

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

07 October 2020

John Clarke, Esq.  
1629 K Street, NW  
Suite 300  
Washington, DC, 20008

Reference: *Lois Moore, et al v. CIA*, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No: 1:20-cv-01027; F-2020-00473

Dear Mr. Clarke:

This is an interim response to your 25 November 2019 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request submitted by your client, Lois Moore, for the following:

1. From the period of March 16, 1954, through 1961, all records of the CIA's efforts in undertaking "clandestine and covert action to locate, identify, and recover those U.S. Prisoners of War still in Communist custody"
2. An unredacted copy of this report [January 5, 1952, *CIA Information Reports*] together with all intelligence material upon which it was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
3. Please produce the [following] referenced [in July 15, 1952, *CIA Cross Reference Sheet*]:
  - a. July 15, 1952 "Basic Communication"
  - b. June 24, 1953 "Basic Document"
  - c. Information described as "etcetera"
  - d. POW Information in, or otherwise "Router to, C.I. File"
  - e. POW information related to or bearing the "Cross Reference Number 040"
  - f. POW Information related to or bearing the "Classification Number 383.6 Korea."
4. All records regarding the June 1, 1951 shoot down and capture over North Korea of the American F-51 piloted by U.S. Air Force Captain Harry Cecil Moore, born February 11, 1924, in Elm Grove, West Virginia, service number AO 711850.
5. All records upon which the following statement from February 27, 1952 memo from Chief of Naval Personnel to Commanding General, Far East Air Force was

based: "It is now believed that there is a possibility that Captain Moore survived and is now a Prisoner of War."

6. All records regarding Captain Moore's incarceration and transportation from North Korea to the Soviet Union, his locations in the Soviet Union, and all evidence that he "may have been interrogated by Soviet officials.
7. An unredacted copy of July 17, 1952, three page *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
8. An unredacted copy of December 31, 1953, *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
9. An unredacted copy of March 24, 1954, *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
10. An unredacted copy of April 23, 1954, *CIA Information Report*.
11. An unredacted copy of April 27, 1954, *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
12. An unredacted copy of December 8, 1954, *CIA Information Report*.
13. Any and all information relating to this Report [January 23, 1992 cable from Embassy Helsinki to Secretary of State]
14. An unredacted copy of March 9, 1988, CIA Memorandum to "US Army Chief, Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action," together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
15. All records relating to any of the POW/MIA's names in the attached list.
16. Any and all records relating that any POW/MIAs may have been held in the prisons identified in the attached list of Russian prison camps.
17. For the period beginning June of 1951, and continuing to the present time, please produce all POW records provided to, or receive from, any office of any component of the Department of Defense, including but not limited to:
  - a. CCRAK
  - b. Air Force 6004 Air Intelligence Service Squadron during the tenure of "Project American."
  - c. Missing in Action Office, including those provided in response to the attached February 12, 1997 letter from U.S. House of Representative James Talent seeking "Intelligence pertaining to American prisoners who were taken to China and the Soviet Union during the war" as well as:
    - i. The 389 American service members who into the 1980's were listed as unaccounted prisoners of war by the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) ii. All U.S. Air Force F-86 pilots who remain unrepatriated.
  - d. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, of AFOSI
  - e. Naval Criminal Investigative Service, or NCIS
  - f. Army Criminal Investigation Command, CID

- g. U.S. Army Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities Far East, or CCRAFE.**
- 18. All POW records prepared by any officer, agent, or employee of the CIA, prepared for the Office of the President including the President's Daily Brief, or PDB, that include information on the possibility of POW's being transferred to the Soviet Union or China.**
  - 19. All records reflecting communications with Members of Congress, or Congressional Oversight committees concerning the capture of American airmen during the Korean conflict who may have been transported to the Soviet Union or China and their presumed fate.**
  - 20. All records concerning POW's and KGB defector Yuri (or Yury) Rastvorov, who informed the United States Government that American military personnel were taken to the Soviet Union during the Korean Conflict. This request includes an unredacted version of the attached page with the heading, "Terminology".**
  - 21. All intelligence material (including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports) concerning statements made by former Czech General Jan Sejna and other former Czech Officials concerning former US POWs held, interrogated and experiment on by Czech and Soviet advisors, and thereafter transferred to China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and the Soviet Union.**

We are processing your request in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.

