

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

DATE 20 JUNE 1977  
IN 319123  
PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR  
DISTRIBUTION TO: SDO

COUNTRY LAOS/SRV

DOI

SUBJECT

RECORDS MAINTAINED BY A SENIOR LAO GOVERNMENT  
AND COMMUNIST PARTY OFFICIAL LISTING AMERICAN  
MIA FROM THE WAR IN LAOS

ACQ

SOURCE

ROGER HALL  
3715 First Ave., Apt. 827  
Silver Spring, MD 20910  
301-585-3361

EXHIBIT 31

000087



IN 319133

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

I

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D

(classification)

1.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] LPDR MINISTER OF NATIONAL  
DEFENSE KHAMTAI SIPHANDON [REDACTED] MAINTAINS IN  
THE MINISTRY A CENTRAL AND HIGHLY CLASSIFIED RECORD OF AMERICAN  
PILOTS CAPTURED BY LAO AND VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST FORCES DURING  
THE WAR IN LAOS. [REDACTED] THIS RECORD ALSO PROVIDES  
DETAILS ON THE DISPATCH OF CAPTURED PILOTS TO PRISONER OF WAR  
(POW) CAMPS AT SEVERAL LOCATIONS IN THE NORTHERN SECTOR OF THE  
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SRV) INCLUDING THE SON TAY CAMP.  
[REDACTED] THIS RECORD HAD BEEN KEPT FROM THE  
OUTSET OF THE WAR, AND PREVIOUSLY HELD IN SAFEKEEPING AT  
KHAMTAI'S FORMER MILITARY HEADQUARTERS IN SAM NEUA, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

B

B

B

B

B

2. [REDACTED] REMARKED THAT IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT COMPLETE

[REDACTED] I

000088



IN 319123

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

(classification)

INFORMATION ON AMERICANS MISSING OR KILLED IN ACTION WILL EVER  
BE RELEASED SO LONG AS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT REFUSES TO ABIDE BY  
THE PROVISIONS OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT TO HEAL THE WOUNDS OF  
WAR, AND THE 17 POINTS INCLUDED IN FORMER PRESIDENT RICHARD M.  
NIXON'S LETTER TO SRV PRESIDENT TON DUC THANG.

3.

4. FIELD DISSEM: NONE

000089



1. 111740112  
 406-142271. OCDSN=DP212

DP = 301604Z AUG 84

CTION: \*UNASSIGNED\*  
 DB-2(1) DB-3(1) NMIC(-)  
 SAFE(-) DC(1)

OTAL COPIES = 00003 MDC = WW

NY MMHSH  
 RZK PR ASP DE  
 301525Z AUG 84  
 M DIRNSA  
 O SSO DIA//DC-2//  
 WHITE HOUSE  
 CIA//DDO/EA/VKL//  
 EM

TOO  
 C FOR MR. CHILDRESS ROOM 302 OLD EOB; CIA FOR MR. FALLS;  
 CIA FOR MR. TRONBRIDGE  
 540210-84

THAT REPORT OF AMERICAN POW CAMP IN LAOS  
 THE FOLLOWING IS AN UNEVALUATED VERSION OF THE THAI  
 LANGUAGE ROYAL THAI ARMED FORCES SECURITY CENTER (AFSC) HUMINT  
 REPORT WHICH WAS PASSED TO U.S. ADVISORS BY A THAI OFFICER  
 CONCERNING A POW/MIA CAMP LOCATED IN SARAVAN PROVINCE, LAOS.

QUOTE  
 SUBJECT: AMERICAN POW CAMP IN SARAVAN PROVINCE (LAOS)  
 DATE: 21 AUG 84

1. THE SPECIAL AFSC DETACHED ELEMENT RECEIVED AN UNCONFIRMED  
 REPORT THAT THERE IS A CAMP FOR AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN THE  
 AREA OF THE HEUP VALLEY, BAN KADON VILLAGE, NIM HIANG SUB-DISTRICT  
 HYANG LAMAH DISTRICT, SARAVAN PROVINCE. A SUMMARY OF THE IMPORTANT  
 FACTS ARE AS FOLLOWS: (BRIEF MAP IS ATTACHED)

- 1.1 NUMBER OF PERSONS IN CUSTODY: 23 AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR
- 1.2 LOCATION: THE CAMP IS IN THE AREA OF THE FOOT OF A MOUNTAIN

CIA/JCRC REPORTING  
 SAYS 20 PWs



R-354  
20

PAGE 2 MLN#48112  
DAN#406-142271 OCDSN#MDP212

&gt;&gt;&gt; P R I O R I T Y

SURROUNDED BY TRENCH WITH WATER FROM THE NAM PHUANG. THE CAMP IS SURROUNDED BY THREE BARBED-WIRE FENCES. THE INTER-MOST BARBED-WIRE FENCE IS CONNECTED TO THE TWO SLEEPING QUARTERS OF THE POW! THE SITE IS COMPOSED OF:

- 1.2.1 TWO POW SLEEPING QUARTERS (INSIDE THE FENCES)
- 1.2.2 ONE KITCHEN BUILDING (OUTSIDE THE FENCES)
- 1.2.3 CAMP FOR ETHNIC KHA LAO SOLDIERS (GUARDS) COMPRISING THREE BUILDINGS.

