

PAGE 001
TOT 1821042 MAY 87

TO DIRNSA, DEPT OF STATE, DIA, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM,
CIA OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS.

PASS EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM;
NSA (EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, NSA);
STATE EXCLUSIVE FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INR; DIA
EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, DIA (DIA IS AUTHORIZED TO PASS
THIS INFORMATION TO THE JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTERS IN
BANGKOK AND BARBERS POINT, HAWAII, FOR COMMANDERS ONLY).
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIST: 18 MAY 1987

COUNTRY: VIETNAM

SUBJ: POW/MIA: ALLEGATION OF A SECRET DOCUMENT THAT
MENTIONS THE ISSUE OF U.S. MISSING-IN-ACTION
SERVICEMEN AS OF MID-1986

DOI: MID-1986

SOURCE:


TEXT: 1. AS OF MID-1986 AN ALLEGED SECRET VIETNAMESE DOCUMENT
CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF U.S. PRISONERS OF
WAR (POW'S): "THE REQUESTS FROM THE AMERICANS CONCERNING THE PILOTS"
(YEU CAU CUA PHIA MY VE PHI CONG). "THIS MATTER DEPENDS ON THE COMING
SECRET MEETINGS" (VAN DE CON TUY THUOC NHUNG CUOC HOP MAT SAP TOI).
THE REMAINING CONTENT OF THE DOCUMENT WAS NOT KNOWN.

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E46. 38-B
000245



EX 38C

2

SUBJECT: Identification of Possible U.S. Prisoner of War Camp in Saravane Province, Lao People's Democratic Republic

TEXT: 1. Circa March 1983, a militia chief claimed that there is a Prisoner of War (POW) Camp located at the foot of Ngoua Mountain (NCA), approximately 25 kilometers south of Kadon Village. According to there were 23 American prisoners of war (POW's) detained in the camp. Prior to 1975 the camp contained 25 American POW's, but two had since died. said that Kadon Village is responsible for growing food for the camp and insisted that he had personally seen the POW's on numerous occasions while escorting food convoys to the camp. added that the militia forces of Chavan Village (YB 2197) were actually responsible for security at the camp.

Exh. 38-C

000246



177

EX 38 D 13


47 -

-(1984)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Vice Director For Collection
Management
Department of Defense
Principal Advisor For Prisoner of War
Missing In Action Affairs
(International Security Affairs)
Director, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Identification of Possible U.S. Prisoners of
War Camp in Saravane Province, Lao People's
Democratic Republic

Exh. 38-D



178

EX 380.4

1. Attached as of possible interest to you is a report obtained

refugee observed an apparent detention camp in Saravane Province, Laos, which a local village militia chief told him contained 23 American Prisoners of War.

2. This very sensitive information is for your background use only. There will be no further distribution of this report and additional dissemination or extraction of this information requires prior approval from this Agency. DIA is authorized to pass this information to the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC)

Deputy Director For Operations

cc: DCI
DDCI
EXEC DIR
STATE/EAP
DIA
NIO/EAP
NSA
NSC

Attachment: Report as stated

EX-38 B-3 5

escorted him to the top of Ngoua Mountain and pointed out the camp to him. According to the camp consisted of four buildings and was surrounded by a fence and a canal. did not claim to see any of the POW's. Both Chavan and Kadon Villages have been under the influence/control of the Communist Pathet Lao since circa 1954.)

3. Udorn Source Comment: This account is the first believable story on the possibility of live American POW's in the LPDR that has been heard since 1975.)

~~EX-386~~

6

PAGE 0001
TOT: 022021Z NOV 87 CIA

TO: DIRNSA, DEPT OF STATE, DIA, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM,
CIA OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS.

PASS: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM;
NSA FOR (EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, NSA);
STATE EXCLUSIVE FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INR; DIA
EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, DIA (DIA IS AUTHORIZED TO PASS
THIS INFORMATION TO THE JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTERS IN
BANGKOK AND BARBERS POINT, HAWAII, FOR COMMANDERS ONLY).

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIST: 02 NOVEMBER 1987

COUNTRY: LAOS/VIETNAM

SUBJ: POW/MIA: REPORTED PRESENCE OF AMERICAN POWS IN HOUA
PHAN PROVINCE, LAOS, AS OF JANUARY 1987

DOI: 18 JUNE 1968 - JANUARY 1987

TEXT:

AS OF JANUARY 1987 "SOME" FORMER AMERICAN POWS WERE

Exh. 38-6

000250



181

MSR

PAGE 0002

TOT: 022021Z NOV 87

CIA

STILL IN THE GENERAL AREA OF BAN BOUAK.

COMMENTED THAT ONE OF THE
POWS IS NAMED WHO WAS CAPTURED ON 18 JUNE 1968 IN
THE VICINITY OF THE BORDER OF HOUA PHAN PROVINCE AND SON LA PROVINCE
OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SRV). ACCORDING TO
WAS DETAINED FOR AN UNSPECIFIED PERIOD OF TIME BUT
WAS EVENTUALLY RELEASED AFTER HE HAD BEEN "REFORMED". (SOURCE
COMMENT: THE TWO ELDERS GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT CONTINUES
TO LIVE IN THE BAN BOUAK AREA UNDER HIS OWN VOLITION. THE DID
NOT INDICATE THAT THEY HAVE EVER HAD DIRECT CONTACT WITH OR
ANY OTHER POW PURPORTEDLY STILL IN THE AREA).

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OUTGOING MESSAGE

PAGE 001
TOT: 182113Z MAY 87 CIA

TO: DIRNSA, DEPT OF STATE, DIA, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM,
CIA OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS.

PASS: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM:
NSA (EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, NSA);
STATE EXCLUSIVE FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INR; DIA
EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, DIA (DIA IS AUTHORIZED TO PASS
THIS INFORMATION TO THE JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTERS)
BANGKOK AND BARBERS POINT, HAWAII. FOR COMMANDERS ONLY).

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIST: 18 MAY 1987

COUNTRY: VIETNAM

SUBJ: POW/MIA: ALLEGATION OF AN INTERROGATION CENTER STILL
HOLDING U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR IN AN UNKNOWN LOCATION
IN SOUTHWEST HA NAM NINH PROVINCE IN EARLY 1986

DOI: EARLY 1986

SOURCE:

TEXT: 1. AS OF EARLY 1986, ALLEGED U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR WERE STILL
BEING HELD AT AN UNKNOWN INTERROGATION CENTER IN AN AREA IN THE
SOUTHWEST QUADRANT, FROM NINH BINH CITY (XH 0340), OF HA NAM NINH
PROVINCE.



183

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

EX-38-HD 9

PAGE 002

THE
ALSO CLAIMED HE SAW MANY AMERICAN POW'S WHILE HE WAS AT HOA
LO PRISON IN HANOI.)

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EX 38 I

16

OUTGOING MESSAGE

PAGE 001
TOT: 102127Z NOV 87 CIA

TO: DIRNSA, DEPT OF STATE, DIA, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM,
CIA OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS.

PASS: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM;
NSA EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, NSA);
STATE EXCLUSIVE FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY, IAR: DIA
EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, DIA (DIA IS AUTHORIZED TO PASS
THIS INFORMATION TO THE JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTERS IN
BANGKOK AND BARBERS POINT, HAWAII, FOR COMMANDERS ONLY).

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIST: 10 NOVEMBER 1987


COUNTRY: VIETNAM

SUBJ: POW/MIA: POSSIBILITY OF EXISTENCE OF AMERICAN POWS
IN SOUTHERN VIETNAM

DOI: AUGUST 1987

TEXT: 1. A SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SRV) OFFICIAL COMMENTED
IN PRIVATE IN LATE OCTOBER 1987 THAT HE IS CERTAIN THAT THERE ARE
AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR (POW) STILL BEING HELD IN REMOTE AREAS OF
SOUTHERN VIETNAM BY PRIVATE MILITANT GROUPS ACTING WITHOUT THE
KNOWLEDGE OF THE SRV LEADERSHIP. ACCORDING TO THIS OFFICIAL, THESE
GROUPS ARE ANTI-COMMUNIST MEMBERS OF THE FORMER SOUTH VIETNAMESE
GOVERNMENT WHOSE MOTIVATION IS FINANCIAL. THIS OFFICIAL COMMENTED
THAT DURING THE VIETNAM WAR, THE VIET CONG MAINTAINED THEIR MILITARY
UNITS IN THE JUNGLES AND TUNNELS FOR YEARS WITHOUT BEING DISCOVERED,
SO IT SHOULD BE NO SURPRISE THAT POW COULD STILL BE HIDDEN.

OUTGOING MESSAGE



EXH. 38-I

TO DIA//VO-PW/ 281935Z OCT 87

CITE CIA

SUBJECT: COMMENT BY LOW-ECHELON SRV OFFICIAL ON POW'S IN
INDOCHINA

2. IN LATE SEPTEMBER AND EARLY OCTOBER 1987 A

REMARKED ON THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF PRIVATE U.S. EFFORTS TO LOCATE PERSONS KILLED, CAPTURED, OR MISSING-IN-ACTION DURING THE VIETNAM WAR, SAYING THAT "THERE ARE LESS THAN 1,200 PRISONERS OF WAR" (POW'S). LATER REMARKED IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION THAT "THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF POW'S IN THE SRV IS SMALL COMPARED WITH THOSE IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA, BOTH IN KNOWN AND UNKNOWN LOCATIONS." HE CONTINUED THAT U.S. POLICY TOWARD LAOS AND CAMBODIA MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE AMERICANS TO PURSUE THE MATTER OF POW'S EFFECTIVELY AND THAT "THE NUMBER OF POW'S AS ESTIMATED BY THE AMERICANS, 1,270, IS HIGHER THAN THE ACTUAL FIGURE." HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE HAD NO IDEA HOW MANY POW'S WERE BEING HELD IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA. (COMMENT: IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE 1,270 FIGURE CITED IS FOR ALL OF INDOCHINA OR MERELY THE SRV.)

