

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

16 September 2021

John Clarke, Esq.
1629 K Street, NW
Suite 300
Washington, DC, 20008

Reference: *Lois Moore, et al v. CIA*, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No: 1:20-cv-01027; F-2020-00473

Dear Mr. Clarke:

This is an interim response to your 25 November 2019 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request submitted by your client, Lois Moore, for the following:

1. From the period of March 16, 1954, through 1961, all records of the CIA's efforts in undertaking "clandestine and covert action to locate, identify, and recover those U.S. Prisoners of War still in Communist custody"
2. An unredacted copy of this report [January 5, 1952, *CIA Information Reports*] together with all intelligence material upon which it was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
3. Please produce the [following] referenced [in July 15, 1952, *CIA Cross Reference Sheet*]:
 - a. July 15, 1952 "Basic Communication"
 - b. June 24, 1953 "Basic Document"
 - c. Information described as "etcetera"
 - d. POW Information in, or otherwise "Router to, C.I. File"
 - e. POW information related to or bearing the "Cross Reference Number 040"
 - f. POW Information related to or bearing the "Classification Number 383.6 Korea."
4. All records regarding the June 1, 1951 shoot down and capture over North Korea of the American F-51 piloted by U.S. Air Force Captain Harry Cecil Moore, born February 11, 1924, in Elm Grove, West Virginia, service number AO 711850.
5. All records upon which the following statement from February 27, 1952 memo from Chief of Naval Personnel to Commanding General, Far East Air Force was

based: "It is now believed that there is a possibility that Captain Moore survived and is now a Prisoner of War."

6. All records regarding Captain Moore's incarceration and transportation from North Korea to the Soviet Union, his locations in the Soviet Union, and all evidence that he "may have been interrogated by Soviet officials.
7. An unredacted copy of July 17, 1952, three page *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
8. An unredacted copy of December 31, 1953, *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
9. An unredacted copy of March 24, 1954, *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
10. An unredacted copy of April 23, 1954, *CIA Information Report*.
11. An unredacted copy of April 27, 1954, *CIA Information Report*, together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
12. An unredacted copy of December 8, 1954, *CIA Information Report*.
13. Any and all information relating to this Report [January 23, 1992 cable from Embassy Helsinki to Secretary of State]
14. An unredacted copy of March 9, 1988, CIA Memorandum to "US Army Chief, Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action," together with the materials upon which this Report was based, including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports.
15. All records relating to any of the POW/MIA's names in the attached list.
16. Any and all records relating that any POW/MIAs may have been held in the prisons identified in the attached list of Russian prison camps.
17. For the period beginning June of 1951, and continuing to the present time, please produce all POW records provided to, or receive from, any office of any component of the Department of Defense, including but not limited to:
 - a. CCRAK
 - b. Air Force 6004 Air Intelligence Service Squadron during the tenure of "Project American."
 - c. Missing in Action Office, including those provided in response to the attached February 12, 1997 letter from U.S. House of Representative James Talent seeking "Intelligence pertaining to American prisoners who were taken to China and the Soviet Union during the war" as well as:
 - i. The 389 American service members who into the 1980's were listed as unaccounted prisoners of war by the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) ii. All U.S. Air Force F-86 pilots who remain unrepatriated.
 - d. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, of AFOSI
 - e. Naval Criminal Investigative Service, or NCIS
 - f. Army Criminal Investigation Command, CID

- g. **U.S. Army Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities Far East, or CCRAFE.**
- 18. All POW records prepared by any officer, agent, or employee of the CIA, prepared for the Office of the President including the President's Daily Brief, or PDB, that include information on the possibility of POW's being transferred to the Soviet Union or China.**
 - 19. All records reflecting communications with Members of Congress, or Congressional Oversight committees concerning the capture of American airmen during the Korean conflict who may have been transported to the Soviet Union or China and their presumed fate.**
 - 20. All records concerning POW's and KGB defector Yuri (or Yury) Rastvorov, who informed the United States Government that American military personnel were taken to the Soviet Union during the Korean Conflict. This request includes an unredacted version of the attached page with the heading, "Terminology".**
 - 21. All intelligence material (including reports, analysis, correspondence, signals intelligence, imagery, and live sighting reports) concerning statements made by former Czech General Jan Sejna and other former Czech Officials concerning former US POWs held, interrogated and experiment on by Czech and Soviet advisors, and thereafter transferred to China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and the Soviet Union.**

We are processing your request in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.

We have identified thirteen (13) documents that are responsive to your request that may be released in segregable form with redactions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(5), and (b)(6). Exemption (b)(3) pertains to Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 3507, noted as exemption "(b)(3)CIAAct;" Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C § 3024(i)(1), noted as exemption "(b)(3)NatSecAct;" Section 424 of Title 10, noted as exemption "(b)(3) 10 USC 424;" Section 798 of Title 18, noted as "(b)(3) 18 USC 798;" and/or Section 3605 of Title 50, noted as exemption "(b)(3) 50 USC 3605." The releasable documents are on the enclosed CD.

A final response will be provided to you on a later date.

Sincerely,



Mark Lilly

Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

27 December 1991

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to your letter of December 12, 1991, concerning the possibility of US POWs/MIAs in the USSR, let me assure you that the Agency is actively pursuing this issue. A senior officer of the Interrepublic Security Service (ISS), the successor organization to the former KGB Second Chief Directorate, advised the Agency on 3 December that the ISS had undertaken "an exhaustive search of available information and resources, and had come up with no indication of such presence in the USSR past or present." On 6 December the ISS passed us a written "official" response. Following is a translation of that response:

"At our request, an investigation was conducted in Kazakhstan concerning the supposed presence of an American military pilot in the village of Saryshagan, Dzhezkazgan Oblast, as presented in the newspaper 'Kommersant' (no. 42, dated 4 November 1991). The pilot was reportedly taken prisoner during the period of war in Indochina.

As a result of the investigation, which included questioning long-time residents, no information was obtained about the presence in that region at any time of an American pilot.

On our part, we also do not have any information about American military personnel located on the territory of the USSR who were missing in action during the course of military activities in Indochina."

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

U.S. SENATE DO NOT REMOVE SENATE SECURITY

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OFFICE OF SENATE SECURITY

DOCUMENT CONTROL NUMBER OSSA-2197

This Document consists of 2 Pages

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The Honorable John F. Kerry

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Regarding alleged statements by retired KGB General Oleg Kalugin, reported by Australian television, that he had been involved in the interrogation of Americans in Vietnam during the 1975-1978 period, we have tasked [redacted] to ask the ISS and the Russian Republic Federal Security Service to confirm the remarks attributed to Kalugin and provide details. [redacted] was also been directed to seek guidance from those services as to how a similar inquiry can be put to the military intel service, the GRU.

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] have been asked for any information they may have on Soviet and/or East European incarceration or interrogation of POWs/MIAs from World War II, the Korean War, or the Vietnam War.

We will keep the Committee advised of any additional information that results from our discussions with the Russian and [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

A copy of this letter is also being provided to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

[Redacted signature box]

(b)(6)

Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

~~SECRET~~

TRANSMITTAL AND DOCUMENT RECEIPT

TO: Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Room 21, Senate Russell Bldg.

FROM: OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ROOM [redacted]
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

(b)(3) CIAAct

RECEIPT:
DATE:

CONTROL NUMBER	DOC. DATE	SUBJECT (Unclassified preferred)	CLASS.
-----0	12/27	letters for Sens. Kerry and Smith <i>DAI-OUT</i> <i>12/27</i> <i>12/27</i>	S

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

**AVOID TRACER ACTION
PLEASE SIGN AND RETURN WITHIN TEN (10) WORKING DAYS.**

RECEIPT

RETURN TO



OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ROOM [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

[Redacted signature area]

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FORM 3772B
12-89

- 1 - WHITE, RETURN COPY
- 2 - CANARY, ADDRESSEE HOLD BACK
- 3 - PINA

NND 982011

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Action

REQUEST FOR THE DCI TO ATTEND A 1 OCTOBER 1996 CLOSED HEARING TO DISCUSS INTERAGENCY EFFORTS TO ACCOUNT FOR AMERICAN SERVICE PERSONNEL AND INTELLIGENCE OPERATIVES WHO REMAIN MISSING IN ACTION FROM THE KOREAN AND VIETNAM WARS

Document Number
OCA-014110-CNV

Date Received
09/25/1996

Task Instructions:

no value

Recipients

- DCI DEUTCH

Request Documents: (b)(3) CIAAct

Additional Document Metadata

OPI		
Secondary OPI		
From		
Other Document Number		(b)(3) CIAAct
Comments		
File Code		
Media Type		
Codewords		
Attachments		
Keywords		
Copies		

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OCA 96-0390

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COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-6035

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ANDREW K. ELLIS, STAFF DIRECTOR

September 25, 1996


Mr. John Deutch
 Director of Central Intelligence
 The Central Intelligence Agency
 Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Deutch:

As the Chairman of both the Subcommittee on Military Personnel of the House National Security Committee and the Subcommittee on Tactical and Technical Intelligence of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), I request your attendance at a closed meeting in Room H-405 of the Capitol (HPSCI hearing room) at 10:00 a.m. on Tuesday, October 1, 1996 to discuss interagency efforts to account for American service personnel and intelligence operatives who remain missing in action from the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

As you know, recent public hearings that I have conducted on POW/MIAs from the Korean War and their possible transfer to the Soviet Union have generated considerable media coverage. It is essential that all U.S. Government agencies coordinate efforts to resolve the fates of our missing heroes. I have learned that interagency rivalry has led to the derailment of recent efforts by Defense Department investigators to obtain important information. For example, an initiative to interview sources in Europe was allegedly sabotaged by a Russian defector working for your agency and a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee currently working at the Defense POW/MIA Office. I have also learned that important documents have been suppressed or remain inappropriately classified. This closed meeting will be an opportunity to candidly address the concerns of Congress regarding these issues and to expedite the accountability process.

