

FBI TAKE FROM 0907 SEPT 2 TO 0900 SEPT 5

FILE: 0084-0-01

SUMMARY:

1. MOSCOW 31/8 - SCHCHEDROV REPORT
2. MOSCOW 30/8 - ARTICLE BY SOVIET CORRESPONDENT KONSTANTIN ATIMONIV--
PHONETIC
3. NCNA 4/9 - LAOTIAN RADIO EXPOSES KONG LE'S CONSPIRACY WITH U.S.
AND LAOTIAN RIGHTWING TROOPS

1. MOSCOW 31 ^{AUG} 66

(Report by IVAN SCHCHEDROV, Pravda's special correspondent), Dear listeners, the United States has always refused to admit that U.S. military forces have participated in the military operations in Laos. Even the white House and pentagon have stated that such an accusation does not conform to the truth. They say that U.S. planes are merely conducting observation flights in the Western part of central and Southern Laos. White House spokesman MCCLOSKEY said He was not aware of U.S. airstrikes against the territories of Laos. The leaders of the rightist faction--the pro-American faction in Laos--have even congratulated Washington for this sort of statement.

For example, Thao MA, commander in Chief of the Air Force of the reactionary rightist faction, said that only his planes have bombed the liberated areas, while U.S. planes have merely conducted observation flights. As for Prince PHOUA, Premier of the National Coalition Government, He said that He and his government have not appealed to the United States to stop its air activities against the Pathet Lao and neutralist forces. The truth is that from May, 1964 to the present, the United States has carried out armed intervention in the affairs of Laos aimed at transforming Laos into a war-front and a third strategic military base in the Indochinese peninsula after South Vietnam and the DRV. As in South Vietnam, U.S. armed intervention in Laos is designed to destroy the patriotic forces and to set up a base of operations and strategic positions in Laos so as to foment war against the Laotian Nation.

Recently, we had a talk with a skinny, tall American named [redacted] (Phonetic), a talk that lasted 24 hours. He said: in July 1965, acting on the orders of the U.S. air force, He took off with a squadron of jet bombers bearing the marks of the U.S. airforce from Takhli airbase on a bombing mission. On the map, the bombing targets were marked Northern Laos and Sam Neua province. Before taking off, He learned that President JOHNSON had personally ordered the air attack. After a few days, the U.S. 23rd squadron received orders to bomb and strafe the territories of the DRV. During his fourth flight, pilot [redacted] (Phonetic) did not RPT not return to his base. His F-25 F-105 bearing the number [redacted] was shot down near Namoi. He was arrested. He recognized his mistake and that he had been forced to participate in this war of banditry. The plane of American pilot [redacted] (PHONETIC) was shot down on 6 June 1964 near Xieng Khoang in the Plaine des Jarres region. This pilot said he had received orders from

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his high command to bomb and destroy the various military units of the Patriotic Forces. This pilot wrote a letter which he signed himself [redacted] There were several documents belonging to another American pilot [redacted] (Phonetic) whose plane was shot down on 18 May 1965 in Sam Neua province. 41 no

Another pilot named DAVID LEWIS HRDLICKA arrived at Ta Khli air base with his comrades in April 1965. After having bombed with his comrades the road and bridges and the various installations in the liberated areas of Laos, he received new orders to bomb the (Thinh Doc May--Phonetic) region in Thong Saly province, Northern Laos. He had contacts with a West German pilot whose plane was shot down in Northern Laos during the month of May (? 1965). This German pilot admitted that the bombing of peaceful villages of Laos was carried out in response to the orders of the U.S. command. 5 yes

All the aforementioned proofs and documents were seized from pilot [redacted] (Phonetic), [redacted] whose plane was shot down in October 1965 in Northern Laos. from another U.S. pilot named [redacted] (Phonetic), [redacted] and from some other pilots. 6 yes

2. OSCW 30 AUG 66 7 no

A Soviet Journalist named (KONSTANTIN ATIONIVJEA --Phonetic) recently returned from a visit to the countries in the Indochinese Peninsula. (words indistinct) he wrote several articles including one dealing with his visit to Laos. The following is what he wrote about his visit to Laos: 8 no

The Laotian people are a persevering and hardworking people who have self-respect and want to enjoy an easy life. I visited the cities and villages and the countryside. I saw gardens planted with coffee and tea. All gardens and plantations are well guarded. However, during the visit I was able to see that the Laotian people have been unable to enjoy a peaceful and happy life, in Laos, it is rare to find a village which has not been bombed and burned. Planes have come daily to bomb and strafe the houses and villages of the inhabitants, causing heavy material loss to the population one can clearly see the distinguishing marks of the intruding planes showing that these planes belong to the U.S. air force.

In Laos, the Americans have sought every means to hide themselves from the public, just as they have been doing in Thailand. One rarely sees U.S. militarymen on the roads and streets of the cities; they are nearly invisible. However, everyone is aware of their presence and their plans. In the airfields, U.S. planes are well camouflaged and kept from view. The Laotian people cannot see these planes. But it is impossible to camouflage the flights of these planes which take off daily from the airfields.

During the visit, I learned that a number of village youths living nearby had been recruited by the Americans to work in the airfields. Two Laotian youths who had worked for some time at Pakse airfield were asked to load bombs onto a U.S. plane. Later this plane took off in an unknown direction. After work, the two youths returned to their village close to the airfield. They saw that the same plane, flying at a low altitude, bombed and strafed their village and then disappeared. They were frightened. Like many other Laotian youths, they were able to realize that the Americans have carried out cruel and criminal acts against the Laotian nation and people.

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These two youths left their village to take up arms in the forest in order to safeguard the territorial integrity of their fatherland.

During my visit to Laos, I learned of an incident involving the Americans. Some time ago, a Jeep carrying many American was fired at as it was passing through a village. Following this incident, all Americans received orders to shoot at any suspicious persons loitering on the roads. The chief of that village told me that he had fought side by side with the guerrillas against the Americans who entered his village. He said: "Now the Americans dare not enter the village." I met him in Luang Prabang and we had a long talk. This man is fully aware of the U.S. aggression in Laos. He is also aware of the dangerous consequences if the Americans intensify their war of aggression against Laos.

I asked him the following question: "Why is there no reconciliation among the three important forces of the country, that is, the patriotic forces, the forces of the rightist faction, and the neutralist forces when they are fully aware that the most important problem is to build a peaceful, neutral, and prosperous Laos, a problem mentioned in the common declaration of the three parties at the time of the formation of the tripartite national coalition government?"

In reply, he said: "I know that this is the first and most important condition for checking U.S. aggression and intervention. Unfortunately, there are people in the rightist faction who are collaborating with the Americans and who only see their own interests and not the interests of the nation and people. These reactionaries only want Laos to become a U.S. base for aggression. And they want the Americans to enslave the Laotian people and to restore a colonialist regime in the country. These reactionaries of the rightist faction have received considerable economic aid from the Americans. They have not used this aid for the benefit of the nation and people as they promised in the past.

"The Americans have also given much money to feed the traitors of the nation and people, especially to PHOU MI NOSAVAN who was sentenced to death following his abortive coup d'etat. People say that (words indistinct) spent much money for the construction of a large villa as a summer resort for PHOU MI NOSAVAN in Song Kla in Southern Thailand. Everyone knows that PHOU MI NOSAVAN has kept in close contact with his subordinates in carrying out acts of sabotage against the Laotian nation. At present, the Americans and their lackeys are seeking a favorable occasion to carry out a new war plan against Laos."

3. PEKING MCVA 4 SEPT 66

"The voice of Laos" in a recent commentary revealed that KONG LE is plotting further concerted action with the U.S. and the Laotian rightwing troops and making intensive preparations to attack the Laotian liberated areas.

KONGLE and Prince SOUVANNA PHOUMA lately moved several battalions from Vang Vieng to Muong Hin, and secretly allowed (words indistinct) the Laotian rightwing troops to enter the Muong Hin area, said the radio. KONG LE's troops collaborated with the rightwing troops in attacking the liberated areas in the Southeastern part of Xieng Khouang province and in the nearby regions. Their special agents have infiltrated into the liberated areas for

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subversive and harassing puproses.

KONG LE and Prince PHOUA connived at the extensive bombings of the Laotian liberated areas by U.S. marauding planes, the radio continued. In Luong Hin, U.S. and Thai officers were training and directing KONG LE's troops, there were now 30 U.S. advisers there. Thailand's artillery has been augmented from one to three battalions.

(Words indistinct) warned KONG LE and Prince PHOUA against their new large scale attacks on the Laotian liberated areas and demanded (word indistinct) end to all attacks.

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JBIS 18

RELEASED POW'S LETTER

LIBERATION RADIO (CLANDESTINE) IN VIETNAMESE TO SOUTH VIETNAM 1300 GMT
18 NOV 69 S

(TEXT) ON 25 OCTOBER 1969, THE CENTRAL TRUNG BO NFLSV COMMITTEE RELEASED THREE U.S. POW'S SO THAT THEY MIGHT RETURN HOME TO REUNITE WITH THEIR FAMILIES. AFTER BEING RELEASED THEY EXPRESSED THESE IMPRESSIONS ON THE UNSWERVING LENIENT AND HUMANE POLICY TOWARD POW'S AND SURRENDERERS BY THE NFLSV AND THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM (READ BY ANNOUNCER--ED):

WE ARE THREE U.S. POW'S.

THE THREE OF US WERE CAPTURED BY THE PLAF DURING VARIOUS BATTLES IN SOUTH VIETNAM. DURING NEARLY 2 YEARS IN CAPTIVITY, OTHER POW'S AND WE ALL LONGED FOR PEACE, EXPECTING THE WAR TO END SOON, BUT WE BECAME MORE AND MORE DEPRESSED SEEING THAT OUR GOVERNMENT LET IT DRAG ON UNREMITTINGLY WITH INCREASING LOSSES IN LIVES OF U.S. YOUTHS.

WE EAGERLY WAITED FOR PEACE SO THAT WE MIGHT SEE OUR FAMILIES AND LOVED ONES AGAIN. WE STILL REMEMBER THE DAYS WHEN WE FRESHLY ARRIVED IN VIETNAM WITH THE THOUGHT THAT WE CAME TO HELP THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AT THEIR REQUEST AND WOULD RETURN HOME SAFELY AT THE END OF 1 YEAR'S SERVICE.

BUT, AFTER A SHORT STAY IN VIETNAM, THROUGH MILITARY OPERATIONS CONDUCTED IN SWAMPY AREAS, CONSTANTLY REMEMBERING OUR RELATIVES AND FRIENDS AND LIVING UNDER THE THREAT OF DEATH, AND WITNESSING OUR COMRADES IN ARMS DIE BESIDE US, WE STOPPED, MEDITATED, AND WONDERED WHETHER WE COULD PROMPTLY RETURN HOME OR WOULD MEET A SLOW AND PAINFUL DEATH OR A QUICK AND EASY ONE IN THE JUNGLE AS FAR FROM OUR COUNTRY AS HALF THE CIRCUMFERENCE OF THE EARTH. WE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEE THE PEOPLE, WHOM WE PRETENDED TO HELP, FLEE WHEN WE CAME TO THEM OR WHEN WE PASSED BY THEM. WE COULD SEE IN THEIR EYES THEIR HATRED AND BITTERNESS TOWARD US.

WE WONDERED WHETHER THEY--THESE PEOPLE WHOSE HOMES AND PROPERTY ARE BEING DESTROYED BY OUR BOMBS AND BULLETS--MIGHT HAVE WANTED US TO COME HERE. REALITIES ABOUT THE WAR HAD BEEN COMPLETELY CONCEALED UNTIL OUR CAPTURE. SINCE OUR CAPTURE, WE WERE NOT TORTURED OR BEATEN, AS HAD BEEN SAID. WE WERE KINDLY TREATED. WE WERE FED AND ADEQUATELY PROVIDED WITH CLOTHES AND OTHER NECESSITIES. OUR BELIEFS WERE RESPECTED. WE WERE ALLOWED TO ORGANIZE OUR HOLIDAYS.

WE WERE ALLOWED TO KEEP OUR BELONGINGS AND MILITARY UNIFORMS. ONE OF US SUFFERED VERY SERIOUS WOUNDS IN HIS ARM AND SHOULDER. THE BONE WAS BROKEN IN TWO PLACES AND WE THOUGHT HE WOULD DIE OF PAIN.

BUT THANKS TO THE DEVOTED TREATMENT BY DOCTORS AND TO THE ADEQUATE SUPPLY OF MEDICINES BY THE NFLSV, THE WOUNDS WERE CURED AND ARE NOW COMPLETELY HEALED. HE WAS EVEN GIVEN PLASMA SHOTS WHICH ARE VERY EXPENSIVE AND BADLY NEEDED BY THEIR WOUNDED. WE WERE VERY SURPRISED AT AND ADMIRERED THEIR HUMANITARIAN DEED.

WE BEGAN TO SEEK TO UNDERSTAND THEM. THROUGH OUR CONTACTS WITH THEM, WE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE VIETCONG ARE NOT CRUEL REBELS, AS WE HAD BEEN TOLD BY OTHER PEOPLE, BUT THAT THE NFLSV COMPRISES PATRIOTIC CITIZENS STRUGGLING FOR PEACE, INDEPENDENCE, FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY, AND REUNIFICATION OF THE FATHERLAND. THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE HAVE SET UP THEIR REVOLUTIONARY ADMINISTRATION.

(MORE)

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CIA-691118-041

THIS IS

ONLY ADD 18 (RELEASED POW'S LETTER)

XXX THEIR REVOLUTIONARY ADMINISTRATION.

(TEXT). IT IS THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM, THEIR GENUINE REPRESENTATIVE. THEY DO NOT NEED OUR AID OR OUR PRESENCE IN THEIR COUNTRY. WE HAVE COME TO VIETNAM ONLY FOR AGGRESSIVE PURPOSES AND HAVE CAUSED INTENSE SUFFERING TO THE VIETNAMESE. THE SAIGON ADMINISTRATION AND THE SO-CALLED REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES WERE SET UP BY OUR GOVERNMENT AS TOOLS FOR AGGRESSION. THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE DO NOT SUPPORT THIS REGIME, WHICH CAN RULE ONLY AT THE COST OF THE SWEAT AND BLOOD OF AMERICAN TROOPS AND PEOPLE.

THE SAIGON ARMED FORCES HAVE PROVEN VERY BAD, LACKING A FIGHTING SPIRIT AND WANTING ONLY TO STAND BEHIND US AND TO WASTE OUR MONEY. SINCE THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE IS JUST, THEY HAVE BECOME STRONGER AND STRONGER AND HAVE SCORED ONE VICTORY AFTER ANOTHER. AND THEY WILL SURELY WIN COMPLETE VICTORY.

THE WAR STARTED BY OUR GOVERNMENT IN VIETNAM HAS IMPAIRED OUR COUNTRY'S HONOR AND PRESTIGE, SINKING INTO THE MUD ALL IDEALS WHICH WE HAVE (WORDS INDISTINCT) CULTIVATED. OUR STAND ON PEACE AND FREEDOM IN THE WORLD HAS DISINTEGRATED BECAUSE OF THE VIETNAM WAR. AMERICANS HAVE SUFFERED FROM THE USELESS LOSS OF THEIR HUSBANDS, FATHERS, SONS, AND BROTHERS. U.S. YOUTHS HAVE BECOME CRIPPLED FOR LIFE. IN SUCH A SITUATION, THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN COMPELLED TO RESORT TO INFLATION AND TAX INCREASES TO SUPPORT THE VIETNAM WAR. WE HAVE SUSTAINED SETBACKS IN EVERY FIELD IN THIS WAR AND WE WILL FAIL COMPLETELY.

BUT THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION STILL WANTS TO CONTINUE USING THE LIVES OF U.S. TROOPS TO PROLONG THE WAR HOPELESSLY AND FREELY. HOWEVER, WE CAN END THIS WAR. PLEASE DO NOT DELAY YOUR REPATRIATION. ORGANIZE YOURSELVES AND UNITE IN DEMANDING AN END TO THE WAR AND YOUR REPATRIATION, THE SOONER THE BETTER. THERE CAN BE NO CHANCE FOR U.S. GENERALS AND OFFICERS TO PREVENT YOU FROM DOING SO.

FRIENDS, THIS IS THE ONLY WAY OF INSURING YOUR LIVES AND YOUR MEETING WITH YOUR RELATIVES. OUR PEOPLE AT HOME ARE STANDING ON OUR SIDE. THEY HAVE TAKEN TO THE STREETS FOR PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION, DEMANDING AN END TO THE WAR, THE RESTORATION OF PEACE, AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL U.S. TROOPS. THEIR PRESSURE IS SO STRONG THAT NIXON HAS HAD TO DEAL WITH THE U.S. TROOP PULLOUT TO APPEASE PUBLIC OPINION. NIXON CANNOT SAVE YOUR LIVES.

YOU MUST ACT TO SAVE YOURSELVES BY OPPOSING THE WAR, BY NOT TAKING PART IN RELIEF OPERATIONS, BY DEMANDING AN UNCONDITIONAL AND COMPLETE U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL, AND BY SUPPORTING THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S JUST STRUGGLE. REMAIN NEUTRAL VIS-A-VIS THEIR ACTIVITIES, DO NOT INTERFERE IN THEIR DOMESTIC AFFAIRS, DEMAND THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT ABANDON ITS SUPPORT TO THE BELLICOSE THIEU-KY-KHIEM ADMINISTRATION AND LET VIETNAMESE PEOPLE OVERTHROW IT AND REPLACE IT WITH A GENUINELY PEACEFUL CABINET WHICH WILL SERIOUSLY NEGOTIATE WITH THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM FOR A PEACE SOLUTION TO THE SOUTH VIETNAM PROBLEM.

FRIENDS, WE WERE FREED BY THE NFLSV AND BY THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT. THIS REPRESENTS A GREAT HONOR TO US AND WAS UNEXPECTED. WHILE THIS LETTER IS IN YOUR HANDS, MAYBE WE WILL BE ON OUR WAY HOME. SO, PLEASE ACCEPT OUR SINCERE STATEMENTS AND ACT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO SAVE YOURSELVES, TO FIND THE WAY OF LIFE AND OF SAFE RETURN, A WAY BETTER THAN DEATH.

(ENDALL)

19 NOV 1012Z CF/KH

0884

NND 982011 - 2500

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED](b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)28 JAN 86
[REDACTED]

Status report on [REDACTED] Lao national who
claimed to have remains of alleged American pilot [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and information on live POWS.

[REDACTED] was scheduled to meet with one of our [REDACTED] ca
20 November 1985. However, [REDACTED] never showed up for the
meeting and [REDACTED] has not been able to reestablish contact
with him. We will advise if contact is reestablished.

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~ (b)(3)
(b)(6)

POLITICAL SOLUTION BASED ON THE RIGHT STAND OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE IS THE ONLY WAY OUT".

B. A SPEECH BY PHAM VAN DONG AT THE "GRAND INDEPENDENCE DAY MEETING" PROBABLY HELD ON 31 AUGUST, IN WHICH HE REITERATES THE SAME POINT. (THE TEXT WAS DISTRIBUTED AT THE RECEPTION FOR THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS ON 1 SEPTEMBER.)

C. THE TERMS OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MFA) STATEMENT ON THE RELEASE (SEE BELOW).

3. THE "NHAN DAN" EDITORIAL ALSO REFERS TO "STAGNATION" OF THE PARIS TALKS, AND DONG IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID IN CONVERSATION WITH DIPLOMATS AT THE RECEPTION THAT THE SITUATION WAS MORE FAVORABLE TO NORTH VIETNAM THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE INDEPENDENCE.

4. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE THEREFORE BEEN AT PAINS TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE GESTURE PROCEEDS FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH, NOT WEAKNESS. THE RELEASE OF THE POWS TO A U.S. "SOCIAL ORGANIZATION" IS ALSO IN LINE WITH RUMORS OF A "GESTURE OVER THE HEAD OF PRESIDENT NIXON". IT MAY ALSO BE DESIGNED TO GIVE CREDIBILITY TO:

A. ASSURANCES SAID TO HAVE BEEN MADE TO

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

CIA-920100-643

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~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THAT POWS WOULD BE RELEASED IF A HALT WERE CALLED TO THE BOMBING OF THE NORTH, AND

B. SENATOR MCGOVERN'S 90-DAY PLAN.

5. ONLY [REDACTED] HAS BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE SERIES OF STATEMENTS WHICH POWS HAVE BEEN MAKING HERE SINCE APRIL. HE WAS ONE OF THE SIGNATORIES OF THE "MESSAGE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND U.S. CONGRESS" IN MAY, AND LATER MET THE PRESS IN HANOI WITH SEVEN OTHER CAPTURED AIRCREW MEMBERS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WAS EXHIBITED WITH 13 OTHER CAPTURED OFFICERS IN JULY, BUT MADE NO STATEMENT. [REDACTED] HAS NOT BEEN MENTIONED IN ANY CONNECTION DURING THE PAST YEAR.

6. THE MFA STATEMENT OF 2 SEPTEMBER ANNOUNCING THE RELEASE MAKES THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. THOUGH THE CAPTURED PILOTS ARE GUILTY OF CRIMES AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, NORTH VIETNAM HAS ALWAYS TREATED THEM HUMANELY;

B. ALL WOULD HAVE HAD A CHANCE OF AN EARLY RELEASE, HAD THE U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO THE PRG'S SEVEN POINTS;

C. WHILE POWS RELEASED IN 1968 HAD EXPRESSED

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

- 3 -

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~~SECRET~~

GRATITUDE FOR THEIR HUMANE TREATMENT, THOSE RELEASED IN 1969 HAD BEEN "COMPELLED" BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO "PUT FORWARD DISTORTIONS ABOUT THE HUMANE POLICY OF NORTH VIETNAM AT COMPLETE VARIANCE WITH THEIR PREVIOUS STATEMENTS". IT IS CLAIMED THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ALSO "USED THESE RELEASED PRISONERS IN WAR ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND OTHER INDO-CHINESE PEOPLES". "IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT SUCH RELEASES HAVE BEEN TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED";

D. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS EXHORTED TO "END ALL INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM", AND "IN THE INTERESTS OF THE FAMILIES OF CAPTURED PILOTS TO STOP USING THE RELEASED PILOTS TO SLANDER NORTH VIETNAM AND FURTHER THE U.S. POLICY OF AGGRESSION IN VIETNAM";

E. "TO EXPRESS SOLIDARITY WITH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WHO ARE STRUGGLING AGAINST THE U.S. 'DIRTY WAR' IN VIETNAM, NORTH VIETNAM WILL HAND OVER THE RELEASED PILOTS TO A U.S. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION ANIMATED WITH GOODWILL, A DESIRE TO BRING ABOUT AN EARLY END TO THE U.S. WAR IN VIETNAM, AND A DESIRE TO HELP THOSE RELEASED NOT TO BE USED IN ACTIVITIES AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM".

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]7 September
1992

U.S. PRISONERS IN NORTH VIETNAM

1. AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE FORTHCOMING RELEASE OF

[REDACTED]

WAS MADE BY HANOI RADIO DURING THE AFTERNOON OF NORTH VIETNAM'S NATIONAL DAY, 2 SEPTEMBER.

2. IN ASSESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS GESTURE, THE FOLLOWING NORTH VIETNAMESE PRONOUNCEMENTS SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT:

A. THE UTTERLY HARD-LINE "NHAN DAN" EDITORIAL OF 31 AUGUST HEADED "TWO KEY PROBLEMS", I.E., "ENDING OF THE U.S. WAR OF AGRESSION", AND "SECURING OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION", IN WHICH IT IS ASSERTED THAT "A

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

0034

Harriet VNA International Service in English 06/11 DXT 9 Apr 71 p

The paper quoted incomplete reports from IPA as saying that since the end of August, the liberation forces and people in the area wiped out or destroyed four battalions and 11 companies of the Saigon army main force, destroyed many pacification teams, wiping out or capturing nearly 4,000 enemy troops including over 100 Americans. They also shot down or destroyed nearly 50 aircraft, destroyed or damaged more than 100 vehicles, and burnt down many logistic depots and other war material of the enemy.

The paper particularly mentioned the brilliant battles at Ngan Tu Rd (Yunnan province) where one enemy battalion was wiped out and the others were badly beaten in the first days of March. The destruction of an entire division in late 1940 resulted in a "Big Six" by the U.S. When a certain division of the Japanese was captured, the wiping out of five relief companies near the same place.

Alongside these major attacks, the paper said, the people and their liberation forces in the high plateaux also made repeated assaults on the creative apparatus of The U.S. - puppets.

Typical of these actions was the bold attack on the Phu Phan district town in Darlac Province where the liberation forces wiped out or captured more than 100 enemy, captured or destroyed nearly 50 military vehicles and shot down 10 aircraft. The paper went on to say that the regional forces and guerrillas in the high plateau have also been very active. They shelled and ground assaulted the operational hqs of the puppet 22nd Division in Play Kan, the Vo Dinh military training centre in Kontum, the base camp of the ranger brigade and an "Open Arms" centre in Pleiku town etc.

The paper said: "the sustained drive of attacks of the liberation forces during more than 1 month reflects the strong and victorious position of the liberation armed forces in the high plateau. It also demonstrates their quick maturity in command, combat skill and organizational capacity which enabled them to take on and wipe out an entire main-force battalion of the puppet army in broad day light under intense bombing and shelling by the enemy."

The recent victories of the PLAP and people in the high plateaux has dealt a mortal blow at the U.S.-puppet plan of launching an operation into the Indochinese tri-border area in order to make up for their heavy losses on the Highway 9-southern land front and in northeast Cambodia. They have compelled the enemy to send reinforcements from the plains and reassign to the high plateaux the whole 27th U.S. Brigade to shore up the battered puppet troops."

"Obviously, these victories have further ruined the 'Vietnamization' program of the U.S. in this region of prime importance for them," the paper stressed.

HQDA (DAMI-DOO-H) cmts: This is the 4th radio broadcast to date on the Hill 1001
 (AKA Fire Base #6, coord YB 935 185, Kontum (P)) battle where following MIAs
 were lost on 31 Mar 71:

Note lines 1 and 4, para 2, allude to capture or killing of Americans "since the end of March" (1971). Lines 3, 4, & 5, para 3, positively states:

"...several U. S. advisors captured.. " at "Fire Base Six". This could only pertain to [redacted], both lost at Fire Base #6.

The reference to Kontum Prov battles in early March 71 may be to incidents in which [] and [] were lost. However, there appears no mention of these in the broadcast.

ACSI-DA DISTR	
TAG CAS DIV	4
TSG	
DIA	1
CIAD	1
USAINTC	4
ACSI FILES	4
DATE: 27	JUN

~~SECRET~~DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JCS MESSAGE CENTER(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)

ROUTINE
R 292235Z OCT 84
FM CIA
TO DIA//DC2

ZYUW RUEAIIA1086 3040114

~~SECRET~~
CITE: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: POW INFORMATION

1. [REDACTED]
INFORMATION WHICH CONCERNS AMERICAN POWS IN LAOS AND VIETNAM:
A. "ON 5 SEPT 83 [REDACTED]

AT A LATER DATE, HE REPORTED TO [REDACTED] THAT HIS
TEAM HAD SIGHTED TWO AMERICANS NAMELY:
"1.1: [REDACTED] (BASED ON LAO SPELLING). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ADDED THAT THERE ARE STILL NINE MORE AMERICAN POWS
DETAINED IN THE AREA OF PHU MUT. ONE OF THEM IS KNOWN AS
[REDACTED] AN AMERICAN TOURIST WHO WAS ARRESTED ON 15 JUN 1974, IN
MUANG PAK HINNABUN, KHWAENG KHAMMUAN.

B. "IN ORDER TO GET TO THE AMERICAN POWS IN ITEMS 1.1 AND
1.2 ABOVE, MONEY MUST BE PAID TO THE VILLAGE HEADMAN AND THIS CAN
BE DONE ONLY BY THROUGH [REDACTED] HE IS THE ONLY PERSON
WHO CAN GET IN TOUCH WITH THE VILLAGE HEADMAN OF BAN PHU MUT.

C. "IN MAY 1984, [REDACTED] IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS A MEMBER
OF THE COMMITTEE WHICH CONTROLS THE AMERICAN POWS AT A DETENTION
CAMP IN VIETNAM LOCATED CLOSE TO THE LAO BORDER. HE CLAIMED THERE
ARE 180 AMERICAN POWS IN THE CAMP, WHICH ARE CONTROLLED BY 40
SOLDIERS - 20 PAVN TROOPS AND 20 LAOTIAN TROOPS - FROM THE KHAMU
TRIBE.

D. [REDACTED] WANTED A REWARD FOR THE ABOVE
INFORMATION AND CLAIMED THEY SAW [REDACTED] IN UDON THANI. AFTER
GIVING HIM A RING FROM AN AMERICAN POW, HE GAVE THEM 16,000 BAHT,
AN ENGLISH BIO DATA FORM FOR AMERICAN POWS, AND A CAMERA. THESE
ITEMS WERE TO BE HANDED OVER TO [REDACTED] IN ORDER THAT THE
AMERICAN POWS COULD FILL OUT THE FORMS AND HAVE THEIR PICTURES
TAKEN.

"IN AUGUST 84, [REDACTED] RETURNED TO THAILAND
WITH THE COMPLETED BIO DATA FORM AND PICTURES OF 10 MEN. HE
DEMANDED 50,000 BAHT IN EXCHANGE FOR THE LOCATION OF THE CAMP.
BECAUSE [REDACTED] DID NOT HAVE THE MONEY TO PAY HIM, HE
RETURNED TO LAOS WITH THE DOCUMENTS.

E. "ON 5 SEPT 84, [REDACTED] IN
THAILAND AND STATED THAT IF THE U.S. AUTHORITIES ARE INTERESTED IN
HELPING THE POWS, HE WILL SEND [REDACTED] BACK TO LAOS
TO CONTACT [REDACTED] TO "TAKE ACTIONS AFTERWARD" (SIC)."

2. ON 15 OCTOBER AN OFFICER [REDACTED]
DISCUSSED THE ABOVE [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] JCRC BELIEVES THAT [REDACTED] IS
PROBABLY IDENTICAL TO [REDACTED] WHOSE C-130 WAS
SHOT DOWN IN LAOS IN MARCH 72, AND WHOSE SERIAL NUMBER IS
IDENTICAL TO THE ONE GIVEN IN 1.1 ABOVE. JCRC CONCLUDES THAT [REDACTED]
IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL TO [REDACTED]
SERIAL NUMBER [REDACTED] (NOTE SLIGHT VARIATION) WHOSE F-4C WENT
DOWN IN LAOS IN FEB 70. ADDITIONALLY, JCRC BELIEVES THAT [REDACTED]

ACTION DC-2(2) (U,6,7,F)
INFO CJCS(4) DJS:(2) J1(1) J3(6) NIDS(1) SECDEF:(1)
SECDEF(9) USDP(15) ASD:MIL(2) ASD:PA(1) NMIC(1)
DC-4A(1) AT-3(1) DE-2(1) DB-2(1) DB-2C(1) DB-4A(1)
DB-4G(1) DB-5D3(1) DIA(1) DC-4A3(1)
+ANMCC FT RITCHIE MD
+CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
+USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
+SAFE

CIA-841029-337

MCN=84304/00290

TOR=84304/0114Z

TAD=84304/0115Z

CDSN=MAK433

PAGE 1

292235Z

P352

NND 982017-188

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

[REDACTED] IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL TO [REDACTED] - A U.S.
CIVILIAN CAPTURED BY THE PATHET LAO IN SEPTEMBER 74. NUMEROUS
REPORTS FROM VARIOUS SOURCES INDICATE THAT [REDACTED] WAS ALIVE AND IN
PATHET LAO HANDS DURING 74-75 TIME FRAME.

[REDACTED]

4. NOT RELEASABLE [REDACTED]

5. DECL OADR DRV [REDACTED] ALL SECRET. BT

~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)

18 April 1973

REPORT CLASS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI AUGUST 1966

SUBJECT SIGHTING OF DEAD U.S. PILOT IN HOA BINH PROVINCE,
NORTH VIETNAM

SCO VIETNAM, SAIGON (28 FEBRUARY 1973)

SOURCE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2000893

NND 982009-2268

[REDACTED]

1. IN MID AUGUST 1966 AT ABOUT 1400 HOURS,

[REDACTED] OBSERVED SEVERAL U.S. JET AIRCRAFT FLY OVER TU SON VILLAGE, KIM BOI DISTRICT, HOA BINH PROVINCE, NORTH VIETNAM (NVN) AT A VERY LOW ALTITUDE. ABOUT 20 MINUTES LATER, THE AIRCRAFT LEFT THE AREA AND FLEW EAST WITHOUT BOMBING ANY TARGETS. ABOUT TWO HOURS LATER, THE LOCAL PEOPLE TOLD THAT A U.S. JET AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN BY MILITIAMEN OF THU PHONG VILLAGE, LOCATED ADJACENT TO TU SON VILLAGE.

2. [REDACTED] TOOK HIS BIKE ALONG ROUTE 12B TO THE INTERSECTION - ABOUT TEN KILOMETERS FROM HOA BINH CITY - WITH ROUTE 12A. LOCAL RESIDENTS THERE TOLD HIM THAT A U.S. F.105 JET AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN BY MILITIAMEN ARMED ONLY WITH RIFLES AND POSITIONED ON A HILL ABOUT ONE KILOMETER FROM ROUTE 12B. THEY SAID THAT A TRAIL OF SMOKE CAME FROM THE AIRCRAFT AS IT CONTINUED TO FLY STRAIGHT INTO A CHAIN OF MOUNTAINS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF ROUTE 12B, CRASHED ABOUT 50 METERS FROM THE PEAK OF THE MOUNTAIN, AND BURST INTO FLAMES. WHEN THONG ARRIVED AT THE INTERSECTION, MILITIAMEN HAD ALREADY BROUGHT SOME DEBRIS DOWN FROM THE WRECKAGE. THE PILOT'S BODY WAS BURNED BEYOND RECOGNITION AND ONLY THE MAIN PART OF HIS BODY WAS FOUND NEAR THE CRASH SITE. HIS REMAINS WERE TAKEN ON A PLANK TO AN OPEN SPACE WHERE HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE HAD GATHERED.

- 2 -

[REDACTED]

CONFIDENTIAL

000894

NND 982009-2269

3. TWO DAYS LATER, [] RETURNED TO THE CRASH SITE AND NOTICED THAT A SIGN HAD BEEN PUT UP NEAR THE AIRCRAFT DEBRIS, WHICH READ "THANH TICH CUA XA THU PHONG" ("ACHIEVEMENT OF THU PHONG VILLAGE"). ABOUT FIVE MONTHS LATER, AS [] PASSED THE SAME AREA, HE OBSERVED THAT MUCH OF THE DEBRIS STILL REMAINED BUT WAS ALMOST COMPLETELY COVERED BY DENSE FOLIAGE.

4. [] COMMENT: THE FOLLOWING IS THE JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER (JCRC) EVALUATION OF THE REPORT: ~~JCRC RECORDS INDICATE THIS REPORT PROBABLY DESCRIBES THE DOWNING OF~~

[]

~~WAS MISSING IN ACTION ON 20 JULY 1966 AT 1535 HOURS~~

~~7.8 N 106.1 E (204671 252101) APPROXIMATELY 7-10 MILES FROM~~

~~PERSON VILLAGE. DESCRIPTION OF DATE, TIME, NUMBER OF PLANES,~~

~~DIRECTION OF FLIGHT, DETAILS OF DOWNING AND LOCATION OF~~

~~DEBRIS ARE QUITE ACCURATE.~~

5. []

[]

- 3 -

[]
CONFIDENTIAL

000895

NND 982009-2270

6.

[REDACTED] DISSEM: DEFENSE ATTACHE FOR JCRC REPRESENTATIVE IN
SAIGON: SENT TO CINCPAC (FOR CINCPAC AND POLAD ONLY) USSAG
AND VIENTIANE (FOR JCRC REPRESENTATIVE ONLY).

REPORT CLASS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 59
(1) (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

- 4 -

[REDACTED]
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0000896

NND 982009- 2271

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)

14 February 1973

REPORT CLASS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI: MID-JUNE 1967

SUBJECT SIGHTING OF U.S. PRISONER OF WAR IN NAM HA PROVINCE,
NORTH VIETNAM

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (9 FEBRUARY 1973)

SOURCE

1. AT NOON ONE DAY IN MID-JUNE 1967, OBSERVED
FROM HIS HOME IN YEN TRI VILLAGE, Y YEN DISTRICT, NAM HA PROVINCE,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[REDACTED]

NORTH VIETNAM (NVN), TWO AIRCRAFT, TRAILING SMOKE, COMING FROM THE DIRECTION OF NAM DINH CITY, NVN. ONE AIRCRAFT BURST INTO FLAMES AND CRASHED NEAR [REDACTED] VILLAGE, ABOUT 25 KILOMETERS SOUTHWEST OF NAM DINH CITY, WHILE THE OTHER AIRCRAFT KEPT FLYING TOWARD THE SEA IN A SOUTHWESTERLY DIRECTION. THE PILOT OF THE AIRCRAFT THAT CRASHED BAILED OUT IN A RED PARACHUTE AND LANDED SAFELY IN A RICE FIELD NEAR COORDINATES XH106383 ABOUT 200 METERS FROM VINH CHI CHURCH, Y YEN DISTRICT, AND ABOUT ONE KILOMETER FROM [REDACTED] HOME. [REDACTED] WENT TO WHERE THE PILOT LANDED AND SAW SEVEN VILLAGE MILITIAMEN STANDING AROUND THE PILOT, ONE OF THEM TAKING THE PILOT'S PISTOL, HELMET, AND BOOTS. THE MILITIAMEN THEN ESCORTED THE PILOT TO THE OFFICE OF THE VILLAGE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE, TRUNG THOM HAMLET, Y YEN DISTRICT, ABOUT ONE KILOMETER SOUTH OF VINH CHI CHURCH. ABOUT AN HOUR AND A HALF LATER, TWO PUBLIC SECURITY AGENTS AND A DRIVER ARRIVED IN A JEEP. THEY BLINDFOLDED THE PILOT, PUT HIM IN THE REAR SEAT OF THEIR JEEP, AND DROVE AWAY IN THE DIRECTION OF NAM DINH CITY.

2. THE PILOT WORE A DARK GREY FLYING SUIT WITH A FLYING HORSE INSIGNIA ON THE LEFT BREAST POCKET AND A WHITE T-SHIRT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[REDACTED]

HE WAS CAUCASIAN, ABOUT 25 YEARS OLD, ABOUT 1.80 METERS TALL, WEIGHED FROM 80 TO 90 KILOS, HAD A HANDSOME SQUARE FACE, BROWN CURLY HAIR, THICK EYEBROWS, AND A ROSY COMPLEXION. HE WORE A GOLD CHAIN AROUND HIS NECK AND A LARGE, BLACK WRIST WATCH WITH A GOLD BAND ON HIS LEFT WRIST. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED] WAS SHOWN THE ALBUM OF "PRISONERS OF WAR AND MISSING IN ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (U) VOLUME II, AND IDENTIFIED THE PHOTOGRAPH [REDACTED] 67 AUG, AS RESEMBLING THE PILOT HE SAW.)

3. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER (JCRC) EVALUATED THIS REPORT AS FOLLOWS: "A CHECK OF THE FILES FOR JUNE 1967 PROVIDED A POSSIBLE CORRELATION FOR THIS REPORT. ON 15 JUNE 1967 AT 1500 HOURS, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WAS DOWNED AT XH148375. THIS IS APPROXIMATELY THREE MILES FROM THE LOCATION GIVEN IN THE REPORT. [REDACTED] HAD A GOOD CHUTE AND WAS SEEN ON THE GROUND IN THE COMPANY OF ANOTHER PERSON. THE AREA WAS HEAVILY POPULATED AND MANY FARM WORKERS WERE OBSERVED IN THE VICINITY BY MEMBERS OF THE FLIGHT. THE PICTURE SELECTED BY [REDACTED] IS NOT [REDACTED] BUT RESEMBLES HIM; THE ESTIMATED AGE OF THE DOWNED PILOT DOES NOT FIT

[REDACTED] WHO WAS 36 IN 1967. THE BEST CHANCE FOR AN

~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

IDENTIFICATION OF THE DOWNED PILOT WOULD APPEAR TO BE THE
"FLYING HORSE" INSIGNIA DESCRIBED BY [] [] COMMENT:

[] NAME APPEARS [] ON THE LISTS OF POW'S PROVIDED
BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND VIET CONG REPRESENTATIVES IN PARIS
AS POW'S SCHEDULED FOR RELEASE TO U.S. AUTHORITIES, AS

FOLLOWS: []

[] THIS IS ONE

YEAR AT VARIANCE WITH JCRC RECORDS OF [] CAPTURE.) []
COMMENT: BOTH DTA AND HIS SERVICE LIST [] CAPTURE DATE AS 15 JUNE 1966.)

4. []

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. [] DISSEM: EMBASSY USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE USARV
NAVFORV 525TH MI GP 7602ND AIG OSI JCRC AT SAIGON: SENT
TO CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC [] VIENTIANE []
REPORT CLASS ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ []

[]
CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY
5B (1) (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSI-
FICATION.

29 November 1971

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Sighting of American Prisoner of War in Phuoc
Long Province

B.G. Jones
S.H.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
PP

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

FOR	DISTRIBUTION
TO: CIG DIV	/
INFO	/
USCIB (CIG)	/
COH FILES	/
DATE: 3 DEC 1971	
MAJ F. E. SHEFFER, GS	

tec.

S-276-73

SECRET

SECRET

S-24-71

1. In March 1965, an American prisoner of war was observed resting along the jungle trail in Phuoc Thanh province (now Phuoc Long province), South Vietnam. He was escorted by three North Vietnamese soldiers, each of whom carried an AK-47. * The guards said that the American had been captured 20 days earlier on the Binh Gia battlefield in Phuoc Tuy province and that he was being taken to a security organization, which was located north of Song Be district city, Phuoc Long province.

2. The guards also said that the American was a commissioned officer but they did not give his actual rank. He wore a green uniform with the words "U.S. Army" on the pocket. He also wore a yellow organizational patch with black stripes on his sleeve. He had no hat but wore a wristwatch and boots. He was caucasian with a ruddy complexion, about 1.75⁶⁹ meters tall, had blond hair, and black moustache and beard, and weighed approximately 75 kilograms. He appeared to be in good health and was not wounded. ** The prisoner was led by a rope tied around his upper arms which were behind his back.

3. The Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) carries a [redacted] who may be identical with subject. He was USA advisor to the 1/7 5th ARVN, missing in action at YT058615, also listed as YT060821, Phuoc Long, on a mission on 10 June 1965.

[redacted] had a ruddy complexion, light brown hair, was approximately 6'1/2" tall and weighed approximately 200 pounds. Weights in past records varied 120-185-200 pounds.

* [redacted] Comment: [redacted] and nine of his coworkers were on a rice procurement mission, heading toward the Song Be jungle area.

** [redacted] Comment: [redacted] and his companions observed the prisoner for about five minutes before he was led off.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

S-24-71

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)REPORT CLASS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COUNTRY LAOS/SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI EARLY MAY - JULY 1971

SUBJECT SIGHTING OF TWO U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR WITH THE NORTH
VIETNAMESE ARMY 2ND YELLOW STAR DIVISION IN LAOS

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (24 JULY 1973)

SOURCE

1. IN EARLY MAY OR JUNE 1971 AND IN JULY 1971,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0162

NW 982007 - 831CIA-73 ~~0724~~ - 167

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SAW TWO U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR (POW'S) ON THREE DIFFERENT OCCASIONS. THE FIRST TIME WAS IN EARLY MAY OR JUNE 1971 WHEN HE SAW THE TWO POW'S EATING LUNCH WITH PERSONNEL OF THE MILITARY STAFF AND POLITICAL OFFICES, NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) 2ND YELLOW STAR DIVISION (SU DOAN 2 SAO VANG), AT THE 13TH COMMO-LIAISON STATION (WD876558), 33RD BINH TRAM, NVA 559TH INFILTRATION LINE (DOUNG DAY 559) IN SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE, LAOS. HE OBSERVED THEM FOR ABOUT 30 MINUTES. THE SECOND TIME [] SAW THE SAME POW'S WAS FOR ABOUT TWO MINUTES IN JULY 1971. THEY WERE WALKING WITH PERSONNEL OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY STAFF OFFICES, NVA 2ND DIVISION, THROUGH THE DIVISION'S BASE CAMP AREA (WD806525) NEAR THE 31ST COMMO-LIAISON STATION (WD826537), 33RD BINH TRAM, NVA 559 INFILTRATION LINE, SAVANNAKHET PROVINCE. THE THIRD TIME HE SAW THE POW'S WAS FOR ABOUT TEN MINUTES IN JULY 1971, WHILE THE POW'S WERE SITTING IN A HUT IN THE DIVISION'S BASE CAMP AREA.

2. THE FIRST TIME [] SAW THE POW'S, [] (LNU), A MEMBER OF THE DIVISION'S MILITARY STAFF OFFICE, SAID THAT THEY WERE OFFICERS WHO HAD BEEN CAPTURED BY THE NVA 2ND DIVISION IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE, SOUTH VIETNAM. [] SAID THAT THE POW'S WERE COLLABORATING WITH THE DIVISION'S POLITICAL AND MILITARY STAFF OFFICES IN A


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


0163

NW 982007 - 832

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


PROSELYTING EFFORT DIRECTED TOWARD U.S. SOLDIERS. BEFORE LAUNCHING AN ATTACK INTO AREAS CONTAINING U.S. UNITS IN LAOS AND SOUTH VIETNAM, THE DIVISION WOULD CONDUCT PROSELYTING EFFORTS IN AN ATTEMPT TO CONVINCE U.S. SOLDIERS TO JOIN THE COMMUNIST SIDE, TO DESERT, OR TO RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES.

3.  OBSERVED THE POW'S THE FIRST TIME FROM AT A DISTANCE OF ABOUT TWO METERS. BOTH WERE CAUCASIAN. ONE WAS ABOUT 30 YEARS OLD, ABOUT 1.80 METERS TALL, AND WEIGHED ABOUT 90 KILOS. HE HAD A HEAVY BUILD, A PINK COMPLEXION, A LONG FACE, SHORT BROWNISH BLOND HAIR, A RECEDING HAIRLINE, A HIGH STRAIGHT NOSE, BROWN EYES, WHITE REGULAR TEETH, A ROUND MOUTH, AND A RED MOLE UNDER HIS LOWER LEFT LIP. HE WAS WEARING A GREEN NVA UNIFORM CONSISTING OF A SHORT-SLEEVED SHIRT AND TROUSERS. HE WAS ALSO WEARING A WHITE METAL "SEIKO" WRISTWATCH AND A LARGE GOLD RING WITH A RED RUBY ON HIS LEFT HAND. THE OTHER POW WAS ABOUT 33 TO 35 YEARS OLD, ABOUT 1.60 METERS TALL, WEIGHED ABOUT 70 KILOS, AND HAD AN AVERAGE BUILD. HE HAD A PINK COMPLEXION, A ROUND FACE, SHORT YELLOW HAIR, BROWN EYES, A ROUND MOUTH, A FRECKLED FACE AND A HOOKED NOSE. HE WAS ALSO WEARING A GREEN NVA UNIFORM, AND A WHITE "SEIKO" WRISTWATCH. THE POW'S APPEARED TO BE IN GOOD HEALTH AND DID NOT HAVE ANY VISIBLE WOUNDS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. IN ABOUT OCTOBER 1972, [REDACTED], A RADIO OPERATOR IN THE NVA 2ND DIVISION, TOLD [REDACTED] THAT THE TWO POW'S HAD BEEN SENT TO NORTH VIETNAM.

5. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER (JCRC) EVALUATED THE REPORT AS FOLLOWS: "RECORDS INDICATE THAT [REDACTED] PROBABLY OBSERVED [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WAS FLYING AN AHIG ON 6 MARCH 1969 WHICH WAS DOWNED BY GROUND FIRE AT ZC177968. THE PILOT RECOVERED AND STATED THAT HE COULD RECALL NOTHING AFTER THE IMPACT. THE CRASH SITE WAS SEARCHED WITH NO TRACE OF THE SUBJECT. AS A RESULT OF GROUND SEARCH, THERE IS AN INDICATION THAT [REDACTED] MAY HAVE BEEN CAPTURED IN THE VICINITY OF THE SITE. [REDACTED] DESCRIPTION FOLLOWS: AGE IN 1971 WAS 31. HEIGHT: 1.77 METERS; WEIGHT: 75KILOS; HAIR: BROWN; RACE: CAUCASIAN; WEARS WHITE SILVER SEKIO WATCH AND LARGE RING ON LEFT HAND. [REDACTED] IS CARRIED AS MISSING IN ACTION. NO CORRELATION COULD BE MADE ON THE SECOND POW CITED IN THE REPORT." AT JCRC'S REQUEST, [REDACTED] WAS RECONTACTED AND SHOWN [REDACTED] PHOTO [REDACTED] "PRECAPTURE PHOTOGRAPHS OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND MISSING IN ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA." MIXED WITH 15 OTHER PHOTOGRAPHS. HOWEVER, [REDACTED] WAS UNABLE TO MAKE AN IDENTIFICATION.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THEN HE WAS SHOWN [] PHOTOGRAPH. AFTER FIVE MINUTES OF STUDY, [] SAID THAT THE PHOTOGRAPH LOOKED VERY SIMILAR TO THE POW WHO WORE THE RING, EXCEPT THAT HIS HAIR WAS LONGER AND THAT HIS NOSE WAS LONGER AND NOSTRILS WERE LESS PRONOUNCED. HE SAID THAT THE SHAPE OF THE FACE, THE EYES, AND THE MOUTH WERE SIMILAR TO THE MAN IN THE PHOTOGRAPH, BUT STOPPED SHORT OF MAKING A DEFINITE IDENTIFICATION BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENCE IN THE HAIR STYLE AND NOSE.)

6. [] DISSEM: DEFENSE ATTACHE FOR JCRC REPRESENTATIVE IN SAIGON: SENT TO CINCPAC (FOR CINCPAC AND POLAD ONLY) USSAG AND VIENTIANE (FOR JCRC REPRESENTATIVE ONLY).

REPORT CLASS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ []

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (1) (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)*Clam*

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI MID-JUNE 1969

SUBJECT SIGHTING OF A U.S. PRISONER OF WAR IN TAY NINH
PROVINCE, SOUTH VIETNAM

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (16 OCTOBER 1973)

SOURCE

1. ONE MORNING IN MID-JUNE 1969,

A SAW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0074

NW 982007 - 759

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A U.S. PRISONER OF WAR (POW) ESCORTED BY THREE ARMED VIET CONG (VC) GUARDS, RESTING BY A ROAD NEAR XT243795, NORTH OF BA DEN MOUNTAIN AND VERY CLOSE TO THE SUOI KY STREAM, PHU KHUONG DISTRICT, TAY NINH PROVINCE, SOUTH VIETNAM. ONE OF THE GUARDS TOLD [] THAT THE POW BELONGED TO A UNITED STATES ARMY ARMORED UNIT THAT WAS CAMPED AT THE TRA PHI FORK, PROVINCE HIGHWAY 4, PHU KHUONG DISTRICT. THE VC HAD ATTACKED THIS UNIT THE NIGHT BEFORE AND THE PRISONER'S TANK HAD BEEN HIT. ALL MEMBERS OF THE TANK CREW ESCAPED EXCEPT THE PRISONER.

2. THE POW DID NOT APPEAR TO BE WOUNDED. HIS HANDS WERE TIED BEHIND HIS BACK WITH ROPE, HE WAS BAREHEADED AND BAREFOOTED, AND WAS WEARING HIS OLIVE DRAB UNIFORM. THE POW WAS A NEGRO AND APPEARED TO BE APPROXIMATELY 1.80 METERS TALL. THE VC SEEMED TO BE TAKING THE POW IN THE DIRECTION OF MIMOT DISTRICT, CAMBODIA.

3. [] COMMENT: THE JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER (JCRC) EVALUATED THE REPORT AS FOLLOWS:

"THIS REPORT DOES NOT READILY CORRELATE WITH INFORMATION IN JCRC FILES. JCRC RECORDS DO NOT REFLECT ANY GROUND INCIDENTS OCCURRING DURING JUNE 1969 IN THE XT GRID WHICH COMPRISES PHU KHUONG DISTRICT, TAY NINH PROVINCE. A SEARCH OF ALL GROUND

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[REDACTED]

INCIDENTS THAT OCCURRED IN THE XT GRID REVEALS TWO INCIDENTS WHICH MAY CORRELATE WITH THE DESCRIBED INCIDENT.

A. "ON 28 FEBRUARY 1968, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WAS SEEN WORKING AS A GUNNER ON A TANK WHEN THE TANK RECEIVED PRG AND AUTOMATIC WEAPON FIRE. A SEARCH OF THE AREA, XT742017, THE NEXT DAY DID NOT DETERMINE [REDACTED] WHEREABOUTS, ALTHOUGH THE BODIES OF TWO OTHER CREWMEN WERE RECOVERED. LATER INTERROGATION REPORTS INDICATED [REDACTED] WAS WOUNDED. [REDACTED] IS CARRIED IN THE STATUS OF MISSING-IN-ACTION.

