

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ROGER HALL, <i>et al.</i> ,	)	
	)	
Plaintiffs,	)	
	)	
v.	)	Civil Action No. 04-0814 (HHK)
	)	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,	)	
	)	
Defendant.	)	
<hr/>		

AFFIDAVIT OF HON. BILL HENDON

**Summary**

1. Along with co-author Elizabeth A. Stewart, I wrote *An Enormous Crime, The Definitive Account of American POWs Abandoned in Southeast Asia*. The book, ten years in the writing, was published by St. Martin's Press in May 2007. *An Enormous Crime* is based primarily on open-source documents; thousands of pages of now-declassified U.S. government documents and my experiences in dealing with the POW/MIA issue. It is the history of living American POWs left behind in Vietnam and Laos at war's end; an account of the circumstances that left them there and what the intelligence indicates they have endured in the years since.

2. When the American government withdrew its forces from Vietnam in 1973, it knowingly left hundreds of U.S. POWs in Communist captivity. (See *An Enormous Crime*, Chapter 9).

3. Since Operation Homecoming in 1973, there have been hundreds of postwar sightings and intelligence reports of Americans being held captive throughout Vietnam and Laos, and numerous secret military signals and codes and messages sent from desperate POWs.

000001

4. I have personal knowledge of several incidents where the CIA has had intelligence on living POWs that has not been publicly acknowledged and/or released.

**Expertise**

5. I was twice elected to the United States Congress from District 11 in my home state of North Carolina and served in the 97th and 99th Congresses, from 1981—1983 and 1985—1987. During both terms in office, I served as an ex-officio member of the House POW/MIA Task Force. Hon. John LeBoutillier, Congressman from New York, served with me on that Task Force during the 97th Congress. During the 99<sup>th</sup> Congress I also served on the House Veterans Affairs Committee.

6. From January through June, 1983 I worked as a consultant on POW/MIA affairs at the Pentagon. During 1991 and 1992 I served as a full-time intelligence investigator assigned to the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs from the office of Sen. Bob Smith (R-NH), the Select Committee's Vice Chairman. I have traveled to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia many times to learn information about and to discuss solutions to the POW/MIA problem.

7. *An Enormous Crime* is the culmination of my having spent 25 years investigating the POW/MIA issue.

**CIA Records of late-1970s imagery/photography of USAF/USN aircrew Escape and Evasion codes at Tran Phu Prison, Haiphong, North Vietnam**

8. In 1981, Hon. John LeBoutillier and I met with CIA Director William Casey at Director Casey's office at Langley, Virginia to discuss the POW/MIA issue. On at least one occasion, Casey shared with us either satellite imagery or aerial photography which showed laundry arranged in the form of escape and evasion codes on the roof of the Tran Phu prison in Haiphong, North Vietnam. To the best of my recollection, Directory Casey told us the imagery/photography had been imaged/taken during the late 1970's. These escape and evasion

codes were information known only to U.S. pilots and air crewmen, and Directory Casey stated that only an imprisoned U.S. flyer could have made the codes on the prison roof.

9. I am certain the CIA was in possession of this imagery in 1981 and I believe it is still in possession of this imagery.

**CIA records of 1981 imagery of US pilot escape and evasion codes at prison near Nhom Marrott, North Vietnam**

10. In early 1981, I was briefed as a member of the House POW/MIA Task Force by U.S. government officials regarding a prison camp near Nhom Marrott, Laos. Congressman LeBoutillier and I were shown aerial/satellite photographs showing the month-by-month progress of the construction of this camp, from the clearing of the jungle to the completion of buildings and guard towers. We were told that the completion of the camp was also confirmed by radio traffic intercepts. American POWs were reliably reported to be in the camp from a human intelligence source inside Laos, satellite imagery (IMINT), and a low power radio intercept (SIGINT). In addition, an escape and evasion code was imaged inside the camp. I saw the imagery and code. A reconnaissance team was sent to the camp and took a number of photographs of the camp and its occupants. I viewed a number of these photographs as a member of the US House POW/MIA task force in 1981 and while an intelligence investigator assigned to the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA affairs in 1992. I believe that the CIA is in possession of both the above described satellite imagery and hand held photography.

11. Later, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Vice Admiral Bobby Inman, USN, briefed me and other members of the Task Force on the findings of the mission. He also showed us a number of black and white hand held pictures said to have been taken of the camp by the reconnaissance team. To my knowledge, these photographs have never been released by the CIA.

**CIA records of a 1992 coded message from Lieutenant Colonel Serex, Dong Vai (Dong Mang) Prison, North Vietnam**

12. Air Force Lt. Col. (then-Major) Henry M. "Mick" Serex, an electronic warfare officer, went missing on April 2, 1972, when his EB-66, code-named "Bat 21," was shot down over the Demilitarized Zone while accompanying a B-52 strike during the Easter invasion. (See Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Officer, "U.S. Personnel Missing, Southeast Asia (and Selected Foreign Nationals) (U)," June 1995, p.42.) Air Force records indicate Bat 21 was hit by a surface-to-air missile while flying at an altitude of approximately twenty-six thousand feet. An intercepted PAVN radio communication reported the shootdown and stated that PAVN personnel had "sighted orange parachutes in the area." (See Exhibit 1: O 032052Z, APR 72 FM DIRNSA) [Director, National Security Agency], Summary. Shootdown of AN-3B-66, [sic] by Battalion 86, 274TH SAM Regiment, released by NSA on January 29, 2001, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, files of Mr. Rich Daly.) One of those parachuting from the plane, navigator Lt. Col. Iceal Hambleton, USAF, reached the ground alive and evaded capture until rescued eleven days later. Though Humbleton reported no knowledge that any of his fellow crewmen might also have survived, an Air Force report filed shortly after his rescue states that "although no contact was established with the [other] crewmembers of Bat 21, the possibility of survival is good, since one member of the crew ejected unobserved and evaded capture until his rescue. Since there were hostile forces in the immediate area, it is possible that the other crewmembers ejected unobserved, are evading capture, or have been captured by the hostile forces." (SUMMARY OF FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES"; Exhibit 2, untitled typewritten USAF after-action report, POW/MIA collection, Library of Congress.

13. In late August 1992, the deputy director of the U.S. Air Force Joint Services SERE Agency (JSSA)—the agency responsible for survival, evasion, resistance, and escape

000004

(SERE) training for U.S. pilots—informed Senate Select Committee investigators that while studying recent (June 5, 1992) satellite imagery of the Dong Vai (Dong Mang) Prison north of Hon Gai, he and one of his associates discovered a valid USAF/USN escape and evasion code in a field just west of the prison and above it the name of a missing USAF flight officer. The deputy director, twenty-six-year veteran Robert G. Dussault, would later testify formally what he and his associate had seen:

- A. . . . I saw up at the CIA, very clearly to me there was the name S-E-R-E-X.  
 Q. Capital letters?  
 A. Yes, and it was in a field just outside the. . . [Dong Vai Prison], and there was a number above it and there was the name SEREX, and below it, as I remember now, 72/TA/88.  
 Q. How many digit number [sic] was above the SEREX?  
 A. I'd say roughly nine or ten. I don't remember. I'd say roughly nine or ten. It could have been a Social Security Number or just my imagination. But the thing that struck me as interesting is that—and I didn't know this at the time, I just wrote that stuff down, and when I got back . . . I checked the list of people that are unaccounted for, and there was an individual still unaccounted for by the name of Serex. . . .  
 Q. Okay, so you saw on a June 5, 1992 photograph of the Dong Mang [Dong Vai] prison camp that you looked at the CIA this year. . . you saw SEREX with the nine to ten digit number above and the 72/TA/88 beneath it?  
 A. Mmm-hmm. [Yes.]  
 Q. How do you interpret the 72/TA/88?  
 A. Well, this is a guess, but the way I would look at it would be that the guy went down in 72—my first reaction would be that he went down in 72, the TA would be his monthly followed by his long term E&E symbol, followed by the year he arrived at the location. That's all speculation.  
 Q. Was A a backup symbol?  
 A. Yes.  
 Q. Do you know when?  
 A. In the—according to my recollection, in the 72 timeframe. . .  
 A. . . . What I did with the CIA [personnel] is I circled it for them to look at.<sup>1</sup>  
 14. I believe that the CIA is in possession of this imagery.

<sup>1</sup> Exhibit 3: Deposition of Robert George Dussault. pp. 75-81, October 8, 1992, (Deposition from Inventory of the Records of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, National Archives).

15. According to available declassified U.S government records, no information pertaining to Serex was received by the government from any official or unofficial source from his date of shootdown (April 2, 1972) until his name and a valid USAF/USN Escape and Evasion code was imaged in the field outside the Dong Vai Prison in northern Vietnam on June 5, 1992.

**Other U.S. POWs believed held at Dong Vai (Dong Mang) Prison, North Vietnam**

16. Satellite imagery imaged in 1975 and analyzed in mid-1976 had shown what CIA and DOD photo interpreters believed at the time was a valid USAF/USN Escape and Evasion code at this same Dong Vai (Dong Mang) prison. (See Exhibit 4, declassified DOD line drawing of imagery of Dong Mang [Dong Vai] Prison, with supporting CIA documentation and memoranda.) In addition, approximately a half dozen postwar HUMINT (human intelligence) reports had told of US POWs being detained at the prison both during and after the war. Included in these reports were reports of fifty to sixty American POWs seen inside the prison in 1976,<sup>2</sup> perhaps thirty seen there again in mid-1979,<sup>3</sup> and three to four dozen reportedly taken there by truck in 1982.<sup>4</sup> I believe that the CIA is in possession of this imagery.