If you cannot attend the meeting, I request that you please send a senior deputy to represent your interests. In addition, because I believe that the current coordination problems can best be overcome by sharing information between agencies in a session involving personnel from several levels of management, I would also request the attendance of the following people: Mr. Frederick P. Hitz, the Inspector General of the CIA; and CIA MROC



11-2005 000005

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(b)(3) CIAAct

Action

**5 MARCH 1999 SENATE MEMBER BRIEFING RE:
POW/MIA**

Document Number
OCA-019866-CNV

Date Received
03/05/1999

Task Instructions:

no value

(b)(3) CIAAct

Recipients

- MFR

Request Documents:

Additional Document Metadata

OPI	<input type="text"/>	
Secondary OPI		
From		
Other Document Number		(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)
Comments		
File Code		
Media Type		
Codewords		
Attachments		
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(b)(3)
CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

3/11/2013 000006

OCA Remarks
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

PRINTED: Wednesday, May 12, 1999
AT: 17:14

CODEWORDS:

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum for the Record

KEY: C/1999-00260

EVENT: MEMBER BRIEFING DATE: 03/05/1999 TIME: 9:00 STATUS: COMPLETED
PLACE: 407 SENATE
FOR: SEN
SUBJECT: POW/MIA

ATTENDEES:

<u>ASSOCIATION</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>ROLE</u>
	DZIATKIEWICZ, ELIZABETH ()	BRIEFER
	ELBERG, GRAEME ()	BRIEFER
	JANNOTTA, SHELLEY ()	BRIEFER
	MOORE, PATRICIA () (b)(3) CIAAct	BRIEFER
	SOTOS, MARY ANNE ()	BRIEFER
DCI/OCA	[Redacted]	SUPPORT
DCI/OCA	[Redacted]	SUPPORT
DOD	LAJOIE, MGEN, RONALD (DOD)	
SEN	SMITH, ROBERT (SEN)	

Executive Summary: (b)(3) NatSecAct

1) ~~(S)~~ [Redacted] The purpose of the briefing was to respond to the major points raised in the 26 January 1999 letter to the DCI from Senators Bob Smith and John Warner (Smith is the head of the Vietnam Working Group on the US/Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs; the commission is chaired by General Roland LaJoie) requesting the following:

- 1) Access to a September 1996 report cited in the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate on the Vietnam POW/MIA issue;
- 2) Access to an August 1998 Top Secret memorandum dissem report which dealt with the alleged transfer of U.S. POWs to the Soviet Union from Vietnam during the Vietnam War;
- 3) Justification for the discrepancy in classification levels between the 1996 and 1998 reports;
- 4) An e (b)(3) NatSecAct nearly two years elapsed before a follow-up report was generated on this matter. (b)(3) CIAAct

2) ~~(S)~~ [Redacted] A package of DO reports and [Redacted] were taken to the meeting for the Senator and General LaJoie to review on a read-and-return basis. The package included the following documents: 1) [Redacted] 10 October 1996, 2) [Redacted] 7 October 1996; 3) CIA [Redacted] 9 September 1998; and 4) DO Memorandum Intelligence Report [Redacted] 26 August 1998. Copies of these documents as well as the 26 January letter authored by Senators Rob Smith and John Warner are attached to this report. (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1)
3) ~~(S)~~ [Redacted] As background, both the 1996 and the 1998 information originated from [Redacted] [Redacted] The August 1998 report recounts stories in circulation among KGB officers over the years that, during the Vietnam War, the KGB transported US POWs clandestinely from North Vietnam to Russia, where they were interrogated and pitched. The stories allege the KGB succeeded in recruiting one American POW who was a member of an American military intelligence service [Redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1)

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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)

[redacted] The [redacted] source had only indirect access to the information and no past reporting record on this issue. Efforts to flesh out the source's account resulted in limited additional details. A thorough review of EA, CE, and CIC records failed to identify any new information which corroborates the stories in the report.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

4) ~~(S)NF~~ [redacted] As background, both the 1996 and the 1998 information originated from [redacted]

The August 1998 report recounts stories in circulation among KGB officers over the years that, during the Vietnam War, the KGB transported US POWs clandestinely from North Vietnam to Russia, where they were interrogated and pitched. The stories allege the KGB succeeded in recruiting one American POW who was a member of an American military intelligence service who had been involved in US intelligence operations.

(b)(6)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

The [redacted] source had only indirect access to the information and no past reporting record on this issue. Efforts to flesh out the source's account resulted in limited additional details. A thorough review of EA, CE, and CIC records failed to identify any new information which corroborates the stories in the report.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Summary Text:

5) ~~(S)NF~~ [redacted] As Senator Smith was delayed for approximately fifteen minutes, the briefers spent the time discussing a broad range of topics with General LaJoie. The General admitted he was not fully briefed on the subject of the meeting, but stated that he understood the core issue as being the transportation of US POWs captured during the Vietnam War to Russia for the purpose of being recruited as informants once they return to the United States. At this point, LaJoie is unconvinced that US POWs were sent to the Soviet Union during the Vietnam War. According to LaJoie, the Russians have admitted that a plan was drawn up between the Soviet and Vietnamese Governments to conduct such a program during the Vietnam War. To date, however, neither have the Russians provided any documentation detailing such a plan to the Commission nor has the Commission has found any evidence that would suggest such a program was carried out.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

6) ~~(S)NF~~ [redacted] In the case of the Korean War, however, the General believes that it is highly likely that US POWs were transported to Russia. The General believes exploitation by the Russians of US POWs occurred during this period, largely due to Stalin and his policies. The Russians continue to deny such any such transfers took place during the Korean War and the issue has yet to be resolved. Discussions continue on this matter between US and Russian negotiators.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

7) ~~(S)NF~~ [redacted] Other topics discussed with the General was his tenure with the Agency. He stated he enjoyed working with the Agency, adding that the Agency culture was very much like the military with its "can-do" spirit. He also identified himself as one the of the first pioneers in improving the working relationship between the Agency and the military. DCEA, who was directly involved in supporting the military during her assignment [redacted]

[redacted] discussed the Agency's evolving relationship with the military with the General until Senator Smith arrived for the meeting

(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

8) ~~(S)NF~~ [redacted] The Senator began the meeting by announcing the Agency refused to admit staff at this session, including Roger Schmaker, who had been specifically requested to participate by Senator Smith's personal office. Roger Schmaker is a DOD employee assigned to support the Commission, who, the Senator added, had the clearance level for this briefing (Top Secret) and had even had access to the two reports identified in his 26 January 1999 letter.

(b)(6)

[redacted] responded to the Senator by stating that in an effort to be as forthcoming as possible in this briefing, we had brought along a package of documentation for review. This package not only included the two reports but DO [redacted] related to this issue which neither Mr. Schmaker nor anyone else outside the Agency would have access. The Senator appeared to accept this explanation and began to review the four documents.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

9) ~~(S)NF~~ (OC) Once the General and Senator had finished reviewing the documents, the briefing began with a discussion of the source information, [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)

[redacted] Details regarding the identities of the subsources or their access to the information provided in the 1996 and 1998 reports are not available. The briefers added that [redacted] was not personally involved in interrogating American POWs and did not have access to interrogation reports. The briefers further explained that the two reports represented two separate meetings with the source, one which took place in mid-1996 and another follow-up meeting in July 1998 to address additional tasking from DPMO generated from the original report. The Senator asked if it would be possible for the Commission to provide questions to present to the source during future meetings to which the briefers replied this would not be a problem.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

10) ~~(S/NF)~~ [redacted] The Senator then asked why nearly two years elapsed before a follow-up report was generated on this matter. The briefers response was that the reasons for the long intervals between reports was due to the infrequency of the meetings with the source, [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

11) ~~(S/NF)~~ [redacted] The Senator then asked for the rationale behind updating the classification level of the second report disseminated in 1998 to "Top Secret" when the original 1996 report was classified only as "Secret". The briefers explained that the reason the second report was classified "Top Secret" was due to source protection. [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

The upgrade of the classification level was because we wanted to be able to provide as detailed an account as possible of the source chain of the information, while still allowing adequate source protection. [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

12) ~~(S/NF)~~ [redacted] The discussion then jumped to a review of [redacted] agency career and experience as a POW during the Vietnam War as well as [redacted] connection with the Agency's [redacted] program ran in the 1950's.

[redacted] agency career began in 1949. [redacted] Weaver held a number of positions in the Agency, [redacted]

(b)(6)

That said, there is no information available which directly connects [redacted] to [redacted]

(b)(1)

In addition, after a considerable investigation [redacted] it was determined that [redacted] was never recruited or cooperated with any foreign intelligence service during the period that he was a POW during the Vietnam War. [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

13) ~~(S/NF)~~ [redacted] CIC officer [redacted] described [redacted] incarceration by the Vietnamese as cruel and difficult. The Vietnamese were aware of [redacted] intelligence affiliation and consequently, [redacted] was often held in solitary confinement and treated very badly by the guards. In order to stay alive, [redacted] provided information to the Vietnamese on cases that he knew had been long terminated; however, when that was not possible he altered the information to make it misleading or incorrect. There is no indication in [redacted] files to show that he was ever

ted by the Vietnamese about [redacted] [redacted] also reported just after the POW's had been notified that they were to be released, he was dressed up and taken to a building in Hanoi for a meeting. In addition to

several Vietnamese officers, a European-looking man was in attendance. He was not introduced, however [redacted] deduced over the next few hours that the individual was probably a Soviet intelligence officer. [redacted] stated that the meeting could be described as a rapport building session. He was not questioned about cases and did not volunteer any such information. When the group broke for lunch, and his captors told him he would be meeting this person again

the afternoon, [redacted] refused. This one brief meeting was the only session [redacted] had with the individual he believed might be a Soviet intelligence officer. While [redacted] was on extended leave following his release, the Soviets placed a postcard in [redacted] mailbox referring to the meeting in Hanoi and stating that if he knew what was good for him, he would follow their directions for a meeting. [redacted] reported the incident to the Agency immediately. He did not follow-up on this contact.

[redacted] also advised that the Agency had no information on [redacted] current status as the Agency had no further contact with [redacted] once he retired from the Agency in 1976.

[redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

14) ~~(S/NF)~~ [redacted] [redacted] also advised that the Agency had no information on [redacted] current status as the Agency had no further contact with [redacted] once he retired from the Agency in 1976.

(b)(3) CIAAct

~~SECRET~~

000009

~~SECRET~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

15) ~~(S, NF)~~ [redacted] Senator Smith specifically expressed an interest in pursuing the information provided in [redacted] paragraph 4 identifying the Khabarovsk or Vladivostok regions as sites where US POWs were reportedly taken within the Soviet Union during the Vietnam War. The Senator asked if it would be possible for him and his commission colleagues to follow-up on this information during their next trip to Russia. The briefers attempted to explain that, in order to protect the source of the information, the commission could act on this information only if it could show that it had received this collaborating information from other venues. General Lajoie, largely due to his ^{past Agency} experience, seemed to grasp this concept fairly quickly; however, the Senator appeared un(b)(1)ed.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

16) ~~(S, NF)~~ [redacted] The Senator also questioned the need for comments from [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct on the contents of the report, suggesting that such comments actually politicized DO reporting. In response, the briefers explained "comment procedures" on DO reporting, [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct


17) ~~(S, NF)~~ [redacted] In closing, Senator Smith asked DCEA [redacted] if she had had an opportunity to review his assessment of the 1998 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Vietnamese intentions, capabilities, and performance concerning the POW/MIA issue and if so, what were her comments on his assessment. In response, DCEA advised that she understood the DCI responded to his concerns via a recent letter and she had no other comments to add to the DCI response.

(b)(3) CIAAct



Liaison Officer
Office of Congressional Affairs

DCI/OCA/CLG/NCB:broadbent:pnr/37922(12 May 99)



(b)(3) CIAAct

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DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

~~RICHARD J. KERR~~

APPEARANCE BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE

25 NOVEMBER 1991

000011

~~SECRET~~21 November 1991
OCA 4837-91

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Robert W. Magner
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs
Office of Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Closed Briefing 25 November 1991

1. You will be making a brief opening statement to the Committee. This will go a long way toward convincing the Committee of the Intelligence Community's commitment to support its work. We have included reference to sources and methods in your remarks because this will be one of the key issues as the Committee presses for full declassification of all materials related to POW/MIA matters.

