evidence of live American POWs still in Southeast Asia. Extensive investigation into the origin of the photos, however, revealed that they were in fact a hoax. The individual believed to be Lt. Borah was actually a Lao named Ahrao, as was confirmed in interviews with him.

In September 1995, the "Office for Seeking Missing Persons" (VNOSMP) reported that it had located a veteran of an antiaircraft battery whose members had found a dead American pilot named "Borah" and had buried the body. The VNOSMP located a witness to the burial and then provided this information (though not the witness) to US investigators in January 1996. In March, a joint US-Vietnamese team excavated the site and recovered a complete set of remains. The remains were subsequently identified as those of Lt. Daniel Borah.



Photo Courtesy CILHI

Figure 2. A recovery team excavates the site of a B-52 crash just outside Hanoi, Vietnam. [redacted]

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has returned remains to US officials on 67 occasions, totaling 717 sets (not all of which were of US personnel). Since January 1992, when joint recovery operations began in earnest, the Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii (CILHI) reports that 263 sets of remains have been repatriated. Of these, identification has been completed on 101 sets, while identifications on 25 sets are pending review by Service Secretaries, and 51 sets are undergoing final lab review. Procedures for handling remains have been jointly developed and work smoothly. [redacted]

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We have no evidence that the Vietnamese presently are storing remains of American dead. A 1987 Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) stated that we had evidence that Vietnam was storing about 400 to 600 sets of remains. But that judgment was retracted in 1996 because it turned out to have been based

on the unsupported testimony of a single unreliable source.² The Vietnamese Government collected and stored remains during the Vietnam war, but we do not know how many. A considerable number were returned to various US delegations that visited Vietnam:

- CILHI reports that since the early 1990s there has been no indication of storage in the remains returned by the Vietnamese to the United States, including those sets of remains obtained outside the JTF-FA joint recovery efforts.³ [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

² Intelligence Community Assessment 96-05, *Vietnamese Storage of Remains of Unaccounted US Personnel* (October 1996). [redacted]

³ DPMO in conjunction with CILHI presently has a study underway to investigate the question of Vietnamese storage of the remains of US personnel. Further conclusions on this issue must await the results of this study. [redacted]

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Resolution of Discrepancy Cases. According to the Department of Defense POW and Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) data, 48 “priority discrepancy” cases remain to be resolved with Vietnam. This compares with the original 196 cases in 1990.⁴ These are cases where US information about a missing US serviceman seems to differ from that of the Vietnamese. Vietnam facilitates a US special team that has extensive geographic access to conduct research and investigations on discrepancy cases.

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US officials believe Vietnam has, for the most part, been cooperative on these cases. The main difficulty in resolving such cases is in obtaining leads. When we or the Vietnamese obtain such leads, they have acted promptly to help resolve the discrepancy, according to US officials.

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Assistance in Implementing Trilateral Investigations With Laos.

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POW/MIA Accounting

The Department of Defense POW and Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) maintains the record of unaccounted for Americans in Vietnam. As of March 1998, 1,565 Americans were so listed. The vast majority of these cases involve individuals who are known to have been killed or were last seen in circumstances in which death was a near certainty:

- Of the 1565, there were 825 confirmed dead at wartime by their commanders and comrades.
- Subsequently, intensive research by US Government officials has established that half the remainder—about 370 people—are dead.
- Only 48 are considered to be priority discrepancy cases—that is, cases involving American personnel who were known to be alive, not gravely wounded, and in proximity to the enemy at the time of their loss.

^a Source: DPMO

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US officials note that the Laotians have become somewhat more cooperative over the last two or three years, perhaps because they are gaining experience with US POW/MIA issues.

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⁴ The original priority discrepancy cases were established by US officials after visits to Vietnam by General Vessey, the US special representative, in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

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Trilateral investigations focus on those areas of Laos that were more or less controlled by Vietnam during the war. The procedures for conducting operations are gradually becoming less cumbersome, such as those for interviewing witnesses and conducting field activities. Joint recovery activities in Laos have been conducted according to geographic priorities, mostly on a North-to-South basis, but the Laotians are showing more flexibility and allowing exceptions when new leads come to light. Consequently, we think that trilateral cooperation will improve. [redacted]

documents. [redacted]

Nevertheless, Vietnam has become more cooperative than before in providing such materials. In several instances, Vietnam has provided documents that its investigators uncovered unilaterally. When the US side has good leads, the process of obtaining records and artifacts has been eased. For example, in May 1995, Vietnamese authorities gave a US delegation over 200 pages of documents, sketch maps, and witness reports collected by their investigation teams. The documents included a comprehensive review of all special remains cases, including photographs, grave registration lists, and "died in captivity" lists. [redacted]

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Provision of POW/MIA-Related Documents, Personal Artifacts, and Equipment. Vietnam has provided over 28,000 documents to US officials, but we believe the Vietnamese probably could improve their record in providing these materials. [redacted]

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Live-Sighting Reports. Live-sighting investigations are a particularly difficult problem. Hanoi is sensitive about allegations it is holding POWs since the releases mandated by the Paris accords in 1973 and expresses doubt that investigations of such reports will yield any results. Hundreds of such reports have been found to be inaccurate during a prescreening process, including many that were received through intelligence channels. Since 1987, US officials have conducted 120 on-site investigations of live-sighting reports. Thus far, none has turned up convincing evidence of live American POWs still in Vietnam. After investigation, many of the reports turned out to be scams. Still others were deemed inaccurate because the investigators could not find the locations or structures cited in the reports. A few have

- Vietnam's archival filing and retrieval system for material 25 to 30 years old may not be adequate to readily produce relevant

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Documents

The Vietnamese have turned over a wide array of wartime and postwar documents that have contributed directly to accounting for missing Americans, resolving questions about why remains cannot be recovered, and confirming loss locations for downed aviators. Among the most useful are a collection of contemporary reports, prepared for Vietnam's internal use, that list US casualties, note whether remains were collected and buried, identify grave sites, and indicate whether the central government was able to collect remains. So far US officials have acquired documents of this type for 21 of 26 northern wartime provinces. Of the five provinces for which these officials do not yet have such records, all are in the far north of Vietnam; there are only two in which Americans were lost in any number.

For several of these same areas, Vietnam has also provided records prepared by wartime military organizations that detail the locations of downed aircraft. Using data from these "shootdown rosters," US officials have been able to locate previously unknown aircraft crash sites and to send joint teams to investigate on the ground and find out what happened to the aircrews.

The documents have also helped determine which US losses were known to Vietnamese forces within a defined geographic area and which were not. Establishing which losses

occurred without Vietnamese awareness has enabled US officials to assess the degree to which they should expect assistance from Vietnam in investigating particular cases. In some cases, such evidence has enabled US officials to conclude that certain aircraft crashed at sea or in remote unpopulated areas.

The ability to prepare, preserve, and transport documents declined precipitously outside northern Vietnam. In southern Vietnam and in the border areas of Cambodia and Laos, the field conditions in which Communist forces operated and the mobility of their headquarters, which frequently came under attack by US and Allied forces, militated against extensive recordkeeping.

The few records acquired from outside northern Vietnam relate chiefly to POWs who died in captivity. One exception is a list of aircraft downed by PAVN forces in southern Laos. This record is a postwar compilation of electronic message traffic from units in this area. The terse entries suggest the focus was identifying units that should be credited with a downing and not where aircraft crashed or what happened to the aircrews.

The Vietnamese have permitted US personnel to examine thousands of open-source wartime records, including museum artifacts and receipts, documentary films, news photos, and central and provincial newspapers.

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turned up Americans or Eurasians who were not former POWs.⁶ The only active case involves Laos. [redacted]

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The SRV's Dedication of Resources to the POW/MIA Issue

Vietnam's primary resource is people, not money. We assess that Vietnam has assigned increasingly qualified people to POW/MIA issues and has given them the authority to act in conjunction with their US counterparts. This assessment is based on the experience of US officials who have longtime experience working with the Vietnamese on the POW/MIA issue. The Vietnamese have become adept at adjusting their support for joint field activities to meet US requirements. [redacted]

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We think that Vietnam is unlikely to devote significant financial resources to support the POW/MIA objective, primarily because it has other demands on its resources it deems more pressing. Thus, we think it likely that Vietnam will modulate its own commitment to support the US effort to achieve full accounting according to its view of US interest in the issue.

Vietnam's primary interest will continue to be engagement with the United States, and Hanoi will watch carefully for signs that Washington's efforts to achieve full accounting are flagging. Vietnam would adjust its policies accordingly. Vietnam probably would regard a US decision to reduce expenditures for the POW/MIA mission or to reduce field activities as an indicator that US interest was waning. [redacted]

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Were POWs Interrogated by Russians?

We are uncertain whether Vietnam or Russia have been fully forthcoming on cases of Russian interrogations of POWs. This question is important because no returning POWs, except

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Some US officials [redacted]

[redacted] say that Vietnam has become somewhat more difficult on this issue.

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⁶ One case, for example, turned out to be a former US serviceman, not a POW, who returned to Vietnam to live with his Vietnamese wife and Amerasian child. [redacted]

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Live-Sighting Investigations

Although 120 live-sighting investigations have been carried out, none has generated any credible evidence of American POWs left in Vietnam. Hanoi protests having to investigate such cases, but reports surface regularly—most recently on five POWs possibly being held in Laos—and established procedures for resolving them continue to work well. For example, the latest live-sighting case in Vietnam was resolved in March 1998.

Other Russians, however, have denied such allegations. Those who were in Vietnam during the war have stated that the Vietnamese, sensitive about sovereignty, did not allow the Soviets to be involved in interrogations. Rather, the Soviets would pass to the Vietnamese their questions, and the Vietnamese would occasionally provide information. Panov, for example, stated that he could only witness interrogations of Americans when his questions were being asked. The Russian questions reflected the Soviet preoccupation with technical intelligence.

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Given these competing claims, the reports require continuing investigation.

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Were Some POWs Transferred to Russia or Elsewhere?

We have reviewed many reports that claim that POWs were transferred out of Vietnam. None of these reports have been substantiated, and many have proved unreliable.⁸ But a few received since 1992 remain under investigation or unresolved.

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for one CIA civilian employee, reported knowledge of being interrogated by Russians. The Russians may have witnessed the interrogation of some POWs without the POW's knowledge. For example, in interviews with US officials, V. G. Panov (Lt. Col., ret.) said that he, along with other foreign officers (Chinese, Korean, and perhaps European), witnessed the interrogations of American POWs on four separate occasions. Panov also stated, however, that he believed the POWs may have been unaware that he was a Soviet officer.

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The evidence on Russian involvement in interrogations is contradictory. Former KGB General Kalugin said that Russians had questioned US POWs; President Yel'tsin also claimed this had happened.⁷ Besides Panov, noted above, other Russian officers interviewed by DPMO's Joint Commission Support Directorate have said they were present during the interrogation of American POWs.

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Although we lack good evidence that POWs were transferred to the USSR, we also conclude that the books should remain open on this issue. Until some of the reporting above is clarified, we cannot say definitively that no POWs were transferred from Vietnam.

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Improving Accounting

We have identified above two types of obstacles to MIA accounting: technical and political. Technical obstacles are those related to retrieving archival materials, pursuing leads, and conducting field activities. They also would include such problems as the circumstances under which the loss of a US soldier occurred or changes in geography—for example, the shifting of rivers or changes in fields and forests. They primarily involve logistics. We assess Vietnam is most likely to be cooperative in resolving these obstacles under these conditions:

We also have credible reports that US POWs were *not* transferred out of Vietnam. General Volkogonov told the US-Russian Commission on POW/MIA Affairs that his delegation had uncovered no evidence that US prisoners had been transported from Vietnam to the USSR. Several of the Russians who served in Vietnam during the war, and would have reason to know, were interviewed by US officials and insisted that no US POWs were transferred to the USSR. For example, K. F. Katushev, former Central Committee Secretary for Maintaining Ties With Other Socialist Countries in the early 1970s, told US interviewers that he would have known if US POWs were transferred to the USSR. He believed no such transfers occurred.

- Continued US cooperation with Vietnamese authorities in applying the best technology and communications to help recover and identify remains.
- Continued US financial commitment to resolution endeavors. We think that the Vietnamese side measures its own efforts by evaluating the US commitment, in addition to relying on the funding.
- Continued nurturing of Vietnamese professional competence. This will require patient engagement but can also encourage the type of mutual respect at the working level that enhances prospects for successful recovery efforts.

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


Figure 3. Having made the ultimate sacrifice, a veteran returns home with full military honors.

Photo Courtesy CILHI

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Political obstacles may be somewhat more difficult to resolve. We think the primary issue will be Vietnamese sensitivity over cooperation with the United States on the POW/MIA issue. The question could become more problematic as local officials question the degree of effort being put toward resolution of US cases

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Overall SRV Performance

On balance, we conclude that Vietnam's performance on the US POW/MIA issue has definitely improved over the past decade.

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things, the lengthy report states that Vietnam was holding 1,205 US POWs in September 1972. The 1,205 figure was 669 more than the highest number the US Government ever believed might be held captive and more than twice as many as the 591 released by Vietnam during Operation Homecoming in 1973. [redacted]

New Information. Since the original examination of the document by the Intelligence Community in 1993, interviews with Russian officials who were knowledgeable of the document continue to validate the claim that it is an authentic GRU document and not a Russian fabrication: (b)(3) NatSecAct

Part II: Intelligence Community Assessment of the "1205" and "735" Documents [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Current Assessment

Although since 1993 we have obtained new information about the two documents above, we believe the assessment released by DOD⁹ remains valid: that is, the documents were probably collected by the military intelligence department of the former Soviet Union (GRU) but are not what they purport to be. That report concluded that the documents contain significant inaccuracies and anomalies. Most important, on the basis of US Government records, the numbers of POWs cited in these documents as being held by North Vietnam were much too high. [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

"1205" Document

The 1205 document purports to be a report by General Tran Van Quang to the Vietnamese Politburo in September 1972. The document came to light in 1993. One copy was found by an American researcher in the Russian archives. Another was provided US officials by Presidential Adviser Volkogonov. Among other

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- GRU Capt. A. I. Sivets told US interviewers in October 1997 that the original document was destroyed, that the source had provided other Vietnamese documents to the GRU, and that the 1205 document was genuine.
- K. F. Katushev, CPSU Central Committee Secretary responsible for maintaining ties to other socialist countries in the early 1970s, when interviewed by US officials on 1 July

⁹ Russian recollections are hazy on whether the "1205" document was originally written in Vietnamese. General Volkogonov, adviser to President Yel'tsin, thought he remembered seeing an original Vietnamese version. In any event, no Vietnamese version of the document has been located. [redacted]

⁹ The work of the Intelligence Community was the basis for a news release by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs on 24 January 1994, entitled, "Recent Reports on American POWs in Indochina: An Assessment." [redacted]

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1997, remembered that he had received a copy of the document in early December 1972.

- Y. P. Glazunov, who served in the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi from 1962 to 1965 as a junior diplomat and again from 1974 to 1978, told US interviewers on 7 March 1997 that he had heard of the 1205 document in the early 1970s when he served in the International Department of the Central Committee. [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

While supporting the authenticity of the document, none of the Russians claimed that the figure of 1,205 POWs was accurate. General Volkogonov, in statements to the press in 1993, expressed doubt about the reliability of the numbers. Similarly, a TASS correspondent who served in Vietnam during the period, V. Kobchev, stated that the numbers were too high. Several of the Russians interviewed indicated that information about US POWs probably would not have been high on the Soviet agenda, and not much scrutiny would have been given the number:

- One interviewee, V. V. Dukhin, who served as a Political Counselor in Russia's Embassy in Hanoi from 1992 to 1995 said that the former DCM in Hanoi, I. A. Novikov, (now deceased) told him he was aware of the 1205 document when it was acquired. Novikov described the document acquisition as "slipshod and not a very conscientious effort." He further stated that the GRU agent who acquired the document was not reliable. [redacted]

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In an interview in April 1997, Vietnamese Sr. Col. (ret.) Bui Tin said that he had a close relationship with General Quang, the putative author of the report. He thought it plausible that Quang could have reported to the Politburo and

that the report could have been in Quang's style. Nevertheless, Tin found the document "very strange."¹¹ [redacted]

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By way of contrast, General Quang, in interviews with US officials consistently denies that he was the source of the report. Vietnamese officials continue to claim the report is a fabrication. [redacted]

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Assessment. None of the new information helps to confirm the accuracy of the 1205 report. As noted in 1993, circumstantial evidence casts doubt on the validity of the report:

- Quang's responsibilities as a battlefield commander in a combat situation make it unlikely that he would be brought to Hanoi to report on issues that were not within his scope of responsibility [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3)
- The length of the report would be inappropriate for a Politburo meeting. According to an academic specialist on Vietnam, during that particular period the Politburo met weekly and was unlikely to have entertained long reports. NatSecAct
- The purpose of the meetings was to make decisions, not listen to long oral reports.
- The tone of the report also is inappropriate. A person of Quang's subordinate status would not have lectured the Politburo on what its policies were. Such hardcore revolu-

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tionaries as Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, and Truong Chinh probably would not have been spoken to in such manner or have tolerated such language.

