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From: [John Clarke](#)
To: [Mezger, Matthew \(USAVAE\)](#)
Cc: [Barghaan, Dennis \(USAVAE\)](#)
Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL] Driggs et al. v. CIA // Civil No. 1:23cv1124 (DJN)
Date: Sunday, February 2, 2025 6:05:41 PM
Attachments: [CIA-Production-12-3-24-CHALLENGED-REDACTIONS.pdf](#)
[Interrogatories-to-CIA-September-2023.pdf](#)
[CIA-NARA-WITHDRAWAL-NOTICES.pdf](#)

Matt

Attached are the only redactions that the plaintiffs will challenge. The redactions regard what Russians said about the "1205 document." If your client cares to explain how what the Russians said could implicate the protections of exemptions 1 or 3, maybe we wouldn't pursue it.

Regarding the search, the attached interrogatories three, four, and five identifies the information we'd like to see in a declaration. I don't want to challenge the search so you are welcome to provide a declaration informally so hopefully you won't have to brief it or file it. However you'd like to proceed. Also, it would be helpful if the declaration recites whether the CIA searched for the records associated with the attached CIA withdrawal notices from NARA.

Thanks

John

On Mon, Jan 27, 2025, at 8:25 AM, Mezger, Matthew (USAVAE) wrote:

Hi John,

Hope you had a nice weekend. We have an answer to your question. Request number 27 in *Driggs* is identical to a request from *Moore*. In *Moore*, the document you attached was denied-in-full. In *Driggs*, that same document was determined releasable in segregable form, resulting in the response to request number 27 that you attached to your email.

All best,

Matt

Matthew J. Mezger

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From: John Clarke <john@johnhclarkelaw.com>

Sent: Tuesday, January 21, 2025 1:26 PM

To: Mezger, Matthew (USAVAE) <MMezger@usa.doj.gov>

Cc: Barghaan, Dennis (USAVAE) <DBarghaan@usa.doj.gov>

Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL] Driggs et al. v. CIA // Civil No. 1:23cv1124 (DJN)

Hi Matt

I am working with my clients to decide what if anything the plaintiffs seek to litigate

I do have a question that may facilitate this.

Request 27 seeks "The withheld-in-full version of the CIA's February 2000 Review of the


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number of American POWs in the 1205 document because the information "was not essential" to the Soviets. His successor, General Korabelnikov, said that he had nothing more to add to the statement made by Ladygin.


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
[REDACTED] The *Critical Assessment* claims that the GRU "has expressed its confidence in both the authenticity and the reliability of the information on the 1205 report." It does not mention, however, that the GRU sources do not support the POW-related content of the documents.

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
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
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SEPARATE OR SECOND PRISON SYSTEM

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[redacted] The NIE stated that, if there were additional POWs, the IC would have known of them unless Vietnam maintained a separate prison unknown to the POWs who returned in 1973. The estimate concluded that, "we have uncovered no reliable evidence that a separate prison system existed for certain POWs; nor do we have such indicators as plausible site locations."

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[redacted] Concerning the issue of a separate or second prison system, the *Critical Assessment* refers to "substantial information and evaluations originated by or made available to the U.S. Intelligence Community both during and/or after the Vietnam War." The assessment asserts that, based on the 735 and 1205 documents, the large number of

Following are excerpts of comments made by current and former Russian officials regarding the 735 or 1205 documents at various meetings or during interviews [REDACTED]

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- ♦ Vyacheslav Dukhin served as Political Counselor at the Russian Embassy in Hanoi (1992-95). He has no first-hand knowledge of the 1205 document but became aware of it in 1993. Dukhin recalled that a former co-worker at the Embassy who served as Deputy Chief of Mission, Igor Novikov, was aware of the 1205 document when it was acquired in 1972. According to Dukhin, Novikov characterized the GRU's acquisition of the 1205 document as slipshod and not a very conscientious effort. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
Novikov did not elaborate but intimated that the GRU agent was not reliable. [REDACTED]

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- ◆ Yevgeniy Glazunov served as a junior diplomat/interpreter at the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi (1962-65) and as a senior advisor to the Ambassador (1974-78). Between these assignments, he worked on Vietnamese issues in the International Department of the Central Committee. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Although aware of the existence of the 1205 document when in the Central Committee, he never saw the document. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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- ◆ Konstantin Katushev served in the early 1970s as the Central Committee Secretary responsible for maintaining ties with other socialist countries such as North Vietnam.

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As to the reliability of

the 1205 document, Katushev says that, insofar as he signed the document and the GRU had good channels and connections to receive information, he had no reason to doubt that the document was what it purported to be, i.e., a report given by General Tran Van Quang. Katushev says that, since this was new information that had never been seen before, it was worthy of the attention of the Communist Party leadership.

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
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
- ◆ General Korabelnikov, Chief of the GRU, in a meeting with Senators Smith and Shelby at the Russian Ministry of Defense,



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He reminded everyone of the letter sent to Senator Smith by General Ladygin (see below), noting that all should pay close attention to that letter. He then proceeded to read it and concluded that he had nothing more to add concerning what General Ladygin wrote.

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When Senator Smith asked the General if he could confirm that the translation of the 1205 document was a valid translation of a reliable document, Korabelnikov said he had already confirmed that the translation was performed in the GRU in Moscow in 1972 but that the original Vietnamese language version of the document no longer existed.

- ◆ General F. Ladygin, former Chief of the GRU, states in a letter to Senator Smith regarding an analysis made by the GRU of the 1205 document, that: the translation of the document was done by the GRU and forwarded to the Central Committee; given his position in the military-political leadership, General Tran Van Quang could have been fully competent on the subjects of the report and able to speak at Politburo meetings; the GRU cannot confirm the accuracy of the number of American POWs in the report (1205), since this information was not essential for the Soviets and not reexamined; and the original report in the

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Vietnamese language was destroyed after being translated in
accordance with existing GRU regulations on handling
documents.

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


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♦ Captain First Rank A. Sivets, a GRU officer,

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revealed that

(a Vietnamese) is the source of

the 1205 document that this source provided a number
of materials to the GRU, and that two GRU assessments of this

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source concluded that he was reliable.

He emphatically stated that the North Vietnamese would not have deceived themselves at a closed Politburo session, noting that they might have provided inaccurate information in press releases or in their negotiations with the Americans, but they would have had no reason to do so in closed sessions of their own political leadership. Sivets acknowledged that this was his personal opinion. Sivets says the GRU performed two assessments of the source's reliability. The agent was judged to be reliable, everything about this agent was in order, and the agent was working for the GRU. The assessment determined that the information received from the agent was first-hand information and accurately reflected the internal political situation in North Vietnam. The GRU would never have sent this information to the Central Committee if there had been any doubt about the reliability of the information.

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
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