2. Our understanding is that the Committee is interested primarily in an informal exchange of information with only limited structure. We do not anticipate that you will be asked any particular questions. Essentially the Committee wants a brief update on what the various agencies are doing in this area and then turn to questions. DIA's prepared talking points reflect that understanding as does the short statement prepared for ADDO Price. Both are in your briefing book. We anticipate having NSA's statement shortly.

3. There are likely to be several areas the Senators will want to explore. One is the whole issue of sources and methods and why sources of considerable vintage and not of central value must be protected. We have taken the position that while we are redacting all reporting to be shown to the Committee staff we will, upon request, show unredacted information to members or cleared staff on a case by case basis. This is an even more liberal policy than is our practice with the Oversight Committees. CIA and DIA have worked out agreed guidelines in this area, a copy of which is in the background material. These guidelines have been shown to Committee staff but not accepted by them.

4. A second issue concerns Laos. The Senators are likely to focus on the large number of unresolved cases in Laos. DIA and CIA will be prepared to respond in detail. There is also keen interest in the status of civilian intelligence operatives

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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SUBJECT: POW/MIA Closed Briefing 20 November 1991

missing in Laos. Again CIA and DIA will be prepared to address. [redacted]

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CIA will address these activities in detail.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

5. There is also the issue of POW/MIA family members having access to classified materials. DOD is seeking to develop a policy in this area in response to Congressional pressure. DIA and CIA have some concerns but will be supportive so long as sources and methods are protected.

6. Overall we anticipate most of this meeting being an information gathering session with the Senators asking questions that they could not get answers to in the open session. Hopefully in this process two points will be made. One that there are strong reasons for keeping some of the materials relating to POW/MIA in classified form. Secondly, there is a need for the Committee to address classified issues in a closed forum. On the latter point, both Senator's Kerry and Smith pressed DIA to discuss code breaking in Laos in open session. NSA will address this issue in the closed session and other speakers will be supportive.

7. There is general agreement that there must be a positive and forthcoming attitude toward responding to the Committee's interests. Yet all agencies want to avoid carte blanche access to all information that includes data revealing sources and the methods of acquisition. Even more, they want to uphold the overall principal of such protections because of the larger equities involved.

[redacted]
Robert W. Magner

(b)(6)

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000014

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, I AM PLEASED TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU THIS AFTERNOON TO UNDERSCORE THE IMPORTANCE THAT I AND THE WHOLE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ATTACH TO YOUR EFFORTS TO WORK TOWARD A FINAL RESOLUTION OF LONGSTANDING CONCERNS ABOUT POWS AND MIAS FROM THE INDOCHINA WAR. I REGRET THAT MY SCHEDULE ALLOWS ONLY A BRIEF APPEARANCE TODAY. I HAVE, HOWEVER, BROUGHT WITH ME SENIOR MEMBERS FROM THE CONCERNED AGENCIES--AND THEIR RESPECTIVE EXPERTS--WHO ARE PREPARED TO BRIEF YOU ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THEIR AGENCIES AND RESPOND TO YOUR QUESTIONS. FROM THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY--THE LEAD AGENCY FOR THE COMMUNITY ON THIS ISSUE--IS ITS NEW DIRECTOR, GENERAL CLAPPER. FROM THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY IS ITS CHIEF OF STAFF, DONALD PARSONS, AND FROM CIA IS ASSOCIATE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS TED PRICE.

LET ME SAY EMPHATICALLY AT THE OUTSET THAT THE WORK OF YOUR NEW COMMITTEE HAS MY FULL SUPPORT AND THAT OF THE DCI. THE SUBJECT OF POW/MIAS IS A DIFFICULT AND HIGHLY EMOTIONAL ONE. I AM AWARE OF THE INTENSE INTEREST IN IT, AND OF THE IMPORTANT ROLE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS PLAYED AND CONTINUES TO PLAY IN DEVELOPING AND DISSEMINATING INFORMATION ON IT. I ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE STRONG VIEWS ABOUT

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INTELLIGENCE REPORTING AND ITS AVAILABILITY TO THOSE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE FATE OF INDIVIDUALS STILL MISSING IN INDOCHINA. I HOPE THAT THROUGH THIS PROCESS THOSE CONCERNS CAN BE PUT TO REST.

THE DCI HAS THE STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROTECTING INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS. I WANT TO ASSURE YOU, HOWEVER, THAT THE INTERAGENCY TEAM THAT HAS BEEN ASSEMBLED WILL BE AS RESPONSIVE AS POSSIBLE IN SETTING ITS GUIDELINES AND IN DEALING WITH THE COMMITTEE'S INTERESTS. ONLY WHEN IT IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR THE PROTECTION OF THOSE SOURCES AND METHODS WILL THERE BE ANY LIMITATIONS ON THE MATERIALS TO BE REVIEWED, AND ANY SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION WILL BE PROVIDED TO YOU.

THROUGHOUT THIS PROCESS I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE MAY WELL BE AREAS OF DIFFICULTY OR DISAGREEMENT, BUT I ASSURE YOU THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS COMMITTED TO WORKING WITH YOU TO REACH ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FULL SHARING OF INFORMATION. I ALSO CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THE COMMUNITY WILL CONTINUE TO ATTACH THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO COLLECTING AND DISSEMINATING INFORMATION ON THE POW/MIA ISSUE AND WILL DEVOTE SUBSTANTIAL RESOURCES WORLDWIDE TO THAT EFFORT. WE WANT TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE.

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LET ME NOW TURN TO THE AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES, EACH OF
WHOM HAS PREPARED REMARKS ADDRESSING THE ACTIVITIES OF
THEIR INDIVIDUAL AGENCIES.

THANK YOU.

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ADDO Statement

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Mr. Chairman, members of Committee, I welcome this opportunity to discuss CIA's role in resolving the status of prisoners-of-war (POW) and missing-in-action (MIA) from the war in Indochina.

- This issue has remained an important collection requirement since the beginning of U. S. involvement in the war in Indochina.

- CIA is committed to continue its intelligence collection program and provide whatever resources are necessary to resolve the status of Indochina War POW's and MIA's.

- As the DCI stated earlier, we are determined to cooperate with the lead Agency, DIA, in every way possible consistent with our statutory requirement to protect sources and methods, in making available to your Committee and to other appropriate recipients, materials bearing on this issue.

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-- Let me emphasize that in almost every instance, we believe we will be able to satisfy your legitimate informational needs on this matter.

To underscore our committment, I want to assure you that the first question our officers in the field ask [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] whom they believe might have access to information on this subject is what do they know about American POW's or MIA's.

-- We ask about the fate of MIA's, details on crash sites, grave locations, live sightings,

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

-- This is an important requirement for our [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct stations worldwide; last year, [redacted] in East Asia, Europe, and the U. S. forwarded reports on this issue.

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(b)(3)
NatSecAct



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Once collected, we disseminate intelligence expeditiously to authorized customers for action.


-- Between 1973 and the present, we have (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct disseminated approximately on subjects such as the downing of U. S. aircraft, possible grave sites, sightings of U. S. servicemen, alleged discovery of remains and Hanoi's position on U. S. MIA's.

-- Some 6.5 linear feet of material covering reporting between 1964 and 1979 has been declassified in response to FOIA requests.



(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct



Mr. Chairman, we in CIA are committed to resolving the
POW-MIA matter, and our resources are turned to this purpose.

This concludes my statement.

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DIA Statement

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NSA Statement

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TALKING POINTS FOR GEN CLAPPER

DIA'S PRIMARY MISSION IS LIVE PRISONER ISSUE -- COLLECTING (STONY BEACH), ANALYZING AND REPORTING ON ANY AMERICANS STILL HELD IN CAPTIVITY.

SECONDARY MISSIONS INVOLVE SUPPORT TO DC AREA POLICY OFFICIALS AND ANALYTIC SUPPORT TO CINCPAC/JCRC FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING EFFORTS.

BOTH MISSIONS INVOLVE HIGHLY SPECIALIZED ANALYSIS THAT USUALLY MUST RELY ON SKETCHY DETAIL. THIS ANALYSIS IS AN ARTFORM REQUIRING CONSIDERABLE OJT.

DIA POW-MIA OFFICE CONTINUOUSLY IN EXISTENCE SINCE VIETNAM WAR. REVIEW POW-MIA AND STONY BEACH RESOURCE NUMBERS ON REVERSE.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

TIMELY RESOLUTION OF PHOTO CASES AND OTHER HIGH VISIBILITY DISCREPANCY CASES HAS UNDERScoreD THE VALUE OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED BY OVERT FIELD INVESTIGATION.

EFFORTS IN-COUNTRY ARE A MAJOR NEW THRUST OF DIA'S EFFORTS (TALK

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

WHAT IS NOW CRITICAL IS GETTING VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIAN GOV'T APPROVAL OF A LIVE SIGHTING INVESTIGATION REGIME SIMILAR TO ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS HAMMERED OUT WITH THE SOVIETS -- NAMELY, NO NOTICE VISITATIONS TO SITES OF FIRST HAND SIGHTING REPORTS AND CERTAIN OTHER CAMPS AND PRISONS THAT COULD POTENTIALLY BE INVOLVED IN HOLDING AMERICAN PRISONERS.

DIA IS NOW WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE JOINT STAFF AND CINCPAC TO INTEGRATE OUR ANALYTIC AND COLLECTION EFFORTS WITH CINCPAC'S PROPOSED POW-MIA JOINT TASK FORCE.

(b)(1)

DIA'S BOTTOM LINE:

- o ISSUE RECEIVING APPROPRIATE PRIORITY WITHIN DIA
 - OFFICE REPORTS TO COMMAND ELEMENT
 - NECESSARY BILLETTS TAKEN OUT OF HIDE BEFORE ACTIVE CONG INTEREST
 - AGGRESSIVE, MOTIVATED AND KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONNEL ASSIGNED
- o OTHER INTEL AGENCIES PROVIDING STRONG SUPPORT
- o (b)(1)
- o DOD POLICY OFFICIALS NO LONGER RELYING ON DIA TO "CARRY THE WEIGHT"
- o DIA IS READY, WILLING AND ABLE TO FULLY SUPPORT THIS COMMITTEE AND THE WHAT HAS BECOME KNOWN AS THE GOVERNMENT'S "FULL COURT PRESS" OVER THE NEXT 2 OR 3 YEARS.

000027

Qs & As

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QUESTION: Please explain why certain information in reports on POW-MIA's still remains protected.

ANSWER: The documents were initially classified to protect national security interests which includes the protection of the source of the information, the place and manner in which it was acquired, any foreign intelligence service involvement, references to other operational activity and administrative details [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted]

Source information continues to be classified despite the passage of time because of the continuing ramifications of protecting sources. [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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QUESTION: What information has been declassified and released to the public via the FOIA?