B. "ON 3 FEBRUARY 1968 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WAS WORKING AS A TRACK COMMANDER ON AN APC WHEN RPO FIRE CAUSED THE VEHICLE TO BE ABANDONED AT XT638218. [REDACTED] WAS LAST SEEN JUMPING FROM THE VEHICLE. A RESCUE TEAM RESCUED THE ASSISTANT GUNNER FROM INSIDE THE APC, BUT COULD NOT FIND [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IS CARRIED IN A STATUS OF CAPTURED BASED ON LATER REPORTS.")

4. [REDACTED] DISSEM: DEFENSE ATTACHE FOR JCRC REPRESENTATIVE IN SAIGON: SENT TO CINCPAC (FOR CINCPAC AND POLAD ONLY) USSAG AND VIENTIANE (FOR JCRC REPRESENTATIVE ONLY).

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (1)
(2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Clark, R. C.

BNK

CONFIDENTIAL(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI MID-OCTOBER 1967

SUBJECT DEATH OF U.S. F-105 JET AIRCRAFT PILOT IN BAC THAI PROVINCE
NORTH VIETNAM

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (19 FEBRUARY 1974)

SOURCE

1. AT ABOUT 1300 HOURS ONE DAY IN MID-OCTOBER 1967, WHILE

CONFIDENTIAL

1

CIA-740219-176

0186

9

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VIET-BAC AUTONOMOUS

REGION, AT ABOUT WJ537967 AT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) TAM DAO MOUNTAIN BASE IN VAN LANG VILLAGE, DAI TU DISTRICT, BAC THAI PROVINCE, NORTH VIETNAM (NVN); HE SAW A U.S. F-105 JET AIRCRAFT HIT BY A SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE (SAM) FIRED BY AN UNIDENTIFIED NVA UNIT PROTECTING THE THAI NGUYEN STEEL PLANT (WJ906840). THE F-105 HAD MADE A BOMBING RUN OVER THE THAI NGUYEN STEEL PLANT AREA AND WAS FLYING WEST TOWARD TUYEN QUANG PROVINCE AT AN ALTITUDE OF ABOUT THREE KILOMETERS.

COMMENT: LIEUTENANT H O A N (LNU), DEPUTY COMMANDER, AND LIEUTENANT LUONG VAN E N G, POLITICAL CADRE, BOTH OF THE 12TH COMPANY, IDENTIFIED THE AIRCRAFT AS AN F-105.)

2. AS SOON AS THE SAM HIT THE F-105, THE AIRCRAFT BURST INTO FLAMES AND EXPLODED INTO PIECES, WHICH FELL OVER THE MOUNTAIN AND RICE FIELD AREAS ENCLOSED WITHIN THE COORDINATES WJ525985, WJ550985, WJ525960, AND WJ550960 IN VAN LANG VILLAGE. OBSERVED THE ENTIRE INCIDENT AND SAID HE SAW NO PARACHUTE COME OUT OF THE F-105. HE AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE 12TH COMPANY RAN IMMEDIATELY TO THE AREA, WHERE THE WRECKAGE FELL, TO SALVAGE.

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[REDACTED]

CONFIDENTIAL

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

FRAGMENTS OF THE AIRCRAFT FOR THEIR PERSONAL USE.

3. AT ABOUT 1400 HOURS THE SAME DAY, PEOPLE FROM VAN LANG VILLAGE WENT OUT TO PICK UP FRAGMENTS FROM THE AIRCRAFT AND FOUND A LEG FROM WHAT THEY BELIEVED WAS THE DEAD PILOT. THEY TOOK IT TO THE VAN LANG VILLAGE COOPERATIVE AND [REDACTED] SAW IT THERE. HE DESCRIBED IT AS THE LEFT LEG FROM A POINT ABOUT SEVEN CENTIMETERS ABOVE THE KNEE. A TORN, MUDDY YELLOW-GREEN SOCK WAS STILL ON THE FOOT AND THE BIG TOE HAD BEEN BLOWN OFF THE FOOT. [REDACTED] ESTIMATED THE LEG WAS ABOUT 60 CM LONG, WEIGHED ABOUT 12 KILOS, HAD A LIGHT COMPLEXION LIKE THAT OF A CAUCASIAN, WAS HAIRY, AND THAT THE HAIR WAS AUBURN COLORED.

4. AT ABOUT 1600 HOURS THE SAME DAY, NORTH VIETNAMESE SECURITY POLICE FROM DAI TU DISTRICT TOWN DROVE INTO THE AREA ON ROUTE 13 AND ORDERED THE VAN LANG VILLAGERS TO BURY THE LEG IN THE RICE-FIELD AREA AT ABOUT WJ535971.

5. [REDACTED] COMMENT: JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER (JCRC) EVALUATES THIS REPORT AS FOLLOWS:

"A. THIS REPORT POSSIBLY DESCRIBES THE INCIDENT INVOLVING [REDACTED] HE WAS A CREW MEMBER ON AN F4B ON A STRIKE MISSION DIRECTED AT PHUC YEN AIRFIELD. AT 1600 HOURS ON

CONFIDENTIAL

[REDACTED] 3 [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

24 OCTOBER 1967, A SAM WAS OBSERVED TO IMPACT THE AIRCRAFT PILOTED BY [REDACTED] AT WJ448736. [REDACTED] WINGMAN. HE CALLED FOR [REDACTED] TO EJECT AFTER HE OBSERVED THE SAM HIT. [REDACTED] RECEIVED NO IMMEDIATE RESPONSE, BUT DID OBSERVE FRONT SEAT EJECTION. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] AIRCRAFT STRUCK THE GROUND WITH NO EJECTIONS OTHER THAN [REDACTED] WHO WAS ALIVE AND IN HIS CHUTE. [REDACTED] NAME WAS NEVER HEARD BY OTHERS IN THE PW SYSTEM.

"(1) [REDACTED] IS CARRIED BY JCRC AS DEAD, BODY-NOT-RECOVERED.

"(2) [REDACTED] WAS RELEASED ON 14 MARCH 1973.

"(3) [REDACTED] WAS RELEASED ON 12 MARCH 1973.

"(4) [REDACTED] (CREW MEMBER) WAS RELEASED ON 5 AUGUST 1969.

"B. ANOTHER POSSIBLE CORRELATION TO THIS REPORT IS THE INCIDENT INVOLVING [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THEY WERE ON A MISSION AT WJ207809 ON 4 OCTOBER 1967. THEY WERE LAST SEEN AT THEIR PRE-MISSION REFUELING POINT. NO FURTHER RADIO CONTACT WAS MADE. BOTH MEN ARE CARRIED AS MISSING-IN-ACTION BY JCRC."

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6. [] DISSEM: DEFENSE ATTACHE FOR JCRC REPRESENTATIVE
IN SAIGON: SENT TO CINCPAC (FOR CINCPAC AND POLAD ONLY) USSAG
AND VIENTIANE (FOR JCRC REPRESENTATIVE ONLY).

REPORT CLASS ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ []
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CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B
(1) (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

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[REDACTED]

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(b)(6)

9 February 1973

REPORT CLASS ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ [REDACTED]

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI FEBRUARY 1967

SUBJECT SIGHTING OF DOWNED U.S. JET IN NAM HA PROVINCE,
NORTH VIETNAM, IN WHICH PILOTS REPORTEDLY KILLED

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (6 FEBRUARY 1973) [REDACTED]


SOURCE

[REDACTED]

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1. AT ABOUT 2100 HOURS ONE DAY BETWEEN 3-6 FEBRUARY 1967, [REDACTED] SAW A BURNING U.S. JET AIRCRAFT FLYING AT LOW ALTITUDE OVER HIS VILLAGE OF HAI TAN, HAI HAU DISTRICT, NAM HA PROVINCE, NORTH VIETNAM. [REDACTED] BELIEVED THE PLANE HAD BEEN HIT INLAND AND THAT THE PILOT WAS PROBABLY MAKING AN ATTEMPT TO REACH THE SEA. THE AIRCRAFT CONTINUED TO LOSE ALTITUDE AND SPEED AND FINALLY EXPLODED, CRASHING IN HAI LY VILLAGE, ABOUT FOUR KILOMETERS FROM HAI TAN VILLAGE, ON THE FOLLOWING DAY, SEVERAL GROUPS OF JET AIRCRAFT COMING FROM THE EAST FLEW OVER THE AREA IN RELAYS FROM DAWN UNTIL LATE AFTERNOON, APPEARING TO BE SEARCHING FOR THE LOST AIRCRAFT. THEY FLEW AT VERY LOW ALTITUDE AND FRIGHTENED THE PEOPLE OF THE DISTRICT SO BADLY THAT THEY REMAINED AT HOME AND DID NOT GO TO EXAMINE THE CRASH SITE.

2. [REDACTED] WENT TO HAI LY VILLAGE TO CUT GRASS FOUR DAYS LATER AND PEOPLE OF THE AREA TOLD HIM THAT THE JET HAD CRASHED IN A FIELD OF RUSHES NEAR COORDINATES XH345222 ABOUT 500 METERS

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NND 982011

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FROM THE SEA. [] PERSONALLY SAW THE TAIL SECTION OF THE AIRCRAFT WHILE WALKING PAST THE AREA. LOCAL PEOPLE TOLD [] THAT TWO PILOTS WERE STILL IN THE AIRCRAFT WHEN IT CRASHED AND THAT THEIR BODIES WERE TORN APART AND SCATTERED ALL AROUND THE CRASH SITE TOGETHER WITH AIRCRAFT DEBRIS. PIECES OF THEIR BODIES INCLUDING THREE LEGS AND A PIECE OF CHEST COVERED WITH THICK BROWN HAIR WERE GATHERED BY LOCAL PEOPLE AND BURIED NEAR THE CRASH SITE.

3. [] COMMENT: THE JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER (JCRC) EVALUATED THIS REPORT AS FOLLOWS: "SCREENING OF JCRC RECORDS RESULTED IN THE POSSIBLE CORRELATION OF THE INCIDENT WITH THAT INVOLVING []

[] WERE ON A FLARE-DROP MISSION WHEN THEY WERE SEPARATED FROM THEIR WING AIRCRAFT. NO CONTACT WAS ESTABLISHED. THE WINGMAN SAW A LARGE EXPLOSION BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN THE AIRCRAFT OF [] THE LOCATION AND TIME FRAME MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT COINCIDE WITH THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE AT THIS OFFICE. []

[] ARE CARRIED BY THEIR SERVICE AS MISSING IN ACTION.")

[] COMMENT: THE NAMES OF [] DO

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NOT APPEAR ON THE LISTS OF POW'S PROVIDED BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
AND VIET CONG REPRESENTATIVES IN PARIS AS POW'S WHO HAVE DIED. ..
NORTH VIETNAMESE IDENTIFICATION OF THE PILOTS MAY HAVE BEEN.
DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE IN THIS INSTANCE.)

4. [REDACTED]

5. [REDACTED] DISSEM: EMBASSY USMACV JCRC 7TH AIR FORCE

USARV NAVFORV 525TH MI GP 7602ND AIF OSI AT SAIGON: SENT

TO CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC [REDACTED] VIENTIANE [REDACTED]

REPORT CLASS ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

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NND 982011 422

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY
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082335Z

TO: PRIORITY DIA WASHINGTON DC//PW-MIA (ATTN. COL. JOE SCHLATTER).

~~SECRET~~

BODY

SUBJECT: AMERICAN POW/MIA LIVING IN LAOS

C O R R E C T I O N

- THIS IS A REISSUE OF [REDACTED] WHICH WAS INADVERTENTLY SENT UNDER THIS NUMBER. THE CORRECT NUMBER SHOULD BE [REDACTED] PLEASE CORRECT ALL FILES. THE TEXT DOES NOT CHANGE. -

1.

THIS INFORMATION WAS TO BE PASSED TO STONY BEACH AND JCRC.

2. ACCORDING TO

25 JANUARY 1990, THERE ARE NO AMERICAN POW/MIA'S LEFT IN LAOS, EXCEPT FOR ONE AMERICAN WHO MARRIED A LAO WOMAN AND RESIDES IN HOUAPHAN PROVINCE. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE LPDR (COL) TURNED OVER ALL ITS AMERICAN POW/MIA'S TO VIETNAM IN 1982/1983 (SIC) BECAUSE THERE WAS NO PLACE IN LAOS TO DETAIN THEM. SIPHON SAID HE DOES NOT KNOW THE NUMBER OF AMERICANS THE COL TURNED OVER TO VIETNAM, BUT HE KNOWS THAT THEY ARE BEING DETAINED AT A PLACE THAT IS 420 KILOMETERS AWAY FROM HANOI, ALTHOUGH SIPHON DOES NOT KNOW IN WHICH DIRECTION. (COMMENT: IF THE PLACE IS INDEED 420 KILOMETERS FROM HANOI, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE SOMEWHERE IN WHAT WAS FORMERLY SOUTH VIETNAM. THE LPDR WAS FORMALLY ESTABLISHED IN 1975.)

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3. SAID HE EXPECTED THE AMERICAN WHO REMAINS IN LAOS IS UNDER LOOSE DETENTION IN ONE OF THE FOUR POLITICAL DETENTION CAMPS OF LAOS IN HOUAPHAN PROVINCE, WHICH INCLUDE:

- A. SOMEWHERE IN XAM NEUA DISTRICT (VH 0158)
- B. THE PHA DENG CAVE PRISON, TWO KILOMETERS EAST OF VIENGXAI DISTRICT (VH 1957)
- C. SOMEWHERE IN XAM TAI DISTRICT (VH 6210)
- D. SOMEWHERE IN XIENG KHO DISTRICT (VH 3990)

4. SAID THAT SOMETIME IN SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER 1989. A

APPROACHED THE LAO WIFE OF THIS AMERICAN PRISONER TWO TIMES AND GAVE HER A PIECE OF PAPER FOR THE AMERICAN TO FILL OUT WITH HIS NAME AND SERIAL NUMBER. THE LAO WIFE TOOK THE PAPER TO HER AMERICAN HUSBAND, BUT BOTH TIMES HE REFUSED TO WRITE ANYTHING DOWN AND TOLD HER TO TELL [REDACTED] THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO MEET OR SPEAK WITH ANYONE.

5. [REDACTED]

6. CLASSIFIED BY SIGNER. DECL OADR DRV [REDACTED] ALL SECRET

0073991.<
END OF MESSAGE

JL BY

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MESSAGE = 00596632

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TO

DIENSA COMMAND CENTER STATE (RCI)
SSO ACSI DA SSO ARLINGTON HALL STATION AFSSO USAF ATTN AFNICAG AFNICC MARYLAND
NFOIO, MARYLAND DIA/ISIC JCS NIC CIA-OCI
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THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS
BEEN RECEIVED FROM [REDACTED] AND IS FORWARDED AS AN
UNEVALUATED REPORT [REDACTED]

DATE OF INFORMATION AS INDICATED/

AUGUST 5

MEETING WITH AMERICAN PILOT POW.

MEETING WITH AMERICAN PILOT POW ON
TRANSMITTED A REPORT OF HIS
COMMENT.MEMBER 496TH TACTICAL SQUADRON, 388TH TACTICAL AVIATION REGIMENT,
BASED [REDACTED] SHOT DOWN OVER HANOI 27 OCTOBER 1967.D GP-1 125 NNNN

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COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI JUNE 1967

SUBJECT DEATH OF A U.S. AIRMAN IN BO TRACH DISTRICT, QUANG
BINH PROVINCE, NORTH VIETNAM

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (12 NOVEMBER 1973)

SOURCE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~12 NOV 73 0200 3
NW 982007 - 705

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1. AT ABOUT 1500 HOURS ONE DAY IN JUNE 1967, [REDACTED] SAW A U.S. F-4 JET HIT BY 37MM ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY FIRE FROM A NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY UNIT IN BO TRACH DISTRICT, QUANG BINH PROVINCE, NORTH VIETNAM. IT HAD BEEN FLYING WITH ABOUT FIVE OTHER JETS THAT WERE BOMBING A BRIDGE (XE647405) ON ROUTE 1-A IN CHANH HOA I VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT. [REDACTED] SAW AN AIRMAN BAIL OUT WITH A WHITE PARACHUTE AND LAND IN A FOREST (XE636386) IN CHANH HOA II VILLAGE, BO TRACH DISTRICT. HIS AIRCRAFT CRASHED INTO DOI TROC HILL (XE448382) IN CHANH HOA II VILLAGE. 17 31 35N - 106 21 55E XE 638 382

2. AT ABOUT 1530 HOURS THE SAME DAY, [REDACTED] WENT TO THE PLACE XE 448 382 WHERE THE AIRMAN HAD LANDED AND SAW HIS BODY LYING IN THE GRASS. LOCAL VILLAGERS TOLD [REDACTED] THAT ABOUT TEN MINUTES AFTER THE AIRMAN LANDED, MILITIAMEN FROM CHANH HOA II VILLAGE FOUND HIM HIDING IN A BAMBOO THICKET AND CAPTURED HIM. THE VILLAGERS WATCHED THEM BEAT HIM TO DEATH WITH HOES AND BAMBOO STICKS.

3. [REDACTED] OBSERVED THE DEAD AIRMAN FOR ABOUT TEN MINUTES FROM A DISTANCE OF ABOUT FIVE METERS. HE WAS A CAUCASIAN, APPEARED TO BE ABOUT 45 YEARS OLD, WAS ABOUT 1.80 METERS TALL, WEIGHED ABOUT 100 KILOGRAMS, HAD A FAIR COMPLEXION, SHORT BLOND HAIR, A

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[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

MOUSTACHE ABOUT ONE CENTIMETER LONG, AND A HEAVY BEARD. HE WAS WEARING A GREEN FLIGHT SUIT. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED] WAS SHOWN VOLUMES I AND II OF "PRISONERS OF WAR AND MISSING IN ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA" BUT WAS UNABLE TO MAKE AN IDENTIFICATION.)

4. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER (JCRC) EVALUATED THE REPORT AS FOLLOWS: "THIS REPORT POSSIBLY CORRELATES WITH THE INCIDENT INVOLVING [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WAS THE PILOT OF AN F4C AIRCRAFT IN A FLIGHT OF TWO THAT WAS ON AN ARMED RECONNAISSANCE MISSION OVER NORTH VIETNAM ON 8 JUNE 1967. THE PLANE WAS HIT BY 37MM ANTIAIRCRAFT GROUND FIRE AND WENT DOWN IN THE VICINITY OF XE343517.

[REDACTED] WAS 1.90 METERS TALL AND HAD SHORT, CROPPED, RED HAIR. VITAL STATISTICS ON [REDACTED] A CREW MEMBER ON THIS FLIGHT, ARE NOT IN JCRC RECORDS, BUT A PHOTO REVEALS

[REDACTED] TO BE AN OLDER, BALDING MAN OF FAIR COMPLEXION. [REDACTED] STATUS IS MISSING-IN-ACTION, AND [REDACTED] STATUS IS KILLED-IN-ACTION, BODY NOT RECOVERED, PER A REQUEST BY [REDACTED] FAMILY.")

5. [REDACTED] DISSEM: DEFENSE ATTACHE FOR JCRC REPRESENTATIVE IN

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SAIGON: SENT TO CINCPAC (FOR CINCPAC AND POLAD ONLY) USSAG
AND VIENTIANE (FOR JCRC REPRESENTATIVE ONLY).
REPORT CLASS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY
5B (1) (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION.

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PAGE 1 OF 3

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

DATE DISTR. 31 JANUARY 1973

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI AUGUST 1972

SUBJECT SIGHTING OF TWO U.S. PILOTS IN AN THUY DISTRICT,
HAIPHONG MUNICIPALITY

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (27 JANUARY 1973) FIELD NO. [REDACTED]

SOURCE [REDACTED]

1. AT ABOUT 1206 HOURS ON ABOUT 28 AUGUST 1972, TWO U.S. AIRCRAFT WERE SHOT DOWN BY NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES OVER AN THUY DISTRICT, HAIPHONG MUNICIPALITY,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

NORTH VIETNAM (NVA) AND THE PILOTS OF THE A CRAFT WERE CAPTURED. THE TWO AIRCRAFT WERE WITH ABOUT TEN OTHERS THAT ATTACKED THE KIEN AN FERRY.

2. ONE OF THE PILOTS BAILED OUT IN A RED PARACHUTE AND LANDED IN BAC HA VILLAGE, AN THUY DISTRICT, ABOUT TWO KILOMETERS SOUTH OF KIEN AN CITY, AND WAS CAPTURED BY MILITIAMEN. THE OTHER PILOT BAILED OUT IN A WHITE PARACHUTE AND LANDED IN THE RICE FIELDS OF UC GIAN VILLAGE, AN THUY DISTRICT, ABOUT THREE KILOMETERS SOUTH OF KIEN AN CITY. HE RESISTED CAPTURE BY FIRING HIS PISTOL AT MILITIAMEN ATTEMPTING TO CAPTURE HIM. HE WAS CAPTURED AFTER RUNNING OUT OF AMMUNITION AND BEING WOUNDED IN ONE THIGH. HE WAS UNABLE TO WALK AND WAS CARRIED TO A VEHICLE BY EIGHT MILITIAMEN. THE PILOTS WERE DRIVEN AWAY IN SEPARATE NVA VEHICLES.

3. [REDACTED] WHO OBSERVED THE PILOTS FROM A DISTANCE OF 200 METERS, RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING DESCRIPTIONS FROM THE MILITIAMEN WHO CAPTURED THE PILOTS. THE PILOT USING THE RED PARACHUTE WAS A COLONEL, CAUCASIAN, ABOUT 34 YEARS OLD, ABOUT 1.80 METERS TALL, WEIGHED ABOUT 90 KILOS, HAD A HEAVY BUILD, WORE TWO PISTOLS, AND A WRISTWATCH WITH A BLACK FACE. THE OTHER PILOT WAS CAUCASIAN, ABOUT 30 YEARS OLD, ABOUT 1.90 METERS TALL, HAD A MEDIUM BUILD, AND WORE A BROWN FLIGHT SUIT.

4. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER (JCRC) EVALUATED THIS REPORT AS FOLLOWS: "SCREENING OF JCRC RECORDS REVEALS THAT DURING THE TIME FRAME MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT, THE BEST POSSIBLE CORRELATION FITS THE INCIDENT INVOLVING [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WERE FLYING AN F4J ON A MIG CAP NEAR HAIPHONG WHEN THEIR AIRCRAFT WAS DOWNED BY UNKNOWN CAUSES. [REDACTED] DESCRIPTIONS FIT THE INDIVIDUALS, AND THE TIME OF DAY MENTIONED IS CLOSE TO THE TIME OF LOSS. [REDACTED] ARE PRESENTLY

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CARRIED AS MISSING IN ACTION BY THEIR SERVICE.")

COMMENT: NEITHER MAN'S NAME APPEARS ON THE LISTS OF POW'S PROVIDED BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND VIET CONG REPRESENTATIVES. IN PARIS AS POW'S SCHEDULED FOR RELEASE TO U.S. AUTHORITIES.)

5.

6. [] DISSEM: EMBASSY USMACV JCRC 7TH AIR FORCE
RV NAVFORV 525TH MI GP 7602ND AIG OSI AT SAIGON: SENT
CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC [] VIENTIANE []

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM
GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION
CATEGORY 5B (1), (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF
AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM
GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION
CATEGORY 5B (1) (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION.

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PILOT MUST BE A MAJOR. THEY EXPLAINED THAT IF THE COLOR OF THE PARACHUTE WAS RED AND WHITE, THE PILOT WOULD BE AN OFFICER BETWEEN THE RANK OF A MAJOR AND COLONEL. IF THE PARACHUTE WAS A PLAIN COLOR, SUCH AS WHITE OR BROWN OR CAMOUFLAGED, THEN THE PILOT WAS A RANK BETWEEN FIRST LIEUTENANT AND CAPTAIN.

4. COMMENT: IN MID-DECEMBER 73, THE JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER (JCRC) EVALUATED THE ABOVE REPORT AS FOLLOWS: THIS REPORT POSSIBLY DESCRIBED THE INCIDENT INVOLVING NAVY

ON 6 MAY 1972, WAS PILOTING AN A7E AIRCRAFT ON A COMBAT MISSION OVER THE DONG HOI AREA OF NORTH VIETNAM. THE FLIGHT LEADER OBSERVED FULLY DEPLOYED CHUTE AND OBSERVED HIM LANDING IN A POPULATED AREA. IS LISTED AS MISSING. THIS IS THE ONLY AIRCRAFT INCIDENT NEAR THE BAN KARAI PASS IN 1972. THERE WERE NO INCIDENTS AROUND THE MU GIA PASS IN 1972.

5. DISSEM: . SENT TO CINCPAC (FOR CINCPAC AND POLAD ONLY), USSAG, SAIGON AND VIENTIANE (FOR JCRC REPRESENTATIVE ONLY).

REPORT CLASS C O N F I D E N T I A L

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1. AT ABOUT 1300 HOURS IN EARLY MAY 1972, WHILE STAYING AT A SMALL HAMLET NEAR MUANG KWANG BINH IN NORTH VIETNAM, DEFECTOR [] SAW FOUR U.S. AIRCRAFT BOMBING THE ROAD BETWEEN MUANG KWANG BINH AND THE LAO BORDER. [] HEARD THE NORTH VIETNAMESE (NVN) SOLDIERS IN CHARGE OF HIS PARTY OF TRAVELERS CALL THE PLANES "PHANTOMS". ONE OF THE PLANES WAS HIT BY NVN ROCKETS AND BURST INTO FLAMES. ONE PILOT PARACHUTED FROM THE PLANE. [] COMMENT: DEFECTOR []


CLAIMED HE TRAVELLED THROUGH LAOS ON THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL AND ENTERED NVN VIA EITHER THE MU GIA PASS OR THE BAN KARAI PASS. HE WAS NOT CERTAIN WHICH ONE. THE AIR ATTACK OCCURRED SHORTLY AFTER HE ENTERED NVN, SO MUANG KWANG BINH SHOULD BE NEAR ONE OF THE TWO PASSES.) []

2. AT ABOUT 1600 HOURS ON THE SAME DAY, [] LEARNED FROM A NVN OFFICER THAT THE U.S. PILOT WHO HAD PARACHUTED FROM HIS PLANE IN THE AFTERNOON HAD ALREADY BEEN SHOT DEAD BY NVN SOLDIERS, BECAUSE HE HAD TRIED TO RESIST THE NVN SOLDIERS WHO RUSHED TO ARREST HIM. IN HIS ATTEMPT TO ESCAPE ARREST, THE U.S. PILOT KILLED TWO NVN SOLDIERS AND WOUNDED A THIRD. []

3. THE NVN SOLDIERS WHO WERE WITH [] AT THE TIME THE U.S. PILOT BAILED OUT OF HIS PLANE, TOLD [] THAT THE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wiles, M.B. - MIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COUNTRY: NORTH VIETNAM

DOI: MAY/JUNE 1972

SUBJECT: SIGHTING OF DOWNING OF U.S. AIRCRAFT IN NORTH
VIETNAM AND DEATH OF U.S. PILOT IN EARLY MAY 1972

ACQ:

SOURCE:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CIA-740104-172

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

29 October 1971

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Background Data Possibly Relevant to the
Current Vietnamese Communist Prisoner
Exchange Overture

1. The current Vietnamese Communist overtures on possible prisoner exchanges, covered in our memoranda of 27 and 28 October, seems to relate to the earlier BUTTERCUP activity that began in August 1967. We have checked the voluminous BUTTERCUP file and found three items of possible relevance. The pertinent traffic should be contained in your records, but in the interests of time and convenience we are repeating it here.

2. The January 1968 Letters. On 3 January 1968, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Richard Steadman was given five letters prepared in Washington for passage to five American citizens believed to be in VC hands. The pertinent message here is Secretary Rusk's cable to Ambassador Bunker transmitted on 3 January 1968 as

"Five letters to US personnel who may be held by VC being carried by Steadman for delivery to Calhoun. Steadman traveling with General William Depuy. ETA Saigon 1330 local January 4 on Braniff military charter flight 241. In view shortness of time suggest envelope be picked up from Steadman upon arrival Saigon.

982010-1647

0935

~~SECRET~~

"Letters are addressed to following US personnel:
(Dates shown are date of casualty, which may be same
as date of capture if men are in fact prisoners.)

John F. Conlon III, Capt. 79318, AF,
4 March 1966

David S. Demmon, SP4, 563 73 772, Army,
9 June 1965

William F. Eisenbraun, Capt. 04074803,
Army, 5 July 1965

Douglas K. Ramsey, Foreign Service Officer,
17 January 1966

"Eisenbraun and Ramsey are confirmed prisoners.
 Conlon, and Demmon are listed as missing in action,
but in each instance there is some reason to hope that
service man is actually prisoner of VC. Families unaware
letters being sent by this route."

~~SECRET~~

982010-1648

0936

~~SECRET~~

4. The February 1968 List. In January and February 1968 there was much discussion about giving the courier for passage to Tran Bach Dang a list of US prisoners whose release we desired as part of any exchange. The most important message here is Secretary Rusk's 7 February 1968 cable to Ambassador Bunker transmitted as []

"List of names to send to [] should be drawn from list of US prisoners we have identified as held by the VC (18 at present). Since [] has been specific with his lists we believe we should also be precise. We recognize problem of choosing among prisoners, and accordingly propose that we select those who have been held two years or longer. This would be a total of ten names: five officers, four EM, one civilian. There is a time gap of eight months between the most recent capture on the list of ten (January 1966) and the next most recent captures (August 1966). From released prisoners we know that the longer a man is held, the more likely he is to be seriously ill. In the absence of reliable information on the health of individual prisoners, a selection by duration of captivity appears to be fairest. Accordingly, the following list should be sent [] with the request that at least three of the named prisoners be released. Message should also state that we would particularly like to have any prisoners who may be seriously sick or injured, whether or not their names are on list. (Date in each case is date of capture, and should not be transmitted to VC.)

Begin list:

T/Sgt Samuel Adams, AF, 31 Oct 65
Capt. Donald Gilbert Cook, MC, 31 Dec 64
Capt. William Forbes Eisenbraun, Army,
6 July 65
Pvt. Robert Russell Garwood, MC, 28 Sept 65
Capt. Lawrence Thomas Holland, AF,
12 June 65
SP/4 James Henry McLean, Army, 9 Feb 65

982010-1649

1 0937

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

M/Sgt Thomas Moore, AF, 31 Oct 65
Douglas K. Ramsey, Civ., 17 Jan 66
Capt. James Nicholas Rowe, Army,
29 Oct 63
Capt. Floyd James Thompson, Army,
26 Mar 64

"Believe we should inform Thieu of plan to send list
and give him opportunity to provide similar list of ARVN
prisoners."

6. The January 1969 List. In a later BUTTERCUP development,
on 30 January 1969 Secretary Rogers sent Ambassador Bunker the
following list of twenty names "suitable to give to VC with request that
they release ten of them in exchange for the four they have requested."
[REDACTED] info copies to Dr. Kissinger and Secretary Laird):

TSGT Samuel Adams, 18554000, AF,
October 31, 1965
Michael D. Bengé, Civilian,
January 31, 1968
SGT Richard Gordon Burgess, 2084229, MC,
September 25, 1966
MAJ Donald Gilbert Cook, 072794, MC,
December 31, 1964

982010-1650

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

3 0938

~~SECRET~~

Gary Daves, Civilian, January 31, 1968
 1st LT David Ronald Devers, 05321911,
 Army. August 13, 1966

TSGT Charles Gale Dusing, 17203698,
 AF, October 31, 1965

SGT Edwin Russel Grissett, Jr., 1938579,
 MC, January 22, 1966

MAJ Lawrence Thomas Holland, 57577,
 AF, June 12, 1965

Philip W. Manhard, Civilian, January 31, 1968

SP4 James Henry McLean, 19722072, Army,
 February 9, 1965

MSGT Thomas Moore, 14268347, AF,
 October 31, 1965

SFC John Joseph O'Neill, 11212494, Army,
 August 13, 1966

Thomas W. Ragsdale, Civilian, January 31, 1968

Douglas Ramsey, Civilian, January 17, 1966

SP5 Edward Daniel Reilly, Jr., 23933241, Army,
 April 26, 1966

CAPT Floyd James Thompson, 05304076, Army,
 March 26, 1964

Eugene Weaver, Civilian, January 31, 1968


Charles Willis, Civilian, January 31, 1968

7. [redacted]


[redacted] and the above list of twenty names was never passed to the Communists. Three of the names on the February 1968 list of ten were not included in the January 1969 list of twenty: US Army Captain Rowe, who escaped on 31 December 1968, US Army Captain William E. Eisenbraun (also an addressee of one of the five January 1968 letters) and USMC Private Robert R. Garwood.

982010 - 1651

3 0939

~~SECRET~~ 

8. I am sending copies of this memorandum on an eyes only basis to the other three recipients of my 27 and 28 October memoranda, namely, Secretary Rogers, Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer.


Richard Helms
Director

cc: Secretary Rogers
Secretary Laird
Admiral Moorer ✓

- 6 -

~~SEC~~

982010-1652

0940

(b)(6)

S. Viet Recapture Firebase Near Laos

Wash. Post, 2 Apr 1971

SAIGON, April 2 (Friday) — Vietnamese were counted (AP) — In their third major assault around the base. He described South Vietnamese week, Communist forces took casualties as "light." Field reports indicated that about 20 nameless firebase near the Laos-Saigon soldiers had been killed and 25 wounded from tian border yesterday and among the two companies — shelled two other frontier posts. about 550 men that had been defending the base.

A Saigon military spokesman said early this morning, however, that South Vietnamese forces had retaken the base No. 6, in the central highlands six miles from the South Vietnam-Laos border. The South Vietnamese were aided by heavy American air support, including fresh raids by B-52 bombers.

There was no official comment on the claim being made in Communist broadcasts that some U.S. advisers had been captured in the assault on the base No. 6, which began Wednesday morning. 31 Mar 71

The spokesman, Lt. Col. Le Trung Hien, said that the bodies of more than 200 North Vietnamese regulars that had driven them out. See INDOCHINA, A22, Col. 1

The attack on Firebase No. 6 began at dawn yesterday, with North Vietnamese troops storming the outpost after a rocket and recoilless rifle barrage. The raiders were identified by the South Vietnamese military command as troops of the veteran 25th North Vietnamese regiment.

An estimated 2,000 enemy troops drove the South Vietnamese from the base, but the defenders spiked their artillery pieces, a government spokesman said, to prevent the North Vietnamese from using them. Later the two companies of defenders joined with reinforcements and close-in fighting continued.

U.S. B-52 bombers and American helicopter units joined the fighting. The U.S. Command said that two UH-1 helicopters were shot down.

The scene of the fighting is a few miles from Hill 873, focal point of the bloody three-week Dakto battle of November 1967, in which about 280 Americans and more than 1,300 North Vietnamese were killed.

DAMI-DOO-H comment:

Possibly the following Army personnel MIA 31 Mar 71:

YB 953 188, HHB, 1/92 Arty

Coord: YB 953 175, MACV Adv Tm 22

ASCI DISTRIBUTION	
TAG CAS DIV	2
TPMS	2
USAINTC (SID)	2
OCH FILES	2
DIAD-6C	2
DATE: 10 SEP 1971	

0107

NW 982007 - 128

FBI
IV 2 Apr 71

L 12

South Vietnam

PLAF IN KONTUM LAUNCH 'VIOLENT ATTACK' AGAINST ENEMY TROOPS

Liberation Radio (Clandestine) in Vietnamese to South Vietnam 1330 GMT
1 April 71 S

(TEXT) Developing their initiative on the battlefield at 0500 on 31 March, the Kontum liberation troops launched a violent attack against all the enemy troops stationed on Hill 1,001 in (? Ngoc To Ba), 40 kilometers northwest of the Kontum provincial capital. According to preliminary reports, after 5 hours of vigorous and relentless combat, which lasted even into the daytime, the Kontum liberation troops, braving fierce bombs and bullets, overran and seized complete control over Hill 1,001, completely annihilated one combined infantry-artillery battalion of the puppet army--which consisted of one battalion command post, three infantry companies, and one 105mm artillery company--and captured the U.S. advisers and many puppet prisoners. The liberation troops (words indistinct) and a large quantity of military equipment.

HQDA (DAMI-DOO-H) cmts: Hill 1001 was Fire Base #6 for ARVN. The captured US advisors reported above therefore are probably Army MIAs who were lost at Fire Base #6 on 31 Mar 71. (FS 6 coord: YB 935 185):

last seen approx YB 953 175

lost at YB 935 188

The above are the only Army losses for the date and location.
"Ngoc To Ba" appears to be another name for Kontum Prov

ACSI-DA DISTR	
TAG CAS DIV	2
TSG	
DIA	1
CIAD	1
CSAINTC	2
ACSI FILES	2
DATE: 26 JUL 1972	

0104

NW 982007 - 725

HANOI ACCLAIMS VICTORIES OF INDOCHINA LIBERATION FORCES

NHAN DAN on Quang Nam PLAF

Hanoi in Vietnamese to South Vietnam 0310 GMT 2 Apr 71 S

[NHAN DAN 2 April commentary "The Quang Nam and Kontum PLAF Have Fought Very Well.":

[Text] In emulating the Route 9 battlefront, the entire vast frontline has repeatedly attacked the enemy and won new feats of arms. According to LHA on the night of 27 March the Quang Nam PLAF unleashed attacks against the American troops' position at (Xa Duc), completely annihilating Battalion 1/46 (as well as the U.S. 196th Brigade of the Americal Division. The PLAF killed and wounded nearly 550 enemy troops and destroyed 4 x 105mm howitzers and many enemy barracks and fortifications. They seized many weapons, including 3 machineguns.

On the morning of 31 March the Kontum PLAF valiantly attacked the enemy in broad daylight on Hill 1001. The PLAF seized and completely annihilated the enemy's 1st Battalion, totally annihilated the puppet infantry-artillery battalion, captured 200 enemy advisers and puppet troops and seized many enemy weapons, radio equipment and war materials.

(Xa Duc) in Quang Nam Province and Hill 1001 in Kontum Province were the scenes of very outstanding annihilation battles by the PLAF. Quick attacks against the enemy were unleashed. They totally annihilated enemy troops, controlled the battlefield, captured enemy POWs and seized enemy weapons. These victorious battles show firm initiative on the battlefield, skillful combat coordination and the resourceful fighting methods with high combat efficiency of the PLAF in the two provinces in the central Trung Bo delta and highland.

We warmly acclaim the Quang Nam and Kontum combatants and compatriots who unleashed vigorous and accurate attacks against the enemy and who won resounding armed exploits. The battle at (Xa Duc) in Quang Nam Province was a decisive blow dealt to the American troops. It shook the White House and the Pentagon. The American aggressors sustained losses. They had to confess that they were the most serious losses in any one battle of the war.

In totally annihilating a U.S. battalion right in its own base during a 15 minute period and in completely controlling the battlefield the Quang Nam liberation combatants have proven their very valiant spirit, skill and good combat ability.

According to Western news agencies, following the PLAF's victory at (Xa Duc) on 27 March the Quang Nam PLAF on four occasions shelled the U.S. garrison at Da Nang and the U.S. base at Chu Lai. The PLAF simultaneously attacked the enemy at the My Dieu concentration camp, 32 kilometers southwest of Da Nang city annihilating the puppet pacification agents, regional and militia troops, and worked hard to free agents and spies.

HQDA (DAMI-DOO-H) cmts: Same info above was reported 1330 GMT, 1 Apr 71 by Liberation Radio in Vietnamese. Info indicates probable capture of two US Army MIAs lost at Fire Base #6 (AKA Hill 1001), YB 935 185:

vic coord YB 953 175

- vic coord YB 935 188

ACSI-DA DISTR	
TAG CAS DIV	2
TSG	1
DIA	1
CIAD	1
USAINTC	2
ACSI FILES	2
DATE: 26 JUL 1972	

0105

NW 982007 - 726

PAGE 001
TOT: 222112Z MAY 89~~SECRET~~

222112Z

TO: DIA//PW-MIA (COL JOE SCHLATTER).

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: INFORMATION ON A POW IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. THE INFORMATION IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH WAS OBTAINED ON 12 AND 17 APRIL 1989 [REDACTED] IN THE CAMBODIAN-THAI BORDER AREA. THE MATERIAL DESCRIBED WAS PASSED TO JCRC AND STONY BEACH AND THIS INFORMATION IS NOW BEING SENT FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

2. A [REDACTED] AFFILIATED WITH ONE OF THE CAMBODIAN RESISTANCE GROUPS PROVIDED A LETTER PURPORTED TO BE FROM AN AMERICAN HELD IN SAIGON. THE AMERICAN IS [REDACTED]

REPORTEDLY WAS A HELICOPTER PILOT WHOSE AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN IN APRIL 1969 WHILE FLYING FROM AN TRI TO THAI AN IN SOUTH VIETNAM. [REDACTED] A BLACK MAN, IS BEING HELD IN A JAIL IN SAIGON WITH THREE OTHER MEN, ALL CAUCASIANS. A PICTURE, SUPPOSEDLY OF [REDACTED] IS ATTACHED TO THE REPORT. THE LETTER FROM [REDACTED] DATED 23 JANUARY 1989, IS ADDRESSED TO [REDACTED] (MISPELLED) AND THE LETTER ITSELF IS FULL OF ERRORS.

3. [REDACTED]

4. CLASSIFIED BY SIGNER.>

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~CIA-890522-628B
~~SECRET~~

NND 982018

DIA SPECIAL
HANDLING REQUIRED~~SECRET~~DUJCS INFORMATION
SERVICE CENTER(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION
OR REPRODUCTION
PER DAM ONLY

COPY NUMBER-----

[REDACTED] LIED ABOUT WHO CONTACTED [REDACTED] HE ORIGINALLY TOLD OUR REPORTERS THAT HE HIMSELF HAD MET [REDACTED] DIRECTLY. WHEN HE MET AN AMERICAN FOR THE FIRST TIME, HE REPEATED THAT HE HAD MET [REDACTED] LATER HE CLAIMED THAT HE HAD NOT BUT THAT HIS FRIEND HAD. THE STORY WAS FULL OF HOLES THAT WAS DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE. HE LIED ABOUT HIS AGE [REDACTED] ABOUT THE PLACE WHERE [REDACTED] WAS MET [REDACTED] TOLD OUR REPORTER THAT HE MET HIM IN SAIGON/HO CHI MINH CITY), ETC. [REDACTED] ALSO CLAIMED HE KNEW THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE REMAINS OF: [REDACTED] (PREVIOUSLY REPORTED BY THE SAME [REDACTED] WHO TURNED OVER THE FIRST LETTER FROM [REDACTED]

9. AS OF 5 AUGUST 1987, JCRC AND STONY BEACH WERE TO BE PASSED THE FOLLOWING. VIETNAMESE LAND REFUGEE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CLAIMED HE ENGAGED IN SEARCHING FOR THE REMAINS OF AMERICANS AND HAD TURNED OVER AT LEAST SIX DOG TAGS TO THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. HE IS A FRIEND OF [REDACTED] WHO CLAIMED HE SAW AN AMERICAN IN PLEIKU. [REDACTED] PROVIDED DOG TAG INFORMATION ON: [REDACTED] (DOG TAG TURNED IN TO THE SRV MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ON 28 MAY 1985): [REDACTED]

JUNE 1987 [REDACTED] IS THE SOURCE OF [REDACTED] OF 6 AUGUST 1987 ON THE SRV ALLEGED SEARCH FOR AN AMERICAN IN PLEIKU IN MAY 1986 AND ON RUMORS AMONG SRV CIVILIANS THAT TURNING OVER AMERICAN REMAINS TO THE SRV GOVERNMENT WOULD LEAD TO RESETTLEMENT [REDACTED]

10. AS OF 18 AUGUST 1987, JCRC AND STONY BEACH WERE TO BE PASSED THE FOLLOWING:

[REDACTED] CLAIMED HIS FRIEND [REDACTED] HAD FOUND A CRASHED AMERICAN AIRCRAFT WITH AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF BODIES IN A FORESTED AREA OF DAO LOC, LAM DONG PROVINCE. ONE SKELETON WITH

~~SECRET~~
SECTION 4 OF 18
CITE [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: VIETNAMESE BOAT AND LAND REFUGEE SOURCE MIA/POW REPORTING FROM [REDACTED] THAILAND [REDACTED]

REFERENCE: NONE
IDENTIFICATION (THE BCI) WAS REMOVED. [REDACTED] SAID THAT HE SAW THE SKELETON AND IT WAS, FOR THE MOST PART, INTACT. THE LOCATION OF THE CRASH SITE IS "MARAGUI," ALSO CALLED "SANTA MARI." [REDACTED] WAS WILLING TO WRITE TO HIS FRIEND TO OBTAIN MORE INFORMATION. [REDACTED]

B. [REDACTED] WAS TO PASS A PHOTOGRAPH OF A DOG TAG RUBBING OF [REDACTED]

MCN=88089/09529 TOR=88089/2331Z

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] THIS NAME WAS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED IN APRIL 1987. ON THE PHOTOGRAPH WERE THE VIETNAMESE WORDS FOR "DAC LAY DISTRICT, 75 KILOMETERS NORTHWEST OF KONUM." ON THE REVERSE OF THE DOCUMENT WERE FIVE THAI NAMES, IN THAI WRITING, AND OTHER "CRYPTIC" INFORMATION. IT WAS NOT KNOWN IF THE THAI WRITING HAS ANY CONNECTION TO THE DOG TAG. THE PHOTOGRAPH WAS TO BE BROUGHT TO [REDACTED] THE NEXT WEEK.

C. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CLAIMED HE WAS CAPTURED BY PAVN IN QUANG TRI IN APRIL 1972. HE WAS SENT TO A REEDUCATION CAMP IN [REDACTED] [REDACTED] CLAIMED HE SAW ONE THAI, TWO SOUTH KOREANS, AND ABOUT 17 AMERICANS AT THE PRISON. THE AMERICANS WERE LATER MOVED TO THE HOA LO PRISON IN HANOI PRIOR TO THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS. NOTHING MORE WAS HEARD ABOUT THE AMERICANS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CLAIMED SECOND-HAND HEARSAY INFORMATION ON AMERICANS IN CAO BANG/LANG SON WHICH HE SUBSCRIBED TO HIS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SAID THAT HE MET WITH FORMER ARVN SPECIAL FORCES MEMBERS WHO WERE JAILED THERE. THEY TOLD [REDACTED] THAT AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF AMERICANS HAD BEEN KEPT THERE. [REDACTED] ALSO CLAIMED TO HAVE INFORMATION ABOUT A SET OF AMERICAN REMAINS IN THE POSSESSION OF A FRIEND. [REDACTED]

C. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CLAIMED AN ACQUAINTANCE NAMED [REDACTED] HAD TOLD HIM ABOUT 54 AMERICANS WHO WERE STILL BEING HELD IN NORTH VIETNAM (NFI). THE AMERICANS WERE IN AN UNKNOWN LOCATION; KEPT IN WOODEN HOUSES; FOUR WATCH TOWERS WERE AT THE SITE WHICH HAD BAMBOO FENCING. [REDACTED] CLAIMED [REDACTED] WAS PAID BY POLICEMEN TO REPAIR MACHINERY AND HAD GONE TO LAOS AND CAMBODIA TO WORK FOR THE SRV. ANOTHER FRIEND OF [REDACTED] WAS VERY INVOLVED IN [REDACTED] FOR AND HIDING AMERICAN REMAINS. [REDACTED] STATED THAT [REDACTED] FRIEND, A [REDACTED], HAD COLLECTED OVER 120 SETS OF REMAINS.

H. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] STATED THAT WHILE IN A REEDUCATION CAMP IN HOANG LIEN SON PROVINCE IN 1978 HE SAW AN AMERICAN WORKING ON ELECTRICAL MACHINERY FOR THE CAMP. [REDACTED] CLAIMED TO HAVE A FRIEND, [REDACTED] WHO LIVED IN SAIGON. [REDACTED] REPORTEDLY HAD A MILITARY ID CARD OF AN AMERICAN, AND WAS LOOKING FOR A WAY TO CONTACT THE AMERICANS ABOUT THE CARD.

I. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CLAIMED THAT IN JANUARY 1987 WHILE RIDING A BUS FROM SAIGON TO PHUONG LAM HE MET A FORMER ARVN RANGER WHO CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN KEPT IN PRISON IN NORTH VIETNAM WITH SOME AMERICANS. [REDACTED]

TAD=88090/0034Z

CDSN=MIA076

PAGE 3
292210Z MAR 88

NW 982015-3451

only page applicable
to filed.

Rest of msg. does
not apply.

3 179

NW 982015-3452

SECRET

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

COPY NUMBER

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R 021852Z MAY 88
FM CIA/DDO
TO DIA//VO-PW/MR WICK TOURISON

ZYUW RUFA11A6662 1231900

SECRET
SECTION 2 OF 2
CITE

SECRET

SUBJECT: VIETNAMESE REFUGEE SOURCE MIA/POM

REF: 29 MARCH 1988; SUBJECT: VIETNAMESE
REFUGEE SOURCE MIA/POM REPORTING FROM

1. AS FOLLOWUP TO REFERENCE, WE ARE FORWARDING THE
FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON

WHO HAVE PROVIDED VARIOUS TYPES OF LIVE SIGHTING, DOG
TAG/REMAINS REPORTING ON THE MIA/POM ISSUE BETWEEN NOVEMBER
1986 AND APRIL 1987. THE WERE INTERVIEWED AT THE
ALL INTERVIEWS
WERE CONDUCTED BY OUR WHICH PASSED THE
LEADS TO JCRC FOR FOLLOWUP ACTION ON THE DATES NOTED BELOW WITH
NO FURTHER FORMAL DISSEMINATION. YOUR COMMENTS ARE REQUESTED
IN ORDER TO HELP DETERMINE THE VALUE OF THIS REPORTING AND
WHETHER THERE ARE ANY DISCERNABLE PATTERNS IN THIS REPORTING
WHICH WE SHOULD BE MADE AWARE OF. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO USE
THIS INFORMATION WITH JCRC AND STONY BEACH.

2. ON 14 NOVEMBER 1986, JCRC WAS PASSED INFORMATION ON
VIETNAMESE CLAIMED HE SAW A
LIVE AMERICAN IN 1976 WITH GROUP 776 IN THE YEN BAI REEDUCATION
CAMP.

3. ON 19 NOVEMBER 1986, JCRC WAS PASSED DOG TAG
INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM DOG TAG
RUBBINGS WERE PROVIDED ON
THE RUBBINGS WERE GIVEN TO THE WIFE OF A SMUGGLER
IN EARLY NOVEMBER 1986 BY UNIDENTIFIED RESIDENTS IN KOMPONG
CHAM PROVINCE. THE RESIDENTS CLAIMED THEY HAD THE
CORRESPONDING REMAINS AND WOULD DELIVER THEM TO U.S.
AUTHITIES UPON RECEIPT OF A PROMISE TO RESETTLE 42 FAMILIES.

4. ON 21 JANUARY 1987, JCRC WAS PASSED THE FOLLOWING:

A. VIETNAMESE REFUGEE HAD ARRIVED AT A
BORDER CAMP WITH BONE FRAGMENTS AND DOG TAGS OF:

B. VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

CLAIMED THAT USAF PILOT HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN OVER
HANOI ON 19 JANUARY 1971. THEY CLAIMED THAT THROUGH VARIOUS
INTERMEDIARIES THEY HAD CONTACT WITH WHO WAS BEING HELD
IN A JAIL IN THE U MINH THUONG, KIEN GIANG PROVINCE. THEY
PRODUCED A LETTER WHICH THEY CLAIMED WAS FROM (THE
LETTER APPEARS BOGUS BUT WILL BE DELIVERED TO YOU TODAY.) BOTH
SAID THAT CLAIMED THERE WERE 186 AMERICANS
BEING HELD AT THE JAIL IN THE U MINH THUONG. A FORMER
ARVN CAPTAIN ALSO CLAIMED TO HAVE KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE REMAINS
OF AMERICAN POWS IN THE AREA.

VIETNAMESE REFUGEE
A FORMER GVN POLICEMAN FOR TEN YEARS CLAIMED HIS

ACTION DIA/SPEC(10)

CIA-880502-605

MCA-AR123/05175 TOR-88123/1900Z JAD-88123/2012Z

CDSN=MIA941

PAGE 1
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004

HELE THE REMAINS OF TWO AMERICANS AT BA CHILL, BINH
THANH DISTRICT, DONG NAI PROVINCE. CLAIMED THAT TWO YEARS
AGO HE SENT DOG TAGS OF THESE REMAINS TO A RELATIVE IN
IN EARLY 1986, TWO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SRV
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR CAME TO'S FAMILY TO TAKE THEIR
BIOGRAPHY, PICTURES AND FINGERPRINTS. ASSUMED THAT THIS
VISIT WAS IN RELATION TO HIS SENDING THE DOG TAGS TO THE U.S.
ALSO CLAIMED THAT AN OLDER MAN HAD THE REMAINS OF
FIVE AMERICANS AT/NEAR CHU LAI AIR BASE.