- The timing of the Politburo meeting is questionable. The report supposedly was given on 15 September 1972, but the Vietnamese claim there was no meeting on that date.

[Redacted] [Redacted]

On that day, Quang Tri fell to South Vietnamese forces and Le Duc Tho, who ranked 5th in seniority on the Politburo, was meeting with Henry Kissinger at a key juncture in the Paris peace talks. Would the Politburo be discussing POW/MIA issues with a general whose forces were defending, and losing, a key city?

[Redacted]

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Although the circumstantial evidence above is not definitive, the content of the report casts even more doubt on its accuracy. The portions of the report dealing with the POW issue are inaccurate with respect to how the prisoners were segregated by rank, where they were located, how they were classified, and the conditions of their release. More important, the numbers of POWs the report claims were held are not accurate:

- The 1993 DOD report observed that the 1,205 figure was 669 more POWs than suggested by any reliable source. We have received no new evidence that would alter that assessment.

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- If there were additional POWs, we would have known of them unless Vietnam maintained a separate prison system unknown to the POWs who returned in 1973. We have uncovered no reliable evidence that a separate prison system existed for certain POWs; nor do we have such indicators as plausible site locations.
- The 1,205 figure is inconsistent with our understanding of how many Americans survived the events in which they were lost to become captives. Based on information available to US researchers as of 19 January 1994 (when the original analysis of the 1205 and 735 documents was released by DOD), at most, the fates of 73 Americans thought to have been last known alive (on the priority case list) were uncertain. Since then, more US remains have been discovered and returned to the United States from Vietnam. Thus far, the circumstances of these recoveries accord with data and leads obtained by Vietnamese and US authorities. Consequently, the number of Americans whose fates are uncertain (on the priority case list) has been reduced to 48. The recoveries contradict the assertion that Vietnam secretly hid, and perhaps secretly eliminated, hundreds of US POWs. [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

Consequently, the Intelligence Community assesses the information in the 1205 document to be unreliable and not a sound foundation for judging Vietnamese performance on the POW/MIA question. [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

“735” Document

The 735 document purports to be a report to the Central Committee by Hoang Anh (mistranslated Anya), a Central Committee Secretary, in late December 1970 or early January 1971. Like the 1205 document, it was acquired by the

GRU. A paragraph in the report says that Hanoi is holding 735 Americans though it has disclosed only 368 to the United States. It also says these POWs will be returned when US forces withdraw from Vietnam. [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

New Information. In 1993 we had only two pages of the 735 report; we now have the full text. The Russian sources who claimed the 1205 document was authentic make the same claim for the 735 document. [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Assessment. The new information reinforces the case that this document is an authentic GRU-collected report. Nevertheless, as with the 1205 document, circumstantial evidence suggests the information in the report is inaccurate:

- The dates are wrong. The report says it was given at the 20th plenary session of the Central Committee in late December 1970 or early January 1971. In fact, the 20th plenum was not held until February 1972. The plenum held in January 1971 was the 19th.
- Hoang Anh was indeed a Secretary of the Central Committee at that time and was responsible for agriculture.¹² There is no reason why he would deliver a report that deals extensively with political and military developments and the situations in Laos and Cambodia. Agriculture is mentioned only briefly.
- The references to agriculture in the 735 do not square with other party documents available at the time. For example, a review of party documents [redacted] reveal a significantly different discussion of

¹² Hoang Anh served in this capacity until his removal in 1974. [redacted]

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agricultural issues. Documents on agricultural policy (probably connected to the 19th plenum in January 1971) that were revealed after the war discuss the need to strengthen agricultural collectives that had been weakened by the need to increase wartime production.

- The report speaks extensively about preparations for the 4th Party Congress, including the establishment of a preparatory committee. In fact, the Politburo did not decide when to hold the 4th Party Congress until July 1975, which was several months after the 24th plenum of the Central Committee. The 4th Party Congress was not held until December 1976.
- Another key anomaly in the purported report is the charge against 16 “opportunist” members of the Central Committee, six of whom are named. If this were true, they should have been promptly ousted from their positions. Yet the report says the controversy had dragged on for years, and Anh’s call for retribution seems unusually weak. In fact, no action appears to have been taken then, and one alleged “opportunist” remained in his sensitive post, heading the army’s General Political Department, until after the war. Factionalism and disagreement over policy broke out during the period of “collective leadership” after the death of Ho Chi Minh. Some of the dissenting policy positions alleged in the 735 report are plausible. But others—such as a proposal to invite foreign (presumably Chinese) troops to help in Laos and South Vietnam—are not. Furthermore, if opportunism and disunity were of such concern, indirect references in the party press would have followed the plenum. [redacted]

[redacted]

As in the case of the 1205 document, the circumstantial evidence against the validity of the report is buttressed by the data on the numbers reported:

- The 1993 DOD report concluded that the 735 number was too high. US records indicate that 384 of the 591 POWs released in 1973 were captured before 1971. The total prisoners Hanoi could have been holding at the time could not have exceeded 470 according to US Government records. No evidence has come to light since 1993 that would cause us to revise our judgment.
- The continued recovery of US remains through the joint field activities since 1993 casts doubt on the likelihood that Vietnam could have been hiding that many unaccounted POW/MIAs. [redacted]

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Consequently, we conclude the 735 document also offers no foundation to support a conclusion that Vietnam has not been forthcoming on POW/MIA issues. [redacted]

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Annex

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Methodology

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**National Security
Information**

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

**Information available as of 13 April 1998 was used in
the preparation of this National Intelligence Estimate.**

**The following intelligence organizations participated
in the preparation of this Estimate:**

The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The National Imagery and Mapping Agency

also participating:

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence,
Headquarters, Marine Corps

**This Estimate was approved for publication by the
National Foreign Intelligence Board under the authority
of the Director of Central Intelligence.**

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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Jan 10, 2025

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4 December 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : John E. Koehler
Director, Intelligence Community Staff

SUBJECT : American POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia (U)

Per your request the attached data relative to the above subject in support of your testimony before the House Task Force on American POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia on 8 December 1981 is provided for your information. The package consists of individual inputs from the Imagery, SIGINT and HUMINT Offices plus a compilation of talking points for your use. Also provided is a working draft of the DIA prepared testimony statement which will be presented by RADM Burkhalter. Please let me know if we can be of any further assistance in this matter. (S)

[Redacted Signature Box]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

John E. Koehler

Attachment:

[Redacted Attachment Box]

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INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
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Jan 10, 2025

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SUBJECT: American POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia

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- 1 - DDCI - w/atts [redacted]
- 2 - ER - w/atts [redacted]
- 3 - D/ICS - w/atts [redacted]
- 4 - O/ICE Subject - w/atts [redacted]
- 5 - O/ICE Chrono - w/atts [redacted]
- 6 - ICS Registry - w/atts [redacted]

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Jan 10, 2025

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4 December 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General Clinton H. Winne, Jr., USAF
 Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff

FROM : Harry C. Eisenbeiss
 Director, Office of Imagery Collection and Exploitation

SUBJECT : American POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia

1. The following is provided in support of Admiral Inman's appearance before the House Task Force on American POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia on 8 December.

IMAGERY:

2. The DIA is the executive agent for stating imagery collection requirements in response to the POW/MIA problem and for exploiting such imagery. RADM Paulson, DC, is the senior DIA officer responsible for MIA/POW matters. DIA is also responding to the House request and Admiral Burkhalter, Deputy Director, will present DIA testimony. For the most part, imagery requirements are generated in an effort to confirm/negate reports from HUMINT sources. These imagery requirements can be categorized as either area search or surveillance depending on the specifics of the information available. Area search is employed whenever a source provides only a general location of a possible POW camp. Surveillance coverage is used to monitor known facilities that are suspected to house POWs/MIAs. DIA performs primary imagery exploitation against this problem. NPIC does not do detailed exploitation, but would provide initial readout of any significant finds relative to this subject. (See DIA imagery report on a suspect POW detention facility at Attachment 3.)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Decompartamentation and sanitization techniques are fully used to make the imagery derived information and/or sketches available for use in debriefings of HUMINT sources.

3. Historically, this imagery requirement has been fairly small in number. For example, in 1981 only about nine requirements have been identified and only six facilities are presently active for imagery collection. There are no special area search requirements currently identified for collection, although Vietnam and Laos have standing broad area search requirements requiring complete

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[Redacted]

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SUBJECT: American POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia

search coverage on a periodic basis. The Intelligence Community is very sensitive to the importance of this problem. These requirements receive whatever collection priority is required to meet imagery needs. The primary factor affecting requirement satisfaction is the adverse weather conditions that are prevalent in this region throughout most of the year and the requirement for very high resolution imagery to accomplish the detailed readout required. Attachment 1 summarizes requirements that were identified during 1981 and the coverage acquired during the specified collection period. Attachment 2 summarizes broad area search coverage of Vietnam and Laos acquired by the two most recent KH-9 missions.

4. Inputs from D/OSC (Attachment 4), D/OHC (Attachment 5), DDO (Attachment 6), working draft of the DIA testimony (Attachment 7), and talking points (Attachment 8) are attached as indicated.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)



For Harry WEISENBETTS OS

Attachments:

- 1 - Recent Collection Reqmts. and Coverage Accomplishments
- 2 - BAS Coverage of Vietnam and Laos
- 3 - DIA Imagery Report
- 4 - OSC Input
- 5 - OHC Input
- 6 - DDO Input
- 7 - DIA Draft Testimony Statement
- 8 - Talking Points

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Recent Collection Requirements and Coverage Accomplishments

<u>Target</u>	<u>REQUIREMENT</u>		<u>COVERAGE ACCOMPLISHMENTS</u>	
	<u>Collection Start</u>	<u>Period Stop</u>	<u>Imaging Attempts</u>	<u>Cloud Free Coverage</u>
Muong suspect POW Camp, Laos	10Jul81	31Dec81	92	14
Di Tri Tam Poss. POW Compound Vietnam	4Jul81	7Dec81	57	17
Yen Bai suspect Grave Sites, Vietnam	11Oct81	9Dec81	10	2
Lang Dan Poss. POW Camp, Vietnam	8Nov81	15Nov81	0	0
Lang Dan Poss. POW Camp, Vietnam	2Dec81	1Jan81	0	0
Pha Thamloung, Laos *	3Jan81	31Dec81	432	136
Muang Xepon, Laos	3Jan81	31Dec81	188	58
Ban Nong Boua, Laos	3Jan81	31Dec81	175	60

(b)(1)
(b)(3) 10 USC 424

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Broad Area Search Coverage

of

Vietnam and Laos

Coverage Accomplishments

<u>Area</u>	<u>Mission/Date</u>	<u>Gross Attempts (Sq.NM)</u>	<u>Gross Cloud- free (Sq. NM)</u>	<u>Cumulative Unique (%)</u>
Vietnam	1216 (18 Jun 80- 5 Mar 81)	165,845	83,264	62
	1215 (16 Mar 79- 19 Sep 79)	159,055	74,991	83
Laos	1216 (18 Jun 80- 5 Mar 81)	184,489	98,488	91
	1215 (16 Mar 79- 19 Sep 79)	81,167	31,187	96

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Jan 10, 2025

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ATTACHMENT 3 to [redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct

IMAGERY ANALYSIS NOTES

SUBJECT: DIA Response to Congressional Requirement for Analysis and/or Confirmation of Reported POW/MIA Sighting in Southeast Asia (TS)

PROBLEM: (TS/TK) Search for suspect POW detention facility reported by a South Vietnamese refugee source.

SUMMARY: (TS/TK) A detailed search of KH-9 imagery over a 900 km area resulted in the identification of a facility which generally corresponded to that which was reported by a refugee source; however, the quality of the KH-9 imagery was marginal resulting in a special [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) 10 USC 424

[redacted] A complete imagery analysis was conducted that included a functionalization and measurement of all structures, measurement of all trenching, berms, fences, and other man-made features.

IMAGERY: (TS/TK)

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) 10 USC 424

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WORKING PAPER

Jan 10, 2025

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1 DEC 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Harry C. Eisenbeiss
Director, Office of Imagery Collection & Exploitation

FROM: [redacted] Director, Office of SIGINT Collection

-(b)(3) 10 USC 424
-(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

SUBJECT: POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia

REFERENCE: DD/ICS Note, Same Subject dated 27 Nov 1981

1. In response to the above reference the following information is provided.

a. SIGINT collection requirements levied against the POW/MIA problem.

Currently there are three active requirements in the National SIGINT Requirements List (NSRL) which request information on POW/MIAs in Southeast Asia. They are:

[redacted] Annotated copies of these requirements reflecting POW/MIA needs are attached. NSA capability statements (Field 23) for each of these requirements state "...Information on U.S. POW/MIAs is rarely observed...and...if observed it will be reported as specified."

b. Evaluation of SIGINT Efforts.

The following evaluation of the results of NSA's SIGINT efforts to date was provided by [redacted], Chief, B5 NSA. B5 is the focal point in NSA for all actions connected with the Southeast Asia POW/MIA issue.

(1) To date there has been no SIGINT information either substantiating or refuting the existence of unaccounted for U.S. POW/MIAs in Southeast Asia. NSA, however, continues to task available collection resources against NSRL requirements concerning POW/MIA information.

(b)(3) 10 USC 424
(b)(3) CIAAct

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
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
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SUBJECT: POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia

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(b)(3) 50 USC 3605
(b)(3) NatSecAct



2. The DDCI in his previous capacity as DIRNSA was aware of all NSA initiatives with regard to U.S. POW/MIAs. NSA B5 is not optimistic that SIGINT will be able to contribute information on this issue. 



Attachments
a/s

(b)(3) 10 USC 424
(b)(3) CIAAct
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(b)(3) NatSecAct

Jan 10, 2025

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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ATTACHMENT 5 to

[Redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct

4 December 1981

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Harry C. Eisenbeiss
Director, Office of Imagery, Collection
and Exploitation

FROM: [Redacted] (b)(3) 10 USC 424
Director, Office of HUMINT Collection

SUBJECT: HUMINT Collection on the POW/MIA Problem
in Southeast Asia

1. National concerns and priorities regarding POW/MIAs are reflected in the National HUMINT Collection Plan #34 on Indochina, issued in March 1981. HUMINT collection responsibilities for objectives on the subject as it relates to Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos are assigned to State (advisory), the CIA's clandestine service and DIA, with supporting responsibilities for the military services, DCD and FBIS. (S)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

2. HUMINT collection which has been productive on POW/MIAs has been primarily from debriefing of refugees from Vietnam and Kampuchea and information in the Vietnamese media.

[Redacted]

3. The principal locus for debriefings is

[Redacted]

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

[Redacted] most such sources, although queried, have no knowledge of this subject. As a result, the reporting on POW/MIAs from debriefings is meager. In the case of DoD, the debriefing and reporting is done by the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, whose entre to refugee camps is on humanitarian grounds. FBIS gives the subject a very high priority; however, reporting has been limited to material from the Vietnamese media, almost all of which is general and reactive to U.S. commentary. (S)

4. In sum, HUMINT collection managers and field entities are fully aware of the importance of the POW/MIA issue and are attempting to improve collection. Collection opportunities, however, have been scarce. (C)

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

(b)(3) CIAAct

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[Redacted]

(b)(3) 10 USC 424
(b)(3) CIAAct

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**SUBJECT: HUMINT Collection on the POW/MIA Problem
in Southeast Asia**

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Attachment 6 to [redacted]

EAST ASIA DIVISION COMMENTS

I. What is the priority of the POW/MIA issue at CIA?

No CIA Station is tasked in its OD with action on the MIA/POW issue. However, our Stations have been tasked by (b)(1) Headquarters and are periodically reminded (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] should be alert and aggressive concerning any information about POW/MIA's. [redacted]

(b)(1) [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] this issue receives as much and sometimes even more attention than other priority objectives of our Stations in Southeast Asia and Agency officers throughout the world. When any believable information on POW/MIA's is obtained in the field, the highest priority is assigned to its verification.

II. What are the resources being assigned to this problem within CIA?

(b)(3) CIAAct At CIA Headquarters there is no DDO officer who has been specifically assigned to the POW/MIA problem. Officers of the [redacted] East Asia Division handle POW/MIA activities as required and in addition to their regular duties. [redacted]

[redacted] As mentioned above, officers at all Stations are alert for any information on POW/MIA's. (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

III. What are the roadblocks to resolving this issue? How can these barriers be eliminated?

The primary roadblock to resolving this issue continues to be the uncooperative attitude of the governments of Vietnam and Laos. They claim they have no POW's and are searching for MIA's.

Jan 10, 2025

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Repeated requests over the years by the U.S. Government for more information or entry into these countries of investigative teams have been stalled. Continued diplomatic efforts combined with intelligence community efforts to obtain positive information appear to be the best available course of action at this time.