We have identified six (6) documents that may be released in segregable form with redactions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). Exemption (b)(3) pertains to Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 3507, noted as exemption "(b)(3)CIAAct" on the enclosed documents, and/or Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C § 3024(i)(1), noted as exemption "(b)(3)NatSecAct" on the enclosed documents. The documents are on the enclosed CD.

A final response will be provided to you on a later date.

Sincerely,



Mark Lilly  
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

COUNTRY USSR

REPORT NO. CS-79883

SUBJECT Alleged American Held in Soviet Prison

DATE DISTR. 8 December 1955

NO. OF PAGES (b)(1) 1  
REQUIRE (b)(3) NatSecAct

DATE OF INFO.

[REDACTED]

PLACE ACQUIRED

DATE ACQUIRED

REFERENCES

BY CABLE

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE:

[REDACTED] (b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

In 1948 in Lita prison, source met an alleged American citizen, who had Polish documents in the name of (fnu) Fawitsky or (fnu) Favelaki. The latter refused to reveal his true name. He spoke German, Russian, French, and English fluently. The Soviets had a photograph of him in the uniform of an American enlisted man. Source last saw him in Lubyanka Prison in 1951.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

STATE ARMY NAVY AIR

Approved for Release  
Date SEP 1995

(b)(3) NatSecAct

TERMINOLOGY

**Zakonservirovannyye agentury-** literally deep frozen networks, or canned or preserved nets. Deep Cover nets.  (b)(3) NatSecAct

**Legalnaya rezidentura-** Legal residency  (b)(3) NatSecAct

**gruppovedy-** principal agents.  (b)(3) NatSecAct

**Trenirovochnoye raspisaniye-** Signal Plan  for period contacts (b)(3) NatSecAct

**Voyevoye Raspisaniye-** Signal plan for use after W/T agent has been activate  (b)(3) NatSecAct

**Operativny Upolnomocheny (OPERUPOLNOMOCHENY)-**Case officer  (b)(3) NatSecAct

**Starshy operativny upolnomocheny-**Senior case officer(DR-19-495)

**Pomeshchnik Operupolnomochemogo-**Junior(sic) case officer.  (b)(3) NatSecAct

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FEB 1952

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

**INFORMATION REPORT**

REPORT

CD NO. (b)(3) CIAAct

COUNTRY Korea/China

DATE DISTR. 17 July 1952

SUBJECT Prisoner-of-War Camps in North Korea and China

NO. OF PAGES 3

DATE OF INFO.

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

PLACE ACQUIRED

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

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\* Except as noted

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SOURCE

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

War Prisoner Administrative Office and Camp Classification

- In May 1952 the War Prisoner Administrative Office (Chan Fu Kuan Li Ch'u) (2069/0199/4619/3810/5710) in P'yongyang, under Colonel No-men-ch'i-fu (6179/7024/1148/1133), an intelligence officer attached to the general headquarters of the Soviet Far Eastern Military District, controlled prisoner of war camps in Manchuria and North Korea. The office, formerly in Mukden, employed 30 persons, several of whom were English-speaking Soviets. LIN Mai (2651/6701) and NAM IL (0589/2480) were deputy chairmen of the office.
- The office had developed three types of prisoner-of-war camps. Camps termed "peace camps," detaining persons who exhibited pro-Communist leanings, were characterized by considerate treatment of the prisoners and the staging within the camps of Communist rallies and meetings. The largest peace camp, which held two thousand prisoners, was at Chungchun. Peace camps were also at K'aiyuan Hsien (124-05, 42-36) and Pench'i (123-43, 41-20).
- Reform camps, all of which were in Manchuria, detained anti-Communist prisoners possessing certain technical skills. Emphasis at these camps was on indoctrination of the prisoners.