D. VIETNAMESE REFUGEE
CLAIMED A FORMER ARVN CAPTAIN IN SAIGON HAD THE REMAINS
AND DOG TAGS OF:

E. VIETNAMESE REFUGEE
CLAIMED HER HAD SEEN A LARGE GROUP
OF AMERICANS BEING HELD IN HA NAM NINH WHILE HE WAS IN
REEDUCATION.

5. ON 28 JANUARY 1987, JCRC WAS PASSED THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM VIETNAMESE REFUGEE
CLAIMED HE KNEW THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE REMAINS
OF FOUR AMERICANS:

6. ON 17 FEBRUARY 1987, JCRC WAS PASSED INFORMATION ON:

WITH TWO SMALL BONE
FRAGMENTS. JCRC ADVISED THAT THE NAMES
DID NOT RELATE TO ANY CASE OF INTEREST; HOWEVER,
THE NAMES
WERE ASSOCIATED WITH AN EARLIER REPORTED SCAM WHEREIN THESE
THREE WERE NAMED TO JCRC AS ALLEGED POW'S IN VIETNAM. FOR THIS
REASON, JCRC WAS INTERESTED IN ANYTHING FURTHER ABOUT THE
REPORT. JCRC ALSO ADVISED THAT CORRELATED T
WHO WAS LOST IN A URIN CRASH SOUTH OF
QUANG TRI ON 2 MAY 1972 WITH PARTIAL REMAINS RECOVERED TO

SECRET
FINAL SECTION OF 2
CITE

SECRET

SUBJECT: VIETNAMESE REFUGEE SOURCE MIA/POM
REPORTING FROM

SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISH IDENTITY. DID NOT CORRELATE T
ANY CASE OF INTEREST.

7. ON 16 MARCH 1987, JCRC WAS PASSED THE FOLLOWING ON

PROVINCE). CLAIMED
SECOND HAND INFORMATION ABOUT THE SIGHTING OF A NUMBER OF LI
AMERICANS IN HOANG LIEN SON PROVINCE, PRESUMABLY DURING THE
LATE 1970'S. THE AMERICANS LIVED IN UNDERGROUND SHELTERS AND
WERE DESCRIBED AS HAVING "SHAGGY BEARDS." HAD THE ADDR
IN HON OF HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW WHO HAD PASSED INFORMATION
HIM ALSO CLAIMED HIS AUNT KNEW SOMEONE IN CENTRAL VIET

ON 3 APRIL 1987 JCRC WAS PASSED THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION WHICH HAD BEEN OBTAINED FROM TWO CAMBODIAN BORD
THEY PROVIDED DOG TAG INFORMATION ON:

SECRET

CODE INFO
SERVICE

COPY NUMBER 19

9. AS OF 8 APRIL 1987, JCRC WAS PASSED THE FOLLOWING DOG TAG INFORMATION FROM UNNAMED VIETNAMESE REFUGEES WITH NO FURTHER IDENTIFYING DATA. JCRC ADVISED THAT NONE OF THE NAMES MATCHED THEIR RECORDS. DOG TAG DATA WAS PROVIDED ON:

THERE WERE ALSO SOME BONES.

10. ON 15 APRIL 1987, JCRC WAS PASSED THE FOLLOWING:

A. VIETNAMESE REFUGEE

CLAIMED HAD BURIED AN AMERICAN WHOSE F-105 WAS SHOT DOWN ABOUT 1966 AT HON ME, KIEN GIANG PROVINCE. WAS AT

B.

CLAIMED HEARSAY FROM A WHO CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN IMPRISONED WITH A NUMBER (ABOUT 60) OF AMERICANS IN A PRISON CAMP ALONG THE LAO BORDER. TOLD THAT HE WAS WITH THE AMERICANS FOR ABOUT ONE YEAR. WAS AT

C. VIETNAMESE REFUGEE

CLAIMED FORMER ARVN LIEUTENANT COLONEL A RESIDENT OF WHO WAS HOLDING THE REMAINS OF AN AMERICAN. WAS AT

D. VIETNAMESE REFUGEE

CLAIMED AN AMERICAN HELICOPTER WAS SHOT DOWN IN 1974 IN THE DUEN HAI AREA, LONG TOAN DISTRICT, WITH TWO AMERICANS ON BOARD. ONE DROWNED IN THE BIEN GIA RIVER AND THE OTHER WAS "EXCHANGED." ALSO CLAIMED HE HAD GIVEN A DOG TAG TO HIS COUSIN BEFORE LEAVING VIETNAM

E. VIETNAMESE REFUGEE

CLAIMED THAT WHILE IMPRISONED AT PHAN DANG LUU PRISON IN HCMC ANOTHER INMATE TOLD HIM OF THE DEATH OF FIVE AMERICANS. INMATE SAW THE FIVE AMERICANS BURIED IN 1970 IN AN ABANDONED WELL IN MUI LON, CU CHI DISTRICT. ACCORDING TO THE BODIES WERE STILL THERE AS OF 1985. WAS AT THE VIETNAMESE

11.

12. DELL OMB DRV BT

COPY #10 A Sent to VO
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COUNTRY CAMBODIA/SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI EARLY JULY 1973
SUBJECT SIGHTING OF THREE U.S. MILITARY PRISONERS OF WAR
IN PREY VENG PROVINCE, CAMBODIA

ACQ VIETNAM, CAN THO (1 AUGUST 1973)

SOURCE

1. THREE CAUCASIAN U.S. MILITARY PRISONERS OF WAR, CLAD IN ONE-PIECE FLIGHT SUITS, ARRIVED IN KOMPONG BAREY HAMLET (WT387317) IN PREY VENG PROVINCE, CAMBODIA, ON 8 JULY 1973. ACCORDING TO A VIET CONG (VC) COMMO-LIAISON CADRE OF THE AREA, THE PRISONERS WERE GUARDED BY THE VC C-10 COMPANY AND WERE BEING TRANSFERRED FROM KANDAL PROVINCE, CAMBODIA, ACROSS PREY VENG PROVINCE TO AN UNIDENTIFIED LOCATION NEAR LOC NINH, SOUTH VIETNAM. THE CADRE SAID THAT

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THE PRISONERS WERE AIRMEN WHO HAD BEEN DOWNED SOUTH OF PHNOM PENH CITY IN EARLY JULY 1973 AND THAT THEY WOULD BE HELD NEAR LOC NINH FOR EXCHANGE AT SOME UNSPECIFIED DATE.

2. THE PRISONERS AND THEIR ESCORT PASSED THROUGH KOMPONG BAREY HAMLET AND WERE THEN HELD FOR TWO DAYS IN A BASE CAMP OF THE K-24 SECURITY ZONE, 700 METERS NORTHWEST OF KOMPONG BAREY. MEMBERS OF THE VC C-10 COMPANY MOVED WITH THE PRISONERS TOWARD THE NORTHEAST ON ABOUT 11 JULY. COMMENT: NO INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE ON THE VC C-10 COMPANY. THE K-24 SECURITY ZONE MAY REFER TO EITHER KI SECTOR 24 OR THE OPERATING AREA OF KHMER INSURGENT (KI) BATTALION K-24 WHICH WAS SUBORDINATE TO THE KI PREY VENG PROVINCE COMMITTEE AND RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY IN THE PROVINCE IN LATE 1972.)

3. COMMENT: FOLLOWING IS THE JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER (JCRC) EVALUATION OF THIS REPORT: THE INFORMATION AS PRESENTED PRECLUDES ANY DEFINITE CORRELATION. SINCE EARLY 1973 ONLY TWO AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN LOST IN CAMBODIA.

WERE FLYING AN F4E IN THE AREA OF YA153151 WHEN THEIR AIRCRAFT DISAPPEARED. BOTH MEN ARE CARRIED AS MISSING IN ACTION.

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[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

WERE FLYING AN F4E IN THE AREA OF XA723037 WHEN THEIR AIRCRAFT
DISAPPEARED. THE CAUSES OF THE DISAPPEARANCES OF THE AIRCRAFT
ARE NOT KNOWN.)

4. [REDACTED] DISSEM: DEFENSE ATTACHE FOR JCRC REPRESENTATIVE
IN SAIGON: SENT TO CINCPAC (FOR CINCPAC AND POLAD ONLY) USSAG
AND VIENTIANE (FOR JCRC REPRESENTATIVE ONLY).

REPORT CLASS ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B(2).
IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

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Intelligence Information Report

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Classified by Recorded Reporting Officer. Exempt from Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 35 (1)(2)
 Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification.

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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REPORT NO. [REDACTED]


DATE DISTR. 12 OCTOBER 1972

COUNTRY - NORTH VIETNAM
 DOI - AUGUST OR SEPTEMBER 1967
 SUBJECT - SIGHTING OF A U.S. PRISONER OF WAR IN HUU QUAN
 VILLAGE, HAIPHONG MUNICIPALITY

ACQ

- VIETNAM, SAIGON (26 SEPTEMBER, 2 OCTOBER 1972) CIA #

SOURCE



1. [REDACTED] SIGHTED AN AMERICAN PRISONER OF WAR (POW) IN HUU QUAN VILLAGE, THUY NGUYEN DISTRICT, HAIPHONG MUNICIPALITY, NORTH VIETNAM (NVN), AT ABOUT 1500 HOURS ONE DAY IN AUGUST OR SEPTEMBER 1967 THE PILOT'S PLANE HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN ABOUT TWO KILOMETERS

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STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CBS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)
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FROM WHERE SIGHTED THE PILOT.

2. ON THE DAY OF SIGHTING, [REDACTED] WHO WAS AT HOME IN TAN DUCOC VILLAGE, ONE KILOMETER FROM HUU QUAN VILLAGE, HEARD THE SOUNDS OF BOMBING AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY (AAA) FIRE AT ABOUT 1400 HOURS. AN HOUR LATER, [REDACTED] AND OTHER PEOPLE FROM THE VILLAGE RUSHED TO HUU QUAN VILLAGE TO SEE THE CAPTURED PILOT. THEY NOTICED THAT TWO OUT OF EIGHT 120MM AAA GUNS IN HUU QUAN VILLAGE WERE DAMAGED AND THAT 13 MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT COMPANY IN THE VILLAGE HAD BEEN KILLED. THE VILLAGERS WERE TRYING TO BEAT THE POW, BUT SOME NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) SOLDIERS EXPLAINED TO THEM THAT THE POW WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO THE NVN GOVERNMENT. THE SPECTATORS WERE TOLD THAT THE POW HAD SHOT AND SERIOUSLY WOUNDED A MILITIAMAN IN HUU QUAN VILLAGE AND HAD BEEN BEATEN UP BY THE OTHER MILITIAMEN. AT ABOUT 1530 HOURS, TWO NVA SOLDIERS ARMED WITH AK RIFLES AND A SOVIET WITH A CAMERA ARRIVED IN A SOVIET-MADE VEHICLE FROM HAIPHONG CITY TO TAKE PICTURES AND PICK UP THE POW.

3. THE PILOT HAD A HEAD WOUND AND WAS COVERED WITH SAND AND DIRT. HE WORE BLUE PANTS, A WHITE, BLOODSTAINED SHIRT AND NO SHOES. HE WAS ABOUT 35 YEARS OLD, 1.80 METERS IN HEIGHT, ABOUT 50 KILOS IN WEIGHT AND HAD A RUDDY COMPLEXION. HIS ATTITUDE WAS HOSTILE. HIS MAUSER PISTOL HAD BEEN TAKEN BY MILITIAMEN IN HUU QUAN VILLAGE. THE POW WAS BELIEVED TO BE A FIELD GRADE OFFICER BECAUSE HIS PARACHUTE WAS RED.

4. [REDACTED] COMMENT: DURING INTERROGATION, [REDACTED] WAS SHOWN THE JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY CENTER (JPRC) ALBUM OF MISSING AND CAPTURED PERSONNEL IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. BUT HE WAS UNABLE TO MAKE ANY IDENTIFICATION. THE JPRC, HOWEVER, EVALUATES THE INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT AS FOLLOWS: "THIS REPORT CORRELATES QUITE WELL WITH JPRC RECORDS ON [REDACTED] WHO WAS DOWNED BY AAA AT THE LOCATION GIVEN BY THIS REPORT AT [REDACTED]"

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PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

1350 HOURS ON 21 SEPTEMBER 1967. [REDACTED] IS CURRENTLY

CARRIED AS CONFIRMED CAPTURED BY THE U.S. NAVY.")

5. [REDACTED] DISSEM: EMBASSY USMACV JPRC 7TH AIR FORCE USARV
NAVFORV COMSEVENTHFLT CTF 77 525TH MI GP 7602ND AIG OSI AT
SAIGON: SENT TO CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC [REDACTED] VIENTIANE.

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER.

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652.

EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (1) (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE
OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

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~~SECRET~~

13 June 1972

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Sighting of U.S. Prisoner of War, Quang Binh Province,
North Vietnam

1. At about 1800 hours on 10 April 1972, four women were observed carrying an American on a stretcher in the vicinity of XD978834 in Vinh Linh District, Quang Binh Province, North Vietnam, apparently in the direction of an ambulance parked nearby. According to the women, the American was a U.S. pilot who had bailed out of his aircraft and was captured in the jungle west of Vinh Linh District on the morning of 9 April. One of the women said he was a captain, and that he had been wounded by shrapnel from the artillery shell which hit his aircraft, but it was only a flesh wound which would heal in two or three weeks.

She said he had been given first aid treatment immediately after his capture. Observed from a distance of about one meter, the pilot was wearing a gray flight suit and appeared to be about 70 inches tall, 27 or 28 years old, with brown curly hair and a dark complexion. His weight could not be estimated, but the women complained that he was heavy to carry. No rank or insignia was visible.

2. [] Comment: When shown pictures provided by the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) of pilots missing in action in early April 1972, [] stated that the prisoner most resembled [] but the prisoner's complexion was darker. According to JPRC, however, [] before [] was missing in action. The closest correlation with [] information is [] who is listed as missing in action on 7 April at XD195655.)

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18 Apr

3. From 2 to 10 April, the 102nd Regiment of the 308th North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Division was camped near the Nui Thi Ve high point (XD936881) in Quang Binh Province for rest before continuing its infiltration into South Vietnam. On 10 April, the Regiment broke camp and traveled by truck to XD978839 along Route 193, where a new road was being constructed west-southwest, through a plantation, and then south parallel to Route 193. An ambulance was parked at XD978839, where the troops left the trucks to travel by foot, apparently waiting for the women to bring the U.S. prisoner.

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IV. 20 Dec 72

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SOUTH VIETNAM

The Vietnamization program is on the brim of the abyss of complete defeat. Developing highly their determination to fight and win, and persistently stepping up their struggle on the military, political and diplomatic fronts, our people will surely smash all the dark and crafty U.S.-puppet schemes and lead the anti-U.S. national salvation resistance to complete victory.

ALLEGED CHRISTMAS MESSAGES, INTERVIEWS OF POW'S

Alleged [] Message

Liberation Radio [Clandestine] in English to American Servicemen in South Vietnam
2330 GMT 17 Dec 72 B--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Christmas message home attributed to POW []]

[Text] [Follows recorded male voice with American accent]

From: [] camp of detention for U.S. servicemen
captured in South Vietnam.

To: []

My dear family and fiancée,

This holiday season marks the third one that we have been separated. I sincerely hope that it is the last. The fond memories of the beautiful Christmases we've had provide a constant source of joy and strength to me.

I am in good health and my spirits are fine. Christmas here will be celebrated with a special meal and the singing of our favorite carols.

I want all of you to have as an enjoyable holiday season as possible. Please have an extra strong cup of eggnog in my absence.

Relay to all my friends and relatives--if you see them--for me and tell them I miss them very much.

[], my faith and love to you remains constant, and remember, if you need anything, just ask my parents.

Merry Christams and happy New Year to you all. I love you all very much. []

[] [recording ends]

Alleged [] Message

Liberation Radio [Clandestine] in English to American Servicemen in South Vietnam
1430 GMT 18 Dec 72 B--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Christmas message home attributed to POW []]

[Text] [Follows recorded male voice with American accent]

To: []

[] captured (?sry) in South Vietnam April 24th,
1968.

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IV. 20 Dec 72

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SOUTH VIETNAM

Dear Mom and Dad and family.

I am very happy to have been given this opportunity to wish you all a Merry Christmas and a happy New Year.

It's been a long time and I (?love and) miss you very much. [phrase indistinct] that I haven't been wounded. I'm in good health, good spirits and am being treated very well.

I was very surprised when (?you wrote me from Missouri saying that) my sister is now married and that [] has a baby girl. Wish them both the best of luck for me.

How is the rest of the family, Mom and Dad? You are both getting on in age--(?you know), but please take care of yourselves and keep your health.

I wish I was there with you this Christmas, but I'm sure you realize the circumstances that are keeping me from you. What are you now doing? I am very anxious to hear from all of you so write when you can. Enjoy yourselves this Christmas, and don't worry about (?me as we will) also celebrate. Decorations [words indistinct] and everything that (?deals with) Christmas but you, my family, but maybe next Christmas.

Again, merry Christmas and a happy New Year. With all my love (?and wishes for) continued happiness and successful lives. [] [recording ends]

Letter Attributed to []

LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY [Clandestine] in English to East Europe and the Far East
1611 GMT 19 Dec 72 B--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] South Vietnam December 19 LPA--Following is a letter of captured U.S. serviceman [] and his other loved ones:

Dearest Mom, Dad, []

Hi, I hope you're all fine. I'm well taken care of. We always have a nice Christmas here. Still only one letter from you, dated 22 May 72, one from [] 30 August 72. When you write, include pictures ok? Sorry Mom, '72 hasn't been so good here. It's meant renewed bombings and many more needless deaths and the President threw away a good chance to get America out of the war with what little honor our nation has left. To me it shows his lack of concern for everyone. His talk of Thieu opposing the peace agreement is a farce to prolong the war. America runs Saigon, controls and pays for the whole mess. It's all a sickening business. The people don't have freedom and our government is keeping it that way. I hope you can understand by now who is prolonging my detention.

I miss you all very much, want to see a picture of [] and cousins, to see how they've grown. [] use all ten lines, don't be proud. Hope your doing fine. Lots I would like to talk to you about. Tell your mom and dad hi for me. Hope the dry cleaners is doing good. Say hi to [] and family. Be sure to say hi to [] want to say much to them. All of you please work hard for peace!

Merry Christmas and a happy New Year.

Love and miss all of you.

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IV. 20 Dec 72

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SOUTH VIETNAM

Interview Attributed to [REDACTED]

Liberation Radio [Clandestine] in English to American Servicemen in South Vietnam
1430 GMT 18 Dec 72 B--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Radio correspondent's interview allegedly with POW [REDACTED]]

[Text] Our correspondent has interviewed captured GI [REDACTED] being under the care of South Vietnam National Front for Liberation and Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam.

Here now is [REDACTED] [Follows recorded male voice with American accent]

I was a crew chief of an army helicopter which was shot down by local guerrillas of Quang Tri Province. I think that the main thing on my mind was how I was going to be treated when I was captured. I had been told before my capture that I would probably be shot or tortured if I was ever taken alive by any guerrillas.

This fear soon faded when I was given a cup of tea shortly after my capture. I understood one basic concept of guerrilla warfare, and that was that an insurgent movement cannot be successful without popular support. I had always felt that as such the average Vietnamese was caught in the middle. I lived in Saigon for 11 months--that included the time of the 1967 elections--and I felt that people there didn't really support the government. It was too far above them--I mean, it didn't seem that the government communicated with the people. On the other hand, I don't believe the people really cared for American presence either.

The average GI I knew didn't understand the people and the people didn't seem like they wanted to accept anything American as far as culture, lifestyle, and things like that. Although some did accept it, they gave me that impression that I think it was out of economic necessity rather than trust. After my capture, I felt conclusive proof that the maxim on guerrilla warfare was true in Vietnam. We moved freely through villages, and at one point several hundred meters from a firebase without being given away. The people seemed happy to see the captives. I was able to understand this later when I learned that the people of Vietnam do not consider the American people as their enemy, only those who make and promote the war.

After nearly 5 years of captivity--I was captured in early February of 1968--I have come to understand something of Vietnamese history, culture and way of life. I realize that it is not easy for those Americans who are isolated from the realities of Vietnam to understand the people and their struggle. But I'm sure if they had been in my place, most would share my view that our involvement is, to say the least, not in the interests of the people here.

From the papers and news about the economic and social conditions at home, the division in our society, and drugs and so on, it is obvious that the war hasn't done America any good either. It is truly a different world here than what I had known in the states. The people have different values and different moral standards in general, and of course they are in a revolutionary ethic which causes them to view problems and events from an completely different viewpoint than Americans.

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IV. 20 Dec 72

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SOUTH VIETNAM

The main thing about the Vietnamese character that stands out in my mind is their sense of humanity and responsibility, not only to their struggle for independence in Vietnam but for the struggle of all people in the world who are fighting for independence and social justice.

I would like to say that I don't feel my captivity has been wasted time, but a very rich experience. I have received very humane treatment, which I know was not always accorded to prisoners taken by ARVN's and U.S. forces, and I think it should serve as the clear proof of the NFL and PRG's just position and humane and lenient policies.

As I said, I lived in Saigon for nearly a year. President Nixon claims that the government there is the only legal and representative one in South Vietnam. But then he considers armed aggression from 10,000 miles away--bombing dikes, using toxic chemicals and so forth--legal acts as well. And of course there are those who are represented by this regime--a handful of generals and so-called politicians--who are more concerned with U.S. dollars than with their own people.

On the other hand, I can say from my own experience that the NFL and PRG represent the true interests of the South Vietnamese. This government in fact exists because of the support it has from the people. In [about a half-minute interruption in the recording] more members of the Georgetown conference of nonaligned countries have recognized the PRG as the legal representative of the South Vietnamese people. I think this is clear proof that the PRG is the real legal government of South Vietnam. [recording ends]

PLAF PAPER HAILS SAIGON AMMO DUMP SABOTAGE

Liberation Radio [Clandestine] in Vietnamese to South Vietnam 1000 GMT 17 Dec 72 S

[QUAN GIAI PHONG newspaper commentary: "Warmly Hail the Saigon PLAF for Their Victory at Thanh Tuy Ha"]

[Text] For a long time now the U.S.-puppets have concentrated tens of thousands of tons of bombs and shells at Thanh Tuy Ha to supply their forces throughout the country. Recently this strategic ammo dump complex was enlarged to contain more bombs and shells sent from the United States within the framework of the Nixon clique's dark scheme to intensively strengthen reserve sources for the puppet army to prolong the war and sabotage peace. Therefore the U.S.-puppets took strict measures to protect the Thanh Tuy Ha ammo dump complex by setting up many closely woven barbed wire fences and using the most modern electronic devices, spotlights, bloodhounds and many puppet units. With these measures the U.S.-puppets believed no one could get into the ammo dump complex.

Yet, on 14 December Thanh Tuy Ha once again has shaken public opinion at home and abroad. The heroic Saigon PLAF attacked the Thanh Tuy Ha ammo dump complex, destroying tens of thousands of tons of bombs and shells, killing or wounding hundreds of enemy defense troops and turning almost all of the enemy's housing facilities and equipment into heaps of steel and bricks. This is the third and biggest explosion at Thanh Tuy Ha since last August.

All our armed forces and people are greatly encouraged by and proud of the bravery, intelligence and creativeness of the Saigon liberation troops who cut deep into and staged a dangerous attack on one of the enemy's most important positions, his storage depots.

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IV. 24 Dec 72

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SOUTH VIETNAM

Our toilet was out of order and the excrement invaded our places. But we could do nothing to it, the tiled roofs of the cells were in complete disrepair and had many holes through which rain, sand and wind were free to pour down. The floor that we lay on was very rough and filthy for it had not been repaired nor washed for years.

That is the place where we lived in the first 4 months and is now used to keep women prisoners.

There are also cells called "cow-sheds." They [were] built by the (puppet) administration in 1970 close to a former cow-shed dating back to the French time, hence their name. The "cow-sheds" are no different from the "tiger cages" except that they are hotter and larger, each keeping 17 persons. The shackles and food ration in a "cow-shed" is exactly the same as in a "tiger cage."

Here is the daily ration allotted us by the administration.

This ration has been confirmed to have been served to over 8,000 inmates of all kinds: Prisoners of war, political prisoners, common law prisoners, women and children, and more than 2,300 other people awaiting pre-trial or "under investigation."

First of all, we want to make clear that our only and uncharged food was decayed dried fish. Our ration was decided by the prison directorate and maintained at strict minimum. As for its quality, it is everybody's guess. The gaolers had many ways to keep us always hungry. One of their methods is to allow a very short time for our meals (3 minutes at the "tiger cages"). Obviously, nobody can eat their fill in such a time-limit, even if there were enough rice for them.

The second method is to cook the rice with a lot of water so the prisoners are quick to satisfy their hunger but also are quick to be hungry again, often 2 or 3 hours after the meal. The third method is to mix sand to our rice. If the prisoners protested and asked for improvement of their ration, the prison authorities retaliated by cutting further the rice ration. This is a cruel method to suppress any voice of protest. What is more, as you can see, rice and soup cannot be gulped down alone without some salted food. In our case, this salted food consisted entirely of dried fish which could hardly deserve this calling because it was so bitter that the prisoners here had called it "quinine fish." People in South Vietnam used to fertilize their paddy fields with this fish. Even the poorest people never eat it. In fact, it is difficult to find a proper word to describe this horrible food. Whenever dried fish was cheap, the gaolers bought a lot of it and stored it from one month to another, sometimes for as long as 6 months. So it became more rotten. We would be lucky when there was some table oil to fry the fish with. When there was no oil, it was cooked in water and when there was not enough fish for all they poured in as much water as was necessary. Sometimes, the little amount of fish was carbonized through over-cooking.

But that was our only alternative, and we gulped down the rice with a feeling as bitter as the fish itself. Beside fried fish, there was the pungent fish pickle. It was diluted in so much water that we only found some tiny decayed fish at the bottom of the pot. Whenever they brought this fish pickle into our cell, everyone felt like vomiting. All we wished then was to eat our rice with some grains of salt or some spoonfuls of sea water. As for salt, the gaolers gave us a bit of it when they were in high spirits. But most of the time, they beat us when we asked for some grains of salt. Once, on May 16, one of our prison mates was summoned to the director's office and beaten black and blue after he asked for some salt.

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IV. 14 Dec 72

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SOUTH VIETNAM

All along the months we were in the tiger cage, never did we see a single leaf of vegetable except in the lunar New Year festival (which they call day of national love). In those days we received each a piece of fat just the size of a fingertip. This was because the piece of fat had "evaporated" when it came through the wardens and "men of order." Due to such a ration, our teeth became all shaky. To solve this problem, we had to eat leaves, worms and even lizards that happened to come into our cells. When we had some "protein" food of that kind, we divided it among ourselves and gave the bigger shares to the weakest among us. On the way back to our cells from the torture rooms, we picked any grass and leaves to supplement the rice, dried fish and pickle.

We were given two meals a day. Our lunch was served at 8 am and dinner at 2 pm. We were given drinking water at meal time, and each time only one third of a milk can. So, when we felt too thirsty, we had to drink our mates' urine. In the first months of our detention, in order to maintain our struggle in the prison, we had to drink water from the toilet regardless of its consequence. Most of us consequently caught diseases such as dysentery and typhoid, to say nothing of the [words indistinct] by the savage beatings. Even as we were sick, it was not easy to get the gaolers [to] change our meal to rice soup. A (?portion) of rice soup was very meagre and usually consisted of barely [words indistinct] spoonfuls. [Words indistinct] who wanted to change his diet into rice soup must warn the authorities many hours, even days, in advance. If a sick prisoner was too hungry and was caught sharing the soup with another sick inmate, he would receive a lot of blows. One day in September 1969, one of our prison mates was bludgeoned as he was eating in a bowl of soup although he had protested loudly "why beat me when I'm so ill?" The warden replied curtly: "If you're ill, we will beat you to death."

In a word, we were fed less than domestic animals, to say (?nothing) of the daily brutal beatings. Nevertheless, we went through it for more than 13 months because we dared stand up against the bestialities of the gaolers at Poulo Condor.

This animal-like life was part of the policy worked out by Le Canh Ve, governor of the island, called "self-reliant economy" policy and adopted by him in 1964 with a view to doing away with the regime of stewards and monopolizing the distribution of food. Thus, Le Canh Ve lived in luxury on the suffering and hunger of more than 8,000 prisoners. Any demand of the prisoners for better living conditions--which was in fact a direct jeopardy to his interests--was stamped out ruthlessly. In the mainland, when the people in a certain province denounced their governor's corruption and exploitation, they could sometimes (?win) success and the governor, in the new political situation of South Vietnam at present, could not easily take retaliatory measures. But here in Con Son things are different. The governor of Con Son would conveniently brand such actions of the masses as "communist revolts" or "prison riots" to drown the struggle in blood. Therefore, he could carry on his brutal rule from 1 year to another without having [to] face censure from either the Saigon administration or public opinion.

U.S. NAVY REFUSES TO ADMIT WARRINGTON HIT

Liberation Radio [Clandestine] in Vietnamese to South Vietnam 1330 GMT 12 Dec 72 S

[Commentary by Nguoi Ban Tia [The Sniper]: "A Meaningless Reason"]

[Text] As VNA reported, the big U.S. destroyer Warrington, after intruding into the territorial waters of the northern part of our country to carry out sabotage activities, was appropriately punished on 17 July by the Quang Binh armed forces and people, who hit it and seriously damaged it.

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IV. 20 Dec 72

K 20

NORTH VIETNAM

Throughout the night, one air attack alert followed the other. The fighter-bombers flew over the city often at low altitude, and with each explosion everything in the center of the capital shook.

From the APP office located in the center of the city, one could see giant mushrooms of fire growing wherever the Americans dropped their deadly bombs.

However, this brutal resumption of the bombings was unable to shake the civilian population's awesome courage and traditional calm. Without losing control, children and adults stood by the individual and collective shelters when an alert began to be sounded, and went inside when the first explosions began.

According to a reliable witness, the bombs reached a district 4 kms from the center of Hanoi, where the Dach Mai hospital is located.

HANOI RELEASES CHRISTMAS MESSAGES ATTRIBUTED TO POW'S

Alleged [] Message

Hanoi in English to American Servicemen Involved in the Indochina War 1300 GMT
18 Dec 72 B--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Christmas message home attributed to POW []]

[Text] [Follows recorded male voice with American accent]

From: []

To: []

[introduction repeated]

Dear []

Hi. The camp authorities have allowed us to write another Christmas letter. Haven't got much to report since my activities here have been pretty much the same routine.

You may not believe this, but since I've been here I've done some touring of Hanoi. I visited a temple and a pagoda and also saw the bomb-damaged French Legation. Some of the other prisoners in my group have visited the revolutionary museum and a collective farm near here. They also saw some bomb damage.

During my trips through the streets of Hanoi, I have always been impressed by the way the Vietnamese carry on business and life as usual in spite of the bombing.

We are making some Christmas decorations in an attempt to brighten this place up. We are working on a small Christmas program also.

Hey, only 10 more shopping days till Christmas and I haven't even started my shopping yet. I haven't received any mail yet. Most reliable way to write here is through [] I'm most anxious to hear some news from home. Love, [] [recording ends]

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IV. 20 Dec 72

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NORTH VIETNAM

Alleged Message

Hanoi in English to American Servicemen Involved in the Indochina War 1300 GMT
17 Dec 72 B--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Christmas message attributed to POW

[Text] [Follows recorded male voice with American accent]

From: To: [Introduction repeated]Dearest

The news about the birth of our son made me happy, proud and even more anxious for an agreement to be reached so I can come home. I was glad to hear everything went well. I'm distressed with all I've missed since 27 June, many (?goals cut short) and perhaps changing my aspirations. Missing the entire experience of our first childbirth and probably a large part of his life is depressing and irreplaceable. These two facts weigh heavy on my mind.

The pictures were great, I'd like more in a few months. Keep up the good work on the packages. We have bread and milk with our meals (?so send) freeze dried bread for bread, cocoa for milk and soup mix for the rice. The drink mix, fruit and coffee are very good. I don't need many snack items. The quantity and variety are fine.

Even though I've said no clothes, the socks, etc., were needed. I hope you received the Christmas cards. One was for you and your folks, the other for my folks and family.

Some pictures have been taken. Hopefully I can send them home. My bridge and chess are improving. We all hope for an early, just peace, discussing the alternatives among ourselves, perhaps not aware of all the implications, but hopeful nonetheless.

When you gather with friends and relatives during this holiday season, don't feel bad or depressed for us, but for those separated permanently. (?Then) say a prayer of joy and thanks that our separation is only temporary.

I miss and pray for our families. My health is good, so don't be concerned. I love you always. [Recording ends]

USSR ENVOY REITERATES KOSYGIN REMARKS ON AID TO DRV

Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0450 GMT 16 Dec 72 S

[Text] On the occasion of the 50th founding anniversary of the USSR, 30 December 1922-30 December 1972, on 15 December the Soviet Embassy in our country held a press conference. A great number of local and foreign newsmen attended.

Speaking at the press conference, Comrade Padolskiy, minister-counselor of the Soviet Embassy, stressed the importance and historic significance of the unification of the various peoples that formed the USSR and clearly pointed out the great contributions of Lenin, who earned the greatest merits in founding the first multinational socialist state in the world.

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Ministry of National Defense
Enemy Military Proselytizing Department




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


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[redacted]

10. U.S. Army Special Forces [redacted] was captured on 26 March 1964 near Khe Sanh in Quang Tri Province, and was taken to a small camp which was built for him in northwestern Thua Thien Province near the Lao border. [redacted] was the only prisoner in the camp. During the fall of 1967, [redacted] was sent to a camp in North Vietnam, which was about 90 miles north of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and about 20 miles inland from the coast. At the time [redacted] arrived, the camp had no cellblock buildings. Three thatch-roofed cellblock buildings were built before the next American civilian and military prisoners arrived at the camp in spring 1968. U.S. POW's named the camp "Portholes."

11. On 8 February 1968, PAVN forces overran the Langvei Special Forces Camp which was located along Route 9 near Khe Sanh in the northwestern corner of Quang Tri Province near the Lao border. PAVN forces captured U.S. Army Special Forces [redacted] [redacted] was taken to a camp in Laos about 30 miles southwest of Langvei, which held about 100 South Vietnamese and Laotians, many of whom had been captured at Langvei. [redacted] was taken with Montagnard prisoners to a different jungle holding camp which also held U.S. Army Special Forces [redacted] [redacted] who was captured on 31 January 1968. [redacted] was moved to [redacted] camp without [redacted] were recaptured after escaping and were taken in early March to another camp just north of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) which also held U.S. Army Special Forces [redacted] [redacted] who had been captured on 25 February 1968 near Khe Sanh. In mid-April 1968, the five were moved to the "Portholes" Camp which held Special Forces [redacted] [redacted] and other American civilian and military prisoners. Air Force [redacted] a search-and-rescue pilot captured on 31 May 1968, arrived later at the "Portholes."

12. In mid-summer 1968, [redacted] and others were moved out of the "Portholes" to a French-built prison on the southwest outskirts of Hanoi, which was named "Skidrow" by

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its American inmates. [] was accompanied by several American civilians who had been captured in Hue City during the Tet offensive. "Skidrow" was the Ministry of Public Security administered Thanh Liet Prison (WJ 851178), which was located about 10 miles south of downtown Hanoi near Bang Liet and Thanh Liet Villages in Thanh Tri District, Hanoi.

13. On 1 February 1968, PAVN forces captured over 20 foreign military and civilian personnel in Hue City. The group included some 14 American civilians: five Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E) personnel; International Voluntary Service

[] The Hue captives were taken within a few days to a temporary camp in the mountains of western Thua Thien Province. About 20 remaining captives (including 10 of the above noted American civilians) were marched to their first permanent camp in North Vietnam in April 1968 - the "Portholes." In June 1968, [] and 14 American civilian prisoners (including []) were transferred from the "Portholes" to the "Skidrow" Prison (Thanh Liet). In March 1971, [] and 13 American civilians were moved to the "Rockpile" annex of the Central Nam Ha Reeducation Camp, which was located near Ba Sao and Phu Ly Villages, 10 kilometers east of Kim Bang (Phu Ly) District Town, Ha Nam Ninh Province, about 65 kilometers south of Hanoi. They were the only U.S. POW's held at the "Rockpile;" all were captured in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces of South Vietnam. [] was kept behind in isolation at "Skidrow", and was later held in isolation during the period December 1971-January 1973 at the "Mountain" Camp, about 40 miles north of Hanoi.

14. In late August 1968, the remaining "Portholes" inmates were transferred to a new camp about 25 to 30 kilometers southwest of Hanoi, which was known as the D-1 Camp and named Camp "Farnsworth" by American inmates. The D-1 Camp (WJ 689017) was located some 30 kilometers southwest of Hanoi in former Hoa Binh Province, and was a Ministry of Public Security facility, which held some 34 U.S. POW's at one time during the period of its existence from 28 August 1969


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to 25 November 1970. With one exception (USAF [redacted]
[redacted] captured 22 March 1968 by PAVN in
Laos), the D-1 Camp held only Americans captured in the
Tri-Thien-Hue Region and in Region 5 of central South Vietnam.
The D-1 Camp was closed after the 21/22 November 1970 Son Tay
Raid, and all D-1 POW's were moved to the "Plantation" Camp in
Hanoi on 25 November 1970. In April 1971, the "Plantation"
received U.S. Army Special Forces [redacted] who
was captured on 25 April 1970 in Pleiku Province. On 7/8 July
1971, the "Plantation" received six Americans who were captured
by PAVN in Laos, including USG civilian [redacted]


Region 5 - Central Vietnam




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[redacted] The Loc Son Camp had been in existence since at least 1966, and held U.S. POW's who were moved to the Region 5 EMPS permanent camp for foreign and U.S. POW's. USMC [redacted] [redacted] was initially held and interrogated at the Loc Son Camp by QDSR EMPS cadres Ho An and Chin, who convinced [redacted] to join the liberation forces. The Loc Son Camp was closed down in late 1968.




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
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21. During the period of its existence, this Region 5 EMPS camp held 32 foreign prisoners (28 U.S. military and four West German civilian medical team members). Of the 32, five U.S. military were released (two on 23 January 1968 and three on 5 November 1969), 12 died (ten U.S. military and two West German civilians). On 4 February 1971, fourteen camp survivors (including two West German civilians) were marched to North Vietnam, arriving at the Hanoi "Plantation" on 1 April 1971; all were released during 1973 Operation Homecoming. Former USMC [redacted] who was converted from POW to collaborator status by the Region 5 EMPS, was moved separately to North Vietnam in late 1969, and returned to the U.S. on 22 March 1979.

B-3 Front - Central Highlands

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
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[redacted]
 [redacted] The camp held an unknown number of U.S. POW's. In early November 1969, U.S. Army Special Forces [redacted] and other surviving U.S. POW's (number unknown) were marched to North Vietnam. With the exception of [redacted] and others arrived at the above mentioned D-1 Camp ("Farnsworth") on 25 December 1969. All were transferred on 25 November 1970 with all D-1 Camp inmates to the Hanoi "Plantation." [redacted] was taken directly to a formal prison on the outskirts of Hanoi where he was kept in an isolation cell until November 1971, when he was placed in a cell with two other U.S. POW's. All returned in 1973 Operation Homecoming.

23. U.S. Army Special Forces [redacted]
 [redacted] was captured on 9 May 1968 when his camp was overrun by PAVN forces in the tri-border area. [redacted]
 [redacted] was captured by PAVN forces on 1 February 1968 in Ban Me Thuot City, Dar Lac Province, and was moved with two other civilian captives who died en route to the regional camp where he met [redacted]. While en route to the camp with [redacted] Summer Institute of Linguistics missionary [redacted] (captured 1 February 1968) died in July 1968, and Christian Missionary Alliance [redacted] (captured 1 February 1968) died in September 1968. [redacted] finally arrived at a large PAVN complex in Cambodia in October 1968, and was put in a cage-like hut next to [redacted] in a stockade area. In early November 1969, [redacted] marched together with other camp survivors to North Vietnam. The group included U.S. Army [redacted]
 [redacted] who were captured on 12 July 1967 while on patrol near Pleiku, and [redacted] (U.S. Army--rank unknown) who was captured on 21 July 1967 in Pleiku. U.S. Army Special Forces [redacted] (captured 26 April 1970 in Pleiku) arrived separately at the Hanoi "Plantation" in April 1971.

COSVN - Southern Vietnam




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
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


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A. Unit 1A was known as Unit A20 (Camp 20/Trai 20/T-20) before April 1968. Unit 1A had a 25-man staff headed by Captain Ba Manh, and was located in the Bo Tuc area of GVN Binh Long Province. It was the only EPO camp in existence before January 1968 for all categories of ARVN, U.S. and Allied personnel. No ARVN prisoners were held in Unit 1A after April 1969. As of early 1970, it held an unknown number of U.S. and foreign POW's.

B. Unit 2A was known as Unit 21 (Camp 21/Trai 21/T-21) before April 1968. Unit 2A had a 25-man staff headed by Senior Lieutenant Huy, and was located in the Katum area of GVN Phu Khuong District, Tay Ninh Province. It was established before Tet (January) 1968 as a detention facility for foreign civilian and military POW's. As of early 1970, it held about seven or eight U.S. POW's. Three U.S. POW's were released in January 1969. U.S. Army [redacted] were released at Ta Xiem in Tay Ninh Province on 1 January 1969.

C. Unit 3A was designated Unit 22 (Camp 22/Trai 22/T-22) before April 1968. Unit 3A had a 25-man staff headed by Senior Lieutenant Tung, and was located in the Katum area of GVN Phu Khuong District, Tay Ninh Province. It was established before Tet 1968 as a detention facility for foreign civilian and military POW's. As of early 1970, it held seven U.S. POW's. One unidentified Caucasian U.S. POW died from malaria in October 1969.

D. Unit 4A was established before Tet 1968 to detain foreign military deserters. Unit 4A had a 10-man staff headed by Lieutenant Quang, and was colocated with the Inter-Unit A Headquarters. As of early 1970, it held only one U.S. Army deserter, who was identified as [redacted] his Vietnamese-Cambodian wife, and two step children were detained at Unit 4A with relative freedom of movement between at least April 1968 and March 1970.

E. Unit 23A was designated Unit 23 (Camp 23/Trai

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23/T-23) before April 1968, and was established before Tet 1968 as a detention camp for ARVN enlisted and NCO POW's. Unit 23A had a 25-man staff headed by Senior Lieutenant Vo Van Thang alias Nam Thang, and was also located in the Katum area of GVN Phu Khuong District, Tay Ninh Province. Unit 23A picked up and detained 35 ARVN enlisted POW's in May 1968 who were released in August/September 1968, and picked up one U.S. POW in June 1968 who was turned over to Unit 3A for detention. Unit 23A also picked up 28 ARVN enlisted POW's in December 1968 who were released in February 1969, as well as 12 ARVN enlisted POW's in February 1969, eight of whom were released in March 1969 and four of whom were transferred to Inter-Unit B. In April 1969, Unit 23A was relieved of its detention functions and became a POW escort unit for ARVN prisoners. Between April 1969 and March 1970, Unit 23A picked up and escorted ten ARVN POW's who were detained by EPO Headquarters elements for interrogation before transfer to Inter-Unit B for permanent detention and/or later release.

31. Inter-Unit C was established in May 1968 in an unknown area. Inter-Unit C had a 25-man staff, and supervised at least three 25-man subcamps for foreign civilian and military POWS.

32. Between March and early April 1970, the above noted EPO camp system was reorganized and consolidated after large numbers of anticipated ARVN and foreign prisoners never materialized. Inter-Unit A was reorganized with U.S. and foreign POW's consolidated into two camps with 25-man staffs directly subordinate to the EPO Policy Office; the Unit 1A Camp (T-20) was kept intact, while other inmates were consolidated into the Unit 2A Camp (T-21) headed by Captain Le Hue alias Ut Hue; the Inter-Unit A Headquarters, along with Units 3A, 4A and 23A were disbanded with personnel reassigned to other but unknown PAVN SVNLA units. Inter-Unit B was disbanded and consolidated into one camp for ARVN prisoners with a 25-man staff directly subordinate to the EPO Policy Office. Inter-Unit C was also disbanded and formed into at least one or possibly two camps for foreign prisoners with 25-man staffs

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directly subordinate to the EPO Policy Office. This EPO camp system was moved deeper in Cambodia prior to the May 1970 U.S./ARVN incursion into Cambodia. As of April 1972, the EPO camp which held USAID official [redacted] was located near the large city of Kratie in Kratie Province, Cambodia.

[redacted]

34. On 12 February 1973, 27 U.S. military and civilian personnel were released from the EPO camp system at Loc Ninh, GVN Binh Long Province, during Operation Homecoming. USAID official [redacted] (captured 17 January 1966) later commented on the deaths of fellow camp inmates U.S. Army [redacted] (captured 16 June 1965) from pneumonia and U.S. Marine [redacted] (captured 31 December 1964 in Tay Ninh Province) from malaria in fall of 1967. U.S. Army Special Forces [redacted] was captured on 24 November 1963 with U.S. Army Special Forces [redacted] at the Hiep Hoa Special Forces Camp in GVN Hau Nghia Province. They were held in camps near the Cambodian border of War Zone "C" in Tay Ninh Province with [redacted]


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[redacted] (captured 29 December 1964) and [redacted]
[redacted] (captured 29 December 1964). [redacted] was
killed in 1965 by escorting guards after an attempted escape
with [redacted] escaped on 9 July 1965; [redacted]
[redacted] were released on 28 November 1965; [redacted] execution
was announced by Radio Hanoi on 26 September 1965; and [redacted]
was released on 7 February 1967.

Region 3 - Southern Mekong Delta




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37. Based on returnee and escapee accounts, eight U.S. POW's were held in segregated MR-3 EPS camps during the period November 1963-December 1968. These pre-1969 U.S. POW's were the only major grouping of U.S. POW's in the MR-3 area. None were transferred from MR-3 to the COSVN SVNLA EPO.

38. Although no information is available on where [] (U.S. Army--rank unknown) was detained, other U.S. POW's captured in MR-3 were grouped together before 1969 in one of two MR-3 EPS camp sites. U.S. Army Special Forces [] described his experiences with other U.S. POW's in this camp system in his book, [] On 29 October 1963, then U.S. Army Special Forces [] Special Forces [] and Special Forces [] were captured by the MR-3 306th Main Force Battalion near the Tan Phu Special Forces Camp in Thoi Binh District, about 26 kilometers north of Ca Mau City in GVN An Xuyen Province. [] arrived on 18 November 1963 at their first formal prison camp which was located south of Ca Mau City in a large mangrove swamp near the Song Qua (Cua) Lon River in the Lower U Minh Forest. The camp was commanded by Major Hai, deputy/political officer Mr. Muoi, and English interpreter Mr. Ba. Although

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wounded, [] tried to escape alone on 19 November and was recaptured. The three were later joined by U.S. Army [] (captured 21 July 1964) on 9 September 1964, and another U.S. POW in December 1964, who later died in the next camp site. In late January 1965, the five were moved to a new camp site near the Song Trem Trem River, northwest of Thoi Binh District Town in the Upper U Minh Forest. The new camp site was in the vicinity of a larger MR-3 EPS camp for ARVN personnel. [] was moved in 1965 to an unknown location. On 26 September 1965, Radio Hanoi announced the execution of [] and U.S. Army Special Forces [] (captured 24 November 1963 at the U.S. Army Special Forces Hiep Hoa Camp in Hau Nghia Province) in retaliation for the GVN "executing three patriots." [] was held at a COSVN SVNLA Political Staff EPO camp after his capture and prior to his execution. Two more U.S. POW's arrived at [] camp in February 1966; both died in the camp. U.S. Special Forces [] (captured 5 July 1966) arrived on 13 August 1966. On 18 October 1967, [] were moved out to be released, leaving only [] as the surviving U.S. POW at the Camp. [] were released on 13 November 1967. On 31 December 1968, the camp area was hit by a U.S. helicopter attack, and [] took the opportunity to escape and was rescued on the scene by a U.S. helicopter. No further reporting is available on the MR-3 EPS camp system. Of the eight U.S. POW's held in these two MR-3 EPS camps, three died in the camp, three were released, one was executed, and one escaped.

[] claimed he saw three U.S. POW's in February 1970 in a prison camp which was located at the junction of the Cai Ngay Canal and Canal No. 5 at WQ 144745 in Tan An Village, Nam Can District, GVN An Xuyen Province, in the Lower U Minh Forest. The three U.S. Army POW's (one captain, one lieutenant, and one sergeant) had been captured at the same time in 1965 or 1966 in the vicinity of Thoi Binh District, An Xuyen Province, by the 303rd Main Force Battalion. At the time of capture, a U.S. Army major was reportedly killed. The lieutenant said he had been an engineer advisor in Saigon before he was assigned to An Xuyen shortly before he was captured. The captain was a wounded ARVN advisor, who had attempted to escape and who was uncooperative during interrogation. The 20-man camp staff was headed by Muoi

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Hung, deputy commander Muoi Ve, and chief interrogator Ba Sanh. This story appears to have several similarities with the above account given by U.S. Army [redacted] since [redacted] with the only three U.S. POW's captured together in the same Tan Phu area mentioned by [redacted] also told his captors that he had been an engineer advisor in Saigon before being recently assigned to the Tan Phu Special Forces Camp.

40. In follow-up debriefings, [redacted] later claimed that MR-3's A-8 POW Detention Camp (designation unconfirmed) had been located on the banks of the Cai Ngai River (WQ 1573) in Dam Doi District, GVN An Xuyen Province, between 1964 and 19 July 1970, when the camp commander received orders to move the camp to the COSVN base camp area. The camp held three U.S. POW's (one captain, one lieutenant and one sergeant) between at least January 1970 and 19 July 1970, who had been capture in Tan Phu and Tan Loc Villages in An Xuyen Province. [redacted] claimed he worked on the camp staff during this period, and did not accompany the camp move with the three U.S. POW's on 20 July 1970. The camp staff also had a 35-man guard platoon, and was commanded by Muoi Hung, deputy commander Muoi Ve, and English interpreter Ba Sanh. [redacted] was unable to make a positive identification from photographs of all U.S. personnel missing or suspected of being captured in GVN An Xuyen Province.

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HEADER

P 261534Z JUL 91
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TO RUCWAAA/FBIS [REDACTED]
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RHHMBRA/JICPC HONOLULU HI
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RUADJNA/DET 31 PSAA YOKOTA AB JA//INOS//
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RUEBFGA/VOA WASH DC
RUEBHAA/STORAGE CENTER FBIS RESTON VA
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RUETIAV/MPC FT GEO G MEADE MD
RUHDBKT/DATT-TLO BANGKOK TH
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RUHHDHA/HQ PACAF IDHS HICKAM AFB HI
RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RULWIOC/SAC INTELLIGENCE OPS CNT OFFUTT AFB NE
RUMJBP/FBIS [REDACTED]
RUMTFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
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WARNING: ATTN BANGKOK AE
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BODY

PASS: ATTN POL

COUNTRY: SRV

SUBJ: U.S. OFFICIAL'S ARRIVAL TO DISCUSS MIA'S REPORTED

SOURCE: HANOI VNA IN ENGLISH 1504 GMT 26 JUL 91
TEXT:

((TEXT)) HANOI VNA JULY 26 -- US DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE KENNETH QUINN, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT OFFICE ON THE AMERICANS MISSING IN ACTION IN THE VIETNAM WAR, ARRIVED HERE TODAY TO DISCUSS WITH THE CONCERNED VIETNAMESE OFFICES MATTERS RELATED TO THE PICTURE OF THREE AMERICANS REPORTED MISSING DURING THE INDOCHINA WAR AND WHO ARE RECENTLY REPORTED BY SOME US NEWSPAPERS TO BE STILL ALIVE.

MR. K. QUINN WAS RECEIVED BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER LE MAI AND HAD A WORKING SESSION WITH LE BANG, DEPUTY HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT FOR AMERICA OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, AND HO XUAN DICH, DIRECTOR OF THE VIETNAMESE OFFICE FOR SEARCH OF MISSING PERSONNEL.

THE VIETNAMESE SIDE REITERATED ITS ACTIVE COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES FOR A SETTLEMENT OF THE MIA QUESTION THE SOONER THE BETTER. IT SUPPLIED THE US SIDE WITH EVIDENCES PROVING THAT THE AMERICAN PILOT [REDACTED] ONE OF THE THREE PERSONS SHOWN IN THE PICTURE, HAD DIED WHEN THE F4C HE WAS PILOTING CRASHED IN HAI HUNG PROVINCE ON SEPTEMBER 16, 1966. THE VIETNAMESE SIDE AFFIRMED THAT THE PHOTO IS A SET-UP. THE VIETNAMESE SIDE REQUESTED THAT THE US GOVERNMENT MAKE IT A RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SUPPLIER OR SUPPLIERS OF THE SAID PHOTO TO COOPERATE WITH THE US AND VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENTS IN INVESTIGATING THIS QUESTION.

