

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

30 April 2021

John Clarke, Esq.
1629 K Street, NW
Suite 300
Washington, DC, 20008

Reference: *Lois Moore, et al v. CIA*, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No: 1:20-cv-01027; F-2020-00473

Dear Mr. Clarke:

This is an interim response to your 25 November 2019 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request submitted by your client, Lois Moore, for the following:

1. **From the period of March 16, 1954, through 1961, all records of the CIA's efforts in undertaking "clandestine and covert action to locate, identify, and recover those U.S. Prisoners of War still in Communist custody"**
2. **An unredacted copy of this report [January 5, 1952, CIA *Information Reports*] together with all intelligence material upon which it was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.**
3. **Please produce the [following] referenced [in July 15, 1952, CIA *Cross Reference Sheet*]:**
 - a. **July 15, 1952 "Basic Communication"**
 - b. **June 24, 1953 "Basic Document"**
 - c. **Information described as "etcetera"**
 - d. **POW Information in, or otherwise "Router to, C.I. File"**
 - e. **POW information related to or bearing the "Cross Reference Number 040"**
 - f. **POW Information related to or bearing the "Classification Number 383.6 Korea."**
4. **All records regarding the June 1, 1951 shoot down and capture over North Korea of the American F-51 piloted by U.S. Air Force Captain Harry Cecil Moore, born February 11, 1924, in Elm Grove, West Virginia, service number AO 711850.**
5. **All records upon which the following statement from February 27, 1952 memo from Chief of Naval Personnel to Commanding General, Far East Air Force was**

based: "It is now believed that there is a possibility that Captain Moore survived and is now a Prisoner of War."

6. All records regarding Captain Moore's incarceration and transportation from North Korea to the Soviet Union, his locations in the Soviet Union, and all evidence that he "may have been interrogated by Soviet officials.
7. An unredacted copy of July 17, 1952, three page *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
8. An unredacted copy of December 31, 1953, *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
9. An unredacted copy of March 24, 1954, *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
10. An unredacted copy of April 23, 1954, *CIA Information Report*.
11. An unredacted copy of April 27, 1954, *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
12. An unredacted copy of December 8, 1954, *CIA Information Report*.
13. Any and all information relating to this Report [January 23, 1992 cable from Embassy Helsinki to Secretary of State]
14. An unredacted copy of March 9, 1988, CIA Memorandum to "US Army Chief, Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action," together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
15. All records relating to any of the POW/MIA's names in the attached list.
16. Any and all records relating that any POW/MIAs may have been held in the prisons identified in the attached list of Russian prison camps.
17. For the period beginning June of 1951, and continuing to the present time, please produce all POW records provided to, or receive from, any office of any component of the Department of Defense, including but not limited to:
 - a. CCRAK
 - b. Air Force 6004 Air Intelligence Service Squadron during the tenure of "Project American."
 - c. Missing in Action Office, including those provided in response to the attached February 12, 1997 letter from U.S. House of Representative James Talent seeking "Intelligence pertaining to American prisoners who were taken to China and the Soviet Union during the war" as well as:
 - i. The 389 American service members who into the 1980's were listed as unaccounted prisoners of war by the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) ii. All U.S. Air Force F-86 pilots who remain unrepatriated.
 - d. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, of AFOSI
 - e. Naval Criminal Investigative Service, or NCIS
 - f. Army Criminal Investigation Command, CID

- g. U.S. Army Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities Far East, or CCRAFE.**
- 18. All POW records prepared by any officer, agent, or employee of the CIA, prepared for the Office of the President including the President's Daily Brief, or PDB, that include information on the possibility of POW's being transferred to the Soviet Union or China.**
 - 19. All records reflecting communications with Members of Congress, or Congressional Oversight committees concerning the capture of American airmen during the Korean conflict who may have been transported to the Soviet Union or China and their presumed fate.**
 - 20. All records concerning POW's and KGB defector Yuri (or Yury) Rastvorov, who informed the United States Government that American military personnel were taken to the Soviet Union during the Korean Conflict. This request includes an unredacted version of the attached page with the heading, "Terminology".**
 - 21. All intelligence material (including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports) concerning statements made by former Czech General Jan Sejna and other former Czech Officials concerning former US POWs held, interrogated and experiment on by Czech and Soviet advisors, and thereafter transferred to China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and the Soviet Union.**

We are processing your request in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.

We have identified eight (8) documents that are responsive to your request. Three (3) documents are being released in full. Four (4) documents may be released in segregable form with redactions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(5) and (b)(6). Exemption (b)(3) pertains to Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 3507, noted as exemption "(b)(3)CIAAct" on the enclosed documents, and/or Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C § 3024(i)(1), noted as exemption "(b)(3)NatSecAct" on the enclosed documents. One (1) document must be withheld in full based on FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) (under the National Security Act of 1947). The releaseable documents are on the enclosed CD.

A final response will be provided to you on a later date.

Sincerely,



Mark Lilly
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED Status: [STAT]
 Report Number: FBIS-SOV-92-028 UDC Number:

Headline: Documents Reveal U.S. POWs Kept in GULAG

Source Line: 92UM0512A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Feb 92 Morning
 Edition p 3

Subslug: [Article by Valeriy Rudnev in the ``IZVESTIYA
 Investigations'' series: ``Where Are Robert Reynolds and
 His Friends? On 8 April 1950, American Pilots Were Downed
 Over the Baltics. Their Fate From Then on Is Unknown.'']

FULL TEXT OF ARTICLE:

1. [Article by Valeriy Rudnev in the ``IZVESTIYA Investigations'' series: ``Where Are Robert Reynolds and His Friends? On 8 April 1950, American Pilots Were Downed Over the Baltics. Their Fate From Then on Is Unknown.'']
2. [Text] Following the fate of our countrymen previously concealed in the secret archives of the Soviet state, the curtain is now beginning to be lifted over the similar fate of foreigners. The truth about the Poles shot in Katyn is already known. Documents on hard labor in the Soviet Union for Japanese prisoners of war have been released. Access has been opened to the files of Italians who were taken prisoner during the Great Patriotic War. The American theme also belongs in this sphere. Much is written about it at present, mainly in conjunction with the secret operations of Soviet secret services involving the internment of American servicemen. IZVESTIYA is embarking on its own investigation of the problem.
3. Lieutenant Robert Reynolds, a U.S. Navy pilot, was downed over the Baltic Sea on 8 April 1950 while on a reconnaissance mission. At any rate, this is what his widow, Jane Reynolds-Howard, maintains in her letter to the head of Soviet State Security, dated 4 November 1991. However, to this day neither she nor the families of other members of the crew-Frank Beckman, Joseph Barass, Tommy Burgess, Joe Denens, John Fett, William Homer, Edward Purcell, Howard Seasheff, and Jack Thomas [names as transliterated]-have received any definite information on their lot from either the American or the Soviet government.
4. Six months after the plane of Robert Reynolds was downed, his two girls, Christine and Caroline, were born. In another six months, Reynolds was officially declared dead. However, Jane hoped for the best. Despite things being very hard for her with two babies and without her husband, she started her own investigation, having abandoned hopes for assistance on the part of officials.

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5. It is known that America is very patriotic. Yuriy Smirnov, chairman of the Russian parliamentary subcommittee for the affairs of prisoners of war, who recently returned from the United States, testified: The unity of what appears to be a mixed and stratified society in its passionate, almost frenzied effort to find its soldiers who failed to return home from foreign lands, and to commemorate them, is striking. However, there are things which America cannot do.

6. At the end of last year, 92 American senators sent a letter to the president of Russia with a request to provide access to the archives of State Security and the GULAG [Main Directorate of Prison Camps] in order to come up with a clear-cut answer to a simple question: Are U.S. citizen prisoners held in Soviet camps or not? American journalists have requested assistance from their Soviet colleagues. Recently, one of the joint investigative reports about MIA's from the Vietnam War was shown in "The Fifth Wheel" on Russian TV. The American collector, Jim Atwood, is prepared to pay \$10,000 to anyone who will obtain documentary evidence concerning at least one fellow American held as a prisoner of war in the Union. If one succeeds in locating a live American prisoner of war the reward will be increased to \$1 million (!). A reward of \$100,000 is also offered for similar information from the American public organization "Accuracy in Media," which published its advertisement in one of the Moscow newspapers. Another public organization, the U.S. National Union of Prisoner of War Families, sent to the KGB a list of 120 names of servicemen, information on whom, as the Union of Families believes, is found in the special archives of the former USSR. The list includes World War II prisoners of war, violators of our airspace downed over our territory, and soldiers and officers missing in action in Laos, Vietnam, Korea, and other countries. The National Union of Families asks that the circumstances of the disappearance of specific individuals, including Robert Reynolds and his comrades, be checked out.

7. FROM A LETTER BY JANE REYNOLDS-HOWARD. "Bob and his comrades were seen in Camp No. 5 in the vicinity of Vorkuta in September 1950. Later, their tracks lead to the area of the Tayshet railroad station in Siberia (Camp No. 20) where an officer from Bob's crew died in one of the hospitals along the Tayshet-Bratsk line. There is information on the sightings of others in the Kolyma camps.

8. Why did we begin our investigation with a specific case? Would it not perhaps be much more important to examine the overall situation—the nature of our presence in Korea, Vietnam, and other hot spots on the planet? Or perhaps look for individuals who, as Russian officials maintain, deserted the U.S. Army in order to seek refuge in

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the territory of the USSR? Or try to unmask malicious schemes by our counterintelligence, and American counterintelligence as well? Of course, it is tempting for a journalist to work on such issues. However, let us not verify or denounce anybody for now. Let us just try to help a common American, Jane Reynolds-Howard, and her children, Christine and Caroline. Let us look at an episode which, by all signs, was typical of the "cold war" which (let us hope) is already past us. This was a war where no battles were fought openly, where enemy personnel were not taken prisoner or declared prisoners of war. Operations in the course of that war were conducted in secret, and people disappeared without a trace. However, it was not without a trace. The trace led to archives. This was where we began our search for Lieutenant Robert Reynolds and his comrades.

9. The Central State Special Archive. This is where the files of the Main Directorate for the Affairs of Prisoners of War and Internees are. Viktor Bondarev, director of the special archive, allowed IZVESTIYA staff to become familiar with some personal files of Americans classified "Top Secret." Of course, we did not find any genuine state secrets. At present, the materials of the special archive are quite accessible to researchers.

10. There were thin files in official looking covers. Registration file for prisoner of war Herman Sh. Camp No. 62, registration file No. 2744. Year and place of birth- 1923, Los Angeles. Property status of father-a house, 150 hectares of orchards. Date of arrival in camp-10 August 1944. The file was closed because of his death on 26 April 1945. Diagnosis-dystrophy. Buried at a public cemetery in Kiev.