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(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

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(b)(3) CIAAct

-2-

4. Normal prisoner-of-war camps, all of which were in North Korea, detained prisoners whom the Communists will exchange. Prisoners in the peace and reform camps will not be exchanged.
5. Officials of North Korean prisoner of war camps sent reports on individual prisoners to the War Prisoner Administrative Office. Cooperative prisoners were being transferred to peace camps. ROK army officers were being shot; ROK army soldiers were being reindoctrinated and assimilated into the North Korean army.

Kangdong Camp

6. In May the largest North Korean prisoner of war camp, detaining twelve hundred prisoners, was near T'ai Ling (1132/1545) mountain, six miles southeast of the Kangdong (126-05, 39-09) (BU-4837) railroad station.<sup>1</sup> The compound, divided with barbed wire and mud embankments into four partitions for American, English, and Turkish prisoners and prisoners of other nationalities, held 840 American, 100 English, 60 Turkish, and 200 hundred French, Dutch, and Canadian troops. Most of the United States prisoners were members of the 1 Cavalry Division and the 24 Infantry Division. General William Dean was moved from Harbin and Mukden to this camp in 1951.
7. The Kangdong camp, organized into study, management, sanitation, and finance sections, compelled the prisoners to study for three hours, to labor for four hours, and to discuss political problems for two hours.
- F-3 8. On 1 May nine thousand (sic) ROK army prisoners and fifty United Nations prisoners were in caves at the Kangdong camp, extending from approximately BU-492363 to BU-494368 in a valley at Adal-ni, Kangdong-myŏn (126-05, 39-09) (BU-4837).<sup>2</sup> Of the ROK army prisoners 10 percent were officers, 50 percent non-commissioned officers, and 40 percent privates. Of the United Nations prisoners 10 percent were Negroes. The prisoners, who received 600 grams of cereal and salt each day, were not required to work and spent only two hours each day out of the caves. An average of two prisoners were dying daily from malnutrition and eruptive typhus. The majority of prisoners at this camp were extremely anti-Communist in thinking. Three North Korean army guards, armed with PPSH's and rifles, were at the entrance of each cave.

Camp Number 106, Mirim

- F-3 9. On 1 May approximately sixteen hundred ROK army prisoners of war, including one hundred officers and five hundred non-commissioned officers, were at the North Korean prisoner of war camp number 106 at approximately YD-472214, 1.6 kilometers southwest of the Mirim railroad station (125-51, 39-01) (YD-4722). Prisoners held here, having been pressed through five ideological screenings, were believed to be potential converts to Communism. The prisoners believed that they were to be assimilated into the North Korean army. Members of political and security detachments maintained strict surveillance of the prisoners. The surveillance often was carried out by members of these bureaus who entered the camps disguised as prisoners.
- F-3 10. Each prisoner received 500 monthly, 1 kilogram of grain and 45 grams of soy bean oil, vegetables, salt, and soy bean paste daily. The prisoners were wearing North Korean army uniforms. The prisoners were constructing air raid shelters near the Mirim-ni airfield ten hours each day. Two hours of indoctrination lectures were also held daily. The prisoners had been organized into squads of ten men. Each of the camp's four battalions had three platoons and each platoon, four squads. A guard platoon, armed with M-1's, carbines, and PPSH's, was at the camp.

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(b)(3) CIAAct

-3-

Suan

- F-3 11. On 5 May 200 ROK army prisoners and 110 prisoners from other United Nations armies including 80 Negroes, were at the North Korean prisoner of war camp at the site of the former Suan mine (126-23, 38-47) (BT-7396), ten kilometers north of Suan (126-22, 38-42) (BT-7186).<sup>3</sup> Lieutenant Colonel KIM Kyu-hwan (6855/1145/3562) commanded the camp. Although other United Nations prisoners were not required to work, the ROK army prisoners constructed shelters and trenches throughout the entire day. The prisoners received only rice balls for food. Several of the other United Nations prisoners had obtained wheat paste from villagers in exchange for watches and other personal possessions. Thereafter the villagers were prohibited from entering the camp area. No sanitary facilities were offered to the prisoners. Approximately fifteen prisoners, including both ROK and United Nations personnel, were too ill to stand.