MR. QUINN THANKED THE VIETNAMESE SIDE FOR ITS COOPERATION AND PROMPT ACTION.

ADMIN

(ENDALL) JB522607,008 261504 [REDACTED] 26/1531Z JUL

BT

#2886

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PAGE 001
TOT: 041852Z SEP 91

~~SECRET~~

041903Z

TO: DIA WASHINGTON DC//PW-MIA/ATTN MR BOB SHEETZ.

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: DEBRIEFING OF [REDACTED] ON POW-MIA ISSUE

REF: DIA WASH S/NF-0760-91/POW-MIA, 192136Z AUG 91

1. THE FOLLOWING REPORT WAS OBTAINED ON 5-6 AUGUST 1991 FROM [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] HE OBTAINED THE INFORMATION FROM
A KHMER RESIDENT OF PHNOM PENH. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] WAS PASSED TO STONY BEACH AND IS
BEING SENT FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

2. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] HAS GOOD CONNECTIONS WITH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA (PRK)
OFFICIALS (NFI) IN THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE USES THIS
RELATIONSHIP TO EARN A LIVING [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] IN AUGUST 1990 [REDACTED] HAD A BUSINESS MEETING AT
[REDACTED] AT
[REDACTED] AT THE AUGUST 1990
MEETING [REDACTED] MENTIONED THAT AN UNIDENTIFIED VIETNAMESE
GENERAL AND AN UNIDENTIFIED VIETNAMESE COLONEL, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] WERE IN
CHARGE OF A PRISON WHERE 120 U.S. POW'S WERE BEING DETAINED. THE
PRISON WAS LOCATED IN A MOUNTAINOUS AREA NEAR HANOI, HOWEVER THE TWO
VIETNAMESE COMMANDERS DID NOT REVEAL THE EXACT LOCATION OF THE
PRISON SITE. THEY FURTHER STATED THAT TWO OF THE PRISONERS WERE
[REDACTED] (SIC). THE TWO ALLEGED
POW'S WERE GOING TO BE RELEASED AND PROVIDED WITH SAFE PASSAGE TO
THAILAND VIA CAMBODIA. IN RETURN FOR THIS PRIVILEGE, THE POW'S
WOULD SPONSOR THE GENERAL, COLONEL AND THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS FOR
ADMISSION TO THE UNITED STATES.

3. LACKING EVIDENCE, [REDACTED] WAS HARD-PRESSED IN BELIEVING [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] STORY. IN AUGUST 1990, AT [REDACTED] REQUEST, [REDACTED]
RETURNED TO SAIGON TO MEET WITH THE COLONEL AND OBTAIN ADDITIONAL
EVIDENCE TO CONFIRM THE STORY. A WEEK LATER [REDACTED] RETURNED
TO PHNOM PENH WITH ONE PHOTOGRAPH DEPICTING THREE POW'S AND ONE
PAPER ON WHICH FIGURED A RIGHT-HAND PRINT. THEY PROVIDED THESE
DOCUMENTS TO [REDACTED] IN PHNOM PENH IN AUGUST 1990. [REDACTED] ASKED [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] TO RETURN TO SAIGON TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE SINCE
[REDACTED] BELIEVED THE PHOTO AND HANDPRINT COULD EASILY HAVE BEEN
FABRICATED. [REDACTED] LEFT PHNOM PENH FOR SAIGON CIRCA
SEPTEMBER 1990.

4. WHEN [REDACTED] RECEIVED THE FIRST SET OF DOCUMENTS FROM [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] IN AUGUST 1990, [REDACTED] HAD TWO ADDITIONAL COPIES OF THE

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CIA-910904-634D
~~SECRET~~

SECRET

PAGE 002

TOT: 041852Z SEP 91

PHOTOGRAPH REPRODUCED. HE GAVE ONE COPY [] WHO PASSED IT TO TWO UNIDENTIFIED RELATIVES OF [] TO HANDCARRY IT TO THE BORDER. THE COURIERS DISAPPEARED WITH THE PHOTO AND WERE NEVER SEEN AGAIN. [] DECIDED TO TAKE THE REMAINING DOCUMENTS TO THE BORDER HIMSELF IN NOVEMBER 1990.

5. IN MID-SEPTEMBER 1990 [] RETURNED TO PHNOM PENH WITH ONE CASSETTE TAPE OF ALLEGEDLY [] RECORDED VOICE, ONE EACH HANDWRITTEN LETTERS FROM [] AND TWO ADDITIONAL ID TYPE/SIZE PHOTOGRAPHS WERE SEEN WEARING PILOT FLIGHT SUIT-TYPE COVERALLS IN THE PHOTOGRAPHS. [] DEMANDED 55 CHI OF GOLD (ONE CHI EQUALS 3.75 GRAMS) FROM [] IN RETURN FOR THE PACKAGE CONTAINING EVIDENCE. [] ATTEMPTED TO BARTER TWO USED AUTOMOBILES AND ONE MOTORCYCLE FOR THE EVIDENCE WITH NO SUCCESS. AS OF NOVEMBER 1990, THE VOICE RECORDED TAPE, TWO LETTERS AND TWO PHOTOGRAPHS WERE STILL IN POSSESSION OF [] IN PHNOM PENH.

6. []

7. CLASSIFIED BY SIGNER. DECL OADR DRV [] ALL SECRET

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

TOP SECRET

M = 585

CATEGORY = 1

MESSAGE = 00350825

MSGMSGMSGMSG070536CZCDAD311HNA108

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190131Z ZFG

FM

TO IDHAD COMNAVFORJAPAN YSHKLR/CINCUSARPAC

ZEM

TOP SECRET

FINAL SECTION OF TWO THE

FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM

AND IS FORWARDED

DATE OF

AS AN UNEVALUATED REPORT

INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

4. MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ABOUT US PILOT PRISONERS OF WAR: "THE US HAS NOT DECLARED WAR (ON NORTH VIETNAM). SHE DOES NOT HAVE ANY LEGAL BASIS TO EXPECT (CAPTURED US PILOTS) TO BE TREATED AS PRISONERS OF WAR BY NORTH VIETNAM. THE CAPTURED US PILOTS WHO HAVE BOMBED INNOCENT PEOPLE, ARE TREATED HUMANELY. IF THEY ARE TREATED BADLY, THIS FACT WILL PROBABLY BE REPORTED IN THE FRENCH NEWSPAPERS. I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOU SEE HOW THE VIET CONG PRISONERS ARE TREATED." (SAYING THIS, [REDACTED] SHOWED ME A RECENT MOSCOW NEWSPAPER WITH A PICTURE OF WHAT APPEARED TO BE A SOUTH VIETNAMESE SOLDIER HOLDING THREE VIET CONG HEADS AND SHOUTING.) THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT POSSIBLY TRY TO GET THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS ACCEPTED BY NORTH VIETNAM. THE US IS A LITTLE CHILDISH IN THIS RESPECT." 5. THIS AMBASSADOR SAID: "ACCORDING TO A 10 FEBRUARY ARTICLE FROM PHNOM PENH BY WILFRED BURCHETT, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND THE NLF SEE FUTURE CONDITIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS FOLLOWS: "A. THE NORTH WILL MAINTAIN MILITARY NEUTRALITY. IT IS OPPOSED TO HAVING THE SOUTH BECOME A SOCIALIST STATE. THE SOUTH WILL BECOME A NON-SOCIALIST STATE, THAT IS, A DEMOCRATIC NEUTRAL COUNTRY WITH A COALITION GOVERNMENT, WITH THE NLF PLAYING A DECISIVE ROLE. "B. THE UNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM WILL BE INDEFINITELY EXTENDED. "HOW RELIABLE IS THIS ARTICLE?" [REDACTED] REPLIED: "THIS ARTICLE IS COMPLETELY ACCURATE. I DO NOT HAVE CONTACT WITH THE NLF HERE, BUT I TALK WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE FREQUENTLY. THIS IS WHAT THEY SAY. I DO NOT KNOW HOW THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS FEEL ABOUT THIS MATTER. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET UNION FULLY UNDERSTANDS THIS LINE OF THINKING BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. WHEN PRIME MINISTER PHAM VAN DONG CAME TO THE SOVIET UNION IN 1965 TO EXPLAIN THE FOUR PEACE CONDITIONS OF NORTH VIETNAM, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE NLF WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SOUTH. FURTHER, IN THE FIVE CONDITIONS ESTABLISHED BY THE NLF, THERE IS NOTHING ABOUT THE COMMUNIZING OF THE SOUTH. THE NLF LEADERS HAVE ANNOUNCED A REALISTIC ECONOMIC POLICY FOR THE SOUTH IN WHICH THERE WILL BE NATIONALIZING OF INDUSTRIES, AID FROM BOTH THE EAST AND THE WEST WILL BE ACCEPTED, AND FOREIGN INVESTMENTS BROUGHT IN. THE PROBLEM IS THAT THE US DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE NLF AS "AN EFFECTIVE PARTICIPANT". THE US IS THINKING OF PUTTING SOME OF THE PRESENT SAIGON GOVERNMENT CABINET MEMBERS AND PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION MEMBERS INTO THE COALITION GOVERNMENT. THE GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE THEORY EXPOSED IN FEBRUARY BY THE SAIGON REGIME MAY BE A CONCEPT OF THE FUTURE COALITION GOVERNMENT WITH THE NLF AS A NUCLEUS."

THE THINKING IS THAT IT IS ALL RIGHT TO INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE FORMER NGO DINH DIEM REGIME IN THE COALITION GOVERNMENT. THEREFORE, PEOPLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM WILL PLAY A LEADING ROLE IN IT. SINCE THIS IS THE CASE, JUST BECAUSE PEOPLE IN EXILE IN PARIS ARE ON THE LIST (OF THOSE WHO MAY

TOP SECRET

NN0982023-5706

~~TOP SECRET~~ ☐

ACTIVIST WHO RECEIVED THE LIBERATED AMERICAN POWS FROM THE VIET CONG IN PHNOM
PENH 11 NOV 67 (BALTIMORE SUN 11 NOV 67) MS 57 CN ILC TI 18 NOV 67 0402Z 800
NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~ ☐

NND982023-5707

~~SECRET~~

SOURCE N: [REDACTED]

CASE#: 10380

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(b)(3)

(b)(6)

IAS:

(if applicable)

DATE CASE CREATED: 8 June 1989

SIGHTING SUMMARY: [REDACTED] Para 5.B. One F-105 Pilot Captured in Quang Trung
Village, Kim Mon District, Hai Hung Province

PRIMARY ANALYST: [REDACTED]

SECONDARY:

B	DOCUMENT(S)	DATE	COMMENTS
	[REDACTED]	270504Z Apr 89	POW-F/H CRS-F: [REDACTED] provided firsthand information concerning the crash of a U.S. aircraft and the capture of the pilot in Hai Hung province.
	Circle Search	23 Jun 89	22NM of circle of 205900N 106300E Quang Trung Village.
	DIA Evaluation	4 Jun 90	Report correlated to [REDACTED] formerly-held U.S. PW.

0002

~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)PAGE 001
TOT: 090711Z FEB 90~~SECRET~~

090711Z

TO: DIA WASHINGTON DC//PW-MIA/ATTN COL JOE SCHLATTER).

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: CLAIMED SIGHTING OF AN AMERICAN IN HO CHI MINH CITY

1. ACCORDING TO A VIETNAMESE REFUGEE

AN UNIDENTIFIED AMERICAN WAS RESIDING IN HO CHI MINH CITY, VIETNAM, AS OF 1988. THE AMERICAN HAD A CRIPPLED CALF AS A RESULT OF A WAR INJURY. HE WAS LIVING AT THE RESIDENCE OF GO VAP DISTRICT, HO CHI MINH CITY. CLAIMED TO HAVE SEEN THE AMERICAN LAST IN 1988.

2.

CLASSIFIED BY SIGNER. DECL OADR DRV ALL ~~SECRET~~

FILE: 135-120-039;

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~CIA-900209-630^H
SECRET

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/ / PER ORIGINATOR.

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PAGE 0001

TOT: 081903Z AUG 91

SECRET
081903ZTO: IMMEDIATE DIA WASHINGTON DC//PW-MIA ATTN MR BOB SHEETZ,
STATE DEPT//INR/EAP/SEA (ATTN D AVERY).

SECRET

SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON PHOTO OF ALLEGED POW'S AND ON LIVE
POW'S IN INDOCHINA

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] WHICH REPORTED ON THE EXISTENCE OF VIET CONG
(VC) PRISON CAMP BETWEEN SAIGON AND CAMBODIA. THIS REPORT IS BEING
PASSED FOR YOUR ACTION.

2. [REDACTED] AS OF EARLY
AUGUST 1991 HE REGARDED THE WELL-PUBLICIZED PHOTOGRAPH OF THREE
ALLEGED U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR AS A HOAX. HE SAID THAT THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT HANDLED THE SAD SITUATION WELL, WITHOUT RAISING THE HOPES
OF THE FAMILIES OF THE MIA'S WHO WERE CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN IN THE
PHOTOGRAPH.

3. THIS OFFICIAL STATED THAT HE IS ABSOLUTELY CONVINCED THAT
THERE ARE NO LIVE POW'S IN VIETNAM. HE MADE THIS STATEMENT BASED ON
HIS PAST PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT ON THIS ISSUE WITH THE MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS. HE COULD NOT DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THERE
COULD BE U.S. SERVICEMEN ALIVE IN LAOS, BUT REGARDED THIS AS ONLY A
SLIGHT POSSIBILITY, GIVEN THE PASSAGE OF TIME AND PRIMITIVE LIVING
CONDITIONS THERE. HE SAID HE WOULD BE HAPPY IF SOME LIVING U.S.
PERSONNEL TURNED UP IN LAOS, BUT HE HAD LITTLE BASIS FOR SUCH
OPTIMISM.

4. [REDACTED] THE OFFICIAL SAID
THAT HE MET A POW NAMED [REDACTED], WHO LATER DIED IN CAPTIVITY.

SECRET

** TEMPORARY WORKING COPY -- DESTROY AFTER USE **

NND 982011 - 1364

PAGE 0002
TOT: 081903Z AUG 91

THE OFFICIAL SAID HE HAD [] DOG TAG [] IN HO CHI MINH
CITY AND WOULD LOOK FOR IT WHEN HE RETURNED THERE.
COMMENT: IN REF REPORT THE OFFICIAL SAID THAT [] LAST NAME WAS
[]

5. []

6. CLASSIFIED BY SIGNER. DECL OADR DRV [] ALL SECRET

ORIG:

CL BY []
END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

END OF MESSAGE

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** TEMPORARY WORKING COPY -- DESTROY AFTER USE **

NND 982011 - 1365

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED](b)(1)
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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Text of [REDACTED] Dated 27 November 1971

1. The following is a text of [REDACTED] dated 27 November:

V is intermediary; A is [REDACTED] officer

A. HELLO.

V. HELLO.

A. YES.

V. YOU'D LIKE TO SPEAK TO [REDACTED]

A. YES, [REDACTED] SPEAKING.

V. OH, GOOD MORNING [REDACTED] HOW DO YOU DO?

A. HOW ARE YOU?

V. YOU HAVE THE SALUTATIONS OF [REDACTED]

A. THANK YOU.

V. YES.


A. YES. WE'VE BEEN AWAITING YOUR CALL FOR SOME

TIME NOW.

V. YES.

A. AND . . .

790317, 24.

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

0482

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

V. YES.

A. I WROTE IT IN ENGLISH, BUT I'M GOING

V. (IN ENGLISH). YOU CAN SPEAK ENGLISH IF YOU LIKE.

A. (IN FRENCH). NO, IT'S OKAY. WHICH DO YOU PREFER?

V. (IN FRENCH). FIRSTLY, WE'LL HAVE TO REVIEW THIS
MATTER AGAIN BECAUSE AS YOU KNOW WHAT COUNTS
IN THIS BUSINESS IS SINCERITY.

A. YES, THAT'S CORRECT.

V. (IN ENGLISH). THE FAIRPLAY, YOU SEE?

A. (IN FRENCH). YES.

V. THE LAST TIME IT WAS AGREED THERE WOULD BE NO
PROPAGANDA OVER THE [REDACTED] AFFAIR AND
YOU DIDN'T KEEP YOUR WORD. THAT WASN'T NICE.

[REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED] RELEASE WAS ON VC
INITIATIVE RATHER THAN BASED ON PRIOR AGREEMENT.)
SECONDLY

A. (INTERRUPTING).

V. LET ME TALK FOR A FEW MINUTES. WE AGREED [REDACTED]
COMMENT: INTERMEDIARY DID NOT PERMIT INTERRUPT-
TION TO HIS REFERENCE TO PREVIOUS AGREEMENT.) THAT
AFTER THE RELEASE OF [REDACTED] THAT YOU
WOULD FREE TWO OF OUR MEN, [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WE WAITED, AND INSTEAD OF THESE TWO MEN YOU FREED ANOTHER, A LIEUTENANT. THIS WAS NOT PART OF OUR AGREEMENT. AND ALSO THE LAST TIME AT TA GANG ROBON WE WAITED AND WE SAW TWO HELICOPTERS WHICH CAME, BUT THE AGREED-UPON SIGNAL WAS NOT GIVEN. IF YOU THINK WE CAN CONTINUE THIS EXCHANGE IN A CORRECT MANNER, WE MUST DO IT UNDER THE AGREED-UPON CONDITIONS.

A. VERY WELL. I'LL TELL YOU WHAT WE PROPOSE.

V. YES.

A. FIRST. WE HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED YOUR REQUEST, YOUR REQUESTS, AND UNDERSTANDABLY THEY REQUIRED CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION. WE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO THE RELEASE OF [REDACTED] MAN-FOR-MAN FOR [REDACTED] WE ARE WELL AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF [REDACTED] AS A HIGH-LEVEL CADRE ON YOUR SIDE, BUT WE WOULD LIKE TO EXCHANGE [REDACTED] FOR [REDACTED] IF YOU STILL AGREE, AT TA GANG ROBON.

V. YES.

A. OKAY.

V. LET ME TALK IF YOU WILL.

A. OKAY.

V. YOU HAVE NOT SPOKEN ABOUT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] COMMENT: BELIEVE DIRECT REFERENCE AT THIS POINT TO [REDACTED] INDICATES SPECIAL IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO HIS RELEASE BY INTER-MEDIARY.) WHAT'S HAPPENED TO HIM?

A. GOOD. CONCERNING [REDACTED] WE WOULD LIKE TO BEGIN WITH [REDACTED] FOR [REDACTED] AND THEN CONCERNING [REDACTED] WE WOULD LIKE TO RECEIVE FROM [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A LIST OF OUR PRISONERS AND A LIST OF FOREIGN PRISONERS AND ALSO OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY OFFICERS. WE WOULD LIKE TO STUDY THIS LIST AND THEN REDISCUSS THIS MATTER AFTER HAVING RECEIVED THE LIST.

V. I UNDERSTAND WHAT YOU SAY AND YOU PLAY A VERY TIGHT GAME. THAT'S VERY GOOD, BUT I REPEAT, WE TOOK THE FIRST STEP. AND YOU KNOW THERE IS NO QUESTION OF BARGAINING OVER THE FIRST STEP. WE WANTED TO TEST YOUR SINCERITY IN SEEING YOU

~~SECRET~~

RELEASE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] BUT NO BARGAINING. AND I REPEAT THAT WE ARE HOLDING OUT FOR OUR MEN BUT ALSO FOR SINCERITY FROM BOTH SIDES. IF YOU THINK YOU CAN DO BETTER BY HOLDING [REDACTED] YOU ARE POORLY CALCULATING. YOU KNOW THAT FOR US SACRIFICE IS OUR DAILY BREAD. THIS TIME, THERE IS ONLY ONE THING. REPEAT WHAT YOU SAID THE LAST TIME. [REDACTED] COMMENT: AS NOTED ABOVE, NO PRIOR AGREEMENT WAS MADE.) THAT IS, THAT YOU WILL FREE [REDACTED] [REDACTED] BOTH AT THE SAME TIME AND YOU WILL SEE THAT WE WILL REPLY VERY APPROPRIATELY TO YOUR GOOD FAITH. IT'S NOT A QUESTION OF BARGAINING. I REPEAT, THERE WILL BE NO DISCUSSIONS BECAUSE THEY WILL RUIN EVERYTHING. WE WANTED THROUGH A SERIES OF SECRET CONVENTIONAL EXCHANGES TO TEST YOUR SINCERITY AND FROM THERE GO ON TO OFFICIAL EXCHANGE. YOU SEE. THEREFORE IT'S NOT IN YOUR INTEREST NOR IN THE INTEREST OF NGUYEN VAN THIEU'S GOVERNMENT TO BARGAIN THIS TIME. DO YOU UNDERSTAND? YOU HAVE OUR CONDITIONS

~~SECRET~~

0486

~~SECRET~~

A. GOOD. YOU UNDERSTAND, SIR, WE ARE NOT BARGAINING IN THAT SENSE, BUT IF YOU STILL INSIST ON HAVING THESE TWO MEN, WHO WILL YOU RELEASE FOR THEM?

V. WE ARE GOING TO RELEASE A NUMBER OF PRISONERS, AMONG THEM CERTAINLY (WILL BE) [REDACTED] AND AFTERWARDS, WE'LL SEE. IN THIS MANNER WE CAN, LITTLE BY LITTLE, ARRIVE AT A VERY FRANK DISCUSSION AND HAVE LISTS AND A KIND OF FAIRNESS, A KIND OF JUSTICE FOR BOTH SIDES. SEE. AND FOR THE FIRST STEP, I REPEAT, NO BARGAINING. IT IS ABOVE ALL A MARK OF GOOD WILL.

A. I UNDERSTAND. WE CONSIDER IT A SIGN OF GOOD WILL ON OUR PART IN FREEING [REDACTED] AM I CORRECT?

V. NO, HE IS NOT THE MAN AGREED UPON, YOU SEE.

[REDACTED] COMMENT: AS NOTED ABOVE, NO PRIOR AGREEMENT WAS MADE.) OUR AGREEMENT WAS TO RELEASE THE TWO GENTLEMEN, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WE ARE SORRY YOU DIDN'T TAKE THIS FIRST STEP, OTHERWISE THIS BUSINESS WOULD BE GOING BETTER THAN IT IS.

A. YES, BUT THERE WAS A BIG PROBLEM. YOU CALLED US

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

AT A BIG MOMENT, DURING THE INAUGURATION OF
PRESIDENT THIEU, AND WE HAD A LOT OF DIFFICULTY
IN REACHING THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES.

V. GOOD. THEN I BELIEVE THAT BOTH SIDES WANT TO GET
THIS MATTER MOVING. THEREFORE, WE WON'T TALK
ANY LONGER ABOUT THE PAST. NOW IF YOU HAVE A
MINUTE, LISTEN TO OUR CONDITIONS. AH, I REPEAT
FOR THIS TIME, IT'S THE SAME PLACE - TA GANG
ROBON, PHUC TINH, TAY NINH. WE'RE GOING AHEAD
A BIT. IT WILL BE FROM 16 HOURS, THAT IS 4 O'CLOCK
IN THE AFTERNOON, NOT 3 O'CLOCK AS BEFORE. I
REPEAT, FROM 1600 HOURS, TA GANG ROBON. THERE
IS ONLY ONE WAY, THAT IS BY USING HELICOPTERS.
NO AUTOMOBILES THIS TIME, NO JEEPS THIS TIME.
ONLY A MAXIMUM OF TWO HELICOPTERS SHOULD COME,
A MAXIMUM OF TWO HELICOPTERS. YOU TURN (CIRCLE)
TWO TIMES, YOU TURN (CIRCLE) TWO TIMES. YOU WILL
SEE BELOW TWO SMOKE SIGNALS. TWO GROUPS OF
SMOKE SIGNALS TO NOTIFY YOU THE APPROXIMATE
AREA WHERE WE CAN MEET, AND THEN ONE OF YOUR
HELICOPTERS, OR BOTH, SHOULD GIVE THE THREE
AGREED-UPON SMOKE SIGNALS; ONE RED, ONE YELLOW

8
SECRET/ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

0488

~~SECRET~~

AND ONE BLUE, BETWEEN THESE TWO (OUR) SMOKE SIGNALS. [] COMMENT: DETAILS REGARDING LANDING SITE ARE MUCH MORE PRECISE THAN IN 27 OCTOBER TELEPHONE CONTACT.)

A. JUST A MINUTE. REGARDING THE SMOKE SIGNALS, INSTEAD OF BLUE, IT WILL BE GREEN.

V. YES, THAT IS, RED, YELLOW AND GREEN.

A. THAT'S RIGHT.

V. WE ARE GOING TO MEET APPROXIMATELY IN THE MIDDLE OF THE (OUR) TWO SMOKE SIGNALS.

A. OKAY.

V. AND, FOR THE DAYS, WE ARE GOING TO DRAW FROM OUR LAST EXPERIENCE. WE LEAVE YOU TO CHOOSE FROM THE 10TH TO THE 20TH OF DECEMBER. BETWEEN THE 10TH AND THE 20TH. BUT TWO GROUPS OF THREE DAYS. FOR EXAMPLE, 10, 11, 12 AND THEN 18, 19, 20.

... TWO GROUPS OF THREE DAYS.

A. KINDLY REPEAT THAT PLEASE.

V. BETWEEN THE 10TH AND 20TH OF DECEMBER. YOU CAN MAKE THE CHOICE AS YOU LIKE, BUT TWO GROUPS OF THREE DAYS. THAT IS, IT'S UP TO YOU TO CHOOSE AND WE WILL CONFIRM THIS A SECOND TIME BY TELEPHC

9

~~SECRET~~

0489

[REDACTED]

A. I'M SORRY, BUT WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY TWO TRIPLED DAYS?

V. THAT IS TO SAY, TWO TIMES THREE CONSECUTIVE DAYS. (IN ENGLISH - TWO TRIPLE OF DAYS). (RETURN TO FRENCH). FOR EXAMPLE, 10, 11, 12 OR 14, 15, 16 FOR EXAMPLE.

A. OKAY, IF WE BRING THESE TWO MEN, I, LISTEN, NOW I CAN'T CONFIRM THIS, RIGHT? IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR YOU TO CALL AGAIN IN THREE DAYS TO CONFIRM IT. BUT IF WE BRING THESE TWO MEN, WHO ARE YOU GOING TO GIVE US AT THAT TIME? WILL [REDACTED] BE THERE AND . . .

V. (INTERRUPTING). SURELY AMONG - THAT IS, THERE WILL BE A SMALL NUMBER AND SURELY AMONG THEM

[REDACTED] COMMENT: MENTION OF ADDITIONAL PRISONERS ALONG WITH [REDACTED] IS NEW FACTOR.)

A. HOW MANY MEN WILL BE THERE?

V. A FEW. (HIS VOICE SEEMED SLIGHTLY HUMORED HERE.)

A. A FEW?

V. YES, A FEW AND SURELY AMONG THEM [REDACTED]

A. GOOD, THAT IS TO SAY, WHEN WE LAND WITH MESSRS.

[REDACTED] . . .

[REDACTED]

V. (INTERRUPTING). YOU WILL HAVE [REDACTED]
THAT'S FOR SURE. YOU WILL HAVE [REDACTED]
IT'S SURE, YOU HAVE MY WORD.

A. AND SOME OTHERS?

V. YES, SOME OTHERS.

A. BUT CAN'T YOU GIVE ME THEIR NAMES?

V. NO, AH . . . FOR THE MOMENT, IT'S NOT POSSIBLE.

A. OKAY, BUT I EXCUSE MYSELF NOW BY BEGINNING TO
SAY THINGS THAT YOU ARE GOING TO UNDERSTAND AS
BARGAINING, RIGHT?

V. NO, BUT FOR THE MOMENT GIVE ME RIGHT AWAY THE
TWO THREE DAYS. AH. BECAUSE WE WILL CONFIRM
WITH YOU A SECOND TIME BY PHONE. SO, WHAT IS
YOUR CHOICE BETWEEN THE 10TH AND THE 20TH FOR
THE TWO THREE-DAY PERIODS?

A. BETWEEN THE 10TH AND THE 20TH, WE CAN SAY THE
10TH, 11TH AND 12TH.

V. YES, 10, 11, 12 AS THE FIRST TRIPLE DAYS. AND THE
SECOND?

A. AND THEN, THAT IS, WE'LL ARRIVE CERTAINLY, SAY,
ON THE 12TH.

V. YES, SAY THE 12TH.

11
SECRET, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

0491

[REDACTED]

A. THE 10TH, EXCUSE ME, THE 10TH.

V. THE 10TH, YES.

A. AND THE OTHER TRIPLE DAYS, SAY THE 13TH, 14TH
AND 15TH.

V. GOOD, TWO CONSECUTIVE TRIPLES.

A. THAT'S IT.

V. THE 10TH TO THE 15TH. AND, WE WILL CONFIRM THIS
BY TELEPHONE WHAT DAY, WHAT TRIPLES OF DAYS
WE ARE GOING TO CHOOSE. AND, IF POSSIBLE, THE
EXACT DAY WE CAN RECEIVE YOU.

A. OKAY. BUT IN ANY CASE, SIR, WE BEGAN WITH THE
QUESTION THAT WE WILL CERTAINLY RELEASE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] FOR [REDACTED]

V. YES.

A. AND WE ASK YOU TO ASK [REDACTED] IF WE CAN
HAVE A LIST OF THE OTHER PRISONERS.

V. YES.

A. OF U.S. PRISONERS AND THEN FOREIGN PRISONERS AND
SOUTH VIETNAMESE OFFICERS.

V. YES.

A. GOOD, WHAT DO YOU . . .

[REDACTED]

V. (INTERRUPTING). YOU KNOW WE'LL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT AND VERY SERIOUSLY EXAMINE YOUR CONDITIONS. BUT I REPEAT ONE MORE TIME AND OUR, OUR ADVICE STICKS TO THE . . . AH, AH, TO INSIST ON THE FACT THAT THE PRISONERS ARE NOT BARGAINABLE. BUT WE WILL STILL EXAMINE VERY SERIOUSLY AND WITH A LOT OF GOOD FAITH YOUR PROPOSITION. GOOD. THEN IS EVERYTHING SETTLED?

A. YES, IT'S CLEAR; ONE MOMENT.

V. (INTERRUPTING). GOOD, IF WE TELEPHONE YOU A SECOND TIME, IT WILL BE PERHAPS AGAIN ONE SATURDAY MORNING.

A. A SATURDAY MORNING.

V. PERHAPS NEXT WEEK.

A. GOOD, OKAY.

V. AND UNTIL THEN, MY WISHES. GOOD BYE.

A. GOOD BYE, SIR.

V. GOOD BYE.

2. TO PROVIDE CONTEXT FOR YOUR REVIEW OF THE ABOVE
TRANSCRIPT:

A. THERE WERE NO APPARENT NUANCES IN THE INTERMEDIARY'S CONVERSATION.

[REDACTED]

B. THE INTERMEDIARY SPOKE IN AN AUTHORITATIVE MANNER.

C. AS YOU ARE AWARE, IT WAS [REDACTED] RELEASE ON VC INITIATIVE THAT TRIGGERED THE SUBSEQUENT EXCHANGE. THERE WAS NO DEAL IN ADVANCE ON [REDACTED] THAT WE KNOW OF.

D. SEVERAL REFERENCES BY THE INTERMEDIARY TO THE PREVIOUS AGREEMENT SEEM TO INDICATE A RELATIVELY HARD-LINE POSITION SINCE NO PREVIOUS AGREEMENT WAS MADE VIA [REDACTED]

E. THE INTERMEDIARY'S FRENCH, AS HIS ENGLISH, WAS CLEAR AND DELIBERATE. ALTHOUGH THE INTERMEDIARY HAS HAD NO DIFFICULTY WITH EITHER LANGUAGE, HE IS OBVIOUSLY MORE COMFORTABLE IN FRENCH.

3. AMBASSADOR BUNKER HAS BEEN BRIEFED AND IS STUDYING THE TRANSCRIPT IN PREPARATION FOR DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WITH MR. SHACKLEY ON 28 NOVEMBER. THE RESULTS OF THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE AMBASSADOR WILL BE CABLED.

4. GENERAL ABRAMS IS NOT PRESENTLY IN THE COUNTRY. MR. SHACKLEY ALERTED GENERAL POTTS THAT [REDACTED] HAS BEEN THE RECIPIENT OF A FOLLOW-UP TELEPHONE CALL CONCERNING THE

[REDACTED]

PRISONER EXCHANGE. MR. SHACKLEY PLANS TO BRIEF GENERAL WEYAND ON THE DETAILS ON 28 NOVEMBER. [REDACTED] SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE IS BRIEFED PROMPTLY ON THE CONTENTS OF THE ABOVE TRANSCRIPT. MR. SHACKLEY WILL SO ADVISE GENERAL WEYAND IN AN EFFORT TO OBVIATE THE USE BY HIM OF MILITARY CHANNELS.

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PAGE 0001

TOT: 231422Z DEC 86

CIA 219395

~~SECRET~~ SPECAT [REDACTED]

SPECAT 231422Z [REDACTED]

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRNSA, DEPT OF STATE, DIA, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM,
[REDACTED]

SERIAL: [REDACTED]

PASS: [REDACTED]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

DIST: 23 DECEMBER 1986

EXCLUSIVE DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED AT END OF REPORT

COUNTRY: LAOS

SUBJ: POW-MIA: STATUS OF ALLEGED LIVE MISSING-IN-ACTION
AMERICAN IN KHAMMOUAN PROVINCE, LAOS

DOI: 8 DECEMBER 1986

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

SECRET

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13

CIA-861223-464D

NND 982011 - 1641

MS

PAGE 0002
TOT: 231422Z DEC 86

TEXT: 1. ON 8 DECEMBER 1986, [REDACTED] SUBORDINATE OF [REDACTED], MET WITH [REDACTED] (LNU), AT THE FORESTRY FACTORY NUMBER FOUR, THAKHEK (VE 8023) DISTRICT TOWN, KHAMMOUAN PROVINCE, LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (LPDR), TO DISCUSS THE ALLEGED LIVE AMERICAN MISSING-IN-ACTION WHO WAS BEING HELD IN KHAMMOUAN PROVINCE. AFTER [REDACTED] ESTABLISHED HIS BONA FIDES WITH BY PROVIDING [REDACTED] GAVE [REDACTED] A SLIP OF PAPER WITH THE NAME [REDACTED] WRITTEN ON IT. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] WAS SERIOUSLY ILL WITH MALARIA. THE NAPENG (WE 7720) VILLAGER CARING FOR [REDACTED] (LNU), TOLD THAT HE HAD SOLD A PAIR OF OXEN VALUED AT APPROXIMATELY 4,500 BAHT, A CART AND THREE "HANGS" (PIECES OF SILVER BARS) TO PURCHASE INJECTION MEDICINE FOR [REDACTED] COMMENT: ABOUT 26 BAHT EQUALS U.S. \$1.00 AT THE OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE. [REDACTED] IS LISTED ON JCRC RECORDS AS AN AIR FORCE MAJOR, WHO WAS A CREW MEMBER ON AN AC 130 AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN IN 1972 IN LAOS AT XD 165414, WHICH IS IN THE GENERAL AREA OF NAPENG VILLAGE.)

2. TOLD TO HAVE [REDACTED] COME FOR [REDACTED] IMMEDIATELY BECAUSE [REDACTED] WAS AFRAID OF BEING TURNED IN TO THE LPDR AUTHORITIES FOR HARBORING HIM. [REDACTED] CLAIMED TO HAVE GIVEN 6,000 BAHT, 4,000 OF WHICH WAS FOR [REDACTED], WHICH HE RAISED BY SELLING A RELATIVE'S NECKLACE AND BY BORROWING FROM ACQUAINTANCES. [REDACTED] HAD SPENT 1,500 BAHT DURING HIS TRIP WHICH LASTED UNTIL 12 DECEMBER. ([REDACTED] COMMENT: SEE [REDACTED] FROM THE [REDACTED] WHICH REPORTED THE PRESENCE OF A LIVE AMERICAN BEING CARED FOR BY NAPENG VILLAGERS.)

DISSEM: FIELD: NONE.

WASHINGTON DISSEM:

TO WHSITRM:

EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

TO STATE:

EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, INR

TO DIA:

EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, DIA

TO NSA:

EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, NSA

WARNING: REPORT CLASS SECRET-- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] -DISSEMINATION AND
EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR.~~SECRET~~

** TEMPORARY WORKING COPY -- DESTROY AFTER USE **

NND 982011 - 1642

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COUNTRY CAMBODIA
DOI 1971
SUBJECT GRAVE SITE OF AMERICAN PILOT
ACQ VIETNAM, BIEN HOA (27 SEPTEMBER 1974)
SOURCE

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)

1. ENCLOSED IS A SKETCH OF THE CRASH SITE OF AN AMERICAN MILITARY PLANE WHICH CRASHED ABOUT 20 JULY 1971 IN THE XVI29028 AREA NEAR A HAMLET IN THE VILLAGE OF SAN DAN, KRATIE DISTRICT, KRATIE PROVINCE, CAMBODIA, AND THE BURIAL SITE OF THE PILOT. THE PILOT WAS THROWN FROM THE PLANE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UPON IMPACT AND APPARENTLY DIED INSTANTLY. LOCAL CAMBODIANS BURIED THE BODY IN THE AREA OF THE CRASH SITE AFTER PUMMELING THE HEAD. THE FOLLOWING WERE THE TWO LOCAL THEORIES AS TO THE CAUSE OF THE CRASH:

A. THE PLANE WAS CONDUCTING AN AIR STRIKE AND DIVED VERY CLOSE TO THE GROUND BUT FOR SOME REASON WAS UNABLE TO REGAIN ALTITUDE AND CRASHED.

B. THE PLANE, SWOOPING TO FIRE AT THREE VIET CONG (VC) SOLDIERS ON HIGHWAY 13 IN SAN DAN, FLEW TOO LOW AND WAS SHOT DOWN.

2. THE GREEN IDENTIFICATION (ID) CARD OF THE PILOT, SOME AMERICAN DOLLAR BILLS AND A VIETNAMESE-LANGUAGE MAP WERE DISPLAYED UNTIL ABOUT 1 OCTOBER 1971 IN THE CITY OF KRATIE. JUDGING FROM THE PHOTO ON THE ID CARD, THE PILOT WAS AN AMERICAN CAUCASIAN, ABOUT 23 YEARS OLD, WITH A DARK CREW-CUT HAIR. THE PILOT'S NAME, HANDWRITTEN ON THE ID CARD, STARTED WITH THE LETTERS COMMENT: THE SOURCE STATED DURING SUPPLEMENTARY DEBRIEFING IN SAIGON THAT PICTURES IN VOLUME I OF "PRISONERS OF WAR AND MISSING IN ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA" RESEMBLED THE ID CARD PHOTO, WITH PHOTO NO. APPEARING TO BE A CLOSER RESEMBLANCE.)

3. THE PLANE, WHICH WAS ESSENTIALLY INTACT EXCEPT FOR THE MISSING REAR SECTION OF ITS FUSELAGE, WAS TAKEN SHORTLY AFTER THE CRASH BY KHMER COMMUNIST (KC) OFFICIALS TO THE CITY OF KRATIE, WHERE IT WAS STILL ON DISPLAY AS OF APRIL 1974 AT THE INFORMATION OFFICE. COMMENT: PROVIDED THE ATTACHED MAP SHOWING THE SITES OF THE CRASH AND THE

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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GRAVE. [] SAID THAT ALL PERMANENT RESIDENTS OF KRATIE WERE AWARE OF THE CRASH AND THAT T H U K KROEUNG VUTHA, A KC INFORMATION OFFICE OFFICIAL IN KRATIE, WAS ONE OF THE OFFICIALS WHO WAS KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THE CRASH AND BURIAL.) [] COMMENT: IN SUBSEQUENT DEBRIEFING IN SAIGON, [] SAID THAT THE DOWNED PLANE WAS EITHER AN OV-2 OR A C-119.)

4. A CAMBODIAN WHO SAID HE HAD COLLECTED PARTS OF THE PLANES FOR LOCAL SALE REPORTED THAT THREE OTHER AMERICAN MILITARY PLANES, INCLUDING TWO JETS AND ONE PLANE OF THE TYPE WHICH CRASHED IN JULY 1971, HAD CRASHED AROUND DECEMBER 1971 IN A JUNGLE NEAR SVAY CREAM (XU423595), SNUOL DISTRICT, KRATIE PROVINCE, CAMBODIA.

5. [] COMMENT: THE JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER (JCRC) EVALUATES THIS REPORT AS FOLLOWS: "A SEARCH OF JCRC RECORDS WAS CONDUCTED WITHIN A 50-MILE RADIUS OF THE REPORTED CRASH COORDINATES (XV129028) AND A SIX-MONTH PARAMETER WAS USED FOR THE REPORTED CRASH DATE (20 JULY 1971). THE SEARCH REVEALED ONLY TWO FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT LOSSES WITHIN THE INDICATED PARAMETERS. AN F-100D WAS DOWNED ON 4 APRIL 1971 AT WU325872. THE PILOT WAS PERFORMING HIS FIFTH STRAFING PASS OVER THE TARGET WHEN HIS AIRCRAFT WAS OBSERVED TO BE STREAMING WHITE SMOKE PRIOR TO IMPACT. THE OTHER LOSS WAS AN OV-10A WHICH LAST HAD RADAR CONTACT AT 0643 ON 29 JANUARY 1971 IN THE VICINITY OF WV650810. THE OV-10 FLIGHT PLAN INCLUDED RECONNAISSANCE ALONG ROUTE 13 FROM SAMBOR (XV085130) TO STOENG TRENG (XV085950). THE PILOTS OF BOTH AIRCRAFT WERE CAUCASIANS WITH DARK HAIR. IN 1971, THE F-100D PILOT WAS 26 AND THE OV-10 PILOT WAS 37. NEITHER OF THE PILOT'S NAMES BEGINS WITH "SCHEI,"

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BUT THE PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION BASED ON THE ID PHOTO COULD CORRELATE WITH EITHER OF THE TWO MEN. ASSUMING THAT THE OV-10, PILOTED BY AIR FORCE FOLLOWED THE FLIGHT PLAN, IT WOULD HAVE PASSED OVER THE GENERAL AREA OF THE CRASH SITE. THE REPORT MAY CORRELATE WITH THE FLIGHT OF WHO IS CURRENTLY CARRIED IN A MISSING STATUS.")

6. DISSEM: DEFENSE ATTACHE FOR JCRC REPRESENTATIVE IN SAIGON: SENT TO CINCPAC (FOR CINCPAC AND POLAD ONLY). USSAG AND VIENTIANE (FOR JCRC REPRESENTATIVES ONLY).

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (1)(2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

21 January 1992

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This responds to your letter of December 13, 1991 addressing issues of Soviet involvement with American POWs. Our response reflects a careful review of our files and is keyed to the points in your letter.

We have reviewed our files and found no information which would indicate that American POWs from either the Korean or Vietnam wars were transferred to the Soviet Union.

With regard to contact by American POWs in Vietnam with Soviets, we have information concerning three probable or possible instances of Soviet involvement.

U.S. SENATE DO NOT REMOVE SENATE SECURITY

A. * * * ERMS40600002716L *

OFFICE OF SENATE SECURITYDOCUMENT CONTROL NUMBER OSS-92-2351This Document consists of 2 PagesCopy 1 of 2~~SECRET~~

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The Honorable John F. Kerry

The third instance has only recently come to our attention, relates to the 1972 time frame, is of a particularly sensitive nature, and will be the subject of separate correspondence.

These are the only instances for which we have information on Soviet involvement with American POWs.

With regard to the issue of Soviet involvement with POWs, we would draw your attention to a TASS news agency dispatch of January 4, 1992 quoting a spokeswoman of the Russian Interrepublic Security Service (ISS), the successor organization of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. According to that statement, the Russian authorities thoroughly searched KGB files and uncovered records of one contact with a US POW in 1973. According to the TASS dispatch, the Soviets suspected the American of being an intelligence officer, but the US POW refused to meet with the Soviets a second time. This information would appear to relate to the first case cited above.

In regard to an earlier Soviet press report of an American military pilot present in the village of Saryshagan, Dzhezkazgan Oblast, the ISS said it had made several initial attempts to gain access to the area but was turned back for security reasons by the military which controls the area. Recently, however, the ISS did succeed in entering Saryshagan. Its investigative checks and interviews gave no indication that Americans were ever present there.

Information concerning the recent debriefing of former KGB General Oleg Kalugin by the US Defense Attache's Office in Moscow would have to be obtained either from DoD or the State Department. Similarly, [redacted]

[redacted] would have to be obtained from the White House.

A copy of this letter is also being provided to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

[redacted]
Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

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DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: DETENTION OF TWO CAUCASIANS, APPARENTLY AMERICANS, IN THE BIEN HOA AREA IN THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

1. [REDACTED] COMMENT: A REPORT NUMBERED [REDACTED] AND DISSEMINATED ON 13 NOVEMBER 1981 PROVIDED INFORMATION FROM A VIETNAMESE REFUGEE WHO REPORTED THE SIGHTING OF A U.S. MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS TECHNICIAN. THE LATTER WAS DETAINED BY THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SRV) IN THE BIEN HOA AREA AS OF APRIL 1981.)

2. AT VARIOUS TIMES BETWEEN 16 DECEMBER 1978 AND 13 NOVEMBER 1980, A WHITE CAUCASIAN, APPARENTLY AMERICAN, MALE WAS SEEN AT THE B-5 POLITICAL PRISONER CAMP-IN BIEN HOA PROVINCE, SRV. THE INDIVIDUAL, NAMED [REDACTED] (PHONETIC), WAS USUALLY SEEN IN THE COMPANY OF A JAPANESE MALE PRISONER. BOTH PRISONERS WERE KEPT IN CHLL 7 AT THE CAMP AND WERE LATER TRANSFERRED TO CELL 11. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE B-5 POLITICAL PRISONER CAMP HAD ABOUT 1,500 POLITICAL PRISONERS AND MOST KNEW THE CAUCASIAN WAS NAMED [REDACTED] BECAUSE HE WAS FREQUENTLY CALLED OUT BY THAT NAME BY GUARDS AT THE CAMP.) THE CAUCASIAN WAS ABOUT 30 YEARS OLD, FIVE FEET, NINE INCHES IN HEIGHT, AND HAD BROWN HAIR. HE HAS BEEN DETAINED AT THE PRISON CAMP SINCE APRIL 1975. BOTH THE CAUCASIAN AND THE JAPANESE PRISONERS WERE KEPT SEPARATED FROM VIETNAMESE PRISONERS AND WERE NOT PERMITTED TO SPEAK TO ANYONE. THE PRISONER IDENTIFIED AS [REDACTED] OFTEN WAS IN THE CAMP'S EXERCISE YARD CLAD ONLY IN SHORTS. HE APPEARED TO BE MENTALLY DERANGED. THE JAPANESE PRISONER, WHO WAS ABOUT 40 YEARS OF AGE, HAD BEEN DETAINED AT THE CAMP SINCE 1975. OCCASIONALLY, VIETNAMESE BUDDHIST MONKS FROM VINH NGHIEN PAGODA IN HO CHI MINH CITY VISITED THE JAPANESE PRISONER AND BROUGHT HIM EXTRA FOOD. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED] BELIEVES THAT THE INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED AS [REDACTED] MAY BE STILL INCARCERATED AT THE B-5 POLITICAL PRISONER CAMP.)

3. BETWEEN AUGUST 1975 AND APRIL 1976, A CAUCASIAN MALE, APPARENTLY AN AMERICAN, WAS BEING HELD AT BIEN HOA MENTAL HOSPITAL, IN BIEN HOA PROVINCE, SRV. THE INDIVIDUAL WENT UNDER THE NAME OF [REDACTED] WHILE AT THE INSTITUTE, HE WORE THE NAVY BLUE UNIFORM WORN BY THE INSTITUTE'S PATIENTS, ALONG WITH RUBBER SANDALS. THE INDIVIDUAL WAS ABOUT 33 YEARS OLD APPROXIMATELY

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DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR

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DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR

SIX FEET TALL, AND WORE A HEAVY BEARD! HE REPORTEDLY HAD BEEN AN "AGRICULTURAL GRADUATE" IN THE U.S. AND HAD WORKED FOR AN UNIDENTIFIED U.S. VOLUNTARY AGENCY IN SOUTH VIETNAM BEFORE APRIL 1975. THE INDIVIDUAL HAD A DEEP FOUR-INCH SCAR ACROSS HIS RIGHT FOREHEAD AS THE RESULT OF A TRAFFIC ACCIDENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM BEFORE 1974. THE PATIENT, WHO SPOKE VIETNAMESE, WAS OFTEN ASKED BY THE INSTITUTE'S STAFF MEMBERS IF HE WISHED TO RETURN TO THE U.S. HE ONLY SHOOK HIS HEAD IN RESPONSE. AS HIS DAILY ROUTINE THE INDIVIDUAL WAS PERMITTED TO CULTIVATE A PATCH OF VEGETABLES NEAR THE HOSPITAL COMPOUND. HE WAS ALLOWED TO MOVE AROUND THE HOSPITAL FREELY BUT WAS NOT PERMITTED TO TALK TO THE HOSPITAL PERSONNEL. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED] SAID HE TALKED BRIEFLY WITH THE INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED AS [REDACTED] TIMES. [REDACTED] BELIEVES THIS INDIVIDUAL MAY BE STILL HELD AT THE BIEN HOA MENTAL INSTITUTE.)

4. [REDACTED] COMMENT: PARAGRAPH 2 IS FROM THE DEBRIEFING OF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

5. [REDACTED] COMMENT: PARAGRAPH 3 IS FROM THE DEBRIEFING OF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR

RVW 13MAR02 [REDACTED] 1 BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT

[REDACTED] NND 982025 -

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DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR

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(b)

14 February 1973

REPORT CLASS ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI OCTOBER 1967

SUBJECT SIGHTING OF U.S. PRISONER OF WAR IN LUC NAM DISTRICT,
HA BAC PROVINCE, NORTH VIETNAM.

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (8 FEBRUARY 1973)

SOURCE

NND 982011 4245

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1. AT ABOUT 1500 HOURS ONE DAY IN MID-OCTOBER 1967, SOURCE SAW A U.S. PRISONER OF WAR (POW) AT XJ625583, ABOUT TWO AND A HALF KILOMETERS EAST OF THE BEN BO AREA, LUC NAM DISTRICT, HA BAC PROVINCE, NORTH VIETNAM. HE HAD LANDED WITH A RED PARACHUTE AND WAS CAPTURED BY CHINESE ANTIAIRCRAFT UNIT PERSONNEL STATIONED IN THE AREA. HIS F-105 AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN BY NORTH VIETNAMESE ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY AND CRASHED AT AN UNIDENTIFIED LOCATION IN QUANG NINH PROVINCE.

2. SOURCE OBSERVED THE POW FOR ABOUT ONE HOUR FROM A DISTANCE OF THREE TO FIVE METERS. THE POW WAS CAUCASIAN, ABOUT 40 YEARS OLD, 1.80 METERS TALL, WEIGHED ABOUT 75 KILOS, HAD A MEDIUM BUILD, DARK COMPLEXION, LONG FACE, BROWN EYES, THICK RED HAIR AND LONG SIDEBURNS. HE WAS DRESSED IN A GREEN FLIGHT SUIT AND WORE A WRISTWATCH AND AN OPAL RING IN A GOLD SETTING.

3. LUC NGAN DISTRICT PUBLIC SECURITY CADRE, THE SECRETARY OF THE LUC NAM DISTRICT PARTY COMMITTEE, AND CADRE OF THE LUC NAM DISTRICT UNIT WERE ALL PRESENT AT THE POW LANDING SITE AND ARGUED WITH THE CHINESE FOR CUSTODY OF THE POW. FINALLY, THE CHINESE RELEASED THE POW AND HE WAS DRIVEN AWAY IN ONE OF FOUR JEEPS OF THE HA BAC PROVINCE PUBLIC SECURITY UNIT. HE WAS NOT TIED OR BLINDFOLDED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. [] COMMENT: ~~source~~ WAS SHOWN THE ALBUM OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND MISSING IN ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (U) AND IDENTIFIED PHOTOGRAPH NO. J030 ON PAGE I A 81 AS SIMILAR TO THE POW HE HAD SEEN.)