11. Registration file of prisoner of war Charles G. Roy. Place of birth-New York. Taken prisoner in 1945. The file was closed on 12 February 1947 in conjunction with him being sent home.

12. V. Bondarev said: "According to data in the special archive as of today, during the entire Great Patriotic War, 108 American prisoners who fought on the side of Fascist Germany, ended up in our territory. After a short stay in Special Camp No. 188 in Tambov Oblast, 68 of them were freed and sent to their native country. Fourteen of them died, and the places of their burial have been determined. The fate of another 26 is not known for sure at present. At least as of 1947, they were entered in documents as being incarcerated in a camp. Probably, they were also handed over to the American side (in the main, the repatriation of Americans was over by 1950). We are now checking out the documentation based on this version. We are verifying the available lists."

13. [Rudnev] However, there are assertions in the press concerning

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thousands of American prisoners of war from the period of the Great Patriotic War.

14. [Bondarev] Apparently, this is about the thousands of our allies taken prisoner by the Germans, liberated by us, and sent to America through Odessa.

15. [Rudnev] What about the fate of U.S. citizens who could have ended up in GULAG camps after 1950?

16. [Bondarev] Our archive has materials concerning the prisoners of war of the Great Patriotic War only.

17. [Rudnev] Is this to say that you will not be able to clarify the fate of Robert Reynolds and his comrades who were downed over the Baltic Sea in April 1950?

18. [Bondarev] I cannot help you with this. Look for pertinent information in other archives.

19. We went to the addresses indicated.

20. Main Administration of Corrections. This militia establishment has information on those who are serving time for crimes committed in the territory of our country. Naturally, we approached them. After all, the R. Reynolds episode is somewhat reminiscent of another one, that of F. Powers who was downed in 1960, convicted for espionage, and for a while served time in a Soviet corrective labor facility.

21. The management of GUID [Main Administration of Corrections] knows about American servicemen who are supposedly held in Soviet camps from newspapers. According to the documents of the corrective labor facilities of our country, there are no American servicemen there at present. One of the GUID managers specified: "Not just servicemen, but other American citizens have not been held in our camps since at least 1970. There are Vietnamese, Arabs, Koreans, and citizens of other countries. The only citizen of Israel is serving time based on a court sentence. However, we do not have Americans. However, give us time and we will verify it. After all, we do not have any special secrets. People end up in our camps only on the basis of court sentences. Besides, the only camp for foreigners in our country is in the limelight. Dozens of delegations have already visited it."

22. Ministry of Defense, the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Armed Forces. There is a reason for our interest in the archives of the military establishment: Reynolds could only have been downed by the military; the exact date of this incident was known, and only

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details had to be established. However, it was not that easy. We could not even get into the Ministry of Defense: Everything came down to short conversations over the phone. Indeed, there is a problem..., we need to verify this and resolve the issue of declassifying certain documents..., of course, the public is entitled to know the truth..., however, I am not aware of this, you had better call N. So, yet another telephone number appeared in my notebook (by now there are 13). The telephone number of Chief of General Staff V. Samsonov became No. 13. As officers from the Ministry of Defense said, only he could authorize verification of the specific case involving Robert Reynolds. However, so far I have not succeeded in getting through to the general. This is why I will take advantage of this opportunity and write a short note to him: 'Esteemed Viktor Nikolayevich! Of course, we are interested in the opinion of the military on the topic of American prisoners of war which is being discussed in the press. We understand that a full search of the archives and the resolution of the issue of the classification of documents take time. This is why we are asking you to check out just one episode of the 'cold war': 8 April 1950, a U.S. Navy plane, the Baltic.'

23. FROM A LETTER BY JANE REYNOLDS-HOWARD. 'Bob and his comrades have long earned your forgiveness. The time has come to send American prisoners home. This action would initiate the healing of the wounds in the hearts of many Americans. I pray for you and your wife every day.'

24. Let us recall that Jane wrote this letter to the head of Soviet State Security, by now a former leader, who resolved to implement profound reforms in the KGB, and who took a step which is unusual in the practice of operations by special services: He handed over to the Americans monitoring equipment installed in the embassy building. How will the new leadership of state security behave?

25. Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation. This is how the former KGB is now called. However, we were greeted benevolently at the ministry, despite the fact that at present it is involved for the most part in restructuring and personnel reassignments. They even assigned an officer to help us.

26. I will admit that we were shown both the letter by Jane Reynolds-Howard and a picture of Lieutenant Reynolds at Lubyanka. At present, they believe that it is stupid to make secrets of such incidents because this gives rise to rumors, idle talk, or even false fabrications about the operation of Soviet special services. However, it is paradoxical that the formerly mighty establishment which held all the secrets of the state under its control has now disintegrated. The once joint archives are now in the jurisdiction of different chiefs. It is not all that easy even for the officers of State

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Security to respond now to a question about what transpired in the sky over the Baltic Sea on 8 April 1950. Even if the officers find this out they will not be able to reveal it: Many documents are classified ``Top Secret.``

27. Is there a way out? At Lubyanka, they believe that, in principle, the issue should be resolved with the participation of interested parties—the parliament, the government, the military, and the special services. This is also what the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Supreme Soviet, and the staff of the president believe. However, everything takes time.

28. Well, let us wait. Meanwhile, since we do not count on familiarizing ourselves with archival documents soon, let us turn to the memories of the people. Please let us know if you have any information about the incident involving Robert Reynolds or his fellow crew members, or if you can clarify the circumstances described in his wife's letter. Let us try to help at least several American families. It is our duty as people.

29. FROM A LETTER BY JANE REYNOLDS-HOWARD. ``I do not feel hostile toward the Soviet people. I understand the situation of Bob and his comrades which brought them to the Soviet GULAG. Of course, my data may seem unconvincing. This is why I ask for help in learning the whole truth about my husband and his comrades, no matter how sad it is...

30. In the picture: Lieutenant Robert Reynolds in 1950.

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED Status: [STAT]
 Report Number: FBIS-SOV-92-036 UDC Number:

Headline: Status of Quest for U.S. MIA's Updated

Source Line: MK2202123092 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 22
 Feb 92 p 4

Subslug: [Vladimir Abarinov article: ``Investigation: Prisoners of War Have Own Archipelago. U.S. Prisoners in Former USSR Still Not Martyrology'']

FULL TEXT OF ARTICLE:

1. [Vladimir Abarinov article: ``Investigation: Prisoners of War Have Own Archipelago. U.S. Prisoners in Former USSR Still Not Martyrology'']
2. [Text] The search for U.S. servicemen who disappeared on USSR territory in various circumstances has been stepped recently. We would remind you that NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA first addressed this problem last August. Since then there has been virtually no progress. However, available information and experience of similar searches gives us every reason to expect success.
3. For starters I must repeat some figures, since those doing the rounds in our press are imprecise and do not differentiate between prisoners of war [POW's] and those missing in action [MIA's] and are often rounded up- presumably, for the writer's convenience.
4. During the Korean war the United States lost 8,177 MIA's and 954 people who it is known for certain were captured and did not return home alive or dead. After the war in Indochina the Americans were missing 2,273 men, of whom 1,678 disappeared in Vietnam, while none of the 500 or more airmen brought down over Laos were repatriated.
5. Air crews downed near the Soviet borders-there were 86 of them in the fifties and sixties-form a separate category of MIA's. Moreover, in most cases the entire crew disappeared.
6. A considerable proportion of the prisoners dating back to the Korean and Vietnam wars were evidently never held on USSR territory-the exception being people of some operational interest. Americans ``liberated'' by the Red Army from Nazi jails in the Balkans, in Poland, and East Germany (and incidentally from Japanese jails in Manchuria) are another matter. Some 20,000 of them failed to return home.
7. Last, officers abducted by the Soviet special services in Berlin,

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Vienna, and certain other points in the Soviet occupied zone during the early postwar years form a special group of MIA's. There are 18 such people in my file.

8. So, where should we look for them?

9. The countless references to the Gulag are totally incorrect: This is quite a justifiable euphemism for U.S. journalists, but for national journalists it is a true indication of incompetence. There were never any POW's in the Gulag—they were dealt with by another main commissariat of the NKVD-MGB [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs—Ministry of State Security], namely the Main Directorate for POW and Internee Affairs, which had its own camps. People convicted of espionage and other real or imaginary crimes are another matter. They not only could have but should have ended up in the Gulag (which was until recently called the GUITU, now the GUID [expansions unknown]).

10. They dealt in the same way with people who did not agree to be recruited or to cooperate in other ways and also with those whose services were no longer needed. The story of Stanislaw Swianewicz is typical; he escaped execution in the Katyn forest in 1940 at the last moment owing to a request from the USSR NKVD Main Directorate for State Security. Sitting in the inner Lubyanka jail, he wrote a treatise on the economy of the Third Reich (Professor Swianewicz was an unsurpassed specialist in this field), after which he was convicted and sent to a camp. These people were often kept in special jails as a "special contingent"—for example, before being exchanged for Rulof Abel, Francis Gary Powers served time in Vladimir jail. What is more, a foreigner could be under investigation for as long as they liked. Prominent Wehrmacht and SS officers captured at the end of the war were only sentenced in 1951–1952. Throughout these six or seven years they were kept in the Lubyanka jail, often in solitary confinement, both before and after sentencing. The same thing happened if there were any special circumstances: That happened, for instance, to Raoul Wallenberg's cellmates and fellow defendants.

11. There are known cases of prisoners (under investigation) being summoned from their cell "with their things" and disappearing without trace. That was the fate that befell Brigade General Leopold Okulice, commander of the Krajowa Army, who was sentenced to 10 years in the camps in June 1945 by the military collegium of the Supreme Court. Okulice's personal prison file was declassified recently, revealing that he died as a result of a failed surgical operation.

12. There were cases of a prisoner liable to repatriation not returning home either. That was the fate of Lieutenant General Reiner Stagel, one of the butchers during the Warsaw uprising. Sentenced to

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25 years in jail and then amnestied, he did not reach the fatherland: The last document in his file is a burial certificate from one of the transit camps. You only have to destroy this last document, and the disappearance of the repatriant would be shrouded in mystery forever.

13. Quite often on his release a prisoner would remain under open surveillance, have his movements restricted, and be given a Russian name. The example of the former Greek Communist Party General Secretary Nikos Zakhariadis, who lived in Surgut under the name Nikolay Nikolayevich Nikolayev and committed suicide in 1979, is not entirely typical: His party colleagues knew of his situation. More often a prisoner did not have an opportunity to make himself known and, when the opportunity did arise, he was already as a rule totally assimilated, had a family, and could not even imagine returning. The author knows of several people like that, including people who are currently prospering—admittedly not Americans.

14. Last, a prisoner might have been executed under Article 58 of the RSFSR Criminal Code (usually charged with espionage or terrorism) or under the decree of 19 April 1943 if the accused were Wehrmacht servicemen or an "accomplice" of the occupiers. I have already written about this hitherto secret act, which has presumably lost its legal validity, that made provision for death by hanging. As far as I am aware, the Belgian national Yermak Lukyanov [name as transliterated] was executed under the draconian decree in May 1984.