1.3 GUARD FORCE: THERE ARE ABOUT 30 FULLY ARMED ETHNIC KHA LAO SOLDIERS AS GUARDS. FROM TIME TO TIME, 10-20 VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS COME AND INSPECT THE CAMP, ABOUT ONCE A MONTH.

1.4 COMMUNICATIONS: THERE IS A RADIO TRANSCEIVER IN CONTACT WITH THE PARENT STATION IN VIENTIANE. IT HAS AN ANTENNA ABOUT 500 FEET HIGH.

2. THE SPECIAL AFSC DETACHED ELEMENT 3-4, AFTER CONSIDERATION, IS OF THE OPINION THAT THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO THE ANTI-SABOTAGE UNIT AND DIV SIX FOR THEIR KNOWLEDGE ALSO.

3. THIS FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION.

COMMENT: A ROUGH SKETCH MAP SHOWS THE CAMP TO BE FOUR HOURS WALK SOUTH FROM BAN KADON (LOCATED AT 1519N 10558E YB1195) ON THE EAST SIDE OF THE NAM PHUANG RIVER. IT SHOWS A SMALL CAMP BOUNDED ON THE LEFT BY THE NAM PHUANG RIVER AND ON THE OTHER THREE SIDES BY A MOAT. THERE IS ONE BARBED-WIRE FENCE BETWEEN THE CAMP AND THE WATER, ONE ALONG THE MIDDLE OF THE MOAT AND ONE BETWEEN THE MOAT AND THE GUARDS. ACCORDING TO THE MAP THERE IS ONLY ONE FENCE AND THE RIVER TO THE WEST. ENTRANCE IS OVER A KUDDEN HAY ON THE EASTERN SIDE.

UNQUOTE

2. EXACT LOCATION OF CAMP IS UNKNOWN; PLACENAMES PROVIDED IN THE REPORT (NAM PHUANG RIVER, HEUP VALLEY, AND HYANG LAMAM DISTRICT) ARE NOT IN GAZETTEERS OR ON MAPS AVAILABLE HERE. BAN KADON IS LOCATED AT YB1195 BUT APPEARS TO BE IN AN AREA WHICH DOES NOT MATCH THE DESCRIPTION IN THE REPORT. A HOUAY PHOUANG STREAM IS IN THE AREA OF YC4010 TO YC5000.

3. WE WILL TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS:

000091



R 354


12.2

\*\*\*\*\*

>>> P R I O R I T Y

PAGE 3 MLN=48112  
DAN=406-142271 OCOSN=MOP212

- A. QUERY THE THAT REGARDING THE IDENTITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE SOURCE AND DATE OF THE INFORMATION.
- B. REQUEST AFSC SEARCH FOR ANY COMMS WHICH MAY BE EMANATING FROM THAT AREA OR SERVING UNITS STATIONED IN THE AREA.
- C. REQUEST AFSC PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THEY MAY HAVE
- 4. WILL KEEP YOU APPRISED OF ANY ADDITIONAL INFO WE MAY ACQUIRE.



#8149

NNNN

000092



NSA  
E.O. 12352  
1.3 (a) [(1), (2), (3), (4), (5)] + (b)

DTG: 190130Z DEC 80

FM

TO

ZL

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: ACFT MOVEMENTS IN LAOS

REF: [REDACTED] OF 060405Z DEC 80

(SC) WOULD APPRECIATE TO REF AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. QUERY HAS TO  
DO WITH [REDACTED] SUSPICION THAT AN AIRCRAFT MAY HAVE BEEN  
USED TO TRANSPORT A NUMBER OF U.S. POWS IN LAOS.

REVW 09 DEC 80

#0045

CC71926

*As suspected: why didn't*

*3 this [REDACTED] say that the first time I*

EXHIBIT 33

000093



[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] 0627,752//

DTG: 090415Z DEC 80

FM:

TO:

REF: [REDACTED]

SUBJ: AIR MOVEMENTS

REF: [REDACTED] DTG 090405Z DEC 80

1. [REDACTED] JUST FINISHED CHECKING WITH SEASAT AND THEY HAD NO REFLECTIONS OF ACFT ACTIVITY IN THAT AREA. THEY DID SAY THAT THEY WOULD RECIEVE [REDACTED] FOR THE 7TH TOMORROW. WILL PASS ON ANYTHING THEY MIGHT COME UP WITH ASAP.

2. REGARDS, [REDACTED]

4072060

*no reflections, who said*

[REDACTED]

NSA

E.O. 12356

1.3 (a) [(1), (2), (3), (4), (5)] + (6)