17. In spite of the prior intelligence reports telling of American POWs being detained at Dong Vai (Dong Mang Prison) in the postwar period, officials quickly developed a program to

---

<sup>2</sup> Exhibit 5: JCRC M80-015, 31 JANUARY 1980 subject: Refugee Report, Alleged Sighting of Caucasians in Captivity, NVN, DIA Source file 0558, both POW/MIA collection, Library of Congress.

<sup>3</sup> Exhibit 6: JCRC HK81-007, subject: Refugee Report, Alleged American Prisoners in Quang Ninh and Memorandum for Record, 21 October 1983, subject: Telecon between Vietnamese Refugee [name redacted] and DC-2 analyst [name redacted], both DIA Source file 1228, Inventory of the Records of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs.

<sup>4</sup> Exhibit 7: CIA IIR (Intelligence Information Report).

assail, ridicule, attack, and discredit the June 5, 1992 imagery so forcefully and thoroughly that its intelligence value would be destroyed.<sup>5</sup>

18. Here, in affiant's opinion, is why they did this:

Today is a day we recognize our POWs and MIAs... Today is a day to remember that over 70,000 Americans remained unaccounted for from World War II, 8,000 from Korea, and over 2,000 from Vietnam.

Today I want to talk about one very basic truth about those Americans unaccounted for, and I want to talk about one very basic lie. The basic truth is this: your government, from the President of the United States on down is fully committed to accounting for these Americans.

[Regarding those unaccounted for from Vietnam], let me give you a short report of the steps we have taken, all within the past year. The President created the office I now occupy, This is the first time that our government has had a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense to focus exclusively on POW-MIA issues. We have begun one of the largest declassifying operations in government history. We have already released 82,000 pages of previously secret and top secret documents relating to POW and MIA matters. Last year we had 150 men and women working POW/MIA issues. We have increased that number to over 400. We have put Americans on the ground in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. We are working full time to account for our missing because we see it as a sacred obligation that we owe these Americans and their families.

And that brings me to the basic lie I mentioned earlier. The basic lie is that the U.S. Government knowingly left Americans behind and is now covering this up. **If this lie lives, then it will tear at the very guts of our military. If future Americans become convinced their country won't stand behind them when the chips are down, then they won't stand on the front lines for their country.** So let me start here, today, with you, to bury this lie.

First, though hundreds of investigators have been through millions of pages of documents, not one shred of evidence, solid evidence, has been found to support this lie. The next time you hear somebody talk about coverup, think about this: Most of the 400 men and women working to account for POW/MIAs are men and women in uniform. Like you, they take pride in their military service. Like you, they would not let their buddies down. Like you, they would be the first to speak out at the first hint of foot-dragging or coverup.

---

<sup>5</sup> "Panel on POWs Deeply Divided Over Direction." *Los Angeles Times*, November 19, 1992, p. A2.

Yes, there are questions about our missing and unaccounted for Americans. But the answers aren't in American files. The answers are in Vietnam, in Laos, [and] in Cambodia. . . .The answers are slow in coming, but we will not rest until we're certain we have them.

Thank you. God bless you. . .God bless the United States Army. . .and God bless the United States of America.

(Emphasis supplied)

"DASD PTAK Addresses AMCI," *Department of Defense POW/MIA Newsletter*, October 1992, p.2, files of William Stewart.

19. Dussault, preparing his testimony for the upcoming Select Committee imagery hearings scheduled for mid-October, met with CIA photo interpreters to review all the postwar imagery relating to POWs and to further discuss the Serex imagery in detail. This meeting took place at the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) (pronounced "N-pick"), a joint CIA/DIA command located at the Navy Yard near Capitol Hill. Dussault later told Senate investigators that to his amazement, the CIA photo interpreters informed him during the portion of the discussion relating to the June 5, 1992, imagery of the Dong Mang [Dong Vai) Prison that the "SEREX 72/TA/88" all of which he had circled on the photograph up at Langley—had now *disappeared*.

Q. You say that you then met again with CIA photo interpreters . . . ?

A. Right. . . . When we went to NPIC, the CIA guys were there and they briefed us. . . . They said look, we saw the numbers. They admitted seeing the same numbers I did. When I circled it they were right there and they said yeah, we saw it. But. . .at NPIC, they briefed the fact that they . . . did a digital on this thing, looked at it on a light table, and it wasn't there, and [they said] it must have been in an anomaly, [a] photographic anomaly.

I don't understand photographic anomalies, I wouldn't know how to explain one if somebody asked me to. . .

. . .When someone tells me that that's a photo anomaly that SEREX would occur on a photo—and they say that happens, a SEREX would appear on a photo and



would be a result of the photographic process. I think that's unusual, but I've got no way to argue with them.<sup>6</sup>

20. I believe that the CIA is in possession of the original unadulterated satellite imagery described above.

21. During the closed briefings, held on October 2 and 5 1992, Dussault explained to the senators what the CIA personnel had said about the June 5, 1992, "SEREX" imagery, offered JSSA's analysis of the other imagery relating to live POWs, and then stunned those present by declaring that, while recently reviewing 1988 imagery of Laos, he and his associates had discovered nineteen four-digit numbers that matched the four-digit authenticators of known MIAs, each laid out or constructed on the ground in remote areas along Lao National Route 4 southeast of the Plain of Jars, and had discovered the name of a missing USAF pilot and an accompanying four-digit number laid out or constructed beside a road east of the Sam Neua Valley.<sup>7</sup> (The name of the missing pilot was Wrye, along with the four-digit number 1104. RF-101 pilot Maj. Blair C. Wrye, USAF, was lost over North Vietnam on August 12, 1966.)

22. I believe that the CIA is in possession of this imagery.

23. An imagery expert later hired by the Select Committee to review the June 5, 1992 imagery from Dong Vai (Dong Mang) discovered another pilot distress signal in the same field where Dussault and his associate had seen and marked the "SEREX 72/TA/88." According to the

---

<sup>6</sup> Exhibit 3: Deposition of Robert George Dussault, pp. 75-81, October 8, 1992, Source: Deposition from Inventory of the Records of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, National Archives.

<sup>7</sup> Exhibit 8: Handwritten investigator's notes titled "Questions For JSSA" and "Questions For DIA/CIA photo interpreters [sic]," both from Working Files of Committee Investigator Bob Taylor, 1991-1992, Inventory of the Records of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, National Archives. Exhibit 9: "Joint Document by LWB & CLL Concerning Unresolved Differences in Their Analyses of Imagery Over Sam Neua, Laos and Adjacent to the Doug Vai Prison in Viet Nam," p.2.

expert, Col. Lorenzo "Larry" Burroughs, USAF (Ret.), who had once served as acting director at NPIC, the signal was the two-letter USAF/USN E&E code "G/Walking X," followed by the four-digit authenticator "2527." Burroughs would later report with a "100% level of confidence" that he had seen the "GX 2527" in the imagery and added that "JSSA has... confirm[ed] and match[ed] this number as a valid authenticator code against a known MIA."<sup>8</sup> I believe that the CIA is in possession of this imagery.

24. Only one of the several known postwar satellite images/photographs showing valid USAF/USN Escape and Evasion codes, secret authenticators and/or the names of missing pilots and/or air crewmen laid out or constructed on the ground in northern Vietnam and/or Laos has ever been declassified and released to the public. Not one of the satellite images/photographs discussed above has ever been made public. The only postwar satellite image showing a valid USAF/USN Escape and Evasion code that *has* been released appears on the cover of *An Enormous Crime*. That image, like the imagery of the nineteen four-digit numbers that matched the four-digit authenticators of known MIAs, each laid out or constructed on the ground in remote areas along Lao National Route 4 southeast of the Plain of Jars, and the name of a missing USAF pilot and an accompanying four-digit number laid out or constructed beside a road east of the Sam Neua Valley, was imaged over northern Laos in early 1988. (Declassified satellite image from Inventory of the Records of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, National Archives). I believe that the CIA is in possession of this imagery.

---

<sup>8</sup> Exhibit 10: "NTM Imagery Analysis Report of POW/MIA Related Photography," December 7, 1992, Prepared by Colonel (Ret.) Lorenzo W. Burroughs, copy faxed by OASD (C3I) 12/14/92 [Excerpts].

*See also* Exhibit 9.

**US Secret Service Agent John Syphrit**

25. In early January, 1986, White House US Secret Service Agent John Syphrit came to my Congressional office and told me that, while stationed in the hallway just outside the Oval Office in late January 1981, he observed and heard the following: President Reagan, Vice-President Bush, Director-designate of the CIA William Casey, and National Security Advisor Richard Allen emerged from the Oval Office and, pausing in the hallway, en route to the Cabinet Room, briefly discussed an offer made by the Vietnamese government to the Reagan Administration to trade the American POWs they were holding in return for payment of some four billion dollars. In August of 1992, the Washington Times (Exhibit 11) recounted this incident, as well as efforts to have Syphrit testify before the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs.

26. Syphrit's account was later corroborated by at least one senior Reagan Administration intelligence official. See "An Enormous Crime," at pp. 458-59.