15. The idea that U.S. pilots could have fought in Korea and Vietnam under assumed names, as was the practice in our country, must be considered groundless. U.S. Army Field Regulation FM 21-76 ("Survival, Avoidance of Capture, and Escape from Jail") in the chapter "Conduct Under Interrogation" recommends that a prisoner give his true name, rank, number, and date of birth. That was how the surviving crew members from the RB-47 aircraft downed over the Barents Sea 1 July 1960 behaved. Their story could serve as a model of what did happen or might have happened to U.S. pilots brought down near Soviet borders.

16. Second pilot Bruce Olsted and navigator John Makkoun [surnames as transliterated] spent almost seven months in Lubyanka. The interrogation indicates that investigator Colonel Pankratov prepared the trial on the basis of the Powers trial. The pilots were freed right after John Kennedy's inauguration as a "goodwill gesture" but only because no confessions were extracted from them. So Americans most likely gave their real names, although prisoners were nearly always given different names in jails and camps.

17. There is another specific difficulty. People of German, Japanese, and Italian descent served in the U.S. Army. It is quite

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possible that these people could have gone to a camp on the basis of 'national allegiance,' especially since the Soviet Union never committed itself to complying with the Hague and Geneva conventions whereby military uniform is the crucial indication of citizenship.

18. In short, the practice of Soviet punitive organs illustrates that anything could have happened to prisoners. Yet there is nothing fantastic about the hope of finding Americans alive or at least traces of them.

19. The reports of Americans in Soviet camps and jails are specific enough to be able to start checking them out. There was a camp somewhere in Belarus in 1945 for black soldiers-nearby inhabitants would hardly have forgotten such an exotic detail. Colonel Gordon, arrested in Vienna in 1949, was seen in Lvov transit jail in 1953. An unnamed lieutenant and NCO [noncommissioned officer], participants in the Korean war, were seen at a phosphorus mine near Yakutsk (Camp No. 307) in 1960. Lieutenant Warren Sanderson was seen at Inte, and Pilot Joe Miller was seen at Karabas in March 1947-he had been brought down over Berlin in 1945. Colonel Jackson, arrested in Berlin, was seen in Dubrovlag (the report is dated mid-1953). The crew of a B-29 brought down over the Sea of Japan 13 July 1952 (13 men) were kept in Khabarovsk POW Camp No. 21 (October 1951), while one of the members of a crew brought down there 6 November 1951 was seen in a military hospital north of Magadan (1954). This pilot served 25 years for espionage. In both cases the reports have come from repatriated Japanese.

20. Dzhezkazgan, Magnitogorsk, Perm, Norilsk, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Pechora, Potma, Tayshet, Verkhneuralsk, Vladivostok, Vologda, Vrangal Island, Yavas, the renowned Vladimir Jail OD-1/st-2 [expansion unknown]-familiar names. Sometimes an American is cited by name, often not, but in these cases minimal additional information is given, for instance: date and place of capture, rank, category of troops. The most detailed information concerns the Vorkuta camps: Mine No. 40-William Bizet [surname as transliterated] from Korea, a lieutenant or NCO convicted under Article 58; Camp No. 6-Major Robert Shvarts [surname as transliterated], abducted in Kassel in 1949; Convalescent Camp-crew of a U.S. Navy Privateer aircraft brought down over the Baltic 8 April 1950 (10 men); Colonel Davison, abducted in Vienna in 1946, is also there.

21. Dmitriy Volkogonov has recently provided documentary confirmation once again that U.S. World War II prisoners were kept in Tambov's 'Rada' (No. 188) POW camp. The colonel general was clearly hasty in declaring his discovery a sensation: In this case it is a question of Americans who served in the German Army (there were at least 108 such people in the Tambov camp, according to 'special'

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archive figures).

22. I must particularly point out that documents concerning POW's and MIA's are still secret in the United States or have been only partially declassified. That is why in a number of cases we do not know the names of the Americans concerned or the source of the information- this information is carefully obliterated when the documents are declassified.

23. There is a great deal of shady business regarding the problem of POW's and MIA's. At one time NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA reported on a photograph that had caused a sensation in the West. It showed three U.S. pilots brought down over North Vietnam and Laos in 1966, 1969, and 1970. The photograph was dated May 1990. I remember a Pentagon spokesman saying that the photograph was a montage. The journal from which the falsifiers (''Cambodian opportunists'') cut the pictures-SOVETSKIY SOYUZ No. 1, 1990-was even named, and it was indicated that it had even been taken out of the Soviet Embassy library in Phnom Penh. It is hard to believe that the mother and the wives of the MIA's did not recognize their close relatives, but that is not the point: This journal is lying in front of me and there is nothing resembling the Cambodian photograph in it.

24. Late last year a KOMMERSANT report that one of the pilots brought down over Vietnam was still living in Kazakhstan caused a great deal of ballyhoo. The reporter for some reason decided not to disclose the pilot's name, however he gave the date that he was captured, from which it is easy to elucidate that he is Navy Lt. James Kelly Patterson, born 14 July 1940, who lived in Long Beach, California, before the war. I have something to say about Patterson. Patterson was a navigator in the crew under the command of Captain Eugene MacDaniel, now the prosperous founder and president of the U.S. Rehabilitation Institute, who spent six years in a Vietnamese jail. He said in an interview last year that he had once received a telephone call from the National Security Council asking him to stop making public statements about MIA's.

25. It is no wonder that the search has as yet had insignificant results.

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SERIAL: MK2202123292
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 COUNTRY: CIS
 SUEJ: TAKE 2 OF 3 -- STATUS OF QUEST FOR U.S. MIA'S UUPDATED
 REF: MK2202123092 MOSCOW NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA RUSSIAN 22 FEB///
 IN MYSTERY FOREVER.

TEXT:

((TEXT)) QUITE OFTEN ON HIS RELEASE A PRISONER WOULD REMAIN UNDER OPEN SURVEILLANCE, HAVE HIS MOVEMENTS RESTRICTED, AND BE GIVEN A RUSSIAN NAME. THE EXAMPLE OF THE FORMER GREEK COMMUNIST PARTY GENERAL SECRETARY NIKOS ZAKHARIADIS, WHO LIVED IN SURGUT UNDER THE NAME NIKOLAY NIKOLAYEVICH NIKOLAYEV AND COMMITTED SUICIDE IN 1979, IS NOT ENTIRELY TYPICAL: HIS PARTY COLLEAGUES KNEW OF HIS SITUATION. MORE OFTEN A PRISONER DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE HIMSELF KNOWN AND, WHEN THE OPPORTUNITY DID ARISE, HE WAS ALREADY AS A RULE TOTALLY ASSIMILATED, HAD A FAMILY, AND COULD NOT EVEN IMAGINE RETURNING. THE AUTHOR KNOWS OF SEVERAL PEOPLE LIKE THAT, INCLUDING PEOPLE WHO ARE CURRENTLY PROSPERING -- ADMITTEDLY NOT AMERICANS.

LAST, A PRISONER MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXECUTED UNDER ARTICLE 58 OF THE RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST REPUBLIC CRIMINAL CODE (USUALLY CHARGED WITH ESPIONAGE OR TERRORISM) OR UNDER THE DECREE OF 19 APRIL 1943 IF THE ACCUSED WERE WEHRMACHT SERVICEMEN OR AN "ACCOMPLICE" OF THE OCCUPIERS. I HAVE ALREADY WRITTEN ABOUT THIS HITHERTO SECRET ACT, WHICH HAS PRESUMABLY LOST ITS LEGAL VALIDITY, THAT MADE PROVISION FOR DEATH BY HANGING. AS FAR AS I AM AWARE, THE BELGIAN NATIONAL YERMAK LUKYANOV ((NAME AS TRANSLITERATED)) WAS EXECUTED UNDER THE DRACONIAN DECREE IN MAY 1984.

THE IDEA THAT U.S. PILOTS COULD HAVE FOUGHT IN KOREA AND VIETNAM UNDER ASSUMED NAMES, AS WAS THE PRACTICE IN OUR COUNTRY, MUST BE CONSIDERED GROUNDLESS. U.S. ARMY FIELD REGULATION FM 21-76 ("SURVIVAL, AVOIDANCE OF CAPTURE, AND ESCAPE FROM JAIL") IN THE CHAPTER "CONDUCT UNDER INTERROGATION" RECOMMENDS THAT A PRISONER GIVE HIS TRUE NAME, RANK, NUMBER, AND DATE OF BIRTH. THAT WAS HOW THE SURVIVING CREW MEMBERS FROM THE RB-47 AIRCRAFT DOWNED OVER THE BARENTS SEA 1 JULY 1960 BEHAVED. THEIR STORY COULD SERVE AS A MODEL OF WHAT DID HAPPEN OR MIGHT HAVE HAPPENED TO U.S. PILOTS BROUGHT DOWN NEAR SOVIET BORDERS.

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SECOND PILOT BRUCE OLSTED AND NAVIGATOR JOHN MAKKOUN ((SURNAMES AS TRANSLITERATED)) SPENT ALMOST SEVEN MONTHS IN THE LUBYANKA. THE INTERROGATION INDICATES THAT INVESTIGATOR COLONEL PANKRATOV PREPARED THE TRIAL ON THE BASIS OF THE POWERS TRIAL. THE PILOTS WERE FREED RIGHT AFTER JOHN KENNEDY'S INAUGURATION AS A "GOOD WILL GESTURE," BUT ONLY BECAUSE NO CONFESSIONS WERE EXTRACTED FROM THEM. SO AMERICANS MOST LIKELY GAVE THEIR REAL NAMES, ALTHOUGH PRISONERS WERE NEARLY ALWAYS GIVEN DIFFERENT NAMES IN JAILS AND CAMPS.

THERE IS ANOTHER SPECIFIC DIFFICULTY. PEOPLE OF GERMAN, JAPANESE AND ITALIAN DESCENT SERVED IN THE U.S. ARMY. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THESE PEOPLE COULD HAVE GONE TO A CAMP ON THE BASIS OF "NATIONAL ALLEGIANCE," ESPECIALLY SINCE THE SOVIET UNION NEVER COMMITTED ITSELF TO COMPLYING WITH THE HAGUE AND GENEVA CONVENTIONS WHEREBY MILITARY UNIFORM IS THE CRUCIAL INDICATION OF CITIZENSHIP.

IN SHORT, THE PRACTICE OF SOVIET PUNITIVE ORGANS ILLUSTRATES THAT ANYTHING COULD HAVE HAPPENED TO PRISONERS. YET THERE IS NOTHING FANTASTIC ABOUT THE HOPE OF FINDING AMERICANS ALIVE OR AT LEAST TRACES OF THEM.