3

000094

002



15 DECEMBER 1982

PRIORITY

NSA  
E.O. 12352  
1.3 (2) [(1), (2), (3), (4), (5)] + (6)

will send via UNOSAP

TO: N-31 - FOR 35, 3366

FM: CDO/AGE/783

NEGATIVE  
FLIGHT ACTY

SUBJECT: AN-26 FLIGHT ACTIVITY IN LAOS

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED

AS A RESULT OF A QUERY TO THE

AS TO POSSIBLE RADAR VERIFICATION OF FLIGHTS TO  
AND FROM CUDOMSAI AND ATTAPU FOR 23 NOVEMBER AND 7  
DECEMBER 1982. RECORDS SHOW A FLIGHT ON 28  
NOVEMBER, BELIEVED TO BE AN-26, FROM THE VICINITY OF  
LONG CHIENG (TG 8322) TO VIENTIANE LANDING THERE 1202  
HOURS. UNABLE TO MONITOR FLIGHT TO AND FROM  
CUDOMSAI BECAUSE OF TERRAIN. ALSO ON 28 NOVEMBER  
RECORDED A FLIGHT, AGAIN BELIEVED TO BE AN-26, FROM THE  
NORTH WHICH LANDED AT ATTAPU CIRCA 1502 HOURS. ON 7  
DECEMBER RECORDED ANOTHER SUSPECTED AN-26 FLIGHT  
FROM THE NORTH WHICH WAS LANDED ATTAPU CIRCA 1500 HOURS  
AND A SECOND FLIGHT FROM HANOI WHICH LANDED AT ATTAPU  
AND PROCEEDED ON TO STEUNG TRENG, KAMPONGEAT.

2.

WOULD WELCOME YOUR COMMENTS ON THIS INFORMATION AS IT  
APPLIES TO THE PRISONER OF WAR SITUATION. RVN DEC 23

000095



NSA [REDACTED]

NSA  
E.O. 12356  
1.3 (a) [(1), (2), (3), (4), (5)] + (6)

31 DECEMBER 1988

IMMEDIATE

00 [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

TO: [REDACTED]

FM: [REDACTED]

PER [REDACTED]

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION OF 31 DECEMBER  
MESSAGE [REDACTED]

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF

BECAUSE U. S. AND THAI POWS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED BY THAIS,

THEY BE REMOVED FROM ATTOPEU PROVINCE.

IT WILL PICK UP POWS AT THE AIRFIELD ON 28 DEC AT

1238 HOURS. [REDACTED]

000096



1 December 1953  
SITSUM ITEM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Serial: [REDACTED]

Subject: U.S. POW/MIA's in Laos

1. [REDACTED] On 28 November, [REDACTED] was contacted by [REDACTED] regarding the subject. Specifically, [REDACTED] advised that he had just been informed about a [REDACTED] which disclosed that 20 "American prisoners" and 16 Laotian prisoners were to be transported from Oudomsai Province, Laos to Vientiane before 2 December. 2 December is the fifth anniversary of the founding of the Lao Peoples Democratic Republic (the Vietnamese backed government currently in power) and Lao insurgent activity against the government and Vietnamese forces in Laos will increase.

2. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

NSA  
E.O. 12356  
1.3 (a) [(1), (2), (3), (4), (5)] + (6)

Encl

[REDACTED] 0175

[REDACTED] 0023  
000097



NSA  
E.O. 12333  
1.3 (a) [(1), (2), (3), (4), (5)] +  
(b)

DTG: 080450Z DEC 80 (RESEND)

FM

TO

ZEM

S E C R E T

SUBJ: ACFT MOVEMENTS IN LAOS

QUERY IF YOU HAVE ANY SOVIET, LAO, OR  
VIETNAMESE AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS BETWEEN VIENTIANE AND ATTOPEU DURING  
5-7 DECEMBER FRAME OR BETWEEN VIENTIANE AND UDOM SAI DURING  
27 NOV - 7 DEC FRAME. WUD APPREC ANY DETAILS ON TYPE AND NATIONALITY  
OF ACFT AND SUSPECTED REASONS FOR FLIGHT.

14

0543

A HOPEN  
1448N 10650E

CC67465

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0027  
00098



DATE: 4 December 1980

# memorandum

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: [REDACTED]

Serial: [REDACTED] 394-80

SUBJECT: American Prisoners in Laos (U)

TO: [REDACTED]

NSA  
E.O. 12356  
1.3 (2) [(1), (2), (3), (4), (5)] & (6)

1. [REDACTED] Regarding the SITSUM item which you received in Bangkok on the subject, we have received a copy of the "collateral" from [REDACTED] East Asia. This "collateral" appears to be an [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] specifically mention 20 American prisoners.

2. [REDACTED] We have requested [REDACTED] contact [REDACTED] to ascertain specific technical details [REDACTED] so we can attempt [REDACTED] Intend to have the wideband tapes shipped here for verification of the [REDACTED] Laotian linguists.

3. [REDACTED] We have notified [REDACTED] of the probable [REDACTED] collateral source for the subject information. [REDACTED] has also been advised.

Encl:

SITSUM Item [REDACTED]  
Subj: U.S. POW/MIA's in Laos

cc: [REDACTED]



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO.  
1 (REV. 7-76)  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6  
5010-107-02

U.S. Government Printing Office

000099



JOINT STAFF  
INFO SERVICE CENTER

COPY NUMBER 10

ROUTINE  
R 220907Z JUN 90  
FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//  
TO DIA WASHINGTON DC//PW-MIA/DAM//

ZYUW RUEHBK6162 1730908

JANGKOK TH 36162

SB-0461 JUN 90

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO SDR S-VOP-05346 (U)

1. MET 1000-1100 HRS.  
22 JUN 90 AT THE HILTON HOTEL, BANGKOK. HAD BEEN  
ADVISED BY TELEPHONE ON 18 JUN 90 THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE  
MEETING WAS TO DISCUSS TWO SPECIFIC INCIDENTS--THE  
"HERLICKA" REPORTING AND THE FEB 73 C47 CRASH REPORTING.

