C05999564

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

CRES-504/92
7 August 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: Charles Boykin
Acting Chief, Collection Requirements and Evaluation Staff, DI

SUBJECT: Declassification of Document on POW/MIAs (U)

1. Action: Approve the declassification of the attached document on **Possible POW/MIA-Associated Markings in Southeast Asia.** This will respond to a Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs request. (U)

2. Background: We have been working with OIA to provide the Committee with documentation and graphics describing possible evidence that American POW/MIAs made markings on a prison roof in Vietnam and on the ground in Laos. OIA has analyzed this possibility using historical imagery. (S/NF) (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

3. On 29 July, the Committee's lead staffer on this issue wrote to the Office of Congressional Affairs seeking declassification of imagery and classified OIA documents already provided to the Committee. [redacted]. We believe public release of the imagery will raise, not reduce speculation about the POW/MIAs. It would surely increase pressure to release additional satellite imagery on other high interest issues, and give the media, Congress, and others the opportunity to second guess analysis of raw intelligence data. (S/NF)

4. Proposed Approach: OIA has prepared two unclassified line drawings to satisfy the 29 July request. The lead staffer recently visited OIA and expressed general satisfaction with the drawings. We think including the declassified text will fulfill the request. We maintained the substance of the original documents (enclosed in folder), but removed text we consider sensitive [redacted] (S/NF) (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

(b)(3)(c) [redacted]

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

C05999564

SECRET
NOFORN

SUBJECT: Declassification of Document on POW/MIAs (U)

5. Staff Position: We recommend declassification of the attached document. In the event this fails to meet the requirements of the Committee, we have a draft memo to the DCI through you requesting declassification of the actual imagery, including implications of a decision to do so and suggestions on how to handle it procedurally. (S/NF)

No

(b)(3)(c)

Charles Boykin

Attachment

APPROVED:

(b)(3)(c)

Deputy Director for Intelligence

11 AUG 1992
Date

DISAPPROVED:

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Date

NOFORN
SECRET

C05999564

SECRET
NOFORN

SUBJECT: Declassification of Document on POW/MIAs (U)

(b)(3)(c)

DI/CRES/IPG/RWeber:raw/[redacted] (7 Aug 92)

Distribution
Orig - addressee, w/att
1 - [redacted]
1 -
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1 -
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1 -

(b)(3)(c)

NOFORN
SECRET

C05999567

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

SUBJECT: CIA Intelligence Reports on Comments of Vietnamese and Lao Government Officials on POW/MIA's and Diplomatic or Foreign Policy Issues (b)(3)(c)

FROM:	EXTENSION	DATE SENT	REQUEST NUMBER
(b)(3)(c) C/EA/ICOG (b)(3)(c)		20Jul92	DD/O 0025/181-92

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
1. Chief, EA (b)(3)(c)		7.20		
2. C/ORMS/INT	7/21	7/21		2-3-45: Ext/KR will forward list of TOs to ORMS/INT/cc for inclusion in PARAS data base.
3. C/ORMS/CCA	22	√11		
4. DC/ORMS	22 JUL 1992			
5. AC/ORMS (b)(3)(c)	22 JUL	1992		(b)(3)(c)
6. SA/DDO		7-22		
7. ADDO		7/22		
8. DDO		✓	✓	
9. O/OCA/S (b)(3)(c)				
10.				
11.				SUSPENSE DATE:
12.				

RETURN TO:

(b)(3)(c)

FORM 8-87 4283

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

C05999567

SECRET

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2677-92

13 AUG 1992

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to the request by the Committee for information on the policies of the Vietnamese and Lao Governments toward the POW/MIA issue. We have identified 116 intelligence reports beginning in February 1977 through June 1992 which contain comments by officials of these governments on this topic. Some of the reports describe other foreign policy or diplomatic issues involving the Lao and Vietnamese Governments in their relations with the United States and other regional countries. As this information was obtained from [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) some of whom are still active and producing intelligence on topics other than POW/MIA, these reports will be retained at CIA headquarters for review for appropriately cleared and designated investigators from the Committee.

An original of this letter is also being sent to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

/s/ Stanley M. Moskowitz

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

(b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

ALL PORTIONS ~~CLASS~~IFIED
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

C05999567

SECRET

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2677-92/1

13 AUG 1992

The Honorable Bob Smith
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

This is in response to the request by the Committee for information on the policies of the Vietnamese and Lao Governments toward the POW/MIA issue. We have identified 116 intelligence reports beginning in February 1977 through June 1992 which contain comments by officials of these governments on this topic. Some of the reports describe other foreign policy or diplomatic issues involving the Lao and Vietnamese Governments in their relations with the United States and other regional countries. As this information was obtained from [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) some of whom are still active and producing intelligence on topics other than POW/MIA, these reports will be retained at CIA headquarters for review for appropriately cleared and designated investigators from the Committee.

An original of this letter is also being sent to Chairman Kerry.

Sincerely,

/s/ Stanley M. Moskowitz

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

(b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

ALL PORTIONS CLASSIFIED
SECRET

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

(b)(3)(c)

OCA 2677-92

SUBJECT: Letter to POW/MIA Committee re Vietnam and Lao Governments

OCA/Senate/RWMagner:jah/ [redacted] (10 Aug 92)

[redacted]

(b)(3)(c)

~~SECRET~~

C05999568

SECRET

DD/O 0025/181-92

20 July 1992

Letter to Kemp + Smith

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert W. Magner
Chief, Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations (b)(3)(c)

FROM: [redacted]
Chief, Indochina Operations Group

SUBJECT: CIA Intelligence Reports on Comments of Vietnamese and Lao Government Officials on POW/MIA's and Diplomatic or Foreign Policy Issues

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

1. This is in response to the request by the Committee for information on the policies of the Vietnamese and Lao governments toward the POW/MIA issue. We have identified 116 intelligence reports beginning in February 1977 thru June 1992 which contain comments by officials of these governments on this topic. Some of the reports describe other foreign policy or diplomatic issues involving the Lao and Vietnamese governments in their relations with the U.S. and other regional countries. As this information was obtained from [redacted] some of whom are still active and producing intelligence on topics other than POW/MIA, these reports will be retained at CIA headquarters for review for appropriately cleared and designated investigators from the Committee.

2. These reports have all been cleared for Committee review by the responsible reports components in the appropriate area divisions.

[redacted] (b)(3)(c)

[redacted] (b)(3)(c)

SECRET

C05999569

UNCLASSIFIED
Central Intelligence Agency

(b)(3)(c)

Washington, D.C. 20505

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

26 August 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Jon Holstine
Investigator
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate

SUBJECT: 1979 "Live Sighting" Report

1. This memorandum responds to your telephone inquiry of 20 August about the availability of information in Agency files regarding an alleged sighting of American prisoners of war in North Korea near Pyongyang in 1979. Unfortunately, we have no data that would be helpful in confirming or denying this report.

2. We can tell you that in February 1988 we received essentially the same inquiry from a Colonel Schlatter of DIA who apparently searched his agency's files without result and passed the question on to us. In March 1988 we reported to DIA that after a thorough search of our files covering the period 1975 through 1982 we found no information bearing on the reported sighting.

3. We can also state that we are aware of the original 1979 report of this story in a Connecticut newspaper and what appears to be a replay of that article on 9 March 1992. We assume it is the latter report that has brought this matter to your Committee's attention. In any case, we hold no information to confirm or deny the alleged sighting.

[redacted]
Senate Liaison
Office of Congressional Affairs

OCA 2770-92

OCA/Senate/[ ]jah/[ ] (27 Aug 92)

[ ]

C05999571

DD/OCA
ER 92-4396/1

DD/SA

(b)(3)(c)

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

27 August 1992

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

MEMORANDUM FOR: William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary, National Security Council

SUBJECT: Release of CIA POW/MIA Documents

1. The subject-matter documents--forwarded by you on 30 July 1992 and 21 August 1992--have been reviewed pursuant to your request. Please inform the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs that the Agency will deal directly with them regarding review and/or release of these documents in accordance with agreed-upon procedures.

2. Thank you for consulting with us on this matter.

[redacted]
Executive Secretary

C05999571

SUBJECT: Release of CIA POW/MIA Documents

[redacted]

C06001216

SECRET

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

23 June 1992
OCA 2340-92

Mr. J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

(b)(6)

Dear Bill:

Enclosed are the items [redacted] requested during his visit to Headquarters the end of May 1992:

(b)(3)(c)

- A copy of CIA report [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

- The [redacted] provided the attached 1976 map of "Detention Camps in Laos Identified From Imagery," which identified the approximate locations of several camps, including one west of Muang Xepone, Savannakhet Province.

(b)(3)(c)

(b)(6)

We have also located information from an asset who visited [redacted] in December 1986. We are prepared to show [redacted] this material when he next visits our office.

Sincerely,

[redacted]

(b)(3)(c)

Robert W. Magnet
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

Enclosure

[redacted]

ALL PORTIONS CLASSIFIED SECRET

SECRET

C06001216

OCA 2340-92

SUBJECT: Letter to Codinha, POW/MIA, re [redacted] Visit to Headquarters in May 1992

(b)(6)

[redacted]

(b)(3)(c)

MSGNO

[redacted]

(b)(3)(c)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL--WNINTEL--NOFORN
DIST: 30 OCTOBER 1986
COUNTRY: LAOS
SUBJ: ABSENCE OF AMERICAN POWS. AT HAT CHAM REEDUCATION CAMPT IN LUANG PRABANG PROVINCE. LAOS: ITS LOCATION AND OPERATION 1975-1986
DOI:
SOURCE: [redacted]

[redacted] SECRET/NF/WN

(b)(3)(n)
(b)(1)

[redacted]

TEXT: 1. A FORMER ROYAL LAO GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WHO WAS HELD IN HAT CHAM (TH 5789) REEDUCATION CAMP, LOCATED IN MUANG NGOY DISTRICT, LUANG PRABANG PROVINCE, LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, FROM 1975 UNTIL HE ESCAPED IN 1985 AND FLED TO THAILAND, STATED THAT HE HAD NEVER SEEN OR HEARD ABOUT ANY AMERICAN POWS WHILE IN REEDUCATION. HE FURTHER STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT ANYONE WHO SAID THAT THEY HAD SEEN AN AMERICAN POW WHILE IN REEDUCATION WAS LYING BECAUSE THE REEDUCATION CAMP INMATES WERE STRICTLY CONTROLLED.

2. HAT CHAM REEDUCATION CAMP WAS LOCATED ON THE EAST BANK OF THE NAM OU RIVER. IT WAS BORDERED ON THE SOUTH BY THE NAM KONG RIVER AND ON THE NORTH BY THE NGOY RIVER. THE WESTERN BOUNDARY WAS THE ROAD TO MUANG NGOY. THERE WERE ABOUT 15 BUILDINGS IN THE CAMP, INCLUDING FOUR BARRACKS FOR PRISONERS LOCATED AT THE NORTH END OF THE CAMP. THE SECURITY OFFICE, CLUB, AND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE WERE LOCATED AT THE SOUTH END OF THE CAMP, AND A WAREHOUSE, KITCHEN, DISPENSARY AND GUARD BARRACKS WERE LOCATED AT THE WEST END OF THE CAMP. THE CAMP ALSO CONTAINED A RICE MILL AND LUMBER YARD. THE GUARD FORCE CONSISTED OF 25 SOLDIERS OF THE LAO PEOPLE'S ARMY (LPA) COMMANDED BY ((PHOUMI)) PAGNASAVAT. THE LPA GUARDS HAD TWO BOATS WITH 125 HORSEPOWER ENGINES USED FOR TRANSPORTATION. THE NEAREST VILLAGE WAS SOP KHAN (TH 5687) LOCATED ABOUT TWO KILOMETERS SOUTH OF THE CAMP. ON THE WEST SIDE OF THE CAMP ACROSS THE NAM OU RIVER, WAS THE PHA KEO CAVE. THE FAMILIES OF THE INMATES LIVED NEAR THE CAMP ON THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY.

3. THE CAMP WAS OPENED IN AUGUST 1975 AND CONTAINED FORMER RLG OFFICIALS FROM LUANG PRABANG AND XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCES. THE CAMP CONTAINED ABOUT 750 PERSONNEL, INCLUDING 400 REEDUCATION INMATES AND 350 FAMILY MEMBERS. THE CAMP WAS DIVIDED INTO FOUR COMPANIES: THE FIRST COMPANY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING THE PERSONNEL RECORDS, MEDICAL TREATMENT, AND CAMP MAINTENANCE; THE SECOND COMPANY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR PLANNING, CONSTRUCTION, EDUCATION AND CLASSES; THE THIRD COMPANY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR CROP CULTIVATION, ANIMAL HUSBANDRY AND FISHING; AND THE FOURTH COMPANY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR WOOD CUTTING, BOAT BUILDING AND METAL WORKING. THE INMATES WERE SENTENCED TO THE CAMP FOR FIVE YEARS AFTER WHICH THEIR CASES WOULD BE REVIEWED AND EACH PERSON WOULD BE PLACED INTO ONE OF THREE CATEGORIES: THE FIRST CATEGORY WAS COMPRISED OF PERSONS WHO WERE TO BE RELEASED FROM REEDUCATION; THE SECOND CATEGORY WERE THOSE WHO WERE TO REMAIN IN REEDUCATION AS SECURITY/GUARD PERSONNEL; AND THE THIRD CATEGORY WERE THOSE TO BE SENTENCED TO FURTHER REEDUCATION. THE CAMP WAS CLOSED IN 1980 BECAUSE OF BORDER PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE LAO AND CHINESE GOVERNMENTS AND THE INMATES WERE EITHER RELEASED OR SENT TO REEDUCATION CAMPS IN XIENG KHOUANG OR ATTOPEU PROVINCES. SOME LPA PERSONNEL REMAINED AT THE CAMP AND SOME INMATES WERE KEPT AT THE CAMP TO TEND THE GARDENS AND WORK FOR THE LPA.

WARNING: REPORT CLASS C O N F I D E N T I A L-

[redacted]

SECRET

(b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

SECRET

Refugee Camps in Laos Identified From Imagery



SECRET
Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
Warning Notice—Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
Releasable UK Can Aus

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C06001216

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Central Intelligence Agency

~~SECRET~~

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 0764-92/3

10 SEP 1992

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to the Committee's April 3, 1992 request for information on the organization, structure and management of the prison camp system in Laos which is enclosed as Tab 1. A study which should also be of interest to the Committee on the Ministry of National Defense Enemy Military Proselytizing Department in Vietnam is enclosed as Tab 2.

An original of this letter is also being sent to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

/s/ Stanley M. Moskowitz

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosures
1. Laos Prison Camp Information
2. Ministry of National Defense Study

(b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

ALL PORTIONS ~~CLASSIFIED~~
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C06001229

Central Intelligence Agency
~~SECRET~~

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 0764-92/4

The Honorable Bob Smith
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

This is in response to the Committee's April 3, 1992 request for information on the organization, structure and management of the prison camp system in Laos which is enclosed as Tab 1. A study which should also be of interest to the Committee on the Ministry of National Defense Enemy Military Proselytizing Department in Vietnam is enclosed as Tab 2.

An original of this letter is also being sent to Chairman Kerry.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosures
1. Laos Prison Camp Information
2. Ministry of National Defense Study

~~ALL PORTIONS CLASSIFIED~~
~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (b)(3)(c)

~~SECRET~~

OCA 0764-92/3

SUBJECT: Response to 3 April Letter from POW/MIA Cmte re Laos Prison Camp System

OCA/Senate/RWMagner:jah [redacted] (8 Sep 92)

(b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

C06001229

1

Lao Peoples Democratic Republic
Ministry of Interior
Prisons and Seminar Camp System

1. The Lao Peoples Democratic Republic (LPDR) Ministry of Interior (MOI) was responsible for the administration and management of all labor reform, reeducation, rehabilitation, seminar, prison, interrogation, and temporary detention facilities for various categories of domestic civil and political criminals, including civilian and military LPDR government and communist party officials who committed criminal and political offenses. The MOI was also responsible for the detention and interrogation of non-Lao foreign nationals in special central-level detention and interrogation facilities. These facilities were usually reserved for national-level political, espionage, and national security-related cases. Cases involving ethnic Vietnamese residents of Laos and ethnic Vietnamese resistance group members captured in Laos were turned over to Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) MOI jurisdiction; captured Vietnamese resistance group personnel were transferred to SRV MOI control in Vietnam. Although fragmentary reporting noted that the MOI had picked up various foreign nationals (Australian, British, French, Thai, West German) after 1975 who were eventually released and allowed to leave the country, reporting did not identify or name the facilities in which they were detained in Vientiane City for questioning.

2. Reporting has indicated the LPDR MOI went through several reorganizations since December 1975 under the guidance and direction of the SRV MOI Specialist Group in Vientiane, and that the LPDR MOI was organizationally structured on the model of the SRV MOI. Reference was made in reporting to a Police Interrogation-Investigations Department under the General Department for Peoples Police (GDPP), which, like the SRV MOI's GDPP Police Interrogation-Investigations Department, would have central-level pre-trial detention and interrogation facilities for the interrogation, investigation and future disposition of major civil criminal cases. Since the LPDR MOI's General Department for Counterintelligence (GDCI) is modeled after the SRV MOI's GDCI, it should also have a Security Interrogation-Investigations Department with its own central-level pre-trial interrogation and detention facilities. These facilities would hold domestic anti-regime political (counterreactionary, counterrevolutionary, economic security, resistance, sabotage, espionage, national security) suspects, as well as foreign nationals, for interrogation, investigation and further disposition.

3. The GDCI's predecessor organization, the Political Security Bloc, had at least two pre-trial detention and interrogation facilities in Vientiane City which appear to fit the profile of central-level GDCI Security Interrogation-Investigations Department facilities. One was known as the That Dam Detention and Interrogation "Center," and the other as the Phonthan Prison. Domestic political cases were held at both facilities, where officers from at least Foreign Counterespionage (Political Security) Department 53 were involved in questioning and investigating political cases with documented or suspected foreign connections. Although no foreign nationals were specifically noted in reporting at these two facilities, one of them may have been involved, for example, in the detention of a West German in 1987. In early September 1987, the Pakse police in Champassak Province arrested a West German female passport holder (not further identified by name) for entering Laos illegally. The woman had papers stating she was a Buddhist nun, who had been ordained in Sri Lanka and was a resident of Ubon Province, Thailand. The Pakse police suspected she was a foreign intelligence agent, and detained and questioned her for 15 days before transferring her on 23 September to the MOI in Vientiane where she was still held as of 28 September 1987; no further information is available.

4. The General Department for People's Police (GDPP) sat on top of a chain of command which was responsible for the MOI prison system. It was headed by General Saisompheng Sengsoulignavong (1981-1990) and his deputies, Lieutenant Colonels Phosai Saipanya (1981-1987), Onsa Vilavong, Sali Phailot, Souban Keophila, and Champa. As of late 1987, Lieutenant Colonel Phosai Saipanya was also in charge of the That Dam Interrogation Center in Vientiane. As of June 1986, the GDPP had about 2,200 personnel. Personnel were assigned to one of at least eight subordinate departments--general staff research, administrative management police, criminal police, traffic and firefighting police, prisons police management (rehabilitation), economic police, security guards police, police interrogation-investigations. The GDPP had two SRV MOI advisory specialists assigned to its main GDPP staff office, as well as two SRV MOI advisory specialists assigned to each department under the GDPP. As of June 1981, the GDPP also had three East German advisory specialists/technicians. Reporting noted that, during the year 1985, 704 persons were arrested for criminal behavior, 154 were sent to prison, 464 were sent to "seminar" camps, 667 civil prisoners were released from prison, 74 prisoners received commuted sentences, and 70 detainees were

released from "seminar" camps.

5. The GDPP Prisons Management (Rehabilitation) Department was headed by Colonel Bounthiem (1981) or Lieutenant Colonel Souban Keophila and his deputy, Major Bounmai Sivin. Two SRV MOI advisory specialists were assigned to the Prisons Management Department. The Department administered all central-level prisons, the reeducation seminar camp system for former Royal Lao Government (RLG) and Royal Lao Armed Forces (FAR) personnel, and provided staff guidance and direction to the prisons management police offices of the Vientiance City Public Security Office (PSO) and all provincial PSO's. Provincial PSO prisons management police offices, as well as subordinate district PSO's, had at least one detention facility. Central facilities included the Sam Khe Prison in Vientiane Province, the That Dam Center in Vientiane City, and the Phonthan Prison in Vientiane City. The Central Sam Khe Prison was French-built at Kilometer Marker-6 (KM-6: TE-5492), was commanded by Than Sounphy (1977-1978), and held about 600 inmates; an unknown number of Thai nationals were held at the Sam Khe Prison during 1977-1978. The Phonthan and That Dam facilities were pre-trial interrogation and detention facilities for criminal and political suspects. The Phonthan and That Dam facilities were associated with the MOI's General Department for Counterintelligence (GDCI). Political counterreactionary, counterrevolutionary, economic security, sabotage, espionage, and national security-related cases were held at these facilities for interrogation, investigation, and further disposition. As of May 1983, the Prisons Management Police Department had 75 headquarters staff personnel; none reportedly had any extensive legal training or background.

6. The Department also had a "rehabilitation" camp complex in Keo Oudom District, Vientiane Province, at the Nam Ngum Dam reservoir (TF 4250): Thao Island (male detainees only), Nang Island (female detainees only), Setthakit, Nampho and Thong Islands. The island camp complex was built in March 1976. It received its first group of 1,500 inmates on 9 April 1976, who had been picked up in massive arrests in Vientiane. Thao Island, formerly known as Ling (Monkey) Island, held about 800 FAR captains and majors as of May 1976. According to the 18 October 1976 issue of the "New Vientiane" daily, the island "reeducation centers" were for drug addicts and for the rehabilitation of "victims of the old regime." In November 1976, the second phase of mass arrests of undesirables in Vientiane began. Among those arrested were teachers, merchants, and foreign mission employees on CIA spy charges;

about 750 to 1,000 political prisoners were first held at the MOI's Central Sam Khe Prison before being transferred to the island camp complex for rehabilitation. According to the 29 November 1976 issue of the "New Vientiane" daily, about 2,300 persons had undergone reeducation at the island camps (500 women and 1,800 men). The paper noted that 100 men and 100 women had requested to remain on the islands. By December 1976, the camp complex held about 2,000 inmates; 1,500 on Thao Island and 500 on Nang Island. The camps were referred by the LPDR as being "drug rehabilitation" islands; "32-year-old welfare official Sichan Sirivong" acted as deputy chairman of the committee running the islands.

7. As of 1978, the island camp complex held about 1,200 inmates in what the LPDR called "rehabilitation centers" and "reeducation centers for social evils." As of mid-1985, the island camp complex held about 1,200 inmates. The Thao Island Camp was commanded by MOI Lieutenant Colonel Inthong and his deputies, Major Bouathin and Captain Khamphet; the camp held 125 male inmates. The Nang Island Camp was commanded by a female named Khamtao, and held 300 female inmates. The Setthakit Island Camp held about 30 individuals who had attempted to escape from the Thao and Nang Island Camps. The Nampho Island Camp was the largest; it was a maximum security hard labor camp with about 600 detainees. The Thong Island Camp held several hundred male inmates who had been transferred from the Thao Island Camp. The LPDR claimed the camps only held common civil prisoners, drug addicts, prostitutes, gamblers, "hippies," and juvenile delinquents. The LPDR used the camps as model showcases for visiting foreigners. No foreign nationals were reported in detention on this island camp complex.

8. In October 1983, the MOI completed construction of a new central-level prison for political prisoners at Phonthan Village, Vientiane City; the prison was more commonly known as the Phonthan Prison. The Phonthan Prison was a pre-trial temporary detention facility, where criminal suspects were interrogated and investigated by the GDPP and where political suspects were interrogated and investigated by the GDCI. The Phonthan Prison consisted of two 8 by 40 meter concrete buildings with corrogated metal roofs; each building had ten cells. No foreign nationals have been reported in detention at this prison.

9. The Reeducation or "Seminar" System of the LPDR dates back to June 1975 when Pathet Lao security forces began taking

over power from Royal Lao Government (RLG) authorities. RLG civil officials and FAR officers were placed in political criminal categories and were sent to seminar camps for reeducation. Responsibilities for the seminar camps were shared by the LPDR MOI and by the LPDR Ministry of National Defense (MND). MND seminar camps were believed to be run by the MND Political Staff Department. In 1977, seminar camps were renamed "production units" to avoid international condemnation. In June 1983, all MND seminar camps, also known as "production units" and as "construction battalions," were turned over to the MOI GDPP's Prisons Management (Rehabilitation) Police Department, which delegated authority for their administration to the prisons management police offices of its provincial public security offices (PSO's). Although the LPDR denied the existence of reeducation and seminar camps, a reeducation camp system continued to exist in Laos under the guise of "production" camps. The LPDR currently prefers to use the term "rehabilitation" when referring to detention facilities. Although the total number of detainees is subject to debate, the following information was available on various types of detention facilities in Laos.

10. FAR field and general grade officers and RLG civil officials of equivalent rank were placed in a maximum security detention camp system in Houa Phan Province, near the Vietnamese border. The Houa Phan seminar camp system was initially established in July 1975 with seven camps (Camps 1 through 7). It was the worst camp system in Laos, and was more commonly known as the Vieng Sai or Sop Hao camp system. Detainees were categorized as dangerous and unlikely to be released. About one-third of all inmates reportedly died from malnutrition, starvation or were executed during the period 1975-1986. After the MND turned over control of the camp system to the MOI in July 1983, the camps were operated by the Houa Phan Province PSO, which established a central camp headquarters at Sop Pan Village (VH 2064) under the command of a MOI lieutenant colonel. No foreign nationals were reported in detention in this camp system. Comments on this camp system are as follows:

A. Seminar Camp 1 was also known as the Sop Ka, Na Ka and "Soun Phiseth" (Special) Camp, and as the Sop Hao Prison. Camp 1 was located at Na Ka Neua Village (VH 441737) on the east side of the Nam Mo (Nam Ma) River across from Sop Hao Village (VH 4373) in a valley about 21 kilometers from Vieng Sai District Town. Camp 1 was a secret political prison which held 39 Lao prisoners. Camp 1 was intended by the LPDR to be a

"death camp" with no survivors of reeducation. The camp held the Royal Lao family, 14 generals, and 11 other senior RLG officials. If inmates did not die from mulnutrition or dysentery, they were executed. The deceased included: King Sisavang Vatthana (1979); Crown Prince Vongsavonang (1977); Queen Khampoui Vatthana (1981); Crown Prince Sisavang Vatthana; Lieutenant Generals Bounpon Makthephalak; Major General Phasouk Solatsaphak; Brigadier Generals Kan Insixiengmai, Itsala Kataidonsasoulit, Li Litthilusa, Lamngeun Phasavat; Colonels Heng Saithavi, Touby Lyfoung, Khamchan Padid, Lian Pavongviangkham; Luang Prabang Province Governor Chao Souk Bouavong; Lao Ambassador to China Balien Phavongviengkham; Minister of Religious Affairs Soukan Vilaysan; and, Minister of Posts and Telecommunications Toubi Li Foung. Camp 1 was closed down in April 1985 after the last two generals (not further identified) were executed on 7 April 1985. No foreign nationals were reported in detention in this camp.

B. Seminar Camp 2 was located at Nouei Nong Tao Village (VH 463704) on the west side of the Nam Mo River near the Houai Vong tributary (VH 4769), and was north of Camp 1. As of August 1986 Camp 2 held about 150 Lao inmates. Of this number, 53 were residents of Vientiane who were not allowed to mix with other inmates. The 53 prisoners from Vientiane were charged with attempts to stage a coup d'etat in 1977; six received life sentences, 13 received 20 year sentences, and 34 received 10 to 15 year sentences. An unknown number of Camp 2 inmates were transferred to Camp 5 in March 1981. No foreign nationals were reported in detention in this camp.

C. Seminar Camp 3 was initially located on the west side of the Nam Mo River near the Houai Vong tributary (VH 4769) at Houei Nong Tao Village (VH 467702). Camp 3 was relocated by late 1980 to Ban Sop Phan (VH 2166) near Ban Loune Village (VH 1868) in Vieng Sai District. Camp 3 was situated on the northern bank of the Nam Pan River, west of its junction with the Nam Hao River, and was about 38 kilometers northeast of Sam Neua City (VH 0157). Route 6 ran along the extreme eastern side of the camp area. In late 1978, Camp 3 held about 330 FAR and police majors and lieutenant colonels from FAR Military Region 1 (MR-1). In 1979, Camp 3 received another 110 FAR MR-1 majors and colonel who had been held in the Phong Saly Province camp system. Camp 3 was commanded by Khamang and his deputy Bounpheng, and had a 50-man guard force. In mid-1983, Camp 3 became a temporary holding camp for others in the Houa Phan seminar camp system who were being considered for release. During the 1983-1985 period, Camp 3 grew to about 300

inmates, plus 800 dependents. As of August 1986, Camp 3 held about 150 inmates who were being considered for release in Vientiane, and was reportedly closed down later (date unknown). No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

D. Seminar Camp 4 was established in September 1975 and held about 520 FAR and police majors to colonels, and civilian grade equivalent inmates, who had been categorized as "progressive" educatees. Until late 1976 the camp was located on the south side (VH 3883) of the Nam Mo River in Xieng Kho District on Route 6 between Muong Hang and Muong Ham Villages. In late 1976, Camp 4 was relocated to a new site at Ban Nam At (former Kok Pho) Village (UIJ 9301) about three kilometers south of Muong Et (Muong Het) Village (UJ 9703) on the west side of the Nam Et (Nam Het) River, about 18 kilometers from Xieng Kho District Town (VJ 1202). In 1977, about 100 colonels and civilian grade equivalents were transferred to Camp 5. In 1978, about 250 inmates were transferred to Camp 6. In 1981, Camps 4 and 6 were moved from their Nam Et River site to the originial Camp 4 location (VH 3883) on the south side of the Nam Mo River on Route 6. The two camps were consolidated and called "Sawmill Production" Unit 6. Seminar Camp 4 was officially closed down with the merger. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

E. Seminar Camp 5 was initially established in June 1975 on the south side (VH 6311) of the Nam Sam River (VH 5212) across from Sam Tai District Town (VH 6211), and moved permanently in early 1976 to a natural cliff area near Ban Sop Phua Village (VH 8325). Camp 5 was a maximum security facility for "incorrigible" hardliners, holding about 700 FAR and police colonels, general grade officers, and senior-level civilian ministers and equivalent ranking officials. On 12 October 1977, 26 senior ranking colonels, generals and ministers were transferred from Camp 5 to Camp 1. Camp 5 received an unknown number of incorrigible "hardliners" from three reeducation camps in adjacent Phong Saly Province in December 1978 when these camps were closed down in fear of Chinese attack. In September 1979, about 25 general grade officers and civilian equivalent grades were accused of plotting to overthrow the LPDR, and reportedly were later executed. By 1982, Camp 5 was known as the Houay Ta-Ngeua Road Construction Unit. As of June 1983, Camp 5 held about 400 inmates who were assigned to hard labor construction gangs in Sam Tai District. Camp 5 was still in existence as of August 1986, and was later reportedly closed down (date unknown). No foreign nationals were reported in

detention at this camp.

F. Seminar Camp 6 was established on 21 July 1975 about five kilometers west of Muong Et (Muong Het) Het Village (UJ 9703) on the south side of the Nam Et (Nam Het) River between Muong Et Village and Na Kham Village (UH 9698) in Xieng Kho District. Route 67 ran through the camp. Camp 6 had the distinction of having been originally used by the Pathet Lao as a prisoner compound as early as 1969. In August 1975, about 600 FAR and police field and general grade officers, and civilian grade equivalents (ministers and province chiefs) were detained at Camp 6, where they were informed that they would not be eligible for release. Later, surviving detainees were categorized as "progressive" educatees. In 1978, Camp 6 received about 250 inmates from Camp 4. Camp 6 then held about 800 inmates, including the FAR Supreme Commander, the FAR G-2 Chief, the FAR Inspector General, and other FAR generals, plus about 200 dependents. Camp 6 was commanded by Colonel Bounlert and had at least a 35-man guard force. In 1981, Camps 4 and 6 were moved from their Nam Et River site to the original Camp 4 location (VH 3883) on the south side of the Nam Mo River between Muang Hom and Muang Hang Villages on Route 6, where the two camps were consolidated and called "Sawmill Production" Unit 6. By June 1982, Camp 6 was known as "Production Unit 6." Inmates were assigned to bridge and road construction and repair, and timber-cutting crews. Camp 6 was still in existence as of March 1987, and was later reportedly closed down (date unknown). No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

G. Seminar Camp 7 was located in an area (VH 422752) about 1,200 meters north of Camp 1 on the east side of the Nam Mo River across from Sop Hao Township (VH 4373), Vieng Sai District. Camp 7 inmates waited six months to three years for trial which found them guilty and sentenced them to long terms of hard labor. The number of detainees at Camp 7 was 350 to 400 during 1976-1978, 450 to 500 during 1979-1980, 250 to 300 during 1981-1982, 150 to 200 during 1983-1984, and 180 to 250 during 1985-1986. Only a few detainees were released and only a few successfully escaped. Two or three prisoners died daily from starvation, disease or were executed. The dead included Lieutenant General Bounleut Sanichan; Brigadier Generals Nouphet Daoheuang, Atsaphangthong Pathammavong, Bounchan Savatphaiphan, Thongphan Khanoksi, Bounthieng Venvongsot, Chao Sin Saisana, Rattanabanlang Chounlamonti; Colonels Amkha Khanthamisai, Phom Phanthavong, Kavin Keonakon (Police), Khammouk Pengsiaroon (Police); Director of Public Works

Itsara Donsasourith. As of August 1986, Camp 7 held about 250 inmates; inmates included FAR/RLG and LPDR military personnel. Camp 7 may be identical with the Thong Eek Prison which was about 14 kilometers east of Sam Neua and which was a pre-trial sentencing facility. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

H. The Pha Deng Camp (VH 2335) was located at Phou Pha Deng about two kilometers east of Viengsai Sai District Town on the road to Nameo (VH 6644). The Pha Deng Camp encompassed a 100 by 200 meter area which was bordered by steep cliffs on one side and a deep valley on the other side. Inmates were kept in caves, and harsh conditions inside the camp led to a number of cases of insanity. As of early 1986, it held about 25 FAR/RLG survivors, who were scheduled for release. Other FAR/RLG inmates had been moved to Seminar Camps 2, 5 or 7. After the last survivors were released in 1986, the Pha Deng Camp was converted into a camp for LPDR personnel. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

I. One Vietnamese boat refugee provided hearsay information about a detention camp which held six U.S. POW's (including two blacks) as of April 1982 in a small valley where Thao La La Hamlet was situated in Houa Phan Province.

11. In June 1983, under MOI direction, the Houa Phan Province Camp complex was consolidated into a composite seminar production battalion headquarters at the Sop Phan Camp near Na Luong Village (VH 3866), Muang Poua Canton, Viengsay District. The composite battalion headquarters staff was commanded by MOI Lieutenant Colonel Maisin Misai (Maysing Meesay), and had four guard companies and two special independent platoons. Each guard company was responsible for the security of one camp. Company 1 was unlocated. Company 2 was colocated with the battalion headquarters and guarded about 100 inmates who were involved in constructing agricultural settlements and roads. Company 3 was located at Houay Ngum Village, Muang Hang Canton (VH 3981), Xieng Kho District (VJ 1101), and guarded inmates who were involved in road construction in remote areas near the Vietnamese border. Company 4 was located at Sop Long Village (VH 3192), Muang Hom Canton, Xieng Kho District, and guarded inmates doing road and bridge repair. The 1st Special Platoon was located in the remote Lao Huong mountainous area, and the 2nd Special Platoon was colocated with the Viengsai District Military Headquarters (VH 2949), where inmates constructed and repaired buildings. Prison inmates of the Sop Hao camp system

were assigned to two production groups which worked on a road and bridge construction project at Sop Long Village (VH 0261), an irrigation project at Houei Tao (VH 0461), and on a hospital, school and residential construction project at Lao Houng Village. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at these camp sites.

12. As of December 1986, Camp 14 was newly established in Houa Phan Province. It was located about one kilometer from Sam Neua District Township (VH 0057), held about 300 inmates, and was operated by the Houa Phan Province PSO as a pre-trial temporary detention facility. The camp was constructed of bamboo and had more than 20 buildings to house inmates and guards. The camp was surrounded by three barbed wire fences, and was divided into light, medium and heavy security areas. Inmates included former RLG officials, and LPDR political prisoners and civil criminals. The camp had a 90-man guard force. As of May 1988, Camp 14 held only civil criminals and LPDR officials on various charges; no RLG inmates were detained there. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

13. Phong Saly Province had a seminar camp complex between August 1975 and November 1978, which held about 2,000 RLG/FAR inmates and about an equal number of family dependents in one of five seminar camps. Each camp had a 50-man staff, including a 35-man guard force. By August 1986, only Camp 5 existed in Phong Saly Province with about 150 FAR enlisted and NCO detainees. No foreign nationals were reported in detention in the Phong Saly Province camp system, which had consisted of Seminar Camps 1 through 5.

A. Seminar Camp 1, also known as the Thong Nam Noi and the Muang Khoua Seminar Camp, was established in August 1975 along Route 19 near Sop Kai Village (TJ 3429), about ten kilometers southwest of Muang Khoua District Town. The camp was located on the east side of Route 19 at Kilometer Marker-91 (possibly TJ 5329) along the Pak River. Initial inmates included about 500 RLG police and FAR lieutenants and captains. Inmates were allowed to be accompanied by dependents to discourage escape attempts. In December 1976, 200 inmates were moved to the Pak Nam Noi Camp (TJ 1334) and to Muang Yo Seminar Camp 4. In June 1977, about 200 FAR enlisted and NCO personnel from Camp 2 were moved to Camp 1. In December 1978, all remaining officer inmates (number unknown) were transferred to the Pak Beng Camp (QC 2302) in Oudomsai Province and then to the Pak Xuang Camp (TH 1110) about 25 kilometers northwest of

Luang Prabang Township. From Pak Xuang, they were flown in two C-47 and C-123 aircraft to the Phonsavan Camp (UG 1253) in Xieng Khoang Province, Sepone in Savannakhet Province, and Attopeu Province, where they were placed in southern seminar camps. They were replaced at Camp 1 by 300 FAR enlisted and NCO inmates with dependents from Camp 2. In April 1982, 300 FAR enlisted and NCO inmates with dependents from Camp 4 were transferred to Camp 1. Inmates were used during the 1980-1986 period to build a laterite road (Provincial Route 48) from Nam Noi to Muang Yo Village in Boun Neua District. Camp 1 was closed down sometime in 1986. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

B. Seminar Camp 2, also known as the Muang Mai District (TJ 6942) Seminar Camp, was located near the SRV border about 20 kilometers northeast of Muang Khoua District Town on the north side of Route 19 near the Nam Noua River. Camp 2 held about 900 RLG/FAR inmates and dependents. All were FAR and RLG police enlisted and NCO personnel from Louang Namtha, Luang Prabang, and Sayaboury Provinces. Inmates were used on road construction work. In June 1977, about 200 inmates were transferred to Muang Khoua Seminar Camp 1, replacing junior grade officers who were moved to Muang Yo Seminar Camp 4, and about 700 inmates were moved to a new Camp 2 site at Pak Nam Noi (TJ 1334). During 1979, Camp 2 had 300 enlisted and NCO inmates; 300 enlisted and NCO inmates were transferred to Muang Yo Seminar Camp 4. Inmates were used during the 1980-1986 period to build a laterite road (Provincial Route 48) from Nam Noi to Muang Yo. Camp 2 was closed down sometime in 1986. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

C. Seminar Camp 3, also known as the Boun Neua Camp, was located about five kilometers south of Boun Neua Township (RD 0198) between Route 49 and the Nam Roun River. Camp 3 initially held 435 inmates (200 from Vientiane and 235 from Luang Prabang Provinces); all were former RLG politicians and national assemblymen; about 45 inmates died at Camp 3. In December 1978, all remaining inmates were transferred to the Houa Phan Province seminar camp system, and Camp 3 was closed. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

D. Seminar Camp 4, also known as the Muang Yo Seminar Camp (QD 9580), was located at Kilometer 65, Muang Yo Village, Boun Neua District (RD 0095), and held about 110 FAR MR-1 (Luang Prabang) field grade officers. In December 1976, about 200 FAR junior grade officers were transferred from Camp 1 to

Camp 4. In December 1978, all field grade officers were transferred to the Houa Phan Province seminar camp system. All junior grade officers were gradually transferred to the Pak Beng Camp (QC 2302) in Oudomsai Province and then to the Pak Xuang Camp (TH 1110) about 25 kilometers northwest of Luang Prabang Township. From Pak Xuang, the inmates were flown in two C-47 and C-123 aircraft to Phonsavan (UG 1253) in Xieng Khoang Province, Sepone in Savannakhet Province, and Attopeu Province. They were replaced by about 300 FAR enlisted and NCO inmates from Camp 2. Inmates were used during the 1980-1986 period to build a laterite road (Provincial Route 48) from Nam Noi to Muang Yo. Camp 4 was closed down in 1986. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

E. Seminar Camp 5 was located at Bouam Phan Village, Khao Canton (TJ 0535) in Muang Khoua District. As of August 1986, Camp 5 held about 130 inmates from Camps 1 and 4 who had not been released. Inmates were used during the 1980-1986 period inmates to build a laterite road (Provincial Route 48) from Nam Noi to Muang Yo. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

14. The Xieng Khoang Province seminar camp system detained about 3,000 detainees as of 1986. Each camp had a 50-man staff, including a 35-man guard force. The Nachong Seminar Camp (UG 134 623), also known as Seminar Camp C.157, was established in June or July 1975 and was located near the Napa River; it was a maximum security camp. Seminar Camp 3 (UG 154 628) was located about three kilometers north of the Nachong Camp; it held about 750 inmates (not including dependents); over 200 inmates died in the camp. Beginning in February-March 1979, Seminar Camp 3 inmates were reassigned to Seminar Camps 515, 518 and 523 for production work. Seminar Camp 4 was located at UG 158 638 and detained "incorrigible" prisoners. In 1980, Seminar Camp 4 inmates were relocated to the Ban Hou area (UG 5964) about two kilometers from Route 7 where it had Subcamps 55, 56, 57 and 58. The Longkai Seminar Camp was located near Ban Ban (UG 5070). It had seven subcamps designated C1 through C7 along the Nam Mat River. Seminar Camp 5 was located on the bank of the Napa River, a few kilometers from its junction with the Nam Ha River, with about 600 detainees; 300 had been transferred from the closed down Camp 4. Seminar Camp 6 was unlocated with about 300 detainees. Seminar Camp 5 and Camp 6 inmates were assigned to Construction (Seminar) Battalions 575 and 611, which were involved in the reconstruction of the Thong Hai Hin (UG 0651) Airfield; each battalion had about 300 inmates. The Bansone

Seminar Camp (UG 292 610) was located about three kilometers from Route 7 between Phonsavan and Nong Pet (UG 310640; it held LPDR inmates who had been transferred from Subcamp 58 of the Longkai Seminar Camp. The Nong Het Seminar Camp (UG 944 550) held about 90 former Royal Lao Air Force officers through the rank of captain. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at any of these camps.

A. The Phonsavan Camp (UG 1351) was established in December 1975 near Lee Village (UG 1052) for about 200 Royal Lao Air Force personnel (privates through captain) and their dependents, and was also known as the 702nd Seminar Battalion. Beginning in early 1986, inmates were gradually released. As of February 1987, about 98 inmates of the Houa Phan Province seminar camp complex had been transferred to the Phonsavan Camp, where they were grouped for onward movement to Vientiane for release. No foreign prisoners were reported in detention at this camp.

B. Seminar Camps 515, 518, 523, 575 and 611 have also been reported as Construction Battalions; each had about 150 inmates. Camp 515 was located at deserted Pha Pang Hang Village (TG 6558) along Route 7 in Pek District; most inmates were FAR Military Region 5 (Vientiane) personnel who had been detained at the Vang Vieng Camp. Camp 515 inmates were used for Route 7 road and bridge repair and construction. Camp 515 was commanded by Major Bounli, had four companies composed of inmates, and a 30-man guard force. Inmates who were too old or ill for hard labor were sent to Hat Village (UG 6657) where about 20 inmates raised vegetables and livestock. Captured escapees were sent to the Phonsavan-Longkai Prison (UG 5566). Only prisoners in poor health were released. In early 1986, Camp 515 companies were sent in rotation to help build the Joint Armed Forces School at Paen (TG 9869), Pek District. In August 1986, Camp 515 was relocated to the Paen area, and had about 50 inmates. Camp 575 was located at Ban Nam Khao (UG 1050) near the end of the Thong Hai Hin Airfield; it had 700 inmates including dependent family members as of 1981. The 606th Seminar Battalion was located about four kilometers east of Phonsavan. Camp 611 was located near Xiang Houng (TG 8262), and had about 600 inmates including dependents. The 705th Seminar Battalion was located at Nam Chat (UG 8107), and was involved in the construction of the Lao Armed Forces Officers Academy at Paen Village (TG 9369). No foreign prisoners were reported in detention at any of these camps.

C. As of spring 1987, the 518th Seminar Battalion

with 145 inmates was building a new runway to handle MIG-21 aircraft at the Thong Hai Hin Airfield (UG 1251) under the supervision of 20 Soviet engineers. The 575th and 611th Seminar Battalions, composed of 150 inmates each, were also involved in the construction. Each of the three battalions were augmented by about 100 dependent females. About 1,000 laborers (inmates and dependents) were involved in the construction. Airfield construction also included plans for over 80 permanent buildings, including 42 three-storey buildings. Construction began in January 1985, and was scheduled to be completed in 1988. Two radar stations were built, one at Phou Keng Mountain (UG 0450) and one at Phou Seu Mountain (TG 9938). Another radar station had previously been built in an area near Bam Gnouan (UG 0953). All construction materials and heavy equipment were provided by the Soviets. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at any of these sites.

D. One Lao resistance member, whose reliability was undetermined, provided information about six U.S. POW's being held in a camp in early March 1986 at the Tham Pha Leung Cave near Phou Sao Village (UG 3918).

15. Vientiane Province had several detention and seminar facilities. The Vang Mieng Seminar Camp was established between February and July 1976, and was located at Vang Mieng Village (TF 136627), and held about 1,000 RLG/FAR detainees in mid-1976. The Ban Thangon Seminar Camp was located about 25 kilometers north of Vientiane City, and held minor political offenders and NCO's who were sentenced to a maximum of three years of imprisonment. The Sammune Muang Fenang Seminar Camp (SF 9772) held FAR company grade officers and NCO's until mid-1979 when the camp was moved to Muang Heuang (UF 6373) in Bolikhamsai Province. As of mid-1984, the Don Pho Seminar Camp was in the area of TF 5055 near the Nam Ngum Dam Reservoir and held FAR NCO's and low level political prisoners. The Thongkheng Seminar Camp was in the area of TF 3439 about 62 kilometers north of Vientiane City. As of mid-1985, seminar laborers were assigned to constructions units at the Basic Joint Operations School at the Dan Mouang Camp (TF 2626), Phon Hong District, and to LPAF Sawmill Enterprise No. 1 at Ban Keun Village (TF 4431), Thoulakhom District. About 120 seminar laborers were assigned to the 582nd Engineering Battalion which was building a Joint Operations School at the Dan Mouang Camp. As of mid-1985, the MND General Logistics Department's Camp Barracks Department used about 350 seminar personnel who were assigned to a transportation company, a brick kiln, two

sawmills, and three construction enterprises. Another 1,000 released seminar inmates were assigned to Production Unit 2, which had four sub-units. Sub-unit 1 fished at the Nam Ngum Dam (TF 4250); Sub-unit 2 bred fish; Sub-unit 3 was tasked with animal husbandry; and Sub-unit 4 cultivated flowers and industrial plants. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at any of these camps.

16. Bolikhamsai Province had an unknown number of detention and seminar camps. In mid-1979, the Vientiane Province Sammune Muang Fenang Camp (SF 9772) moved to Muang Heuang (UF 6373) in Bolikhamsai Province with an unknown number of FAR company grade officer inmates. As of the mid-1980's, about 1,000 released FAR seminar inmates were assigned to Production Unit 1 in Paksane District (UF 5832). Production Unit 1 built roads, bridges, buildings, and cleared wood from the junction of Route 4 at Paksane to Route 401 at Thong Phan Kham (UF 6450). No foreign nationals were reported in detention at any of these camps.

17. Luong Namtha and Sayaboury Province had an unknown number of detention facilities and no known seminar camps. Several hundred former RLG civil servants and FAR personnel from these two provinces were initially sent to the Pak Beng Seminar Camp (QC 2302), Oudomsai Province, in July-August 1975. The Pak Beng Camp was a temporary holding facility for RLG and FAR personnel. FAR personnel were sent to the Nam Bac Seminar Camp (TH 3582) in Luang Prabang Province before being further transferred to the Phong Saly Province Seminar Camp system. In December 1978, FAR junior grade officers in the Phong Saly Province Seminar Camp system were gradually transfered to the Pak Beng Camp and then to the Pak Xuang Camp (TH 1110) about 25 kilometers northwest of Luang Prabang Township. From Pak Xuang, the inmates were flown in two C-47 and C-123 aircraft to Phonsavan (UG 1253) in Xieng Khoang Province, Sepone in Savannakhet Province, and Attopeu Province. The Oudomsai Province camp (not further identified) was closed in early 1979, and all inmates (mostly FAR MR-1 officers), were transferred to an unknown camp in Xieng Khouang Province. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at these camps.

18. Luang Prabang Province had several detention and seminar camps. Between 1975 and 1985, there were two main seminar camps, two smaller ones, and a jail in Muang Ngoi District Town. All were located along the Nam Ou River or along its tributaries. The two main seminar camps were Hatchan

(TH 5890) and Nam Bac (TH 3582), which was across the Nam Bak River from Ban Nakhon Village (TH 4680). In 1976, about 500 FAR NCO's were transferred from Luang Prabang Province to the Nakay Seminar Camp in Khammouan Province, and several hundred FAR MR-1 NCO's were held at the Nam Bac Camp (TH 3582). Most NCO's were usually released after two to four years of imprisonment. Comments are available on the following camps:

A. The Ban Hatchan Seminar Camp (TH 5890) was established in August 1975 for RLG civil servants from Luang Prabang, Xieng Khouang and Sayaboury Provinces. The Hatchan Camp was located south of Muang Ngoi District Town in a valley formed by the Phaboun and Phapae Mountains along the Nam Ou River; it was bordered on the south by the Nam Kong River and on the north by the Nam Ngoi River. The Hatchan Camp held about 400 inmates plus 350 dependents. Inmates were usually released after two to four years of imprisonment. The Ban Hatchan Seminar Center was noted in the overt Vientiane press in June 1977, and was closed down in 1980 after remaining inmates were transferred to seminar camps in Xieng Khouang and Attopeu Provinces. No foreign nationals were reported by former inmates in detention at this camp.

B. The Nam Bac Seminar Camp (TH 3582) was established in August 1975 for FAR personnel, and was also known as the Oudomsai (Nam Bac) District Seminar Camp, in Luang Prabang Province. FAR MR-1 officers were initially held at the camp. On 31 November 1975, 110 FAR MR-1 field grade officers were transferred to Phong Saly Province Seminar Camp 4. Lieutenants and captains were also sent Phong Saly Province Seminar Camp 1, and NCO's were sent to Phong Saly Province Seminar Camp 2. The Nam Bac Seminar Center was noted in the overt Vientiane press in June 1977. The Nam Bac Camp held several hundred NCO's and a few officers until it was closed down in 1980 after remaining inmates were transferred to seminar camps in Xieng Khouang and Attopeu Provinces. No foreign nationals were reported by former inmates in detention at this camp. However, one individual, whose reliability was undetermined, provided information about 12 U.S. POW's who were held at the Nam Bac Camp after being captured there during the war years; five U.S. POW's were reportedly moved to the USSR in 1985 and seven were reportedly still kept at the Nam Bac Camp as of mid-1986 with about 30 alleged former Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) POW's.

C. The Ban Hatxao Seminar Camp or Jail (TH 5226 or TH

5477) (2035N/10238E) was located on the bank of the Nam Ngu River, and held about 60 RLG civil servants. In December 1978, Ban Hatxao Camp inmates were moved to the Ban Pakchim Seminar Camp (2026N/10230E) and were gradually released after about four years of imprisonment. The Ban Hatxao Camp held about 200 prisoners as of September 1986. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

D. The Ban Namo Camp (TH 0012) held about 200 captured Lao resistance members as of late 1983. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at this camp.

E. Two small seminar camps (Nos. 193 and 196) were respectively located near a bridge over the Nam Bak River near the junction of the Nam Bak and Houei Ngeu Rivers, and at Nanongxung. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at these two camps.

F. A camp for returning Lao refugees was located about 40 kilometers northeast of Luang Prabang Township near the Nam Ai River. Another camp for returning Lao refugees was built in the Ban Gnhok Van area (TH 1808). No foreign nationals were reported in detention at these camps.

G. Another individual, whose reliability was undetermined, provided information about having seen two Caucasians in leg irons, who had been captured before 1972, along the main road about 8.0 kilomters east of Muang Ngoi (TH 5891) in April 1986. This person also provided information (FIR-317/09341-86 of 22 July 1986) about a detention camp at Ban Don Lae (TH 5085) in Muang Ngoi District, which held two male and four female Americans in a cave guarded by eight People's Armed Forces of Vietnam (PAVN) and 14 LPAF personnel; the cave camp was called the Widow's Cave (Tham Mae Mai). Other than this, no foreign nationals were reported in detention at any camp in the province by former inmates.

20. In Khammouan Province, the camp system held about 2,300 RLG and FAR inmates as of July 1985, including about 500 FAR and police officers. In 1975, field grade officers were sent to the Sepone Seminar Camp in Savannakhet Province. About 50 RLG police enlisted and NCO personnel, and second lieutenants were sent to the Phonkhen Seminar Camp (WE 1738) in September 1975, where they were assigned to agricultural and road repair tasks on Route 8. In September 1976, 43 surviving inmates were relocated to the Thoen Douan (Theun Douan) aka

Nakay Seminar Camp (WE 2554), Gnommalat District, where it was also known as the 74th Production Group. About 500 NCO's were transferred from Luang Prabang Province to the Nakay Camp in 1976. As of late 1979, the Nakay Camp held about 2,000 enlisted and officer personnel through captain rank from Khammouan and Savannakhet Provinces. Inmates were assigned to one of six production battalions under the 74th Production Group. Inmates performed hard labor, clearing forests, cultivating rice paddy fields, and repairing roads. Dependents began joining the inmates in 1980. As of mid-1984, inmates at the Na Kai province camp (WE 3060) were used as the labor force for State Forestry Enterprises Nos. 4 and 5. The Mahaxai 75th Production Subgroup (1725N/10512E) had about 400 inmates who performed road construction and repair work on Route 12 between Gnommalat District and Thakhek District Town. The Naden Camp (1729N/10525), also known as the 70th Production Group, was relocated in 1980 to new quarters about 2.5 kilometers east of Ban Naden between Route 12 and the Xe Bang Fai River. About 25 percent of all inmates in the Khammouan Province camp system either died or escaped. As of January 1986, the camp system held about 200 inmates and dependents who were assigned to one of four 50-man companies. Although no foreign nationals were reported by former inmates in detention at any of these camps, Lao resistance members claimed to have information on live U.S. POW's in various areas of Khammouan Province as follows:

A. One Lao resistance member, whose reliability was undetermined, provided information about four U.S. POW's at the Nadeng Prison in Khammouan Province as of February 1983. This same report also noted that the Lao resistance member had obtained information from an escaped inmate who reportedly had met two U.S. POW's at this prison during the period mid-1981 to January 1983.

B. Another Lao resistance member, whose reliability was undetermined, provided information about 17 U.S. POW's being held at a detention camp near Phahoi Village (possibly WD 4598), which was about two kilometers southwest of the junction of Routes 122 and 123 (WD 4799) and about 50 kilometers southeast of Mahaxai District Town.

C. This same Lao resistance member had earlier claimed to have information on one U.S. POW who was being protected and guarded by villagers at Napeng Village (WE 7115), Talong Canton (WE 7019), Boualapha

District, in October 1986. The subsource for this Lao resistance member was also debriefed and claimed that one U.S. POW was being held by Napeng villagers as of November-December 1986.

21. In Savannakhet Province, about 3,500 seminar camp inmates (with dependents) from the ranks of sergeant to major were assigned to five road construction and two bridge construction units along Route 9 from Xa Thamouak (WD 9732), Phin District, Savannakhet Province, east to the Vietnamese border, and west to Phalane Canton (WD 6041), Atsaphangthong District, Savannakhet Province. Production work camps were located near Xa Thamouak (WD 9732), Sepone (XD 3244), Senkua Toulouang (XD 1753), Lako (XD 5857), and Ban Buk (XD 6152). In July 1975, all FAR personnel in FAR Military Region 3 (MR-3) were ordered to report for indoctrination training. About 300 FAR MR-3 officers from the ranks of major to colonel were held at the Fa Ngum School (1634N/10445E) in Savannakhet City for a one-month preliminary seminar before being sent in mid-August and September 1975 to the Sepone Seminar Camp by C-47 aircraft. Twelve senior officers, including Brigadier General Nouphet Daoheuang (FAR MR-3 Commander), Police Colonels Chanpheng Phetsomphou and Sisouvan, Colonels Soulang Phetsomphou and Kamko, and Lieutenant Colonel Sivisai, were transferred to the Houa Phan Province seminar camp complex. On 7 September 1975, 290 majors to colonels were sent to the Sepone Seminar Camp, which held about 1,000 inmates and dependent families. By March 1978, the Sepone Seminar Camp was closed down because of repeated escape attempts. About 190 Sepone Seminar Camp inmates were transferred to the Senkua Tonglouang Seminar Camp (XD 1884) near Ban Senkua (XD 1753), about 30 kilometers northwest of Sepone near the Nambok/Nam Xe Kok River (XD 1854). The Senkua Seminar Camp held about 1,000 inmates and dependent families. Again, because of repeated escape attempts, about 100 surviving inmates of the Senkua Seminar Camp were relocated in April 1979 to the Lako Seminar Camp (XD 5957), also known as the Vinko Camp, about seven kilometers from the Vietnamese border. During February-June 1983, about 30 Lako Seminar Camp inmates were relocated to the Ban Buk (Ban But) Seminar Camp. The Ban Buk Seminar Camp (XD 6152) was located about 10 kilometers south of the Lako Seminar Camp, and was about five kilometers from the Vietnamese border. As of late 1986, there were only 16 inmates and one family left at the Ban Buk Camp. Other inmates either had died, were shot attempting to escape, or had been transferred

to the district jail for disciplinary action. Camp officials never spoke of release, and it appeared that the policy was to let the inmates gradually die off. The Ban Phabang Seminar Camp (1653N/10619E) held about 600 elderly and retired RLG civil servants and FAR personnel with dependents who had been transfered from camps at Ban Kengkhan and Ban Xieng Hom (1647N/10619E); inmates did agriculture and husbandry work. The Ban Dong Seminar Camp (1638N/10625E) initially held about 900 officers through captain rank, and by late 1984 held about 300 surviving inmates. The Ban Dong Camp was located about 22 kilometers east of Sepone District Township along Route 9. The Savannakhet Province Public Security Office (PSO) administered the Kaeng Khan Prison (XK 221530) in Sepone District, which held about 200 inmates in harsh conditions; about 50 inmates were held in solitary confinement on espionage charges. Although no foreign nationals were reported by former inmates in detention at any of these camps, Lao resistance members claimed to have information on live U.S. POW's in various areas of Savannakhet Province as follows:

A. One Lao resistance member, whose reliability was undetermined, provided information about 19 live American POW's at a site near Dong Kok, Muang Angkham (1701N/10602E).

B. [redacted] (n)

22. The Saravane Province seminar camp system existed between July 1975 and at least 1980. In July 1975, about 900 RLG police and FAR Military Region 4 (MR-4) officers and NCO's were initially concentrated in a temporary seminar camp at the Saravane Town Airfield (XC 5738). All were moved to the Ban Bung Kham Seminar Camp (XC 2238) in August 1975. In September 1979, about 200 officers were flown by C-47 aircraft from Luang Prabang Province to the Pakse Airfield, Champassak Province, where they were then taken by truck and on foot to the Dakchung Seminar Camp (YC 4211 or YC 5010) near the Vietnamese border. As of 1980, all seminar camps in Saravane Province became known as "production" camps. In 1980, the Dakchung Camp was closed down; half of the inmates were sent to Attopeu Province and half were reportedly sent to an unlocated camp in Vietnam. About 2,000 RLG police and FAR MR-4 NCO's had been assigned to agricultural and road repair "production" units in the Thateng (WC 4907) area of Saravane Province and in the Paksong (XB 3278) area of Champassak Province. Saravane Province was later split in two with the eastern half being currently known as Sekong Province. Sekong Province includes the areas of the Dakchung and Thateng camps. Although no foreign nationals were reported by former inmates in detention at any of these camps, Lao resistance members claimed to have information on live U.S. POW's in various areas of Saravane Province as follows:

A. One Lao resistance member, whose reliability was undetermined, provided information about two U.S. POW's at the Dakchung Camp in November 1986.

B. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

C. [redacted] (1) (3)(n)

[redacted]

)(1)
)(3)(n)

D. Another individual, whose reliability was undetermined, provided hearsay information on sightings of American POW's in Saravane Province, two live Americans at a detention camp in Ta-Oy (Ta-Oi) District (XC 6148) of Saravane Province in 1985, and on six Americans being held in Hue, Vietnam.

23. The Attopeu Province "seminar" system held about 600 inmates as of September 1986 who were detained in the 402nd and 979th "Seminar" Battalions. An unknown number of inmates were detained at the 981st "Seminar" Battalion which is unlocated in Attopeu Province. The camp system was established in June 1975 for the detention of FAR Military Region 4 (MR-4) civilian and military personnel. No foreign nationals were reported in detention in this camp system. Comments are as follows:

A. The 402nd Seminar Battalion was established in June 1975 in Attopeu Province at the Houai Phok Camp (YB 0238) and consisted of four seminar companies in subcamps of about 150 detainees each. In June 1975, about 600 FAR MR-4 Region 4 officers from second lieutenant to colonel rank were concentrated at the Teacher's College at Kilometer 3 (WB 8971) east of Pakse District Town (WB 8671), Champassak Province, for preliminary indoctrination. Upon registration, about 100 majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels were flown directly to Attopeu (XB 9838) on 27 July 1975; an unknown number of these officers were later transferred to the Houa Phan Province seminar camp system. After completing a one-month course, 400 second lieutents and captains detainees were assigned to "Seminar" Companies 1 through 4. On 15 August 1975, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Seminar Companies were flown by C-47 aircraft from Pakse to the Attopeu Airport. The 4th Seminar Company of 100 detainees was sent to Samakkhisai (Attopeu) District (XB 9837). No foreign nationals were reported in detention at any of these sites.

B. During the first three months in Attopeu Province,

about 10 officers tried to escape; all were captured and executed. The 1st Seminar Company of junior grade officers was located at the base of the Phou Saphong Mountain and the Nam Xe Kong River (XB 9882), Saisettha District; the 2nd Seminar Company of 180 lieutenants and captains was at Houai Phok (YB 0238), Saisettha District; the 3rd Seminar Company of 180 lieutenants and captains was at Ban Bung along the Nam Xe Kong River, Saisettha District. In early 1976, the 3rd Seminar Company was relocated to Ban Hatliang (YB 0636) where it received inmates from the dissolved 4th Seminar Company which had been located at Ban Hom (XB 9824). In 1977, the 1st Seminar Company was relocated across from the Attopeu Province Military Command and the 2nd Seminar Company was relocated to Ban Kengpok. In mid-1977, about 120 inmates from the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Seminar Companies were assigned to a road construction unit which repaired a twelve kilometer section of the road to Ban Fangdeng (YB 0932). The 2nd Seminar Company was located opposite Fangdeng Village at YB 0839, moved in 1977 to Houei Pok Village (YB 0238) to work on Route 16, and worked on an airstrip at XB 9638. The 2nd Seminar Company had 100 inmates plus dependents and was still located near Fangdeng Village in January 1987. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at any camp sites.

C. In September 1979, a group of 600 RLG police and FAR officers, students and air force pilots were moved from camps in northern Laos (Phong Saly, Xieng Khoang, Louang Namtha, Oudomsai) and from the Sam Khe Prison in Vientiane to an unknown location in Sansai District, about 30 kilometers from Attopeu Township near the SRV border. This group was the 979th Seminar Battalion. Chao Chanthalangsy, a younger brother of the Lao King, was killed at the Attopeu Camp in March 1985, and was buried in a cemetery for seminar inmates near the Attopeu Airport (XB 9638). In 1981, the 979th Seminar Battalion with about 300 inmates was relocated to the Dakkoum Camp near the Vietnamese border. Inmates performed hard labor on road and bridge construction crews. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at any of these camp sites.

D. In 1981, the Attopeu Province Seminar Camp system was reorganized. A 160-man production group was formed with inmates from the 979th and 402nd Seminar Battalions. As of 1981, the 402nd Seminar Battalion held about 500 RLG civilian and FAR inmates, and the 979th Seminar Battalion had about 400 inmates. The 1st Company was relocated to the former FAR military headquarters in Attopeu Township where it was known as the "municipal construction unit;" the 2nd Company was

relocated from the Houai Phok Camp (1448N/10653E) to the Ban Hom Camp (XB 9824); and the 3rd Company was relocated from Ban Hat Liang Village (YB 0636) to the Attopeu Airport area where 150 inmates grew crops, cut timber, built housing, and did road construction and repair work. The 4th Company was reformed with inmates from the 979th Seminar Battalion, and was colocated with the 1st Company. As of September 1986, the 402nd Seminar Battalion still held about 300 inmates with no plans for release. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at any camp sites.

E. The Attopeu Province Public Security Office Prison had a 25-man guard force and held about 50 prisoners in three cells. One cell held civil criminals, another held seminarcamp inmates, and the third cell held a mix of civil prisoners and reeducatees. The Attopeu Province Public Security Office also had another prison (YB 6525) in Sansai District near the Tri-border area of Laos-Cambodia-Vietnam. The Sansai District Prison, which also had a 25-man staff, held 26 RLG police and FAR officials and former ethnic Lao local USAID employees under maximum security detention until late 1981 when 24 survivors were transferred to the Attopeu Prison. No foreign nationals were reported in detention in these facilities.

23. In the case of Champassak Province, about 1,000 military and police NCO's from FAR MR-4 were assigned to "production" camps which performed agriculture and road repair work in the Paksong (XB 3278) area, Champassak Province. Otherwise, no permanent seminar camps were reported in this province, because of its immediate proximity to the Thai border. On 4 July 1985, Champassak Province authorities established a camp for returning Lao refugees at Nongsip Village (WB 9685), Bachiang Chaleunsouk District. MOI Order 1-553 (1 June 1985) stipulated that Lao residents with homes in Champassak, Saravane, Attopeu or Sekong Provinces would be concentrated at this camp. No foreign nationals were reported in detention at these camps.

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Ministry of National Defense
Enemy Military Proselytizing Department

1. The Enemy Military Proselytizing Department (Cuc Binh Dich Van) is a Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) military intelligence and security service, which has historically been involved in various aspects of the the administration, handling, interrogation, indoctrination, and psychological warfare exploitation of POW's. It was also known as the Military Proselytizing Department (Cuc Binh Van), and was more commonly referred to as being the Enemy Proselytizing Department (Cuc Dich Van/CDV or EPD). Although overtly under the General Political Department of the Ministry of National Defense (MND), the EPD was covertly subordinate to the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and its pre-June 1975 predecessor Ministry of Public Security. The EPD was a staff-line department with the cover number designation K-30 through at least mid-1981, and was subordinate to the MOI's Protection Bloc (Khoi Bao Ve). In October 1981, the MOI underwent a major reorganization, which resulted in the upgrading of its professional blocs into a general department (tong cuc) structure with subordinate departments. The MOI's Protection Bloc was dissolved with subordinate departments placed under the MOI's General Department for the Development of Forces, the General Department for People's Police, and the General Department for People's Security, which was further reorganized and renamed the General Department for Counterintelligence in 1989.

2. The EPD was the only known service with responsibilities for psychological warfare and recruitment operations against enemy military forces. Recruitment operations were conducted under the name of military proselytizing (binh van). During the Vietnam War, the EPD, in fulfilling its psychological warfare responsibilities, was involved in the administration, handling, interrogation, indoctrination and psychological warfare exploitation of former Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), U.S., and Allied Forces POW's. In doing so, the EPD worked closely with the Ministry of Public Security and its K-32 Military Security Department (Cuc Bao Ve Quan Doi/MSD). Like the EPD, the MSD was also overtly subordinate to the MND General Political Department. The Ministry of Public Security and its MOI successor provided the MSD and the EPD with professional guidance, equipment, personnel, and training.

3. In North Vietnam, the EPD had the primary responsibility for the indoctrination of U.S. POW's, and for supervising the implementation of party-sponsored POW policies. Although the EPD was responsible for the administration and indoctrination of U.S. POW's, they were physically detained in Ministry of Public Security detention facilities. U.S. POW's captured in North Vietnam were transferred to the Ministry of Public Security's Central Hoa Lo Prison in Hanoi. Ministry of Public Security prison authorities informed the EPD of U.S. POW arrivals, since the EPD had no permanently assigned personnel at Hoa Lo. EPD Policy Office cadre were sent to Hoa Lo, where U.S. POW personal efforts were turned over to the EPD Policy Office for storage and where EPD Policy Office cadres conducted preliminary debriefings. EPD preliminary debriefings focused on the collection of psychological assessment data. Psychological assessment results were used to draft indoctrination plans and to determine which methods of interrogations would be used against a POW by Military Intelligence Department, also known as the Research Department (Cuc Nghien Cuu/CNC), interrogators of the MND General Staff Department. Debriefings and interrogations were designed by the EPD to assist in the preparation of psychological warfare materials against enemy forces; emphasis was placed on obtaining handwritten letters and statements, and taperecorded anti-war messages from POW's for replay over Radio Hanoi. The EPD Policy Office also maintained a central listing of all U.S. POW's, who were processed and detained at Ministry of Public Security detention facilities, and had direct input into recommending who was to be released early.

4. The EPD sat on top of a vertical chain of command over all enemy proselytizing components in the PAVN down to the regimental level. Enemy proselytizing components were subordinate to the political staffs of PAVN corps, military regions, special regions, divisions, regiments, provincial and major city military commands. The involvement of these components with U.S. POW's in North Vietnam has not been determined. Although enemy proselytizing components had no known detention facilities in North Vietnam during the Vietnam War years, EPD forward commands in South Vietnam administered a detention camp system for captured ARVN and Allied/U.S. personnel.

5. With few exceptions, the EPD forward commands were the responsible authorities in South Vietnam with detention facilities for enemy military personnel, foreign

civilian and foreign military personnel under the name of Hanoi's National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN) and Hanoi's Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG). During the 1973 Operation Homecoming, 122 U.S. POW's were released under the banner of Hanoi's PRG. All had been held at one time in EPD forward command camps in South Vietnam. After Operation Homecoming, the EPD forward commands in South Vietnam continued to be responsible for a detention camp system for ARVN personnel.

6. The EPD had five major forward commands in South Vietnam during the period. Three forward commands were responsible for Central Vietnam: the Tri-Thieu-Hue Military Region (TTHMR) Political Staff's Enemy Military Proselyting Section, which had military proselytizing (recruitment), psychologicial warfare propaganda, and prisoner (military and foreign) handling functions; the Region 5 Enemy Military Proselytizing Section, which had military proselytizing (recruitment),psychological warfare propaganda and prisoner (military and foreign) handling functions; and the B-3 Central Highlands EMPS which also had similar functions. Two forward commands were responsible for the remainder of South Vietnam. They were: the Party's Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) Military Proselytizing Section, which was responsible only for proselytizing (recruitment) operations against enemy military personnel; and, the Enemy Proselytizing Office (Phong Dich Van) of the PAVN's South Vietnamese Liberation Armed Forces (SVNLA) Political Staff Department, which was responsible for the detention handling and psychological warfare exploitation of captured enemy military personnel (Vietnamese, U.S., Allied Forces). Captured foreign civilian personnel were categorized and treated as foreign military personnel.