---

27. The Exhibits attached hereto, and listed below my signature, are authentic.

---

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Executed this 19 day of <sup>APRIL</sup> ~~May~~, 2008. (SH)

Bill Hendon  
Bill Hendon

000011

**THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK**

<u>Exhibit 1:</u> O 032052Z, APR 72 FM DIRNSA) [Director, National Security Agency], Summary. Shootdown of AN-3B-66, [sic] by Battalion 86, 274Th SAM Regiment, released by NSA on January 29, 2001, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, files of Mr. Rich Daly. . . . .	15-16
<u>Exhibit 2:</u> Untitled typewritten USAF after-action report, POW/MIA collection, Library of Congress. . . . .	17
<u>Exhibit 3:</u> Deposition of Robert George Dussault. pp. 75-81, October 8, 1992, Source: Deposition from Inventory of the Records of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, National Archives. . . . .	18-25
<u>Exhibit 4:</u> Declassified DOD line drawing of imagery of Dong Mang [Dong Vai] Prison, with supporting CIA documentation and memoranda. . . . .	26-34
<u>Exhibit 5:</u> CRC M80-015, 31 JANUARY 1980 subject: Refugee Report, Alleged Sighting of Caucasians in Captivity, NVN, DIA Source file 0558, both POW/MIA collection, Library of Congress. . . . .	35-36
<u>Exhibit 6:</u> JCRC HK81-007, subject: Refugee Report, Alleged American Prisoners in Quang Ninh and Memorandum for Record, 21 October 1983, subject: Telecon between Vietnamese Refugee [name redacted] and DC-2 analyst [name redacted], both DIA Source file 1228, Inventory of the Records of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. . . . .	37-41
<u>Exhibit 7:</u> CIA IIR (Intelligence Information Report) . . . . .	42-44
<u>Exhibit 8:</u> Handwritten investigator's notes titled "Questions For JSSA" and "Questions For DIA/CIA photo interpreters [sic]," both from Working Files of Committee Investigator Bob Taylor, 1991-1992, Inventory of the Records of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, National Archives. . . . .	45-51
<u>Exhibit 9:</u> "Joint Document by LWB & CLL Concerning Unresolved Differences in Their Analyses of Imagery Over Sam Neua, Laos and Adjacent to the Doug Vai Prison in Viet Nam," p. 2. . . . .	52-53
<u>Exhibit 10:</u> "NTM Imagery Analysis Report of POW/MIA Related Photography," December 7, 1992, Prepared by Colonel (Ret.) Lorenzo W. Burroughs, copy faxed by OASD (C3I) 12/14/92 [Excerpts]. . . . .	54-58

Exhibit 11: *Panel awaits agent's story on POW swap*, Washington  
Times, A4, Aug. 11, 1992. . . . . 59-61

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

CATEGORY = 4

M = 83

MESSAGE = #1918523

ZCZC003 7992EXA581 LOO LN NO. #69

DD 143163 #942138

ZNY MMHSH

ZKZX 00 ZLZ OIO DE

O #32#522 APR 72 ZYM

FM DIRNSA

TO NSA

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

XXMM

ENP1F0083842 3/004

V895-72

(b) (1)

(b) (3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-19 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

VIETNAMESE AIR SUMMARY FOR #1/17#82 TO #2/17#82 APRIL 1972 NORTH  
XXCC

(ALL TIMES ZULU) PART ONE, HIGHLIGHTS A. SUMMARY 1. SHOOTDOWN OF AN-38-66 BY BATTALION 86, 274TH SAM REGIMENT. B. DETAILS. 1. AT #952 BATTALION 86 (LOCATED IN DMZ) THE 274TH SAM REGIMENT REPORTED THE LAUNCH OF THREE SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES. THE SPEAKER REPORTED THAT THEY HAD STRUCK THE TARGET AND AT THE SAME TIME HAD LIGHTED ORANGE PARA- CHUTES IN THE VICINITY OF BAI SON (16-53N 107-02E). COLLATERAL SOURCES REPORTED THE LOSS OF AN F-66 AIRCRAFT AT THE DMZ. (2) #187-72, #218#93) PART TWO, ROUTINE ACTIVITY A. AIR ACTIVITY TWO MIG-17 PILOTS AT KIEN AN, TWO MIG-21 PILOTS AT QUAN LANG AND ONE MIG-21 PILOT AT BAI THUONG WERE PLACED ON STRIP ALERT AT VARIOUS TIMES THROUGHOUT THE DAY. TWO MI-6'S FLEW FROM PHUC YEN TO GIA LAM. B. SAM/AAA ACTIVITY 1. BETWEEN #405 AND #581, BATTALION 41 (UNLOCATED) OF THE NVN 263RD SAM REGIMENT WAS NOTED TRACKING TWO HOSTILE AIRCRAFT NORTHEAST OF VINH OVER THE GULF OF TONKIN. 2. BETWEEN #949 AND 1028, BATTALION 88 (UNLOCATED) OF THE 274TH SAM REGIMENT WAS DETECTED TRACKING AN UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT SOUTH OF THE DMZ NEAR DONG HA. 3. FROM #339 UNTIL #347, AN UNIDENTIFIED UNIT POSSIBLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE 267TH SAM REGIMENT WAS NOTED TRACKING FOUR HOSTILE AIRCRAFT IN THE VICINITY OF THE DMZ. C. RADAR ACTIVITY - NTR D. COMMUNICATIONS DEVELOPMENTS DURING THREE SEPARATE PERIODS BETWEEN 2325 1 APRIL AND #988 2 APRIL AIRFIELD CONTROLLERS AT QUAN LANG AIRFIELD WERE NOTED IN UNUSUAL COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES DURING THE FIRST PERIOD. 2325 THRU 2335 TWO CONTROLLERS

APPEARED TO BE TESTING UNSPECIFIED EQUIPMENT. IN THE SECOND INCIDENT BETWEEN #186 AND #158, THE SAME WERE USED IN PROBABLE SIMULATED COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITY. AND FINALLY BETWEEN #988 AND #921, QUAN LANG GROUND CONTROLLERS SIMULATED PRACTICE GCI ACTIVITY. THE

USED IN THE EARLIER ACTIVITY WERE LAST NOTED AT PHUC YEN ON 27 AND 29 MARCH RESPECTIVELY. PART THREE, AIR MOVEMENTS STATISTICAL SUMMARY (READ, TIME/MR PILOTS, TYPE ACFT/ACTUAL PILOT NR/ACTY/ALT/AREA/AVIONICS/COMMENTS.) A. NVAF FIGHTERS 1. BAI THUONG (1) 1158-1204/ONE, MIG-21A VSTRIP ALERT--BAI THUONG AFLD--/. 2. KIEN AN (1) 2221/THO, MIG-17A VSTRIP ALERT--KIEN AN AFLD--/. 3. QUAN LANG (1) 2358/ONE, MIG-21A VSTRIP ALERT--QUAN LANG AFLD--/. (2) 2325/ONE, MIG-21A VSTRIP ALERT--QUAN LANG AFLD--/. B. NVAF BOMBERS/TACTICAL TRANSPORTS - NTR C. NVAF TRANSPORTS - NTR D. NVAF HELICOPTERS 1. INTERAIRFIELD (1) #857-#988/THO, MI-6A VAF--PHUC YEN TO GIA LAM--INA. E. NON-NVAF TRANSPORTS - NTR PART

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

Released by NSA on 29 Jan 81  
pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act  
Case # 79137-96

1001

000015

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

FOUR. ADDENDA/CORRECTIONS IN THE WAS FOR 29/1700Z TO 30/1700Z  
 (3/00/ [REDACTED] YR92-72, 212054Z MARCH ADD THE FOLLOWING TO PART ONE, A. SUMMARY  
 1. ONE NVAF MIG-21 CRASHES IN THE QUAN LANG AREA FOLLOWING FLIGHT OVER SOUTHERN  
 LAOS ON 30 MARCH 1972 B. DETAILS ON 30 MARCH BETWEEN 1217 AND 1325, ONE NORTH  
 VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE (NVAF) MIG-21 STAGED FROM VINH, OVERFLEW SOUTHERN LAOS,  
 AND WAS SUBSEQUENTLY UNABLE TO RECOVER AT VINH DUE TO ADVERSE WEATHER. THE MIG  
 THEN PROCEEDED TO QUAN LANG WHERE INTERNAL EQUIPMENT (ARK-15) MALFUNCTION AND  
 ADVERSE WEATHER AGAIN PREVENTED HIS LANDING. FINALLY, AS A RESULT OF FUEL  
 EXHAUSTION, THE PILOT EJECTED FROM THIS AIRCRAFT AND THE MIG CRASHED IN AN AREA  
 EAST OF QUAN LANG. THE MIG-21 INVOLVED IN THIS ACTIVITY DEPLOYED FROM PHUC YEN  
 TO VINH UNDER RADIO SILENCE DURING THE 0900 HOURS. (2/00/ [REDACTED] YR43-72,  
 031901) ADD THE FOLLOWING TO PART THREE, ALPHA, ITEM 4, 4. INTERAIRFIELD (1)  
 0906-0934/ONE, MIG-21, [REDACTED] JAF/-/PHUC YEN TO VINH, -/RADIO SILENCE, SEE  
 HIGHLIGHTS. (2) 1228-1325/ONE, MIG-21, [REDACTED] ATTEMPTED INTCP, 3000-100000/SOUTHERN  
 NVN, LAOS AND SOUTH VIETNAM/CROSS UP/ SEE HIGHLIGHTS. XXHH A 000 03163 NNNH

FOIA(b)1 1  
 FOIA(b)3 - 50 USC 403  
 FOIA(b)3 - 18 USC 798  
 FOIA(b)3 - P.L. 86-36 sec 6

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

000016



*Why is this here?*

11. WITNESSES AND/OR PERSONS BELIEVED TO HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF MISSING PERSONNEL OR AIRCRAFT  
ATTACH PERTINENT STATEMENTS FROM EACH

LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE INITIAL	GRADE	SOCIAL SECURITY NO. AND SERVICE NUMBER
CHESTER, ROBERT L.	MAJOR	DATA
EVANS, JAMES L.	LT COLONEL	
ANDERSON, EDWARD L.	MAJOR	
HEWITT, DAVID R.	CAPTAIN	
SMITH, RICHARD E.	MAJOR	

12. DETAILED CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING DISAPPEARANCE (Duration, extent and results of search, life saving equipment available and/or used, if applicable, peculiarities of tides, terrain, etc., and any other details pertinent to a determination of status not included elsewhere in this report.) (S)