ANSWER: Ann Mills Griffiths, Executive Director of the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia, filed an FOIA case in May 1979 requesting all documents and intelligence reports, not previously released, which originated or were held by CIA elements operating in Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia from May 1964-present (May 79) which relate to American POWs.

Six and one-half linear feet have been released to the public and DIA in response to this request. The information is compiled chronologically and it is contained in some twenty-two volumes representing periodic releases over a ten year period ending in 1989. A complete set is on file in Information Services Division, DDA in Ames Building.

These reports are in sanitized form, having details about sources and methods deleted from them. They may be passed, as is, in a body to a centrally controlled DIA reading room for access by the public. Privacy concerns of multiple American names in many reports have not been addressed and we defer to the DIA on this issue.

QUESTION: Is there any intelligence reporting to indicate the possible presence of POW-MIA's from the Indochina War being transferred to the Soviet Union or China?

ANSWER: We have neither substantive intelligence or fragmentary reporting which indicates that American POW's were transferred to the Soviet Union or China during the war. We are in the the process of querying the KGB on this issue. Because of the previous hostile environment in Moscow, collection on POW-MIA's was not a requirement [redacted] Considering the changes in recent months, we will reemphasize this requirement [redacted] in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

QUESTION: Are you familiar with the case of the mortician who claimed there were over 400 sets of remains of Americans from the Indochina War being warehoused in Hanoi?

ANSWER: [redacted], a Vietnamese refugee residing in a refugee camp [redacted] was interviewed by [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
NatSecAct

[redacted] in November 1979. During this interview, [redacted] asserted that he personally inspected the remains of

(b)(6)
(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] 400 U.S. military personnel which were in secret storage

(b)(1) in Hanoi. The [redacted] requested [redacted]

(b)(1) [redacted] in an attempt to verify [redacted] claim. The results

(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] did not support [redacted] claims on either the 400 sets of remains or that he personally saw three alive American soldiers in Hanoi. A [redacted]

(b)(6)
(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted]

(b)(1) [redacted] in

the United States with results that [redacted] was telling the

truth with regard to the remains and the live Americans. At

the time, [redacted] conclusion was that [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] were incorrect as to the dates used in the

test questions. We have not seen a copy of the [redacted]

report to make an analysis.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

QUESTION: What can you tell us about the possible existence of POW-MIA's in Laos?

ANSWER: Over the years there have been continuing stories about the possible existence of POW's still being held in Laos. I spoke earlier of [redacted] [redacted] as well as the attempts to locate POW-MIA's via imagery. There were reports of alleged POW working in gold mines or held being held in caves. A report regarding a caucasian spotted bathing in a stream in north Laos was investigated and to the best of our knowledge was a Czech geologist working in the area. Our capabilities in Laos are somewhat limited but we do attempt to followup and verify substantive reporting on POW-MIA's. We have no reporting to support the claim that there may still be POW's or MIA's being held in Laos. In fact, in spite of all our efforts over a number of years, we have received no credible evidence that there are in fact American prisoners being held in Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
NatSecAct

With regard to pilots or crew members of Air America or Continental Air Service, there were nine individuals unaccounted as of mid-1973. All of these cases were turned over to the Department of Labor for resolution as the individuals were contract employees of the U.S. government.

QUESTION: Why was source information given away to the Vietnamese and Cambodian authorities in July 91 while at the same time we continue to protect refugee sources?

BACKGROUND: In July 1991 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Ken Quinn, passed a list of names of individuals to Cambodian and Vietnamese authorities requesting access to talk with these individuals on POW-MIA matters. He did this while visiting Hanoi and Phnom Penh on POW-MIA matters.

ANSWER: The individuals in question were not sources of intelligence but were individuals thought by State or the families of POW-MIA's to have possible information. [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] We do not know what, if any followup there has been on this issue as we were not involved in this [redacted]

(b)(1)

QUESTION: Is it possible to provide the families of POW/MIA's access to a broader range of classified information?

ANSWER: We are willing to work in concert with DIA on this issue as they maintain the files on the individual POW or MIA's. Our concern is that sources and methods continue to be protected and we are hopeful that we can come up with a mutually beneficial solution. The files currently under review for this committee could possibly be made available to the families if properly controlled in a secure facility to which the families could be given access.

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QUESTION: Are you familiar with the events surrounding the fall of Lima Site 85 in March 1968?

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

ANSWER: Lima Site 85 [redacted] located 25 kilometers from the North Vietnamese/Laotian border atop Phou Pha Thi mountain. The site was used to direct and control attacking jet fighters and bombers to their targets and to provide them with precise bomb release points, under radar control.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
NatSecAct

[redacted] On 10

March 1968, the site began to receive heavy incoming mortar and artillery fire, and in the early morning hours that followed, 20 heavily armed infiltrators launched a surprise attack on the

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] Of the [redacted] Americans at the site, only five technicians [redacted] were extracted.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

our officers was wounded, five of the six technicians were wounded, one of them being hit by fire while in the helicopter and he died in route. The [redacted] remaining Americans were presumed dead.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

An enemy buildup had been underway for several months in the area prior to the attack and intelligence reporting indicated that the safety of the site was questionable after 10 March.

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

19 SEP 1991

The Honorable Richard B. Cheney
The Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Agency has been contacted by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence Duane P. Andrews concerning Senate Resolution 82 which creates a temporary Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. It is my understanding that this Committee will request access to Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) files, some of which contain CIA-generated classified information. Assistant Secretary Andrews has asked that the Agency work with the Department of Defense (DoD) to develop guidelines concerning Committee access to these files.

In response to Secretary Andrews' request for assistance, Agency officers are working with the newly-created POW/MIA Data Release Office to review DIA files. Once these officers have determined the scope and sensitivity of the CIA-originated information in the files, we will be able to develop appropriate guidelines for use with the Committee. In addition, I have designated a senior attorney in the Office of General Counsel to work with DoD attorneys to negotiate with the Select Committee concerning access to classified information in the files. I want to assure you that the Agency will cooperate fully with the Committee, and I am confident that guidelines can be developed that will ensure full compliance with the spirit of Senate Resolution 82 while at the same time meeting our statutory duty to protect intelligence sources and methods.

I have designated [redacted] Chief, Policy and Coordination Staff as the Agency's point of contact on this matter.

(b)(3) CIAAct

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Richard J. Kerr".

Richard J. Kerr
Acting Director of Central Intelligence

000038

4 OCT 91

(b)(1)
(b)(3) 50 USC 3605
(b)(3) NatSecAct

CATEGORIES FOR REVIEW/REDACTION WITH RELEASE OF
CLASSIFIED POW/MIA DOCUMENTS TO APPROPRIATELY
SCI CLEARED STAFF OF TEMPORARY SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS.

REPORT ORIGINATOR

REDACT

RATIONALE

DoD HUMINT

STONY BEACH team members' names

Compromise the safety and mission of US collection personnel

Detailed source data/biographic reports/source numbers

Jeopardize safety of sources

Ongoing clandestine operational data

Reveal extent and involvement of US intelligence operations; cause extreme embarrassment to the Thai or other foreign governments

NSA

[Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) 50 USC 3605
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) 50 USC 3605
(b)(3) NatSecAct

When SIGINT reporting related to [Redacted] is received, it will be reviewed to ensure [Redacted] would not be jeopardized or collection methods compromised. Content that would reveal [Redacted] or other intelligence sources will be protected.


Not applicable

Historical SIGINT can be released at the Secret SCI level

~~SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL~~

STATE	U.S. Government policies under negotiation		Would compromise ongoing US foreign policy positions and interests
ASD/ISA	Not applicable	(b)(1)	Classified cables can be released
OVERHEAD IMAGERY	Not applicable	(b)(3) CIAAct	Images can be released at the SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL level
DEBRIEFS	Not releasable	(b)(3) NatSecAct	Executive Order 11652 dated 8 Mar 72; ASD/ISA memo I-86/19832, dated 3 Jan 87; release of this information would violate confidentiality agreements with returned POWS.

CIA



~~SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL~~

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~~SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

NOTES:

1. Although material has been redacted based on guidelines established above, all the documents retain their original classification.
2. Material extracted from the file will be noted on the file index (e.g., "source biographic sheet is not included").
3. Information that has been extracted or redacted from original file can be reviewed by committee members. Staff will be allowed to review the original files on a case-by-case basis.
4. All classified material requires handling and protection in accordance with Senate Resolution 400 as adopted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.


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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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OCA 4821-91
18 November 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Committee Hearing on 15 November

1. I attended a portion of the above-mentioned open Hearing (list of members attached). This was an opportunity for the Administration in the persons of Bob Sheetz of DIA, Ken Quinn from State and Carl Ford from DOD/ISA to address some of the charges made by other witnesses before the Committee the previous week. Ford's Statement is attached.

2. During the questions period, several areas of inquiry developed which could bear on the closed briefing now scheduled for 1430 on 20 November in S407. Agency participants at that briefing should be prepared to deal with some if not all of these issues.

3. Although unrelated to the actual focus of the investigation, there was considerable interest in the possible presence of POW/MIAs in the Soviet Union given the recent press article on that possibility. The Senators asked specifically if there had been contact with the KGB to inquire about this. State noted the diplomatic efforts. The Agency rep could be asked about contact with the KGB.

4. Ken Quinn was asked repeatedly about a list of individuals in Indochina who allegedly had information about POW/MIAs which he had given to the Vietnamese and Cambodian authorities in July 1991. Senators Smith and Grassley in particular asked if, in effect, he was not passing source information. They went on to ask why the Administration would give away one type of source information while vigorously guarding the refugee reporting sources. Quinn explained the difference between people who are in fact intelligence sources and those we believe have information and with whom we wanted to be in contact. Smith and/or Grassley can be counted on to raise the same issue at the closed briefing.

5. Carl Ford raised the issue of providing POW/MIA family members access to a broader range of classified information, saying that he is wrestling with how to arrange such access.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

000043

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Committee Hearing on 15 November

(In an earlier conversation Keith Hall told me that this is something that Defense is pushing and will eventually need an Agency input relative to the inclusion of CIA material in the DOD holdings.) The Agency rep should be prepared with some form of response if this issue comes up. Senator Robb was particularly interested in this aspect of the discussion.

6. Senator Kerry wanted information on those unaccounted for in the "secret war" in Laos. He wanted to know if they were in the overall 2,000 plus figure carried as POW/MIA. Ford said that it was only in the late 70's that those clandestine operatives were included in the overall count. Up to that time, there had been a secret list of such POW/MIAs. This bothered Kerry a great deal, and he can be certain to ask the Agency representative for more information.

7. Kerry asked about code breaking in Laos in 1968-1973. Witnesses declined to respond in open testimony and pointed to the absence of an NSA representative. This issue is certain to arise in the closed briefing. Senator Smith also asked specifically if there had been any operations into Laos in the period after 1973. Ford said he didn't know, and Smith was incredulous. Quinn said that he had recently learned from another witness-

(b)(6)

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

None of the witness had any personal knowledge of such operations. The Agency representative should be prepared to address this issue NatSecActtail.