2. J APPEARED FOR THE MEETING WITH AN  
UNIDENTIFIED CAUCASIAN MALE IN TOW. IDENTIFIED  
THE PERSON ONLY AS A FRIEND, AND POSITIONED HIM AT A  
HEADY TABLE. THE INDIVIDUAL WAS

THAT INCLUDED NAMES OF ACTUAL MISSING PERSONS MUST BY LAW  
BE PASSED TO THE FAMILIES INVOLVED. RESPONDED  
THAT HE NEVER ASKED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO CONTACT THE  
FAMILIES.

8. MAIN INTEREST APPEARED TO BE  
OPENING A NEW CHANNEL TO THE US GOVERNMENT SO THAT HE  
COULD VERIFY PW-MIA REPORTS HE CONTINUALLY RECEIVES. RO  
ADVISED THAT WE WOULD ACCEPT ANY INFORMATION HE  
PROVIDES BUT THAT WE WERE LOOKING FOR VERIFIABLE DATA,  
NOT RUMORS. RO FURTHER ADVISED THAT REGARDLESS  
OF WHAT HE REPORTED, THERE WOULD BE NO REWARDS AND  
WOULD NEVER BE ASKED TO ACT ON BEHALF OF THE U.S.  
GOVERNMENT IN ANY MATTER RELATING TO THE PW-MIA ISSUE.

9. RO TERMINATED THE MEETING WHEN BEGAN  
REPEATING THAT HE DIDN'T WANT TO BE SEEN AS TRYING TO  
PROFIT ON PW-MIA INFORMATION AND THAT HE WAS WILLING TO  
REWARD HIS SOURCES OUT OF HIS OWN POCKET.

87

IRRELEVANT DATA DELETED

4. WOULD NOT RESPOND TO SPECIFIC  
QUESTIONS ON THE "HERLICKA" CASE. HE STATED THAT IN DEC  
89 HE HAD RECEIVED INFO FROM

THAT D.

HERLICKA WAS HELD WITH ONE OTHER UNIDENTIFIED AMERICAN IN  
THE VICINITY OF LAK KAO. CLAIMED A PHOTOCOPY OF  
AN I.D. CARD ASSOCIATED WITH "BANNERMAN" WAS RELATED TO  
THIS CASE. SAID HE DID NOT THINK WHO

CUSTODY OF ANY AMERICAN PWS. RIT WAS AN INTERMEDIARY FOR  
PROMISED TO FORWARD.  
WITHIN A FEW DAYS. ALL DOCUMENTS HE HAD RECEIVED ON THE  
MATTER.

IRRELEVANT DATA DELETED

HE ALSO STATED THAT "IF ONLY HE  
HAD KNOWN IN ADVANCE THAT RO WISHED TO TALK ABOUT THESE  
TWO CASES", HE WOULD HAVE COME PREPARED TO DISCUSS THEM  
IN DETAIL.

IRRELEVANT DATA DELETED

EXHIBIT 34

7. RO EXPLAINED TO THAT ANY INFORMATION

(M)

MCN=90173/03974

TOR=90173/09242

TAD=90173/09252

CDSN=MIA213

PAGE 1 OF 1  
220907Z JUN 90

000100



P USDAO BANGKOK TH/ 936734  
 ORIGIN DAO INFO ORIG COPY//STAMP//ENVELOPE// INHIBIT (1)

VZCZC  
 RR RUUKJCS  
 DE RUEBCK #6734 212 \*\*  
 ZNY

R 311139Z JUL 91  
 FM USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//  
 TO DIA WASHINGTON IC//PW-MIA/DAH/DAT-3//  
 BT

BANGKOK TH 36734

CHRG: DAO 87/31/01  
 APPRV: DAO 87/31/01  
 DRFTD: DAO 87/31/01  
 CLEAR: DAO 87/31/01  
 DISTR: DORO  
 ORIGIN: OCR

SB-0218 91

SUBJECT: ALLEGED HEARSAY LIVE SIGHTING OF U.S. POW -  
 - TRADING VISAS FOR U.S. POW'S.

1. ON 02 JUL 91, SOURCE, AN AMERICAN CITIZEN  
 OF THAI ANCESTRY NAMED SC, HOME ADDRESS:  
 SD, PHONE  
 NUMBER SD, VISITED THE EMBASSY AND CALLED TH-  
 B1 (NO) STATING THAT HE HAD EARLIER BEEN IN CONTACT  
 WITH THE PW-MIA OFFICE IN THE PENTAGON IN WASHINGTON,  
 D.C. AFTER ALLEGEDLY WRITING PRESIDENT BUSH A PERSONAL  
 LETTER, OFFERING HIS ASSISTANCE IN THE RESOLUTION OF  
 THE PW-MIA ISSUE, SOURCE STATED THAT HE HAD TALKED TO A  
 DIA-LAO ANALYST OF THE PW-MIA SHOP (NFI) AND THAT THE  
 ANALYST HAD GIVEN SOURCE THE STONY BEACH TEAM CHIEF'S  
 NAME AND PHONE NUMBER IN BANGKOK.