Sariwon

- F-3 12. In late April approximately eight hundred United Nations prisoners were in a series of underground shelters at approximately YC-436673 in a valley between two hills four kilometers northeast of the Sariwon railroad station (125-46, 38-30) (YC-4064). On each side of the valley at the base of the two hills were 25 shelters. One shelter in every five accommodated the camp guards. Eight hundred Chinese Communist soldiers, armed with PPSH's and rifles, guarded the area. Dummy guards were also used at night. The majority of the guards were billeted in a nearby village of fifteen homes. The guard billets were easily visible from the air. Each prisoner received pork soup and 600 grams of cereal three times daily and a package of cigarettes each day. The prisoners were required to work for one hour and attend indoctrination meetings for two hours daily.

Mukden

13. On 6 January 1952 four hundred United States prisoners, including three hundred Negroes, were being detained in two buildings at Hsiao Nan Kuan Chieh, at the southeast corner of the intersection, in Mukden. One building, used as the police headquarters in Hsiao Nan Kuan during the Japanese occupation, was a two-story concrete structure, 30 meters long and 20 meters wide. The other building, one story high and constructed of gray brick, was behind the two-story building. Both buildings had tile roofs. All prisoners held here, with the exception of three second lieutenants, were enlisted personnel. The prisoners, dressed in Chinese Communist army uniforms, with a red arm band on the left arm, were not required to work. Two hours of indoctrination were conducted daily by staff members of the Northeast Army Command. Prisoners were permitted to play basketball in the courtyard. The attempt of three white prisoners to escape caused the withdrawal of permission for white prisoners to walk alone through streets in the vicinity of the camp. Two Chinese Communist soldiers guarded groups of white prisoners when such groups left the buildings. Negroes, however, could move outside the compound area freely and individually. Rice, noodles, and one vegetable were served daily to the prisoners in groups of 10 to 15 men. One platoon of Chinese Communist soldiers guarded the compound.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

1. Comment. In late February 1952 two thousand prisoners, slightly inclined toward Communism, were being detained at the base of a mountain three kilometers west of Kangdong, according to [redacted] and re(b)(1)iced reports.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

2. Comment. This is presumably information on the same camp as that reported in paragraphs 6-7 above.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

3. Comment. In March approximately 4,300 ROK prisoners, chiefly officers, were at the Suan camp, [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
**INFORMATION REPORT**

(b)(3) CIAAct

COUNTRY USSR  
SUBJECT US Prisoners of War in USSR



(b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

DATE DISTR. 27 Apr 1954

NO. OF PAGES 3

NO. OF ENCLS.

SUPP. TO REPORT NO.


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(b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

1.



(b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Information regarding the presence of US prisoners (captured during the Korean War) on the territory of Asiatic USSR. Mostly they were in Komsomolsk (Amur River), Magadan (Bay of Nogaev, Sea of Okhotsk), Chita, Irkutsk, Molotov, Gubalka (northwest of Molotov), Komi Permiak (Siberia), Kudymkar (northwest of Molotov), Chernov (on the Kama River, north of Molotov. There is nothing to indicate that any of them have ever been returned.).

2.

Over a year ago, the Soviet authorities established camps for prisoners (not necessarily US) taken in Korea by the Sino-North Korean forces. These camps were located at:

- Komsomolsk, on the River Amur
- Magadan, on the bay of Nogaev, Sea of Okhotsk
- Chita
- Irkutsk

Prisoners from both the US and the various cooperating European armies were alike known as Voenno-plenniye Amerikantsi.