Major NAME was the pilot of an EB-66 aircraft, call sign Bat 21, which departed Korat Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand, on a normal Electronic Countermeasures mission at approximately 1337 hours, local, 2 April 1972. Other crewmembers on board were, Lt Colonel Ieal Hambleton, Navigator, Lt Colonel Anthony R. Giannangeli, EWO, Major NAME, EWO, Lt Colonel NAME, EWO, and First Lieutenant NAME, EWO. At approximately 1000Z hours, location 1645N - 10641E, an F-105, call sign Coy 01, flying an Arc Light Support mission had a SAM launch indication. The aircraft commander observed the missile contrail and the SAM explosion at about 26000 feet. At the same time he saw an aircraft diving in the vicinity of the explosion and thought it had evaded the SAM. He then noticed flame trailing each wing and the aircraft break into two (2) major pieces and two (2) smaller ones at about 16000 feet. The burning wreckage continued to the ground. One member of coy flight (a flight of two F-105s), reported hearing an intermittent beeper on guard channel. Bat 21's wingman, Bat 22, was in a SAM break maneuver at this time. Personnel aboard Bat 22 reported hearing a short beeper and a direction by an airborne aircraft to "come up voices". Shortly thereafter, they heard the airborne aircraft establish voice contact with Bat 21 Bravo (Lt Colonel Hambleton). He stated that he was okay and in good spirits. SAR was effected immediately and continued throughout the night. SAR efforts were severely hampered by heavy ground fire and poor weather conditions. On 2, 3, 4, and 5 April, voice contact with Bat 21 Bravo continued. SAR efforts continued daily until Bat 21 Bravo was rescued on 13 April 1972. Throughout the period of the SAR, voice contact was maintained with Bat 21 Bravo, however, no contact was ever established with other crewmembers of Bat 21. All personnel aboard the EB-66 have had extensive jungle survival training and carried the standard jungle survival equipment.

13. OPINION OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER

☒ A. CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANT CONTINUATION IN A MISSING STATUS

☐ B. CHANGE FROM MISSING TO DEAD

C. REASONS

Although no contact was established with the crewmembers of Bat 21, the possibility of survival is good, since one member of the crew ejected unobserved and evaded capture until his rescue.

Since there were hostile forces in the immediate area, it is possible that the other crewmembers ejected unobserved, are evading capture, or have been captured by the hostile forces.

NAME is the only Colonel (i.e., Lt Col) who meets the height and location of capture.

14. COMMANDING OFFICER

15. AFM AND TEAM

16. SIGNATURE

COMMITTEE CONFIDENTIAL

(3)

Stenographic Transcript of  
HEARINGS  
Before the

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

DEPOSITION OF ROBERT GEORGE DUSSAULT

*5 Guy is from JSSA, the  
ESCAPE + EVASION GUY IN D.O.D.*

Thursday, October 8, 1992

Washington, D.C.

COMMITTEE CONFIDENTIAL

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY  
1111 14TH STREET, N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-5650  
(202) 289-2260

000018

③

75

1 another -- angle has a lot to do with it. There's a 2, that  
2 looks like a 3 -- but again, I wouldn't stand 100 percent on  
3 this that they are there in reality, okay? People have told  
4 me that this occurs, and I believe it. I've seen stuff on a  
5 screen that had five numbers all over the screen, based on  
6 this type of thing being shown on a TV screen, numbers appear  
7 everywhere.

8 But what I'm bringing out at this point is I don't  
9 think this is exactly the one I saw in the CIA because the one  
10 at CIA, as I recall, was a lot bigger. There was also a field  
11 out here where I saw what looked like a name, and below the  
12 name was -- here it comes -- do you see this? 5-3-3-5-5-4-  
13 5 -- do you see that?

14 MR. DYSON: I can't.

15 THE WITNESS: Anyway, these numbers appear to me.  
16 What we're really dealing with here is something that is maybe  
17 overgrown, something that was maybe clear at one time and now  
18 no longer exists, but right now it's not easy to see. I see  
19 it. But in talking to the photo interpreters, they say this  
20 happens everywhere. It's a photo anomaly. And to save the  
21 game, I can't argue with them.

22 Q. Have any of the numbers or groups of numbers that  
23 you've seen in this photograph been compared to known  
24 authenticator numbers of MIA's?

25 *Begin* A. I didn't check it against any list. What did seem

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.  
1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W.  
SUITE 400  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005  
(202) 289-2260  
(800) FOR DEPO

000019

1 to make -- on this particular photograph that I saw up at the  
2 CIA, very clearly to me there was the name S-E-R-E-X. (K)

3 Q. Capital letters?

4 A. Yes, and it was in a field outside this -- excuse  
5 me, I don't know if it was exactly that field, but it was in a  
6 field just outside the same place, and there was a number  
7 above it and there was the name SEREX, and below it, as I  
8 remember now, 72/TA/88.

9 Q. How many digit number was above the SEREX?

10 A. I'd say roughly nine or ten. I don't remember. I'd  
11 say roughly nine or ten. It could have been a Social Security  
12 Number or just my imagination. But the thing that struck me  
13 as interesting is that -- and I didn't know this at the time,  
14 I just wrote that stuff down, and when I got back Al checked  
15 the list of people that are unaccounted for, and there was an  
16 individual still unaccounted for by the name of Serex.

17 Now, when someone tells me that that's a photo  
18 anomaly that SEREX would occur on a photo -- and they say that  
19 happens, a SEREX would appear on a photo and would be a result  
20 of the photographic process, I think that's unusual, but I've  
21 got no way to argue with them.

22 Q. Now, which photograph was this that you saw the  
23 SEREX on?

24 A. This one. I'm saying, here it's supposed to be the  
25 same date and same location, but I believe it was a little bit

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.  
1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W.  
SUITE 400  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005  
(202) 289-2260  
(800) FOR DEPO

000020

(5)

77

1 bigger and better.

2 Q. Okay, so you saw on a June 5, 1992 photograph of the  
3 Dong Mang prison camp that you looked at at the CIA this year  
4 is a picture that you saw the SEREX with the nine to ten digit  
5 number above and the 72/TA/88 beneath it?

6 A. Mmm-hmm.

7 Q. How do you interpret the 72/TA/88?

8 A. Well, this is a guess, but the way I would look at  
9 it would be the guy went down in 72 -- my first reaction would  
10 be that he went down in 72, the TA would be his monthly  
11 followed by his long term E&E symbol, followed by the year he  
12 arrived at that location. That's all speculation.

13 Q. Was A a backup symbol?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Do you know when?

16 A. In the -- according to my recollection, in the 72  
17 timeframe.

18 Q. And what about T, was that a primary symbol?

19 A. Mmm-hmm?

20 Q. You say you wrote down the nine to ten digit number?

21 A. No, I didn't write anything down.

22 Q. Oh.

23 A. I put it all in my head.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. What I did with the CIA is I circled it for them to

Dong Mang  
AKA Dong VAI

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.  
1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W.  
SUITE 400  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005  
(202) 289-2260  
(800) FOR DEPO

000021

1 look at. When they told me the next time I met them that they  
2 looked at that and they went back to the number one, highest  
3 quality photo that they had, that stuff wasn't there. And  
4 that being photo interpreters, what I saw was a photo anomaly.  
5 And basically, I bought it.

6 Q. You said at some point, while you were looking at  
7 the photograph at the CIA, you memorized the nine or ten-  
8 digit number?

9 A. No, I didn't.

10 Q. Oh, you didn't memorize it?

11 A. I didn't memorize the number at the top. I  
12 memorized the one below, which is the one I read to you. I  
13 remember seeing 72/TA/88, because that was, for some reason,  
14 easy for me to remember.

15 Q. Do you know whether anyone has ever compared the  
16 nine to ten digit number that was son top of SEREX to --

17 A. I don't think anybody has. I don't even know what  
18 the number is. I'd have to look at the photograph and pull it  
19 off. I may have read it aloud, and Al Erickson may have taken  
20 it as a note. But I'll have to check on that, I don't  
21 remember.

22 Q. I think we can all agree that that's something that  
23 someone should do.

24 A. Oh, yeah.

25 Q. Right away.

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.  
1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W.  
SUITE 400  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005  
(202) 289-2260  
(800) FOR DEPO

000022

1 A. So I'll talk to him as soon as I get back this  
2 afternoon.

3 Q. To Erickson?

4 A. Yeah. See if he's got a note on the numbers I read  
5 off. I'm pretty sure I read it off to somebody. I don't know  
6 if it was the CIA people or Al. I did not take it.

7 Q. It seems to me that that number ought to be checked  
8 against the guy's -- Mr. Serex's Social Security Number  
9 against his authenticator number to see if there's any  
10 overlap.

11 Q. You say that you then met again with CIA photo  
12 interpreters who told you that it was a photographic anomaly.

13 A. Right. That was it. When we went to NPIC, the CIA  
14 guys were there and they briefed us on what they tried. They  
15 said look, we saw the numbers. They admitted seeing the same  
16 numbers I did. When I circled it they were right there and  
17 they said yeah, we saw it. But when we met a week ago, 2  
18 weeks ago, at NPIC, they briefed the fact that they tried to  
19 go back to the original, more recent stuff, they did a digital  
20 on this thing, looked at it on a light table, and it wasn't  
21 there, and it must have been an anomaly, photographic anomaly.

22 I don't understand photographic anomalies, I  
23 wouldn't know how to explain one if somebody asked me to. And  
24 when I have to stand up and say hey, are you a photo  
25 interpreter, I have to say no. So what I said the other day

11  
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.  
1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W.  
SUITE 400  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005  
(202) 289-2260  
(800) FOR DEPO

DISAPPEARED  
AT NPIC

000023

1 about deferring to these experts, in one sense, I have to do  
2 that and in another sense I still wonder.