2. SOURCE STATED THAT HE MADE FREQUENT TRIPS  
 BACK TO THAILAND FOR BUSINESS PURPOSES AND ON THIS  
 PARTICULAR TRIP HE HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH SEVERAL OLD  
 BUSINESS ACQUAINTANCES IN NORTHEAST THAILAND WHOM HE  
 REFUSED TO NAME. THESE BUSINESS CONTACTS WERE OFTEN IN  
 RECEIPT OF INFORMATION CONCERNING ALLEGED, LIVE U.S. PW  
 AND HAD TOLD HIM THAT THERE ARE AT LEAST 10 (TEN)  
 AMERICAN PWS BEING HELD IN THE VICINITY OF CHIANG  
 KHONG, IN NORTHERN LAOS, NEAR THE CHINESE BORDER, BY  
 ELEMENTS OF THE LAO PEOPLES ARMY. THE PW ARE BEING  
 HELD IN CAVES (NFI). A RANSOM MUST BE PAID FOR THEIR  
 RELEASE. SOURCE STATED THAT ONE OF THE PW IS LT NAME  
 NAME. HE PROVIDED HIM WITH A XEROX COPY OF LT NAME  
 NAME'S MILITARY ID CARD AND AN ATTACHED HAND WRITTEN  
 NOTE ALLEGEDLY FROM LT NAME AS PROOF. SOURCE REFUSED  
 TO IDENTIFY THE OTHER NINE ALLEGED U.S. PW.

3. SOURCE STATED THAT HE REALIZED THAT THE  
 OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY WAS THAT NO AWARDS  
 COULD BE PAID FOR PW/MIA INFO. HOWEVER, HE STATED THAT  
 AS AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL HE KNEW OF SEVERAL HIGH  
 RANKING THAI ARMY GENERALS AND SEVERAL WEALTHY  
 BUSINESSMEN IN THAILAND, NONE OF WHOM HE IDENTIFIED,  
 WHO WOULD BE WILLING TO SUPPLY THE REQUIRED RANSOM  
 MONEY IN EXCHANGE FOR A NUMBER OF TOURIST VISAS (B-1,  
 B-2) AND STUDENT VISAS FOR THEIR RELATIVES TO VISIT AND  
 STUDY IN THE UNITED STATES.

P // //

USDAO BANGKOK TH/ 936734

4. NO THANKED SOURCE FOR HIS OFFER TO ASSIST  
 IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE PW-MIA ISSUE AND REINFORCED  
 THE SOURCE'S OWN UNDERSTANDING (STATED IN PARAGRAPH  
 3 ABOVE) OF U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY CONCERNING THE NON-  
 PAYMENT OF REWARDS. HE ALSO INFORMED SOURCE THAT THE  
 VISA PROPOSITION WAS IN VIOLATION OF U.S. LAW AND  
 REGULATIONS AND WAS COMPLETELY OUT OF THE QUESTION.

5. LT NAME HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF PAST  
 REPORTING BY THIS OFFICE.

BT  
 #6734

NNNN


P

USDAO BANGKOK TH/ 836734

EXHIBIT 35

000101





Source  
NP 004822

2626

25

ROUTINE  
R 071424Z SEP 84  
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//DC-2//  
TO JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH  
INFO CDR JCRC BARBERS PT HI

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
JCS MESSAGE CENTER  
ZYUN RUEKJCS6281 2522002  
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J36//

SUBJ: ALLEGED LIVE U.S. PWS HELD IN LAOS  
REF: JCRC LIAISON BANGKOK TH MSG DTG 311013Z AUG 84, SAB  
1. REQUEST YOU EXPEDITIOUSLY REINTERVIEW ALL SOURCES OF INFORMATION REPORTED IN REF AND OBTAIN DETAILED INFORMATION REGARDING THEIR RESPECTIVE SIGHTINGS.  
2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION, INTERIM ASSESSMENTS AND GUIDANCE WILL BE FORTHCOMING BY DIA IN SEPARATE MESSAGES.

ACTION DC-2(2)  
INFO NMIC(1) VO(1) DIA(1)  
+SAFE

2626

(D, 6, 8, F)

5

NOV 04 03:00/0337P TOR#84

1/2603Z CDSN:WIA101 PAGE 1 OF 1

26

000666

000102





## DPMO POLICY MEMORANDUM

09 JUN 1995

### COMPENSATION FOR INFORMATION RELATING TO UNACCOUNTED FOR U.S. SERVICE PERSONNEL

**POLICY:** This memorandum reaffirms U.S. Government (USG) policy that accounting for U.S. military and related-civilian personnel is a humanitarian issue based on the principle that all individuals who make the ultimate sacrifice in service to their nation deserve to be accounted for, and, if possible, their remains returned to U.S. soil. DoD encourages individuals to cooperate with U.S. investigators seeking to account for Americans, but will not reward an individual or group for recovery and return of remains or information relating to an unaccounted for individual. To reduce the risk of Americans being held as hostages, the USG has long held that it will not pay ransom for hostages, prisoners of war, or other individuals held against their will as a result of service to their country. The refusal to pay for remains of our fallen is an extension of this principle.