8. Overall there was a very heavy emphasis on the Laotian situation throughout the Q and A period reflecting an apparent belief on the part of some Committee members that there is far less accountability for POW/MIAs in Laos and more evidence of their possible presence there after Operation Homecoming in 1973. Agency representatives should be prepared to deal especially with reporting on Laos and operational activity there related to POW/MIA matters.

(b)(6)


Robert W. Magner
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs
Office of Congressional Affairs

Attachment

OCA 4821-91

SUBJECT: POW/MIA Committee Hearing on 15 November

OCA/Senate/RWMagner (18 Nov 91)



(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE OF POW-MIA

Offices: 705 Senate Hart Office Building
Main Office Number: (202) 224-2038
Majority Staff Director Frances Zwenig: 202-224-2038
Minority Staff Director Al Ptak: 202-224-2306

MAJORITY:

Chairman John Kerry, Mass.

Thomas Daschle, S.D.

Harry Reid, Nev.

Charles Robb, Va.

Robert Kerry, Neb.

Herb Kohl, Wisc.

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TESTIMONY AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY

BY

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CARL W. FORD, JR.

BEFORE
THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

NOVEMBER 15, 1991

**TESTIMONY
AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY
BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS**

Carl W. Ford, Jr.

**Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)**

November 15, 1991

Mr. Chairman, Senator Smith, members of the Committee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to return to comment on issues that have arisen during the three days of historic hearings that you convened last week on the POW/MIA issue.

First, I would like to clarify a point that came up in last Thursday's testimony concerning the "last known alive" discrepancy cases. The definition of a discrepancy case is:

A case about which the USG has convincing evidence that the Governments of Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia should have specific knowledge.

The term "discrepancy case" includes not only individuals who were "last known alive, but also individuals who were known dead, but for whom the Indochinese Governments should be able to provide information or remains. As you can see, the definition is broad. Within this broad definition, we have identified three subcategories of cases. We did this because over the years a great deal of confusion has developed over what

precisely we were talking about--the terms "discrepancy case," "compelling case," "last known alive case," "Vessey case," all meant different things to different people.

The three subcategories of discrepancy cases are:

LAST KNOWN ALIVE: Those cases in which the US has information that the individual survived the loss incident and fell into enemy hands. In the case of air incidents, this includes cases in which the crew members are believed to have successfully exited their aircraft and to have been alive on the ground. In the case of ground incidents, this includes cases in which the individuals were last known alive, were not gravely wounded, and were in proximity to enemy forces who should have specific knowledge of the incident.

POW AT HOMECOMING: A specific group of individuals who, during the Vietnam War, were classified by their commanding officers and Service Secretaries as POWs but did not return during Operation Homecoming. These cases are also known to many families as "last known alive" due to their POW status. There were 97 individuals so listed. Subsequently, 42 "listed POWs" have been accounted for through unilateral SRV repatriation. The remainder are still unaccounted for.

KNOWLEDGE OF THE INCIDENT:

Circumstances of loss or subsequent information is convincing that Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia should have knowledge of the incident. In some of these cases, there is convincing evidence that the individual did not survive the incident of loss. In many cases, there is convincing evidence that Vietnam also has remains.

With this background, now I will shift to the 119 individuals who have been discussed in the testimony here, called variously "Vessey cases" and the "Vessey discrepancy cases." The first point to make is that, from the beginning, the list was not meant to be all-encompassing. In 1988, DIA, JCRC, General Vessey and the Office of the Secretary of Defense worked together to develop a list of most compelling last known alive cases, as well as other discrepancy cases, i.e., cases of individuals for whom the Vietnamese should have knowledge of the fate of the individual and remains if the individual is dead. *The list was not exhaustive, merely illustrative.* The primary purpose was to shed light on the live prisoner issue by asking the Vietnamese to help us solve cases in which there was either hard evidence or a strong possibility that the individual survived the incident of loss, but did not return at Operation Homecoming, and for whom, as of 1987, there had been no accounting. So far, despite our investigative efforts, we have not returned any live Americans or uncovered proof that unaccounted for Americans are alive in Vietnam.

There are additional cases, beyond the 119 individuals, which fit into the discrepancy case definition. Again, not all of the "Vessey" discrepancy

cases involve individuals who were last known alive. Some of them involve individuals who are known dead—but the Vietnamese should be able to provide information or remains.

In addition to the 119 individuals whose cases were presented to the Vietnamese by General Vessey, we determined that there are 64 other individuals who meet the "last known alive" definition as well as 13 individuals who were classified by their respective Service Secretary as a POW at Operation Homecoming in 1973, and who are not included in the "Vessey" cases who are otherwise not accounted for. This group of cases will be the focus of the full time efforts of the Hanoi Office under the USCINCPAC Joint Task Force earlier described to this committee by General Christmas. They will all be investigated within Phase I of the USCINCPAC plan.

DIA as Family Outreach Organization

Next, I would like to address an issue that has been implicit in the testimony you have heard from many family members regarding DIA. The issue of family members and DIA analysts meeting directly to discuss individual cases has proved problematic. DIA is an intelligence collection and analysis agency. Their personnel are not trained for family outreach and the function of family outreach is not an appropriate one for that agency. The families' primary point of contact for discussion of their cases is the designated Service Casualty Affairs Office. Those offices are staffed with personnel trained to perform the family outreach role. In the case where a

family is dissatisfied with the service received from the Service Casualty Affairs Office, the proper place to redress that problem is with my office.

The problems experienced within DIA that resulted in the changes made by the Secretary's Management Inquiry related to functions assumed by the PW-MIA Office that were not within their mission. Those functions have been removed and placed within my office.

Allegations by Dr. O'Grady

We certainly understand the grief felt by Dr. O'Grady over her family's loss. We have reviewed the O'Grady case file and we believe that Dr. O'Grady's family has been properly served by our casualty affairs process. The O'Grady case is one in which we believe that the family has been promptly and accurately notified about investigative activity and information relating to the case.

Dr. O'Grady's sweeping allegations of Government nonfeasance, malfeasance and misfeasance are without factual basis. For example, Dr. O'Grady states that her family was advised from the time that her father became missing that he was dead. That statement is quite simply wrong. From immediately after his incident of loss, the Air Force believed there was a good possibility he survived. He was seen to eject from his aircraft. He was seen with a good parachute, and his chute was seen on the ground, but he was not in it. All indications were that he survived his ejection.

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Colonel O'Grady was carried in a missing in action status until 1977 when his status was reviewed, at the express request of his wife, and his status changed to deceased and a Presumptive Finding of Death was entered in his case.

A second, most serious allegation was made by Dr. O'Grady which requires discussion. She alleged in her testimony that "identifications were made with teeth and teeth fragments but when independent forensic anthropologists were consulted, there were no dental records to be compared to. Again, this is absolutely false. There has never been a dental identification rendered by the U. S. Army Central Identification Laboratory without benefit of dental records. In every case, either a ante-mortem dental X-ray or a dental chart was available to provide the factual predicate for the dental identification. No other forensic laboratory in the world has as many independent procedural safeguards as has the Central Identification Laboratory. Should you have any further questions on this point, I have the Commander, U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory available to respond.

I have a detailed written response to the other allegations made by Dr. O'Grady in her testimony that I would like to submit for the record.

 **Stevens and Lundy Response**

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(b)(3) 10 USC 424

As dissatisfied with the Department's performance as the families clearly are, the Department of Defense has vigorously pursued the

investigation of the photo. I have personally made myself available to the families to answer their questions and respond to their concerns, as has my staff and the Director of the DIA Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs. We have been unable to either confirm or disprove the identifications of the subjects of the photo made by the family members. We are continuing to investigate the photograph. Any intimation by the families that there has been less than an honest effort to investigate and locate the source of the photo is disingenuous. The facts establish otherwise. We have requested assistance from the Vietnamese at the highest levels of Government. We have sent three separate investigative teams to Cambodia to follow-up information and attempt to locate the source of the photograph. We have requested all of our [redacted] world-wide to search for the photo in Eastern-bloc magazines. We have tasked national technical means to obtain information on reports associated with the photographs and have established all-source collection requirements to obtain additional information about the photo, the individuals or the associated reporting. We are continuing to investigate vigorously, however, without some new leads, we may not be able to solve the mystery of this photo.

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(b)(6)
(b)(3) 10 USC 424

Finally, and this is an important point, [redacted] case is not closed. It is still under active investigation and any preliminary judgements made have been set aside pending further investigative activity and information.

I would like to submit a brief written response to the specific allegations contained within the testimony of the families for the record.

Donohue Allegations

Mr. Donohue stated in previous testimony that he has information about his brother, Captain Morgan Donohue, lost in Laos on 13 December 1968, and relates the fact that the presence in intelligence reporting of his father's zip code is proof that his brother is still alive in Laos, because only his brother could know the postal zip code of his father. In fact, the postal zip code of Major Donohue's father was contained within a widely circulated flyer that the family prepared and distributed throughout Southeast Asia. It is not unusual that information contained in such flyers later shows up in intelligence reports about American POWs.

Lost Records

There have been allegations made that fingerprint and other records have "mysteriously" disappeared from DoD files. There is no conspiracy to purge records. The Department of Defense does not maintain fingerprint records. The FBI is the sole agency with that responsibility. I request that this letter, from FBI Director Sessions to Congressman Solarz explaining "lost" or purged fingerprint records be entered in the record.

To prevent a recurrence of this problem in the future, I have tasked the Service Secretaries to examine possible alternatives to establish a redundant, independent source for military fingerprints separate from the FBI records. I will report to the Committee and to the families when we have implemented a solution to this problem.

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Senate Foreign Relations Committee Minority Staff Report

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Tracy Usry of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Minority staff came before this Committee to defend the minority staff report, An Examination of U. S. Policy Toward POW/MIAs, authored in large measure by himself. That report is replete with factual errors. I would like to take just a moment to discuss a few of the most glaring examples of poor research and error.

On page 5-8 of the Report, the staff states:

"In fact, only 591 U.S. POWs were repatriated by the North Vietnamese during Operation HOMECOMING, which is 12% of the figure of 5,000 U.S. POWs held by the North Vietnamese reported by the *New York Times*.

The original New York Times article, the primary source material, appeared on the front page of the 6 March 1973 issue. The number "5,000" appeared only once in the entire article—quoting an American source who stated at a meeting of the Joint Military Commission the previous day, North Vietnam had demanded the release of 5,000 Communist prisoners held by Saigon.

This 5,000 number cited incorrectly in the report has been oft-quoted by POW activists and is used within the report to lend

credence to the allegation that 85 % of American prisoners of war were withheld by Hanoi after Operation Homecoming.

A second glaring inaccuracy is found in the Prologue to Part II, page *i*. The report states:

"In spite of 1,400 unresolved reports of first hand live-sightings, the Department of Defense, remarkably, still believes it has "no credible evidence." How does it dismiss these reports?

In fact, there are numerous inaccuracies in just that simple statement. First, while there have been cumulatively over 1,400 first-hand live sighting reports, only approximately 100 are unresolved. Second, live-sighting reports have not been dismissed. In over 75 percent of the first-hand live sightings received, DIA (b)(3) 10 USC 424 have been able to establish that the report is true. These reports involve POWs who returned at Operation Homecoming, or have been correlated to other Americans or Westerners, such as missionaries or individuals stranded in South Vietnam when the Communists took control. Almost three hundred relate to Private Garwood, who returned from Vietnam in 1979.