EXH. 38 J

000255



17

ADDITION, HIS NORMAL HABIT WHEN FACED WITH A QUESTION HE DOES NOT WISH TO ANSWER IS TO IGNORE THE QUESTION. IT IS CLEAR HE CONSIDERS THE SUBJECT OF POW'S TO BE SENSITIVE. HE ALSO APPEARS, HOWEVER, TO BE INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING THE TOPIC AND HAS REMARKED THAT HE WOULD PROVIDE MORE DETAILS WHEN AND IF HE GAINED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. THE WORD USED IN REFERRING TO THE POW'S WAS THE VIETNAMESE WORD "TU BINH," THAT IS "PRISONER OF WAR." WHETHER HE MEANT TO INCLUDE OTHER TYPES OF HOSTAGES OR PRISONERS UNDER THIS TERM IS UNCLEAR.)

4.

PAGE 002
TOT 200512Z AUG 69 CIA

THAT THERE ARE LESS THAN 1,200 POW'S. HE
LATER REMARKED IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION THAT THERE WERE POW'S IN
LAOS AND CAMBODIA, BOTH IN KNOWN AND UNKNOWN LOCATIONS. HE
CONTINUED THAT U.S. POLICY TOWARD LAOS AND CAMBODIA MAKES IT
IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE AMERICANS TO PURSUE THE MATTER OF POW'S
EFFECTIVELY AND THAT THE NUMBER OF POW'S AS ESTIMATED BY THE
AMERICANS, 1,270, IS HIGHER THAN THE ACTUAL FIGURE. HE CONCLUDED BY
SAYING THAT HE HAD NO IDEA HOW MANY POW'S WERE BEING HELD IN LAOS
AND CAMBODIA. (COMMENT IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE 1,270 FIGURE IS
FOR ALL OF INDOCHINA OR MERELY VIETNAM. THE MOTIVATION FOR THE
TO MAKE SUCH REVELATIONS TO THE CONTACT
IS UNCLEAR. IT IS ALSO UNCLEAR WHY OR HOW A LOW-LEVEL
WOULD HAVE ACCESS TO SUCH INFORMATION.)

END OF MESSAGE

Esth. 38-K

000257



EX 38 L 14

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

To: Bill Codinha, Bob Taylor
Subject: President's Daily Intell Briefings

----- Message Contents -----

I've asked Bob Magner for access to file copies of the Daily Intell Summaries prepared for the President by CIA. They are usually about one or two pages of the most timely intell topics of the day, and are limited to only a handful of people. I am specifically looking for references for briefings given to the President regarding the possibility of POWs being transferd to the East Bloc after Homecoming. I have a source who claims to have seen them.

Almost in the same nano-second that the briefings were mentioned, he said they were not available to anyone. This only made me want them more. I said surely the Senators could review them. He evaded an answer to that, by saying they could look for a specific topic, if we knew the timeframe, and they could tell us about it. Right! I went ahead and gave him a specific window of time and subject (Moscow Bound) and asked him to look, but told him to expect the Committee to revisit the issue of reviewing this potential goldmine. If you happen to talk to Magner you may wish to mention we would like access to review, in person, these briefings. MFR 22/6/92 Bob T.



10 JUL 1970

DRAFT
MACSOG DOCUMENTATION STUDY (U)

APPENDIX A

SUMMARY OF MACSOG DOCUMENTATION STUDY

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C. Approach	A-4
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24 FEB 1970

EXHIBIT

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2. (C) Basic Agreements Between DOD and CIA

The Study sets forth the basic agreements between DOD and CIA for the planning and conduct of covert/PM operations during the pre-MACSOG period. In particular, these agreements cover such matters as logistical support, and command and operational arrangements both during peace and war.

3. (C) DOD Support of CIA (Covert/PM Operations)

In this subject area, the Study outlines chronologically the main support by DOD to CIA in the field of covert/PM operations during the pre-MACSOG period. This support is related to the basic agreements between DOD and CIA, referred to in the preceding paragraph. In this regard, DOD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in various directives, set forth a multitude of military responsibilities in the field of covert/PM operations during both peace and war. These responsibilities cover such matters as the provision by the DOD of materiel and personnel support to the CIA and the establishment within DOD of a point of contact which would enable the coordination of DOD support to CIA. In addition, this portion of the Study details the progressive assumption by DOD of certain CIA responsibilities in the field of covert/PM operations. Since the subject of intelligence was of particular importance, DOD also prescribed DIA's functional responsibilities in this area and that agency's relationship to SACSA and CIA.

4. (C) DOD Organization for Covert/PM Actions

a. This section traces the evolution within DOD of the major organizational arrangements for handling covert/PM

b. Except for the formation of the Special Group (5412)/
.303 Committee, the Washington-level organizational process
largely began with the advent of the Kennedy administration
(1961) and the organizational machinery it considered
necessary for implementing the President's policies on Vietnam.
Detailed in this section of the Study are the particulars
concerning the establishment in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense of an assistant to the Secretary of Defense whose
responsibilities would cover such functional areas as
Special Group (5412) matters and DOD-CIA relationships of
special interest to the Secretary of Defense. Brigadier
General Edward G. Lansdale, USAF, was designated as the
Special Assistant and he functioned in that capacity from
February 1961 until his office was disestablished in
September 1963.

c. In March 1961, the Secretary of Defense authorized the
establishment of a "small, secure staff element in the Joint
Staff" for the processing of CIA requests for peacetime
military support of covert operations. This staff element,
named the Special Operations Division, was placed in the
Directorate for Plans and Policy (J-5). With the increased
emphasis and scope of counterinsurgency operations and
subsidiary activities, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
directed the establishment of OSACSA effective 23 February
1962. At that time, the Special Operations Division of J-5,
complete with personnel and functions, was transferred to
OSACSA.

d. With the disestablishment of General Lansdale's office,
in September 1963, its functions which were to be continued

OSACSA and DIA.

b. Except for the formation of the Special Group (5412)/303 Committee, the Washington-level organizational process largely began with the advent of the Kennedy administration (1961) and the organizational machinery it considered necessary for implementing the President's policies on Vietnam. Detailed in this section of the Study are the particulars concerning the establishment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense of an assistant to the Secretary of Defense whose responsibilities would cover such functional areas as Special Group (5412) matters and DOD-CIA relationships of special interest to the Secretary of Defense. Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, USAF, was designated as the Special Assistant and he functioned in that capacity from February 1961 until his office was disestablished in September 1963.

c. In March 1961, the Secretary of Defense authorized the establishment of a "small, secure staff element in the Joint Staff" for the processing of CIA requests for peacetime military support of covert operations. This staff element, named the Special Operations Division, was placed in the Directorate for Plans and Policy (J-5). With the increased emphasis and scope of counterinsurgency operations and subsidiary activities, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff directed* the establishment of OSACSA effective 23 February 1962. At that time, the Special Operations Division of J-5, complete with personnel and functions, was transferred to OSACSA.

d. With the disestablishment of General Lansdale's office, in September 1963, its functions which were to be continued were divided between OSACSA and DIA.

* JCS Memorandum, CM 560-60

HEARINGS

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
Before

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

DEPOSITION OF COS, VIENTIANE (1968-70)

Friday, May 29, 1992

Washington, D.C.

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY
1111 14TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-5650
(202) 289-2260

Attachment 3

000036

EXHIBIT

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4 order to maintain it, which took a lot of people.

5 Q. When you arrived, was there still a residual support to
6 resistance groups in South Vietnam?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Do you recall any operations that were still going on
9 of a paramilitary type or support type in South Vietnam?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Was there anything still going on in Laos?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Had the station closed down in Laos?

14 A. No.

15 Q. I understand was the last station chief.
16 Was the station still open?

17 A. The station was still open. An officer was appointed
18 to replace him. was already elsewhere. I'm not
19 entirely certain of the exact timing of the closing of the
20 station, but it was done while I was Chief of Station. I know
21 that. I was Chief of Division, excuse me.

22 Q. Chief of Division.

23 A. It came about because of the enormous restrictions
24 imposed upon the embassy. If you remember this, the Lao were
probably the unfriendliest of those where we still had relations.

PRODUCED FROM THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

19

1 They confined everybody in the embassy to the city limits of
2 Vientiane and they reduced the embassy to a total of 12 people,
3 of which they would only grant three diplomatic immunity, which
4 did not leave any for us.

5 You really must understand that there were not, there
6 was not much in the way of residual operations in Indochina.

7 It was possible to deal across the border in black
8 operations into Laos. A decision was made to close the Vientiane
9 station at a time when I was not very familiar with it. But I
10 point out again that directly above me, literally, was Ted
11 Shackley, and beneath me was his former deputy and a number of
12 very highly qualified East Asia officers.

13 It was not I who closed the station but the DDO and
14 perhaps the DCI.

15 Q. Who was his deputy below you, working below you, did
16 you say?

17 A. I didn't say. But it was --

18 THE WITNESS: -- again, I don't know. Do we have a
19 problem with this. Excuse me.

20 [Witness confers with counsel]

21 THE WITNESS: Well, I'll tell you.

22 the man.

23 BY MR. McCREARY (Resuming):

24 Q. That name has come to our attention before.

25 A. Okay.

PRODUCED FROM THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

20

1 MR. McCREARY: Let me just say that we have deposed
2 other CIA officers. There's a privacy issue, a confidentiality
3 issue. But your name has come to us because of conversations
4 with others at which CIA attorneys have been present. So we are
5 on the record here and we are at a level of classification that
6 is appropriate, I think, to discuss these matters without getting
7 into too many details which you may veto in the interest of the
8 agency --

9 MR. BOWMAN: Correct.

10 MR. McCREARY: -- to protect those. But I think names
11 are fair game. Is that correct?

12 MR. BOWMAN: Correct.

13 BY MR. McCREARY (Resuming):

14 Q. I think that context statement is very helpful to
15 understand, to our understanding.

16

17

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22 Everything had been consolidated into Bangkok.. This is
23 something, again, which happened before me but had involved the
24 Thai Government in the withdrawal of a very large number of
25 Americans, military as well as Agency, from Thailand, in a sort

REPRODUCED FROM THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

21

1 of seaming. I kind of became aware of some of these things as
2 time went on. But that is a fair statement.

3 We had only Chiang Mai and Bangkok, and Chiang Mai took
4 over the functions for : insofar as there were any. I mean,

:
:

8 Q. What would have happened to the files and those maps
9 and so on, anything that the Agency considered of value? When
10 you opened the door to , there were maps on the
11 wall. There were still file cabinets, I suppose, or something.