5. [] COMMENT: THE JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER (JCRC) EVALUATED THIS REPORT AS FOLLOWS: "IN THE AREA AND TIME FRAME MENTIONED, THE MOST LIKELY POSSIBILITY IS THAT SOURCE OBSERVED MAJOR WAYNE E. F U L L A M (ACCESSION NO. 0767) USAF, WHO WAS SHOT DOWN AT 1615 HOURS 7 OCTOBER 1967, AT XJ962562. MAJ FULLAM WAS FLYING AN F105D AND THE CRAFT WAS DOWNED IN THE VICINITY DESCRIBED BY ~~source~~ SOURCE'S DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA, TIME, AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DOWNING IS SIMILAR TO THE ACTUAL INCIDENT. FURTHER, THE PICTURE SELECTED BY ~~source~~ CLOSELY RESEMBLES MAJOR FULLAM (SEE PHOTO F040 ON PAGE I A-219). HE MADE A HIGH SPEED EJECTION, IN EXCESS OF 500 KNOTS. HE HAD A GOOD CHUTE, WITH A VERY STRONG BEEPER SIGNAL. AFTER THE CHUTE DEPLOYED, HE DID NOT DEPLOY HIS SEAT KIT, AND WAS NOT OBSERVED MOVING DURING HIS DESCENT. FULLAM'S FLIGHT FLEW RECAP FOR 15-20 MINUTES AND THROUGHOUT THIS TIME CONTINUED TO RECEIVE SIGNALS FROM HIS BEEPER. BUT AT NO TIME WAS THERE APPARENT ANY ATTEMPT MADE BY HIM TO ESTABLISH CONTACT USING HIS

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EMERGENCY RADIO. ON ARRIVAL OF SEARCH AND RESCUE FLIGHT, HIS CHUTE WAS SEEN HANGING FROM THE TREES, WITH HIS BEEPER STILL TRANSMITTING. HOWEVER, ON THE NEXT PASS THE BEEPER HAD BEEN TURNED OFF AND THE CHUTE REMOVED FROM THE TREES. BASED ON THE ABOVE FACTS, IT IS ASSUMED THAT MAJ FULLAM WAS INJURED OR POSSIBLY KILLED DURING HIS EJECTION. MAJ FULLAM IS PRESENTLY CARRIED AS MIA IN NORTH VIETNAM.") [] COMMENT: MAJOR FULLAM'S NAME DOES NOT APPEAR ON THE LISTS OF POW'S PROVIDED BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND VIET CONG REPRESENTATIVES IN PARIS AS POW'S SCHEDULED FOR RELEASE TO U.S. AUTHORITIES OR OF THOSE WHO DIED IN CAPTIVITY.)

6. [] DISSEM: EMBASSY USMACV JCRC 7TH AIR FORCE
USARV NAVFORV 525TH MI GP 7602ND AIG OSI AT SAIGON: SENT TO
CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC [] VIENTIANE []
REPORT CLASS ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ []

[]
[]
CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B
(1) (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

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(b)(6)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

22 September 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Vice Admiral V. P. de Poix
Director
Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : Photographs of U.S. POWs Introduced at the
29 June 1972 Press Conference in Hanoi

1. Although some still photography of the 29 June 1972 press conference has appeared in Communist press radiophoto material, the attached photographs taken at the conference may be of value as additional background.

2. Since the photographs were acquired from a [redacted] who could be harmed by disclosure, it is requested that the [redacted] classification be retained and that the photographs not be shown to next-of-kin at this time.

[redacted]
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment

cc: Admiral Rectanus w/photos
Admiral Whitmire w/photos & negatives
Admiral Murphy
General Ogan w/photos
Colonel Iles
Colonel Allen
Colonel Quillian
Captain Adams


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
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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT:

Text of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

REFERENCES: A.

B. [REDACTED]

1. Following now represents guidelines for anticipated call from [REDACTED] intermediary. Guidelines incorporate Reference A guidance and President Thieu's points as outlined in Reference B. Guidelines are presented as one package as though we understand intermediary may have to refer back to his principals for guidance before precise arrangements for final exchange are worked out. In such an event, we will push for confirmation of our arrangement from his side at earliest possible time.

2. In reading this exchange please note V is [REDACTED] intermediary and A is [REDACTED]

A. V. I WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK TO [REDACTED]

B. A. I'M SORRY BUT [REDACTED] IS NOT HERE. I AM MR.

FRANCIS. I AM A COLLEAGUE OF [REDACTED] AND I'M FULLY AUTHORIZED TO ACT ON HIS BEHALF TO INSURE THAT THERE ARE NO DELAYS IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS EVEN WHEN [REDACTED] ISN'T AVAILABLE. WE HAVE SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME REVIEWING OUR LAST TELEPHONE CONVERSATION OF 4 DECEMBER AND WE EXPECT YOU TO RECONTACT US TO TELL US OF MR. BACH DANG'S DECISION CONCERNING OUR PROPOSAL. WE WOULD LIKE TO REPEAT THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO RELEASE [REDACTED] IN EXCHANGE FOR [REDACTED] AS A

982010-1640

0928

SECRET [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

FIRST STEP TO FUTURE EXCHANGES. AGAIN WE WOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT IF YOU WILL MAKE THIS INITIAL EXCHANGE AND IF YOU WILL PROVIDE US WITH A LIST OF AMERICANS, FOREIGNERS, AND VIETNAMESE OFFICERS WHO ARE PRISONERS, THIS WILL MAKE THINGS MOVE FASTER AND WILL ASSIST US IN WORKING OUT THE DETAILS OF FUTURE EXCHANGES THAT WOULD INVOLVE [REDACTED] DO YOU HAVE AN ANSWER FROM MR. BACH DANG OR A NEW PROPOSAL? (COMMENT: IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE CALLER WILL REHASH PREVIOUS DEMANDS BUT AS INDICATED ABOVE WE ARE GOING TO GIVE INTERMEDIARY AMPLE TIME TO STATE HIS POSITION ON OFF CHANCE THEY ARE WILLING TO COMPROMISE OR MAKE ALTERNATE PROPOSAL. IF INTERMEDIARY REMAINS ADAMANT WE WILL REPLY AS FOLLOWS:)

C. A. I UNDERSTAND WHAT YOU SAY. YOU ARE ONLY INTERESTED IN RELEASE OF [REDACTED] TOGETHER. IN EXCHANGE FOR THESE TWO MEN YOU ARE PREPARED TO RELEASE [REDACTED] AND SOME OTHERS. THAT IS NOT ENOUGH. THE TWO PRISONERS YOU WANT ARE SPECIFIC, VERY IMPORTANT INDIVIDUALS. WE NEED TO KNOW HOW MANY AND WHICH PRISONERS WOULD BE RELEASED IN EXCHANGE. OBVIOUSLY, THERE MUST BE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING FOR AN EXCHANGE TO TAKE PLACE. WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT WE SHOW GOOD FAITH ON BOTH SIDES BY EXCHANGING [REDACTED] FOR [REDACTED] AS FIRST STEP, BUT YOU HAVE REFUSED THAT OFFER. IN VIEW OF THIS, LET ME STATE CLEARLY, WE ARE PREPARED TO

982010-1641 [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

0929

~~SECRET~~

RELEASE BOTH [REDACTED] I REPEAT WE ARE WILLING TO RELEASE
BOTH [REDACTED] BUT WE MUST KNOW HOW MANY AND WHICH.

PRISONERS YOU WILL RELEASE IN EXCHANGE. WE ALSO NEED A CLEAR
UNDERSTANDING AS TO HOW AND WHERE THIS EXCHANGE WILL TAKE
PLACE. IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRISONERS YOU HAVE
ASKED FOR, WE ASK THAT YOU ARRANGE THE RELEASE OF AT LEAST
TEN PRISONERS INCLUDING [REDACTED] IN EXCHANGE FOR [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I SAY AGAIN, WE ASK THAT YOU ARRANGE THE RELEASE OF
AT LEAST TEN PRISONERS, INCLUDING [REDACTED] IN EXCHANGE
FOR [REDACTED]

DO YOU UNDERSTAND AND WILL YOU BE ABLE TO
ARRANGE THE RELEASE OF THESE PRISONERS? CAN YOU GIVE ME AN

ANSWER NOW? I REPEAT, WE ARE PREPARED TO RELEASE BOTH

[REDACTED] BUT FOR THIS WE NEED TO
KNOW WHO AND HOW MANY WILL BE RELEASED IN THE EXCHANGE
ALONG WITH [REDACTED]

(COMMENT: IF CALLER SAYS HE NEEDS TIME TO ANSWER,
HE WILL BE ASKED "WHEN WILL YOU BE ABLE TO HAVE AN ANSWER?"
A TIME WILL BE SET - WE WILL PUSH FOR EARLIEST POSSIBLE REPLY.
IF HE STATES THAT HE CANNOT ARRANGE RELEASE OF MORE
PRISONERS, HE WILL BE REMINDED OF HIS REPEATED REFERENCES
TO OTHERS IN ADDITION TO [REDACTED] AND ASKED TO PROVIDE SPECIFICS.

982010-1642

0930

~~SECRET~~

IF HE SAYS TEN IS TOO MANY, HE WILL BE TOLD THAT WE CONSIDER THIS AN APPROPRIATE NUMBER TO EXCHANGE FOR PRISONERS AS IMPORTANT AS [REDACTED] EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO PIN DOWN INTERMEDIARY TO GIVE SPECIFIC DETAILS AS TO HOW MANY "OTHERS" WILL BE INVOLVED AND SPECIFIC DATE FOR EXCHANGE. WHILE WE APPRECIATE DESIRE NOT TO GET HUNG UP ON POINT OF "OTHERS", PRESIDENT THIEU ON THE OTHER HAND WOULD PREFER NOT SIMPLY ACCEPT ARRANGEMENT INVOLVING UNSPECIFIED "OTHERS". BY PRESSING FOR DETAILS AND DATE WE WILL HOPEFULLY BE ABLE TO SATISFY VARIOUS DESIRES TO MOVE AHEAD AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AND AT SAME TIME HONOR THIEU'S PREFERENCE NOT TO ENGAGE IN OPEN ENDED AND ILL DEFINED SWAP. AS STATED IN PARAGRAPH 1 WE RECOGNIZE THIS APPROACH MIGHT REQUIRE THE INTERMEDIARY TO SEEK GUIDANCE BUT WE WILL PRESS FOR QUICK ANSWER SUGGESTING OTHER SIDE RESPOND WITHIN THREE DAYS. WHETHER INTERMEDIARY IS ABLE TO MAKE DECISION OR NOT ON NUMBERS OF PRISONERS, NAMES, ETC. WE WILL ASK HIM TO LISTEN TO REMAINDER OF OUR PROPOSAL SO THAT HE CAN PASS ENTIRE MESSAGE TO MR. BACH DANG.

D. A. WE WOULD LIKE TO OUTLINE THE EXACT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE RELEASE. THERE MUST BE AN UNDERSTANDING THAT PRISONERS TO BE RELEASED BY EACH SIDE WILL BE BROUGHT TO

982010-1643

0931

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

EXCHANGE POINT AT AN AGREED TIME. THERE MUST BE A MILITARY STANDDOWN IN THAT AREA FOR A RADIUS OF 5 KILOMETERS. DO YOU UNDERSTAND? PLEASE LET ME CONTINUE. THE EXCHANGE SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT LEAST ONE KILOMETER OUTSIDE THE VILLAGE OF TA GANG ROBON. WE SUGGEST AN AREA, APPROXIMATELY ONE KILOMETER NORTHEAST OF TA GANG ROBON JUST OFF THE HIGHWAY. IN OUR SURVEY OF THE AREA, WE NOTED SOME FIRM GROUND ABOUT ONE KILOMETER NORTHEAST OF TA GANG ROBON ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THE HIGHWAY THAT LOOKED SUITABLE TO SUPPORT THE LANDING OF ONE OR MORE HELICOPTERS. IF THIS AREA IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO YOU WE MUST INSIST YOU CHOOSE AN AREA AT LEAST ONE KILOMETER AWAY FROM THE VILLAGE OF TA GANG ROBON THAT IS SUITABLE FOR HELICOPTER LANDINGS AND WE WILL LOOK FOR YOUR SMOKE SIGNALS IN THAT AREA. DO YOU UNDERSTAND? SPECIFICALLY, WE WILL BRING [REDACTED] TO THE EXCHANGE AREA IN TWO SEPARATE WHITE HELICOPTERS. WE WILL ARRIVE, HOWEVER, WITH TOTAL OF THREE WHITE HELICOPTERS. I REPEAT, THREE WHITE HELICOPTERS. THAT WAY THERE WILL BE ENOUGH SEATS TO TAKE AWAY THE PRISONERS YOU RELEASE.

E. A. WE PROPOSE THAT THE TIME BE SET FOR 1600 HOURS, I REPEAT 1600 HOURS. DO YOU AGREE TO THAT? OK. PLEASE LET ME CONTINUE. THE FIRST HELICOPTER CONTAINING [REDACTED] WILL CIRCLE TA GANG ROBON. [REDACTED] WILL GIVE AGREED UPON

982010-1644
[REDACTED]

J 0932

~~SECRET~~

SMOKE SIGNALS: ONE RED, ONE YELLOW, AND ONE GREEN. WE WISH TO POINT OUT THAT WE PLAN ON USING THREE WHITE HELICOPTERS IN THE EXCHANGE AREA BUT ONLY TWO, AS YOU SUGGESTED, WILL BE OVER TA GANG ROBON AREA AT ONE TIME. THE FIRST HELICOPTER WILL LAND BETWEEN YOUR SMOKE SIGNALS APPROXIMATELY ONE KILOMETER OUTSIDE OF TA GANG ROBON. [] WILL BE ON THE FIRST HELICOPTER AND WE WILL PICK UP [] AND SOME OTHERS IN EXCHANGE FOR [] WILL BE IN THE SECOND HELICOPTER ABOVE THE LANDING AREA AND WHEN [] [] AND A PORTION OF THE OTHERS ARE ON OUR FIRST HELICOPTER, THE SECOND HELICOPTER WILL LAND WITH [] THIS SECOND HELICOPTER WILL PICK UP SOME OF THE ADDITIONAL PRISONERS WHO ARE TO BE EXCHANGED FOR [] IF, HOWEVER, [] IS ALONE WHEN WE RELEASE [] AND NO OTHER PRISONERS ARE IN SIGHT THE HELICOPTER CONTAINING [] WILL NOT LAND. IN THIS EVENT, WE WILL HAVE THE THIRD HELICOPTER LAND AND AWAIT FOR THE APPEARANCE OF THE OTHER PRISONERS. WHEN THEY APPEAR AND IT IS EVIDENT THAT THEY ARE TO BE EXCHANGED BY YOUR ALLOWING THEM TO GET ON THE HELICOPTER, WE WILL LAND THE HELICOPTER CONTAINING [] THE EXCHANGE WILL BE COMPLETED AT THAT POINT AND OUR TWO HELICOPTERS WILL DEPART.

982010-1645

0233

~~SECRET~~

F. A. [] WILL BE ABLE TO VERIFY THAT [] IS
IN FACT ON THE SECOND HELICOPTER. WE WILL NEED SIMILAR
ASSURANCE THAT YOU HAVE OTHERS TO EXCHANGE BEFORE []
[] HELICOPTER WILL LAND. DO I MAKE MYSELF CLEAR?

G. YOU HAVE OUR ASSURANCE THAT THERE WILL BE A MILITARY
STANDDOWN BY OUR SIDE AND WE EXPECT THAT YOU WILL APPRO-
PRIATELY HONOR THIS STANDDOWN. IS THERE ANYTHING YOU WISH
ME TO REPEAT? ARE YOU PREPARED TO AGREE TO OUR PROPOSAL
NOW INCLUDING NUMBER OF PRISONERS YOU WILL EXCHANGE ALONG
WITH [] IF SO WE ARE PREPARED TO GO AHEAD THREE
DAYS FROM NOW AT 1600 HOURS. IF YOU ARE NOT PREPARED TO
AGREE PLEASE CALL US BACK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH THE NUMBER
OF PRISONERS AND THE SPECIFICS AS TO THE DATE FOR THE EXCHANGE.

982010-1646

0934

~~SECRET~~

--DISSEMINATION AND
EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)

SUBJECT: Downing of Two U.S. Aircraft in Quang Ninh Province
in Mid-1964

TEXT: 1. In approximately July 1964 a U.S. pilot parachuted into a narrow valley between two hills approximately two kilometers (km) west of Ha Lam coal mine and two km east of Lon Ton market, Hon Cai District, Quang Ninh Province. The pilot's aircraft was believed to have been hit by anti-aircraft fire and to have exploded in mid-air. The pilot was mortally wounded and efforts to revive him were unsuccessful. He was removed to an unknown location by local forces. The pilot, who wore a helmet and dark gray clothing, was tall, between 1.7 and 1.8 meters tall and had a beard.

2. In approximately August 1964 a U.S. aircraft crashed into the sea approximately 12 km southwest of Cua Ong Port, Cam Pha, Quang Ninh. Two U.S. airmen, between 30 and 40 years of age, escaped from the wreckage of the plane. The two airmen were captured by border control Public Security forces and brought to the Cam Pha District office. According to local Public Security forces one of the airmen was a captain and the other a major. The fate of the two airmen was not known.

3. [redacted] Comment: The above information was obtained from the debriefing of a Vietnamese refugee, [redacted] Biographic information is as follows:

a. [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

--DISSEMINATION AND
EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR

NND-982020

1560

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] -DISSEMINATION AND
EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR

[REDACTED]

b. [REDACTED] said that in approximately July 1964 after a trip to the Lon Ton market he saw the wounded airmen. In approximately August 1964 he was fishing near the spot where the two airmen escaped from their aircraft with two rubber dinghies. [REDACTED] was unable to state with certainty the distances and direction in the two incidents.

[REDACTED]

DECL OADR DRV [REDACTED] BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] -DISSEMINATION AND
EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR

NNI-982020

L1

1561

Lee C.K. - MIA~~CONFIDENTIAL~~(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)

23 May 1973

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI MID-JULY 1969

SUBJECT DEATH OF U.S. PILOT IN HAIPHONG PROVINCE, NORTH VIETNAM

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (28 APRIL 1973) ... ~~CIA~~ ~~AT~~

SOURCE

CIA-730523-169

NND 982019 -769

2000241

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. IN MID-JULY 1968, [REDACTED] SAW A PILOT FALL TO HIS DEATH IN KIEN THIEP VILLAGE, TIEN LANG DISTRICT, HAIPHONG PROVINCE, NORTH VIETNAM (NVN), AFTER HIS PARACHUTE COLLAPSED WHILE IN DESCENT. [REDACTED] SAW THE PILOT'S AIRCRAFT HIT BY A [REDACTED] SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE OVER HAIPHONG CITY, WITH THE AIRCRAFT BREAKING INTO TWO PIECES AND THE PILOT EJECTING. THE PILOT WAS WEARING A GREY FLIGHT SUIT, AND HIS WHITE CHUTE INITIALLY APPEARED TO FUNCTION PROPERLY, BUT SUDDENLY THE PARACHUTE COLLAPSED AND THE PILOT PLUMMETED TO THE GROUND, LANDING IN A BAMBOO THICKET.

2. [REDACTED] SAID HE SAW ONE PIECE OF THE PLANE FALL IN BAC PHONG HAMLET (XH583869), KIEN THIEP VILLAGE; HE OBSERVED THE INCIDENT FROM ABOUT TWO KILOMETERS AND DID NOT GO NEAR THE AREA WHERE THE PILOT FELL FOR FEAR OF COMING UNDER FIRE FROM OTHER U.S. AIRCRAFT. LATER IN THE DAY, A CADRE FROM TIEN LANG DISTRICT TOLD [REDACTED] THAT THE PILOT, AN AMERICAN, WAS KILLED IN THE FALL AND THAT HE HAD BEEN PILOTING AN F-4H AIRCRAFT.

3. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE FOLLOWING IS THE JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER (JCRC) EVALUATION OF THE REPORT: EXTENSIVE EFFORTS TO CORRELATE THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT RESULTED IN THE POSSIBLE IDENTIFICATION OF THE INCIDENT INVOLVING

- 2 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NND 982019 770

2000242

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~[REDACTED]
DOWNED ON 9 JULY 1967.

[REDACTED] WAS FLYING AN A-4C NEAR HAIPHONG, NORTH VIETNAM. HIS AIRCRAFT WAS HIT BY A SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE. THE AIRCRAFT WENT OUT OF CONTROL AND WAS SEEN SPINNING DOWNWARD IN FLAMES. NO PARACHUTE WAS OBSERVED AND NO COMMUNICATION WAS ESTABLISHED WITH THE PILOT. SINCE SEVERAL YEARS HAVE PASSED SINCE THE INCIDENT OCCURRED, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT [REDACTED] SAW THE CRASH IN 1967 RATHER THAN IN 1968. THE LOCATION OF THE CRASH SITE GIVEN BY THE SOURCE CLOSELY MATCHES INFORMATION ON HAND. [REDACTED] IS PRESENTLY CARRIED AS MISSING-IN-ACTION BY HIS PARENT SERVICE.)

4. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

- 3 -

[REDACTED]
NND 982019-77/

E000243

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. [REDACTED] DISSEM: DEFENSE ATTACHE FOR JCRC REPRESENTATIVE
IN SAIGON) SENT TO CINCPAC (FOR CINCPAC AND POLAD ONLY)
USSAG AND VIENTIANE (FOR JCRC REPRESENTATIVES ONLY)
REPORT CLASS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPTION CATEGORY
58 (1) (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION.

- 4 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NND 982019-772

0000244

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)

5 January 1973

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Sighting of Three American Prisoners of War in Tan Uyen District, Bien Hoa Province, South Vietnam

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

1. In May or June 1970 at about 1700 hours one afternoon, [REDACTED] observed three U.S. prisoners of war (POWs) in Binh Co Hamlet, Binh My Village, Tan Uyen District, Bien Hoa Province, South Vietnam (SVN), for about 30 minutes from a distance of about ten meters. According to their six guards, who were members of the unit which had captured them, the POWs were ambushed while riding in a jeep by soldiers of the Viet Cong (VC) Chau Thanh District unit, Binh Duong Province, on Inter-province Road 16, near XT916292, about seven kilometers northwest of Tan Uyen District Town. /1/

/1/The above information was coordinated with JPRC which made the following comments: "JPRC's correlation of this report indicates that [REDACTED] probably described the incident involving [REDACTED]"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0132

NND 982014 - 554

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. All of the POWs appeared to be in good health and did not appear to be wounded. They were caucasian and wore civilian clothes. One POW was about 35 years old, 1.90 meters tall, had a medium build and a long face. The second was about 1.80 meters tall and had a heavy build. The third POW was about 1.70 meters tall and also had a heavy build. /2/

3. The POWs and their guards remained overnight in Binh Co Hamlet. The POWs were given bread to eat and were placed in trenches to sleep. The next morning they were sent to the VC Subregion (SR) 5 headquarters in War Zone D. The guards were armed with AK rifles and tied the hands of each man for the trip. /3/ and /4/

/1/ Continued. [redacted] all of the U. S. Army. The three individuals were last seen on 23 June 1970; their vehicle was found later the same day at XT801340 on a road near Ben Cat Village, Binh Duong Province, SVN. Further, this is the only date/circumstance correlation for the time frame and area. The vehicle involved was a two and one-half ton military vehicle, not a jeep, and was left at the scene. These individuals are carried by the U. S. Army in the following status: [redacted] captured (based on additional information)."

/2/ [redacted] was shown the "Photographs of Missing and Captured Personnel in SEA" album published by the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) but was unable to identify any of the men.

/3/ VC SR-5 has since been redesignated Thu Bien SR. Thu Bien SR includes Government of Vietnam (GVN) Duc Tu and Tan Uyen Districts, Bien Hoa Province; Bien Hoa City; most of Thu Duc District, Gia Dinh Province; Chau Thanh, Lai Thieu and Phu Giao District, Binh Duong Province; Phu Cuong City and portions of Kien Tan District, Long Khanh Province.


/4/ [redacted]

-2-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0133

NND 982014 - 555

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM
GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652. EXEMPTION
CATEGORY 5B (1) (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTO-
MATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

-3-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0134

NND 982014 - 556

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

16 February 1973

REPORT CLASS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI LATE FEBRUARY 1965

SUBJECT SIGHTING OF A U.S. PILOT IN GIA LAM DISTRICT, HANOI,
NORTH VIETNAM

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (12 FEBRUARY 1973)

SOURCE

1. AT ABOUT NOON ONE DAY IN LATE FEBRUARY 1965.

NND 982011

9

422

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SAW A U.S. F-105 JET SHOT DOWN WHILE IT WAS BOMBING THE DUC GIANG POL STORAGE FACILITY IN GIA LAM DISTRICT, HANOI, NORTH VIETNAM. THE JET WAS SHOT DOWN BY ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY LOCATED NEAR TAY LAKE, HANOI, AND CRASHED IN GIA LAM DISTRICT. A PILOT BAILED OUT OF THE JET WHEN IT STARTED BURNING, USED AN ORANGE PARACHUTE, AND LANDED IN THE DUC GIANG AREA, GIA LAM DISTRICT. HE WAS IMMEDIATELY CAPTURED BY NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITIAMEN.

2. ON THE SAME DAY AT ABOUT 1400 HOURS, THE CAPTURED PILOT WAS PUT INTO THE BACK OF A SOVIET-MADE FOUR-WHEELED TRUCK AND DRIVEN INTO HANOI. THE TRUCK WAS BEING DRIVEN VERY SLOWLY AND WAS ABLE TO FOLLOW IT ON FOOT FROM THE HOAN KIEM LAKE AREA, AND DOWN HANG KHAY, HANG BAI, PHO HUE STREETS AND INTO BACH MAI AREA IN HANOI. OBSERVED THE PILOT FOR ABOUT ONE HOUR AT A DISTANCE OF ONE OR TWO METERS. HE SAID THE PILOT'S RIGHT ARM WAS INJURED AND IT HAD BEEN BANDAGED AND WAS IN A SLING HANGING FROM HIS NECK. THE PILOT WAS A CAUCASIAN, ABOUT 1.85 METERS TALL, WEIGHED BETWEEN 80 AND 90 KILOS AND WAS WELL PROPORTIONED. HE HAD SHORT, DARK BLOND HAIR, SIDEBURNS, AND A RUDDY COMPLEXION. HIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


HELMET HAD BEEN TAKEN AWAY. THE PILOT WAS WEARING AN OLIVE DRAB FLIGHT SUIT WITH A YELLOW EAGLE EMBLEM ON HIS CHEST, BLACK CALF-HIGH MILITARY SHOES, AND A SILVER WATCH WITH A BLACK FACE. ON HIS LEFT WRIST.

3. 
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. [] COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THE DATE GIVEN BY SOURCE IS 16 MONTHS PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT, MANY DETAILS MATCH THE SHOOTDOWN AND CAPTURE OF [] WHO WAS PHOTOGRAPHED IMMEDIATELY AFTER CAPTURE WITH A SLING ON HIS LEFT ARM, RIDING IN A FOUR WHEEL TRUCK. HE WAS SHOT DOWN AT ABOUT 1240 HOURS ON 29 JUNE 1966 ABOUT TWO AND ONE-HALF MILES NORTHEAST OF HANOI IN AN AREA CALLED GIA LAM ON MAPS OF HANOI. [] WAS IN THE FIRST GROUP OF POW'S = TO BE RELEASED BY NORTH VIETNAM.

5. [] DISSEM: EMBASSY USMACV JCRC 7TH AIR FORCE USARV NAVFORV 525TH MI GP 7602ND AIG OSI AT SAIGON. SENT TO CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC [] VIENTIANE []

REPORT CLASS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ []

[]
CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B-(1)-(2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

562
NND 982011 4215

SECRET--

--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF
INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR.THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE.SUBJECT: Downing of a U.S. Aircraft in North Central
Vietnam in 1972; Location of a Prisoner of
War Camp

TEXT: 1. In approximately April 1972 a U.S. F-4 aircraft was shot down near a prisoner of war holding camp off the Ho Chi Minh Trail believed to be in north central Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), Binh Tri Thien Province or in southwestern SRV Nghe Tinh Province. The pilot of the aircraft, a tall black captain, broke his left leg in the crash, was captured and taken to the camp. He died two days later. The location of the pilot's grave is not known.

2. Approximately 30 prisoners were at the holding camp at the time the captain was captured. It is not known whether the prisoners saw the pilot, however. The holding camp was located approximately two or three kilometers north of the junction of the trail and the Ben Hai River. 1700N 10705E

4. () Comment: See () for further biographic data on the source of this report.)

DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY
ORIGINATOR.DECL OADR DRV () BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL
PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL
DOCUMENT.

SECRET--

--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF
INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR.

9/11/84

- Dr. [redacted] AN inquiry, please.
- Informal eval to CIA.
 - Correlates to [redacted]

See

his casualty folder.

- The PW Camp probably one known as Mai Son Indochina Center or Sen Trung PW Camp, Vinh Linh District, Quang Binh (now Binh Tri Thien) Province.

- [redacted] died as result of infected wounds. One report located burial site at XE523 830.
- 545 PF soldiers who were held at Camp place it at XD958 884.



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1100

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OTHER DIST= 1 2979 2990 2991 2992 3003 3910 3927
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ZCZCHLA1125ADE0276
FTTSZYUW RUEA11A4930 2980728-SSSS--RUETIAA.
ZNY SSSSS/MEBFB
ZKZK RF ZRL DF
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1101

CAT= 7561 MSG NR= 299005000110 DATE= 860026 PAGE= 2

POINT, HAWAII, FOR COMMANDERS ONLY).

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

PAGE 2 RUEAIIA 4930 S E C R E T [REDACTED]

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T-- [REDACTED]

DIST: 24 OCTOBER 1986

EXCLUSIVE DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED AT END OF REPORT

COUNTRY: LAOS/VIETNAM

SUBJ: ALLEGED LOCATION OF LIVE AMERICAN POWS IN LUANG
PRABANG PROVINCE, LAOS

DOI: MID 1986

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED]

PAGE 3 RUEAIIA 4930 S E C R E T [REDACTED]

REPORTEDLY SAW THE POWS, THERE WERE SEVEN AMERICAN POW'S AS OF MID-
1986 BEING DETAINED AT A CAMP NEAR NAM BAO (TH 3683) TOWN, OUDOMSAI
DISTRICT, LUANG PRABANG PROVINCE, LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
(LPDR). [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN POWS IN THIS

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NND 982024 - 2913

RECEIPTED INFORMATION REPORT

1102

CAT= 2561 MSG NS= 290005000110 DATE= 860026 PAGE= 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HAVE REPORTED A REEDUCATION CAMP AT NAM BAC. THE CAMP WAS EMPTIED OF REEDUCATION INMATES ABOUT 1980 AND THE CAMP WAS OCCUPIED BY PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM (PAVN) TROOPS.) SIX OF THE AMERICANS WERE HISPANICS AND ONE WAS A CAUCASIAN AMERICAN NAMED [REDACTED] (PHONETIC). THERE HAD BEEN 12 AMERICAN POWS AT THE SITE BUT IN 1985 FIVE OF THE AMERICANS POWS WERE MOVED TO THE SOVIET UNION. ALL OF THE AMERICAN POWS HAD BEEN CAPTURED IN 1968 WHILE WORKING AT THE NAM BAC CAMP. [REDACTED] COMMENT: NAM BAC WAS THE SITE OF AN AIRFIELD DURING THE INDOCHINA WAR. NO AMERICANS WERE STATIONED THERE, BUT SOME AMERICAN PERSONNEL VISITED THERE OCCASIONALLY. NONE OF THEM WERE LOST.) THE CAMP WAS OVERRUN BY THE ENEMY AND THE AMERICANS WERE CAPTURED. IN ADDITION TO THE AMERICANS, PAGE 4 RUEAIIA 4930 S E C R E T [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

THERE WERE 30 FORMER SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRISONERS AT THE CAMP.

2. THE PRISON CAMP WAS SURROUNDED BY A DOUBLE FENCE. THE INTERNAL AREA WAS FENCED WITH BAMBOO WHILE THE EXTERNAL AREA WAS FENCED WITH NINE WALLS OF BARBED WIRE, EACH ABOUT 170 CENTIMETERS IN HEIGHT. THERE WERE ABOUT SIX TO EIGHT BUILDINGS FOR PRISONERS IN THE INTERNAL AREA. EACH PRISONER BUILDING WAS ABOUT 50X10 METERS IN

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SITE, BUILT OF CEMENT WITH CORRUGATED-SHEET METAL ROOFING. THE TOTAL INTERNAL AREA WAS ABOUT 3 RAI IN SIZE. [REDACTED] COMMENT: 2.5 RAI (EQUALS ABOUT ONE ACRE.)

3. THE AMERICAN POWS WERE GUARDED BY LAO PEOPLE'S ARMY (LPA) SOLDIERS AND HAD BEEN WORKING AS CONSTRUCTION FOREMEN FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A DISPENSARY AND LIVING QUARTERS BUILDING LOCATED ACROSS ROUTE SIX FROM THE CAMP WHICH WAS LOCATED ON THE NORTH SIDE OF ROUTE SIX. A PAVN SECURITY UNIT WAS LOCATED NEAR THE DISPENSARY/LIVING QUARTERS AREA AND A PAVN CHECKPOINT WAS LOCATED AT FUANG HOY (TH 5891). THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE POWS HAD BEEN SERVING AS CONSTRUCTION WORKERS FOR THE PROJECT. THESE TWO BUILDINGS WERE COMPLETED IN 1985. THE PRISONERS WERE GUARDED BY LPA SOLDIERS WHEN

PAGE 5 RUCATIA 4930 S E C R E T [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

THEY MOVED OUTSIDE THE CAMP, BUT WERE ALLOWED TO SPEAK WITH LOCAL VILLAGERS. THE LPA SECURITY CHIEF AT THE CAMP WAS ((SITHON)) (LNU).

4. THE LIVING CONDITIONS OF THE POWS WERE TERRIBLE. THEY WERE GIVEN MILLED BUT UNPOLISHED RICE TO EAT WHICH WAS SOMETIMES SUPPLEMENTED BY WHEAT OF EARLEY FROM CUBA. THE POWS WERE IN BAD HEALTH DUE TO MALNUTRITION.

ACCS: [REDACTED]

DISSEM: FIELD: NONE.

WASHINGTON DISSEM:

TO INSITEM:

EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, WHITE HOUSE

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SITUATION ROOM.

TO STATE: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, INR.

TO DIA: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, DIA.

TO NSA: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, NSA.

WARNING: REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] -DISSEMINATION AND

PAGE 6 PRELIM 4930 ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR--FG1.

DECL: GADR DRY [REDACTED] BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS
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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

22 January 1992

The Honorable Bob Smith
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

This responds to your letter of December 13, 1991 addressing issues of Soviet involvement with American POWs. Our response reflects a careful review of our files and is keyed to the points in your letter.

We have reviewed our files and found no information which would indicate that American POWs from either the Korean or Vietnam wars were transferred to the Soviet Union.

With regard to contact by American POWs in Vietnam with Soviets, we have information concerning three probable or possible instances of Soviet involvement.

U.S. SENATE DO NOT REMOVE SENATE SECURITY

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OFFICE OF SENATE SECURITY

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The Honorable Bob Smith

The third instance has only recently come to our attention, relates to the 1972 time frame, is of a particularly sensitive nature, and will be the subject of separate correspondence.

These are the only instances concerning which we have information on Soviet involvement with American POWs.

With regard to the issue of Soviet involvement with POWs, we would draw your attention to a TASS news agency dispatch of January 4, 1992 quoting a spokeswoman of the Russian Interrepublic Security Service (ISS), the successor organization of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. According to that statement, the Russian authorities thoroughly searched KGB files and uncovered records of one contact with a US POW in 1973. According to the TASS dispatch, the Soviets suspected the American of being an intelligence officer but the US POW refused to meet with the Soviets a second time. This information would appear to relate to the first case cited above.

In regard to an earlier Soviet press report of an American military pilot present in the village of Saryshagan, Dzhezkazgan Oblast, the ISS said it had made several initial attempts to gain access to the area but was turned back for security reasons by the military which controls the area. Recently, however, the ISS did succeed in entering Saryshagan. Its investigative checks and interviews gave no indication that Americans were ever present there.

Information concerning the recent debriefing of former KGB General Oleg Kalugin by the US Defense Attache's Office in Moscow would have to be obtained either from DoD or the State Department. Similarly, [redacted]

[redacted] would have to be obtained from the White House.

A copy of this letter is also being provided to Chairman Kerry.

Sincerely,

[redacted]
Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

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SECTION 1 OF 18
CITE**SECRET**SUBJECT: VIETNAMESE BOAT AND LAND REFUGEE SOURCE MIA/POW
REPORTING FROM [REDACTED] AND TRAT THAILAND

REFERENCE: NONE

1. PER DISCUSSIONS WITH DIA/VO-PW ANALYSIS BRANCH CHIEF MR. WICK TOURISON, WE ARE FORWARDING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON [REDACTED] WHO HAVE PROVIDED VARIOUS TYPES OF LIVE SIGHTING, DOG TAG/REMAINS REPORTING ON THE MIA/POW ISSUE BETWEEN MAY 1987 AND 25 MARCH 1988. THE [REDACTED] WERE INTERVIEWED AT THE KLONG YAI HOLDING CENTER IN TRAT, THAILAND. ALL INTERVIEWS WERE CONDUCTED BY OUR [REDACTED] WHICH PASSED THE LEADS TO JCRC AND STONY BEACH FOR FOLLOWUP ACTION ON THE DATES NOTED BELOW WITH NO FURTHER FORMAL DISSEMINATION. YOUR COMMENTS ARE REQUESTED IN ORDER TO HELP DETERMINE THE VALUE OF THIS REPORTING AND WHETHER THERE ARE ANY DISCERNABLE PATTERNS IN THIS REPORTING WHICH WE SHOULD BE MADE AWARE OF. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO USE THIS INFORMATION WITH JCRC AND STONY BEACH.

2. ON 7 MAY 1987, JCRC WAS ADVISED THAT [REDACTED] HAD ARRIVED IN TRAT ON 30 MARCH 1987 WITH THE ALLEGED BONES OF [REDACTED] ARRIVED IN KHLONG YAI, THAILAND, WITH THE REMAINS OF ALLEGED U.S. SERVICEMAN [REDACTED]

3. AS OF 21 MAY 1987, JCRC WAS TO BE PASSED THE FOLLOWING. [REDACTED] PROVIDED DOG TAG INFORMATION ON FOUR DECEASED AMERICANS, AND CLAIMED HE HAD INFORMATION ABOUT TWO LIVE AMERICANS POWS WHO WERE MOVED FROM HANOI TO A "SECRET PRISON" IN SOUTHERN VIETNAM NEAR THE CAMBODIAN BORDER IN 1986. [REDACTED] CLAIMED HE HAD CONTACT WITH A NETWORK WHICH COULD RETURN TO THE PRISON TO OBTAIN THE NAMES AND PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE POW'S, BUT HE NEEDED OPERATIONAL FUNDS TO SUPPORT THE MISSION. [REDACTED] WAS GIVEN [REDACTED] EXAMINATIONS IN NOVEMBER 1986. [REDACTED] INDICATED DECEPTION ON THE MATTER OF MIA/POW'S. AFTER THE SECOND SESSION, [REDACTED] ADMITTED THAT HE HAD FABRICATED THE MIA/POW INFORMATION PROVIDED DOG TAG INFORMATION ON [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] REPORTEDLY KILLED IN A BATTLE WITH THE VIET CONG AT A RUBBER PLANTATION IN KOMPONG CHAM PROVINCE IN 1970; [REDACTED] REPORTEDLY CAPTURED BY THE VIET CONG IN 1970, KILLED BY THE KHMER ROUGE AT VIET CONG DIRECTION, [REDACTED] NETWORK CONTACTED THE KHMER ROUGE COMMANDER MOK THY WHO LED THEM TO THE GRAVE SITE; [REDACTED] REPORTEDLY KILLED IN A F-105 CRASH IN 1970 IN SNEUL DISTRICT, KRATIE PROVINCE; [REDACTED] KILLED WITH THREE ARVN SOLDIERS IN A HELICOPTER CRASH IN 1970 IN NIMOT DISTRICT, KOMPONG CHAM PROVINCE; ID CARD AND INSIGNIA ON THE BODY INDICATED [REDACTED] WAS A COLONEL.

4. ON 2 JUNE 1987, JCRC WAS PASSED THE FOLLOWING. [REDACTED] CLAIMED TO BE A CATHOLIC PRIEST. HE STATED THAT IN MAY 1967 HE HAD MET [REDACTED] WHO TOLD HIM THAT AN AMERICAN SOLDIER WAS LIVING IN GIA LAT-KONTUM PROVINCE [REDACTED]

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5. ON 10 JUNE 1987, THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO STONY BEACH. [REDACTED] HEARSAY INFORMATION ON TWO AMERICANS LIVING IN SOUTH VIETNAM [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] TOLD HIM THAT SOME PEASANTS LIVING IN THE RUNG SAT AREA OF DONG NAI PROVINCE SAW TWO MALE AMERICANS (ONE BLACK AND ONE CAUCASIAN) WHO WERE "MAKING BAMBOO BUCKETS." THE TWO AMERICANS REPORTEDLY ASKED FOR ASSISTANCE IN LEAVING. [REDACTED]

6. AS OF 30 JUNE 1987, JCRC AND STONY BEACH WERE TO BE PASSED THE FOLLOWING:

A. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE [REDACTED] CLAIMED HE CAME ACROSS AN AMERICAN AROUND SEPTEMBER 1978 AT THE YEN BAI REEDUCATION CAMP. THE AMERICAN WORE CIVILIAN CLOTHES, WAS ABOUT 1.75 METERS TALL, AND WEIGHED OVER 60 KILOGRAMS. HE APPEARED IN GOOD HEALTH. IT WAS RUMORED AMONG THE OTHER VIETNAMESE PRISONERS THAT THIS AMERICAN WAS AN ELECTRICAL REPAIRMAN.

B. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE [REDACTED] ALSO CLAIMED HE CAME ACROSS AN AMERICAN IN 1978 WHILE AT THE PHONG QUAN REEDUCATION CAMP IN HOANG LIEU SON PROVINCE. THE AMERICAN WAS WEARING A FATIGUE SHIRT, AND APPEARED IN GOOD HEALTH. ACCORDING TO RUMORS AMONG THE OTHER VIETNAMESE PRISONERS, THE AMERICAN WAS WORKING ON GENERATORS FOR THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.

C. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (DOB: CIRCA 1931) HELD THE REMAINS OF THREE AMERICANS. [REDACTED] TO BRING OUT THE REMAINS OF ONE OF THESE MEN, BUT [REDACTED] WAS AFRAID OF BEING CAUGHT. [REDACTED] STATED THAT HE

SECRET
SECTION 2 OF 18
CITE**SECRET**SUBJECT: VIETNAMESE BOAT AND LAND REFUGEE SOURCE MIA/POW
REPORTING FROM [REDACTED] THAILAND

REFERENCE: NONE

SAW SOME OF THE REMAINS AND DOG TAGS. ONE OF THE SETS OF REMAINS REPORTEDLY BELONGED TO AN AMERICAN WHOSE PLANE WAS SHOT DOWN IN THE A SAO VALLEY, THUA THIEN PROVINCE. ALL EIGHT MEN IN THE AIRCRAFT WERE KILLED, AND ONLY SEVEN BODIES WERE RECOVERED LATER BY THE AMERICANS. THE EIGHTH MAN WAS APPARENTLY THROWN FROM THE CRASH SITE AND HIS BODY WAS NOT RECOVERED. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] SKETCH MEMORY, THE EIGHTH MAN WAS EITHER A MAJOR OR A LIEUTENANT COLONEL WHOSE REMAINS WERE INTACT EXCEPT FOR THE SKULL. [REDACTED] ALSO PROVIDED HEARSAY ABOUT LIVE AMERICANS WHICH WAS PASSED EARLIER THIS MONTH. [REDACTED] ADMITTED THAT HE WAS APPROACHED BY SRY INTELLIGENCE AGENTS WHO ASKED HIM TO REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES IN THE PHU QUY CATHOLIC PARISH WHERE HE RESIDED. HE REFUSED. [REDACTED] STATED THAT HE COULD AND WOULD WRITE TO [REDACTED]

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E. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE

[REDACTED] CLAIMED HIS FRIEND [REDACTED] HAD INTRODUCED HIM TO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AND HE CLAIMED CONNECTIONS WITH AN ORGANIZATION THAT WAS HARBORING "SOME AMERICANS STILL ALIVE" AND HOLDING A NUMBER OF AMERICAN REMAINS. [REDACTED] REPORTEDLY SENT A LIST OF SOME OF THESE AMERICANS TO THE UNITED STATES (NFI). THERE WERE A FEW ARRESTS AND ESCAPES IN [REDACTED] STORY WHICH SEEMED UNLIKELY. NO NAMES OR LOCATIONS WERE PRODUCED. [REDACTED] ADDED THAT [REDACTED] AND HIS RESISTANCE ORGANIZATION DID NOT TRUST HIM [REDACTED] BECAUSE HE WAS NEW TO THEM. [REDACTED] ON 16 SEPTEMBER.

F. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE

[REDACTED] CLAIMED [REDACTED] PARACHUTED INTO THE [REDACTED] IN 1971 WITH TWO AMERICANS. THEY WERE SUBSEQUENTLY CAPTURED BY [REDACTED] ANOTHER ARVN SOLDIER WHO WAS JAILED WITH [REDACTED] RETURNED IN 1985 AND TOLD [REDACTED] FAMILY THAT [REDACTED] WAS STILL IN JAIL WITH SOME AMERICANS. THIS MAN REPORTEDLY ESCAPED FROM VIETNAM HOPING TO RESETTLE IN THE UNITED STATES. [REDACTED]

G. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE

[REDACTED] CLAIMED [REDACTED] CLAIMED THAT, WHILE WORKING AS A HAIRDRESSER IN SAIGON, A CUSTOMER RELATED THAT HER SON FOUND TWO PLASTIC BAGS OF REMAINS WITH TWO DOG TAGS. THE CUSTOMER [REDACTED] WANTED ASSISTANCE IN RESETTLEMENT AND FELT THAT [REDACTED] AS A [REDACTED] EMPLOYEE COULD HELP. [REDACTED]

14. ON 9 OCTOBER 1987, JCRC AND STONY BEACH WERE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING:

A. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE

[REDACTED] CLAIMED THAT WHILE IN REEDUCATION CAMP IN [REDACTED] IN NORTH VIETNAM HE CAME ACROSS SOME CHILDREN WHO SPOKE OF THE "TALLER PRISONERS WHO COULD NOT SPEAK VIETNAMESE." AT ANOTHER LOCATION IN [REDACTED] HE FOUND SOME ENGLISH WRITING IN ONE OF THE PRISONS. IN 1980 [REDACTED] WAS RELEASED FROM REEDUCATION CAMP AFTER AN ACCIDENT. WHILE ATTEMPTING TO ESCAPE THROUGH CAMBODIA, [REDACTED] MET WITH TWO OTHER VIETNAMESE MEN-- [REDACTED] WHO SPOKE OF A GROUP OF 80 AMERICANS LIVING IN AN UNKNOWN LOCATION IN VIETNAM AND ANOTHER AMERICAN LIVING IN PLEIKU. [REDACTED] PROVIDED ONLY HEARSAY INFORMATION. [REDACTED] MOVED TO [REDACTED]

B. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE

[REDACTED] CLAIMED HIS [REDACTED] HELD THE REMAINS OF TWO AMERICANS AT HIS RESIDENCE IN THE [REDACTED] RESIDENTIAL SECTION. [REDACTED] MOVED TO [REDACTED]

C. BONE FRAGMENTS AND DOG TAG RUBBINGS OF THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS WERE PROVIDED BY A CAMBODIAN SMUGGLER:

- (1) [REDACTED] (PREVIOUSLY REPORTED ON 14 AUGUST). THERE IS ONLY ONE BONE FRAGMENT AND IT IS UNKNOWN WHICH PERSON THE FRAGMENT SUPPOSEDLY IDENTIFIES.
- (2) [REDACTED] REPORTED ON 14 AUGUST. A SINGLE FRAGMENT AND A PHOTO OF A DOG TAG.
- (3) [REDACTED] REPORTED ON 14 AUGUST. DOG TAG RUBBING ONLY.
- (4) [REDACTED] REPORTED ON 10 SEPTEMBER AS [REDACTED]
- (5) [REDACTED] REPORTED ON 10 SEPTEMBER.
- (6) [REDACTED] REPORTED ON 10 SEPTEMBER.
- (7) [REDACTED] REPORTED ON 10 SEPTEMBER.
- (8) [REDACTED] REPORTED ON 10 SEPTEMBER AS [REDACTED]
- (9) [REDACTED] REPORTED ON 10 SEPTEMBER AND EARLIER. THE DOG TAG RUBBING WAS ON TIN FOIL PAPER, THE FIRST TIME THIS TECHNIQUE HAD BEEN SEEN [REDACTED]

15. ON 26 OCTOBER 1987, JCRC AND STONY BEACH WERE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING:

A. WHILE IN PHNOM PENH, A CAMBODIAN BORDER SMUGGLER OBTAINED THE FOLLOWING NAME OF AN AMERICAN SUPPOSEDLY KILLED IN CAMBODIA-- [REDACTED] THIS NAME WAS ALSO REPORTED IN MID-SEPTEMBER 1987 BY A [REDACTED] IN THAT PROVINCE. JCRC REPORTED THIS NAME WAS NOT ON ITS MIA/POW LISTING.

B. VIETNAMESE LAND REFUGEE

[REDACTED] AND REPORTED THAT A NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE WERE ARRESTED FOR DEALING IN U.S. REMAINS. HE ADDED THAT A FRIEND [REDACTED] HAD ACQUAINTANCES WHO KNEW WHERE A NUMBER OF AMERICAN REMAINS WERE BURIED IN THE BAN ME THUOT FOREST. [REDACTED] WAS AT THE [REDACTED] REFUGEE CAMP.

C. VIETNAMESE LAND REFUGEE [REDACTED] CLAIMED INFORMATION ABOUT AMERICANS LIVING IN VIETNAM AND ALSO ON THE STATUS OF ELEVEN AMERICAN REMAINS. [REDACTED] SAID HE HAD MET AND TALKED WITH TWO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY ON 1 OCTOBER WHEN HE TURNED OVER PHOTOS OF AT LEAST ONE AMERICAN. [REDACTED] WAS AT THE [REDACTED] REFUGEE CAMP.

D. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE

[REDACTED] CLAIMED [REDACTED] BELONGED TO HIS FAMILY. [REDACTED] CLAIMED HE SAW TWO DOG TAGS OF [REDACTED]

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SECTION 7 OF 18
CITE [REDACTED]

SECRET

SUBJECT: VIETNAMESE BOAT AND LAND REFUGEE SOURCE MIA/POW REPORTING FROM [REDACTED] THAILAND

REFERENCE: NONE
AMERICANS KILLED IN AN AIRCRAFT CRASH IN A RUBBER PLANTATION, POSSIBLY NEAR CU CHI. ONLY ONE LAST NAME WAS REMEMBERED: [REDACTED] THE OTHER NAME WAS [REDACTED] MOVED TO [REDACTED]

F. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE

[REDACTED] COLLEGE EDUCATED, CLAIMED HEARSAY ABOUT OTHERS HOLDING SOME AMERICAN REMAINS. SHE CLAIMED THEY WERE REPORTEDLY TRYING TO BRING THE REMAINS TO THAILAND. SHE MOVED TO [REDACTED]

16. ON 27 OCTOBER 1987, JCRC AND STONY BEACH WERE PASSED THE FOLLOWING:

A. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE

[REDACTED] ACCOMPANIED BY [REDACTED] CLAIMED HAD HAD MET AN AMERICAN AND HIS VIETNAMESE WIFE AT TAN CHAU AROUND OCTOBER 1986. THE AMERICAN FERRIED PEOPLE ACROSS A RIVER IN A ROW BOAT. THE AMERICAN'S WIFE REPORTEDLY STATED THAT THE AMERICAN HAD BEEN RELEASED FROM REEDUCATION CAMP BUT COULD NOT FIND A WAY TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY. [REDACTED] MOVED TO [REDACTED] ON 2 OCTOBER

B. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE

[REDACTED] TWELVE YEARS OF EDUCATION, CLAIMED A PRIEST IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS WAS HOLDING TWO SETS OF AMERICAN REMAINS. SHE ALSO STATED THAT IT WAS WELL KNOWN THAT AN AMERICAN, NOW OLD AND BLIND WAS LIVING IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS. [REDACTED] MOVED TO [REDACTED]

C. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE

[REDACTED] CLAIMED THAT HE HELPED [REDACTED] AND HIS FIVE FAMILY MEMBERS APPLY FOR RESETTLEMENT IN THE U.S. [REDACTED] CLAIM FOR RESETTLEMENT WAS THAT HE REPORTEDLY TURNED [REDACTED]

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TO: DIA//PW-MIA (WARREN GRAY).