3 Q. Had you ever heard of Mr. Serex?

4 A. No. I didn't realize -- in fact, when I first  
5 looked at that, I thought the guy was saying SERE -- survival  
6 evasion resistance escape -- to get somebody's attention in  
7 our business. So it may be possible it ain't Serex, it's some  
8 guy trying to get our attention to survive, as an alternative.  
9 Okay, so that's another one. You know, I sit here and try  
10 give all possible solutions. The first one, i.e., Serex, may  
11 be the valid one. Maybe the number above that would be the  
12 key.

13 Q. Were there any other symbols that you saw on the  
14 equivalent of this photograph that we should know about?

15 A. No, I didn't see any. Al may have seen something,  
16 but I didn't see anything.

17 Q. When was it that you first looked at the June 5th,  
18 1972 photograph over at the CIA?

19 A. I think it was -- when did we go to CIA? August  
20 timeframe, I think. I'd have to look. Either August  
21 or September or something like that. I'd say August.

22 Q. August 1992.

23 A. Wait a minute, hold on. CIA, Langley, 13 August.

24 Q. And then you went back a second time -- did you say  
25 about a month later and met with them again?

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.  
1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W.  
SUITE 400  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005  
(202) 289-2260  
(800) FOR DEPO

000024



1 A. No, we only went there once. The next time we met  
2 them is when they visited us at NPIC that one morning.

3 Q. And NPIC, just for the record, is what? (9)

4 A. National Photographic Interpretation Center.

5 Q. It's located at?

6 A. It's located at the Navy Yard in Washington, D.C.  
7 It's run by the CIA and DIA. It's a joint command, I guess. END

8 Q. I want to ask you some questions about the possible  
9 52K symbol seen at Nhom Marat in 1981. Are you familiar with  
10 that photograph?

11 A. Oh, yeah. I am familiar with the case. I've seen  
12 the photograph. I haven't really spent that much time with  
13 the photograph. I don't think we ever had a copy of that in  
14 our possession. We were shown it here.

15 Q. You were shown it here at the Senate?

16 A. Mmm-hmm.

17 Q. When was that?

18 A. I think April.

19 Q. During the first deposition?

20 A. Mmm-hmm.

21 Q. Had you never seen it before that?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Let's just assume, for sake of this discussion, that  
24 it really is a 52K. What does that mean to you as an expert  
25 in E&E?



ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.  
1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W.  
SUITE 400  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005  
(202) 289-2260  
(800) FOR DEPO

000025

Prison Camp  
Dong Mang, Vietnam  
30 July 1975



*Pseudocolor Enhancement of Rooftop Markings*



000026

6 July 1976.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

ATTENTION [REDACTED]

THROUGH [REDACTED]

SUBJECT : Dong Mang Prison Camp, NVN

REFERENCES : (a) Requirement No. DDO/48/76 (25 May 1976)  
(b) IAS Project No. 054145

1. This memorandum is in response to your requirement for [REDACTED] analysis of a prison camp located in the vicinity of Cam Pha, North Vietnam. [REDACTED]

#### Prison Location

NF 48-12

2. The prison is located at 21-04-00N 107-07-15E, approximately 26 kilometers west-northwest of the port of Cam Pha. It is located in a secluded area at the base of the foothills about 1 kilometer north of Dong Mang and 2 kilometers north of Route 183.

#### Discussion

3. Although we were unable to find any conclusive evidence that this prison might contain American POWs, we did notice several unique features in this prison that differ from other known Vietnamese prisons. It is secluded in a relatively remote area and has an access control point on the road leading to the camp. Walls within the compound physically and visually segregate the prisoners. The visual segregation of prisoners indicates it is not a forced labor camp. The only other known prison that used internally walled compounds to segregate the prisoners was the former POW camp at Dan Hoi.

4. Roof repair work was [REDACTED] on one of the confinement buildings/living quarters [REDACTED]. A close study of the roof repair work revealed a unique alternating light and dark pattern on the roof. This pattern, in the form of squares, was repeated

000027

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Dong Mang Prison Camp, NVN

three times at different locations on the roof. Because of the seemingly unusual manner in which the roof was being repaired we attempted to discern if this pattern was coincidental or purposeful. We were unable to make this distinction and realize that the prospect of it being purposeful is remote. It is not known if prisoners would be used or allowed to make these repairs. However, we did investigate this possibility. An attempt was made to transpose this pattern into Morse code. The white squares, being larger than the dark ones, were considered as dashes and the dark squares as dots. A dash-dot-dash in Morse code transposes as the letter "K". [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Two other less conspicuous possibilities exist. These are the letters "NI" and "TA" that are variations of the same dash-dot-dash pattern. We contacted an individual in the Office of Naval Intelligence who has extensive knowledge of the POW situation. According to this source, the letter "K" was the permanently designated signal letter assigned to air crews should they be downed and unable to recall the monthly and/or daily assigned signal letters. This information has been confirmed through discussions with former POWs.

#### Construction Details

5. The prison was [REDACTED] in the early stages of construction adjacent to a small possible detention camp on [REDACTED] July 1972. The possible detention camp consisted of a secured compound containing approximately ten small, semipermanent buildings. As work on the present prison progressed, the semipermanent facility was dismantled.

6. The currently existing prison consists of a walled compound containing eight confinement buildings/living quarters, one probable messhall, two support buildings, at least four latrines, ten unidentified buildings and two probable guard houses/towers. The interior of the compound is divided into 14 separately secured areas. Each area is secured by a solid wall with a single access. The only buildings in the compound that are not separately secured are the probable messhall and two support buildings. Studies of prisons in North Vietnam known to contain POWs during the war have shown efforts to segregate the prisoners by using walls or other materials to obscure visibility. However, none were as extensively segregated as at this compound. A small building, possibly used for solitary confinement, is located outside of the walled

-2-

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

000028

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Dong Mang Prison Camp, NVN

compound. The building is secured on three sides by fencing and on one side by the east wall of the compound. Two possible guard houses/towers are at the two outer corners of the fenced area. Another guard tower is located on a hillside outside of the compound near the southeast corner and it affords good visibility of the entire prison.

7. During the construction of one of the confinement buildings/living quarters, we [determined] the building would contain eight rooms or cells. Assuming the other confinement buildings also contain eight rooms and if two to four prisoners were in each room the compound could contain between 130 to 260 prisoners.

8. A large area behind the east (rear) wall of the compound has been cleared and leveled. Portions of an outer wall have been constructed around the compound with one segment of this outer wall extending into the cleared area. The height of this outer wall is about three times higher than the existing wall securing the prison. If this cleared area is for enlarging the compound, it could increase the current capacity by approximately 50 percent.

9. The administration and support facility for the prison is located just outside of the prison compound. This facility consists of one administration building, three barracks, one probable messhall and 11 support buildings:

10. A possible satellite/auxiliary detention camp is located 1,100 meters northwest of the main compound. This camp began to develop as construction of the main compound progressed. It may have been constructed to hold personnel from the possible detention camp that was dismantled to make room for the main compound. If, as it appears, this satellite area is a detention facility, it indicates an effort to separate the prisoners being kept there from those being confined at the main compound. Otherwise the main compound would have originally been constructed of sufficient size to accommodate these prisoners.

11. This possible satellite compound is triangular shaped and contains four to five possible confinement buildings/living quarters and seven or eight support buildings. These buildings are much smaller than those at the main compound. Two walls of the compound were in the open, but vegetation obscures the area where the third wall should be located. A

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Dong Mang Prison Camp, NVN

large opening can be seen where the two visible walls should meet.. This large opening raises questions about the security of the compound. Nine administration/support buildings are located outside of the compound.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]




[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]




[REDACTED]


9 July 1976

  
  
  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
Imagery Analysis Service

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing to DOD on North Vietnamese Prison Camp

On 21 June 1976 Messrs.   
 of IAS accompanied by   
briefed Rear Admiral James B. Stockdale, USN and Commander C. R. Polfer,  
USN (both former POWs in North Vietnam).

The purpose of the briefing was to solicit DOD aid in identifying possible  American presence at a prison camp in North Vietnam. Although Admiral Stockdale was unable to provide any indicators he referred us to Commander Robert Burroughs (retired) at the Office of Naval Intelligence who had extensive contact with the POWs during their debriefings. Commander Burroughs was briefed on 24 June 1976. Commander Burroughs did not give us confirmation of American presence but did indicate that one possible sign of evidence we were pursuing was feasible. A white, dark, white pattern seen on a roof within the compound could, by transposing the pattern into Morse code, indicate the letter "K". Commander Burroughs informed us that the letter "K" was the permanently designated letter assigned to air crews as a signal should they be downed and unable to recall the monthly and/or daily assigned signal letters. This information has been confirmed through discussions with former POWs.

  
Distribution:  
  
  
  


[REDACTED]

9 July 1976

[REDACTED]

Copy 1

NOTE FOR: Mr. Bush

The possibility of the existence of this camp was first raised by [REDACTED] that such a camp existed on an island near Cam Pha and continued to hold American POWs. [REDACTED] to the United States after leaving North Vietnam which ultimately came to the attention of the DDO, who has followed up on the case [REDACTED] IAS was asked to search for such a camp by the DDO. It failed to find one on any of the many islands in that region but did locate this camp inland and to the west of Cam Pha. The attached memorandum provides some information on its characteristics.




Three people in the Pentagon have been contacted for information on North Vietnamese prison camps. The initial contact was with Admiral Lawrence who referred the IAS analyst to Admiral Stockdale. He in turn referred the analyst to Cmdr. Burrows who is supposed to be the Pentagon's leading expert on POW camps. I have expressed your concern about the sensitivity of the hypothesis that this camp holds POWs with those in IAS which served to re-enforce their appreciation of its sensitivity. All material, of which the attached report is the only significant piece, will be stamped sensitive and given controlled dissemination.