12 A. No, no.

13 Q. No, nothing?

14 A. The files were all withdrawn. Everything was
15 withdrawn. Those maps were like decorations and I couldn't tell
16 you whether that was a true statement of the situation. But it
17 was obviously left there in a kind of sentimental way. --It was no
18 longer relevant to anything.

19 Q. Except to some extent to our investigations today I
20 must add.

21 Would those files have been evacuated through Bangkok
22 or would they have come to Headquarters and been reduced to
23 microfilm, or what would you say?

24 A. I do not know.

25

PRODUCED FROM THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

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5 The division chief is very remote from the field.
6 Operations are run in the field. The division chief becomes
7 aware of operations which shouldn't be run or where there is a
8 controversy or where there is a very high interest in general.

9 I was in the orientation phase and in the drawdown
10 phase in my first year or so. I found that Bangkok station,
11 which was being run in my view extremely efficiently by people
12 who were very familiar with what they were doing, with the Thais
13 and the relationship with the Thais was very important. I have
14 no doubt whatever that all classified material was withdrawn and
15 I think would have found its way back to Headquarters. But I
16 cannot honestly say that.

17 Q. Your testimony, then, is that this was not your
18 responsibility to withdraw the material? This occurred before
19 you arrived?

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. Is the same statement true with respect to the station
22 in Laos? You testified it did close down while you were division
23 chief. Would you have been involved in the administration of
24 that, settling the administration, if you will?

25 A. At a considerable distance.



National Archives and Records Administration

700 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20408-0001

April 22, 2008

Mr. Roger Hall
8715 First Ave.
Apt. 827
Silver Spring, MD 20910

Dear Roger:

Hi Per your telephone call with Michael Kurtz last week, attached is the list of depositions withdrawn in full from the records of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. The list was compiled by looking in the OSS Parallel File series for each deposition listed in the "Formerly Classified Depositions" list in Appendix K (p. 93) of Ed Schamel's Reference Information Paper 90. I submitted this list as a mandatory declassification review request this morning.

You will hear from us as soon as any of the depositions is returned from the declassifying agency.

Sincerely,


KRISTEN WILHELM
Center for Legislative Archives

Encl.

Esh. 36-A

NARA's web site is <http://www.archives.gov>

000237



April 22, 2008

POW/MIA Depositions Withdrawn in Full

Daniel Arnold	OSS-93-0011	(Box 97)
Brian Bucklee	OSS-92-4398	(205)
Richard Childress	OSS-92-5345	(201)
Marvin M. Connon	OSS-92-2566	(205)
Steven Davis	OSS-92-3263	(205)
• Lawrence R. Devlin	OSS-92-4145	(201)
Roger W. Eggert	OSS-92-5106	(98)
Lincoln Faurer	OSS-92-5318	(98)
Timothy Geraghty	OSS-92-2823	(204)
Don E. Gordon	OSS-92-4294	(204)
Max Hugel	OSS-92-5419	(98)
Bobby Ray Inman	OSS-92-5023	(203)
H.P.V. Insisiengmay	OSS-92-4969	(101)
Robert C. Kingston	OSS-92-4147	(101)
Thomas E. Lacy	OSS-92-3840	(101)
John McMahon	OSS-92-4660	(105)
Richard Secord	OSS-92-4452	(107)
Francis Sheery	OSS-92-5178	(104)
Michael H. Sherwood	OSS-92-5122	(104)
John H. Stein	OSS-92-5001	(103)
William Sullivan	OSS-92-4830	(103)
• Bernhard H. Tovar	OSS-92-4453	(112)
Jerry Tuttle	OSS-92-2833,	(205)
	OSS-92-2623	
Robert Garwood	OSS-92-2291	(119)
Charles Trowbridge	OSS-92-3154	(205)



National Archives and Records Administration

8601 Adelphi Road
College Park, Maryland 20740-6001

April 28, 2008

Roger Hall
8560 Second Avenue, Suite 621
Silver Spring MD 20910

Dear Mr. Hall:


- ¶1 This is in response to your Mandatory Review request of April 15, 2008 which was received in this office on April 16, 2008 (our reference number MR 30088).
- ¶2 We forwarded your request for RG 46, depositions for John Mason (Box 100) and William Graver (Box 204) to the appropriate office for further action.
- ¶3 The National Archives and Records Administration has limited authority to release national security or other sensitive information. Pursuant to 5 USC 552 (a)(6)(B)(iii)(III), if you have requested information of a restricted nature, in most cases it will be necessary to send copies of the documents to appropriate agencies for further review.
- ¶ Please advise us of any change of address that may occur during the time that it takes to complete your case. In the event any correspondence to you from this office is returned as undeliverable, no forwarding address, we will presume you are no longer interested in pursuing the case and the case will be closed.

We will notify you as soon as the review of all parties is complete.

Sincerely,

Mark Murphy
for THOMAS HAUGHTON
Archives Specialist
Special Access and FOIA Staff

Exh. 36-C





National Archives and Records Administration

700 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20408-0001

May 25, 2006

The attached list contains Office of Senate Security document numbers, with date of document, number of pages, and NARA MDR case number, for the records of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs that were denied in full by the CIA per Roger Hall's mandatory declassification review request.




KRISTEN WILHELM

E44. 36-B

000239

NARA's web site is <http://www.archives.gov>



000203

P2

92-2561	1/23/1992	2	982011
92-2561	1/28/1992	2	982011
92-2561	1/28/1992	1	982011
92-2561	1/30/1992	1	982011
92-2660	1/21/1992	2	982011
92-2823	3/3/1992	173	982025
92-3266	3/30/1992	9	982006
92-3857	8/19/1992	1	982005
92-4989	9/15/1992	176	982015
92-5106	9/30/1992	132	982014
92-5168	10/16/1992	138	982025
92-3289	no date	1	982023
92-3289	no date	1	982023
92-3993	no date	2	982008
92-3286	no date	1	982023
92-3286	no date	1	982023
92-3213	no date	13	982020
92-3213	no date	13	98202

P/

LIST OF SSC POW/MIA DOCUMENTS DENIED IN FULL BY THE CIA			
OSS Number	Date of Document	# of Pages	MDR Case Number
92-3151	5/10/1971	2	982011
92-3151	5/8/1971	3	982011
92-4469	c. 1976	1	982012
92-2580	c. 12/1979	116	982011
92-3199	3/20/1980	4	982018
92-3633	12/10/1980	1	982024
92-3633	c. 4/1978	1	982024
92-3633	c. 9/1979	1	982024
92-3633	12/10/1980	1	982024
92-3633	no date	3 (all maps)	982024
92-3848	1/13/1981	1	982025
92-3999	8/26/1981	7	982008
92-3999	8/27/1981	7	982008
92-3999	8/27/1981	2	982008
92-2664	c. 4/1982	8	982005
92-4018	12/19/1983	2	982008
92-0325	4/25/1984	7	982018
92-3257	8/17/1984	1	982021
92-3993	6/18/1985	2	982008
92-3989	7/17/1985	4	982008
92-4017	7/18/1985	2	982008
92-3989	8/1/1985	2	982008
92-3080	10/30/1985	12	982011
92-2657	8/15/1986	2	982006
92-4637	8/15/1986	2	982021
92-2919	12/30/1987	1	982006
92-2919	12/30/1987	1	982006
92-4221	1/22/1988	7	982006
92-4753	1/22/1988	1	982006
92-4753	1/22/1988	1	982006
92-3421	7/1/1998 [sic]	1	982019
92-3196	2/23/1989	2	982020
92-3196	2/23/1989	1	982020
92-3196	2/24/1989	1	982020
92-2561	6/10/1991	1	982011
92-2193	8/1/1991	2	982011
92-4273	8/1/1991	2	982010
92-2193	8/2/1991	1	982011
92-2561	8/9/1991	2	982011
92-2561	10/9/1991	1	982011
92-2561	8/22/1991	2	982011
92-2373	11/14/1991	1	982011
92-2373	11/15/1991	1	982011
92-2373	11/15/1991	1	982011
92-2373	11/19/1991	1	982011
92-2371	1/21/1992	2	982011
92-2371	1/21/1992	4	982011
92-2371	1/21/1992	8	982011
92-2561	1/23/1992	1	982011



DIRECTORATE OF
OPERATIONS

DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION

Foreign Intelligence Information Report

WARNING NOTICE—INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

**FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS
STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT**

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

**REPORT CLASS. C O N F I D E N T I A L—WMINTEL—
NOFORN**

COUNTRY

USSR

DATE DISTR.

12 March 1982

SUBJECT

**Alleged Soviet Incarceration of
U.S. Vietnam Prisoners of War
(DOI: 1970)**

REFERENCES

SOURCE

SUMMARY: According to [REDACTED]
Grigoriyev, specially selected U.S. prisoners of war were being
received into the Soviet Union circa 1970 for long term or
lifetime incarceration and "ideological retraining." He implied
the number involved to be about 2,000. The goal of the program
was indefinite, but involved intensive psychological investiga-
tion of the prisoners and retraining to make them available
as required to serve the needs of the Soviet Union. [REDACTED]

1. (Headquarters Comment: This report should be read with
caution. CIA records contain no confirmation of the alleged intelligence
affiliation of the subsource cited below, despite the source's assertion
that Grigoriyev held a leading position in the KGB. Several other
persons named in the text likewise cannot be identified. We have
never before encountered even vague rumors among Soviet dissidents or
other informants that any U.S. POW's from Vietnam are incarcerated in.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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EXHIBIT

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WARNING NOTICE
SOURCE SOURCES AND METHODS L
FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT
TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the USSR, much less that 2,000 such individuals are leading "reasonably normal lives" in the same region where numerous Soviet political prisoners have resided in exile. In short, while the source may be reporting his recollection of an actual conversation, we strongly believe that this report merits little if any credence from analysts. However, in light of continuing high interest in the question of U.S. personnel still listed as missing in action in Southeast Asia, this report is being disseminated with appropriate caveats to concerned members of the U.S. Intelligence Community.)