(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) CIAAct

-2-

3. In Feb 1952, three hundred US prisoners of war were transported by rail from Chita to Molotov (in Soviet Russia, east of the Ural Mountains). At Chita, in Eastern Siberia, the prisoners were sorted out.
4. The prisoners were dressed in cotton mattress-cover cloth of the Soviet type. They wore no insignia. They traveled on a train of nine cars under strict MVD (Ministry Internal Affairs) guard. They made a long halt at the prison of the city of Gubakha and were not sent on to the prison at Molotov until 5 Apr 52. In Mar 1952 there were reports of other loads of prisoners being transported. These men spoke English among themselves. They were shipped, in groups of about fifty, every fifteen days, though it is not known how long this continued.
5. About this same time, [redacted] a group of prisoners were being sent to Komi Permiak, in the northwestern part of Siberia. Their eventual destinations were Molotov, Gubakha (northwest of Molotov), Kudymkar' also northwest of Molotov), and Chermoz (on the Kama River, north of Molotov). (b)(3) NatSecAct
6. Still another report, dated Apr 1952, reported the presence of US prisoners. These were probably US officers. At Molotov this group of prisoners of war was designated, "American staff group." They were placed in an MVD building and completely isolated from the rest of the world.
7. The camps of Gubakha, Kudymkar' and Chermoz were also isolated and were under control of the MVD. The political control was in charge of a man named Edovin, of the Communist Party organization at Komi-Permiak. The three camps were under direction of a well-known Soviet officer, under the name of Kalypin, rank unknown. (b)(3) NatSecAct
8. In another camp, near the railroad station of Gubakha, called Zapretechdelanki, there were 150 US prisoners. ([redacted] has probably mixed up an "Entrance Forbidden" sign with the name of the camp. [redacted] Russian is mixed, but certainly "zapreshchat" means "to forbid.") (b)(3) NatSecAct
9. These prisoners were kept under constant surveillance by Soviet agents, who knew English perfectly. The Soviet authorities tried their best to build up a list of US prisoners who were not completely hostile to Soviet ideology or who were at least not inveterate foes of it. The US prisoners talked a good deal. In this way, the Soviet agents were able to pick out those men who might be willing to ameliorate their situation by taking an interest in courses of political instruction.
10. Every two or three days, an MVD officer called away one or two prisoners (the Soviet first choices for such instruction). These prisoners never came back to the camp.
11. Some prisoners were sent to the forced labor camps and used in the construction of a railway line. This camp was called Gaysk. These prisoners wore padded tunics of the Russian style and pantaloons. They wore a civilian headdress called "sibirski". Conditions were primitive. Sickness and death rates were high.

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(b)(3) CIAAct

-3-

12. According to information covering the period Aug to Dec 1952, three hundred US prisoners were transported to the camps mentioned above. The total number of prisoners brought in the same direction reached six thousand.

13. According to information received  the following facts may be regarded as established:

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- a. Prisoners were taken by rail from the station of Poset (on the Chinese-Soviet boundary) over the line of the East Siberian Railway. They were taken to the eastern Urals.
- b. Prisoners were also taken by boat from the ports of Bukhta, Okhotsk, and Magadan. They then went by rail or truck to Vaikarem ~~[sic]~~ (on the Sea of Chukost) to Ust Maisk (on the Aldan River) and to Yakutsk (on the Lena River.)
- c. Transportation of prisoners to Vaikarem, or Vakairam, ~~[sic]~~ was followed by their distribution to a network of camps in the region of Nizhni Kolymsk, on the East Siberian Sea. These camps were run by the MVD, under the command of an officer of unknown rank, named Sorochuk (probably an MVD major) and a civilian official named Chimbo.
- d. At the highest possible estimate, there were no more than 12,000 of these prisoners. By Apr 1952, three hundred were dead and 400 had been taken to barracks, gravely ill.

- end -



(b)(3) NatSecAct

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION

018521

COUNTRY USSR (Tyumen Oblast)

REPORT

SUBJECT Soviet Concentration Camps in the Vorkuta Area

DATE DISTR.

23 April 1954

NO. OF PAGES

3 (b)(3) CIAAct

DATE OF INFO.

REQUIREMENT NO.

