

HALL, ET AL. V. CIA, 04-00814-HHK
COLE DECLARATION
EXHIBIT D

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

5 August 2010

James H. Lesar, Esquire
1003 K Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20001

Reference: F-1994-00036
F-1998-00734
F-1998-00735
F-1998-00736
F-1998-00742
D.C. Cir. No. 04-5235

Dear Mr. Lesar:

This is further to our letter dated 7 November 2005 which concerns your 5 January 1994 and 23 April 1998 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests and your subsequent litigation above made on behalf of your client, Roger Hall, as it pertained to several subjects. Specifically, this letter addresses two documents previously denied in our response to you dated 7 November 2005. While indexing the 26 documents previously denied for our Vaughn, we have now determined that two documents can be released. Enclosed is one document that can be released in its entirety (C00437023), and one document that can be released in segregable form with deletions made on the basis of FOIA exemption (b)(3). Because the information in question is the subject of pending litigation in federal court, the CIA cannot accept any administrative appeal of the determination.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Delores M. Nelson".

Delores M. Nelson
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Chief, Personal Affairs Branch
[Redacted] Headquarters

EXTENSION
[Redacted]

NO.

DATE

10/21/80

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.	[Redacted] Hqs.			
2.				
3.	C/OS/SSD [Redacted] Hqs.			
4.				
5.				
6.	C/PAB [Redacted] Hqs.			
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

As a courtesy to our colleagues at the Department of Labor, Branch of Special Claims, please advise of any information that might be reflected in your records on the MIA's listed in the attached letter.

[Redacted]

Please call [Redacted] for hand carry.

b(3)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUN 2001

[Redacted]

FORM 3-62

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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FROM: [Redacted]
 Chief, Personal Affairs Branch
 Headquarters

EXTENSION
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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE
 RECEIVED FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS
 [Redacted]

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. [Redacted] Hqs.

OCT 27 1980

3. C/PAB
 [Redacted] Hqs.

As a courtesy to our colleagues at the Department of Labor, Branch of Special Claims, please advise of any information that might be reflected in your records on the MIA's listed in the attached letter.

[Redacted]

Please call [Redacted] for hand carry.

1-3 NO RECORD IN
 OF ANY OF THE ATTACHED
 NAMES, [Redacted]

FORM 3-82 **610** USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: [Redacted]
Chief, Personal Affairs Branch
[Redacted] Headquarters

EXTENSION NO.

DATE 10/21/80

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. C/OS/SSD
[Redacted] Hqs.

21 OCT 1980

✓

2.

3.

4.

5. C/PAB
[Redacted] Hqs.

✓

6.

7.

8. OF/PB
736 Ames
Attn: [Redacted]

11/4

9.

Please call [Redacted]
[Redacted]

5 - 8 Per our telecon.

10. C/PAB

Hqs

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

FORM 3-62

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22 May 1972

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Soviet Reaction to a commando raid to release US prisoners-of-war in downtown Hanoi and/or prisoners-of-war ten miles outside Hanoi

1. The initial Soviet reaction to the Son Tay raid in November 1970 was propagandistic. Moscow did not appear especially alarmed, and its media focused instead on the increase in US air strikes that occurred at about the same time. In the wake of the raid, the North Vietnamese undertook to close the radar gap that had enabled US forces to reach Son Tay undetected, and they conducted at least two combined air and ground force exercises aimed at repelling future US raids. Although there is no direct evidence, it seems reasonable to assume that Moscow provided both advice and materiel.
2. Further raids like Son Tay would be likely to produce a similar Soviet response so long as those raids were designed solely to rescue American POWs and were neatly executed. The USSR would protest vigorously in the diplomatic and propaganda arena and would probably be willing to provide Hanoi with advice and additional air defense materiel designed to forestall future US raids. The protest would be more vigorous if the raids took place in Hanoi, and the Soviets presumably would be under more pressure from Hanoi to provide equipment to forestall future US attempts. The Soviets would probably be receptive to this kind of pressure, moreover, because the USSR would resent US boldness in launching an attack on the capital of a "fraternal socialist ally."
3. If either type of raid failed as the Son Tay raid failed, or if the raids resulted in American casualties and US personnel being taken prisoner, the propaganda outcry probably would be more extensive and sustained. The Soviets would be under less pressure, however, to provide Hanoi with new equipment. Soviet propagandists would be sure to point to the venture as one more example of the futility of US efforts in Vietnam and as one more proof

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that the only way to get the prisoners back is by negotiation.

4. In any event, the Soviets would not attach major importance to the venture or draw from it new conclusions about the proper policy toward the US or the Vietnamese problem. Having accepted a summit meeting in the wake of wider US military action against the DRV, they are not likely to alter their current course because of an event which would touch their direct interests not at all.

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