DoD will continue to honor commitments negotiated in good faith with foreign governments to compensate for costs associated with the repatriation of remains ultimately judged to be those of missing Americans. Excluding negotiated costs associated with joint recoveries, in most cases such compensation for individual citizens will be based on fair and reasonable costs associated with the recovery, transfer, and storage of repatriated remains. In most instances this compensation will be paid to the foreign government with the expectation that government officials will reimburse individual citizens responsible for the unilateral return of remains.

This policy differs from that regarding POWs and individuals who are not in a captive status, but attempting to evade or escape from hostile territory. Consistent with existing policy and commitments, such as those extended in service personnel blood chits, DoD will monetarily reward an individual or group who directly liberates an American service member detained against his or her will in a foreign country as a result of his or her status as a U.S. combatant. To receive such a reward, the individual must be returned to U.S. custody and identified as an actual POW or MIA from a recognized conflict.

**RATIONALE:** The DoD decision not to pay for the recovery of remains or for information related to such recovery stems directly from the negative consequences associated with such action. Specifically, experience has shown that offering monetary awards for the turnover of remains often encourages:

- **Looting of Crash and Grave Sites.** Individuals eager to make a profit in the trading of remains or information associated with loss incidents feel emboldened to rob graves and loot crash sites in an effort to obtain artifacts and remains for sale. For example, remains traders have in the past regularly desecrated graves,



EXHIBIT 36


000103



including those of their own family members or of foreign soldiers, in an attempt to dupe U.S. investigators into accepting non-American remains.

- **Destruction of Remains and Crashsite Evidence.** Unauthorized excavation of graves and crash sites frequently result in damage to potential investigation sites, thus severely complicating subsequent official USG accounting efforts. Moreover, some individuals eager to make a profit have, in the past, destroyed remains--for example, breaking a large bone into little pieces--to maximize the amount of money they can collect. Likewise, large pieces of wreckage often are dispersed among many individuals, or even among different villages, in an attempt to maximize the amount of reward money collected.
- **Identification Complications.** Even when individuals seeking a reward turn over legitimate remains, the lack of a chain of custody associated with such recoveries can severely hinder the identification process. Many identifications rely on crash site evidence recovered in conjunction with the remains to make an identification strong enough to withstand Armed Forces Identification Review Board scrutiny. The absence of such associated evidence and the lack of first hand knowledge of a site make it more difficult for the Central Identification Laboratory to make an identification.
- **Impaired Government-to-Government Cooperation.** Currently the USG enjoys a high level of cooperation around the globe from foreign officials involved in joint investigative and recovery activities. Such cooperation includes local officials' willingness to persuade their citizens to turn over American remains as a humanitarian gesture. A USG willingness to reward individual citizens, however, would make them less likely to cooperate with their government officials, who do not offer such rewards. Experience has shown that in these circumstances foreign officials become less committed to the accounting process and less willing to cooperate with U.S. officials.
- **Potential Personal Security Dangers.** Although a minimal risk, DoD cannot discount the possibility that some individuals may seek to harm U.S. or other western individuals in an attempt to recover a reward associated with the return of remains.

Approved



James W. Wold  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(POW/MIA Affairs)

1 June 1995

000104



Stenographic Transcript of  
**HEARINGS**  
Before the

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

**UNITED STATES SENATE**

CONTINUED DEPOSITION OF  
ADMIRAL (Ret.) THOMAS HINMAN MOORER

Thursday, April 30, 1992

Pages 172 through 316

Exhibit Numbers 5 through 10

Washington, D.C.

EXHIBIT 37

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY  
1111 14TH STREET, N.W.

000105



1 information, it should be made in compliance with the  
2 law." That's my position. I tell Red McDaniels and all  
3 these guys that all the time.

4 Q. It's hard to argue with that position.

5 A. Yes. What do you want me to say about that?

6 Q. I guess what I want to ask you is, in your  
7 opinion, if you consider the April 12 press conference  
8 statements of Mr. Shields, the June 8, 1973 memo of Mr.  
9 Clements, really putting himself into the process of  
10 moving people into a POW status, and then the July 17 memo  
11 of Mr. Clements saying we're going to move forward with  
12 status changes into the KIA status, is there any pattern,  
13 any political pattern or any pattern whatsoever that has  
14 any significance or should have any significance to our  
15 committee?

16 A. No. I think that that directive, that he was  
17 going to take over the change in status, is a matter of  
18 common sense, for the simple reason that you've got three  
19 categories: killed, missing, and POW. Once they get  
20 moved into that POW status, God help you, there'd be an  
21 avalanche of relatives there in five minutes. So that's  
22 why it's most important that, when you do a change of  
23 status to POW, you know what you're talking about because  
24 you're going to have a hell of a lot of questions to  
25 answer, I guarantee you, whether the guy's a POW or not.



This report contains unprocessed information.  
Plans and/or policies should not be evolved  
or modified solely on the basis of this report.