2. In a private conversation which was held circa 1970, KGB Lieutenant General Petr Ivanovich ((Grigoriyev)) stated that many specially selected U.S. prisoners of war were being received from North Vietnam for long term or lifetime custody and "ideological re-training" in the Soviet Union. (Source Comment: Grigoriyev did not state specifically the number of prisoners involved. The term he used was "v poriyadke neskol'kikh tysyach v nas tozhe yest" which translates as "on the order of several thousand," implying the number to be about 2,000). The prisoners were destined for confinement at a facility near Perm. Grigoriyev, who learned of the program from an unnamed high level KGB colleague, understood that Soviets rather than North Vietnamese were involved in the initial selection process and that participants were to be continually assessed for suitability. He implied that individuals determined to be unsuitable would be eliminated and replaced with other candidates. (Source Comment: Grigoriyev made his comment while serving as a political ideologist and personnel officer at the All-Union Scientific-Technical Information Center of the State Committee for Science and Technology in Moscow. He had previously served as Chief of the KGB's Personnel Directorate and in that capacity would have very likely made contacts among KGB officials subsequently responsible for organizing any such prisoner program.)

3. According to Grigoriyev, the goals of the U.S. prisoner program were indefinite but involved intensive psychological studies of the individuals and utilization of them as required to serve the needs of the Soviet Union. Grigoriyev understood that the detention facility was not a standard prison, but rather one in which inmates could lead reasonably normal lives. During the conversation Grigoriyev recalled that precedents existed for such a program in the Soviet Union and cited similar previous efforts with Spanish, Japanese, and Chinese nationals. He stated that in past programs, participants were encouraged to marry Soviet women.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT
TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

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4. [REDACTED] Comment: Source described Grigoriyev as a very professional and security-conscious person who confided in source because of their unique personal relationship. Grigoriyev, in his capacity as an institute personnel officer, was the first individual to interview source upon his transfer to the information center. Grigoriyev requested basic biographic data and acknowledged being acquainted with several individuals listed by source, particularly [REDACTED] General Feodor Petrovich ((Skrynnik)), who had a GRU officer serve as Deputy Chief of Intelligence for the Far Eastern Military District in the early 1950's. Skrynnik and Grigoriyev owned dachas near each other and while not close friends, held each other in high respect. In addition to Skrynnik, Grigoriyev was acquainted with (FNU) ((Prudnikov)) who was active in Western Europe and Germany for the KGB, (FNU) ((Grodoselskiy)) who had served as a KGB official in Poland and Germany, and (FNU) ((Gridniyev)) who served as KGB Deputy Chief for Administration and Supply. A sense of trust had therefore been developed over many years of mutual association with top level KGB and GRU officers.) (Headquarters Comment: Prudnikov may be identical with Mikhail Sidorovich Prudnikov, dob circa 1912, a senior Soviet intelligence official whose memoirs of operations during and after World War Two have been published in the USSR. CIA records do not identify any individual named Grodoselskiy or Gridniyev as having served in Soviet intelligence.)

5. Grigoriyev volunteered the information regarding the Vietnam prisoners during one of many private conversations during the late 1960's and early 1970's. His duties were not particularly demanding after his years as an administrator in the KGB. He was often finished with his work in the early afternoon and, rather than go home or engaged in outside interests, held informal discussions in his office. [REDACTED] Comment: Source stated that he was the person most frequently chosen by Grigoriyev for private conversations.) Topics primarily involved Grigoriyev's personal affairs and health, but also included political topics. During one of these sessions the subject of prison camps arose, in particular those which furnished labor for Siberian economic development. The conversation then shifted to Vietnam and the apparent increase in strength of South Vietnam at the time and the apparent instability in the North. Grigoriyev agreed, citing the massive U.S. commitment to the South, but added that the Soviets were also making gains. He then described the program involving U.S. prisoners.

CONFIDENTIAL

APR-24-2005 09:28 FROM

10:3016573693

INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS II

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT
TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6. Grigoriyev was trained as a professional military officer and served in the tank troops during World War II. After the war he was assigned to the Party Central Committee as an army representative. In the period 1953-1954 he became KGB Deputy Chief for Personnel. He subsequently became critical of the recruitment policies of KGB head Vladimir Yefimovich ((Semichastnyy)) and was transferred from his position to that of KGB Security Chief for Soviet Bloc nations. Soon thereafter he developed a heart ailment and retired. In the late 1960's he accepted the position at the Information Center.

7. General Skrynnik joined the Russian cavalry in 1917 and subsequently entered the Odessa artillery school. Upon graduation he was assigned to the Zhitomir military district. In 1931 he entered the Frunze Military Academy. He advanced rapidly and in the 1933-1934 period was sent to China as Deputy Military Attache. He joined Mao's long march and began to establish intelligence agent networks for the Soviet Union. He remained in China until 1942 except for a brief return in 1939 to establish an intelligence school in Moscow for China operations. In the spring of 1942 he was recalled from China to become chief of intelligence on the northwestern front, where he remained for the duration of the war. After the war he was assigned as Soviet representative to the Berlin Joint Commission for Repatriation. After serving in Berlin from 1945 to 1949 he returned to Moscow as either chief or deputy chief for intelligence at the Frunze Academy. He then served as Deputy Intelligence Chief of the Far Eastern Military District. He retired from the military in 1953. Skrynnik was subsequently recalled to duty to re-establish agent networks in China after the China-USSR split but refused to leave retirement. (Headquarters Comment: CIA records contain no independent confirmation of the details of Skrynnik's career provided here.)

REPORT CLASS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~—WARNING NOTICE—INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED—NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS—
RVW 16FEB02 ORC RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER EXT SAME RSN 3DS. ALL
PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

2291 ~~REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS~~

CONTINUATION SHEET

000272

000209

[REDACTED]
Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

29
ROGER HALL
8715 First Ave., Apt. 827
Silver Spring, MD 20910
301-585-3361

9 March 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Joseph A. Schlatter, US Army
Chief, Special Office for Prisoners of War
and Missing in Action

SU^bJECT: Alleged Sightings of American POWs in
North Korea from 1975 to 1982 [REDACTED]

REFERENCE: Memo for the DDI fm Colonel Schlatter,
dtd 19 Feb 88, Same Subject

1. In response to your request, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] three separate reports of
such sightings, which are attached:

- o The first report, dated April 1980, indicates that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] sighted two Americans in August 1986
on the outskirts of P'yongyang. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] about 10 military pilots
captured in North Vietnam were brought to North Korea.
- o The second report, also dated in April 1980, apparently
describes the same incident [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- o In the third report, dated March 1988, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] indicated sighting
as many as 11 Caucasians, possibly American prisoners from the
Korean war, in the fall of 1979 on a collective farm north of
P'yongyang. [REDACTED]

E44. 35

000235

Exhibit 44

2. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
Office of East Asian Analysis

Attachments:
As stated

REPRODUCED FROM THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 6012958
By DA NARA. Date 7/26/96
Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.2
NND 942062
By DM/HRM Date 5/22/96

6 October 1992

Mr. J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Codinha:

Mr. Taylor of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs requested that 22 documents [REDACTED] be made available to Committee members during the closed hearing [REDACTED]

We have redacted 20 of the documents requested for delivery to the Committee on the day(s) of the closed hearing. We will make these documents available on the condition that these documents be retrieved at the end of each session and returned each evening to the Agency for storage. We will provide an officer to assume responsibility for the documents.

The other two documents on Mr. Taylor's list, a December 1980 DIA report and a March 17, 1981 State Department telegram from Embassy Vientiane, cannot be released by this Agency. If needed, the Committee should seek release directly from DIA and from the Department of State.

Sincerely,

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

FORM 107-1 (Rev. 1-78)
CONTROL NUMBER 05292-5076
When consists of 1 Pages
Copy 1 of 1

ALL PORTIONS CLASSIFIED
SECRET

CL BY 133763
DECL OADR
DRV FM HUM 4-82

~~SECRET~~



000212

TRANSMITTAL RECEIPT

Box 29

DATE: 02/12/93 12 DOCUMENTS

PAGE 1

METHOD/NO/COURIER: COURIER//

RECEIPT: X-OSS-93-00096

FROM: OFFICE OF SENATE SECURITY
 SECRETARY OF THE SENATE
 ROOM S-407
 THE CAPITOL
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510

TO: NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
 CENTER FOR LEGISLATIVE ARCHIVES
 REFERENCE BRANCH (NNLR)
 8TH AND PENNSYLVANIA AVE, NW
 WASHINGTON, DC 20408

No. DCN [COPY]

ECN

CL Pages

- | | | |
|---|--------------------|-----|
| 1. OSS-92-5173 [1]
FILES PERTAINING TO AL SHINKLE(U) | .ERMS4060006141 S | 658 |
| 2. OSS-92-5076 [1]
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR 22 DOCUMENTS RE: NHOMMARATH/U | .ERMS4060005950G S | 1 |

MWF Oct 8, 2002

001, 0/001, 001, CS/RF

12 Aug 14030

COUNTRY - LAOS

DOI 29 JULY

SUBJECT ENEMY P

ACQ : : LAOS, V

SOURCE

INTEL

SECTION 1

SUPDATA

REPORT PREPARED BY

PRISON LOCATIONS VERIFIED

BY TWO OR MORE

NO FILE.

FILED 120410Z

(REDACTED) DELETED FROM PAGE 2 LINE 5.)

1. AS OF 29,
PRISONS AND/OR PR
NEW PRISONS HAVE
XD 3658, WERE OR
NOT BEEN REPORTED
RESPECTIVELY AND
AN ESTIMATED 1,2

Approved for Release
Date 12 MAR 83 23286

12 Aug 70

EXHIBIT

46

94

198

000214

MVF from CIA Oct 8, 2002

DRAFT

7 March 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Status Report on [REDACTED]

1. At the request of [REDACTED], DIA, a research was conducted to ascertain whether or not any rescue attempts was made on the prison camp located at BAN NAKAY NEUA, Laos (vicinity VH195565) to free [REDACTED]. Further, one of the recent returnees reported that there was information that [REDACTED] had died in a cave because the guards had stopped feeding him.

2. All available information indicates that [REDACTED] was last identified during the period April-June 1965 in the prison camp mentioned in paragraph 1. A later report in September 1966 reports that an unidentified American pilot had died because he was unable to eat while interned in this prison camp.


3. An intelligence collection effort was conducted in September 1966 into this particular area but no actual attempts were conducted to rescue any detainees in this camp. No further information on [REDACTED] has been reported since June 1965.

SOURCE

S: Information

Approved for Release
Date 23 Jul 86

213



14753

000216

ADVANCE COPY ☒ 9067 ☐ 15712 REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

BY: T AT: 15.

DISSEM BY: 49

ACTION UNIT: FILE, VR, ADDP, CG/DO, FI 2 IV, RI/AN.