The Tri-Thien-Hue Region (TTHR)

7. The Tri-Thien-Hue Region (TTTHR) Party Committee was established in early 1967 as part of the reorganization of the Inter-Region 5 (Lien Khu 5), which was renamed Region 5 (Khu 5). The TTHR Party Committee assumed control over the Quang Tri Province Party Committee (also known as Front 7), the Thua Thien Province Party Committee, and the Hue City Party Committee. The Military Affairs Committee of the TTHR Party Committee was known as the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region (TTHMR). The TTHMR had three staff offices (military,

political, logistics). The Enemy Military Proselytizing Section (EMPS) was subordinate to the TTHMR Political Staff. As of late 1968, the EPMS was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Le Quoc Chinh (1967-1968) and his deputy, Major Nguyen Thieng, and was organized into administrative, enemy situation research, penetration (fifth column), American proselytizing, and detention camp subsections. Its seven-man American Proselytizing Subsection was established in April 1967 under Captain Ngo Thong. Its detention camp subsection had two camps (not further identified), which were segregated temporary holding facilities for U.S. POW's and ARVN officers before they were moved onwards to North Vietnam. American Proselytizing Subsections were formed during the April-June 1967 period under the political staff enemy military proselytizing sections of the Quang Tri and Thua Thien Province Military Commands and the Hue City Military Command.

8. As of June 1968, the TTHMR's Quang Tri (Front 7) Province EMPS was headed by Captain Phan Huu Them (captured 19 June 1968) and his deputy, Senior Lieutenant Nguyen Tung. The Quang Tri EMPS had about 25 personnel who were assigned to its six-man American Proselytizing Subsection headed by Senior Lieutenant Nguyen Hoi, its three-man Propaganda Subsection headed by Senior Lieutenant Nguyen Muon, its six-man Penetration Subsection headed by Senior Lieutenant Trinh Dinh Tu, and its six-man Detention Camp Subsection headed by Senior Lieutenant Nguyen Xuyen. Its Detention Camp Subsection had two temporary camps for U.S. and ARVN POW's in Trieu Phong District. One was a small temporary holding camp for U.S. POW's in an area (YD 2235) near the EMPS Headquarters. The other camp (YD 3436) had a 12-man staff and held only ARVN personnel. ARVN officers and U.S. POW's were escorted to the TTHMR Political Staff's EMPS and ARVN enlisted personnel and deserters were usually released after being indoctrinated. The Quang Tri EMPS provided direction and guidance to district-level EMPS and to combat unit political staff enemy military proselytizing components. The Quang Tri EMPS was later headed by Captain Nguyen Tung (June 1968-July 1969) and Senior Lieutenant Nguyen Muon (July-December 1969). The Thua Thien Province EMPS was similarly organized and staffed with two detention camps; one for foreign prisoners and one for ARVN. Captured ARVN officers and U.S./foreign personnel were moved up the chain of command to the TTHMR EMPS.

9. The TTHMR EMPS detention camp system did not handle foreign prisoners captured by PAVN forces. Based on accounts from former U.S. POW's, American personnel captured by PAVN

units in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces were transferred through temporary detention facilities to North Vietnam, and not through the TTHMR EMPS system. The following examples illustrate the handling and movement of American personnel in this geographical area.

10. U.S. Army Special Forces Captain Floyd James Thompson was captured on 26 March 1964 near Khe Sanh in Quang Tri Province, and was taken to a small camp which was built for him in northwestern Thua Thien Province near the Lao border. Thompson was the only prisoner in the camp. During the fall of 1967, Captain Thompson was sent to a camp in North Vietnam, which was about 90 miles north of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and about 20 miles inland from the coast. At the time Thompson arrived, the camp had no cellblock buildings. Three thatch-roofed cellblock buildings were built before the next American civilian and military prisoners arrived at the camp in spring 1968. U.S. POW's named the camp "Portholes."

11. On 8 February 1968, PAVN forces overran the Langvei Special Forces Camp which was located along Route 9 near Khe Sanh in the northwestern corner of Quang Tri Province near the Lao border. PAVN forces captured U.S. Army Special Forces Sergeants Dennis L. Thompson, Harvey G. Brande and William G. McMurray. Brande was taken to a camp in Laos about 30 miles southwest of Langvei, which held about 100 South Vietnamese and Laotians, many of whom had been captured at Langvei. Thompson was taken with Montagnard prisoners to a different jungle holding camp which also held U.S. Army Special Forces Sergeant John A. Young who was captured on 31 January 1968. Thompson was moved to Brande's camp without Young. Brande and Thompson were recaptured after escaping and were taken in early March to another camp just north of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) which also held U.S. Army Special Forces Sergeants William G. McMurry and John A. Young, and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Private Ronald L. Ridgeway who had been captured on 25 February 1968 near Khe Sanh. In mid-April 1968, the five were moved to the "Portholes" Camp which held Special Forces Captain Floyd Thompson and other American civilian and military prisoners. Air Force Captain Edward W. Leonard, a search-and-rescue pilot captured on 31 May 1968, arrived later at the "Portholes."

12. In mid-summer 1968, Captain Floyd Thompson and others were moved out of the "Portholes" to a French-built prison on the southwest outskirts of Hanoi, which was named "Skidrow" by

its American inmates. Captain Thompson was accompanied by several American civilians who had been captured in Hue City during the Tet offensive. "Skidrow" was the Ministry of Public Security administered Thanh Liet Prison (WJ 851178), which was located about 10 miles south of downtown Hanoi near Bang Liet and Thanh Liet Villages in Thanh Tri District, Hanoi.

13. On 1 February 1968, PAVN forces captured over 20 foreign military and civilian personnel in Hue City. The group included some 14 American civilians: five Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E) personnel; International Voluntary Service (IVS) English teacher Gary Daves; IVS worker Sandra Johnson (released 31 March 1968); Quaker missionary doctor Marjorie Nelson (released 31 March 1968); Thomas Ragsdale; U.S. State Department Senior COORDS Representative Philip Manhard; USG COORDS Advisor Eugene Weaver; U.S. Navy civilians Lewis Myer and Lawrence Stark; and, Voice of America Station Manager Charles Willis. The Hue captives were taken within a few days to a temporary camp in the mountains of western Thua Thien Province. About 20 remaining captives (including 10 of the above noted American civilians) were marched to their first permanent camp in North Vietnam in April 1968 - the "Portholes." In June 1968, Captain Floyd Thompson and 14 American civilian prisoners (including Manhard, Myer, Stark, Willis, Cloden Adkins, Robert Olsen) were transferred from the "Portholes" to the "Skidrow" Prison (Thanh Liet). In March 1971, Captain Thompson and 13 American civilians were moved to the "Rockpile" annex of the Central Nam Ha Reeducation Camp, which was located near Ba Sao and Phu Ly Villages, 10 kilometers east of Kim Bang (Phu Ly) District Town, Ha Nam Ninh Province, about 65 kilometers south of Hanoi. They were the only U.S. POW's held at the "Rockpile;" all were captured in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces of South Vietnam. Philip Manhard was kept behind in isolation at "Skidrow", and was later held in isolation during the period December 1971-January 1973 at the "Mountain" Camp, about 40 miles north of Hanoi.

14. In late August 1968, the remaining "Portholes" inmates were transferred to a new camp about 25 to 30 kilomoters southwest of Hanoi, which was known as the D-1 Camp and named Camp "Farnsworth" by American inmates. The D-1 Camp (WJ 689017) was located some 30 kilometers southwest of Hanoi in former Hoa Binh Province, and was a Ministry of Public Security facility, which held some 34 U.S. POW's at one time during the period of its existence from 28 August 1969

to 25 November 1970. With one exception (USAF Lieutenant Colonel Theodore W. Guy, captured 22 March 1968 by PAVN in Laos), the D-1 Camp held only Americans captured in the Tri-Thien-Hue Region and in Region 5 of central South Vietnam. The D-1 Camp was closed after the 21/22 November 1970 Son Tay Raid, and all D-1 POW's were moved to the "Plantantion" Camp in Hanoi on 25 November 1970. In April 1971, the "Plantation" received U.S. Army Special Forces Major Artice W. Elliott, who was captured on 25 April 1970 in Pleiku Province. On 7/8 July 1971, the "Plantation" received six Americans who were captured by PAVN in Laos, including USG civilian Ernest C. Brace.

Region 5 - Central Vietnam

15. Following the reorganization in early 1987, Region 5 had geographical jurisdiction in central South Vietnam over GVN Quang Nam, Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, Kontum, Pleiku, Phu Bon, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Dar Lac, and Khanh Hoa Provinces. Region 5's B-3 Front (Central Highlands) included GVN Kontum, Pleiku, Phu Bon and Darlac Provinces. Region 5's Quang Nam Province included GVN Quang Tin Province and Que Son District of GVN Quang Nam Province. Region 5's Quang Da Special Region (QDSR) included all of GVN Quang Nam Province except Que Son District.

16. As of January 1969, the Region 5 Enemy Military Proselytizing Section (EMPS) sat on top of a vertical party chain of command over subordinate provincial enemy military proselytizing sections, and was headed by Senior Colonel Nguyen Thanh aka Tri (1968-1969) and his deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Thai (1969). The EMPS had subordinate administrative, enemy situation research, propaganda, penetration, military proselytizing, and detention subsections.

17. The Region 5 EMPS also had a detention subsection which supervised two regional-level detention camps that held U.S. POW's of all ranks and ARVN officers for interrogation, indoctrination, and psychological warfare exploitation. One camp held U.S. and foreign POW's, and the other camp held ARVN officers. The Region 5 EMPS detention camp for U.S. and foreign POW's was operated by the Quang Da Special Region (QDSR) Party Committee's Enemy Military Proselytizing Section (Ban Binh Dich Van). Subordinate Region 5 Provincial EMPS' had

at least one detention camp for ARVN enlisted personnel, and were not authorized to hold foreign military and civilian prisoners. Region 5 combat subordinates and Region 5 provincial military command combat subordinates were required to transfer foreign military and foreign civilian prisoners up to the Region 5 EMPS detention camp. Foreign prisoners captured in the B-3 Front Central Highlands Provinces of Dar Lac, Pleiku, Kontum and Phu Bon were not processed through the above noted Region 5 EMPS camp system, and were instead moved to the B-3 Front EMPS regional-level camp for foreign POW's.

18. During the period May 1968-November 1970, the Quang Da Special Region (QDSR) Enemy Military Proselytizing Section (Ban Binh Dich Van/EMPS) was headed by Colonel Than Tan Trinh aka Tri (1967-1969), Tran Vinh Quoc (1970 killed in an air strike) and Lieutenant Colonel Le Quan (March-November 1970), and deputy chiefs, Ngo Xuan Ha (1970) and Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Luong Dao (1969-1970). As of mid-1970, the EMPS was organized into administrative, enemy situation research, propaganda, penetration, and detention subsections, and was located in the mountains of Xuyen Hiep Village, Duy Xuyen District (BT 0242). Its detention subsection had a 15-man temporary prison camp, which was located at Loc Son Mountain, Loc Son Village (AT 8349), Dai Loc District, GVN Quang Nam Province. The Loc Son Camp had been in existence since at least 1966, and held U.S. POW's who were moved to the Region 5 EMPS permanent camp for foreign and U.S. POW's. USMC Private "Bobby" (Robert R. Garwood) was initially held and interrogated at the Loc Son Camp by QDSR EMPS cadres Ho An and Chin, who convinced "Bobby" to join the liberation forces. The Loc Son Camp was closed down in late 1968.

19. In Region 5 Quang Nam Province (GVN Quang Tin Province and Que Son District of GVN Quang Nam Province), capturing units escorted U.S. and foreign POW's (regardless of rank) and ARVN officers to the Hon Tau Camp which was located in the Hon Tau Mountains of Que Son District. The Hon Tau Camp guards escorted U.S. and foreign POW's to the same above noted Region 5 EMPS camp for foreign POW's. ARVN officers were moved to a separate Region 5 EMPS camp. Although information on other Region 5 provincial EMPS is not available, the provincial EMPS were presumably similar organized with foreign POW's transferred up the chain of command to the Region 5 EMPS camp for foreign POW's.

20. The MR-5 EMPS detention camp (cover designation unknown) for foreign and U.S. POW's was moved periodically between 1965 and February 1971 to avoid enemy military actions. The camp was located in the following areas by approximate dates with camp commanders noted: location unknown (December 1965-February 1966, Camp Commander Ninh; Tra Khe Village, Tra Bong District, GVN Quang Ngai Province (February 1966-February 1967 and January-December 1968), Camp Commander Duong or Phuong); Xa Ngheo aka Xa Rieng Village (BS 1392), Tra My District, GVN Quang Tin Province (February-December 1967), Camp Commander Khoang or Quang, and December 1968-April 1969, Camp Commander unknown; Tra Giac Village (AS 9990), Tra My District, GVN Quang Tin Province (1 May 1969-4 February 1971), Camp Commander Duong or Phuong. The Tra Khe Camp site was located in a heavily forested area northwest of the Na Nieu River, about six hours walking distance from the point where the Vieng Stream flowed south into the Na Nieu River, and about 15 kilometers southwest of Tra Bong District Town.

21. During the period of its existence, this Region 5 EMPS camp held 32 foreign prisoners (28 U.S. military and four West German civilian medical team members). Of the 32, five U.S. military were released (two on 23 January 1968 and three on 5 November 1969), 12 died (ten U.S. military and two West German civilians). On 4 February 1971, fourteen camp survivors (including two West German civilians) were marched to North Vietnam, arriving at the Hanoi "Plantation" on 1 April 1971; all were released during 1973 Operation Homecoming. Former USMC Private Robert Garwood, who was converted from POW to collaborator status by the Region 5 EMPS, was moved separately to North Vietnam in late 1969, and returned to the U.S. on 22 March 1979.

B-3 Front - Central Highlands

22. The Region 5 EMPS camp for foreign POW's did not hold any foreign U.S. POW's captured in the B-3 Front Central Highlands, which encompassed GVN Dar Lac, Pleiku, Kontum, and Phu Bon Provinces. Although there is no reporting available on the B-3 Front EMPS structure, it was probably organized like the TTHR EMPS and the Region 5 EMPS. Based on fragmentary information from returnees, U.S. POW's, who were captured within this geographical area, were moved to a regional-level camp in Cambodia across from Kontum and Pleiku

Provinces in the tri-border area of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The camp held an unknown number of U.S. POW's. In early November 1969, U.S. Army Special Forces Lieutenant Stephen R. Leopold, USAID agriculturist Michael D. Benge, and other surviving U.S. POW's (number unknown) were marched to North Vietnam. With the exception of Benge, Leopold and others arrived at the above mentioned D-1 Camp ("Farnsworth") on 25 December 1969. All were transferred on 25 November 1970 with all D-1 Camp inmates to the Hanoi "Plantation." Benge was taken directly to a formal prison on the outskirts of Hanoi where he was kept in an isolation cell until November 1971, when he was placed in a cell with two other U.S. POW's. All returned in 1973 Operation Homecoming.

23. U.S. Army Special Forces Lieutenant Stephen R. Leopold was captured on 9 May 1968 when his camp was overrun by PAVN forces in the tri-border area. USAID official Michael D. Benge was captured by PAVN forces on 1 February 1968 in Ban Me Thuot City, Dar Lac Province, and was moved with two other civilian captives who died en route to the regional camp where he met Leopold. While en route to the camp with Benge, Summer Institute of Linguistics missionary Henry F. Blood (captured 1 February 1968) died in July 1968, and Christian Missionary Alliance nurse Betty Ann Olsen (captured 1 February 1968) died in September 1968. Benge finally arrived at a large PAVN complex in Cambodia in October 1968, and was put in a cage-like hut next to Leopold in a stockade area. In early November 1969, Benge and Leopold marched together with other camp survivors to North Vietnam. The group included U.S. Army Sergeants Martin Frank, Nathan Henry, Cordine McMurray, Stanley Newell and Richard Perricone who were captured on 12 July 1967 while on patrol near Pleiku, and Carroll Flora (U.S. Army--rank unknown) who was captured on 21 July 1967 in Pleiku. U.S. Army Special Forces Major Artice W. Elliott (captured 26 April 1970 in Pleiku) arrived separately at the Hanoi "Plantation" in April 1971.

COSVN - Southern Vietnam

24. For the remainder of South Vietnam which was under COSVN jurisdiction, military proselytizing recruitment functions were separated from enemy proselytizing psychological warfare and POW handling functions. Under COSVN, the Enemy Proselytizing Office (Phong Dich Van/EPO) of the PAVN's SVNLA Political Staff Department was the highest central authority

with primary responsibility for the administration, detention, indoctrination, and psychological warfare exploitation of foreign civilian, foreign military, and ARVN prisoners. All captured foreign civilian personnel were categorized as enemy "spies," and were treated as captured foreign military personnel.

25. The EPO administered a central-level detention camp system for U.S. and other foreign POW's, as well as a segregated central-level camp system for ARVN personnel. The EPO had at least one camp which held a small number of U.S. POW's as early as late 1963. The EPO had no responsibilities for the detention of communist personnel, captured Vietnamese civilians, or captured GVN civil officials, which fell under the jurisdiction of COSVN's Security Office camp system.

26. The EPO issued guidance and monitored the implementation of POW guidelines within the PAVN's SVNLA through the Enemy Proselytizing Sections (EPS) of subordinate Military Region, Sub-Region and Provincial Military Command Political Staffs, and through the enemy proselytizing subsections of subordinate combat division and regiment political staffs. Combat division and regiment political staff enemy proselytizing subsections had temporary POW holding facilities. The enemy proselytizing subsections of provincial military command political staffs had at least one POW detention camp for ARVN enlisted and NCO personnel. Capturing units were required to transfer foreign POW's and ARVN officers up through channels to the EPO. Although foreign POW's were to be transferred by the various Military Region EPS to the SVNLA Political Staff's EPO, U.S. and foreign POW's captured in Region 3 were reportedly not transferred to the COSVN-level SVNLA EPO camp system. Region 3 was responsible for the southernmost Mekong Delta area of South Vietnam, which included GVN An Xuyen, Ba Xuyen, Bac Lieu, Chuong Thien, Kien Giang, Phong Dinh, Sa Dec, Vinh Binh, Vinh Long Provinces, and parts of GVN An Giang and Chau Doc Provinces.

27. As of April 1970, the EPO was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ngo Dao Trai (Ngo Dat Tai aliases Le Trai, Muoi Tai) and his deputies, Major Pham Ban (Pham Tran Ban alias Ba Ban), Major Bui Thanh Ngon (alias Ba Ngon), and Major Bui Thiep. Lieutenant Colonel Le Hoa headed the EPO during 1964-1966. The EPO was located in the Bridge 48 area within the COSVN/SVNLA Headquarters complex in the Fishhook area of Kompong Cham Province, Cambodia, across the border from GVN Phu Khuong District, Tay Ninh Province. The EPO was organized into a

command group and five major sections: policy (ban chinh sach), propaganda (ban tuyen truyen), cadre (ban can bo), enemy situation (ban dich tinh), and the in-combat or battlefied proselytizing section (ban dich van trong chien dau). The EPO reception station was located in an area about a one-hour walk southeast in GVN Phu Khuong District, Tay Ninh Province. The EPO Headquarters had the cover number designation J-2 with Letter Box Number 86,300/YK, and about 350 personnel. About 50 personnel were assigned to the EPO Headquarters and about 300 personnel were assigned to its subordinate detention facilities. With few exceptions, all command cadre and officers were professional PAVN officers of ethnic North Vietnamese or southern regroupee origin. Southern regroupee officers were persons born in South Vietnam, who were sent to North Vietnam after 1954, where they were trained and assigned as commissioned PAVN officers, and sent back to South Vietnam by PAVN to fill command and control positions in the PAVN's SVNLA structure.

28. The EPO Policy Section was the most important staff section. The EPO Policy Section was headed by Major Tran Van Luc (Nguyen Tan Luc) alias Nam Luc. Key cadres included Senior Captain Vo Dau alias Ba Dau, Senior Captain Phi Long alias Sau Phi Long, Senior Captain Ngu, Captain Tran Chau, and Senior Lieutenant Thai Thanh Phong alias Quyen. Major Luc was later killed in a B-52 air strike in December 1972, and was replaced as head of the EPO Policy Section by Major Dao Si To. The EPO Policy Section was responsible for supervising the administration of subordinate detention facilities, interrogating and indoctrinating POW's and deserters, recommending POW's for release, arranging POW release ceremonies, maintaining a central registry of POW's and deserters processed through and/or detained by the EPO, and monitoring the implementation of POW guidelines on the treatment and handling of POW's and deserters by all enemy proselytizing field units within its area of jurisdiction. The EPO Policy Section directly supervised three major detention units, which were called Inter-Units A, B, C (Lien Doi A, B, C) before the EPO camp system was reorganized in spring 1970.

29. Detention Inter-Unit A was established around May 1968 in the Cut Spring area about 12 kilometers southeast of Katum in GVN Phu Khuong District, Tay Ninh Province, near the Cambodian border. In October 1969, the Cut Spring area was bombed by B-52's with no casualities suffered by Inter-Unit A. Inter-Unit A was relocated to the Phum Trapang Phlos/Phum Dar

area (vicinity XT 203977) of Kompong Cham Province, Cambodia, across the border of Tay Ninh Province. Inter-Unit A had a 25-man staff headed by Senior Captain Le Hong Bien (Le Binh) alias Hai Bien and his deputy, Captain Le Hue alias Ut Hue. Inter-Unit A supervised four small detention subcamps (Units 1A, 2A, 3A and 4A) and Escort Unit 23A, which are described as follows:

A. Unit 1A was known as Unit A20 (Camp 20/Trai 20/T-20) before April 1968. Unit 1A had a 25-man staff headed by Captain Ba Manh, and was located in the Bo Tuc area of GVN Binh Long Province. It was the only EPO camp in existence before January 1968 for all categories of ARVN, U.S. and Allied personnel. No ARVN prisoners were held in Unit 1A after April 1969. As of early 1970, it held an unknown number of U.S. and foreign POW's.

B. Unit 2A was known as Unit 21 (Camp 21/Trai 21/T-21) before April 1968. Unit 2A had a 25-man staff headed by Senior Lieutenant Huy, and was located in the Katum area of GVN Phu Khuong District, Tay Ninh Province. It was established before Tet (January) 1968 as a detention facility for foreign civilian and military POW's. As of early 1970, it held about seven or eight U.S. POW's. Three U.S. POW's were released in January 1969. U.S. Army James W. Brigham, Thomas N. Jones and Donald G. Smith were released at Ta Xiem in Tay Ninh Province on 1 January 1969.

C. Unit 3A was designated Unit 22 (Camp 22/Trai 22/T-22) before April 1968. Unit 3A had a 25-man staff headed by Senior Lieutenant Tung, and was located in the Katum area of GVN Phu Khuong District, Tay Ninh Province. It was established before Tet 1968 as a detention facility for foreign civilian and military POW's. As of early 1970, it held seven U.S. POW's. One unidentified Caucasian U.S. POW died from malaria in October 1969.

D. Unit 4A was established before Tet 1968 to detain foreign military deserters. Unit 4A had a 10-man staff headed by Lieutenant Quang, and was colocated with the Inter-Unit A Headquarters. As of early 1970, it held only one U.S. Army deserter, who was identified as McKinley Noland. Noland, his Vietnamese-Cambodian wife, and two step children were detained at Unit 4A with relative freedom of movement between at least April 1968 and March 1970.

E. Unit 23A was designated Unit 23 (Camp 23/Trai

23/T-23) before April 1968, and was established before Tet 1968 as a detention camp for ARVN enlished and NCO POW's. Unit 23A had a 25-man staff headed by Senior Lieutenant Vo Van Thang alias Nam Thang, and was also located in the Katum area of GVN Phu Khuong District, Tay Ninh Province. Unit 23A picked up and detained 35 ARVN enlisted POW's in May 1968 who were released in August/September 1968, and picked up one U.S. POW in June 1968 who was turned over to Unit 3A for detention. Unit 23A also picked up 28 ARVN enlisted POW's in December 1968 who were released in February 1969, as well as 12 ARVN enlisted POW's in February 1969, eight of whom were released in March 1969 and four of whom were transferred to Inter-Unit B. In April 1969, Unit 23A was relieved of its detention functions and became a POW escort unit for ARVN prisoners. Between April 1969 and March 1970, Unit 23A picked up and escorted ten ARVN POW's who were detained by EPO Headquarters elements for interrogation before transfer to Inter-Unit B for permanent detention and/or later release.

30. Inter-Unit B was established in May 1968 in the Xom Giua area (vicinity WT 9869) of Svay Rieng Province, Cambodia, opposite GVN Phuoc Ninh District, Tay Ninh Province. Inter Unit B had a 25-man staff headed by Senior Captain Dau, and supervised three subcamps (Units 1B, 2B and 3B) for ARVN officers and enlisted personnel. Units 1B, 2B and 3B had 25-man staffs, and held unknown numbers of ARVN detainees.

31. Inter-Unit C was established in May 1968 in an unknown area. Inter-Unit C had a 25-man staff, and supervised at least three 25-man subcamps for foreign civilian and military POWS.

32. Between March and early April 1970, the above noted EPO camp system was reorganized and consolidated after large numbers of anticipated ARVN and foreign prisoners never materialized. Inter-Unit A was reorganized with U.S. and foreign POW's consolidated into two camps with 25-man staffs directly subordinate to the EPO Policy Office; the Unit 1A Camp (T-20) was kept intact, while other inmates were consolidated into the Unit 2A Camp (T-21) headed by Captain Le Hue alias Ut Hue; the Inter-Unit A Headquarters, along with Units 3A, 4A and 23A were disbanded with personnel reassigned to other but unknown PAVN SVNLA units. Inter-Unit B was disbanded and consolidated into one camp for ARVN prisoners with a 25-man staff directly subordinate to the EPO Policy Office. Inter-Unit C was also disbanded and formed into at least one or possibly two camps for foreign prisoners with 25-man staffs

directly subordinate to the EPO Policy Office. This EPO camp system was moved deeper in Cambodia prior to the May 1970 U.S./ARVN incursion into Cambodia. As of April 1972, the EPO camp which held USAID official Douglas K. Ramsey was located near the large city of Kratie in Kratie Province, Cambodia.

33. EPO Propaganda Section and EPO Enemy Situation Research Section personnel also had direct access to U.S. and foreign POW's held in the EPO Policy Section's detention camp system. Key cadres in the EPO Propaganda Section, who had direct access to U.S. POW's, included Senior Captain Nguyen Van So alias Bay Tuoi, and Captains Duy Hoa alias Ba Hoa, and Dao Si To alias Tam To. Propaganda Section cadres conducted political indoctrination sessions, and proselytized U.S. POW's to write anti-war statements, which were used to develop indoctrination materials, including psychological warfare leaflets. U.S. POW statements were sent to the EPD Headquarters in Hanoi where they were used to assist in the indoctrination of U.S. POW's in North Vietnam \Enemy Situation Research Section indoctrinators were responsible for interrogating U.S. POW's for information on the history, morale, and biographic backgrounds of U.S. division-level units and commanders. Attention was placed on the degree of racism and segregation in U.S. units and on the relationship between enlisted and officer personnel. Special emphasis was placed on identifying the psychological, morale and ideological status of key U.S. unit commanders, and on the effectiveness of their units in combat. The Enemy Situation Section had ten personnel headed by Senior Captain Hai Ca; Senior Lieutenant Nguyen Hung Tri was fluent in English and was used as an English interpreter and interrogator with U.S. POW's.

34. On 12 February 1973, 27 U.S. military and civilian personnel were released from the EPO camp system at Loc Ninh, GVN Binh Long Province, during Operation Homecoming. USAID official Douglas K. Ramsey (captured 17 January 1966) later commented on the deaths of fellow camp inmates U.S. Army Major John R. Schuman (captured 16 June 1965) from pneumonia and U.S. Marine Captain Donald G. Cook (captured 31 December 1964 in Tay Ninh Province) from malaria in fall of 1967. U.S. Army Special Forces Sergeant Issac Camacho was captured on 24 November 1963 with U.S. Army Special Forces Sergeants Claude D. McClure, Kenneth M. Roraback and George E. Smith at the Hiep Hoa Special Forces Camp in GVN Hau Nghia Province. They were held in camps near the Cambodian border of War Zone "C" in Tay Ninh Province with Major John R. Schuman, Captain Donald G. Cook and Army

Sergeants Charles Crafts (captured 29 December 1964) and Harold G. Bennett (captured 29 December 1964). Sergeant Bennett was killed in 1965 by escorting guards after an attempted escape with Captain Cook; Camacho escaped on 9 July 1965; McClure and Smith were released on 28 November 1965; Roraback's execution was announced by Radio Hanoi on 26 September 1965; and Crafts was released on 7 February 1967.

Region 3 - Southern Mekong Delta

35. As noted in paragraph 26 above, U.S. POW's captured in COSVN's Region 3 area were not transferred to the COSVN-level SVNLA Political Staff Department's Enemy Proselytizing Office (EPO) camp system. The Region 3 Party Committee was responsible for the southernmost Mekong River delta area, which included GVN An Giang (minus Cho Moi District), An Xuyen, Ba Xuyen, Bac Lieu, Chuong Thien, Kien Giang, Phong Dinh, Sadec, Vinh Binh, Vinh Long Provinces, and only that portion of Chau Doc Province which was on the west side of the Mekong (Hau Giang) River. The Region 3 Party Committee's Military Affairs Section provided party guidance and direction to its military apparatus, which was more commonly known as Military Region 3 (MR-3). The Region 3 Party Committee and its MR-3 had nine provincial party committees and provincial military commands whose boundaries differed from and overlapped GVN provincial boundaries as follows:

A. Ca Mau Province: GVN An Giang Province; western portion of GVN Bac Lieu Province Gia Rai District; southern portion of GVN Kien Giang Province Hieu Le District; and a western portion of GVN Kien Giang Province Kien An District.

B. Can Tho Province: GVN Phong Dinh Province; GVN An Giang Province Thot Not District; GVN Chuong Thien Province Long My District; portions of GVN Chuong Tien Province Duc Long, Kien Thien and Kien Long Districts; GVN Ba Xuyen Province Ke Sach and Thuan Hoa Districts.

C. Rach Gia Province: GVN Kien Giang Province; GVN Chuong Thien Province Kien Hung and Kien Long Districts; part of GVN GVN Chuong Thien Province Duc Long District; southern part of GVN An Giang Province Hue Duc District; GVN Chau Doc Province Tinh Bien and Tri Ton Districts. Rach Gia Province was reorganized in 1973 with Ha Tien, Kien Luong, Tinh Bien and Tri Ton Districts transferred to the new Long Chau Ha Province.

D. Soc Trang Province: GVN Bac Lieu Province (minus western portion of Gia Rai District); GVN Ba Xuyen Province minus Ke Sach and Thuan Hoa Districts; and parts of GVN Chuong Thien Province Kien Long and Kien Thien Districts. Soc Trang Province was reorganized in November 1973 when Bac Lieu Province was created. Soc Trang Province then included afterwards only GVN Bac Lieu Province Vinh Chau District, GVN Ba Xuyen Province minus Ke Sach and Thuan Hoa Districts, and parts of GVN Chuong Thien Province Kien Long and Kien Thien Districts.

E. Vinh Long Province included the following up to mid-1973: GVN Sa Dec Province; GVN Vinh Long Province Binh Minh, Chau Thanh and Cho Lach Districts; and portions of GVN Vinh Long Province Minh Duc, Tam Binh and Tra On Districts west of the Song Mang Thu River. Vinh Long Province was reorganized in August 1973 with all of GVN Sa Dec Province, and portions of Vinh Long Province Binh Minh and Chau Thanh Districts west of National Route 4 transferred to the newly created Sa Dec Province.

F. Tra Vinh Province included: GVN Vinh Binh Province; GVN Vinh Long Province Vung Liem District; and portions of GVN Vinh Long Province Minh Duc, Tam Binh and Tra On Districts east of the Song Mang Thu River.

G. Sa Dec Province evolved out of Vinh Long Province in August 1973 with all of GVN Sa Dec Province, and portions of Vinh Long Province Binh Minh and Chau Thanh Districts west of National Route 4.

H. Long Chau Ha Province was formed in autumn 1973 out of Rach Gia Province with Ha Tien, Kien Luong, Tinh Bien and Tri Ton Districts.

I. Bac Lieu Province was established in November 1973 out of Soc Trang Province and included: GVN Bac Lieu Province (except Vinh Chau District); GVN Ba Xuyen Province Nga Nam and Thanh Tri Districts; and parts of GVN Chuong Thien Province Kien Thien and Long My Districts.

36. Military proselytizing (recruitment) operations were separated from military psychological warfare propaganda and detention functions in Region 3. The Region 3 Party Committee's Military Proselytizing Section received guidance and direction from the COSVN Military Proselytizing Section, and was responsible only for military proselytizing operations,

providing staff guidance and direction to provincial party committee military proselytizing sections and their subordinate district party committee military proselytizing subsections. The MR-3 Political Staff's Enemy Proselytizing Section (EPS) received guidance and direction from the COSVN SVNLA Political Staff Department's Enemy Proselytizing Office (EPO), and was responsible for military psychological warfare propaganda and detention functions for ARVN and U.S. POW's. The MR-3 EPS, in turn, sat on top of a chain of command over provincial military command political staff enemy proselytizing sections, which had at least one detention camp for captured enemy military personnel. Provincial military command political staff enemy proselytizing sections provided staff guidance and direction to subordinate district unit political staff enemy proselytizing subsections, which also had a detention camp for low-ranking enemy military personnel. Capturing units were required to move foreign prisoners and ARVN officers up the enemy proselytizing chain of command to the MR-3 Political Staff's EPS, which placed these categories of prisoners in segregated detention camps.

37. Based on returnee and escapee accounts, eight U.S. POW's were held in segregated MR-3 EPS camps during the period November 1963-December 1968. These pre-1969 U.S. POW's were the only major grouping of U.S. POW's in the MR-3 area. None were transferred from MR-3 to the COSVN SVNLA EPO.

38. Although no information is available on where Robert White (U.S. Army--rank unknown) was detained, other U.S. POW's captured in MR-3 were grouped together before 1969 in one of two MR-3 EPS camp sites. U.S. Army Special Forces Major James N. Rowe described his experiences with other U.S. POW's in this camp system in his book, "Five Years to Freedom." On 29 October 1963, then U.S. Army Special Forces Lieutenant James N. Rowe, Special Forces Captain Humbert Roque (Rocky) Versace and Special Forces Sergeant Daniel L. Pitzer were captured by the MR-3 306th Main Force Battalion near the Tan Phu Special Forces Camp in Thoi Binh District, about 26 kilometers north of Ca Mau City in GVN An Xuyen Province. Rowe, Versace and Pitzer arrived on 18 November 1963 at their first formal prison camp which was located south of Ca Mau City in a large mangrove swamp near the Song Qua (Cua) Lon River in the Lower U Minh Forest. The camp was commanded by Major Hai, deputy/political officer Mr. Muoi, and English interpreter Mr. Ba. Although

wounded, Captain Versace tried to escape alone on 19 November and was recaptured. The three were later joined by U.S. Army Master Sergeant Edward Johnson (captured 21 July 1964) on 9 September 1964, and another U.S. POW in December 1964, who later died in the next camp site. In late January 1965, the five were moved to a new camp site near the Song Trem Trem River, northwest of Thoi Binh District Town in the Upper U Minh Forest. The new camp site was in the vicinity of a larger MR-3 EPS camp for ARVN personnel. Captain Versace was moved in 1965 to an unknown location. On 26 September 1965, Radio Hanoi announced the execution of Captain Versace and U.S. Army Special Forces Sergeant Kenneth M. Roraback (captured 24 November 1963 at the U.S. Army Special Forces Hiep Hoa Camp in Hau Nghia Province) in retaliation for the GVN "executing three patriots." Sergeant Roraback was held at a COSVN SVNLA Political Staff EPO camp after his capture and prior to his execution. Two more U.S. POW's arrived at Rowe's camp in February 1966; both died in the camp. U.S. Special Forces Sergeant James Jackson (captured 5 July 1966) arrived on 13 August 1966. On 18 October 1967, Sergeants Pitzer, Johnson and Jackson were moved out to be released, leaving only Lieutenant Rowe as the surviving U.S. POW at the Camp. Pitzer, Johnson and Jackson were released on 13 November 1967. On 31 December 1968, the camp area was hit by a U.S. helicopter attack, and Rowe took the opportunity to escape and was rescued on the scene by a U.S. helicopter. No further reporting is available on the MR-3 EPS camp system. Of the eight U.S. POW's held in these two MR-3 EPS camps, three died in the camp, three were released, one was executed, and one escaped.

39. Later, one individual, claiming to be a former prison camp interpreter for eight days in February 1970 and whose reporting reliability could not be established, claimed he saw three U.S. POW's in February 1970 in a prison camp which was located at the junction of the Cai Ngay Canal and Canal No. 5 at WQ 144745 in Tan An Village, Nam Can District, GVN An Xuyen Province, in the Lower U Minh Forest. The three U.S. Army POW's (one captain, one lieutenant, and one sergeant) had been captured at the same time in 1965 or 1966 in the vicinity of Thoi Binh District, An Xuyen Province, by the 303rd Main Force Battalion. At the time of capture, a U.S. Army major was reportedly killed. The lieutenant said he had been an engineer advisor in Saigon before he was assigned to An Xuyen shortly before he was captured. The captain was a wounded ARVN advisor, who had attempted to escape and who was uncooperative during interrogation The 20-man camp staff was headed by Muoi

Hung, deputy commander Muoi Ve, and chief interrogator Ba Sanh. This story appears to have several similarities with the above account given by U.S. Army Lieutenant James N. Rowe, since Rowe, Captain Versace and Sergeant Pitzer with the only three U.S. POW's captured together in the same Tan Phu area mentioned by this source. Rowe also told his captors that he had been an engineer advisor in Saigon before being recently assigned to the Tan Phu Special Forces Camp.

40. In follow-up debriefings, the same source later claimed that MR-3's A-8 POW Detention Camp (designation unconfirmed) had been located on the banks of the Cai Ngai River (WQ 1573) in Dam Doi District, GVN An Xuyen Province, between 1964 and 19 July 1970, when the camp commander received orders to move the camp to the COSVN base camp area. The camp held three U.S. POW's (one captain, one lieutenant and one sergeant) between at least January 1970 and 19 July 1970, who had been capture in Tan Phu and Tan Loc Villages in An Xuyen Province. Source claimed he worked on the camp staff during this period, and did not accompany the camp move with the three U.S. POW's on 20 July 1970. The camp staff also had a 35-man guard platoon, and was commanded by Muoi Hung, deputy commander Muoi Ve, and English interpreter Ba Sanh. Source was unable to make a positive identification from photographs of all U.S. personnel missing or suspected of being captured in GVN An Xuyen Province.

41. At least one other foreign national was captured in Region 3; however, he was handled by the Security Section of Region 3's Ca Mau Province Party Committee. The Ca Mau Province Party Committee Security Section was subordinate to the Region 3 Party Committee Security Section, and had one province-level prison camp and seven District Security Section camps. As of June 1969, the Province Security Section's prison camp was located at VQ 947723 under the command of Tu Quan aliases Luong Hoang Ngoi and Bay Ngoi. In February 1969, a Japanese newspaperman named "Shahashi" (phonetic spelling) was held in the camp after he was captured traveling on the road from Ca Mau City to Dam Doi District. The Japanese was later taken to Cambodia and released about seven months after his capture. Shahashi may be identical with a Japanese national named Sahashi Yoshihiko who was captured on 28 December 1968 and released on 4 June 1969. Although the camp was moved frequently, it always stayed within the area of the Nam Can Forest, which was more commonly referred to as the U Minh Ha or Lower U Minh in mangrove swamps. All other inmates were ethnic

Vietnamese. The Ca Mau Province Security Section reported to the Region 3 Party Committee Security Section which was located in Muoi Te District (VR 9020) in the Upper U Minh Forest.

Post 1973 Operation Homecoming

42. The EPD camp system continued to exist in South Vietnam after Operation Homecoming ended on 1 April 1973. Subordinate EPD commands in South Vietnam continued to be responsible for the detention of ARVN personnel in its established camp system. Following the communist takeover of South Vietnam in April 1975, the EPD commands in South Vietnam shared responsibilities with the Ministry of Public Security (now known as the Ministry of Interior) for the handling of massive numbers of ARVN and civilian GVN officials. COSVN's PAVN SVNLA Headquarters was installed in the former ARVN Joint General Staff (JGS) Headquarters compound in Saigon, where it became the Ministry of National Defense (MND) Forward Command for South Vietnam. The SVNLA Political Staff Department's Enemy Proselytizing Office (EPO) became the MND Forward Command General Political Department's EPD.

43. Senior COSVN SVNLA EPO command officers assumed key positions in the PAVN-administered reeducation camp system for ARVN in the southern portion of Vietnam. EPO Deputy Chief Lieutenant Colonel Bui Thanh Ngon became chief of the MR-9 (former MR-3) Political Staff's Military Reeducation Management Office in Can Tho. EPO Deputy Chief Lieutenant Colonel Bui Thiep became chief of the MR-7 Political Staff's Reeducation Management Office with the rank of colonel, and EPO Deputy Chief Lieutenant Colonel Pham Ban became deputy chief of the MR-7 Political Staff's Reeducation Management Office with Lieutenant Colonel Phan Dinh Thu. Under Colonel Bui Thiep, the MR-7 Reeducation Management Office's Group 500 administeaed and supervised a number of PAVN-run reeducation camps for ARVN in Dong Nai, Song Be and Tay Ninh Provinces.

C06001232

SECRET

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

18 September 1992

OCA 3002-92

Mr. Bob Taylor
Investigator
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Taylor:

Per your previous request, I am forwarding to you an assessment prepared by the Office of Imagery Analysis on surface markings found near Ban Nampo, Laos. We are unable to provide an unclassified version of this assessment, but have included one unclassified line drawing with the classified graphics enclosed.

Please let me know if I may be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

[redacted]
John L. Breckenridge
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

(b)(3)(c)

Enclosures

(b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

ALL PORTIONS CLASSIFIED
SECRET

SECRET

C06001232

OCA 3002-92

SUBJECT: Letter to Bob Taylor, POW/MIA re Ban Nampo



(b)(3)(c)

C06001232

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN WNINTEL~~
Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

10 September 1992

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Analysis of Surface Markings Near Ban Nampo (C)

REFERENCE: Telephone request from Bob Taylor to OCA, Same Subject, August 1992 (C)

1. In response to a request from the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, analysts [redacted] have been searching historical film of several regions in Laos to identify any additional surface markings that could possibly have been manmade. [redacted] from 30 December 1987 showed unusual markings--two resembling an arrow and the letter "P", and another that possibly resembles the letter "O" or "e"--on the ground near Ban Nampo, Laos. The possible arrow measures approximately 33 meters by 31 meters and points at an azimuth of 21 degrees. The possible "P" lies just to the east of the arrow and measures approximately 13 meters in length. The possible "O" or "e" is east of the "P" and measures approximately 10 meters across. We are uncertain as to why these markings were made or how, nor do we know how long the markings may have been present. ~~(S NF WN)~~ (b)(3)(n) (b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

2. The markings are located in a valley along the Houay Xong River on a hillside just west of Route 13 and the hamlet of Ban Nampo at geocoordinates 18-58-49N/102-25-44E, UTM48QTG29280062, in north-central Laos. Ban Nampo is four nautical miles north of Vang Vien, Laos and is not located near any reported POW detention facilities. A search in both directions along the azimuth indicated by the possible arrow failed to turn up any unusual facilities or additional symbols. (S NF WN)

[redacted] ~~(S NF WN)~~ (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

[redacted]

SUBJECT: Analysis of Surface Markings
Near Ban Nampo (C)

4. We exploited the [redacted] to determine the location, orientation, and dimensions of the markings (Attachment 1). [redacted] This process enabled us to more confidently determine that the material used to form the possible arrow was different from that used to form the other markings. Our analysis suggests the following: (b)(3)(n) (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

- The December 1987 [redacted] shows that the field where the markings appear had been recently cleared of forest. Additionally, three areas had been burned probably to dispose of downed trees and vegetation. Further indications of forest clearing were several dark areas that are probably holes from uprooted trees [redacted] (b)(3)(n) (b)(1) (b)(3)(c)

- [redacted] from August 1992 shows that the area had been slightly expanded and parts of it had been recently burned possibly to dispose of additional downed trees and vegetation. In addition, there are several dark areas remaining that are probably holes from uprooted trees filled with water. (b)(3)(n) (b)(1)

- The light color of the markings made them stand out from the background of darker vegetation and burned areas. Differences in the intensity between the possible arrow and the other markings suggest that the materials used to form them were different. In the case of the possible arrow, the markings appear to have more definition and are slightly elevated when compared with the other markings. It is possible that the arrow was formed by downed trees that were bleached by the sun while the material used to form the other markings may have been light colored dry earth or rocks.

- Alternatively, the arrow could have been formed by three separate trails that converge near a central point. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

SUBJECT: Analysis of Surface Markings
Near Ban Nampo (C)

- No other markings or symbols were identified in the immediate Ban Nampo area on [redacted] (~~S NF WN~~)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

[redacted]

(b)(3)(c)

C06001232

SECRET NOFORN

Attachment 1 of 3

(b)(3)(c)

Surface Markings
Ban Nampo, Loas
30 December 1987



METERS

FEET

SECRET NOFORN

C06001232

Surface Markings
Ban Nampo, Laos
30 December 1987
Secret NOFORN WNINTEL
Attachment 2 of 3

Surface Markings
Ban Nampo, Laos
30 December 1987

Attachment 3 of 3



C06001232

C06001232

Surface Markings
Ban Nampo, Loas





C06001233

~~SECRET~~

OCA 3023-92
18 September 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Meeting with Senator Smith (R-NH)
18 September at 1300

1. In response to Senator Smith's letter to the DCI, [redacted] and I took the Senator some of the material he requested, principally the PDB summaries which had already been reviewed by Senator Kerry. [redacted] and I met with the Senator alone; his aide [redacted] was not present.

2. Senator Smith had the following additional requests (or clarifications of requests):

a. Date of PDB item of 18 May 1974: [redacted] Senator Smith speculated that the summary was misdated 1974, that 1973 made more sense, [redacted] He asked us to check the date and get back to him on Monday, 21 September.

b. Senator Smith was unhappy that we did not have the [redacted] traffic associated with three intel reports. He said he needs to understand better the background to the sourcing of these reports: better description of [redacted] better understanding of the circumstances of report acquisition. The report mainly at issue is that quoting [redacted] later termed a fabrication: Smith wants to know how we determined that the report was a fabrication (or misquoting, or whatever).

c. Finally, Senator Smith was interested in how such terms as [redacted] and "POW trump card" came to be used in analytic pieces.

3. The PDB item which caught Smith's attention appears to be based on an NSA intercept of some Pathet Lao directive. The PDB item is correctly dated. [redacted] has called up the NID

[redacted]

ALL PORTIONS CLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Meeting with Senator Smith (R-NH)
18 September at 1300 hours

of that date to trace sourcing. Other material indicates that the only US prisoner known held by the Pathet Lao at that date was a contract civilian pilot who was later released.

/s/
John L. Breckenridge
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

[redacted]

(b)(3)(c)

C06001235

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Congressional Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20505
Telephone: 482-6136

TO: Bob Taylor
Investigator
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs

OCA 3068-92
29 September 1992

Bob,

Attached please find the response to your verbal request of 18 August 1992.

Please let me know if you need anything further.

(b)(3)(c) [redacted]

John L. Breckenridge
Deputy Director for
Senate Affairs

Attachment

FORM 2-86 **1533** OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (40)

(b)(3)(c)

OCA/Senate/JLBreckenridge:jah/[redacted] (29 Sep 92)

[redacted]

(b)(3)(c)

C06001235

~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

SUBJECT: Declassification of an Extract from a 6 January 1981 Directorate of Operations Spot Report, "Developments Concerning Alleged Presence of U.S. Prisoners in Laos"

FROM:	EXTENSION	DATE SENT	~~REQUEST NUMBER~~
C/EA/ICOG (b)(3)(c)	(b)(3)(c)	24SEP92	

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
1. DCEA/SEA		24/9		(b)(3)(c)
2. Chief, EA				
3. C/ORMS/CCA (b)(3)(c)				
4. DC/ORMS				(b)(3)(c)
5. C/ORMS				
6. SA/DDO (b)(3)(c)		28/9		
7. ADDO		9.29		
8. DDO			✓	
9. O/OCA/S (b)(3)(c)				
10.				
11.				
12.				

SUSPENSE DATE:

RETURN TO: Please call for pickup. (b)(3)(c)

FORM 4283 8-87

~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

C06001235

SECRET

23 September 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Breckenridge
Chief, Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: [redacted] (b)(3)(c)
Chief, Indochina Operations Group

SUBJECT: Declassification of an Extract from a 6 January 1981 Directorate of Operations Spot Report, "Developments Concerning Alleged Presence of U.S. Prisoners in Laos"

REFERENCE: 18 August 1992 verbal request by Senate Select Committee Investigator Mr. Robert Taylor

The declassified extract requested by Mr. Taylor is attached, for passage to him. For internal Agency use only is a copy of the entire Spot Report, which remains classified SECRET. Please pass the unclassified sheet only to Mr. Taylor.

[redacted] (b)(3)(c)

Attachments:
Extract
Spot Report

[redacted] (b)(3)(c)

SECRET

C06001235



(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

C06001235

81-001



(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)
(b)(6)

C06001236

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

CRES-552/92
29 September 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: (b)(3)(c) Chief, Collection Requirements and Evaluation Staff/DI

SUBJECT: Declassification of OIA Memos on Surface Markings Near Ban Nampo, Laos (U)

1. Action Requested: Approve declassification of the two attached OIA-produced memos on surface markings near Ban Nampo, Laos. This will respond to a Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs request. The objective is to give the declassified memos to the Vice Chairman of the Committee, Senator Bob Smith, when OIA analysts meet with him on Wednesday, 30 September. (U)

2. Background: We have been working with OIA to provide the Committee with documentation and graphics describing possible evidence that American POW/MIAs made markings on a prison roof in Vietnam and on the ground in Laos. OIA has analyzed this possibility using historical imagery. (~~S~~/~~NF~~)

3. The DDI has already declassified five OIA memos written from 1976-1992 on possible POW/MIA markings. He declassified the documents, on our recommendation, to respond to requests from the Senate Select Committee. As before, we do not recommend (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) declassifying [redacted]
We believe public release of the imagery would therefore raise, not reduce, speculation about the POW/MIAs. (~~S~~/~~NF~~)

(b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Declassification of OIA Memos on Surface Markings Near Ban Nampo, Laos (U)

4. Recommendation: Approve declassification of the two attached OIA memos. (U)



(b)(3)(c)

Attachments
A. Memorandum dtd 17 August on Identification of Unusual Surface Markings
B. Memorandum dtd 10 September on Analysis of Surface Markings Near Ban Nampo

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

SUBJECT: Declassification of OIA Memos on Surface Markings Near Ban Nampo, Laos (U)

APPROVED:

Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence

29 SEP 1992
Date

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Declassification of OIA Memos on Surface Markings Near Ban Nampo, Laos (U)

DI/CRES/IPG [redacted] (29 Sep 92) [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(3)(c)

C06001236

A

C06001236

[redacted] [redacted]

17 August 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]

VIA: [redacted]

FROM: [redacted]

SUBJECT: Identification of Unusual Surface Markings Near Ban Nampo, Laos [redacted]

1. Analysts [redacted] have been searching historical data of several regions in Laos for the last six weeks in response to requests from the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. We have recently identified what appear to be highly unusual markings near the town of Ban Nampo, Laos. These markings resemble an arrow and the letter "P." An examination of Pacific Air Combat Operations Staff pilot escape and evasion code symbols from the late 1960s and early 1970s shows that the P, also known as the "Flying Papa," was used both as a primary and as a backup evasion signal for downed Air Force pilots. In addition, instructors from the Joint Services survival and evasion school have informed us that downed pilots are trained to use arrows to point out their direction of movement or their location. [redacted]

2. The markings are located on a cleared hilltop area just west of the hamlet of Ban Nampo at geocoordinates 18-58-49N/102-25-44E, UTM48QTG29280062, in north-central Laos. Ban Nampo is 4 nautical miles north of Vang Vien, Laos. The possible arrow measures approximately 33 meters by 31 meters and points at an azimuth of 21 degrees. The possible P lies just to the east of the arrow and measures approximately 13 meters in length. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

SUBJECT: Identification of Unusual Surface Markings Near Ban Nampo, Laos [redacted]

[redacted]

3. Ban Nampo is not located near any reported POW detention facilities, and a search in both directions along the azimuth indicated by the arrow failed to turn up any unusual facilities or additional symbols. However, we are continuing our own analysis of the area, and will inform you should we uncover any additional information. [redacted]

4. We alerted Chuck Knapper of DIA [redacted] to enable their immediate followup. Mr. Knapper has passed the information to Warren Gray in DIA's Special Office of POW/MIA Affairs, which has chartered responsibility for following POW issues. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

C06001236

C06001236

[redacted]

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

10 September 1992

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Analysis of Surface Markings Near Ban Nampo (C)

REFERENCE: Telephone request from Bob Taylor to OCA, Same Subject, August 1992 (C)

1. In response to a request from the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, analysts [redacted] have been searching historical data of several regions in Laos to identify any additional surface markings that could possibly have been manmade. [redacted] Data from [redacted] December 1987 showed unusual markings -two resembling an arrow and the letter "P", and another that possibly resembles the letter "O" or "e"--on the ground near Ban Nampo, Laos. The possible arrow measures approximately 33 meters by 31 meters and points at an azimuth of 21 degrees. The possible "P" lies just to the east of the arrow and measures approximately 13 meters in length. The possible "O" or "e" is east of the "P" and measures approximately 10 meters across. We are uncertain as to why these markings were made or how, nor do we know how long the markings may have been present. [redacted]

2. The markings are located in a valley along the Houay Xong River on a hillside just west of Route 13 and the hamlet of Ban Nampo at geocoordinates 18-58-49N/102-25-44E, UTM48QTG29280062, in north-central Laos. Ban Nampo is four nautical miles north of Vang Vien, Laos and is not located near any reported POW detention facilities. A search in both directions along the azimuth indicated by the possible arrow failed to turn up any unusual facilities or additional symbols.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

SUBJECT: Analysis of Surface Markings
Near Ban Nampo [redacted]

4. We exploited the data to determine the location, orientation, and dimensions of the markings (Attachment 1). [redacted] This process enabled us to more confidently determine that the material used to form the possible arrow was different from that used to form the other markings. Our analysis suggests the following:

- The December 1987 data shows that the field where the markings appear had been recently cleared of forest. Additionally, three areas had been burned probably to dispose of downed trees and vegetation. Further indications of forest clearing were several dark areas that are probably holes from uprooted trees [redacted]

- Data from August 1992 shows that the area had been slightly expanded and parts of it had been recently burned possibly to dispose of additional downed trees and vegetation. In addition, there are several dark areas remaining that are probably holes from uprooted trees filled with water.

- The light color of the markings made them stand out from the background of darker vegetation and burned areas. Differences in the intensity between the possible arrow and the other markings suggest that the materials used to form them were different. In the case of the possible arrow, the markings appear to have more definition and are slightly elevated when compared with the other markings. It is possible that the arrow was formed by downed trees that were bleached by the sun while the material used to form the other markings may have been light colored dry earth or rocks.

- Alternatively, the arrow could have been formed by three separate trails that converge near a central point. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

SUBJECT: Analysis of Surface Markings
Near Ban Nampo [redacted]

- No other markings or symbols were identified in the immediate Ban Nampo area [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

C06001236

Surface Markings
Ban Nampo, Loas





C06001239

JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS, Chairman
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, SOUTH DAKOTA
HARRY REID, NEVADA
CHARLES S. ROBB, VIRGINIA
J. ROBERT KERREY, NEBRASKA
HERBERT H. KOHL, WISCONSIN

BOB SMITH, NEW HAMPSHIRE, Vice Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, ARIZONA
HANK BROWN, COLORADO
CHUCK GRASSLEY, IOWA
NANCY LANDON KASSEBAUM, KANSAS
JESSE HELMS, NORTH CAROLINA

FRANCES A. ZWENIG, STAFF DIRECTOR
J. WILLIAM CODINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

September 1, 1992

Mr. Robert Magner
Office of Legislative Affairs
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Magner:

The Senate Select Committee on Prisoner of War and Missing in Action Affairs requests all information your organization possesses concerning a Lao refugee whom DIA identifies as source 2402.

The Committee also requests that your Agency declassify and send to the Committee a large file concerning the sightings in Laos in 1986 by sources 5343 and 5991. This file bears directly on testimony given on 4 and 5 August 1992 before this Committee in open session. Should national security requirements prevent you from declassifying the whole file, we request that you provide an official, unclassified summary of the file for the public record and declassify as many of the documents in the file as possible.

The point of contact on the Staff for these requests is [redacted] who can be reached at [redacted] (b)(6)

Sincerely,

J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel

JWC/kb/jm

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

C06001239

TTS.
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, SOUTH DAKOTA
ARRY REID, NEVADA
CHARLES S. ROBB, VIRGINIA
ROBERT KERREY, NEBRASKA
ERBERT H. KOHL, WISCONSIN
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JESSE HELMS, NORTH CAROLINA

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

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(b)(6)

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Chief Counsel

JWC/kb/jm

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

C06001239

JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS, Chairman
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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

September 1, 1992

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Deputy Director for Senate Affairs
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Sincerely,

J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel

JWC/kb/jm

[redacted]

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Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA FILE: 5-20W

RECEIPT:

OCA 0653-92

29 MAR 1992

Ms. Frances Zwenig
Staff Director
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Ms. Zwenig:

Enclosed are the CIA documents selected by the POW/MIA Committee from the State Department's "Sievert's Collection" that we have reviewed. Of the entire package, source redactions were made on a very small number of documents. Let me know if I may be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

/s/ Stanley M. Moskowitz

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

OCA - COMPT
LOGGED

OCA 0653-92

SUBJECT: Letter to Frances Zwenig re "Sievert's Collection"



C06001246

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	CONTROL #	DATE OF REQUEST
TO: D/OCA	OCA 0653-92	20 Mar 92
FROM: PNCaster via CFTurgeon via DD/OCA		SUSPENSE DATE

SUBJECT: Letter to Frances Zwenig re "Sievert's Collection" (b)(3)(c)

NOTES

Should we be a little clearer in explaining what we mean by "source redactions"? It may not be obvious to the reader.

[redacted]

COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices)

NAME	OFFICE	DATE
See attached router		

ACTION REQUIRED BY D/OCA

For your signature

FORM 2-86 4118 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

C06001246

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

SUBJECT: CIA Documents from the "Sieverts Collection" at the Department of State, Requested by Senate Select Committee for POW/MIA Affairs

FROM:	EXTENSION	DATE SENT	REQUEST NUMBER
James D. Anders, Jr. C/EA/ICOG		18Mar92	DDO 92-0025/067

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
1. Chief, EA				These documents have been reviewed individually by ICOG/EA. Approximately 5-6 have been redacted to remove references that could pinpoint sources or sub sources.
2. C/ORMS/CCA	18/3/92			
3. DC/ORMS				
4. AC/ORMS	19 MAR 1992			
5. SA/DDO				
6. ADDO		3.19		
7. DDO			✓	
8. C/OCA/S				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				

SUSPENSE DATE:

RETURN TO:

LOGGED

FORM 8-87 4283

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

S E C R E T
ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(c)

18 March 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert W. Magner
Chief, Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: James D. Anders, Jr.
Chief, Indochina Operations Group

SUBJECT: CIA Documents from the "Sieverts Collection" at the Department of State, Requested by Senate Select Committee for POW/MIA Affairs

The Senate Select Committee for POW/MIA Affairs recently reviewed 43 boxes of documents at the Department of State, known as the "Sieverts Collection". The Committee indicated it wished to have certain CIA documents it selected from the collection. Attached are the CIA documents selected by the Committee.

James D. Anders,

C06001248

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

SUBJECT: Letter of 17 January 1992 from Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs (b)(3)(c)

FROM:	EXTENSION	DATE SENT	REQUEST NUMBER
James D. Anders, Jr. C/EA/ICOG		7Feb92	DD/O 0025/037-92

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
1. Chief, EA	2/7	2/7		
2. DC/ORMS				
3. A C/ORMS	4 FEB 1992			
4. SA/DDO		2/9		
5. ADDO		2 19		
6. DDO	21 Feb			
7. C/OCA/S				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				

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SUSPENSE DATE:

RETURN TO:

OCA - CMPT 4 LOGGED

FORM 8-87 4283

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

HARRY REID, NEVADA
CHARLES S. ROBB, VIRGINIA
HANK BROWN, COLORADO
CHUCK GRASSLEY, IOWA
JESSE HELMS, NORTH CAROLINA
FRANCES A. ZWENIG, STAFF DIRECTOR
ALAN C. PYAL, DEPUTY STAFF DIRECTOR
J. WILLIAM COCHRAN, GENERAL COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

January 17, 1992

Mr. Stanley Moskowitz, Director
Congressional Relations
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Moskowitz:

We are writing to request your assistance in setting up a briefing, which can be accomplished in stages, and providing documentation in support of the briefing, on the following items. As we said, this can be done in stages as worked out between Committee Investigators and your office.

I. A. Organization of the Vietnamese Government
B. All known on- or off-the-record statements by Vietnamese Government officials indicating U.S. POW's remained in Vietnam after March 29, 1973.
C. Organization of the "Communist" Party of Vietnam, including Party units responsible for prisoners.
D. Detailed Organization of the Ministry of Interior and other agencies responsible for POW's, including Command, Control, and Communications Structure.

II. A. Structure of the Prison and Camp System, including
1. list of camp heads
2. recruitment thereof,
3. training,
4. ethnic features
5. rotation policy
6. schedules
7. the typical day
8. rations and other support
9. map depicting all camps where post-29 March 1973 reporting indicated Americans might be held captive;
10. Photography/imagery of those camps
11. foreign involvement
12. inspections and other outside visitations/involvement
13. changes in any of the above over time
14. differential treatment according to nationality of prisoner.

III. A. Patterns and linkages, including
1. food,

2. physical and/or other organization links to Laos, China, USSR, other foreign countries.
3. prisoner or prison personnel movement patterns,
4. supply patterns

IV. All documents concerning decisions of party and government in relation to POW's, and/or evidence of policy changes over time.

V. Examination of policy toward and treatment of prisoners during the Post - War period.

VI. Review of all captured or surreptitiously acquired documents in the possession of the CIA which relate to any of the following categories:

U.S., American, foreign (farang), white, caucasian, negro, black or unidentified prisoners of war, missing in action, prisoners, air pirates, war criminals, capital offenders, or detainees, named or unnamed, alleged to be alive in Vietnam after 29 March 1973 in any situation suggesting confinement, detention, or restraint in any of the following locations:

Cao Bang Province
Ha Tuyen Province
Hoang Lien Province
Lai Chu Province
Lang Son Province
Son La Province
Vinh Phu Province
Bac Thai Province
Hanoi Province
Ha Bac Province
Quang Ninh Province
Ha Son Binh Province
Hai Hung Province
Hai Phong Province
Ha Nam Ninh Province
Thai Binh Province
Thanh Hoa Province
Nghe Tinh Province
Quang Binh Province
Quang Tri Province
Thua Thien Hue Province
Quang Nam Danang Province
Quang Ngai Province
Gia Long Kontum Province
Binh Dinh Province
Phu Yen Province
Dac Lac Province
Khanh Hoa Province
Song Be Province
Lam Dong Province

Thuan Hai Province
Tay Ninh Province
Dong Nai Province
Dac Khu-Vung Tai-Con Dao Province
Ho Chi Minh Province
Long An Province
Tieng Gang Province
Dong Thap Province
Ben Tre Province
Ang Giang Province
Cuu Long Province
Hau Giang Province
Kien Giang Province
Minh Hai Province
Binh Tri Thien Province
Nghia Binh Province
Phu Kanh Province

If the information is not available by province, map grid coordinates should be provided (Southeast Asia Briefing Map - Graphic); grid coordinates applicable to this request fall within grid squares TJ, TK, TL, UR, US, UG, UH, UJ, UK, UL, VQ, VR, VS, VF, VG, VH, VJ, VK, VL, VA, WQ, WR, WS, WT, WE, WF, WG, WH, WJ, WK, WL, WA, XQ, XR, XS, XT, XU, XD, XE, XF, XG, XH, XJ, XK, XL, XA, YS, YT, YU, YV, YA, YB, YC, YD, YH, YJ, YK, XV, ZS, ZT, ZU, ZA, ZB, ZC, ZD, ZJ, AM, AN, AP, AQ, AR, AS, AT, AU, BN, BP, BQ, BR, BS, BT, CN, CP, CQ, CR, CS, CT.

The Select Committee Investigative staff will work with your office to establish a time table for the briefing(s) requested herein and for the delivery of appropriate documents. We would like to underline the urgency of our request, and urge your cooperation as we work to resolve this issue.

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Bob Smith
Vice Chairman

John F. Kerry
Chairman

C06001250

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(b)(3)(c)

	CONTROL #	DATE OF REQUEST
TO: D/OCA	OCA 0039-92/3	26 Jan 92
FROM: DD/SA via DD/OCA		SUSPENSE DATE

SUBJECT: Letter to Senators Kerry/Smith re POW/MIA Issues

NOTES

COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices)		
NAME see attached router	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE

ACTION REQUIRED BY **D/OCA**

For your signature Signed

FORM 2-86 **4118** OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

C06001250

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

SUBJECT: Letter of 17 January 1992 from Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs

FROM:	EXTENSION	DATE SENT	REQUEST NUMBER
James D. Anders, Jr. C/EA/ICOG		6Mar92	DD/O 0025/056-92

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
1. Chief, EA				
2. OIA				
3. C/ORMS	6 March 92			
4. ~~DC/ORMS~~				
5. C/ORMS	9 MAR 1992			
6. SA/DDO		3-9		
7. ADDO		3/10		
8. DDO				
9. C/OCA/S	11 Mar			
10.				
11.				
12.				

SUSPENSE DATE:

LOGGED

RETURN TO:

FORM 8-87 4283

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

5 March 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert W. Magner
Chief, Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: James D. Anders, Jr.
Chief, Indochina Operations Group

SUBJECT: Imagery of Possible Detention Facilities in Laos

REFERENCE: Letter of 17 January 1992 from Senators Kerry and Smith of the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs to the DCI

1. This is in reply to the letter of 17 January 1992 which requested imagery or photography of prison camps or detention facilities. CIA's Office of Imagery Analysis has been able to locate dated imagery of several suspected detention facilities in Laos which are available for review at CIA Headquarters by appropriately cleared and designated Committee personnel. OIA has advised us that it has no file prints of any post-29 March 1973 suspect detention facilities in Vietnam or Cambodia, and no knowledge of the existence of any office-produced POW/MIA imagery files other than those relating to the aforementioned suspect detention facilities in Laos.

2. We have also requested the National Photographic Interpretation Center review their archives for material on this subject and will advise the Committee of the results of this search as soon as possible.

[redacted]

James D. Anders,

[redacted]

C06001251

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TO: D/OCA	CONTROL #: OCA 0039-92/7	(b)(3) REQUEST
FROM: DD/SA via DD/OCA		SUSPENSE DATE:

SUBJECT: Letter to Senator Kerry re POW/MIA issues (FBIS Reporting)

NOTES

COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices)

NAME	OFFICE	DATE
See attached router		

ACTION REQUIRED BY D/OCA

For your signature

FORM 2-86 4118 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

C06001251

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 0039-92/7

23 MAR 1992

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your letter dated January 17, 1992 which requested information concerning decisions of the Vietnamese government and party in relations to POWs, and/or evidence of policy changes over time. The enclosed material from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) addresses some of these issues. We have also included as part of this package some additional material on the POW issue which the Committee may find useful for background.

TAB A: Analysis on the POW/MIA issue prepared by FBIS based only on selected Foreign Public Media September 7, 1972 - January 23, 1992

TAB B: Foreign Media Report on the return of US MIA remains by SRV 74 - November 1991

TAB C: Foreign Media Reports on live sightings and the whereabouts of remains as monitored by FBIS May 3, 1977 - June 13, 1990

TAB D: Official SRV Statements on the POW/MIA issue as monitored by FBIS June 30, 1990 - January 30, 1992

TAB E: Official SRV Statements on POW/MIA issue as monitored by FBIS January 28, 1974 - September 18, 1989

OCA-COMPT LOGGED SC

The Honorable John F. Kerry

TAB F: Selected Vietnamese media commentaries on POW/MIA issues as monitored by FBIS January 28, 1974 - January 21, 1992

TAB G: Foreign Media Reports on meetings between Vietnamese and US delegations on the POW/MIA issue as monitored by FBIS October 4, 1974 - February 1, 1992

All of this material is unclassified and will also be provided to the Department of Defense Central Documentation Office for inclusion in the repository for declassified information on POW/MIAs at the Library of Congress.

Sincerely,

/s/ Stanley M. Moskowitz

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

C06001251

OCA 0039-92/7

SUBJECT: Letter to Senator Kerry re POW/MIA issues (incoming ltr dated 17 Jan)



C06001252

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

(b)(3)(c)

SUBJECT:
Letter of 17 January 1992 from Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs

FROM:	EXTENSION	DATE SENT	REQUEST NUMBER
James D. Anders, Jr. C/EA/ICOG		5Mar92	DD/O 92-00251/63

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
1. Chief, EA	3-6	3-6		
2. C/ORMS		3/9/92		
3. DC/ORMS				
4. Chief, ORMS	13 MAR 1992			
5. SA/DDO		3-16		
6. ADDO				
7. DDO				
8. C/OCA/S				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				

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SUSPENSE DATE:

RETURN TO:

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FORM 8-87 4283

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

6 March 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert W. Magner
Chief, Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: James D. Anders, Jr.
Chief, Indochina Operations Group

SUBJECT: Decisions of the Vietnamese Government and Party in Relation to POW's

REFERENCE: Letter of 17 January 1992 from Senators Kerry and Smith of the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs to the DCI

1. This is in reply to the letter of 17 January 1992 which requested information concerning decisions of the Vietnamese government and party in relations to POW's, and/or evidence of policy changes over time. The following material from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) addresses some of these issues. We have also included as part of this package some additional material on the POW issue which the Committee may find useful for background.

TAB A: Analysis on the POW/MIA Issue Prepared by FBIS Based Only on Selected Foreign Public Media 7 Sep. 72 - 23 Jan. 92

TAB B: Foreign Media Reports on the Return of U.S. MIA Remains by SRV, 74 - Nov. 91

TAB C: Foreign Media Reports on Live Sightings and the Whereabouts of remains as Monitored by FBIS 3 May 77 - 13 June 90

TAB D: Official SRV Statements on the POW/MIA Issue as Monitored by FBIS, 30 June 90 - 30 Jan. 92

TAB E: Official SRV Statements on POW/MIA Issue as Monitored by FBIS, 28 Jan. 74 - 18 Sep. 89

SUBJECT: Decisions of the Vietnamese Government and Party in Relation to POW's

TAB F: Selected Vietnamese Media Commentaries on ~~POW/MIA Issue as Monitored by FBIS~~
28 Jan. 74 - 21 Jan. 92

TAB G: Foreign Media Reports on Meetings between Vietnamese and U.S. Delegations on the POW/MIA Issue as Monitored by FBIS
4 Oct. 74 - 1 Feb. 92

2. All of this material is unclassified and will also be provided to the Department of Defense Central Documentation Office for inclusion in the repository for declassified information on POW-MIA's at the Library of Congress.



James D. Anders, Jr.

C06001254

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

DDI 0025-1037-92

(b)(3)(c)

7 February 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert W. Magner
Chief, Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: James D. Anders, Jr.
Chief, Indochina Operations Group

SUBJECT: Request for Information on Vietnamese Government Decisions in Relations to POW's

REFERENCE: Letter of 17 January 1992 from Senators Kerry and Smith of the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs to the DCI

1. This is in reply to Part IV of the 17 January 1992 letter requesting information on decisions of the Vietnamese Communist Party and Government in relation to POW's. We are prepared to provide a briefing on this subject to appropriately cleared and designated Committee personnel.

2. We are providing the four attached documents which we hope will be useful for the committee. The first (TAB A), is a February 1992 Directorate of Intelligence (DDI) assessment entitled "Vietnam: Adjusting Its Strategy on the POW/MIA Issue". The second (TAB B), is a September 1987 DDI Special National Intelligence Estimate entitled "Hanoi and the POW/MIA Issue". The third (TAB C), is a June 1984 DDI memorandum entitled "Vietnam: Using the MIA Issue as a Bargaining Chip". The forth document (TAB D), is a 1989 DDI assessment entitled Perestroyka, Lao Style: Implications for Vietnam and the United States" which makes some reference to Laos and the POW/MIA issue.