THE REPORTS OF AMERICANS IN SOVIET CAMPS AND JAILS ARE SPECIFIC ENOUGH TO BE ABLE TO START CHECKING THEM OUT. THERE WAS A CAMP SOMEWHERE IN BELORUSSIA IN 1945 FOR BLACK SOLDIERS -- NEARBY INHABITANTS WOULD HARDLY HAVE FORGOTTEN SUCH AN EXOTIC DETAIL. COLONEL GORDON, ARRESTED IN VIENNA IN 1949, WAS SEEN IN LVOV TRANSIT JAIL IN 1953. AN UNNAMED LIEUTENANT AND NCO, PARTICIPANTS IN THE KOREAN WAR, WERE SEEN AT A PHOSPHORUS MINE NEAR YAKUTSK (CAMP NO. 307) IN 1960. LIEUTENANT WARREN SANDERSON WAS SEEN AT INTE. AND PILOT JOE MILLER WAS SEEN AT KARABAS IN MARCH 1947 -- HE HAD BEEN BROUGHT DOWN OVER BERLIN IN 1945. COLONEL JACKSON, ARRESTED IN BERLIN, WAS SEEN IN DUBROVLAK (THE REPORT IS DATED MID-1953). THE CREW OF A B-29 BROUGHT DOWN OVER THE SEA OF JAPAN 13 JULY 1952 (13 MEN) WERE KEPT IN Khabarovsk POW CAMP NO. 21 (OCTOBER 1951), WHILE ONE OF THE MEMBERS OF A CREW BROUGHT DOWN THERE 6 NOVEMBER 1951 WAS SEEN IN A MILITARY HOSPITAL NORTH OF MAGADAN (1954). THIS PILOT SERVED 25 YEARS FOR ESPIONAGE. IN BOTH CASES THE REPORTS HAVE COME FROM REPATRIATED JAPANESE.

DZHEZKAZGAN, MAGNITOGORSK. PERM, NORILSK, NOVOSIBIRSK, OMSK, PECHORA, POTMA, TAYSHET, VERKHNEURALSK, VLADIVOSTOK, VOLOGDA, VRANGEL ISLAND, YAVAS, THE RENOWNED VLADIMIR JAIL OD-1/ST-2 ((EXPANSION UNKNOWN))... FAMILIAR NAMES. SOMETIMES AN AMERICAN IS CITED BY NAME, OFTEN NOT, BUT IN THESE CASES MINIMAL ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS GIVEN, FOR INSTANCE: DATE AND PLACE OF CAPTURE, RANK, CATEGORY OF TROOPS. THE MOST DETAILED INFORMATION CONCERNS THE VORKUTA CAMPS: MINE NO. 40 -- WILLIAM BIZET ((SURNAME AS TRANSLITERATED)) FROM KOREA, A LIEUTENANT OR NCO CONVICTED UNDER ARTICLE 58; CAMP NO. 6 -- MAJOR ROBERT (?) SHVARTS ((SURNAME AS TRANSLITERATED)), ABDUCTED IN KASSEL IN 1949; CONVALESCENT CAMP -- CREW OF A U.S. NAVY PRIVATEER AIRCRAFT BROUGHT DOWN OVER THE BALTIC 8 APRIL 1950 (10 MEN); COLONEL DAVISON, ABDUCTED IN VIENNA IN 1946, IS ALSO THERE.

DMITRIY VOLKOGONOV HAS RECENTLY PROVIDED DOCUMENTARY CONFIRMATION ONCE AGAIN THAT U.S. WORLD WAR II PRISONERS WERE KEPT IN TAMBOV'S "RADA" (NO. 188) POW CAMP. THE COLONEL GENERAL WAS CLEARLY HASTY IN DECLARING HIS DISCOVERY A SENSATION: IN THIS CASE IT IS A QUESTION

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OF AMERICANS WHO SERVED IN THE GERMAN ARMY (THERE WERE AT LEAST 108 SUCH PEOPLE IN THE TAMBOV CAMP, ACCORDING TO "SPECIAL" ARCHIVE FIGURES).

I MUST PARTICULARLY POINT OUT THAT DOCUMENTS CONCERNING POW'S AND MIA'S ARE STILL SECRET IN THE UNITED STATES OR HAVE BEEN ONLY PARTIALLY DECLASSIFIED. THAT IS WHY IN A NUMBER OF CASES WE DO NOT KNOW THE NAMES OF THE AMERICANS CONCERNED OR THE SOURCE OF THE INFORMATION -- THIS INFORMATION IS CAREFULLY OBLITERATED WHEN THE DOCUMENTS ARE DECLASSIFIED.

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27 September 1993



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Mon Sep 27 06:47:26 1993

AP--rw PM-USPOWs

Story: a0429

Time: 09-27-93 0015EDT

Ref:

PM-US POWs, Bjt, 980

U.S. Claims Hundreds Of American POWs From Korea Were Taken To USSR

By ROBERT BURNS

Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) — The U.S. government says it has "broad and convincing" evidence that the Soviet Union secretly and illegally moved hundreds of U.S. Korean War prisoners to its territory in the early 1950s and never released them.

It is by far the most dramatic and comprehensive assertion by Washington on a Soviet connection to missing U.S. servicemen since the Korean fighting ended in 1953.

The allegation was made in a detailed presentation by a senior State Department official at a meeting with Russian officials in Moscow earlier this month.

The evidence is detailed in a 77-page report titled "The Transfer of U.S. Korean War POWs to the Soviet Union." It was given to the Russians at the Moscow meeting but the Clinton administration has refused to publicly release it.

A copy of the report was obtained by The Associated Press.

"The Soviets transferred several hundred U.S. Korean War POWs to the USSR and did not repatriate them," the report said. "This transfer was mainly politically motivated with the intent of holding them as political hostages, subjects for intelligence exploitation and skilled labor within the camp system."

It asserted that the evidence gave a "consistent and mutually reinforcing description" of Soviet intelligence services forcibly moving U.S. POWs to the USSR at a time when Soviet forces, including anti-aircraft units, were active in North Korea.

It did not assess how long the American servicemen — mostly Air Force aviators — may have lived, or whether any might still be alive in the former Soviet Union.

Just last year the U.S. government said it had no evidence of such transfers. Washington has known, though, since the end of the war that some evidence existed that U.S. POWs from Korea had been taken to the Soviet Union. It asked Moscow for information on this in May 1954 and again in July 1956. Both times the Soviet government denied any knowledge of U.S. POWs on its soil.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin said last year that Soviet records showed 59 captured U.S. servicemen in Korea were interrogated by Soviet officials, and that 12 crew members of U.S. aircraft shot down in reconnaissance missions unrelated to the Korea war were transferred to Soviet territory. But the Yeltsin government has yet to concede that Americans were taken from Korea.

In the three years of fighting in Korea, in which the United States led a U.N. force on the side of South Korea against communist North Korea, 54,246 Americans were killed. The government lists 8,140 as unaccounted for, although the number of missing for which there is no direct evidence of death is estimated at 2,195. Many of the "unaccounted for" were not recovered because they were buried in battlefield graves in North Korea or died in POW

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camps.

The U.S. report on U.S. Korean War prisoners taken to the Soviet Union gave no specific figure but the analysis seemed to indicate it is fewer than 600.

It identified by name 31 missing Air Force F-86 fighter pilots who are among the most likely identifiable servicemen to have been taken by the Soviets for their knowledge of the plane's capabilities, plus six other Air Force aviators about whom the U.S. government believes Russia has additional information.

The report describes a top-secret program of the Soviet MGB (predecessor to the KGB) to capture American fliers and other U.S. and allied troops in Korea, interrogate them, and then transfer them into Joseph Stalin's notorious Gulag system of slave labor camps in Siberia and other parts of the Soviet Union.

"The range of eyewitness testimony as to the presence of U.S. Korean War POWs in the Gulag is so broad and convincing that we cannot dismiss it," the report said, adding that the prisoners probably were forced to assume new identities.

Since the report was written, a retired Russian colonel has come forward and told investigators for the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission for POWs-MIAs that a man he saw twice at a Siberian prison in the mid-1960s was described to him by the prison commander as an American brought there from the Gulag system.

The Russian colonel, Vladimir Malinin, said the man in the prison bore a convincing resemblance to Marine Corps Sgt. Philip Vincent Mandra, who disappeared on the northern Korean battlefield in August 1952 after an encounter with Chinese troops. U.S. officials view Malinin's testimony as credible, though not conclusive, evidence that Mandra was in the Siberian prison.

The report given to the Russians this month is based on a variety of sources: U.S. government records dating to the beginning of the Korean conflict in 1950, documents made available by Moscow since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and recent interviews by U.S. investigators with former Soviet officials, including retired officers who said they participated in the transfers.

The report said the Soviet intelligence apparatus had gained extensive experience with using POWs in the Gulag during World War II, and that when Stalin ordered the invasion of South Korea in June 1950 it simply expanded the practice.

"By the middle of 1950, the Soviet Union had at hand a vast, well-practiced, efficiently operating and profitable system for the collection, incarceration and exploitation of POWs" — American, South Korean and others, it said.

One hub of the Soviet operation against allied POWs was Khabarovsk, in extreme southeastern Russia, the report said. Prisoners were taken there from Korea, interrogated by military intelligence agents and then shipped off to labor camps in the Soviet interior. It said at least one American was taken to Moscow.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
REPORT CLASS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~-WMINTEL--NOFORN
DIST: 3 JUNE 1986

COUNTRY: NORTH KOREA

SUBJ: POSSIBLE LOCATION OF REMAINS OF U.S. SOLDIERS WHO DIED
DURING THE KOREAN WAR; PRISONERS OF WAR ALLEGEDLY STILL
LIVING IN NORTH KOREA

DOI: SPRING 1985 - FEBRUARY 1986

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

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A D D E N D U M

TEXT: 1. AN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE WITH THE ABOVE
HEADING AND NUMBER WAS ISSUED ON 4 APRIL 1986. THE SOURCE HAS
PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN RESPONSE TO
FURTHER REQUIREMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT.

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2. IN FEBRUARY 1986 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] LEARNED OF THE DISCOVERY OF
HUMAN REMAINS IN THE CH'ANGJIN-HO AREA OF NORTH KOREA FROM
TUK-NAM, A DIRECTOR IN CHARGE OF FILMS IN THE KOREAN WORKERS'

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[REDACTED] THE REMAINS OF FEWER THAN TEN
INDIVIDUALS WERE UNEARTHED FIVE YEARS AGO; MANY HAD DOG TAGS.
AFTER DISCOVERY THE REMAINS WERE LEFT IN THE SAME PLACE AND
COVERED OVER.

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3. PRISONERS OF WAR (POW) HAVE NOT APPEARED IN ANY
FILMS OTHER THAN THE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED "NAMELESS HEROES."

4. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: SOURCE DID NOT KNOW THE
EXACT NUMBER OF DOG TAGS RECOVERED WITH THE REMAINS. HE HAD NO
INFORMATION ON THE DISCOVERY OF ANY OTHER REMAINS OF U.S. OR
THIRD-COUNTRY PERSONNEL IN NORTH KOREA. HE WAS AWARE OF NO POW
BEING HELD IN NORTH KOREA OTHER THAN THE INDIVIDUAL WHO REPORTDLY
PLAYED A ROLE IN THE FILM "NAMELESS HEROES." HE HAD NO
INFORMATION ON WHERE POWS WERE HELD.)

ACQ: (LATE MAY 1986).

ACTION DIA(1) (U,6,7)
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28 NOVEMBER 1952

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Korea

T W O C A M P S

KOREAN WAR

Moscow Stresses Repatriation Principle: The consistent Communist emphasis on the principle of repatriation of all prisoners of war and denunciation of the U.S. advocacy of no forced repatriation remain the dominant elements in Moscow comment on the U.N. debates on Korea. The Soviet position is made explicit in the Vishinsky speech on 24 November in which the Indian draft resolution is denounced. Communist objection to the 17 November resolution became evident in a 20 November TASS review of the proposal reporting the similarity between the Indian resolution and the U.S. position. TASS reports the "uneasiness" of other delegations as a result of the Menon speech, but there is no emphasis on Western disunity.

More explicit Communist opposition to the resolution was contained in a commentary on 22 November which "rumored" that the U.S. "has decided to take a favorable stand on this draft resolution." This broadcast charges that the resolution "is based on the principle of forcible screening and detention of war prisoners" and declares that the functions of the proposed repatriation commission would consist "of running the concentration camps where the war prisoners would languish." The "doom" awaiting these war prisoners is likened to the "tragic fate of the displaced persons who, after the second world war were forcibly detained ... and then became the slaves of landowners and capitalists." This may be an attempt by Moscow to discredit the position of the West in granting political asylum to war prisoners. Previous Moscow comment has rejected the concept of asylum for POWs and has insisted that the prisoners were being detained to provide cannonfodder for the armies of Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee.

Attention to Communist-Proposed Commission Fades: Comment on the Communist-proposed Korean Commission--which had been touted as making possible peaceful settlement of the Korean question--disappears as the Indian proposal comes under attack. The 10 November Vishinsky speech endorsing and elaborating on this commission was broadcast 87 times, compared to the 167 and 101 devoted to his first two U.N. speeches. A commentary by Romanov on 16 November--broadcast to the UK only--continued the trend toward greater specificity on this proposed commission and seemed to indicate the importance placed upon it by the Communists. Romanov called for "action" as opposed to the "talk of principles," for "only action can advance the Korean truce talks." He also suggested that "the only way to continue the (truce) talks is to transfer them to a higher level," presumably the Korean commission. The importance of a resumption of the truce talks is emphasized by Romanov's statement that "it will not be possible to make another step toward ending this...war until the truce talks are resumed." No explanation of how final agreement can be achieved is made however.

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28 NOVEMBER 1952

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That this commentary was intended to prompt favorable British attention to the Communist proposal seems indicated by the following: (1) the British U.N. delegation was taken to task for dismissing the Vishinsky proposal for a Korean commission "without taking the trouble to examine it at all impartially;" and (2) the favorable response evoked by the proposal, even from those "who certainly cannot be suspected of leaning toward the Soviet viewpoint" was cited. However, Moscow has not directed a similar commentary to any other nations which might be considered especially receptive to a compromise settlement of the Korean issue.

Self-Strength Subject of Explicit Comment: Recent Moscow comment has become more specific concerning the strength of the Chinese and Korean forces. A rare review of military events in Korea by Col. Tolchenov--broadcast to the home audience only--refers in unusually specific terms to the improved technical equipment, especially artillery, to the powerful fortifications and strong "joint defense system" established across Korea, to the plentitude of weapons and ammunition and to the generally improved capabilities of the Korean and Chinese troops. The theme is echoed by TASS correspondent Tkachenko in Pyongyang who quotes a downed U.S. pilot, Captain Robert Henry, as admitting the growing difficulties faced by the U.S. Air Force since "the Koreans and Chinese have now acquired a great many anti-aircraft batteries and planes." This specificity, unusual in Moscow comment to date, has been foreshadowed by Peking comment on recent military events. Reference to the increased military and air capabilities has not been broadcast to the Koreans however.

New Threats Minimized By Inherent Weaknesses: The Soviet home and Korean audiences hear of the continued threat raised by U.S. aggressiveness. The home audience is told that despite our "disgraceful military failures" in Korea, a campaign is now in progress in the United States calling for increased military pressure on Korea, the bombing of Manchuria, the blockade of China and the use of the A-bomb. The blackmail which this campaign represents however is termed "the weapon of the weak against the cowards" and Moscow--in its first reaction to the announcement of hydrogen bomb experiments--implies that "hydrogen blackmail" will be no more successful than was atomic blackmail.

Moscow reports to its Korean listeners that inasmuch as the United States has failed to get sufficient troops from its satellites and is unwilling to provide more itself, South Koreans are to be armed in increasing numbers. Listeners are reassured however that the South Koreans hate their "oppressors" and are considered "unreliable" as military allies by the United States, while other comment reviews the record of South Korean resistance operations. At the same time a warning is extended to the United States that if it persists in its plan for mobilization of the South Koreans, much the same result can be expected as took place in China when wholesale desertions weakened the conscripted Chiang army.

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KOREAN WAR: Intransigence on POW Issue Continues

Korea

Comment on the United Nations debate on Korea reflects the continuing Communist intransigence on the POW repatriation issue. The following points sum up the Communist position:

1. The real issue is the forcing of prisoners to refuse to go home, not forcing the prisoners to go home as the United States claims.
2. The Geneva Convention does not recognize any choice on the part of prisoners regarding repatriation, hence discussion of "political asylum" in this context by America and its allies confuses the real issue.
3. The compromise proposals of Peru and Mexico are contrary to international law since they predicate the right of prisoners to deny repatriation.

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This position is made clear in Moscow comment on the speeches of Soviet delegates as well as in criticism of the speeches supporting the U.S. position. The United States is charged with "dodging the issue in an endeavor to whitewash itself in the eyes of public opinion," while those delegates who supported the U.S. stand on repatriation are accused of being "tedious and boring."

Peaceful Settlement Through New Commission Stressed: Originally proposed by Poland as part of its omnibus resolution on 17 October, the commission plan received no attention from Moscow until specifically endorsed by Vishinsky on 29 October. Comment during the past week, as well as the Vishinsky address of 10 November--which has been broadcast 54 times to date--states that the new commission should extend "assistance to the repatriation of all prisoners of war" but there is no explanation of how this "assistance" would be facilitated or on what principles it would be based. At the same time, Moscow drops all reference to the compromise proposals offered at Panmunjom on 8 October by the Communist delegation and ignores recent Peking hints that repatriation covers some form of reclassification.

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INFORMATION REPORT

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SUBJECT	749 UN Prisoners of War Camps and Conditions	DATE DISTR.	13 May 1953
DATE OF INFO.	See attachment	NO. OF PAGES	1 (b)(3) CIAAct
PLACE ACQUIRED		REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
		REFERENCES	

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THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
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Forwarded herewith for your information and retention is Supplement III of "UN Prisoners of War Camps and Conditions in Korea, Manchuria and China", dated 1 May 1953.

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Enclosure: 1 report (16 pages)

Distributions: Air (8 copies)
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S E C R E T
Security Information

UN PRISONERS OF WAR
CAMPS AND CONDITIONS
IN
KOREA, MANCHURIA
AND CHINA

SUPPLEMENT VII
1 May 1953

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S E C R E T

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1. The purportedly wounded and sick POWs exchanged last month were collected in three camps, Chon-Ma, #7 (by 1 Dec/52 CCRAK camp numbering); Pyoktong, #5; and Manpojin. All three camps lie along the Yalu River, on the Manchurian border. The existence of Manpojin, northernmost of the three, had not previously been acknowledged by the Communists, but had been carried on our maps until 20 Jan/53, when it was considered abolished as there had been no report on it since 15 Apr/52. Why the Communists should suddenly, and in this fashion, admit that there was a collection camp at Manpojin is a mystery. The coordinates for Manpojin are BA 7259; the nearest listed camp is at Kuup-tong (#4), at BA 4930, too great a distance away to be part of the same camp.

2. A number of single reports, all unconfirmed and all some months old, have come in on new camp locations at:

Changan-sa	DT 1974	Sosong-dong	YD 2151
Chinnapo	YC 0988	Sokkal	CT 0143
Chuk-chon	CU 5408	Sonam	BT 5115
Hoeyang	CT 7884	Songhwa	XC 8549
Kobang-san	YD 4715	Songnae-dong	XE 5644
Coal Mine		Song-ni	CU 3589
(Pyongyang)		Tangsong-ri	YD 3123
Musong-ni	YC 1198	Tonso-dong Area	YD 4222
Nae-dong	CU 3589	Umchon-dong	BT 6049
Pack'un-jang	CU 6499	Yongdae-ri	BU 5722
Pongnae-do	YD 3518	Yulmong-ri	YC 4078
Sanghung-dong	YD 3725	Yusong	EV 5295
Sanun-dong	YD 3433	Yongbong-ri	YD 3582

The majority of these reports indicated that the enclosures were small, possibly transient, and the majority of POWs were South Koreans. Details will not be included in this or future reports, unless further confirmation is forthcoming.

3. Since there have been no reports on the following camps since 1 Sept/52, they will be considered abolished for purposes of this report:

KOREAN CAMPS

Chasong	CA 0392	Namchon-up	BT 7346
Haeryang-ni	CU 4713	Pongung	CV 7714
Hungdong-ni	BT 9794	Sangaenggun	YC 0579
Hwangju	YC 4138	Sego-ri	YC 0438
Hwapung-ni	CT 1075	Sinyang	YC 4059
Kyongchang-ri	YD 3721	Taesu-ri	YD 5516
Mayul-ri	BT 6247	Um-dong	BU 5035
Myohyang-san	BT 6532	Yanggu	DT 1171

} Possibly
} same camp

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MANCHURIA-CHINA

Antung	124-18, 40-38	Harbin	124-10, 42-50
Chekiang Prov.		K'aryun Shien	124-05, 42-36
Chungchun	125-20, 40-53	Pench'i	123-43, 41-02

I. KOREAN POW CAMPS

(b)(3) NatSecAct

A. Acknowledged Camps (arranged by camp number) (Only those camps about which there has been additional information since the 20 Jan/53 report will be listed.)