[REDACTED]

Reel 519






9 July 1976


  
  
  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
Imagery Analysis Service

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing to DOD on North Vietnamese Prison Camp

On 21 June 1976 Messrs.  of IAS accompanied by  briefed Rear Admiral James B. Stockdale, USN and Commander C. R. Polfer, USN (both former POWs in North Vietnam).

The purpose of the briefing was to solicit DOD aid in identifying possible  American presence at a prison camp in North Vietnam. Although Admiral Stockdale was unable to provide any indicators he referred us to Commander Robert Burroughs (retired) at the Office of Naval Intelligence who had extensive contact with the POWs during their debriefings. Commander Burroughs was briefed on 24 June 1976. Commander Burroughs did not give us confirmation of American presence but did indicate that one possible sign of evidence we were pursuing was feasible. A white, dark, white pattern seen on a roof within the compound could, by transposing the pattern into Morse code, indicate the letter "K". Commander Burroughs informed us that the letter "K" was the permanently designated letter assigned to air crews as a signal should they be downed and unable to recall the monthly and/or daily assigned signal letters. This information has been confirmed through discussions with former POWs.



Distribution:


76 - 28

9 July 1976

Copy 1

NOTE FOR: Mr. Bush

The possibility of the existence of this camp was first raised by [REDACTED] that such a camp existed on an island near Cam Pha and continued to hold American POWs. [REDACTED] to the United States after leaving North Vietnam which ultimately came to the attention of the DDO, who has followed up on the case [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IAS was asked to search for such a camp by the DDO. It failed to find one on any of the many islands in that region but did locate this camp inland and to the west of Cam Pha. The attached memorandum provides some information on its characteristics.

Three people in the Pentagon have been contacted for information on North Vietnamese prison camps. The initial contact was with Admiral Lawrence who referred the IAS analyst to Admiral Stockdale. He in turn referred the analyst to Cdr. Burrows who is supposed to be the Pentagon's leading expert on POW camps. I have expressed your concern about the sensitivity of the hypothesis that this camp holds POWs with those in IAS which served to re-enforce their appreciation of its sensitivity. All material, of which the attached report is the only significant piece, will be stamped sensitive and given controlled dissemination.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Recd 519

15 FEB 1980



## JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER

LIAISON OFFICE  
AMERICAN EMBASSY  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 98348

FROM: JCRC-LNB

Reference: M80-015

31 January 1980

SUBJ: Refugee Report, Alleged Sighting of Caucasians in Captivity, NVN

TO: Commander, JCRC  
Barbers Point, HI 96862

Mr. SC (Boat #DN 0487), a 23 year old native of Mong Cai, NVN, was interviewed at Pulau Bidong, Malaysia, on 18 January 1980. He stated that in early 1976 he saw American pilots in captivity at the Dong Dang Public Security Camp located in Quang Yen District of Quang Ninh Province at approximate coordinates YJ0533 on Route 183 just outside the town of Dong Dang. SC claimed he saw several caucasians in striped prisoner clothing within the camp area on various work projects. Asked about how many caucasians he saw, SC stated that he heard there were 50 or 60 in the camp but he only saw a few of them. SC described the camp as having 6 meter high concrete walls all around. When asked how he could see through a 6 meter wall, SC stated that this sighting was made from a nearby hill northwest from a distance of 500 to 600 meters. Interviewer pointed out that the hill must have been quite high to offer such a view over a 6 meter wall. SC agreed, but further went on to say that the inside of the camp was also hill-shaped, and that is why he was able to see the caucasians. He said he was in the area on a business/pleasure trip with some friends when one of them pointed to the camp and said there were Americans in there. That is when SC noticed the caucasians. His friends said the caucasians were American pilots captured in 1972. Asked to describe the prisoners he saw, Quang said they were wearing baggy striped prison uniforms and SC couldn't tell if they were healthy or not but all appeared skinny. He stated that many had "red faces", apparently from exposure to the sun. The camp was fairly isolated, about a 20 minute walk on a curving road from the main road (183), SC said. He saw no vehicles entering or leaving the camp. He said there were several nice houses built outside of the camp (about 5 or 6).

Comments: SC was previously interviewed on 16 November 79 at which time he reported a second hand account of live Americans working with the resistance forces in Long Khanh. (See report M79-254.) At that time he made no mention of his rather significant sighting in Quang Ninh. Asked why he had not mentioned this sighting during the previous

000035

EVOLUTION

10 FEB 1980

interview, he said he thought we were only interested in South Vietnam.

SC seemed very unsure of his information throughout this interview and was particularly unsure of the number of Americans he saw, starting with "over 50" and finally saying that he saw only a few but that he was sure there were many more. His general demeanor and claimed ability to determine a man's race and facial color from half a kilometer away gave the interviewer the impression that SC is a less than reliable source.

It is noted, too, that there is some question as to SC place of birth. In spite of the above, there appears to be a grain of belief on

SC part that Americans are still held at the Dong Dang facility, and SC seems to know a great deal about the area. With this in mind, an attempt will be made to re-interview SC during the next interview trip to Pulau Bidong, Malaysia.

NAME



## JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER

LIAISON C REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES  
AMERICAN EMBASSY  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96346

FROM: JCRC-LNB

Reference: HK81-007

30 December 1981

SUBJ: Refugee Report, Alleged American Prisoners in Quang Ninh

TO: Commander, JCRC  
Barbers Point, HI 96862

Source: SC ; DPOB: SD , SD Yen Hung  
District, Quang Ninh Province; ID card SD former  
merchant; interviewed at SD , on 15 December 1981; map  
NF48-12.

Source had five years of primary school at his POB studying there from the age of nine until fourteen years of age. Source had to leave school when his father was detained and sent for reeducation (unable to explain why, except that his father had bad political ideas). After school, Source remained at home with his mother and did not seek employment. Source was never called for military service (he speculated that he was not called because of his father's reputation as a trouble maker). At the age of 21 Source got married and continued to reside with his mother and his father who returned from reeducation the same year (he could not explain the reason for his father's release). Source's wife and four children remained at his POB when Source departed Vietnam. (He stated he left them behind because he was afraid they would be captured in the escape attempt. He plans to request family reunification after resettlement.) Source departed Vietnam from Hai Phong on 22 August 1981 with 14 other refugees including Source's two younger sisters and their husbands. Source's brother-in-law, *Name*, was the boat owner. Source heard from his parents that he has relatives in the U.S. who moved from North Vietnam to the south in 1954. Source believes that his relatives were in the U.S. on student visas and were studying law at the time of the communist takeover in 1975. (Source was not able to provide any names or addresses of any relatives in the U.S. Source claimed that he had heard their names mentioned by his parents but had forgotten them.) Source stated that after his resettlement he will establish contact with his relatives in the U.S. (he could not explain how he would contact them other than just "asking around"). At the time of the communist takeover of the south in 1975, Source resided at his POB.

Source stated that sometime during mid 1979 (didn't recall what month) he went to deliver rice to his cousin *Name* who was undergoing reeducation at Dong Vai Prison, Hoanh Bo District, Quang Ninh Province (he could not explain the reason for cousin's reeducation other than that he had been accused of having "bad political ideas"). Source's cousin had been in reeducation since 1973 and had previously received rice from other relatives (didn't know which relatives). Source was tasked by his parents to deliver rice on the mid 1979 trip. Source claimed he was able to find the way by asking road directions as he went along. When Source arrived at Dong Vai prison he observed approximately 30 male caucasian prisoners who were outside of their cells for sun and

000037

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

exercise. Source observed the men from a distance of approximately 100 meters for a period of from five to ten minutes. Source's cousin told him that the men were Americans. Source's cousin also told him that all of the men could speak Vietnamese well and that he had had an opportunity to talk to some of them. Source did not know any details concerning the conversation between his cousin and the alleged Americans. Source heard from his cousin that the section of the prison where the alleged Americans were held was called F6. Source heard from his cousin that the commander of the prison was LTC Dong. Source did not know which section his cousin was held in, the composition of the prison, or the prison population. Source observed that the 30 alleged Americans were all dressed in white or light gray uniforms with two-inch vertical red stripes. Source was not able to provide any further description of the prisoners. Source stated that the prisoners were not bound or chained and were able to walk around in the compound. Source observed that the prison was inside of a five meter high cement wall with a one meter electrified fence on top. A three meter high bamboo fence followed the inner contour of the cement wall. Guard dogs were placed between the cement wall and bamboo wall to prevent escape by the prisoners. Source stated that the dogs were big and black and were the "German" type. Military guards armed with assault (AK) rifles were all around the prison. Source heard from his cousin that the American prisoners had been moved to Dong Vai Prison from a camp near Phu Tho when the Chinese attacked Vietnam. Source stated that he did not know of anyone in addition to his cousin who observed the alleged American prisoners. Source did not know the location of Dong Vai Prison except that it was located near Vu Oai Village (NFI) and approximately 45 kilometers from the Dong Dang Road junction (poss location vic YJ 0431). Source stated that he rode a bicycle for one half day along a gravel road through the mountains from Dong Dang Road junction to Dong Vai Prison. Near the prison Source turned off the gravel road and crossed a wooden bridge over a creek and then arrived at the large metal gate of the prison. Source stated that his cousin was released from reeducation at the time of his visit (he could not explain why, and he explained the rice resupply trip at the time of cousin's release by stating that the release was unexpected with no prior notification). Source speculated that his cousin who also observed the American prisoners, would not try to escape from Vietnam because it was "too difficult". Source had not been accepted for resettlement by any country and therefore was not able to provide a forwarding address. Source intends to seek resettlement in the U.S.