James D. Anders, Jr.

C06001324

JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS, Chairman
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, SOUTH DAKOTA
HARRY REID, NEVADA
CHARLES S. ROBB, VIRGINIA
J. ROBERT KERREY, NEBRASKA
HERBERT H. KOHL, WISCONSIN

BOB SMITH, NEW HAMPSHIRE, Vice Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, ARIZONA
HANK BROWN, COLORADO
CHUCK GRASSLEY, IOWA
NANCY LANDON KASSEBAUM, KANSAS
JESSE HELMS, NORTH CAROLINA

FRANCES A. ZWENIG, STAFF DIRECTOR
DINO CARLUCCIO, DEPUTY STAFF DIRECTOR
J. WILLIAM CODINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

OCA-0843-92

June 10, 1992

Mr. Stanley Moskowitz
Director
Congressional Relations
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

Dear Mr. Moskowitz:

~~(S)~~ It has come to the attention of this Committee, that the Central Intelligence Agency may have, as a matter of policy or in the interest of protecting sensitive sources, reported certain intelligence information to policy makers and other intelligence consumers as "collateral" information, when in fact it may have been collected by technical means.

~~(S)~~ In particular, we are interested in COMINT information pertaining to U.S. POWs in Southeast Asia, that CIA may have obtained directly [redacted] which were reported by CIA to be from collateral, i.e. HUMINT, sources.

~~(S)~~ It is, therefore, requested that CIA identify all such reports and their original source, and provide this Committee with all supporting documentation related to each individual case. We request this information be provided by 22 June, 1992. The Committee point-of-contact for this request is Mr. Robert P. Taylor, 202-224-2317.

Sincerely,

(b)(6) [redacted]

J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel

JWC/kb/bt

U.S. SENATE DO NOT REMOVE SENATE SECURITY
ERMS40600049730

DOCUMENT CONTROL NUMBER: JSC-S-4552
Mr. Document Collection
PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

C06001324

OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS ROUTING SLIP	ACTION	INFO
D/OCA		✓
DD/OCA		✓
SPECIAL ASSISTANT		
DD/LEGISLATION		
DD/SENATE	X	
DD/HOUSE		
DD/CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT		
DD/INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ISSUES		
CONSTITUENT INQUIRIES OFFICER		
FOIA/PA OFFICER		
SECURITY OFFICER		
OCA/COMPT/ISC		✓
SUSPENSE 19 JUNE DATE ACTION OFFICER: BOB MAGNER		
REMARKS: (NO)		
CONTROL NUMBER: OCA-0843/92		
FILE: OCA 0843-92 11		

FORM 4422
Nov 91

C06001358

SECRET

Central Intelligence Agency

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2288-92
22 June 1992

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to the request by your Committee for specific CIA reports on POW/MIA issues held by the National Security Council. We have assembled those reports which can be viewed at CIA Headquarters by cleared and designated Committee personnel per previously established procedures. The sources of these reports in question are active DO assets and inadvertent disclosure of their contents could damage our collection capabilities or adversely impact on other equities.

Please let me know if I can be of further assistance. An original of this letter is also being sent to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

ALL PORTIONS CLASSIFIED SECRET

SECRET

SECRET (b)(3)(c)

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO THE Central Intelligence Agency EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2288-92/1

22 June 1992

The Honorable Bob Smith
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

This is in response to the request by your Committee for specific CIA reports on POW/MIA issues held by the National Security Council. We have assembled those reports which can be viewed at CIA Headquarters by cleared and designated Committee personnel per previously established procedures. The sources of these reports in question are active DO assets and inadvertent disclosure of their contents could damage our collection capabilities or adversely impact on other equities.

Please let me know if I can be of further assistance. An original of this letter is also being sent to Chairman Kerry.

Sincerely,

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

ALL PORTIONS CLASSIFIED SECRET

SECRET

C06001358

OCA 2288-92

SUBJECT: Letter to Kerry/Smith, POW/MIA re NSC Documents

OCA/Senate/PNCaster:jah [redacted] (15 Jun 92)

Distribut[redacted]
Origina[redacted]

C06001360

~~SECRET~~

OCA 2318-92
17 June 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Intelligence Reports on the Activities of the Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs

1. By prior arrangement on the morning of 17 June I met with Senator John Kerry, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs, to show him two [redacted] bearing on his Committee's April trip to Indochina. I explained that [redacted] we had sought this opportunity to make him aware of them. Kerry read both reports carefully, commenting that they did not provide a totally accurate picture although he understood that the reports [redacted] He took particular note of the reference in one of the reports to the fact that the Vietnamese "had had something to hide" in the immediate post-war period and asked if there was any way to follow up on that. I said we could certainly look into that but could not promise any results. He asked if the reports could be retained by the Committee, and I explained that given their sensitive nature they could not and he did not press. The Senator seemed appreciative of the effort we made and indeed the general effort the Agency has made in supporting his Committee. I told him that we have also requested a meeting with Vice Chairman Smith but had not arranged that session as yet.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

[redacted]
Robert W. Magner
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

[redacted] (b)(3)(c)

~~ALL PORTIONS CLASSIFIED~~
~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

SECRET

C06001361

SECRET

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 0833-92/1

17 June 1992

Mr. J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Bill,

In response to your letter of June 3, 1992, please find an analysis of the "USA" photograph prepared by the Agency's Office of Imagery Analysis. I trust this will be helpful as you continue to study this particular issue.

Please feel free to contact me should you require any additional information.

Sincerely,

Robert W. Magner
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

Enclosure

(b)(3)(c)

Downgrade to UNCLASSIFIED When Separated From Enclosure

SECRET

OCA 0833-92/1

SUBJECT: Response to 3 June Letter from POW/MIA Affairs re Photograph dated 22 January 1988



(b)(3)(c)

C06001361

SECRET
NOFORN WNINTEL
Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

16 June 1992

(b)(3)(n)
(b)(1)

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Analysis of Surface Markings at Sam Neua, Laos (C)

REFERENCE: Letter to D/OCA, Same Subject, dtd June 3, 1992

1. [redacted] several unusual markings--the letters "USA" and what resembled a US Air Force escape and evasion symbol known as a "Walking Kilo"--on the ground west of Sam Neua, Laos. We are uncertain as to who may have made those markings, but recently completed analysis gives us a better understanding of how the markings were made, how long the markings may have been present, and what activity may have been going on concurrently in the surrounding region. (S NF WN)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

2. [redacted]

- The USA letters were newer by an undetermined period of time (but not more than a few months) than the possible Walking Kilo. [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(3)(c)

NOFORN WNINTEL
SECRET

SUBJECT: Analysis of Surface Markings at Sam Neua, Laos (C)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

- The USA markings were manmade. Because of the apparent age and decay of the possible Walking Kilo, it could not be determined if it was manmade, although that possibility cannot be ruled out.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

- No other markings or symbols were identified in the Sam Neua area

- The markings appear to have been created by forming slight depressions in the ground--either stamped, or more likely dug--that were then filled with water. The light tone surrounding the letters may indicate recently-dug soil, and the narrow portions of the "S" may indicate that the water was drying up. The markings do not appear to be formed from manmade material or from vegetation.

- Since the markings were constructed in a rice paddy, it is likely that the USA was formed after the harvest season, which ends in December, and would have been obliterated by the beginning of the rainy seasons in May, when rice shoots are transplanted into the flooded paddies. (S NF WN)

3. In related analysis, our study indicates that the markings may have been visible from a portion of Route 6 just to the northeast. The letters were positioned so that an individual traveling along Route 6 from northeast to southwest could have seen them. In addition, the markings would have been clearly visible to an aircraft or helicopter taking off from the airfield at Sam Neua, which is 3.2 km to the west northwest, if that aircraft took off from east to west into the prevailing winds and flew in the direction of Vientiane or Xiangkhoang. (S NF WN)

4. Finally, we studied other available information to assess contemporaneous related activity in Hua Phan Province in general and the Sam Neua area in particular and reached the following conclusions:

SUBJECT: Analysis of Surface Markings at Sam Neua, Laos (C)

- There was a substantial amount of [redacted] reporting on sightings of American POWs in the region during this time, much of it probably prompted by DIA's effort to follow up on the discovery of the Sam Neua markings. (b)(3)(n) (b)(1) However, in no case did further analysis or source vetting confirm any of this reporting.

- Reporting [redacted] indicated that there was in 1988, and continues to be to this day, a certain amount of insurgency activity--best described as low-level and hit-and-run--in the vicinity of Sam Neua. This in turn prompted some counterinsurgency operations by Lao government forces, and may account for some reports of unusual activity.

- It is very likely that a small number of Soviet personnel (mainly pilots) occasionally visited Sam Neua as late as 1988. A limited number of other Westerners similarly traveled to the town, sometimes up Route 6 past the site of the Sam Neua markings.

- Finally, an historical precedent exists for suggesting the presence of American POWs in the Sam Neua area. Photographs taken by a reconnaissance aircraft on 11 October 1969, [redacted] shows what may be as many as 20 non-Asians accompanied by Pathet Lao guards near caves at Ban Nakay Teu (UTM VH197561), 20 km east of the Sam Neua markings. Sam Neua at that time was a major Pathet Lao stronghold. (S ~~NF~~)

(b)(3)(n)
(b)(1)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

[redacted]

C06001361

SECRET NOFORN

Attachment (3)

Markings in Rice Paddy
Near Sam Neua, Laos



SECRET NOFORN

(b)(1)
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

(b)(1)
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

C06001361

OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS
ROUTING SLIP

	ACTION	INFO
D/OCA		X
DD/OCA		X
SPECIAL ASSISTANT		
DD/LEGISLATION		X
DD/SENATE	X	
DD/HOUSE		X
DD/CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT		X
DD/INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ISSUES		X
CONSTITUENT INQUIRIES OFFICER		
FOIA/PA OFFICER		
SECURITY OFFICER		
OCA/COMPT/ISC		X

SUSPENSE 22 June '92
DATE

ACTION OFFICER: Bob M.

REMARKS: (PW 6-8-92)

CONTROL NUMBER: OCA 0833-92

FILE: OCA 0833-92 11

FORM 3422
N (v-9)

C06001361

JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS, Chairman
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United States Senate

FRANCES A. ZWENIG, STAFF DIRECTOR
DINO CARLUCCIO, DEPUTY STAFF DIRECTOR
J. WILLIAM CODINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

June 3, 1992

Mr. Stanley Moskowitz, Director
Congressional Relations
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Moskowitz:

Your agency provided this Committee a copy of a photograph, referred to as the "USA" photograph, pertaining to a site in Southeast Asia, dated 22 January 1988. The Committee intends to achieve a complete understanding of all the circumstances surrounding this occurrence, as well as evaluate the steps taken by the Defense Intelligence Agency to fully investigate the case.

Accordingly, the Committee is requesting that the Central Intelligence Agency perform an independent technical evaluation of the photograph. Precisely, we ask that CIA/OIA determine, from whatever photography available, the probable means of construction of the symbols; whether the symbols appear to have been made at the same time or in stages; the probable identity of the symbols (letters or numbers); possible meaning of the symbols (i.e. military evader symbols); and contemporaneous activity in the immediate area.

Again, we ask that this be an independent CIA assessment, without consultation with DIA. If this assessment can be made available to the Committee by 19 June, it would be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel

JWC/kb/bt

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C06001362

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DATE: 5SPOW

Central Intelligence Agency

(b)(3)(c)

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2290-92
15 June 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Frances Zwenig
Staff Director
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate

FROM: Robert W. Magner
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

SUBJECT: Information on Organization of the Vietnamese Government and Communist Party

1. Attached are three unclassified reference aids prepared by the CIA Directorate of Intelligence's Office of Leadership Analysis (LDA) dealing with the organization of the Vietnamese Government and the Communist Party of Vietnam which the Committee may find useful in understanding the organization of these entities:

-- Government Structure of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: The Machinery of State (April 1990);
-- Communist Party of Vietnam (May 1987);
-- Director of Officials of Vietnam (February 1992).

2. Additional copies are available should they be desired.

[redacted]
Robert W. Magner

Attachments

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

C06001362

OCA 2290-92

SUBJECT: Memorandum to Zwenig, POW/MIA re Information on Organization of Vietnamese Government and Communist Party

OCA/Senate/RWMagner:jah [ ] (15 Jun 92)

C06001362

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

SUBJECT: Request for Information on Organization of the Vietnamese Government and Communist Party

FROM:	EXTENSION	DATE SENT	REQUEST NUMBER
James D. Anders, Jr. C/EA/ICOG		3June92	

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
1. Chief, EA				
2. C/ORMS				
3. DC/ORMS	10 JUN 1992			
4. DC/ORMS		10 JUN 1992		
5. O/OCA/S				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				

SUSPENSE DATE:

RETURN TO:

FORM 10-84 4283

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

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(b)(3)(c)

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2282-92

11 June 1992

Mr. J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Codinha:

In response to your letter of June 8, 1992, we have searched Agency records for data on Mr. Deen Iadtrong and found no information. If it were possible to identify the position cited in the letter with greater precision, we could possible search further.

Sincerely,

Robert W. Ma[illegible]r
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

ALL PORTIONS CLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

OCA 2282-92

SUBJECT: Response to POW/MIA Committee re Deen Iadtrong



C06001364

OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS ROUTING SLIP	ACTION	INFO
D/OCA		X
DD/OCA		X
SPECIAL ASSISTANT		
DD/LEGISLATION		
DD/SENATE		X
DD/HOUSE		
DD/CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT		
DD/INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ISSUES		
CONSTITUENT INQUIRIES OFFICER		
FOIA/PA OFFICER		
SECURITY OFFICER		
OCA/COMPT/ISC		X

SUSPENSE N/A
DATE

ACTION OFFICER: No Action Req'd

REMARKS: RB

CONTROL NUMBER: ER 3285-92

FILE:

FORM 4422
Nov-91

LOGGED

C06001365

ER 92-3285 16 JUN 1992

(b)(6)

JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS, Chairman
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J. WILLIAM CODINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

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June 8, 1992

Mr. Robert Gates
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Gates:

I am writing to request your assistance in obtaining any information the Central Intelligence Agency may have on a Laotian individual reported to us as having information about Americans held captive in Laos.

His name is Deen Iadtrong, reportedly a Laotian "director". Biographical information, especially a description of his official status and duties, would be most useful. If this is in classified form, it can be delivered to Senate Security at S-407.

We would like to have this information by June 15, 1992. Thank you for your continued assistance.

Sincerely,

J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel

JWC/kb/jdh

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C06001368

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~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA FILE: 5580W
RECEIPT #: 'S'

(b)(3)(c)

11 June 1992
OCA 2258-92

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to the Committee's letter of April 3, 1992 requesting more detailed responses to some aspects of its January 17, 1992 letter, the enclosed report on the Lao People's Democratic Republic's Ministry of Interior has been prepared. I trust this will be of particular value to the Committee in its work.

We will also be forwarding separately additional materials pertinent to the April 3, 1992 request.

This letter is also being sent to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

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ISC

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C06001368

~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

11 June 1992
OCA 2258-92/1

The Honorable Bob Smith
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

In response to the Committee's letter of April 3, 1992 requesting more detailed responses to some aspects of its January 17, 1992 letter, the enclosed report on the Lao People's Democratic Republic's Ministry of Interior has been prepared. I trust this will be of particular value to the Committee in its work.

We will also be forwarding separately additional materials pertinent to the April 3, 1992 request.

This letter is also being sent to Chairman Kerry.

Sincerely,

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

ALL PORTIONS CLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

OCA 2258-92

SUBJECT: Letter to Kerry/Smith, POW/MIA Cmte
(incoming ltr dated 3 Apr 92)

OCA/Senate/RWMagner:jah/ (8 Jun 92)

OCA 2258-92/1

C06001368

30 April 1992

Lao People's Democratic Republic
Ministry of Interior

1. The Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) Ministry of Interior (MOI) headquarters compound is located on Nong Bon Street, Vientiane City, about 500 meters from the US Embassy. A 12-man guard force guards the compound and access to the Ministry itself is tightly restricted. The Minister and Vice Ministers of the LPDR MOI are Asang Laoly, Lieutenant General (two-star) Khamphon Boutdakham and Bounma Mithong, respectively.

2. The Ministerial Secretariat was headed as of July 1990 by Colonel Bounpheng Vongmachanh; Somboun Vongphachanh headed it from 1975-1977 when it was known as the General Affairs Department. As of 1986, the Secretariat employed about 200 personnel. The Secretariat has an unknown number of subordinate offices and departments. The Communications Department was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Thongsay or Major Khamsai, had 80 communicators and technicians as of 1981 who had been trained by the SRV MOI, and operated its own "police signals school" according to the overt press. The Records Department was headed by Souvanakhamphong Vanthanouvong (1975-1981), and had about 100 personnel as of 1981.

3. The General Department for the Development of Forces was headed by Colonel Soutchai Thammasit. As of 1986, it had about 600 personnel. Personnel were assigned to one of at least six departments: cadre organization, party development, inspectorate, propaganda-training, political affairs, or training.

A. The Cadre Organization (Personnel) Department drafted and supervised the establishment of reorganization plans and table of organization strength levels for the ministerial secretariat, general departments, departments, offices, and training schools, as well as for the Vientiane City Public Security Office and for all provincial public security offices. As the personnel management staff of the MOI, it assigned, reassigned, or transferred personnel to meet current organizational strength levels and requirements. The department was also involved in recommending training programs for cadres before their assignments to components within the ministry. Colonel Sout Chi was cited in the overt Vientiane press in August 1981 as Chief, Cadre Organization Department.

B. The Party Development Department was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Bouangeun.

C. The Propaganda and Training Department was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Khamla Keophithoun.

D. The Inspectorate was headed by Major Khampha.

E. The Political Department, headed by Major Somsai, administered a political indoctrination school at Huai Saimoun, Phon Hong District (TF 2746), Vientiane Province.

F. The Training Department, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Kongoi and Captain Sengmani, operated the Don Tiou Police Officers School (TE 5398); the Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) Police School at Nam Yoi (vicinity TE 4193); and two Cultural Schools for ministry personnel and their dependents at the Nam Ngum Reservoir (TF 4150).

4. The General Department for People's Police (GDPP) was headed by General Saisompheng Sengsoulignavong (1981-1990) and his deputies, Lieutenant Colonels Phosai Saipanya (1981-1987), Onsa Vilavong, Sali Phailot, Souban Keophila, and Champa. As of late 1987, Lieutenant Colonel Phosai Saipanya was also in charge of the That Dam Interrogation Center in Vientiane. As of 1986, the GDPP had about 2,200 personnel. Personnel were assigned to one of at least nine subordinate departments: general staff research, administrative management police, criminal police, traffic police, firefighting police, prisons police management (rehabilitation), economic police, security guards police, or police investigations-interrogation. As of 1981, the GDPP had three East German advisory technicians.

A. The Administrative Management Police Department, also known as the People's Police Department and as the Population Census Police Department, was headed in 1984 by Lieutenant Colonel Sali Phailot. As of 1981, the department was staffed by 20 personnel who handled the MOI's countrywide family registration and identification card system, and managed the LPDR census program.

B. The Criminal Police Department was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Soubane. The department was responsible for preparing criminal cases for prosecution. It had 60 personnel trained by SRV MOI specialist personnel.

C. The Prisons Management (Rehabilitation) Department was headed by Colonel Bounthiem (1981) or Lieutenant Colonel Souban Keophila. It administered all central-level prisons, including the Sam Khe Prison in Vientiane Province, and the reeducation "seminar" camp system for former Royal Lao Government detainees. It sat on top of a chain of command which provided staff guidance and direction to all detention facilities in Laos which were administered by the Vientiane City and 16 Provincial Public Security Offices (PSO's) and their district PSO temporary detention facilities. As of 1983, the department had 75 staff personnel. None had any extensive legal training or background.

D. The Economic Police Department was headed by Major Thongpan.

E. The Security Guards Police Department was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Champa and has been referred to in the overt press as the Capital Defense or Security Guards Brigade. It had at least five 250-man security guard police battalions (203rd, 206th, 207th, 208th and 209th) under its operational direction. The 203rd Battalion performed unspecified functions in Sikhattabong District (TE 4588), Vientiane City. The 206th had four companies and was responsible for providing external security to seventeen state and party installations in and around Vientiane City. The 207th Battalion was based at Kilometer 3 on Route 13 near the residence of the Soviet Military Attache in Vientiane City, and had four companies responsible for manning thirty-eight checkpoints in and around Vientiane City, and for guarding state offices and socialist bloc diplomatic missions. The 208th Battalion was based at Kilometer 6 near the Sam Khe Prison in Vientiane City. The 208th was a mobile reaction battalion with four companies and was responsible for countering resistance activities in Vientiane Province and for guarding the external perimeter area of the Sam Khe Prison. The 209th Battalion was established in November 1983 at Nong Nieng Village, Saithani District, Vientiane City, where it had five companies under the command of Major Phan and his deputy, Captain Vandi.

5. The General Department for Counterintelligence (GDCI) was headed by Vice Minister Khamphon Boutdakham and his deputies, Colonels Bounpheng Vongphachan and Phetsamone

Vongphathon. The GDCI was previously known as the General Department for People's Security (1982-1989) and as the Political Security Bloc (1976-1982). The GDCI, like its predecessors, came into being when the MOI was reorganized along Vietnamese MOI lines with the direct participation of the SRV MOI Specialist Group in Vientiane. It is the "secret police" or "KGB" side of the MOI, and occupies the former USAID "Silver City" housing complex in Vientiane, where most of its command and departmental staff personnel work. The GDCI has about 1,000 personnel who are assigned to one of at least ten staff departments: general staff research, political security aka foreign counterespionage, counterreactionaries aka domestic counterespionage, economic security, internal security, leadership security, security investigations-interrogation, technical radio, border security aka border guards, or intelligence. As of 1986, the GDCI had about 1,000 personnel.

The GDCI operated its own training facilities in Vientiane City. Its Political Security School was located near the Wat That Luang (TE 5088), Phonthan Village (TE 5086), Saisettha District. The school conducted six-month courses for groups of 60 police and military personnel from the rank of sergeant. Although its curriculum is not known, all trainees were required to study the Thai language. Graduates were assigned to cover positions with state enterprises and other agencies which dealt with foreigners. Other trainees were sent to the Ministry's Don Tiou School (TE 5398), Saithani District, Vientiane City. Graduates of "intelligence" courses were dispatched as refugees to penetrate refugee camps in Thailand, and to collect intelligence on anti-LPDR resistance groups.

A. Leadership Security Department 11 was located next to the Setthathilat Hospital near the That Louang Pagoda in Vientiane City, and worked closely with the SRV MOI Specialist Group in providing security escorts to visiting Vietnamese party and state dignitaries. Department 11 provided bodyguard security personnel to senior state and party officials, and visiting foreign dignitaries. As of 1981, it had about 300 personnel who had been trained by SRV MOI instructors. Leadership Security Department 11 was also known as Political Security Department 11, and was refered to in the overt press as "Public Security Department 11".

B. Internal Security Department 32 provided chauffeurs, cooks, and some guard personnel to senior Lao

officials. As of 1981, it had about 70 staff personnel who had been trained by SRV MOI specialists, and was also known as Political Security Department 32.

C. Technical Department 95 was established in 1980 with SRV MOI, Soviet and Cuban technical assistance, and initially had about 40 personnel who had been trained by SRV MOI specialist personnel. It was responsible for the intercept and analysis of civilian and foreign diplomatic communications.

D. The Border Security or Border Guard Department, as of 1981, had about 150 personnel in Vientiane. Personnel were assigned to border guard posts at the Wattay Airport and at the Tha Deua-Thanaleng ferry crossing point (TE 6179) with Thailand. Several border guard posts have been noted in Sayaboury Province with ethnic Hmong tribesmen. All border guard posts had the mission of ensuring border security against penetration by hostile forces, proselytizing hill tribe villages, collecting tactical intelligence, and harassing Thai border police outposts along the Sayaboury Province border.

E. Foreign Counterespionage or Political Security Department 53 reported directly to Vice Minister/GDCI Director Khamphon Boutdakham and to the Minister himself. It was the professional foreign counterintelligence staff of the MOI, and was located on the fifth floor of the MOI headquarters building where 50 staff officers were assigned in 1983. Most operational components and personnel were located in the former USAID "Silver City" compound. Department 53 regularly dispatched agents into refugee camps in Thailand to collect intelligence on anti-LPDR resistance movements. Department 53 was also heavily involved in the recruitment and dispatch of commercial assets abroad to at least Australia, Canada, France, and the United States, and actively targeted U.S. facilities in Thailand. More importantly, Department 53 is responsible for the penetration of all foreign missions in Laos.

Department 53 was responsible for the 1976 indoctrination seminar courses for and arrests of local employees of foreign embassies (U.S., French, British,

etc.). All Lao employees of foreign embassies were required to fill out detailed personal history statements, and were told that they were now employees of the Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Corps Service Department (DCSD). From its inception, the DCSD was staffed and directed by professional Department 53 personnel who proceeded to organize all foreign embassy local employees into agent and informant networks with instructions to collect information on their foreign employers. Department 53 has similarly penetrated every foreign non-diplomatic representation and international organization present in Laos.

As of 1983, Department 53 was organized into an unknown number of subordinate staff offices. The General Staff Research Office supported the operational needs of departmental offices. The Cadre Organization Office handled all personnel affairs for Department 53. Economic Security Office 3 was responsible for ensuring the security of central-level ministries and state agencies. Office 3 also investigated LPDR corruption cases. Foreign Capitalist Countries Office 4 collected information on Western Capitalist countries; handled agent assets inside and outside Laos; conducted surveillance on foreigners; and monitored Lao nationals in contact with foreigners. Office 4 maintained liaison with the LPDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to obtain information collected by LPDR diplomatic missions. Offices 5 and 6 have unknown responsibilities and cannot be further identified. Emigration-Immigration Office 7 handled emigration-immigration affairs, issued passports and visas, and approved or disapproved the foreign travel of officials and residents.

F. Counterreactionaries Department 74 (also known as Political Security, Domestic Counterespionage or Political Enemies) evolved out of Department 53 in mid-1983. Department 74 is the professional domestic counterintelligence staff of the MOI. By mid-1986, all Department 74 personnel had received SRV MOI training in Vietnam. Department 74 dispatched staff personnel and agents who were tasked with collecting intelligence on Thai-based refugee and resistance camps. Intelligence collected by Departments 53 and 74 enabled LPDR authorities to successfully intercept resistance forces

when they crossed the border. Collected intelligence was passed to the Lao People's Armed Forces (LPAF) for joint actions against resistance forces in Laos.

G. The Intelligence Department had about 100 personnel as of 1981. By mid-1985, plans were being implemented to assign staff officers to various but unstated LPDR diplomatic missions abroad. As of September 1985, several staff officers had been assigned to LPDR embassies to monitor diplomatic personnel and to counter anti-LPDR activities.

6. The General Department for Logistics (GDL) had about 500 personnel as of 1986. Personnel were assigned to one of at least six subordinate departments: general staff research, construction, finance, medical, supplies, or transportation. The Medical Department operated a medical school which opened its first course in 1979. The Transportation Department had at least one transportation battalion and a driver's training school.

7. The Vientiane City and Provincial Public Security Offices: The MOI provided professional guidance, training and equipment to the Vientiane City Public Security Office (PSO) and to 16 Provincial Public Security Offices in the LPDR. All are similarly organized with staff and operational components like the MOI, and have subordinate public security offices established in every district. The Vientiane City Provincial PSO and subordinate district PSO's have at least one prison detention facility.

8. Control of foreign tourists and officials: An MOI GDCI Lieutenant Colonel concurrently headed the Department of Tourism and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (TCRFCD), Ministry of Information, Propaganda, Culture and Tourism. The TCRFCD submitted all foreign tourist visa applications to the MOI and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and routinely cabled name trace requests to the SRV MOI in Hanoi. The MFA was instructed to issue visas only after the visa applications were approved by the SRV MOI in Hanoi and its MOI surrogate in Vientiane. All tourist groups were assigned MOI tourist guides. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Consular Department was also headed by a professional MOI officer. Visa applications for foreign officials to be assigned in Vientiane were similarly sent to the MOI and to the SRV MOI in Hanoi for approval. In this manner, the SRV MOI monitored the entry of all foreign tourists and officials to Laos.

In March 1985, the MOI and its subordinate PSO's began enforcing new regulations on the travels of foreigners in Laos. Foreigners were required to stay in the homes of residents who vouched for them after their sponsors received PSO approval. Visiting foreign businessmen were required to stay in designated hotels. In Vientiane, the MOI compiled surveillance report information on foreign nationals from the Vientiane PSO, LPRP Youth Group members, employees of foreign residences and offices, shopkeepers, and area residents.

9. The Reeducation "Seminar" Camp System: The Reeducation "Seminar" System of the LPDR dates back to June 1975 when Pathet Lao security forces began taking over power from Royal Lao Government (RLG) authorities. RLG civilian and military officers were categorized into political criminal categories and were placed in seminar camps for reeducation. Responsibilities for the seminar camps were shared by the LPDR MOI and by the LPDR Ministry of National Defense (MND). MND "seminar" camps were believed to be run by the MND's Political Staff Department. In 1977, reeducation seminar camps were renamed "production units" to avoid international condemnation. All MND "seminar" camps aka "production units" aka "construction battalions" were turned over to the MOI General Department for People's Police (GDPP) Prisons Management (Rehabilitation) Police Department in June 1983. Although the LPDR has denied the existence of reeducation camps, a reeducation camp system continued to exist in Laos under the guise of "production" camps. The total number of detainees is unknown.

10. Soviet Bloc Advisory and Technical Assistance: As of 1989, the LPDR MOI had an unknown number of Soviet, East German, and Cuban advisory personnel, and had received a variety of technical and training assistance from the Soviet Bloc. Soviet aid to the MOI was coordinated through the Soviet Embassy's economic attache in Vientiane. In 1979, the Soviets provided trucks, cars, motorcycles, uniforms, blankets, sweaters, and mosquito nets, and the East Germans provided truck radios, other vehicle radio equipment, and unknown types of communications equipment. The MOI expected about U.S. $300,000 in aid from East Germany for the 1984-1985 period. By March 1985, the MOI had improved its ability to conduct effective security operations in the Vientiane Capital area due to Soviet assistance which enabled them to monitor telephones and to link isolated security incidents which had earlier evaded detection.

Soviet personnel participated as instructors at several central-level LPDR MOI schools. A Soviet communications technician taught at a two-month course for MOI Communications Department personnel at the MOI's Don Tiou NCO and Officer School in 1983. In early 1986, an unknown number of MOI officers were sent to the USSR for unspecified training. In early October 1986, the MOI sent 100 security officers to the USSR for a short advanced training course of unknown duration and content. At least two Cubans were assigned to unknown advisory positions with the MOI in Vientiane and three East German advisory technicians were assigned to the overt police as of 1981.

11. SRV Ministry of Interior (MOI) Influence Over the LPDR MOI: The SRV MOI controlled and directed all covert and overt operations of the LPDR MOI which functioned as an extension of the SRV MOI. The SRV MOI headquarters in Hanoi supervised operations in the LPDR; maintained radio communications with an unknown size MOI Specialist Group in Vientiane and with the LPDR MOI; operated a special school in Hanoi, which trained SRV MOI personnel for assignment in the LPDR; and operated another school in the Hanoi area which trained LPDR MOI officers and noncommissioned officers (NCO's).

12. All LPDR MOI mail censorship personnel were selected and trained by the SRV MOI General Department for People's Security (GDPS) at a compartmented training facility in Hanoi. All LPDR MOI mail censors spoke fluent Vietnamese and received six-month courses in mail reception-selection, opening, research, and chemical-photographic systems and techniques. The same applied to LPDR MOI audio and surreptitious entry personnel. The LPDR MOI Mail Censorship Office censored all international mail to and from foreign countries other than the SRV. All mail between the LPDR and the northern SRV was censored in Hanoi, and all mail between the LPDR and the southern SRV was censored by the Ho Chi Minh City Public Security Office.

13. By 1985, the SRV MOI Specialist Group had about 200 personnel assigned to the LPDR MOI; all held second lieutenant to colonel officer rank. The group had eight five- to 10-man specialized teams on two- to six-month rotational assignment, in addition to two officers assigned to each general department and subordinate department. Senior specialists assigned to the four LPDR MOI general departments held lieutenant colonel or colonel rank. One 10-man team was assigned to the LPDR MOI General Department for People's Police.

C06001368

	CONTROL #	DATE OF REQUEST
TO : D/OCA	OCA 2258-92	08 Jun 92
FROM : Bob Magner, DD/Senate Via DD/OCA		SUSPENSE DATE

SUBJECT : Response to POW/MIA Cmte re 3 Apr 92 Letter re Lao People's Democratic Republic Ministry of Interior

NOTES

Signed

CONTROL #	DATE
	SUSPENSE DATE

COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices) NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE

ACTION REQUIRED BY D/OCA

Signature please

FORM 2-86 4118 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

C06001369

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee for POW/MIA Affairs Request for Information on the Lao Ministry of Interior (b)(3)(c)

FROM:	EXTENSION	DATE SENT	REQUEST NUMBER
James D. Anders, Jr. C/EA/ICOG		20May92	DD/O 0025/135-92

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
1. Chief, EA				
2. C/ORMS				
3. DC/ORMS				
4. C/ORMS	4 JUN 1992			
5. SA/DDO				
6. ADDO				
7. DDO				
8. O/OCA/S				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

SUSPENSE DATE:

RETURN TO:

OCA RECEIPT LOGGED ISC

FORM 10-84 4283

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

C06001369

~~SECRET~~

DD/O 92-1135-92

19 May 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert W. Magner
Chief, Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: James D. Anders, Jr.
Chief, Indochina Operations Group

SUBECT: Senate Select Committee for POW/MIA Affairs
Request for Information on the Lao Ministry of Interior

This is in response to a request by the Committee for information on the Lao Peoples Democratic Republic (LPDR) Ministry of Interior (MOI) organization and structure. We hope the Committee finds the attached study useful and we are prepared to answer additional questions they may have on this subject. We are in the process of preparing the information on the Lao prison system and will forward the study as soon as it is completed.

James D. Anders, Jr

~~SECRET~~

C06001372

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2171-92
21 May 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert W. Taylor
Investigator
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate

Bob,

As a follow on to your meeting at Headquarters on 15 May 1992, I am forwarding a copy of one of the letters you reviewed; a 26 September 1984 letter from a [redacted] to Director Casey.

(b)(6)

The two other pieces of correspondence--a National League of Families letter dated 31 January 1984 and an early 1984 letter written by [redacted] both originated with [redacted] at the NSC and we recommend that your request for retention be directed there since they were not addressed to nor independently acquired by the CIA.

[redacted]
Robert W. Magner
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs
Office of Congressional Affairs

Attachment

(b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

C06001372

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

SUBJECT: Items Requested by Senate Investigator Robert Taylor

FROM:	EXTENSION	DATE SENT	REQUEST NUMBER
James D. Anders, Jr. C/EA/ICOG		19May92	OD/O 0025/127-92

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
1. Chief, EA				
2. C/ORMS	20 MAY			
3. DC/ORMS	4 MAY 1992			(b)(3)(c)
4. ~~C/ORMS~~				
5. SA/DDO				
6. ADDO		5.20		
7. DDO			✓	
8. O/OCA/S				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				

SUSPENSE DATE:

RETURN TO:

FORM 10-84 4283

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

(b)(3)(c)
(b)(5)
(b)(6)



C06001373 C.I.A. Directo

C I A. Headquarters."

Langley Park, Virginia.

(b)(3)(c)

Dear Sir;

Date: Sept. 28th 1984.

A week and a half (give a Day or two) ago, I sent a Letter to you and Your Agency; in Regards to me & The Men I have Recruited to Return to North VietNam, to Perform a Covert Operation into That Country.

I sent The Letter to You & The Agency Addressed to Your Headquarters in Washington D.C, Not Realizing Your Agency is Located in Langley Park Virginia mr. Director. I have No Way of Knowing, if You Received Such a Letter From me, Laying out The Details to Covert Operation Coded "Come back Home" into North VietNam By me & my men Sir.

Anyway This Letter Will inform You; until You Can either Locate Such Letter I've Already Sent or Send Someone to see me, on The Covert operation objectives we will Accomplish, once we enter North VietNam Again.

I Must State Now; That me and my men have No intention of Threatening The National Security of our Country The United State of America, or Bring Hatred Down on its President mr. Ronald R. Reagan & The American Beauracacy (Government) & it's Citizens By our operation into North VietNam mr. Director.

When we enter such Country; we will Carry No identification whatsoever to identify us As Americans, Until we have emerged fro The Jungles of North VietNam in 6 months Sir.

The Reasons Why me and The 29 men I have Recruited Are Returning to North VietNam and Risking our Lives to Accomplish Such Operation Are As Follows:

1.) To Bring every American Serviceman & Woman held Captive in Jungle Prison Camps from the VietNam War still Being held in North Vietnam As of todays Home That we Can find;

2.) To Bring every CIA Field Officer Still Alive who is Being held Captive in Jungle Prison Camps Home to You & The Agency and their Country & Families;

3.) To take Hand Held Video tape Camera Footage of Troop Movements - Nort COVERS

1

Vietnam Documents We find and other important Stuff That Can Be useful to Your Agency;

4.) to Bring Back With us Paper Documents That we find For Your Agency As well a Maps & excetra;

5) to Capture if Possible Any High Ranking North VietNamese & Russian Military Leaders to Smuggle Back to our Country and Your Agency.

One of The Men I have Recruited has in his Possession, a Letter Smugg. out of North VietNam from his Brother, who is Still Being Held Prisoner in a VietNamese Jungle Prison Camp Named in The English Language of "Camp 7"; And With Such Proof At hand That Americans Are Still held As Prisoners of The Vietnam War - me & my men Are Returning to Bring Them Home MR. Director

The Reason Why I Wrote & Sent The First Letter to You & The Agency to The Washington D.C. Address; was to find out if You & The Agency had Balls enoug to Want to Join our Covert operation into North VietNam Sir.

If You and The Agency, especially Your Covert Operations Section Desire to Joi us; me & my men Would Require That You Arrange for The following to uphold You Part of The Operation MR. Director:

1) to enable us to Be Stationed At General George C. Patton's Empty Headquarters Are at Fort BenNing Georgia for a Period of 7 Weeks to train to Refresh ourselves, Weapons and to Be Able to Redo Airborne training and Be Briefed By Your Agency c Known Things in North VietNam; (I have the Complete 7 Week training Schedule Made u

2) to equip me & my men With Advanced Weaponery & Devices from other Countries, s No Heat Falls onto The United States of America if someone is Caught (We Prefer The Use of Israelli Uzi 9mm Submachine Pistols With Silencers - Walther PPK 9mm Pist With Silencers - A.T.S. Inc. XM18 Rotating 12 guage Weapon Systems - & Other Foreign Weapo & Gear For our Covert Operation);

3.) Each Man including me in The 30 man Unit is to Be Paid $75,000.00 up Front At Th Start of The training & operation - And upon Completion of The operation each man Will Receive a Bonus of $50,000.00 For a total of $125,000.00 per man for a Grand total of $3,750,000.00 (Not much of A Dent in Your Agency Bank Roll of money).

4.) You Shall Arrange transportation to & From North Vietnam - for my men & me plus The American's & Documents We Bring out With us - Plus Arrange For At Least 1 No more than 2 Air Drops of Ammo & food at PreArranged Dates And times Duri. our 6 month operation into North VietNam.

If You And Your Agency Can Come to terms With The Conditions o Number 1-4 Above As We Require That You Do; Then Your Next Step is to Get in Contact With me - Since I'm Delegated The Recruiter, Spokesman, Plann & Commander of Operation "Come Back Home" As Soon As You Can.

One Word of Warning to You & Your Agency Mr. Director - If my men & me Smell a Double Cross At All; we have The Capabilities to Pull The Operation off on our own and Sell our Story to Several Agencies upon our Return From North VietNam.

We have The Manpower - Will & Determination to Accomplish our planned objectives; And we have The Financial Backing If You & Your Agency fail to work With us Mr. Director.

As For Weapons - we can in one Nights Work Get everything from M16 rifles - M203's - M60's - .45's - Grenades - Plastic Explosives - LAW's & Shells - 40mm RR 20mm Armour Piercing Cannons - Primer Detonating Cord & excetra (everything America made) That we Need For our North Vietnam Covert operation.

In All Reality We Don't Need You & Your Agency Around us - But we Want to give You All The Satisfaction of Working With trained Professionals who Can Guarantee a 85% or Better Accomplishment of our objectives and operation everyone of us (30 total) will Return from North VietNam Sir.

We have The Manpower & skill to Succeed in What we Do - Do You & The Agency have The Guts As Men to Partake In Such a Covert Operation Like we will Do, or Are You All A Bunch of Thumb Sucking Little Boy's Scared of what we Can Do Mr. Director.

If You Desire to Work With my men & me; "You & The Agency have Until Monday October 8th 1984 to Contact me"; otherwise we will Do What we have planned on our own, & Laugh at You And The Agency when we All Return From North VietNam Sir.

We Are Men Set out to Do a Mans Service And Job for our Country & It's People, And we Will Succeed In Bringing our Fellow Americans & Stuff Home From North VietNam - We Are Not Boys Like Some Who Are Worried About Their Federal Jobs and expensive Clothes & things Mr. Director.

Do You & Your Agency Desire to Work With us or All You All A Bunch of Scared Kids.

Yours

[redacted]

(b)(6)

P.S. See You All Soon or When My men & Me Return From North VietNam As Heroes.

3

Viewing an archived action from [redacted]

S

Action

20 JUNE 1997 DDCI MEETING WITH SEN. SMITH RE: POW/MIA ISSUES

Document Number: OCA-02667-00

Date Received: 06/20/1997

Task Instructions:

no value

Request Documents: [redacted]

Recipients

- MFR

Additional Document Metadata

OPI

Secondary OPI

From

Other Document Number

Comments

File Code

Media Type

Codewords

Attachments

Keywords

Copies

[redacted]

(b)(3)(c)

S

Viewing an archived action from Extral [redacted]

(b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

3/15/2013

C06001378

(b)(3)(c)

PRINTED: Monday, September 11, 2000
AT: 17:38

CODEWORDS:

SECRET

11 September 2000

Memorandum for the Record

OCA 00-02667

KEY: C/97-05862

EVENT: DDCI MEETING DATE: 06/20/1997 TIME: 8:30 STATUS: COMPLETED
PLACE:
FOR: SEN SMITH (b)(3)(c)
SUBJECT: PW/MIA ISSUES

ATTENDEES:

ASSOCIATION	NAME	ROLE
A/DCI	TENET, GEORGE (A/DCI)	
D/OCA	MOSEMAN, JOHN (D/OCA)	
PERSTAFF SEN		(b)(6)
SEN	SMITH, ROBERT (SEN)	
SSCI	DORN, PETER (SSCI)	

Executive Summary:
[EXECUTIVE-SUMMARY]

[SUPPORTING-TEXT]

Summary Text:

(C) The ADCI briefly met with Sen. Bob Smith to discuss POW/MIA matters as well as a current budget issue relating to Special Navy.

(S) With respect to POW/MIA matters, Sen. Smith and the DCI discussed whether the POW/MIA analytic activity should be maintained as it is in the Defense Department. The ADCI said he would work with Gen. Hughes and discuss the matter. The ADCI stressed that objectivity is the key to intelligence analysis and that policy should not drive analysis in any way.

(S) Sen. Smith then discussed some specific matters, including a discussion he had with a Russian named Volganov who reportedly told Sen. Smith that the Vietnamese were holding back information on POW/MIA matters. In addition, Sen. Smith indicated that he was aware of some 300 NSA reports relating to Afghanistan and Russian POW/MIA matters.

(U) The ADCI in general indicated to Sen. Smith that he would attempt to be helpful.

(b)(3)(c)

(C) See addendum to this memorandum regarding discussion of Special Navy.

John H. Moseman
Director of Congressional Affairs

(b)(3)(c)

SECRET

D/OCA/JHMoseman:jab:x



Viewing an archived action

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Action

RESPONSE TO ART GRANT'S VERBAL REQUEST RE 141 POW/MIA DOCUMENTS

Document Number: **OCA-005986-CNV**

Date Received: **01/07/1993**

Recipients

- SEN. GRANT

(b)(3)(c)

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3/15/2013

C06001384

#11

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 1000-93
7 JAN 1993

[redacted]
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
(b)(6) Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear [redacted]

During your review of the internal correspondence of this Agency which related to the POW/MIA issue, you asked that copies of certain documents be made available to you through the Office of Senate Security. An earlier request asked that we provide a list of finished analytic products published by the Agency during the years 1970-1975.

The 141 documents which we are sending through Senate Security are those you flagged for copying from CIA operational files. This count is slightly more than the 139 you requested because some proved to be multiple documents filed as a package. Moreover, two of the documents you requested were originated by other US Government agencies and were therefore not copied for you.

We are forwarding copies of these documents for your further review and for discussion as you deem useful with the leadership of the POW/MIA Committee and with senior Committee staff. Because these documents relate directly to matters of sources and methods which the Director of Central Intelligence is charged by law to protect, we cannot permit these documents to be included in the POW/MIA Committee's final report. They are not to be copied or otherwise reproduced, and we ask that they be returned as soon as possible but no later than 1 March 1993.

Enclosed for your retention is a declassified version of the subject list of CIA finished intelligence products.

As in the past, we remain committed to supporting the work of the Select Committee.

Sincerely,

/s/ Stanley M. Moskowitz

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

C06001384

(b)(6) OCA 1000-93

SUBJECT: Response to [redacted] Verbal Request re 141 POW/MIA Documents

[redacted]

(b)(3)(c)

(b)(3)(c)

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

Viewing an archived action from [ ] Close

U

Action

TRANSMITTAL OF CIA RESPONSE TO SEN. SMITH'S REQUEST FOR DECLASSIFICATION OF SEVERAL CIA DOCUMENTS RELATING TO POW/MIAS IN VIETNAM

Document Number: OCA-020060-CNV

Date Received: 06/20/1997

Task Instructions:

no value

Request Documents:

Recipients

- SEN. SMITH

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	
Secondary OPI	
From	
Other Document Number	
Comments	
File Code	
Media Type	
Codewords	
Attachments	
Keywords	
Copies	

U

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C06001387

OCA [illegible]

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

Ref: OCA 97-1360
ER 97-2056

OCA 97-1497
20 June 1997

The Honorable Bob Smith
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Smith:

This letter forwards documents in response to your letter of 31 March 1997, which requested information relating to American POWs and MIAs from the Vietnam War. As I indicated in my interim response of 2 May 1997, appropriate Agency offices have searched their records for information relevant to the eight specific requests you made. Enclosed with this letter--as detailed below--are four documents that bear on five of those requests. We are continuing to search for any other responsive information and will forward you any additional information we find. We have also asked the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) for assistance with your request for particular imagery, and will notify you when NIMA completes its search.

- Enclosure 1 is a declassified copy of the CIA report requested in items 1 and 2 of your letter.
- Enclosure 2 is a copy of the declassified CIA report requested in item 3 of your letter.
- Enclosure 3 is a copy of the declassified CIA report requested in item 4 of your letter.
- Enclosure 4 is a copy of a declassified CIA report as requested in item 6 of your letter.

We believe the above enclosures complete our response to the indicated items in your letter. We have redacted the enclosures as necessary to protect intelligence sources and methods.

With respect to the other items you requested, we are continuing to search for information responsive to item 5, but have not yet located relevant documents. We will forward any such documents we find as quickly as possible. We have asked NIMA to search its files for the imagery you requested in item 7; again, we will forward any releasable imagery that is found.

(+1 Smith) I-102D

The Honorable Bob Smith

Finally, we have discussed with the Defense Intelligence Agency the source noted in item 8 of your letter. We have not located any CIA reports concerning this source that respond to your request.

We appreciate your patience while we conducted this search and declassification effort, and we thank you for your continued interest in POW/MIA issues. Please let me know if we may be of any other assistance.

Sincerely,

/s/ John H. Moseman

John H. Moseman
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosures

The Honorable Bob Smith



C06001387

FOLLOWING NEW INFORMATION RECEIVED 16 MARCH 1973 PARALLELS EARLIER REPORT THAT THERE ARE MORE U.S. POWS THAN COMMUNISTS HAVE OFFICIALLY ADMITTED.

WHO OBTAINED INFO FROM DURING MEETING WITH VC MILITARY PERSONNEL MARCH 1973.

SAID ON 12 MARCH 1973 THAT THE FIGURE OF 585 UNITED STATES PRISONERS OF WAR (POWS) RELEASED OFFICIALLY TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IN ITS NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE POWS, WAS DEVELOPED AS A "BARGAINING FIGURE" BY THE VC (SIC) FOR NEGOTIATING PURPOSES WITH THE UNITED STATES. HE SAID THAT SINCE THE 1954 INVOLVEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM MANY ADDITIONAL POWS HAVE BEEN CAPTURED, AND THE PRISONERS NOT YET LISTED BY THE COMMUNISTS WILL BE A SUBJECT OF DIRECT SECRET NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN HANOI AND THE UNITED STATES. HE SAID HANOI WILL USE THESE POWS AS A "BARGAINING TOOL" TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL "CONCESSIONS" FROM THE UNITED STATES.

[redacted]

Frc 1 of 2

C06001387

#3

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: HANOI'S POSITION ON AND ACTIVITIES REGARDING THE ISSUE OF U.S. PERSONNEL MISSING-IN-ACTION IN INDOCHINA.

SUMMARY: AS OF EARLY JUNE 1981, NEITHER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SRV) GOVERNMENT NOR THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PARTY HAD ORDERED A NATIONAL-LEVEL SEARCH IN INDOCHINA FOR U.S. PERSONNEL MISSING-IN-ACTION (MIA) IN THE INDOCHINA WAR ENDING IN 1975. WITHIN THE SRV MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (BNV) NO MENTION WAS EVER MADE OF AN SRV OFFICE TO HANDLE MIA MATTERS. FOR NORTH VIETNAM THE SRV MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE HAS RECORDS OF U.S. AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN IN THE PERIOD 1964-1972. ALTHOUGH HANOI GAINED CONTROL OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND LAOS IN 1975 AND KAMPUCHEA IN 1979, ITS CAPABILITY TO ACCOUNT FOR PRISONERS OF WAR (POW'S) AND MIA'S HAS NOT BEEN SYSTEMATICALLY ORGANIZED. SOME SRV PERSONNEL HAVE COMMENTED ON HANOI'S MANIPULATION OF THE MIA ISSUE AS A BARGAINING CHIP TO SEEK CONCESSIONS FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. IF THE SRV STILL HOLDS U.S. PERSONNEL, THEY COULD POSSIBLY BE LOCATED AT FOUR SITES IN NORTH VIETNAM. END SUMMARY.

1. AS OF EARLY JUNE 1981, NEITHER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SRV) NOR ITS RULING VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PARTY (VNCP) POLITBURO HAD ORDERED ANY NATIONAL-LEVEL SEARCH FOR THE REMAINS OF U.S. MISSING-IN-ACTION (MIA) PERSONNEL IN THE SRV, LAOS OR IN KAMPUCHEA. POLITBURO POLICY ON THE U.S. PRISONER OF WAR (POW)/MIA ISSUE WAS CLASSIFIED AS A STATE SECRET AND WAS NOT PUBLICIZED IN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY STATE AND VNCP AGENCIES, OR TO THE VIETNAMESE POPULACE. HANOI APPEARED PROUD OF THE FACT THAT SOME (NUMBER UNKNOWN) U.S. POW'S AND U.S. MIA REMAINS HAD NOT BEEN RETURNED TO THE U.S. COMMENT: THE U.S. POW/MIA ISSUE WAS BEING KEPT ALIVE AS "BARGAINING CHIPS" TO PRESSURE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO CARRY OUT PROVISIONS OF THE 1973 PARIS AGREEMENT.)

C06001387

2. AS OF EARLY JUNE 1981, THERE WAS NO ORGANIZED PUBLIC SEARCH FOR THE REMAINS OF U.S. PERSONNEL IN THE SRV, LAOS, OR KAMPUCHEA. NO INSTRUCTIONS WERE ISSUED BY THE SRV GOVERNMENT OFFICES, INCLUDING THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (BO NOI VU-BNV), TO SUBORDINATE ECHELONS TO LOOK FOR U.S. REMAINS. WITHIN BNV CIRCLES, NO MENTION WAS EVER MADE OF AN OFFICE CREATED BY THE SRV TO SEARCH FOR U.S. REMAINS.

3. FOR THE NORTHERN PART OF THE SRV, THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (MND) HAS COMPLETE RECORDS OF ALL U.S. AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN BY TIME, DATE AND PLACE, AS WELL AS DATA ON CAPTURED AND DEAD AIR CREW MEMBERS BETWEEN 1964 AND 1972. THE BNV KEPT COMPLETE RECORDS ON ALL U.S. POW'S, WHO HAD BEEN TRANSFERRED TO PRISON FACILITIES WHICH WERE ADMINISTERED BY THE BNV AND WHERE INTERROGATIONS WERE CONDUCTED. FOR EXAMPLE, THE CENTRAL HOA LO PRISON IN HANOI WAS AND HAS ALWAYS BEEN ADMINISTERED BY THE BNV PRISONS MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT (KH-6). THE HOA LO PRISON WAS THE ONLY KNOWN PRISON FACILITY WHICH WAS PHYSICALLY GUARDED BY THE BNV. AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF PRISON FACILITIES FOR U.S. PERSONNEL WERE GUARDED BY MND GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT MILITARY JUSTICE DEPARTMENT (CUC QUAN PHAP/CQP) PERSONNEL IN JOINT ACTION WITH THE BNV. THE SON TAY PRISON WAS THE ONLY KNOWN FACILITY GUARDED BY THE CQP.

4. AS FAR AS THE SOUTHERN SRV AND LAOS SINCE 1975 AND KAMPUCHEA SINCE 1979 ARE CONCERNED, HANOI'S CAPABILITY TO ACCOUNT FOR U.S. POW'S AND MIA REMAINS WAS NOT AS SYSTEMATICALLY ORGANIZED AS IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY. NEVERTHELESS, HANOI THROUGH ITS BNV AND THE MND COULD TASK ITS SUBORDINATE COMMANDS IN THE SOUTHERN SRV TO SEARCH FOR U.S. REMAINS IF IT DESIRED. NO ORDER TO DO SO WAS ISSUED THROUGH BNV CHANNELS AS OF EARLY JUNE

1981. ALTHOUGH THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (LPDR) HAD SOME DEGREE OF AUTONOMY FROM THE SRV, HANOI HAD THE POWER TO DISCLOSE INFORMATION ON U.S. PERSONNEL WHO WERE EITHER CAPTURED ALIVE OR DIED DURING THE INDOCHINA WAR YEARS IN AREAS UNDER PATHET LAO CONTROL. IF THE PATHET LAO HAD CAPTURED U.S. PERSONNEL, HANOI WOULD KNOW OF IT. IN THE CASE OF KAMPUCHEA, SINCE 1979 HANOI COMPLETELY CONTROLS ALL FACETS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA (PRK) GOVERNMENT AND, IF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA (DK) RECORDS ON AMERICAN PERSONNEL HAD FALLEN INTACT INTO SRV HANDS, HANOI WOULD HAVE THEM.

5. AFTER HANOI'S TAKEOVER OF SOUTH VIETNAM IN APRIL 1975, SEVERAL FOREIGNERS WERE CAPTURED AND/OR ARRESTED IN THE SOUTHERN SRV. KG-3 AUDIO OPERATIONS OFFICE 1 HAD INSTALLED A NUMBER OF AUDIO IMPLANT DEVICES INSIDE THE CHI HOA PRISON IN HO CHI MINH CITY (HCMC) AND IN THE BIEN HOA PRISON. THESE TWO PRISONS WERE ADMINISTERED BY THE SRV PRISONS MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT (KH-6). THE SRV FOREIGN COUNTERESPIONAGE DEPARTMENT (KD-3) WAS ALSO INVOLVED IN UNSPECIFIED ACTIVITIES AT BOTH PRISONS.

6. SOME SRV PERSONNEL HAVE MADE COMMENTS ON HANOI'S POSITION ON THE MIA ISSUE SINCE THE COMMUNIST VICTORY IN 1975. IN MID-1976, SENIOR COLONEL [redacted] COMMENTED ON THE STRATEGIC TACTICS (DUONG LOI CHIEN LUOC) OF THE SRV TOWARDS THE U.S., WHICH SUPPORTED THE OBJECTIVE OF NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND WOULD BREAK THE U.S. "ENCIRCLEMENT" EFFORTS OF THE SRV. THE SRV STRATEGY WAS TO USE THE U.S. MIA ISSUE TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC AID FOR THE SRV. THE SRV MEANS WERE TO CONDUCT DIALOGUES ON THE U.S. MIA ISSUE WITH PRIVATE U.S. RELIGIOUS, CHARITABLE AND OTHER GROUPS. HANOI HOPED

THAT THESE GROUPS WOULD GENERATE PRESSURE ON THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THAT THESE GROUPS WOULD IN TURN PROVIDE SOME ECONOMIC OR MEDICAL AID TO THE SRV. THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS WAS TO CULTIVATE SYMPATHY FOR THE SRV AND TO DEMONSTRATE THE HUMANENESS OF THE SRV TOWARDS THE AMERICAN POPULACE, WHICH WOULD HELP HANOI ACHIEVE ITS GOAL OF ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

8. (COMMENT: THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS LARGELY SPECULATION IF U.S. PERSONNEL WERE AND ARE BEING DETAINED IN THE SRV AFTER 1973, HANOI MIGHT BE KEEPING THEM IN ONE OF FOUR PROBABLE AREAS IN THE NORTHERN SRV: THE DA PHUC AIR BASE AREA, THE CENTRAL HOA LO PRISON IN HANOI, HA SON BINH PROVINCE, AND HA NAM NINH PROVINCE. THE DA PHUC AIRBASE AREA WHICH SERVED AS ONE OF THE MOST SENSITIVE MILITARY BASES IN THE SRV, WAS BUILT WITH SOVIET ASSISTANCE AND WAS FREQUENTED BY SOVIET PERSONNEL. IT WAS LARGELY MADE UP OF CAVES TO CONCEAL VARIOUS TYPES OF MIG AIRCRAFT AND COULD CONCEIVABLY BE USED TO KEEP PRISONERS. THE HOA LO PRISON IN HANOI COULD STILL BE USED TO HOUSE U.S. PRISONERS, BASED ON THE FACT THAT HANOI'S PROPAGANDA MACHINERY HAS MADE A FILM RECORD OF PRISON CONDITIONS THERE AFTER 1973, THE PROVINCES OF HA SON BINH AND HA NAM NINH (PARTICULARLY THE AREA OF FORMER NINH BINH PROVINCE) WERE OTHER LIKELY AREAS WHERE U.S. PRISONERS MIGHT BE HELD, BECAUSE COLLECTIVIZED AREAS THERE COULD BE CAMOUFLAGED TO LOOK LIKE REGULAR VILLAGES. OTHER FACTORS WHICH MIGHT FAVOR THE POSSIBILITY OF THESE TWO PROVINCES HAVING U.S. POW'S WERE THAT THEY WERE LOCATED FAR FROM THE CHINA-SRV BORDER; WERE SPARSELY POPULATED, MOUNTAINOUS AND HEAVILY FORESTED; AND PRISONER FACILITIES COULD BE EASILY CONCEALED FROM THE KNOWLEDGE OF LOCAL INHABITANTS.

C06001387

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Vice Director For Collection
Management
Department Of Defense
Principal Advisor For Prisoner Of War
Missing In Action Affairs
(International Security Affairs)
Director, Vietnam, Laos And Kampuchea
Bureau Of East Asian And Pacific Affairs
Department Of State

SUBJECT : The Transfer of Caucasian Prisoners By Truck From Thanh Hoa to Quang Ninh Province, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, in Early March 1982

C06001387

SUBJECT: The Transfer of Caucasian Prisoners By Truck From Thanh Hoa To Quang Ninh Province, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, in Early March 1982.

TEXT: 1. In early March 1982 a cargo truck driver casually told a friend in Hai Phong, Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), that he had just returned from transporting Caucasian prisoners, whom he presumed were Americans. The driver was hired to transport goods and was sent from Hai Phong to Reeducation Camp 90A/TD63 in Cam Tuy, Thanh Hoa Province. He arrived at the camp at night and was told to stay in the driver's cabin while people were loaded into the rear of the truck. The truck was covered and remained covered during the trip to the Dong Vai Reeducation Camp in Quang Ninh Province. The driver arrived at the Dong Vai Camp at night and was again instructed to remain in the truck cabin. When the people were taken from the truck, the driver saw that they were handcuffed in pairs. There were three or four dozen of these prisoners, most of whom were a head taller than the guards. The driver said that when he cleaned the back of the truck after the trip, there were many empty food cans. The driver stated that other prisoners, such as former officers of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, were usually just given bread.

2. According to a Hai Phong resident, Camp 90A/TD63 was located on top of a hill in Cam Tuy, about ten kilometers from Thanh Hoa Town via Route 15, and approximately 20 kilometers west of the Cam Tuy train station. Before 1975 the camp held northerners who had committed grave civil offenses. After 1975, the camp held former officers of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam in compartmented areas. The Dong Vai Camp is a national prison camp under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior (Bo Noi Vu/BNV). To reach Dong Vai Camp, one must travel from Hon Gai Town to Bai Chay and then to Dong Dang Town. In Dong Dang Town one turns at the Cho Troi market to Hoang Bo and Vu Streets where the

C06001387

ocal people can give directions to the nearby Dong Vai Camp. The Dong Vai Camp held prisoners who had committed grave civil offenses and were sentenced to ten or more years of hard labor. (Source Comment: The Dong Vai Camp should not be confused with the Dong Muoi Camp, under BNV supervision, also located near Hon Gai. From Hon Gai, one reaches the Dong Muoi Camp via Long Tonc and Nui Xe villages.)

C06001387

SENSIND: PAGE: 1

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FRP: . . . . . .

SUBJ: DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

PSR

PAGE 001
TOR: 28 MAY 82

5 Pages —
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REFS:

Item 6

11. [redacted] NEVER SAW OR HEARD ANYTHING ABOUT U.S. POW'S WHILE IN SAM NEUA. EXCEPT ON ONE OCCASION WHICH OCCURED MUCH EARLIER. IN 1969 [redacted] ATTENDED THE FIRST MEDICAL CONGRESS

IN SAM NEUA AND MET

THE SAM NEUA AREA, WHILE VISITING IN
AND SAID THIS WAS WHERE THE U.S. POW'S HAD BEEN HELD. HE POINTED OUT A CERTAIN CAVE TO
SAID HE HAD VISITED THE CAVE IN ORDER TO ADMINISTER MEDICAL
ATTENTION PRIOR TO THEIR EVACUATION TO NORTH VIETNAM. THIS IS
ALL COULD RECALL ABOUT THE CONVERSATION WITH
GAVE NO FURTHER INFORMATION REGARDING THE PRISONNERS
OR WHEN THEY HAD BEEN EVACUATED, WHICH HAD TO BE SOME TIME PRIOR
TO THE MEDICAL CONGRESS IN 1969. WAS LED TO BELIEVE THAT
NO U.S. POW'S REMAINED IN THIS AREA AND ALL HAD BEEN EVACUATED
TO NORTH VIETNAM FOR MORE SECURE SAFEGUARDING.

C06001388

SECRET

OCA 2048-92
5 May 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting Between Senate POW/MIA Committee Investigator and DI/OIA Personnel

1. On Thursday, 30 April 1992 at 1000 in [redacted] OHB, Senate Select Committee for POW/MIA Affairs investigator, Bob Taylor, met with DI/OIA analysts to discuss various imagery issues related to the Committee's work. Attending from OIA were [redacted] represented OCA. (b)(3)(c)

2. In summary, the meeting was largely a discussion of the limits on CIA's capability to provide imagery support for POW/MIA issues and of the complexities involved in analyzing information such as manmade letters on the ground detected by imagery.

3. Taylor began by citing the 1988 imagery near Sam Neua, Laos that showed the letters "USA" in a rice paddy. He noted the presence of a faded letter "K" below "USA" which, according to Taylor, caused analysts at JSSA--DOD's escape and evasion training group--"to almost fall off their chairs." Taylor said the "K" was a well-known pilot's distress signal and that the JSSA analysts felt that a US person must have made the letters. He added that since the "K" was faded, the more distinct "USA" might have been added later in desperation. Taylor asked if OIA was familiar with such signals. [redacted] responded that OIA was not cognizant of such codes, and noted the letter was too faded to determine how it was made or its relationship to "USA." (b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n)

4. Taylor asserted that in the 1980 [redacted] in which the numbers "52" were detected, a "K" was also present. He also recalled a 1973 case in which the letters "TH" (possibly for [redacted]) were detected along with a four digit number which could have been an authenticator code. The OIAers could not recall the latter case.

[redacted]

SECRET

(b)(3)(n)
(b)(1)

Regarding the [redacted], [redacted] noted it was unclear whether the imagery actually showed "52." [redacted] countered that CIA humint had POWs leaving the area near the time the numbers were imaged and that the numbers had faded the following month. Taylor went on to describe other instances where he had learned of symbols picked up by imagery, including an "AS" southwest of the "USA" area and a "555"--the designator of a reconnaissance group that had flown over Laos--at another location. He suggested that OIA should be more sensitized to looking for such signals in imagery. (b)(3)(c)

5. [redacted] then explained that DIA was designated as the focal point on POW matters to avoid duplication of effort by government agencies. DIA had the necessary databases, resources and expertise. OIA would only get involved when it detected something unusual and even then the information would go to DIA for action. CIA's only major involvement in the issue came around 1983-84 when DO reporting indicated some Caucasians might be at a facility in Laos, but there was no subsequent imagery to confirm the information. Otherwise OIA was not officially involved in POW/MIA intelligence. The analysts also noted that the size of Indochina made looking for POW signals a daunting task and that only one OIA analyst was devoted to Indochinese military issues. Even "USA" was not discovered until several months after the imagery was taken. Asked by Taylor where the POW issue stood on OIA's collection priority list, the OIAers noted it was not there. OIA's job was more order of battle military analysis. Taylor then noted that even DIA lacks the resources to do initiative-type work and only responds to specific reports or requests. He saw this as a "big hole" in the process and that if there were POWs that might be leaving signals no one was watching for them. The OIAers did agree that imagery analysts needed to be sensitized to looking for possible MIA signs when reviewing imagery.

6. Taylor then described the Committee's recent visit to the "USA" area, noting that they actually landed in the wrong valley and never saw the site. The area was populated on a seasonal basis, but one permanent resident noted that prisoners--inferred by the codel as Asians--occasionally moved through the area.

7. Taylor continued that he did not blame CIA for shortfalls in POW intelligence, but saw a problem in that information was not adequately shared or cross-checked. He noted that JSSA never saw the "USA" imagery until he showed it to them and that CIA did not know the significance of "K" until now. Taylor then asked if OIA could help him locate some imagery of "explicit" POW signals in Vietnam in the early 1980s that CIA retiree Bill Graver had recalled in an earlier interview. The analysts were skeptical but said they would check. Taylor then asked how frequently sites like "USA" were imaged and whether, for example, the area was imaged a week or so before the letters were seen. Merritt noted the infrequency of such coverage. They could only go over previous imagery of the site taken long before the letters were imaged but found nothing. Taylor then noted that he found a POW "tasking" from late 1988-early 1989 in DIA files apparently for covering the Thai-Lao border area and asked if OIA knew about it. Merritt responded we didn't, adding that DIA neither informed nor coordinated with us on all of its activities. Taylor then noted seeing an imagery report from 1983 at Ft. Bragg which noted a "high probability" of US prisoners being at one site in Vietnam. The drafter was someone named Adams. The OIAers could neither recall the document nor the name. Taylor then asked how frequently Kontum in Vietnam was imaged, noting the [redacted] source had said some POWs had been moved there and perhaps they might have left some signs. [redacted] responded that we look at Kontum now and then to monitor military forces there. (b)(3)(n) (b)(1)

8. Returning to the need to sensitize imagery analysts to watch for POW signals again, Taylor provided the name and number of Bob Dussault of JSSA who could brief on military distress signals. The meeting ended at 1115.

(b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

Senate Liaison

SECRET

SUBJECT: Meeting between Senate POW/MIA Committee Investigator and DI/OIA Personnel



(5 May 92)

(b)(3)(c)

C06001389

UNCLASSIFIED

Service Item Report

03/19/2013

Service Item ID:

Priority: **ROUTINE**

Permanent Recall? **N**

Request Date: 03/19/2013:06:58 AM

Due Date:**04/18/2013**

Recall Reason:

Request Comments: (U) ROGER H

Service Item Comments: (U)

(b)(3)(c)

Requester Notes ID:
Secure Phone:
Non-secure Phone:

Recepient Name:

Recipient Address: AARC

Secure Phone:

Non-secure Phone:

Classified By:

Derived From:

Declassify On:

UNCLASSIFIED

C06001389

~~SECRET~~

OCA 2760-92
20 August 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs Investigator Bob Taylor Concerning Sanitized DO Documents, Imagery and a Chronology on PDB References to POWs and MIAs

(b)(3)(c)

1. On 18 August at 1430 hours Bob Taylor of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs was briefed at OCA in [redacted] on recent CIA work on the issue and also received declassified documents from 1976 and later dealing with (b)(3)(n) (b)(1) [redacted] efforts to determine if POWs remained in Southeast Asia [redacted] Present were [redacted] DO/EA/ICOG, [redacted] DI/OIA, [redacted] [redacted] DO/ORMS, [redacted] OCA/Senate Division, [redacted] Career Trainee in OCA/Senate Division, and [redacted] [redacted] Career Trainee in OCA/Senate Division.

2. Mr. Taylor read the PDB chronology OCA prepared on POW/MIA articles. He asked if there was ever any identification of the five POWs mentioned in the 8 May 1974 PDB article. Our answer was no, to the extent of our knowledge. Taylor also wanted to know about the status of the documents that are being researched and prepared from the Executive Registry dealing with POWs. We informed him that the documents are being prepared and will be available soon. (b)(3)(c) Next, he requested release of a DO Spot Report dated (b)(3)(n) (b)(1) 6 January 1981 concerning possible POWs in Laos. [redacted] told Taylor the report will not be released [redacted]

3. [redacted] then briefed Taylor on a piece of (b)(3)(n) (b)(1) [redacted] from 30 December 1987 that shows a large ***arrow*** and a ***P***. [redacted] said CIA's DDI Helgerson and the DIA had been alerted about the finding. [redacted] since date of the original photo does not show still-distinguishable markings. (b)(3)(n) (b)(1) The markings were located west-south-west of Sam Nuea in excess of 100 kilometers in the "Quang Vien" Provence. Heater had a memorandum of explanation [redacted]

(b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(c)

~~ALL PORTIONS CLASSIFIED~~
~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Meeting with Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs Investigator Bob Taylor Concerning Sanitized DO Documents, Imagery and a Chronology on PDB References to POWs and MIAs

(b)(3)(c) (b)(3)(n) (b)(1)

which he will deliver to OCA and through the office to Taylor. Taylor, [redacted] and [redacted] then discussed the relation of the newest [redacted] to other [redacted] previously released or briefed.

4. The briefing ended at about 1530 hours.

[redacted]
Career Trainee
Senate Division

(b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

C06001390

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

(b)(3)(c)

Central Intelligence Agency

SECRET

Washington, D.C. 20505

14 August 1992
OCA 2420-92/3

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to the request contained in the July 9, 1992 letter to the National Security Council, enclosed are declassified versions of the six groups of CIA POW/MIA intelligence reports on Laos and Vietnam which were previously sent to the Committee in redacted form. The groups are separated according to reports categories, with three groups of reports each on Laos and Vietnam.

An original of this letter is also being sent to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

[redacted]

Robert W. Magner [redacted]
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

Enclosures
1. Logs of Documents
2. Documents

(b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

ALL PORTIONS CLASSIFIED SECRET

SECRET

C06001390

Central Intelligence Agency

SECRET

Washington, D.C. 20505

14 August 1992
OCA 2420-92/4

The Honorable Bob Smith
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

In response to the request contained in the July 9, 1992 letter to the National Security Council, enclosed are declassified versions of the six groups of CIA POW/MIA intelligence reports on Laos and Vietnam which were previously sent to the Committee in redacted form. The groups are separated according to reports categories, with three groups of reports each on Laos and Vietnam.