1. Imsan-ni (XE 8779): Camp #1 is 10 mi. ENE of Sakchu (Paengyong). (Comment: Sakchu was removed from listing as not having been heard from since Aug/51, but may now prove to be part of #1 complex.)
2. (Branch 2) Changson: In Sept/52 a camp with approximately 1,250 UN POWs housed in six large barracks (70 x 5 x 3 m) was at XE 8779, SW of Chang-ni (XE 8780). Only US POWs were seen in compound. Barracks had earth walls and cement roofs, POWs lived four to a room. Fed mostly bread, seemed undernourished. Some of POWs wore old uniforms, other blue fatigues. Camp was garrisoned by 150 CCE (Diagram of camp attached to cited report.)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

5. Pyoktong (Kuksa-ri, YE 0699) - FBIS, Pyongyang, 4 Mar/53 broadcasts stated Enoch and Quinn were in Camp #5. One convoy of exchanged POWs collected at, or were already interned in Pyoktong, which has long been known as "The University" for indoctrination.
7. (a) Chon-ma (XE 6448): One convoy of exchanged POWs collected at this camp.
- (b) Yongsan-ni (XE 5644): Unconfirmed report states there are 200 ROK POWs in this camp. Possibly Camp #7, Branch 1.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

8. Anju (YD 2887)

- (a) In Sept/52 source was sent to Anju to transport supplies. Observed 400 ROK in vicinity being compelled to repair roads. Wooden boxes strapped to each POWs back to hamper escape. Source heard camp for ROK POWs located 1½ km. SW of Anju.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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- (b) As of Sept/52, there were five independent enclosures in Camp #8 in and around a former primary school, approximately 300 m. W of Taet'aryong-ni gate (YD 3524). 1,000 ROK POWs slated to serve in NKA, but returned to POW status after peace talks began. POWs worked four hours a day, took three hours indoctrination per week. Most POWs didn't accept Communism, many planned escape and sang ROK songs while marching. POWs fed 600 gr. rice, kaoliang, soy oil a day; undernourished and diseased. Wore blue coveralls. PO-RO in red on camp roofs. Camp guarded with four light machine guns, posted at 10 m. intervals, during the night.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (c) Yongso-ri (YD 2688, vic. Anju) Unconfirmed report of 600 ROK POWs at this location.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

9. Chaedong-ni (Singchang-ni) (BU 6073)

- (a) As of Sept/52, there was a camp with 2,000 POWs at the foot of a hill near Singch'ang (BU 5265), established in June/52. Camp was 500 x 300 m., fenced with barbed wire. POWs worked six hours a day, given two hours indoctrination a day, screened once a month for potential agents to be used against the South Koreans.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (b) In Apr/52, source was in vicinity of Songhyon-ni (BU 5165; heard that thirty ROK POWs had escaped from nearby camp. June/52, in same vicinity, source saw a number of POWs getting firewood on hill. POWs in groups of three, guarded by two NKA. In Oct/52, source heard that the Political Commissar had told men they "must capture more prisoners", and to "treat them well".

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

10. Sunan (YD 3241)

- (a) As of Sept/52, there was a camp with 3,000 ROK POWs in sixteen dugout shelters at the foot of a hill E of Sunan. Camp had been established in early July/52. Camp was 2½ km. around, fenced with barbed wire. POWs worked six hours a day, given two hours indoctrination. Screened twice a month for potential agents vs. South Korea.

(Comment: According to SO 99143, a camp with 1,000 ROK POWs was at the site of the former Sunan High School, next to cemetery 1 km. NE

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of Sunan RR Station. This camp had been moved to Sunan from Kirim-ni 20 July/52 because of UN bombings. Field comment in this report states Camp #13 at Sunan was listed by the Communists 12 July/52.)

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

11. Pyongyang Complex

- (a) Huan-dong (YD 4333) As of 30 Nov/52, 24 USAF pilots were interned in Huan-dong. Camp in building 20 x 6 x 4 m. Guard posted in four phases of building. 50 personnel in charge of camp ops. POW schedule: up at 7; breakfast at 8, indoctrination 9:30-12; lunch 12:30; free from 7-8; supper 8:30, recreation 10; bed 10:30. Fed 600 gr. rice, vegetables, soy oil per day; weak, yellow complexioned from diet. No medical equipment in camp. Billets DDT sprayed once a week. POWs wore one-piece fatigues and USAF pilot jackets. POWs refused to listen to lectures, were homesick. Building surrounded by barbed wire, guarded by one squad of soldiers. Camp was moved here July/52 from Pyongyang area.

(Comment: Directorate had one previous report of camp with 20 UN pilots at YD 4136 [CCRAK #F-1589, 12 July/52].)

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b) Kirim-ni (YD 3823):

- (1) As of Oct/52, 2,000 ROK POWs were interned at YD 3832, probably Kirim-ni camp.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (2) As of 21 Sept/52, 1,500 ROK POWs were in a red brick, 2-story school building at YD 3824 in Kirim. POWs worked in groups of 25 repairing bomb damage. Daily ration of 700 gr. of corn or rice with salt and seaweed.

(Comment: Probably same camp as Sinsong-dong [See p. 7, item(e)], Hasokhwa-ri [See p. 6, item (b)].)

- (3) As of 13 Sept/52, the NK bureau supervising POW camps in NK HQs in semi-underground houses 10 x 3 x 2 m. at YD 3824 on NW edge of Moran-bong in Kirim-ni. POWs were brought here immediately after capture, sent to Kangdong after interrogation, and thence to other camps in North Korea.

(Field Comment: SO 103362 [See p. 6, item (a)] states there was an interrogation camp at YD 4234.)

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

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- (c) Mirim-ni (YD 4622) Branch 2: As of Sept/52, a camp with 2,000 ROK POWs was located in one wooden building and two one-story concrete buildings at YD 5524, approximately 8,500 m. E of Mirim-ni. POWs had worked at Mirim airfield from Apr/51 to Apr/52, when construction work stopped because of UN raid. Camp was operated by a company of NKA. POWs given daily three hour indoctrination. Allowed to walk within 200 m. radius of camp in groups of two or three with consent of guards.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (d) Nangyo-dong (YD 3526): As of Sept/52, source saw POW camp for ROKs in vicinity YD 3522. Source heard from another soldier that there were 1,000 ROK POWs in the camp. Camp administered by Pyongyang Security Regt. Located at former Parim People's School. PO-RO characters on roof of building.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (e) Namsa-ri (YD 4725): 12 US POWs reported at these coordinates. 18 Oct/52 photos neither confirm nor disprove.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

(f) Pyongyang Area:

- (1) CCRACK CR #140, 20 Aug/52 reported 500 ROK (NK anti-Communists) POWs at YD 3822 in five personnel shelters. 8 Nov/52 photos neither confirm nor disprove.

- (2) As of late Sept/52, 50 UN POWs (30 ROK, 20 US) seen in Pyongyang. Appeared haggard and dirty, but clothes in fair condition. POWs being marched north.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (3) Source saw 50 ROK POWs escorted to gate of Pyongyang camp for lunch by one-star NK officer and four NCOs. POWs in blue overalls. Source didn't know number of POWs in camp.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (g) Sosong-ni (YD 3622) Branch 1: Camp at YD 364214 photographed 8 Nov/52. 1,000 ROK POWs had been reported here. Camp probably Branch 1, Camp #11 as reported by Communists. Photos neither confirmed nor disproved.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

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- (h) Yongsong (YD 4033): As of Dec/52, a POW camp for USAF was located on a wooded hill in Yongsong-ni area (YD 4233) with 26 Caucasian, 8 Negro POWs. Camp approximately 100 m. in circumference, enclosed with barbed wire, guarded by platoon of NKA. POWs treated better than infantry POWs, no forced labor. Camp often visited by Soviet AF advisors.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (i) Wasan-ni (YD 3928): This camp possibly closed in July-Aug/52 POW camp re-shuffle. CCRAK F-1979, 15 July/52 stated 20-50 UK POWs this location and numerous reports from March to mid-July/52 tend to confirm each other as to camp's existence during that period.

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The following are new camp listings in the Pyongyang area:

- (a) Hach'u-dong (YD 4234), Interrogation camp: As of Aug-Sept/53, UN and ROK POWs were interrogated in buildings of a former brick factory in this location. Camp attached to NKA General HQ, established in Mar/51. POWs from all parts of front interrogated here prior to assignment to other camps. 15 Aug/52 there were 150 ROK and 30 other UN POWs here. Number of POWs varied because of large turn-over, but averaged 150. Other UN POWs separated from ROKs and interrogated in English. When more POWs were to be interrogated than camp could accomodate, the excess was sent to other camps and English-speaking interrogators sent with them. Daily rice ration of 700 gr. with supplemental rations of vegetable soup and mackerel. ROK POWs had bread as main food (probably in lieu of rice.) All POWs wore blue fatigues and received regulation NK issue of beds and everyday articles. POWs did light work in camp area. Lt. Col. YI (fnu) was commanding officer, aged 38, graduate of English Literature at Nippon University, member SK Labor Party prior to war.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (b) Hasokhwa-ri (YD 2538): As of 30 Sept/52, there was a camp holding 2,000 ROK POWs in 12 dug-out shelters near Hasokhwa-ri. Camp established Aug/52. Area 1½ km. circumference, fenced with barbed wire. POWs worked on nearby farms 8 hours a day, given 2 hours indoctrination daily. Screened three times monthly for potential agents to be used vs. South Koreans.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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- (c) Pyongsang Prison Area (YD 3721): 800 ROK POWs reported in this location in Pyongyang. Prison and schools in area had been virtually demolished but possible POWs were still in area. (Photos made 8 Nov/52.)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (d) Sijong-myon (YD 4933), probably interrogation camp: Source observed 60 US POWs being taken to Sijong-myong office by NKA officer from NKA GHQ. Source said POWs lived in a number of civilian homes in area.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (e) Sinsong-dong (YD 2151): As of 30 Sept/52, a camp containing 3,700 ROK POWs was in 18 dug-out shelters at the foot of a hill this location. Camp 2 km. diameter and fenced with barbed wire. POWs worked 8 hours a day, given 2 hours indoctrination daily. Screened twice a month for potential agents to be used vs. South Koreans.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

12. Ch'ahwangch'on (YD 3538)

- (a) CCRAK A-208 places Soyang-ni (Hung-ni) at YD 3734, holding 2,500 ROK POWs. This may be incorrect reference to camp #12, but the number of POWs is excessive if so.

- (b) Camp #12 is headquarters for the "American-British POW Organization for Peace", which puts out a newspaper there. Ambrose Nugent is a POW in #12.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

21. Chail-li (YD 2649), Indoctrination Camp. POW camp for AF personnel at YD 2649. POWs undernourished, averaged 3-4 in sick bay, treated by doctors from nearby ChiCom ambulance unit. Innoculations given by three male nurses from unit; (POWs told innoculations necessary to protect from germ warfare, but caused fever and POWs suspicious of them.) Recreation: volleyball and swimming at irregular times -- games short and few who played didn't overdo. Compulsory indoctrination in camp. 2-3 POWs eager to learn but majority not interested. POWs represented by a leader. Those who tried to escape lost meal privileges and forced to write self-criticism. If escape successful, POW leader to be punished, but beatings now allowed. Roll call in camp. Guards regular NKA, treated POWs well, made regular rounds of camp at night. (Sketch of camp layout attached to cited report.)