Unfortunately, another and serious roadblock to obtaining positive information on the subject is the publicity given to leaks of confidential activities, and publicity given to the wild and inaccurate stories of various adventurers.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

As a result of publicity, many Lao and Vietnamese believe that claiming to possess information on POW/MIA's is a way to ensure entry to the United States, various Indochinese resistance groups view it as a method of obtaining covert U.S. Government financial and military support, and professional fabricators see it as a way of obtaining funds. The continued visits to Thailand of various soldiers of fortune working on their own or on behalf of private groups serves to additionally confuse the issue. Considerable intelligence community time and effort is wasted on the stories of fabricators and soldiers of fortune. Also, the actions of adventurers and inaccurate publicity has undoubtedly caused the Vietnamese and Lao to tighten security and to become more intransigent in their attitude towards our diplomatic efforts.

IV. Has the United States intelligence community achieved smooth cooperation among its members on this issue?

We believe there is good cooperation among the members of the intelligence community both at the Headquarters level and in the field. DIA is recognized as the focal point for all POW/MIA information and CIA passes all information obtained on the subject to DIA.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

We believe DIA is doing an excellent job in this difficult activity and will continue to cooperate fully.

V. At what point does DIA pass primary tasking to CIA?


The passing by DIA of primary tasking to CIA is on a case-by-case basis depending on which organization has the ability to perform specific tasks.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct




VI. What more can the United States Government do to assist the intelligence community on this issue?

Sufficient support and cooperation is being provided at this time. We know that if additional resources are necessary that the administration will be responsive to any requests. The problem is not one of resources or even intelligence, especially in the case of alleged POW's. It has not been demonstrated, at least on the basis of the considerable available information, that additional collection resources would lead to a definitive resolution of this issue. Sufficient assets are in place and a large volume of information is continually being screened and checked. To date, information indicating locations of POW's and MIA's in Laos or Vietnam has not proved credible. We and DIA have gone to considerable lengths to check out the more promising leads.

VII. What more can the United States intelligence community do on this issue?

The intelligence community continues to be alert and receptive to any information concerning POW/MIA's. We will actively and aggressively continue to search for, and follow up on new sources of information.



Jan 10, 2025

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Statement of

RADM E.A. Burkhalter, Jr., USN

Deputy Director

Defense Intelligence Agency

on

Prisoners of War and Missing in Action

Before the

Task Force on American Prisoners

and Missing in Southeast Asia

House Subcommittee

on

Asian and Pacific Affairs

December 8, 1981

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CONFIDENTIAL

Jan 10, 2025

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MR. CHAIRMAN AND HONORABLE MEMBERS:

DUE TO PRIOR COMMITMENTS WHICH HAVE TAKEN HIM OUT OF TOWN, THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES WILLIAMS, HAS ASKED ME TO APPEAR BEFORE THE TASK FORCE TODAY AND REPRESENT THE AGENCY ON THE SUBJECT OF DIA'S INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS TO DETERMINE THE FATE OF AMERICANS STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

I APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO YOUR INVITATION AND COME BEFORE YOU ON THIS MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE. THE TASK FORCE'S VIGOROUS EFFORTS DIRECTED TOWARD DETERMINING THE FATE OF THOSE AMERICANS LISTED AS PRISONER OF WAR OR MISSING IN ACTION AND WHO STILL REMAIN UNACCOUNTED FOR IS WELL RECOGNIZED BY DIA. I ALSO KNOW THAT THE TASK FORCE IS WELL AWARE OF DIA'S ROLE AND CONTRIBUTIONS.

IN THAT REGARD, I DO WANT TO REAFFIRM DIA'S FULL COOPERATION WITH YOU IN THIS MATTER. I WOULD ALSO EMPHASIZE RIGHT FROM THE START THAT THE CRITICAL NEED FOR CONTINUED INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS IS RECOGNIZED AND I ASSURE YOU THAT DIA WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT NEEDED FOR AS LONG AS AMERICANS REMAIN UNACCOUNTED FOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. RADM JERRY PAULSON, WITH WHOM YOU ARE FAMILIAR, IS THE ASSISTANT VICE DIRECTOR FOR COLLECTION MANAGEMENT AND HEADS OUR PW/MIA STAFF.

LIKE MOST MILITARY MEN, MY PERSONAL ASSOCIATION WITH MEN WHO ARE NOW AMONG THE MISSING HAS KEPT ME CLOSE TO THE ISSUE FOR MANY YEARS. AS PART OF DIA'S COMMAND ELEMENT I FOLLOW THIS AGENCY'S EVERY DAY EFFORTS ON THIS ISSUE THROUGH A DAILY REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR. I CAN SAY WITHOUT RESERVATION THAT DIA REMAINS DEDICATED IN ITS PURSUIT AND RESEARCH OF INFORMATION WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE DETERMINATION OF THE PRESENT FATE OF THESE MISSING AMERICANS. ASSUREDLY, THE PW/MIA FUNCTION HAS AND WILL CONTINUE TO RECEIVE STRONG COMMAND ATTENTION WITHIN DIA.

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Jan 10, 2025

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AFTER HAVING SAID THAT OUR EFFORTS CONTINUE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, ADD, AND REGRETTABLY SO, THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE SITUATION SINCE DIA'S CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY OF SIX MONTHS AGO. THERE ARE STILL 2,496 AMERICANS WHO WERE DETERMINED TO BE EITHER A PRISONER, MISSING OR KILLED (BODY NOT RECOVERED) THAT REMAIN UNACCOUNTED FOR. WE HAVE STRESSED IN THE PAST THAT DIA MAKES NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE TERMS OF AN INDIVIDUAL STATUS. OUR GOAL IS TO RECOVER ANY AMERICAN - WHETHER LIVE OR DEAD. OUR COLLECTION AND RESEARCH EFFORTS RELATIVE TO REPORTS OF AMERICANS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA REFLECT OUR DEDICATION TO THAT END.

UNDERSTANDABLY, THE REFUGEE REPORTING FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA CONTINUES TO BE OUR MAJOR SOURCE OF INFORMATION. SINCE THE COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF SOUTH VIETNAM IN 1975 WE HAVE ACQUIRED A TOTAL OF 1,303 REPORTS BEARING ON THE PW/MIA PROBLEM. OF THE TOTAL REPORTING, 386 ARE LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS. APPROXIMATELY 33 PERCENT OF THESE LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS HAVE BEEN EQUATED TO AMERICANS WHO HAVE SINCE BEEN ACCOUNTED FOR. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT USING A SLIGHTLY MORE LIBERAL APPROACH, THAT AN ADDITIONAL ¹⁰ PERCENT OF THE SIGHTING REPORTS WOULD EQUATE TO ACCOUNTED FOR AMERICANS. SOME OF THE REMAINING SIGHTING REPORTS ARE FABRICATIONS AND OTHERS ARE REPORTS FROM PERHAPS WELL INTENDED BUT MISGUIDED INDIVIDUALS. THERE ARE OTHER SIGHTING REPORTS WHICH WE HAVE EXTENSIVELY INVESTIGATED AND OTHERS, FOR WHICH OUR FOLLOW UP EFFORTS CONTINUE. DESPITE THE LARGE NUMBER OF SIGHTING REPORTS WHICH REMAIN UNRESOLVED AND OUR PERSISTENT EFFORTS, WE STILL CAN NOT PROVE THAT THERE ARE ANY AMERICANS BEING DETAINED AGAINST THEIR WILL.

AS A CASE IN POINT, WE HAD HIGH HOPES FOR ONE OF OUR RECENT LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS. APPROXIMATELY 165 MANDAYS HAVE BEEN EXPENDED IN HOPEFUL PURSUIT OF THE TRUTHFULNESS OF THE SOURCE'S INFORMATION. THE INTERVIEWS, INVESTIGATIONS, POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS AND ANALYTICAL RESEARCH COVERED A PERIOD BACK TO 1954,

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Jan 10, 2025

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AND INVOLVED A NUMBER OF AGENCIES AND ORGANIZATIONS IN FOUR COUNTRIES.

AFTER THIS THOROUGH EXAMINATION ARE WE NOW SATISFIED THAT THIS SOURCE HAS BEEN DECEPTIVE AND UNTRUTHFUL.

DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS DIA HAS TAKEN EVER INCREASING STEPS TO INTENSIFY ITS EFFORTS AND CAPABILITIES COMMENSURATE WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE.

DIA'S PW/MIA STAFF IS CURRENTLY AT A MANNING LEVEL OF 15 PERSONNEL. THE STAFF HAS ADDED PERSONNEL WITH LANGUAGE CAPABILITIES IN VIETNAMESE AND CHINESE, AND WITH EXTENSIVE INVESTIGATIVE BACKGROUNDS. THE EXPERIENCE LEVEL OF THE STAFF RELATIVE TO ANALYTICAL SKILLS AND SOUTHEAST ASIAN BACKGROUND INCLUDING INCOUNTRY EXPERIENCE IS EXCEPTIONAL. ADDITIONALLY, WE ARE REGULARLY ASSISTED IN OUR EFFORTS THROUGH THE DEFENSE ATTACHE SYSTEM, PHOTO INTERPRETERS, LINGUISTS, INVESTIGATORY PERSONNEL, AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS ON A WORLD WIDE BASIS. NO BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS ARE IMPOSED ON RESEARCH, INTERVIEWS AND INVESTIGATIVE FOLLOW-UP ASSOCIATED WITH DIA'S PURSUIT OF PW/MIA INFORMATION. ALTHOUGH TRAVEL ALLOCATIONS REMAIN AUSTERE FOR OTHER PURPOSES, THIS SAME POLICY OF NO CONSTRAINTS APPLIES TO TRAVEL FUNDS ASSOCIATED WITH DIA'S QUICK REACTION TEAM WHICH TRAVELS WITHIN CONUS AND OVERSEAS TO INTERVIEW SOURCES OF POTENTIAL PW/MIA INFORMATION DEEMED ESSENTIAL TO OUR EFFORTS. OUR WORKING RELATION AND SUPPORT FROM OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUE TO BE EXCELLENT. ESPECIALLY NOTEWORTHY IS THE COOPERATION AND RESPONSIVENESS OF THE JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER PERSONNEL TO OUR TASKING AND FOLLOW-UP REQUIREMENTS RELATIVE TO REFUGEE INTERVIEWS. IN ORDER TO ENSURE A COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING EXISTS ON VARIOUS ISSUES AND REQUIREMENTS, DIA RECENTLY BROUGHT THE JCRC BANGKOK LIAISON OFFICER TO WASHINGTON FOR EXTENSIVE WORKING DISCUSSIONS AND MEETINGS WITH SENIOR LEADERSHIP. ADDITIONALLY, THROUGH DIA INITIATION, THE STATE DEPARTMENT OBTAINED AUTHORIZATION FOR JCRC PERSONNEL TO CONDUCT PW/MIA INTERVIEWS WITH

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Jan 10, 2025

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VIETNAMESE REFUGEES IN HONG KONG AND MACAO. THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN THE DEBRIEFINGS HAS BEEN EXEMPLARY THROUGHOUT THE VARIOUS REFUGEE CAMPS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. THEIR PROFESSIONALISM GREATLY FACILITATES OUR ANALYTICAL EFFORTS.

DIA PROVIDES THE INTELLIGENCE UPON WHICH DECISIONMAKERS DEVELOP U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY. THE LEADERSHIP WITHIN THE DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENSE AND STATE MEMBERS OF THIS TASK FORCE AND OTHER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS HAVE BEEN UPDATED ON OUR CURRENT INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS THROUGH INFORMAL CLOSED SESSION BRIEFINGS. WHEN OUR RESEARCH HAS DEVELOPED INFORMATION TO A POINT THAT FURTHER PURSUIT WARRANTS ACTION BEYOND THE CAPABILITY OR CHARTER OF DIA THEN AT THAT POINT ACTION IS TRANSFERRED TO THE APPROPRIATE ORGANIZATION OR AGENCY. ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION DEVELOPED IN THIS MANNER WOULD BE PROVIDED TO DIA FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS AND DISSEMINATION. I THINK IT WORTHWHILE AT THIS POINT TO NOTE AGAIN THAT ALTHOUGH THIS IS A HUMANITARIAN ISSUE, SOME OF THE INFORMATION MUST BE CLASSIFIED AND REMAIN SO IF OUR EFFORTS ARE TO BE EFFECTIVE AND ALSO TO PRECLUDE HARM TO ANY AMERICANS WHO MIGHT STILL BE HELD IN CAPTIVITY. SINCE PFC ROBERT GARWOOD, USMC, RETURNED FROM VIETNAM IN FEBRUARY 1979, DIA HAS WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE MARINE CORPS ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES CONCERNING HIS CASE. ALTHOUGH RESTRAINED FROM DEBRIEFING GARWOOD DUE TO HIS COURT MARTIAL, DIA DID HAVE ACCESS TO PW/MIA INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED BY THE MARINE CORPS, AND BY THE FORMER CHAIRMAN AND A PRESENT MEMBER OF THIS SUBCOMMITTEE DURING 1979. THE MARINE CORPS RECENTLY ADVISED DIA THAT THE PRESENT STATUS OF GARWOOD'S COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS WERE SUCH THAT THEY HAD NO FURTHER RESERVATIONS IN REGARD TO AN INTERVIEW WITH GARWOOD. A LETTER HAS BEEN SENT FROM DIA TO GARWOOD'S COUNSEL REQUESTING HIS COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING A GARWOOD INTERVIEW DEDICATED TO THE HUMANITARIAN ISSUE OF RESOLVING THE FATE OF THOSE AMERICANS STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

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4

Jan 10, 2025

000082

THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS CONTINUE TO BE OBSTACLES ON THE PW/MIA ISSUE. DURING PREVIOUS TESTIMONY BEFORE THIS SUBCOMMITTEE, DIA REPORTED THAT IT HAD JUDGED AS VALID A FORMER VIETNAMESE ARTICIAN'S INFORMATION THAT THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT HAS IN ITS POSSESSION THE REMAINS OF SOME 400 U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL LOST AS A RESULT OF HOSTILITIES IN INDOCHINA. THE FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THIS SUBCOMMITTEE CONFRONTED THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WITH THIS INFORMATION IN HANOI. VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS DENIED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THESE REMAINS. IN OUR TESTIMONY IN JUNE OF THIS YEAR IT WAS NOTED THAT THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HAD RECENTLY ANNOUNCED THEY WOULD PROVIDE THE REMAINS OF THREE ADDITIONAL MISSING AMERICANS. IT WAS ALSO NOTED THAT THE RETURN OF THESE REMAINS WERE WELCOMED, AND IN A LARGER SENSE, IT WAS A CYNICAL REFLECTION ON THEIR INTRANSIGENCE ON THIS ISSUE. THESE REMAINS HAVE SINCE BEEN RETURNED AND IDENTIFIED AS BEING THREE INDIVIDUALS WHO HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF OUR NEGOTIATION FOLDER EFFORTS. IN PARTICULAR, THESE CASES WERE THREE OF FOUR INCLUDED IN MEETINGS WITH THE VIETNAMESE JUST PRIOR TO AND AT THE TIME OF THE VIETNAMESE ANNOUNCEMENT. THE EVENT OF A SIMULTANEOUS RETURN OF THESE THREE INDIVIDUALS CONSIDERING THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THEIR LOSS, VARIED YEARS OF LOSS, AND CONFIRMED KNOWLEDGE FOLLOWING THEIR LOSS, CLEARLY SIGNALS THAT THE VIETNAMESE DID NOT JUST RECOVER THESE INDIVIDUALS ON THE BASIS OF DETAILED INFORMATION PROVIDED IN OUR NEGOTIATION FOLDERS. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE VIETNAMESE ARE WITHHOLDING INFORMATION. ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN OCCASIONAL SMALL GAINS, THE OVERALL ISSUE OF AN ACCOUNTING REMAINS VIRTUALLY UNACCOMPLISHED. RECENT PROPOSALS TO THE VIETNAMESE FOR A CONTINUATION OF THE PW/MIA MEETINGS IN HANOI THIS PAST FALL AND A RECIPROCAL PW/MIA VISIT TO HAWAII, WERE DEFERRED BY THE VIETNAMESE. A VERY RECENT PROPOSAL FOR A STATE AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENT SPECIAL PW/MIA MISSION TO VISIT VIENTIANE WAS ALSO TURNED DOWN BY THE LAOTIANS. WE ARE STILL AWAITING THE

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... RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSAL THAT THE STATE/DOD ...
HANOI. THE VIETNAMESE AND LAO REACTION TO THESE PROPOSALS IS TYPICAL OF THEIR
ATTITUDE OVER THE YEARS. THEREIN LIES THE ROADBLOCK TO ACHIEVING AN
ACCOUNTING FOR OUR MISSING.