An original of this letter is also being sent to Chairman Kerry.

Sincerely,

[redacted]

Robert W. Magner
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

Enclosures
1. Logs of Documents
2. Documents

(b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

ALL PORTIONS CLASSIFIED
SECRET

SECRET

OCA 2420-92/3

SUBJECT: Letter to Kerry/Smith, POW/MIA Cmte re Declassification of Documents per 9 July 1992 Request to NSC

[redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(3)(c)

C06001391

(b)(3)(c)

TO : D/OCA	CONTROL # OCA 2420-92/1	DATE OF REQUEST 21 Jul 92
FROM : DD/Senate Via DD/OCA		SUSPENSE DATE

SUBJECT : Letter to Chairman John Kerry and Vice Chairman Bob Smith re response to the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs Letter to the President Relative to Declassification of Documents

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

NOTES



COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices)		
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE

ACTION REQUIRED BY **D/OCA**

Review and Passage to DCI for Signature please

FORM 2-86 **4118** OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

C06001391

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Letter to Chairman John Kerry and Vice Chairman Bob Smith, POW/MIA re Response to Letter to the President Relative to Declassification

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
Stanley M. Moskowitz Director of Congressional Affairs 5	37605	OCA 2420-92 DATE 23 JUL 1992

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Executive Registry				
2.				
3. Executive Director				
4.				
5. Deputy Director of Central Intelligence				
6.				
7. Director of Central Intelligence			8	
8.				
9. Return to Director of Congressional Affairs				
10.				
11. DD/SA				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
1-79

C06001391

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2420-92/1
23 July 1992

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Pursuant to the Senate Resolution 324 on the Declassification of POW/MIA materials, the July 1, 1992 letter to the President on the same issue and the July 9, 1992 Committee elaboration of its request, Agency documents requested by the Committee are being reviewed and this letter constitutes an interim response.

With regard to those Agency documents that CIA has transferred to the Director of the National League of Families, copies of those documents were deposited with the Library of Congress on January 14 of this year and are available there for the Committee's review and copying. A small portion of those documents are currently being reviewed by the Defense Intelligence Agency's Central Documents Office to ensure their compliance with the McCain law.

Concerning the 120 documents related to Laos and Vietnam that have been provided to the Committee, some 30 of those reports have been declassified with some redaction, and the remainder will be redacted and declassified to meet your August 15, 1992 deadline.

The specific overhead photography requested by the Committee is currently being reviewed for declassification. Either the photography or line drawings based on the photography will be made available to the Committee as requested by the July 23, 1992 deadline.

We will be reviewing the materials requested in annex "A" of the Committee's July 9, 1992 letter and believe that we will be able to complete the declassification process of those materials by the July 23 deadline. Those included in the addenda to Annex "A" pose more of a problem. The

The Honorable John F. Kerry

Typescript Study of June 1992 on the Vietnam prison systems will be reviewed for declassification. Given its length and complexity, this may not be completed by 23 July. The typescript on the Lao Ministry of Interior, given its current and sensitive nature, cannot be declassified.

Finally, we will be reviewing other Agency files for additional materials that can be declassified.

As we complete various aspects of this process we will be working with the Committee to ensure that the materials are made available in the most expeditious manner possible.

An original of this letter is also being sent to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

OCA 2420-92/1

SUBJECT: Letter to Kerry/Smith, POW/MIA re Response to the Letter to the President Relative to Declassification of Documents

OCA/Senate/RWMagner:jah/ (21 Jul 92)

Distribut
Origina

C06001391

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2420-92/2
23 July 1992

The Honorable Bob Smith
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

Pursuant to the Senate Resolution 324 on the Declassification of POW/MIA materials, the July 1, 1992 letter to the President on the same issue and the July 9, 1992 Committee elaboration of its request, Agency documents requested by the Committee are being reviewed and this letter constitutes an interim response.

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The specific overhead photography requested by the Committee is currently being reviewed for declassification. Either the photography or line drawings based on the photography will be made available to the Committee as requested by the July 23, 1992 deadline.

We will be reviewing the materials requested in annex "A" of the Committee's July 9, 1992 letter and believe that we will be able to complete the declassification process of those materials by the July 23 deadline. Those included in the addenda to Annex "A" pose more of a problem. The

The Honorable Bob Smith

Typescript Study of June 1992 on the Vietnam prison systems will be reviewed for declassification. Given its length and complexity, this may not be completed by 23 July. The typescript on the Lao Ministry of Interior, given its current and sensitive nature, cannot be declassified.

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An original of this letter is also being sent to Chairman Kerry.

Sincerely,

Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

SPOT REPORT

2 JULY 1992

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
ACTION TO DECLASSIFY DOCUMENTS RELATED TO POW/MIA MATTERS

On 2 July 1992, the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs voted unanimously to ask the President to issue an executive order declassifying all POW/MIA-related documents available in the U.S. Government inventory. A letter containing this request has been sent to the President.

--The Senate document attached to the letter lists 250 volumes of POW/MIA information already released by the Agency to the Director of the National League of Families (Anne Mills-Griffith). These documents have already been declassified by the Agency.

--The attachment requests declassification of an estimated 120 other Agency documents related to Vietnam and Laos which are now in the Committee's possession. We believe that these documents are related to live sighting reports and can be easily declassified.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

--The Senate request includes imagery [redacted]

--The Senate requests that any other POW/MIA-related document held by the Agency be declassified. The latter request will be the most difficult for the Agency to honor. This will require careful review and consideration.

Since this is a late-breaking event, it is too early to determine what will follow. We have learned from the Select Committee Staff that a Committee meeting is scheduled for 23 July 1992 to weigh the response from the Executive Branch. Staffers predict that if the response is judged to be inadequate, there will be a motion to invoke Senate Resolution 400. This resolution, via the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence mechanism, would require a vote before the entire Senate to force the President's hand on this issue.

(b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

C06001397

01/02 16:40 002

Bob M - I hope they are not going unilaterally release videos.

76185

John F. Kerry, Massachusetts, Chairman
Bob Smith, New Hampshire, Vice Chairman

Tom Daschle, South Dakota
Harry Reid, Nevada
Charles Robb, Virginia
Bob Kerrey, Nebraska
Herb Kohl, Wisconsin

John McCain, Arizona
Hank Brown, Colorado
Charles Grassley, Iowa
Nancy Landon Kassebaum, Kansas
Jesse Helms, North Carolina

Select Committee on
POW / MIA Affairs

Francis A. Zwenig, Staff Director
Dino L. Carluccio, Deputy Staff Director
J. William Codinha, Chief Counsel

(b)(3)(c)

United States Senate, Washington, DC 20510-6500 (202) 224-2306

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
July 1, 1992

CONTACT: Deborah DeYoung
202/224-2075

COMMITTEE TO VOTE THURSDAY

ON PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF POW/MIA DOCUMENTS

WASHINGTON -- Members will consider measures designed to press for immediate and comprehensive declassification and release of POW/MIA documents at a public meeting Thursday, Chairman John F. Kerry, D-Massachusetts, and Vice Chairman Bob Smith, R-New Hampshire, announced today.

The meeting will begin at 9 a.m. on Thursday, July 2 in Room 106 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building.

This action follows a recommendation of the Committee's Declassification Task Force, headed by Sen. Charles Robb, D-Virginia, and Sen. Charles Grassley, R-Iowa.

"Too much time has passed -- and too much false information has been circulated -- to wait any longer for full declassification," Kerry said. "If U.S. teams are to have any credibility in the future, the public must know what has been done in the past on behalf of our missing servicemen."

"There is no national security reason to continue to keep POW/MIA documents, now in the possession of the Select Committee, hidden from the American people," Smith added.

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

C06001398

OCA 2420-92

10 July 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/OCA

FROM: Robert W. Magner
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

SUBJECT: Response to the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs Letter to the President Relative to Declassification of Documents

(b)(3)(c)

1. Attached is the prioritized schedule for declassification that [redacted] was able to get from the Committee earlier this week. It provides for a bit more time to comply but is still overarching in its requirements. I have highlighted those portions relative to CIA in the attachment. Outlined below is a status report on what the Agency has been asked for and the status of our response. You may want to share this with the DCI, and we may want to consider a letter to the Committee giving the status of our compliance and the problems we may encounter in that regard.

Documents to be declassified by 23 July 1992:

- CIA: Four specific documents on Laos cited in Attachment "A" of the attachment.

  Status: DO is seeking to identify and will undertake the declassification procedure.

- Photography and Imagery--All designated imagery listed in Attachment "C" collected by National Technical means indicating the possible presence of American POWs in Southeast Asia after 1973. This should include all photography revealing possible distress signals or symbols.

  Status: OIA/DI is reviewing the specific cases and has consulted with CRES. [redacted]

(b)(3)(n)

[redacted]

SUBJECT: Response to the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs Letter to the President Relative to Declassification of Documents

Documents to be declassified by 15 August 1992:

- CIA: All POW/MIA related documents that CIA has transferred to the Director of the National League of Families over a period of years in the 1980s.

  Status: These documents which amount to eight boxes of 125 volumes of CIA materials which have been redacted and released to the League. The documents were also declassified in the process of releasing. A set of the documents has been provided to the Central Documents Office at DIA for legal review prior to passage to the Library of Congress. To comply we would have to copy the documents, which are held in the FOIA office or request that the Committee do so. Given the fact that these were passed to the League under FOIA we may have to address some legal concerns. Additionally, as in the case of the JFK files, the DCI may want to have the documents reviewed prior to release to determine if more information in them can be made available insofar as the original redaction occurred in some cases over a decade ago. This of course would greatly delay the whole process.

- CIA: Declassify all other POW/MIA related documents held by CIA.

  Status: While there are documents in the Agency operational files that could be declassified, they are interwoven with other documents that are sensitive in nature, relate to sources and methods [redacted] (b)(3)(n) [redacted] Considerable resources would be required to undertake this separation and review, and it is highly doubtful if the 15 August deadline could be met. Frankly, my experience with the Committee would suggest that for the present at least we could ignore this aspect of the requirement provided that we are forthcoming in other areas.

SUBJECT: Response to the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs Letter to the President Relative to Declassification of Documents

- CIA: CIA Documents sent to the Select Committee--The 120 CIA documents related to Laos and Vietnam that have been sent to the Select Committee should be declassified.

Status: 30 of these reports have been redacted and declassified and the rest are in train. With the additional personnel that the DO has put on the job the 15 August deadline can be met. Beyond the 120 reports provided to the Committee there are an additional 370 reports which were contained in DIA live sighting files which have been redacted in those files which the Committee also possesses. The DO is preparing to declassify these reports as well. Four to six additional personnel have been placed on the project.

Documents to be released 15 September 1992:

- CIA: Photography and Imagery--All imagery collected by National Technical Means indicating possible presence of American POWs in Southeast Asia after 1973 and not previously designated for declassification.

Status: There are only the specific photographs listed in the request for 23 July above.

2. Comment: Essentially we are in pretty good shape. My understanding is that the DO will be bringing this issue to the DCI's attention on Monday. At this point the DCI needs to know the dimension of the problem and the fact that he will have to make some decisions in the near term.

Robert W. Magner

Attachment



C06001404

Central Intelligence Agency

OCA FILE SSPOW

RECEIPT #

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2690-92
12 August 1992

Mr. Bob Taylor
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Taylor:

In response to your letter of July 29, 1992 and in accordance with your follow-up conversations with myself and officers in the Office of Imagery Analysis, forwarded herewith are the unclassified reports you requested including two briefing boards.

As you will appreciate, considerable effort has gone into this response, and I hope that it is useful to the Committee and satisfies your needs.

Sincerely,

[redacted] (b)(3)(c)

Robert W. Magner
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

Enclosures
1. 2 Copies of Report
2. Briefing Board -- Dong Mang, Vietnam
3. Briefing Board - Ban Kouanpho, Laos

C06001404

OCA 2690-92

SUBJECT: Letter to Bob Taylor, POW/MIA re 29 Jul Request

OCA/Senate/RWMagner:jah/ (12 Aug 92)

(b)(3)(c)

JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS, Chairman
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, SOUTH DAKOTA
HARRY REID, NEVADA
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HERBERT H. KOHL, WISCONSIN

BOB SMITH, NEW HAMPSHIRE, Vice Chairman
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JESSE HELMS, NORTH CAROLINA

FRANCES A. EWENIG, STAFF DIRECTOR
J. WILLIAM GODINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

July 29, 1992

Mr. Bob Magner
Deputy Director
Legislative Affairs,
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Magner Bob

Per our phone conversation of 27 July, I am forwarding specific information to enable your agency to fully meet the Committee request of 9 July, for declassification of imagery and related written analysis. For clarification, the Committee is interested in "declassifying" the original documents, with the original analysis intact.

The Committee's intent in requesting the imagery's declassification, even in the form of line diagrams, was to depict the possible symbols discovered at each site, listed on attachment "C" of the 9 July request. It also was the Committee's intent to receive line diagrams that were essentially identical to the imagery photographs in the possession of the Committee, to include all labelling and annotations.

Several of the diagrams, forwarded by CIA do not depict any symbols, that were present on original photography. None of the original analysis, much of which originated from the CIA, was declassified or forwarded as requested. Specifically, we are seeking the following:

-- From your 22 June 92 letter, TCS 2522-92, an accurate line diagram with all annotations taken from the 20"x 24" blow-up of imagery taken of Dong Mang, 30 July 75.

-- From your 22 June 92 letter, TCS 2522-92, a declassified copy of the CIA Imagery Analysis Service report of 6 July 1976 of the Dong Mang camp, with all attached diagrams.

-- From your 22 June 92 letter, TCS 2522-92, a declassified copy of the CIA Imagery Analysis Service memorandum for the record, dated 9 July 76.

-- An accurate line diagram with all annotations and labelling from the CIA 30 December 80 imagery, titled Detention Camp East of Thakhek, with labels and arrows as shown in the original copy forwarded this Committee, i.e., "5" and "2".

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

Page 2
Robert Magner

-- A declassified copy of the 6 January 1981 CIA "Spot Report", with imagery analysis assessment of "52" and possible "K", and the noted meaning the "K".

-- A declassified copy of the recent CIA evaluation prepared and forwarded to this Committee pertaining to the "USA" photograph, as well as the CIA evaluation on the Muang Tan area symbols, currently being prepared by CIA (SSC ltr dtd 13 July 92).

-- A revised line diagram of the Muang Tan diagram sent this Committee, covering a wide enough area to depict all the symbols, not shown in the copy forwarded.

The Pseudocolor enhancements need not be added to any of the line diagrams.

We would appreciate these and any other contemporaneous analysis pertaining to the photos identified in attachment "C", or any photos revealing symbols. As I mentioned earlier, we now plan to address these items in a hearing scheduled for 12 ~~July~~ August. Thanks Bob.

Sincerely,

Bob T

Bob Taylor
SSC POW/MIA Affairs

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C06001404

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

CRES-504/92
7 August 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: Charles Boykin
Acting Chief, Collection Requirements and Evaluation Staff, DI

SUBJECT: Declassification of Document on POW/MIAs (U)

1. Action: Approve the declassification of the attached document on **Possible POW/MIA-Associated Markings in Southeast Asia.** This will respond to a Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs request. (U)

2. Background: We have been working with OIA to provide the Committee with documentation and graphics describing possible evidence that American POW/MIAs made markings on a prison roof in Vietnam and on the ground in Laos. OIA has analyzed this possibility using historical imagery. (S/NF)

3. On 29 July, the Committee's lead staffer on this issue wrote to the Office of Congressional Affairs seeking declassification of imagery and classified OIA documents already provided to the Committee

[redacted] We believe public release of the imagery will raise, not reduce speculation about the POW/MIAs. It would surely increase pressure to release additional satellite imagery on other high interest issues, and give the media, Congress, and others the opportunity to second guess analysis of raw intelligence data. (S/NF) (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

4. Proposed Approach: OIA has prepared two unclassified line drawings to satisfy the 29 July request. The lead staffer recently visited OIA and expressed general satisfaction with the drawings. We think including the declassified text will fulfill the request. We maintained the substance of the original documents (enclosed in folder), but removed text we consider sensitive and which directly refers to sources. (S/NF) (b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

CLBY:
DECL:
DRVFM:

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

C06001404

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

SUBJECT: Declassification of Document on POW/MIAs (U)

5. Staff Position: We recommend declassification of the attached document. In the event this fails to meet the requirements of the Committee, we have a draft memo to the DCI through you requesting declassification of the actual imagery, including implications of a decision to do so and suggestions on how to handle it procedurally. (S/NF)

No

[redacted]
Charles Boykin

Attachment

(b)(3)(c)

APPROVED:

[redacted]
Deputy Director for Intelligence

11 AUG 1992
Date

DISAPPROVED:

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Date

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

C06001404

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~

SUBJECT: Declassification of Document on POW/MIAs (U)

DI/CRES/IPG/RWeber:raw, [redacted] (7 Aug 92)

(b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

~~NOFORN~~
~~SECRET~~

10 August 1992

Possible POW/MIA-Associated Markings in Southeast Asia

Introduction

This information was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency for the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. It is a summary of CIA analysis performed in 1976, 1980, 1981, and 1992 of areas in Vietnam and Laos where markings on buildings and terrain were evaluated as evidence of possible links to US POW/MIAs in Southeast Asia.

July 1976 Analysis of Dong Mang Prison Camp, North Vietnam

The prison is located at 21-04-00N/107-07-15E, approximately 26 kilometers west-northwest of the port of Cam Pha. It is located in a secluded area at the base of the foothills about 1 kilometer north of Dong Mang and 2 kilometers north of Route 183.

Although we were unable to find any conclusive evidence that this prison might contain American POWs, there are several unique features in this prison that differ from other known Vietnamese prisons. It is secluded in a relatively remote area and has an access control point on the road leading to the camp. Walls within the compound physically and visually segregate the prisoners. The visual segregation of prisoners indicates it is

not a forced labor camp. The only other known prison that used internally walled compounds to segregate the prisoners was the former POW camp at Dan Hoi.

There was roof repair work on one of the confinement buildings/living quarters in July 1975. A study of this revealed a unique alternating light and dark pattern on the roof. This pattern, in the form of squares, was repeated three times at different locations on the roof. Because of the seemingly unusual manner in which the roof was being repaired, we attempted to discern if this pattern was coincidental or purposeful. We were unable to make this distinction and realize that the prospect of it being purposeful is remote. It is not known if prisoners would be used or allowed to make these repairs. However, we did investigate this possibility. An attempt was made to transpose this pattern into Morse code. The white squares, being larger than the dark ones, were considered as dashes and the dark squares as dots. A dash-dot-dash in Morse code transposes as the letter K. However, two less conspicuous possibilities exist. These are the letters NT and TA that are variations of the same dash-dot-dash pattern. We contacted an individual in the Department of Defense who has extensive knowledge of the POW situation. According to this individual, the letter K was the permanently designated signal letter assigned to air crews should they be downed and unable to recall the monthly and/or daily assigned signal letters. This information has been confirmed through discussions with former POWs.

The prison was under construction adjacent to a small possible detention camp in July 1972. The possible detention camp consisted of a secured compound containing approximately ten small, semipermanent buildings. As work on the present prison progressed, the semipermanent facility was dismantled.

The currently existing prison consists of a walled compound containing eight confinement buildings/living quarters, one probable messhall, two support buildings, at least four latrines, ten unidentifed buildings and two probable guard houses/towers. The interior of the compound is divided into 14 separately secured areas. Each area is secured by a solid wall with a single access. The only buildings in the compound that are not separately secured are the probable messhall and two support buildings. Studies of prisons in North Vietnam known to contain POWs during the war have shown efforts to segregate the prisoners by using walls or other materials to obscure visibility. However, none were as extensively segregated as at this compound. A small building, possibly used for solitary confinement, is located outside of the walled compound. The building is secured on three sides by fencing and on one side by the east wall of the compound. Two possible guard houses/towers are at the two outer corners of the fenced area. Another guard tower is located on a hillside outside of the compound near the southeast corner and it affords good visibility of the entire prison.

During construction of one of the confinement buildings/living quarters, we determined that there would be eight rooms or cells. Assuming the other confinement buildings also contain eight rooms and if two to four prisoners were in

each room, the compound could contain between 130 and 260 prisoners.

A large area behind the east (rear) wall of the compound has been cleared and leveled. Portions of an outer wall have been constructed around the compound with one segment of this outer wall extending into the cleared area. The height of this outer wall is about three times higher that the existing wall securing the prison. If this cleared area is for enlarging the compound, it could increase the current capacity by approximately 50 percent.

The administration and support facility for the prison is located just outside the prison compound. This facility consists of one administration building, three barracks, one probable messhall and several support buildings.

A possible satellite/auxiliary detention camp is located 1,100 meters northwest of the main compound. This camp began to develop as construction of the main compound progressed. It may have been constructed to hold personnel from the possible detention camp that was dismantled to make room for the main compound. If this satellite area is a detention facility, it indicates an effort to separate the prisoners being kept there from those being confined at the main compound. Otherwise the main compound would have originally been constructed of sufficient size to accomodate these prisoners.

This possible satellite compound is triangular shaped and contains four to five possible confinement buildings/living

quarters and several support buildings. These buildings are much smaller than those at the main compound. Two walls of the compound are in the open, but vegetation covers the area where we expect the third wall to be. There is a large opening where the two walls should meet. This large opening raises questions about the security of the compound. Nine administration/support buildings are located outside of the compound.

December 1980 Analysis of Nhommarath Detention Camp East of Thakhek, Laos

A detention camp is located in central Laos, 67 km east of Thakhek at 17-30-46N/105-25-19E. It is in a relatively isolated area. The camp was established between April 1978 and September 1979. We determined it was occupied in December 1980, but could not identify persons in the camp.

The camp is located in the northwest of a large cleared area of slash and burn activity. What appears to be a low fence is present at the tree line around part of the clearing. The camp consists of an outer area and an inner area, each of which is enclosed by a fence.

The outer stockade-type fence is about 2-3 meters tall and encompasses an area of about 18,200 square meters. Between this outer fence and the inner fence, there are guard force quarters, a trench, an automatic weapons position, two observation towers, and row crops. The observation towers are thatch-roofed and each has a platform estimated to be 3-4 meters above the ground. The

only entrance through the outer fence is at the southwest corner. A trail leads from this entrance to Route 12, about 500 meters to the west. The trail is wide enough for vehicles but there was no indication of vehicular use.

The inner compound is located near the center of the camp. The compound encompasses an area of about 2,800 square meters and is enclosed by a stockade-type fence about 2-3 meters high. The main entrance to this compound is near the southwest corner with a second entrance near the northwest corner. The inner compound contains five buildings, several sheds, and various unidentified structures/objects located mostly along the compound perimeter. The two largest buildings appear to be barracks. A narrow fenced corridor extends from the southeast corner of the inner compound into a cluster of trees.

A flat, nearly square cleared area of about 760 square meters is about 40 meters east of the camp. Its function is unknown. A small possible earthen dam is located on a stream that flows through the east side of the camp. A few buildings, which could have some relation to the camp, are located in the forest south of the slash and burn area around the camp.

The assessment that this facility is for the detention of personnel, rather than to keep out personnel or animals, is based on several factors. First, the two stockade-type fences are not typical of defensive measures in the area nor do villages in the area use fences. Second, the observation towers are located outside of but near the inner compound, providing a good view of the compound, but only a limited view of areas beyond the outer

fence. Third, the camp is located near the edge of the slash and burn area and the vegetation has been allowed to grow back outside the outer fence on the northern and western sides. Fourth, the facility was not built on high ground for control over the surrounding terrain. Finally, the low level of activity between the camp and the surrounding villages and Route 12 indicates little contact with the outside.

In April 1978, only a narrow foot trail passed through the heavy forest now containing the camp. By September 1979, the primary structures had been constructed but the camp did not seem complete.

January 1981 Analysis of Nhommarath Detention Camp, Laos

A detention camp is located in central Laos, 67 km east of Thakhek at 17-30-46N/105-25-19E. It is in a relatively isolated area. The camp was established between April 1978 and September 1979 and was occupied in December 1980. We could not identify persons in the camp.

The camp is located in the northwest of a large cleared area of slash and burn activity. What appears to be a low fence is present at the tree line around part of the clearing. The camp consists of an outer area and an inner area, each of which is enclosed by a fence.

The outer stockade-type fence is about 2-3 meters tall and encompasses and area of about 18,200 square meters. Between this

outer fence and the inner fence, there are guard force quarters, a trench, an automatic weapons position, two observation towers, row crops, and what appears to be the number 52 on the ground. Also located between the two fences is a stream with two earthen dams used to impound water, probably for the row crops. The observation towers appear to be positioned for observing the inner compound. The towers are thatch-roofed and each has a platform estimated to be 3-4 meters above ground. The only entrance through the outer fence is at the southwest corner. A trail leads from this entrance to Route 12, about 500 meters to the west. The trail is wide enough for vehicles, but there was no evidence of vehicular traffic.

What appears to be the number 52 is on the ground in the row crop area between the inner compound and the stream on the east side of the camp. Each numeral is 1-2 meters wide and 3 meters high. The two numerals appear to be shallow depressions, possibly with low vegetation along some of the outer edges. If the numerals had been formed by vegetation, growth over time would have enhanced their shape. However, this is not the case according to comparative analysis. The location of the numerals is such that they most likely cannot be seen from either of the two observation towers because of trees located in the line of sight.

The inner compound is located near the center of the camp. The compound encompasses an area of about 2,800 square meters and is enclosed by a stockade-type fence about 2-3 meters high. The main entrance to this compound is near the southwest corner with a second entrance near the northwest corner. The inner compound

contains five buildings, several sheds, and various unidentified structures/objects located mostly along the compound perimeter. The two largest buildings appear to be barracks. The inner compound seemed to be occupied in December 1990. Two parallel fenced corridors extend from the southeast corner of the inner compound into a cluster of trees.

A gently sloped, nearly square, cleared area of about 760 square meters is located about 40 meters east of the camp. A tree was left standing in one corner of the area and a possible automatic weapons position was recently dug in another corner. This cleared area's function is unknown. A third earthen dam is located outside the fenced camp on the stream that flows through the east side of the camp. A few buildings, which could have some relation to the camp, are located in the forest south of the slash and burn area around the camp.

The assessment that this facility is for the detention of personnel, rather than to keep out personnel or animals, is based on several factors. First, the two stockade-type fences are not typical of defensive measures in the area nor do villages in the area use fences. Second, the observation towers are located outside of but near the inner compound, providing a good view of the compound, but only a limited view of areas beyond the outer fence. Third, the camp is located near the edge of the slash and burn area and the vegetation has been allowed to grow back outside the outer fence on the northern and western sides. Fourth, the facility was not built on high ground for control over the surrounding terrain. Finally, the low level of activity

between the camp and the surrounding villages and Route 12 indicates little contact with the outside.

In April 1978, only a narrow foot trail passed through the heavy forest now containing the camp. By September 1979, the primary structures had been constructed but the camp did not appear complete.

1992 Analysis of Surface Markings at Sam Neua, Laos

Our analysis of January 1988 information focused on several unusual markings--the letters USA and what resembled a US Air Force escape and evasion symbol known as a Walking Kilo (essentially the letter K used to indicate a downed pilot)--on the ground west of Sam Neua, Laos. We are uncertain as to who may have made these markings, but recently completed analysis gives us a better understanding of how the markings were made, how long the markings may have been present, and what activity may have been going on concurrently in the surrounding region.

We obtained early 1987 and mid-1988 information on the Sam Neua area, but the markings were not present as in January 1988. Technical analysis enabled us to more confidently determine that there was a relative age difference between the USA letters and the possible Walking Kilo. It also enabled us to make an assessment as to the method used to create the markings. Our analysis suggests the following:

- The USA letters were newer by not more than a few

months than the possible Walking Kilo.

-- The USA markings were manmade. Because of the apparent decay of the possible Walking Kilo, it could not be determined if it was manmade, although that possibility cannot be ruled out.

-- No other markings or symbols were identified in the Sam Neua area.

-- The markings appear to have been created by forming depressions in the ground--either stamped, or more likely dug--that were then filled with water. The area surrounding the letters may indicate recently dug soil, and the narrow portions of the S may indicate that the water was drying up. The markings do not appear to be formed from manmade material or from vegetation.

-- Since the markings were constructed in a rice paddy, it is likely that the USA was formed after the harvest season, which ends in December, and would have been obliterated by the beginning of the rainy seasons in May, when rice shoots are transplanted into the flooded paddies.

In related analysis, our study indicates that the markings may have been visible from a portion of Route 6 just to the northeast. The letters were positioned so that an individual traveling along Route 6 from the northeast to southwest could have seen them. In addition, the markings would have been

clearly visible to an aircraft or helicopter taking off from the airfield at Sam Neua, which is 3.2 km to the west northwest, if that aircraft took off from east to west into the prevailing winds and flew in the direction of Vientiane or Xiangkhoang.

Finally, we studied other information to assess activity in Hua Phan Province in general and the Sam Neua area in particular. We reached the following conclusions:

-- An historical precedent exists for suggesting the presence of American POWs in the Sam Neua area. Photographs taken by a reconnaissance aircraft in October 1969 show what may be as many as 20 non-Asians accompanied by Pathet Lao guards near caves at Ban Nakay Teu, 20 km east of the Sam Neua markings. Sam Neua at that time was a major Pathet Lao stronghold.

-- There was a substantial amount of reported sightings of American POWs in this region following the discovery of the Sam Neua markings, indicating that DIA's investigations probably prompted locals to offer information after the markings were found. However, in no case did further analysis confirm any of these reports.

-- Reports indicate that there was in 1988, and continues to be to this day, a certain amount of insurgency activity--best described as low-level hit-and-run--in the vicinity of Sam Neua. This in turn prompted some counterinsurgency operations by Lao government forces, and may account for some reports of unusual activity.

-- It is very likely that a small number of Soviet personnel (mainly pilots) occasionally visited Sam Neua as late as 1988. A limited number of other Westerners similarly traveled to the town, sometimes up Route 6 past the site of the Sam Neua markings.

1992 Analysis of Surface Markings Near Muang Tan, Laos

Our analysis of January 1988 also focused on what appeared to be ground markings resembling possible numbers and letters in rice paddies 500 meters south of the village of Muang Tan, about 43 km southeast of Xieny Khouang provincial town, on Highway 42. These markings resembled (depending on the orientation) A5!, K5!, i5Y, or iSY in one rice paddy, and in the other paddy either 07 or L0. Although a conclusive assessment of the origin and the intent of these markings may never be achieved, recent analysis has provided some additional information that may be useful in determining whether or not these markings can be attributed to a possible American POW/MIA presence.

When the USA marking was detected near Sam Neua, Laos, we reexamined other areas in Laos and discovered the possible markings near Muang Tan. We obtained late 1988 and early 1989 information on the Muang Tan area, but the markings were not present as in January 1988.

Our review indicates that the possible markings most likely were associated with the rehabilitation of terraced rice paddy dikes.

-- We compared the January 1988 information with later data and found a realignment of the rice paddy contain- in the possible markings resembling 07/L0. The 7/L marking actually was the result of a shadow cast by the rising sun on an angular but--at the time--disconnected section of terraced dike. Subsequently, a completed dike with the 7/L shaped angle was incorporated into a longer terrace. The 0 (like a square with rounded corners) had disappeared, but one side of this round-cornered square had been incorporated into a new terrace dike. This shape routinely occurs throughout rice paddies in this region, and may represent a small diked area employed in the growing, harvesting, or processing of rice.

-- Similar comparative analysis of the terraced rice paddy in which the possible A5!/K5!/i5Y/iSY marking was noted indicated that portions of the possible 5/S, the !/i and the A/K/Y were also part of an effort to rehabilitate and realign the dike. However, only a portion of the possible markings can readily be attributed to shadow caused by the buildup in height of a section of dike wall. The remainder may result from shadows in depressions--possibly caused by excavation of soil to rebuild the dike.

-- Much of the roughly 90,000 square meter paddy area containing the possible markings was being rehabilitated in 1988 and 1989. The repair and rehabilitation of terraced paddies is a routine occurrence in Southeast Asia. This work generally occurs in the dry season (November through April), after the rice harvest.

We also assessed other activity in the Xieng Khouang area in 1988.

-- There were some reports regarding sightings or lack of sightings of possible American POWs in Xieng Khoung Province. Evidence cited in many of these reports is inconclusive and often contradictory.

-- A few Soviet military advisors were involved--at least in the earlier stages--in a long-term effort beginning in 1975 to upgrade the Xieng Khoung (aka Thong Hai Hin) Airfield. Some probably were still in the area in 1988.

-- The Lao resistance was active in Xieng Khouang Province in 1987-88, although the small size of the insurgency limited it to hit-and-run attacks against government outposts in the countryside. This may account for some reports of unusual activity.

C06001405

~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency

OCA FILE: SSPOW

RECEIPT #

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2677-92

18 AUG 1992

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to the request by the Committee for information on the policies of the Vietnamese and Lao Governments toward the POW/MIA issue. We have identified 116 intelligence reports beginning in February 1977 through June 1992 which contain comments by officials of these governments on this topic. Some of the reports describe other foreign policy or diplomatic issues involving the Lao and Vietnamese Governments in their relations with the United States and other regional countries. As this information was obtained from [redacted] some of whom are still active and producing intelligence on topics other than POW/MIA, these reports will be retained at CIA headquarters for review for appropriately cleared and designated investigators from the Committee.

An original of this letter is also being sent to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

/s/ Stanley M. Moskowitz

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

(b)(3)(c)

CIA-CONG

RECEIVED

[redacted]

ALL PORTIONS CLASSIFIED
SECRET

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DR

~~SECRET~~

C06001405

SECRET

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2677-92/1

18 AUG 1992

The Honorable Bob Smith
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

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An original of this letter is also being sent to Chairman Kerry.

Sincerely,

Stanley M. Moskowitz

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

ALL PORTIONS CLASSIFIED SECRET

CL
DEC
DRV

(b)(3)(c)

SECRET

OCA 2677-92

SUBJECT: Letter to POW/MIA Committee re Vietnam and Lao Governments

OCA/Senate/RWMagner:jah/ [redacted] (10 Aug 92) (b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

DCI EXEC REGISTRY
RECEIPT #

Central Intelligence Agency

(b)(3)(c)

Washington, D.C. 20505

11 August 1992
OCA 2461-92/3

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In your letter of June 24, 1992, you requested access to information pertaining to the ongoing POW/MIA investigation that may be contained in The President's Daily Brief. We have just completed a search of this publication for the period 1972 to 1992. Our search revealed a number of entries concerning US POWs, almost all of which date to the latter stages of the war in Southeast Asia.

In accordance with our letter of July 24, 1992, a chronology and summary of these entries has been prepared and can be reviewed by appropriately cleared Committee staff at CIA. Your staff should contact my office to arrange access to this information.

An original of this letter is also being sent to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

C06001406

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

11 August 1992
OCA 2461-92/4

The Honorable Bob Smith
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

In your letter of June 24, 1992, you requested access to information pertaining to the ongoing POW/MIA investigation that may be contained in The President's Daily Brief. We have just completed a search of this publication for the period 1972 to 1992. Our search revealed a number of entries concerning US POWs, almost all of which date to the latter stages of the war in Southeast Asia.

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An original of this letter is also being sent to Chairman Kerry.

Sincerely,

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

OCA 2461-92/3

SUBJECT: Letter to Kerry/Smith, POW/MIA Cmte re Access to DO Files and President's Daily Brief

OCA/Senate/TEAuld:jah/ (11 Aug 92)

C06001410

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

Central Intelligence Agency

OCA FILE: 5540 37

RECEIPT #: (b)(3)(C)

Washington, D.C. 20505

24 July 1992

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Your letter of June 24, 1992 complimenting the Agency on its support to the work of your Committee was greatly appreciated. I want to assure you that this level of cooperation will continue as your investigation moves ahead. The letter makes two requests, however, with which it will be difficult to comply completely, but which I hope we will nonetheless be able to accommodate in a meaningful way.

The letter requests complete access to all Directorate of Operations files on the POW/MIA issue. While there is much routine data in such files, they also contain sensitive material that would identify sources and methods, which in some instances relate to ongoing intelligence activities. Because of that, I am reluctant to provide such unlimited access. Additionally, these files contain material provided by liaison services or third agencies of our government, for which we would have to request approval for the requested review.

I believe, however, that we can be supportive of the Committee's interest. Over the past months, we have regularly drawn material from these files in response to specific Committee requests and I understand this has proven to be a satisfactory arrangement with Committee staff. I can assure you that your staff will be provided access to available data in our operational files that is not source sensitive relative to its areas of specific interest.



The Honorable John F. Kerry

Concerning access to the President's Daily Brief, I am sure that you can appreciate the sensitive nature of this communication and the difficulty in providing access to this material to Committee staff. I have, however, asked that all items in that publication dealing with the POW/MIA issue be retrieved and that a chronology and summary of those items be prepared for staff review. In those instances in which an item was also published in the National Intelligence Daily, we will provide the Committee a copy of the latter. I trust this will be satisfactory. Your staff will be advised when the material is available.

An original of this letter is also being sent to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

C06001410

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

24 July 1992

The Honorable Bob Smith
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

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An original of this letter is also being sent to Chairman Kerry.

Sincerely,

Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

OCA 2461-92

SUBJECT: Letter to Kerry/Smith, POW/MIA re DO Files and PDB

OCA/Senate/RWMagner:jah (20 Jul 92)

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

(b)(3)(c)

OCA FILE: SSPOW
RECEIPT #:

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

6 August 1992
OCA 2653-92

Mr. J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Codinha:

Your letter of July 14, 1992 to the National Security Council asked, in part, that the CIA Inspector General review its files for any documents or reports on the POW/MIA issue. This letter is to advise you that such a search has been undertaken and no documents or reports responsive to your request have been found.

Sincerely,

[redacted]

Robert W. Magner
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

C06001414

OCA 2653-92

SUBJECT: Letter to Codinha, POW/MIA re IG Search

OCA/Senate/RWMagner:jah/ (6 Aug 92)

C06001416

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN WNINTEL~~

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

6 August 1992
OCA 0886-92/1

Mr. J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Codinha:

Enclosed is the analysis requested in your letter of July 13, 1992 regarding the photography dated January 22, 1988.

If you need anything further, please contact me.

Sincerely,

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

(b)(3)(c)

Downgrade to UNCLASSIFIED When
Separated From Enclosure

~~NOFORN WNINTEL~~
~~SECRET~~

OCA 0886-92/1

SUBJECT: Letter to Codinha, POW/MIA Cmte re July 13 Request Regarding Photography January 22, 1988

OCA/Senate/RWMagner:jah/ [redacted] (4 Aug 92) (b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

C06001416

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NOFORN WNINTEL

Central Intelligence Agency

30 July 1992

Washington, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Analysis of Surface Markings Near Muang Tan, Laos (C)

REFERENCE: Senate Select Committee Memo, dated 13 July 1992, Requesting Analysis [redacted] (C) (b)(3)(c)

1. [redacted] showed what appeared to be ground markings resembling possible numbers and letters in rice paddies 500 meters south of the village of Muang Tan, about 43 kilometers southeast of Xieng Khouang provincial town, on Highway 42. These markings resembled (depending on the orientation) "A5!", "K5!", "i5Y", or "iSY" in one rice paddy, and in the other paddy either "07" or "L0". (b)(3)(n) (b)(1) Although a conclusive assessment of the origin and the intent of these markings may never be achieved, recent analysis has provided some additional information that may be useful in determining whether or not these markings can be attributed to a possible American POW/MIA presence. (S NF WN)

2. [redacted] (S NF WN)

3. Our review [redacted] indicates that the possible markings most likely were associated with the rehabilitation of terraced rice paddy dikes.

- [redacted] shows the realignment of the rice paddy containing the possible markings resembling "07/L0". The "7/L" marking [redacted] actually resulted from a shadow cast by the rising sun on

(b)(3)(n) [redacted]

(b)(3)(c) Derivative Cl by [redacted] Declassify: [redacted] Derived From: [redacted]

NOFORN WNINTEL
SECRET

SUBJECT: Analysis of Surface Markings Near Muang Tan, Laos (C)

(b)(3)(n) (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

an angular but--at the time--disconnected section of terraced dike. [redacted] shows a completed dike with the "7/L"-shaped angle incorporated into a lengthier terrace. The "0" (actually resembling a square with rounded corners) had disappeared by [redacted] but one side of this round-cornered square had been incorporated into a new terrace dike. However, this shape routinely occurs throughout rice paddies in this region, and may represent a small diked area employed in the growing, harvesting, or processing of rice.

- Similar analysis of the [redacted] terraced rice paddy in which the possible "A5!/K5!/i5Y/iSY" marking was previously observed indicated that portions of the possible "5/S", the "!/i" and the "A/K/Y" were also part of an effort to rehabilitate and realign the dike. However, only a portion of the possible markings can readily be attributed to shadow caused by the buildup in height of a section of dike wall. The remainder may result from shadows in depressions--possibly caused by excavation of soil to rebuild the dike.

(b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

- [redacted] shows that much of the roughly 90,000 square meter paddy area containing the possible markings/shadows had been rehabilitated. The repair and rehabilitation of terraced paddies is a routine occurrence in Southeast Asia. This work generally occurs in the dry season (November through April), after the rice harvest. (S NF WN)

(b)(3)(n) (b)(1)

4. We also reviewed other sources to assess contemporaneous activity in the Xieng Khouang area in 1988.

- There was a small number of [redacted] reports during this time regarding either sightings or the lack of sightings of possible American POWs in Xieng Khouang Province. Evidence cited in many of these is inconclusive, and often contradictory.

(b)(3)(n) (b)(1)

- A few Soviet military advisors were involved--at least in the earlier stages--in a long-term effort beginning in

SUBJECT: Analysis of Surface Markings Near Muang Tan, Laos (C)

1975 to upgrade the Xieng Khouang (aka Thong Hai Hin) Airfield. Some probably were still in the area in 1988.

- The Lao resistance was active in Xieng Khouang Province in 1987-1988, although the small size of the insurgency limited it to hit-and-run attacks against government outposts in the countryside. This may account for some reports of unusual activity.

- In 1986, the US Embassy Vientiane reported on an ongoing ordnance disposal effort by the Mennonite Central Committee. The Mennonites reportedly were given access to Xieng Khouang Province (and the western sections of Savannakhet) beginning in 1977, but we are unaware if this access has produced any significant reporting of a possible POW/MIA presence. (S NF WN))

Attachments:
1. Explanation of Graphics
2. Line Drawing
3.
4.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

ATTACHMENT 1 OF 4

Explanation of Graphics of Possible POW/MIA Markings

The attached graphics are based on analysis of terrain features at two rice paddies in Laos. The black and white drawing (Attachment 2) provides a view of the estimated 90,000 square meter area in question, along with the drafter's representation of the possible markings present at that location. Attachments 3 and 4 are computer enhancements using color application to show variations in the appearance of possible markings against the paddy background. Attachments 3 and 4 have been subdivided into two images of the same location for comparison of the possible marking with and without the color enhancement. (C)

C06001416

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Attachment 2 of 4

Surface Markings
Muang Tan, Laos
22 January 1988

(b)(3)(c)



(b)(3)(c)

SECRET NOFORN

SECRET NOFORN WNINTEL

Enhancement of Markings in Rice Paddies Near Muang Tan, Laos



SECRET NOFORN WNINTEL

SECRET NOFORN WINTEL

Enhancement of Markings in Rice Paddies Near Muang Tan, Laos



SECRET NOFORN WINTEL

C06001416

	CONTROL #	DATE OF REQUEST
TO : D/OCA	OCA 0886-92/1	4 Aug 92
FROM : Bob Magner, DD/SA Via DD/OCA		SUSPENSE DATE

SUBJECT : Letter to Codinha, POW/MIA Cmte re 13 July request for analysis of photograph dated 22 Jan 88.

NOTES

COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices)

NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE

ACTION REQUIRED BY **D/OCA**

Signature please

FORM 2-86 4118 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

C06001416

OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS ROUTING SLIP

	ACTION	INFO
D/OCA		X
DD/OCA		X
SPECIAL ASSISTANT		
DD/LEGISLATION		
DD/SENATE	X	
DD/HOUSE		
DD/CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT		
DD/INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ISSUES		
CONSTITUENT INQUIRIES OFFICER		
FOIA/PA OFFICER		
SECURITY OFFICER		
OCA/COMPT/ISC		X

SUSPENSE 30 July 92
DATE

ACTION OFFICER:

REMARKS: VER

CONTROL NUMBER: OCA 0886-92

FILE:

FORM 3422
Nov-91

CIA-RDP
LOGGED
92

C06001416

JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS, Chairman
BOB SMITH, NEW HAMPSHIRE, Vice Chairman
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, SOUTH DAKOTA
JOHN McCAIN, ARIZONA
HARRY REID, NEVADA
HANK BROWN, COLORADO
CHARLES S. ROBB, VIRGINIA
CHUCK GRASSLEY, IOWA
J. ROBERT KERREY, NEBRASKA
NANCY L. ANDON KASSEBAUM, KANSAS
HERBERT H. KOHL, WISCONSIN
JESSE HELMS, NORTH CAROLINA
FRANCES A. ZWENIG, STAFF DIRECTOR
DINO CARLUCCIO, DEPUTY STAFF DIRECTOR
J. WILLIAM CODINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

July 13, 1992

Mr. Stanley Moskowitz, Director
Congressional Relations
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Moskowitz:

Your agency recently provided for this Committee an independent technical evaluation of photography, referred to as the "USA" photograph, pertaining to a site in Southeast Asia, dated 22 January 1988. We greatly appreciate the timeliness and detail with which you responded to our initial request.

Similarly, we ask that your agency perform an analysis of photography taken the same date, 22 January 1988, approximately 140km to the southwest (191345N 1033030E). This involves a larger area and number of possible man-made symbols. We again ask that CIA/OIA determine, from whatever photography available, the probable method of construction; whether the symbols appear to have been made at the same time or in stages; the probable identity of the symbols (letters or numbers); possible meaning of the symbols (i.e. military evader symbols); and contemporaneous activity in the immediate area.

Again, we ask that this be an independent CIA assessment, without consultation with DIA. If this assessment can be made available to the Committee by 31 July, it would be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

[redacted] (b)(6)

J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel

JWC/kb/bt

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

Viewing an archived action from

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Action

RESPONSE TO 26 FEBRUARY 1999 LETTER RE: DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW OF RECORDS OF THE U.S. SENATE - SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

Dcoument Number
OCA-022364-CNV

Date Received
06/03/1999

Task Instructions:
no value

Recipients

(b)(6)

Request Documents:

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	
Secondary OPI	(b)(3)(c)
From	
Other Document Number	
Comments	
File Code	
Media Type	
Codewords	
Attachments	
Keywords	
Copies	

U

Viewing an archived action from

C06002269

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OIM 99-0195
3 June 1999

[redacted]
Assistant Archivist for
Records Services
National Archives at College Park
8601 Adelphi Road
College Park, Maryland 20740-6001

(b)(6)

Reference: EO-1999-00116

Dear [redacted]

The following is in response to your 26 February 1999 letter regarding the declassification review of Records of the U.S. Senate - Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, your project numbers NND 982005 through 982026. The 22 boxes of approximately 4000 multi-page documents, comprising some 40,000 pages, began arriving in our offices in late April 1998. The final boxes were not received until the end of May. We have had the equivalent of one full-time employee dedicated to this project from late August 1998 to the present.

Our project continues in cooperation with the appropriate Agency components. We anticipate, given resources and competing litigation and special search demands, that all Agency originated, Senate Select Committee documents will have received a full re-review and be ready for release by the end of the calendar year. All documents that require referral to other government agencies will be tasked out shortly, with completion requested by 30 November 1999 so that those documents may be incorporated in the final delivery.

While we share with you and the Senate a strong commitment to making the maximum amount of declassified information available to the public as soon as possible, there are a record number of other large projects underway that demand our attention, and we remain subject to many other court orders. Our

[redacted]

limited resources must be stretched to accommodate all appropriate requests. Please convey my assurance to [redacted] that we will do all we can to speed the completion of this major project. (b)(6)

Sincerely,

[redacted] (b)(3)(c)

for Lee S. Strickland
Information and Privacy Coordinator

[redacted] (b)(6)

DA/OIM/LSSD/Jmaier:tak/31287 (3 June 1999)
s/da/oim/irgfrontoffice/general/tab/[redacted].doc (b)(3)(c)

[redacted] (b)(3)(c) (b)(6)

Viewing an archived action from [ ] Close

(b)(3)(c)

Action

5 MARCH 1999 SENATE MEMBER BRIEFING RE: POW/MIA

Dcoument Number: **OCA-019866-CNV**

Date Received: **03/05/1999**

Task Instructions:

no value

(b)(3)(c)

Request Documents: [ ]

Recipients

- MFR

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	
Secondary OPI	
From	
Other Document Number	
Comments	
File Code	
Media Type	
Codewords	
Attachments	
Keywords	
Copies	

(b)(3)(c)
(b)(6)

Viewing an archived action from [ ] Close (b)(3)(c)

C06002273

OCA Records

PRINTED: Wednesday, May 12, 1999
AT: 17:14

CODEWORDS:

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum for the Record

KEY: C/1999-00260

EVENT: MEMBER BRIEFING DATE: 03/05/1999 TIME: 9:00 STATUS: COMPLETED
PLACE: 407 SENATE
FOR: SEN
SUBJECT: POW/MIA

ATTENDEES:

(b)(3)(c)

ASSOCIATION	NAME	ROLE
	DZIATKIEWICZ, ELIZABETH ()	BRIEFER
	ELBERG, GRAEME ()	BRIEFER
	JANNOTTA, SHELLEY ()	BRIEFER
	MOORE, PATRICIA ()	BRIEFER
	SOTOS, MARY ANNE ()	BRIEFER
DCI/OCA		SUPPORT
DCI/OCA		SUPPORT
DOD	LAJOIE, MGEN, RONALD (DOD)	
SEN	SMITH, ROBERT (SEN)	

Executive Summary:

1) ~~(S NF~~ The purpose of the briefing was to respond to the major points raised in the 26 January 1999 letter to the DCI from Senators Bob Smith and John Warner (Smith is the head of the Vietnam Working Group on the US/Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs; the commission is chaired by General Roland LaJoie) requesting the following:

1) Access to a September 1996 report cited in the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate on the Vietnam POW/MIA issue;
2) Access to an August 1998 Top Secret memorandum dissem report which dealt with the alleged transfer of U.S. POWs to the Soviet Union from Vietnam during the Vietnam War;
3) Justification for the discrepancy in classification levels between the 1996 and 1998 reports;
4) An explanation as to why nearly two years elapsed before a follow-up report was generated on this matter.

(b)(3)(c)

2) ~~(S NF~~ A package of DO reports and were taken to the meeting for the Senator and General LaJoie to review on a read-and-return basis. The package included the following documents: 1) 10 October 1996, 2) 7 October 1996; 3) CIA 9 September 1998; and 4) DO Memorandum Intelligence Report 26 August 1998. Copies of these documents as well as the 26 January letter authored by Senators Rob Smith and John Warner are attached to this report.

3) ~~(S NF~~ As background, both the 1996 and the 1998 information originated from The August 1998 report recounts stories in circulation among KGB officers over the years that, during the Vietnam War, the KGB transported US POWs clandestinely from North Vietnam to Russia, where they were interrogated and pitched. The stories allege the KGB succeeded in recruiting one American POW who was a member of an American military intelligence service

(b)(3)(n)
(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

B-103H

(b)(6)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(3)(n)
(b)(1)

(b)(3)(n)
(b)(6)
(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] The [redacted] source had only indirect access to the information and no past reporting record on this issue. Efforts to flesh out the source's account resulted in limited additional details. A thorough review of EA, CE, and CIC records failed to identify any new information which corroborates the stories in the report.

(b)(3)(c)

4) ~~(S NF~~ [redacted] As background, both the 1996 and the 1998 information originated from [redacted] The August 1998 report recounts stories in circulation among KGB officers over the years that, during the Vietnam War, the KGB transported US POWs clandestinely from North Vietnam to Russia, where they were interrogated and pitched. The stories allege the KGB succeeded in recruiting one American POW who was a member of an American military intelligence service who had been involved in US intelligence operations [redacted] The [redacted] source had only indirect access to the information and no past reporting record on this issue. Efforts to flesh out the source's account resulted in limited additional details. A thorough review of EA, CE, and CIC records failed to identify any new information which corroborates the stories in the report.

Summary Text:

(b)(3)(c)

5) ~~(S NF~~ [redacted] As Senator Smith was delayed for approximately fifteen minutes, the briefers spent the time discussing a broad range of topics with General LaJoie. The General admitted he was not fully briefed on the subject of the meeting, but stated that he understood the core issue as being the transportation of US POWs captured during the Vietnam War to Russia for the purpose of being recruited as informants once they return to the United States. At this point, LaJoie is unconvinced that US POWs were sent to the Soviet Union during the Vietnam War. According to LaJoie, the Russians have admitted that a plan was drawn up between the Soviet and Vietnamese Governments to conduct such a program during the Vietnam War. To date, however, neither have the Russians provided any documentation detailing such a plan to the Commission nor has the Commission has found any evidence that would suggest such a program was carried out.

(b)(3)(c)

6) ~~(S NF~~ [redacted] In the case of the Korean War, however, the General believes that it is highly likely that US POWs were transported to Russia. The General believes exploitation by the Russians of US POWs occurred during this period, largely due to Stalin and his policies. The Russians continue to deny such any such transfers took place during the Korean War and the issue has yet to be resolved. Discussions continue on this matter between US and Russian negotiators.

(b)(3)(c)

7) ~~(S NF~~ [redacted] Other topics discussed with the General was his tenure with the Agency. He stated he enjoyed working with the Agency, adding that the Agency culture was very much like the military with its "can-do" spirit. He also identified himself as one the of the first pioneers in improving the working relationship between the Agency and the military. DCEA, who was directly involved in supporting the military during her assignment [redacted] discussed the Agency's evolving relationship with the military with the General until Senator Smith finally arrived for the meeting.

(b)(3)(n)
(b)(1)

(b)(3)(c)

8) ~~(S NF~~ [redacted] The Senator began the meeting by announcing the Agency refused to admit staff at this session, including Roger Schmaker, who had been specifically requested to participate by Senator Smith's personal office. Roger Schmaker is a DOD employee assigned to support the Commission, who, the Senator added, had the clearance level for this briefing (Top Secret) and had even had access to the two reports identified in his 26 January 1999 letter. [redacted] responded to the Senator by stating that in an effort to be as forthcoming as possible in this briefing, we had brought along a package of documentation for review. This package not only included the two reports but DO [redacted] related to this issue which neither Mr. Schmacker nor anyone else outside the Agency would normally have access. The Senator appeared to accept this explanation and began to review the four documents.

(b)(6)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(3)(c)

9) ~~(S NF~~ [redacted] Once the General and Senator had finished reviewing the documents, the briefing began with a discussion of the source information, [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

~~SECRET~~

(b)(3)(n)
(b)(1)

Details regarding the identities of the subsources or their access to the information provided in the 1996 and 1998 reports are not available. The briefers added that was not personally involved in interrogating American POWs and did not have access to interrogation reports. The briefers further explained that the two reports represented two separate meetings with the source, one which took place in mid-1996 and another follow-up meeting in July 1998 to address additional tasking from DPMO generated from the original report. The Senator asked if it would be possible for the Commission to provide questions to present to the source during future meetings to which the briefers replied this would not be a problem.

(b)(3)(c)

10) ~~(S NF~~ The Senator then asked why nearly two years elapsed before a follow-up report was generated on this matter. The briefers response was that the reasons for the long intervals between reports was due to the infrequency of the meetings with the source,

(b)(3)(n)
(b)(1)

(b)(3)(c)

11) ~~(S NF~~ The Senator then asked for the rationale behind updating the classification level of the second report disseminated in 1998 to "Top Secret" when the original 1996 report was classified only as "Secret." The briefers explained that the reason the second report was classified "Top Secret" was due to source protection.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

The upgrade of the classification level was because we wanted to be able to provide as detailed an account as possible of the source chain of the information, while still allowing adequate source protection.

(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(c)

12) ~~(S NF~~ The discussion then jumped to a review of agency career and experience as a POW during the Vietnam War as well as connection with the Agency's program ran in the 1950's. agency career began in 1949. Weaver held a number of positions in the Agency, That said, there is no information available which directly connects to

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

In addition, after a considerable investigation it was determined that was never recruited or cooperated with any foreign intelligence service during the period that he was a POW during the Vietnam War.

(b)(6)
(b)(3)(n)
(b)(1)

(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(c)

13) ~~(S NF~~ CIC officer described incarceration by the Vietnamese as cruel and difficult. The Vietnamese were aware of intelligence affiliation and consequently, was often held in solitary confinement and treated very badly by the guards. In order to stay alive, provided information to the Vietnamese on cases that he knew had been long terminated; however, when that was not possible he altered the information to make it misleading or incorrect. There is no indication in files to show hat he was ever interrogated by the Vietnamese about also reported just after the POW's had been notified that they were to be released, he was dressed up and taken to a building in Hanoi for a meeting. In addition to several Vietnamese officers, a European-looking man was in attendance. He was not introduced, however deduced over the next few hours that the individual was probably a Soviet intelligence officer. stated that the meeting could be described as a rapport building session. He was not questioned about cases and did not volunteer any such information. When the group broke for lunch, and his captors told him he would be meeting this person again in the afternoon, refused. This one brief meeting was the only session had with the individual he believed might be a Soviet intelligence officer. While was on extended leave following his release, the Soviets placed a postcard in mailbox referring to the meeting in Hanoi and stating that if he knew what was good for him, he would follow their directions for a meeting. reported the incident to the Agency immediately. He did not follow-up on this contact.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(3)(c)

(b)(3)(c)

14) ~~(S NF~~ also advised that the Agency had no information on current status as the Agency had no further contact with once he retired from the Agency in 1976.

(b)(3)(c)

~~SECRET~~

(b)(3)(c)

~~SECRET~~

15) ~~(S NF~~ [redacted] Senator Smith specifically expressed an interest in pursuing the information provided in [redacted] (b)(3)(c) [redacted] paragraph 4 identifying the Khabarovsk or Vladivostok regions as sites where US POWs were reportedly taken within the Soviet Union during the Vietnam War. The Senator asked if it would be possible for him and his commission colleagues to follow-up on this information during their next trip to Russia. The briefers attempted to explain that, in order to protect the source of the information, the commission could act on this information only if it could show that it had received this collaborating information from other venues. General Lajoie, largely due to his past Agency experience, seemed to grasp this concept fairly quickly; however, the Senator appeared unconvinced.

(b)(3)(c)

16) ~~(S NF~~ [redacted] The Senator also questioned the need for comments from [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) [redacted] on the contents of the report, suggesting that such comments actually politicized DO reporting. In response, the briefers explained "comment procedures" on DO reporting, [redacted] [redacted]

(b)(3)(c)

17) ~~(S NF~~ [redacted] In closing, Senator Smith asked DCEA [redacted] if she had had an opportunity to review his assessment of the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Vietnamese intentions, capabilities, and performance concerning the POW/MIA issue and if so, what where her comments on his assessment. In response, DCEA advised that she understood the DCI responded to his concerns via a recent letter and she had no other comments to add to the DCI response. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

(b)(3)(c) [redacted]

Liaison Officer
Office of Congressional Affairs

DCI/OCA/CLG/NCBroadbent:pnr/37922(12 May 99)

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

(b)(3)(c)

DAC 99-00582

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING SHEET

1. CONTROL NUMBER: DAC 99-00582	**2. SUSPENSE DATE:**
3. SUBJECT: Letter to Senator Smith	
4. ORIGINATION OFFICE: NIC, 7E62 OHB, 37322	**5.DATE:** 29 January 1999

6. PURPOSE:
Responds Letter to Senator Smith

7. SUMMARY:

8. COORDINATION:

9. RECOMMENDATION:

(b)(3)(c)

10. DATE IN:	11. ROUTE TO	12. ACTION (Check a Box)	13. NONCONCUR REASON	14. DATE OUT:
	TITLE	☐ SIGNATURE ☐ CONCUR ☐ FYI		
1/29/99		☐ SIGNATURE ☑ CONCUR ☐ FYI		2/2/99
FEB 03 1999		☐ SIGNATURE ☐ CONCUR ☐ FYI		FEB 03 1999
FEB 03 1999		☐ SIGNATURE ☐ CONCUR ☐ FYI		2/4/99
FEB 04 1999		☐ SIGNATURE ☐ CONCUR ☐ FYI		FEB 17 1999
Feb 17th	SIGNATURE	☐ SIGNATURE ☐ CONCUR ☐ FYI		
	TITLE	☐ SIGNATURE ☐ CONCUR ☐ FYI	L-225	DCI EXEC REG CENTER
	SIGNATURE			

FORM 4-97 4468 (EF)

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

CL BY:
CL REASON:
DECL ON:
DRV FROM:

C06002274

File

DCI ACTION CENTER
ROUTING SLIP

		ACTION	INFO			ACTION	INFO
1	DCI		X	11	OPA		
2	DDCI		X	12	DDA		
3	DDCI/CM			13	DDI		
4	ADCI/MS		E-Copy	14	DDO		
5	EXDIR/CIA			15	DDS&T		
6	CHMN/NIC		E-Copy	16	A/NIO/EA		X
7	IG			17			
8	GC			18			
9	COMPT			19			
10	OCA		X	20			

SUSPENSE DATE: N/A

DOCUMENT NO: DAC 00390-99 (b)(3)(c)

Action Officer:

COORDINATION/ROUTING:

No written response necessary. FYI only.

SUMMARY:

FYI copy of letter from Samuel Berger in response to The Honorable Robert Smith's (Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Ethics) recent letter regarding the NIE on the Vietnam POW/MIA issue.

Date: 26 January 1999
Received in DAC: 26 January 1999

C06002274

DA C-00390-99

CONGRESSIONAL CORRESPONDENCE ACTION PLAN

	Suspense Date	Control Number

ACTION: Please forward response as indicated below to OCA for coordination and transmittal.

☐ **Prepare a response for DCI signature.**

Lead Action Office:

Information Copies:

☐ **Prepare a response for D/OCA signature.**

Lead Action Office:

Information Copies:

☑ **NO WRITTEN RESPONSE NECESSARY**

Lead Office: NIC, A/NZO - East Asia

Follow-Up Action:

Information Copies: Special Counsel, Ken Levit

OCA ACTION OFFICER: ADCI-MS,

Advance Copies Provided To: OCA/FO, CIDE

Comments:

(b)(3)(c)

Form 7-98 4499 (EF) Obsolete Previous Editions

C06002274

SECRET/NOFORN

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

17 February 1999

The Honorable Bob Smith
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Smith:

(S NF) As I promised in my letter of 17 December, I convened the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB)—senior leaders of the Intelligence Community—on 19 January to discuss your extensive critique of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Vietnam's performance on the POW/MIA issue.

(S NF) The NFIB members, after a full discussion, voted unanimously to let this Estimate stand. They stressed that this is not a traditional estimate that attempts to get beyond current intelligence to make judgments about the future. Rather, we were tasked to review as best we could scarce information of varying reliability to make judgments about the current behavior of the Vietnamese government. NFIB principals continue to believe that the published NIE fulfills this mandate, and that it makes clear both the gaps and the methodologies used to assess what information we do have.

(S NF) Dealing with critical gaps in information, as you know, is a constant of the intelligence analysis business. We must be prepared to weigh the impact of new information or fresh challenges to our assumptions. NFIB members want to assure you that any new information will be provided to those responsible for dealing with the POW/MIA question. The NIE remains an accurate assessment of our current knowledge and understanding of the issue.

(b)(3)(c)



SECRET/NOFORN

The Honorable Bob Smith

(S NF) NFIB members again commended both the senior analyst who supervised the drafting of this NIE and the rigorous interagency process that made this Estimate an Intelligence Community product, not the work of a single author. NFIB members emphasized that they fully accept the testimony of the professional officers who worked on this project that, at all times, they "called it as they saw it" in developing their judgments. I accept their word, and that of NFIB members, that there was at no time any effort to distort judgments from outside or inside the Community.

(U) In closing, let me again express our deep commitment to a full accounting of those missing from the Vietnam War. I can assure you that the Intelligence Community is working hard to achieve this objective.

Sincerely,

George J. Tenet

C06002274

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

The Honorable Bob Smith

(b)(3)(c)

DCI/NIC/[redacted]:mmc/[redacted] (1 Feb 99)



~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

C06002275

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

Viewing an archived action from [redacted]

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(b)(3)(c)

Action

RESPONSE TO 25 NOVEMBER 1998 LETTER RE: NIE ON VIETNAMESE INTENTIONS, CAPABILITIES AND PERFORMANCE CONCERNING POW/MIA ISSUES

Dcoument Number: **OCA-019711-CNV**

Date Received: **12/17/1998**

Task Instructions:

no value

Request Documents: [redacted]

Recipients

- SEN. BOB SMITH

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	[redacted]
Secondary OPI	
From	
Other Document Number	
Comments	
File Code	
Media Type	
Codewords	
Attachments	
Keywords	
Copies	

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Viewing an archived action from [redacted]

(b)(3)(c)

(b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

3/11/2013

C06002275

SECRET/NOFORN

(b)(3)

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

17 December 1998

The Honorable Bob Smith
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Smith:

(S NF) I appreciate the concern expressed in your letter of 25 November 1998 about the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning POW/MIA Issues. I recognize your long-standing interest in the issue, as well as your tireless efforts on behalf of military personnel and their families. I assure you that the Intelligence Community will seriously consider your criticism and suggestions. I agree that we owe the families of POWs and MIAs our best effort.

(S NF) As you know, Intelligence Community Principals in the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), which I chair, discussed and approved the estimate on 13 April 1998. I have directed that your evaluation of the NIE be placed on the agenda for the NFIB now scheduled for January. I will inform you of the results.

Sincerely,

George J. Tenet

(b)(3)(c)

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET/NOFORN

DCI/OCA/CLG/[redacted] pnr/[redacted] (7 Dec 98)
OCA 98-1663
FN: WDATA/liaison/[redacted] doc

(b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

Viewing an archived action from Extral Close

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Action

FYI COPY OF LETTER RE: RESPONSE OF NIE ON THE VIETNAM POW/MIA ISSUE

Dcoument Number: **OCA-000095-CNV**

Date Received: **01/19/1999**

Task Instructions:

no value

Request Documents: I97NB5FU.TIF

Recipients

- CHAIRMAN ROBERT SMITH

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	oca_cdocs_lib
Secondary OPI	no value
From	SAMUEL BERGER
Other Document Number	
Comments	MEA
File Code	L-303
Media Type	PP
Codewords	
Attachments	
Keywords	
Copies	

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Viewing an archived action from Extral Close

C06002276

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 19, 1999

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your recent letter on the National Intelligence Estimate published earlier this year that assessed Vietnam's commitment to accounting fully for Americans missing in action during the Vietnam conflict, and examined Russian documents that -- if accurate -- would bring into question whether all American prisoners of war were released in 1973.

First, let me say that I appreciate your careful and detailed examination of this estimate. George Tenet has indicated that he welcomes such scrutiny as essential to helping make sure our intelligence agencies maintain the highest standards of research and analysis on issues that are critical to our national security. Indeed, he has mandated that more rigorous "red teaming" be incorporated into future estimates on such issues. In this particular instance, I understand he is placing your critique on the agenda for the next meeting of the Intelligence Community body that originally approved the Vietnam POW/MIA estimate.

I believe it important to note that the estimate was drafted by experts who represent our intelligence agencies' collective wisdom on the POW/MIA issue. They worked in accord with long-standing procedures governing finished intelligence assessments. They laid out a methodology and noted problems or gaps in available information. Their product was reviewed by some of our most senior intelligence officers, and released ultimately under the authority of the DCI himself. We depend on this process to yield informed, balanced and unbiased assessments on key foreign policy matters.

For this reason, I must take exception to any suggestion that I or any member of the National Security Council staff sought to influence the judgments reached by the Intelligence Community in this estimate. Each of us at the NSC understands the importance of ensuring that our intelligence agencies conduct their work in this objective fashion, without outside interference. The best

interests of the military and the country demand that we endeavor to achieve the best analysis of the facts and then tailor our policy to these facts, rather than vice versa.

Let me take this opportunity to underscore the President's personal commitment to the fullest possible accounting of our POWs and MIAs as the cornerstone of his Vietnam policy. This Administration will continue to work with the Government of Vietnam, and dedicate our own resources, to ensure that this goal is achieved. With the help of dedicated individuals such as yourself, I am confident that we will succeed.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

Samuel R. Berger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

The Honorable Robert C. Smith
Chairman
Select Committee on Ethics
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

C06002279
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(b)(3)(c)

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(b)(3)(c)

Action

DCI letter to Senator Smith regarding POW/MIA NIE

Dcoument Number **DAC-00582-99**

Date Received **02/17/1999**

Task Instructions: (b)(3)(c)

no value

Request Documents: [redacted]

Recipients

- Senator Bob Smith

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	[redacted]
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Keywords	
Copies	

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Viewing an archived action from [redacted]

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3/11/2013

C06002279

SECRET/NOFORN

OCA Records

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

17 December 1998

OCA 98-1663

The Honorable Bob Smith
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Smith:

(S NF) I appreciate the concern expressed in your letter of 25 November 1998 about the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning POW/MIA Issues. I recognize your long-standing interest in the issue, as well as your tireless efforts on behalf of military personnel and their families. I assure you that the Intelligence Community will seriously consider your criticism and suggestions. I agree that we owe the families of POWs and MIAs our best effort.

(S NF) As you know, Intelligence Community Principals in the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), which I chair, discussed and approved the estimate on 13 April 1998. I have directed that your evaluation of the NIE be placed on the agenda for the NFIB now scheduled for January. I will inform you of the results.

Sincerely,

George J. Tenet

(b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

SECRET/NOFORN

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C06002279

SECRET/NOFORN

DCI/OCA/CLG/[redacted]:pnr/[redacted] (7 Dec 98)
OCA 98-1663
FN: WDATA/liaison[redacted].doc

(b)(3)(c)



SECRET/NOFORN

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(b)(3)(c)

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Action

25 NOVEMBER 1998 LETTER REQUESTING THAT THE POW/MIA NIE BE RECALLED

Dcoument Number: OCA-02495-00

Date Received: 11/25/1998

Task Instructions:

no value

Request Documents:

Recipients

- GEORGE TENET

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	
Secondary OPI	
From	
Other Document Number	
Comments	
File Code	
Media Type	
Codewords	
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Keywords	
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Viewing an archived action from

C06002280

OCA 00-02495

H/C 4050
4:30pm

11/30/98

BOB SMITH
NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-2903

November 25, 1998

The Honorable George Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence
Chairman, National Foreign Intelligence Board
Room 7D56, CIA Headquarters

Dear George:

Please find enclosed a copy of ***A Critical Assessment*** concerning the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the Vietnam POW/MIA issue. This assessment was prepared by my office following your declassification and public release of the Key Judgments portion of the NIE this past August.

I am making four requests of you with this letter. First, I request that you convene, in the next 60 days, a meeting of the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) to consider my request that the referenced NIE be retracted for the reasons noted in my attached assessment.

Second, I urge you in the strongest possible terms to personally read the NIE, and then read my assessment of the NIE, before acting on my retraction request. I think you will agree with me that there are serious problems with the NIE. The problems can either be attributed to shoddy research or a deliberate, pre-determined strategy to discredit relevant information. In either case, it's a sad commentary on the U.S. Intelligence Community.

Third, I request that a copy of my assessment of the NIE be disseminated to those who have already received the NIE itself, and I request that I be notified as to who those people are. I would be pleased to assist you in disseminating my assessment. And fourth, I request that both my assessment and the remaining portions of the NIE be processed for declassification immediately.

I look forward to hearing from you as soon as possible, and I trust you will consider the concerns and requests I am raising with you in a thoughtful and serious manner. Finally, please know that I am available to meet with you at any time to discuss this matter further.

With warm regards,

Bob Smith

BOB SMITH, U.S.S.