There are numerous other factual inaccuracies throughout the report. To catalogue the inaccuracies would require a document of equal length and would be beyond the scope of my testimony here today. Further, to do so would require diverting manpower from

more important tasks related to the function of investigating POW/MIA cases.

A more important issue that this Committee should address of Mr. Usry is why he and other staff members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff have withheld from the Department of Defense information relevant to the investigation of the Stevens case and the Borah case. Not only has Mr. Usry withheld information that would have assisted the Department of Defense in more expeditiously investigating these cases, but he has stood by while Senate staff members directed sources not to provide their information to members of my staff, the DIA, or others within the Department of Defense investigating these cases.

I am personally outraged by the obstruction that Mr. Usry has presented to the DoD investigations of these cases. That any American would withhold relevant information or otherwise not cooperate with an on-going DoD POW/MIA investigation is shocking and should not be tolerated by you--his employers--the Members of the United States Senate. The families of the two individuals deserve better treatment than that.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that you will question Mr. Usry about how long he had the Borah information before July 1991. When the Department of Defense finally received the information, we resolved the case in less than 2 months.

Response to Judge Gayden's Allegations

The Borah and Carr families have been the losers as a result of the allegations made by a number of individuals before this Committee. Family confidence in their Government has been further eroded by the unsubstantiated and specious claims of Government conspiracy. Mr. Sheetz will later discuss the Carr case in detail, however, I would like to spend a moment on the Borah case and the allegations made by Judge Gayden before this Committee.

Judge Gayden's allegation that the Department of Defense would knowingly provide to the family, the Congress and the American people altered photographs of the meeting between our investigator, Bill Gadoury, and the individual is ludicrous. Even more disturbing is the fact that Judge Gayden, an officer of a court, would allege that he had obtained a photo analysis of the photos of the meeting and then assert that the DoD photos are frauds. This Committee can not stand by and let these gross distortions of fact go unnoticed. If Judge Gayden's photo experts believe the DoD photos are a fraud, he should produce their reports, or their testimony, or an affidavit or other suitable evidence.

Our investigators, with the help of the Lao, found the individual photographed in Laos and identified as Lieutenant Borah. The individual is not Lieutenant Borah. The Borah family has been convinced by Judge Gayden's bailiff, Khambang Sibounheuang, that the individual is Lieutenant Borah, and Khambang has accompanied the two Borah sons to Laos. Khambang's blood relative in Laos passed the roll of film containing

the Borah photos to Khambang in the United States. Khambang has a long history of providing POW related materials, from as early as 1985; and none— not one— of his leads has ever proven valid.

I have a fact sheet on Khambang that I would request be entered into the record. The Judge Gayden/Khambang connection needs to be thoroughly investigated. I hope that this Committee will undertake that task.

Bailey Cooperation

Finally, I would like to clarify a point raised by Lieutenant Colonel Bailey in his testimony. Lieutenant Colonel Bailey suggested that the Secretary of Defense may have misspoken in his testimony before this Committee. Lieutenant Colonel Bailey suggested that the Secretary was mistaken in his recitation of what Bailey agreed to provide to the Department of Defense in Thailand and that he was further mistaken in attributing to Bailey a comment that the "Carr" photograph "may have been" taken in Thailand or Burma. I would like to make clear for the record that the Secretary of Defense did not misspeak nor was he mistaken in any of the testimony he provided to this committee relative to Lieutenant Colonel Bailey.

Bailey's promises of cooperation were made to the Secretary of Defense in the presence of myself, and Congressmen McCloskey and Visclosky in the Secretary's office. The Secretary's testimony correctly reflected who and

what Bailey stated he would make available to our investigators. It also correctly reflected what Bailey told our investigators in Bangkok about where the photograph may have been taken. We have a chronology of our conversations with Bailey which I would like to make a part of the record. I have with me the individuals who were involved in the Carr investigation with Colonel Bailey and who will provide you the facts about their investigation. Mr. Bob Sheetz, the Chief of the Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs will address the specifics of the conduct of the Carr investigation of which Bailey was a part.

Thank you Mr. Chairman and Senator Smith. I am prepared now to respond to your questions.

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Executive Registry
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12 NOV 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Interagency Committee on Vietnam MIA's/POW's

1. I hereby establish an Interagency Committee on Vietnam MIA's/POW's under the chairmanship of Brigadier General James Shufelt (DIA). The purpose of the Committee is to exhaust all intelligence within the Community regarding the location and identification of Americans who might be held or interned in Southeast Asia.

2. I request that the appropriate NFIB agencies nominate representatives to serve on the Committee under Brigadier General Shufelt's chairmanship. Representatives will also be responsible for ensuring that any intelligence information presently held within the Intelligence Community is proffered to the Committee.

3. I am asking Lieutenant General Leonard Perroots, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, to oversee this activity on my behalf.

for William J. Casey

William J. Casey

Distribution:

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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

between the

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA)

and the

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SERVICE INTELLIGENCE REPRESENTATIVES

on

PARTICIPATION AT INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INDOCHINA PW/MIAS MEETINGS

A. PURPOSE

This memorandum of understanding clarifies the roles and responsibilities of each organization during participation in Interagency Committee on Indochina PW/MIAs meetings on the collection, oversight and coordination of intelligence relating to American servicemen and civilians who remain unaccounted for as a result of the war in Indochina (1961-1975).

B. BACKGROUND

Resolution of the PW/MIA issue is a matter of personal interest to the President of the United States, who has pledged that it is a matter of the highest national priority within his Administration. In implementation of this priority the purpose of the committee will be to formulate, coordinate, and manage new collection initiatives to ensure that all intelligence disciplines are sensitized to the issue. It will provide a clearing house for the exchange of PW intelligence and a forum for the discussion and resolution of related collection problems and requirements. The committee will make aggressive use of appropriate resources of specialized components of the intelligence community to identify, augment or supplement, confirm, or otherwise qualify intelligence information relating to U.S. PW/MIAs.

C. ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT

1. DIA shall provide the chairmanship and staff and administrative support for the committee.

2. The committee shall be comprised of one principal general-flag officer or equivalent civilian level representative of the following U.S. Government components: Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central

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Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and Service Intelligence representatives. The DIA representative at the committee meetings will also be the principal Joint Chiefs of Staff representative. All members and other attendees shall have TOP SECRET and SI/TK clearances.

3. Responsibilities of member representatives pertaining to the collection of PW/MIA related intelligence shall be consistent with the charter of the parent Department, Agency or Bureau.

4. The committee shall meet at the call of the Chairman but not less than quarterly.

D. IMPLEMENTATION AND TERMINATION

This memorandum of understanding shall become binding and enter into force upon signature by all parties. It shall remain in effect until revised or terminated and will be reviewed annually.

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(b)(6)

James W. Shufflett

JAMES W. SHUFFLETT / BG USA

[Redacted Signature Box]

Defense Intelligence Agency

Date: 28 Mar 86

[Redacted Signature Box]

Deputy Chief, Policy and
Coordination Staff
Central Intelligence Agency

Date: 3/28/86

Edward W. Rudolph

EDWARD W. RUDOLPH
Chief, Operations Directorate B5
National Security Agency


Date: 28 Mar 86


James H. Geer

JAMES H. GEER
Assistant Director, Intelligence
Division
Federal Bureau of investigation

Date: 4/15/86


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(b)(3) 10 USC 424


JOHN J. TAYLOR
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Coordination
Bureau of Intelligence & Research
Department of State



Date: April 17, 1986

Date: 2 APR 1986



RICHARD J. POWERS, JR., COL, USA
Director, Intelligence Systems
Office of the Assistant Chief of
Staff Army Intelligence
Department of the Army




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Date: 28 March 1986

Date: 24 April 86


DONALD W. MCFADYEN, Colonel, USAF
Director, Joint Services Support
Directorate
Department of the Air Force


F. J. BRETH, Brig Gen, USMC
Director of Intelligence
Headquarters
United States Marine Corps

Date: 28 MAR 86

Date: 3 April 86

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE OF POW-MIA

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Main Office Number: (202) 224-2038
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Minority Staff Director Al Ptak: 202-224-2306

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Charles Grassley (R-IA)
Hank Brown (R-CO)

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1. Senator Kerry, Senator Smith, it is a privilege for me to appear here today. We all recognize the importance of your endeavor and I am here to emphasize the commitment of NSA to supportg your efforts. For years, NSA has been actively involved on this issue primarily with the Defense Intelligence Agency, but also with individual Congressman and Congressional Committees. As we have done with these organizations in the past, we will make available to you all the data that can assist you in your investigation.

2. To ensure we would be prepared to be responsive to the committee we have again conducted a comprehensive review of SIGINT holdings for the period 1965 to the present. This review included:

a. manually scanning all SIGINT material which might contain any reference to POW/MIAs during or after the war.

b. interviewing selected analysts and managers who served at NSA Headquarters or in the field,

c. reconstructing and evaluating the SIGINT process used during the war.

Additionally, we attempted to uncover any material which might be related to recent allegations and to review any new information that has come to light since our last complete review in 1987.

3. I would like to take a few minutes and explain how NSA has conducted its business in regard to the POW/MIA task. During the Vietnam War, our ability to access the communications of Southeast Asian

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Communist Forces was very good. Over seventy (70) ground-based collection sites, no fewer than twelve (12) types of airborne collection platforms, and numerous shipborne collectors worked 24-hours a day against the full range of target communications. Thousands of people, primarily uniformed military personnel, were involved in this massive signals intelligence effort. The SIGINT system had an excellent capability to collect information on aircraft shootdowns and on downed fliers. We intercepted information that some crew members did not survive the shootdown. In other cases, we were able to detect initial capture and subsequent movement of prisoners by the capturing unit to either a holding location or to a place designated as a camp. We were aware of the existence of more permanent prison camps from non-SIGINT sources, but in spite of our "vast collection resources, we never heard any communications emanating from these camps.

4. The enormous amount of data collection during the war had to be processed manually. Because of this we did not always process everything, but we did process everything related to downed fliers or captured Americans. This was our highest priority mission. Intercept operators were trained to recognize critical information, and were instructed to notify supervisors immediately when information on downed fliers or captured servicemen was intercepted. This information was processed immediately and reported in the most expeditious manner to tactical units to aid in search and rescue operations.

5. Our information can be divided into two categories. We have a total of 1530 "incident" reports which are based on military

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communications and relate to specific losses. We have approximately 500 "non-incident" reports which are associated with the general topic of POW/MIAs. We reported both tactical and strategic information. Tactical reporting included information on such subjects as shootdowns of aircraft and locations of enemy forces. A special reporting series, called SONGBIRD Reports, was established for information pertaining to prisoners, prisoner locations, movement of prisoners, shootdown of aircraft, or any other information relating to the fate of U.S. servicemen. Strategic reporting included such activities as North Vietnamese infiltration and resupply. This information came from communications serving the network of roads, transportation units, and rest stops known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail and from communications serving military elements in Northern Vietnam.