THE EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR DIA'S EFFORTS AS PREVIOUSLY STATED BY THE TASK
FORCE AND THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS HAVE BEEN MOST
ASSURING AND THAT SUPPORT WILL BE CALLED UPON SHOULD THE OCCASION ARISE. AT
PRESENT IT IS FELT THAT ACTIONS OF THE TASK FORCE AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE,
COUPLED WITH THOSE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE
COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA THROUGH ALL AVAILABLE DIPLOMATIC
CHANNELS IS OUR BEST COURSE OF ACTION TO ACHIEVE ADDITIONAL ACCOUNTING OF OUR
MISSING MEN. FURTHER RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE RESTS WITH THE INFORMATION HELD
BY THOSE GOVERNMENTS AND NOT IN THE INFORMATION HELD BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.
IN SPITE OF THE INTRANSIGENCE OF THESE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS ON THIS ISSUE, IT
IS DIA'S INTENT AND DUTY TO COLLECT AND ANALYZE ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION AND
FOR AS LONG AS NECESSARY.

DIA HAS PLACED THE HIGHEST PRIORITY ON INFORMATION RELATING TO AMERICANS WHO
MIGHT STILL BE ALIVE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE A
DEDICATED AND PROFESSIONAL EFFORT TOWARD A SUCCESSFUL ACCOUNTING FOR AMERICANS
MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I WANT YOU TO KNOW DIA'S RESOLVE IS UNWAVERING. LIEUTENANT
GENERAL WILLIAMS, MYSELF, RADM PAULSON AND HIS STAFF WILL CONTINUE TO
COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH YOUR TASK FORCE.

DRAFT

Jan 10, 2025

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) 10 USC 424
(b)(3) 50 USC 3605
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct



Jan 10, 2025

000085

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

~~RICHARD J. KERR~~

APPEARANCE BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE

25 NOVEMBER 1991

Jan 10, 2025

000086

~~SECRET~~21 November 1991
OCA 4837-91

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Robert W. Magner
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs
Office of Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Closed Briefing 25 November 1991

1. You will be making a brief opening statement to the Committee. This will go a long way toward convincing the Committee of the Intelligence Community's commitment to support its work. We have included reference to sources and methods in your remarks because this will be one of the key issues as the Committee presses for full declassification of all materials related to POW/MIA matters.

2. Our understanding is that the Committee is interested primarily in an informal exchange of information with only limited structure. We do not anticipate that you will be asked any particular questions. Essentially the Committee wants a brief update on what the various agencies are doing in this area and then turn to questions. DIA's prepared talking points reflect that understanding as does the short statement prepared for ADDO Price. Both are in your briefing book. We anticipate having NSA's statement shortly.

3. There are likely to be several areas the Senators will want to explore. One is the whole issue of sources and methods and why sources of considerable vintage and not of central value must be protected. We have taken the position that while we are redacting all reporting to be shown to the Committee staff we will, upon request, show unredacted information to members or cleared staff on a case by case basis. This is an even more liberal policy than is our practice with the Oversight Committees. CIA and DIA have worked out agreed guidelines in this area, a copy of which is in the background material. These guidelines have been shown to Committee staff but not accepted by them.

4. A second issue concerns Laos. The Senators are likely to focus on the large number of unresolved cases in Laos. DIA and CIA will be prepared to respond in detail. There is also keen interest in the status of civilian intelligence operatives

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Jan 10 2025

000087

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SUBJECT: POW/MIA Closed Briefing 20 November 1991

missing in Laos. Again CIA and DIA will be prepared to address. Finally there is specific interest in the 1981 CIA operation into Laos and any subsequent cross border activity. CIA will address these activities in detail.

5. There is also the issue of POW/MIA family members having access to classified materials. DOD is seeking to develop a policy in this area in response to Congressional pressure. DIA and CIA have some concerns but will be supportive so long as sources and methods are protected.

6. Overall we anticipate most of this meeting being an information gathering session with the Senators asking questions that they could not get answers to in the open session. Hopefully in this process two points will be made. One that there are strong reasons for keeping some of the materials relating to POW/MIA in classified form. Secondly, there is a need for the Committee to address classified issues in a closed forum. On the latter point, both Senator's Kerry and Smith pressed DIA to discuss code breaking in Laos in open session. NSA will address this issue in the closed session and other speakers will be supportive.

7. There is general agreement that there must be a positive and forthcoming attitude toward responding to the Committee's interests. Yet all agencies want to avoid carte blanche access to all information that includes data revealing sources and the methods of acquisition. Even more, they want to uphold the overall principal of such protections because of the larger equities involved.

Robert W. Magner

(b)(6)

2
Jan 10 2025

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000088

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DDCI Opening Remarks

ADDO Statement

NSA Statement

DIA Statement

Qs & As

Background Information

- 19 Sep 91 Letter from ADCI to Richard B. Cheney,
The Secretary of Defense
- 04 Oct 91 Categories for Review/Redaction with
Release of Classified POW/MIA Documents to
Appropriately SCI Cleared Staff of Temporary
Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
- 18 Nov 91 Memorandum for the Record re POW/MIA
Committee Hearing on 15 November
- 12 Nov 85 Memorandum for National Foreign Intelligence
Board re Interagency Committee on Vietnam MIA's/POW's
- 1986 Memorandum of Understanding between the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA)

Jan 10, 2025

000089

Jan 10, 2025

000090

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, I AM PLEASED TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU THIS AFTERNOON TO UNDERSCORE THE IMPORTANCE THAT I AND THE WHOLE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ATTACH TO YOUR EFFORTS TO WORK TOWARD A FINAL RESOLUTION OF LONGSTANDING CONCERNS ABOUT POWS AND MIAS FROM THE INDOCHINA WAR. I REGRET THAT MY SCHEDULE ALLOWS ONLY A BRIEF APPEARANCE TODAY. I HAVE, HOWEVER, BROUGHT WITH ME SENIOR MEMBERS FROM THE CONCERNED AGENCIES--AND THEIR RESPECTIVE EXPERTS--WHO ARE PREPARED TO BRIEF YOU ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THEIR AGENCIES AND RESPOND TO YOUR QUESTIONS. FROM THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY--THE LEAD AGENCY FOR THE COMMUNITY ON THIS ISSUE--IS ITS NEW DIRECTOR, GENERAL CLAPPER. FROM THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY IS ITS CHIEF OF STAFF, DONALD PARSONS, AND FROM CIA IS ASSOCIATE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS TED PRICE.

LET ME SAY EMPHATICALLY AT THE OUTSET THAT THE WORK OF YOUR NEW COMMITTEE HAS MY FULL SUPPORT AND THAT OF THE DCI. THE SUBJECT OF POW/MIAS IS A DIFFICULT AND HIGHLY EMOTIONAL ONE. I AM AWARE OF THE INTENSE INTEREST IN IT, AND OF THE IMPORTANT ROLE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS PLAYED AND CONTINUES TO PLAY IN DEVELOPING AND DISSEMINATING INFORMATION ON IT. I ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE STRONG VIEWS ABOUT

Jan 10, 2025

000091

INTELLIGENCE REPORTING AND ITS AVAILABILITY TO THOSE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE FATE OF INDIVIDUALS STILL MISSING IN INDOCHINA. I HOPE THAT THROUGH THIS PROCESS THOSE CONCERNS CAN BE PUT TO REST.

THE DCI HAS THE STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROTECTING INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS. I WANT TO ASSURE YOU, HOWEVER, THAT THE INTERAGENCY TEAM THAT HAS BEEN ASSEMBLED WILL BE AS RESPONSIVE AS POSSIBLE IN SETTING ITS GUIDELINES AND IN DEALING WITH THE COMMITTEE'S INTERESTS. ONLY WHEN IT IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR THE PROTECTION OF THOSE SOURCES AND METHODS WILL THERE BE ANY LIMITATIONS ON THE MATERIALS TO BE REVIEWED, AND ANY SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION WILL BE PROVIDED TO YOU.

THROUGHOUT THIS PROCESS I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE MAY WELL BE AREAS OF DIFFICULTY OR DISAGREEMENT, BUT I ASSURE YOU THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS COMMITTED TO WORKING WITH YOU TO REACH ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FULL SHARING OF INFORMATION. I ALSO CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THE COMMUNITY WILL CONTINUE TO ATTACH THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO COLLECTING AND DISSEMINATING INFORMATION ON THE POW/MIA ISSUE AND WILL DEVOTE SUBSTANTIAL RESOURCES WORLDWIDE TO THAT EFFORT. WE WANT TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE.

Jan 10, 2025

000092

LET ME NOW TURN TO THE AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES, EACH OF
WHOM HAS PREPARED REMARKS ADDRESSING THE ACTIVITIES OF
THEIR INDIVIDUAL AGENCIES.

THANK YOU.

Jan 10, 2025

000093

ADDO Statement

Jan 10, 2025

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Mr. Chairman, members of Committee, I welcome this opportunity to discuss CIA's role in resolving the status of prisoners-of-war (POW) and missing-in-action (MIA) from the war in Indochina.

- This issue has remained an important collection requirement since the beginning of U. S. involvement in the war in Indochina.

- CIA is committed to continue its intelligence collection program and provide whatever resources are necessary to resolve the status of Indochina War POW's and MIA's.

- As the DCI stated earlier, we are determined to cooperate with the lead Agency, DIA, in every way possible consistent with our statutory requirement to protect sources and methods, in making available to your Committee and to other appropriate recipients, materials bearing on this issue.

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Jan 10, 2025

000095

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-- Let me emphasize that in almost every instance, we believe we will be able to satisfy your legitimate informational needs on this matter.

To underscore our commitment, I want to assure you that the first question our officers in the field ask of agents or other contacts whom they believe might have access to information on this subject is what do they know about American POW's or MIA's.

-- We ask about the fate of MIA's, details on crash sites, grave locations, live sightings, attitudes and policies of governments involved in this matter, efforts by these governments to exploit, conceal or distort information and reactions to U. S. investigative teams.

-- This is an important requirement for our stations worldwide; last year, over 20 in East Asia, Europe, and the U. S. forwarded reports on this issue.

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Jan 10, 2025

000096

- We periodically cable collection guidance to all stations underscoring our emphasis on this matter; the last such cable was sent in July.

 - Through the years, in collecting information from unilateral agents, contacts, refugee debriefings, liaison services, travelers, defectors and walk-ins worldwide, we have virtually left no stone unturned.

 - We continue to press our liaison counterparts who have unique access: the Germans are debriefing former East Germans security officials, and Asian and European services have tried to verify information on POW's-MIA's in Hanoi, where until earlier this year the USG had no presence.
-
- We have used imagery to cover suspicious areas and possible prison and detention sites. One such mission led to an extensive follow-up operation I will describe later.

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Jan 10, 2025

000097

Once collected, we disseminate intelligence expeditiously to authorized customers for action.

-- Between 1973 and the present, we have disseminated approximately 630 reports on subjects such as the downing of U. S. aircraft, possible grave sites, sightings of U. S. servicemen, alleged discovery of remains and Hanoi's position on U. S. MIA's.

-- Some 6.5 linear feet of material covering reporting between 1964 and 1979 has been declassified in response to FOIA requests.

I would like to describe a mission undertaken in Laos in 1981 to confirm or refute the presence of U. S. prisoners in a remote jungle prison.

-- This operation involved human source collection, imagery, cooperation with liaison and extensive coordination with several U. S. government agencies.

-- The first information came from a liaison contact who said he was told by senior Lao government officials that American POW's were in this prison.

-- Imagery identified what appeared to be the figure "52" in the camp garden. Intensive photographic analysis indicated the shadows of the camp's prisoners appeared to be longer than those of Asians.

-- Thousands of man hours were expended over a several month period to train, prepare, equip and brief a reconnaissance team, which executed this dangerous mission within a few months of first reporting on this installation.

-- The team reported observing only Asians under detention in this prison. Their photography of the facility confirmed their observations.

Mr. Chairman, we in CIA are committed to resolving the POW-MIA matter, and our resources are turned to this purpose.

This concludes my statement.

5

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Jan 10, 2025

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DIA Statement

Jan 10, 2025

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NSA Statement

Jan 10, 2025

000101

TALKING POINTS FOR GEN CLAPPER

DIA'S PRIMARY MISSION IS LIVE PRISONER ISSUE --- COLLECTING (STONY BEACH), ANALYZING AND REPORTING ON ANY AMERICANS STILL HELD IN CAPTIVITY.

SECONDARY MISSIONS INVOLVE SUPPORT TO DC AREA POLICY OFFICIALS AND ANALYTIC SUPPORT TO CINCPAC/JCRC FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING EFFORTS.

BOTH MISSIONS INVOLVE HIGHLY SPECIALIZED ANALYSIS THAT USUALLY MUST RELY ON SKETCHY DETAIL. THIS ANALYSIS IN AN ARTFORM REQUIRING CONSIDERABLE OJT.

DIA POW-MIA OFFICE CONTINUOUSLY IN EXISTENCE SINCE VIETNAM WAR. REVIEW POW-MIA AND STONY BEACH RESOURCE NUMBERS ON REVERSE.

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)

TIMELY RESOLUTION OF PHOTO CASES AND OTHER HIGH VISIBILITY DISCREPANCY CASES HAS UNDERScoreD THE VALUE OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED BY OVERT FIELD INVESTIGATION.

[REDACTED] EFFORTS IN-COUNTRY ARE A MAJOR NEW THRUST OF DIA'S EFFORTS (TALK THRU [REDACTED])

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

WHAT IS NOW CRITICAL IS GETTING VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIAN GOV'T APPROVAL OF A LIVE SIGHTING INVESTIGATION REGIME SIMILAR TO ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS HAMMERED OUT WITH THE SOVIETS -- NAMELY, NO NOTICE VISITATIONS TO SITES OF FIRST HAND SIGHTING REPORTS AND CERTAIN OTHER CAMPS AND PRISONS THAT COULD POTENTIALLY BE INVOLVED IN HOLDING AMERICAN PRISONERS.

DIA IS NOW WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE JOINT STAFF AND CINCPAC TO INTEGRATE OUR ANALYTIC AND COLLECTION EFFORTS WITH CINCPAC'S PROPOSED POW-MIA JOINT TASK FORCE. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

DIA'S BOTTOM LINE:

- o ISSUE RECEIVING APPROPRIATE PRIORITY WITHIN DIA
 - OFFICE REPORTS TO COMMAND ELEMENT
 - NECESSARY BILLETTS TAKEN OUT OF HIDE BEFORE ACTIVE CONG INTEREST
 - AGGRESSIVE, MOTIVATED AND KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONNEL ASSIGNED

- o OTHER INTEL AGENCIES PROVIDING STRONG SUPPORT

- o [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

- o DOD POLICY OFFICIALS NO LONGER RELYING ON DIA TO "CARRY THE WEIGHT"

- o DIA IS READY, WILLING AND ABLE TO FULLY SUPPORT THIS COMMITTEE AND THE WHAT HAS BECOME KNOWN AS THE GOVERNMENT'S "FULL COURT PRESS" OVER THE NEXT 2 OR 3 YEARS.

Jan 10, 2025

000102

Qs & As

Jan 10, 2025

000103

QUESTION: Please explain why certain information in reports on POW-MIA's still remains protected.

ANSWER: The documents were initially classified to protect national security interests which includes the protection of the source of the information, the place and manner in which it was acquired, any foreign intelligence service involvement, references to other operational activity and administrative details such as cryptonyms, field report numbers, source and field comments.

Source information continues to be classified despite the passage of time because of the continuing ramifications of protecting sources. Other sources would be wary of cooperating with us if we released information which pinpoints its origin with no regard for the effect this information might have on heirs, survivors or colleagues.

Involvement of foreign intelligence services is a highly sensitive matter and reflects not only on our continuing cooperative agreement with them, but also of foreign relations concerns should the facts of our involvement with a given service be revealed.

~~Jan 10, 2025~~

000104

QUESTION: What information has been declassified and released to the public via the FOIA?

ANSWER: Ann Mills Griffiths, Executive Director of the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia, filed an FOIA case in May 1979 requesting all documents and intelligence reports, not previously released, which originated or were held by CIA elements operating in Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia from May 1964-present (May 79) which relate to American POWs.

Six and one-half linear feet have been released to the public and DIA in response to this request. The information is compiled chronologically and it is contained in some twenty-two volumes representing periodic releases over a ten year period ending in 1989. A complete set is on file in Information Services Division, DDA in Ames Building.

These reports are in sanitized form, having details about sources and methods deleted from them. They may be passed, as is, in a body to a centrally controlled DIA reading room for access by the public. Privacy concerns of multiple American names in many reports have not been addressed and we defer to the DIA on this issue.

QUESTION: Is there any intelligence reporting to indicate the possible presence of POW-MIA's from the Indochina War being transferred to the Soviet Union or China?