(Classification and Control Markings)

VIETNAM

Description of U.S. PW  
Camp in Laos

NUMBER: 723.610

3. REPORT NUMBER: 1 775 0034 71  
(5905-04)

3. DATE OF REPORT: 31 March 1971

10. NO. OF PAGES: 2

11. REFERENCES: SICR: D-7CX-49018  
DIRM: 1Q16, 6G  
(Refer to COMMENTS for additional  
references)

12. ORIGINATOR: Hq 1021st USAF Fld Acty Sq

13. PREPARED BY: Det 5, 1021st USAF Fld Acty Sq

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

For Colonel, USAF

RECD CO-3 09 APR 1971

LTOL

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: Unknown Period between  
1965 - 19705. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Thailand  
28 February 1971

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B/F/F INFORMATION 6

7. SOURCE: 15310085/OTS 500271/OTS 500371

15. SUMMARY:

"EVALUATION OF THIS REPORT IS REQUESTED"

(Leave Blank)

This report provides information on a U.S. PW camp located in the immediate vicinity of XAMTAI (195920N/1043835, VH622102, Sheet 5948-IV), Laos. During an unspecified period between 1965 and 1970, a group of 50 to 100 U.S. PW's were interned at this detention facility.

## CIRCUMSTANCES OF ACQUISITION:

1. The information in this report was obtained from DATA, a former PL soldier who defected in early February 1971. DATA as in the XAMTAI area during an unspecified period between 1965 and 1970 where he claimed to have personally observed the reported PW detention site.

2. During an unspecified time period between 1965 and 1970, a group of 50-100 U.S. PW's were held at a detention facility in the immediate vicinity of XAMTAI in HOUA PHAN Province, Laos, near the NVN border. This camp was referred to by Pathet Lao (PL) personnel as "KHAI KHOK SOONKLANG KAO PAED (Center Prison Number 98 Camp)" and sometimes termed "The Center" or "98th Camp". While PW's were held there, this PW camp was the main detention facility for U.S. PW's in Laos. "The Center" camp

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

DIA, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT,  
USARPAC, FICPAC, DOD/PRO,  
JSPC, 314A0.

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

REGRAUING: JDD DLR 5200.110

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

EXHIBIT 38

000107



<p><b>NOTE:</b> This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.</p>		<p>This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.</p>	
(Classification and Control Markings)			
1. COUNTRY: LAOS	8. REPORT NUMBER: 1 775 0003 71 (5905-04)	<p>REC'D 03-23 MAR 1971</p>	
2. SUBJECT: (U) Possible Location of American POW Site in Laos	9. DATE OF REPORT: 4 March 1971		
3. ISC NUMBER: 723.670	10. NO. OF PAGES: 2		
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 20 December 1970	11. REFERENCES: SICR: D-7CX-49018 DIRM: 1Q16, 6G MSG: Det 5 Msg DTG: 140905Z Jan 71 (BRIGHT LIGHT) MAP: (See COMMENTS)		
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Thailand 27 December 1970	12. ORIGINATOR: Hq 1021st USAF Fld Acty Sq	13. PREPARED BY: Det 5, 1021st USAF Fld Acty Sq	
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F/F/F/F INFORMATION 6	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: Lt Col FOR Colonel, USAF		
<p>7. SOURCE: 15310076/OTS 502370/FAR Official/Unidentified Informants</p>			
<p>15. SUMMARY:</p> <p>An unspecified number of Americans who had been captured in Laos are reported to be detained in the Valley KHUN PRA TAEM (VH213585; 202530N/1041442E, Sheet NF 48-14), HUA PHAN (SAM NEUA) Province, Laos. The point(s) of capture are unknown; the captors were identified only as Pathet Lao. The location is further described as a relatively small, shallow dead-end valley, east of RAUNG KHU (ED: Coordinates unknown) Village. The detention facilities are described as a cave with only one "tunnel-like" opening at one end of the valley. The cave opening faces to the west, and has a door structure (ED: Composition unknown) to permit opening and closing the cave. The valley was described as having only one access way and contains several other caves, all described as being fortified against aerial bombing. One company of soldiers (ED: one Source stated 50-60 men) guard the cave entrance. One Source stated that many Americans were definitely held in the cave, but the exact number was unknown. The duration of detention was also unknown.</p>			
<p>CIRCUMSTANCES OF ACQUISITION:</p> <p>1. In ethnic Thai with numerous high-level contacts within the Royal Lao Army (FAR), obtained the information from an unidentified member of FAR in VIENTIANE.</p>			
<p>COMMENTS OF THE COLLECTOR:</p> <p>2. Files available at this detachment do not contain any previous reporting of a POW detention facility at the precise location mentioned in this report. There has been previous reporting that American POWs formerly held at BAN NAKAY NEUA (VH1956; 202445N/1041350E, Sheet NF 48-14) were possibly moved as of 20 October 1970.</p>			
<p>16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:</p> <p>DIA, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, USARPAC, FICPAC, DOD/PRO, PEC, 5AF, 13AF, JSPC, 314AD, 327AD, MACV, 7AF, 600MTG(SN).</p>		<p>17. DOWNGRADING DATA:</p>	
<p>18. ATTACHMENT DATA:</p>		<p>19. ATTACHMENT DATA:</p>	



CONTINUATION SHEET

REPORT NO. 775 0003 71  
 PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES  
 ORIGINATOR Hq 1021st USAF Fld  
 Acty Sq

(Classification and Control Markings)

(Leave Blank)

to an unknown location north of BAN NAKAY NEUA. The site location of this report is approximately four kilometers northeast of BAN NAKAY NEUA.