DCI, D/DCI, DOP,

260814Z MAY 71 CITE VIENTIANE

DIRECTOR INFO SAIGON

SECTION ONE OF TWO

INTEL

SUPDATA FOR SAIGON COMMENTS AND HQS REVIEW.

PARAS 2, 4, 6.

OBTAINED FROM PARAS 9-11

SEE

VIENTIANE NOTAL/ POSSIBLY AFFECTING

DISSEM.

LT-15641, U-18521, P-14300.

FILED 260814Z

COMMENT: WHEN DISSEM

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COUNTRY

DOI

SUBJECT

ACQ

SOURCE

SUMM

OF TWO AM

IN CAPTIV

NAMESE GU

A VILLAGE

SIGHTING

THE BOLOV

AND DETAI

FINEMENT

Approved for Release
Date 1 APR 1985



000217

MWF from CIA Oct 8, 2002

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P-...

Intelligence Information Cable

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
STATE/INT (M) NMCC/MC (C)CDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR CBA/MCC NIC NSA SOO ONE CDS OCS F315 L73
IES AND U4A

D/EPIC

13 MAR 69 22 44z

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Sec. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

U.S. SECRET (151C)



THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

13 18 51 12269

DIST 13 MARCH 1969

COUNTRY LAOS

DOI MAY 1967

SUBJECT CAPTURE OF TWO U.S. PILOTS DURING THREE DAY AIR
ATTACK IN THE SAM NEUA AREA OF MOUA PHAN PROVINCE

ACQ LAOS, VIENTIANE /

SOURCE

1.3(a)(4)

1.3(a)(4)

1. IN MAY 1967, PATHET LAO /PL/ POSITIONS IN THE VICINITY OF

2U

2T

May 1967

1.3(a)(4)

76-064

EXHIBIT

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Approved for Release
Date OCT 1994

942067-579

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P.2


~~SECRET (When Filled In)~~(b)(1)
(b)(3)

• ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

IN 09917

PAGE 1 OF 12 PAGES



Routing

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Classification

Internal Use Only

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

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~~SECRET~~

31

DIST 31 DECEMBER 1969

COUNTRY LAOS

Dates

Signature

SUBJECT ACTIVITY ALONG ROUTE 6/65 IN THE VICINITY OF BAN
NAKAY NEUA

ACQ

Source

SUMMARY. ANALYSIS OF AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY Dates

REVEALED A HIGH LEVEL OF ACTIVITY ALONG ROUTES 65 AND 6 FROM VH 2157 TO VH 100630. NINETY FACILITIES INCLUDING 12 TRUCK PARKS, 64 BIVOUAC/STORAGE AREAS, THREE OCCUPIED ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN SITES, AND A SMALL ARMS FIRING RANGE WERE OBSERVED. THE ROUTE SEGMENT IS IN GOOD CONDITION AND APPEARS TO BE SUSTAINING A HIGH LEVEL OF TRAFFIC. END OF SUMMARY.

Classification

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: SEP 2002

EXHIBIT

51

Received by MWF from
CIA Minneapolis Oct 8, 2002
000219

MUF from CIA Oct 8, 2002~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

5 March 1973

REPORT CLASS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED/~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~/
CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY LAOS

DOI MARCH 1972

SUBJECT SIGHTING OF THREE CAPTURED AMERICAN PILOTS, THREE THAI
PILOTS AND FOUR LAOS PILOTS IN SAM NEUA PROVINCE

ACQ LAOS, VIENTIANE (19 FEBRUARY 1973)

SOURCE

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE 21 APR 1986

EXHIBIT

52

tabbles

000220

ADVANCE COPY	<input type="checkbox"/> ISSUED	<input type="checkbox"/> SLOTTED
BY: _____ AT: _____ DESIGNED BY: _____ ACTION UNIT: _____		
FILE, VR / <u>SUSPENSE</u> <u>DDP</u>		

15 Aug 72

H [REDACTED] H

I [REDACTED] 151042 Z AUG 72 INTEL 684019
 I CITE VIENTIANE [REDACTED] SECTION 1 OF 2

DIRECTOR INFO [REDACTED] SAIGON [REDACTED] E

[REDACTED] DEFERRED INTEL [REDACTED] G

SUPDATA [REDACTED] PER HQS INSTRUCTIONS. [REDACTED] F
 [REDACTED] OBTAINED. [REDACTED] G

[REDACTED] NO INDEX. NO FILE.
 FILED: 151042Z

Pow's file

PM Board	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Intel Bd	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Other Bd	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other Sitrops	<input type="checkbox"/>
State/Def	<input type="checkbox"/>
Destroy	<input type="checkbox"/>
CHRON File	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Destroy	<input type="checkbox"/>
Second Copy to:	<u>1st</u>

11764

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EXHIBIT
 53

#272
 Fed Reals.

Approved for Release
 Date 25 SEP 1984

Approved for Release
 Date 25 SEP 1984

000221

MWF from CIA Oct 8, 2002

Intelligence Information Report

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PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

REPORT NO.

DATE DISTR 24 November 1971

COUNTRY Laos/North Vietnam/Thailand

DO 1968 - Early 1971

SUBJECT

1. See Lao Hak Sat Weekly bulletin containing photo, maps and details of American prisoners captured by the Pathet Lao
2. Location and details of a PT Prison near the NVA Supreme headquarters in Sam Neua Province, Laos

ACQ Laos, Vientiane (22 October 1971)

SOURCE

[REDACTED]

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(classification)

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STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

[REDACTED]

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VETER
JOINT VETERApproved for Release
Date JUN 1968

EXHIBIT

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Intelligence Information Cable

IN 216941

PAGE 1 OF 10 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO [REDACTED] H

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0116512

CITE TDCS-314/12572-70

DIST 1 DECEMBER 1970

COUNTRY LAOS

DOI 25 NOVEMBER 1970 AND AS STATED

SUBJECT ENEMY PRISONS IN LAOS

ACQ LAOS, VIENTIANE /28 NOVEMBER 1970/ [REDACTED] D

SOURCE [REDACTED] B

1. AS OF 25 NOVEMBER 1970 GROUND SOURCES CONFIRMED 45 ENEMY PRISONS AND/OR PRISONER OR WAR /POW/ CAMPS OR COMPLEXES IN LAOS. BASED ON ANALYSIS OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION, AN ESTIMATED 1,000 ENEMY PERSONNEL WERE COMMITTED TO GUARDING AND MAINTAINING PRISON FACILITIES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. SIX NEW PRISONS HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED SINCE AUGUST, WHILE THE PRISON FACILITY PREVIOUSLY CONFIRMED AT MUONG PHINE /XD 0927/ WAS DROPPED

FROM THIS LISTING
SECTOR. PRISONER
PHINE AREA PROBAB
FIELD COMMENT.

IN AUGUST. THE 1
COMPILING THIS RI

2. POW CAMPS
LOCATIONS TO INSI
SUCCESSFUL PRISON
INDOCTRINATION OF
SHOW FAVORABLE PI
UNITS OR OTHER SI
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3. AMERICAN I
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Intelligence Information Cable

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PAGE 1 OF 10 PAGES

DATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY) CIA/NMCC MHC NSA SDG ONE CDS

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012232Z

CITE

DIST 1 APRIL 1970

COUNTRY LAOS

DOI 20 MARCH AND AS STATED

SUBJECT ENEMY PRISONS IN LAOS

ACQ

SOURCE

SECDEF, VIETNAME 125 MARCH 1970

1. AS OF 20 MARCH 1970 THERE WERE 38 CONFIRMED ENEMY PRISONS OR PRISONER OF WAR (POW) CAMPS IN LAOS. AN ESTIMATED 1,800 ENEMY PERSONNEL WERE COMMITTED TO GUARDING, ESCORTING AND PROVIDING SUPPORT FOR POWS. FIELD COMMENT - THESE PERSONNEL WERE RELECTED AS A PORTION OF COMMAND AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL FOR LAOS, AS REPORTED IN THE COLLATION OF GROUND OBSERVER REPORTS ON DISPOSITION OF ENEMY FORCES IN LAOS AS OF 15 MARCH. SEE

Approved for Release
Date 24 JAN 80

EXHIBIT

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167

53 000224

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RELATIONS
in brief
for file

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MWF from CIA Oct 8, 2002

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED MAR 5 20 29Z71 TOCS 114/02432-71 F	
5 Mar 71	
051231Z MAR 71 CITE [REDACTED] I, B 5 MAR IN 280425	
DIRECTOR INFO VIENTIANE, [REDACTED] SAIGON, [REDACTED]	
INTEL [REDACTED] G	
SECTION 1 OF 2	
SUPDATA [REDACTED] REPORT PREPARED BY [REDACTED] G	
PRISON LOCATIONS VERIFIED BY TWO OR MORE INDEPENDENT SOURCES. [REDACTED] NO FILE. C	
PASS ALL [REDACTED] FILED TO PACOM, USMACV FOR JPRC, D, E	
7TH AF AND IFA/NKP ELECTRICALLY.	
FILED	051231Z

LAOS LOCATIONS
 2 Mar 71
 (updates Nov 70 report)


[REDACTED] I

Approved for Release
 Date 31 May 89

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Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Sec. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

DIRECTORATE OF
PLANS

PAGE 1 OF 7 PAGES

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~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

DATE DISTR. 14 April 1972

COUNTRY Laos/North Vietnam

DCI December 1970

SUBJECT Description and Location of Pathet Lao/Neo Lao Huk Sat Offices,
Officials and Activities in Ban Nakay Noua, Sam Neun Province,
LaosACQ Laos, Vientiane (25 November 1971, FIELD NO. [REDACTED]
6 March 1972)

Information about how we collected this information

Nothing about POW/MIA's

Incidental mention of Ban Nakay

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(S)~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

2046-149-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: SEP 2002

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MVF from CIA Oct 8, 2002

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Intelligence Information Report

[REDACTED]

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PAGE 1 OF 4

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REPORT NO. ICS-311/03739-729

DATE DISTR. 27 JULY 1972

COUNTRY : LAOS/NORTH VIETNAM

DOI : JULY 1966 - NOVEMBER 1967

SUBJECT : 1. SIGHTING OF 10 U.S. POW'S ON THE PAUL DOUMER BRIDGE IN HANOI IN NOVEMBER 1967

* 2. SIGHTING OF DEAD U.S. PILOT IN THE SAM NEUA AREA OF LAOS IN JULY 1966

ACQ

LAOS, VIENTIANE (25 JUNE, 12 JULY 1972)