ANSWER: We have neither substantive intelligence or fragmentary reporting which indicates that American POW's were transferred to the Soviet Union or China during the war. We are in the the process of querying the KGB on this issue. Because of the previous hostile environment in Moscow, collection on POW-MIA's was not a requirement of this station. Considering the changes in recent months, we will reemphasize this requirement to our station's in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

QUESTION: Are you familiar with the case of the mortician who claimed there were over 400 sets of remains of Americans from the Indochina War being warehoused in Hanoi?

ANSWER: Mr. Tran Viem Loc, a Vietnamese refugee residing in a refugee camp in Hong Kong, was interviewed by the Defense Liaison Office (DLO) in November 1979. During this interview, Mr. Loc asserted that he personally inspected the remains of over 400 U.S. military personnel which were in secret storage in Hanoi. The DLO requested polygraph support from Hong Kong station in an attempt to verify Mr. Loc's claim. The results of this test did not support Mr. Loc claims on either the 400 sets of remains or that he personally saw three alive American soldiers in Hanoi. A review of this polygraph by our Headquarters, a standard procedure, supported the call by the polygraph examiner. DIA subsequently polygraphed Mr. Loc in the United States with results that Mr. Loc was telling the truth with regard to the remains and the live Americans. At the time, DIA's conclusion was that the questions asked by our polygraph examiner were incorrect as to the dates used in the test questions. We have not seen a copy of the DIA polygraph report to make an analysis.

QUESTION: What can you tell us about the possible existence of POW-MIA's in Laos?

ANSWER: Over the years there have been continuing stories about the possible existence of POW's still being held in Laos. I spoke earlier of the reconnaissance mission that was conducted, as well as the attempts to locate POW-MIA's via imagery. There were reports of alleged POW working in gold mines or held being held in caves. A report regarding a caucasian spotted bathing in a stream in north Laos was investigated and to the best of our knowledge was a Czech geologist working in the area. Our capabilities in Laos are somewhat limited but we do attempt to followup and verify substantive reporting on POW-MIA's. We have no reporting to support the claim that there may still be POW's or MIA's being held in Laos. In fact, in spite of all our efforts over a number of years, we have received no credible evidence that there are in fact American prisoners being held in Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia.

With regard to pilots or crew members of Air America or Continental Air Service, there were nine individuals unaccounted as of mid-1973. All of these cases were turned over to the Department of Labor for resolution as the individuals were contract employees of the U.S. government.

QUESTION: Why was source information given away to the Vietnamese and Cambodian authorities in July 91 while at the same time we continue to protect refugee sources?

BACKGROUND: In July 1991 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Ken Quinn, passed a list of names of individuals to Cambodian and Vietnamese authorities requesting access to talk with these individuals on POW-MIA matters. He did this while visiting Hanoi and Phnom Penh on POW-MIA matters.

ANSWER: The individuals in question were not sources of intelligence but were individuals thought by State or the families of POW-MIA's to have possible information. This was not a clandestine intelligence collection activity. We do not know what, if any followup there has been on this issue as we were not involved in this overt collection effort.

QUESTION: Is it possible to provide the families of POW/MIA's access to a broader range of classified information?

ANSWER: We are willing to work in concert with DIA on this issue as they maintain the files on the individual POW or MIA's. Our concern is that sources and methods continue to be protected and we are hopeful that we can come up with a mutually beneficial solution. The files currently under review for this committee could possibly be made available to the families if properly controlled in a secure facility to which the families could be given access.

7
~~SECRET~~
Jan 10 2025

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QUESTION: Are you familiar with the events surrounding the fall of Lima Site 85 in March 1968?

ANSWER: Lima Site 85 was a TACAN facility located 25 kilometers from the North Vietnamese/Laotian border atop Phou Pha Thi mountain. The site was used to direct and control attacking jet fighters and bombers to their targets and to provide them with precise bomb release points, under radar control. The site was manned by 16 Air Force technicians and a FAC, all under cover as civilians, and two CIA officers. On 10 March 1968, the site began to receive heavy incoming mortar and artillery fire, and in the early morning hours that followed, 20 heavily armed infiltrators launched a surprise attack on the TACAN facility. Of the 19 Americans at the site, only five technicians and the two CIA personnel were extracted. One of our officers was wounded, five of the six technicians were wounded, one of them being hit by fire while in the helicopter and he died in route. The 11 remaining Americans were presumed dead.

An enemy buildup had been underway for several months in the area prior to the attack and intelligence reporting indicated that the safety of the site was questionable after 10 March.

Jan 10, 2025

000112

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

19 SEP 1991

The Honorable Richard B. Cheney
The Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Agency has been contacted by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence Duane P. Andrews concerning Senate Resolution 82 which creates a temporary Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. It is my understanding that this Committee will request access to Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) files, some of which contain CIA-generated classified information. Assistant Secretary Andrews has asked that the Agency work with the Department of Defense (DoD) to develop guidelines concerning Committee access to these files.

In response to Secretary Andrews' request for assistance, Agency officers are working with the newly-created POW/MIA Data Release Office to review DIA files. Once these officers have determined the scope and sensitivity of the CIA-originated information in the files, we will be able to develop appropriate guidelines for use with the Committee. In addition, I have designated a senior attorney in the Office of General Counsel to work with DoD attorneys to negotiate with the Select Committee concerning access to classified information in the files. I want to assure you that the Agency will cooperate fully with the Committee, and I am confident that guidelines can be developed that will ensure full compliance with the spirit of Senate Resolution 82 while at the same time meeting our statutory duty to protect intelligence sources and methods.

I have designated Jack O'Donnell, Chief, Policy and Coordination Staff as the Agency's point of contact on this matter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Richard J. Kerr".

Richard J. Kerr
Acting Director of Central Intelligence

Jan 10, 2025

000113

4 OCT 91

CATEGORIES FOR REVIEW/REDACTION WITH RELEASE OF
CLASSIFIED POW/MIA DOCUMENTS TO APPROPRIATELY
SCI CLEARED STAFF OF TEMPORARY SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS.

REPORT ORIGINATOR

REDACT

RATIONALE

DoD HUMINT

STONY BEACH team members' names

Compromise the safety and mission of US collection personnel

Detailed source data/biographic reports/source numbers

Jeopardize safety of sources

Ongoing clandestine operational data

Reveal extent and involvement of US intelligence operations; cause extreme embarrassment to the Thai or other foreign governments

NSA

Ongoing operations

When SIGINT reporting related to ongoing operations is received, it will be reviewed to ensure operations would not be jeopardized or collection methods compromised. Content that would reveal ongoing POW/MIA operations or other intelligence sources will be protected.

Not applicable

Historical SIGINT can be released at the Secret SCI level

~~SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL~~

STATE	U.S. Government policies under negotiation	Would compromise ongoing US foreign policy positions and interests
ASD/ISA	Not applicable	Classified cables can be released
OVERHEAD IMAGERY	Not applicable	Images can be released at the SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL level
DEBRIEFS	Not releasable	Executive Order 11652 dated 8 Mar 72; ASD/ISA memo I-86/19832, dated 3 Jan 87; release of this information would violate confidentiality agreements with returned POWS.
CIA	Source/asset identifying data	Jeopardize safety of sources
	Agency employee identification	Compromise the safety and mission of US government personnel
	Foreign liaison identifying information; third agency information with appropriate referral information added; place acquired (when clandestine collection involved); field report number; cryptonyms; current operational activities.	Reveal extent and nature of US government clandestine operations
	Methodology	Identifies sensitive operational methods and capability

~~SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL~~

Jan 10, 2025

000115

~~SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL~~

Intelligence
Reports/Evaluation
of Reports

Employee identification

Could open unauthorized lines of communication or create pressures for unauthorized release of intelligence material. In addition, for analyst evaluation of reports, information received at a later date may have confirmed, changed or invalidated an earlier evaluation. The current agency position on the analysis over time is more relevant to understanding the case, and would be provided as required.

NOTES:

1. Although material has been redacted based on guidelines established above, all the documents retain their original classification.
2. Material extracted from the file will be noted on the file index (e.g., "source biographic sheet is not included").
3. Information that has been extracted or redacted from original file can be reviewed by committee members. Staff will be allowed to review the original files on a case-by-case basis.
4. All classified material requires handling and protection in accordance with Senate Resolution 400 as adopted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

~~SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL~~

Jan 10, 2025

000116

~~SECRET~~
CIA CRITERIA

DELETE

- Source/Asset identifying data (an identifying number corresponding to the DIA file will be assigned for inquiry and accountability purposes)
- Foreign liaison identifying information
- Third Agency Information with appropriate referral information added
- Place acquired where clandestine collection involved
- Agency employee identification (requires DIA assistance since such information will likely not appear in the CIA report but in collateral documents)
- Cryptonyms
- Field Report Number
- Reference to current operational activities
- Methodology

RULES

- Staffer clearances will be granted on the same basis as those of SSCI staffers.
- Committee members may view original reports at DIA (where record file maintained) or at CIA; Staffer access to original reports will be on case by case basis based upon demonstrated compelling need. .
- Committee may not release Agency-associated classified information to the public without prior Agency declassification.
- Storage of classified material will be in accordance with procedures established for SSCI storage and as worked out with Senate Security Officer DiSilvestro.

OCA 4821-91
18 November 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Committee Hearing on 15 November

1. I attended a portion of the above-mentioned open Hearing (list of members attached). This was an opportunity for the Administration in the persons of Bob Sheetz of DIA, Ken Quinn from State and Carl Ford from DOD/ISA to address some of the charges made by other witnesses before the Committee the previous week. Ford's Statement is attached.

2. During the questions period, several areas of inquiry developed which could bear on the closed briefing now scheduled for 1430 on 20 November in S407. Agency participants at that briefing should be prepared to deal with some if not all of these issues.

3. Although unrelated to the actual focus of the investigation, there was considerable interest in the possible presence of POW/MIAs in the Soviet Union given the recent press article on that possibility. The Senators asked specifically if there had been contact with the KGB to inquire about this. State noted the diplomatic efforts. The Agency rep could be asked about contact with the KGB.

4. Ken Quinn was asked repeatedly about a list of individuals in Indochina who allegedly had information about POW/MIAs which he had given to the Vietnamese and Cambodian authorities in July 1991. Senators Smith and Grassley in particular asked if, in effect, he was not passing source information. They went on to ask why the Administration would give away one type of source information while vigorously guarding the refugee reporting sources. Quinn explained the difference between people who are in fact intelligence sources and those we believe have information and with whom we wanted to be in contact. Smith and/or Grassley can be counted on to raise the same issue at the closed briefing.

5. Carl Ford raised the issue of providing POW/MIA family members access to a broader range of classified information, saying that he is wrestling with how to arrange such access.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Jan 10, 2025

000118

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Committee Hearing on 15 November

(In an earlier conversation Keith Hall told me that this is something that Defense is pushing and will eventually need an Agency input relative to the inclusion of CIA material in the DOD holdings.) The Agency rep should be prepared with some form of response if this issue comes up. Senator Robb was particularly interested in this aspect of the discussion.

6. Senator Kerry wanted information on those unaccounted for in the "secret war" in Laos. He wanted to know if they were in the overall 2,000 plus figure carried as POW/MIA. Ford said that it was only in the late 70's that those clandestine operatives were included in the overall count. Up to that time, there had been a secret list of such POW/MIAs. This bothered Kerry a great deal, and he can be certain to ask the Agency representative for more information.

7. Kerry asked about code breaking in Laos in 1968-1973. Witnesses declined to respond in open testimony and pointed to the absence of an NSA representative. This issue is certain to arise in the closed briefing. Senator Smith also asked specifically if there had been any operations into Laos in the period after 1973. Ford said he didn't know, and Smith was incredulous. Quinn said that he had recently learned from another witness----of one operation. None of the witness had any personal knowledge of such operations. The Agency representative should be prepared to address this issue in detail.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

8. Overall there was a very heavy emphasis on the Laotian situation throughout the Q and A period reflecting an apparent belief on the part of some Committee members that there is far less accountability for POW/MIAs in Laos and more evidence of their possible presence there after Operation Homecoming in 1973. Agency representatives should be prepared to deal especially with reporting on Laos and operational activity there related to POW/MIA matters.

(b)(6)

Robert W. Magner
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs
Office of Congressional Affairs

Attachment

Jan 10²/2025

000119

OCA 4821-91

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Committee Hearing on 15 November

OCA/Senate/RWMagner [redacted] (18 Nov 91)

(b)(3) CIAAct

Distribution:

(b)(6)

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Subject

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE OF POW-MIA

Offices: 705 Senate Hart Office Building
Main Office Number: (202) 224-2038
Majority Staff Director Frances Zwenig: 202-224-2038
Minority Staff Director Al Ptak: 202-224-2306

MAJORITY:

Chairman John Kerry, Mass.

Thomas Daschle, S.D.

Harry Reid, Nev.

Charles Robb, Va.

Robert Kerry, Neb.

Herb Kohl, Wisc.

MINORITY:

Vice Chairman Robert
Smith, N.H.

John McCain, Ariz.

Jesse Helms, N.C.

Nancy Kassebaum, Kan.

Charles Grassley, Iowa

Hank Brown, Colo.

Jan 10, 2025

000121

TESTIMONY AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY

BY

**PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

CARL W. FORD, JR.

**BEFORE
THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS**

NOVEMBER 15, 1991

Jan 10, 2025

000122

**TESTIMONY
AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY
BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS**

Carl W. Ford, Jr.

**Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)**

November 15, 1991

Mr. Chairman, Senator Smith, members of the Committee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to return to comment on issues that have arisen during the three days of historic hearings that you convened last week on the POW/MIA issue.

First, I would like to clarify a point that came up in last Thursday's testimony concerning the "last known alive" discrepancy cases. The definition of a discrepancy case is:

A case about which the USG has convincing evidence that the Governments of Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia should have specific knowledge.

The term "discrepancy case" includes not only individuals who were "last known alive, but also individuals who were known dead, but for whom the Indochinese Governments should be able to provide information or remains. As you can see, the definition is broad. Within this broad definition, we have identified three subcategories of cases. We did this because over the years a great deal of confusion has developed over what

Jan 10, 2025

000123

precisely we were talking about--the terms "discrepancy case," "compelling case," "last known alive case," "Vessey case," all meant different things to different people.

The three subcategories of discrepancy cases are:

LAST KNOWN ALIVE: Those cases in which the US has information that the individual survived the loss incident and fell into enemy hands. In the case of air incidents, this includes cases in which the crew members are believed to have successfully exited their aircraft and to have been alive on the ground. In the case of ground incidents, this includes cases in which the individuals were last known alive, were not gravely wounded, and were in proximity to enemy forces who should have specific knowledge of the incident.

POW AT HOMECOMING: A specific group of individuals who, during the Vietnam War, were classified by their commanding officers and Service Secretaries as POWs but did not return during Operation Homecoming. These cases are also known to many families as "last known alive" due to their POW status. There were 97 individuals so listed. Subsequently, 42 "listed POWs" have been accounted for through unilateral SRV repatriation. The remainder are still unaccounted for.

Jan 10, 2025

000124

KNOWLEDGE OF THE INCIDENT:

Circumstances of loss or subsequent information is convincing that Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia should have knowledge of the incident. In some of these cases, there is convincing evidence that the individual did not survive the incident of loss. In many cases, there is convincing evidence that Vietnam also has remains.

With this background, now I will shift to the 119 individuals who have been discussed in the testimony here, called variously "Vessey cases" and the "Vessey discrepancy cases." The first point to make is that, from the beginning, the list was not meant to be all-encompassing. In 1988, DIA, JCRC, General Vessey and the Office of the Secretary of Defense worked together to develop a list of most compelling last known alive cases, as well as other discrepancy cases, i.e., cases of individuals for whom the Vietnamese should have knowledge of the fate of the individual and remains if the individual is dead. *The list was not exhaustive, merely illustrative.* The primary purpose was to shed light on the live prisoner issue by asking the Vietnamese to help us solve cases in which there was either hard evidence or a strong possibility that the individual survived the incident of loss, but did not return at Operation Homecoming, and for whom, as of 1987, there had been no accounting. So far, despite our investigative efforts, we have not returned any live Americans or uncovered proof that unaccounted for Americans are alive in Vietnam.

There are additional cases, beyond the 119 individuals, which fit into the discrepancy case definition. Again, not all of the "Vessey" discrepancy

Jan 10, 2025

000125

cases involve individuals who were last known alive. Some of them involve individuals who are known dead—but the Vietnamese should be able to provide information or remains.

In addition to the 119 individuals whose cases were presented to the Vietnamese by General Vessey, we determined that there are 64 other individuals who meet the "last known alive" definition as well as 13 individuals who were classified by their respective Service Secretary as a POW at Operation Homecoming in 1973, and who are not included in the "Vessey" cases who are otherwise not accounted for. This group of cases will be the focus of the full time efforts of the Hanoi Office under the USCINCPAC Joint Task Force earlier described to this committee by General Christmas. They will all be investigated within Phase I of the USCINCPAC plan.