AN

JCRC Liaison Officer

Atch:  
Camp Sketch

000038



REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Memorandum for Record

21 October 1983

SUBJECT: Telecon between Vietnamese Refugee SC and DC-2 analyst

1. On 19 October 1983 the undersigned, along with interpreter *Name* telephoned SC and interviewed him with regard to a firsthand live sighting he had previously reported to JCRC officials in 1981.
2. According to his initial testimony, SC claims to have travelled to the Dong Vai Prison in Quang Ninh Province sometime during mid-1979 to take rice to his cousin who was in reeducation there. When SC arrived at the prison, he observed approximately 30 Caucasian prisoners outside of their prison cells for 5 to 10 minutes from approximately 100 meters away. SC learned from his cousin that the area where the "Americans" were held was designated F-6. The alleged Americans were all dressed in white or light gray uniforms with two-inch vertical red stripes. SC added that his cousin was released from reeducation at the time of his visit.
3. During this telephonic interview, SC stated that, while on a trip to bring food to his brother who was in reeducation, he had seen between 50 and 60 U.S. prisoners at the Dong Vai prison camp. When asked how he knew that the men were Americans, SC responded that he could not be sure, but that they were all Caucasians. None of the men appeared to be injured. SC gave the name of his brother as being *Name* (consistent with name he had provided earlier). He stated that he had been to Dong Vai on two separate occasions to see his brother. The first visit took place two years earlier (1977) and on each occasion he had travelled alone to Dong Vai. He gave the location of the camp as being about 80 kilometers from his home at *Data* Hamlet, Yen Hung District, Quang Ninh Province. He travelled the entire distance by bike.
4. According to SC, upon arriving at Dong Vai, he was required to stand in line outside the prison compound in order to see his brother. It was while waiting in line that he observed the alleged American prisoners from a distance of two to three hundred meters for one to two hours. At this point, it was mentioned to SC that the undersigned noted considerable discrepancies in what he was now stating compared with the information he had given JCRC. SC explained this by saying that he observed the Caucasians from 100 meters away for five or ten minutes while they were outside of their cells, but that when they went indoors, they were further away (200-300 meters) and at this point he observed them for one to two hours. SC then proceeded to describe the men as wearing light grey prison uniforms with blue strips. They all appeared to be doing lawn work in an area of the camp that was designated F-4. SC stated that his brother was in a different section of the camp but that the Vietnamese prisoners occasionally had contact with the Americans, who could speak Vietnamese. SC was told by other prisoners at Dong Vai that the Caucasians were Americans. When asked about the date of the sighting, SC stated that it

000040



REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

had taken place during the time of the Chinese-Vietnamese conflict. When asked about his brother's release, he answered that his brother had been released about six months after the China-Vietnam conflict. SC was also queried as to what his brother told him about the Americans after his release from Dong Vai. He responded only that they spoke of "pleasantries" and did not discuss the U.S. PWs.

5. SC went on to say that his father had been in the Vietnamese Army under the French and his family was therefore considered a bad element by the Communists. For this reason, he chose to leave Vietnam from Haiphong with the assistance of his sister and brother-in-law. He felt that the danger of remaining in Vietnam was much greater for him than his wife and children.

6. At this point in the interview the undersigned determined it necessary to mention to SC several remarks he had made which contradicted his earlier statements to JCRC in Hong Kong. When asked about the discrepancy between the 50-60 U.S. PWs he now claimed to have seen and his earlier claim of 30 PWs, SC explained that during his interview in Hong Kong, he was asked to recall how many Americans he'd seen and he told them "a bunch" which he estimated to be 30. But, he went on, the men were walking all around so it was difficult for him to tell how many there were. He could only guess, therefore, that they numbered between 30 and 60. I asked SC if he believes he has a good memory and he readily replied that he did. I then asked him how is it that he gave the camp designation to JCRC as F-6 and provided it to me as F-4. SC responded that his memory may not be perfect on other matters, but he is sure that the designation began with an "F". Other discrepancies were pointed out to SC (i.e., prisoners' uniforms, brother's release date from prison) and, at the same time he was asked if he would be willing to submit to a polygraph examination. It appeared that SC wished to avoid any further explanations and/or confrontation on this matter, and stated that his main concern since he has come to this country has been to work hard as he has a wife and 5 children to support. Finally, after stalling awhile, SC agreed to a polygraph examination.

7. SC has in the past expressed an eagerness to present his report to U.S. Government officials. It is the undersigned's opinion that ~~the only one~~ <sup>method by which we can verify</sup> means of resolving his sighting is to administer a polygraph examination to him.

AN

DC-2 Analyst

Ch 23 CU 4 Cantruy 44-1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Vice Director For Collection  
Management  
Department Of Defense  
Principal Advisor For Prisoner Of War  
Missing In Action Affairs  
(International Security Affairs)  
Director, Vietnam, Laos And Kampuchea  
Bureau Of East Asian And Pacific Affairs  
Department Of State

SUBJECT :The Transfer of Caucasian Prisoners By Truck  
From Thanh Hoa to Quang Ninh Province, Socialist  
Republic of Vietnam, in Early March 1982

± Ac... 1

CH23CU40mtruy 44-2

SUBJECT: The Transfer of Caucasian Prisoners By Truck From  
Thanh Hoa To Quang Ninh Province, Socialist Republic  
of Vietnam, in Early March 1982.

TEXT: 1. In early March 1982 a cargo truck driver casually told a friend in Hai Phong, Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), that he had just returned from transporting Caucasian prisoners, whom he presumed were Americans. The driver was hired to transport goods and was sent from Hai Phong to Reeducation Camp 90A/TD63 in Cam Tuy, Thanh Hoa Province. He arrived at the camp at night and was told to stay in the driver's cabin while people were loaded into the rear of the truck. The truck was covered and remained covered during the trip to the Dong Vai Reeducation Camp in Quang Ninh Province. The driver arrived at the Dong Vai Camp at night and was again instructed to remain in the truck cabin. When the people were taken from the truck, the driver saw that they were handcuffed in pairs. There were three or four dozen of these prisoners, most of whom were a head taller than the guards. The driver said that when he cleaned the back of the truck after the trip, there were many empty food cans. The driver stated that other prisoners, such as former officers of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, were usually just given bread.

2. According to a Hai Phong resident, Camp 90A/TD63 was located on top of a hill in Cam Tuy, about ten kilometers from Thanh Hoa Town via Route 15, and approximately 20 kilometers west of the Cam Tuy train station. Before 1975 the camp held northerners who had committed grave civil offenses. After 1975, the camp held former officers of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam in compartmented areas. The Dong Vai Camp is a national prison camp under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior (Bo Noi Vu/BNV). To reach Dong Vai Camp, one must travel from Hon Gai Town to Bai Chay and then to Dong Dang Town. In Dong Dang Town one turns at the Cho Troi market to Hoang Bo and Vu Streets where the

CH23C04ANTWY44-3.

Local people can give directions to the nearby Dong Vai Camp. The Dong Vai Camp held prisoners who had committed grave civil offenses and were sentenced to ten or more years of hard labor. (Source Comment: The Dong Vai Camp should not be confused with the Dong Muoi Camp, under BNV supervision, also located near Hon Gai. From Hon Gai, one reaches the Dong Muoi Camp via Long Tong and Nui Xe villages.)

---

## Questions for JSSA

To JSSA (Intro Questions to establish expertise)

- Have JSSA describe their responsibilities.
- Wasn't JSSA an intelligence organization until recently - when moved to Air Force Operations?
- What kind of intelligence experience do JSSA personnel have?
- Doesn't JSSA manage a number of compartment programs?
- ★ - Isn't JSSA the executive agent and ultimate authority for Pilot distress symbols for all the Services?
- Doesn't JSSA have overall responsibility to train pilots for all the services on how to make distress symbols?
- Mr Erickson, did you train pilots on distress symbols during the Vietnam War? What did you promise them? (That if they <sup>and</sup> put out distress symbols, we would come after them.)
- Do you Mr Dussault have any training in imagery analysis?

2

(To JSSA cont)

- \* - Mr Dismalt, how long have you worked POW issues? Weren't you a debriefer at Homecoming?
- \* - Col Bonn, I understand JSSA has been designated the executive agent for writing DoD's new directive that outlines what components will have POW related responsibilities in the future, and what those responsibilities will be.

Key Questions to JSSA

- When was the first time JSSA was shown the 1973 "TH" photo? (Ans: mid-80's)
- When was the first time JSSA was shown the 1981 "52" photo at Nhom Marrot? (Ans: By the Committee 1991)
- When was the first time JSSA was shown the 1988 "USA" photo? (Ans: By the Committee in 1992)
- When was the first time JSSA was shown the 1975 Dong Mang "roof top" photo? (Ans: By the Committee in 1992)
- \* - So, DIA has never shown JSSA any of these symbols when they were taken?

000046

3

(To JSSA cont)

- What is your analysis of the 1973 "TH" photo?

★ ★ - Has JSSA found what appear to be other symbols on hand copy photography the Committee has had DIA send to you for evaluation? (Ans: yes)

★ ★ ★ - Has JSSA found a number of possible authenticator numbers (4-digit numbers) that ~~may be~~ match the authenticator numbers of Missing Americans?  
 (Ans: yes)

★ ★ - How many have you found?  
 (Ans: 19-20)

★ ★ - Have you found any Names? (Ans: yes)  
 Do you have any names that match MIAs? (Ans: yes) What Date?  
 (Ans: June 1992!)