(Comment: Prior to June/52, a camp housing US POWs was in five large buildings at YD 267497 near Chail-li--almost certainly same as above. First building at YD 272497, second at YD 265487, third at YD 273477, fourth at YD 300503, fifth at YD 296508. In June/52, 120 POWs moved to

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Kangdong camp (BU 4837.) [SO 96821 stated there were 80 Caucasian POWs (believed US) and 150 ROKs in Kangdong as of late June/52.] 8 Oct/52 56 NKA Evacuation Hospital was in houses vacated by POWs. One company of troops at YD 374505, another 600 m. N of Chail-li, another 2 mi. S of HQ at YD 374505.)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

22. Tari-gol (Pukchin (YE 3732-3454)

- (a) A POW camp with 1,600 ROK and 400 other UN POWs located in two school buildings at YD 3353, W of Pukchin. ROK POWs in larger building (2-story brick, 80 x 90 x 12 m.) UN POWs in smaller building. (flat cement 25 x 20 x 8 m.) Daily ration of 600 gr. rice, 200 gr. sorghum often cut because of shortages. POWs wore NK uniforms, cloth shoes. Some worked transporting machine parts to Unsan gold mine (YE 3253), others worked in mine in two shifts of 12 hours each.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (b) As of 13 Sept/52, there was a POW camp containing 1,500 ROK and 600 US in caves formerly occupied by the Unsan gold mine at YE 3732, E of Maebong-dong (YE 3823). POWs given daily ration of 700 gr. of food (70% grain.) Many POWs were ill, wore ragged dirty NKA uniforms. US POWs rarely seen. ROK POWs made NKA uniforms on sewing machines and did other machine and tool work. Compulsory indoctrination three hours a week, plus periodic debate and criticism sessions, and occasional rallies denouncing SK and US governments. Camp had 120 guards armed with four light machine guns.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Manpojin (BA 7259): Camp never listed by the Communists; last information re its existence over a year old. One convoy of exchanged POWs nevertheless collected at this camp.

B. Unacknowledged Camps

1. New Listings

- (a) Kasong-ni (YD 3189): 400 ROK ex-POWs in NKA "Liberation Unit" this location (unconfirmed).

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (b) Kowon-gun (CU 5266): In June/52, 200 ROK, 30 Caucasian, 7 Negro POWs transferred by truck from South Hamgyong Province penitentiary to Kowon-gun where they were to repair damaged railroads. POWs chained together in groups of five. While traveling through Kungjon-ni

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district of Hamhung City (CV 7517), 5 US, 7 ROK POWs and 2 of 20 NK guards were killed in UN air raid. Guards said that POWs would be transferred to Musan area (EB 1875) to avoid future raids.

(Comment: Camp probably no longer in existence.)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (c) Kung-dong (YC 4268): Unconfirmed report of 600 ROK POWs this location.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (d) Naedong-ni (YD 1273): As of 22 Nov/52, camp housing approximately 500 ROK POWs located in civilian houses. Camp established late July/52.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (e) Oksang-dong Gold Mine (YD 3975): 1,000 ROK POWs reported confined this location. One report states old Camp #8 (Taesong-ni) might have moved here. Camp used to give newly captured POWs six month indoctrination course. Photos taken 26 Nov/52 neither confirm nor disprove.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (f) Powon-ni (YD 0667): An unconfirmed report states 200 POWs of unknown nationality lived in eight civilian houses and did farming in this area.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (g) Sinjong-ni (YC 2755): Unconfirmed report states 400 ROK POWs lived in 40 civilian houses this area. Worked repairing bridge at YC 2652.

- (h) Sohang-ni (YD 2385):

- (1) There have been sporadic reports over a long period of a camp at this location, containing 2,500 ROK POWs. Photos made 27 Sept/52 show possibility of camp location here.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (2) CCRAK F-5640, 2 & 3 Nov/52 lists another Sohang-ni at YD 5303, with unknown number of ROK POWs. States this camp is an indoctrination center.

- (i) Sonp'yong (CT 5191): A POW camp containing 100 US, 500 ROKs in a former school and nearby houses this location. POWs fed 500gr. grain a day. No clothes or bedding issued. US and ROK POWs given same

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treatment, including indoctrination. Converted ROK POWs taken into NKA, called "Liberated Soldiers".

(Comment: Possibly same camp reported by different source in SO 102998.)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

CCRAK J-1223, July/52 reported 100 US, 500 ROK POWs this location. No photo coverage.

- (j) Sohwa Electric Factory (YE 0302): Single reports states some of the 700 US, 1,800 ROK POWs in camp near this location work in factory, remainder are being indoctrinated.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (k) Togwon-ni (BU 4455): 400 US, 70 ROK POWs reported this location. Kirim-ni camp said to have been moved here. (Photo coverage 25 Nov/52 neither confirms nor disproves.)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

2. Old Listings, New Confirmations

- (a) Chosan (YF 3623) (Once considered abolished for report purposes, reinstated on basis of following information.): As of mid-Sept/52 a POW camp containing 300 ROKs was located in coal mine pits near Chosan. POWs mined coal on an average of 7 hours daily. Fed 700 gr. rice and 30 gr. other grain. Sick treated by NKA surgeons, but treatment inadequate. POWs were taught NKA regulations and basic military subjects, given 2-3 hours indoctrination daily. Camp guarded by platoon of NKA, who were forbidden contact with civilians. Most of the POWs had enlisted in the 22nd Brigade, NKA after capture but were discharged in Apr/52 and sent to Chosan to wait POW exchange.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (b) Kangdong (Chiktong camp, YD 5423)

- (1) 180 US, 120 ROK POWs reported here. 130 of US POWs were Negroes, 50 were USAF. POWs lived in five houses 9 x 4 x 4 m. US POWs in three of houses ROKs in two. Barbed wire around camp. Camp guarded and operated by 60NKA. Camp commander a Major. POWs worked repairing roads. Fed 1,000 gr. food daily. Dressed in brown one-piece fatigues. Given haircut every two weeks, bath once weekly. Each POW wore white numbered tag by which he was identified. POWs got occasional package of cigarettes. Camp occasionally inspected by three Russians. Camp said to have been moved to this location Mar/52.

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(Comment: Directorate has had no other reports of Camp at these exact coordinates, but many reports of camp in general area.)

[REDACTED]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (2) Photo coverage of 24 Oct/52 neither confirms nor disproves the many reports on Kangdong camp. Conflict because of confusion of this camp with Camp #11, Branch 3 (formerly Camp 8) where 180 UN Caucasians and 900 ROK POWs are said to be held.

[REDACTED]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (3) As of 13 Sept/52, Kangdong Camp #8, with 2,000 ROK POWs living in houses formerly occupied by Taeson Coal Mine (YD 5724) employees was at this location. POWs organized in four companies and transportation company; four platoons to a company and four squads to each platoon. POWs used as squad leaders and assistant platoon leaders. Fed 600 gr. (20% rice) per day. Wore ragged blue coveralls. Medical facilities poor, POWs unhealthy. Worked around camp 3-4 hours daily, had 2-3 hours indoctrination twice a week, discussion periods periodically (where truce talks not mentioned.) POWs hostile toward guards, some escaped (usually during air raids). Camp organization: Maj. head; Captains in charge of political, management, supply sections; medical section of four under a Jr. Lt.; approximately 30 additional personnel on total staff. Camp guarded by 150 NKA under command of Ministry Internal Affairs, armed with four light machine guns. Officers carried pistols, EM carried burp guns and Soviet rifles. PO-RO marker on roof of camp.

[REDACTED]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (c) Karyoju-ri (CT 2691): As of Sept/52, 500 ROK POWs reported this location. No confirmation or photo coverage.

[REDACTED]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- (d) Koem-ni (YD 5622) (Once considered abolished, reinstated on following basis): As of Sept/52, a camp containing 300 ROK POWs was in a village at YD 558222, near Koem-ni. The village was formerly for employees of a nearby coal mine. POWs slept in a building 30 x 3 x 3 m., formerly the billet for male mine workers. Two hour indoctrination course given three times a week in a tile-roofed building 40 x 20 x 5 m, with eight windows on N and S sides, eight entrances. PO-RO marker on S side of roof. POWs mined coal eight hours a day, beginning work at 8 a.m. Three - four POWs shared one blanket, used hemp or rice bags as mattresses. POWs fed 500 gr. rice, 200 gr. soy or corn, with

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vegetable side dish. POWs in poor condition because of hard labor, poor food, lack of camp sanitation. Camp guarded by three platoon NKA armed with Soviet rifles and PPShs who patrolled area day and night.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

- (e) Pakchun-gol (XC 8550): 10,000 ROK POWs said to be located along valley 3 km. N of Pakchun. Source saw 1,000 of these POWs working on river bank construction project.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

II. MANCHURIA-CHINA

A. Old Listings, New Confirmations

1. Mukden (126-93, 46-05) (Considered abolished in former report, existence reconfirmed by following information): 14 politico-military cadres well versed in English and Korean were assigned 15 Nov/52 by the General Political Department, ChiCom Military Council to Mukden to form US and ROK POWs for thought reform and espionage training. POWs were divided into three categories:

- (a) Younger POWs from Company Officer up who were considered straightforward to be trained in thought reform and espionage;
- (b) POWs desultory in thought and accustomed to POW life were to be bribed by material inducements and set to gathering propaganda which would give them a good impression of the Communists. Their family correspondence would publicize "happy life" in camps and create US anti-war sentiment;
- (c) Stubborn POWs were to be segregated from categories (a) and (b), put to forced labor and refused correspondence.

The ChiCom Military Council selected Quinn, O'Neal and seven other AF men from Camp #2 as the first group to be trained in Mukden (phonetic names given by original agent.)