DIA as Family Outreach Organization

Next, I would like to address an issue that has been implicit in the testimony you have heard from many family members regarding DIA. The issue of family members and DIA analysts meeting directly to discuss individual cases has proved problematic. DIA is an intelligence collection and analysis agency. Their personnel are not trained for family outreach and the function of family outreach is not an appropriate one for that agency. The families' primary point of contact for discussion of their cases is the designated Service Casualty Affairs Office. Those offices are staffed with personnel trained to perform the family outreach role. In the case where a

Jan 10, 2025

000126

family is dissatisfied with the service received from the Service Casualty Affairs Office, the proper place to redress that problem is with my office.

The problems experienced within DIA that resulted in the changes made by the Secretary's Management Inquiry related to functions assumed by the PW-MIA Office that were not within their mission. Those functions have been removed and placed within my office.

Allegations by Dr. O'Grady

We certainly understand the grief felt by Dr. O'Grady over her family's loss. We have reviewed the O'Grady case file and we believe that Dr. O'Grady's family has been properly served by our casualty affairs process. The O'Grady case is one in which we believe that the family has been promptly and accurately notified about investigative activity and information relating to the case.

Dr. O'Grady's sweeping allegations of Government nonfeasance, malfeasance and misfeasance are without factual basis. For example, Dr. O'Grady states that her family was advised from the time that her father became missing that he was dead. That statement is quite simply wrong. From immediately after his incident of loss, the Air Force believed there was a good possibility he survived. He was seen to eject from his aircraft. He was seen with a good parachute, and his chute was seen on the ground, but he was not in it. All indications were that he survived his ejection.

Jan 10, 2025

000127

Colonel O'Grady was carried in a missing in action status until 1977 when his status was reviewed, at the express request of his wife, and his status changed to deceased and a Presumptive Finding of Death was entered in his case.

A second, most serious allegation was made by Dr. O'Grady which requires discussion. She alleged in her testimony that "identifications were made with teeth and teeth fragments but when independent forensic anthropologists were consulted, there were no dental records to be compared to. Again, this is absolutely false. There has never been a dental identification rendered by the U. S. Army Central Identification Laboratory without benefit of dental records. In every case, either a ante-mortem dental X-ray or a dental chart was available to provide the factual predicate for the dental identification. No other forensic laboratory in the world has as many independent procedural safeguards as has the Central Identification Laboratory. Should you have any further questions on this point, I have the Commander, U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory available to respond.

I have a detailed written response to the other allegations made by Dr. O'Grady in her testimony that I would like to submit for the record.

Robertson, Stevens and Lundy Response

As dissatisfied with the Department's performance as the families clearly are, the Department of Defense has vigorously pursued the

Jan 10, 2025

000128

investigation of the photo. I have personally made myself available to the families to answer their questions and respond to their concerns, as has my staff and the Director of the DIA Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs. We have been unable to either confirm or disprove the identifications of the subjects of the photo made by the family members. We are continuing to investigate the photograph. Any intimation by the families that there has been less than an honest effort to investigate and locate the source of the photo is disingenuous. The facts establish otherwise. We have requested assistance from the Vietnamese at the highest levels of Government. We have sent three separate investigative teams to Cambodia to follow-up information and attempt to locate the source of the photograph. We have requested all of our Defense Attaches, world-wide to search for the photo in Eastern-bloc magazines. We have tasked national technical means to obtain information on reports associated with the photographs and have established all-source collection requirements to obtain additional information about the photo, the individuals or the associated reporting. We are continuing to investigate vigorously, however, without some new leads, we may not be able to solve the mystery of this photo.

Finally, and this is an important point, Colonel Robertson's case is not closed. It is still under active investigation and any preliminary judgements made have been set aside pending further investigative activity and information.

I would like to submit a brief written response to the specific allegations contained within the testimony of the families for the record.

Jan 10, 2025

000129

Donohue Allegations

Mr. Donohue stated in previous testimony that he has information about his brother, Captain Morgan Donohue, lost in Laos on 13 December 1968, and relates the fact that the presence in intelligence reporting of his father's zip code is proof that his brother is still alive in Laos, because only his brother could know the postal zip code of his father. In fact, the postal zip code of Major Donohue's father was contained within a widely circulated flyer that the family prepared and distributed throughout Southeast Asia. It is not unusual that information contained in such flyers later shows up in intelligence reports about American POWs.

Lost Records

There have been allegations made that fingerprint and other records have "mysteriously" disappeared from DoD files. There is no conspiracy to purge records. The Department of Defense does not maintain fingerprint records. The FBI is the sole agency with that responsibility. I request that this letter, from FBI Director Sessions to Congressman Solarz explaining "lost" or purged fingerprint records be entered in the record.

To prevent a recurrence of this problem in the future, I have tasked the Service Secretaries to examine possible alternatives to establish a redundant, independent source for military fingerprints separate from the FBI records. I will report to the Committee and to the families when we have implemented a solution to this problem.

Jan 10, 2025

000130

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Minority Staff Report

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Tracy Usry of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Minority staff came before this Committee to defend the minority staff report, An Examination of U. S. Policy Toward POW/MIAs, authored in large measure by himself. That report is replete with factual errors. I would like to take just a moment to discuss a few of the most glaring examples of poor research and error.

On page 5-8 of the Report, the staff states:

"In fact, only 591 U.S. POWs were repatriated by the North Vietnamese during Operation HOMECOMING, which is 12% of the figure of 5,000 U.S. POWs held by the North Vietnamese reported by the *New York Times*.

The original New York Times article, the primary source material, appeared on the front page of the 6 March 1973 issue. The number "5,000" appeared only once in the entire article—quoting an American source who stated at a meeting of the Joint Military Commission the previous day, North Vietnam had demanded the release of 5,000 Communist prisoners held by Saigon.

This 5,000 number cited incorrectly in the report has been oft-quoted by POW activists and is used within the report to lend

Jan 10, 2025

000131

credence to the allegation that 85 % of American prisoners of war were withheld by Hanoi after Operation Homecoming.

A second glaring inaccuracy is found in the Prologue to Part II, page i. The report states:

"In spite of 1,400 unresolved reports of first hand live-sightings, the Department of Defense, remarkably, still believes it has "no credible evidence." How does it dismiss these reports?

In fact, there are numerous inaccuracies in just that simple statement. First, while there have been cumulatively over 1,400 first-hand live sighting reports, only approximately 100 are unresolved. Second, live-sighting reports have not been dismissed. In over 75 percent of the first-hand live sightings received, DIA analysts have been able to establish that the report is true. These reports involve POWs who returned at Operation Homecoming, or have been correlated to other Americans or Westerners, such as missionaries or individuals stranded in South Vietnam when the Communists took control. Almost three hundred relate to Private Garwood, who returned from Vietnam in 1979.

There are numerous other factual inaccuracies throughout the report. To catalogue the inaccuracies would require a document of equal length and would be beyond the scope of my testimony here today. Further, to do so would require diverting manpower from

Jan 10, 2025

000132

more important tasks related to the function of investigating POW/MIA cases.

A more important issue that this Committee should address of Mr. Usry is why he and other staff members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff have withheld from the Department of Defense information relevant to the investigation of the Stevens case and the Borah case. Not only has Mr. Usry withheld information that would have assisted the Department of Defense in more expeditiously investigating these cases, but he has stood by while Senate staff members directed sources not to provide their information to members of my staff, the DIA, or others within the Department of Defense investigating these cases.

I am personally outraged by the obstruction that Mr. Usry has presented to the DoD investigations of these cases. That any American would withhold relevant information or otherwise not cooperate with an on-going DoD POW/MIA investigation is shocking and should not be tolerated by you—his employers—the Members of the United States Senate. The families of the two individuals deserve better treatment than that.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that you will question Mr. Usry about how long he had the Borah information before July 1991. When the Department of Defense finally received the information, we resolved the case in less than 2 months.

Jan 10, 2025

000133

Response to Judge Gayden's Allegations

The Borah and Carr families have been the losers as a result of the allegations made by a number of individuals before this Committee. Family confidence in their Government has been further eroded by the unsubstantiated and specious claims of Government conspiracy. Mr. Sheetz will later discuss the Carr case in detail, however, I would like to spend a moment on the Borah case and the allegations made by Judge Gayden before this Committee.

Judge Gayden's allegation that the Department of Defense would knowingly provide to the family, the Congress and the American people altered photographs of the meeting between our investigator, Bill Gadoury, and the individual is ludicrous. Even more disturbing is the fact that Judge Gayden, an officer of a court, would allege that he had obtained a photo analysis of the photos of the meeting and then assert that the DoD photos are frauds. This Committee can not stand by and let these gross distortions of fact go unnoticed. If Judge Gayden's photo experts believe the DoD photos are a fraud, he should produce their reports, or their testimony, or an affidavit or other suitable evidence.

Our investigators, with the help of the Lao, found the individual photographed in Laos and identified as Lieutenant Borah. The individual is not Lieutenant Borah. The Borah family has been convinced by Judge Gayden's bailiff, Khambang Sibounheuang, that the individual is Lieutenant Borah, and Khambang has accompanied the two Borah sons to Laos. Khambang's blood relative in Laos passed the roll of film containing

Jan 10, 2025

000134

the Borah photos to Khambang in the United States. Khambang has a long history of providing POW related materials, from as early as 1985; and none-- not one-- of his leads has ever proven valid.

I have a fact sheet on Khambang that I would request be entered into the record. The Judge Gayden/Khambang connection needs to be thoroughly investigated. I hope that this Committee will undertake that task.

Bailey Cooperation

Finally, I would like to clarify a point raised by Lieutenant Colonel Bailey in his testimony. Lieutenant Colonel Bailey suggested that the Secretary of Defense may have misspoken in his testimony before this Committee. Lieutenant Colonel Bailey suggested that the Secretary was mistaken in his recitation of what Bailey agreed to provide to the Department of Defense in Thailand and that he was further mistaken in attributing to Bailey a comment that the "Carr" photograph "may have been" taken in Thailand or Burma. I would like to make clear for the record that the Secretary of Defense did not misspeak nor was he mistaken in any of the testimony he provided to this committee relative to Lieutenant Colonel Bailey.

Bailey's promises of cooperation were made to the Secretary of Defense in the presence of myself, and Congressmen McCloskey and Visclosky in the Secretary's office. The Secretary's testimony correctly reflected who and

Jan 10, 2025

000135

what Bailey stated he would make available to our investigators. It also correctly reflected what Bailey told our investigators in Bangkok about where the photograph may have been taken. We have a chronology of our conversations with Bailey which I would like to make a part of the record. I have with me the individuals who were involved in the Carr investigation with Colonel Bailey and who will provide you the facts about their investigation. Mr. Bob Sheetz, the Chief of the Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs will address the specifics of the conduct of the Carr investigation of which Bailey was a part.

Thank you Mr. Chairman and Senator Smith. I am prepared now to respond to your questions.

Jan 10, 2025

000136

12 NOV 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Interagency Committee on Vietnam MIA's/POW's

1. I hereby establish an Interagency Committee on Vietnam MIA's/POW's under the chairmanship of Brigadier General James Shufelt (DIA). The purpose of the Committee is to exhaust all intelligence within the Community regarding the location and identification of Americans who might be held or interned in Southeast Asia.

2. I request that the appropriate NFIB agencies nominate representatives to serve on the Committee under Brigadier General Shufelt's chairmanship. Representatives will also be responsible for ensuring that any intelligence information presently held within the Intelligence Community is proffered to the Committee.

3. I am asking Lieutenant General Leonard Perroots, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, to oversee this activity on my behalf.

William J. Casey

William J. Casey

Distribution:

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CONFIDENTIAL
Jan 10, 2025

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000137

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

between the

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA)

and the

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SERVICE INTELLIGENCE REPRESENTATIVES

on

PARTICIPATION AT INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INDOCHINA PW/MIAS MEETINGS

A. PURPOSE

This memorandum of understanding clarifies the roles and responsibilities of each organization during participation in Interagency Committee on Indochina PW/MIAs meetings on the collection, oversight and coordination of intelligence relating to American servicemen and civilians who remain unaccounted for as a result of the war in Indochina (1961-1975).

B. BACKGROUND

Resolution of the PW/MIA issue is a matter of personal interest to the President of the United States, who has pledged that it is a matter of the highest national priority within his Administration. In implementation of this priority the purpose of the committee will be to formulate, coordinate, and manage new collection initiatives to ensure that all intelligence disciplines are sensitized to the issue. It will provide a clearing house for the exchange of PW intelligence and a forum for the discussion and resolution of related collection problems and requirements. The committee will make aggressive use of appropriate resources of specialized components of the intelligence community to identify, augment or supplement, confirm, or otherwise qualify intelligence information relating to U.S. PW/MIAs.

C. ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT

1. DIA shall provide the chairmanship and staff and administrative support for the committee.

2. The committee shall be comprised of one principal general-flag officer or equivalent civilian level representative of the following U.S. Government components: Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central

Jan 10, 2025

000138

Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and Service Intelligence representatives. The DIA representative at the committee meetings will also be the principal Joint Chiefs of Staff representative. All members and other attendees shall have TOP SECRET and SI/TK clearances.

3. Responsibilities of member representatives pertaining to the collection of PW/MIA related intelligence shall be consistent with the charter of the parent Department, Agency or Bureau.

4. The committee shall meet at the call of the Chairman but not less than quarterly.

D. IMPLEMENTATION AND TERMINATION

This memorandum of understanding shall become binding and enter into force upon signature by all parties. It shall remain in effect until revised or terminated and will be reviewed annually.

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

(b)(6)




JAMES W. SHUFELT, BG, USA



Defense Intelligence Agency

Date: 28 Mar 86




MAURICE A. SOVERN

Deputy Chief, Policy and
Coordination Staff
Central Intelligence Agency

Date: 3/28/86

(b)(3) 50 USC 3605



National Security Agency




JAMES H. GEER

Assistant Director, Intelligence
Division
Federal Bureau of investigation


Date: 28 Mar 86

Date: 4/15/86




JOHN J. TAYLOR
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Coordination
Bureau of Intelligence & Research
Department of State

Date: April 17, 1986




E.B. BAKER, JR., RADM, USN
Director, East Asia & Pacific Region
Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs
Department of Defense

Date: 2 APR 1986



RICHARD J. POWERS, JR., COL, USA
Director, Intelligence Systems
Office of the Assistant Chief of
Staff Army Intelligence
Department of the Army

Date: 28 March 1986




DALE N. HAGEN, RADM, USN
Commander Naval Intelligence
Command
Department of the Navy

Date: 24 April 86



DONALD W. MCFADYEN, Colonel, USAF
Director, Joint Services Support
Directorate
Department of the Air Force

Date: 28 MAR 86



F. J. BRETH, Brig Gen, USMC
Director of Intelligence
Headquarters
United States Marine Corps

Date: 3 April 86

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE OF POW-MIA

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Main Office Number: (202) 224-2038
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Minority Staff Director Al Ptak: 202-224-2306

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Hank Brown (R-CO)

Jan 10, 2025

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1. Senator Kerry, Senator Smith, it is a privilege for me to appear here today. We all recognize the importance of your endeavor and I am here to emphasize the commitment of NSA to supportg your efforts. For years, NSA has been actively involved on this issue primarily with the Defense Intelligence Agency, but also with individual Congressman and Congressional Committees. As we have done with these organizations in the past, we will make available to you all the data that can assist you in your investigation.

2. To ensure we would be prepared to be responsive to the committee we have again conducted a comprehensive review of SIGINT holdings for the period 1965 to the present. This review included:

a. manually scanning all SIGINT material which might contain any reference to POW/MIAs during or after the war.

b. interviewing selected analysts and managers who served at NSA Headquarters or in the field,

c. reconstructing and evaluating the SIGINT process used during the war.

Additionally, we attempted to uncover any material which might be related to recent allegations and to review any new information that has come to light since our last complete review in 1987.

3. I would like to take a few minutes and explain how NSA has conducted its business in regard to the POW/MIA task. During the Vietnam War, our ability to access the communications of Southeast Asian

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HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

Jan 10, 2025

Communist Forces was very good. Over seventy (70) ground-based collection sites, no fewer than twelve (12) types of airborne collection platforms, and numerous shipborne collectors worked 24-hours a day against the full range of target communications. Thousands of people, primarily uniformed military personnel, were involved in this massive signals intelligence effort. The SIGINT system had an excellent capability to collect information on aircraft shootdowns and on downed fliers. We intercepted information that some crew members did not survive the shootdown. In other cases, we were able to detect initial capture and subsequent movement of prisoners by the capturing unit to either a holding location or to a place designated as a camp. We were aware of the existence of more permanent prison camps from non-SIGINT sources, but in spite of our vast collection resources, we never heard any communications emanating from these camps.

4. The enormous amount of data collection during the war had to be processed manually. Because of this we did not always process everything, but we did process everything related to downed fliers or captured Americans. This was our highest priority mission. Intercept operators were trained to recognize critical information, and were instructed to notify supervisors immediately when information on downed fliers or captured servicemen was intercepted. This information was processed immediately and reported in the most expeditious manner to tactical units to aid in search and rescue operations.