Unclassified when separated from classified enclosure

L-309 (P)

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(b)(3)(c)

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Action

RESPONSE RE: REQUEST FOR DECLASSIFICATION OF NIE: VIETNAMESE INTENTIONS, CAPABILITIES, AND PERFORMANCE CONCERNING THE POW/MIA ISSUE

Dcoument Number: **OCA-008541-CNV**

Date Received: **08/03/1998**

Task Instructions:

no value

Request Documents:

Recipients

- SENATORS KERRY/KERREY/MCCAIN/GLENN/CLELAND/HA

Additional Document Metadata

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From	
Other Document Number	
Comments	
File Code	
Media Type	
Codewords	
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Keywords	
Copies	

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Viewing an archived action from

C06002344

NIC 98-2771

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

August 3, 1998

The Honorable John Kerry
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Kerry:

In response to your request of 22 July 1998, I have decided to declassify, in full, the Key Judgments of NIE 98-03, **Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue**. In reaching this decision, I had to balance the legitimate interest of the public in this issue, including our common objective in resolving remaining uncertainties, and my obligation to protect intelligence sources and methods. These Key Judgments, which are available to the public, are reflected in the enclosure.

I believe declassification of the remaining text of the NIE would be inappropriate at this time, and perhaps harmful to efforts to recover MIA remains and resolve other open questions concerning the fates of Americans who remain unaccounted for. In my view, the release of the full text of the NIE could actually harm cooperation with Vietnamese and other officials whose work has been vital to successful remains recovery operations. For example, many of those identified as "cooperative" with US officials might be less willing or able to be so if their roles were publicized. Similarly, many American officials who cooperated in the preparation of the classified NIE did so with the expectation that their views would be kept out of the public record.

1-9.15

The Honorable John Kerry

This NIE was specifically requested as an intelligence product, accessing the full array of information available to the Intelligence Community. As such, there are portions which involve sources and methods that would be damaged if it were released in full. A heavily redacted document would prevent some of this damage, but of itself would then spur interest in and demands for what was not released. Furthermore, in some cases the remaining text would not support some of the key judgments.

Of course, we will make the document available and brief interested Members of Congress through established channels.

Sincerely,



George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

The Honorable John Kerry



C06002344

NIC 98-2771

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

August 3, 1998

The Honorable J. Robert Kerrey
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Kerrey:

In response to your request of 22 July 1998, I have decided to declassify, in full, the Key Judgments of NIE 98-03, Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue. In reaching this decision, I had to balance the legitimate interest of the public in this issue, including our common objective in resolving remaining uncertainties, and my obligation to protect intelligence sources and methods. These Key Judgments, which are available to the public, are reflected in the enclosure.

I believe declassification of the remaining text of the NIE would be inappropriate at this time, and perhaps harmful to efforts to recover MIA remains and resolve other open questions concerning the fates of Americans who remain unaccounted for. In my view, the release of the full text of the NIE could actually harm cooperation with Vietnamese and other officials whose work has been vital to successful remains recovery operations. For example, many of those identified as "cooperative" with US officials might be less willing or able to be so if their roles were publicized. Similarly, many American officials who cooperated in the preparation of the classified NIE did so with the expectation that their views would be kept out of the public record.

The Honorable J. Robert Kerrey

This NIE was specifically requested as an intelligence product, accessing the full array of information available to the Intelligence Community. As such, there are portions which involve sources and methods that would be damaged if it were released in full. A heavily redacted document would prevent some of this damage, but of itself would then spur interest in and demands for what was not released. Furthermore, in some cases the remaining text would not support some of the key judgments.

Of course, we will make the document available and brief interested Members of Congress through established channels.

Sincerely,



George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

Central Intelligence Agency

The Honorable J. Robert Kerrey

Washington, D.C. 20505



C06002344

NIC 98-2771

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

August 3, 1998

The Honorable John McCain
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator McCain:

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The Honorable John McCain

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Sincerely,

George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

The Honorable John McCain



C06002344

NIC 98-2771

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

August 3, 1998

The Honorable John Glenn
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Glenn:

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The Honorable John Glenn

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Sincerely,

George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

The Honorable John Glenn



C06002344

NLC 98-27

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

August 3, 1998

The Honorable Max Cleland
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Cleland:

In response to your request of 22 July 1998, I have decided to declassify, in full, the Key Judgments of NIE 98-03, Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue. In reaching this decision, I had to balance the legitimate interest of the public in this issue, including our common objective in resolving remaining uncertainties, and my obligation to protect intelligence sources and methods. These Key Judgments, which are available to the public, are reflected in the enclosure.

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The Honorable Max Cleland

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Sincerely,

George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

The Honorable Max Cleland



C06002344

NLC 98-277

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

August 3, 1998

The Honorable Chuck Hagel
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Hagel:

In response to your request of 22 July 1998, I have decided to declassify, in full, the Key Judgments of NIE 98-03, Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue. In reaching this decision, I had to balance the legitimate interest of the public in this issue, including our common objective in resolving remaining uncertainties, and my obligation to protect intelligence sources and methods. These Key Judgments, which are available to the public, are reflected in the enclosure.

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The Honorable Chuck Hagel

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Of course, we will make the document available and brief interested Members of Congress through established channels.

Sincerely,

George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

The Honorable Chuck Hagel



ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

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Action

CIA RESPONSE TO CDA REGARDING POW/MIA DOCUMENTS(NOTE-ATTACHMENTS NOT SCANNED)

Dcoument Number: OCA-02821-00

Date Received: 10/02/2000

Task Instructions:

no value

Request Documents:

Recipients

- R. SHELBY/R. BRYAN

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	
Secondary OPI	
From	
Other Document Number	
Comments	
File Code	
Media Type	
Codewords	
Attachments	
Keywords	
Copies	

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C06002345

Central Intelligence Agency

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2000-1420
2 October 2000

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

(U) Enclosed is CIA's response to a Congressionally Directed Action contained in the Classified Annex of the FY2000 Intelligence Authorization Conference Report. The CDA directed the Agency to compile a list of POW/MIA documents relating to the Vietnam War that have not been made available to the public.

(U) Please note that--for ease of handling--the first 557 documents of the 561 listed have been classified as SECRET, while the last four listings are on a separate page and are classified as TOP SECRET.

(U) If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call or have your staff call [redacted] of my staff on [redacted] A copy of this letter is also being sent to Vice Chairman Bryan.

Sincerely,

[redacted]

John H. Moseman
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure:
POW/MIA Document List ~~(TS)~~

[redacted]

Classification is UNCLASSIFIED
When Separated from Enclosures

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

OCA 00-02821

OCA 00-14208/1

TOP SECRET



C06002345

Central Intelligence Agency
TOP SECRET

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2000-1420/1
2 October 2000

The Honorable Richard H. Bryan
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

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Sincerely,

[redacted]

John H. Moseman
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure:
POW/MIA Document List (TS)

Classification is UNCLASSIFIED
When Separated from Enclosures

[redacted]

TOP SECRET

Viewing an archived action from [ ] Close

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Action

(OCA 01-00541) CLARIFYING COMMENT RE: JOINT REPORT ON POW/MIA

Dcoument Number: OCA-00541-01

Date Received: 09/27/2000

Task Instructions:

no value

Request Documents: [ ]

Recipients

- SSCI: RICHARD SHELBY

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	
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From	
Other Document Number	
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Media Type	
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Keywords	
Copies	

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[ ] 3/11/2013

C06002346

OCA 01-00541

SEP-28-2000 12:30 INTEL-REVIEW-DIRECTORATE- P.02/02

D/OCA
DD/OCA
DD-NSL/OCA
EA/OCA

Will accompany the CD Rom version which SSCI intends to post on the internet today, 10/2/00.



SEP 27 '00

Honorable Richard C. Shelby
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-6475

(b)(3)(c)

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Attached is a clarifying comment that should go with the unclassified version of our Joint Report entitled, "A Review of the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate on POW/MIA Issues and the Charges Levied by a *Critical Assessment* of the Estimate (1999-5974-IG) (00-OIR-04)," dated February 29, 2000.

Additionally, an earlier modification, with the attached clarification, will be sent to all recipients of the classified report through appropriate Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency secure channels. Your Committee is one such recipient.

This concludes our efforts on this issue requested by you on March 8, 1999.

A similar letter has been provided to Vice Chairman Bryan.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

L. Britt Snider
Inspector General
Central Intelligence Agency

Donald Mancuso
Acting Inspector General
Department of Defense

Attachment

POW/MIA

TOTAL P.02

SEP 27 2000

Honorable Richard H. Bryan
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-6475

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

Attached is a clarifying comment that should go with the unclassified version of our Joint Report entitled, "A Review of the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate on POW/MIA Issues and the Charges Levied by a *Critical Assessment* of the Estimate (1999-5974-IG) (00-OIR-04)," dated February 29, 2000.

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A similar letter has been provided to Chairman Shelby.

(b)(3)(c) Sincerely, (b)(6)

L. Britt Snider
Inspector General
Central Intelligence Agency

Donald Mancuso
Acting Inspector General
Department of Defense

Attachment

Clarifying Comment

to

The ***Unclassified*** Version of

A JOINT REPORT
A REVIEW OF THE 1998 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON
POW/MIA ISSUES AND THE CHARGES LEVIED BY
A *CRITICAL ASSESSMENT* OF THE ESTIMATE
(1999-5974-IG)
(00-0IR-04)
29 February 2000

THIS COMMENT PERTAINS TO THE SECTION "MEETING WITH DPMO ANALYSTS" AT PAGE 29 OF THE JOINT REPORT:

By way of clarification, the matter of a possible security violation was outside the scope of our review. It should be noted, however, that during the time that we were researching this report, we discovered no information that supports the perception that the Joint Commission or its support directorate within DPMO violated appropriate security regulations. Additionally, we did not consider the appropriateness of the relationship between the JCSD and the Joint Commission, created in 1992 by the United States and the Russian Federation, as it also was outside the scope of this review.

C06002354
ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

(b)(3)(c)

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Action

ADCI/MS Response to Senator Shelby's POW/MIA Letter

Dcoument Number: DAC-03848-00

Date Received: 09/01/2000

Task Instructions:

no value

Request Documents: [ ]

Recipients

- ADCI/MS [ ]

Additional Document Metadata

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Other Document Number	
Comments	
File Code	
Media Type	
Codewords	
Attachments	
Keywords	
Copies	

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C06002354

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2000-1381
1 September 2000

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am responding on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence to your letter of 24 July 2000 requesting a chronological listing of classified information or documents in the CIA's possession pertaining to U.S. military personnel listed as prisoner, missing, or unaccounted for since 1965. This letter will also serve as the response of the Directors of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) and the National Security Agency (NSA), in an effort to update you concisely on Intelligence Community-wide efforts relating to the Committee's request.

I must report, however, that full compliance with the Committee's request by the specified 29 August 2000 deadline proved impossible, given its massive scope. Nevertheless, CIA, NIMA, and NSA are all engaged in a variety of efforts, summarized below, that we believe will go a long way towards prompt satisfaction of what your staff has indicated are two central interests of the Committee in connection with the overall request. The summary states, in particular, that the CIA's listing of Speicher-related disseminations, and withheld Vietnam POW/MIA documents will be provided imminently. CIA and the other affected agencies will provide additional responsive material by the specified target dates. We believe this approach will get as much relevant information to the Committee as quickly as possible. I trust that this procedure and the summary that follows will assist the Committee in meeting its oversight responsibilities.

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby

Gulf War (Speicher)

- DIA has provided CIA a detailed draft assessment of intelligence relating to LDCR Speicher and is currently working with CIA to produce a coordinated Intelligence Community assessment. I will submit DIA's findings to the Committee in mid-September 2000.

- CIA is preparing a listing of disseminated classified materials relating to LCDR Michael Speicher. CIA anticipates completing this by 29 September 2000.

- NIMA has recently completed a review of imagery that may help corroborate information provided by intelligence sources concerning the status of LCDR Speicher. NIMA anticipates completing the analysis of this reviewed imagery by 1 November 2000.

- I have been informed that a joint DoD/CIA Inspector General review of Intelligence Community support to the Speicher case is currently being prepared and will be delivered to the Committee this Fall.

- NSA has completed several extensive searches for information on LCDR Speicher and has not located any information.

Vietnam

- CIA is expediting the completion of the Congressionally Directed Action (CDA) to compile a listing of those POW/MIA documents that were identified as a result of Executive Order 12812 but withheld from release. Although the deadline for the CDA is January 1st, 2001, CIA anticipates being completed by 15 September 2000.

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby

- NSA is reviewing and declassifying over 20,000 pages of NSA-originated records and approximately 3,000 pages of records which were originated by other agencies but contain NSA equities as part of the NARA declassification review. NSA anticipates completing this task by 31 December 2000.

- CIA is also engaged in a major effort to review and declassify over 900 CIA-originated documents from the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs collection held at NARA. CIA anticipates completing this task by 31 July 2001.

Please be assured that the Intelligence Community fully shares your sense of the priority and importance of all POW/MIA matters. The IC is committed to working with you and members of your staff to satisfy the Committee's request as quickly and completely as possible given the need to maintain each agency's ability to meet its core mission-related responsibilities at the appropriate operations tempo.

As the ADCI/MS, I have a strong personal interest in making sure that the POW/MIA issue receives the highest priority in the Intelligence Community and I stand ready to discuss these issues with you at your earliest convenience. Please contact me if you have any questions, or have a member of your staff contact [redacted] from the Office of Congressional Affairs on [redacted].

Sincerely,

[redacted]

Major Gen. John H. Campbell
Associate Director of Central Intelligence
for Military Support

C06002354

DAC-03848-00
OCA00-02668
OCA-00-1381



POW/MIA

C06002257
ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

(b)(3)(c)

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Action

LETTERS TO SHELBY AND BRYAN FROM DCI ON POW/MIA ISSUES AND THE DECLASSIFYING OF THE NIE AND THE CRITICAL ASSESSMENT, MARCH 24, 2000

Dcoument Number: **DAC-01430-00**

Date Received: **03/24/2000**

Task Instructions:

no value

Recipients

- Shelby/Bryan

Request Documents: [ ]

Additional Document Metadata

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Other Document Number		
Comments		
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Media Type		
Codewords		
Attachments		
Keywords		
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C06002357

DAC

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO DAC- 01430-00

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

IG 2000-0317
24 March 2000

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your 8 March 2000 letter requesting that the Inspector General prepare an unclassified version of the joint Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Report entitled "A Review of the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate on POW/MIA Issues and the Charges Levied by *A Critical Assessment* of the Estimate."

CIA and relevant agencies whose classified documents were used in the Report are in the process of declassifying the National Intelligence Estimate and the *Critical Assessment*. This process will be completed soon and will facilitate declassification of the Inspector General's Report. While this will not be accomplished by the end of the month as you requested, we will proceed as expeditiously as possible.

An identical letter is being provided to Vice Chairman Bryan.

Sincerely,

George J. Tenet

George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby

OIG/IG/[redacted]tw (21 Mar 00) [redacted]
DCI/OIG/SRS/IG Staff/POWMIA/dci_shelby_bryan.doc

[redacted]

C06002357

DAC

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

IG 2000-0318
24 March 2000

The Honorable Richard H. Bryan
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

This is in response to your 8 March 2000 letter requesting that the Inspector General prepare an unclassified version of the joint Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Report entitled "A Review of the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate on POW/MIA Issues and the Charges Levied by *A Critical Assessment* of the Estimate."

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Sincerely,

George J. Tenet

George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

The Honorable Richard H. Bryan

OIG/IG [redacted] tw (21 Mar 00) [redacted]
DCI/OIG/SRS/IG Staff/POWMIA/dci_shelby_bryan2.doc

[redacted]

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(b)(3)(c)

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Action

SSCI REQUEST FOR IG TO DECLASSIFY THE POW/MIA NIE & PREPARE AN UNCLASSIFIED VERSION (NOTE: UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ATTACHED TO LETTER)

Dcoument Number **OCA-00288-00**

Date Received **03/08/2000**

Task Instructions:

no value

Recipients

- DCI: TENET

Request Documents: [ ]

Additional Document Metadata

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[ ] 3/11/2013

C06002378

RICHARD C. SHELBY, ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN
RICHARD H. BRYAN, NEVADA, VICE CHAIRMAN
RICHARD G. LUGAR, INDIANA
JON KYL, ARIZONA
JAMES M. INHOFE, OKLAHOMA
ORRIN G. HATCH, UTAH
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NICHOLAS ROSTOW, STAFF DIRECTOR
ALFRED CUMMING, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
KATHLEEN P. McGHEE, CHIEF CLERK

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475

SSCI #2000-1153-A

March 8, 2000

The Honorable George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Director:

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence requests that you direct the Inspector General to prepare an unclassified version of the Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency Joint Report entitled, "A Review of the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate on POW/MIA Issues and the Charges Levied by A Critical Assessment of the Estimate" (1999-5974-IG)(00-OIR-04) dated February 29, 2000. The Committee believes that much information in the report can and should be declassified. We therefore request that you direct the IG to scrutinize the report to ensure that as much as possible is declassified.

A copy of this unclassified version should be provided to this Committee by March 30, 2000. Thank you for your attention to this matter.

An identical copy of this letter is being sent to Secretary of Defense William Cohen.

Sincerely,

Richard Shelby

Richard C. Shelby
Chairman

Richard H. Bryan
Vice Chairman

cc: The Honorable William S. Cohen
The Honorable L. Britt Snider, CIA Inspector General

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

(b)(3)(c)

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Action

CIA RESPONSE TO SSCI REGARDING REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE POW/MIA ISSUE

Dcoument Number: OCA-50208-99

Date Received: 07/21/1999

Task Instructions:

no value

Request Documents: [ ]

Recipients

- SSCI: R. SHELBY/R. KERREY

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	
Secondary OPI	
From	
Other Document Number	
Comments	
File Code	
Media Type	
Codewords	
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[ ] 3/11/2013

C06002379

Central Intelligence Agency

OCA 99-5020B

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 99-1357
21 July 1999

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

(U) On behalf of DCI Tenet, thank you for your letter of 24 June 1999 requesting CIA assistance in furnishing to the Committee four POW/MIA-related documents for review by Senator Bob Smith in support of his position as Chairman of the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on POW and MIAs Vietnam War Working Group. As discussed earlier with the Staff Director of the SSCI, the first three documents are indeed CIA material and we have assembled this material for review. Due to the sensitivity of this material; however, we request that SSCI staff review this material at CIA Headquarters at their convenience. Should Senator Smith wish to review this material at any time in the future, an Agency representative is prepared to bring this material to appropriate spaces in the Capitol building at the Senator's earliest convenience.

(U) These documents were previously provided to Senator Smith for review on two earlier occasions, the first being at the 5 March 1999 briefing which he referred to in his 10 June 1999 letter addressed to you. The second occasion took place on the afternoon of 9 March 1999 where Senator Smith reviewed this material privately in classified Senate spaces for approximately 45 minutes. The fourth document identified in your letter for review was originated by the Department of State, which is attached.

~~let~~ We invite you to have a member of the SSCI staff come to Headquarters to read the Agency material that has been assembled in response to this request and stand ready to provide this material to Senator Smith upon his request. Please contact me if you have any questions, or have a member of your staff contact [redacted] of my staff on [redacted] to make appropriate arrangements.

Sincerely,

[redacted]

John H. Moseman
Director of Congressional Affairs

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OCA
B-202 P

C06002379

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 99-1357/1
21 July 1999

The Honorable J. Robert Kerrey
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

(U) On behalf of DCI Tenet, thank you for your letter of 24 June 1999 requesting CIA assistance in furnishing to the Committee four POW/MIA-related documents for review by Senator Bob Smith in support of his position as Chairman of the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on POW and MIAs Vietnam War Working Group. As discussed earlier with the Staff Director of the SSCI, the first three documents are indeed CIA material and we have assembled this material for review. Due to the sensitivity of this material; however, we request that SSCI staff review this material at CIA Headquarters at their convenience. Should Senator Smith wish to review this material at any time in the future, an Agency representative is prepared to bring this material to appropriate spaces in the Capitol building at the Senator's earliest convenience.

(U) These three Agency documents were previously provided to Senator Smith for review on two earlier occasions, the first being at the 5 March 1999 briefing which he referred to in his 10 June 1999 letter addressed to you. The second occasion took place on the afternoon of 9 March 1999 where Senator Smith reviewed this material privately in classified Senate spaces for approximately 45 minutes. The fourth document identified in your letter for review was originated by the Department of State, which is attached.

~~(C)~~ We invite you to have a member of the SSCI staff come to Headquarters to read the Agency material that has been assembled in response to this request and stand ready to provide this material to Senator Smith upon his request. Please contact me if you have any questions, or have a member of your staff contact [redacted] of my staff on [redacted] to make appropriate arrangements.

Sincerely,

[redacted]

John H. Moseman
Director of Congressional Affairs

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C06002379

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The Honorable Richard C. Shelby

DCI/OCA/Liaison [redacted] trh x34543 (21 Jul 99)
(w/data/front office/ddoca/[redacted] pow mia.doc)
OCA 99-1357

[redacted]

[redacted]

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C06002379

DAC 99-04156
OCA Records

CONGRESSIONAL CORRESPONDENCE ACTION PLAN

Date / Time Received	Suspense Date	Control Number
25 JUNE 1999 1732 HRS		SSCI #99-1780

ACTION: Please forward response as indicated below for DCI for coordination and transmittal.

☐ **Prepare a response for DCI signature.**

Lead Action Office:

Information Copies:

☐ **Prepare a response for D/OCA signature.**

Lead Action Office:

Information Copies:

☒ **NO WRITTEN RESPONSE NECESSARY**

Lead Office: DO

Follow-Up Action: Provide requested documents to Senate Security for review & return.

Information Copies:

OCA ACTION OFFICER:		
Advance Copies Provided T	OCA F/O. c/o Liaison	c/Registratory

Comments: OCA F/O to discuss with DO/FO for approval to provide doc's.

☐ NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION WITHOUT PRIOR OCA APPROVAL.

Form 3-99 4499 (EF) Obsolete Previous Editions

B-202

C06002379

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~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

SECURE FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL FORM

SENDING SECURE FAX TELEPHONE NUMBER

RECEIVING SECURE FAX TELEPHONE NUMBER

NUMBER OF PAGES (INCLUDING TRANSMITTAL SHEET) 8 pages

FROM OCA / LG

NAME / OFFICE / EXTENSION

SUBJECT POW / MIA

TO: (ADDRESSEE / ORGANIZATION / OFFICE / EXTENSION)

1. ATTN:
2.
3. Hi Heres the
4. information!
5.
6. Thanks
7. Call if you
8. have questions.
9.
10.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTION

RELEASING OFFICIAL

PRINTED NAME SIGNATURE

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION

C06002379

TO : D/OCA , DD/OCA, OCA/EA, C/Liaison, DC/Liaison	CONTROL # OCA 99 -1357	DATE OF REQUEST 7/21/99
FROM : OCA/LIAISON		SUSPENSE DATE

SUBJECT : Letter to th Honorable Richard C. Shelby
POW/MIA issue.

NOTES

COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices)

NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE

ACTION REQUIRED BY **D/OCA**

FORM 2-86 **4118** OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

C06002379

DOCUMENT
DOCNO:
PRODUCER:
AGENCY:
DOCTYPE:
DOR:
TOR:
DOCPREC:
ORIGDATE:
MHFNO:
DOCCLASS:

CDS

/ /

UNCLASSIFIED

FRP: ,2,3, , , , ,

SUO

PAGE 001
TOR: MAY 99

CONTROLS
UNCLAS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR EAP/BCLTV

E.O. 12958: N/A

TEXT
TAGS: MOPS, VM
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: REMAINS STUDY COMMENTS

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED (SBU) PROTECT ACCORDINGLY

1. (SBU) [redacted] IS VERY CONCERNED AFTER READING NOTES (SEE BELOW), LOOKING AT ANNNOTATIONS (FAXED TEXT SENT TO BCLTV) AND THEN READING THE ENTIRE REMAINS STUDY. HE BELIEVES THE STUDY DOESN'T CONTRIBUTE TO THE OVERALL GOAL OF "FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING" BECAUSE IT STILL FOSTERS OLD SUSPICIONS AND GENERATES NEW DOUBTS ABOUT COOPERATION. IT CREATES NEW AND UNHELPFUL NUMBERS ON REMAINS, WHICH WILL BE TAKEN AS DEFINITIVE, EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE CAVEATED AS UNVERIFIABLE BY HARD EVIDENCE. MOREOVER, THE WAY WE READ THE TEXT WE SEE IT PROVIDING MORE AMMUNITION TO CRITICS TO CHALLENGE THE PRESIDENT'S CERTIFICATION.

2. (SBU) WE ARE AWARE THE LONG GESTATION PROCESS FOR THIS STUDY HAS ENSURED PEOPLE ON THE OUTSIDE ARE EAGERLY AWAITING ITS PUBLICATION. WE BELIEVE THE STUDY MAKES CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLICY OBJECTIVES AND HELPS IN THE PROCESS TO DEMONSTRATE EFFORTS ON "FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING." BUT, WE DON'T THINK THE PRESENT ARRANGMENT AND CONTEXT OF THE STUDY WILL RESULT IN THOSE CONTRIBUTIONS BEING ACKNOWLEDGED. IN ITS PRESENT FORM, THE STUDY SEEMS MOSTLY TO DEMONSTRATE THERE HAS BEEN A VERY DETAILED ALL SOURCE ANALYSIS OF MATERIALS RELATED TO THE ISSUE OF STORED REMAINS WHICH DEMONSTRATES DPMO HAS A BETTER HANDLE ON THIS NUMBER THAN THE FOLKS AT CILHI WHO USED ONLY FORENSIC DATA. IT DEMONSTRATES THERE WAS A LOT OF HARD WORK DONE OVER THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS TO COLLECT AND ANALYZE DATA. BUT, THAT SAID, THE REST OF THE STUDY IS SO CAVEATED ON "FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING" ISSUES IT LEADS TO THE JUDGMENT WE HAVE NO VERIFIABLE DATA TO REACH CONCLUSIONS.

3. (SBU) WE ARE AWARE DASD JONES HAS PERSONALLY SENT THIS STUDY BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARDS FOR TONE AS WELL AS CONTENT. BUT WE STILL FIND GRATUITOUS COMMENTS AND JUDGMENTAL LANGUAGE IN A NUMBER OF PLACES WHICH WILL ONLY ANTAGONIZE AND CREATE NEGATIVE REACTIONS AMONG THE VETERANS/FAMILIES GROUPS AND WITH THE VIETNAMESE. THE STUDY NEEDS TO BE LOOKED AT AGAIN IN THAT CONTEXT.

4. (SBU) WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE STUDY SHOULD BE RELEASED NOW OR IN THE COMING MONTHS WITHOUT EXTENSIVE REVIEW AND REWORKING. RELEASING IT IN THE TIMEFRAME CURRENTLY BEING CONSIDERED, AROUND TIME OF LEAGUE OF FAMILIES CONVENTION, WOULD BE A DIRECT HINDRANCE TO DISCUSSIONS ON THE JACKSON-VANIK WAIVER. WE REQUEST AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE ENTIRE STRATEGY AND SCOPE OF THE REMAINS STUDY WITH DASD JONES AND HIS ANALYSTS HERE IN HIS END-JUNE VISIT TO SEE IF WE CAN DETERMINE A DIFFERENT WAY TO PRESENT THE POLICY CONCLUSIONS WITHOUT THE NEGATIVE BAGGAGE. WE HOPE YOU CAN CONVINCE DASD JONES THIS IS THE BEST WAY TO GO DURING YOUR REVIEW NEXT WEEK.

5. (SBU) FOLLOWING IS AN ATTEMPT TO LOOK AT THE TEXT OF THE

STUDY FROM TWO PERSPECTIVES, THE NUMERICAL CONCLUSIONS AND WHETHER THEY CLARIFY OR ENCUMBER THE "FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING" PROCESS AND SECOND, THE CHALLENGES CREATED TO THE PRESIDENT'S CERTIFICATION OF VIETNAMESE COOPERATION.

BEGIN TEXT:

THE DPMO REMAINS STUDY REACHES A NUMERICAL CONCLUSION CONCERNING THE NUMBER OF REMAINS COLLECTED AND STORED BY HANOI WHICH IS MISLEADING AND LIKELY TO CREATE GREATER CONTROVERSY IF IT IS MADE PUBLIC. ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS THROUGHOUT THE STUDY, THE REPORT RAISES SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PRESIDENTQS DECLARATION WE HAVE BEEN RECEIVING FULLEST POSSIBLE COOPERATION FROM THE VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES MANY OF THESE RELATING TO VIETNAMQS INABILITY TO PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT MISSING DOCUMENTS. (THIS IS ONE OF THE MOST CONTINUOUS ARGUMENTS MADE BY THE LEAGUE OF FAMILIES.)

THE STUDYQS INTRODUCTION POSTULATES A VERY IMPORTANT CONCLUSION CONCERNING FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING, THE VIETNAMESE DO NOT HAVE LARGE NUMBERS OF REMAINS IN THEIR CONTROL AND THEREFORE ACCOUNTING RESULTS WILL LARGELY DEPEND ON OUR OWN RECOVERY EFFORTS. THIS IS A POSITIVE CONCLUSION, BUT IN ISOLATION AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE OTHER QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE STUDY, IT LOSES ITS IMPACT.

CRITICS OF THE U.S. POLICY ON POW/MIA AND THOSE WHO ARE UNWILLING TO ACCEPT HANOIQS GOOD FAITH WILL FIND MUCH IN THIS STUDY TO SUPPORT THEIR CONTENTIONS. THE REPORT, FOR EXAMPLE, DOES A FINE JOB OF DEMONSTRATING THE RELEASE OF COLLECTED REMAINS DURING THE 1970-1990 TIME PERIOD WAS DONE FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES BY THE HANOI LEADERSHIP. CONCLUSIONS THAT THE VIETNAMESE NEVER COLLECTED REMAINS FROM LAOS, WHEN THEY DID COLLECT AT LEAST TWO FROM CAMBODIA WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED BY CRITICS. AS NOTED ABOVE, ANOMALIES IN THE PROVISION OF DOCUMENTS WILL STAND OUT AS KEY FAILURES BY THE VIETNAMESE TO COOPERATE. WHILE WE DESCRIBE THE SEARCH FOR THESE DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION AS ONGOING ACTIVITIES, CRITICS WILL SAY THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE EARLIER.

THE NUMBERS ISSUE:

-- IN ITS EFFORTS TO QUANTIFY THE NUMBER, DPMO GIVES GREATEST WEIGHT TO TWO VIETNAMESE SOURCES. THEY IDENTIFY APPROXIMATELY 300 INDIVIDUALS IN THIS CATEGORY. (SEE P. 23)

-- DPMO, FROM ITS OWN RESOURCES, CLAIMS TO BE SURE OF 263 REMAINS AND BELIEVES AN ADDITIONAL 11 WERE ALSO STORED, BRINGING ITS TOTAL TO 274. (SEE P. 31) (OF THESE 249 HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AND 25 HAVE NOT.)

-- INEXPLICABLY DPMQ THEN ROUNDS ITS 274 NUMBER TO BETWEEN 270 AND 280, AS A MINIMUM ADDING AN ADDITIONAL SIX CASES/REMAINS TO THE TOTAL.

-- THIS CREATES THE BIGGEST PROBLEM FOR US TO DEAL WITH THE VETERANS AND FAMILIES ORGANIZATIONS BECAUSE IT REACHES THE CONCLUSION HANOI STILL HAS 20-30 ADDITIONAL REMAINS WHICH IT HAS FAILED TO TURN OVER TO THE USG. (NOTE: BASED ON THE EARLIER ASSUMPTION THEY COULD ONLY COMPLETELY ACCOUNT FOR 263, THERE WOULD BE EVEN MORE LOGIC TO START THE NUMBER RANGE AT 260, GIVING US A GAP OF 20-40.)

IT IS IMPORTANT HERE TO NOTE THE STUDY THROUGHOUT INDICATES ALL OF THIS INFORMATION IS QUESTIONABLE AND IT QUALIFIES VIRTUALLY EVERY IDENTIFICATION OF NUMBERS WHICH IS MADE IN THE SECTION WHICH DEALS WITH HOW MANY REMAINS WERE COLLECTED. (SEE PP.21-24). THIS SAME CONCLUSION, UNCERTAINTY, IS REACHED WHEN IT COMES TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE VIETNAMESE GAVE US BACK ALL THEY COLLECTED. (SEE P. 33)

-- WITH NO ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSION, APPENDIX 3 INCLUDES A STATEMENT ON THE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN BY THE VIETNAMESE WHICH SUGGESTS SOME SETS OF REMAINS COLLECTED FROM THE PROVINCES COULD HAVE BEEN LOST OR MISIDENTIFIED IN THE PROCESS OF TRANSFER FROM LOCALITIES TO HANOI. THIS CONCLUSION WITHOUT FURTHER EVIDENCE SEEMS UNLIKELY TO BE ACCEPTED ESPECIALLY WHEN THE COLLECTION EFFORT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN RATHER CAREFULLY CARRIED OUT. (SEE P. 43)

-- DPMOQS ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION RELATED TO THE PRIORITY AND SPECIAL REMAINS CASES IS AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD, AND IT REACHES THE CONCLUSION SOME OF OUR ORIGINAL REASONS FOR CLASSIFYING INDIVIDUALS IN THESE CATEGORIES WAS WRONG. BUT THERE IS NOTHING IN THE PRESENTATION OF ARGUMENTATION WHICH WILL CONVINCE THE CRITICS ON THESE ISSUES, ABSENT SOME ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTATION OF SOME OF THE ASSERTIONS IN THIS SECTION. (SEE P. 40)

-- IN THIS REGARD, FOR EXAMPLE, THE STUDY CONCLUDES WE WERE WRONG TO ASSUME THE VIETNAMESE WOULD BE ABLE TO ACCOUNT FOR REMAINS OF INDIVIDUALS WHO HAD DIED IN CAPTIVITY (GRAVES REGISTRATION LISTS) BUT PROVIDES NO EVIDENCE FOR WHY WE SHOULD REACH THIS CONCLUSION. (SEE P. 41)

-- VIETNAMESE RECOVERY EFFORTS OF PAVN LOSSES IN LAOS INDICATE THE VIETNAMESE HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN MAKING ANY KIND OF IDENTIFICATION OF THE LOST PERSONNEL BUT THIS IS THEN PARALLELED WITH COMMENTS FROM VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS WHICH SAY THEY HAVE NEVER RECOVERED ANY AMERICAN REMAINS IN THE PROCESS OF THESE RECOVERIES. IF THEIR PROCESS IS SO UNSCIENTIFIC HOW CAN WE ACCEPT THE CONCLUSION NO AMERICAN REMAINS HAVE BEEN COLLECTED? (SEE PP. 19-20)

THE DOCUMENTS/COOPERATION PROBLEMS:

-- STARTING WITH THE SUMMARY, THERE ARE REFERENCES TO

ONGOING REQUESTS/SEARCHES FOR DOCUMENTS WHICH CALL INTO QUESTION THE DEGREE OF COOPERATION OF THE HANOI AUTHORITIES. (SEE P. 5)

-- THE STUDY IDENTIFIES SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS DETERMINING THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF A KEY VIETNAMESE ORGANIZATION WHICH HANDLED REMAINS COLLECTIONS AND STORAGE RELATED TO THE LAST TURNOVER OF STORED REMAINS IN 1990 WHICH MAKES IT DIFFICULT TO EVALUATE IF MORE WERE SO STORED. (SEE P. 14)

-- INTERVIEWS WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS INVOLVED IN THE SEARCH FOR REMAINS ALONG THE CENTRAL COAST OF VIETNAM (MR5), INDICATE THEY PROVIDED INFORMATION IN THE FORM OF SKETCHES OF GRAVE SITES WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN OBTAINED. (SEE P. 15)

-- DPMO SAYS IT CANNOT VERIFY WHETHER THE VIETNAMESE HAVE GIVEN US BACK ALL OF THE REMAINS THEY COLLECTED BECAUSE WE LACK ACCESS TO INVENTORIES, COMPLETE RECORDS, OR OTHER INFORMATION THAT WOULD PROVIDE A DEFINITIVE ANSWER. (SEE P.33)
-- DPMO STUDY RAISES ISSUE OF VIETNAMESE TELLING US AFTER 1990 THEY STILL HAD SOME REMAINS WHICH HAD NOT BEEN REPATRIATED BUT THEN LEAVES THE VALUE/VALIDITY OF THESE STORIES UP IN THE AIR, PARTICULARLY CONCLUDING THEY CANQT DETERMINE WHETHER THE 1990 TURNOVERS WERE THE LAST OF WHAT HANOI HAD TO RETURN OR WHETHER THEY STOPPED RETURNING REMAINS. HOWEVER, IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THIS DISCUSSION, THE STUDY SAYS THE VIETNAMESE PROBABLY HAVE RECORDS . . . THAT WOULD ANSWER THIS QUESTION AND THERE IS STRONG EVIDENCE THE VIETNAMESE MAINTAINED AN INVENTORY OF THE REMAINS THEY COLLECTED. (SEE P. 34)

-- ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE, THE STUDY THE MAKES ITS MOST DAMNING CONCLUSION ON THIS ISSUE STATING DESPITE OUR REPEATED REQUESTS, WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO ACQUIRE A COMPANION LIST OF REMAINS THAT WERE RECOVERED, WHICH EVEN OUR VIETNAMESE COUNTERPARTS AGREED WOULD HAVE BEEN CREATED AT THE SAME TIME; AND THEN, WHEN THE VIETNAMESE SAY THEY DONQT HAVE ANYTHING ELSE TO TURN OVER, DPMO CONCLUDES THESE ASSURANCES LACK CREDIBILITY. (SEE P. 35)

THE DPMO STUDY PROVIDES GOOD INFORMATION TO SHAPE OUR CONCLUSIONS ON HOW WE CAN ACHIEVE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING. IT DEMONSTRATES A THOROUGH AND RIGOROUS REVIEW OF MATERIALS WHICH VALIDATE THE EFFORTS OF DPMO ANALYSTS TO SEARCH OUT AND INVESTIGATE EACH INDIVIDUAL CASE AND, WITHOUT BLOWING ANY HORNS, SUGGESTS WITHOUT THE DPMO ANALYSIS WORK WEQD NOT HAVE RECOVERED MUCH OF WHAT WEQVE DONE THROUGH THE JOINT RECOVERY EFFORTS. IT ALSO CLARIFIES CONCERNS ABOUT NUMBERS OF STORED REMAINS, PARTICULARLY WHEN IT COMES TO EVALUATING THE DPMO CONCLUSIONS ON STORED REMAINS VERSUS THOSE OF CILHI. (HOPEFULLY, THAT WAS NOT THE MAIN REASON FOR THIS ANALYSIS.)
END TEXT

RECEIVED
JUN 25 1999
By 1732

U.S. Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence

Fax Cover Sheet

To: JOHN MOSEMAN, CIA (b)(6)

From: [redacted]

SSCI#: 99-1780

Date: 6/25/99

Time: 17:28

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Page 1 of 7

Prepared by: JW

Note to Recipient:

If you did not receive every page of this facsimile, please call (202) 224-1771.

C06002380

RICHARD C. SHELBY, ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN
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CHRISTOPHER C. STRAUB, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
KATHLEEN P. McGHEE, CHIEF CLERK

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475

June 24, 1999

SSCI# 99-1780

The Honorable George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Director:

Pursuant to Section 405 of Public Law 102-88, Senator Bob Smith has asked this Committee to obtain POW/MIA-related documents for his review. Senator Smith is the Senate's representative to the U.S.- Russian Joint Commission on POWs and MIAs and the U.S. Chairman of that Commission's Vietnam War Working Group.

Please provide to this Committee the documents listed in the attachment. If you have any questions, please have your staff contact Pete Dorn or Al Cumming of our staff at 202-224-1700.

Sincerely,

Richard Shelby

Richard C. Shelby
Chairman

J. Robert Kerrey
Vice Chairman

CC: Senator Bob Smith

C06002380

BOB SMITH
NEW HAMPSHIRE

opinion@smith.senate.gov
http://www.senate.gov/~smith/

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-2903

June 10, 1999

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
CHAIRMAN, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ETHICS

The Honorable Richard Shelby
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Richard:

Pursuant to Section 405 of Public Law 102-88 (FY91 Intelligence Authorization Act), I respectfully ask that your Committee request the following information or documents in the possession, custody, or control of the agencies or departments referenced below. This data relates to the issue of U.S. POW/MIA personnel or the remains of such personnel.

(b)(3)(c)

[redacted] Oct 96
From CIA to DoD POW/MIA Office
Subject: Vietnam - POW Information
Classification level: "SECRET"

[redacted] Nov 96
From CIA to DoD POW/MIA Office
Ref: [redacted] Oct. 96 message from CIA to DPMO
Classification level: "SECRET"

26 August 1998
CIA DO Memorandum, Intelligence
[redacted]
Classification level: "TOP SECRET"

(b)(6)

[redacted] May 99
From American Embassy Hanoi [redacted] to SECSTATE
Subject: Remains Study Comments
Cable [redacted]
Classification level: "UNCLASSIFIED, but sensitive, handle accordingly"

The first three reports referenced above were the subject of a request to the Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence by myself and the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Warner, on January 26, 1999. I received a subsequent briefing on this matter by the Central Intelligence Agency on March 5, 1999, but would nonetheless like these documents furnished to the Senate, in accordance with Public Law 102-88, for more detailed review. These reports pertain to matters I am attempting to investigate further as the Senate Leadership-appointed representative to the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POWs and MIAs, and the U.S. Chairman of that Commission's Vietnam War Working Group.

DIRKSEN BUILDING
SUITE 307
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-2903
(202) 224-2841
(202) 224-1353 (FAX)

1750 ELM STREET
SUITE 100
MANCHESTER, NH 03104
(603) 634-5000
(800) 922-2230

ONE HARBOUR PLACE
SUITE 435
PORTSMOUTH, NH 03801
(603) 433-1667
(800) 922-2230

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It is my understanding that the last cable has a direct bearing on intelligence analysis and information pertaining to Vietnamese knowledge on POW/MIA matters, and may explicitly constitute an effort by the Executive Branch to prevent disclosure of certain information to Congress that could result in added support for legislation I recently introduced which the Administration opposes. This legislation (S.J. Res. 28) is now pending before the Senate and may be considered further in the next several weeks.

I thank you for your prompt attention to this request, and would appreciate your assistance with respect to these matters prior to the July 4th recess. My staff point of contact on this matter is Dino L. Carluccio on my personal staff who may be reached at 4-3828.

With warm regards,

Bob Smith

BOB SMITH, U.S.S.

cc: The Honorable Robert Kerrey, Vice-Chairman, SSCI
The Honorable John Warner, Chairman, SASC
The Honorable Trent Lott, Majority Leader

C06002380

106TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. J. RES. 28

Disapproving the extension of the waiver authority contained in section 402(c) of the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to Vietnam.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 7, 1999

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

---

JOINT RESOLUTION

Disapproving the extension of the waiver authority contained in section 402(c) of the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to Vietnam.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That Congress does not approve the extension of the authority contained in section 402(c) of the Trade Act of 1974 recommended by the President to Congress on June 3, 1999 with respect to Vietnam.

O

meaning as set forth in paragraph 3.4(f) of Executive Order 12333, dated December 4, 1981, or successor orders.

SEC. 405. FURNISHING OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES ON INTELLIGENCE.

(a) FURNISHING OF SPECIFIC INFORMATION- In accordance with title V of the National Security Act of 1947, the head of any department or agency of the United States involved in any intelligence activities which may pertain to United States military personnel listed as prisoner, missing, or unaccounted for in military actions shall furnish any information or documents in the possession, custody, or control of the department or agency, or person paid by such department or agency, whenever requested by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives or the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

(b) ACCESS BY COMMITTEES AND MEMBERS OF CONGRESS- In accordance with Senate Resolution 400, Ninety-Fourth Congress, and House Resolution 658, Ninety-Fifth Congress, the committees named in subsection (a) shall, upon request and under such regulations as the committees have prescribed to protect the classification of such information, make any information described in subsection (a) available to any other committee or any other Member of Congress and appropriately cleared staff.

TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PROVISIONS

SEC. 501. REIMBURSEMENT RATE FOR CERTAIN AIRLIFT SERVICES.

(a) IN GENERAL- Chapter 157 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

'Sec. 2642. Reimbursement rate for airlift services provided to Central Intelligence Agency

'(a) AUTHORITY- The Secretary of Defense may authorize the use of the Department of Defense reimbursement rate for military airlift services provided by a component of the Department of Defense to the Central Intelligence Agency, if the Secretary of Defense determines that those military airlift services are provided for activities related to national security objectives.

C06002380

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAR 2 3 1999

Honorable Robert C. Smith
Chairman, Strategic Forces
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Bob:

The classified reports you requested in your and John Warner's January 26, 1999, letter were originated by the Central Intelligence Agency. I understand that Agency personnel briefed you and General Lajoie on these reports on March 5, 1999. I hope their briefing answered your questions.

I assure you that the Department takes seriously the oversight responsibility of Congress and remains committed to full cooperation on this issue. Your continued support to all our servicemen is gratefully acknowledged.

Sincerely,

C06002382

SECRET

OCA 3232-92
29 October 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: 29 October Meeting with Frances Zwenig, POW/MIA Committee

1. I met with Frances Zwenig in her office on 29 October to review where we stand on matters affecting the POW/MIA Committee. The good news is that, at least so Ms Zwenig professes, the Committee's mandate ends 2 January 1993 and is unlikely to be renewed, though she granted that Senator Smith is sure to seek a new mandate for the group from the new Congress.

2. General Sejna: I informed Frances that General Sejna is still on an Agency annuity [redacted] (b)(3)(c) She said she had been aware of the fact but not of the amount. I asked that she ensure Senators Kerry and Smith knew this fact before (and if) Sejna is called to testify.

3. Sejna-bis: She had two further questions, which CE Division can answer: whether Sejna made statements about POWs when he was first debriefed by the Agency or in any contemporaneous reporting? Also, do we know whether Sejna has been involved with the private POW groups? I said the first question certainly has an answer; the second may not as Sejna is a private US citizen and may consort with whomever he wishes. {ORMS checked: the answer to the first is "not that anyone has found but CE is double-checking the original reporting;" and "no information."}

4. Access to Ops Files: Frances said that Senators Kerry and Smith intend to call the DCI this week or next to make a pitch for Committee access to the Ops files held by EA on POWs. I referred her to the 20 October letter which the DDCI signed in the Director's absence, restating the DCI's position of last June when Kerry asked the same question. Zwenig made it clear that the Agency will come under heavy and public criticism from the Committee if it does not make operational files accessible, opining CIA does not need such criticism in the current environment. See separate note to D/OCA and the DCI on this issue.

5. Committee Plans: Two sets of hearings are planned for the months ahead: in November on Soviet aspects of the POW issue; in December on DIA's overall management of the POW/MIA issue. (b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

SECRET

SUBJECT: 29 October Meeting with Frances Zwenig, POW/MIA Committee

Frances said CIA is not needed, as of today, in the November hearings--unless we come up with information on Soviet handling of POWs, of course. She amended the statement to say that we may need to send someone to put the Sejna testimony in context if Sejna testifies; and Art Grant's quest for someone to take responsibility for the Soviet end of things is still to be resolved.

The December hearings will be different--and would seem likely a snakepit (my description, not hers). The issue will be how well DIA handled the whole account. It will begin with a panel of "experts" who have critiqued DIA's stewardship of the POW account. On 2 December, the Committee wants to have someone to testify on how CIA handled reporting on POW issues. In this formulation we are not cast in the role of excoriating DIA, but we'll have to watch this agenda closely as it develops. I asked Frances to send us something in writing setting out what the Committee wants of us in December. These hearings will end with a review of private endeavors to free POWs and finally a panel to allow the families of POW/MIAs to comment on the quality of support they received from DIA. Sounds like fun.

Frances added, of course if the Committee has not been given access to the [redacted] files they've requested, this issue will arise in the December hearings. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

And in the Committee's report, which is to be published on 17 December.

6. Frances said she hopes to move on and out after 2 January, when this version of the Committee will end. She had undisguised contempt for most of the people she works with on the Committee and said she is further disappointed by government as a whole in its handling of these sorts of issues and its cooperation. She wants to get involved in export/import business in Southeast Asia but added she hasn't quite got anything set up yet.

Oddment: She said McCreary has a contract and teaches analytical methods here at CIA??? Her point was that the standards of objectivity and intellectual rigor demonstrated by McCreary on the Committee makes her wonder for the future of analysis in the CIA.

(b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

John L. Breckenridge
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

C06002382

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: 29 October Meeting with Frances Zwenig, POW/MIA Committee



(b)(3)(c)

C06002385

~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

SSPOW

OCA 0958-92/2
28 October 1992

Mr. Robert Taylor
Investigator
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Taylor:

Enclosed are the declassified intelligence reports which were used to derive the Central Intelligence Agency's intelligence report on Dong Vai Prison. The yellow areas on the enclosed report are covered by the reports we found. There were apparently two other refugee reports we could not find, one by a former ARVN or GVN officer.

If you have any questions please feel free to contact me at [redacted]

Sincerely,

John L. Breckenridge

John L. Breckenridge
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

Enclosures

(b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

ALL PORTIONS CLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

C06002385

OCA 0958-92/2

SUBJECT: Letter to Robert Taylor, POW/MIA Affairs Cmte, re Dong Vai Prison



(b)(3)(c)

C06002385

REPORT No. 1)

[Central Quang Ninh Reeducation Camp (Dong Vai Prison, Hoanh Bo Prison, or 60A/TD63/QN) was a French-built prison about 12 kilometers west of Hon Gai City near Dong Vai (YJ 2030) in Hoanh Bo District, Quang Ninh Province. It had a 200-man staff which manned two subordinate camps (KA, KB).] Prior to May-June 1976, it held northern criminals who had been tried and sentenced to more than two years of imprisonment. Most were transferred to other facilities to make room for ARVN/GVN inmates from the southern SRV in mid-1976. Between June 1976 and December 1978 it held about 1,000 Vietnamese inmates, including 20 ARVN field grade officers, 60 GVN national police colonels, 100 GVN CIO officers, 200 GVN national police officers, 100 GVN civil servants and 300 northern civil criminals. By August 1978, all ARVN/GVN inmates had been transferred to other camps in the northern SRV leaving it with only northern civil criminals. The camp was evacuated in late 1978 before the 1979 Chinese border attacks and was later transferred to the control of the Quang Ninh Province PSO. [There were no foreigners reported in detention at the Central Quang Ninh Reeducation Camp during the period 1976-1988.] [One northern boat refugee provided hearsay information subsourced to an SRV cargo truck driver about the transport in early March 1982 of three or four dozen handcuffed Caucasian prisoners, presumed by the truck driver to be Americans, from the Cam Thuy Reeducation Camp in Thanh Hoa Province to the Dong Vai Reeducation Camp in Quang Ninh Province. This person noted that the Dong Vai Camp was a MOI central-level camp which was located near Dong Dang Town in an area called Dong Vai and that it held northern inmates who had committed grave civil offenses and who had been sentenced to ten or more years of hard labor.] A second northern boat refugee provided hearsay information on an unknown number of alleged U.S. POW's, including one colonel, who were held at the Dong Vai Camp as of 1977-1978 and who had all been moved out of the Dong Vai Camp in 1978 to an unknown location. According to this second person, the Dong Vai Camp was located about 124 kilometers northeast of Lang Bang (YJ 1926) in Hoanh Bo District and had its Bai Muoi or Dong Muoi Camp annex in the Cao Thang Ward (YJ 1920) of Hon Gai City.

REPORT No. 2)

DIA calls it DONG VAI

C06002385 (REPORT NO. 1)

COUNTRY: VIETNAM
SUBJ: ABSENCE OF AMERICANS AT THE QUANG NINH AND CAMP NO. FIVE REEDUCATION CAMPS IN NORTH VIETNAM; INFORMATION ON THESE FACILITIES
DOI: NOVEMBER 1976 - APRIL 1982
SOURCE:

(b)(3)(n)

TEXT: 1. THE QUANG NINH REEDUCATON CAMP WAS LOCATED ABOUT 12 KILOMETERS (KMS) WEST OF HON GAI CITY, QUANG NINH PROVINCE, NORTH VIETNAM. FROM NOVEMBER 1976 TO SEPTEMBER 1978 THERE WERE NO AMERICAN OR FOREIGN PRISONERS AT THE QUANG NINH CAMP. THIS REEDUCATION FACILITY WAS DIRECTLY SUBORDINATE TO THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (BNV). THE QUANG NINH REEDUCATION CAMP WAS BUILT BY THE FRENCH PRIOR TO 1954. THE CAMP WAS ENCLOSED BY A RECTANGULAR NATURAL STONE WALL. THE 14 DETENTION ROOMS WERE CONSTRUCTED OF BRICK AS WERE THE DISPENSARY AND THE MESS FACILITY. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WAS SEVERELY LIMITED WITHIN THE COMPOUND. THE PRISON STAFF HEADQUARTERS WAS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE COMPOUND.

2. THE QUANG NINH REEDUCATION CAMP WAS DIVIDED INTO SUBCAMPS KA AND KB, BOTH OF WHICH WERE WITHIN THE COMPOUND. SUBCAMP KA HELD ABOUT 300 CRIMINALS. SUBCAMP KB CONSISTED OF APPROXIMATELY 600 POLITICAL PRISONERS OF THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES: FORMER GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) CIVIL SERVANTS; POLITICAL PARTY MEMBERS; OFFICERS FROM THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION; POLICE OFFICERS OF FIELD GRADE AND ABOVE; AND A NUMBER OF RESISTANCE FORCE MEMBERS. COMMENT: [redacted] WAS UNABLE TO ESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF EACH CATEGORY OF POLITICAL PRISONERS.)

3. THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 175 ARMED PUBLIC SECURITY GUARDS AND STAFF MEMBERS STATIONED IN AND AROUND THE CAMP. COMMENT: [redacted] DID NOT KNOW IF THIS CAMP CONTINUED TO

(b)(3)(n)

OPERATE IN 1986 [redacted]

4. AS OF APRIL 1982 THERE WERE NO AMERICAN OR FOREIGN PRISONERS AT REEDUCATON CAMP NUMBER FIVE IN THANH HOA PROVINCE, NORTH VIETNAM. [redacted] COMMENT: [redacted] THE CAMP WAS 50 KMS FROM THE BORDER OF LAOS AND 60 KMS FROM THANH HOA CITY.) THE NO. FIVE REEDUCATION CAMP WAS DIRECTLY SUBORDINATE TO THE BNV. THE CAMP COMMANDER WAS BNV MAJOR DO ((NAM)). THERE WAS A STAFF OF ABOUT 100 PUBLIC SECURITY CADRE AND GUARDS AT CAMP NO. FIVE.

5. CAMP NO. FIVE WAS DIVIDED INTO SUBCAMPS A, B, C AND D. SUBCAMP A DETAINED APPROXIMATELY 500 WOMEN CRIMINALS. THERE WERE ABOUT 700 MALE PRISONERS IN SUBCAMP B. THE INMATES OF SUBCAMP C INCLUDED POLITICAL AND CRIMINAL PRISONERS. THERE WERE SOME 300 CRIMINALS IN SUBCAMP C. THE 500 POLITICAL PRISONERS IN SUBCAMP C CONSISTED OF FORMER SENIOR LEVEL GVN CIVIL SERVANTS, EX-ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) OFFICERS, FORMER POLITICAL PARTY MEMBERS, INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND GVN POLICE OFFICERS. SUBCAMP D HELD THREE TYPES OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, I.E., FORMER GVN CIVIL SERVANTS, EXARVN OFFICERS FROM THE RANKS OF CAPTAIN TO LT. COLONEL AND RALLIERS.

(b)(3)(n) [redacted] COMMENT: RALLIERS ARE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO DESERTED/DEFECTED TO THE GVN PRIOR TO APRIL 30, 1975.) THERE WERE AN ESTIMATED 500 EX-GVN CIVIL SERVANTS AND ARVN OFFICERS, MOST OF WHOM WERE ARVN OFFICERS. THERE WERE ABOUT 150 RALLIERS. SUBCAMP D ALSO DETAINED ABOUT 300 CRIMINALS.

6. [redacted] COMMENT: [redacted] IF THIS FACILITY WAS STILL FUNCTIONING IN 1986.)

(b)(3)(n)

C06002385 (PART NO. 2)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Vice Director For Collection Management
Department Of Defense
Principal Advisor For Prisoner Of War Missing In Action Affairs
(International Security Affairs)
Director, Vietnam, Laos And Kampuchea
Bureau Of East Asian And Pacific Affairs
Department Of State

SUBJECT : The Transfer Of Caucasian Prisoners By Truck From Thanh Hoa to Quang Ninh Province, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, in early March 1982

C06002385

SUBJECT: The Transfer of Caucasian Prisoners By Truck From Thanh Hoa To Quang Ninh Province, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, in Early March 1982.

TEXT: 1. In early March 1982 a cargo truck driver casually told a friend in Hai Phong, Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), that he had just returned from transporting Caucasian prisoners, whom he presumed were Americans. The driver was hired to transport goods and was sent from Hai Phong to Reeducation Camp 90A/TD63 in Cam Tuy, Thanh Hoa Province. He arrived at the camp at night and was told to stay in the driver's cabin while people were loaded into the rear of the truck. The truck was covered and remained covered during the trip to the Dong Vai Reeducation Camp in Quang Ninh Province. The driver arrived at the Dong Vai Camp at night and was again instructed to remain in the truck cabin. When the people were taken from the truck, the driver saw that they were handcuffed in pairs. There were three or four dozen of these prisoners, most of whom were a head taller than the guards. The driver said that when he cleaned the back of the truck after the trip, there were many empty food cans. The driver stated that other prisoners, such as former officers of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, were usually just given bread. [redacted] (b)(3)(n) [redacted] Comment: No information was available concerning the identity or background of the driver. The friend to whom this story was related did not ask any questions of the driver.)

2. According to a Hai Phong resident, Camp 90A/TD63 was located on top of a hill in Cam Tuy, about ten kilometers from Thanh Hoa Town via Route 15, and approximately 20 kilometers west of the Cam Tuy train station. Before 1975 the camp held northerners who had committed grave civil offenses. After 1975, the camp held former officers of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam in compartmented areas. The Dong Vai Camp is a national prison camp under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior (Bo Noi Vu/BNV). To reach Dong Vai Camp, one must travel from Hon Gai Town to Bai Chay and then to Dong Dang Town. In Dong Dang Town one turns at the Cho Troi market to Hoang Bo and Vu Streets where the

local people can give directions to the nearby Dong Vai Camp. The Dong Vai Camp held prisoners who had committed grave civil offenses and were sentenced to ten or more years of hard labor. [redacted] Comment: The Dong Vai Camp should not be confused with the Dong Muoi Camp, under BNV supervision, also located near Hon Gai. From Hon Gai, one reaches the Dong Muoi Camp via Long Tong and Nui Xe villages.)

(b)(3)(n)

C06002385

Central Intelligence Agency

SSPOW

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 0958-92/1
14 October 1992

Mr. Robert Taylor
Investigator
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Taylor:

The Committee's written request dated 8 October 1992 concerning alleged reports, analysis or memoranda on American POWs held in the vicinity of Dong Mang prison camp could not be found. After further review with DIA we have concluded that the DIA's Dong Mang could possibly refer to the Dong Vai Prison (same geographic coordinates that were given for Dong Mang).

Enclosed is a declassified study on Dong Vai Prison. This is from a classified study on prisons which we previously sent the Committee. After extensive research, this study was the only piece of intelligence found concerning this issue. If you have any further questions please contact me at 703-482-8806.

Sincerely,

John L. Breckenridge
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

Enclosure

C06002385

OCA 0958-92/1

SUBJECT: Letter to Robert Taylor, POW/MIA Affairs Cmte re Dong Mang Prison Camp

(b)(3)(c)

C06002385

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP Date 13 OCT. 92

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. OCA/		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		

	Action		File		Note and Return
	Approval		For Clearance		Per Conversation
	As Requested		For Correction		Prepare Reply
	Circulate		For Your Information		See Me
	Comment		Investigate		Signature
	Coordination		Justify		

REMARKS

This place has another name, but is in the same (general) location as the coordinates you gave me for DONG MANG.

Therefore can you send this to the Committee (unclassified) saying this is a "possible"? (It is from a classified study on prisons which we sent them before).

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post) | Room No.—Bldg. | Phone No.

5041-102

☆ U.S. G.P.O. 1991 281-781/40007

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
Prescribed by GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

(b)(3)(c)

Central Quang Ninh Reeducation Camp (Dong Vai Prison, Hoanh Bo Prison, or 60A/TD63/QN) was a French-built prison about 12 kilometers west of Hon Gai City near Dong Vai (YJ 2030) in Hoanh Bo District, Quang Ninh Province. It had a 200-man staff which manned two subordinate camps (KA, KB). Prior to May-June 1976, it held northern criminals who had been tried and sentenced to more than two years of imprisonment. Most were transferred to other facilities to make room for ARVN/GVN inmates from the southern SRV in mid-1976. Between June 1976 and December 1978 it held about 1,000 Vietnamese inmates, including 20 ARVN field grade officers, 60 GVN national police colonels, 100 GVN CIO officers, 200 GVN national police officers, 100 GVN civil servants and 300 northern civil criminals. By August 1978, all ARVN/GVN inmates had been transferred to other camps in the northern SRV leaving it with only northern civil criminals. The camp was evacuated in late 1978 before the 1979 Chinese border attacks and was later transferred to the control of the Quang Ninh Province PSO. There were no foreigners reported in detention at the Central Quang Ninh Reeducation Camp during the period 1976-1988. One northern boat refugee provided hearsay information subsourced to an SRV cargo truck driver about the transport in early March 1982 of three or four dozen handcuffed Caucasian prisoners, presumed by the truck driver to be Americans, from the Cam Thuy Reeducation Camp in Thanh Hoa Province to the Dong Vai Reeducation Camp in Quang Ninh Province. This person noted that the Dong Vai Camp was a MOI central-level camp which was located near Dong Dang Town in an area called Dong Vai and that it held northern inmates who had committed grave civil offenses and who had been sentenced to ten or more years of hard labor. A second northern boat refugee provided hearsay information on an unknown number of alleged U.S. POW's, including one colonel, who were held at the Dong Vai Camp as of 1977-1978 and who had all been moved out of the Dong Vai Camp in 1978 to an unknown location. According to this second person, the Dong Vai Camp was located about 124 kilometers northeast of Lang Bang (YJ 1926) in Hoanh Bo District and had its Bai Muoi or Dong Muoi Camp annex in the Cao Thang Ward (YJ 1920) of Hon Gai City.

C06002385

OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS
ROUTING SLIP

	ACTION	INFO
D/OCA		X
DD/OCA		X
SPECIAL ASSISTANT		
DD/LEGISLATION		X
DD/SENATE	X	
DD/HOUSE		X
DD/CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT		X
DD/INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ISSUES		X
CONSTITUENT INQUIRIES OFFICER		
FOIA/PA OFFICER		
SECURITY OFFICER		
OCA/COMPT/ISC		X

SUSPENSE 27 Oct. 92
DATE

ACTION OFFICER: John B

REMARKS: PW

CONTROL NUMBER: OCA ~~0460-92~~ 0958-92

FILE: 0958-92/1

FORM 4422
NOV 91

C06002385

JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS, Chairman
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, SOUTH DAKOTA
HARRY REID, NEVADA
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HANK BROWN, COLORADO
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NANCY LANDON KASSEBAUM, KANSAS
JESSE HELMS, NORTH CAROLINA

FRANCES A. ZWENIG, STAFF DIRECTOR
J. WILLIAM CODINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

8 October 1992

Mr Stanley Moskowitz, Director
Congressional Relations
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Moskowitz:

The Committee requests that all Central Intelligence Agency reports, analysis or memoranda related to HUMINT reports of alleged American POWs held in the vicinity of Dong Mang prison camp (21-04-00N 107-07-15E) in 1975-79 be forwarded to the Committee in declassified form.

This material is required for our hearing scheduled for 15 October; therefore, we request it be provided by 13 October. If you have any questions regarding this request, please contact Committee Investigator Robert Taylor at 202-224-2317.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel

JWC/kb/bt

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

C06002387

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs Request for Copies of CIA Documents Found in NSC Files

FROM:	EXTENSION	DATE SENT	REQUEST NUMBER
C/EA/ICOG		30Sep92	DDO 0025/2592

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
1. DCEA/SEA				
2. Chief, EA				
3. C/ORMS/CCA	10/02			
4. DC/ORMS				
5. C/ORMS				
6. SA/DDO				
7. ADDO		10.2		
8. DDO				
9. O/OCA				
10.				
11.				
12.				

(b)(3)(c)

DOCUMENT LOGGED
DO NOT DESTROY
RETURN TO
DCI/OCA REGISTRY
Hqs.

SUSPENSE DATE:

RETURN TO:

FORM 6-87 4283

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

SECRET

0025/254-92

30 September 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Breckenridge
Chief, Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: [redacted] (b)(3)(c)
Chief, Indochina Operations Group

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
Request for Copies of CIA Documents Found in
NSC Files

REFERENCE: A. NSC Letter to the Executive Secretary, CIA, dated 21 August 1992
B. CIA Letter to NSC dated 27 August 1992

1. Attached are the CIA documents which the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs requested as a result of the Committee's review of NSC files which contained the documents.

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

[redacted] (b)(3)(c)

Attachments:
As stated

[redacted]

SECRET

C06002387

26 October 1992

Mr. J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20510-6500

Dear Mr. Codinha:

1. Attached are the CIA documents which the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs requested as a result of the Committee's review of NSC files which contained these documents.

2. We have made several redactions in the intelligence reports for source protection.

Sincerely,

John Breckenridge
Deputy Director Senate Division

(b)(3)(c)

All MATERIAL Secret



C06002388 CLASSIFIED with ~~SECRET~~ attachment

~~SECRET~~

ER 92-4396
20176

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(6)

August 21, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES R. OLIVER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Release of POW/MIA Documents

The staff of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs has requested that the National Security Council provide to the Committee pertinent documents related to this issue. We have located additional documents that contain CIA equities. Please advise as to our response to the Committee. Copies of these documents are being held in our Office of Records Management (202-395-7356) pending your instructions.

A prompt response would be appreci[redacted]

(b)(6)

William F. ~~Sittmann~~
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A POW/MIA Documents

UNCLASSIFIED with ~~SECRET~~ attachment

~~SECRET~~

DCI EXEC REG

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

ER 92-4396/

Central Intelligence Agency

(b)(3)(c)

Washington, D.C. 20505

27 August 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary, National Security Council

SUBJECT: Release of CIA POW/MIA Documents

1. The subject-matter documents--forwarded by you on 30 July 1992 and 21 August 1992--have been reviewed pursuant to your request. Please inform the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs that the Agency will deal directly with them regarding review and/or release of these documents in accordance with agreed-upon procedures.

2. Thank you for consulting with us on this matter.

[redacted]

James R. Oliver
Executive Secretary

C06002390

SUBJECT: Release of CIA POW/MIA Documents

Distribut
Origina

C06002416

~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

OCA 1039-93
8 January 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Report - Telecon with Frances Zwenig

1. Frances Zwenig called late on the 7th on a few issues left from the POW/MIA Committee; she is working from a temporary location in Senator Kerry's office. I talked to her again this morning to hammer out some details.

A. [redacted] As now drafted the report takes up this [redacted] by approaching the topic through a discussion of [redacted] After laying out this matter, including disagreements in interpretation, it goes on according to Ms. Zwenig in a statement along these lines: *That CIA received from a sensitive source information indicating that U.S. POWs had been sent to this location; that CIA did not disseminate this report outside its own channels and was unable to explain this lapse in responding to the Committee's investigation.* (b)(3)(n) (b)(1)

Ms. Zwenig asked approval to draw from classified testimony [redacted] She felt something additional is needed in the report to put the above in proper context. Note that it is not clear just what report the drafters have in mind: If the report [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

(as I think likely), then the further context is needed as Ms. Zwenig argues--unless we simply stand behind our barricades of classification and take our in-coming unfairly.

I checked with [redacted]. We agreed to ask the Committee to take out [redacted] that which needs to be protected by classification. What we worked out was a sentence stating that *CIA's investigation of this report in 1981* (i.e., timely follow-up) *failed to find evidence to corroborate that report or to confirm the presence of POWs in the location.* (b)(3)(c) (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

ALL PORTIONS ~~CLASSIFIED~~
~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (b)(3)(c)

~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Report - Telecon with Frances Zwenig

I checked this with Ms. Zwenig on Friday morning. She felt it did not go far enough [redacted] After a second round of discussion with her, we settled on a statement along the following lines to add to the report just after that portion quoted above which charges that we had a report on a sighting and buried it.

> *Investigation by CIA of this report in 1981, which was recounted in detail in closed session to the Committee, failed to corroborate this report or to find other evidence of the presence of POWs in that location; further, a key Lao member of the investigating group reported in closed session that he had been asked by members of the Lao Resistance to report the presence of a Caucasian but had replied that doing so would be wrong because their report would not be true.*

B. Security Review of the Committee Report: Ms. Zwenig also wanted us to know that the Committee had agreed to submit the final draft to a security review, at the urging of several (most particularly NSA). The report will be in Senate Security on Monday from 0900 to 1700 for review. (I had been told separately by Art Grant of the SSCI the previous day that the POW/MIA Committee had agreed to allow only one member of the Intelligence Community review the document, but Ms. Zwenig said that the Committee was concerned only that there not be a large group--that it is more important that those reviewing the document do so within the hours given at Senate Security and complete the process on Monday, 11 January. She specifically said that two people might be able to do the work quicker by splitting the report between them. (She doesn't know that this isn't the way things work but her comment does admit more than one reviewer.) I passed this word to [redacted] who will plan on looking the report over for CIA purposes.

[redacted] (b)(3)(c)

John L. Breckenridge
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

OCA/Senate/JLBreckenridge:/jah (13 Jan 93)

1 [redacted]

C06002417

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP Date 28 June 93

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. C/OCA/SENATE		
2.		
3.	(b)(3)(c)	
4.		
5.		

	Action		File		Note and Return
	Approval		For Clearance		Per Conversation
	As Requested		For Correction		Prepare Reply
	Circulate		For Your Information		See Me
	Comment		Investigate		Signature
	Coordination		Justify		

REMARKS

FYI - this shows just how long Sen. Smith has been obsessed with the [redacted] report. Time has not lessened his ardor, either -

(b)(3)(n) [redacted]

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
	Phone No.

5041-102

☆ U.S. G.P.O. 1991 281-781/40010

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
Prescribed by GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

C06002417

~~SECRET~~

(b)(3)(c)

OCA 87-6156
18 December 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Representatives Bob Smith (R., NH) and John Rowland (R., CN) Regarding MIA/POW Issue

(b)(3)(c)

1. On 18 December 1987 I met with Representatives Bob Smith and John Rowland in 115 Cannon House Office Building. The purpose of the meeting was to show them a January 1977 Field Report [redacted] and the 1983 [redacted] on the same report, which they were demanding to see. The two Congressmen were angry, confrontational and frustrated, though they were more rational and polite than they had been on the telephone. In sum, the two Congressmen who are on a Sub-committee on missing U.S. servicemen in Indochina are trying to track down any information they can find on MIAs and POWs, and at the same time, determine how the U.S. government has handled any of that information. They have become increasingly frustrated because they feel that the DIA has withheld much information from them, and they have escalated their demands for more information by submitting a "Resolution of Inquiry" before Congress. (b)(3)(n)

2. The CIA's most recent involvement with these two Congressmen began as follows:

(a) From an unidentified individual the Congress-men acquired the number of our raw report [redacted] and began to press the DIA to provide that report (copy attached hereto);

(b) The DIA correctly referred to the Agency as the originator of the report for permission to release it;

(c) Early during the week of 14 December, Mr. Smith attempted to call the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) on this matter, and the DCI's secretary called us (OCA) to determine what Mr. Smith was calling about; (b)(3)(c)

All Portions ~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

(b)(6)

(d) Mr. Smith's staffer, [redacted] called OCA to demand that we provide the report;

(e) One of our OCA officers correctly informed the staffer that we may well not be able to provide Mr. Smith with a raw report, which is factual because we do not usually provide the Congress with raw reports, even to our own Oversight Committees;

(f) On 16 December we learned that Rep. Rowland was also trying to call the DCI, and we called him back to ask if we could help. We learned it was also about the raw report, which we tried to locate in our own system. We then learned after extensive checking that the report had been rescinded and that we could not even find our own copy, and thus we asked DIA to bring us the file, including the copy of our rescinded report;

(g) On 17 December we made direct contact with Mr. Rowland and attempted to explain the situation about the rescinded report, which we were trying to locate and for which we were trying to get permission to show him. He was reasonable but warned that Mr. Smith was getting more and more angry;

(h) Also on the same day the DIA team came to Headquarters with a copy of the whole file and the raw field report we ourselves could not retrieve from the system;

(i) On the afternoon of 17 December and throughout most of 18 December we worked with the DDO to get permission to show the Congressmen the report, and the DDO was cooperative;

(j) Meanwhile, I talked with Mr. Rowland or his staffer several times on 18 December to tell them that we were doing our best, that we would probably be able to get the report for them. In our final call Mr. Rowland became furious and informed me that he and Mr. Smith were filing the "Resolution of Inquiry", asked that the Director call him, and implied that I was in trouble. I told him that the Director was very busy, that I was trying my best to cooperate but that if he wanted to get tough about this, he could and should go through the HPSCI to get what he wanted;

(k) A couple of hours later we got permission from the DDO to show the report and the rescind notice and I was on my way to the Hill.