More than 80 ROK POWs were to be selected for three month training at Mukden. Those considered progressive thinkers to be either released or smuggled to South Korea for espionage work.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

2. Peiping (116-24, 39-36): General Dean refused to cooperate in promotion of EW campaign. Reported sent to Peiping.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

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SUMMARY OF POW CAMPS

	ACKNOWLEDGED CAMPS	UNACKNOWLEDGED CAMPS
KOREA	No.	
	1. Imsan-dong (Sakchu)	Chosan (back in)
	2. Changson (Er. 2)	Kangdong
	# 5. Pyoktong (Kuksa-ri)	Karyoju-ri
	# 7. Chon-ma (Yongsan-ni)	Kasong-ni*
	8. Anju	Koem-ni (back in)
	Taet'aryong-ni*	Kowan-gun*
	Yongso-ri	Kung-dong*
	9. Chaedong-ni	Naedong-ni*
	Singchang-ni	Oksang-dong Gold Mine*
	Songhyon-ni	Pakchun-gol
	10. Sunan	Pwon-ni*
	11. Pyongyang Complex	Sinjong-ni*
	Huan-dong	Sohang-ni*
	Hachu-dong*	Sohwa Electric Factory*
	Hasokhwa-ri*	Sonp'yong*
	Kirim-ni	Togwon-ni*
	Mirim-ni (Br. 2)	
	Namgyo-dong	
	Namsa-ri	
	Pyongysang Prison Area*	
	Soson-ni (Br. 1)	
Sijon-myon*		
Sinsong-dong*		
Yongsong		
Wasan-ni ?		
12. Ch'ahwangch'on		
Soyang-ni		
21. Chail-li		
22. Tari-gol (Pukchin)		
- - - - -		
# Manpojin (back in)		
MANCHURIA- CHINA		Mukden (back in) Peiping

LEGEND: # Camps at which POWs collected for Apr/53 exchange
 * New Listings
 ? May have been abolished
 (back in) Camps believed abolished for lack of information.
 New reports reinstate existence.

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TRENDS AND MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS (OPINION)

1. In Korea, the foregoing shows twelve acknowledged, eleven numbered camps (#21 and #22 acknowledged by CCRACK only.) April exchange POWs collected at Camps #5 and #7, and the previously unacknowledged, unnumbered Manpojin (except for those POWs captured in Mar/53 and Apr/53.) It also shows sixteen unacknowledged camps, eleven of which are new listings, two of which have previously been considered abolished but which have been reinstated on the basis of new information. In Manchuria-China, there are two listings: General Dean reported in Peiping, and Mukden as a thought training and espionage center.

2. POW Control and Movement:

a. A POW General Command has reportedly been set up in the Pyongyang area at YD 825228 in ten caves of unknown size with four entrances. (See cited report, Ex. A #10 for location Ex. 10 for details of camp.) This Command believed to be governing all POW enclosures in NK. Source was told by civilian in vicinity that the POW registration section of this HQ was responsible for POW files, and all information re food, medical treatment, supplies. Area guarded by 150 NKA from the Home Ministry Guard Unit, armed with three heavy machine guns, six light machine guns, 100 PPShs. Area heavily wooded, naturally camouflaged. No civilians allowed to enter area.

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

b. According to an article in magazine Hsing-tao Chou-pao of Hong Kong, by a Seoul correspondent, all UN POWs under ChiCom control were being sent either to target areas or to China in large numbers. The first action had been instituted by the Koreans to decrease UN bombing activity; latter action was used by Chi-Coms as ammunition in further truce talks. Source said it was very possible the ChiComs would send all UN POWs to the Chinese mainland.

(Comment: There have been previous reports re evidence of POW movements in NK in vicinity of military targets and from NK in vicinity of military targets and from NK into China and Manchuria.)

[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

3. POW Interrogation and Indoctrination:

a(1) Procurement and interrogation of UN POWs: Communist forces attempt to indoctrinate all troops to the value of capturing UN personnel, or inducing them to surrender. Troops to squad level given oral propaganda phrases to memorize, interrogation forms to be filled in by UN POWs immediately after capture, instructions for use in Chinese and English for front line units. Forms ask information and diagrams re strength and disposition of POWs' unit, artillery positions, supply dumps, ammo and other equipment reserves, etc. After front line interrogation Communists rely on shock and fear to get cooperation. Before POWs sent to rear, they're told of CCF good treatment policy, and that CCF thought "all capitalists their enemies." After first phases of capture, UN POWs' chances for survival are good: they are interrogated by "psychological persuasion", and POWs refusing to fill out interrogation forms are not punished.

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a(2) Indoctrination of UN POWs: The Communists' attempt to indoctrinate UN POWs on first contact, greeting them as "liberated brothers", telling them they have been misled and are "imperialist tools", not individually responsible for anti-Communist actions. They are also told they will see the error of their ways and learn the right of Communism. Only torture used was psychological--release hopes were alternately build up and dashed. Degree of indoctrination depended on eventual use planned for POWs.

[redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

b. As of Dec/52, the Recon. Platoon of the 91st Regt, captured US POW in vicinity of Hill 601 (DT 3550) and brought him to Recon. Plat. CP. Here US POW was treated as a guest, given same food as NK troops. He was interrogated by a Sr. Lt. imported from 45th NK Div. CP. When he was released (for unknown reasons) he was accompanied by five members of the Recon. Plat. to UN MLR, and given a parting Christmas gift by the Sr. Lt.

[redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

c. Five loose notebook sheets of a captured enemy document (printed in Chinese) sets forth these principles for indoctrination of US POWs:

(1) How we treat US POWs: don't kill or maltreat, don't take personal possessions, treat the wounded. Treat all POWs equally because "US capitalists are the real enemy and the majority of POWs were laborers who were forced to fight." If POWs lay down their arms, they are not the enemy. POWs must obey orders or they will be punished.

(2) For whom are they fighting and why?

(3) Who invaded whom?

(4) Who won and who lost?

(5) Who is enemy of the US people?

500th MISG Bul. Enemy Documents, #101, 22 Dec/53

4. Treatment of UN POWs:

a. Stories of POW treatment told by exchanged POWs vary widely. It is noteworthy that the prisoners in the first convoy (19 Apr/53) to be exchanged felt, on the whole, that the Reds "had done as well by us as they could." Ten of the POWs in this convoy, which collected at Chon-ma came from Pyoktong, known to be the largest of the NK indoctrination camps, and four of these ten are on the Communist-suspect "watch list", available from intelligence sources.

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While ten of the prisoners in the 20 Apr/53 convoy had been interned at Pyoktong, none of their names appear on the watch list, and several of them told reporters stories of atrocity and brutality to POWs, so apparently their indoctrination had not been successful. (In this connection, it must be noted that most of the reported atrocities occurred in late 1950 and early 1951.) The three watch list suspects from this group came from Changson camp, as did the three from the group repatriated 23 Apr/53.

Brutal treatment of sick, wounded, and undernourished POWs, according to one of the few officers exchanged to date, "improved or fell off according to progress at the truce talks...when the negotiations picked up, the Chinese had buddy buddy week with us." The officer, 1st Lt. Roy M. Jones, Minneapolis, also said indoctrination was stopped completely last year when "we saw in the Communists' paper that the Commies had objected at the truce talks to indoctrination of their prisoners. After that they stopped indoctrinating us."

POW exchange of the third day was of prisoners all but two of whom were captured in March, and who had thus never been in a rear-area camp. These men had little complaint of their treatment.

b. The prisoner exchange and several recent magazine articles have made the public more aware of the 3,000 plus discrepancy between the Defense Department MIA total and the US prisoners admittedly in Communist hands. 1950-51 atrocities, malnutrition, forced labor, resulting illness, etc., might account for many of this number, but not for all. Attention is called to three magazine articles, all published in April 1953:

- (1) "Unreported G.I.'s in Siberia," Nagorski, ESQUIRE, May issue, p. 51,
- (2) "Deal for US POWs in Korea," US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, April 24 issue, p. 35,
- (3) "I Saw Your Prisoner Sons," Yeh Min, PARADE, Sunday, April 5,

While none of these articles are based on confirmed information, all mention the possibility of unaccounted-for POWs being in Manchuria, China, and/or Russia. Released as they were at the time of the POW exchange, and coupled with stories of returning POWs themselves, they will undoubtedly influence general suspicion of Red motives and intentions in any possible future POW exchanges.

Regarding motives and intentions, the primary POW-returnee complaint was that much sicker men had been left behind in camp. Several were actually bewildered as to why they had been selected for exchange. It is always possible that the unforeseen immediacy of the exchange caught the Reds unaware and without the time for proper screening of sick and wounded POWs. However, viewing the geographic spread of the returnees'

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hometowns, it is more logical to believe that they had been carefully selected, and long in advance of the exchange, not for extent of wounds or illness, but for possible use to the Communist Party. Returnees will come back to homes concentrated along lines of communication and in the southern mountain coal mining area. In almost every case, the returnee's hometown is within easy distance of some strategic US defense area (Oak Ridge, Alamogordo, Rock Island Arsenal, several large air force bases, etc.) A top-heavy percentage comes from Puerto Rico.

Of the watch list returnees, one comes from a small town in southern Maine, not far from Boston; one each from New York City and Philadelphia with their shipyards; one from Oklahoma City and its oil supply; two from the southern coal mining area; one from Syracuse and the Great Lakes shipping system; and one from San Francisco.

5. Propaganda:

a. During February and March 1953, the BW campaign, which had continued with varying intensity since its inception in February 1952, was revived by the ChiComs.

(1) 20 Feb/53 Peiping broadcast (FBIS-monitored): "US planes dropped insects on Manchurian and North Korean towns during December."

(2) 22 & 24 Feb/53, Peiping broadcasts: "Two senior USMC 1st Marine Air Wing officers confirmed that the JCS directed planned BW, following reports of international investigating bodies. (Col. F. H. Schwable, Maj. R. H. Bley's depositions followed.)

(3) 5 Mar/53 broadcast: Peiping accused British Minister of State Selwyn Lloyd of "covering up" US BW by denying Alan Winnington's accusations of "a conspiracy of silence in Tokyo, Washington and London."

(4) 6 Mar/53 Pyongyang broadcast: POW Enoch (Camp #5) had sent a letter to The Congress of Peoples for Peace in Vienna during Dec/52 calling for an early solution to the war and a halt to BW. POW Quinn (also at Camp #5) had written a similar letter to the Congress. (NB: Both letters were introduced on the broadcast by identical wording in their forwards.)

b. Early April 1953 broadcasts concentrate on the latest effort to achieve a peaceful settlement of the prisoner issue; broadcasts made after the POW exchange had begun recite the "good treatment of POWs"-line.

The following elements characterize the current propaganda pattern:

(1) A drop in atrocity charges prior to the resumption of truce talks in 6 Apr/53 indicate a desire to avoid comment which might hinder a truce agreement. This is the first time attention has been given to an amenability phase of the Korean war rather than to the denunciation of US "aggression or bestiality."

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(2) Increased comment on recent military operations, which may stem from a desire to prove the Commies are negotiating from a position of strength. Propaganda-wise, Peiping seems to be setting the stage for a claim that their basic objectives in Korea have been attained.

(3) Repatriation of UN POWs: description of good treatment on convoys; POW comment on ending the war; claim that many of wounded POWs had been hurt in UN bombings of camps; description of farewells in camp; gratitude of POWs to captors for good treatment while interned; suggestion by various returnees that they would probably be "hospitalized" for quite awhile after their return--misgivings over prospects of the "screening and remodeling course" awaiting them on the other side.