5. Our information can be divided into two categories. We have a total of 1530 "incident" reports which are based on military

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HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
Jan 10, 2025

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communications and relate to specific losses. We have approximately 500 "non-incident" reports which are associated with the general topic of POW/MIAs. We reported both tactical and strategic information. Tactical reporting included information on such subjects as shootdowns of aircraft and locations of enemy forces. A special reporting series, called SONGBIRD Reports, was established for information pertaining to prisoners, prisoner locations, movement of prisoners, shootdown of aircraft, or any other information relating to the fate of U.S. servicemen. Strategic reporting included such activities as North Vietnamese infiltration and resupply. This information came from communications serving the network of roads, transportation units, and rest stops known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail and from communications serving military elements in Northern Vietnam.

6. We understand that the committee is especially concerned about the fate of American MIAs captured in Laos. Laotian codes were broken during the war and the communications of Pathet Lao Headquarters were intercepted. Regretably, while we had voluminous intercept of Laotian communications, they do not provide any new information on the fate of our men lost in Laos.

7. Also, no SIGINT evidence is available to either confirm or deny allegations of [redacted] involvement with American POWs. NSA has completed a review of pertinent [redacted] material. As with our study of Vietnamese communications, there is no evidence to indicate that [redacted] involved POWs. Our search of Soviet communications that may be related to the POW/MIA issue continues, but

(b)(1)
(b)(3) 18 USC 798
(b)(3) 50 USC 3605
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

Jan 10, 2025

000144

(b)(3) 18 USC 798
(b)(3) 50 USC 3605
(b)(3) NatSecAct

as with our efforts in researching Vietnamese communications, we have yet to find any SIGINT evidence [redacted]

8. NSA currently holds approximately 2000 SIGINT reports, dating from 1965 to the present, relating to the loss, capture, and status of U.S. personnel in Southeast Asia. To illustrate the challenge of following individual POWs, of all the POW/MIA related incidents reported in SIGINT during the war, less than 100 names of captured Americans are contained in our reporting. The majority of these people were subsequently accounted for. All of this information was reported in our normal system and made available during previous investigations. Let me emphasize however, that none of our data contains evidence that American service personnel remain in Vietnam today or were left behind after Operation HOMECOMING.

9. We spent many years after the war searching for communications that could reveal evidence that U.S. personnel were held in Vietnam but were not successful. The only collection, reflecting POW/MIA matters we

[redacted] is that associated with reactions to Joint Casualty Resolution Commission teams and some [redacted] views on general POW/MIA issues.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) 18 USC 798
(b)(3) 50 USC 3605
(b)(3) NatSecAct

On the question of releasing intelligence data, there are good reasons why even after 20-25 years, some intelligence information relating to POW/MIAs is, and should remain, classified. For example, similar sources and methods are used today by NSA against other targets, particularly [redacted]. Moreover, some of these sources and methods are associated directly with [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) 18 USC 798
(b)(3) 50 USC 3605
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

Jan 10, 2025

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We recognize the concerns of POW/MIA families, and we want to explore methods for them to gain access to data associated with their kin while at the same time protecting our sources and methods. I would like to caution everyone, however, that what we hold as described above only applies to a very few families and even that involves not more than one or two SIGINT reports per family.

On the other hand, for you and/or your cleared staff, we stand ready to show our entire SIGINT POW/MIA-related reports and to help interpret them as necessary for you and respond to any of your questions.

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HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

Jan 10, 2025

000146

QUESTION: Please explain why it is necessary to protect the sources of information on POW's and MIA's.

ANSWER: In the intelligence collection process, whether it be on POW's and MIA's or other requirements, we have a statutory responsibility under the National Security Act of 1947 and E.O. 12356 to protect the source of the information, the place and manner in which it was acquired, any foreign intelligence service involvement, references to other operational activity and administrative details such as cryptonyms, field report numbers, source and field comments.

If we were unable to guarantee this protection, it would impact on our ability to collect intelligence. Other sources would be wary of cooperating with us if information were released which pinpoints its origin without consideration of the effect this information might have on the source, and his heirs, survivors or colleagues. It is important to understand that in many cases, especially with regard to information

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct


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
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) CIAAct 000150



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(b)(3) NatSecAct 000151



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(b)(3) CIAAct
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
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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct




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(b)(3) NatSecAct



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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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Jan 10, 2025

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SPOT REPORT

6 DECEMBER 1991

UPDATE ON PW-MIA ACTIVITIES

(b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct

1. FILES AT DIA: A total of 496 "live-sighting" files in the Prisoner of War-Missing in Action (PW-MIA) Task Force for Intelligence Data Release have been reviewed and sanitized at the Pentagon. [redacted]

[redacted] The files reviewed were from the 1,500 live-sighting files of which only 496 contained Agency reporting. The agreed-upon Inter-Agency guidelines were used in deleting identification of sources, names of Agency personnel, place acquired, liaison involvement, and methods of acquisition. DIA PW-MIA appreciated our Agency's cooperation and [redacted] effort is particularly noteworthy.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

2. Response to the Committee's letter: During ADDO'S 4 December one-on-one with DCEA, the wording of the response letter to the Committee was raised. You should be receiving the draft of this letter from ORMS which in-part reads "It has been agency practice to provide all information on PW-MIA's to DIA and this information should be available in their files. In response to your request, we are undertaking a review of all files held by the Agency which bear on this issue to ensure that all pertinent data has been passed to DIA."

3. EA/ICOG PW-MIA: This component is being formed with [redacted] the Chief to review our files on PW-MIA's and ensure that all the reporting on this issue has been forwarded to DIA. All archived files on the subject are being retrieved and will be reviewed. We will also look at substantive issues such as programs in Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia associated with our operational and collection activities on PW-MIA's. [redacted] will be [redacted] We have discussed with ORMS the need for additional funding for [redacted] to assist with this project. [redacted] the [redacted] provide administrative assistance as required and [redacted] are working on locating office space for the group. We are receiving excellent cooperation from all concerned and [redacted] has been particularly helpful with several aspects of the program.

(b)(3) CIAAct
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-- WARNING NOTICE --
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED



(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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Jan 10, 2025

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

4. The KGB Connection: [redacted] met with former KGB General Oleg Kalugin on 29 November to discuss PW-MIA issues. Kalugin made it clear he was not intimately familiar with the subject and those statements he did make were not supported by facts. See the attached cable for further details. Also attached is a 1982 CIA report [redacted] [redacted] heard from KGB General Grigoriyev that 2,000 POW's from the Vietnam war had been incarcerated in the Soviet Union for "ideological retraining." [redacted] comment was included in this report which in part said that CIA records contain no information that Grigoriyev held a leading position in the KGB and that the report merits little if any credence from analysts.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

5. Call to Security Duty Officer on Alleged POW's: The PW-MIA Office at the Pentagon is investigating the call made to our Security Duty Officer on 2 December by an alleged Navy Seal reporting a sighting of MIA's in Cambodia. [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] talked with anyone on this subject as claimed in the report and DIA PW-MIA has not been able to identify the individual who claimed to be Lt. Demarco. They are going to follow this up with the Seal Team in Coronado, California, and will advise when further details are obtained.

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Jan 10, 2025

000157

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

(b)(3) NatSecAct

JOINT STAFF INFO SERVICE CENTER +++EXCLUSIVE+++

File Pow MIA

IMMEDIATE
O 021958Z DEC 91

ZYUW RUEHMCA4410 336195F

TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES. SECONDLY, HE NOTES THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE HAVE BEEN VERY PRO-AMERICAN ALL ALONG, NOT JUST AFTER PERESTROIKA: IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO HIDE A U.S. POW, UNLESS IN VERY CONFINED AREAS, BUT FOR WHAT PURPOSE? THIRDLY, TRUTH IS BREAKING OUT ALL OVER. NO ONE CAN KEEP A SECRET AND THERE ARE MANY THAT WOULD STOP AT NOTHING TO DISCREDIT THE FORMER REGIME BY GOING PUBLIC IF IN FACT AMERICAN POW WERE IN THE USSR.

FM [redacted]
TO DIA WASHDC [redacted]
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC [redacted]

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

SECRET

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

(b)(3) NatSecAct

S-1438-91

(b)(6)

SUBJECT: POW-MIA ISSUES (U) (b)(3) 10 USC 424

(b)(1)

1. (C) ON FRIDAY EVENING, 29 NOVEMBER 1991 [redacted] MET WITH FORMER KGB [redacted] TO DISCUSS ONGOING POW/MIA ISSUES. FROM THE VERY START [redacted] MADE IT CLEAR THAT ALTHOUGH HE WAS MENTIONED IN THE PRESS, HE WAS NOT INTIMATELY FAMILIAR WITH SUBJECT AND COULD NOT PROVIDE ANYTHING MORE THAN AN OVERVIEW OF EVENTS AS HE REMEMBERS THEM.

(b)(1)

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2. (S) [redacted] INVOLVEMENT IN POW INTERROGATION WAS MINIMAL. UNTIL AN AGREEMENT ON THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WAS SIGNED BY THE KGB AND ITS VIETNAMESE COUNTERPART--ABOUT 1977 OR 1978--HE WAS NOT SURE OF THE EXACT YEAR--CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES WAS VIRTUALLY NON-EXISTENT. AFTER THE AGREEMENT WAS IN PLACE, THE VIETNAMESE REQUESTED KGB ASSISTANCE IN "DISMANTLING" THE U.S. EMBASSY IN SAIGON, WHICH THE KGB WAS HAPPY TO DO. AFTER THIS EVENT, THE KGB IN A LOW KEY MANNER, REQUESTED AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO A FEW U.S. POWS THAT MAY STILL HAVE BEEN HELD IN VIETNAM. (NOTE: KALUGIN STATED THAT AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF AMERICAN POWS IN 1977-1978 WERE KEPT BY THE VIETNAMESE, BUT DID NOT KNOW FOR WHAT PURPOSE.) REASON FOR THE REQUEST WAS TO ASSESS SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT EFFECTIVENESS AND IN TURN, FAMILIARIZE THEMSELVES WITH U.S. DOCTRINE. A THREE (OR POSSIBLY) FOUR MAN TEAM WAS DISPATCHED TO VIETNAM--LOCATION UNKNOWN--AND A LIST OF U.S. POWS WAS PROVIDED TO THE SOVIET SIDE--NUMBER OR NAMES UNKNOWN--FROM WHICH THE KGB TEAM PICKED THREE INDIVIDUALS: ONE WAS A "SENIOR" NAVAL OFFICER--RANK UNKNOWN--AN AIR FORCE PILOT, AND A SUSPECTED CIA-RELATED PERSON. AN EFFORT TO TURN THESE INDIVIDUALS WAS MADE AT THAT TIME. KALUGIN DID MENTION, HOWEVER, THAT AN ATTEMPT TO CONTACT THE THREE AMERICANS IN THE UNITED STATES A FEW YEARS LATER WAS UNSUCCESSFUL.

(b)(1)

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4. (S) [redacted] DID GO OUT OF HIS WAY TO STATE THAT AMERICANS COULD BE RESIDING IN THE USSR, BUT ADDED THAT THIS HAS TO BE LOOKED AT ON A CASE-TO-CASE BASIS. FOR EXAMPLE: AN AMERICAN POW COULD HAVE MET AND MARRIED A RUSSIAN WOMAN AND RETURNED WITH HER TO THE SOVIET UNION. HERE HE CITED THAT THIS MIGHT BE THE CASE OF SOMEONE LIKE THE AMERICAN SUPPOSEDLY LIVING IN SARYSHAGAN, QUICKLY ADDING THAT HE PERSONALLY DOES NOT BELIEVE THE STORY. AT THIS POINT [redacted] SURPRISED ALUSNA BY STATING BT
SECRET SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 34410

THAT ALTHOUGH HE UNDERSTOOD CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST, ESPECIALLY IN AN ELECTION YEAR, HE COULD NOT QUITE UNDERSTAND THE SUDDEN AND ALMOST INTENSE INTEREST THAT THE U.S. WAS SHOWING ON THE POW ISSUE, STATING THAT HE HAD MANY MORE POW/MIAS DURING THE KOREAN WAR WITHOUT TODAY'S FERVOR. RO SUMMARILY EXPLAINED THAT CIRCUMSTANCES WERE IN FACT, NOT SIMILAR.

5. (C) [redacted] IS AN INTERESTING CASE STUDY. HE IS VERY WESTERN IN HIS DRESS AND MANNERISMS--LIVED IN THE U.S. FOR FIVE YEARS, SPEAKS EXCELLENT ENGLISH (AMERICAN)--STUDIED AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN 1958, IS URBANE, POLISHED AND VERY CONGENIAL. HE IS A FORMER USSR PEOPLES' DEPUTY; HE CONTINUES TO BE ENGAGED IN GOVERNMENT BUT AS A CONSULTANT. HE APPEARS TO BE, HOWEVER, ON THE MARGINS CONCERNING THE POW/MIA QUESTION AND HAS PROBABLY EXHAUSTED HIS OWN KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT.

6. (C) BECAUSE OF THE POTENTIALLY DAMAGING INFORMATION ADDRESSED IN PARAGRAPH TWO ABOVE, EMBASSY IS TREATING THIS AS A SPECAT/EXDIS MATTER.

7. (C) EMBASSY INTER-AGENCY GROUP WOULD APPRECIATE ANALYSIS AND ANY FEEDBACK ON INFORMATION PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH TWO, BUT WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED IN LEARNING MORE ABOUT THE GRU CONNECTION AND HOW THIS COULD BE FURTHER PURSUED.

8. (C) NEXT STEP: AWAIT KALUGIN'S CALL TO SEE IF FORMER SUBORDINATE AND SOVIET TEAM CHIEF WOULD BE WILLING TO TALK TO US.
DECL: OADR BT

(b)(1)
(b)(3) 10 USC 424

3. (S) IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT GENERAL KALUGIN IS NOT IN THE MAINSTREAM OF POW ISSUES, NOR DOES HE BELIEVE, FROM A KGB PERSPECTIVE, THAT THE ISSUE IS BONA FIDE AND NOT A FABRICATION. FIRST HE FEELS THAT DURING THE 1970'S BREZHNEV (AND BY ASSOCIATION, ANDROPOV) WAS VERY CAREFUL

ACTION: MR. SASEK/DIA

ACTION [redacted]

(b)(3) 10 USC 424 (M,C)

++++EXDIS++++

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TAD=91336/2315Z

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PAGE 1 OF 1
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Jan 10, 2025

000158



Foreign Intelligence Information Report

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PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

REPORT CLASS. ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ -- ~~W N I N T E L~~ -- REPORT NO. [Redacted]
~~NOFORN~~

COUNTRY USSR

DATE DISTR.

12 March 1982

(b)(3) CIAAct

SUBJECT Alleged Soviet Incarceration of U.S. Vietnam Prisoners of War (DOI: 1970)

REFERENCES [Redacted]

SOURCE

[Redacted Source Information]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUMMARY: According to KGB Lieutenant General Petr Ivanovich Grigoriyev, specially selected U.S. prisoners of war were being received into the Soviet Union circa 1970 for long term or lifetime incarceration and "ideological retraining." He implied the number involved to be about 2,000. The goal of the program was indefinite, but involved intensive psychological investigation of the prisoners and retraining to make them available as required to serve the needs of the Soviet Union. Grigoriyev made the comment during one of many personal conversations held with a colleague whose father-in-law was a GRU General and who shared many common acquaintances with Grigoriyev among top level KGB and GRU officers. END SUMMARY.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

1. (Headquarters Comment: This report should be read with caution. CIA records contain no confirmation of the alleged intelligence affiliation [Redacted] that Grigoriyev held a leading position in the KGB. Several other persons named in the text likewise cannot be identified. We have never before encountered even vague rumors among Soviet dissidents or other informants that any U.S. POW's from Vietnam are incarcerated in

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

FORM 2-81 2290 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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(b)(3) CIAAct

the USSR, much less that 2,000 such individuals are leading "reasonably normal lives" in the same region where numerous Soviet political prisoners have resided in exile.



we strongly believe that this report merits little if any credence from analysts. However, in light of continuing high interest in the question of U.S. personnel still listed as missing in action in Southeast Asia, this report is being disseminated with appropriate caveats to concerned members of the U.S. Intelligence Community.)