When I arrived at 115 Cannon both Mr. Smith and Mr. Rowland were waiting for me, polite and controlled but clearly angry. I apologized for the delay and explained that it is highly unusual for us to share raw reports with anyone other than the Intelligence Community, including even our own Oversight Committees, because such information is usually fragmentary, often misleading and is unevaluated. But we were cooperating, so I showed them the two documents. At first they just about flipped with frustration. Just what had we and the government done with the information we learned in 1977? [redacted] Why had it taken two weeks for Mr. Smith to get his hands on what might have been a significant document? It took at least twenty minutes of polite, but at times, very firm explanation about how such reports are handled, "third party" rules on releasing reports, and the risks we all take [redacted] especially when it comes to a highly emotional subject. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) (b)(3)(n) (b)(1)

When a semblance of calm returned, the two Congressmen told me their story, and as a vet of Indochina (which I told them I was), I could not help but be sympathetic with their frustration. Mr. Smith has been working this issue for some time; he too is a Vietnam veteran, Navy. They have amassed a great deal of information on this subject and have made a number of trips to Hanoi to get remains back. They honestly believe that they are not being treated candidly by the DIA, and they feel real pressure from constituents and a sincere obligation to the MIA/POWs to pursue this issue. They explained that there are 2,041 acknowledged MIA/POWs, and they say they know for a fact that Hanoi has 97 boxes of remains "on the shelf", of which some 60 have been handed over in bits and dribbles. Forensic research shows that most of the bodies were never even buried, though lately some remains show signs that the bones were buried after sitting on a shelf, just to make them look as though they were recently dug up. They anticipate receiving more on their trip to Hanoi 4-14 January 1988, probably part of the 97 they say they know about. The two Congressmen appear convinced that the Vietnamese and the Laotians are holding live POWs and many more remains, held hostage because former President Nixon in 1973 promised the North Vietnamese 3.25 billion dollars as the war ended --- and Congress has refused to grant that aid.

Mr. Smith then went on to say that former Director Bill Casey admitted as much right in Mr. Smith's office several months before Casey became ill. He said that Bill Casey sat right there on that couch, in front of five Congressmen and

said, "Sure, we f----d up. We did leave men behind in Indochina, but what do you want us to do now? Do you want us to start bombing again, or to negotiate with those Communists?"

I stressed to the two Congressmen that the DIA is the focal point for this whole issue and that we provide the DIA with any and all information we may collect on this subject. They acknowledged this, even complimented [redacted], but said that all they will get is "being jacked around". Even Secretary of Defense Carlucci recently tried to side-step the issue during a recent meeting, saying, "we're working on it". I offered a DDI briefing on the subject, but the Congressmen did not take me up on the offer.

After all of this emotion and frustration had been vented, Mr. Smith said to me that if I were called to testify because of his "Resolution of Inquiry", that would not be necessary because he recognized that I was trying to cooperate, in a sense only a messenger with bad news, and that I should refer anyone to him should I be summoned.

We then chatted briefly about my own career and I was able to slip out with my head still on my shoulders and the skin on my back, though there were no wishes for happy holidays. We will hear from them again.

(b)(3)(c)

I have prepared a draft letter for Judge Webster to send to Mr. Smith, and we will alert the DIA people about this meeting because they are going to feel the heat soon. I also believe it would be prudent for the DCI to invite Messrs. Smith and Rowland to a breakfast or some sort of meeting.

[redacted]

Deputy Director, House Affairs
Office of Congressional Affairs

Attachment

[redacted]

C06002424

FAX MESSAGE FROM

BOB SMITH

UNITED STATES SENATOR FOR NEW HAMPSHIRE

(b)(3)(c) To: [redacted]

[redacted]

From: Russ

Date: 16 Oct 00 Page 1 of: 4

Notes: As discussed. Thanks for your help. [redacted] (b)(6)

Sent From:

WASHINGTON, DC
SD 307
Washington, DC 20510
Phone: 202-224-2841
FAX: 202-224-1353

MANCHESTER
1750 Elm Street, Suite 100
Manchester, NH 03104
Phone: 603-634-5000
FAX: 603-634-5003

PORTSMOUTH
1 Harbour Place
Portsmouth, NH 03801
Phone: 603-433-1667
FAX: 603-433-1885

10/16/00 MON 08:52 FAX

C06002424

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

SSCI # 2000 - 3113

w/00-0101-G

19 July 2000

The Honorable Richard H. Bryan
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

(U//~~FOUO~~) In response to Section 309 of the FY 2000 Intelligence Authorization Act, attached is the declassified version of the April 1998 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) titled "Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue." Also attached is the declassified version of "A Critical Assessment", a critique of the 1998 NIE produced by the office of Senator Bob Smith.

(U//~~FOUO~~) We remain committed to providing all the support we can to resolving uncertainties regarding Americans missing during the Vietnam conflict. In declassifying this information, we have made every effort to carefully balance the legitimate interest of the public in this issue, with our obligation to protect intelligence sources and methods and our ability to continue to collect intelligence on this critical topic. We have declassified those portions of the documents in question which we felt could reasonably be released without jeopardizing options for gaining further insights into this important matter.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Office of the Inspector General (IG) has also, at the request of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, declassified the joint DOD/CIA IG review of the NIE. Enclosed is an advanced copy of that document. The printed version will follow shortly. The key judgments conclude that:

- appropriate methodology and sound analysis were used in producing the NIE
- conclusions of the NIE were balanced and well-documented
- no Administration official influenced the substance or fundamental judgments of the NIE

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

10/16/00 MON 08:52 FAX

The Honorable Richard H. Bryan

(U) Originals of this letter are also being sent to Chairman Shelby, the Chairman and Ranking Democratic Member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Chairmen of the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Defense.

(U) If you have any questions on this matter please contact me or have a member of your staff contact [redacted] of my staff at [redacted].

(b)(3)(c)

Sincerely,

[redacted]

John H. Moseman
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

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H.R.1555

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Enrolled Bill (Sent to President))

SEC. 307. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.

Section 305(b)(2) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-293; 110 Stat. 3465; 8 U.S.C. 1427 note) is amended by striking `subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) of section 243(h)(2) of such Act' and inserting `clauses (i) through (iv) of section 241(b)(3)(B) of such Act'.

SEC. 308. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON VIETNAM-ERA PRISONERS OF WAR AND MISSING IN ACTION PERSONNEL AND CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF ESTIMATE.

(a) DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW- Subject to subsection (b), the Director of Central Intelligence shall review for declassification the following:

(1) National Intelligence Estimate 98-03 dated April 1998 and entitled `Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning the POW/MIA Issue'.

(2) The assessment dated November 1998 and entitled `A Critical Assessment of National Intelligence Estimate 98-03 prepared by the United States Chairman of the Vietnam War Working Group of the United States-Russia Joint Commission on POWs and MIAs'.

(b) LIMITATIONS- The Director shall not declassify any text contained in the estimate or assessment referred to in subsection (a) which would--

(1) reveal intelligence sources and methods; or

(2) disclose by name the identity of a living foreign individual who has cooperated with United States efforts to account for missing personnel from the Vietnam era.

(c) DEADLINE- The Director shall complete the declassification review of the estimate and assessment under subsection (a) not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 309. REPORT ON LEGAL STANDARDS APPLIED FOR ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE.

C06002429

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

SECRET
Central Intelligence Agency

(b)(3)(c)

Washington, D.C. 20505

20 OCT 1992 OCA 3128-92

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I appreciate greatly the comments in your letter of September 1992 praising the Agency for its support to the POW/MIA Committee's investigations.

As you know, I had my staff pull together for you a summary of information relating to POW/MIA issues from the President's Daily Brief (PDB). I am advised that both you and Senator Smith reviewed this material personally, as did other members of your Committee staff. Pursuant to your request, I also had the Executive Registry review its files and extract pertinent documents for your Committee staff to review. We have found no other "Special Briefs" or additional notes (as, for example, any that former Director William Casey might have made) related to these issues. We have, however, responded to other questions submitted by Mr. Taylor of your Committee, and will continue to work closely with your staff on this matter.

I would like to reiterate at this juncture remarks I made in a letter of July 24, 1992 to you. I have a statutory responsibility to protect sources and methods, including material shared with us by other governments. I cannot therefore accede to your request for unrestricted access to operational or source files. To meet the needs of the Committee, however, we have made available to your staff as requested all reporting relative to specific reports, sightings and incidents, and have declassified as much of this information as possible.

The Honorable John F. Kerry

Your letter asked that all files relating to three specific reports be made available to the Committee. My staff has prepared for your background a summary of source vetting information which underlie the specific intelligence disseminations on which you requested additional information in your letter. We will make arrangements with your staff to review this material. I hope these summaries will meet your needs.

An original of this letter is also being sent to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

C06002429

SECRET
Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

20 OCT 1992

OCA 3128-92/1

The Honorable Bob Smith
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

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The Honorable Bob Smith

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An original of this letter is also being sent to Chairman Kerry.

Sincerely,

[redacted]

Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

C06002429

~~SECRET~~

OCA 3128-92

SUBJECT: Response POW/MIA Affairs Cite re 10 Sep 92 Letter from Vice Chairman Smith

OCA/Senate/JLBreckenridge:jah [ ] (9 Oct 92)



~~SECRET~~

C06002429

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Response to POW/MIA Affairs Cmte re 10 Sep 92 Letter from Vice Chairman Smith

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
Stanley M. Moskowitz Director of Congressional Affairs		OCA 3128-92
		DATE 15 October 1992

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Executive Registry	15 OCT 1992			
2.				
3. Executive Director	16 OCT 1992	16 OCT		
4.				
5. Acting Director of Central Intelligence		16/10		Please sign for the DCI.
7. Return to Director of Congressional Affairs	22 OCT [illegible]			
8.				
9. DDCI A	22 OCT 1992			
10.				
11. OCA Registry				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

DCI EXEC

FORM 1-79 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

C06002429

S/S-RG-W

OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS ROUTING SLIP	ACTION	INFO
D/OCA		X
DD/OCA		X
SPECIAL ASSISTANT		
DD/LEGISLATION		X
DD/SENATE	X	
DD/HOUSE		X
DD/CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT		X
DD/INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ISSUES		X
CONSTITUENT INQUIRIES OFFICER		
FOIA/PA OFFICER		
SECURITY OFFICER		
OCA/COMPT/ISC		X
SUSPENSE 21 Sept. 92 DATE ACTION OFFICER: John B.		
REMARKS: RW		
CONTROL NUMBER: EK 4630-92		
FILE:		

FORM 4422
Nov-91

C06002429

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

ROUTING SLIP

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI				
3	EXDIR/CIA				
4	EXDIR/ICA				
5	DDA				
6	DDI		X		
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T				
9	D/OPAI				
10	IG				
11	COMPT				
12	D/OCA	X			
13	GC		X		
14	Chm/NIC				
15					
16					
17					
18					
19					
20					
21					
22		Acknowledge: 21 Sept			
	SUSPENSE	Substance: 28 Sept Date			

Remarks D/OCA to prepare response for DCI signature in consultation with DDI, DDO, OGC.

ER 92-4630

Executive Secretary

14 Sept 92

Date

3637 (10-81)

C06002430

(b)(3)(c)

ER 92-4630

JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS, Chairman
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, SOUTH DAKOTA
HARRY REID, NEVADA
CHARLES S. ROBB, VIRGINIA
J. ROBERT KERREY, NEBRASKA
HERBERT H. KOHL, WISCONSIN

BOB SMITH, NEW HAMPSHIRE, Vice Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, ARIZONA
HANK BROWN, COLORADO
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NANCY LANDON KASSEBAUM, KANSAS
JESSE HELMS, NORTH CAROLINA

United States Senate

FRANCES A. ZWENIG, STAFF DIRECTOR
DINO CARLUCCIO, DEPUTY STAFF DIRECTOR
J. WILLIAM CODINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

September 10, 1992

The Honorable Robert Gates
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bob:

I am writing concerning three important matters relating to my work as Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. As you know, I deeply appreciate the cooperation your agency has given the Committee during the course of its investigation. I am hopeful that your cooperation will continue into the following areas of the Committee's work:

1. I would appreciate the opportunity to review the following three reports originated by your agency, in addition to all files and actions relating to the three reports --

[redacted]

It is my hope that these reports and materials can be provided to my office in unclassified form, although I wish to review any redacted portions.

2. I would like to arrange for the opportunity to review information in the President's Daily Brief which may concern our POW/MIA investigation. I understand from your Agency's August 11, 1992 letter that a search of this publication for the period 1972 to 1992 has been completed and potential POW/MIA has been prepared for review.

3. I am informed by staff that, with the exception of your Agency's [redacted] file, the Committee has had almost no access to CIA's operational files, the Executive Registry, and any "Special Briefs" which may contain important information on the POW/MIA issue. I ask that you take steps to ensure the Committee has access to these materials.

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

4. Finally, it is my understanding that former CIA Director William Casey kept notes on many of his meetings and discussions during his tenure at the Agency. I would ask that you ensure that any relevant POW information from these notes are provided to me for review.

Bob, I want to underscore the importance that I place on your permitting full access by the Committee to this information. I know that neither of us wants the Committee to fail in its mission to review all potential POW/MIA information in the possession of our government. Both of us have worked too diligently this past year to become vulnerable to legitimate criticism that the investigation was incomplete.

I believe your cooperation to date has been excellent, and I look forward to working with you in the months ahead as we complete our investigation.

With warm regards,

Bob Smith

BOB SMITH, USS
Vice Chairman, Select Committee
on POW/MIA Affairs

BS/dc

C06002433

JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS, Chairman
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, SOUTH DAKOTA
HARRY REID, NEVADA
CHARLES S. ROBB, VIRGINIA
J. ROBERT KERREY, NEBRASKA
HERBERT H. KOHL, WISCONSIN

BOB SMITH, NEW HAMPSHIRE, Vice Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, ARIZONA
HANK BROWN, COLORADO
CHUCK GRASSLEY, IOWA
NANCY LANDON KASSEBAUM, KANSAS
JESSE HELMS, NORTH CAROLINA

FRANCES A. ZWENIG, STAFF DIRECTOR
J. WILLIAM CODINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL

(b)(6)

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(6)

October 1, 1992

Mr. John Breckenridge
Office of Legislative Affairs
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Breckenridge:

The Senate Select Committee on Prisoner of War and Missing in Action Affairs requests all information your organization possesses concerning a Jack Williamson. Mr. Williamson worked for the US Agency for International Development in Laos from 1963 to the mid-1970s. We are particularly interested in any association with your agency.

The point of contact on the Staff for this request is [redacted] who can be reached at [redacted] We appreciate your continued assistance to the committee.

Sincerely,

[redacted]

J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel

JWC/kb/jm

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

C06002434

~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 3085-92
6 OCT 1992

Mr. J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Codinha:

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

Mr. Taylor of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs requested that 22 documents relating to [redacted] be made available to Committee members during the closed hearing on that operation.

We have redacted 20 of the documents requested for delivery to the Committee on the day(s) of the closed hearing. We will make these documents available on the condition that these documents be retrieved at the end of each session and returned each evening to the Agency for storage. We will provide an officer to assume responsibility for the documents.

The other two documents on Mr. Taylor's list, a December 1980 DIA report and a March 17, 1981 State Department telegram from Embassy Vientiane, cannot be released by this Agency. If needed, the Committee should seek release directly from DIA and from the Department of State.

Sincerely,

/s/ Stanley M. Moskowitz

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

(b)(3)(c)

ALL PORTIONS CLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

OCA 3085-92

SUBJECT: Letter to Codinha, POW/MIA Cmte, re Redacted 22 Nhommarath Documents



(b)(3)(c)

C06002435

SECRET
Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

2 October 1992
OCA 3088-92

Mr. J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

Dear Mr. Codinha:

Your letter of September 1, 1992 requested that the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs be provided all information available to this Agency on a Lao refugee whom DIA identifies [redacted] You also requested a review of other reporting concerning the sightings at Maung Ngoy, Laos, by [redacted]

[redacted] of the Committee staff has been advised that all information relating to [redacted] in our files is available for review at our Headquarters. These documents chronicle the efforts which this Agency undertook to authenticate this [redacted]

(b)(6)

Our material on the sightings at Maung Ngoy, reported by [redacted] has already been reviewed by [redacted] and portions thereof were released in declassified form to the Committee (specifically nine intelligence reports and portions of other operational cables which contained information on Maung Ngoy from other sources). The other documents in the Maung Ngoy file have been reviewed but may not be declassified as they relate directly to sensitive sources and methods or are extraneous to the Maung Ngoy investigation. Committee investigators are free to review this material again in original classified form at our Headquarters if the Committee wishes.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

Sincerely,

[redacted]
John L. Breckenridge
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

(b)(3)(c)

ALL PORTIONS CLASSIFIED
SECRET

SECRET

OCA 3088-92

SUBJECT: Letter to Codinha, POW/MIA Cmte, re 1 Sep Ltr on Lao Source Information

OCA/Senate/JLBreckenridge:jah/ [redacted] (2 Oct 92)

[redacted] (b)(3)(c)

C06002435

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

SUBJECT:

Reply to 1 September 1992 Requests from Senate Select Committee Concerning LAO Reports

FROM:	EXTENSION	DATE SENT	REQUEST NUMBER
C/EA/ICOG		24 Sep 92	DDO 0025/24 92

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
1. DCEA/SEA		24/9		
2. Chief, EA				
3. C/ORMS		9/28		
4. DC/ORMS				
5. C/ORMS	29 SEP 1992			
6. SA/DDO		30/9		
7. ADDO		10.1		
8. DDO			✓	
9. O/OCA/S				
10. Return to				
11. Registry for filing				
12.				

(b)(3)(c)

SUSPENSE DATE:

RETURN TO:

LOGGED

FORM 4283 8-87

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

C06002436

SECRET

23 September 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Breckenridge
Chief, Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: [redacted] (b)(3)(c)
Chief, Indochina Operations Group

SUBJECT: Reply to 1 September 1992 Requests from Senate Select Committee Concerning Lao Reports

REFERENCE: 1 September 1992 Letter from Committee Counsel J. William Codinha, attached

The reference (attached) requests detailed information on the source of a POW report on LAOS, as well as the declassification of the file we prepared previously on two reports of American POW's seen near Maung Ngoy, LAOS, and the efforts undertaken by several assets to corroborate those reports. Committee investigator (b)(6) [redacted] previously visited Headquarters to review that file. We suggest sending the Committee the following response:

(Begin proposed text of reply:) (b)(3)(n) (b)(1)

1. The Agency has received the Committee's 1 September 1992 request concerning reports of American POW sightings in LAOS by [redacted] in 1984 and 1986.

2. We have extracted from our files extensive information held on individuals identified by DIA as [redacted] and have created a separate file on him. This information chronicles efforts the Agency undertook to authenticate this source. As was stated to [redacted] last week at the Capitol, this new file is (b)(6) available at our Headquarters for review by [redacted] at his convenience.

3. The Agency compiled earlier a complete file based on two reports of American POW's reportedly seen near Maung Ngoy, LAOS which we obtained from DIA-numbered [redacted] (not the identified DIA [redacted]) This file demonstrates efforts undertaken by the Agency in 1986 to corroborate those two reports. [redacted] reviewed this file during an earlier visit to our Headquarters. Since then the Agency has declassified and released to the Committee nine intelligence reports or portions of operational cables which contain information obtained from several

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)





(b)(3)(c)



SECRET

C06002436

JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS, Chairman
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, SOUTH DAKOTA
HARRY REID, NEVADA
CHARLES S. ROBB, VIRGINIA
J. ROBERT KERREY, NEBRASKA
HERBERT H. KOHL, WISCONSIN

BOB SMITH, NEW HAMPSHIRE, Vice Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, ARIZONA
HANK BROWN, COLORADO
CHUCK GRASSLEY, IOWA
NANCY LANDON KASSEBAUM, KANSAS
JESSE HELMS, NORTH CAROLINA

FRANCES A. ZWENIG, STAFF DIRECTOR
J. WILLIAM CODINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

September 1, 1992

Mr. Robert Magner
Office of Legislative Affairs
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Magner:

The Senate Select Committee on Prisoner of War and Missing in Action Affairs requests all information your organization possesses concerning a Lao refugee whom DIA identifies as source 2402.

The Committee also requests that your Agency declassify and send to the Committee a large file concerning the sightings in Laos in 1986 by sources 5343 and 5991. This file bears directly on testimony given on 4 and 5 August 1992 before this Committee in open session. Should national security requirements prevent you from declassifying the whole file, we request that you provide an official, unclassified summary of the file for the public record and declassify as many of the documents in the file as possible.

The point of contact on the Staff for these requests is [redacted] who can be reached at [redacted] (b)(6)

Sincerely,

J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel

JWC/kb/jm

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

C06002442

DAC 99-00582

(b)(3)(c)

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING SHEET

1. CONTROL NUMBER: DAC 99-00582	2. SUSPENSE DATE:
3. SUBJECT: Letter to Senator Smith	
4. ORIGINATION OFFICE: NIC, 7E62 OHB, 37322	5.DATE: 29 January 1999

6. PURPOSE:
Responds Letter to Senator Smith

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

7. SUMMARY:

8. COORDINATION:

9. RECOMMENDATION:

10. DATE IN	11. ROUTE TO	12. ACTION (Check a Box)	13. NONCONCUR REASON	14. DATE OUT
		☐ SIGNATURE ☐ CONCUR ☐ FYI		
1/29/99		☐ SIGNATURE ☑ CONCUR ☐ FYI		2/2/99
FEB 03 1999		☐ SIGNATURE ☐ CONCUR ☐ FYI		FEB 03 1999
FEB 03 1999		☐ SIGNATURE ☐ CONCUR ☐ FYI		2/4/99
FEB 04 1999		☐ SIGNATURE ☐ CONCUR ☐ FYI		FEB 17 1999
Feb 17th	SIGNATURE	☐ SIGNATURE ☐ CONCUR ☐ FYI		
	TITLE SIGNATURE	☐ SIGNATURE ☐ CONCUR ☐ FYI	L-225	DCI EXEC REG CENTER

FORM 4-97 4468 (EF)

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

CL BY:
CL REASON:
DECL ON:
DRV FROM:

C06002442

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

17 December 1998

The Honorable Bob Smith
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Smith:

(~~S NF~~) I appreciate the concern expressed in your letter of 25 November 1998 about the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Vietnamese Intentions, Capabilities, and Performance Concerning POW/MIA Issues. I recognize your long-standing interest in the issue, as well as your tireless efforts on behalf of military personnel and their families. I assure you that the Intelligence Community will seriously consider your criticism and suggestions. I agree that we owe the families of POWs and MIAs our best effort.

(~~S NF~~) As you know, Intelligence Community Principals in the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), which I chair, discussed and approved the estimate on 13 April 1998. I have directed that your evaluation of the NIE be placed on the agenda for the NFIB now scheduled for January. I will inform you of the results.

Sincerely,

George J. Tenet

(b)(3)(c)

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

C06002442

SECRET/NOFORN

DCI/OCA/CLG/[redacted]:pnr[redacted] (7 Dec 98)
OCA 98-1663
FN: WDATA/liaison[redacted].doc

[redacted]

SECRET/NOFORN

C06002451

(b)(3)(c)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Office of General Counsel

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

6 June 1994

John C. Mattes
Brickell Concours - Suite 800
1401 Brickell Avenue
Miami, Florida 33131

Dear Mr. Mattes:

Thank you for your correspondence of 9 May 1994. As you suggested, our office obtained a copy of the declassified study, commissioned by the the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1970, to which you referred in your letter.

Upon careful review of that study and other government records, we are unable to identify any information that evidences an obligation on the part of this agency to provide compensation for your clients.

If you have specific documentation pertaining to the issues you have raised in your correspondence that you wish to share with this office, we will review that information and respond to you in a timely fashion.

Thank you for contacting us with your concerns.

Sincerely,

[redacted]

[redacted]
Attorney-Advisor

C06002453

ER-94-0543/2 (b)(6)

JOHN C. MATTES, ESQ.
BRICKELL CONCOURS - SUITE 800
1401 BRICKELL AVENUE
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33131
TEL: (305) 374-5590
FAX: (305) 358-8565

June 17, 1994

Senator John Kerry
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and
International Operations
421 Russel Senate Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(6)

Attn: Jonathan Winer

RE: COMMANDO POW's

Dear Senator Kerry:

I'm writing to you concerning the plight of my clients, who were Vietnamese POW's. Between 1959 and 1969, a number of my clients, were recruited by the United States to participate in covert operations inside North Vietnam. While on their missions, a number of them were captured, tried, and imprisoned. As POW's, they suffered for many years.

For a number of months, I've been attempting to assist these individuals in a variety of ways. Besides trying to help them in leaving Vietnam, I'm also trying to get them their back pay from United States agencies.

Recently, I've been in touch with the CIA regarding the back pay owed the commandos by the agency. Unfortunately, the CIA has claimed they have no legal obligation to provide for their own agents (see enclosure).

I would strongly suggest that the CIA be questioned on what grounds they feel they can abdicate responsibility for their own. It is sad enough to think that these POW's were abandoned for all those years, however, it is far more troubling that they are being ignored now.

I appreciate your attention to this.

Cordially,

(b)(6)

John C. Mattes

JCM/jm
cc: - Admiral James Woolsey,
CIA Director
- Dorothy S. Kim, General Counsel
CIA

C06002458

SECRET
Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

28 September 1992

OCA 2768-92/1

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On August 25, 1992 the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs reviewed the PDB Chronology of POW/MIA references. The following responds to some of the Committee's questions. The PDB office of the DDI was unable to locate their sources for the PDB items and the overt press (The New York Times) did not identify the reportedly captured Americans. After searching the Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB), predecessor of the NID, on these issues a few sources were obtained and are noted below:

a. **Question**: In the May 8, 1974 article on Laos, there is reference to five US military personnel believed to be held. What are their names and who is the source of this report?

Answer: We cannot tell now who was referred to in the May 8, 1974 PDB, but it is likely that this may be a reference to five of the eight crewmen of the EC47Q ("Baron-52") which was shot down over Laos on February 5, 1973. On the other hand, it may have been a reference to some other missing Americans possibly captured by the Pathet Lao. We cannot determine who the source was for this report.

b. **Question**: A February 4, 1972 note uses the word "noteworthy" to describe a change in the Communists' seven-point plan. Why was this "noteworthy?"

Answer: We believe the analyst used "noteworthy" to describe the change in previous Communist formulation that stated that prisoners would not be freed until the end of the US withdrawal. (b)(3)(c)

ALL PORTIONS CLASSIFIED
SECRET

SECRET

The Honorable John F. Kerry

c. **Question:** In a June 4, 1974 article on Laos, four Americans are believed to have been captured in Laos prior to the February 1973 cease-fire agreement. Who are the four Americans and what is the source of the report?

Answer: We do not know the names of the four Americans referred to in this article, nor do we know the source of the report. It is possible that this is another reference to the four crew members of the EC47Q, although their capture occurred just after the cease-fire.

d. **Question:** An August 16, 1975 note mentions eight Americans who were included in 13 POWs to be transported to Hanoi. Who were the eight?

Answer: The eight Americans were probably the group of American civilians captured at Ban Me Thuot on March 12, 1975, sometimes called "the Struharik group," who together with James F. Lewis (captured in Phan Rang on April 16, 1975) comprised the nine American citizens released from Hanoi on October 30, 1975. They were: Paul A. Struharik, John D. Miller, Carolyn P. Miller, Lucille A. Miller, Betty J. Mitchell, Richard L. Phillips, Lilliam M. Phillips, and Jay Scarborough.

The "13 prisoners of war" mentioned by the North Vietnamese transportation unit were probably the above eight, plus James F. Lewis, and four other prisoners captured in South Vietnam in March and April 1975. These four may have been Enrique Tolentino, Norman Johnson, Joan Johnson, and Peter Whitlock. On October 30, 1975 the North Vietnamese also released five non-US citizens: the Johnsons (Canadians), Whitlock (Australian), Filipinos Enrique Tolentino and Arellano Bugarin.

e. **Question:** Articles from July 8, 1972 and July 20, 1972 report that the North Vietnamese were killing American prisoners. What are the sources for this information? Did DIA get distribution of these reports? Did General Vessey use this information to assist his negotiations with North Vietnamese?

The Honorable John F. Kerry

Answer: The article from July 8, 1972 was derived from three NSA reports which must be released through NSA. [redacted]

The NID, formerly the CIB, is normally distributed to Intelligence Community agencies which include DIA.

We have no information regarding General Vessey's usage of this information to assist his negotiations with the North Vietnamese.

f. **Question:** [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) Why was there no reporting in the PDB from 1978 to 1986?

Answer: We have no information on the decisions made on the editing and contents of the PDB during this period. [redacted] was not reported in the PDB because it is not the method by which CIA's own operational activities are reported. The PDB also would not comment on other reporting of events (as, for example, of non-official efforts) unless we had independently acquired intelligence information of importance.

An original of this letter is also being sent to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

C06002458

SECRET
Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

28 September 1992
OCA 2768-92/2

The Honorable Bob Smith
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

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ALL PORTIONS CLASSIFIED SECRET

SECRET

The Honorable Bob Smith

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The Honorable Bob Smith

Answer: The article from July 8, 1972 was derived from three NSA reports which must be released through NSA. [redacted]

[redacted]

The NID, formerly the CIB, is normally distributed to Intelligence Community agencies which include DIA.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

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Answer: We have no information on the decisions made on the editing and contents of the PDB during this period. [redacted] was not reported in the PDB because it is not the method by which CIA's own operational activities are reported. The PDB also would not comment on other reporting of events (as, for example, of non-official efforts) unless we had independently acquired intelligence information of importance.

An original of this letter is also being sent to Chairman Kerry.

Sincerely,

[redacted]

(b)(3)(c)

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

OCA 2768-92/1

SUBJECT: Response to POW/MIA Affairs Committee
25 August 92 Questions

OCA/Senate [redacted] (17 Sep 92)

[redacted]

(b)(3)(c)

C06002458

TO : D/OCA	CONTROL #	DATE OF REQUEST
	OCA 2768-92/1	25 Sep 92
FROM : [redacted]		SUSPENSE DATE

SUBJECT : Response to POW/MIA Affairs Committee re 25 August Questions

NOTES

Answer to last question rewritten per [redacted] request.

(b)(3)(c)

COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices)

NAME	OFFICE	DATE
[redacted]		
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE

ACTION REQUIRED BY **D/OCA**

Signature please

FORM 2-86 **4118** OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

C06002458

TO : D/OCA (b)(3)(c)		CONTROL # OCA 2768-92/1	DATE OF REQUEST 17 Sep 92
FROM : [redacted] CT Via DD/Senate Via DD/OCA			SUSPENSE DATE

SUBJECT : Response to POW/MIA Affairs Committee re 25 August Questions

NOTES

John Brackenridge

I don't like the answer to the last question

(1) were there not non-official recce attempts?

(2) we would not normally report DO ops in the PDB. A more likely reason would not be included NOT because it wasn't important!!

(3) and the last para isn't very helpful

COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices)		
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
Mike Stein		
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE

ACTION REQUIRED BY D/OCA

Signature please

FORM 4118 2-86 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

C06002463
ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

Central Intelligence Agency

(b)(3)(c)

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2906-92

8 SEP 1992

Mr. J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Codinha:

In response to your letter of July 24, 1992, records of the Agency's Executive Registry have been reviewed for the materials you requested relative to the POW/MIA issue. A number of Agency substantive documents bearing on the POW/MIA issue have been so identified and will be made available to appropriately cleared Committee personnel to review at our Headquarters. This includes the minutes and supporting documents of one NSPG meeting which dealt in part with the POW/MIA issue. We have received clearance from the NSC to include this material in the package to be reviewed with the proviso that those reviewing the document be limited to yourself, Ms. Zwenig, or Mr. Kravitz, and that any notes on the document be retained by the Agency.

No documents were found which related in any way to an alleged 1981 White House meeting to discuss a reputed offer by the Vietnamese to return live POWs nor were any documents recovered dealing with the issue of possible transfers of POWs to the Soviet Union or China.

Sincerely,

/s/ Stanley M. Moskowitz

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

C06002463

OCA 2906-92

SUBJECT: Letter to J. William Codinha re ER Document Search as Requested by 24 Jul 92 Letter

OCA/Senate/RWMagner:jah/[ ] (3 Sep 92)

Distribution:
Original -
1 -
1 -
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C06002465

Central Intelligence Agency

OCA FILE:
RECEIPT #:

Washington, D.C. 20505

14 December 1992
OCA 0982-92/1

Mr. J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Codinha:

Your letter of 20 October 1992 inquired about information relevant to the POW issue which the Committee thought available in the files and archives of the National Warning Staff.

It will not be appropriate or useful to make the entire files and archives available to the Committee. To assist the work of the Committee, however, the National Intelligence Officer for Warning ensured that a thorough review was undertaken to locate any files or reports touching on issues before the Committee. No file specifically devoted to POW/MIA issues exists in current holdings or in archives. Other files were hand-searched, particular attention being paid to those on Vietnam and Korea.

The National Warning Staff files contained several documents, both classified intelligence reports and open press articles, which related to the POW/MIA issue. Two classified reports were originated by CIA: a December 1982 assessment of the Lao resistance; and an October 1991 report relating a Vietnamese official's views on normalizing relations with the United States. We believe both reports have already been made available to the Committee but have appended copies to this letter for ease of reference.

Sincerely,

[redacted]

John L. Breckenridge
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

(b)(3)(c)

Enclosures

[redacted]

Downgrade to UNCLASSIFIED
When Separated From Enclosures

SECRET

OCA 0982-92/1

SUBJECT: Response to Codinha, POW/MIA Affairs Cmte, re Information Available in National Warning Staff Files



(b)(3)(c)

C06002465

SECRET

JOINT STAFF
INFO SERVICE CENTER

ROUTINE ZYUW RUEAIIA4903 2762128 [redacted] A RECURRING CONCERN DURING THE CONGRESS WAS THE
R 032121Z OCT 91 PERCEPTION OF THE DERAILING OF VIETNAMESE-SOVIET RELATIONS AS THE
FM CIA USSR LEADERSHIP LOOKED INCREASINGLY TOWARD THE WEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN
TO DIRNSA DEPT OF STATE//INR STABILIZATION OF ITS DYNAMIC DOMESTIC EVENTS AND DISTANCED ITSELF
DIA WASHINGTON DC WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM FROM THE PROMINENT REMAINING SOCIALIST REGIMES VIETNAM AND CUBA
DEPT OF COMMERCE (b)(6) (b)(3)(n) (b)(1)

S E C R E T NOFORN WNINTEL

CITE CIA 914109

SERIAL: TD-00-B-321/07089-91
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REPORT CLASS SECRET --WNINTEL--NOFORN
DIST: 03 OCTOBER 1991

COUNTRY: VIETNAM

SUBJ: VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL'S VIEWS ON NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND CHINA

DOI: LATE AUGUST 1991 (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

SOURCE: [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(6) (b)(3)(n)

[redacted]

2. [redacted] AT THE SEVENTH PARTY CONGRESS HELD EARLIER THIS YEAR, THE COUNTRY'S NEWLY EMERGING LEADERSHIP DECIDED THAT IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH CHINA WAS THE LINCHPIN TO ENSURE THAT VIETNAM WAS NOT ISOLATED IN FUTURE ASIAN POLITICAL AFFAIRS. TOWARD THAT END, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS NGUYEN CO ((THACH)) WAS PRESSURED INTO STEPPING ASIDE. HE HAD REPEATEDLY BEEN IDENTIFIED AS THE PRINCIPAL SPOKESMAN IN THE ANTI-CHINESE ELEMENTS OF THE "OLD LEADERSHIP" AND HIS OUSTER HAD BEEN A KEY STIPULATION BY THE CHINESE IN ANY MOVEMENT TOWARD IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. (b)(6) (b)(3)(n) (b)(1)
PROF. [redacted] AND BELIEVED THAT THE NEW MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WAS DISTINCTLY MORE POSITIVELY INCLINED TOWARD CHINA.

3. IN WHAT [redacted] ACKNOWLEDGED AS AN APPARENT CONTRADICTION, THE NEW MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IS PRIVATELY LESS FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. THAN WAS THACH BUT THE NEW LEADERSHIP AS A WHOLE HAS BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY DISPLAYED A NEAR OBSESSION WITH RECTIFYING THE POW/MIA MATTER AND REALIZING AN END TO THE U.S.-IMPOSED TRADE EMBARGO. ACCORDING TO [redacted] THE PARTY CONGRESS CONCLUDED THAT REINITIATION OF TRADE WITH THE U.S. WAS CRITICAL TO VIETNAM EMERGING FROM THE SUSTAINED ECONOMIC MALAISE, PARTICULARLY AS SOVIET AID DRAMATICALLY DIMINISHED. THROUGHOUT THE CONGRESS VARIOUS PROPOSALS WERE TABLED REGARDING THE FORMULATION OF JOINT U.S.-VIETNAMESE TEAMS TO EXPEDITE THE SEARCH FOR MISSING U.S. SERVICEMEN OR THEIR REMAINS.

4. [redacted] TALKED OF THE APPOINTMENT OF MANY HIGH LEVEL OFFICIALS AT THE PARTY CONGRESS AS CLEAR EVIDENCE OF THE "YOUTH MOVEMENT" SWEEPING THROUGH VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP RANKS. IN FACT, HE CHARACTERIZED HIMSELF AS A "TRANSITIONAL FIGURE" DUE TO HIS AGE OF

6. AS THE CONVERSATION PROGRESSED [redacted] DID MENTION THAT HE HAD BEEN ASKED BY AIR VIETNAM TO APPROACH A MAJOR U.S. COMMERCIAL CARRIER REGARDING THE PROSPECTS FOR POSSIBLE SALE/LEASING OF AIRCRAFT IMMEDIATELY UPON EXPIRATION OF THE TRADE EMBARGO. THE VIETNAMESE AIRLINE ALSO WAS INTERESTED IN A FLIGHT TRAINING PROGRAM BEING ESTABLISHED FOR ITS CREW MEMBERS. HOWEVER, ALL PARTIES READILY AGREED THAT COMPENSATION FOR EITHER AIRCRAFT OR TRAINING WOULD HAVE TO BE "IMAGINATIVELY ARRANGED" AS VIETNAM SIMPLY DID NOT CURRENTLY HAVE HARD CURRENCY FOR SUCH ACTIVITIES.

7. FINALLY, [redacted] THE MAJORITY OF VIETNAM'S NEW LEADERSHIP TEAM APPEARS CONFIDENT THAT THE TRADE EMBARGO WITH THE U.S. WOULD BE LIFTED BEFORE YEAR'S END. [redacted] BELIEVED THAT VIETNAM WAS NOW ACTING IN GOOD FAITH CONCERNING THE PREVIOUSLY CONTENTIOUS ISSUE OF THE POW'S AND MIA'S AND THAT U.S. BUSINESS WOULD SOON BE LOBBYING HARD FOR ENTREE INTO THE VIETNAMESE MARKETPLACE, PARTICULARLY IN THE AGRICOMMODITY SECTOR. (b)(6) (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

ACQ: (EARLY SEPTEMBER 1991)

DISSEM: [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

[redacted] REPORT CLASS S E C R E T [redacted]

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DIST: 6 DECEMBER 1982

COUNTRY: LAOS/THAILAND/VIETNAM/CHINA

SUBJ: APPRAISAL OF SITUATION: THE LAO RESISTANCE

DOI: 30 NOVEMBER 1982

SOURCE: THIS IS A FIELD APPRAISAL. (b)(3)(n) (b)(1)
IT IS AN INTERPRETATION BASED ON PREVIOUSLY REPORTED INFORMATION.
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SUMMARY: ARMED RESISTANCE AGAINST THE LPDR GOVERNMENT HAS CONTINUED ERRATICALLY SINCE EARLY 1976 WITH LITTLE OR NO SIGNIFICANT GAINS. THE ABSENCE OF UNITY, OVERT SUPPORT, AND CAPABLE LEADERSHIP HAS KEPT THE LAO RESISTANCE FRAGMENTED AND WEAK. LPA AND PAVN FORCES, WHILE SUPERIOR TO THE RESISTANCE, ARE STRETCHED TOO THINLY TO ELIMINATE THE RESISTANCE FORCES COMPLETELY. THE RTG HAS PROVIDED LIMITED AMOUNTS OF COVERT SUPPORT TO RESISTANCE FORCES, BUT THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE RTG WOULD WANT TO RISK CONFRONTATION WITH THE SRV BY EXPANDING SUCH AID. CHINA'S MOTIVES FOR BECOMING INVOLVED ARE NOT CLEAR, BUT IT IS LIKELY THAT THE CHINESE REGARD LIMITED COVERT SUPPORT TO THE MOVEMENT AS ANOTHER POINT OF PRESSURE ON THE SRV AND AS A CONVENIENT MEANS OF INFLUENCING THE LPDR. THE LPDR AND SRV VIEW THE RESISTANCE ACTIVITY WITH SOME CONCERN BUT NOT AS A MAJOR THREAT. IN THE ABSENCE OF A CHANGE IN THAI OR CHINESE POLICY TOWARD SUPPORTING THE RESISTANCE, THE MOVEMENT IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE ON ITS PRESENT LOW-LEVEL COURSE.
ORCON WNINTEL

TEXT: INTRODUCTION

1. OPPOSITION TO THE PATHET LAO REGIME BEGAN SHORTLY AFTER THE COMMUNISTS TOOK OVER THE COUNTRY IN DECEMBER 1975. THE OPPOSITION RESULTED FROM A SERIES OF INEPT MOVES INSTITUTED BY THE LEADERSHIP OF THE NEWLY FORMED LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (LPDR) WHICH LED TO POLITICAL UPHEAVAL, SEVERE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DISLOCATION AND WIDESPREAD UNCERTAINTY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. WHEN THOUSANDS OF SENIOR AND MIDDLE-LEVEL BUREAUCRATS AND MILITARY OFFICERS WERE PRESSED INTO REEDUCATION CAMPS, THE RESULTING SEPARATION OF FAMILIES SPARKED FEAR AND TRIGGERED THE FLIGHT OF MOST OF THE COUNTRY'S INTELLECTUALS, BUREAUCRATS, AND TECHNOCRATS. AN ESTIMATED 500,000 LAO HAVE FLED THE LPDR IN THE PAST SIX YEARS. MANY OF THESE REFUGEES CARRIED THEIR RESENTMENT FOR THE LPDR REGIME AND ITS MENTOR, THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SRV), INTO REFUGEE CAMPS ALONG THE THAILAND-LPDR BORDER. THE CAMPS QUICKLY BECAME CENTERS OF AGITATION AGAINST THE LPDR AND FERTILE BREEDING GROUND FOR SELF-STYLED RESISTANCE LEADERS.
ORCON WNINTEL.
ENCOURAGED BY AMBIGUOUS OFFERS OF THAI SUPPORT AND NURTURED BY PROMISES OF AID FROM PROMINENT LAO EMIGRES ABROAD, MAKE-SHIFT TEAMS OF INSURGENTS SPRANG UP IN CAMPS ALONG THE BORDER. THESE RESISTANCE TEAMS WERE POORLY TRAINED AND EQUIPPED. THEY OFTEN WERE LED BY INEXPERIENCED LEADERS. THESE RESISTANCE TEAMS NEVERTHELESS HARASSED LAO PEOPLE'S ARMY (LPA) AND PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM (PAVN) INSTALLATIONS AND CONVOYS ALONG ROUTE 13 AND THE MEKONG RIVER FROM CHAMPASSAK TO VIENTIANE PROVINCE.

2. FOLLOWING THE PAVN INVASION OF KAMPUCHEA AND THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN CHINA AND THE SRV IN LATE 1978 AND EARLY 1979, ETHNIC MINORITY TRIBESMEN IN REMOTE MOUNTAINOUS STRETCHES OF LPDR MILITARY REGION-1 (MR-1) WERE PROVIDED SOME AID AND WEAPONS TRAINING BY THE CHINESE. SMALL POCKETS OF RESISTANCE ACTIVITY SUBSEQUENTLY APPEARED IN THE HIGHLANDS OF LOUANG NAMTHA, OUDOMSAI, AND SAYABOURY PROVINCES IN 1981 FOLLOWING THE RETURN OF THESE TRIBESMEN FROM TRAINING SITES IN CHINA. EXCEPT FOR PARTS OF MR-1 AND CLASHES INVOLVING THE HMONG ETHNIC MINORITY GROUP DEEP IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS OF LPDR MR-II, WHICH ENDED IN 1980 WITH THE DEFEATED HMONG SCATTERED TO ADJOINING PROVINCES AND REFUGEE CAMPS
ORCON WNINTEL
IN THAILAND, MOST OF THE RESISTANCE ACTIVITY HAS BEEN CONFINED TO BORDER AREAS FROM SAYABOURY IN THE NORTHWEST TO CHAMPASSAK IN THE LPDR PANHANDLE. REPORTS OF RESISTANCE ACTIVITY IN OTHER PARTS OF THE LPDR SUCH AS HOUAPHAN, XIENG KHOUANG, AND AREAS CONTIGUOUS TO THE SRV, FOR THE MOST PART, INVOLVED CLASHES WITH NOMADIC HILL TRIBESMEN, OUTLAW BANDS, OR "SOCIAL UNDESIRABLES" WANDERING ABOUT WITHOUT OFFICIAL PERMISSION AND ATTEMPTING TO LIVE OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT CONTROL. THE LPA NORMALLY DOES NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THESE PEOPLE AND THE MORE OR LESS LOOSELY ORGANIZED RESISTANCE ELEMENTS OPERATING FROM BASES IN THAILAND.

STATUS OF RESISTANCE

3. AS OF NOVEMBER 1982, THERE WERE AN ESTIMATED 9,000 INSURGENTS INVOLVED IN THE OVERALL ANTI-LPDR RESISTANCE MOVEMENT. APART FROM TOKEN AID PROVIDED BY THE CHINESE AND LIMITED COVERT SUPPORT FROM THAILAND, LITTLE SUPPORT FOR THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT HAS MATERIALIZED OVER THE PAST SIX YEARS. THE THAI PERMIT RESISTANCE TEAMS TO REGISTER IN REFUGEE CAMPS AND DRAW UNITED NATIONS
ORCON WNINTEL
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR) RATIONS FOR THEMSELVES AND THEIR FAMILIES. THESE TEAMS ARE BIVOUACKED IN SECRET SITES ALONG THE BORDER TO KEEP THE THAI INVOLVEMENT COVERT. MORE THAN ANY OTHER FACTOR, THE ABSENCE OF SOLID OVERT BACKING BY THAILAND HAS HOBBLED THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AND KEPT IT FRAGMENTED. THERE IS NO UNITY AMONG THE VARIOUS FACTIONS INVOLVED IN THE RESISTANCE, AND THERE IS NO COORDINATION AMONG THAI COVERT SUPPORT UNITS SPONSORING THE RESISTANCE TEAMS. THIS IS A DELIBERATE ASPECT OF THAI POLICY WHICH VIEWS THE POSSIBILITY OF A UNIFIED RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AS PROBABLY UNCONTROLLABLE AND POTENTIALLY DETRIMENTAL TO THAI INTERESTS. ACTIVITIES OF RESISTANCE TEAMS, WHETHER INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OR SABOTAGE, USUALLY REFLECT THE IDIOSYNCRASIES OF LOCAL THAI COMMANDERS. THE MOVEMENT ALSO HAS BEEN BUFFETED BY COMPETING DEMANDS FOR ALLEGIANCE FROM DIFFERING FACTIONS SUCH AS ((PHOUMI)) NOSAVAN'S UNITED LAO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (ULNLF); ((XONG LE)) S NEUTRALISTS IN CHINA; PROMINENT FORMER LAO LEADERS LIVING IN EXILE ABROAD; AND OPPORTUNISTS SUCH AS ((BOUN EUT)) SAYCOCIE IN THAILAND. (((END COMMENT. BOUNLEUT WAS PHOUMI NOSAVAN'S AIDE-DE-CAMP IN VIENTIANE IN THE EARLY 1960'S.)) BICKERING, LACK OF SUPPORT, AND THE CONTINUOUS DRAIN ON MANPOWER AS INSURGENTS FILTER OUT OF THE BT

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IN EARLY 1982 WAS LED BY ((PHOU)) (LNU), A FORMER FAR CAPTAIN. PHOU HAD ABOUT 130 TROOPS BASED ON THA LI (QV 5750), LOEI PROVINCE, THAILAND, AND WAS ACTIVE IN SOUTHERN SAYABOURY PROVINCE. HE WORKED CLOSELY WITH THAI COVERT SUPPORT TEAMS AGAINST LPA UNITS IN BOTENE (QV 3167), KENTHAO (QV 5461), AND PAKLAY DISTRICTS AND HARASSED CIVILIAN AND MILITARY TRAFFIC ALONG ROADS IN THE THREE DISTRICTS. HIS ACTIONS HAVE FORCED THE LPA TO STRENGTHEN ITS FORCES IN SOUTHERN SAYABOURY.

STATUS OF RESISTANCE IN LPDR MR-II

10. MOST RESISTANCE ACTIVITY IN MR-II HAS BEEN CARRIED OUT BY HMONG FROM BAN VINAY, A HMONG REFUGEE CAMP IN LOEI PROVINCE, THAILAND, AND FROM TEAMS OF LOWLAND LAO OPERATING WITH THAI COVERT SUPPORT FROM NONG KHAI PROVINCE. FROM 1976 TO 1980, THE HMONG STUBBORNLY RESISTED LPA AND PAVN ATTACKS AGAINST THEIR MOUNTAIN
ORCON WNINTEL
VILLAGES IN PHOU BIA (UF 0798) AND LONG TIENG (TG 8313) UNTIL THEY WERE PUSHED OUT. THE FOUR-YEAR STRUGGLE EXHAUSTED THEIR STORES OF AMMUNITION AND WEAPONS AND RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF HUNDREDS OF YOUNG HMONG. THERE WERE STRONG INDICATIONS THAT PAVN FORCES HAD EMPLOYED CHEMICAL WARFARE AGAINST THE HMONG IN AND AROUND PHOU BIA. MANY OF THOSE WHO WERE NOT KILLED FLED TO ADJACENT PROVINCES AND TO THAILAND. AS A RESULT OF THE LONG STRUGGLE, HMONG RANKS HAVE BEEN DECIMATED TO THE POINT WHERE THERE ARE FEWER THAN 2,000 MEN WHO ARE EITHER WILLING OR CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING INSURGENT ACTIVITY IN MR-II. THESE INSURGENTS OPERATE PRIMARILY IN POCKETS NORTHWEST OF MUANG MOC (UF 9592), IN THE REGION WEST OF VANG VIENG (TF 3295), AND IN THE HIGHLANDS FROM BAN DONE (SF 6898) TO PAK CHOM (RV 0592). THE LEADER OF THE HMONG IN BAN VINAY IS ((VANG)) NENG WHO IS CLOSE TO HMONG LEADER FORMER GENERAL ((VANG)) PAO. AT ANY GIVEN TIME, FROM 100 TO 300 HMONG TROOPS OPERATE INSIDE VIENTIANE PROVINCE ON BEHALF O THE THAI COVERT TEAM IN LOEI COLLECTING INTELLIGENCE OR CARRYING OUT SMALL-SCALE HARASSMENT ATTACKS. ALTHOUGH STILL CAPABLE OF POSING A MINOR THREAT TO PARTS OF VIENTIANE PROVINCE, INCLUDING THE CAPITAL, THE SPIRIT OF THESE HMONG HAS BEEN BROKEN, AND MOST OF THE HMONG HAVE LITTLE HOPE OF EVER RETURNING TO THEIR HOMES IN THE CENTRAL
ORCON WNINTEL
HIGHLANDS.

11. GROUPS OF LOWLAND LAO NUMBERING ABOUT 500 INSURGENTS OPERATE FROM COVERT BASES IN NONG KHAI, THAILAND, ACROSS THE MEKONG IN VIENTIANE CITY AND PROVINCE. DURING 1982, THEY APPARENTLY WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR FIVE GRENADE ATTACKS, INCLUDING INCIDENTS AT THE SOVIET CULTURAL CENTER AND POLISH EMBASSY. FOLLOWING THESE INCIDENTS, HOWEVER, THEY WERE ORDERED BY THE THAI NOT TO ATTACK SOVIET INSTALLATIONS. ALTHOUGH THE ACTIONS OF THESE INSURGENTS ARE LARGELY INEFFECTUAL, THEY HAVE SERVED TO KEEP LPDR SECURITY UNITS IN THE AREA TENSE AND ALERT.

STATUS OF RESISTANCE IN LPDR MR-III

12. MR-III IS STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT REGION TO THE LPDR BECAUSE OF ITS COMMUNICATIONS LINK TO THE SRV. THE AREA IS ALSO SIGNIFICANT BECAUSE IT HAS A SIZABLE POPULATION SYMPATHETIC TO THE RESISTANCE AND IS AN IMPORTANT FOOD GROWING AREA. RESISTANCE ACTIVITY IN THE REGION HAS VARIED IN INTENSITY OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS WITH MUCH OF IT DIRECTED TOWARD LIGHTLY GUARDED PAVN
ORCON WNINTEL

CONVOYS ON ROUTE 13 AND BARGE TRAFFIC ON THE MEKONG. AS OF NOVEMBER, THERE WERE ABOUT 2,800 INSURGENTS, CONSISTING OF MORE THAN 30 SMALL GROUPS OF 20-50 TROOPS EACH, OPERATING AGAINST TARGETS IN KHAMMOUAN AND SAVANNAKHET PROVINCES. THESE GROUPS OPERATED WITH LIMITED THAI COVERT SUPPORT FROM BASES ALONG THE MEKONG FROM UBON TO NAKHON PHANOM PROVINCE. ON 20 MAY, TO EXERT BETTER THAI CONTROL, THAI COVERT SUPPORT TEAMS ORGANIZED THESE GROUPS INTO THE 415TH REGIMENT UNDER THE COMMAND OF ((BOUNMA)) VORACHAK AND ((BOUNLEUT)) SOULIGNAMA. THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 415TH REGIMENT WAS IN NAKHON PHANOM PROVINCE. THE TEAMS, HOWEVER, CONTINUED TO OPERATE AS SEPARATE ENTITIES. DESPITE THAI ATTEMPTS TO ORGANIZE THE DISPARATE GROUPS OF MR-III AND MR-IV INSURGENTS, THE MOVEMENT REMAINS SPLIT INTO SEVERAL COMPETING FACTIONS. SOME INSURGENTS ARE ALIGNED WITH PHOUMI NOSAVAN (RIGHTISTS); SOME SUPPORT KONG LE (NEUTRALISTS); AND OTHERS INCLUDING A FEW FORMER PATHET LAO LEADERS (NATIONALISTS) OPERATE INDEPENDENTLY OF EITHER GROUP. INSURGENT TEAMS OPERATING IN THEIR NATIVE AREAS IN KHAMMOUAN PROVINCE HAVE THE SUPPORT OF FAMILY AND FRIENDS IN THE REGION AND GOOD AREA KNOWLEDGE. FEWER THAN TEN PERCENT OF THE INSURGENTS HAVE HAD ANY PRIOR MILITARY
ORCON WNINTEL
EXPERIENCE, HOWEVER. WEAPONS ARE CLOSELY CONTROLLED BY THAI COVERT SUPPORT TEAMS, AND THERE ARE INADEQUATE MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT. THE SINGLE THREAD HOLDING THESE RESISTANCE TEAMS TOGETHER IS THE HOPE THAT THE RTG MIGHT EXPAND ITS SUPPORT FOR THE MOVEMENT. THE GROUPS USUALLY OPERATE ABOUT 10-20 KILOMETERS INLAND FROM THE MEKONG OSTENSIBLY BECAUSE OF A LACK OF FOOD BUT MORE LIKELY BECAUSE THEY FEEL SECURE CLOSE TO THE BORDER. THEIR PRIMARY MISSIONS ARE TO HARASS LPA AND PAVN UNITS AND TO GATHER INTELLIGENCE. THEIR ACTIVITIES ARE TIGHTLY CIRCUMSCRIBED BY THE THAI.

13. ON 10 JUNE, THAI COVERT SUPPORT TEAMS ORGANIZED THE 31ST RESISTANCE REGIMENT IN MUKDAHAN PROVINCE. THE NEW REGIMENT WAS HEADED BY ((SING)) INTHISAN. OTHER LEADERS WERE ((CHAMPHENG)) CHANTHAPHON, POLITICAL AFFAIRS; ((BOUNSOUAN)) SOUMPHONPHAKDI, RESISTANCE FORCES; ((SIMUANG)) CHANTHALANGSI, INTELLIGENCE; AND ((XON)) SOUMPHONPHAKDI, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PROPAGANDA AFFAIRS. THE 31ST REGIMENT'S AREA OF OPERATIONS IS SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE. LIKE THE 415TH REGIMENT, THE 31ST IS A REGIMENT IN NAME ONLY AND ITS DISPARATE PARTS OPERATE AUTONOMOUSLY. THE THAI COVERT TEAM MADE ARRANGEMENTS TO PROVIDE LIMITED SUPPORT AND ALSO ARRANGED WITH THE MUKDAHAN
ORCON WNINTEL
DISTRICT HOSPITAL TO PROVIDE FREE MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR ANTI-LPDR

RESISTANCE TROOPS IN EXCHANGE FOR DONATIONS OF BLOOD FROM THE INSURGENTS. MANY OF THE INSURGENTS HAVE FRIENDS OR FAMILY STILL RESIDING IN SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE, AND THERE SEEMS TO BE SOME SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT FOR THEM THERE. HOWEVER, THEY ARE NO MATCH FOR THE SUPERIOR PAVN, LPA, AND VILLAGE MILITIA FORCES IN THE REGION.

STATUS OF RESISTANCE IN LPDR MR-IV

14. IN SEPTEMBER 1982, THAI COVERT TEAMS IN UBON RATCHATHANI PROVINCE CONSOLIDATED SEVERAL RESISTANCE SPLINTER GROUPS NUMBERING ABOUT 2,500 TROOPS INTO THE FOURTH ANTI-LPDR RESISTANCE DIVISION. AS OF NOVEMBER 1982, THE DIVISION WAS LED BY ((SAN)) AKKHASA AND HAD ONLY ABOUT 1,485 TROOPS. MANY OF THE TROOPS HAD LEFT FOR RESETTLEMENT IN THIRD COUNTRIES, DEFECTED TO THE LPA, OR LAID DOWN THEIR ARMS AND RETURNED TO REFUGEE CAMPS. ONE OF THE FOURTH DIVISION'S REGIMENTS OBTAINED SOME AID FOR SYMPATHETIC DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA FORCES FOR A TIME UNTIL THAI COVERT TEAMS, ALARMED AT THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH COLLABORATION, PUT A STOP TO IT. THE FOURTH DIVISION FOUND LITTLE

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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OF THE RESISTANCE IN MR-IV PROVIDES A FAIRLY ACCURATE PICTURE OF THE PLIGHT OF THE RESISTANCE OVERALL AND UNDERSCORES ITS THREE GLARING WEAKNESSES--LACK OF SUPPORT, UNITY, AND CAPABLE LEADERSHIP.

STATUS OF LPA FORCES

15. THE LPA NUMBERS ABOUT 60,000 TROOPS ORGANIZED INTO TWO DIVISIONS AND TWO BRIGADES. THE LPA IS DEPLOYED THINLY IN ALL PARTS OF THE COUNTRY WHICH SEVERELY HAMPERS ITS EFFECTIVENESS. THE LPA LEADERSHIP IS COMPRISED OF LONG-TIME PATHET LAO FIGHTERS WHO SERVED ORCON WNINTEL
EXTENSIVELY WITH PAVN FORCES. HOWEVER, THE OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LPA ITSELF IS QUESTIONABLE. DISCIPLINE IS LAX; TRAINING IS MINIMAL; AND BECAUSE OF POOR AND IRREGULAR PAY, MOTIVATION IS LOW. A NUMBER OFUSOVIET AND SRV ADVISORS ARE WORKING TO IMPROVE THE LPA. MANY LPA UNITS ARE FORCED TO BE SELF-SUFFICIENT AND OFTEN ENGAGE IN OPIUM TRADING TO OBTAIN MONEY TO PURCHASE FOOD. THERE HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS REPORTS OF INDIVIDUAL LPA SOLDIERS SELLING THEIR WEAPONS TO OBTAIN MONEY TO BUY FOOD OR CLOTHING FOR THEMSELVES OR THEIR FAMILIES. THE AVERAGE LPA SOLDIER DISPLAYS NONE OF THE AGGRESSIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF HIS PAVN COMRADES. MANY LPA SOLDIERS HAVE FRIENDS OR FAMILY MEMBERS IN THE RESISTANCE AND OFTEN AVOID ENCOUNTERS WITH THE INSURGENTS TO AVOID INFLICTING CASUALTIES. THE LPA, HOWEVER, IS A RELATIVELY ORGANIZED MILITARY FORCE WITH VASTLY SUPE"OR FIRE AND MANPOWER AND IS MORE THAN AN EQUAL MATCH FOR THE RESISTANCE, ESPECIALLY WHEN BOLSTERED BY THE PRESENCE OF PAVN. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: THE WPA "BRIGADES" SHOULD BE CONSIDERED DIVISIONS, GIVING THE LPA A TOTAL OF FOUR.)

SRV PRESENCE IN THE LPDR
ORCON WNINTEL
16. THE SRV VIEWS THE LPDR AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF ITS UNOFFICIAL
INDOCHINA FEDERATION AND AS A STRATEGIC BUFFER ON ITS WESTERN FLANK. IT MAINTAINS AN ESTIMATED 40,000 PAVN COMBAT TROOPS IN THE COUNTRY AND ABOUT 12,000 CONSTRUCTION WORKERS, MILITARY AND POLITICAL ADVISORS. IT HAS THREE PAVN COMBAT DIVISIONS IN THE LPDR, I.E., THE 379TH DIVISION IN LUANG PRABANG, THE 324 (3248) DIVISION IN VANG VIENG,
AND THE 968TH DIVISION IN SENO, TO PROVIDE SUPPORT AND TRAINING FOR THE LPA. HOWEVER, MOST OF THE PAVN FORCES ARE DISPOSED IN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS AROUND URBAN CENTERS, MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS ROUTES. LARGE PARTS OF THE BORDER AND INTERIOR ARE LEFT RELATIVELY UNGUARDED AND PROVIDE EASY ACCESS FOR THE ANTI-LPDR RESISTANCE FORCES OPERATING FROM THAILAND. THE PAVN UNITS, ALTHOUGH FAR SUPERIOR TO THE RESISTANCE TROOPS, ARE TOO THINLY STRETCHED TO CONTAIN THE ELUSIVE INSURGENTS. MOREOVER, THERE IS LITTLE OR NO SYMPATHY FOR THE VIETNAMESE AMONG INHABITANTS OF AREAS THEY CONTROL. CONSEQUENTLY, THEY RECEIVE LITTLE COOPERATION FROM THE PEOPLE. PAVN TROOPS ALIENATE THE LAO BY CONFISCATING FOOD, MISTREATING LAO WOMEN, AND GENERALLY TREATING THE LAO AS INFERIORS. LARGE PARTS OF ATTOPEU PROVINCE HAVE BEEN POPULATED BY ETHNIC VIETNAMESE WHO ARE EXPLOITING THE REGION'S TIMBER RESOURCES. OTHER ORCON WNINTEL
PARTS OF THE LPDR PANHANDLE PROVINCES ADJACENT TO THE SRV HAVE BEEN FLOODED WITH ETHNIC VIETNAMESE WHO ARE ENGAGED IN TIMBER AND MINING OPERATIONS. THIS ACTIVITY HAS THE TACIT APPROVAL OF THE LPDR AS ONE OF THE FEW MEANS AVAILABLE TO IT TO REPAY THE SRV FOR ITS LARGE INVESTMENTS OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL SUPPORT. THE SRV DOES NOT VIEW THE RESISTANCE IN ITS PERSENT STATE AS CONSTITUTING ANY SERIOUS THREAT TO THE LPDR REGIME ALTHOUGH INCREASED CHINESE OR THAI SUPPORT WOULD BE WORRISOME TO HANOI. THE RESISTANCE PROVIDES SOME JUSTIFICATION FOR MAINTAINING PAVN TROOPS IN THE LPDR, KEEPS THE ((KAYSONE)) PHOUMVIHAN REGIME DEPENDENT ON THE SRV, AND PROVIDES A BARRIER TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF LPDR RELATIONS WITH THAILAND.

RTG VIEWS OF THE ANTI-LPDR RESISTANCE

17. THE UNDERLYING FACTORS OF THE THAI APPROACH TO RELATIONS WITH THE LPDR AND, BY EXTENSION, THE RESISTANCE, ARE THE OVERSHADOWING
THREAT POSED BY THE SRV AND THE IMPACT ON THAILAND OF LAO REFUGEES. RELATIONS BETWEEN THAILAND AND THE LPDR HAVE OFTEN BEEN STRAINED OVER THE PAST SEVEN YEARS, BUT BOTH SIDES ENDEAVORED TO MAINTAIN THE ORCON WNINTEL
APPEARANCE OF CORRECTNESS AS BEING IN THEIR BEST INTERESTS. THE LANDLOCKED LPDR IS PARTIALLY DEPENDENT ON OVERLAND IMPORTS AND EXPORT THROUGH THAI PORTS, WHILE THAILAND SEEKS TO MINIMIZE THE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER OPENLY HOSTILE NEIGHBOR WHILE PREOCCUPIED WITH THE MORE THREATENING PROBLEM OF KAMPUCHEA. THAILAND WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY LIKE TO SEE A FRIENDLIER GOVERNMENT INSTALLED IN VIENTIANE THAT COULD RID THAILAND OF ITS REFUGEE PROBLEM. IT WOULD ALSO WELCOME THE APPEARANCE
OF A REGIME MORE POLITICALLY DISTANT FROM HANOI IF THAT COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT ANTAGONIZING THE LATTER. IN REALITY, HOWEVER, THE THAI ARE FACED WITH THE PROBLEM OF HAVING TO DEAL WITH A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT WHICH PURSUES POLICIES THE THAI FIND REPUGNANT AND THREATENING. THE RTG HAS, THEREFORE, EVOLVED AN APPROACH THAT PUBLICLY DISAVOWS ANY INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ANTI-LPDR RESISTANCE WHILE COVERTLY PROVIDING LIMITED ENCOURAGEMENT AND SUPPORT WHICH IT HOPES WILL LEAD TO SPONTANEOUS INTERNAL CHANGE IN THE LPDR. CRITICS OF THAI POLICY -- PEOPLE WHO ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THE LAO RESISTANCE, WHO VIEW THE LAO STRUGGLE AS AN EXTENSION OF THE KAMPUCHEAN CONFLICT AND, THEREFORE, DESERVING OF EQUAL THAI SUPPORT -- HAVE DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING THE THAI POSITION. THE THAI SEE LITTLE SIMILARITY IN THE TWO STRUGGLES. TO THEM, KAMPUCHEA REPRESENTS A CLEAR CASE OF ORCON WNINTEL
FOREIGN AGGRESSION -- A POSITION THAT IS SHARED BY MOST NATIONS AND IS REINFORCED BY THE WEIGHT OF FREE WORLD OPINION. THE ANTI-LPDR RESISTANCE, ON THE OTHER HAND, DESPITE SOME PAVN PRESENCE, IS VIEWED AS PURELY AN INTERNAL LPDR MATTER. THE RTG IS RELUCTANT TO SUPPORT A HIGHLY VISIBLE UNITED RESISTANCE ON THAI SOIL THAT WOULD BE UNCONTROLLABLE AND COULD LEAD TO A CONFRONTATION WITH THE SRV. IN THE MEANTIME, THAILAND IS FACED WITH THE DILEMMA OF WHAT TO DO WITH THE LARGE NUMBERS OF LAO REFUGEES INSIDE ITS BORDERS. THERE HAVE BEEN RECENT INDICATIONS THAT THE RTG HAS BEEN CONSIDERING A PROPOSAL TO RESETTLE SIZABLE NUMBERS OF ETHNIC HMONG TO SITES IN NAN PROVINCE ADJACENT TO THE LPDR BORDER. THAI SUPPORTERS OF THE PLAN THEORIZE THAT THE HMONG WOULD EVENTUALLY TRICKLE BACK INTO THE LPDR AND THEREBY PARTLY SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF WHAT TO DO WITH HMONG WHO ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THIRD COUNTRIES. WHILE THERE IS A PRECEDENT FOR SUCH A PLAN ON A LIMITED SCALE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EIGHT RESISTANCE VILLAGES OF HILL TRIBESMEN IN NORTHERN CHIANG RAI PROVINCE IN 1981, ANY EXPERIMENT OF A SIZABLE NATURE COULD CREATE PROBLEMS WITH WHICH

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CONTINUED RESISTANCE TO THE LPDR. THE PROSPECT OF LIVING LEGALLY IN PEACEFUL, FAMILIAR SETTINGS WITH INTERNATIONAL AID WOULD EXERT AN ENORMOUS APPEAL TO LARGE NUMBERS OF HMONG AND OTHER LAO ALREADY RESETTLED ILLEGALLY IN THAILAND OUTSIDE THE REFUGEE CAMPS. THERE ARE AN ESTIMATED 15,000 LAO RESIDING ILLEGALLY IN PROVINCES ALONG THE THAI BORDER. THE SETTLEMENT ALMOST CERTAINLY WOULD DRAW LARGE NUMBER OF LPA AND POSSIBLY PAVN SECURITY FORCES TO THE SAYABOURY SIDE OF THE BORDER TO COUNTER A PERCEIVED THREAT TO AN AREA RICH IN TIMBER RESOURCES AND ECONOMICALLY IMPORTANT TO THE LPDR. ENSUING TENSION WOULD INCREASE THE CHANCES FOR CLASHES AMID CHARGES OF THAI PROVOCATION.

LPDR PERCEPTIONS OF THE RESISTANCE

18. THE LPDR REGARDS THE RESISTANCE WITH SOME CONCERN BUT NOT AS A MAJOR THREAT. THE SPORADIC ATTACKS ON THE LPDR GENERATE CONORCON WNINTEL
TINUING TENSION IN BORDER AREAS FORCING THE GOVERNMENT TO ALLOCATE INCREASINGLY SCARCE NUMBERS OF SECURITY FORCES TO URBAN AREAS, INSTALLATIONS, AND COMMUNICATIONS ROUTES IN THE AFFECTED REGIONS. ATTACKS ALSO HAVE COST LIVES AND SOME LOSSES IN FOODSTUFFS, BUILDING SUPPLIES, AND EQUIPMENT. CONVOYS ON ROUTE 13 AND BARGE TRAFFIC PLYING BETWEEN MR-II AND MR-IV ARE FAVORITE TARGETS OF INSURGENTS. WHILE CONCERNED ABOUT THE DRAIN ON RESOURCES DEVOTED TO COUNTERING THE RESISTANCE, THE LPDR PROBABLY SEES CERTAIN BENEFITS IN A NONTHREATENING INSURGENCY. IT DEFLECTS ATTENTION FROM THE BASIC UNPOPULARITY OF THE REGIME IN THE FACE OF STAGGERING ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
AND PROVIDES THE GOVERNMENT WITH AN EXCUSE TO PROLONG TOUGH POPULATION
CONTROL MEASURES IN THE NAME OF SECURITY. THE INSURGENCY ALSO PROVIDES A HANDY EXPLANATION FOR DEFAULTING ON DEVELOPMENT GOALS SUPPORTED BY WESTERN AND INTERNATIONAL AID DONORS WHICH ARE IN FACT CAUSED BY LAO INCOMPETENCE AND MISMANAGEMENT. IT ALSO PROVIDES JUSTIFICATION FOR SEEKING CONTINUED SOVIET MILITARY AID AND SUPPORT.

CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN THE ANTI-LPDR RESISTANCE

19. CHINA BEGAN PROVIDING WEAPONS AND TRAINING TO SMALL NUMBERS ORCON WNINTEL
OF ETHNIC MINORITY TRIBESMEN IN THE NORTHWESTERN LPDR IN EARLY 1960 FOLLOWING ITS CLASH WITH THE SRV OVER HANOI'S OUSTER OF THE PRO-CHINESE DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA REGIME IN PHNOM PENH. CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH HANOI AND VIENTIANE COOLED SIMULTANEOUSLY FOLLOWING THAT INCIDENT. IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT CHINA DECIDED TO PROVIDE LOW-LEVEL SUPPORT TO SOME INSURGENT GROUPS AS A MEANS OF MAINTAINING PRESSURE ON THE SRV AND POSSIBLY AS LEVERAGE TO PROD THE LPDR INTO ADOPTING A MORE FAVORABLE STANCE TOWARD CHINA. CHINA HAS FEW AVAILABLE OPTIONS TO PROD VIENTIANE INTO LINE WITH BEIJING. CHINA DOES NOT HAVE THE ECONOMIC RESOURCES TO LURE THE LPDR AWAY FROM THE SOVIET-SRV CAMP AND TO ADOPT A BELLIGERENT STANCE TOWARD THE TINY NATION AS CHINA IS DOING
ALONG ITS BORDER WITH THE SRV, WOULD BE COSTLY AND WOULD NOT ENHANCE CHINA'S IMAGE AMONG THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. CHINA IS BELIEVED TO HAVE TRAINED ABOUT 2,000 LAO INSURGENTS IN THE PAST TWO YEARS. IT HAS ALSO BEEN HOST TO SEVERAL LAO EXILES, THE MOST PROMINENT BEING FORMER PAR GENERAL KONG LE. DESPITE RECENT INDICATIONS THAT CHINA MIGHT BE CONSIDERING INCREASING ITS SUPPORT FOR THE RESISTANCE, THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT CHINA WISHES TO OVERTHROW THE KAYSONE REGIME OR DO ANYTHING TO SEND IT SPIRALING MORE DEEPLY INTO SOVIET AND SRV ARMS. ADDITIONALLY, CHINA ALMOST CERTAINLY WOULD NOT WELCOME THE IN-
ORCON WNINTEL
STALLATION OF A PRO-WESTERN GOVERNMENT IN VIENTIANE, WHICH IS FAVORED BY MOST OF THE THAILAND-BASED RESISTANCE GROUPS. IT APPEARS PROBABLE THAT CHINA HAS CHARTED A MODEST COURSE OF SUPPORT TO FOSTER AN IMAGE OF THE INSURGENCY AS A POTENTIAL THREAT TO VIENTIANE WHICH IT CAN READILY MANIPULATE TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE LPDR AND THE SRV.

CONCLUSIONS

20. THE ANTI-LPDR RESISTANCE IN ITS PRESENT FRAGMENTED FORM POSES LITTLE MORE THAN AN IRRITANT TO THE LPDR. IT HAS LITTLE HOPE OF DESTABILIZING THE KAYSONE GOVERNMENT AND VIRTUALLY NONE OF REPLACING IT. ITS PROSPECTS FOR ACHIEVING A VIABLE THREAT REST ALMOST ENTIRELY ON EXPANDED THAI OR CHINESE SUPPORT AND ON A COLLECTIVE WILL TO PERSIST, NEITHER OF WHICH APPEARS IMMINENT. MOREOVER, DEVELOPMENT

ELSEWHERE IN INDOCHINA, E.G., KAMPUCHEA, WHICH WOULD FREE LARGE NUMBERS OF PAVN FORCES FOR DEPLOYMENT TO THE LPDR WOULD BE A SERIOUS SETBACK FOR THE INSURGENTS. IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT THE ANTI-LPDR RESISTANCE MOVEMENT WILL CONTINUE AT ITS PRESENT INEFFECTUAL PACE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.
ORCON WNINTEL

21. [redacted] THE AMBASSADOR HAS SEEN THIS APPRAISAL AND POSES NO OBJECTION TO ITS DISSEMINATION.)

ACQ: [redacted]

DISSEM: [redacted] EMBASSY (AMBASSADOR, DCM, POLITICAL COUNSELOR ONLY), DEFENSE ATTACHE (COL. CRIST ONLY) AT BANGKOK. SENT TO [redacted] AMBASSADORS ONLY), HONG KONG (CONSUL GENERAL ONLY), CINCPAC (EXCLUSIVE FOR CINCPAC, COMIPAC AND POLAD).

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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

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October 20, 1992

Mr. John Breckenridge
Office of Congressional Affairs
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Breckenridge:

The Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs requests the Central Intelligence Agency provide to the Committee the files of the National Indications Center and of its successor organization, the Strategic Warning Staff, that cover the period 1948 through 1975. These files contain information relating to the losses of U.S. military personnel during the major crises and conflicts of the post-war period. This material is required to support a forthcoming hearing by this Committee.

These files are in the archives of the Central Intelligence Agency, filed variously. Some are listed under the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence; some are under the Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board, and some are logged under the National Intelligence Council. In addition, one five-drawer file cabinet located in the National Warning Staff contains a large number of post-war crisis management files that are related to the investigations of the Committee.

A large amount of this information can be declassified.

Ms. Linda Whitlow, Secretary for the National Intelligence Officer for Warning and the National Warning Staff, located in Room 1C925, The Pentagon, has a complete file of all materials archived by the National Indications Center and the Strategic Warning Staff. Please provide a copy of this master list to the Committee by 30 October.

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Additionally, as a part of this request, please provide copies of any and all intelligence reports issued by your organization that relate to or discuss the fate of U.S. military personnel captured during the Korean War and captured during the various crises during the cold war, after World War II.

Sincerely,

J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel

JWC/kb/wl

C06002472

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SUBJECT: Briefing of Senate Select Committee Staffers on Three Indviduals

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S E C R E T

3 November 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Breckenridge
Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: [redacted]
Chief, Indochina Operations Group

SUBJECT: Briefing of Senate Select Committee Staffers on Three Individuals

REFERENCE: Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs letter to you of 30 October 1992

1. In response to the attached Reference request, we plan to brief the Select Committee staffers orally, providing the information contained in the attached traces on the two Vietnamese and one American about whom the Committee inquired. We will not pass the written traces to the staffers, nor will we declassify our traces, although we can expect to be asked to do so.

2. We received the Reference request late on 30 October, and prepared the attached traces on 2 November. Despite the 4 November deadline imposed by Mr. Codinha, please do not schedule the briefing until this memorandum has been routed through [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

Attachments: Traces

[redacted]

S E C R E T

2 November 1992



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

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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

October 30, 1992

Mr. John Breckenridge
Office of Congressional Affairs
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Breckenridge:

The Senate Select Committee on Prisoner of War and Missing in Action Affairs requests the Central Intelligence Agency to arrange a briefing on 4 November 1992 for key Staff members on any and all information the agency has concerning [redacted] and [redacted] does business at [redacted] is a student at [redacted] and a researcher in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

Additionally, the Committee is interested in any information you might have on a Vietnamese diplomat named Ambassador Can who was the second ranking officer in the Vietnamese Mission to the UN.

Sincerely,

[redacted]

J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel

JWC/kb/jm

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence

[redacted]

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]

ATTENTION [redacted]

THROUGH [redacted] (b)(3)(c)

SUBJECT : Dong Mang Prison Camp, NVN

REFERENCES : (a) Requirement No.
(b) IAS Project No.

1. This memorandum is in response to your requirement for [redacted] analysis of a prison camp located in the vicinity of Cam Pha, North Vietnam. [redacted]

Prison Location

NF 48-12

2. The prison is located at 21-04-00N 107-07-15E, approximately 26 kilometers west-northwest of the port of Cam Pha. It is located in a secluded area at the base of the foothills about 1 kilometer north of Dong Mang and 2 kilometers north of Route 183.

Discussion

3. Although we were unable to find any conclusive evidence that this prison might contain American POWs, we did notice several unique features in this prison that differ from other known Vietnamese prisons. It is secluded in a relatively remote area and has an access control point on the road leading to the camp. Walls within the compound physically and visually segregate the prisoners. The visual segregation of prisoners indicates it is not a forced labor camp. The only other known prison that used internally walled compounds to segregate the prisoners was the former POW camp at Dan Hoi.

4. Roof repair work was [redacted] on one of the confinement buildings/living quarters [redacted] A close study of the roof repair work revealed a unique alternating light and dark pattern on the roof. This pattern, in the form of squares, was repeated

[redacted]

[redacted]

SUBJECT: Dong Mang Prison Camp, NVN

three times at different locations on the roof. Because of the seemingly unusual manner in which the roof was being repaired we attempted to discern if this pattern was coincidental or purposeful. We were unable to make this distinction and realize that the prospect of it being purposeful is remote. It is not known if prisoners would be used or allowed to make these repairs. However, we did investigate this possibility. An attempt was made to transpose this pattern into Morse code. The white squares, being larger than the dark ones, were considered as dashes and the dark squares as dots. A dash-dot-dash in Morse code transposes as the letter "K". [redacted] two other less conspicuous possibilities exist. These are the letters "NT" and "TA" that are variations of the same dash-dot-dash pattern. We contacted an individual in the Office of Naval Intelligence who has extensive knowledge of the POW situation. According to this source, the letter "K" was the permamently designated signal letter assigned to air crews should they be downed and unable to recall the monthly and/or daily assigned signal letters. This information has been confirmed through discussions with former POWs.

Construction Details

5. The prison was [redacted] in the early stages of construction adjacent to a small possible detention camp on [redacted] July 1972. The possible detention camp consisted of a secured compound containing approximately ten small, semipermanent buildings. As work on the present prison progressed, the semipermanent facility was dismantled.

6. The currently existing prison consists of a walled compound containing eight confinement buildings/living quarters, one probable messhall, two support buildings, at least four latrines, ten unidentified buildings and two probable guard houses/towers. The interior of the compound is divided into 14 separately secured areas. Each area is secured by a solid wall with a single access. The only buildings in the compound that are not separately secured are the probable messhall and two support buildings. Studies of prisons in North Vietnam known to contain POWs during the war have shown efforts to segregate the prisoners by using walls or other materials to obscure visibility. However, none were as extensively segregated as at this compound. A small building, possibly used for solitary confinement, is located outside of the walled

[redacted]

compound. The building is secured on three sides by fencing and on one side by the east wall of the compound. Two possible guard houses/towers are at the two outer corners of the fenced area. Another guard tower is located on a hillside outside of the compound near the southeast corner and it affords good visibility of the entire prison.

7. During the construction of one of the confinement buildings/living quarters, we determined the building would contain eight rooms or cells. Assuming the other confinement buildings also contain eight rooms and if two to four prisoners were in each room the compound could contain between 130 to 260 prisoners.

8. A large area behind the east (rear) wall of the compound has been cleared and leveled. Portions of an outer wall have been constructed around the compound with one segment of this outer wall extending into the cleared area. The height of this outer wall is about three times higher than the existing wall securing the prison. If this cleared area is for enlarging the compound, it could increase the current capacity by approximately 50 percent.

9. The administration and support facility for the prison is located just outside of the prison compound. This facility consists of one administration building, three barracks, one probable messhall and 11 support buildings.

10. A possible satellite/auxiliary detention camp is located 1,100 meters northwest of the main compound. This camp began to develop as construction of the main compound progressed. It may have been constructed to hold personnel from the possible detention camp that was dismantled to make room for the main compound. If, as it appears, this satellite area is a detention facility, it indicates an effort to separate the prisoners being kept there from those being confined at the main compound. Otherwise the main compound would have originally been constructed of sufficient size to accommodate these prisoners.

11. This possible satellite compound is triangular shaped and contains four to five possible confinement buildings/living quarters and seven or eight support buildings. These buildings are much smaller than those at the main compound. Two walls of the compound are in the open, but Vegetation obscures the area where the third wall should be located. A

[redacted]

SUBJECT: Dong Mang Prison Camp, NVN

large opening can be seen where the two visible walls should meet. This large opening raises questions about the security of the compound. Nine administration/support buildings are located outside of the compound.

[redacted]

[redacted]

C06002491









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



[redacted]

K= -.-

NT= -. -

TA= - .-

[redacted]

AA= .- .-

AR= .- .-.

[redacted]

C06002491

02 JUN 1993

CLASSIFIED VERSION OF UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS HAND DELIVERED TO HILL ON 26 MAY 93 BY [redacted] SENATE LIAISON OFFICER.

DELIVERED TO: HPSCI, SSCI, SEN SMITH, AND TO WOODWARD, SEN KERRY'S OFFICE.

(b)(3)(c)

C06002491 DD/SA SECRET NOFORN

(b)(3)(n) (b)(1) **The [redacted] Reports**

Seven intelligence reports on treatment of US prisoners in Hanoi--disseminated during 1970--found by CIA in routine review for the Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs. Not released until February 1993 (after Select Committee went out of business), due to massive volume of information reviewed. (b)(3)(c)

(b)(1) (b)(3)(n) [redacted]

Political sensitivity: The reports tend to corroborate both the numbers and some other facts contained in the recently-released Russian document (purporting to be a report to the Vietnamese Politburo, it claimed Hanoi held 1205 POWs in 1972). [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

(b)(1) (b)(3)(n) **On** [redacted] A "rallier" (*chieu hoi*) in 1969, formerly a North Vietnamese army doctor. Claimed a lot of knowledge on the POW system, but his reporting was portrayed at the time as second or third hand. [redacted] was "surfaced" in Saigon in 1971 for the press, probably because his information on Russian, Chinese and Czech involvement in interrogating POWs (subsequently proven inaccurate) was useful. CIA decided his numbers of POWs were not verifiable and could only mislead families, and deleted that section from his press conference. [redacted]

Additional Questions of Concern

Assessment of his reporting -- Not formally done yet. Initial reviews indicate a lot of errors in his information on how POWs were handled. Enough to make all his reporting, including numbers, suspect. Because CIA knew so little about the system at the time, his reports were disseminated. Subsequent debriefs of actual POWs prove his information erroneous.

[redacted] No longer in possession of current information, was evidently not very useful in consultant position (no disseminable info). Seems to have wanted to pursue other employment options, as a medical doctor, perhaps in US.

Where is he now? -- We don't know. INS has no record of him as an immigrant, refugee, or applicant for asylum. [redacted]

SECRET NOFORN

C06002560

~~SECRET~~

OCA 0551-92
6 March 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Senator Robert C. Smith (R NH)

1. On the early afternoon of 6 March, [redacted] Acting (b)(3)(c)
Director of the Office of Security, and the undersigned met with Senator Robert C. Smith, Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. The meeting was at Senator Smith's request to discuss the status of the SCI Security clearance request for minority staff director [redacted] (b)(6)
[redacted] Senator Smith had reviewed the FBI report upon which the Agency determination on the clearance would be based. He had significant concerns about the report which he found inaccurate and misleading and asked to meet with the Agency official who would make the determination in this case--[redacted]--to offer his views. (b)(3)(c)

2. [redacted] opened the meeting by explaining his (b)(3)(c)
position and the fact that he had not, as yet, reviewed the FBI report but wanted to hear the Senator's views which he could then factor into his decision. Senator Smith explained that he had briefed Mr. [redacted] on the FBI report which he had (b)(6)
obtained from Senator Kerry and based on that briefing Mr. [redacted] had prepared a point by point rebuttal. (b)(6)
Senator Smith provided a copy of the rebuttal to [redacted] and then proceeded to review the points and to offer his own opinion and elaboration on the issues. Following this presentation Senator Smith asked for an expeditious resolution of the case and received [redacted]'s assurances assuming that no further investigatory actions were required.

[redacted] (b)(3)(c)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

4. Senator Smith expressed his appreciation for the Agency's efforts, underscored his continued displeasure with the tone and content of the FBI report, and his eagerness to have this key staff officer properly cleared so that he could get on with his responsibilities and his role within the Committee.

[redacted]

Robert W. Magner
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs (b)(3)(c)
Office of Congressional Affairs

C06002560

OCA 0551-92

SUBJECT: Meeting with Senator Robert C. Smith (R NH)



(b)(3)(c)

C06002570

S E C R E T

E.O. 12958 6025/291-94

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

(b)(3)(c)

29 October 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Breckenridge
Chief, Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: [redacted]
Chief, Indochina Operations Group

SUBJECT: Information on Air America Pilots
Clarence N. Driver and James H. Ackley

REFERENCE: Senate Select Committee Letter to DoD POW/MIA CDO dated 22 October 1992

1. This is in response to the request by the Committee for files on Clarence Driver and other crewmen on an Air America C-123 lost over Laos on 7 March 1973.

2. Attached are declassified copies of the personnel files on Clarence N. Driver and James H. Ackley, the American civilian pilots of the Air America C-123 which crashed in Laos on 7 March 1973. Their personnel files contain only documents relative to their applications for employment, their pilot qualifications, and offers of employment from Air Asia Company Limited. There is nothing in their files concerning their deaths.

[redacted]

S E C R E T

SUBJECT: Information on Air America Pilots Clarence N. Driver and James H. Ackley

3. Also attached are copies of several documents from our records of Air America losses in Southeast Asia. These list only names and losses by years, and provide no details on crashes. The 1973 memorandum entitled "American Casualties in Laos," which should remain classified SECRET, states that Air America records do not provide details on casualty incidents.

4. We have not found any other information on this loss.

Attachments:
As stated

C06002571

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(6)

(b)(6)

JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS, Chairman
BOB SMITH, NEW HAMPSHIRE, Vice Chairman
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, SOUTH DAKOTA
JOHN McCAIN, ARIZONA
HARRY REID, NEVADA
HANK BROWN, COLORADO
CHARLES S. ROBB, VIRGINIA
CHUCK GRASSLEY, IOWA
J. ROBERT KERREY, NEBRASKA
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HERBERT H. KOHL, WISCONSIN
JESSE HELMS, NORTH CAROLINA
FRANCES A. ZWENIG, STAFF DIRECTOR
J. WILLIAM CODINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

October 22, 1992

Margaret R. Munson
Director, DoD POW/MIA CDO
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, DC 20301-3040

Dear Ms. Munson:

We request a declassified copy of all files including, but not limited to, DIA, JCRC, CIA or other casualty files pertaining to Clarence Driver. Clarence Driver reportedly was the First Officer on a C-123 owned by Air America lost over Laos on March 7, 1973. Please include the unclassified files of the other crewmen lost on this flight or any separate file on the aircraft lost.

We would also appreciate an unclassified version of the information reports provided to DIA by Wayne Johnson. Mr. Johnson worked for USAID in Laos from 1967 - 1975 and assisted JCRC from 1979- 1981. Mr. Johnson provided information to Robert DeStatte and Warren Gray through the years and to DIA through Ken Quinn. We are interested in what was reported, how this information was recorded and how the information was processed.

We would appreciate this information by October 28, 1992. Please contact Nick Nicklas at 224-4819 with any questions concerning this request.

(b)(6)

Sincerely,

J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel

JWC/kb/nn

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

C06002573

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

(b)(3)

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 0981-92/1

9 NOV 1992

Mr. J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Codinha:

Your letter of October 20, 1992 asked about a list we might have received from a liaison service on US POWs still alive and in captivity in Southeast Asia. It also asked us to conduct a thorough search for information from liaison services on the fate of American POWs, and to provide copies of such reporting not already made available to the Select Committee.

We have received no reporting from any liaison service on US POWs still alive in Southeast Asia. We did receive from a European service in early October 1992 a list dated November 15, 1970 prepared by Ministry of National Defense in Hanoi of US pilots captured in Vietnam between August 1964 and November 1970. This document was disseminated on October 14, 1992 to the Defense Intelligence Agency. We were advised by the PW-MIA Office at DIA that all pilots on the list were returned in Operation Homecoming or had been accounted for in other ways. A review of our POW/MIA chronological file holdings revealed no other list from any liaison service.

Our review did surface three intelligence reports from a liaison service which had not already been provided the Committee. We have requested approval from that liaison service to declassify these three reports for your use.

Sincerely,

/s/ Stanley M. Moskowitz

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

C06002573

~~OCA-0981-92/1~~

SUBJECT: Letter to William Codinha, POW/MIA Cmte re Liaison Service List of POWs



C06002574

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling — Congressional Action

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs Request for Lists of POWs, and Other Items Received From Liaison Services

FROM:	EXTENSION	DATE SENT	REQUEST NUMBER
C/EA/ICOG		27Oct92	DCI 0025/22-92

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
1. DCEA/SEA		28/10		
2. AC/EA				
3. C/ORMS	29/10/92			
4. DC/ORMS				
5. C/ORMS	30 OCT 1992			
6. SA/DDO		30/10		
7. ADDO		11.2		
8. DDO				
9. O/OCA/S				
10.				
11. Return to ISC				
12.				

(b)(3)(c)

SUSPENSE DATE:

RETURN TO:

FORM 8-87 4283 SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling — Congressional Action

C06002574

S E C R E T

26 October 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Breckenridge
Chief, Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: [redacted] (b)(3)(c)
Chief, Indochina Operations Group

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee On POW-MIA Affairs
Request for Lists of POWs, and Other Items
Received From Liaison Services

REFERENCE: Senate Select Committee Letter, dated
20 October 1992

1. This is in response to the attached request by the Committee for lists of POWs, and other items received from liaison services.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n) 2. The only list of American POWs which we have received from a liaison service was the attached list, which we received from [redacted] and passed to DIA (PW-MIA) on 14 October 1992. The list of 368 American pilots captured by North Vietnam between 5 August 1964 and 15 November 1970 was prepared by the North Vietnam Ministry of National Defense. DIA (PW-MIA) advised us that all the pilots on the list were returned at Operation Homecoming or otherwise accounted for; in other words, no new names of missing Americans appeared on this list.

3. We have just completed a review of our POW-MIA chronological file holdings, but did not find any other such list received from any liaison serves.

[redacted] (b)(3)(c)

S E C R E T

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee On POW-MIA Affairs Request for Lists of POWs, and Other Items Received From Liaison Services

4. With regard to your second request, we have no other documents, lists or reports received from friendly intelligence services which we have not already provided to the Committee, except for three intelligence reports from a liaison service which will be declassified when we receive approval from that service.

[redacted] (b)(3)(c)

Attachment:
As stated

C06002574

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

U.S. PILOTS CAPTURED

IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

(from August 5, 1964 to November 15, 1970)

SR No	NAME	RANK		SERVICE No
1	ABBOTT Wilfred Keese	CAPT	FV	3081739
2	ABBOTT Robert Archie	1 LT	FR	81453
3	ABBOTT Joseph S.Jr	CAPT	FV	3057099
4	ABBOTT John Captured : 20/4/66 - Dead 27/4/66	CDR		505134
5	ALCORN Wendell Reed	LTJG		658707
6	ALVAREZ Everett Jr	LTJG		644124
7	ANDERSON Gareth Laverne	LTJG		682482
8	ANDREWS Anthony Charles	CAPT	FR	3146561
9	ATTERBERRY Edwin Lee Captured : 12/8/67 - Dead : 18/5/69	CAPT	FV	3065473
10	AUSTIN William Renwick II	CAPT	FR	71588
11	BAGLEY Bobby Ray	MAJ	FV	3034566
12	BAILEY James William	LTJG		684790
13	BAKER Elmo Clinnard	MAJ	AO	3026432
14	BALDOCK Frederick Charles Jr	LTJG		666620
15	BALLARD Arthur Theodore Jr	CAPT	FR	31816
16	BARBAY Lawrence	CAPT	FV	3054027
17	BARNETT Robert Warren	MAJ	FR	31021
18	BARRETT Thomas Joseph	1 LT	FV	3120130
19	BAUGH William Joseph	CAPT	FR	65597
20	BEAN James Ellis	COL	FR	35014
21	BELL James Franklin	LCDR		515877
22	BERG Kile Dag	CAPT	AO	3103302
23	BERGER James Robert	CAPT	FV	3119242
24	BISS Robert Irwin	CAPT	FV	3103220

25	BLACK Arthur Neil	AIRMAN 2nd class	AP	12666475
26	BLACK Cole	LCDR		594387
27	BLACK Jone David	CAPT	FR	55413
	Captured : 27/10/67- Released : 16/2/68			
28	BLEVINS John Charles	CAPT	FR	82666
29	BLISS Ronald Glenn	1 LT	FR	78537
30	BOLSTAD Richard Eugene	CAPT	FR	81278
31	BOMAR Jack Williamson	MAJ	FV	2251452
32	BORLING John Lorin	1 LT	FR	69907
33	BOYD Charles Graham	CAPT	FR	72601
34	BOYER Terry Lee	1 LT	FR	3153642
35	BRADY Allen Colby	CDR		542856
36	BRAZELTON Michael Lee	1 LT	FV	3148590
37	BRENNEMAN Richard Charles	1 LT	FV	3158661
38	BRIDGER Barry Bruton	1 LT	FV	3131623
39	BRODAK John Warren	CAPT	FV	3108628
40	BROWN Paul Gordon	1 LT		094576
41	BROWNING Ralph Thomas	1 LT	FR	78556
42	BRUDNO Edward Alan	1 LT		78285 A
43	BRUNHAVER Richard Marvin	LTJG		674218
44	BRUNSTROM Alan Leslie	MAJ	AO	3023441

45	BUCHANAN Hubert Elliot	1 LT	FV	3148528
46	BURDETT Edward Burke	COL		10188 A
	Captured : 18/11/67 - Dead : 18/11/67			
47	BURER Arthur William	CAPT	FV	3087646
48	BURNS Donald Ray	MAJ	FR	44702
49	BURNS John Douglass	LCDR		613414
50	BURNS Michael Thomas	1 LT	FV	3189503
51	BURROUGHS William David	MAJ	FR	27184
52	BUTLER Phillip Neal	LT		647398
53	BUTLER William Wallace	CAPT	FV	3133430
54	BYRNE Ronald Edward Jr	MAJ		27821 A
55	CAMERON Kenneth Robbins	CDR		554612
	Captured : 18/5/67 - Dead : 4/10/70			
56	CAMPBELL Burton Wayne	1 LT	FR	70564
57	CAREY David Jay	LTJG		677935
58	CARPENTER Allen Russell	LT		657951
59	CARPENTER Joe Victor	CAPT	FR	60538
	Captured : 15/2/68 - Released : 18/7/68			
60	CARRIGAN Larry Edward	CAPT	AO	3119604
61	CHAMBERS Carl Dennis	1 LT	FV	3133401
62	CHAPMAN Harlan Page	CAPT		071437
63	CHAUNCY Arvin Roy	LCDR		614788
64	CHERRY Fred Vann	MAJ		45554 A

65	CHESLEY Larry James	1 LT	AO	3147498
66	CHRISTIAN Michael Durham	LTJG		673624
67	CLARK John Walter	CAPT	FR	70474
68	CLEMENTS James Arlen	MAJ	FV	3021015
69	CLOWER Claude Douglas	LCDR		605476
70	CCBELL Earl Glenn Captured : 5/11/67 - Dead : 5/11/70	CAPT	FR	61453
71	COFFEE Gerald Leonard	LT		625308
72	COKER George Thomas	LTJG		669409
73	COLLINS James Quincy Jr	CAPT		27908 A
74	COLLINS Thomas Edward III	CAPT		68082 A
75	CONNELL James Joseph	LT		647438
76	COPELAND H.C.	MAJ	FV	3015953
77	CORDIER Kenneth William	CAPT	FR	71351
78	CORMIER Arthur	S.SGT	AF	12454730
79	COSKEY Kenneth Leon	CDR		571080
80	CRANER Robert Roger	MAJ	FV	3034313
81	CRAYTON Render	LCDR		529039
82	CRECCA Joseph Jr	1 LT	FR	83481
83	CRONIN Michael Paul	LTJG		668952
84	CROW Frederick Austin Jr	LTC	FR	26569
85	CURTIS Thomas Jerry	CAPT		47753 A

86	CRUMLEDR Carl Boyette	LTC	FR	27705
87	DAIGLE Glenn Henri	LTJG		667122
88	DANIELS Verlyne Wayne	CDR		554745
89	DAUGHTREY Robert Norlan	CAPT	AO	3056891
90	DAVIES John Owen	1 LT	FV	3152430
91	DAVIS Edward Anthony	LTJG		658959
92	DAY George Everette	MAJ	FR	49555
93	DENNISON Terry Arden Captured : 19/7/66 - Dead : 21/7/66	LT		625395
94	DENTON Jeremiah Andrew Jr	CDR		485087
95	DIEHL William Calvin Captured : 7/11/67 - Dead : 8/11/67	MAJ	FR	60982
96	DODGE Ward Kent Captured : 5/7/67 - Dead : 12/7/67	MAJ	FR	43924
97	DONALD Myron Lee	1 LT	FR	80331
98	DOREMUS Robert Ba tsch	LCDR		597366
99	DOSS Dale Walter	LCDR		591159
100	DOUGHTY Daniel James	CAPT	AO	3037760
101	DRAMESI John Arthur	CAPT		65320 A
102	DRISCOLL Jerry Donald	1 LT	FR	69973
103	DUART David Henry	CAPT	FV	3057321
104	DUNN John Howard	MAJ		059941
105	DUTTON Richard Allen	MAJ	FR	22497

106	EASTMAN Leonard Corbett	LT		624192
107	ELLIS Jeffrey Thomas	CAPT	FV	3135610
108	ELLIS Leon Francis	1 LT	FR	3171887
109	ESTES Edward Dale	LCDR		605484
110	EVERSON David	MAJ	FR	56893
111	FANT Robert St Clair Jr	LT		653848
112	FELLOWES John Heaphy	LCDR		603983
113	FER John	CAPT	FR	63823
114	FINLAY John Stewart III	LTC	FR	19805
115	FISHER Kenneth	CAPT	FR	67431
116	FLEENOR Kenneth Raymond	MAJ	FR	27797
117	FLESHER Hubert Kelley	CAPT	FR	32199
118	FLOM Frederick Russell	1 LT	FV	3157103
119	FLYNN John Peter	CCL	FR	15760
120	FORBY Willis Ellis	CAPT	AO	3040351
121	FORD David Edward	CAPT	FV	3122074
122	FOWLER Henry Pope	1 LT	FR	3148574
123	FRANKE Fred Augustus William Jr	CDR		513370
124	FREDERICK John William Jr	W.O.		082847
125	FRIESE Lawrence Victor	CAPT		091579
126	FRISHMAN Robert Franchet	LTJG		642530

Captured : 24/10/67 - Released : 5/3/69

127	FULLER Robert Byron	CDR		542952
128	GADDIS Norman Carl	COL	FR	26772
129	GAITHER Ralph Ellis	ENSIGN		686365
130	GALANTI Paul Edward	LT		659047
131	GARTLEY Markham Ligon	LTJG		703644
132	GERNDT Gerald Lee	1 LT	FV	3163167
133	GIDEON Willard Selleck	MAJ	FV	3025283
134	GILLESPIE Charles Rodgers Jr	CDR		542951
135	GLENN Danny Elloy	LTJG		668152
136	GOODERMOTE Wayne Keith	LTJG		693919
137	GRAY David Fletcher Jr	1 LT	FV	3158230
138	GREENE Charles Edward Jr	CAPT	FV	3081054
139	GRIFFIN James L. Captured : 19/5/67 - Dead : 21/5/67	LCDR		595955
140	GRUBB Wilmer Newlin Captured : 26/1/66 - Dead : 4/2/66	CAPT	FV	2211784
141	GRUTERS Guy Dennis	CAPT	FR	78680
142	GUARINO Lawrence Nicholas	MAJ		52573 A
143	GUTTERSEN Laird	MAJ	FR	26408
144	HAINES Collins Henri	LCDR		593915
145	HALL Thomas Renwick Jr	LTJG		662719
146	HALL George Robert	CAPT		25106 A

147	HALL Keith Norman	CAPT	FR	61501
148	HALYBURTON Porter Alexander	LTJG		677514
149	HARDMAN William Morgan	LCDR		625171
150	HARRIS Carlyle Smith	CAPT		46663 A
151	HARTMAN Richard D. Captured : 21/7/67 - Dead : 22/7/67	LCDR		613595
152	HATCHER David Burnnet	CAPT	FV	3040002
153	HEGDAHL Douglas Brent Captured : 5/4/67 - Released : 5/8/69	SEAMAN APPRENTICE	B	626330
154	HEILIG John	LT		667042
155	HEILIGER Donald Lester	CAPT	FR	55023
156	HESS Jay Criddle	CAPT	FV	3038594
157	HICKERSON James Martin	LCDR		561065
158	HILL Howard John	1 LT	FR	80413
159	HINCKLEY Robert Bruce	CAPT	FV	3146679
160	HITESHEW James Edward	MAJ	FR	46668
161	HIVNER James Otis	CAPT	FR	50815
162	HOFFSON Arthur Thomas	1 LT	FV	3152442
163	HORINEK Ramon Anton	CAPT	FR	49644
164	HUBBARD Edward Lee	1 LT	FV	3122827
165	HUGHES James Lindberg	LTC	FR	43211
166	HUGHEY Kenneth Raymond	MAJ	FR	31352

(10)

167	HUTTON James Leo	LCDR		602748
168	HYATT Leo Gregory	LCDR		613640
169	INGVALSON Roger Dean	MAJ	FR	30713
170	JAMES Charlie Negus Jr	CDR		544080
171	JAMES Gobel Dale	MAJ	FR	3006133
172	JAYROE Julius Skinner	CAPT	FV	3058698
173	JEFFREY Robert Duncan	CAPT	FV	3117985
174	JENKINS Harry Tarleton Jr	CDR		504424
175	JENSEN Jay Roger	CAPT	FV	3033604
176	JOHNSON Harold Eugene	CAPT	FR	72372
177	JOHNSON Samuel Robert	MAJ	FR	25936)
178	JONES Murphy Neal	CAPT	FR	69506
179	JONES Robert Campbell	1 LT	FR	81333
180	KARI Paul Anthony	CAPT		66675 A
181	KASLER James Helms	MAJ	FR	24551
182	KEIRN Richard Paul	CAPT	AO	936812
183	KERR Michael Scott	1 LT	FR	83644
184	KEY Wilson Denver	LT		669207
185	KIRK Thomas Henry Jr	LTC	FR	20794
186	KNUTSCH Rodney Allen	LTJG		667751
187	KOPTEIN Theodore Frank	LCDR		597544

188	KRAMER Galand Dwight	1 LT	FV	3155965
189	LAMAR James Lasley	LTC	FV	1909733
190	LANE Michael Christopher	1 LT	FV	3134159
191	LARSON Gordon Albert	LTC	FR	26473
192	LASITER Carl William	CAPT	FR	66064
193	LAWRENCE William Porter	CDR		543032
194	LEBERT Ronald Merle	1 LT	FV	3176215
195	LENGYEL Lauren Robert	CAPT	FR	3081654
196	LEWIS Earl Gardner	LTJG		683095
197	LIGON Vernon Peyton Jr	LTC	FR	33825
198	LILLY Warren Robert	CAPT	FR	57557
199	LOCKHART Hayden James	1 LT		62669 A
200	LOW James Frederick Captured : 16/12/67 - Released : 18/7/68	MAJ	FR	23194
201	LUNA Jose David	CAPT	FV	3122671
202	LURIE Alan Pierce	CAPT	FR	65266
203	MADISON Thomas Mack	MAJ	FV	2249519
204	MAKOWSKI Louis Frank	MAJ	FR	47317
205	MARTIN Edward Holmes	LCDR		584587
206	MARVEL Jerry Kendell	MAJ		070296
207	MASTIN Ronald Lambert	1 LT	FR	79450

(17)

208 MATHENY David Paul ENSIGN 710099

Captured : 5/10/67 - Released : 16/2/68

209	MAYHEW William John	LT	691368
210	MC CAIN John Sidney	LCDR	624787
211	MC CUISTION Michael K.	CAPT FR	71416
212	MC DANIEL Norman Alexander	CAPT FR	55957
213	MC DANIEL Eugene Barker	LCDR	602046
214	MC GRATH John Michael	LT	659291
215	MC KAMEY John Bryan	LT	614791
216	MC KNIGHT George Grissby	CAPT AO	3051289
217	MC MANUS Kevin Joseph	1 LT FR	78805
218	MC NISH Thomas Mitchell	1 LT FR	78806
219	MC SWAIN George Palmer	ENSIGH	697713
220	MEANS William Harley	CAPT FV	3058903
221	MECHENBIER Edward John	1 LT FR	78807
222	MECLEARY Read Blaine	LTJG	678398
223	MEHL James Patrick	CDR	543070
224	MERRITT Raymond James	MAJ	44729 A
225	METSGER William John Jr	LTJG	687659
226	MEYER Alton Benne	CAPT FR	74897
227	MILLER Edison Wainwright	LTC	054602

228	MILLER Edwin Frank	LTJG		706510
229	MILLIGAN Joseph Edward	1 LT	FV	3055216
230	MOBLEY Joseph Scott	LTJG		701867
231	MOE Thomas Nelson	1 LT	FR	3175200
232	MONLUX Harold Deloss	1 LT	FV	3161422
233	MOORE Ernest Melvin Jr	CDR		553659
234	MOORE Dennis Anthony	LT		641432
235	MORGAN Herschell Scott	CAPT	AO	3057445
236	MULLEN Richard Dean	LCDR		584928
237	MULLIGAN James Alfred	CDR		504324
238	MYERS Armand Jesse	CAPT	FR	47337
239	Myers Glenn Leo	1 LT	FV	3161931
240	NASMYTH John Heber Jr	1 LT	FV	3120117
241	NAUGHTON Robert John	LT		646287
242	NEUENS Martin James	1 LT	FR	78831
243	NEWCOMB Wallace Grant	CAPT	FV	3130931
244	NEWSOM Benjamin Byrd Captured : 23/7/66 - Dead : 26/7/66	MAJ	FR	2217686
245	NIX Cowan Glenn	CAPT	FR	74953
246	NORRINGTON Giles Roderick	LT		690103
247	NORRIS Thomas Elmer	CAPT	FR	77071

248	NORTH Kenneth Walter	CAPT FR	53604
249	ODELL Donald Eugene	MAJ FV	3057281
250	OSBORNE Dale Harrison	LCDR	614229
251	OVERLY Norris M. Captured : 11/9/67 - Released : 16/2/68	MAJ	45067 A
252	PARROTT Thomas Vance	CAPT FV	3103992
253	PEEL Robert Delayney	1 LT AO	3117963
254	PEMBERTON Gene Thomas Captured : 23/7/66 - Dead : 2[illegible]/7/66	MAJ FR	26552
255	PERKINS Glendon William	CAPT FV	3101454
256	PETERSON Douglas Brian	CAPT FR	54627
257	PIRIE James Glenn	LCDR	614186
258	PITCHFORD John Joseph	CAPT FV	2245522
259	PLUMB Joseph Charles	LTJG	678505
260	POLLACK Melvin	1 LT FV	3149044
261	POLLARD Ben Marksbury	MAJ FR	53879
262	PROFILET Leo Twyman	CDR	506413
263	PURCELL Robert Baldwin	CAPT	53786 A
264	PURRINGTON Frederick Raymond	LTJG	680259
265	PYLE Darrel Edwin	1 LT FV	3145936
266	PYLE Thomas Shaw II	CAPT FV	3103812
267	RATZLAFF Richard Raymond	LTJG	681476

268	R.Y James Edwin	1 LT		80893 A
269	REHMANN David George	ENSIGH		698502
270	REYNOLDS John Anzuena	CAPT		68584 A
271	RICE Charles Donald	ENSIGN		710266
272	RINGSDORF Herbert Benjamin	1 LT	FR	75446
273	RISNER Robinson	LTC		26905 A
274	RIVERS Wendell Burke	LCDR		555144
275	ROBINSON William Andrew	AIRMAN lst class	AF	14782798
276	ROLLINS David John	LT		633926
277	RUHLING Mark John	CAPT	FV	3139169
278	RUMBLE Wesley Lewis Captured : 28/4/68 - Released : 5/8/69	LT	FV	3153865
279	RUNYAN Albert Edward	MAJ	FR	49475
280	RUSSELL Kay	LCDR		563567
281	RUTLEDGE Howard Elmer	CDR		506435
282	SANDVICK Robert James	CAPT	FR	47755
283	SAWHILL Robert Ralston Jr	MAJ	FR	24101
284	SCHIERMAN Wesley Duane	CAPT	AO	3058242
285	SCHMIDT Norman Captured : 1/9/65 - Dead : 31/8/67	MAJ	FR	42819
286	SCHOEFFEL Peter Vanruyter	LCDR		584717

287	SCHULZ Paul Henry	LCDR		616785
288	SCHWEITZER Robert James	CDR		574894
289	SEEBER Bruce Gibson	CAPT		47135 A
290	SEHORN James Eldon	CAPT	FV	3132084
291	SHANAHAN Joseph Francis	CAPT	FR	72170
292	SHANKEL William Leonard	LTJG		664281
293	SHATTUCK Lewis Wiley	CAPT	AO	3036821
294	SHIVELY James Richard	1 LT	FR	78909
295	SCHUMAKER Robert Harper	LCDR		548955
296	SCHUMAN Edwin Arthur III	LCDR		584738
297	SIGLER Gary Richard	1 LT	FV	3157864
298	SIJAN Lance Peter Captured : 12/1/68 - Dead : 22/1/68	1st LT		80654
299	SIMA Thomas William	CAPT	FV	3038065
300	SIMONET Kenneth Adrian	MAJ	FR	23521
301	SINGLETON Jerry Allen	1 LT	FR	64076
302	SMITH Wayne Ogden	1 LT	FR	80670
303	SMITH Dewey Lee	MAJ	FR	64990
304	SMITH Bradley Edsel	LTJG		682780
305	SMITH Richard Eugene Jr	MAJ	FR	57992
306	SMITH Homer Leroy Captured : 20/5/67 - Dead : 21/5/67	CDR		521872

307	SOUTHWICK Charles Everett	LCDR		544716
308	SPENCER Larry Howard	LTJG		674085
309	SPOON Donald Ray	1 LT	FR	78929
310	STACKHOUSE Charles David	LT		647984
311	STAFFORD Hugh Allen	LCDR		614922
312	STAMM Ernest Albert Captured : 25/11/68 - Dead : 16/1/69	CDR		584755
313	STARK William Robert	LCDR		619808
314	STAVAST John Edward	MAJ	FR	52944
315	STERLING Thomas James	MAJ	FR	45475
316	STIER Theodore Gerhard	LTJG		669500
317	STIRM Robert Lewis	MAJ	FV	3036919
318	STOCKDALE James Bond	CDR		485624
319	STOCKMAN Hervey Studdiford	LTC	FR	50436
320	STOREY Thomas Gordon	CAPT	FR	73117
321	STORZ Ronald Edward Captured : 28/4/65 - Dead : 23/4/70	CAPT		3057474
322	STRATTON Richard Allen	LCDR		602087
323	STUTZ Leroy William	1 LT	FR	78935
324	SULLIVAN Timothy Bernard	LTJG		688505
325	SULLIVAN Dwight Everett	MAJ	FV	3025678
326	SUMPTER Jr Thomas Wrenne	MAJ	FR	32044

327	SWINDLE Orsen George	CAPT		078193
328	TALLEY Bernard Leo Jr	1 LT	FR	3129281
329	TANGEMAN Richard George	LT		669370
330	TANNER Charles Nels	LCDR		588973
331	TEMPERLEY Russell Edwin	CAPT	FR	59025
332	TERRELL Irby David	MAJ	FV	3035168
333	TERRY Ross Randle	LT		622502
334	THOMPSON Fred Neal Captured : 20/3/68 - Released : 18/7/68	MAJ	FR	75175
335	THORNESS Leo Keith	MAJ	FV	3025937
336	THORNTON Gary Lynn	ENSIGN		700903
337	TOMES Jack H.	CAPT	FR	65155
338	TORKELSON Loren Harvey	1 LT	FV	3155656
339	TRAUTMAN Konrad Wigand	CAPT	FV	1909945
340	TSCHUDY William Michael	LTJG		660481
341	TYLER Charles Robert	MAJ	FR	58050
342	UYEYAMA Terry Jun	CAPT	FR	3085365
343	VAN HOAN Jack Linwood	MAJ	FR	65085
344	VENANZI Gerald Santo	1 LT	FV	3173807
345	VISSOTZKY Raymond Walter	MAJ	FV	3006144
346	VOGEL Richard Dale	MAJ	FR	49594

347	VOHDEN Raymond Arthur	LCDR		586702
348	WADDELL Dowey Wayne	MAJ	FR	54772
349	WAGGONER Robert Frost	CAPT	FV	3065137
350	WALKER Hubert Clifford	CAPT	FV	3145724
351	WALTERS Jack Captured : 19/5/67 - Dead : 20/5/67	LT		666504
352	WALTMAN Donald Glenn	CAPT	FR	53895
353	WARNER James Howie	1 LT		092816
354	WEBB Ronald John	CAPT	FR	72828
355	WELLS Norman Louross	CAPT	FV	3037386
356	WENDELL John Henry Jr	CAPT	FR	61974
357	WESKAMP Robert Larry Captured : 25/4/67 - Dead : 25/4/67	CAPT	FV	3152424
358	WHEAT David Robert	LTJG		677374
359	WIDEMAN Robert Earl	LTJG		689953
360	WILBER Walter Eugene	CDR		539459
361	WILSON Glenn Hubert	CAPT	FR	54287
362	WILLIAMS Lewis Irving Jr	LTJG		694463
363	WINN David William	COL	FR	36646
364	WOODS Brian Dunstan	LCDR		618063
365	WOODS Robert Deane	LT		632730

C06002574

(20)

366 WRITER Lawrence Daniel CAPT FV 3156989

367 YOUNG James Faulds MAJ FR 46611

368 ZUHOSKY Charles Peter LTJG 631560

Hanoi, November 15, 1970

C06002574

TO: D/OCA	CONTROL#: OCA 0981-92/1	DATE OF REQUEST: 3 Nov 92
FROM: DD/SA Via DD/OCA		SUSPENSE DATE:

SUBJECT: Letter to William Codinha, POW/MIA Cmte, re Possible List of American POWs provided by Liaison Service

NOTES

Staff John B. reconfirmed w/ the DO that we can give the list to the Committee

(b)(3)(c)

COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices)		
NAME: See attached router	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE

ACTION REQUIRED BY **D/OCA**

Signature please

FORM 2-86 **4118** OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

C06002574

OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS ROUTING SLIP	ACTION	INFO
D/OCA		X
DD/OCA		X
SPECIAL ASSISTANT		
DD/LEGISLATION		X
DD/SENATE	X	
DD/HOUSE		X
DD/CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT		X
DD/INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ISSUES		X
CONSTITUENT INQUIRIES OFFICER		
FOIA/PA OFFICER		
SECURITY OFFICER		
OCA/COMPT/ISC		X

SUSPENSE 6 NOV. 92
DATE

ACTION OFFICER: [redacted]

(b)(3)(c)

REMARKS: FW

CONTROL NUMBER: OCA 0981-92

FILE: OCA 0981-92 1 1

FORM 4422
Nov 91

C06002575

(b)(6)

JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS, Chairman
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, SOUTH DAKOTA
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FRANCES A. ZWENIG, STAFF DIRECTOR
J. WILLIAM CODINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(6)

October 20, 1992

Mr. John Breckenridge
Office of Congressional Affairs
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Breckenridge:

Information available to the Committee staff from credible sources indicates that a liaison service within the past several years passed lists of the names of U.S. POWs still alive and in captivity in Southeast Asia. Please provide copies of those lists.

Secondly, please conduct a thorough review of the files on information passed by friendly intelligence services concerning the fate of U.S. POWs in Southeast Asia and provide copies of any documents, lists, or reports that have not already been provided to the Select Committee.

Sincerely,



J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel

(b)(6)

JWC/kb/wl

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

C06002576

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Cong. Action

SUBJECT: Declassified Copy of Intelligence Report for Senator Smith

FROM:	EXTENSION	DATE SENT	REQUEST NUMBER
C/EA/ICOG		9Nov92	[illegible] 0085/099-92

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
1. DCEA/SEA		11/9		OCA FILE: SSpeer "S"
2. Chief, EA	9 NOV 1992			
3. C/ORMS				
4. DC/ORMS	9 NOV 1992			
5. C/ORMS	9 NOV 1992			(b)(3)(c)
6. SA/DDO				
7. ADDO		11/9		
8. DDO				
9. O/OCA/	10 NOV 1992	11/9		
10.				
11.				
12.				

SUSPENSE DATE:

RETURN TO:

LOGGED

FORM 4283 8-87

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

C06002576

S E C R E T

6 November 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Breckenridge
Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: [redacted]
Chief, Indochina Operations Group

SUBJECT: Declassified Copy of Intelligence Report, For Senator Smith

REFERENCE: Senator Smith's request, per his memorandum and your 5 November memorandum, attached

1. OCA: Please send the following text to the Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs on 9 November, per Senator Smith's request.

2. Attached is the unclassified copy of the 1982 intelligence report which Senator Smith requested be delivered to him by 9 November 1992.

[redacted] (b)(3)(c)

Attachment: As stated

[redacted]

S E C R E T

C06002576

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

REPORT CLASS

COUNTRY USSR

DATE DISTR. 12 March 1982

SUBJECT Alleged Soviet Incarceration of U.S. Vietnam Prisoners of War (DOI: 1970)

REFERENCES

SOURCE

SUMMARY: According to KGB Lieutenant General Petr Ivanovich Grigoriyev, specially selected U.S. prisoners of war were being received into the Soviet Union circa 1970 for long term or lifetime incarceration and "ideological retraining." He implied the number involved to be about 2,000. The goal of the program was indefinite, but involved intensive psychological investigation of the prisoners and retraining to make them available as required to serve the needs of the Soviet Union. [redacted] (b)(3)(n) [redacted] END SUMMARY.

(b)(3)(c)

1. [redacted] Comment: This report should be read with caution. CIA records contain no confirmation of the alleged intelligence affiliation of the subsource cited below, despite the source's assertion that Grigoriyev held a leading position in the KGB. Several other persons named in the text likewise cannot be identified. We have never before encountered even vague rumors among Soviet dissidents or other informants that any U.S. POW's from Vietnam are incarcerated in

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FORM 2290 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

the USSR, much less that 2,000 such individuals are leading "reasonably normal lives" in the same region where numerous Soviet political prisoners have resided in exile. In short, [redacted] (b)(3)(n) we strongly believe that this report merits little if any credence from analysts. However, in light of continuing high interest in the question of U.S. personnel still listed as missing in action in Southeast Asia, this report is being disseminated with appropriate caveats to concerned members of the U.S. Intelligence Community.)

2. [redacted] circa 1970, KGB Lieutenant General Petr Ivanovich ((Grigoriyev)) stated that many specially selected U.S. prisoners of war were being received from North Vietnam for long term or lifetime custody and "ideological re-training" in the Soviet Union. [redacted] Comment: Grigoriyev did not state specifically the number of prisoners involved. The term he used was "v poryadke neskol'kikh tysyach v nas tozhe yest'' which translates as "on the order of several thousand," implying the number to be about 2,000). The prisoners were destined for confinement at a facility near Perm. Grigoriyev, who learned of the program from an unnamed high level KGB colleague, understood that Soviets rather than North Vietnamese were involved in the initial selection process and that participants were to be continually assessed for suitability. He implied that individuals determined to be unsuitable would be eliminated and replaced with other candidates. (Comment: Grigoriyev made his comment while serving as a political ideologist and personnel officer at the All-Union Scientific-Technical Information Center of the State Committee for Science and Technology in Moscow. He had previously served as Chief of the KGB's Personnel Directorate and in that capacity would have very likely made contacts among KGB officials subsequently responsible for organizing any such prisoner program.)

3. According to Grigoriyev, the goals of the U.S. prisoner program were indefinite but involved intensive psychological studies of the individuals and utilization of them as required to serve the needs of the Soviet Union. Grigoriyev understood that the detention facility was not a standard prison, but rather one in which inmates could lead reasonably normal lives. During the conversation Grigoriyev recalled that precedents existed for such a program in the Soviet Union and cited similar previous efforts with Spanish, Japanese, and Chinese nationals. He stated that in past programs, participants were encouraged to marry Soviet women.

(b)(3)(n)

4. (Comment: [redacted] described Grigoriyev as a very professional and security-conscious person . Grigoriyev, in his capacity as an institute personnel officer, [redacted] acknowledged being acquainted with several individuals [redacted] particularly General Feodor Petrovich ((Skrynnik)), who had a GRU officer serve as Deputy Chief of Intelligence for the Far Eastern Military District in the early 1950's. Skrynnik and Grigoriyev owned dachas near each other and while not close friends, held each other in high respect. In addition to Skrynnik, Grigoriyev was acquainted with (FNU) ((Prudnikov)) who was active in Western Europe and Germany for the KGB, (FNU) ((Gradoselskiy)) who had served as a KGB official in Poland and Germany, and (FNU) ((Gridniyev)) who served as KGB Deputy Chief for Administration and Supply. A sense of trust had therefore been developed over many years of mutual association with top level KGB and GRU officers.) [redacted] Comment: Prudnikov may be identical with Mikhail Sidorovich Prudnikov, dob circa 1912, a senior Soviet intelligence official whose memoirs of operations during and after World War Two have been published in the USSR. CIA records do not identify any individual named Grodoselskiy or Gridniyev as having served in Soviet intelligence.)

(b)(3)(c)

5. Grigoriyev volunteered the information regarding the Vietnam prisoners [redacted] during the late 1960's and early 1970's. His duties were not particularly demanding after his years as an administrator in the KGB. He was often finished with his work in the early afternoon and, rather than go home or engaged in outside interests, held informal discussions in his office. [redacted]

(b)(3)(n)

Topics primarily involved Grigoriyev's personal affairs and health, but also included political topics. During one of these sessions the subject of prison camps arose, in particular those which furnished labor for Siberian economic development. The conversation then shifted to Vietnam and the apparent increase in strength of South Vietnam at the time and the apparent instability in the North. Grigoriyev agreed, citing the massive U.S. committment to the South, but added that the Soviets were also making gains. He then described the program involving U.S. prisoners.

6. Grigoriyev was trained as a professional military officer and served in the tank troops during World War II. After the war he was assigned to the Party Central Committee as an army representative. In the period 1953-1954 he became KGB Deputy Chief for Personnel. He subsequently became critical of the recruitment policies of KGB head Vladimir Yefimovich ((Semichastnyy)) and was transferred from his position to that of KGB Security Chief for Soviet Bloc nations. Soon thereafter he developed a heart ailment and retired. In the late 1960's he accepted the position at the Information Center.

7. General Skrynnik joined the Russian cavalry in 1917 and subsequently entered the Odessa artillery school. Upon graduation he was assigned to the Zhitomir military district. In 1931 he entered the Frunze Military Academy. He advanced rapidly and in the 1933-1934 period was sent to China as Deputy Military Attache. He joined Mao's long march and began to establish intelligence agent networks for the Soviet Union. He remained in China until 1942 except for a brief return in 1939 to establish an intelligence school in Moscow for China operations. In the spring of 1942 he was recalled from China to become chief of intelligence on the northwestern front, where he remained for the duration of the war. After the war he was assigned as Soviet representative to the Berlin Joint Commission for Repatriation. After serving in Berlin from 1945 to 1949 he returned to Moscow as either chief or deputy chief for intelligence at the Frunze Academy. He then served as Deputy Intelligence Chief of the Far Eastern Military District. He retired from the military in 1953. Skrynnik was subsequently recalled to duty to re-establish agent networks in China after the China-USSR split but refused to leave retirement. [redacted] Comment: CIA records contain no independent confirmation of the details of Skrynnik's career provided here.)

(b)(3)(n)

C06007738

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs Request for Copies of CIA Documents Found in NSC Files

FROM:	EXTENSION	DATE SENT	REQUEST NUMBER
S.H. C/EA/ICOG		19Oct92	DD/O 92-0025/283

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
1. AC/EA				
2. C/ORMS	11/2/92			
3. DC/ORMS	2 NOV 1992			
4. C/ORMS				
5. SA/DDO		3/11		
6. ADDO		11.3		
7. DDO			✓	
8. O/OCA				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				

(b)(3)(c)

O/OCA/S
Resume to
See Notes enclosed

SUSPENSE DATE:

RETURN TO:

FORM 8-97 4283

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

C06007738

SECRET

19 October 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Breckenridge
Chief, Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: [redacted]
Chief, Indochina Operations Group

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
Request for Copies of CIA Documents Found in
NSC Files

REFERENCES: A. NSC Letter to the Executive Secretary, CIA,
8 September 1992
B. CIA Memorandum to NSC, 15 September 1992

1. The attached file contains CIA documents which the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs requested as a result of the Committee's review of NSC files which contained the documents.

2. The selected documents have been sanitized for Committee use only.

(b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

SECRET

C06007738

ER 92-4610/2

Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Secretariat

15 September 1992

NOTE FOR: Jim Anders
C/ICOG/POW/DO

Please handle in the same manner as previous requests. I will notify the NSC that we will respond directly to the Committee.

(b)(3)(c)

[redacted]
Executive Secretary

Attachment

C06007738

ER 92-4670/1

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

15 September 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]
Executive Secretary, National Security Council

SUBJECT: Release of CIA POW/MIA Documents

1. The subject-matter documents--forwarded by you on 8 September 1992--have been reviewed pursuant to your request. Please inform the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs that the Agency will deal directly with them regarding review and/or release of these documents in accordance with agreed-upon procedures.

2. Thank you for consulting with us on this matter.

(b)(3)(c)

[redacted]
Executive Secretary

C06007738

SUBJECT: Release of CIA POW/MIA Documents



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C06007738

UNCLASSIFIED with
SECRET attachment

ER 92-4640

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 8, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR [redacted]
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Release of CIA POW/MIA Documents

The staff of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs has requested that the National Security Council provide to the Committee pertinent documents related to this issue. The enclosed documents originated with the CIA. Please advise as to our response to the Committee. A copy of this document is being held in our office of Records Management [redacted] pending your instructions.

(b)(3)(c)

A prompt response would be appreciated.

[redacted]
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A POW/MIA Documents

UNCLASSIFIED with
SECRET attachment

C06007738

Remove this
index before
passage of file

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SECRET

DOCUMENTS SANITIZED ONLY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
PER 15 SEP 92 REQUEST

1. CIA MEMO 02 MAR 73 SANIT
From Acting Deputy Director Colby to Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger Re: Supplementary Comment on Report concerning U.S. Prisoners Allegedly Held by Viet Cong

2. [redacted] 13 FEB 73 [redacted] [redacted] SANIT
Plans of the VC Duy Xuyen District Committee of the VC Quang Da Special Zone for the Release of U.S. and South Vietnamese Prisoners of War

3. [redacted] 10 OCT 72 [redacted] [redacted] SANIT
Statement of a Viet Cong Regional Commander in December 1981 on Hanoii's Policy Concerning the Exploitation and Release of U.S. Prisoners of War; with typed note from Director Helms to Henry Kissinger

4. [redacted] 5 OCT 72 [redacted] [redacted] SANIT
National Liberaation Front Plan to Release U S. POWs for Propaganda Purposes; with typed note from Director Helms to Henry Kissinger

5. CIA MEMO 22 SEP 72 SANIT
From Director Helms to Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger Re: Proposed Prisoner Exchange in reference to CIA Memo of 11 MAY 72 - Subject: 11 MAY 72 [redacted] Telephone Call Regarding Prisoner Exchange

6. [redacted] 20 SEP 72 SANIT
CIA MEMO From Director Helms to Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger Re: Plans of the War Crimes Commission of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam [redacted]

7. [redacted] 10 MAR 73 DENIED [redacted]
[redacted]

8. CIA MEMO DENIED-AMC
Medical notes concerning mental health of ex-POW CIA staffer [redacted]

9. [redacted] 20 OCT 72 [redacted] SANIT
A North Vietnamese Official's Statement That China and the USSR are Pressuring Hanoi to Negotiate; and his Comments on Hanoi's Peace Proposal and Other Aspects of the Vietnam Situation

10. CIA MEMO 09 MAY 69 SANIT
DI Intelligence Memorandum Re: The Liberation Front's New Peace Proposal (pages 1 & 3 only)

11. [redacted] 07 SEP 72 [redacted] SANIT
Observations of [redacted] on the Release of American POWs; with typed note from Director Helms to Dr. Kissinger

12. [redacted] 12 SEP 72 [redacted] SANIT
Comments of North Vietnamese Official [redacted] Concerning the Pending Release in Hanoi of Three American Prisoners of War

13. WHITE HOUSE MEMO 20 SEP 72 SANIT
White House Memo From Tom Latimer to Dr. Kissinger Re: POW Release

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(b)(3)(n)
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Committee
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CIA MEMO From Director Helms to Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger Re: Plans of the War Crimes Commission of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)
[redacted]

7. [redacted] 10 MAR 73 DENIED [redacted] (b)(3)(c)
[redacted] (b)(1) (b)(6) (b)(3)(n)

8. CIA MEMO DENIED-AMERICAN CITIZEN
Medical notes concerning mental health of ex-POW CIA staffer [redacted] (b)(3)(c)

9. [redacted] 20 OCT 72 SANITIZED
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11. CS-317/09096-72 07 SEP 72 SANITIZED (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)
Observations of [redacted] on the Release of American POWs; with typed note from Director Helms to Dr. Kissinger

12. CS-317/09099/72 12 SEP 72 SANITIZED
Comments of North Vietnamese Official [redacted] Concerning the Pending Release in Hanoi of Three American Prisoners of War

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White House Memo From Tom Latimer to Dr. Kissinger Re: POW Release

SECRET

C06007751

SSP Rev

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 3239-92

3 November 1992

Mr. J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. Codinha:

Enclosed are the nine declassified Muang Ngoy documents requested by [redacted] on 30 October 1992. The sketched maps have also been declassified.

If you have any further questions please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely,

[redacted]

(b)(3)(c)

John L. Breckenridge
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

Enclosures

C06007751

OCA 3239-92

SUBJECT: Letter to William Codinha, POW/MIA Cmte re Muang Ngoy Declassified Documents per John McCreary 30 October Request



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1

(1986)

FOLLOWING THEIR RELEASE FROM PRISON CAMPS LOCATED IN NORTHERN LAOS, FORMER LAO ARMY (HMONG) TROOPS, TOLD THAT TWO OF THE CAMPS THEY WERE IMPRISONED IN ALSO CONTAINED AMERICAN POWS. ACCORDING TO MANY INDIVIDUALS WHO HAD SERVED UNDER HIS COMMAND DURING THE WAR IN LAOS TOLD HIM THEY HAD BEEN IN TWO DIFFERENT CAMPS WITH 23 AMERICAN PRISONERS IN 1975 AND 1976. PRESSED FOR SPECIFICS ON SOURCING, . SAID THAT HE COULD NOT RECALL THE NAMES OF THE MEN WHO TOLD HIM THAT THEY HAD BEEN IN CAMPS WITH LIVE AMERICANS; HOWEVER, HE TOLD THAT MANY, MANY MEN HAD RECOUNTED THE STORY, AND HE HAD TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE TROOPS WHO HAD CLAIMED THE SIGHTINGS. ACCORDING TO , THE MEN CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN IN A CAMP NEAR (VH 1650) SOMETIME IN THE 1975/76 TIME FRAME. THE FORMER HMONG PRISONERS TOLD HIM AFTER THEIR RELEASE, FOLLOWING A STINT AT THE CAMP MENTIONED ABOVE, THEY ALONG WITH THE 23 AMERICANS, WERE TRANSFERRED TO A SECOND CAMP LOCATED NEAR (UH 5566). AS RECALLED, THE FORMER HMONG TROOPS TOLD HIM THAT SOMETIME IN 1976 THE AMERICANS WERE PULLED OUT AND MOVED TO ANOTHER CAMP. SAID THAT HIS MEN HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE AMERICANS WERE OFTEN RELUCTANT TO EAT FOOD SERVED THEM BY THEIR VIETNAMESE GUARDS BECAUSE THEY FEARED THE FOOD CONTAINED POISON. ASKED IF HE COULD SUPPLY ANY ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON THE SIGHTINGS, APOLOGIZED BY SAYING THAT HE HAD HEARD THE STORIES MANY YEARS AGO AND THAT HE COULD NOT PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL DETAILS.

THE PORTER WHICH HAD CRASHED NEAR NONG HET HAD BEEN PILOTED BY AN AMERICAN WHO SURVIVED THE CRASH. ACCORDING TO , BOTH HE AND THE AMERICAN PILOT WERE TAKEN PRISONER AND HELD IN NONG HET. AS RECALLED, TOLD HIM THAT THEY WERE THEN TAKEN TO A LOCATION SOMEWHERE IN NORTH VIETNAM. AT THE PRISON THEY WERE TAKEN TO IN VIETNAM, TOLD THAT FOUR AMERICAN SERGEANTS WERE BEING HELD. SAID THAT AFTER ABOUT ONE WEEK HE WAS TAKEN BACK TO LAOS, HOWEVER, THE AMERICANS WERE RETAINED IN VIETNAM.

ACCORDING TO JCRC PRELIMINARY READOUT ON ABOVE, BOTH ALLEGED SIGHTINGS ARE PLAUSIBLE. JCRC ADVISED THAT THEY HAVE HAD REPORTING IN THE PAST INDICATING THAT THERE ARE TWO RE-EDUCATION CAMPS IN THE GENERAL AREA CITED ABOVE. JCRC INDICATED THAT THEY GET MANY LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS FROM THE AREA CITED; THEY HAVE HAD REPORTS IN THE PAST OF HMONGS BEING HELD WITH AMERICANS; AND THAT THEIR RECORDS INDICATE SEVERAL PLANES WENT DOWN IN NONG HET AREA.

(1.)

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AN SRV OFFICIAL ABROAD SAID THAT THERE ARE NO AMERICAN POWS STILL ALIVE IN VIETNAMESE PRISON CAMPS OR ELSEWHERE. HE ADMITTED THAT THERE WERE PERHAPS FORMER U.S. SERVICEMEN WHO MIGHT HAVE REMAINED IN VIETNAM, BUT THERE ARE NO POWS BEING HELD AT THE LOCAL LEVEL WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF SENIOR SRV OFFICIALS.

ACCORDING TO , THERE ARE NO LIVE OR CAPTIVE POWS/MIAS STILL IN VIETNAM. IN SOURCE'S OPINION, REPORTS OF CAPTIVE POWS/MIAS ARE NOTHING MORE THAN OLD SIGHTINGS OF DOWNED CREWS LOST IN THE JUNGLES. SOURCE BELIEVES ANYONE LOST IN THE JUNGLES WOULD CERTAINLY BE DEAD, AND EVEN IF THERE WERE ANY LIVING POWS/MIAS THEY WOULD PROBABLY BE IN LAOS OR CAMBODIA, NOT VIETNAM.

(1986)

(2.)

C06007751

HAS NEVER RECEIVED ANY REPORTING CONCERNING SIGHTINGS OF LIVE AMERICAN POW'S IN THE LUANG PRABANG AREA.

(1986)

DEBRIEFED TWO REFUGEES FROM THE MUANG NGOY AREA. BOTH MEN WERE HELD IN REEDUCATION CAMPS IN MUANG NGOY AREA FROM 1975-1985. ACCORDING TO THE TWO MEN, WHO WERE INTERVIEWED SEPARATELY, THERE ARE TWO MAIN REEDUCATION CAMPS, TWO SMALLER REEDUCATON CAMPS, AND A JAIL LOCATED IN MUANG NGOY. ALL ARE LOCATED ALONG THE NAM OU RIVER OR ITS TRIBUTARIES AND MUCH OF THE TRAVEL TO THE CAMPS IS BY BOAT. THE TWO MAIN REEDUCATION CAMPS ARE HAT CHAM (TH 5890) AND NAM BAK (NCA), LOCATED ACROSS THE NAM BAK RIVER FROM BAN NAKHON (TH 4680) VILLAGE. THE HAT CHAM CAMP IS LOCATED IN THE VALLEY OF THE PHABOM AND PHAPAE MOUNTAINS ALONG THE NAM OU RIVER. FORMER ROYAL LAO GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES FROM LUANG PRABANG AND SAYABOURY PROVINCES WERE DETAINED AT THIS CAMP WHICH CONSISTED OF ABOUT 15 HOUSES, FOUR BARRACKS, AND ONE RICE MILL. IN 1980, MANY OF THE INMATES FROM THIS CAMP WERE TRANSFERRED TO CAMPS IN ATTOPEU AND XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCES. ACCORDING TO ONE OF THE REFUGEES, THE INMATES AT THE NAM BAK CAMP HAD ALSO BEEN SENT TO OTHER CAMPS IN ATTOPEU AND XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCES AND THE CAMP WAS NOW OCCUPIED BY PAVN TROOPS. THE JAIL WAS LOCATED AT HAD XAO (EITHER TH 5226 OR TH 5477) AND WAS ALSO LOCATED ALONG THE NAM OU RIVER. THE JAIL WAS USED TO HOUSE REEDUCATION CAMP INMATES WHO WERE NOT COOPERATIVE OR WERE CREATING PROBLEMS. ALSO LOCATED IN THIS GENERAL VICINITY WERE PHAKEO (TH 5919) CAVE AND TWO SMALLER REEDUCATION CAMPS, NUMBER 196 LOCATED AT NANONGXUNG (NCA) AND NUMBER 193 LOCATED NEAR A BRIDGE OVER THE NAM BAK RIVER NEAR THE JUNCTION OF THE NAM BAK AND HOUEI NGEU RIVERS. BOTH MEN STATED THAT THEY HAD NOT HEARD ABOUT OR SEEN ANY AMERICAN POWS IN THIS AREA.

(3.)

WHO WAS HELD IN HAT CHAM (TH 5789) REEDUCATION CAMP, LOCATED IN MUANG NGOY DISTRICT, LUANG PRABANG PROVINCE, LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, FROM 1975 UNTIL HE ESCAPED IN 1985 AND FLED TO THAILAND, STATED THAT HE HAD NEVER SEEN OR HEARD ABOUT ANY AMERICAN POWS WHILE IN REEDUCATION. HE FURTHER STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT ANYONE WHO SAID THAT THEY HAD SEEN AN AMERICAN POW WHILE IN REEDUCATION WAS LYING BECAUSE THE REEDUCATION CAMP INMATES WERE STRICTLY CONTROLLED. (1986)

2. HAT CHAM REEDUCATION CAMP WAS LOCATED ON THE EAST BANK OF THE NAM OU RIVER. IT WAS BORDERED ON THE SOUTH BY THE NAM KONG RIVER AND ON THE NORTH BY THE NGOY RIVER. THE WESTERN BOUNDARY WAS THE ROAD TO MUANG NGOY. THERE WERE ABOUT 15 BUILDINGS IN THE CAMP, INCLUDING FOUR BARRACKS FOR PRISONERS LOCATED AT THE NORTH END OF THE CAMP. THE SECURITY OFFICE, CLUB, AND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE WERE LOCATED AT THE SOUTH END OF THE CAMP, AND A WAREHOUSE, KITCHEN, DISPENSARY AND GUARD BARRACKS WERE LOCATED AT THE WEST END OF THE CAMP. THE CAMP ALSO CONTAINED A RICE MILL AND LUMBER YARD. THE GUARD FORCE CONSISTED OF 25 SOLDIERS OF THE LAO PEOPLE'S ARMY (LPA) COMMANDED BY ((PHOUMI)) PAGNASAVAT. THE LPA GUARDS HAD TWO BOATS WITH 125 HORSEPOWER ENGINES USED FOR TRANSPORTATION. THE NEAREST VILLAGE WAS SOP KHAN (TH 5687) LOCATED ABOUT TWO KILOMETERS SOUTH OF THE CAMP. ON THE WEST SIDE OF THE CAMP ACROSS THE NAM OU RIVER, WAS THE PHA KEO CAVE. THE FAMILIES OF THE INMATES LIVED NEAR THE CAMP ON THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY.