SOURCE

[REDACTED]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

Date 20 AUG 1979

2231-01

Distribution		Dissem controls					
STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA		(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

DIA #8

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59

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MWF from CIA Oct 8, 2002

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PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

REPORT NO. CS-311/08268-71

DATE DISTR. 24 November 1971

COUNTRY Lao/North Vietnam/Thailand

DOI 1966 - Early 1971

SUBJECT 1. Mao Lee Hak Sat Weekly Bulletin Containing Photographs and Details of American Prisoners Captured by the Pathet Lao

2. Location and Details of a PL Prison Near the NLHS Supreme Headquarters in San Neua Province, Laos

ACQ Laos, Vientiane (22 October 1971)

SOURCE

5

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE 1971

STATE DIA ATAF NAVY AIR NSA

EXHIBIT

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60

000228

MWF from CIA Oct 8, 2002

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

DATE 26 MAY 1971
IN 342541
PAGE 1 OF 8 PAGES

COUNTRY LAOS

DOI 1967 A 17 APRIL 1971

SUBJECT REPORTS OF TWO AMERICAN MALE AND ONE AMERICAN
FEMALE HELD PRISONER BY THE PL/NVA NEAR SAM
NEUA IN APRIL 1971 AND IN THE LAO NGAM AREA
IN 1967-68

ACQ

SOURCE

SUMMARY. ON 17 APRIL 1971 AND CIRCA 1967-1968 A GROUP
OF TWO AMERICAN MALES AND ONE AMERICAN FEMALE WERE OBSERVED
IN CAPTIVITY UNDER THE CONTROL OF PATHET LAO AND NORTH VIET-
NAMESE GUARDS. THE 1971 SIGHTING TOOK PLACE IN BAN TONG,
A VILLAGE NEAR SAM NEUA IN HOUA PHAN PROVINCE. THE EARLIER
SIGHTING OCCURRED IN A VILLAGE NEAR LAO NGAM JUST NORTH OF
THE BOLOVENS PLATEAU IN SOUTH LAOS. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTIONS
AND DETAILS SURROUNDING THEIR CAPTURE AND SUBSEQUENT CON-
FINEMENT ARE PROVIDED. END OF SUMMARY.

EXHIBIT

61

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE 26 OCT 1978

000229

Approved For Release 2000/05/10 : CIA-RDP78B04560A006900010023-8

		SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM			25X1D	R-35/78	
SUBJECT	ORIG	TYPE	REPT NR	COORD	CY	SC	ACC NR
MILITARY							
25X6	BAN NAKAY TEU POW CAMP SEARCH	DIA	IIM	98-2478-78	2824N 18413E	LA	#5 S#46393
	CHANGPO RI 91ST REGIMENT + BKS REAR SVC AREA	ARMY	BREF	PIB892-69	3818N	12781E	KN #5 S#46335
	CHILCHON DONG ARMY BARRACKS + STORAGE	ARMY	BREF	BLZ87-8144-78	3848N	12634E	KN #5 S#46637
	CHUNGDOONG NI HEADQUARTERS 35TH MORT REGT/BKS	ARMY	BREF	PIB897-69	3821N	12718E	KN #5 S#46334
	GUAIMARO MILITARY POST	DIA	IIM	98-8342-78	2183N	87721W	CU #4 S#46645
	HA NOI ARMY BARRACKS QUINH LOI SOUTH SEARCH	DIA	IIM	98-2635-78	2188N	18551E	VN #5 S#46619
	HA NOI/BAC MAI AIRFIELD MILITARY EQUIP O/B	ARMY	BREF	BLZ85-8124-78	2859N	18558E	VN #8 S#46338
	HAI PHONG ARMY BARRACKS TRAM BAC SEARCH	DIA	IIM	98-2649-78	2858N	18648E	VN #8 S#46724
	HOETANG ARMY BARRACKS + HQ 1ST ARMY GROUP	ARMY	BREF	BLZ87-8142-78	3842N	12735E	KN #5 S#46468
	HUTEN DE PHO BEN POW CAMP SEARCH	DIA	IIM	98-8622-78	2127N	18552E	VN #7 S#46618
	HWALCHON NI BARRACKS AREA NORTH	ARMY	BREF	BLZ87-8165-78	3845N	12748E	KN #5 S#46818
	HYOSONG DONG HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARTY REGIMENT	ARMY	BREF	PIB896-69	3821N	12788E	KN #5 S#46351
	KAESONG ARMOR INSTALLATION SE	ARMY	BREF	BLZ87-8157-78	3755N	12637E	KN #5 S#46613
	KAMPONG SPEU MILITARY STORAGE	CIA	INFR	RSO881-78	1126N	18433E	CR #5 S#46612
	KANGSO MILITARY AREA NNM	ARMY	BREF	BLZ87-8146-78	3988N	12528E	KN #5 S#46636
25X6	KOKSAN GUN 3RD MOTORIZED INF DIV/BKS/STORAGE	ARMY	BREF	BLZ87-8147-78	3845N	12639E	KN #5 S#46636
	KOKSAN 7TH MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT + BKS	ARMY	BREF	BLZ87-8138-78	3847N	12639E	KN #5 S#46618
	KUJONG DONG HEADQUARTERS 17TH ARTY REGT/BKS	ARMY	BREF	BLZ87-8148-78	3888N	12641E	KN #5 S#46816
	KUMSONG HEADQUARTERS 16TH INF REGT/ARMY BKS	ARMY	BREF	BLZ87-8164-78	3825N	12736E	KN #5 S#46817
	KYAUHT HEADQUARTERS 3RD ARTY REGT BKS + STG	ARMY	BREF	BLZ87-8158-78	3818N	12635E	KN #5 S#46813
	MILITARY, LAOS-VIETNAM NORTH LOGISTICS ACT	CIA	INFR	RSO894-78			LA #5 S#46918
	MILITARY, LOGISTICS ACTIVITY	CIA	INFR	RSO188-78			LA #5 S#46928
	MILITARY, LOGISTICS ACTIVITY	CIA	INFR	RSO188-78			VN #5 S#46928
	MILITARY, VIETNAM NORTH-LAOS LOGISTICS ACT	CIA	INFR	RSO894-78			VN #5 S#46918
	MIRAM NI ARMY BARRACKS + HQ 51ST ARTY REGT	ARMY	BREF	PIB891-69	3817N	12657E	KN #5 S#46332
	MUNMYONG NI ARMY BARRACKS + STORAGE AREA	ARMY	BREF	BLZ87-8165-78	3812N	12626E	KN #5 S#46819
	MUNKUNG DONG ARMY BARRACKS EAST	ARMY	BREF	BLZ87-8148-78	3821N	12658E	KN #5 S#46638
	NANGWOL NI/SANUM DONG ARMY BARRACKS	ARMY	BREF	BLZ87-8168-78	3988N	12546E	KN #5 S#46687
25X6	NANGWOL L HEADQUARTERS 51ST INF REGT SOUTH	ARMY	BREF	PIB894-69	3827N	12711E	KN #5 S#46462
	OUON NI HEADQUARTERS 42ND INF REGT/RKS AREA	ARMY	BREF	PIB898-69	3821N	12719E	KN #5 S#46333
	PANGWJAE ARMOR INSTALLATION	ARMY	BREF	BLZ87-8154-78	3828N	12642E	KN #5 S#46761
	SINANJU ARMY BARRACKS + STORAGE AREA	ARMY	BREF	BLZ87-8155-78	3834N	12538E	KN #5 S#46762
	SOKCHONG DONG HQ 24TH MORTAR REGT BKS + STG	ARMY	BREF	BLZ87-8162-78	3821N	12525E	KN #5 S#46815
	SONG DONG ARMY BARRACKS	ARMY	BREF	BLZ87-8181-78	3827N	12525E	KN #5 S#46758
	SONGSE RI ARMOR INSTALLATION	ARMY	BREF	BLZ87-8156-78	3819N	12639E	KN #5 S#46814
	SUHAN ARMY BARRACKS	ARMY	BREF	BLZ87-8152-78	3825N	12712E	KN #5 S#46759
25X6	SUNGAM NI ARMY BKS STGE + HQ 21ST INF REGT	ARMY	BREF	BLZ87-8161-78	3838N	12681E	KN #5 S#46811
	SUNGHO DONG MILITARY STORAGE AREA	ARMY	BREF	BLZ87-8159-78	3854N	12681E	KN #5 S#46812
	TOKSAN DONG ARMY BARRACKS NW	ARMY	BREF	BLZ87-8158-78	3888N	12648E	KN #5 S#46757
	UNSAN NI ARMY BARRACKS SE 2	ARMY	BREF	BLZ87-8141-78	3821N	12684E	KN #5 S#46611
	TONAN MILITARY BARRACKS + STORAGE AREA	ARMY	BREF	BLZ87-8149-78	3758N	12618E	KN #5 S#46756

25X6


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SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Approved For Release 2000/05/10 : CIA-RDP78B04560A006900010023-8



MWF from CIA Oct 8, 2002

see page 13
Ben Nakay photo

10 August 1992

Possible POW/MIA-Associated Markings in Southeast Asia

Introduction

This information was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency for the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. It is a summary of CIA analysis performed in 1976, 1980, 1981, and 1992 of areas in Vietnam and Laos where markings on buildings and terrain were evaluated as evidence of possible links to US POW/MIAs in Southeast Asia.

July 1976 Analysis of Dong Mang Prison Camp, North Vietnam

The prison is located at 21-04-00N/107-07-15E, approximately 26 kilometers west-northwest of the port of Cam Pha. It is located in a secluded area at the base of the foothills about 1 kilometer north of Dong Mang and 2 kilometers north of Route 183.