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SUBJECT: REPORT OF POW'S IN LAOS


1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WHICH HAS BEEN PASSED TO STONY BEACH, HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM

2. ACCORDING TO TWO AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR (POW'S) ARE NOW BEING HELD CAPTIVE IN A LEU VILLAGE IN XIANG KHOANG PROVINCE NEAR THE VIETNAMESE BORDER. THEY ARE BEING HELD AND GUARDED BY A LOCAL VILLAGE MILITIA GROUP; THE LAO AUTHORITIES AND THE LAO ARMY APPARENTLY DO NOT KNOW OF THEIR PRESENCE. THE POW'S HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED BY AS

3. ONE OF THE TWO AMERICANS IS MARRIED TO A LEU WOMAN AND THEY NOW HAVE THREE CHILDREN. ONE WAS INJURED WHEN HIS PLANE CRASHED DURING THE WAR AND HE SUBSEQUENTLY LOST AN ARM. BOTH ARE LIVING MISERABLY AND WANT TO ESCAPE. THE VILLAGE IN WHICH THEY ARE HELD IS ENTIRELY ISOLATED, LOCATED IN A REMOTE AREA.

4. IS AWARE OF THE AMERICANS' PRESENCE DUE TO THE FACT THAT FRIENDS OF HIS HAVE VISITED THE VILLAGE. SINCE WORD OF A TWO MILLION DOLLAR REWARD FOR RETURN OF U.S. POW'S HAS SPREAD, THE VILLAGERS AND ALL WANT A PIECE OF THE ACTION. SAYS THAT HE CAN BRING THE TWO POW'S TO THE THAI BORDER IF HE CAN REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH RESPONSIBLE U.S. REPRESENTATIVES.

5. STATED THAT IN ADDITION TO THE TWO LIVE POW'S, THIS VILLAGE ALSO HAS THE REMAINS OF 17 AMERICAN MISSING IN ACTION (MIA). THE VILLAGERS WANT TO TURN OVER THE REMAINS FOR A REWARD AS WELL. PROVIDED A SOMEWHAT LEGIBLE LIST OF SOME OF THOSE 17 AMERICANS. FOLLOWING ARE THOSE ON THE LIST WHOSE NAMES ARE LEGIBLE ENOUGH FOR US TO REPRINT HERE:

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TO DIA//VO-PW/MR WICK TOURISON

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SECTION 1 OF 18

CITE

~~SECRET~~SUBJECT: VIETNAMESE BOAT AND LAND REFUGEE SOURCE MIA/POW
REPORTING FROM THAILAND

REFERENCE: NONE

1. PER DISCUSSIONS WITH DIA/VO-PW ANALYSIS BRANCH CHIEF MR. WICK TOURISON, WE ARE FORWARDING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON [REDACTED] WHO HAVE PROVIDED VARIOUS TYPES OF LIVE SIGHTING, DOG TAG/REMAINS REPORTING ON THE MIA/POW ISSUE BETWEEN MAY 1987 AND 25 MARCH 1988. THE [REDACTED] WERE INTERVIEWED AT THE KLONG YAI HOLDING CENTER IN TRAT, THAILAND. ALL INTERVIEWS WERE CONDUCTED BY OUR [REDACTED] WHICH PASSED THE LEADS TO JCRC AND STORY BEACH FOR FOLLOWUP ACTION ON THE DATES NOTED BELOW WITH NO FURTHER FORMAL DISSEMINATION. YOUR COMMENTS ARE REQUESTED IN ORDER TO HELP DETERMINE THE VALUE OF THIS REPORTING AND WHETHER THERE ARE ANY DISCERNABLE PATTERNS IN THIS REPORTING WHICH WE SHOULD BE MADE AWARE OF. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO USE THIS INFORMATION WITH JCRC AND STORY BEACH.

[REDACTED] HAD ARRIVED IN TRAT ON 30 MARCH 1987 WITH THE ALLEGED BONES OF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ARRIVED IN KLONG YAI, THAILAND, WITH THE REMAINS OF ALLEGED U.S. SERVICEMAN [REDACTED]

3. AS OF 21 MAY 1987, JCRC WAS TO BE PASSED THE FOLLOWING. [REDACTED] PROVIDED DOG TAG INFORMATION ON FOUR DECEASED AMERICANS, AND CLAIMED HE HAD INFORMATION ABOUT TWO LIVE AMERICANS POWS WHO WERE MOVED FROM HANOI TO A "SECRET PRISON" IN SOUTHERN VIETNAM NEAR THE CAMBODIAN BORDER IN 1986. [REDACTED] CLAIMED HE HAD CONTACT WITH A NETWORK WHICH COULD RETURN TO THE PRISON TO OBTAIN THE NAMES AND PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE POW'S, BUT HE NEEDED OPERATIONAL FUNDS TO SUPPORT THE MISSION. [REDACTED] WAS GIVEN EXAMINATIONS IN NOVEMBER 1986. [REDACTED] INDICATED DECEPTION ON THE MATTER OF MIA/POW'S. AFTER THE SECOND SESSION ADMITTED THAT HE HAD FABRICATED THE MIA/POW INFORMATION PROVIDED DOG TAG INFORMATION ON:

[REDACTED] REPORTEDLY KILLED IN A BATTLE WITH THE VIET CONG AT A RUBBER PLANTATION IN KOMPONG CHAM PROVINCE IN 1970; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] REPORTEDLY CAPTURED BY THE VIET CONG IN 1970. KILLED BY THE KHMER ROUGE AT VIET CONG DIRECTION [REDACTED] NETWORK CONTACTED THE KHMER ROUGE COMMANDER MOK THY WHO LED THEM TO THE GRAVE SITE; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] REPORTEDLY KILLED IN A F-105 CRASH IN 1970 IN SNUK DISTRICT, KRATIE PROVINCE; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] KILLED WITH THREE ARVN SOLDIERS IN A HELICOPTER CRASH IN 1970 IN MINOT DISTRICT, KOMPONG CHAM PROVINCE. ID CARD AND INSIGNIA ON THE BODY INDICATED [REDACTED] WAS A COLONEL.

4. ON 2 JUNE 1987, JCRC WAS PASSED THE FOLLOWING.

[REDACTED] CLAIMED TO BE A CATHOLIC

PRIEST HE STATED THAT IN MAY 1987 HE HAD MET [REDACTED]

WHO TOLD HIM THAT AN AMERICAN

SOLDIER WAS LIVING IN GIA LAI-KONTUM PROVINCE [REDACTED]

ACTION DIA/SPEC(10)

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5. ON 10 JUNE 1987 THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO STORY BEACH [REDACTED] A GAVE HEARSAY INFORMATION ON TWO AMERICANS LIVING IN SOUTH VIETNAM [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] TOLD HIM THAT SOME PEASANTS LIVING IN THE RUNG SAT AREA OF DONG NAI PROVINCE SAW TWO MALE AMERICANS (ONE BLACK AND ONE CAUCASIAN) WHO WERE "MAKING BAMBOO BUCKETS." THE TWO AMERICANS REPORTEDLY ASKED FOR ASSISTANCE IN LEAVING THE AREA.

6. AS OF 30 JUNE 1987, JCRC AND STORY BEACH WERE TO BE PASSED THE FOLLOWING:

A. [REDACTED] CLAIMED HE CAME ACROSS AN AMERICAN AROUND SEPTEMBER 1978 AT THE YEN BAI REEDUCATION CAMP. THE AMERICAN WORE CIVILIAN CLOTHES, WAS ABOUT 1.75 METERS TALL, AND WEIGHED OVER 60 KILOGRAMS. HE APPEARED IN GOOD HEALTH. IT WAS RUMORED AMONG THE OTHER VIETNAMESE PRISONERS THAT THIS AMERICAN WAS AN ELECTRICAL REPAIRMAN.

B. [REDACTED] ALSO CLAIMED HE CAME ACROSS AN AMERICAN IN 1978 WHILE AT THE PHONG QUAN REEDUCATION CAMP IN HOANG LIEN SON PROVINCE. THE AMERICAN WAS WEARING A FATIGUE SHIRT, AND APPEARED IN GOOD HEALTH. ACCORDING TO RUMORS AMONG THE OTHER VIETNAMESE PRISONERS, THE AMERICAN WAS WORKING ON GENERATORS FOR THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.

[REDACTED] HELD THE REMAINS OF THREE AMERICANS. [REDACTED] TO BRING OUT THE REMAINS OF ONE OF THESE MEN, BUT [REDACTED] WAS AFRAID OF BEING CAUGHT. [REDACTED] STATED THAT HE

~~SECRET~~

SECTION 2 OF 18

CITE

~~SECRET~~SUBJECT: VIETNAMESE BOAT AND LAND REFUGEE SOURCE MIA/POW
REPORTING FROM THAILAND

REFERENCE: NONE

SAW SOME OF THE REMAINS AND DOG TAGS. ONE OF THE SETS OF REMAINS REPORTEDLY BELONGED TO AN AMERICAN WHOSE PLANE WAS SHOT DOWN IN THE A SAO VALLEY, THUA THIEN PROVINCE. ALL EIGHT MEN IN THE AIRCRAFT WERE KILLED, AND ONLY SEVEN BOOIES WERE RECOVERED LATER BY THE AMERICANS. THE EIGHTH MAN WAS APPARENTLY THROWN FROM THE CRASH SITE AND HIS BODY WAS NOT RECOVERED. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] SKETCHY MEMORY, THE EIGHTH MAN WAS EITHER A MAJOR OR A LIEUTENANT COLONEL WHOSE REMAINS WERE INTACT EXCEPT FOR THE SKULL. [REDACTED] ALSO PROVIDED HEARSAY ABOUT LIVE AMERICANS WHICH WAS PASSED EARLIER THIS MONTH. [REDACTED] ADMITTED THAT HE WAS APPROACHED BY SI INTELLIGENCE AGENTS WHO ASKED HIM TO REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES IN THE PHU QUY CATHOLIC PARISH WHERE HE RESIDED. HE REFUSED [REDACTED] STATED THAT HE COULD AND WOULD WRITE TO [REDACTED]

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D VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE
CLAIMED HE MET AN AMERICAN IN HOANG LIEN SON
PROVINCE IN 1976. THE AMERICAN WORKED FOR THE 776TH UNIT, WENT
BY THE NAME "NAM," AND SPOKE FLUENT VIETNAMESE. (COMMENT:
PROBABLY A TYPICAL [REDACTED] CASE.)

F VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE
CLAIMED TWO AMERICAN ADVISORS WERE
KILLED IN AN AMBUSH IN 1972 AT CHI LANG WHERE THEIR BODIES WERE
BURIED BY LOCAL VILLAGERS. THOUGH A SEARCH OF THE AREA WAS
MADE TO RECOVER THE BODIES LATER [REDACTED] BELIEVED THE BODIES
WERE STILL THERE.

G VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE
CLAIMED ANOTHER [REDACTED] STORY. THIS
NAME WAS OFTEN REPORTED AND IS NOT ON THE JCRC ROSTER.

27. ON 5 JANUARY 1988, JCRC AND STONY BEACH WERE PASSED
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

A VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE
CLAIMED THAT WHILE IN REEDUCATION IN 1977/1978
IN HOANG LIEN SON HE SAW AN AMERICAN OPERATING A MOVIE
PROJECTOR. THE AMERICAN WAS IN HIS TWENTIES AND USED THE NAME
"NGUYEN VIET NAM." (COMMENT: [REDACTED] USED THIS NAME.)

R VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE
CLAIMED HIS COUSIN [REDACTED] TRIED TO BUY
THE REMAINS OF AN AMERICAN KILLED IN VIETNAM. THE COUSIN WAS A
MIDDLEMAN WHO WAS APPROACHED BY A THIRD PERSON LOOKING FOR
THOSE FLEEING THE COUNTRY TO BUY THE REMAINS.

SECRET
SECTION 13 OF 18
CITE [REDACTED]

SECRET

SUBJECT: VIETNAMESE BOAT AND LAND REFUGEE [REDACTED] MIA/POW
REPORTING FROM [REDACTED] THAILAND

REFERENCE: NONE

C VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE
CLAIMED HIS SISTER [REDACTED] HELD THE
REMAINS OF AN AMERICAN AT [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] ADDED THAT A GROUP OF FORMER ARVN OFFICERS
MET WEEKLY TO COLLECT INFORMATION ABOUT AMERICAN REMAINS. THE
LEADER OF ONE GROUP DISAPPEARED IN 1986. MOST PEOPLE WERE
INVOLVED IN THE BUYING OF REMAINS IN HOPES OF RESETTLING IN THE
U.S.

D VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE
CLAIMED A MYRIAD OF
STORIES. HE CLAIMED HIS SISTER HELD THE REMAINS OF THREE
AMERICANS IN KOMPONG SOM PORT, CAMBODIA; HEARSAY ABOUT A BLACK
AMERICAN LIVING IN HOC MON, HCMC; FORMER OFFICERS SOLD AMERICAN
REMAINS.

E VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE
CLAIMED HE HAD REMOVED THE REMAINS OF ONE AMERICAN
FROM A RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT DOWNED WITHIN 17 KILOMETERS OF
THE HAI VAN PASS NEAR DANANG. THE REMAINS WERE HELD AT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PASSED THIS
INFORMATION TO VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND
TO HIS BROTHER LIVING IN AUSTRALIA. THE BROTHER IN AUSTRALIA
TURNED OVER THE INFORMATION TO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY

F. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE
[REDACTED] CLAIMED HER FAMILY HELD THE REMAINS
OF AN AMERICAN IN QUI NHON CITY.

G. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE
[REDACTED] CLAIMED HIS UNCLE HELD THE REMAINS OF AN AMERICAN
IN PHU YANG DISTRICT OF THUA THIEN. [REDACTED] ALSO CLAIMED HE HAD
ESCAPED FROM THE AI TU REEDUCATION CAMP IN NOVEMBER 1978.

H VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE
CLAIMED HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW [REDACTED]
TURNED OVER THE REMAINS OF TWO AMERICANS TO THE VIETNAMESE
INTERIOR MINISTRY IN AUGUST 1987.

I. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE
[REDACTED] CLAIMED HIS FRIENDS [REDACTED] COULD HELP THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT FIND A CAMP WHERE AMERICAN AND KOREAN PRISONERS WERE
HELD "IN THE JUNGLE." [REDACTED] DID NOT SEEM TO KNOW ANY DETAILS.

J VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE
CLAIMED THAT WHILE IN THE NGHIA LO
REEDUCATION CAMP IN 1976/1977 TWO AMERICANS WERE POINTED OUT BY
THE CAMP CADRE. ONE WAS WHITE, THE OTHER WAS BLACK. BOTH WERE
REPAIRING WATER PUMPS. THE TWO REPORTED AMERICANS WERE SEEN
FROM A DISTANCE OF ABOUT 150 METERS. BOTH WERE DESCRIBED AS
B-52 PILOTS. THEY WERE ABOUT 1.7 TO 1.8 METERS TALL AND
SLENDER. [REDACTED] MANY OTHER ARVN OFFICERS SAW THE
TWO AMERICANS. [REDACTED] COULD REMEMBER THREE ARVN OFFICERS BY
NAME: [REDACTED] HAS NOT SEEN THESE THREE MEN SINCE THEY WERE SPLIT UP IN
SUBSEQUENT CAMPS.

28. AS OF 14 JANUARY 1988, JCRC WAS ADVISED THAT [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] CLAIMED HE HAD SEEN AN AMERICAN
NAMED [REDACTED] WORKING AT A HOSPITAL IN BIEN HOA IN 1976 AND
1977. [REDACTED] WAS REPORTEDLY FROM CALIFORNIA. IN LATE 1977,
VIETNAMESE TROOPS REMOVED [REDACTED] FROM THE HOSPITAL.

29. AS OF 15 JANUARY 1988, JCRC AND STONY BEACH WERE TO
BE PASSED THE FOLLOWING:

A VIETNAMESE LAND REFUGEE
[REDACTED] CLAIMED THAT WHILE IN REEDUCATION
IN NORTH VIETNAM HE SAW AN AMERICAN WORKING IN THE CAMP AS AN
ELECTRICIAN [REDACTED] WAS AT VIETNAMESE PLATFORM [REDACTED]

B VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE
[REDACTED] CLAIMED THAT WHILE IN LAO CAI
REEDUCATION CAMP HE SAW ABOUT 20 AMERICAN NAMES PRINTED ON THE
WALL MARKED WITH THE YEARS 1972 AND 1973.

C. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE
[REDACTED] TURNED OVER A DOG TAG WITH THE
NAME [REDACTED] CLAIMED SHE HAD PURCHASED THE ACCOMPANYING SET OF
(SIC) [REDACTED] REMAINS, REPORTEDLY FROM THE VIET-LAO BORDER, WHILE STILL IN
VIETNAM WITH A FRIEND. THE FRIEND RESIDED AT [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] THE DOG TAG WILL BE TURNED OVER
ASAP.

D. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE
[REDACTED] CLAIMED THAT WHILE ON A ROAD [REDACTED]

MCN=88089/09529 TOR=88089/2331Z

TAD=88090/0034Z CDSN=MIA076

SECRET

PAGE 10
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only page applicable
to filed.

Rest of msg. does
not apply.

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SECTION 1 OF 5
CITE [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION ON POW/MIA LIVE SIGHTINGS,
DOG TAGS AND REMAINS

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM VARIOUS
VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE, BORDER SMUGGLERS AND CASUAL [REDACTED] ON
POW/MIA LIVE SIGHTINGS, DOG TAGS AND REMAINS. INFORMATION WAS
PASSED AS NOTED TO JCRC AND/OR STONY BEACH. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED
TO USE THIS INFORMATION WITH JCRC AND STONY BEACH.

2. WE ARE FORWARDING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON 15
VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE SOURCES AND FOUR BORDER SMUGGLERS WHO
HAVE PROVIDED VARIOUS TYPES OF LIVE SIGHTING, DOG TAG/REMAINS
REPORTING ON THE MIA/POW ISSUE. ALL INTERVIEWS WERE CONDUCTED
BY [REDACTED] WHICH PASSED THE LEADS TO JCRC AND
STONY BEACH FOR FOLLOWUP ACTION ON THE DATES NOTED BELOW WITH
NO FURTHER FORMAL DISSEMINATION.

A. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CLAIMED HE SAW AN AMERICAN LIVING WITH ETHNIC
TRIBESMEN IN OCTOBER 1983 NEAR DAC TO VILLAGE, BAN ME THUOT
PROVINCE. THE AMERICAN WAS DESCRIBED AS A CAUCASIAN WITH
LIEUTENANT COLONEL RANK WHO WAS SHOT DOWN IN 1972. THERE HAVE
BEEN MANY STORIES ABOUT AMERICANS LIVING WITH ETHNIC TRIBESMEN
IN THIS AREA. THEY ARE OFTEN ATTRIBUTED TO AN INDIAN
SUPPOSEDLY LIVING IN THE AREA. [REDACTED] ALSO REPORTED THAT IN
OCTOBER 1984 HE SAW THREE AMERICANS IN SA RUYNH DISTRICT, QUANG
NGAI PROVINCE. THE THREE AMERICANS WERE WORKING ON AN OIL
PROJECT ON "HAT NAM" (PROBABLY HAINAM) ISLAND WHEN A STORM SENT
THEM ADRIFT. ONE OF THE AMERICANS WAS [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] AS OF EARLY 1985, THE THREE AMERICANS WERE
MOVED TO HANOI. [REDACTED] PROVIDED THE NAMES: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] DOG
TAGS FOR THE ABOVE NAMED INDIVIDUALS WERE TURNED OVER TO [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] OF THE INTERIOR MINISTRY IN HO CHI MINH CITY (HCMC).
[REDACTED] HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A CHIEF INSPECTOR
[REDACTED] WAS MOVED TO PHANAT NIKHOM ON 20
JANUARY 1988. INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO JCRC AND STONY BEACH
ON 9 MARCH 1988.

B. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CLAIMED HEARSAY FROM [REDACTED] ABOUT THE
SINKING OF AN AMERICAN SHIP OFF THE COAST OF NGOC HIEN
DISTRICT, MINH HAI PROVINCE. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED], A NUMBER OF
AMERICAN BODIES WERE NOT RECOVERED FROM THAT VESSEL. [REDACTED] WAS
MOVED TO [REDACTED] INFORMATION WAS
PASSED TO JCRC AND STONY BEACH ON 9 MARCH 1988.

C. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CLAIMED AN ACQUAINTANCE HELD THE REMAINS OF ONE
AMERICAN. [REDACTED] SAID THE ACQUAINTANCE COULD BE CONTACTED
THROUGH HIS FAMILY [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] WAS MOVED TO PHANAT NIKHOM ON 20
JANUARY 1988. INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO JCRC AND STONY BEACH
ON 9 MARCH 1988.

D. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A FORMER ARVN CAPTAIN, CLAIMED HIS SISTER
[REDACTED] INFORMATION ABOUT THE REMAINS OF ONE
AMERICAN. SHE COULD BE CONTACTED AT [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] MOVED TO PHANAT

ACTION DIA/SPEC(19)

(M)

MCN=89117/01940

TOR=89117/05132

TAD=89117/05392

COSN=MIA659

PAGE 1 OF 4

NIKHOM ON 20 JANUARY 1988. INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO JCRC AND
STONY BEACH ON 9 MARCH 1988.

E. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CLAIMED A NEIGHBOR [REDACTED] HELD THE REMAINS OF
ONE AMERICAN AT HIS HOME IN [REDACTED] REPORTEDLY TURNED THE
REMAINS OVER TO GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY [REDACTED] AND HOPED TO BE
RESETTLED VIA THE ODP PROGRAM [REDACTED] WAS MOVED TO PHANAT
NIKHOM ON 20 JANUARY 1988. INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO JCRC AND
STONY BEACH ON 9 MARCH 1988.

F. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CLAIMED THAT WHILE IN REEDUCATION
CAMPS IN YEN BAI AND HOANG LIEN SON HE CAME ACROSS A WHITE
AMERICAN USING THE NAME "TRAM VAN NAM." AT THE HEADQUARTERS OF
THE 776TH UNIT WHICH WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTROLLING THE CAMP,
[REDACTED] SAW NAM AND A BLACK MAN. ACCORDING TO GUARDS, THESE TWO
AMERICANS VOLUNTEERED TO REMAIN AFTER THE WAR. IN EARLY 1960
WHILE IN HOA LO PRISON [REDACTED] CLAIMED HE SAW TWO AMERICANS (ONE
YOUNG AND ONE OLD). [REDACTED] STATED THAT HE CONTACTED THEM BY
HORSE CODE AND THE TWO AMERICANS WERE VICTIMS OF A SHIPWRECK IN
1975 POSSIBLY NEAR CON SON. [REDACTED] WAS INVOLVED IN SEARCHING FOR
AMERICAN REMAINS AND CLAIMED INFORMATION ON NEARLY 40 SETS OF
REMAINS, MOST OF WHICH WERE TURNED OVER TO VIETNAMESE
AUTHORITIES. [REDACTED] ALSO MENTIONED A HELICOPTER CRASH SITE ALONG
THE BANK OF A RIVER NEAR THE BIEN HOA-PUONG LONG-SONG BINH
PROVINCIAL BOUNDARIES. [REDACTED] PRODUCED ONE NAME BUT WAS NOT SURE
IT WAS CORRECT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WAS MOVED TO PHANAT NIKHOM ON 20 JANUARY 1988.
INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO JCRC AND STONY BEACH ON 9 MARCH
1988.

G. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CLAIMED TO HAVE INFORMATION ABOUT TWO
SETS OF AMERICAN REMAINS BURIED IN HOC MON. [REDACTED] SO CLAIMED
THAT HIS RELATIVES HELD ONE AMERICAN DOG TAG. [REDACTED] WAS MOVED TO
PHANAT NIKHOM ON 20 JANUARY 1988. INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO
JCRC AND STONY BEACH ON 9 MARCH 1988.

H. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CLAIMED TO HAVE SEEN AN AMERICAN BETWEEN
SEPTEMBER 1976 AND FEBRUARY 1978 AT THE CATHEDRAL IN SAIGON.
THE AMERICAN WAS NAMED [REDACTED] BORN ABOUT 1953, AND WAS FROM
PENNSYLVANIA. [REDACTED] WAS REPORTEDLY AN "INTERNATIONAL VOLUNTARY
STUDENT" WHO WAS ALLOWED TO REMAIN AFTER THE WAR [REDACTED]
REPORTEDLY LIVED AT THE [REDACTED]
HOME. [REDACTED] WAS MOVED TO PHANAT NIKHOM ON 20 JANUARY 1988.

~~SECRET~~
SECTION 2 OF 5
CITE [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION ON POW/MIA LIVE SIGHTINGS,
INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO JCRC AND STONY BEACH ON 9 MARCH
1988.

I. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CLAIMED HIS AUNT [REDACTED] HAD
INFORMATION ON AMERICAN REMAINS THE AUNT LIVED AT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WAS MOVED TO PHANAT NIKHOM ON 20 JANUARY 1988.
INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO JCRC AND STONY BEACH ON 9 MARCH
1988.

J. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] TURNED OVER ONE DOG TAG AND EIGHT
RUBBINGS OF THE FOLLOWING NAMES: [REDACTED]

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TIME OF THE CRASH (NF1). [] STATED THAT [] WAS TOLD THAT THERE WERE CURRENTLY FIVE POW'S BEING HELD IN THE PRISON WHERE THE ELECTRICIAN PREVIOUSLY WORKED. THE PRISON WAS REPORTEDLY LOCATED ABOUT A SEVEN DAYS WALK FROM THE MEKONG RIVER (NF1). [] WAS TOLD THAT THE ELECTRICIAN WAS WILLING TO GUIDE ANYONE TO THE GENERAL AREA OF THE PRISON SITE. [] APOLOGIZED FOR THE LACK OF ANY SPECIFIC DETAILS WHICH HE ATTRIBUTED TO HIS POOR COMMAND OF THE THAI LANGUAGE. MR. [] AGAIN OFFERED TO ASSIST APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS IN CONTACTING THE [] OF THE POW REPORT SHOULD THEY WISH TO PURSUE THE INFORMATION FURTHER.

C. [] COMMENTED THAT STONY BEACH OFFICERS WERE IN [] DURING THE WEEK OF 14 MARCH BUT APPARENTLY MADE NO ATTEMPT TO CONTACT [] REGARDING HIS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED POW INFORMATION. [] TO ADVISE IF STONY BEACH INTENDED TO CONTACT [] AND IF ANY FURTHER ACTION WAS REQUIRED BY BASE. [] PASSED A COPY OF SUBPARAGRAPH B ABOVE REPORT TO THE STONY BEACH TEAM ON THE MORNING OF 22 MARCH. STONY BEACH THEN ADVISED THAT THEY WOULD TURN OVER THE ABOVE SUBPARAGRAPH A AND B REPORTS TO THEIR OVERT DEBRIEFING TEAM IN [] FOR FOLLOWUP ACTION, AND THAT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR FURTHER ACTION []

5. ON 9 MARCH 1988, THE STONY BEACH TEAM IN [] WAS PASSED THREE LEADS:

A. VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEE []

[] CLAIMED THAT ON ONE AFTERNOON ABOUT OCTOBER 1972 TWO CAUCASIAN U.S. AIRMEN RECEIVED EMERGENCY TREATMENT AT THE HA SAN HOSPITAL, HUI DEO TOWN (XJ 7411), THUY NGUYEN DISTRICT, HAIPHONG CITY. ONE AIRMAN HAD A BROKEN LEG; THE OTHER AIRMAN WAS WOUNDED IN HIS ARM. THEIR FACES WERE BLOODY, POSSIBLY FROM INJURIES. THEY REPORTEDLY HAD BEEN RECENTLY CAPTURED AT THUY DUONG VILLAGE (XJ 7512), THUY NGUYEN DISTRICT. THEIR AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN BY AN AAA UNIT ON HUI DEO HILL AND CRASHED IN A RICE FIELD AT THUY DUONG AFTER IT AND TWO OTHER AIRCRAFT, INCLUDING ONE ALLEGED B-52, BOMBED SEVERAL PLACES IN HAI PHONG. [] CLAIMED HE SAW THREE AIRCRAFT BOMB A PLACE ABOUT ONE KILOMETER FROM HIS VILLAGE OF PHA LE (XJ 815115) IN THE MORNING. ONE AIRCRAFT CRASHED IN THE DIRECTION OF THUY DUONG, ABOUT SEVEN KILOMETERS WEST OF PHA LA. ON THE SAME AFTERNOON, Y WENT TO THE HA SAN HOSPITAL TO VISIT HIS MOTHER WHO WAS HOSPITALIZED THERE, AND SAW THE TWO CAUCASIAN AIRMEN FROM THE DOOR OF THE EMERGENCY ROOM. FROM PEOPLE AT THE HOSPITAL, Y LEARNED THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE AIRMEN'S CAPTURE AND THE ALLEGATION OF A B-52 BEING AMONG THE AIRCRAFT. HE COULD NOT

~~SECRET~~SECTION 4 OF 5
CITE []~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION ON POW/MIA LIVE SIGHTINGS, DESCRIBE THE AIRMEN IN ANY MORE DETAIL.

B. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED IN EARLY []

MID-1970 DURING THE BOMBARDMENT OF THE PHU LUONG BRIDGE, AN F-105 AIRCRAFT WAS REPORTEDLY DOWNED BY A MISSILE UNIT LOCATED IN KIM MON DISTRICT, HAI HUNG PROVINCE. ONE CAUCASIAN U.S. AIRMAN BAILED OUT VERY HIGH UP IN THE SKY. AFTER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME HE LANDED AT QUANG TRUNG VILLAGE (APPROXIMATE XJ 575215) SOUTH-SOUTHWEST OF THE YEN PHU MOUNTAINS, KIM MON DISTRICT. HE WAS IN GOOD PHYSICAL CONDITION. THE AIRCRAFT CRASHED AT HIEP THUNG VILLAGE AT THE NORTHERN FOOT OF THE NEO PASS (XJ 565 230). THE AIRMAN WAS BEATEN BY THE LOCAL PEOPLE BEFORE A CHINESE VEHICLE FROM THE HAI DUONG (NOW HAI HUNG) PROVINCE MILITARY PROVINCE CAME AND DROVE HIM TO THE UNIT'S HEADQUARTER. [] CLAIMED HE WAS WORKING FOR AN INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION IN THE AREA OF THE INCIDENT. LATER, HE AND OTHER WORKERS WENT TO "SEE" THE CAPTURED AIRMAN AND THE MILITIA DIGGING UP OF THE AIRCRAFT. HE DESCRIBED THE DIRECTION OF THE SITE WHERE THE AIRMAN LANDED AND THE CRASH SITE IN DETAIL. HE SAID HE COULD NOT GET CLOSE TO THE SCENE, SO HE DID NOT HAVE A DETAILED PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE AIRMAN. THE COMMANDER OF THE PROVINCIAL MILITARY UNIT WAS LE THUA DAO.

C. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED IN LATE []

[] BEFORE NOON ONE DAY IN MAY OR JUNE 1968, TWO ALLEGED U.S. AIRMEN PARACHUTED DOWN AND LANDED AT CHO HUONG OR LANG HUONG, SEVERAL HUNDRED METERS EAST OF THE PHUC HAI ROAD JUNCTION (XN 730995), AN THUY DISTRICT, HAI PHONG CITY. ONE CAUCASIAN AIRMAN WAS ABOUT 1.8 METERS TALL, AND HAD LIGHTLY CURLED IVORY-WHITE HAIR AND GREEN EYES. HE WAS NOT FAT, BUT HIS FLESH WAS SOFT. HE WAS WEARING A GREEN UNDERSHIRT AND WALKED BARE FOOTED CLIMBING. HE WAS TAKEN AWAY THAT AFTERNOON BY A PUBLIC SECURITY VEHICLE. THE OTHER AIRMAN DIED WHEN HE LANDED. HIS BODY WAS COVERED, SO HIS PHYSICAL TRAITS WERE NOT KNOWN. HE WAS TAKEN BY AMBULANCE TO KIEN AN TOWN (XJ 6902) HOSPITAL, HAI PHONG. ACCORDING TO LOCAL MILITIA, HE WAS KILLED BY GROUND FIRE WHILE HIS PARACHUTE WAS DESCENDING. THEY ALSO SAID HIS PARACHUTE WAS RED AND THAT THE LIVE AIRMAN'S PARACHUTE WAS BLUE/GREEN. THEIR AIRCRAFT CRASHED SOME NINE KILOMETERS TO THE SOUTH IN KIEN THUY DISTRICT, HAIPHONG. THE DEAD AIRMAN WAS EVACUATED ABOUT HALF AN HOUR BEFORE THE LIVE AIRMAN. [] CLAIMED HE WAS THEN LIVING AT PHUC HAI (XJ 7300), AN THUY. THE AIRMEN WERE ALREADY CAPTURED WHEN HE ARRIVED AT THE SCENE. HE CLAIMED HE WAS ABLE TO GET CLOSE TO THE AIRMEN AND HAD TOUCHED THE LIVE ONE. [] WAS ABOUT 1.5 METERS TALL AND HIS HEAD ONLY REACHED THE LIVE AIRMAN'S ARMPIT.

6. THE INFORMATION BELOW WAS OBTAINED BY OUR [] OFFICE:

A. ON 11 AUGUST 1988, A CASUAL CONTACT OF [] PASSED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WHICH HE HAD RECEIVED THE SAME DAY FROM HIS RELATIVE, []

[] UNIDENTIFIED CONTACTS IN LAOS BROUGHT HIM A SILVER BADGE (DOG TAG?) MEASURING TWO INCHES BY TWO INCHES WHICH HAD BEEN TAKEN FROM THE BODY OF AN AMERICAN PILOT FOUND AT THE SCENE OF AN AIR CRASH. THE SILVER TAG WAS INSCRIBED: []

[] STATED THAT THE BADGE HAD BEEN FOUND NEAR THE AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE AND THAT "THEY" WERE BRINGING THE UPPER PART OF THE SKELETON, INCLUDING THE SKULL, FROM THE LAO SIDE TO HIM SOON. "THEY" INFORMED HIM THAT "THEY" HAD FOUND THE REMAINS OF TEN MORE AMERICAN "SOLDIERS" IN LAOS AND VIETNAM. "THEY" WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT REWARDS FOR SUCH REMAINS. THE REPORT WAS PASSED TO THE STONY BEACH TEAM IN [] WHICH WAS REQUESTED TO TAKE CHARGE OF FOLLOWING UP ON THE FOREGOING INFORMATION.

6. AS OF 4 FEBRUARY 1989, FORMER 5TH S.F. REGIMENT

MCN=89117/01920

LOR=89117/05132

T4D=69117/05302

CDSN=MIA659

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(b)(3)
(b)(6)

9 November 1971

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Report of a U.S. Prisoner of War at Viet Cong Prison Camp
in Dam Doi District, An Xuyen Province

1. Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) [redacted] who with five other ARVN prisoners of war (POW) escaped from a Viet Cong (VC) prison camp in Dam Doi District, An Xuyen Province on 18 October, gave the following account of the capture of three members of Mobile Advisory Team 49, of which he was a member, by a VC unit which overran the ARVN Tam Soc outpost (WR912577) in Hoa Tu District, Ba Xuyen Province on 24 March 1969. The men captured were team interpreter, [redacted]

[redacted] (According to the Joint Personnel Recovery Center records, [redacted] is identical with [redacted]) Two other members of the team are believed to have been killed during the attack.

2. The day following their capture, [redacted] was killed by the VC captors because of injuries he received during the attack on the outpost, and because he tried to escape. [redacted] and [redacted] were forced to travel for 32 days, by foot and sampan, to Kien Giang Province, where they remained for several days. They were then taken to a prison camp at WQ381843 in Dam Doi District.

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

3. At Dam Doi Prison Camp [REDACTED] was kept separate from the ARVN prisoners, of which there were seven, five officers and two noncommissioned officers. There were never more than a total of eight prisoners in the camp at one time. The guard force numbered from 8 to 20. The ARVN prisoners were not physically abused or mistreated, but they were interrogated daily during the first month. Afterwards they were interrogated about twice a year, apparently for harassment; these interrogations lasted approximately two hours each. The prison routine never varied. The prisoners arose at 0700 hours and were fed a breakfast of rice, salt, and occasionally fish at 0800 hours. They were not given lunch, but were permitted to rest from 1200 to 1400 hours. Supper, consisting of rice, salt, and fish was served at 1800 hours. The prisoners were chained by the ankle at 2100 hours. During the day they repaired huts, bunkers, and bridges, and helped on woodchopping and fishing details.

4. Air and ground operations were conducted near the camp between June 1969 and October 1971, but its location remained undetected. The location of the camp was never changed during [REDACTED] confinement; however, with the escape of the six ARVN prisoners, [REDACTED] believes the VC will move the camp to another site.

5. In June 1969, the camp guard force numbered more than 20 men. When [REDACTED] escaped there were only eight. The camp chief was believed to be Nam Den, who had arrived in camp about one week prior to [REDACTED] escape. The political officer was Tu Lui, who had been there six months. [REDACTED] did not know to what section or command the prison camp belonged. While cleaning the guards quarters he noted the symbols "A5B" and "G36" on two documents but did not know what they signified.*

[REDACTED] Comment: [REDACTED] last saw [REDACTED] about a year ago. However, another prisoner who escaped with [REDACTED] is reported to have seen [REDACTED] at the camp in about mid-September 71.

-2-

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~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

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/12/ PER ORIGINATOR

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PAGE 001

TOT. 121528Z OCT 89

~~SECRET~~

121528Z

TO: DIA//PW-MIA (COL JOE SCHLATTER).

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: DOG TAG AND LIVE SIGHTING IN LAOS

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS

THE
OBTAINED THE INFORMATION FROM ONE OF 40 RECENTLY ARRIVED
VIETNAMESE BOAT REFUGEES WHO ARE NOW
THE INFORMATION HAS BEEN PASSED TO JCRC AND STONY
BEACH AND NOW IS BEING SENT FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

2. A VIETNAMESE EJAT REFUGEE IN TRAT PROVINCE PASSED A COPY OF
A DOG TAG RUBBING TO A THAI OFFICIAL. THE DOG TAG IS THAT OF:
A HANDWRITTEN NOTE, IN
VIETNAMESE, WITH THE RUBBING STATES THAT IS AN AMERICAN
CAPTAIN AND A HELICOPTER PILOT. WAS REPORTEDLY SHOT DOWN AT
KONTUM DISTRICT IN MARCH 1972 AND HIS BODY BURIED IN GIA LAI -
KONTUM PROVINCE.

3. ON 03 OCTOBER 1989, A LETTER WAS RECEIVED FROM
WHICH CONTAINED THE POW RELATED INFORMATION
DESCRIBED BELOW. THE LETTER CONTAINED INFORMATION FROM A FORMER LAO
PEOPLE'S ARMY FIRST LIEUTENANT KHAMPHOU DOUANGMANYCHAN, WHO RESIDES
IN XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCE. THE DATE AND PLACE OF
MEETING WITH KHAMPHOU WAS NOT INDICATED IN THE LETTER. A GIST OF
THE LETTER WAS TO BE PASSED TO STONY BEACH.

4. ON 03 OCTOBER 1989, OUR RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING
POW/MIA RELATED INFORMATION FROM A
THE CLAIMS HE OBTAINED THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION.

TOLD THE THAT THERE ARE 14 AMERICAN POW'S BEING HELD
AT THAM LUANG, NACHIK CANTON IN THE VIENGXAI DISTRICT (VH2949) OF
HOUAPHAN PROVINCE. "THAM LUANG" IS THE FORMER RESIDENCE OF PRINCE
SOUPHANOUVONG, ACCORDING TO THE SAID THAT THAM
LUANG IS LOCATED ONE KILOMETER EAST OF BANCHIK, WHICH IS 17
KILOMETERS EAST OF THE VIENGXAI MUNICIPALITY. SAID THAT
THE 14 AMERICAN POW'S ARE GUARDED BY A 26-MAN POLICE COMPANY
COMMANDED BY A POLICE LIEUTENANT SITHA. SAID THE POW'S
GROW RICE AND VEGETABLES FOR A LIVING BUT THEY ARE NOT ALLOWED TO
WEAR SHOES. ALSO ACCORDING TO THERE ARE THREE ADDITIONAL
POW'S BEING HELD AT AN AIR BASE IN MAUNG HAM (UH9647). THESE THREE
POW'S ARE REPORTEDLY BEING USED TO TEACH ENGLISH TO BANGKOK SOLDIERS
AND HOW THE LATTER ARE TO USE AN AIR SIGNAL SYSTEM. SAID
THERE ARE FOUR MIG-21'S LOCATED AT THE SAME AIRBASE. NO FURTHER
INFORMATION WAS AVAILABLE.

5.

6. CLASSIFIED BY SIGNER. DECL OADR DRV ALL ~~SECRET~~
FILE:

~~SECRET~~

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(b)(6)PAGE 0001
TOT: 181916Z FEB 88~~SECRET~~

181916Z

TO: DIA//VO-PW MR WICK TOURISON.

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: ALLEGED FIRST HAND LIVE SIGHTING REPORTING FROM

1. PER DISCUSSIONS WITH DIA/VO-PW ANALYSIS BRANCH CHIEF MR. WICK TOURISON ON 11 FEBRUARY 1988, WE ARE FORWARDING INFORMATION

2. SOURCE:

[] REPORTED THREE SIGHTINGS OF U.S. POW/MIA PERSONNEL IN LAOS IN 1984. DEBRIEFING WAS IN FRENCH BUT [] MADE REFERENCE TO NOTES HE HAD PREPARED IN [] WE OBTAINED THESE NOTES AND THEY ARE ENCLOSED. YOU WILL BE ABLE TO DISCERN IMPRESSIONS OF PREVIOUSLY WRITTEN NOTES ON THE PAPER, POSSIBLE WRITTEN ON 31 AUGUST 1987. THESE APPEAR TO BE IN A DIFFERENT HAND AND MAY OR MAY NOT BE RELEVANT.

3. [] WAS UNABLE TO SPECIFY WHAT MONTH SIGHTS OCCURRED. [] WAS ON THE ROAD FOR TWELVE MONTHS AS PART OF []

4. THE FIRST SIGHTING OCCURRED 30 KILOMETERS NORTH OF

~~SECRET~~

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NND 982011 - 1297

PAGE 0002
TOT: 181916Z FEB 88

SEPONE. [REDACTED] SEVENTEEN U.S. PERSONNEL WERE HELD IN A MONTAGNARD ENCAMPMENT ON A SMALL RIVER. THEY APPEARED TO BE IN GOOD HEALTH AND WERE FED TWICE A DAY, AT NOON AND 1700 HOURS. THEY WERE TREATED AS PRISONERS AND WERE NOT, AS IN THE CASE OF THE SECOND SIGHTING, INTEGRATED INTO THE LOCAL POPULATION.

5. THE SECOND SIGHTING WAS AT KHAM KER, NEAR NAPE IN KHAKEM PROVINCE. HERE HE MET [REDACTED] WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS A FORMER USAF BOMBER PILOT AND SON OF "A GENERAL" IN THE SEVENTH FLEET. [REDACTED] WAS MARRIED TO A MONTAGNARD WOMAN WITH WHOM HE HAD TWO CHILDREN. HE WAS INTEGRATED INTO THE COMMUNITY AND HAD COMPLETE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT. AT THIS SAME LOCATION WAS A BLACK AMERICAN, ALSO FREE. HE WAS UNMARRIED.

6. THE THIRD SIGHTING WAS AT A CAMP 20 KILOMETERS OFF THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL (SEE SKETCHES). TWENTY-SEVEN U.S. SERVICEMEN WERE INCARCERATED HERE WITHIN A COMPOUND SURROUNDED BY FOUR ROWS OF BAMBOO FENCING. THE PRISONERS WORKED AT CUTTING FIREWOOD. THEY WERE TAKEN OUT EACH DAY BY GUARDS WHO WERE OF THE KHA SENG ETHNIC GROUP. ABOUT 200 METERS OUTSIDE THE COMPOUND WERE THREE GRAVES OF U.S. SERVICEMEN WHO HAD DIED IN THIS PRISON.

7. AT THIS POINT HAVING GATHERED THE HIGHLIGHTS, WE PERSUADED [REDACTED] TO SPEAK DIRECTLY WITH [REDACTED] OF YOUR OFFICE. AS AGREED WITH YOUR OFFICIALS, PLEASE FEEL FREE TO CONTINUE TELEPHONE CONTACT WITH THE [REDACTED]

THIS EXERCISE DEALT WITH A SUBJECT MATTER AND A REGION THAT WE ARE NOT COMPLETELY FAMILIAR WITH, SO OUR APOLOGIES FOR ANY ERRORS IN THE SPELLING OF LAOTIAN NAMES. I WOULD APPRECIATE FROM YOU AN ASSESSMENT OF THE VALUE OF THIS INFORMATION IN DUE COURSE.

8. [REDACTED]

12. [REDACTED]

END OF MESSAGE

CL BY [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

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ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX190 MCN = 91296/07842 TOR = 912960631

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ZNR UUUUU

HEADER

O 230631Z OCT 91

FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUWSMXI/MAC INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN//

RUCQVAB/USCINGSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL

RUEALGX/SAFE

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INFO RAYWBF/ONA CANBERRA AS

RAYWDA/DIO CANBERRA AS

RHHMCMY/JLCPAC HONOLULU HI

RUADTBB/CDR1STBN1STSFGA TORII STA JA//SSO//

RUAJMAB/FOSIF WESTPAC KAMI SEYA JA

RUCIPGA/HQ AFESC TYNDALL AFB FL//DEHM//

RUDMMIC/NAVMARINTCEN WASHINGTON DC

RUDDMAX/FAISA FT BRAGG NC

RUEACMC/CMC WASH DC//MSPA-1 INTC//

RUEACNP/COMNAVMILPERSCOM WASH DC//NMPC-12//

RUEADWD/CSA WASHINGTON DC//DAAG-CAD//

RUEAHQA/AFIA WASHINGTON DC

RUEBFGA/VOA WASH DC

RUEBHAA/STORAGE CENTER FBIS RESTON VA

RUEHBT/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//INR/EAP//

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//D/PW//

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//EAP/VLC//

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//INR/SEA//

RUEKJCS/DEFINTAGENCY WASH DC

RUEOACC/CDR PSYOPGP FT BRAGG NC//ASOF-POG-SB//

RUETIAV/MPC FT GEO G MEADE MD

RUHDBKT/DATT-TLO BANGKOK TH

RUHHDHA/CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI//XP//

RUHHDHA/HQ PACAF IDHS HICKAM AFB HI

RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

RULWIOC/SAC INTELLIGENCE OPS CNT-OFFUTT AFB NE

RUMJBP/FBIS OKINAWA JA

RUMTFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

RUWSMXI/MAC INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//INO//

RUYLBAH/DODSPECREP OKINAWA JA

RUYLSD/NAVSECGRUACT HANZA JA

ACCT FBBK-EWDK

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CONTROLS

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WARNING: ATTN BANGKOK AE

ATTN BANGKOK LOCAL

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PAGE:0012

WARNING: AS OF FILING TIME VIETNAMESE MEDIA MONITORED BY BANGKOK
BUREAU HAVE NOT BEEN OBSERVED TO REPORT THE FOLLOWING.
BUREAU RECEIVED NHAN DAN WITH LAG TIME OF 7-10 DAYS.

SERIAL: BK2310062291

BODY

PASS: ATTN POL

COUNTRY: SRV

SUBJ: 1ST VO VAN KIET MEETING WITH MIA RELATIVE REPORTED

SOURCE: HONG KONG AFP IN ENGLISH 0604 GMT 23 OCT 91

TEXT:

((TEXT)) HANOI, OCT 23 (AFP) -- THE DAUGHTER OF A U.S. PILOT
REPORTED MISSING IN ACTION (MIA) DURING THE VIETNAM WAR MET HERE
WITH VIETNAMESE PREMIER VO VAN KIET, NHAN DAN NEWSPAPER SAID
WEDNESDAY.

[REDACTED] WHOSE FATHER WAS ONE OF THREE AMERICAN
MIAS PICTURED IN A FAKE PHOTOGRAPH THAT SURFACED RECENTLY, MET THE
PREMIER TUESDAY, THE OFFICIAL NEWSPAPER SAID.

THE MEETING WITH THE PREMIER, WHICH THE DAILY DESCRIBED AS
"CORDIAL AND OPEN," WAS REQUESTED BY [REDACTED] WHO ARRIVED HERE
SATURDAY TO DETERMINE THE TRUE FATE OF HER FATHER, [REDACTED]

"VIETNAM IS DOING ITS BEST TO HELP THE SEARCH FOR MIAS AND TO
CONTINUE TO RETRIEVE AND RETURN (TO THE UNITED STATES) ANY REMAINS,"
KIET SAID AT THE MEETING, ADDING THAT "VIETNAM STILL CONSIDERS (THE
MIA ISSUE) A HUMANITARIAN ISSUE."

"VIETNAM IS WILLING TO RECEIVE RELATIVES OF MIAS WHO WISH TO COME
TO VIETNAM" TO SEEK THE TRUTH REGARDING THE MISSING SERVICEMEN, NHAN
DAN QUOTED HIM AS SAYING.

THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THE VIETNAMESE PREMIER HAD RECEIVED THE
RELATIVE OF AN MIA.

[REDACTED] EXPRESSED HER APPRECIATION OF THE EFFORTS OF THE
GOVERNMENT AND VIETNAMESE PEOPLE IN SEARCHING FOR THE MIAS AND FOR
THE INFORMATION SUPPLIED ON THE FAKE PHOTOGRAPH THAT HAD SUGGESTED
THE THREE AMERICANS WERE STILL ALIVE, NHAN DAN SAID.

THE PHOTOGRAPH CAME TO LIGHT IN JULY AND WAS CONFIRMED AS A FAKE
BY U.S. OFFICIALS, AFTER THE VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES FURNISHED PROOF
THAT [REDACTED] HAD DIED WHEN HIS PLANE CRASHED ON SEPTEMBER 16,
1966, IN THE PROVINCE OF HAI HUNG.

DURING HER FOUR-DAY STAY IN VIETNAM, [REDACTED] ALSO MET OFFICIALS
FROM THE AMERICAN MIA OFFICE IN HANOI AND THEIR VIETNAMESE
COUNTERPARTS.

ADMIN

(ENDALL) JB502310.023 230604 [REDACTED] 23/0625Z OCT

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Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

[Redacted]

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE


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REPORT NO. [Redacted]

DATE DISTR. 15 APRIL 1971

COUNTRY CAMBODIA/SOUTH VIETNAM/NORTH VIETNAM
DOI MAY - NOVEMBER 1970
SUBJECT DETENTION OF SIX AMERICAN PRISONERS AT THE KRONG
R'BUK DETENTION CAMP, CHBAR DISTRICT, MONDOL KIRI
PROVINCE, CAMBODIA

ACQ
SOURCE



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CONFIDENTIAL [Redacted]

(classification)		(dissem controls)					(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)
STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	

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PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGE [REDACTED]

SUMMARY. IN MID-NOVEMBER 1970 SIX AMERICAN PRISONERS WERE BROUGHT FROM THE AREA OF THE DAK DAM RIVER TO THE KRONG R'BUK DETENTION CAMP, CHBAR DISTRICT, MONDOLKIRI PROVINCE. THE AMERICANS WERE CAPTURED AFTER THEIR HELICOPTER WAS SHOT DOWN. THEY WERE TO REST AT THE CAMP FOR THREE DAYS. NONE OF THE PRISONERS WAS WOUNDED. THEY WERE ISOLATED AT THE CAMP AND WERE NOT USED FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES. THEY WERE CLOSELY GUARDED. THE PRISONERS WERE FED DAILY ONE CANTEEN CUP OF RICE MIXED WITH DEER MEAT, FISH OR BAMBOO SPROUTS. END SUMMARY.

1. IN MID-NOVEMBER 1970, SIX AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR /POW/ WERE BROUGHT FROM NEAR THE DAK DAM RIVER TO THE KRONG R'BUK DETENTION CAMP AT YV295134, CHBAR DISTRICT, MONDOLKIRI PROVINCE.

[REDACTED] COMMENT--THE DAK DAM RIVER RUNS ALONG THE CAMBODIAN/ SOUTH VIETNAMESE BORDER FROM ABOUT YU8080 TO YV7040. THEY WERE ACCOMPANIED BY 18 ENLISTED KHMER ROUGE /KR/ CADRES, TWO KR OFFICERS, AND THREE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY /NVA/ MAJORS. ACCORDING TO NVA LIEUTENANT COLONEL /FNU/ W A, SENIOR PROPAGANDA OFFICER FOR THE PROVINCE, WHO HAD ARRIVED AT THE CAMP IN EARLY NOVEMBER FROM BU RMIT /YU297747/, THE SIX AMERICANS WERE CAPTURED AFTER THEIR HELICOPTER WAS DOWNED BY NVA FIRE. HE SAID THAT TWO OTHER CREW MEMBERS HAD DIED IN THE CRASH. THE PRISONERS WERE TO SPEND THREE DAYS RESTING AT THE CAMP AND THEN WERE TO BE TAKEN TO "PROVINCE" FOR INTERNMENT. WA INDICATED THE PRISONERS WOULD EVENTUALLY BE TAKEN TO NORTH VIETNAM. [REDACTED]

COMMENT--SEE [REDACTED] ON THE DETENTION CAMP AND JOINT KR/NVA HEADQUARTERS AT KRONG R'BUK.