RD

PLACE ACQUIRED

REFERENCES

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.  
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.  
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

1. The commander of the concentration camp complex in the Vorkuta (N 66-22, E 70-08) area is an MVD officer, Major General Derevyankin. The political officer at Camp No. 14 is Senior Lieutenant Kech. The following are among the camp personnel at Camp No. 2:

- Major Malikov, Camp Commander
- Major Dikhtyaryov, Assistant Camp Commander
- Captain Makhalov, Supply Officer
- Captain Pokhomov, MVD Representative (Upolnomochenny MVD)
- Senior Lieutenant Prokhorov, MVD Representative
- Senior Lieutenant Kalikin, Administrative Officer
- Sergeant Major Mishinko, Assistant to the MVD Representatives
- Sergeant Major Kirilova (female), Head of the Medical Unit.

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

2.

Apparently, single guard units were responsible for guarding more than one camp, since many camps were located within a few kilometers of each other.

3. The city of Vorkuta has a population of approximately 60,000 people. Vorkuta has numerous new cultural buildings. The city is ringed with concentration camps, the prisoners being employed principally in coal mines. There are, however, also other enterprises such as brickyards, sawmills, and a cement factory, which also employ prisoners of the area. The camp numbers [redacted] ranged from 1 to 60. [redacted] Camp Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 14, 29, 30, 55, and 60; [redacted] possibly some of these camps are in an area other (b)(1) the Vorkuta (b)(3) NatSecAct. (See sketch of the Vorkuta camp area on page 3.)

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

4. Camp No. 2 is located approximately 20 kilometers north of Vorkuta on a single-track railroad line. The camp is for political prisoners only. In December 1953 there were 2,700 prisoners at this camp. This camp operated one mine shaft, No. 7. The prisoners worked in the mine 12 hours a day, although the official work-day was nine hours. Crude mining methods were employed.

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STATE	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	FBI		AEC						
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(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

- 2 -

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

5. The following nationalities were represented among the prisoners at Camp No. 2: Western Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Russians, Germans (including Volga Germans), Moldavians, Chechens, Georgians, Armenians, [redacted] Komi, [redacted] Hungarians, Poles, Japanese, and Chinese. Of the Germans, 120 were from Germany as opposed to the Volga Germans. Ten of the 120 Germans were repatriated [redacted]. There were approximately 100 Russians in the camp. The Western Ukrainians and the Lithuanians were by far the largest two national groups at this camp. There were no Koreans at this camp.

(b)(1)  
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

6. There were among the prisoners at Camp No. 2 many who had been sentenced for collaboration with or service in the German Army during World War II. There were, however, no Vlassovites at this camp. Except for the Western Ukrainians, who were called Zapadniki (Westerners) in camp, the various Soviet nationalities got along well together. There was, however, some discrimination against the Germans by the Soviet nationalities, particularly from former collaborators who claimed that the Germans had let them down. The Western Ukrainians were clannish and nasty to all other nationalities. There were a great number of informers among the Western Ukrainians.
7. From the beginning of 1952, the prisoners began to receive pay for their work and their rations were improved. Until August 1953, they received 100 rubles per month in cash and another 100 rubles were credited to their account. This money could be spent in the camp canteen. After August 1953, as the result of a strike (covered below) the prisoners' pay was raised to 150 rubles per month in cash and an equal amount was credited to their account.
8. The daily food ration at this camp for the prisoners was as follows:

200 grams of oat meal,  
650 grams of soup,  
23 grams of meat,  
27 grams of sugar,  
800 grams of bread,  
50 grams of white rolls, and  
20 to 25 grams of fat.

The above ration was known as the "northern ration" (severnnyy payok) and was much larger than the rations in concentration camps farther to the south. It was also more substantial than the average daily food consumed on many kolkhozy. Persons who refused to work had their daily ration reduced to 350 grams of bread and soup.