Although we were unable to find any conclusive evidence that this prison might contain American POWs, there are several unique features in this prison that differ from other known Vietnamese prisons. It is secluded in a relatively remote area and has an access control point on the road leading to the camp. Walls within the compound physically and visually segregate the prisoners. The visual segregation of prisoners indicates it is

EXHIBIT

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63

1

NND 982014 - 1726

Received by MWF
from CIA attorney
in Minneapolis
October 8, 2002

000231

SEE P.2 164 to H

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

DATE 5 OCTOBER 1971

PAGE 1 OF 25 PAGES

COUNTRY LAOS

DOI 25 SEPTEMBER 1971, AND AS STATED

SUBJECT ENEMY PRISONS IN LAOS

FOV-14,280

1. [REDACTED] COMMENT. THIS REPORT UPDATES FOV-23,008, ISSUED IN MARCH 1971. SINCE THE ISSUANCE OF THAT REPORT, THREE NEW PRISONS HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED AND PRISONS AT THE FOLLOWING TWELVE LOCATIONS HAVE BEEN DROPPED FROM LISTINGS AS THEY NO LONGER MET CRITERIA FOR CONFIRMATION: QC 5729, RC 0788, TH 3886, TH 5891, VH 0157, UG 9555, VF 9616, VF 9926, WF 0823, WE 2125, WD 7884, XD 0838, XD 2179, XD 3047, XC 1606, XD 7788 AND XB 8405. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE TECHNIQUES USED IN COMPILING THIS REPORT ARE DISCUSSED IN THE FINAL PARAGRAPH.

Approved for Release
Date March 95

EXHIBIT

65

Received by MWP [unclear] CH
Minneapolis Oct 8, 2002

000233

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TO: Bill Bennett
202/293-1702

7/10/92 Called Guffeth - he denied
all - said he was in Army in 1975.
I was a electronic specialist on Hawk

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW / MIA AFFAIRS
INTERNAL MEMORANDUM

mundo system

BT

TO: J W Codinha, Chief Counsel (FILE)

FROM: Jon D. Holstine, Investigator

SUBJECT: "Mr. Littleton"

DATE: July 8, 1992

Loise Veesy

Bill, at your instructions I called "Mr. Littleton" at 615/824-2160, who had called about existence of US POWs in Laos in 1977. As it turned out, he has given us a fictional name. (A nom de phone?) Seems an acquaintance of his volunteered in the context of a conversation on the topic of Americans missing in Southeast Asia (if I understood him correctly) that he knew there had been American prisoners in Laos because in 1977 he was part of a special forces team which penetrated Laos to photograph and plant listening devices near a supposedly empty prison or POW camp facility. It was not empty but heavily guarded including anti-aircraft weapons. He said they saw and photographed 36 Americans and brought the film back. Said it wasn't a Rambo-style camp but was heavily guarded. He and 4 others on the mission took the photos and returned with the film, which they turned over to superiors and were sworn to secrecy on the mission.

Nov-Dec 77

for
DIA

5 in group

Team
usually
had
8
people

The informant provided us with the name address and phone number of the alleged former special forces man. Says the man was in a unit where they were required to perform assassinations and that the man suffered career damage because he refused to kill a teenager.

Of importance: "Mr. Littleton," who is a busy beaver, tipped off Ross Perot on this, and Perot had his people interview the man -- apparently two men in Dallas.

36
Lancaster's

Mr. X is not anxious to talk about this. "Littleton" seems determined to get his story out. "Littleton" is an acquaintance of Hamilton Gayden. I have X's name, address, and phone number, and will pass it on to whomever picks this up. It sounds like a Covert Operations matter.

cc: Bob Taylor
John McCreary

Ernest Guffeth Blackville TN

615
A: 552-5310

Valerij

Burtich

000234




87

Si

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505



16 June 1992

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Analysis of Surface Markings
at Sam Neua, Laos (C)

REFERENCE: Letter to D/OCA, Same Subject, dtd June 3, 1992

In January 1988,
1. [REDACTED] Several unusual markings--the letters "USA" and what resembled a US Air Force escape and evasion symbol known as a "Walking Kilo"--on the ground west of Sam Neua, Laos. We are uncertain as to who may have made those markings, but recently completed analysis gives us a better understanding of how the markings were made, how long the markings may have been present, and what activity may have been going on concurrently in the surrounding region. [REDACTED]

2. *We obtained early 1987 and mid-1988 information on the Sam Neua area.*
[REDACTED]

Analysis enabled us to more confidently determine that there was a relative age difference between the USA letters and the possible Walking Kilo. It also enabled us to make an assessment as to the method used to create the markings. Our analysis suggests the following:

- The USA letters were newer by an undetermined period of time (but not more than a few months) than the possible Walking Kilo. [REDACTED]



000236

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

TASKER NUMBER 199

DUE DATE 4 Dec 92

REDACT DECLASSIFY X

DOCUMENTS REMOVED/~~BEING REVIEWED~~:

- 1) CIA Memo, 26 NOV 1975
- 2) CIA Memo, 8 NOV 1975
- 3) CIA Memo, 21 NOV 1975
- 4) DCD 1/2 with atchs, 14 Apr 1975

**DOCUMENTS
REMOVED**

**NOT
DECLASSIFIED**



Non Menor

TASKER NUMBER CDO-012

DUE DATE 10 Dec 92

REDACT DECLASSIFY X

DOCUMENTS REMOVED/BEING REVIEWED:

• OIA/ERD-307/80; DTD 16 Dec 80 (4 pgs) PAZ


DOCUMENTS
REMOVED

pers
Non
Menor
photos

NOT
DECLASSIFIED

PER CIA

Per Executive Order 12812
"Disclosure...would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy of returnees, family
members of POWs and MIAs, or other persons, or would



000238

CIA
F 94 0036
21 January 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record

SUBJECT : Discussion with Col. Dan Hatch, SACSA
of JPRC operation in Cambodia
and other topics

Attending: Col. Dan Hatch, SACSA

F, H

1. Col. Hatch arrived about 1110 and said that he had not obtained authority to brief on the Cambodia operation of JPRC. Col. Hatch accepted a list of questions and said that he would LDX the answers to [REDACTED] the same afternoon.

2. Col. Hatch remained after the breakup of the hoped for briefing on the Cambodia operation to discuss with [REDACTED] a draft cable which SACSA was being asked by Air Force to have sent to American Embassy Vientiane. The cable requests in essence that the highest possible priority be assigned to collection of intelligence on American PWs who may be held in Laos. The cable reasons that since only 3 PWs from Laos are confirmed held in NVN, therefore a major effort should be made to locate the remaining 227 who are listed as MIA in Laos and may still be held in Laos. The cable acknowledges that these men may be held in unadmitted camps in North Vietnam. The cable makes no demands and no misstatements of fact. [REDACTED] stated that he could see little chance for the cable causing any great change in what is being done in Laos and little chance that it would cause anguish or misunderstanding.

3. Col. Hatch stated that the Joint Staff had noted an improvement in reporting from Laos on PW intelligence since Col. Hatch's visit to [REDACTED] on 1 September 1970. At that time Col. Hatch discussed with [REDACTED] the reply which SACSA was sending to a CINCPAC complaint of insufficient action by CIA in Laos; the complaint was based on talks at [REDACTED] the monthly meeting. Specifically, Col. Hatch stated that Joint Staff was pleased to note that [REDACTED] had been committed by Vientiane to the collection of PW intelligence.

4. [REDACTED] stated to Col. Hatch that to the best of his knowledge there had been no basic change in the operational problems outlined during the 1 September visit, except that more NVA troops are now being captured and debriefed. We believed that the debriefing of these captives could be improved and would provide additional insight into the location and treatment of PWs.

EXHIBIT

70

INFO: J3-1 J5-1 SACSA-3 SAMAA-1 SECDEF-7 ASD/ISA-5
DIA-15 CSA-1 CSAF-5 CNO-2 CMC-3 CJCS-1 FILE-1(46)

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ROUTINE

IN CALL 4055337
FOR NMCC/HC
PAGE 5 OF 8 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA EDO

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081422Z CITE TDCS -314/05071-67

DIST 8 APRIL 1967

COUNTRY: LAOS

DOI: 1 FEBRUARY 1967

SUBJECT: VISIT OF SOUPHANOUVONG TO THREE AMERICANS HELD IN
A CAVE ON THE HOU EI VONG IN HOUA PHAN PROVINCE

ACQY

LAOS, VIENTIANE (8 APRIL 1967)

SOURCE:

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date

1. ON 1 FEBRUARY 1967 [REDACTED] ATTENDED A CEREMONY HELD
TO WELCOME SOUPHANOUVONG WHO HAD COME TO VISIT THE THREE AMERICAN
PRISONERS HELD IN A CAVE NEAR KANG LIT. [REDACTED] COMMENT: -

(NOT YET RECEIVED)

DATED 5 APRIL 1967, (NOT DISSEMINATED ELECTRICALLY)

BECAUSE IT CONTAINED A MAP OF THE AREA, REPORTED THREE

AMERICAN PILOTS IN A CAVE NEAR THE KANG LIT WATERFALL ON THE

HOU EI VONG BETWEEN BAN KANG KONG (374475) AND DANE PHAO

(VH 369540). THE PILOTS HAD BEEN MOVED THERE FROM BAN NAKAY

EXHIBIT

71

1 of 2 000241

IN 40551

TDCS -314/05071-67

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

(classification)

(dissem controls)

TEU (VH 1935) IN MARCH 1966. IN [REDACTED] THE SOURCE CORRECTED HIS EARLIER REPORT, DISSEMINATED AS [REDACTED] (TDCS-314/16404-66) / THAT THERE WERE TWO PILOTS IMPRISONED NEAR THE HOUET VONG.) THE CEREMONY WAS HELD OUTSIDE OF THE CAVE WHERE THE AMERICANS WERE IMPRISONED. [REDACTED] ALONG WITH DOME VILLAGERS, HAD BEEN INVITED TO MEET THE AMERICANS.

2. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] ONE OF THE AMERICANS WAS SMALL, ABOUT THE SIZE OF A LAD. THE SECOND WAS BALD OR BALDING, AND THE THIRD HAD A CREW CUT AND HAIRY ARMS AND CHEST. [REDACTED] COULD NOT REMEMBER ANY NAMES. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED] COULD NOT IDENTIFY ANY OF THE AMERICANS IN PHOTOGRAPHS SHOWN HIM.)

3. [REDACTED] SAID THE AMERICANS SEEMED TO BE HAPPY AND CHEERFUL AND IN GOOD HEALTH. THEY WERE NOT TIED OR HANDCUFFED. THEY JOXED AND SMILED WHEN THEY TALKED WITH SOUPHANOUVONG. ONE OF THEM TAPPED [REDACTED] ON THE BACK AND SHOOK HIS HAND.