2. [redacted] which was held circa 1970, KGB Lieutenant General Petr Ivanovich ((Grigoriyev)) stated that many specially selected U.S. prisoners of war were being received from North Vietnam for long term or lifetime custody and "ideological re-training" in the Soviet Union. Comment: Grigoriyev did not state specifically the number of prisoners involved. The term he used was "v poryadke neskol'kikh tysyach v nas tozhe yest'" which translates as "on the order of several thousand," implying the number to be about 2,000). The prisoners were destined for confinement at a facility near Perm. Grigoriyev, who learned of the program from an unnamed high level KGB colleague, understood that Soviets rather than North Vietnamese were involved in the initial selection process and that participants were to be continually assessed for suitability. He implied that individuals determined to be unsuitable would be eliminated and replaced with other candidates. Grigoriyev made his comment while serving as a political ideologist and personnel officer at the All-Union Scientific-Technical Information Center of the State Committee for Science and Technology in Moscow. He had previously served as Chief of the KGB's Personnel Directorate and in that capacity would have very likely made contacts among KGB officials subsequently responsible for organizing any such prisoner program.)

3. According to Grigoriyev, the goals of the U.S. prisoner program were indefinite but involved intensive psychological studies of the individuals and utilization of them as required to serve the needs of the Soviet Union. Grigoriyev understood that the detention facility was not a standard prison, but rather one in which inmates could lead reasonably normal lives. Grigoriyev recalled that precedents existed for such a program in the Soviet Union and cited similar previous efforts with Spanish, Japanese, and Chinese nationals. He stated that in past programs, participants were encouraged to marry Soviet women.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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(b)(3)
CIAAct

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~



(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

5. Grigoriyev volunteered the information regarding the Vietnam prisoners [redacted] during the late 1960's and early 1970's. His duties were not particularly demanding after his years as an administrator in the KGB. He was often finished with his work in the early afternoon and, rather than go home or engaged in outside interests, held informal discussions in his office. [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct



(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] During one of these sessions the subject of prison camps arose, in particular those which furnished labor for Siberian economic development. The conversation then shifted to Vietnam and the apparent increase in strength of South Vietnam at the time and the apparent instability in the North. Grigoriyev agreed, citing the massive U.S. commitment to the South, but added that the Soviets were also making gains. He then described the program involving U.S. prisoners.

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
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~



(b)(3) CIAAct

6. Grigoriyev was trained as a professional military officer and served in the tank troops during World War II. After the war he was assigned to the Party Central Committee as an army representative. In the period 1953-1954 he became KGB Deputy Chief for Personnel. He subsequently became critical of the recruitment policies of KGB head Vladimir Yefimovich ((Semichastnyy)) and was transferred from his position to that of KGB Security Chief for Soviet Bloc nations. Soon thereafter he developed a heart ailment and retired. In the late 1960's he accepted the position at the Information Center.

7. General Skrynnik joined the Russian cavalry in 1917 and subsequently entered the Odessa artillery school. Upon graduation he was assigned to the Zhitomir military district. In 1931 he entered the Frunze Military Academy. He advanced rapidly and in the 1933-1934 period was sent to China as Deputy Military Attache. He joined Mao's long march and began to establish intelligence agent networks for the Soviet Union. He remained in China until 1942 except for a brief return in 1939 to establish an intelligence school in Moscow for China operations. In the spring of 1942 he was recalled from China to become chief of intelligence on the northwestern front, where he remained for the duration of the war. After the war he was assigned as Soviet representative to the Berlin Joint Commission for Repatriation. After serving in Berlin from 1945 to 1949 he returned to Moscow as either chief or deputy chief for intelligence at the Frunze Academy. He then served as Deputy Intelligence Chief of the Far Eastern Military District. He retired from the military in 1953. Skrynnik was subsequently recalled to duty to re-establish agent networks in China after the China-USSR split but refused to leave retirement.



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(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

ROUTING SLIP

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR/CIA		X		
4	EXDIR/ICA		X		
5	DDA				
6	DDI		X		
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T		X		
9	D/OPAI				
10	IG				
11	COMPT				
12	D/OCA		X		
13	GC		X		
14	Chm/NIC				
15	D/OIA/DI		X		
16	D/NPIC		X		
17					
18					
19					
20					
21					
22	ER				

SUSPENSE _____
Date

Remarks

(b)(6)

ER 92-6058

Executive Sec
23 December 1992

Date

3637 (10-81)

FLIP #1

ER 92-6058



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340- 6720



2 2 DEC 1992

U-0274, [redacted] (b)(3) 10 USC 424

From: Defense Intelligence Agency/Office for Imagery Analysis
National Photographic Interpretation Center/Imagery Exploitation Group
Central Intelligence Agency/Office of Imagery Analysis

To: Honorable Duane P. Andrews
Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I)
The Pentagon, Room 3E-172
Washington, D.C. 20301-3040

Subj: Evaluation of Suspect POW/MIA Symbols (b)(3) 10 USC 424

1. On 21-22 December, 1992, an interagency working group led by DIA and composed of senior imagery analysts from DIA [redacted] NPIC/IEG, and CIA/OIA was convened at (b)(3) 10 USC 424 [redacted] and tasked with evaluating the Joint Document by LWB and CLL entitled "Concerning Unresolved Differences in their Analysis of Imagery over Sam Nuea, Laos and Adjacent to the Dong Vai Prison in Vietnam" dated 17 December 1992. The purpose of the team effort was to evaluate suspect POW/MIA symbols observed on imagery dated 5 June 1992, 22 January 1988 and 6 December 1988. The imagery and imagery exploitation systems used were identical to those used by LWB and CLL in their evaluations. Two additional items, reported in the document, were reportedly resolved prior to the panel meeting and are not addressed in this report.

2. The team consisted of six individuals with no recent POW/MIA involvement. Their specialties and experience levels are listed below for background purposes:

Organization	Team Member	Geographic Specialty	Experience
NPIC/IEG	1	East Asia	25 years
	2	South Asia, SE Asia	6 years
DIA [redacted] (b)(3) 10 USC 424	3	Russia-Eurasia	16 years
	4	Russia-Eurasia, China, SE Asia	19 years
CIA/OIA	5	Russia-Eurasia,	22 years
	6	Rest of World Middle East	8 years 20 years



Jan 10, 2025

P-100-000164
X: REF: C-100-IR

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

The team was provided with a separate work space area to analyze and review the information and imagery. Administrative support was provided by a [redacted] element not involved in the POW/MIA issue. The imagery was analyzed using state-of-the-art light tables/optics and was viewed in hardcopy duplicate positive format for all images and one image was analyzed using a digital imagery exploitation work station.

3. Findings of the team are as follows:

a. Image 1 - Dong Vai Prison - 5 June 1992. This image was viewed both on the digital workstation and on hardcopy duplicate positive imagery.

- Reported Symbol GX 2527: The consensus of the team was that although portions of what could be interpreted as letters/numbers were observed in the field, they appeared to be too haphazard and ill-defined to be a man-made distress signals.

- Reported Symbol PAI/RAL: The consensus of the team was that some of the letters could be discerned; however, the team concluded that they were probably a combination of trails and vegetation and not intentionally prepared man-made markings.

- Reported Symbol 2327: The team had great difficulty in confirming the presence of these numbers, leading to the conclusion that whatever was present was a natural configuration and not intentionally prepared man-made markings.

b. Image 2 - Sam Nuea Area, Laos - 22 January 1988. This image was viewed on hardcopy duplicate positive imagery.


- Reported Symbols 1104 and WRYE: The team was able to discern portions of what could be interpreted as letters and numbers; however, the team concluded that these "symbols" were probably a result of a combination of shadows and vegetation along the side of the road/trail and not intentionally prepared man-made markings.

- Reported Symbol VASYA: The team concluded that it was extremely difficult to discern this "symbol" and judged that it was a combination of shadows and vegetation on the edge of a field and not intentionally prepared man-made markings.

c. Image 3 - Sam Nuea Area, Laos - 6 December 1988. This image was viewed on hardcopy duplicate positive imagery.

- Reported Symbol 14192: After a detailed review of the area in question, all of the team members concluded that the reported symbol could not be identified on the imagery.

4. Summary: On the basis of viewing the same imagery as that in the referenced document, the team concluded that none of the suspect symbols could be identified as intentionally prepared man-made markings. This assessment represents a consensus of all of the team members.



(b)(3) 10 USC 424
(b)(6)

cc: RADM William Studeman, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Mr. Wayne Strand, Central Imagery Office

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Jan 10, 2025

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DEC 22 3 51 PM '92

Defense Intelligence Agency

[Redacted]

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

Washington Navy Yard
Washington, D. C. 20340-6730

Facsimile Cover Sheet

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

DATE: 22 DEC 92

TO: ADM STUDEMAN

ADDRESS: CIA

TELEPHONE: [Redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct

FROM: [Redacted] (b)(3) 10 USC 424
(b)(6)

PAGES: 4 (Including this cover sheet)

IF ALL PAGES ARE NOT
RECEIVED PLEASE CALL

AT [Redacted] (b)(3) 10 USC 424

FACSIMILE PHONE NUMBER: [Redacted] (b)(3) 10 USC 424



Senator Bob Smith
Washington, DC 20510

Memorandum

(202) 224-2841

CIA 1982 Report

*Subject: Transfer of U.S. POWs
to Perm, Russia during
the Vietnam conflict.*

*Information cited from KGB
Lt. General Grigoryev.*

*Shown to Select Committee in
February, 1992 on eve of
Committee trip to Moscow.*

*Declassification requested by
Monday, November 9, 1992
before Tuesday/Wed. hearings.*

Jan 10, 2025

000169

1.

JOHN F. KERRY MASSACHUSETTS
Chairman
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JERRY H. MOSE NORTH CAROLINA

FRANCIS A. PALNIG STAFF DIRECTOR
ALAN C. PIKE DEPUTY STAFF DIRECTOR
J. WILLIAM COONHA CENTRAL COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW MIA AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

January 22, 1992

Mr. Stanley Moskowitz, Director
Congressional Relations
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Moskowitz:


The Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs is investigating allegations that American POWs in Southeast Asia may have been interrogated by Soviet officials and possibly transported to the Soviet Union or the Peoples Republic of China. Accordingly, the Committee would like to review any intelligence reports originated by the Central Intelligence Agency pertaining to Soviet or Chinese contacts with American POWs.

Additionally, the Committee would like to review any analyst intelligence assessments/monographs, NID reports, intelligence briefings or memoranda relating to Soviet or Chinese contact with American POWs. There also is one intelligence report we are requesting by its specific report number: CS-311/04439-71. If you provide this and the other material we have requested it would be greatly appreciated. We would like to review these documents by 10 February, 1992.

Sincerely,



Bob Smith
Vice Chairman



John F. Kerry
Chairman

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SOUTH DAKOTA	JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA
IDAHO	HANK BROWN, COLORADO
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ALAN C. PTAK, DEPUTY STAFF DIRECTOR	
J. WILLIAM CODINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL	

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8500

December 12, 1991

The Honorable Robert Gates
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington DC 20505

file Congressional letters

Dear Mr. Gates:

Reports continue to surface that Soviet officials have admittedly participated in the interrogation of American POWs after 1973. Most recently, former Soviet KGB and military personnel, interviewed by the Australian "60 Minutes" program, described interrogations and live sightings of American POWs as late as 1978. Among these sources is Oleg Kalugin, a retired general in the KGB, who reportedly said he personally headed an interrogation team in Vietnam in 1975-78, that interrogated Americans.

The Committee recognizes the inherent difficulties in pursuing these matters, given the current state of disarray in the former Soviet Union. However, these difficulties should not deter this government from undertaking a quick and active investigation of these reports. We urge you to take advantage of the apparent Soviet willingness to discuss these matters openly with the western press, and dedicate intelligence resources to follow these important leads.


In particular, the opportunity may exist to establish an ongoing dialogue with Soviet intelligence services on the issue of American POW/MIAs, not only those lost in Southeast Asia but those unaccounted for in Korea and World War II. Likewise, the Committee encourages you to ascertain if other former Warsaw Pact countries may also be willing to cooperate in this regard.

Your efforts in this regard are greatly appreciated, and we ask that you keep us posted as to developments.

Sincerely,



Bob Smith
Vice Chairman



John F. Kerry
Chairman

JFK/kb

Jan 10, 2025

000171

NEW HAMPSHIRE	BOB SMITH, NEW HAMPSHIRE, Vice Chairman
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	J. WILLIAM CODINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

December 13, 1991

The Honorable Robert Gates
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Director Gates:

As you are well aware, there have been numerous reports recently concerning the possible interrogation of American POWs by Soviet intelligence officers during the Vietnam War as well as the possible transfer of POWs to the Soviet Union during both the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

Although the Committee realizes that the investigation of these reports is ongoing, we would nevertheless appreciate receiving as soon as possible whatever documentation of these reports of a Soviet connection exists, including the recent


[redacted] and the 1955 document labeled "Re U.S. POWs in USSR." which National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft withheld this year from public release.

Please contact Frances Zwenig, Staff Director of the Select Committee, if you have any questions.

Sincerely,



Bob Smith
Vice Chairman



John F. Kerry
Chairman

b)(3) 10 USC 424
b)(3) NatSecAct

JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS,
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WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

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Washington, D.C. 20505

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[redacted]

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(b)(3) 10 USC 424


(b)(3) NatSecAct

Please contact Frances Zwenig, Staff Director of the Select Committee, if you have any questions.

Sincerely,



Bob Smith
Vice Chairman



John F. Kerry
Chairman

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RESPONSES TO SSCI QUERIES RE POW/MIA/KIA RECORDS

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Are POW/MIA/KIA documents being reviewed by the OIM Declassification Center (ODC) under the automatic declassification procedures of Executive Order 12958?

(U//FOUO) The ODC has come across few POW/MIA documents in the course of its review - primarily due to the fact that Directorate of Operations documents generally, and intelligence reporting after 1956, are exempt from automatic declassification review. The ODC does, however, maintain a "watch list" for documents that are subject to review under other Agency programs, such as documents related to the JFK Act or Nazi war crimes. Included on this list are POW/MIA documents from Korea and Vietnam. To date, the ODC has reviewed approximately 60 documents and 400 photographs related to the issue of POWs and MIAs.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ What is the current disposition of the 574 documents that were denied in full under Executive Order 12812?

(U//FOUO) The 574 documents denied in full under Executive Order 12812, as well as some additional documents since that order, are maintained in one place by the Directorate of Operations. These documents were the subject of a FOIA litigation and, consequently, were re-reviewed last year for release. Approximately 40 documents were released following this review, while the remaining documents were again denied in full.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ What kind of list could CIA create related to POW/MIA/KIA documents? What kind of effort would be required to create this list?

(U//FOUO) Despite the previous efforts of the CIA, as outlined below, the requirement to produce a list of all classified documents that pertain to the subject of United States prisoners of war, missing in action personnel, or killed in action personnel whose remains have not been recovered and identified would be a massive undertaking requiring significant searches, as well as the diversion of major personnel resources, to create the list. As we discussed previously, numerous factors enter into the answer to these questions.

*denied, non-responsive / relevant
to be*

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~~(U//FOUO)~~ First, earlier reviews of this subject have concentrated on Southeast Asia - the proposed language in Sen. Smith's proposal did not limit the required list to this area. Thus new searches would be required for World War II, the Korean War, the Cold War, and the Persian Gulf War to locate any responsive documents to create such a list. These searches would be difficult, particularly in the earlier timeframe and subject to the vagaries of the indexing schemes of the various records systems. For example, prior to 1967, finished intelligence records in the Directorate of Intelligence are searchable only by title under broad general subject headings or office of origination. Disseminated intelligence reports (as opposed to finished) are searchable only by means of broad subject codes. Potentially responsive documents are then retrieved individually and must be reviewed manually to determine if indeed they are responsive.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Second, the searches previously conducted on Southeast Asia were done in the early 1990's. Despite the collection of documents held by the Directorate of Operations on behalf of the Agency noted above, additional searches to retrieve information acquired since the early 1990's, would need to be undertaken to ensure that all responsive documents are captured.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Third, all the previous searches focused on POWs and MIAs - not KIAs. New searches would be required to identify responsive documents for this topic.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Fourth, in order to conduct a truly comprehensive search to compile this list, all incidents in which POWs, MIAs, or KIAs were lost would need to be provided so that the incidents themselves could be searched. Without this information, any searches conducted would be limited to general terminology and risk not capturing all responsive documents required to produce the list.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The CIA has a list of documents reviewed in response to a 1979 FOIA request for all POW/MIA documents related to Vietnam. The list is over 1,000 pages long and contains all documents reviewed for relevance in that case. The vast majority were found to be non-relevant, but the list does not contain the final determination related to each document, and therefore would likely be of limited utility. The list also does not contain all the information sought by Sen. Smith (date of information, for example), again limiting its utility as the documents would have to be manually located, retrieved, and reviewed to compile the missing information. As an aside, this case lasted over 10

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000175

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years and was estimated at that time to have cost the CIA \$1.5 million.

(~~U//FOUO~~) The resource implications of producing this list are also enormous at a time when CIA information review and release resources are already taxed. The CIA is processing 22 boxes of material (approximately 40,000 documents) from the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs for declassification review. The CIA also must meet its statutory obligations under the FOIA, the Privacy Act, the FRUS statute, and the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, in addition to the requirements of the Chile/Pinochet special search ordered by the Administration and its obligations under Executive Order 12958.

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