3. THE CAMP WAS OPENED IN AUGUST 1975 AND CONTAINED FORMER RLG OFFICIALS FROM LUANG PRABANG AND XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCES. THE CAMP CONTAINED ABOUT 750 PERSONNEL, INCLUDING 400 REEDUCATION INMATES AND 350 FAMILY MEMBERS. THE CAMP WAS DIVIDED INTO FOUR COMPANIES: THE FIRST COMPANY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING THE PERSONNEL RECORDS, MEDICAL TREATMENT, AND CAMP MAINTENANCE; THE SECOND COMPANY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR PLANNING, CONSTRUCTION, EDUCATION AND CLASSES; THE THIRD COMPANY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR CROP CULTIVATION, ANIMAL HUSBANDRY AND FISHING; AND THE FOURTH COMPANY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR WOOD CUTTING, BOAT BUILDING AND METAL WORKING. THE INMATES WERE SENTENCED TO THE CAMP FOR FIVE YEARS AFTER WHICH THEIR CASES WOULD BE REVIEWED AND EACH PERSON WOULD BE PLACED INTO ONE OF THREE CATEGORIES: THE FIRST CATEGORY WAS COMPRISED OF PERSONS WHO WERE TO BE RELEASED FROM REEDUCATION; THE SECOND CATEGORY WERE THOSE WHO WERE TO REMAIN IN REEDUCATION AS SECURITY/GUARD PERSONNEL; AND THE THIRD CATEGORY WERE THOSE TO BE SENTENCED TO FURTHER REEDUCATION. THE CAMP WAS CLOSED IN 1980 BECAUSE OF BORDER PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE LAO AND CHINESE GOVERNMENTS AND THE INMATES WERE EITHER RELEASED OR SENT TO REEDUCATION CAMPS IN XIENG KHOUANG OR ATTOPEU PROVINCES. SOME LPA PERSONNEL REMAINED AT THE CAMP AND SOME INMATES WERE KEPT AT THE CAMP TO TEND THE GARDENS AND WORK FOR THE LPA.

C06007751

LUANG PRABANG PROVINCE, LAOS

DOI: MID-1986

TEXT: 1. ACCORDING TO A LAO RESIDENT WHO DROVE A SUPPLY TRUCK AND REPORTEDLY SAW THE POWS, THERE WERE SEVEN AMERICAN POW'S AS OF MID-1986 BEING DETAINED AT A CAMP NEAR NAM BAC (TH 3683) TOWN, OUDOMSAI DISTRICT, LUANG PRABANG PROVINCE, LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (LPDR). COMMENT: THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN POWS IN THIS GENERAL AREA WAS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED

FORMER REEDUCATION CAMP INMATES FROM LUANG PRABANG PROVINCE, WHO FLED TO THAILAND IN 1986, HAVE REPORTED A REEDUCATION CAMP AT NAM BAC. THE CAMP WAS EMPTIED OF REEDUCATION INMATES ABOUT 1980 AND THE CAMP WAS OCCUPIED BY PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM (PAVN) TROOPS.) SIX OF THE AMERICANS WERE HISPANICS AND ONE WAS A CAUCASIAN AMERICAN NAMED THERE HAD BEEN 12 AMERICAN POWS AT THE SITE BUT IN 1985 FIVE OF THE AMERICANS POWS WERE MOVED TO THE SOVIET UNION. ALL OF THE AMERICAN POWS HAD BEEN CAPTURED IN 1968 WHILE WORKING AT THE NAM BAC CAMP. COMMENT: NAM BAC WAS THE SITE OF AN AIRFIELD DURING THE INDOCHINA WAR. NO AMERICANS WERE STATIONED THERE, BUT SOME AMERICAN PERSONNEL VISITED THERE OCCASIONALLY. NONE OF THEM WERE LOST.) THE CAMP WAS OVERRUN BY THE ENEMY AND THE AMERICANS WERE CAPTURED. IN ADDITION TO THE AMERICANS, THERE WERE 30 FORMER SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRISONERS AT THE CAMP.

2. THE PRISON CAMP WAS SURROUNDED BY A DOUBLE FENCE. THE INTERNAL AREA WAS FENCED WITH BAMBOO WHILE THE EXTERNAL AREA WAS FENCED WITH NINE WALLS OF BARBED WIRE, EACH ABOUT 170 CENTIMETERS IN HEIGHT. THERE WERE ABOUT SIX TO EIGHT BUILDINGS FOR PRISONERS IN THE INTERNAL AREA. EACH PRISONER BUILDING WAS ABOUT 50X10 METERS IN SIZE, BUILT OF CEMENT WITH CORRUGATED-SHEET METAL ROOFING. THE TOTAL INTERNAL AREA WAS ABOUT 3 RAI IN SIZE. (FIELD COMMENT: 2.5 RAI EQUALS ABOUT ONE ACRE.)

3. THE AMERICAN POWS WERE GUARDED BY LAO PEOPLE'S ARMY (LPA) SOLDIERS AND HAD BEEN WORKING AS CONSTRUCTION FOREMEN FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A DISPENSARY AND LIVING QUARTERS BUILDING LOCATED ACROSS ROUTE SIX FROM THE CAMP WHICH WAS LOCATED ON THE NORTH SIDE OF ROUTE SIX. A PAVN SECURITY UNIT WAS LOCATED NEAR THE DISPENSARY/LIVING QUARTERS AREA AND A PAVN CHECKPOINT WAS LOCATED AT MUANG NGOY (TH 5891). THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE POWS HAD BEEN SERVING AS CONSTRUCTION WORKERS FOR THE PROJECT. THESE TWO BUILDINGS WERE COMPLETED IN 1985. THE PRISONERS WERE GUARDED BY LPA SOLDIERS WHEN THEY WORKED OUTSIDE THE CAMP, BUT WERE ALLOWED TO SPEAK WITH LOCAL VILLAGERS. THE LPA SECURITY CHIEF AT THE CAMP WAS ((SITHON)) (LNU).

4. THE LIVING CONDITIONS OF THE POWS WERE TERRIBLE. THEY WERE GIVEN MILLED BUT UNPOLISHED RICE TO EAT WHICH WAS SOMETIMES SUPPLIMENTED BY WHEAT OR BARLEY FROM CUBA. THE POWS WERE IN BAD HEALTH DUE TO MALNUTRITION.

(5.)

C06007751

SUBJ: INFORMATION ON MUANG NGOY, LAOS, LOCATION OF AN ALLEGED AMERICAN POW SIGHTING

DOI: AUGUST 1986

ACCORDING TO A LAO MERCHANT WHO TRAVELED THROUGH MUANG NGOY ON 17 AUGUST 1986, THERE WAS ABOUT ONE BATTALION OF PAVN TROOPS IN THE GENERAL VICINITY OF MUANG NGOY. THERE WAS A PAVN UNIT OF UNKNOWN STRENGTH STATIONED IN MUANG NGOY. THE TOWN OF MUANG NGOY HAD ABOUT 200 FAMILIES. A BRIDGE OVER THE NAM OU RIVER, WHICH WAS LOCATED IN MUANG NGOY, HAD GUARD BUNKERS LOCATED AT EACH END. IN THE PAST, THE MERCHANT HAD HEARD THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOVIET AND CUBAN ADVISORS IN MUANG NGOY. PRESENTLY, THERE WERE ONLY VIETNAMESE ADVISORS IN MUANG NGOY.

ACCORDING TO THE MERCHANT, MUANG NGOY IS VERY IMPORTANT DUE TO ITS GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION. ROAD TRAVEL FROM XIENG KHOUANG, HOUA PHAN, LUANG PRABANG AND OUDOMSAI PROVINCES PASSES THROUGH MUANG NGOY. THESE ROUTES ARE VERY IMPORTANT TO THE MOUNTAINOUS AREAS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, WHICH USES THEM TO TRANSPORT OPIUM FROM THESE PROVINCES FOR THE LAO GOVERNMENT, TO AREAS WHERE THE OPIUM CAN BE SHIPPED TO THAILAND AND OTHER COUNTRIES. THE VIETNAMESE AND LAO GOVERNMENTS HAD PLANS TO BUILD A HOSPITAL, SCHOOL, AND OTHER BUILDINGS IN MUANG NGOY. THERE ARE SEVERAL CAVE COMPLEXES IN THE MUANG NGOY

AREA. PHAKEO (TH 5919), AND PHAKOU (NCA), ARE THE PRIMARY CAVE COMPLEXES IN THE AREA. THE MERCHANT, WHO WAS FROM LUANG PRABANG PROVINCE AND HAS TRAVELED WIDELY IN LAOS, HAD NEVER HEARD ABOUT

AMERICAN POWS IN THE MUANG NGOY AREA.

A LAO REFUGEE WHO TRAVELED THROUGH MUANG NGOY AND SPENT THE NIGHT OF 03 AUGUST IN MUANG NGOY, WHILE FLEEING FROM LAOS TO THAILAND, REPORTED THAT MUANG NGOY WAS SITUATED ON BOTH THE EAST AND WEST BANKS OF THE NAM OU RIVER. THERE WAS ONE PLATOON OF PAVN TROOPS WHO GUARDED THE BRIDGE OVER THE NAM OU RIVER LOCATED AT MUANG NGOY. ON THE EAST BANK OF THE NAM OU, MUANG NGOY CONSISTED OF ABOUT 20-30 HOUSES AND THREE NOODLE SHOPS. WHERE THE REFUGEE ATE DINNER. THE ROAD THROUGH TOWN HAD BEEN BUILT BY THE CHINESE AND WAS SURFACED WITH TAR. THE BRIDGE WAS CONCRETE AND HAD ONE CONCRETE GUARD HOUSE LOCATED AT EACH SIDE OF THE BRIDGE. THE REFUGEE WAS TRAVELING WITH A CIVILIAN CONVOY ENROUTE FROM SAM NUEA (VH 0057) TO SAVANNAKHET (VD 7331). THE CONVOY TRAVELED TO MUANG NGOY ON ROUTE SIX. THE TIGHTEST SECURITY ON THE ROUTE WAS FROM MUANG HIEM (UH 3021) THROUGH MUANG NGOY. THE REFUGEE WAS TOLD THAT THE REASON FOR TIGHTER SECURITY WAS RESISTANCE ACTIVITY IN THE AREA.

ON THE WEST SIDE OF THE NAM OU, MUANG NGOY CONSISTED OF ABOUT 100 HOUSES. ALSO CONNECTED TO MUANG NGOY WAS A VILLAGE OF ABOUT 200 HUTS. ALL HOUSES IN THE TOWN WERE OF WOOD CONSTRUCTION AND WERE ALL ONE-STOREY. IN WEST MUANG NGOY THERE WAS A SMALL STATE SHOP. THE PAVN TROOPS WERE BILLETED IN WEST MUANG NGOY, WHICH WAS BORDERED ON THE NORTH BY LARGE MOUNTAINS WITH CLIFFS. HE DID NOT OBSERVE ANY CAVES. SUBJECT SAID THAT MUANG NGOY HAD ELECTRIC POWER AT NIGHT FOR ABOUT TWO OR THREE HOURS. THE WOOD HOUSES IN WEST MUANG NGOY WERE FOR PEOPLE WHO WORKED FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND AT THE STATE SHOP. THE REFUGEE STATED THAT A CARGO BOAT WAS LOCATED ON THE EAST BANK OF THE NAM OU.

THE CONVOY WAS NOT STOPPED AT THE BRIDGE AND NO ONE QUESTIONED THEM OR CHECKED ON THEM WHILE THEY WERE IN MUANG NGOY. THEY SLEPT IN THE TRUCKS AND SUBJECT OBSERVED NOTHING UNUSUAL IN THE TOWN. THE REFUGEE DID NOT HEAR ANY RUMORS OR INFORMATION ABOUT AMERICAN POWS IN THE MUANG NGOY AREA.

(6.)

C06007751

HAS BEEN ON A TRIP TO HOUA PHAN, XIENG KHOUANG AND LUANG PRABANG PROVINCES. SHE PASSED THROUGH MUANG NGOY ON 17 AUGUST (1986) ON THE TRIP THROUGH MUANG NGOY SHE WAS TRAVELING WITH STATED THAT THE MUANG NGOY AREA WAS A STRATEGIC POINT FOR THE MADC BECAUSE OF THE GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION AND BECAUSE IT WAS A CROSSROADS FOR GOODS SHIPPED FROM THE XIENG KHOUANG, SAM NEUA, HOUA PHAN, LUANG PRABANG AND OUDOMSAI AREAS.

PROVIDED VERY DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE MADC OPERATIONS IN THE FIVE NORTHERN PROVINCES. IN ADDITION, STATED THAT IN NOVEMBER 1983 OR 1984, WAS UNSURE AS TO EXACT DATE, HER BROTHER TOLD HER THAT HE HAD SEEN FOUR "FARANGS" (WESTERN CAUCASIANS), WHICH HE BELIEVED WERE AMERICAN POWS, IN XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCE. THE BROTHER WAS DRIVING ON THE ROAD FROM XIENG KHOUANG TO SALAPHOUKHOUN WHEN HE SAW A GROUP OF MEN BY THE ROAD. THE GROUP OF MEN INCLUDED THREE MEN WHICH THE BROTHER RECOGNIZED AS FORMER FAR GENERALS, ABOUT 14 OTHER FAR SOLDIERS AND THE FOUR FARANGS. THE GROUP TRIED TO STOP HIS TRUCK BUT WAS AFRAID AND REFUSED TO STOP. THE BROTHER TOLD THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE MEN HAD ESCAPED FROM PRISON CAMP AND WERE ATTEMPTING TO FLEE.

(7.)

C06007751

IN LATE JULY 1986,
WHO IS A LAO RESIDENT, VISITED BAN KHOANG (QD 9332). BAN KHOANG HAS ABOUT 35 FAMILIES OF ETHNIC EUE PEOPLE. WHILE IN BAN KHOANG, REQUESTED TO VISIT MUANG NGOY (TH 5891), OBSTENSIVELY TO SEE THE GOLDEN BUDDHA AND THE MAGIC METAL REPORTED TO BE HARDER THAN STEEL AND INVULNERABLE. WAS TOLD THAT HE COULD NOT GO THERE BECAUSE THERE WERE MANY PAVN IN MUANG NGOY AND THEY AND THE LPA DO NOT ALLOW OUTSIDERS. WHEN ASKED WHY THE AREA WAS RESTRICTED, HE WAS TOLD IT WAS BECAUSE THERE ARE AMERICANS BEING HELD THERE.

CONVINCED
TO GO TO MUANG NGOY AND BUY THEM A BUDDHA IMAGE.
WALKED TO THE INTERSECTION AT QD 8418 AND CAUGHT A BUS TO MUANG NAM BAC (TH 3583) AND WALKED TO MUANG NGOY KAO (TH 5891). UPON RETURN THEY SAID THAT SECURITY WAS VERY TIGHT IN MUANG NGOY AND THERE WERE MANY PAVN. THEY STAYED WITH A FRIEND AND ASKED HIM TO TAKE THEM TO THE CAVE OF THAM PHA YONG WHERE A GOLDEN BUDDHA IS ON DISPLAY. SAID THAT PEOPLE WERE ABSOLUTELY FORBIDDEN TO ENTER THE AREA BY THE PAVN. THERE ARE FOUR CAVES IN THE AREA AND PAVN USES THREE CAVES AND PROTECTS THEM WITH 30 MM ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS. ANOTHER CAVE CALLED THAM MUANG NGOY IS THE MOST RESTRICTED AREA BECAUSE IT IS A DETENTION CENTER. THERE IS ROOM FOR 3000 PEOPLE INSIDE THE CAVE. IT WAS THE SITE OF DETENTION OF THE LAST LAO KING OF LAOS AND MANY ROYAL RELATIVES AFTER THE COMMUNSTS TOOK OVER.

SAID THAT THE PAVN HAD CAUGHT THREE AMERICANS "SINCE" 1975 AND PUT THEM IN THE CAVE CALLED SOP KHAN NOI. MANY VILLAGERS FROM MUANG NGOY HAVE SEEN THE AMERICANS WHEN THEY ARE TAKEN OUT TO BATHE AND GO TO THE BATHROOM. SAID THAT HE HAD SEEN THE AMERICANS WHEN HE SOLD SUGAR CANE AND FOOD TO THE PAVN WHO GUARDED THE CAVE. ONE AMERICAN IS TALLER THAN THE OTHERS WITH BROWN HAIR AND WALKS LIKE HE HAS AN INJURED RIGHT LEG. THE SECOND AMERICAN IS OF MEDIUM HEIGHT WITH SIDEBURNS AND A BLACK SPOT ON HIS RIGHT CHEEK THAT MIGHT BE A BIRTHMARK OR A SCAR CAUSED BY BEING HIT OR BURNED. COULD THINK OF NO DISTINGUISHING FEATURES FOR THE THIRD AMERICAN.

ON 3 JUNE 1986, THE PAVN HAD REPORTEDLY MOVED THE POWS FROM SOP KHAN NOI TO THAM MUANG NGOY CAVE. THE PAVN SAID THAT ANY VILLAGER ENTERING THE NEW AREA WOULD BE SHOT. HAD NOT BEEN TO THE THAM MUANG NGOY CAVE SINCE THE AMERICANS WERE MOVED THERE BUT USED TO HUNT IN THE AREA AND PROVIDED A SKETCH MAP.

THE SKETCH MAP IS CLEAR

ON MANY POINTS BUT HAS ONE GLARING ERROR. ACCORDING TO THE MAP, MUANG NGOY MAI (NEW MUANG NGOY) AND MUANG NGOY KAO (OLD MUANG NGOY) ARE ON THE WEST BANK OF THE NAM OU RIVER. UNLESS THESE ARE TWO SUB-VILLAGES OF MUANG NGOY THEY ARE ON THE WRONG BANK. HOWEVER, THE SKETCH MAP DOES SHOW THE AIRFIELD WHICH BELIEVES MUST BE THE ONE AT TH 573894. FROM THE MAP GUESSED THAT THE CAVE WHERE THE REPORTED AMERICANS ARE NOW IS AT TH 573984 OR JUST TO THE SOUTH IN THE IRREGULAR HILL THAT HAS ITS PEAK AT TH 563888. THE OLD CAVE IS LOCATED ABOUT TWO KILOMETERS NORTH OF THE NEW SITE AND ON THE EAST BANK OF THE RIVER. PUTS THIS AT THE HILL WITH ITS PEAK AT TH 588899. THEY ARE BASING LOCATIONS ON THE SUPPOSITION THAT GOT THE AIRFIELD SITE ABOUT RIGHT. IF SO THEN THE OLD CAVE, NEW CAVE AND A PAVN AAA SITE MARKED, THAT WE PUT ON THE HILL AT TH 583881 WOULD BE ABOUT RIGHT.

(8.)

C06007751

REPORTED AT 18 AUGUST MEETING THAT FROM 9 TO 11 JULY 1986 THREE AMERICAN PRISONERS WERE BROUGHT TO MUANG PAKBENG (QC 2301) FROM OUDOMSAI (RC 0291) BY CAR. THEY WERE BROUGHT DOWN TO FIX FOUR OFFICIAL VEHICLES THAT WERE OUT OF ORDER AND TO REPAIR THE ENGINE OF A LOCAL RICE MILL. AFTER DOING THE WORK THEY WENT BACK TO OUDOMSAI.

WISH TO NOTE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE AN ACTIVE VEHICLE MAINTAINANCE PROGRAM IN NORTH LAOS. WE REPORTED IN THE MOST THAT THE SOVIET MILITARY MISSION IN VIENTIANE HAD GIVEN A ONE DAY AUTOMOTIVE MAINTAINANCE COURSE TO THE LPA 3RD DIVISION AT LUANG NAMTHA ON 11 JULY. ANOTHER REPORT , REPORTED THAT A SOVIET INSTRUCTOR GAVE A COURSE IN LUANG PRABANG FROM 28 JUNE TO 30 JULY FOR CIVILIAN MECHANICS FROM THE SIX NORTHERN LAO PROVINCES. THUS SIGHTING OF "AMERICAN" MECHANICS MIGHT BE VALID BUT THEY MIGHT ALSO BE CAUCASIAN RUSSIAN ADVISORS.

C06007751


NEW SITE
OLD SITE
airfield (old)
Sop Khon Noi
Muang Ngoy Mai
Muang Ngoy Kao
Loung Phrabang


CHINA
M. SING
Nam Ou
VIETNAM
Ban Khoang
Ban Nakhan Noi
Ban Nakhan
NEW SITE
Thami Muang Ngoy
PAW Detention Camp
Since 3 June 86.
Muang Ngoy Kao
Light house
OLD SITE
Cave
PAUN AAA (30mm)
Rice Field
Oudomsai
Tham Pha Yong
Louang Phrabang

C06007751

C06007756

~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency

55 POW

Washington, D.C. 20505

2 November 1992
OCA 3201-92

Mr. J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

Dear Mr. Codinha:

We have reviewed for declassification several of the depositions made to the Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs by former and current CIA employees [redacted].

Of those at hand (sent to the Committee on October 13, 1992), Mr. George Carver's deposition was declassified after we made a few deletions to protect sources and methods. Depositions of the other individuals must, however, remain classified SECRET. They discuss in detail Agency sources, [redacted] methods [redacted].

(b)(3)(n)
(b)(1)

Specifically these are the depositions of the following indivdiuals: [redacted]

(b)(6)

We will, of course, advise you promptly of the results of our review of any future depositions of other Agency officers as they become available to us.

Sincerely,

[redacted]

(b)(3)(c)

John L. Breckenridge
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

[redacted]

ALL PORTIONS CLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

C06007756

OCA 3201-92

SUBJECT: Letter to Codinha, POW/MIA Affairs re Declassifying Depositions



(b)(3)(c)

C06008028

~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

SUBJECT: Decision Not to Declassify Depositions Made to Senate Select Committee by agency Officers and a Former Asset

FROM:	EXTENSION	DATE SENT	REQUEST NUMBER
C/EA/ICOG		20 Oct 92	DCI/O 0025/271-92

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
1. Acting Chief, EA		21		
2. C/ORMS		10/21/92		
3. DC/ORMS				
4. C/ORMS	23 OCT 1992			
5. SA/DDO		23/10		
6. ADDO		10:23		
7. DDO				
8. O/OCA/S				
9.	10.26	10.26		
10.		Letter Sent TO JOHN FOR Review		
11.				
12.				

(b)(3)(c)

SUSPENSE DATE:

RETURN TO:

FORM 4283 8-87 ~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In) Priority Handling Congressional Action

C06008028

~~SECRET~~

0025/27-92

20 October 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Breckenridge
Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: [redacted] (b)(3)(c)
Chief, Indochina Operations Group

SUBJECT: Decision Not to Declassify Depositions Made to Senate Select Committee by Agency Officers and a Former Asset

REFERENCE: Senate Select Committee requests for declassification of the depositions

(To OCA: Please send the following text to the Committee.)

1. We have reviewed several depositions made to the Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs by former and current CIA employees, [redacted] (We may not have received all Agency officers' depositions made to date.) Retiree Mr. George Carver's deposition was declassified after a few deletions were made for security reasons. Depositions by the following individuals will not be declassified, but must remain classified Secret because they discuss Agency sources, [redacted] methods, [redacted] (b)(3)(n) (b)(1)

The depositions we will not declassify are those which were made by the following individuals:

[redacted] (b)(6) (b)(3)(c)

2. We will advise you separately of our decisions on depositions made by other Agency officers, after we have received them. [redacted] (b)(3)(c)

~~SECRET~~

C06008037

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

~~SECRET~~

SSPOW

Central Intelligence Agency

(b)(3)(c)

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 0980-92/1
2 November 1992

Mr. Robert Taylor
Investigator
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Taylor:

Regarding your letter dated October 22, 1992, the Central Intelligence Agency does not have an archival category of documentation or a storage facility by the name of "Rosebud." We are unable to find any reference to a "Rosebud" as a codeword for a facility, an archive, or any POW-related issue.

Sincerely,

[redacted]

John L. Breckenridge
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

ALL PORTIONS CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

C06008037

OCA 0980-92/1

SUBJECT: Letter to Robert Taylor, POW/MIA Affairs Cmte re "Rosebud"



C06008037

OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS ROUTING SLIP	ACTION	INFO
D/OCA		X
DD/OCA		X
SPECIAL ASSISTANT		
DD/LEGISLATION		X
DD/SENATE	X	
DD/HOUSE		X
DD/CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT		X
DD/INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ISSUES		X
CONSTITUENT INQUIRIES OFFICER		
FOIA/PA OFFICER		
SECURITY OFFICER		
OCA/COMPT/ISC		X
SUSPENSE 9 NOV '92 (DATE) ACTION OFFICER: John B.		
REMARKS: PW		
CONTROL NUMBER: OCA 0980-92		
FILE: OCA 0980-92		

FORM 4422
Nov-91

C06008360

(b)(6)

JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS, Chairman
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, SOUTH DAKOTA
HARRY REID, NEVADA
CHARLES S. ROBB, VIRGINIA
J. ROBERT KERREY, NEBRASKA
HERBERT H. KOHL, WISCONSIN

BOB SMITH, NEW HAMPSHIRE, Vice Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, ARIZONA
HANK BROWN, COLORADO
CHUCK GRASSLEY, IOWA
NANCY LANDON KASSEBAUM, KANSAS
JESSE HELMS, NORTH CAROLINA

FRANCES A. ZWENIG, STAFF DIRECTOR
J. WILLIAM CODINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(6)

October 22, 1992

Mr. Stanley Moskowitz, Director
Congressional Relations
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Moskowitz:

The Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs has received information that the Central Intelligence Agency may have an archival category of documentation or a storage facility by the name of "Rosebud." We have been informed that this material contains sensitive POW-related material.

Accordingly, the Committee would like confirmation if such a group of documents exists and, if such is the case, to review those documents at the earliest convenience. If you have any questions regarding this request, please contact Committee investigator Mr. Robert Taylor at 202-224-2317.

Sincerely,

J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel

JWC/kb/bt

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

C06008360

Select Committee on

POW / MIA Affairs

Tom Daschle, South Dakota
Harry Reid, Nevada
Charles Robb, Virginia
Bob Kerrey, Nebraska
Herb Kohl, Wisconsin

John McCain, Arizona
Hank Brown, Colorado
Charles Grassley, Iowa
Nancy Landon Kassebaum, Kansas
Jesse Helms, North Carolina

Francis M. Zwenig, Staff Director
Alan C. Pak, Deputy Staff Director
J. William Codinha, General Counsel

United States Senate, Washington, DC 20510-6500 (202) 224-2074

FAX COVER SHEET

DD/SENATE

TO: Stanley Moskowitz

FROM: Bill Codinha

2 PAGES, INCLUDING COVER

DATE: 22 October 92

C06010751

~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

SUBJECT: Draft Response to Senator Kerry re his Letter Concerning the POW/MIA Issue

FROM:	EXTENSION	DATE SENT	REQUEST NUMBER
C/ORMS/		11 Dec. 1991	DD/91-0025/121

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
1. DC/ORMS				
2. C/ORMS				
3. SA/DDO [redacted] (b)(3)(c)		12/11		
4. ADDO				
5. DDO		Rec. 11		
6.				
7. Robert Magner, OCA/S [redacted]				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				

SUSPENSE DATE:

RETURN TO:

FORM 4283 ~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In) Priority Handling Congressional Action

C06010751

SECRET

11 December 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert W. Magner
Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Liaison

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: Richard W. Coffman
Chief, Congressional and Covert Action Oversight Group
Operations and Resource Management Staff

SUBJECT: Draft Response to Senator Kerry re his Letter Concerning the POW/MIA Issue

REFERENCE: Letter of 19 November 1991 from Senator Kerry to Mr. Gates

1. In response to Senator Kerry's referenced letter, it is proposed that the following response be sent him and signed by Mr. Moskowitz:

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Director has asked me to convey to you his deep interest in the resolution of the POW-MIA issue and his pledge of full cooperation from the Intelligence Community. He has also asked me to respond to your letter of November 19, 1991, on the POW-MIA issue.

It has been Agency practice to provide all relevant information on POW-MIA's to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and this information should be available in their files. In response to your request, we are undertaking a review of all files held by the Agency which bear on this issue to ensure that all pertinent data has been passed to DIA. If we find additional material, our intention is to pass it concurrently to the committee and to DIA. This will assure that this data is available to your committee.

Attached is a list of former Chiefs of Station from the countries you requested. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) (b)(3)(c)

(b)(3)(c)

SECRET

C06010751

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Draft Response to Senator Kerry re his Letter Concerning the POW/MIA Issue

The Director has asked me to serve as the point of contact for your committee. I look forward to working with you on this issue. Please advise if there is any way the Agency can be of further assistance.

Signed by

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

Stanley Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

~~SECRET~~

C06010751

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)







(b)(3)(c)

C06010752

ER 91-3784

(b)(3)(c)

Y MASSACHUSETTS,
A. DASCHLE, SOUTH DAKOTA
REID, NEVADA
LES S. ROBB, VIRGINIA
OBERT KERREY, NEBRASKA
ERBERT H. KOHL, WISCONSIN

BOB SMITH, NEW HAMPSHIRE,
Vice Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, ARIZONA
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JESSE HELMS, NORTH CAROLINA

FRANCES A. ZWENIG, STAFF DIRECTOR
ALAN C. PTAK, DEPUTY STAFF DIRECTOR
J. WILLIAM CODINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

November 19, 1991

The Honorable Robert M. Gates, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Director:

Pursuant to our conversations with you on the POW/MIA issue, we are writing to make a formal request from the Central Intelligence Agency for all documents on POW/MIAs of the Vietnam War era. We are particularly interested in documents relating to Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and China.

Additionally, we ask you to assign an individual at the Agency who would be our liaison on the POW/MIA issue.

Finally, we request a list of the names and the ways to contact each of the station chiefs in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam from 1968 to the relevant final date for each country.

Thank you very much for your helpfulness in supplying this information and we look forward to reviewing the documents.

Sincerely,

Bob Smith
Vice Chairman

John F. Kerry
Chairman

cc: The Honorable David Boren

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C06010757

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

Central Intelligence Agency

(b)(3)(c)

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 3394-92
9 December 1992

Robert E. McDaniel, Esq.
Devine Millimet & Branch
111 Amherst St.
Manchester, N.H. 03105

Dear Mr. McDaniel:

I have been informed that the Senate Select Committee for POW/MIA Affairs proposes to depose your client, former Deputy Director for Operations Max Hugel, on Thursday, December 10, in New York City. You asked us to advise you in writing of our position on this proposal.

The Central Intelligence Agency has been fully cooperative with all Committee depositions of current and former Agency employees. Whether Mr. Hugel agrees to be deposed is, of course, a matter within his sole discretion. Should he be deposed, he may discuss classified information relevant to the Committee's inquiry, within the limits of the security clearances of those present. This authority to discuss classified information does not extend to the identification of any Agency source. Any question concerning sources should be directed by the Committee to this office.

Should Mr. Hugel agree to be deposed, [redacted] from this office will attend on behalf of the Agency.

Sincerely,

[redacted]

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

C06010757

Mr. Robert McDaniel

OCA/LEG [redacted] (8 December 1992) OCA 3394-92

[redacted]

C06010757

TO : D/OGA ~~via DD~~/OCA	CONTROL # OCA 3394-92	DATE OF REQUEST 9 December 1992
FROM : DD/LEG/OCA		SUSPENSE DATE

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Affairs

NOTES



COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices)		
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE

ACTION REQUIRED BY **D/OCA**

For signature.

FORM 2-86 4118 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

?06010758

OCA 3371-92
7 December 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Executive Director

FROM: Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Issues

1. According to a staff investigator of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, a telephone call to you from either Sen. Kerry or Sen. Smith concerning Agency operational files is "imminent." Specifically, the purpose of the call is to request again that Committee staff have direct, unrestricted access to POW/MIA operational files.

2. Because this request has been flatly denied in the past, and based on a proposal previously floated by Committee staff, we expect that a compromise will be suggested that would allow a "trusted third party" to review the files and report to the Committee. The third party that has been mentioned is [redacted] a Senate Intelligence Committee staffer on detail to the Senate POW/MIA Committee. Apparently, the Committee Staff Director, Frances Zwenig, believes that [redacted] would identify and report all relevant information, and would also be trusted by the CIA to handle source and method information appropriately. (b)(6)

3. If we agree to consider the compromise idea, I should add that the suggestion of [redacted] is not one supported by the entire Committee. Some of the staff do not believe he would be an objective neutral, and may insist on substituting one of their own. We have no information on whether Sen. Smith concurs in the choice of [redacted]

Stanley M. Moskowitz

C06010758

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Issues



(b)(3)(c)

C06010758

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
POW/MIA Issues

FROM:
Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

EXTENSION

NO.
OCA 3371-92

DATE
7 December 1992

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Executive Registry	07 DEC 1992			
2.				
3. Executive Director	8 DEC 1992	8 DEC 1992		
4.				
5. Deputy Director of Central Intelligence		12/9		
6. (b)(3)(c)				
7. Director of Central Intelligence	10 Dec			
8.				
9. Return to Director of Congressional Affairs		12/14		
10.				
11. OCA				
12.				
13. OCA				
14.				(b)(3)(c) (b)(5)
15.				

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
1-79

C06010758

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Associate Deputy Director for Operations

D
D
O

DCI

We can concur if:

1. Sen Kerry/Smith agree to appointing one "trusted third party". We would prefer (from what we know) that this person be Zwenig's candidate - ART GRANT.

2. That we have a substantive member of the East Asia POW MIA Task force work with Grant in going through the ops files

[redacted]

(b)(5)
(b)(3)(n)

In sum, while the access to the ops is would not be "unrestricted" - Grant will have access to the entire body information he needs to see.

Ted.

C06010758

TO : D/OCA (b)(3)(c)	CONTROL # OCA 3371-92	DATE OF REQUEST
FROM :		SUSPENSE DATE

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Issues

NOTES

Signed

COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices)		
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE

ACTION REQUIRED BY **D/OCA**

Please sign

FORM 2-86 **4118** OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

C06010759

TO : D/OCA	CONTROL #	DATE OF REQUEST OCA 3344-92 24 November 1992
FROM : [redacted] OCA		SUSPENSE DATE

SUBJECT: ~~POW~~/MIA Issues

(b)(3)(c)

11/27/92 ; to EK

NOTES

Signed
hand carried

COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices)		
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE
NAME	OFFICE	DATE

ACTION REQUIRED BY **D/OCA**

FORM 4118 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
2-86

C06010759

SECRET

OCA 3344-92
27 NOV 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Executive Director

FROM: Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Issues

1. This is to advise you of a recent development in the Senate POW/MIA Committee's investigation. (U)

2. To date, the CIA--in sharp contrast to the DIA--has not been the focus of Committee criticism, even from Senator Smith, the harshest critic of the government. The performance of Agency personnel (current and former employees, [redacted] etc.) in depositions and in the Committee's closed hearings on [redacted] issues and [redacted] has been very good. (TS) (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

3. According to a Committee staff attorney, however, the CIA may be the target of criticism in the Committee's final report, due to be issued in mid-December. This criticism apparently would stem from (1) the CIA's continued refusal to grant Committee staff direct unrestricted access to operational files; and (2) a perception that the CIA "hid" information concerning the transfer of American POWs from both Vietnam and Korea to the Soviet Union. (U)

4. As to the former issue, Committee staff have reviewed POW/MIA operational files here at Headquarters where we have determined that the files are responsive to a specific Committee request for information. There hasn't been and isn't now any compelling reason, however, to accede to Committee requests for comprehensive unrestricted access to all such files. (U) (b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

SECRET

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Issues

5. As to the latter issue, one Committee source is Czech defector Jan Sejna. Mr. Sejna, now 65 and a contractor for DIA, defected in 1968. He had been a member of the Czech Parliament, Secretary of the Communist Party from 1964-1968, and Secretary of the Defense Council. (U)

6. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) He stated that he had given the CIA this information during his post-defection debriefings. ~~(S)~~

7. Prior to Mr. Sejna's deposition, we advised the Committee that our records show not only that Mr. Sejna never mentioned POW issues to the CIA during or since his debriefings, but also that in 1968, he explicitly denied having any knowledge about American POWs in North Vietnam. We further advised the Committee that the CIA could not corroborate Mr. Sejna's information. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) Nevertheless, elements of the Committee staff are likely to believe Mr. Sejna. ~~(S)~~

8. The Committee appears to be internally split on several important issues, including whether or not the Committee should be reauthorized in the new Congress. We do not, however, believe that there is any internal obstacle to including criticism of CIA in the final report. We will provide additional information on the Committee's intentions as it becomes available. (U)

Stanley M. Moskowitz

C06010759

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Issues OCA 3344-92



(b)(3)(c)

C06010762

(b)(3)(c)

~~SECRET//NOFORN//~~ [redacted]

The Associate Director of Central Intelligence
for Military Support
Washington, D.C. 20505

MAR 2 3 2001

The Honorable Robert C. Smith
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-2903

Dear Senator Smith:

~~(S NF)~~ This letter is a further response to the request (made in a mid-2000 note from your staff to the CIA's Office of Congressional Affairs and alluded to in your 19 October 2000 letter to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence) for any POW-related information that might have been provided to the US government by GRU General-Major Dmitriy Fedorovich Polyakov.

~~(S NF)~~ The CIA has carried out a complete review of its files on General Polyakov, who disappeared in the 1980's and is presumed--though not certainly known--to have been executed by the USSR. Only one document sourced to him, a 27 September 1967 intelligence report, is relevant to the topic of US Vietnam-era POWs/MIAs. That report (CSDB-312/02644-67, marked SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM) is enclosed.

[redacted]

(U) Research continues on other queries raised in your 19 October letter; I wish to assure you of my personal interest in seeing these questions resolved as speedily as feasible.

Sincerely,

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

[redacted]

John H. Campbell
Lieutenant General, USAF

(b)(3)(c)

Enclosure

[redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN//~~ [redacted]

OCA 01-00481
DAC 01-01190

~~SECRET//NOFORN//~~ [redacted]

(b)(3)(c)

SUBJECT: Letter to The Honorable Robert C. Smith

[redacted]

TO: The Honorable Robert C. Smith
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-2903



(b)(3)(c)

~~SECRET//NOFORN//~~ [redacted]

2001
POW/MIA

C06010762

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T

COUNTRY	USSR/North Vietnam (b)(3)(c)	REPORT NO.	
SUBJECT	Soviet Involvement in North Vietnam	DATE DISTR. 27	September 1967
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	Up to August 1967		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.		FIELD REPORT NO.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Soviet Bloc source whose reliability cannot be judged, from a Soviet officer who had served in North Vietnam.

1. The USSR is having difficulty supplying North Vietnam; the situation in that country is bad.

2. The USSR has no contact with American prisoners in North Vietnam. However, some reports of interrogation of the prisoners are passed officially to the Soviet Embassy by the North Vietnamese. These are generally one-page reports which have little value.

3. U.S. military hardware which falls into North Vietnamese hands is not provided to the Soviets by either the North Vietnamese or the Chinese, but the Soviets have been able to steal an item from time to time.

(b)(3)(c)

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C06010762 [redacted] FORN// [redacted] (b)(3)(c)

[redacted] em Controls//Non-Intell//Declass (as appropriate)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT (Optional) Letter to The Honorable Robert C. Smith

FROM
SA/ADCI/MS

Extension

NO. DAC 01190-01

DATE 03/21/2001

TO (Officer designation, room, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICIAL'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
				FULL SIGNATURE IS REQUESTED BY OCA Thank you.
1. C/CE -		23Mar01		For Coordination
2. C/EA -	23/3	23/3		For Coordination
3. DO/IRO	3/23			For Coordination
4. C/CIC	23 Mar	23 Mar		For Coordination
5. D/OCA	3/23	3/23		For Coordination
6.				
7.				(b)(3)(c)
8.				
9.				
10. ADCI/MS				For Signature
11.				
12. C/D/OCA				
13.				Please call for pick up.
14.				

SECRET//NOFORN// [redacted]

(b)(3)(c)

FORM 02-01 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

C06010762

OCA 00-02974

OCA Records 8

CONGRESSIONAL CORRESPONDENCE ACTION PLAN

Date / Time Received	Suspense Date	Control Number

ACTION: Please forward response as indicated below to OCA for coordination and transmittal.

☐ **Prepare a response for DCI signature.**

Lead Action Office:

Information Copies:

☒ **Prepare a response for D/OCA signature.**

Lead Action Office: AO CI-MS

Information Copies: DO/COS; DO/NE; DO/EUR; DO/EA

☐ **NO WRITTEN RESPONSE NECESSARY**

Lead Office:

Follow-Up Action:

Information Copies:

OCA ACTION OFFICER (b)(3)(c)

Advance Copies Provided To: OCA/AO
C/Raisin

Comments:

☐ NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION WITHOUT PRIOR OCA APPROVAL.

2000

POW/MIA

Form 3-99 4499 (EF) Obsolete Previous Editions

C06010767

CONFIDENTIAL

09 October 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]
Office of Congressional Affairs

FROM: Acting Chief, EA/Security

SUBJECT: SSCI Information Request - [redacted]

(b)(1) (b)(6)

1. Based on the limited data provided in your request, the Office of Security could not verify that a [redacted] reportedly an employee of [redacted] was affiliated with or worked for the CIA in Laos between 1963 and mid-1970. (C)

2. Should you develop additional biographic or other information on [redacted] please feel free to contact this office, through [redacted] in EA/ICOG, for further research. (C)

(b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

C06010768

ALL REDACTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE MADE PURSUANT TO EXEMPTION (b)(3)(c)

(b)(3)(c)

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 0958-92/1

14 October 1992

Mr. Robert Taylor
Investigator
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Taylor:

The Committee's written request dated 8 October 1992 concerning alleged reports, analysis or memoranda on American POWs held in the vicinity of Dong Mang prison camp could not be found. After further review with DIA we have concluded that the DIA's Dong Mang could possibly refer to the Dong Vai Prison (same geographic coordinates that were given for Dong Mang).

Enclosed is a declassified study on Dong Vai Prison. This is from a classified study on prisons which we previously sent the Committee. After extensive research, this study was the only piece of intelligence found concerning this issue. If you have any further questions please contact me at [redacted]

Sincerely,

(b)(3)(c) [redacted]

John L. Breckenridge
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

Enclosure

C06010768

OCA 0958-92/1

SUBJECT: Letter to Robert Taylor, POW/MIA Affairs Cmte re Dong Mang Prison Camp



(b)(3)(c)

Central Quang Ninh Reeducation Camp (Dong Vai Prison, Hoanh Bo Prison, or 60A/TD63/QN) was a French-built prison about 12 kilometers west of Hon Gai City near Dong Vai (YJ 2030) in Hoanh Bo District, Quang Ninh Province. It had a 200-man staff which manned two subordinate camps (KA, KB). Prior to May-June 1976, it held northern criminals who had been tried and sentenced to more than two years of imprisonment. Most were transferred to other facilities to make room for ARVN/GVN inmates from the southern SRV in mid-1976. Between June 1976 and December 1978 it held about 1,000 Vietnamese inmates, including 20 ARVN field grade officers, 60 GVN national police colonels, 100 GVN CIO officers, 200 GVN national police officers, 100 GVN civil servants and 300 northern civil criminals. By August 1978, all ARVN/GVN inmates had been transferred to other camps in the northern SRV leaving it with only northern civil criminals. The camp was evacuated in late 1978 before the 1979 Chinese border attacks and was later transferred to the control of the Quang Ninh Province PSO. There were no foreigners reported in detention at the Central Quang Ninh Reeducation Camp during the period 1976-1988. One northern boat refugee provided hearsay information subsourced to an SRV cargo truck driver about the transport in early March 1982 of three or four dozen handcuffed Caucasian prisoners, presumed by the truck driver to be Americans, from the Cam Thuy Reeducation Camp in Thanh Hoa Province to the Dong Vai Reeducation Camp in Quang Ninh Province. This person noted that the Dong Vai Camp was a MOI central-level camp which was located near Dong Dang Town in an area called Dong Vai and that it held northern inmates who had committed grave civil offenses and who had been sentenced to ten or more years of hard labor. A second northern boat refugee provided hearsay information on an unknown number of alleged U.S. POW's, including one colonel, who were held at the Dong Vai Camp as of 1977-1978 and who had all been moved out of the Dong Vai Camp in 1978 to an unknown location. According to this second person, the Dong Vai Camp was located about 124 kilometers northeast of Lang Bang (YJ 1926) in Hoanh Bo District and had its Bai Muoi or Dong Muoi Camp annex in the Cao Thang Ward (YJ 1920) of Hon Gai City.

C06010768

UNCLASSIFIED

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS
AND
COMPTROLLER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

CONTROL NO. 2-1689

TRANSMISSION DATE: 15 OCT 1992

PAGES: 2

TRANSMITTED TO:

FAX NO: 202-224-2155

NAME: BOB TAYLOR

ORGANIZATION: POW/MIA AFFAIRS

BLDG, ROOM:

TELE/EXT: 202-224-2306

SUBJECT: PRISON CAMP INFO

TRANSMITTED FROM:

FAX NO:

NAME: DCA

BLDG, ROOM:

TELE/EXT:

NOTE:

THIS COPIER IS DESIGNATED AS "UNATTENDED" AND WILL RECEIVE DOCUMENTS FROM 0700-1900. YOU MUST LET THE RECEIVING PARTY KNOW YOU ARE SENDING A FAX.

Central Quang Ninh Reeducation Camp (Dong Vai Prison, Hoanh Bo Prison, or 60A/TD63/QN) was a French-built prison about 12 kilometers west of Hon Gai City near Dong Vai (YJ 2030) in Hoanh Bo District, Quang Ninh Province. It had a 200-man staff which manned two subordinate camps (KA, KB). Prior to May-June 1976, it held northern criminals who had been tried and sentenced to more than two years of imprisonment. Most were transferred to other facilities to make room for ARVN/GVN inmates from the southern SRV in mid-1976. Between June 1976 and December 1978 it held about 1,000 Vietnamese inmates, including 20 ARVN field grade officers, 60 GVN national police colonels, 100 GVN CIO officers, 200 GVN national police officers, 100 GVN civil servants and 300 northern civil criminals. By August 1978, all ARVN/GVN inmates had been transferred to other camps in the northern SRV leaving it with only northern civil criminals. The camp was evacuated in late 1978 before the 1979 Chinese border attacks and was later transferred to the control of the Quang Ninh Province PSO. There were no foreigners reported in detention at the Central Quang Ninh Reeducation Camp during the period 1976-1988. One northern boat refugee provided hearsay information subsourced to an SRV cargo truck driver about the transport in early March 1982 of three or four dozen handcuffed Caucasian prisoners, presumed by the truck driver to be Americans, from the Cam Thuy Reeducation Camp in Thanh Hoa Province to the Dong Vai Reeducation Camp in Quang Ninh Province. This person noted that the Dong Vai Camp was a MOI central-level camp which was located near Dong Dang Town in an area called Dong Vai and that it held northern inmates who had committed grave civil offenses and who had been sentenced to ten or more years of hard labor. A second northern boat refugee provided hearsay information on an unknown number of alleged U.S. POW's, including one colonel, who were held at the Dong Vai Camp as of 1977-1978 and who had all been moved out of the Dong Vai Camp in 1978 to an unknown location. According to this second person, the Dong Vai Camp was located about 124 kilometers northeast of Lang Bang (YJ 1926) in Hoanh Bo District and had its Bai Muoi or Dong Muoi Camp annex in the Cao Thang Ward (YJ 1920) of Hon Gai City.

C06010772

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

SUBJECT: Response Letter to The Honorable Bob Smith

FROM:	EXTENSION	DATE SENT	REQUEST NUMBER
Chief, Indochina Operations Group, East Asia Division		29Sep92	DO/O 92025/258-92

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
1. Deputy Chief, East Asia for Southeast Asia		30/9		
2. Deputy Chief, East Asia Division	2 OCT 1992			
3. Chief, East Asia Division				For Signature.
4. C/ORMS/CCA	10/5/92			
5. Deputy Chief, Operations and Resource Management Staff				(b)(3)(c)
6. Chief, Operations and Resource Management Staff				
7. DDO Secretariat	6 OCT 1992			
8. Special Assistant to the Deputy Director for Operations		6/10		To 11: Please detach Tab A materials and notify committee investigators that it is ready for review at Hqs.
9. Associate Deputy Director for Operations				
10. Deputy Director for Operations	8 Oct			
11. John Breckenridge O/OCA/S				
12. Stanley M. Moskowitz Director of Congressional Affairs				

SUSPENSE DATE:

RETURN TO:

FORM 8-87 4283

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congression Action

C06010772

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

SUBJECT:

Response Letter to The Honorable Bob Smith (Continued)

FROM:	EXTENSION	DATE SENT	REQUEST NUMBER

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
1. Executive Registry				
2.				
3. Deputy Director of Central Intelligence				
4.				
5. Director of Central Intelligence				
6.				(b)(3)(c)
7. [redacted] Chief, East Asia Division				
8. [redacted]				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				

SUSPENSE DATE:

RETURN TO:

FORM 8-87 4283

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressio Action

C06010772

SECRET

OIS/O 0025/258-92

48-92

2 OCT 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: [redacted] (b)(3)(c)
Chief, East Asia Division

SUBJECT: Response to The Honorable Bob Smith

REFERENCE: Letter to DCI from Bob Smith, dated 10 September 1992

1. Action Requested: That you sign the attached letter to Senator Bob Smith, and a copy for Senator John Kerry, in response to Senator Smith's letter to you dated 10 September 1992.

2. Background: While the Agency continues to be complimented by members of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA affairs, and committee investigators have been gracious in their praise of our prompt and in-depth responses to formal and informal queries, Senator Smith has now requested access to a growing number of operational files and a variety of executive level publications. We have complied with almost every request and have granted committee investigators sweeping access to unvarnished operational file holdings. I believe, however, that it is imperative at this point to reiterate to Senator Smith the DCI's responsibility to protect sources and methods and to deny further unrestricted access to operational files. This position is consistent with your 24 July 1992 letter to Senator John F. Kerry, and in no way impedes ongoing committee investigations.

3. Recommendation: I recommend that you sign the attached letter to Senator Smith, as well as the copy for Senator Kerry.

[redacted]
/s/ Floyd L. Paseman
(b)(3)(c)

(b)(3)(c)
Attachment:
As stated

[redacted]

[redacted]

SECRET

SUBJECT: Response to The Honorable Bob Smith

C/EA/ICOG:LSHarrison:mev [ ] (28 September 1992)



(b)(3)(c)

C06010772

ATTACHMENT

C06010772

ATTACHMENT

Form 8-66 163a

REFERENCE

C06010772

C06010772

(b)(1)
(b)(5)
(b)(3)(n)

SECRET



SECRET

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SECRET



SECRET

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

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(b)(5)

SECRET

C06010772

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)



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(b)(3)(n)



C06010772

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

C06010772

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)

[redacted]

C06010772

SECRET

1 July 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: AC/EA/ICOG

FROM: C/EA/ICOGPOW

SUBJECT: Our POW/MIA File Holdings

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

1. We have 39 sequentially numbered volumes of files, dating from 1967 comprising about 4.5 (For some unknown reason, there is no material for the period from though no sequentially numbered file is missing.) These are the chronological files containing all the POW/MIA traffic from and it is these files that Bob Taylor has twice expressed an interest in examining in toto, or at least looking through. He feels he will find in them some leads which he can explore with us and other agencies, such as references to sightings, intercepts, and other "evidence" of POW's. I have no objection to his seeing them, though that is a policy decision. I do not feel there is anything embarrassing to the Agency in them. To the contrary: they show how much effort has been expended by Agency officers over the years in running down every lead to POW/MIA information. One thing they show convincingly is that the Agency never "covered up" any information on POW's or MIA's.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

2. Also in the category of operational files are our volumes of files, which Bob Taylor has already examined, and two soft files (plus some photos) on the loss of Site 85 in Laos. The Site 85 files contain a few somewhat sensitive items, but they can be examined if necessary. In fact we had expected the Committee to be asking us about Site 85, but so far they have not done so.

(b)(1)
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(3)(n)

SECRET

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)
(b)(5)
(b)(6)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(1)
(b)(6)
(b)(3)(n)

4. In our move up here, our office also inherited a number of sensitive files, such as [redacted] files on the last days of the Saigon and Vientiane Stations, and individual files on Agency employees who were imprisoned and/or died in Vietnam. I believe these files should definitely be considered internal and privileged Agency information.

(7)

5. [redacted]

(7)

6. We also have a number of other files, such as "Casualties in Southeast Asia", listing losses of Air America, Continental and Bird Air. The Committee can see those. We have also created a number of our own internal Branch files since our Branch was created in December. I don't feel those should be shown to the Committee, since they concern our work, and do not constitute information on POW's as such. [redacted] The only soft file which might contain critical remarks about the Committee is our CDO (DoD Central Documentation Office) file, specifically my reports on the CDO weekly meetings. In the course of our work we have also opened some soft files on individuals we have had correspondence on, such as Michel Honorin and Ernest Labounty, but there is nothing in those files that the Committee cannot see. In fact such files show how conscientiously we have pursued every potential source of POW/MIA information.

(7)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

(b)(3)(c) [redacted]

C06010772

S E C R E T

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

ICOG SPOT REPORT -- 16 September 1992

Bob Taylor, the Senate Select Committee investigator who has concentrated on the [redacted] operation, described plans for the forthcoming Committee hearings on [redacted] when he visited Headquarters on 16 September.

Four days of Committee hearings in mid-October will start with a two-day open hearing with DIA on ground symbols and imagery. A separate day (tentatively set for 14 October) will be devoted to [redacted] The morning session will be open, to discuss the intelligence reporting which led to the operation. For this session Taylor requested a sanitized description of [redacted] and an unclassified summary of the information she provided. The open session will also include declassified line drawings of overhead imagery. The afternoon session will be closed, as it will cover operational aspects. [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(n)

[redacted]

possibly former National Security Advisor Richard Allen.

[redacted]

Taylor also mentioned that Committee Vice Chairman Senator Smith had written the Director to ask (again) that CIA open its operational files to perusal by Committee staffers. We expressed the belief that some mutually satisfactory solution could be worked out.

(b)(1)
(b)(5)
(b)(3)(n)

S E C R E T

C06010772

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

8 MAR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James D. Rosenthal
Director, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Department of State

Mr. Frank A. Sieverts
Deputy Coordinator for Prisoner of War and
Missing in Action Matters
Department of State

Bruce L. Heller
Commander, USN (R)
Chief, Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Branch
Resources and Installations Division
Directorate for Intelligence (Research Center)
Defense Intelligence Agency

FROM : [redacted] (b)(3)(c)
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Comment by [redacted] Possibility of U.S. Prisoners Being Held by the SRV for Use in Negotiations on Aid from the U.S. for the SRV

Attached as of possible interest to you is a report [redacted] in early March 1977. We are giving this report no further dissemination.

[redacted]

Attachment:
Report as Stated

DISSEMINATION AND [illegible]
ORIGINATOR

C06010772

(b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

COUNTRY: Vietnam

DOI : Late February 1977

SUBJECT:

U.S. Prisoners Being Held by the SRV for Use in Negotiations on Aid from the U.S. for the SRV

(b)(3)(n)

[redacted] said that Hanoi naturally knows where U.S. pilots shot down over North Vietnam are buried. In response to a statement that the SRV no longer has any Americans still under detention, the [redacted] demurred and said that there are American prisoners of war (POW's), some of whom are members of wealthy families, still in the SRV and they would not be released until U.S. financial aid for the SRV was forthcoming. [redacted]

2. The [redacted] indicated that the information on MIA's was one trump card the SRV held in the forthcoming negotiations with the U.S. and explained that the SRV, as the victor in the Vietnam war, would take advantage of this situation in negotiating with the U.S. for aid in economic reconstruction. He said that some wealthy prominent American families had been in direct contact with Hanoi in an effort to acquire information about family members who were MIA's.

However, the SRV had not released such information on the assumption that more could be gained by the SRV economically by awaiting the opening of formal negotiations with the U.S. Government.

C06010772

1-2023

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

11 MAR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James D. Rosenthal
Director, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Department of State

Mr. Frank A. Sieverts
Deputy Coordinator for Prisoner of War
and Missing in Action Matters
Department of State

(b)(3)(c) Bruce L. Heller, Commander, USN (R)
Chief, Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Branch
Resources and Installations Division
Directorate for Intelligence (Research Center)
Defense Intelligence Agency

FROM: [redacted]
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Comments on
Relations with the United States and the
Presence of Americans in the SRV

The attached report, which is of possible interest to you, was obtained March 1977. We are giving this information no further dissemination.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 1 MAY 2023

[redacted]

cc: [redacted]

C06010772

(b)(3)(n)



(b)(3)(n)



C06010772

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Vice Director for Collection
Management
Department of Defense
Principal Advisor for Prisoner of War
Missing in Action Affairs
(International Security Affairs)
Director, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT : Comments of Indonesian Ambassador to Hanoi on American Prisoners of War Remaining in Vietnam

NO HARD COPY FOLLOWS

Attached is a notice to recall the report bearing this title and number.

(b)(3)(c)

John H. Stein
Deputy Director for Operations

C06010772

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Comments of [redacted] on American Prisoners of War Remaining in Vietnam

(b)(3)(n) (b)(3)(c)

On 16 March 1977 a memorandum report bearing the above subject and the number [redacted] was disseminated. It has been subsequently learned that the source, who was described as "a generally reliable source with excellent access to high-level [redacted] officials," has provided fabricated information, and the then [redacted] has said that he never received any information while in [redacted] (1976 - 80) that live U.S. prisoners of war were being held by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Government. Therefore, the information in the memorandum should be disregarded and all references to the report should be removed from computer listings and file holdings.

[redacted] (b)(3)(c)

C06010772

1-2024

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

16 MAR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James D. Rosenthal
Director, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Department of State

Mr. Frank A. Sieverts
Deputy Coordinator for Prisoner of War
and Missing in Action Matters
Department of State

(b)(6) [redacted] Commander, USN (R[redacted]
Chief, Prisoner of War/Missing in A[redacted] Branch
Resources and Installations Division
Directorate for Intelligence (Research Center)

Raymond Vohden, Captain, USN
Principal Advisor for Prisoner of War and
(b)(3)(c) Missing in Action Affairs
(International Security Affairs)
Office of the Secretary of Defense

FROM : [redacted]
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Comments
on American Prisoners of War Remaining in
Vietnam

Attached as of possible interest to you is a report resulting from information obtained late January 1977. We are giving this report no further dissemination.

[redacted]

[redacted]

1-2024

SOLUTION

C06010772

[redacted] (b)(3)(c)

COUNTRY: Vietnam

DOI : January 1977

SUBJECT: Comments on
American Prisoners of War Remaining in Vietnam

ACQ :

SOURCE :

1. [redacted] there were American prisoners of war (POW's) still remaining in Vietnam and that these POW's posed a problem to the opening of diplomatic relations between the SRV and the United States (U.S.). these POW's included some who did not want to return to the U.S.

2. Comment: Other than one American civilian who was arrested in Saigon after its fall in 1975, the SRV is not known to have any live American military or civilian prisoners. Nevertheless, several unconfirmed reports have appeared since May 1975 on the possibility of some U.S. prisoners still remaining in Vietnam.)

C06010772

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

8 MAR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James D. Rosenthal
Director, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Department of State

Mr. Frank A. Sieverts
Deputy Coordinator for Prisoner of War and
Missing in Action Matters
Department of State

Bruce L. Heller
Commander, USN (R)
Chief, Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Branch
Resources and Installations Division
Directorate for Intelligence (Research Center)
Defense Intelligence Agency

FROM : [redacted] (b)(3)(c)
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Comment by [redacted] Possibility of U.S. Prisoners Being Held by the SRV for Use in Negotiations on Aid from the U.S. for the SRV

Attached as of possible interest to you is a report [redacted] in early March 1977. We are giving this report no further dissemination.

[redacted]

[redacted]

DISSEMINATION AND [illegible]
ORIGINATOR

C06010772

(b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

COUNTRY: Vietnam

DOI : Late February 1977

SUBJECT:

U.S. Prisoners Being Held by the SRV for Use in Negotiations on Aid from the U.S. for the SRV

(b)(3)(n)

[redacted] said that Hanoi naturally knows where U.S. pilots shot down over North Vietnam are buried. In response to a statement that the SRV no longer has any Americans still under detention, the [redacted] demurred and said that there are American prisoners of war (POW's), some of whom are members of wealthy families, still in the SRV and they would not be released until U.S. financial aid for the SRV was forthcoming. [redacted]

[redacted]

2. The [redacted] indicated that the information on MIA's was one trump card the SRV held in the forthcoming negotiations with the U.S. and explained that the SRV, as the victor in the Vietnam war, would take advantage of this situation in negotiating with the U.S. for aid in economic reconstruction. He said that some wealthy prominent American families had been in direct contact with Hanoi in an effort to acquire information about family members who were MIA's.

However, the SRV had not released such information on the assumption that more could be gained by the SRV economically by awaiting the opening of formal negotiations with the U.S. Government.

C06010772

1-2023

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

11 MAR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James D. Rosenthal
Director, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Department of State

Mr. Frank A. Sieverts
Deputy Coordinator for Prisoner of War
and Missing in Action Matters
Department of State

Bruce L. Heller, Commander, USN (R)
Chief, Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Branch
Resources and Installations Division
Directorate for Intelligence (Research Center)
Defense Intelligence Agency

FROM: [redacted]
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Comments on (b)(3)(c)
Relations with the United States and the
Presence of Americans in the SRV

1. The attached report, which is of possible interest to you, was obtained [redacted] March 1977. We are giving this information no further dissemination.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
[redacted]
MAY 2001

[redacted]
ZIA-31770159-77

cc: [redacted]

C06010772

(b)(3)(c)
(b)(3)(n)



C06010772

(b)(3)(n)





C06010772

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Vice Director for Collection
Management
Department of Defense
Principal Advisor for Prisoner of War
Missing in Action Affairs
(International Security Affairs)
Director, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT : Comments of Indonesian Ambassador to Hanoi on American Prisoners of War Remaining in Vietnam

NO HARD COPY FOLLOWS

Attached is a notice to recall the report bearing this title and number.

(b)(3)(c)

John H. Stein
Deputy Director for Operations

C06010772

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Comments of [redacted] on American Prisoners of War Remaining in Vietnam

(b)(3)(n) (b)(3)(c)

On 16 March 1977 a memorandum report bearing the above subject and the number [redacted] was disseminated. It has been subsequently learned that the source, who was described as "a generally reliable source with excellent access to high-level [redacted] officials," has provided fabricated information, and the then [redacted] has said that he never received any information while in [redacted] that live U.S. prisoners of war were being held by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Government. Therefore, the information in the memorandum should be disregarded and all references to the report should be removed from computer listings and file holdings.

[redacted] (b)(3)(c)

C06010772

1-2024

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James D. Rosenthal
Director, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Department of State

16 MAR 1977

(b)(6)

Mr. Frank A. Sieverts
Deputy Coordinator for Prisoner of War
and Missing in Action Matters
Department of State

Bruce L. Heller, Commander, USN
Chief, Prisoner of War/Missing in
Resources and Installations Divisi
Directorate for Intelligence (Research Center)

Raymond Vohden, Captain, USN
Principal Advisor for Prisoner of War and
Missing in Action Affairs
(International Security Affairs)
Office of the Secretary of Defense

FROM :

(b)(3)(c) Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Comments
on American Prisoners of War Remaining in
Vietnam

Attached as of possible interest to you is a report resulting from information obtained late January 1977. We are giving this report no further dissemination.

cc:

1-2024

C06010772.

[redacted] (b)(3)(c)

COUNTRY: Vietnam

DOI : January 1977

SUBJECT: Comments on American Prisoners of War Remaining in Vietnam

ACQ :

SOURCE :

1. [redacted] there were American prisoners of war (POW's) still remaining in Vietnam and that these POW's posed a problem to the opening of diplomatic relations between the SRV and the United States (U.S.). [redacted] these POW's included some who did not want to return to the U.S.

2. Comment: Other than one American civilian who was arrested in Saigon after its fall in 1975, the SRV is not known to have any live American military or civilian prisoners. Nevertheless, several unconfirmed reports have appeared since May 1975 on the possibility of some U.S. prisoners still remaining in Vietnam.)

C06010784

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OCA 0244-92

31 January 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Staff Briefing, Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs

1. On the afternoon of 28 January 1992 in Hart 211 Jim Anders, C/ICOG, and the undersigned met with Frances Zwenig, Committee Staff Director, Dino Carluccio, Deputy Staff Director, and Committee Counsel, Bill Codinha, to review the status of Committee requests. Blythe Thomas from the SSCI staff, who carries the POW/MIA portfolio for that committee, also attended.

2. Ms. Zwenig opened the session by asking if a portion of a 1987 SNIE on POW/MIAs addressing the issue of French POWs on Indochina could be declassified for Committee use. (Approval for this declassification was obtained the following day. Copy attached). She then outlined the status of the Committee's anticipated travel to Southeast Asia saying that it appeared likely that the trip, scheduled to commence on 7 February, may well be postponed. Magner asked to be informed immediately of any decision because we would be informing [redacted] to travel to Bangkok to meet with the Committee as discussed with the DDO by Senator Kerry the previous week. (b)(3)(c)

3. The meeting then turned to a review of the three letters recently sent by the Committee to the Agency requesting detained information and briefings on Vietnam and [redacted] Anders explained that some of these requests were duplicative to earlier requests, covered areas more appropriately dealt with by DIA or represented areas where the Agency had few holdings. The three memos were reviewed point by point and the Committee was advised what we could and could not answer, and a mutually satisfactory arrangement on providing the responses was reached. Anders made the point that it would be especially useful to know what the Committee was looking for in a particular piece of correspondence and that it would be helpful to work with the Committee staff in framing questions. The staff also made the point that it was tasking several agencies on the same issues and was not interested in coordinated responses, but the responses of individual agencies even if thin or incomplete. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n) (b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

LOGGED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SUBJECT: Staff Briefing, Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs~~

4. The staff also asked about the status of our response to earlier letters. Magner explained that the responses had been provided to Senate Security more than a week earlier (a point confirmed with Senate Security later and the Committee so advised). The staff then asked that we provide copies of the reporting [redacted] requested. It was agreed that an ICOG officer would bring the reports in question to S-407 for Committee staff review and then return them to the Agency [redacted] Zwenig said that Bill Taylor of the staff had been selected to review those files. (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)

5. Carluccio at the end of the meeting asked about three specific reports on Laos. Later that day he phoned the numbers to Magner. Insofar as he identified them by date time groups rather than [redacted] number, Magner asked where the information had been obtained. Carluccio indicated that the data had come from the Air Force but would not go further. It is possible that just as the Committee has been seeking to obtain NSA material from the Air Force, it may also be seeking to get around the third agency rule with regard to Agency material as well.

[redacted]

Robert W. Magner
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs
Office of Congressional Affairs

(b)(3)(c)

Attachment

[redacted]

C06010784

Declassified for DSWMIA
29 Jan 92

ANNEX B

The French Experience

In more than three decades since the end of the first Indochina war, the French Government has yet to receive a full accounting for its missing servicemen. (c)

By 9 September 1954, the deadline for release of all prisoners of war under the Geneva Agreements, the Vietnamese Communists had returned about one-third of the prisoners listed by the French. By May 1955, when the last French forces pulled out of North Vietnam, the number of men from the French Expeditionary Corps listed as "missing or failed to return from captivity" totaled 8,746, of whom 2,995 were French nationals. (c)

When accused of withholding prisoners, the Hanoi government subsequently asserted that it had released all POWs in accordance with the Geneva Agreements, and that any missing personnel whom they had not listed as having "rallied" to their side should be considered as killed in action or dead from wounds. In 1955-56, under the supervision of the International Control Commission (ICC), Hanoi released a total of 450 non-French soldiers of the Foreign Legion for repatriation to Central and Eastern Europe. Reliable Western observers in Vietnam during this period said that hundreds more legionnaires were released via China without the required notice to the ICC or the French Command. Later, during the 1960 and early 1970s, the Hanoi government repatriated hundreds of non-French personnel to their native countries as a result of actions initiated by their embassies, without informing the French authorities or the ICC. There are indications that some of these persons may not have been in Vietnam on their own volition. (c)

Most of those not repatriated prior to the September 1954 deadline were not French nationals from Metropolitan France but were East Europeans, North Africans, and other nationalities who had served in the French Expeditionary Corps. The only French nationals who are known to have been returned to French authorities after 1954 were 40 enlisted men released in 1962 and flown to France with their Vietnamese families. Some if not all reportedly were tried as deserters in France. (c)

In June 1971, responding to a question in the National Assembly, the French Foreign Minister asserted that to the government's knowledge no French POWs were held in North Vietnam after the execution of the Geneva Accords in 1954, and that no members of the French Far East Expeditionary Corps were being held against their will in 1971. (c)

The Remains Issue

While the French Government apparently is satisfied that all French prisoners were released at the end of the Indochina war, it is clear that the Hanoi government did not honor the terms of the Geneva Agreement to account for all French troops who were under Vietnamese control after the end of the war. (c)

The remains of over 22,000 French nationals and legionnaires were initially buried in Vietnam. In February 1955, the French High Command and the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) signed a graves agreement to establish protocols for repatriation of the remains of men who had fallen on both sides in the conflict. They were to take "all necessary measures" to complete the task by 1 July 1956—17 months after signature of the agreement. In the following 21 years, as of February 1976, the Vietnamese returned to France fewer than 1,500 sets of remains. All of the remains released by Hanoi had been buried by the French in military cemeteries in North Vietnam. Hanoi has not returned the remains of any of the men listed by the French as missing in action or as having died in captivity. Despite the substantial political and economic concessions the French have made to Hanoi since 1954, France has never received a full accounting for its missing and dead. (c)

In contrast, in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, where the host governments cooperated with the French, the French Graves Service was able to reinter in the French cemetery at Tan Son Nhut, Saigon, the remains of virtually all French military personnel who had died in those countries. (c)

In August 1986 Paris and Hanoi reached an agreement concerning the repatriation of the remains of an estimated 25,000 French soldiers killed during the first Indochina war. The operation is expected to take two years, with the costs, estimated at $2.5 million, being borne by France. (c)

ANNEX B

The French Experience

In more than three decades since the end of the first Indochina war, the French Government has yet to receive a full accounting for its missing servicemen.

By 9 September 1954, the deadline for release of all prisoners of war under the Geneva Agreements, the Vietnamese Communists had returned about one-third of the prisoners listed by the French. By May 1955, when the last French forces pulled out of North Vietnam, the number of men from the French Expeditionary Corps listed as "missing or failed to return from captivity" totaled 8,746, of whom 2,995 were French nationals.

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The Remains Issue

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In August 1986 Paris and Hanoi reached an agreement concerning the repatriation of the remains of an estimated 25,000 French soldiers killed during the first Indochina war. The operation is expected to take two years, with the costs, estimated at $2.5 million, being borne by France.

C06010785

OCA 0205-92
24 January 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing for POW/MIA Committee Staff Member [redacted] by [redacted] re His Forthcoming Article

1. At 1400 hours on 24 January 1992 [redacted] met with [redacted] Investigator for the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. [redacted] has written a draft article for publication in the press on the POW issue. As a courtesy, the Committee was provided an advance copy on 23 January. This led to the request to meet with [redacted] The article recounts the story of three Americans who were held by the Vietnamese after the fall of Saigon and the end of the war. It reviews this issue in the context of claims by Oleg Kalugin that the Soviets interrogated American POWs in Vietnam as late as 1978.

(b)(6)

2. [redacted] opened the meeting by reviewing Kalugin's recent testimony before the committee offering his own comments that Kalugin was most credible and that he, [redacted] believed him. [redacted] summarized his article, stressed that essentially all he knew as in the text. He did not know who Kalugin was talking about but allowed that any one of the three individuals cited in his article could have been involved although the time frame was wrong. [redacted] asked for specifics on the return of the remains of Tucker Gouggleman. [redacted] said that he believed that they were returned in 1977 and was not aware of any controversy over whether or not the remains were genuine. [redacted] offered his opinion that if there were three individuals in Vietnam--whether POWs or not--it suggested that the Vietnamese were not completely forthcoming and that the issue needed to be pressed. He also recounted his own relationship with [redacted] and the latters keen interest in the issue, particularly the status of [redacted]

3. [redacted] did not probe and seemed primarily interested in a simple reconfirmation by Beck of the statements in his article. [redacted] made it very clear that he believed that there were as many as 60 POWs held by the Vietnamese after 1973, that they were interrogated by the Soviets and did not return to the United States. [redacted] also said that he believes that [redacted] was a very good witness, was highly believable but that [redacted] was less credible because of his claims that there were up to 1,600 POWs held after 1973.

DECLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Briefing for POW/MIA Committee Staff Member by [redacted] re His Forthcoming Article

(b)(6)

4. [redacted] asked [redacted] about a number of individuals that could be mutual acquaintances from their mutual service in Vietnam prior to 1975. [redacted] had only vague recollections. This did not appear to be investigative probing but simply and effort to establish some mutual ground. [redacted] seemed satisfied with the discussion and did not indicate any further interest in talking with [redacted] The meeting ended after about 35 minutes with no followup. On departing [redacted] who has been working for the Committee for only four days, said that there were some 10 investigators on the Committee together with six professional staff. His qualifications would appear to stem from his role as DAO in Saigon after the close out of MACV in 1973.

[redacted]

Robert W. Magner
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs
Office of Congressional Affairs

[redacted]

(b)(3)(c)