3. Aerial photographic coverage, 12 January 1971, of the reported site is available. A scale of approximately 1:3000 in vertical format reveals an occupied facility with a physical description which is identical to the facility in this report plus several man-made structures. Location of the photo site is approximately 700 meters northeast of the reported facility, and is precisely at (VH217590; 202548N/1041500E, Sheet NF 48-14).

4. Information in this report partially satisfies SICR D-7CX-49018. Collection action continues.

5. (U) Coordinates in this report were derived from AMS Series 1501, Sheet NF 48-14, Edition 2, Dtd 1967.

000109



David E. Engle

Bx1

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SA 99 A-193


~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~  
~~CONTAINS CODEWORD~~

June 9, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: The Situation Room

SUBJECT: Additional Information Items



~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~  
~~CONTAINS CODEWORD~~

(DP)

EXHIBIT 39

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4

NSC 12/29/92 F92-1404

5/5/93


000110



REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES


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~~CONTAINS CODEWORD~~

- 4 -



1.3 (25) MIA/Laos: The Pathet Lao's chief representative in Vientiane June 8 accepted a personal letter from Mrs. Kay to her husband but told our Embassy officer that further information on two other acknowledged POW's (Hrdlicka and Debruin) must await the formation of a new coalition government in Laos.

SANITIZED



~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~  
~~CONTAINS CODEWORD~~

000111



PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF INFORMATION

Information to be evaluated: See copy attached.

REPORTED SIGHTING OF EIGHT TO TEN ALLEGED AMERICANS IN LAOS

1. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] had obtained the information about ten days earlier in conversation with a Pathet Lao soldier. The soldier claimed that about two months earlier, he had personally observed Americans working with the North Vietnam Army near the Demilitarized

EXHIBIT 40

4 JUN 1982

RELEASED

Enclosure 4 (S-56, 168/DB-4)

000112



A Zone between North and South Vietnam. [REDACTED]

was not able to recontact the Pathet Lao source or obtain further confirmation.

3. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

A  
B  
B  
4. The information which [REDACTED] provided [REDACTED] in 1976 contained items not in the information provided [REDACTED] in 1974. The new bits of information were as follows:

A  
a. The 1974 report mentioned [REDACTED] [REDACTED] that the North Vietnamese were exploiting certain PWs for their technical skills, and that the PWs worked on the Ho Chi Min trail; but the 1974 report did not specify that the PWs cooperated with the North Vietnamese by defusing unexploded ordnance.

b. The 1974 report did not mention that the group of 8 to 10 American PWs were known to be in the vicinity of Sam Neua in early 1973.

000113



c. Nor did the earlier report mention a suspicion the the group of American PWs had been in the vicinity of the Plain of Jars.

d. the 1974 report did not mention dates on which new bits of information were acquired.

e. The 1974 report mentioned "brainwashing", but was not as specific as the 1976 report in stating that the American PWs were cooperating with the North Vietnamese as a result of being pressured until they "broke".

5. [REDACTED]

6. One of the Americans released from Laos, a civilian named Emmet Kay, was captured on 7 May 1973 and on 11 June 1973 moved into the Sam Neua area, where he was held until his release on 18 September 1974. Although Emmet Kay's captivity did not overlap with the period when [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the 8 to 10 Americans were known to



be in the Sam Neua area, i.e., early 1973, Emmet Kay might have learned from the guards or prison personnel if such a large group of American PWs was being held or had been held nearby. At no time during his detainment in the Sam Neua area did he have knowledge or hear of any other U.S. personnel being held in the area.

A 7. None of the returnees in Operation Homecoming had been forced to perform hard labor, such as road building. If the [REDACTED] report is looked on as a report on Americans performing hard labor, then it is a unique report. On the other hand, if it is viewed in terms of exploitation of technical skills, then it must be considered compatible with many other reports of attempts to exploit PWs. The returnees had seen two American PWs who cooperated with the enemy. There have been unconfirmed reports of collaborators. The North Vietnamese deliberately exploited the skills of the PWs for propaganda. It is not inconceivable that they might have tried to exploit PWs skilled in ordnance. Military pilots, as a rule, did not possess such skills.

A  
A 8. Although there is no confirmed reporting that correlates directly with the [REDACTED] report, there are reports of varying reliability which might possibly be related. For instance, a series of reports [REDACTED]



A [REDACTED] stated that nine American PWs were held in the vicinity of Mahaxay, a town about 30 miles east of Thakhek in Central Laos, in September 1973. One report said they were taken to Hanoi in September 1973. Another report said nine Americans were still in the area, at a detention camp near a town called Pha Katao, in March 1974. This information did not correlate to any known individual or group of PW/MIAs; the nine Americans captured in Laos and released in Operation Homecoming had all been moved out of Laos to Hanoi well before the end of 1972. This series of reports did not imply that the nine Americans in the Mahaxay area had been defusing ordnance or cooperating in any way with the North Vietnamese. The Mahaxay reports remain unconfirmed in spite of extensive research and follow-up.

A 9. It is highly unlikely that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] could at this time provide enough information, even if they were available for extensive debriefing, to establish positive identification of persons they may have seen working on the Ho Chi Min trail, or to establish conclusively that such persons were Americans and not Europeans, Russians, Cubans or other nationalities. Research at this time would probably produce as little or less than it did in 1974 [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]