6. We understand that the committee is especially concerned about the fate of American MIAs captured in Laos. Laotian codes were broken during the war and the communications of Pathet Lao Headquarters were intercepted. Regretably, while we had voluminous intercept of Laotian communications, they do not provide any new information on the fate of our men lost in Laos.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct 7. Also, no SIGINT evidence is available to either confirm or deny negotiations of [redacted] involvement with American POWs. NSA has completed a review of pertinent [redacted] material. As with our study of Vietnamese communications, there is no evidence to indicate that [redacted] involved POWs. Our search of [redacted] communications that may be related to the POW/MIA issue continues, but

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as with our efforts in researching Vietnamese communications, we have yet to find any SIGINT evidence of [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

8. NSA currently holds approximately 2000 SIGINT reports, dating from 1965 to the present, relating to the loss, capture, and status of U.S. personnel in Southeast Asia. To illustrate the challenge of following individual POWs, of all the POW/MIA related incidents reported in SIGINT during the war, less than 100 names of captured Americans are contained in our reporting. The majority of these people were subsequently accounted for. All of this information was reported in our normal system and made available during previous investigations. Let me emphasize however, that none of our data contains evidence that American service personnel remain in Vietnam today or were left behind after Operation HOMECOMING.

9. We spent many years after the war searching for communications that could reveal evidence that U.S. personnel were held in Vietnam but were not successful. The only collection, reflecting POW/MIA matters we

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POW/MIA issues.

On the question of releasing intelligence data, there are good reasons why even after 20-25 years, some intelligence information relating to POW/MIAs is, and should remain, classified. For example, similar sources and methods are used today by NSA against other targets, particularly [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct Moreover, some of these sources and methods are associated directly with [redacted]

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[redacted]

We recognize the concerns of POW/MIA families, and we want to explore methods for them to gain access to data associated with their kin while at the same time protecting our sources and methods. I would like to caution everyone, however, that what we hold as described above only applies to a very few families and even that involves not more than one or two SIGINT reports per family.

On the other hand, for you and/or your cleared staff, we stand ready to show our entire SIGINT POW/MIA-related reports and to help interpret them as necessary for you and respond to any of your questions.

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QUESTION: Please explain why it is necessary to protect the sources of information on POW's and MIA's.

ANSWER: In the intelligence collection process, whether it be on POW's and MIA's or other requirements, we have a statutory responsibility under the National Security Act of 1947 and E.O. 12356 to protect the source of the information, the place and manner in which it was acquired, any foreign intelligence service involvement, references to other operational activity and administrative details such as cryptonyms, field report numbers, source and field comments.

If we were unable to guarantee this protection, it would impact on our ability to collect intelligence. Other sources would be wary of cooperating with us if information were released which pinpoints its origin without consideration of the effect this information might have on the source, and his heirs, survivors or colleagues. It is important to understand that in many cases, especially with regard to information

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Approved for Release: 2021/09/16 C06002566

~~SECRET~~


(b)(1)
(b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3)
NatSecAct

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(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct



(b)(1)

(b)(6)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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SPOT REPORT

6 DECEMBER 1991

UPDATE ON PW-MIA ACTIVITIES

1. FILES AT DIA: A total of 496 "live-sighting" files in the Prisoner of War-Missing in Action (PW-MIA) Task Force for Intelligence Data Release have been reviewed and sanitized at the Pentagon.

(b)(6)

(b)(3) CIAAct

The files reviewed were from the 1,500 live-sighting files of which only 496 contained Agency reporting. The agreed-upon Inter-Agency guidelines were used in deleting identification of sources, names of Agency personnel, place acquired, liaison involvement, and methods of acquisition. DIA PW-MIA appreciated our Agency's cooperation and [redacted] effort is particularly noteworthy.

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

2. Response to the Committee's letter: During ADDO'S 4 December one-on-one with DCEA, the wording of the response letter to the Committee was raised. You should be receiving the draft of this letter [redacted] in-part reads "It has been [redacted] agency practice to provide all information on PW-MIA's to DIA and this information should be available in their files. In response to your request, we are undertaking a review of all files held by the Agency which bear on this issue to ensure that all pertinent data has been passed to DIA."

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

3. [redacted] PW-MIA: This component is being formed with [redacted] the Chief to review our files on PW-MIA's and ensure that all the reporting on this issue has been forwarded to DIA. All archived files on the subject are being retrieved and will be reviewed. We will also look at substantive issues such as programs in Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia associated with our operational and collection activities on PW-MIA's. [redacted]

[redacted] will be [redacted] We have discussed with [redacted] the need for additional funding for [redacted] to assist with this project. [redacted] the [redacted] provide administrative assistance as required and [redacted] are working on locating office space for the group. We are receiving excellent cooperation from all concerned and [redacted] has been particularly helpful with several aspects of the program.

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(6)

[redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) 10 USC 424

4. The KGB Connection: [redacted] met with former KGB General Oleg Kalugin on 29 November to discuss PW-MIA issues. Kalugin made it clear he was not intimately familiar with the subject and those statements he did make were not supported by facts. See the attached cable for further details. Also attached is a 1982 CIA report [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] heard from KGB General Grigoriyev that 2,000 POW's from (b)(1) the Vietnam war had been incarcerated in the Soviet Union for "ideological retraining." [redacted] comment was included in this report which in part said that CIA records contain no information that Grigoriyev held a leading position in the KGB and that the report merits little if any credence from analysts.

5. Call to Security Duty Officer on Alleged POW's: The PW-MIA Office at the Pentagon is investigating the call made to our Security Duty Officer on 2 December by an alleged Navy Seal reporting a sighting of MIA's in Cambodia. [redacted]

(b)(1) [redacted] talked with anyone on this (b)(3) NatSecAct subject as claimed in the report and DIA PW-MIA has not been able to identify the individual who claimed to be Lt. Demarco. They are going to follow this up with the Seal Team in Coronado, California, and will advise when further details are obtained.

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JOINT STAFF
INFO SERVICE CENTER
+++EXCLUSIVE+++

File Pow
msA

IMMEDIATE
C 021958Z DEC 91
FM [redacted]
TO DIA WASHDC (b)(3) 10 USC 424
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC/ [redacted]

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 [redacted]
SECRET [redacted]

S-1438-91 (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: POW-MIA ISSUES (U)

1. (C) ON FRIDAY EVENING 29 NOVEMBER 1991 [redacted] MET WITH FORMER [redacted] TO DISCUSS ONGOING POW/MIA ISSUES. FROM THE VERY START [redacted] MADE IT CLEAR THAT ALTHOUGH HE WAS MENTIONED IN THE PRESS, HE WAS NOT INTIMATELY FAMILIAR WITH SUBJECT AND COULD NOT PROVIDE ANYTHING MORE THAN AN OVERVIEW OF EVENTS AS HE REMEMBERS THEM. (b)(1)

2. (S) [redacted] INVOLVEMENT IN POW INTERROGATION WAS MINIMAL. UNTIL AN AGREEMENT ON THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WAS SIGNED BY THE KGB AND ITS VIETNAMESE COUNTERPART--ABOUT 1977 OR 1978--HE WAS NOT SURE OF THE EXACT YEAR--CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES WAS VIRTUALLY NON-EXISTENT. AFTER THE AGREEMENT WAS IN PLACE, THE VIETNAMESE REQUESTED KGB ASSISTANCE IN "DISMANTLING" THE U.S. EMBASSY IN SAIGON, WHICH THE KGB WAS HAPPY TO DO. AFTER THIS EVENT, THE KGB IN A LOW KEY MANNER, REQUESTED AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO A FEW U.S. POWS THAT MAY STILL HAVE BEEN HELD IN VIETNAM. (NOTE: KALUGIN STATED THAT AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF AMERICAN POWS IN 1977-1978 WERE KEPT BY THE VIETNAMESE, BUT DID NOT KNOW FOR WHAT PURPOSE.) REASON FOR THE REQUEST WAS TO ASSESS SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT EFFECTIVENESS AND IN TURN, FAMILIARIZE THEMSELVES WITH U.S. DOCTRINE. A THREE (OR POSSIBLY) FOUR MAN TEAM WAS DISPATCHED TO VIETNAM--LOCATION UNKNOWN--AND A LIST OF U.S. POWS WAS PROVIDED TO THE SOVIET SIDE--NUMBER OR NAMES UNKNOWN--FROM WHICH THE KGB TEAM PICKED THREE INDIVIDUALS: ONE WAS A "SENIOR" NAVAL OFFICER--RANK UNKNOWN--AN AIR FORCE PILOT, AND A SUSPECTED CIA-RELATED PERSON. AN EFFORT TO TURN THESE INDIVIDUALS WAS MADE AT THAT TIME. KALUGIN DID MENTION, HOWEVER, THAT AN ATTEMPT TO CONTACT THE THREE AMERICANS IN THE UNITED STATES A FEW YEARS LATER WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. [redacted]

[redacted]

3. (S) IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT GENERAL KALUGIN IS NOT IN THE MAINSTREAM OF POW ISSUES, NOR DOES HE BELIEVE, FROM A KGB PERSPECTIVE, THAT THE ISSUE IS BONA FIDE AND NOT A FABRICATION. FIRST HE FEELS THAT DURING THE 1970'S BREZHNEV (AND BY ASSOCIATION, ANDROPOV) WAS VERY CAREFUL

ACTION: MR. SASEK/DIA (b)(3) 10 USC 424

ACTION [redacted] (M,C)

+++EXDIS++++

MCN=91336/05887 TOR=91335/2044Z TAD=91336/2315Z

CDSN=MIA530

~~SECRET SPECAT~~

PAGE 1 OF 1
021958Z DEC 91
C2 SECT MSG

000083

TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES. SECONDLY, HE NOTES THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE HAVE BEEN VERY PRO-AMERICAN ALL ALONG. NOT JUST AFTER PERESTROIKA: IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO HIDE A U.S. POW, UNLESS IN VERY CONFINED AREAS, BUT FOR WHAT PURPOSE? THIRDLY, TRUTH IS BREAKING OUT ALL OVER. NO ONE CAN KEEP A SECRET AND THERE ARE MANY THAT WOULD STOP AT NOTHING TO DISCREDIT THE FORMER REGIME BY GOING PUBLIC IF IN FACT AMERICAN POW WERE IN THE USSR.