2. NO ONE IN KRONG R'BUK SPOKE ENGLISH AND APPARENTLY NO EFFORT WAS MADE TO QUESTION THE PRISONERS. THE PRISONERS WERE ISOLATED AT THE CAMP AND WERE NOT USED FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES BY THE KR OR NVA, AND NO KR WERE ALLOWED TO SEE THE PRISONERS. HOWEVER, THEY WERE VISITED BY THE CAMP COMMANDER, NOT IDENTIFIED BY NAME, A 60-YEAR OLD NVA COLONEL WHO DRESSED IN BLUE COTTON SLACKS AND SHIRT AND WALKED WITH A CANE. THE PRISONERS WERE BOUND WITH NYLON CORD AND CLOSELY GUARDED. THEY WERE DRESSED IN

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GI AND WHITE UNDERSHORTS, TORN BLACK PAJAMA SHIRTS, AND "HO CHI MINH" SANDALS. NONE WAS WOUNDED BUT TWO HAD SCRATCHES AND CUTS ABOUT THEIR FACES AND ARMS.

3. THE PRISONERS WERE FED DAILY ONE NVA CANTEEN CUP OF RICE MIXED WITH DEER MEAT ONE DAY, FISH THE NEXT, AND BAMBOO SPROUTS THE FOLLOWING DAY. THIS WAS DONE TO IMPRESS THE PRISONERS WITH THE FACT THAT FOOD WAS PLENTIFUL AND VARIED. THEY WERE GIVEN NUOC MAM WITH THE RICE. [REDACTED] COMMENT--NUOC MAM, A FISH SAUCE, WAS SERVED AT THE SENIOR OFFICERS MESS AND WAS CONSIDERED TO BE A LUXURY FOR THE PRISONERS. THE PRISONERS ATE LUNCH AT 1200 HOURS AT THE SENIOR OFFICERS' TABLE AFTER THE OFFICERS HAD FINISHED THEIR LUNCH. AT NIGHT THEY WERE GIVEN "CHOKO" PARS /SIC/ TO EAT WITH HOT TEA. THE NVA/KR DAILY ISSUE OF FOOD FOR BOTH OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN WAS ONE CANTEEN CUP OF COOKED RICE PER MEAL. THEIR DAYTIME MEAL WAS SERVED WITH EITHER VEGETABLES OR MEAT, WHICHEVER WAS AVAILABLE. AT NIGHT THEY ATE THEIR CANTEEN CUP OF RICE WITH A CONCENTRATED CHOCOLATE BAR AND EITHER HOT TEA OR "SWEET WATER," A DRINK WHICH WAS MADE OF FLOWERS, SUGAR AND BOILING WATER. THE PRISONERS DID NOT RECEIVE THIS SECOND CUP OF RICE. SWEET POTATOES WERE FREQUENTLY EATEN WHEN RICE WAS SHORT OR TO AUGMENT THE RICE RATION WHEN VEGETABLES OR MEAT WERE IN SHORT SUPPLY. THE NVA DELIBERATELY DID NOT EAT SWEET POTATOES OR ALLOW THEM TO BE SERVED TO THE PRISONERS.

4. THE PRISONERS ALL CARRIED NVA ISSUE PACKS WITH RICE FOR THE MARCH. ALL WERE WHITE MALES.

A. PRISONER 1 WAS ABOUT 6 FEET TALL, WEIGHT 140 LBS. BUILD, "LIGHT COLORED EYES," LONG BROWN HAIR AND HEAVY GRAY BEARD. HE HAD SCRATCHES ON HIS FACE AND ARMS WHICH HAD BEEN TREATED WITH IODINE.

B. PRISONER 2 WAS SHORTER THAN PRISONER 1, HAD BROWN HAIR AND A MUSTACHE, APPEARED OLDER THAN THE OTHERS AND WAS HEAVY SET.

C. PRISONER 3 WAS ABOUT 6 FEET TALL, APPEARED TO BE THE YOUNGEST OF THE SIX. HE HAD BLACK HAIR, THIN AND SHORT, NO

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PAGE 4 OF 4 PAC

BEARD, WAS HEAVY SET, HAD "LIGHT COLORED EYES" AND A "LARGE STOMACH."

D. PRISONER 4 WAS ABOUT 5'8" TALL, DARK BROWN HAIR, AND "BLOATED STOMACH." COMMENT--"BLOATED" STOMACH INDICATED A CONDITION ATTRIBUTED TO LACK OF VITAMINS AND TO MALNUTRITION, WHEREAS "LARGE STOMACH" MEANT FAT OR OVERWEIGHT./

E. PRISONER 5 WAS ABOUT 5'8" TALL HAD BROWN HAIR, AND HAD A "BLOATED" STOMACH.

F. PRISONER 6 WAS THE SHORTEST OF THE SIX, HAD BLACK HAIR AND A THIN BUILD.

5. COMMENT--JOINT PRISONER RECOVERY CENTER RECORDS REFLECT THAT ON 2 MAY 1970 A UH-1H WITH SEVEN ABOARD WENT DOWN AT XU240009. THE FOLLOWING PERSONS WERE ON BOARD-

6. DISSEM--STATE, USMACV, 7TH AIR FORCE, NAVFORV, 525TH MI GP, 1021 FAS, OSI, CINCPAC, PACFLT, PACAF, ARPAC
VIENTIANE,

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CONTINUATION SHEET

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US T SACSA-3 S8MAA-1 SDEF-7
 SA-5 SA-15 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-4 CMC-3
 (15) JHA/JS

SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR FORCE CIA/INM USIA
 EYD DRE
 THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
 CITE [REDACTED]

NORTH VIETNAM

LATE SEPTEMBER - EARLY OCTOBER 1967

1. LOCATION OF PRISON FOR AMERICAN PILOTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
2. AMERICAN PILOTS DOWNED OVER NORTH VIETNAM ON 21 SEPTEMBER AND 3 AND 4 OCTOBER 1967

1 DECEMBER 1967

ACQ

SOURCE

LATE SEPTEMBER TO EARLY OCTOBER 1967 BELIEVES THAT A PRISON WHERE AMERICAN PILOTS ARE INTERVIEWED IS LOCATED IN THE VICINITY OF AN UNIDENTIFIED BRIDGE ON THE SONG LAP RIVER, APPROXIMATELY 1,700 FEET EAST OF THE CONFLUENCE OF THE SONG LAP AND SONG TRAM RIVERS. [REDACTED] BASES HIS BELIEF ON A CONVERSATION HE HAD IN LATE SEPTEMBER WITH THE [REDACTED]

CONFIDENTIAL

NAVINT.COM

Enclosure (1) To Serial 05480

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 ON RIGHT SIDE
 OF FOLDER

IN [REDACTED]

- PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ [REDACTED]
(When released, (When released, control))

IN HAIPHONG. [REDACTED] SAID THAT A BOMB DROPPED BY AN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT HAD EXPLODED BETWEEN HIS HOME AND THE PRISON WHERE AMERICAN PILOTS WERE INTERNED. [REDACTED] EXPLAINED THAT THE TARGET OF THE BOMBING RAID WAS PROBABLY A BRIDGE NEAR HIS HOME AND POINTED TO THE BRIDGE ON A MAP IN [REDACTED] WHICH IS DESCRIBED BELOW. [REDACTED] COMMENTED THAT THE AREA IS OFF LIMITS TO FOREIGNERS AND THAT HE WAS, THEREFORE, NOT ABLE TO VERIFY THE LOCATION OF THE PRISON CAMP.

2. THE FOLLOWING INCIDENTS OF AMERICAN PILOTS BEING DOWNED OVER NORTH VIETNAM WERE OBSERVED IN LATE SEPTEMBER AND EARLY OCTOBER 1967:

A. ON 21 SEPTEMBER 1967 AT 1230, AN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT WAS HIT BY NORTH VIETNAMESE GROUND FIRE. THE PILOT EJECTED SAFELY BUT WAS KILLED WHEN HE LANDED ON ROCKY TERRAIN FOUR TO FIVE KILOMETERS NORTH EAST OF HAIPHONG. A PHOTOGRAPH OF THE PILOT'S CORPSE WAS DISPLAYED AT [REDACTED] IN HAIPHONG. THE PILOT APPEARED TO BE ABOUT 27 YEARS OLD.

B. ON 3 OCTOBER 1967 AT APPROXIMATELY 1600, AN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT WAS DOWNED BY NORTH VIETNAMESE GROUND FIRE AND CRASHED INTO THE SONG DA BACH RIVER. THE PILOT PARACHUTED SAFELY INTO THE RIVER AND WAS RESCUED BY AN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT NEAR ZERO

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
SECRET
(When controlled)

ON CHART 795 ON TACTA HAIPHONG SHEET, SCALE 1:250,000 IN THE
BACH RIVER. COMMENT. NORTH VIETNAMESE

ARMED MEN ARE ARMED WITH RIFLES AND SIDEARMS. THEY REPORTEDLY
HAVE AMERICAN PILOTS WHO HAVE PARACHUTED INTO THE RIVER

ON 4 OCTOBER 1967 AT APPROXIMATELY 1200, AN AMERICAN
AIRCRAFT WAS DOWNED BY GUNS OF THE CHINESE MERCHANT SHIP HA PENG
(PHONETIC) WHICH WAS AT NUMBER TWO BUOY AT HAIPHONG PORT. THE
AIRCRAFT WAS CAPTURED AND INTERNED. THE HA PENG, AN 8,000 DEADWEIGHT
TON DIESEL MOTOR SHIP OF CANTON REGISTRY, IS PAINTED LIGHT GRAY
WITH BLACK TRIM. THE SHIP IS EQUIPPED WITH TWO OERLIKON TYPE
ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS, PROBABLY OF 20MM CALIBER. SINCE 1966, ALL
CHINESE MERCHANT VESSELS HAVE MOUNTED WEAPONS AFTER PASSING ZERO
TWO AIR FIRE AT AMERICAN AIRCRAFT DURING BOMBING RAIDS.

DISSEM: CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC STATE ARMY
NAVY AIRAFF USARPAC/J COMNAVJ NISOU 5AF 549SG 500MIC
USARPAC DET4/FTD (ALSO SENT [REDACTED] AND SAIGON). GP



1554 Intelligence Information Report

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DIRECTORATE FOR PLANS

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PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

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REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

DATE DISTR. 7 OCTOBER 1971

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM 1922

DOI JUNE - NOVEMBER 1969

SUBJECT DOWNING OF AN AMERICAN PLANE OVER LONG TOAN DISTRICT, VINH BINH PROVINCE, IN 1969

ACQ [REDACTED]

SOURCE [REDACTED]

1. ON 13 AUGUST 1971, A FORMER LONG (VC) VILLAGE-LEVEL CADRE STATED THAT AN OBSERVATION PLANE CARRYING TWO AMERICANS WAS SHOT DOWN BY THE VC 2ND BATTALION ON THE EDGE OF CON LOI HAMLET, PROBABLY IN EARLY JULY 1969. AT THAT TIME, THIS FORMER VC CADRE AND 48 OTHER CADRES WERE ATTENDING A THREE-MONTH COUNTERINTELLIGENCE COURSE IN THE VC SECURE AREA OF CON LOI HAMLET (XR5455), LONG VIL- LAGE, LONG TOAN DISTRICT, VINH BINH PROVINCE.

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PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS		

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HQDA (DAMI-000-H) 21 APR 1972: Circumstances

and location indicate probably

(PH 15 Nov 69). Also

Possibly (MIA

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PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

2. THE AIRCRAFT WAS PAINTED GRAY AND HAD SQUARE-TIPPED WINGS. ONE OF THE TWO AMERICANS, A CAPTAIN, HAD BEEN SHOT THROUGH THE LEFT ARM AND THE CHEST AND WAS DEAD WHEN THE VC REACHED THE CRASH SITE. THE OTHER, A MAJOR, ^{OR LCDR?} WAS ALIVE AND HOLDING A MAP IN HIS HAND. HE WAS ESCORTED BY LY THANH K Y, ALIAS BAY T I N H, AND FOUR GUERRILLAS TO THE SITE OF THE TRAINING CLANS AND WAS PARADED IN FRONT OF THE STUDENTS. BAY TINH, SECRETARY OF THE TRA QU DISTRICT COMMITTEE, PULLED A .45 CALIBER PISTOL AND POINTED IT AT THE AMERICAN, THREATENING HIM. THE MAJOR RESPONDED BY TEARING OPEN HIS SHIRT AND DARING BAY TINH TO SHOOT HIM. THE STUDENTS PREVAILED UPON BAY TINH NOT TO KILL THE PRISONER.

3. AFTER ABOUT 30 MINUTES THE PRISONER WROTE A NOTE, THE CONTENTS OF WHICH WERE NOT DISCLOSED TO THE STUDENTS, AND GAVE IT TO ONE OF THE GUARDS WHO GAVE IT TO BA O A I, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE VC TRA VINH (GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) VINH BINH AND PART OF VINH LONG) PROVINCE COMMITTEE. ABOUT TWO HOURS LATER BA OAI ORDERED LE VAN C H I E N, VC VILLAGE UNIT LEADER, TO TAKE THE PRISONER AWAY AND HE WAS ESCORTED TO AN UNKNOWN DESTINATION. COMMENT: BA OAI, TRUE NAME TRAN L A I, AND LY THANH KY WERE BOTH KILLED DURING GVN MILITARY OPERATIONS IN 1973.)

4. TWO DAYS AFTER THE PLANE WAS DOWNED MANY HELICOPTERS, POSSIBLY A DOZEN, REPEATEDLY OVERFLEW THE AREA OF CON LOI HAMLET. ON THE FOURTH DAY AFTER THE PLANE WAS DOWNED, THE VC INVITED THE RESIDENTS OF CON LOI AND ADJACENT HAMLETS TO A CELEBRATION HONORING THE VC SOLDIERS WHO SHOT DOWN THE AIRCRAFT. FOUR OR FIVE RESIDENTS WENT TO OBSERVE THE BURIAL SITE OF THE AMERICAN WHO HAD BEEN KILLED. THE GRAVE WAS IN CON LOI HAMLET, ABOUT 600 METERS FROM THE SEASHORE AND 1,000 METERS SOUTH OF THE RIVER IN VINH LOI. COMMENT: THE VINH LOI RIVER DOES NOT APPEAR ON THE U.S. ARMY ENGINEERS MAP 1:100,000, SHEET 7228, SERIES L627. IT IS POSSIBLE THE REFERENCE IS TO THE RACH CON LOI WHICH IS IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA.)

5. COMMENT: ON 8 AUGUST 1971, A FORMER RESIDENT OF CON LOI HAMLET, WHO ALSO ATTENDED THE CELEBRATION HONORING THE VC

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[REDACTED]

SOLDIERS WHO SHOT THE PLANE DOWN, SAID THE BODY OF AN AMERICAN WAS BURIED IN CON LOI HAMLET. HE SAID ONE AMERICAN HAD SURVIVED THE CRASH.)

6. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY CENTER (JPRC) LISTS ONLY ONE OBSERVATION PLANE DOWN IN THIS AREA. IT WAS SHOT DOWN ON 15 NOVEMBER 1969 OVER LOAN TOAN DISTRICT, VINH BINH PROVINCE, AT XR730700.)

7. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE, USMACV, USAID, CORDS, DIA/USFPAO (MR. LINCOLN ONLY) 7TH AIR FORCE USARV MAJFORV 525TH MI GP 1021ST FAS OSI CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC [REDACTED].

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Classified
Review on

7 OCT 1991

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Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)DIRECTORATE FOR
PLANS

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAC

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REPORT NO: [REDACTED]

DATE DISTR. 15 OCTOBER 1971

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI LATE NOVEMBER 1969

SUBJECT SIGHTING OF A DEAD AMERICAN AND OBSERVATION OF
HIS BURIAL

ACQ

SOURCE [REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED] COMMENT: ON 15 NOVEMBER 1969 AN OV-1 MOHAWK AIR-
CRAFT, PILOTED BY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WAS SHOT DOWN OVER LONG TOAN DISTRICT IN
VIETNAM PROVINCE.) [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS
RELATED TO THE ABOVE-MENTIONED INCIDENT ONLY BY APPROXIMATE TIME-
FRAME AND LOCATION. SEE [REDACTED]
WHICH CONCERNS THE DOWNING OF AN AMERICAN PLANE IN THE SAME AREA.)

2. IN LATE 1969 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] LEARNED FROM FRIENDS THAT A U.S. AIR-
CRAFT HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN IN LONG TOAN DISTRICT AND THAT TWO AMERICAN
PILOTS HAD PARACHUTED AND HAD BEEN CAPTURED BY THE VIET CONG (VC). A

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1343-08 (2)

14 Jan 73
Member duty
taken out by
[REDACTED] declassified
Source says
after crash
remains body on truck
until Feb 1970

10 Dec
[Signature]

0086

NW 982007 - 887

CIA-711015-080

C O N F I D E N T I A L

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL--

COUNTRY: VIETNAM

DOI : AUGUST - EARLY DECEMBER 1975

SUBJECT: AMERICANS REMAINING IN SAIGON

ACQ :

SOURCE :

1. SEVERAL AMERICANS (NAMES UNKNOWN) WERE LIVING WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) IN SAIGON PRIOR TO THE CURRENCY EXCHANGE ON 22 SEPTEMBER 1975. THEY WERE HOUSED AND FED FREE OF CHARGE, BUT NONETHELESS HAD OCCASIONAL COMPLAINTS ABOUT THEIR SITUATION. ON 22 SEPTEMBER ALL OF THESE AMERICANS EXCEPT ONE SHOWED UP WITH SEVERAL HUNDRED THOUSAND OLD GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) PIASTERS EACH, TO BE EXCHANGED FOR NEW PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT (PRG) DONG. BECAUSE OF THIS EVIDENCE THAT THEY WERE NOT DESTITUTE, THE ICRC MADE THEM LEAVE ICRC PREMISES. ONE AMERICAN WAS PERMITTED TO REMAIN,

THE ICRC HAS MADE SPECIAL PETITION TO AUTHORITIES TO PERMIT TO DEPART VIETNAM, WITH NO

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REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL--

RESULTS AS OF EARLY DECEMBER.

4. IN AUGUST 1975, [REDACTED] WENT TO TAN SON NHUT AIRPORT EXPECTING TO LEAVE VIETNAM, HAVING AN EXIT VISA AND ALL HIS DOCUMENTATION IN ORDER. THE AUTHORITIES DID NOT PERMIT [REDACTED] TO LEAVE, BASING THE REFUSAL ON SOME FLIMSY EXCUSE. BAR BELIEVES THAT THE AIRPORT AUTHORITIES SIMPLY SAID THEY HAD NOT RECEIVED PROPER NOTIFICATION, BUT HE THINKS THE REAL REASON WAS BECAUSE THE U.S. HAD VETOED PRG ADMISSION TO THE U.N. [REDACTED]

5. [REDACTED]

6. ANOTHER AMERICAN WHOSE NAME IS UNKNOWN AND WHO SPEAKS VIETNAMESE, IS PEDALLING A CYCLO.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L**REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL--**

9. WHETHER ANY AMERICANS OTHER THAN [REDACTED] POSSESSED
EXIT VISAS IS UNKNOWN. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE AUTHORITIES
ARE HOLDING THE REMAINING AMERICANS "FOR RANSOM.")

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY
5B (2).

IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION

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COUNTRY CAMBODIA
DOI JULY 1974
SUBJECT DETENTION OF TWO U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR BY COMMUNISTS
IN CAMBODIA
ACQ 5 - 20 NOVEMBER 1974

SOURCE

1. AROUND 5 JULY 1974 A TELEGRAM FROM K H I E U SAMPHAN, DEPUTY
PRIME MINISTER OF THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNION (GRUNK), WAS
RECEIVED BY THE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT OF CAMBODIA (FUNK) "RIUREAN

POLITIQUE" IN PEKING STATING THAT

[REDACTED] HAD BEEN CAPTURED AND WERE BEING HELD BY COM-
MUNIST FORCES IN THE KHMER COMMUNIST AREA OF KRATIE PROVINCE, CAMBODIA,
AS OF JULY 1974. THE TELEGRAM WAS SHOWN TO PRINCE NORODOM S I H A N O U K
WHO READ IT AND RETURNED IT TO THE BUREAU. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE TELEGRAM
WAS ONLY A FEW LINES LONG AND DID NOT MENTION THE HEALTH OF THE PRISONERS
OR ANY PLANS TO MOVE THEM FROM KARTIE. IT GAVE ONLY THE NAMES AND GRADES
OF THE AMERICANS AND STATED THAT THEY HAD BEEN CAPTURED AND WERE BEING HELD
BY THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLES' NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMED FORCES /CPNLAF/ IN
KRATIE.)

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[REDACTED]

2. DURING A DISCUSSION WHICH SIHANOUK HELD WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS ENTOURAGE, IT WAS DECIDED THAT WESTERN PRISONERS SHOULD BE KEPT ALIVE FOR POLITICAL REASONS, I.E., POSSIBLE PRISONER EXCHANGE, UNTIL AFTER THE "LIBERATION" OF CAMBODIA. [REDACTED] COMMENT: CABLES OF THIS NATURE REGULARLY GO FROM CAMBODIA TO HANOI, THEN TO PEKING, BUT THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME IN THREE AND A HALF YEARS AMERICAN NAMES WERE SEEN. THERE IS SPECULATION HOWEVER, THAT OTHER WESTERNERS, PROBABLY FRENCH, ARE BEING HELD IN CAMBODIA.)

3. [REDACTED] DISSEM: SENT TO [REDACTED] (PRINCIPAL OFFICERS ONLY) SAIGON (DEFENSE ATTACHE FOR JCRC REPRESENTATIVE) [REDACTED] (PRINCIPAL OFFICERS ONLY) CINCPAC (FOR CINCPAC AND POLAD ONLY) USSAG AND VIENTIANE (FOR JCRC REPRESENTATIVES ONLY).

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

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TO: DIA WASHINGTON DC//POW-MIA (ATTN: ROBERT DESTATTE).

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE U.S. MIA IN VIETNAM

1. ON 21 JANUARY 1991, [REDACTED] SPOKE WITH [REDACTED] CONTACTED OUR OFFICE TO ADVISE THAT HE HAD RECENTLY RECEIVED INFORMATION REGARDING A POSSIBLE U.S. ARMY INDIVIDUAL WHO IS REPORTED TO BE IN HIDING IN HO CHI MINH CITY. [REDACTED] (WHO IS MARRIED TO A VIETNAMESE) RECEIVED CORRESPONDENCE ON 19 JANUARY 1991, INCLUDING PHOTOGRAPHS, FROM HIS WIFE'S COUSIN WHO IS LOCATED IN [REDACTED] ON THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUAL, POSSIBLY AN MIA:

[REDACTED] MIA SINCE CIRCA 1970 LOC: HO CHI MINH CITY, VIETNAM TEXT: IN JANUARY 1991, [REDACTED] WAS REPORTED BY A VIETNAMESE IMMIGRANT TO HAVE BEEN ALIVE AND HIDING IN HO CHI MINH CITY AS OF MID-1990. [REDACTED] REPORTED TO BE BLACK, HAS HOME OF RECORD OF [REDACTED] WAS REPORTED TO HAVE SERVED AS A HELICOPTER PILOT WITH THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION IN 1970.

2. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED]

5. CLASSIFIED BY SIGNER. DECL OADR DRV [REDACTED] ALL
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END OF MESSAGE~~SECRET~~CIA-910129-030L
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TO: DIA WASHINGTON DC//PW-MIA (ATTN MR BOB SHEETZ).

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EZ2:

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON A VC PRISON CAMP

REF:

1. THE FOLLOWING REPORT WAS OBTAINED FROM [REDACTED] AND IT RESPONDS TO YOUR REQUIREMENTS. THE REPORT IS BEING PASSED FOR YOUR INTEREST.

2. IN EARLY SEPTEMBER 1991 [REDACTED] COMMENTED ON HIS PREVIOUS STATEMENTS ON THE POW-MIA ISSUE. HE STATED THAT DURING THE WAR YEARS HE HAD BEEN [REDACTED] AND IN THE COURSE OF HIS JOURNALISTIC DUTIES, HE WAS POSTED TO THE CAMP CONTAINING U.S., SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND OTHER POW'S. [REDACTED]

3. THE CAMP [REDACTED] WHERE HE MET AMERICAN POW "JOHN" WAS A FOUR-HOUR WALK WEST OF LOC LINH TOWN, ON THE VIETNAMESE-CAMBODIAN BORDER. PRISONERS WERE BROUGHT TO THIS AREA FROM ALL OVER SOUTH-CENTRAL VIETNAM. AT THE TIME THE AREA WAS REGARDED AS BEING A RELATIVELY SECURE VC AREA AND OFFERED EASY WITHDRAWAL INTO CAMBODIA. AT THE TIME [REDACTED] ARRIVED IN 1966, THERE WERE FIVE PRISONERS AT THIS CAMP. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WAS ASKED TO HELP WITH THE INTERROGATION OF THE POW'S. PRISONERS WERE KNOWN BY NUMBER, AND IT WAS NOT UNTIL LATER IN THE WAR THAT PRISONERS WERE COMMONLY REFERRED TO BY THEIR VIETNAMESE/PHONETIC NAMES. "JOHN" WAS NUMBER 3 -- THIS NUMBER WAS ON HIS SHIRT. THE CAMP COMMANDER WAS FNU ((TRONG)), A NORTHERNER (HE SPOKE WITH A NORTHERN ACCENT) OF FOUR STAR RANK. (("HANH BA")), A SENIOR OFFICIAL WHO SUPERVISED SEVERAL CAMPS AND WAS TRONG'S BOSS, PERIODICALLY VISITED THE AREA [REDACTED] "HANH

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~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

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PAGE 0C

BA" WAS A SOUTHERNER; [REDACTED] DID NOT RECALL EVER HEARING "HANH BA'S" REAL NAME. ([REDACTED] COMMENT: THIS CODE/FAMILIAR NAME IS DERIVED FROM THE VIETNAMESE FOR "SECOND SON.") THE VC CAMP TYPICALLY CONSISTED ONLY OF SEVERAL CAMOUFLAGED BAMBOO HUTS. THE CAMPS REGULARLY CHANGED LOCATIONS (ABOUT EVERY THREE MONTHS). PRISONERS WERE HELD IN BAMBOO CAGES. [REDACTED] RECOLLECTED SEEING SEVERELY WOUNDED PRISONERS TRANSPORTED IN CRAMPED BOXES SLUNG FROM POLES CARRIED ON THE SHOULDERS OF "TWO WOMEN." CAMPS HAD NUMERICAL DESIGNATIONS BUT WERE MORE COMMONLY REFERRED TO BY THEIR LOOSE GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS, E.G. "HIGH MOUNTAIN CAMP" OR THE "DEEP RIVER CAMP".

4. WHEN [REDACTED] LEFT THE CAMP IN 1968, THERE WERE 20 TO 25 PRISONERS, INCLUDING WHAT HE THOUGHT WERE SOME SOUTH KOREANS. THE HIGHEST RANKING AMERICAN WAS "TWO OR THREE STARS" -- PRESUMABLY AROUND THE ARMY CAPTAIN RANK. MOST WERE ENLISTED MEN. HE THOUGHT NONE WERE PILOTS. SEVERAL WERE CRITICALLY WOUNDED AND DIED FROM INADEQUATE MEDICAL CARE. OTHERS WERE INCAPACITATED BY DISEASES. ONLY A FEW WERE IN REASONABLY GOOD HEALTH AND AMBULATORY. [REDACTED] SAID THAT SUBSEQUENTLY HE HAD HEARD THAT IN LATE 1968 OR 1969, THE CAMP AREA HAD BEEN HEAVILY BOMBED AND MANY/ALL PRISONERS WERE KILLED.

5. [REDACTED] REITERATED THAT WHEN HE RETURNS TO SAIGON HE WILL GET "JOHN'S" DOG TAGS. [REDACTED] SAID THAT HE HAD A DIARY AT HOME WHICH MAY CONTAIN DETAILS ABOUT THE CAMP THAT HE MAY HAVE FORGOTTEN.

6. [REDACTED]

7. CLASSIFIED BY SIGNER. DECL OADR DRV [REDACTED] ALL SECRET

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[REDACTED]

COUNTRY: VIETNAM

DOI : LATE MARCH-JULY 1976

SUBJECT: 1. AMERICANS REMAINING IN SAIGON AND REPORTED
CAPTURE OF TWO AMERICANS NEAR VUNG TAU
2. AMERICAN PRISONERS, INCLUDING WAR WOUNDED,
ALLEGEDLY STILL BEING HELD IN VIETNAM

SOURCE :

[REDACTED]

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SUMMARY. AS OF MID-MAY 1976 TWO AMERICANS WHO WERE FORMERLY EMPLOYED AT LONG BINH BASE WERE LIVING IN THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS COMPOUND IN SAIGON. THEIR NICKNAMES AND PHYSICAL DESCRIPTIONS ARE GIVEN. IN LATE NOVEMBER 1975, THE COMMUNISTS CLAIMED THE CAPTURE OF TWO AMERICAN AND ABOUT 20 VIETNAMESE IN VUNG TAU AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES THERE HELD A MOCK TRIAL

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[REDACTED]

TO TRY THESE PRISONERS. IN MAY 1976 A NORTH VIETNAMESE CADRE WHO HAD BEEN SENT TO SAIGON TOLD A SOUTH VIETNAMESE CONTACT THAT HE HAS SEEN "MANY" AMERICAN PRISONERS IN HANOI WHO WERE SUFFERING FROM WAR WOUNDS OR MENTAL DISORDERS. IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1976 NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFICERS TOLD A SAIGON BLACK MARKETEE THAT SERIOUSLY ILL AMERICAN PRISONERS WERE STILL BEING HELD IN NORTH VIETNAM BECAUSE THE COMMUNISTS FEARED THEIR RELEASE WOULD HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINION. IN EARLY JULY 1976 A NORTH VIETNAMESE SECURITY OFFICIAL PROCESSING A GROUP DEPARTING VIETNAM AT TAN SON NHUT AIRPORT, WHEN PURPOSELY PROVOKED BY A QUESTION ON AMERICAN PRISONERS STILL IN VIETNAM, REPLIED THAT "THEY WOULD BE HANDLED SEPARATELY." END SUMMARY.

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[REDACTED]

1. TWO MALE AMERICANS WERE LIVING IN THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS (IRC) COMPOUND IN SAIGON AS OF MID-MAY 1976. BOTH MEN FORMERLY WERE EMPLOYED AT LONG BINH BASE, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] LAST SAW THE TWO AMERICANS APPROXIMATELY 10 DAYS BEFORE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2. ONE OF THE MEN WAS NAMED [REDACTED] HE WAS 28-30 YEARS OLD, APPROXIMATELY 170 POUNDS, AND 5 FEET 8 INCHES TALL. HE HAD CURLY DARK BROWN HAIR WITH A GOATEE, BROWN EYES, FAIR COMPLEXION, MUCH BODY HAIR, AND NO NOTICEABLE SCARS. HE WORE GLASSES AND HAD A MANNERISM WHICH WAS DESCRIBED AS SHRUGGING HIS SHOULDERS OFTEN. THIS MAN WAS KNOWN TO SPEAK ONLY ENGLISH. HIS HEALTH APPEARED TO BE GOOD.

3. THE SECOND MAN WAS NAMED [REDACTED] HE WAS IN HIS EARLY 30'S, WAS LESS THAN 5 FEET 8 INCHES TALL, AND WEIGHED ABOUT 180 POUNDS. HE HAD DARK BROWN HAIR, A RUDDY COMPLEXION, AND NO NOTICEABLE MANNERISMS. IN ADDITION TO ENGLISH, HE SPOKE SOME VIETNAMESE AND A LITTLE FRENCH.

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4. IN LATE NOVEMBER 1975 [REDACTED]

TWO AMERICANS AND ABOUT 20 VIETNAMESE HAD BEEN CAPTURED IN THE SMALLER OF TWO MOUNTAIN AREAS NEAR BACK BEACH IN VUNG TAU. [REDACTED] SAID THE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES HAD REQUIRED THEM TO GO TO THE CITY CENTER WHERE THEY SAW TWO AMERICANS AND ABOUT 20 VIETNAMESE TIED TOGETHER BEING MARCHED THROUGH THE STREETS. THE AUTHORITIES STATED THESE PRISONERS HAD BEEN CAPTURED IN THE SMALLER MOUNTAIN AREA, WHICH WAS PLACED OFF LIMITS BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF RESISTANCE FORCES THERE. [REDACTED]

about 100

ON A SUBSEQUENT VISIT TO VUNG TAU SEVERAL WEEKS LATER,

ALSO HEARD OVER LOUDSPEAKERS THAT A MOCK TRIAL FOR THESE PRISONERS WAS CONDUCTED IN AN OPEN BEACH AREA, AT WHICH THE COMMUNIST PROSECUTORS SAID THAT ANYONE BEARING ARMS AGAINST THE COMMUNIST REGIME WOULD BE SENTENCED TO DEATH. NO PRISONERS WERE PRESENT AT THE TRIAL AND NO SPECIFIC MENTION OF AMERICANS WAS MADE DURING THE TRIAL. ALTHOUGH ALL PRISONERS WERE SENTENCED TO DEATH, [REDACTED] DID NOT KNOW WHETHER ANY OF THE AMERICANS WERE

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[REDACTED]

EXECUTED, BUT VUNG TAU RESIDENTS SAID THAT ONE VIETNAMESE
EX-COLONEL CAPTURED ON THAT OCCASION HAD BEEN KILLED.

[REDACTED] COMMENT: WHETHER THE TWO CAPTURED INDIVIDUALS
IDENTIFIED AS "AMERICANS" WERE ACTUALLY NON-AMERICAN
CAUCASIANS CANNOT BE DETERMINED. ALTHOUGH THE COMMUNIST
AUTHORITIES CLAIMED THESE "AMERICANS" WERE INVOLVED IN
RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES, THEY POSSIBLY WERE MERELY IN HIDING
IN VUNG TAU, WHICH IS A WELL KNOWN AREA FOR ESCAPE FROM
VIETNAM BY BOAT. NO FURTHER INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED ON
THE CONDITION, TREATMENT AND FATE OF THESE "AMERICANS.")

5. IN MAY 1976, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SAID A FRIEND OF HIS TOLD OF SEEING
"MANY" AMERICAN PRISONERS IN THE HANOI AREA. THE FRIEND ADDED
THAT ALL OF THE PRISONERS WERE EITHER SERIOUSLY INJURED, I.E.
CRIPPLED BY WAR WOUNDS OR SUFFERING FROM MENTAL DISORDERS
RELATING TO THEIR LONG IMPRISONMENT OR HARSH TREATMENT. [REDACTED]
FRIEND, WITH WHOM HE WAS IN FREQUENT CONTACT, WAS A NORTH
VIETNAMESE LIEUTENANT COLONEL WHO WAS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE NATIVE
WHO HAD SERVED WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) FOR OVER
20 YEARS. [REDACTED] SAID THAT HIS FRIEND, WHO WAS INVOLVED IN THE
SAIGON BLACK MARKET, HAD BECOME DISAFFECTED AFTER THE

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[REDACTED]

"LIBERATION" OF SOUTH VIETNAM SINCE HE BELIEVED THE NORTHERNERS TOOK EVERYTHING AND DISPOSSESSED THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE.

[REDACTED] COMMENT: THE TIME FRAME FOR THE OBSERVATION OF AMERICAN PRISONERS IS UNKNOWN. SINCE SOME OF THESE AMERICANS WERE REPORTEDLY SUFFERING FROM WAR WOUNDS, THEY COULD POSSIBLY BE PRISONERS OF WAR.)

6. IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1976, [REDACTED]

SAID THAT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS NVA OFFICERS, WHO WERE [REDACTED] CUSTOMERS, SAID THAT AMERICAN PRISONERS WERE STILL BEING HELD IN NORTH VIETNAM. THEY ALSO TOLD [REDACTED] THAT SINCE THESE PRISONERS WERE ALL SICK OR BADLY INJURED, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (DRV) AUTHORITIES WERE AFRAID OF A POSSIBLE UNFAVORABLE IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINION SHOULD THEY BE RELEASED.

[REDACTED] COMMENT: THE TIME FRAME FOR THE CONTINUED DETENTION OF THESE AMERICAN PRISONERS IS UNKNOWN.)

7. IN JULY 1976, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

WHO HAD BEEN PERMITTED TO LEAVE SOUTH VIETNAM, WAS
DELIBERATELY PROVOKED BY ONE OF THEM, [REDACTED]
ON THE SUBJECT OF AMERICANS STILL IMPRISONED. WHEN
WAS ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO "MORE THAN 10 AMERICANS
STILL IN VIETNAMESE JAILS, [REDACTED] REPLIED THAT "THEY WOULD
BE HANDLED SEPARATELY." [REDACTED] INTERPRETED THIS REPLY TO
BE AN ADMISSION BY THE NVA OFFICERS THAT SOME AMERICANS
WERE STILL IMPRISONED IN VIETNAM.

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2

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CITE CIA/

ATTN:

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SUBJECT: DOG TAG FROM LAOS

1. FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED BY [REDACTED] ON 11 AUGUST 1988 AND WAS TO BE PASSED TO STONY BEACH TEAM. IT IS BEING SENT FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

2. ON 11 AUGUST, A CASUAL CONTACT PASSED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WHICH HE HAD RECEIVED ON SAME DAY FROM HIS RELATIVE.

3. ONE OF [REDACTED] UNIDENTIFIED CONTACTS IN LAOS BROUGHT HIM A SILVER BADGE (DOG TAG?) MEASURING TWO INCHES BY TWO INCHES WHICH HAD BEEN TAKEN FROM THE BODY OF AN AMERICAN PILOT FOUND AT THE SCENE OF AN AIR CRASH. THE SILVER TAG IS INSCRIBED:

A. [REDACTED] STATED THAT THE BADGE HAD BEEN FOUND NEAR THE AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE AND THAT "THEY" ARE BRINGING THE UPPER PART OF THE SKELETON, INCLUDING THE SKULL, FROM THE LAOS SIDE TO HIM SOON. "THEY" INFORMED HIM THAT THEY FOUND THE REMAINS OF 10 MORE AMERICAN "SOLIDERS" IN LAOS AND VIETNAM. "THEY" WANT TO KNOW ABOUT REWARDS FOR SUCH REMAINS.

5. [REDACTED] IS REQUESTED TAKE CHARGE OF FOLLOWING UP ON FOREGOING INFORMATION. [REDACTED] REQUESTS CONTACT SOONEST SINCE HE EXPECTS TO BE CONTACTED BY HIS [REDACTED] IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

6. [REDACTED]

7.. DECL OADR DRV [REDACTED]

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SUBJECT: INFORMATION ON [REDACTED] AS OF 1971

1. THE FOLLOWING REPORT WAS OBTAINED IN 1971 BY [REDACTED] WHO TASKED AN [REDACTED] TO SHOW THE [REDACTED] A CARD CONTAINING A PICTURE OF A U.S. PERSON MISSING IN ACTION (MIA). [REDACTED] THE CARD WAS INSCRIBED WITH A REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON HIS FATE. THE CARD WAS SHOWN TO [REDACTED] IN PATHET LAO (PL) COMMUNIST CONTROLLED AREAS NEAR MUONG PHINE (XD0928), LAOS. THE RESPONSES WERE COLLATED IN ONE REPORT WHICH WAS SENT TO OUR THEN EXISTING OFFICE IN VIENTIANE. THE REPORT WAS NOT DISSEMINATED, POSSIBLY BECAUSE SOME STATEMENTS APPEARED DOUBTFUL, SUCH AS THE PL HOLDING U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR (POW) NEAR MUONG PHINE. IN FEBRUARY 1991 [REDACTED] REVIEWED THE FILE AND RECONSTRUCTED HIS ORIGINAL REPORT TO THE BEST OF HIS ABILITY. HE NOTES THAT THE DATES ARE APPROXIMATE BECAUSE THEY ARE BASED ON CONTACTS' RECOLLECTION OF EVENTS OCCURRING AROUND THAT TIME, SUCH AS THE END OF THE RAINY SEASON.

2. THE PL CAPTORS TOOK [REDACTED] TO MUANG PHINE (XD0928), LAOS, IN JUNE 1966. ON 3 JANUARY 1967 HE LEFT MUANG PHINE AND ARRIVED ON 5 JANUARY AT A PRISON AT MUANG NONG (XD6009), WHICH CONTAINED ONLY EIGHT OTHER U.S. POW'S. AT MUANG NONG THE PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM (PAVN) CAPTORS GUARDED [REDACTED] STRICTLY AND HE SUFFERED VERY MUCH. WHILE THE PAVN GUARDS DID NOT TORTURE [REDACTED] HE WAS HELD IN PRISON AND SUBJECTED TO PROPAGANDA LECTURES. PL GENERAL KHAMKONG (SIC) AND PAVN GENERAL TAO (SIC), WHO SPOKE ENGLISH, WERE THE ONLY HIGH RANKING OFFICERS TO INTERROGATE [REDACTED] THE PAVN GUARDS OFTEN WERE ANGRY WITH THE POW'S BECAUSE OF U.S. BOMBING IN THE AREA. [REDACTED] WAS ALLOWED TO EAT AND TALK WITH THE OTHER POW'S, BUT WHETHER HE EVER RECEIVED LETTERS OR PACKAGES IS UNKNOWN. BECAUSE HE WAS STRICTLY GUARDED, [REDACTED] NEVER ESCAPED FROM EITHER PRISON. ON 2 JANUARY 1968 A PAVN GUARD NAMED "DNG (MR.) LUI" AND SIX OTHER GUARDS TOOK [REDACTED] AND EIGHT OTHER POW'S AWAY. THE VILLAGERS WERE TOLD ONLY THAT THE POW'S WERE BEING TAKEN AWAY

FOR "TRAINING."

3. [REDACTED]

4. CLASSIFIED BY SIGNER. DECL OADR DRV [REDACTED] ALL SECRET

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Perestroyka, Lao Style: Implications for Vietnam and the United States

An Intelligence Assessment

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
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Perestroika, Lao Style: Implications for Vietnam and the United States (C NF)

An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by
 Office of East Asian Analysis, with a
contribution from Office of
Leadership Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
 DEA

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EA 89-10016
May 1989

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***Perestroyka, Lao Style:
Implications for Vietnam
and the United States***

Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 1 May 1989
was used in this report.*

Laos is engaged in a concerted campaign to revive its moribund economy and to open the country to more Western influences after more than a decade of being locked in an almost exclusive alignment with Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Following the lead of those countries, Vientiane is experimenting with economic reforms to liberate the economy from central control while relying more on market forces. Laos is also moving toward at least the semblance of representative government by holding direct elections for the first time under Communist rule and drafting a constitution that would give much of the recent reform a legal framework.

Vientiane has reestablished economic ties to ASEAN, Japan, and the West in the past two years. The government has also taken steps to improve foreign relations with countries toward which it has been hostile: Laos restored relations with China to the ambassadorial level last year after nearly a decade of tensions, and has dramatically improved its relations with Thailand since their 1988 border dispute. Vientiane's efforts have been accompanied by startling gestures of independence from Vietnam and the Soviet Union such as declaring that Laos has a mixed, not "socialist" economy and that it no longer wants the "outdated Indochina Federation."

Laos is eager to improve relations with the United States as another way of underscoring its distinct nationality and independence from Vietnam, and in the past two years has made overtures to the United States on issues such as MIAs and narcotics. Vientiane would welcome US private investment and is likely to be more cooperative on bilateral issues of concern to Washington to encourage the budding relationship, but will expect reciprocity. For example, Vientiane has made clear that it will use the MIA issue to bargain for its own humanitarian needs, and that it links cooperation on MIAs to other bilateral issues, such as narcotics. Conversely, reformers in Vientiane who advocate opening the country to the West and cooperating on bilateral issues point out that slow progress on Lao humanitarian concerns or criticism by Washington over narcotics risks undermining their efforts.

Vientiane's new course is remarkable in that, unlike reform efforts in China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam, it was started by the senior revolutionaries who have ruled since the Communist takeover in 1975, and not by the advent to power of new, pragmatic, reform-minded leaders. Lao leaders admit that their previous policies did not improve the economy or

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free Laos of its heavy dependence on foreign aid. Vientiane is also concerned that a settlement in Cambodia could thrust Laos into direct competition for Western aid and investment with both Vietnam and Cambodia.

So far, Vientiane's new policies have had mixed results. The government is probably encouraged by the dramatic drop in inflation and the increase in business activity. However, its efforts to attract foreign investment have been largely unsuccessful, and state-owned firms continue to perform poorly. In addition, Laos's economic prospects are limited by its roughly \$1 billion debt to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, poorly developed transportation and communications systems, inexperienced managers, and an unskilled work force. These problems could undermine government reformers if the reform program does not show progress soon or results in a loss of control over the economy.

Laos will have a more balanced relationship with Vietnam as each country focuses on improving its economy, but Vietnam will continue to be the paramount influence in Laos well into the next decade, in our view. Hanoi will probably allow Vientiane considerable latitude in its domestic and foreign policies, especially when Laotian interests parallel its own. Vietnam has already withdrawn all but 10,000 of its 40,000 troops in Laos and thereby lent some credibility to Vientiane's assertions of independence as well as to its own claims that it wants improved relations with its neighbors and will withdraw all of its troops from Cambodia. Over the longer term, Vietnamese influence is likely to wane and Laos's strong ethnic, economic, and geographic connections to Thailand will reassert themselves.

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
~~Secret~~**Scope Note**

The relationship between the United States and Laos revolves around three major issues: resolving POW/MIA cases, halting the production and trafficking of illicit narcotics, and reducing the flow of refugees from Laos into Thailand. Measurable progress has been made in the past year on all of these issues, and both sides have expressed an interest in expanding economic relations as well. This paper is one in a series of intelligence assessments on the rapidly changing military, political, and economic environment in the Indochina countries and the unique policy questions that Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia pose for the United States. It examines Vientiane's efforts to take advantage of Vietnam's disengagement from Laos and Cambodia by introducing economic reform and establishing closer relations with the West. Readers interested in additional analysis of developments in these countries can consult the following recent publications:

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Figure 1. Acting President Phoumi Vongvichit casts his vote in the November 1988 provincial election—the first such election under the Communist regime

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***Perestroika, Lao Style:
Implications for Vietnam
and the United States***

Vientiane's "New Thinking"

After more than a decade of being locked in an almost exclusive alignment with Vietnam and the Soviet Bloc, Laos has embarked on a concerted campaign to revive its moribund economy and to increase interaction with the West and Japan. The most striking sign of Vientiane's *chintanakan mai* or "new thinking" is its economic policy. Following the lead of Vietnam and the Soviet Union, Vientiane is experimenting with a series of reforms that it calls the "New Economic Mechanism" (NEM) to free the economy from central control and allow a greater role for market forces. The reform program began to emerge during the Fourth National Communist Party Congress in November 1986, which focused on economic matters. Party General Secretary Kaysone Phomvihane—the driving force behind reform—subsequently admitted in speeches and interviews that the party acted in haste after taking power in 1975 to close down the private economy, and said reform is aimed at "encouraging and creating conditions for all economic sectors to broaden production."

Since the program began, visitors to Laos have reported striking changes in the towns along the Mekong River, including markets bursting with consumer goods from Thailand, hundreds of new cafes, shops and video arcades, and nightclubs crowded each night with young people drinking German beer and dancing to Western and Thai rock music. Laos is taking tentative steps toward greater political openness as well by holding direct elections—the first under Communist rule—that it went to great lengths to publicize in the Lao and foreign press. Not only did Vientiane give foreign journalists unprecedented access to polling stations and to top Politburo members, it also recently allowed Westerners to visit parts of the country that have been off limits since the Communist takeover.

Vientiane's new course is remarkable in that, unlike Vietnam, China, or the Soviet Union, where the ascendancy of economic pragmatists in the party and government spurred reform efforts, Laos continues to

be ruled by the same seven men who have led the Communist Party since the end of the Second World War and the government since taking power in December 1975. There are some signs that a second-generation leadership is emerging, but, the Politburo has yet to cede any real power to these younger officials (see appendix A).

Behind the Shift

Economic Morass. In a rare interview with the Western press last year, General Secretary Kaysone conceded that, in spite of many efforts, there had been no real improvement in the economy and the standard of living since his government came to power (see inset). The Lao Communists took over one of the world's least developed countries, and a decade of effort to place the economy under state control only helped consolidate that dubious standing. Growth rates between 1976 and 1985 averaged about 4.3 percent per year, and per capita income stayed flat at less than \$200,

Vientiane is concerned that a settlement in Cambodia could thrust it into direct competition for Western aid with both Vietnam and Cambodia. Vice Foreign Minister Soubanh told Western journalists late last year that, once a settlement is reached in Cambodia, there is bound to be lively competition among foreign donors considering aid and investment in the Indochinese countries, and among the three Indochinese countries themselves. We believe that, in head-to-head competition for Western loans, landlocked Laos would lose out to Vietnam in terms of cheap labor and market size, and Cambodia would be a more compelling case for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction. By showcasing reform to Western donors now, Vientiane probably hopes to steal a march on the other Indochinese countries in attracting Western technology and capital.

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Vientiane's Postwar Policies

Following the Communist takeover in 1975, the Lao Government immediately began establishing strict control over the nation's economy. It put in place a rigid planning structure with economic goals dictated from the top down. The central government determined production, material allocation, employment, investment, and foreign trade, along with prices, wages, and exchange rates. It expropriated private enterprises and created large state-run firms. Nevertheless, the government did not completely eliminate privately owned firms. Although data measuring the state's share of the industrial economy are sketchy, artisanal workshops and other private companies involved in manufacturing and services continued to operate, many averaging only three to five employees, according to Lao data.

Supervising ministries exercised almost complete control over the state firms, with only the most routine decisions made at the enterprise level. Vientiane also assumed direct control of credit distribution through the Bank of Laos. In agriculture, the government initially tried to collectivize production into state farms. This option failed to produce the expected gain in output because of resistance by peasants and was abandoned in favor of a more gradual approach involving the use of voluntary cooperatives.

Green Light From Abroad. Vietnam's own economic troubles have also permitted Laos greater independence of action. Since 1985, recognizing that its long-term national security depends as much on economic stability as on military strength, Hanoi has changed the direction of its foreign and economic policies.¹

Vietnam's General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh told a Foreign Ministry conference in early 1987 that Hanoi must revise its attitudes toward Cambodia and Laos, stressing the

need to strengthen their party and government structures so they could govern themselves. Vietnam has encouraged Laos to undertake economic reform and end its economic isolation from the West.

Vietnamese advisers in Lao ministries are aiding NEM supporters by pushing the reform line in the Lao bureaucracy. We believe that both sides recognize that Laos will need to have greater control over its own affairs, especially in economic matters, in the coming years (see inset).

As it has with Hanoi, the Soviet Union has encouraged Vientiane's economic reform efforts because it is eager to see more efficient use of the roughly \$100 million in aid it pumps into Laos annually.

Soviet leaders reportedly made it clear that, in an era of tighter budgets, countries will be expected to use aid more wisely (see inset).

Lao economic officials studied Chinese economic reform policies in 1985 and 1986, but found the *perestroyka*, or restructuring, policies advocated by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev more palatable.

since 1987, Kaysone has been seeking advice from Gorbachev as well as from economic experts in countries such as Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany, and Kaysone has publicly acknowledged the stimulus of the Soviet Union's *perestroyka* program.

Laotian officials are more attracted by the policies of their successful neighbor, Thailand, than by those of either Vietnam or the Soviet Union. Although Lao officials stress that there is no existing model that has the same characteristics as Laos, the Lao Ambassador to Thailand said publicly in 1988 that Laos will use Thailand's economic development policy as a pattern for its own development.

More recently, the same official noted that Thailand has a lot of experience in agriculture, tourism, and industry and that Laos would examine what was good for Laos in opening its doors to all

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Lao Economic Reform Outstripping the Vietnamese

The Lao economy is like a pirogue, small, easily maneuverable but open to danger from wind and wave. When you put an engine on it, it can take off at great speed. The Vietnamese economy, on the other hand, is like a great oceangoing vessel, slow to accelerate and slow to change course. Furthermore, its structure is rusty and its hull is taking on water.