9. Motion pictures were occasionally shown to the prisoners. The frequency with which movies were shown depended upon the prisoners' achievement of production norms. There were loudspeakers in all barracks buildings. Newspapers and books were also available to the prisoners.
10. The guard personnel wore red shoulder boards with blue piping. Some troops with dark blue shoulder boards occasionally appeared for special checks. The interior guard consisted of middle-aged guards who were friendly to the prisoners. The exterior guard personnel were much younger and unpleasant.
11. There were 5,000 prisoners at Camp No. 14. One of the prisoners was an old Trotskyite who had been a prisoner since 1932. This camp contained a power plant. All particulars on this camp such as food rations, pay, attitude of Western Ukrainians, recreational facilities, etc., are similar to those at Camp No. 2.
12. There was no sign of organized anti-Soviet activity in the prison camp. On the basis of observations made at Camp No. 2 it is clear that prisoners were afraid to discuss politics because of the existence of informers among the prisoners. There were probably groups of friends among the prisoners who trusted each other and perhaps discussed political subjects. There were two young Russian prisoners in Camp No. 2 who had been sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment for distributing anti-Soviet leaflets in Moscow. It is not known whether these men belonged to any organization and what sort of leaflets they had distributed.

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13. Stalin's death did not bring about any improvements in the prison camps, judging from observations in Camp No. 2. Actually, the guards became worse. Improvements had been introduced a year earlier. Judging from extremely limited political conversations, nothing good was expected from Malenkov by the prisoners. The post-Stalin amnesty affected prisoners with five-year terms only, but it did include political prisoners in this category. In general, prisoners who were released had to remain in the Vorkuta area, but some released prisoners with families were sent to free exile settlements in Siberia and Central Asia. The prisoners learned of the 17 June riots in East Germany through Soviet newspapers and loudspeakers in July. Some of the prisoners expected immediate war and thought that arms would be dropped to them by the Americans.

14. As a result of Beriya's arrest a general strike by the prisoners in the Vorkuta area took place, lasting from 22 July to 1 August 1953. Camps No. 2, 3, 14, 29, 30, and possibly others were involved in the strike. The strikers insisted that, since Beriya had been denounced as a traitor and a foreign agent, they were being held illegally, as they had been arrested by Beriya. Soviet citizens demanded immediate release or transfer to free exile areas. Foreigners demanded repatriation or transfer to PW camps. Major General Derevyankin as well as another high MVD official came to Camp No. 2 and probably other camps to talk to the prisoners. The result of the strike was a cutting down of the work-day to nine hours, the removal of numbers from uniforms, higher pay (see paragraph 7), and the removal of certain restrictions. In some camps there was violence on the part of the guards who tried to force the prisoners to go back to work, but this was not the case at Camp No. 2. The strike was viewed as a great success for the prisoners.


15. [Redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

16. [Redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

Germans were released before the completion of their sentences. They were repatriated to Germany by train traveling a circuitous route. Leaving Vorkuta, the train proceeded through Enta, Ukhta (N 63-34, E 53-42), Kotlas (N 61-16, E 46-35), Voroshilovgrad (N 48-34, E 39-20), and then west to Brest-Litovsk (N 52-07, E 23-42). In the early part of the journey they traveled on a separate prison train; later, through Brest-Litovsk and Poland, their car was hitched on to regular passenger trains.

Diagram of Camp Area [Redacted]

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY	USSR (Far East)	REPORT	[Redacted]
SUBJECT	Exploitation of Prisoners-of-War of the Soviets	DATE DISTR.	24 March 1954 (b)(3) CIAAct
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THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.  
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

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1. [Redacted] the Soviet Intelligence Service is exploiting United Nations, particularly US, PWs in China and North Korea. [Redacted] some PWs listed as missing were in fact turned over to the Soviets by the Chinese and North Koreans. These PWs will be screened by the Soviets, and those eventually selected will be trained to be illegal residents either in [Redacted] (b)(1) or in other countries where they can live as Americans. (b)(3) CIAAct
2. Some selected PW personnel will also be used in propaganda work, especially as radio announcers because there is a shortage of this type of personnel.
3. Those PWs who are found to be unsuitable will never be released because they will have learned too much about Soviet PW handling techniques. Use will also be made of the identities and biographies of dead PWs in preparing legends of new Soviet agents.

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