- I notice you keep deferring to the Photo Interpreter's, have you been told to do this? (Ans: yes)

★ - The Committee recently forwarded to you (JSSA) a December 1988 photo of the "USA" site. We thought we saw some possible symbols. Did you find any on that photo? (Ans: yes)  
 (cont)

000047

4

(To JSSA)

★ ★ - What did you find on the December 1988 photo of the "USA site" ?  
(ANS: A "USA" and a "XMAS")

★ ★ ★ - Do these symbols, in your expert opinion as DoD's authority on distress symbols, appear to be consistent with the symbols taught to pilots during the Vietnam War ? (ANS: YES)

★ ★ ★ ★ - In your opinion as the DoD component responsible for training pilots in the use of distress symbols and Authenticator numbers, ~~appear to confirm to~~ Do these symbols appear to confirm to your training and methods ? (ANS: YES)

- Is it the opinion of JSSA, that the USA "K" symbol appears to be a valid pilot distress symbol ?  
(ANS: YES)

- What does JSSA make of the "A5" and "LO" symbols at Young TAN ?  
Is there any possible significance, if these are real symbols ? (ANS: A "White", still MIA, was a A5 pilot - only one unaccounted for

000048



## Questions for DIA/CIA Photo Interpreters

\*\*\* — CAN you see any of these symbols on the hard copy photos — the ones JSSA has found?  
(ANS: (IF Pushed they should admit they see them)

\*\*\* — IF you blow up any photo enough, the image will disappear. Convince me you are not making the symbol disappear in your enlarging process?

— IF ~~you~~ I can see these symbols on the photograph and they appear to be symbols, a series of numbers or letters, tell <sup>us</sup> what they are if they are not manmade symbols?

\*\*\* — Are you willing to tell this Committee with absolute certainty that these symbols ~~you say~~ are not there — are photographic anomalies?

— you had better be 100% certain because American lives may depend on your answer,

\*\*\* — Can you say with absolute certainty your photographic technology is without fault — cannot possibly be missing something?

NAL ARCHIVES

To DIA/CIA 2

\*\*\* — Can you say the "USA VC" is not a distress signal with certainty? If not, then it may in fact be a distress symbol, is that right?  
(ANS: CIA has said it "could be" a distress signal) in deposition

\*\*\* — (To DIA) When did Al Shinkle supposedly make, or have made, the USA Symbol as you suggest? How do you explain what appears to be another "USA" symbol seen in the same valley 10 months later in December 1988? Also an "XMAS" symbol?

— (To DIA) IN 1973 you obtained a photo of a symbol "1973" or "1573" "TH" in Laos. What did you do to investigate this symbol? (ANS: They will say Emmet Kay made?)  
(Ask JSSA of their opinion of who made it)

— (To DIA) What did you do to investigate the 1975 Dong Mang roof top symbol in morse code?

ASK!!!  
\*\*\* — (To DIA/CIA Photo Interpreters) Explain to me how JSSA or I can see 4-digit numbers, in a line, oriented the same direction, that match the 4 digit Authenticator numbers of missing pilots and you say it's an illusion or shadows? How can this be possible 5 times, 10 times 19 times?

000050

JNAL ARCHIVES

3

To DIA/CIA

\*\*\* - (To Photo Interpreters) Have you seen the name JSSA says they see on a 5 June 1992 photograph of the Dong Mang Prison Camp in Vietnam? (ANS: The CIA analyst has admitted in deposition he can see it) "SERE"

\*\*\* - (To JSSA) What does "SERE" mean to you? Is it a possible name of anyone missing in the war? (ANS: SEREX MIA)

\*\*\* - (To DIA General Clapper) Is your entire position hinged on the analysis of your photo interpreters, & the "technology" of their equipment? In other words, do you dismiss JSSA's observations simply because your Photo Interpreters can't see the symbols after they enlarge, stretch and otherwise distort the image we can see with the naked eye on the photo? IF SO, this is a very weak position when American lives may be at stake.

\*\*\* - IF you can't say with absolute 100% certainty these are not legitimate symbols, I believe it inappropriate - perhaps irresponsible - to take the position these are not real, when American lives may depend on it.

000051

DEC-17-92 THU 12:09

P.02

**Joint Document by:**

**LWB & CLL**

**Concerning Unresolved  
Differences in Their  
Analyses of Imagery Over  
Sam Nuea, Laos and  
Adjacent to the Dong Vai  
Prison in Viet Nam**

**December 17, 1992**

000052

DEC-17-92 THU 12:10

P. 04

### Documentation of the Analyses

In order to assure that the results of this paper are as clear as possible, the following definitions have been agreed upon:

- **Man-made**—scars and suspect symbols that are attributed to conventional human activities unrelated to POW distress signals.  
Examples—USA symbol at Sam Nuea  
"Arrow" at Ban Nam PO
- **Intentional distress signal**—man-made symbol constructed to alert others of a distressful condition.
- **Natural configurations**—having the appearance of symbols but are not man-made or intentionally made.

Following is a listing of the unresolved images along with descriptions of the analysis by LWB and CLL.

Dong Vai Prison area.

Symbol GX2527

LWB Analysis

GX 2527, was found about 415 feet S/E of the Dong Vai Prison in an open field, using special imagery enhancement techniques of positive and negative viewing, etc. Note: Since follow-up action by JSSA has also validated and matched this number with a given MIA, no further discussion is made. LWB Analysis is unchanged.

CLL Analysis

Using the IDEX-2, Zoom-500, and prints made by LWB, tonal and textural changes were observed that simulated parts of this alphanumeric; I believe these to be natural shadings in the field and are not man-made intentional symbols. I can only state coincidence with the possible match with an authenticator number.

12/14/92

18:35

703 614 8080

OASD(C3I)

**NTM IMAGERY ANALYSIS REPORT  
OF POW/MIA RELATED PHOTOGRAPHY**

Date: 07 DECEMBER 1992

Prepared by:  
Colonel (Ret.) Lorenzo W. Burroughs

000054

①

12/14/82

16:40

703 614 8060

OASD(CJI)

40

Dong Mang (Cam Pha) Symbols

000055

12/14/92

18:38

703 814 8080

OASD(C3I)

1. STATEMENT OF REQUIREMENT

This imagery analysis requirement is a direct out growth of the hearings on the POW/MIA Affairs by the US Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. LWB & Associates was ask to perform and independent assessment on selected NTM imagery, pertaining to, alleged pilot distress symbols detected in Southeast Asia. The tasks required analysis of all possible symbols previously identified by DIA, CIA, or JSSA in each target area. Also to determine if symbols are man made and the degree of confidence, expressed as a percentage. Additionally provide alternative explanations for the appearance of the possible images, to include possible age of symbols using the same frames of NTM imagery which JSSA identified a number of possible authenticator numbers and other markings. The task order ( see appendix I ) also required LWB & Associates to identify any other symbols on the imagery examined, which may not have been previously reported.

000056



12/14/92 16:37

703 814 8080

OASD(CJI)

\* GX 2527 Located in open field (100% level of confidence) 415 ft. S/E of Dong Vai Prison Note: Target can only be seen on the IDEX using special enhancement technique. JSSA has also confirm and match this number as a validate authenticator code against a known MIA.

\* The Letters P A I R A L (?) can also be seen in an area directly across from the Prison at a point east of the Lake in a low and open hedges grove (level of confidence 70%). Note: These letters can be seen on IDEX using both positive and negative processing; the letters R A L stand out even with image rotation).

\* A detail search of a suspect area about 150 feet North of the above area, and east of the primary road was made to confirm or negate suspect symbols 172 TA 88. Suspect area is a low cut over grown hedge grove which made it difficult to analyze. A 20-30% level of confidence call is made for the possible numbers of 1 3 k (or X ) A 7 2 2 ? See discussion.

\* In an area due South of the above suspect activity and closer to the possible name PAIRAL is an area where with special Photographic Printing and Processing Techniques I believe contains a number of older symbols etc.. such as to warrant special consideration by DIA & CIA/NPIC.

A detail and lengthy analysis was made of the Ban Nampo Symbols and Arrow. This is a military area with what appear to be Quonset like Huts, seven in a row (use unknown). The arrow points to what appears to be a military area with no activity. The Arrow Symbol appear to be man made because of its well define shape, conversely the letter 'P' lack shape and definition. This suspect area is considered negated for POW/MIA Symbols.

In summary its my opinion that while a large percentage of suspect symbols were negated there is justification for continue and expanded imagery collection and analysis of suspect subject areas of Sam Neua Valley and Dong Mang general area for possible new activity.

000057

12/14/92 16:40

703 614 8060

OASD(C3I)

## TAB 3 DONG HANG ( DONG VAI PRISON AREA )

Review of this suspect target area was conducted as an area analysis due to the known POW activity of this prison as reported by CIA. The area East of the prison was the subject of LWB search and analysis efforts. While this area is not active as can be seen on 1992 Imagery it and does not warrant further analysis. The following suspect symbols and numbers were detected with a given level of confidence:

## (SUSPECT NEW SYMBOLS)

- A. GX 2527. was found about 415 feet S/E of the Dong Vai Prison in an open field, using special imagery enhancement techniques of positive and negative viewing etc. Note: Since follow-up action by JSSA has also validated and matched this number with a given MIA no further discussion is made.
- B. P A I RAL, suspect name is found in a low open hedge area which is serving as a border or boundary marker to separate the fields directly across the primary road E/S of the lake which look like a boot. All possible techniques were used to confirmed of deny, due to the fact that the letters RAL can easily be seen a of confidence call of 70% is made.
- C. 172TA88? Suspect Symbols this area is located about 150ft. North of the suspect PAIRAL in a heavy bushy area which made analysis difficult. The possible numbers 1 3 k ( or X ) A722 can be seen on a very low probability. The call is 20-30%.
- D. Suspect Number 232? or 8 can be seen using IDEX just South of the name the suspect name PAIRAL. The call is 40%.
- E. Like the Number 232? or 8 there is an area with a X a possible other numbers, that with special processing enhance ~~these numbers and suspect symbols~~ which appear ( thought weak ) in an open field. Special Processing is recommended for this entire area, further that the area of search and surveillance be expanded in minimum of 250 miles radius from the Dong Vai Prison to look to look for confinement centers and symbols.

NOTE: With the exception of the Name PAIRAL all other Symbols and Numbers appears to be very old and may account for the like of reporting by other agencies.

000058