A senior Lao official

Although far from problem-free, the Lao reforms have been more successful than those of the Vietnamese. In response to criticism from potential aid donors, Vientiane simplified its exchange rate system and allowed the kip to rise nearly to the level of the black-market rate without undermining domestic confidence in the currency. By contrast, both domestic and international markets lack confidence in the Vietnamese dong, which was devalued five times from 368 to 4,500 to the US dollar between November 1988 and March 1989 and remains below the black-market rate of 5,000 dong per dollar. According to official data, Laos successfully slowed the rate of inflation from 100 percent in 1985 to 11 percent in 1988, while Vietnamese inflation is hovering in the triple-digit range for the third straight year and undermining Hanoi's efforts to restructure its economy. Vientiane's efforts have been made easier by several factors. Because it is so small and less encumbered by socialist dogma, the Lao economy responds to changes in policies and inputs more readily than its Vietnamese counterpart. In addition, Vientiane has access to Western aid unavailable to Hanoi because of the international economic embargo imposed on Vietnam following its invasion of Cambodia.

countries for economic ties. For its part, Bangkok is seeking stronger economic links to Laos because it hopes to move Vientiane away from Vietnamese domination and decrease regional tensions

The "New Economic Mechanism"—Blueprint for Change

Reforms . . . The nascent NEM includes a broad array of reforms with which top party officials, including General Secretary Kaysone, are publicly associating themselves:

- *Price reform.* Vientiane acknowledged in 1987 that if it wanted a more market-oriented economy its price structure would have to respond to changes in supply and demand. Under the NEM, only the prices of minerals, water, electricity, postal services, and air transportation are set by the state. All others are determined by market forces.
- *Wage reform.* Hoping to boost labor productivity, in March 1988 Vientiane began to allow state firms to determine their wage costs. The government sets a minimum wage, but has abolished the upper wage limit for public-sector employees. Furthermore, state firms no longer need authorization from Vientiane to decide what remuneration system to apply. State cooperatives now pay bonuses on the basis of productivity, and the system of payment in kind to civil servants—whereby they received wages in coupons that could be redeemed in selected state shops—has been replaced by cash payments tied to output.
- *More efficient state enterprises.* The NEM allows enterprise managers autonomy in making production, investment, employment, and pricing decisions. Managers are free to find their own raw materials instead of waiting for the government to supply them, and state firms are expected to earn a profit instead of relying on government subsidies to cover their losses.
- *The growth of private enterprise.* The NEM encourages private enterprises and competition between state and private sectors by lifting checkpoints at provincial borders so goods can be moved more freely; permitting competition among trading firms and legalizing private traders; taxing enterprises at a fixed, predetermined rate instead of requiring

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The Dependence on Agriculture and Foreign Aid

The structure of production and employment in Laos is dominated by agriculture, which accounts for about 60 percent of GDP and three-quarters of total employment. According to a press report, local purchasing power is fueled by \$3-5 million annually in remittances sent by Lao emigrants. Most of the country's 3.9 million inhabitants live in small, scattered villages and do subsistence farming. Although rice, the predominant crop, takes up over 80 percent of the cultivated area, efforts are under way to increase the cultivation of cash crops, such as coffee, for export. The government claims the country is self-sufficient in food, but shortages are chronic: grain production missed its 1.6-million-metric-ton target by 25 percent in 1987. Foreign aid made up the deficit in 1987, and some provinces still have food shortfalls resulting from the severe drought that affected the region early in 1988.

The industrial sector, largely based in the Vientiane area, contributes only 6 percent of GDP and is limited to consumer goods, hydroelectricity, and tin and gypsum mining. Laos has no railroads, few internal communications, a road network in serious disrepair, and dependable electricity in only a small portion of the country. The main economic artery, the Mekong River, carries an estimated one-fifth of commercial traffic but is unnavigable in the dry season. Consequently, despite considerable resources of land, timber, and minerals, the country's land-locked position and poor infrastructure, combined with a lack of funds and technically trained personnel, make exploiting resources difficult. Furthermore, Laos's widely dispersed population and poor

transportation give Vientiane little hope of achieving production economies of scale. Laos faces a shortage of skilled labor because most educated Lao fled into exile after the Communist takeover.

Laos generates few exports and is almost totally dependent upon foreign assistance. In 1987, total trade amounted to \$280 million, according to a Lao official. Exports reached \$64 million, of which \$35 million went to non-Communist countries. Hydro-electricity from the Nam Ngum Dam north of Vientiane and forestry products account for over 90 percent of Lao sales to the non-Communist countries (see figure 2). A number of donors, among them the Soviet Union, Japan, Sweden, and Australia, provide over \$150 million annually in development assistance. The World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the United Nations finance projects in Laos and intend eventually to look beyond basic infrastructure and agricultural development toward industrial undertakings.

The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank account for most of Laos's hard currency debt. Their project-related loans feature long grace and repayment periods along with low or no interest charges. Loan commitments by the development banks to Laos are on the order of \$250 million and are projected to rise to roughly \$350 million by the end of 1990, according to the US Embassy. All other Western and UN aid to Laos is in the form of grants, and virtually all bilateral aid donors outside the Soviet Bloc have converted any outstanding loans into grants.

firms to transfer all profits to the state; and allowing producers and consumers to sign contracts, eliminating the practice of selling all production to a state entity at a set price before parceling it out to consumers.

- *Agricultural reform.* The NEM puts less emphasis on collective production, abolishes mandated farm prices, and allows peasants to negotiate prices for their products with government agencies or in private markets.


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
Figure 2
Laos: Composition of Exports, 1987

Percent

Total



To West



- *Breaking the state monopoly on foreign trade.* In 1987, Vientiane began to permit provinces to establish international trading firms to deal with exports after they have met their obligation to the central government. The NEM also allows joint venture companies between provinces and local private traders to export and import directly and to use a portion of their foreign exchange earnings for imports. Provincial trading firms, however, would still be required to meet their quotas to Vientiane.
- *A new foreign exchange rate.* To further boost trade, Vientiane abandoned its inefficient multitiered exchange rate system in late 1987. This move, along with an 11-percent devaluation in 1988, brought the official rate to 400 kip per US dollar, nearly the same as the black-market rate.

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- *A foreign investment code.* Similar to one enacted in 1987 by Vietnam (see appendix B), Vientiane's 1988 code permits foreigners to invest in all sectors of the economy except public utilities and defense, to form joint ventures with Lao firms, or to create solely-foreign-owned firms with 15-year renewable licenses. The code provides foreign firms with guarantees against nationalization and allows them to repatriate after-tax profits. [redacted]

Restructuring... To better implement the NEM's measures, Vientiane is streamlining public administration, hoping to reduce what Kaysone calls the incurable disease of bureaucratic control over the economy. Even before the Fourth Party Congress, the government began to prune jobs in topheavy ministries and to move officials, sometimes from the capital to the provinces, to spread its limited expertise and management skills. [redacted]

[redacted] in 1987 the Politburo realized that the ministries were still overstaffed and laden with incapable senior officials who gained political power during the revolution but were incapable of administering ministerial affairs. The Politburo believed the rigidity and redundancy in the ministries made them incapable of coping with the new policy of economic reform and in early 1988 decided to begin restructuring ministries to improve their abilities to implement the NEM. The Lao State Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Committee, later redesignated the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT), became the test case for the restructuring. [redacted] believe the reorganization of this important part of the economic bureaucracy was intended to make more efficient use of Laos's growing foreign aid. [redacted]

The Politburo also decided to give lower levels some decisionmaking power, retire aged and uneducated cadres at the senior and provincial levels of government, and promote younger, more qualified people, [redacted]

Changes within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) exemplify Vientiane's new personnel policy. [redacted] a senior Foreign Ministry official last year requested that half—about 200—of the Ministry's cadres either retire or resign. [redacted]

[redacted] A Lao diplomat said that the complete emphasis on economic matters is a major change. [redacted]

[redacted] Vientiane plans to press on with organizational reform by integrating several more ministries and reassigning responsibilities and personnel. [redacted]

[redacted] in December 1988 Kaysone ordered the Council of Ministers to reduce the number of vice ministers and reassign some of them to the provinces. Kaysone also wanted government officials and party members to campaign for seats in the National Assembly and to readjust the order of seniority of party leaders at the next party congress to reflect their performance in office. [redacted]

... And Their Impact. Vientiane is probably encouraged by the increase in business activity stimulated by the NEM. As a result of agricultural reforms, prices received by farmers soared 50 to 300 percent in some cases, greatly increasing producer incentives. [redacted]

[redacted] new small businesses—usually family-run—open nearly every day. The majority are service and trade oriented, such as retail stores and repair shops. Some light industry is springing up as well, primarily garment factories and small plants producing household goods. Many government ministries under orders to become self-supporting have opened restaurants, coffee shops, and snack bars as quick ways to generate revenue. [redacted]

The impact of reforms is most visible in Vientiane and a few other cities. Imported construction materials, such as cement, nails, and paint are being sold in Luang Prabang, located about 210 kilometers north of Vientiane, for the first time since the mid-1970s. In Vientiane, the private home construction market is also experiencing an upswing. At the city's sprawling central market, US dollars, Thai baht, and the local kip are all legally used to purchase imported and domestic goods. The remodeled market is on lease for 10 years to Thai businessmen who share profits with the government. [redacted]

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
The comprehensive price reform package that Vientiane introduced shortly after the NEM got under way ranks as one of its most impressive achievements. Whereas price reform has been the bane of reformers in most Communist countries, touching off inflation and occasional panic buying and forcing planners to back down on other reform measures, Vientiane's price policy was implemented fairly smoothly. Early price hikes reflected a near quadrupling of official prices as Vientiane allowed them to move toward prices set in free markets. Supply responses to the price hikes, decontrol of the transportation sector, and increased imports of consumer goods caused free market prices to level off, however, after the first quarter of 1986. According to official figures, inflation plummeted from 100 percent in 1985 to 5.5 percent at the end of 1987. It rose slightly to 11 percent in 1988, according to press reports. []

Despite the NEM's accomplishments, important sectors of the Lao economy have experienced a lackluster performance. In fact, overall economic growth slipped from 9 percent in 1985 to about 2 percent in 1987 (see figure 4), according to official statistics, and Laotian per capita income continues to rank among the world's lowest (see figure 5). The economy lacks capital, and efforts to attract foreign investment to increase and diversify exports have been largely unsuccessful. Many of Laos's new entrepreneurs are engaged in reselling imported products rather than producing goods for the domestic or foreign market. Vientiane probably is most displeased with how poorly state-owned firms are performing under the NEM. State enterprises are having trouble adjusting to the new regulations requiring that they be self-supporting, [] Many are extremely inefficient and continue to operate in the red, requesting subsidies to pay salaries and other expenses. Accounting procedures and management techniques are inadequate. []

The dominant agricultural sector has also fallen on hard times because of weather-related problems that the NEM was unable to offset. []

[] Vientiane early in 1989 asked for international assistance to counter a drought-induced rice shortage of 375,000 metric tons, more than double

Figure 4
Selected Countries: Per Capita GDP, 1987



321899 5-89

earlier estimates. The shortage was aggravated by farmers in the south selling rice to Thailand, and was especially troubling for reformers because it followed three years of good harvests when Vientiane's efforts to dismantle collective farms and to improve its irrigation system brought average growth rates in rice production of nearly 9.6 percent. Even if food aid is forthcoming, Laos's weak distribution system may prevent the food from reaching the most needy provinces []

Although problems in the agricultural sector and within state enterprises are undoubtedly real, they may be generating more concern among Lao

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Figure 5
Laos: Change in Real GDP, 1983-87

Percent

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

1983

84

85

86

87

321900 5-89

reformers than is warranted. We believe that Vientiane may unknowingly be overstating the impact of these sectors on the overall economy because of its inability to measure the thriving private-sector activity. The government has probably not yet developed the skills and manpower to use Western concepts of economic data. Furthermore, private entrepreneurs probably deliberately understate their earnings to reduce the amount of taxes they pay to the state. (C NF)

Political Reforms: Democracy, Lao Style

Laos's wide-ranging economic measures have been accompanied by only modest political reform. [redacted] there are still relatively few signs of *glasnost*, or openness, in Laos. Not even a

hint of intraparty criticism preceded Laos's 1986 party congress as it did before Vietnam's the same year, and, although there is more discussion and criticism of government policies in the press than before, it does not match levels in the Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam. [redacted] the party leadership in Laos seems determined to keep the reins of control firmly in its grasp, perhaps the better to push forward the reforms of the new economic mechanism. [redacted]

Organizing Elections. The most dramatic step Vientiane has taken to involve its citizens in the country's political life is the holding of direct elections. Some district-level² offices were filled by secret ballot in June 1988, provincial elections were held in November, and the final round of elections to the National Assembly was held in March 1989. The publicity surrounding the elections and the novelty of voting resulted in a high turnout. According to the government news media, the turnout in district and provincial elections ranged from 96 to 99.8 percent. [redacted]

Not all candidates for the district assemblies had to be members of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, and multiple candidates vied for positions. On average, however, about half the candidates were party members or sponsored by the party-controlled Lao Front for National Construction (LFNC). [redacted] Other nonparty candidates were screened by the LFNC, which rejected those it considered insufficiently committed to the party's ideals. Thus, while publicly talking of democracy, the party clearly ensured that it would not be disadvantaged. [redacted]

The elections in any case pave the way for the passage and ratification of a constitution that would give the recent reforms a legal framework. Laos has not had a constitution or written code of law since the Constitution of 1947 was abrogated with the Communist takeover. [redacted] a constitution that Vientiane had been working on [redacted]

² Districts in Laos are approximately equivalent to counties or townships in the United States. [redacted]

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[] was completed early last year. [] the 1989 elections will be followed by a parliamentary session that may adopt the constitution and complete the government reorganizations. However, Kaysone himself has said that it may take a year or two to ratify the constitution []

Humanitarian Concerns. Vientiane is also showing more tolerance toward followers of the former royal Lao government. [] the government has closed a number of "reeducation" camps and is releasing political prisoners from remaining camps [] about 350 detainees were freed last year, and [] some former camp prisoners have been permitted to obtain passports and exit visas. Accurate figures for camp populations are not available, but, of the original 10,000 to 15,000 prisoners, roughly 1,000 to 1,500 remain [] Vientiane also is trying to woo back many among the 10 percent of the country's population who fled into exile after 1975 to countries such as the United States, France, Canada, and Australia, explaining in an editorial that Laos needs "to learn from professionals of the old capitalist regime." []

Vientiane's "Open-Door Policy"

Courting Old Enemies. In tandem with economic reform, Laos has reestablished economic ties to ASEAN, Japan, and the West in hopes of breaking its dependence on the socialist bloc and diversifying its relations into every arena where there are gains to be made. In the summer of 1988, Vientiane welcomed the first high-level Malaysian delegation since 1975. In April 1988, Foreign Minister Phoun visited Japan for talks on development assistance and investment in Laos, and Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Makino made a trip to Vientiane in March 1989. Japan, the largest non-Communist donor, gives \$14 million annually to Laos, and Vientiane has agreed to accept Japanese "Peace Corps" volunteers for the first time since 1975. Lao efforts to improve relations with the European Community have resulted in about \$20 million in bilateral aid last year—a high sum by Lao standards—and Franco-Lao relations have progressed so dramatically that they are almost normal. []

Laos has also taken steps to improve foreign relations with countries toward which it has been hostile—China, Thailand, and the United States. []

[] the Lao may feel that they can encourage the Soviets and their allies to be more responsive with their aid if Vientiane holds out the possibility of playing these "cards." Whatever Vientiane's motives, Laos and China restored relations to the ambassadorial level in September 1988 after nearly a decade of tensions following Hanoi's and Beijing's border war in 1979. During the two years prior to upgrading ties, the China-Laos border was reopened to trade and travel, and []

[] the Chinese said that they would no longer support Lao resistance groups. []

[] Vientiane and Beijing have signed three trade agreements since they resumed normal relations and are planning more visits of trade delegations. Lao officials hope these contacts will open the gate for further trade, academic visits, and cultural exchanges. []

Lao-Thai relations have improved dramatically since the 1988 border dispute. Both countries have shifted their attention to economic initiatives. Although they have not settled the boundary question, the exchanges of military delegations, Foreign Ministry officials, and Prime Ministers between Vientiane and Bangkok—the highest level of contacts since 1979—have paved the way for a growing number of bilateral ties that may well prevent border issues from becoming flashpoints again any time soon. Senior Lao officials are putting special emphasis on Thailand as they play up their investment code, hoping that, once Thai businesses are well established in Laos, it will be easier to attract larger, Western investors. []

[] To facilitate trade, Vientiane has eased controls along the Thai border. For its part, Bangkok has cut the list of items banned for export to Laos from 61 to 29; Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi says Bangkok may abandon the list if bilateral relations continue to improve. []

Since 1987, the Lao have repeatedly called for better US-Lao relations. Despite some difficult moments,

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relations have improved markedly in the past year as Vientiane has been more responsive to Washington's concerns [redacted]

- Laos resumed cooperation with the United States on the MIA issue in mid-1987 after a two-year hiatus. Since then, the United States and Laos have jointly excavated five wartime crash sites, surveyed prospective excavation sites, and completed two rounds of technical talks. In addition, Vientiane unilaterally undertook two excavations and sent two official delegations to tour facilities at the Joint Casualty Resolution Center in Honolulu to improve Lao understanding of US MIA identification and resolution techniques.
- Vientiane is trying to mollify international concerns about Lao involvement in narcotics and has warned government officials that drug trafficking will no longer be tolerated (see appendix C). [redacted] Lao officials were surprised when Washington denied narcotics cooperation certification to Laos in March 1989. Vientiane responded by temporarily suspending a joint MIA excavation, but has since indicated that it still desires improved bilateral relations and will continue to cooperate on the MIA issue.
- Although Lao officials have shown no signs that they would accept mass repatriation of the over 70,000 Lao refugees in Thailand, a UN High Commission for Refugees representative reports that Vientiane is accelerating returns and has decided to set up a committee to discuss the refugee problem. According to UNHCR figures, Laos is now accepting about 150 refugees per month and has already surpassed its 1988 record of 200 for the entire year. [redacted]

Juggling Old Friends. Vientiane's efforts to develop more cordial relations with its longtime enemies have been accompanied by unusual gestures of independence from its longtime supporters, Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Early in 1988 senior government planners asserted that Laos has a mixed, not "socialist," economy and that it is moving toward a market-based system. They also declared that Laos is nonaligned because it is not a member of any bloc such as CEMA. [redacted]

the Lao have also become more openly critical of Vietnam's poor economic showing and privately complain about Vietnamese exploitation of Lao resources such as timber. In one of the frankest comments ever on Laos's relationship with Vietnam, the Lao Ambassador to Thailand said in an interview in March 1989 that Laos no longer wants the "outdated Indochina Federation scheme." He added that the concept of a cohesive Indochina under Vietnamese domination made sense 40 years ago when Vietnam and Laos were "fighting the big imperialists," but that the three countries now consult from positions of "mutual understanding and respect." [redacted]

We believe these are attempts by Laos to assert its nationalism and pursue a foreign policy within the limits of its relationships with its two powerful mentors. [redacted] the Lao, while perhaps privately resenting Vietnamese and Soviet tutelage, do not openly fight it. They are far too weak to shake off these predominating powers, so they hope instead to achieve a quiet maneuverability. Indeed, [redacted] some elements within the Lao Government and party probably desire improved relations with the United States and other Western and Asian countries to counterbalance the overwhelmingly Vietnamese and Soviet influences. [redacted]

In this respect, we believe that Vientiane is anxious for the Cambodia question to be resolved so Laos can move out even more boldly to improve relations in the region and the world. Although Laos does not hold the same pariah status in the international community that Vietnam does because of its invasion of Cambodia, it almost certainly believes that its economic development is hindered by the issue. Vientiane may also believe that by strengthening bilateral ties to the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) it can to some extent dilute Vietnam's dominance of both countries in a postsettlement Indochina. Laos has been steadily increasing economic and cultural relations with the PRK, and, along with Phnom Penh, Vientiane welcomed the April 1988 Geneva Agreement on Afghanistan while Hanoi accorded it a cool reception and objected to Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev's suggestion that it could be a model for a Cambodia settlement. [redacted]

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The Rocky Road Ahead

Although Lao leaders seem determined to press on with economic change, they will face numerous reform-related problems over the next three to five years that will make them wary of moving too fast. The difficulties will probably not force Vientiane to back away from policies introduced so far, but major changes that could significantly reduce the role of state-owned enterprises in production and international trade will probably be slow in coming []

Economic Stumblingblocks. Ironically, the productive forces that Vientiane is seeking to unleash with the NEM pose the most immediate threat to the reform program, in our view. While the economy has become more responsive to market forces—and hence to fluctuations associated with normal business activity—we have seen no evidence that Vientiane has the knowledge or the fiscal and monetary tools necessary to control, for example, a sudden burst of inflation. []

[] Because so few people in Laos have experience in operating in a profit-motivated, price-determined economy, no one in government seems to know where the economy will go or what to do about it. Under these circumstances, we believe reform elements could easily be undermined if prices begin rising too quickly or the economy slips into deeper doldrums. The fact that the senior leadership remains staffed by those who initially engineered tight control over the economy probably bodes poorly for toleration of wide and sudden economic swings. []

We believe most potential Western investors will remain cautious about entering Laos, despite Vientiane's willingness to open the door. The Lao market is small and labor is largely unskilled []

[] These problems and the uncertainties associated with Vientiane's new policy direction will probably keep

most Western investors on the sidelines until they see how companies from Thailand manage. In fact, most investment over the next few years is likely to come from countries in the region, and will probably focus almost exclusively on exploiting and processing Lao-tian natural resources []

The NEM also faces an uphill battle to generate growth in the state-owned industrial sector. If Vientiane is serious about its quest for economic efficiency, it will have to confront its inefficient state-run firms with the prospects of bankruptcy, and will have to deal with resulting unemployment. Here, too, we believe the bureaucracy may tend to accept the inefficiencies of the old system rather than trying to manage the fallout from economic change. []

Basic, underlying problems will also limit the potential of reforms:

- The economy is woefully short of effective managers.
- Although the government has built roads, improved river transportation, and undertaken electrification projects, the country's transportation and communications systems remain poor, and the capital shortage and long leadtime for such projects make it unlikely that significant improvements in infrastructure will occur over the next five years.
- Vientiane is talking with the Asian Development Bank about restructuring its monetary and banking system, but it has made little effort to establish a private banking sector to encourage savings and channel capital for a market-oriented economy. (C NF)

Even if the reforms achieve better-than-expected results, Laos's economic growth may be constrained by its ability to repay its debts to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Those countries are by far Laos's biggest creditors, holding about 75 percent of Vientiane's debt of roughly \$1 billion. While Lao reformers stress exports to hard currency countries, they say

~~Secret~~



Figure 6. Small businesses are flourishing under the New Economic Mechanism...



... but industries continue to be plagued by problems such as their inability to get spare parts to maintain equipment.

very little publicly about meeting their financial obligation to Moscow and its allies. State Bank of Laos officials are confident that the Soviets will roll over their debts indefinitely and have hinted that the long-term debt could be forgiven. Vientiane may also be encouraged by Gorbachev's debt moratorium proposal to the UN late last year. If so, Vientiane may well be able to muddle through the early 1990s and emerge with manageable debt levels. On the other hand, the Soviets may demand that the lion's share of any increased production go toward servicing Laos's debts. Should this occur, Vientiane would have to cut back plans to bring in sizable quantities of Western technology and equipment.

Economic relations with Thailand, upon which Laos is counting heavily, may also be disappointing. The Lao are already complaining about the dumping of sub-standard Thai products in their country. Furthermore, Thailand continues to be a magnet for Lao capital instead of the other way around. As long as the Lao perceive that Thai banks are safehavens for funds that might otherwise be arbitrarily taxed or confiscated, capital flight will continue and hamper the development of local banking and capital formation. Laos may also find it difficult to make inroads into regional markets because virtually everything it manufactures will face competition from cheaper, better quality Thai products.

Political Pitfalls. Another serious challenge to the NEM may come from bureaucratic opposition. While few in Laos's top leadership oppose reform, there are signs of dissension over how to implement it. This tension is likely to build if the reforms show only limited success.

Moreover, some of the more hardline party cadres view the reforms as a step backward in the march toward socialism and refuse to

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implement them. As a Vientiane radio editorial last year complained, many officials "lack enthusiasm in working and take no initiative. . . . Those with the old way of thinking always use the authority of bureaucratic centralism and arbitrariness to intimidate and repress others." Perhaps as a warning that the government is firmly embarked on its new economic course, Kaysone recently publicly criticized conservative factions as one of the most important obstacles that reform faces. [redacted]

offices [redacted]

The hardliners in the Lao bureaucracy may have ammunition for their arguments if Lao companies agree to poorly negotiated contracts with foreign firms. If the Lao side suffers significant losses through lack of business knowledge, a backlash could result that would impede further progress toward opening the country to foreign firms. Given the inexperience of most Lao companies in dealing with foreign firms and the lack of managerial and business talent in Laos, we would not be surprised to see the Lao being taken advantage of in some of their early forays into the world market. [redacted]

The government's reorganization also poses risks and challenges for the regime. Officials at all levels fear they may lose their positions as others have already.

[redacted] morale at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs hit an alltime low as a result of personnel cuts there, and some in the lower or middle ranks who remained considered resigning in protest. This resistance undoubtedly accounts at least in part for the snail's pace at which Vientiane has been able to implement bureaucratic restructuring. Moreover, according to press reports, the apparent indecision surrounding the reorganization has often caused work in government offices to grind to a halt: while waiting for the changes, deputy ministers and department heads have sent even the most mundane problems to the Prime Minister's office for approval. [redacted]

Restructuring also threatens to leave offices understaffed or with many of the least competent officials in place. [redacted] some officials who have been transferred to the provinces have taken with them knowledge irreplaceable in Laos's thinly staffed and thinly documented central government

Implications for Vietnam . . .

We believe that Laos will continue to grow stronger in its relationship with Vietnam as both countries concentrate on their economic initiatives. Over the longer term, as Laos opens to the rest of the world, Vietnamese influence is likely to wane and Laos's strong ethnic, economic, and geographic connections with Thailand will reinforce themselves. In the meantime, Vietnam will be the paramount influence in Laos well into the 1990s: the senior leaders of the two nations have strong and longstanding personal, military, and party ties, and thus share many ideological, political, and economic perceptions. This congruence of interests will almost certainly ensure that Vientiane keeps in step with Vietnam on important security issues. For example, Vientiane's efforts to improve ties to China and Thailand almost certainly met with approval from Hanoi. In fact, Chinese officials viewed the upgrade in relations with Vientiane as a signal from Hanoi to both Beijing and Bangkok that Vietnam desires better ties. [redacted]

[redacted] Sino-Lao rapprochement and its attendant assurances on Lao security concerns also made possible the withdrawal of the majority of Vietnamese troops from Laos—a fact that both Indochinese countries can use to their advantage. The withdrawal of all but about 10,000 of the 40,000 troops and most of Vietnam's advisers since 1987 lends credibility to Vientiane's assertions of independence and to Hanoi's claims that it wants to improve relations with its neighbors and will withdraw all of its troops from Cambodia. [redacted]

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... And the United States

There are several obstacles to the growth of US-Lao economic relations. With the exception of some overseas Lao, the pool of likely US investors in Laos is probably small. Vientiane may also choose to proceed cautiously in its dealings with US firms to minimize any potential problems with Hanoi and Moscow. Laos wants the United States to grant it tariff preferences under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Vientiane will have difficulty, however, trying to satisfy Congressional requirements for GSP privileges until it shows progress on issues such as recognition of international workers' rights, settlement of expropriation questions, and satisfactory bilateral cooperation on narcotics. Until it does, foreign investors will be reluctant to establish garment factories in Laos that could take advantage of the cheap labor and the lack of a quota for the US market.

Vientiane is likely to be cooperative on bilateral political issues, but will continue to look for reciprocity, direct or indirect, from the United States. For example, Vientiane has made it clear that it will use the MIA issue to bargain for what it considers its own humanitarian needs, such as aid for war orphans and invalids and in rebuilding clinics, schools, and roads, and often looks for specific US gestures in response to Lao promises.





Figure 7. Soft drink factory near Vientiane: wooing back exiles and foreign investment.

US-Lao relations could also be hindered by the activities of private US citizens to support Lao resistance groups and to bring unconfirmed "live" American POWs out of Laos. Both activities trigger charges of US interference in Lao internal affairs, despite the fact that Washington does not assist these groups.


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Appendix A

Key Lao Personalities



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Appendix B

Laos-Vietnam: A Comparison of Foreign Investment Codes

Many of Laos's economic reforms are patterned after Vietnam's and the foreign investment code is no exception. Both investment laws require a minimum of 30-percent foreign participation in a joint venture, guarantee against nationalization, and permit repatriation of profits. Neither code specifies how 100-percent foreign-owned enterprises will be treated legally, except to say that they will be handled differently than in the past. Some subtle differences in the two codes include:

Provision	Laos	Vietnam
Official response to foreign investor request to form joint venture	30 days	Three months
Taxes	Rate of 25 to 35 percent. Income tax could be exempted for two to four years after a venture begins earning profits and reduced by 50 percent for the next two years. Ventures will pay a tax for use of natural resources to support operations.	Rate of 15 to 25 percent. Taxes may be deferred for up to two years after a venture begins and reduced by 50 percent for the subsequent two years. Reinvested profits are exempt from taxes or taxed at a reduced rate.
Investment contract length and extension option	Normal length up to 15 years; may be extended.	Normal length up to 20 years; may be extended.
Special treatment by the government	In some cases the state may offer unspecified concessions to a foreign investor.	Not applicable.

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Appendix C

**The Narcotics Issue: Vientiane's
Damage Control Efforts**

Vientiane's historical response to charges of its complicity in the drug trade has been angry denial or the countercharge that, because Laos has no consumption problem, the action rests with the consuming countries. Since mid-1987, however, Vientiane has taken a number of steps to show the United States and other potential aid donors and foreign investors that it is willing to cooperate in the international effort against narcotics production and trafficking. Nonetheless, the regime's sincerity remains in doubt.

[redacted] officials of the Lao Government continue to ship large quantities of drugs to international markets, and Southeast Asian traffickers still find Laos an attractive safehaven:

June

The Lao attend at the vice-ministerial level the International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking (ICDAIT) in Vienna. The conference adopted a resolution committing participants to cooperate against drug abuse and against trafficking in illicit drugs.

February

Vientiane approves a United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) project to find a substitute for opium cultivation in an area of Vientiane Province [redacted]

April

Laos enacts the "Laws Concerning Economic Violations," which include laws on narcotics production, trafficking, and use.

June

[redacted]

Lao authorities selectively arrest 48 persons involved in the refining and sale of heroin, including a member of the Communist Party's Central Committee. Many of these traffickers reportedly failed to pay refinery taxes.

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August

Trial of the 48 drug traffickers. Briefing the diplomatic corps on the trial, a Foreign Ministry official condemns the drug trade and for the first time mentions that Vientiane recognizes its obligations under the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotics. Nonetheless, there are reports that the traffickers were later quietly released.

Lao press runs a front-page, unprecedented article detailing an anti-drug-trafficking public education seminar that has been started in Luang Prabang Province.

August-October

Vientiane orders provincial authorities to temporarily suspend cultivation of marijuana and opium. Senior central government officials traveled to the provinces to reiterate the order, but so far have taken no concrete steps to enforce it.

October

November

December

1989

January

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March

Lao officials respond to Washington's narcotics decertification by temporarily suspending cooperation on bilateral issues pending Vientiane's review of the decertification. After a brief postponement, Vientiane proceeds with a scheduled joint MIA excavation. Bilateral antinarcotics efforts are moving forward.

This information is Secret

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

(b)(3)

10 NOV 1976

N --
Chief, PW/MIA Branch
Resources and Installations Division
Directorate for Intelligence Research
Defense Intelligence Agency
2076 Arlington Hall Station
Washington, DC 20301

Dear

This is in reply to your memorandum of 30 September 1976
(S-8491/DB-4H) which requested the mandatory classification
review of [REDACTED]

The report must remain classified pursuant to Sec 5(B)(2)
of Executive Order 11652, but we have determined that seg-
regable portions may be released. A sanitized version is
enclosed.

Sincerely,

Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosure



0036

NW 982007 - 875

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(b)(3)
(b)(6)

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI EARLY JULY 1972

SUBJECT SIGHTING OF DOWNED U.S. CREWMAN IN GIO LINH DISTRICT,
QUANG TRI PROVINCE, SOUTH VIETNAM

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (18 SEPTEMBER 1974)

SOURCE

1

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79D 317-20

NND 982011 - 2326

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. AT ABOUT 1700 HOURS ONE DAY IN EARLY JULY 1972, A U.S. F-4 AIRCRAFT WAS HIT BY 12.8MM ANTIAIRCRAFT FIRE FROM THE VIET CONG GIO LINH DISTRICT UNIT, QUANG TRI PROVINCE, SOUTH VIETNAM. TWO PERSONS BAILED OUT OF THE PLANE IN RED PARACHUTES, AND THE AIRCRAFT BURST INTO FLAME AND CRASHED IN THE VILLAGE OF GIO LE. ONE OF THE CREWMEN LANDED ABOUT EIGHT KILOMETERS OFF THE SHORE OF THE VILLAGE OF GIO LE AND WAS RESCUED BY A HELICOPTER. THE OTHER CREWMAN LANDED AT ABOUT YD237764 IN CAM PHO HAMLET, TRUNG GIANG VILLAGE, GIO LINH DISTRICT, AND WAS CAPTURED BY LOCAL GUERRILLAS. LATER THAT DAY, THE CAPTIVE WAS EVACUATED IN A HAMMOCK TO HA THUONG HAMLET, GIO LE VILLAGE, AND THEN ON TO NORTH VIETNAM BY TRUCK.

2. THE CAPTURED CREWMAN WAS WOUNDED IN HIS HEAD AND LEFT THIGH, THE THIGH WOUND APPEARING TO BE SERIOUS. HE WAS CAUCASIAN, ABOUT 32 YEARS OLD, ABOUT 1.80 METERS TALL, WEIGHED BETWEEN 90 AND 100 KILOGRAMS AND HAD A STOCKY BUILD, BLACK CREW-CUT HAIR, SIDEBURNS AND A MUSTACHE. HE WORE A WRIST WATCH WITH A BLUE FACE AND STAINLESS STEEL BAND. THE GUERRILLAS WHO

2

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NND 982011 - 2327

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CAPTURED HIM SAID THAT THE CREWMAN WAS A U.S. NAVAL PILOT.

[] COMMENT: REVIEWED THE TWO VOLUMES OF "PHOTOGRAPHS OF MISSING AND CAPTURED PERSONNEL IN SOUTHEAST ASIA" BUT WAS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ANY OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS AS RESEMBLING THE MAN HE SAW. [] SAW THE DOWNING OF THE AIRCRAFT AND THE RESCUE OF ONE CREWMAN. HE OBSERVED THE PRISONER FOR ABOUT 10 MINUTES FROM A DISTANCE OF ABOUT FIVE METERS.)

3. [] COMMENT: JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER (JCRC) EVALUATES THIS REPORT AS FOLLOWS: "THIS INCIDENT PROBABLY CORRELATES TO []

[] HE IS CURRENTLY CARRIED BY THE SERVICE AS MISSING. THE REPORT DIFFERS AS TO THE DATE OF THE INCIDENT AND THE PLACE OF THE RESCUE OF THE SECOND CREWMEMBER. THE DATE OF THE [] INCIDENT WAS 7 MAY 1972, AND [] COMPANION WAS RECOVERED INLAND AT APPROXIMATELY YD0997 ON THE SAME DAY BY SAR FORCES.")

4. [] DISSEM: DEFENSE ATTACHE FOR JCRC REPRESENTATIVE IN SAIGON: SENT TO CINCPAC (FOR CINCPAC AND POLAD ONLY) USSAG AND VIENTIANE (FOR JCRC REPRESENTATIVE ONLY).
REPORT CLASS ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ []

3

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CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (1)
(2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

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~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In)(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)

Intelligence Information Cable

● PRIORITY

IN 363529

STATE/INR NMCC/MC (DIA) CIA/NMCC MIC NSA ~~NSA~~ NSC/S SDO NIO CRS

PAGE 1 OF 9 PAGES

Classified by Recorded Reporting Officer, Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 38 (1), (2). Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

DIRECTORATE OF

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

~~SECRET~~

CITE

DIST 18 SEPTEMBER 1974

COUNTRY LAOS

DOI 17 SEPTEMBER 1974

SUBJECT EXCHANGE OF POW LISTS AT 17 SEPTEMBER JCIA
MEETING AND DECISION TO HOLD SECOND EXCHANGE ON
29 SEPTEMBER

ACO LAOS , VIENTIANE (17-18 SEPTEMBER 1974)

SOURCE

(SUMMARY: THE JOINT COMMISSION TO IMPLEMENT THE
AGREEMENT (JCIA) MET ON 17 SEPTEMBER 1974 TO DISCUSS
FINAL PROCEDURES FOR THE PRISONER OF WAR (POW) EXCHANGE
TO BE HELD ON 19 SEPTEMBER. THE TWO SIDES EXCHANGED
POW LISTS. THE LPF LIST CONTAINED ONE AMERICAN,
20 LAO AND THE VIENTIANE SIDE LIST
CONTAINED 173 NORTH VIETNAMESE AND SEVEN LPF POW'S.

~~SECRET~~

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CIA-740918-188

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EDITIONS

IN 363529

PAGE 2 OF 9 PAGES

SECRET

(classification)

(release controls)

IT WAS AGREED BY THE JCIA THAT A SECOND EXCHANGE WOULD TAKE PLACE ON 29 SEPTEMBER AND THAT NO MORE THAN 50 NAMES WOULD BE EXCHANGED THEN. ARRANGEMENTS WERE DISCUSSED FOR THE TURNOVER TO AMERICAN AUTHORITIES IN VIENTIANE OF [REDACTED] ON 18 SEPTEMBER. VIENTIANE SIDE CHIEF DELEGATE SOUKAN VILAYSAN MENTIONED A LETTER OF PROTEST RECEIVED FROM THE LAO PRESS ASSOCIATION AGAINST THE DECISION LIMITING THE NUMBER OF PRESS REPRESENTATIVES. THE LPF AGREED TO HAVE THREE ADDITIONAL MINISTRY OF INFORMATION REPRESENTATIVES PRESENT. SOUKAN SUGGESTED THAT THE FOREIGN PRESS REPRESENTATION BE INCREASED AND THE JCIA AGREED TO ALL 17 FOREIGN PRESS REPRESENTATIVES TO ATTEND. IT WAS AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE FIVE C-123 AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED FOR THE POW EXCHANGE. END SUMMARY.)

1. THE JOINT COMMISSION TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT (JCIA) MET ON 17 SEPTEMBER 1974 TO EXCHANGE THE PRISONER OF WAR (POW) LISTS AND TO MAKE FINAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FIRST POW EXCHANGE ON 19 SEPTEMBER 1974. IT WAS AGREED BY THE JCIA THAT A SECOND EXCHANGE WOULD TAKE PLACE ON 29 SEPTEMBER AND THAT NO MORE THAN 50 NAMES WOULD BE EXCHANGED

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PAGE 3 OF 9 PAGES

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(classification)

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THEN.

2. AT THE OPENING OF THE MEETING, VIENTIANE SIDE CHIEF DELEGATE TO THE JCIA S O U K A N VILAYSAN SAID THAT THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION (ICC) HAD WRITTEN TO THE JCIA CONGRATULATING IT ON PROGRESS MADE AND EXPRESSED ITS WILLINGNESS TO SEND SIX ICC REPRESENTATIVES TO THE PLAIN OF JARS TO OVERSEE THE POW EXCHANGE. SOUKAN ASKED IF THE LAO PATRIOTIC FRONT (LPF) HAD RECEIVED A COPY OF THIS LETTER AND UPON LEARNING THAT THEY HAD NOT PROVIDED THEM WITH ONE.

3. THE TWO SIDES THEN EXCHANGED POW LISTS. THE LPF LIST CONTAINED ONE AMERICAN, [REDACTED] 20 LAO AND [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE VIENTIANE SIDE LIST CONTAINED 173 NORTH VIETNAMESE AND SEVEN LPF POW'S. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE LPF LIST CONTAINS NO NAMES OF FAR PERSONNEL. [REDACTED] BELIEVE THAT THE LIST ARE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, POSSIBLE DISTRICT CHIEFS, WHO HAD BEEN CAPTURED BY THE PATHET LAO (PL), BUT DO NOT DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOME OF THE LAO LISTED ARE IRREGULAR PERSONNEL.)

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4.

COMMENT:

FAR HAS NOW DECIDED TO RETURN ALL 173 NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) POW'S. DUDONE SAID THAT SOME TIME AGO FAR TALKED TO THE NVA POW'S PRIVATELY AND ASKED SIX TO STAY. RECENTLY FAR TALKED TO THEM AGAIN AND THREE OF THE SIX ASKED TO STAY. IN THE PAST COUPLE OF DAYS FAR TALKED TO THE SIX TOGETHER AND OPENLY IN FRONT OF OTHERS, BUT NONE WANTED TO STAY. THE JCIA NOW DOES NOT INTEND, AS HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN PLANNED, TO ASK THE NVA POW'S AT THE AIRPORT BEFORE TAKE-OFF IN FRONT OF THE ICC IF ANY WISHED TO REMAIN.) COMMENT: IT WOULD APPEAR THAT FAR HAS DECIDED TO GET RID OF A PROBLEM BY SENDING ALL THE NVA POW'S BACK.)

5. ARRANGEMENTS WERE THEN DISCUSSED FOR THE TURNOVER OF [REDACTED] IT WAS NOTED THAT A [REDACTED] PLANE WOULD BE USED AND THAT THE AMERICAN EMBASSY WAS MAKING ARRANGEMENTS. [REDACTED] PLANE WAS SCHEDULED TO FLY TO LUANG PRABANG LEAVING VIENTIANE AT 1490 HOURS ON 17 SEPTEMBER AND DEPARTING PHONGSAVAN AT 0800 ON 18 SEPTEMBER.

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DEPENDING ON WEATHER CONDITIONS, THE PLANE SHOULD BE BACK IN VIENTIANE BY 1300 HOURS. ACCORDING TO THE LPF, THE [] PLANE WHICH WAS ORIGINALLY GOING TO BE USED DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH GAS. WHEN THE AMERICAN EMBASSY COULD NOT PROVIDE THE RIGHT GAS FOR THE PLANE, IT WAS PROPOSED THAT A [] PLANE BE USED. [] COMMENT: PRIOR TO THE MEETING [] WAS ASKED IF THERE WERE NOT OTHER AMERICAN POW'S SINCE MANY WERE LISTED AS MISSING IN ACTION. [] REPLIED THAT THE LPF HAD NO OTHER AMERICANS.)

6. SOUKAN THEN MENTIONED A LETTER RECEIVED FROM THE LAO PRESS ASSOCIATION PROTESTING THE DECISION LIMITING PRESS REPRESENTATIVES AND ASKING THE JCIA TO RECONSIDER THE NUMBER OF LAO AND FOREIGN PRESS REPRESENTATIVES TO BE INCLUDED AT THE POW EXCHANGE. THE LPF AGREED TO HAVE THREE ADDITIONAL MINISTRY OF INFORMATION REPRESENTATIVES PRESENT: ONE FROM AGENCY LAO PRESS, ONE FROM LAO RADIO AND ONE PHOTOGRAPHER. SOUKAN MENTIONED THAT THERE WERE 43 FOREIGN PRESS REPRESENTATIVES ACCREDITED IN VIENTIANE. HE SUGGESTED THEY ALL BE PERMITTED TO GO SO AS NOT TO DISCRIMINATE; HOWEVER, IF IT WAS NECESSARY

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TO LIMIT THOSE ATTENDING, HE URGED THAT THE LIMIT BE INCREASED FROM TEN TO FIFTEEN. FOLLOWING DISCUSSION A TOTAL OF 17 FOREIGN PRESS REPRESENTATIVES WAS AGREED UPON. [REDACTED] COMMENT: REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FOLLOWING FOREIGN PRESS MEDIA HAVE BEEN INVITED TO ATTEND THE POW EXCHANGE: NCNA, AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, REUTERS, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, TOKYO NEWS SERVICE, COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SERVICE, AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING SERVICE, MAINICHI SHIMBUN, NEW YORK TIMES, AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANY, BANGKOK DAILY NEWS, PRAVDA, VOICE OF AMERICA, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, YAMIURI SHIMBUN, MARKBLOCH (GERMAN) AND NORTH VIETNAMESE PRESS.)

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7.

COMMENT:

[REDACTED] IN DISCUSSING THE FACT THAT TEN FOREIGN PRESS REPRESENTATIVES WERE BEING SELECTED BY THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION TO GO TO THE POW EXCHANGE, STRESSED THAT ONLY LPF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE MINISTRY HAD THE RIGHT TO MAKE THE SELECTION BECAUSE THE SITE FOR THE EXCHANGE IS IN LPF CONTROLLED AREA.)

8. CONCERNING LAO PRESS REPRESENTATIVES, LPF ACTING CHIEF DELEGATE P R A D I T H THIENGTHAM SAID THAT THE LPF WERE WILLING TO CONSIDER MORE THAN FIVE, SUCH AS REPRESENTATIVES OF LAN XANG KAO NA AND THE YOUNG IDEALS PARTY PAPER, AN A KHOT. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THE LPF CATEGORICALLY REFUSED TO INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF XAT LAO OR SIENG SERI SINCE THESE MEDIA DO NOT REPRESENT THE TWO SIDES AND ARE TRYING TO CREATE DISSENSION.

9. IT WAS AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE FIVE C-123 AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED FOR THE PRISONER EXCHANGE: FOUR TO TRANSPORT THE POW'S AND ONE FOR THE JCIA AND OTHER LAO GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES, THE ICC REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LAO AND FOREIGN PRESS REPRESENTATIVES. IF ALL GOES

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ACCORDING TO SCHEDULE THE OFFICIAL AND PRESS REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD RETURN TO VIENTIANE BY 1600 HOURS 19 SEPTEMBER. THE LAO POW'S WILL BE FLOWN TO THE RECEPTION CENTER AT PHOU KHAO KHOUA. THE [] POW'S WILL BE FLOWN DIRECTLY TO [] EXCEPT FOR ONE AIRCRAFT, WITH BOTH [] AND LAO ON BOARD, WHICH WILL LAND FIRST AT PHOU KHAO KHOUA TO OFF-LOAD THE LAO POW'S.

10. [] COMMENT: ACCORDING TO PRESS INTERVIEWS, SOME OF THE NVA POW'S AT SAM KHE PRISON IN VIENTIANE CLAIMED THEY ARE PLANNING TO EMBARASS LAO AUTHORITIES DURING THE PRISONER EXCHANGE ON 19 SEPTEMBER. FIRSTLY THEY WILL REFUSE TO WEAR FRESH CLOTHING PROVIDED FOR THE OCCASION AND INSIST ON WEARING TATTERED AND WORN PRISON UNIFORMS. IN ADDITION, THEY WILL CLAIM THAT THEY HAVE BEEN DEPRIVED OF ADEQUATE CLOTHING AND FOOD THROUGHOUT THEIR IMPRISONMENT, WHILE EXONORATING PRISON AUTHORITIES OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR CONDITION, THEY PLAN TO ACCUSE FAR G-2 OF ALL FORMS OF MISTREATMENT, INCLUDING TORTURE WITH ELECTRODES.)

11. [] DISSEM: EMBASSY (AMBASSADOR WHITEHOUSE, DCM, CHIEF POLITICAL SECTION ONLY) AT VIENTIANE: SENT TO

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CINCPAC (EXCLUSIVE FOR CINCPAC AND POLAD),

, SAIGON, USSAG FOR LT GEN BURNS ONLY AND
JCRC FOR BRIG GEN ULATOSKI ONLY.)REPORT CLASS ~~S E C R E T~~

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM
GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION
CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI MID-AUGUST 1972

SUBJECT SIGHTING OF A CAPTURED U.S. F-4 JET PILOT IN HANOI

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (13 AUGUST 1974)

SOURCE

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0687

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NND 982011 - 2344

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1. AT ABOUT 0900 HOURS ON A SUNDAY AROUND THE MIDDLE OF AUGUST 1972, A U.S. F-4 JET AIRCRAFT FLYING FROM THE WEST WAS HIT BY AN AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE FIRED FROM A NORTH VIETNAMESE (NVN) MIG FIGHTER DURING A DOGFIGHT OVER HANOI. THE JET BURST INTO FLAME AND EXPLODED, BUT BEFORE THE EXPLOSION, A CREWMAN USING A RED PARACHUTE SAILED OUT AND LANDED IN HANOI.

2. A LITTLE LATER THE SAME DAY, THE CREWMAN HAD BEEN CAPTURED BY THE NVN SECURITY PERSONNEL AT HIS LANDING PLACE ON COT CO STREET. HE WAS A MAJOR, SERVICE NOT IDENTIFIED, AND HAD BEEN THE PILOT OF THE JET. AT THE TIME OF OBSERVATION, HE WAS WEARING STRIPED PRISONER-OF-WAR PAJAMAS. HIS HANDS WERE TIED BEHIND HIM AND HE WAS ESCORTED INTO A JEEP BY THREE NVN SECURITY AGENTS ARMED WITH K&S4 PISTOLS. THE PILOT WAS A HEALTHY-LOOKING CAUCASIAN

2

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OF ABOUT 32 YEARS. HE WAS ABOUT 1.85 METERS TALL AND WEIGHED ABOUT 95 KILOGRAMS. HE HAD A RATHER SQUARE FACE. A RUDDY SKIN, A LARGE MOUTH AND SOMETHING OF A PAUNCH. HIS HAIR, MOUSTACHE AND SIDEBURNS WERE AUBURN, [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED] REVIEWED BOTH VOLUMES OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND MISSING IN ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND SAID THAT PICTURE [REDACTED] IN VOLUME II BORE SOME RESEMBLANCE TO THE PRISONER HE OBSERVED.)

3. [REDACTED] COMMENT: JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER (JCRC) EVALUATES THIS REPORT AS FOLLOWS: "JCRC IS UNABLE TO CORRELATE THIS REPORT WITH ANY INCIDENT IN THE JCRC DATA BASE. THE PERSON DEPICTED IN DIA NO. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HOWEVER, [REDACTED] BAILED OUT OF HIS AIRCRAFT APPROXIMATELY 45 MILES SW OF HANOI AT THE APPROXIMATE COORDINATES 2030N 1050E (WH1050). THIS POSITION WAS VERIFIED BY SAR FORCES WHO HAD RADIO CONTACT WITH HIM ON THE GROUND SHORTLY AFTER HE LANDED. THE LAST KNOWN LOCATION OF [REDACTED] CONFLICTS, THEREFORE, WITH THE SOURCE'S ASSERTION THAT THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE INCIDENT BAILED OUT AND LANDED IN HANOI.")

4. [REDACTED] DISSEM: DEFENSE ATTACHE FOR JCRC REPRESENTATIVE IN SAIGON: SENT TO CINCPAC (FOR CINCPAC AND POLAD ONLY) USSAG

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AND VIENTIANE (FOR JCRC REPRESENTATIVE ONLY).

REPORT CLASS ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ 





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(2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.




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28 Mar 75

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI LATE AUGUST 1972

SUBJECT U.S. AIR CRASH FATALITY IN NORTH VIETNAM

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (8 JANUARY 1975) SOURCE 
1

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P O O (1-10-100-4)

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[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

1. AT ABOUT 1200 HOURS ONE DAY IN LATE AUGUST 1972, A U.S. F-105 AIRCRAFT APPROACHED FROM THE DIRECTION OF DONG ANH DISTRICT OUTSIDE HANOI AND SUDDENLY, FOR UNKNOWN REASONS, NOSEDIVED AND CRASHED AT ABOUT (WJ842074) IN THE VILLAGE OF THANH THUY, THANH OAI DISTRICT, HA TAY PROVINCE, NORTH VIETNAM. THE PILOT BAILED OUT OF THE AIRCRAFT IN A WHITE PARACHUTE AND LANDED ABOUT 100 METERS FROM THE CRASH SITE. AT THE TIME OF OBSERVATION, THE PILOT WAS DEAD, PRESUMABLY FROM A CHEST WOUND. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED] BELIEVED THAT THE PILOT HAD BEEN SHOT TO DEATH BY MILITIA-MEN OF THANH THUY VILLAGE.)

205
1054

2. THE DECEASED PILOT WAS A CAUCASIAN, ABOUT 27 YEARS OLD AND ABOUT 1.80 METERS TALL. HE WEIGHED ABOUT 80 KILOS AND HAD A STRONG BUILD, BLOND HAIR AND A STRAIGHT NOSE.

90
122
16
160
176

3. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED] REVIEWED BOTH VOLUMES OF "PRISONERS OF WAR AND MISSING-IN-ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, BUT WAS UNABLE TO MAKE AN IDENTIFICATION.)

4. [REDACTED] COMMENT: JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER (JCRC) EVALUATES THIS REPORT AS FOLLOWS: "THE INFORMATION PROBABLY

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[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

CORRELATES TO [REDACTED] WHO WENT DOWN
IN AN F4D AT WG920912 ON 26 DECEMBER 1971. HE IS CURRENTLY
LISTED AS MISSING.")

5. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE CRASH SITE GIVEN BY JCRC IN ITS
EVALUATION IS NOT IN HA TAY PROVINCE AS WAS THE CRASH SITE
REPORTED BY [REDACTED]

6. [REDACTED] DISSEMI DEFENSE ATTACHE FOR JCRC REPRESENTATIVE
IN SAIGON; SENT TO CINCPAC (FOR CINCPAC AND POLAD ONLY) JCRC
REPRESENTATIVE SAMAE SAN AND VIENTIANE (FOR JCRC REPRESENTATIVE
ONLY).

REPORT CLASS ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B(1)(2).
IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

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