4. [REDACTED] COUNTED 32 KHA GUARDS SURROUNDING THE AMERICANS. HE COMMENTED THAT THERE ARE USUALLY MANY PL TROOPS IN THE AREA AND THAT SOME HAVE VEHICLES. THE ROAD TO THE PRISON IS ROUGH AND PASSES THROUGH WOODS.

5. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE ARMY AIR USMACV 7TH AIR

[REDACTED]

From
CIA

40551

TDCS -314/05071-67

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

[REDACTED]

(classification) (information sensitivity)

FORCE CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SON TAY RAID

TIMETABLE OF PLANNING

1. Mid-May, USAF intelligence that prisoners were at Son Tay.
2. 5 June 1970, SACSA J-3 briefed JCS and recommended feasibility study of rescue. JCS approved.
3. 10 June, 12 man feasibility group formed.
4. 10 July, feasibility group briefed JCS that rescue attempt possible and presented concept of operations. JCS approved concept and directed commencement of detailed planning and training.
5. 8 August, Joint Contingency Task Group (JCTG) formed. BGEN Leroy Manor, Commander.
6. 12 August, SECDEF briefed and approved program of intensive training and rehearsals.
7. 20 August, training began.
8. 28 August, training and operations plan completed.
9. 16 September, COMJCTG briefed JCS plan was feasible and force would be trained and ready 8 October. COMJCTG recommended mission be conducted 21 October.
10. 24 September, SECDEF and Dir, CIA briefed. Approval was deferred pending word from higher authority.
11. 8 October, COMJCTG briefed the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; it was determined to delay the operation until November.
12. 27 October, Chairman, JCS approved deployment of JCTG to SEA.
13. 15 November (approx), JCTG completed deployment to SEA.
14. 18 November, final authority to COMJCTG to conduct mission.
15. 20 November, mission executed.





THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

29 ^{July}~~May~~ 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL BROWN

THROUGH: LT GENERAL SMITH ^S

Subject: Information on Son Tay Raid

1. In response to your questions, the attached timetable provides a chronology on Son Tay which identifies who made the various decisions and when. Detailed decision and intelligence data is not available in JCS documents, as the entire Son Tay affair was kept on very close hold basis to the extent that decisions were made in Executive Session only and no record was kept of the meetings. The only existing official document on Son Tay is the commander's report on the rescue operation itself, which does not include the planning and approval process.

2. Air Staff Plans research concerning Son Tay raid planning and information from members of the planning group that existed in 1970 reveal that during the early stages of the Son Tay planning effort (approximately May 1970) it was learned that the monsoon was dominating the mountain approaches to Son Tay and that it would not be possible to bring a formation across the mountains at low altitude until the weather had broken. Thus, from the beginning, the planning group was working towards an October window as the very first time when the weather would permit low altitude approaches using the cover of the mountains into Son Tay. Their notes indicate that the decision was made to begin intelligence gathering and the detailed planning and preparation needed in order to get the team to maximum proficiency by the time the October window would appear.

3. With five months' lead time, it appears that every deliberate effort was made to ensure that the task group was completely prepared and had every advantage on their side to ensure the very best chance of success. In doing so, innovative tactics and procedures were developed, and new concepts for weapon application, integration of the air and ground team, and communications were developed specifically for the Son Tay raid. Throughout the planning and preparation for Son Tay, extensive efforts were made to



2 of 5 000245

gather detailed intelligence data on the compound and adjacent areas. The 170 practices to which the News and World Report article referred represents the grand total of all ground assault practices from small element walk-throughs to integrated rehearsals. There were only 10 to 15 full dress rehearsals. Approximately one third of the practice sessions were accomplished during the five week period between being ready (8 October) and deployment (15 November), which resulted from delay in mission approval.

DATA

4. The Son Tay operation may well have been an important contributor to the DATA capability to conduct the DATA operation. A few months after the Son Tay raid, several of the participating officers gave a detailed briefing to DATA military personnel. Review of media accounts of the DATA operation points out some remarkable consistencies between the DATA operation and the Son Tay raid, although, admittedly, many standard raid techniques were used in both raids:

a. Both raids employed three main assault groups to secure the prisoners, shoot the guards, and prevent reinforcements from approaching the area. At DATA, one of these groups also destroyed the MIG aircraft to insure that the raiding party could not be pursued.

b. During ingress to the objective area, both operations used terrain masking. The DATA, however, had less low altitude electronic equipment aboard the aircraft, and we do not know which portions of the route utilized airways.

c.

DATA

d. Both raids used cover aircraft as much as possible. The DATA used F-4s to protect the primary aircraft from the DATA threat for approximately 130 miles south DATA both departing and arriving. The Son Tay raid utilized various aircraft to protect the raiding party from any hostile aircraft.

e. Deception and diversion area techniques were used by both raiding parties; however, accurate details on the operation are not yet known. Newspaper reports assert that the first two DATA aircraft DATA were disguised DATA. It is also reported that the first two DATA gained access to the airport through normal radio transmission techniques

DATA
j. The Son Tay raid used a diversion area firefight a short distance from the prison compound and a major flare drop over Haiphong in order to mask the arrival of the helicopters.

f. In each operation, one aircraft was detailed to remain on the ground for a short period DATA to monitor the scene after the other aircraft had departed, to insure that there were no stragglers or other survivors remaining.

g. During the preparation phase, attack units for both operations practiced on a mock-up of the objective area.

h. Both raids timed their arrivals based on moon position

DATA
i. Numerous alternative and contingency plans were prepared for each operation, i.e., alternative missions for assault elements to enable flexibility during actual operations. Destruction of the MIGs DATA was not preplanned according to media reports, although the DATA briefed otherwise.

5. In spite of the similarities in the assault phase of each raid, the circumstances surrounding each operation are markedly different. The DATA assault teams had operated together on at least two other operations, and they were already practiced in the basic skills and tactics of raid-type warfare. Thus, the DATA military were capable of putting together a plan on very short notice when they were confronted with a "now or never" situation. They were aided immeasurably by the receipt of accurate intelligence data

DATA
Because there was no immediacy in the Son Tay operation, the planning and preparation was carefully done over a five-month period. Another significant aspect is pertinent:

DATA the
US NCA only became aware of our Son Tay effort after we had developed a plan and had trained our force.

6. In response to your direction, CINCREC has developed a draft of JCS OPLAN 0300 on this type of unconventional warfare operation, and is planning to bring it to Washington within the next two weeks for coordination.

7.

DATA

ABR
COLONEL RENSHAW

REPRODUCED FROM THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Copy 01

was
SACSA

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM

Date 9 September 1970

To: Brigadier General Blackburn
THRU: Colonel Gibson
Subject: US PWs in Laos (S)

1. The attached message a reply to a CINCPAC recommendation for Washington level effort to bring about a reordering of priorities in the training and targeting

DATA

2. Coordination has been obtained from NAME DIA (Capt Harris).

3. Recommended Action: Sign and dispatch attached message to CINCPAC.

E. E. M.
EDWARD E. MAYER
Colonel, USA
Chief, Special Opns
Div

Prepared by:
Lt Col D. C. Hatch, USAF
Special Operations Div (J-39)
Ext: 55805

EXHIBIT

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1 of 3

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER

MESSAGE CENTER

11FK Interim msg re h.t.
Compac 27 Aug 70

SOD

VVVZCZCMLT133

MULT

ACTION SACSA(03)

DISTR CJCS(05) DJS(03) J3(12) J5(02) RF
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ADV DISTR NMCC: DDO(01)

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DE RUHHQA #3395 2380353

ZNY

R 260357Z AUG 70

FM CINCPAC

TO RUEKJCS/JCS

INFO RHMSMVA/COMUSMACV

BT

COPY NO. _____

U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR IN LAOS (S)

A. JOINT WORLDWIDE EVASION AND ESCAPE MANUAL DATED 1 AUG 67

B. CINCPAC 052204Z JUN 70

1. REF A CONTAINS BASIC POLICY, DOCTRINE AND GUIDANCE ON EVASION AND ESCAPE (E&E) FOR MAJOR COMMANDS AND UNITS OF ALL THE MILITARY SERVICES. REF B CONTAINED INVITATIONS, AND A PROPOSED AGENDA FOR 22-24 JUN JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY CENTER (JPRC), E&E CONFERENCE IN SAIGON AND UDORN.

2

3

TO DATE, THE MEAGER AND IN MANY CASES OUTDATED PW CAMP INFORMATION HAS BEEN "SPIN-OFF" FROM ROAD AND TRAILWATCH MISSIONS. ONCE ENTERED IN THE LAOS PW DETENTION FACILITIES LIST, THE LOCATION OF A REPORTED SIGHTING MAY PROVIDE THE ENEMY'S SANCTUARIES THAT WILL REMAIN FREE FROM AIR ATTACK FOR UP TO THIRTY-SIX MONTHS. A TIMELY AND AGGRESSIVE PROGRAM TO FOLLOW-UP PW SIGHTING REPORTS WOULD ENHANCE PW RECOVERY CHANCES. IN THOSE CASES WHERE SUCH FOLLOW-UP CONFIRMS THAT THERE ARE NO PW'S IN THE AREA, HIGHLY LUCRATIVE ENEMY TARGETS CAN BE RE-OPENED TO AIR STRIKES.

4. ALL ATTENDEES AT THE SAIGON/UDORN MEETINGS WERE IN AGREEMENT THAT FIELD EFFORTS SHOULD BE INTENSIFIED TO IMPROVE THE PRODUCTIVITY OF E&E/JPRC OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, IT IS STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT

PAGE 1

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ACTION: SACSA(1)1 GEN BLACKBURN

DISTR: CJCS(5)2-6 ADM MOORER DJS(1)7 GEN VOGT J3(1)8 GEN ZAIS

J5(1)9 ADM WEINEL FILE(1)10 JRT/BHL

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JCS FILE COPY

2 of 3

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

81961

ACTION BE UNDERTAKEN AT WASHINGTON LEVEL IN AN EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT A
REORDERING OF PRIORITIES IN THE TRAINING
TO MORE EFFECTIVELY ACCOMPLISH THE SUCCESSFUL IDENTIFICATION,
ASSISTANCE AND RECOVERY OF U.S. PW'S IN LAOS.

GP-1

BT

#3395

ANNOTES

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