4. (S) [redacted] DID GO OUT OF HIS WAY TO STATE THAT AMERICANS COULD BE RESIDING IN THE USSR, BUT ADDED THAT THIS HAS TO BE LOOKED AT ON A CASE-TO-CASE BASIS. FOR EXAMPLE: AN AMERICAN POW COULD HAVE MET AND MARRIED A RUSSIAN WOMAN AND RETURNED WITH HER TO THE SOVIET UNION. HERE HE CITED THAT THIS MIGHT BE THE CASE OF SOMEONE LIKE THE AMERICAN SUPPOSEDLY LIVING IN SARYSHAGAN, QUICKLY ADDING THAT HE PERSONALLY DOES NOT BELIEVE THE STORY. AT THIS POINT [redacted] SURPRISED ALUSNA BY STATING BT

SECRET SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 34410

THAT ALTHOUGH HE UNDERSTOOD CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST, ESPECIALLY IN AN ELECTION YEAR, HE COULD NOT QUITE UNDERSTAND THE SUDDEN AND ALMOST INTENSE INTEREST THAT THE U.S. WAS SHOWING ON THE POW ISSUE, STATING THAT HE HAD MANY MORE POW/MIAS DURING THE KOREAN WAR WITHOUT TODAY'S FERVOR. RO SUMMARILY EXPLAINED THAT CIRCUMSTANCES WERE IN FACT, NOT SIMILAR.

5. (C) [redacted] IS AN INTERESTING CASE STUDY. HE IS VERY WESTERN IN HIS DRESS AND MANNERISMS--LIVED IN THE U.S. FOR FIVE YEARS, SPEAKS EXCELLENT ENGLISH (AMERICAN)--STUDIED AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN 1958, IS URBANE, POLISHED AND VERY CONGENIAL. HE IS A FORMER USSR PEOPLES' DEPUTY; HE CONTINUES TO BE ENGAGED IN GOVERNMENT BUT AS A CONSULTANT. HE APPEARS TO BE, HOWEVER, ON THE MARGINS CONCERNING THE POW/MIA QUESTION AND HAS PROBABLY EXHAUSTED HIS OWN KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT.

6.(C) BECAUSE OF THE POTENTIALLY DAMAGING INFORMATION ADDRESSED IN PARAGRAPH TWO ABOVE, EMBASSY IS TREATING THIS AS A SPECAT/EXDIS MATTER.

7.(C) EMBASSY INTER-AGENCY GROUP WOULD APPRECIATE ANALYSIS AND ANY FEEDBACK ON INFORMATION PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH TWO, BUT WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED IN LEARNING MORE ABOUT THE GRU CONNECTION AND HOW THIS COULD BE FURTHER PURSUED.

8.(C) NEXT STEP: AWAIT KALUGIN'S CALL TO SEE IF FORMER SUBORDINATE AND SOVIET TEAM CHIEF WOULD BE WILLING TO TALK TO US.
DECL: OADR BT

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct



Foreign Intelligence Information Report

(b)(3) NatSecAct

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

REPORT CLASS. ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L - W N I N T E L - -~~ REPORT NO. [redacted]
~~NOFORN~~

COUNTRY USSR

DATE DISTR.

12 March 1982

(b)(3) CIAAct

SUBJECT Alleged Soviet Incarceration of U.S. Vietnam Prisoners of War (DOI: 1970)

REFERENCES [redacted]

SOURCE

(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(6)

SUMMARY: According to KGB Lieutenant General Petr Ivanovich Grigoriyev, specially selected U.S. prisoners of war were being received into the Soviet Union circa 1970 for long term or lifetime incarceration and "ideological retraining." He implied the number involved to be about 2,000. The goal of the program was indefinite, but involved intensive psychological investigation of the prisoners and retraining to make them available as required to serve the needs of the Soviet Union. Grigoriyev made the comment [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(6)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

i. [redacted] This report should be read with caution. [redacted]

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)



(b)(3) NatSecAct

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(3) CIAAct



the USSR, much less that 2,000 such individuals are leading "reasonably normal lives" in the same region where numerous Soviet political prisoners have resided in exile.

(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)



from analysts. However, in light of continuing high interest in the question of U.S. personnel still listed as missing in action in Southeast Asia, this report is being disseminated with appropriate caveats to concerned members of the U.S. Intelligence Community.)

2. [redacted] which was held circa 1970, KGB Lieutenant General Petr Ivanovich ((Grigoriyev)) stated that many specially selected U.S. prisoners of war were being received from North Vietnam for long term or lifetime custody and "ideological re-training" in the Soviet Union. [redacted] Grigoriyev did not state specifically the number of prisoners involved. The term he used was "v poryadke neskol'kikh tysyach v nas tozhe yest'" which translates as "on the order of several thousand," implying the number to be about 2,000). The prisoners were destined for confinement at a facility near Perm. Grigoriyev, who learned of the program from an unnamed high level KGB colleague, understood that Soviets rather than North Vietnamese were involved in the initial selection process and that participants were to be continually assessed for suitability. He implied that individuals determined to be unsuitable would be eliminated and replaced with other [redacted] Grigoriyev made his comment while serving as a political ideologist and personnel officer at the All-Union Scientific-Technical Information Center of the State Committee for Science and Technology in Moscow. He had previously served as Chief of the KGB's Personnel Directorate and in that capacity would have very likely made contacts among KGB officials subsequently responsible for organizing any such prisoner program.)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

3. According to Grigoriyev, the goals of the U.S. prisoner program were indefinite but involved intensive psychological studies of the individuals and utilization of them as required to serve the needs of the Soviet Union. Grigoriyev understood that the detention facility was not a standard prison, but rather one in which inmates could lead reasonably normal lives. [redacted] Grigoriyev recalled that precedents existed for such a program in the Soviet Union and cited similar previous efforts with Spanish, Japanese, and Chinese nationals. He stated that in past programs, participants were encouraged to marry Soviet women.

(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT
TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

(b)(3)
CIAAct


~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~



(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

5. Grigoriyev volunteered the information regarding the Vietnam prisoners [redacted] during the late 1960's and early 1970's. His duties were not particularly demanding after his years as an administrator in the KGB. He was often finished with his work in the early afternoon and, rather than go home or engaged in outside interests, held informal discussions in his office. [redacted]



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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[Redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[Redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct

6. Grigoriyev was trained as a professional military officer and served in the tank troops during World War II. After the war he was assigned to the Party Central Committee as an army representative. In the period 1953-1954 he became KGB Deputy Chief for Personnel. He subsequently became critical of the recruitment policies of KGB head Vladimir Yefimovich ((Semichastnyy)) and was transferred from his position to that of KGB Security Chief for Soviet Bloc nations. Soon thereafter he developed a heart ailment and retired. In the late 1960's he accepted the position at the Information Center.

7. General Skrynnik joined the Russian cavalry in 1917 and subsequently entered the Odessa artillery school. Upon graduation he was assigned to the Zhitomir military district. In 1931 he entered the Frunze Military Academy. He advanced rapidly and in the 1933-1934 period was sent to China as Deputy Military Attache. He joined Mao's long march and began to establish intelligence agent networks for the Soviet Union. He remained in China until 1942 except for a brief return in 1939 to establish an intelligence school in Moscow for China operations. In the spring of 1942 he was recalled from China to become chief of intelligence on the northwestern front, where he remained for the duration of the war. After the war he was assigned as Soviet representative to the Berlin Joint Commission for Repatriation. After serving in Berlin from 1945 to 1949 he returned to Moscow as either chief or deputy chief for intelligence at the Frunze Academy. He then served as Deputy Intelligence Chief of the Far Eastern Military District. He retired from the military in 1953. Skrynnik was subsequently recalled to duty to re-establish agent networks in China after the China-USSR split but refused to leave retirement.

[Redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

REPORT CLASS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[Redacted]

ALL

PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

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~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency

OCA FILE SSPOW

RECEIPT # _____

IS

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 5098-91

27 DEC 1991

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to your letter of December 12, 1991, concerning the possibility of US POWs/MIAs in the USSR, let me assure you that the Agency is actively pursuing this issue. A senior officer of the Interrepublic Security Service (ISS), the successor organization to the former KGB Second Chief Directorate, advised the Agency on 3 December that the ISS had undertaken "an exhaustive search of available information and resources, and had come up with no indication of such presence in the USSR past or present." On 6 December the ISS passed us a written "official" response. Following is a translation of that response:

"At our request, an investigation was conducted in Kazakhstan concerning the supposed presence of an American military pilot in the village of Saryshagan, Dzhezkazgan Oblast, as presented in the newspaper 'Kommersant' (no. 42, dated 4 November 1991). The pilot was reportedly taken prisoner during the period of war in Indochina.

As a result of the investigation, which included questioning long-time residents, no information was obtained about the presence in that region at any time of an American pilot.

On our part, we also do not have any information about American military personnel located on the territory of the USSR who were missing in action during the course of military activities in Indochina."

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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~~SECRET~~

The Honorable John F. Kerry

Regarding alleged statements by retired KGB General Oleg Kalugin, reported by Australian television, that he had been involved in the interrogation of Americans in Vietnam during the 1975-1978 period, we have tasked [redacted] to ask the ISS and the Russian Republic Federal Security Service to confirm the remarks attributed to Kalugin and provide details. [redacted] was also been directed to seek guidance from those services as to how a similar inquiry can be put to the military (b)(1) intelligence service, the GRU. (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] have been asked for any information they may have on Soviet and/or East European incarceration or interrogation of POWs/MIAs from World War II, the Korean War, or the Vietnam War.

We will keep the Committee advised of any additional information that results from our discussions with the Russian [redacted]

(b)(1) [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] A copy of this letter is also being provided to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

[Redacted signature box]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

to Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

~~SECRET~~

000089

~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 5098-91/1

27 DEC 1991

The Honorable Bob Smith
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

In response to your letter of December 12, 1991, concerning the possibility of US POWs/MIAs in the USSR, let me assure you that the Agency is actively pursuing this issue. A senior officer of the Interrepublic Security Service (ISS), the successor organization to the former KGB Second Chief Directorate, advised the Agency on 3 December that the ISS had undertaken "an exhaustive search of available information and resources, and had come up with no indication of such presence in the USSR past or present." On 6 December the ISS passed us a written "official" response. Following is a translation of that response:

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As a result of the investigation, which included questioning long-time residents, no information was obtained about the presence in that region at any time of an American pilot.

On our part, we also do not have any information about American military personnel located on the territory of the USSR who were missing in action during the course of military activities in Indochina."

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~

000090

The Honorable Bob Smith

(b)(1) Regarding alleged statements by retired KGB General Oleg
(b)(3) NatSecAct/5-1978 period, we have tasked [redacted] to ask the ISS
and the Russian Republic Federal Security Service to confirm the
remarks attributed to Kalugin and provide details. [redacted]
has also been directed to seek guidance from those services as to
how a similar inquiry can be put to the military intelligence
service, the GRU. (b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] have been asked for any
information they may have on Soviet and/or East European
incarceration or interrogation of POWs/MIAs from World War II,
the Korean War, or the Vietnam War.

We will keep the Committee advised of any additional
information that results from our discussions with the Russian

(b)(1) [redacted]
(b)(3) NatSecAct

A copy of this letter is also being provided to Chairman
Kerry.

Sincerely,

[redacted signature box]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

for Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Letters to Senators Kerry and Smith re POWs/MIAs
in the USSR



(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

CCA Records

OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS

Routing Slip

OCA FILE: SSPOW
RECEIPT #:

	ACTION	INFO
1. D/OCA		X
2. DD/OCA		
3. D/Legislation		X
4. D/Senate Liaison	X	
5. D/House Liaison		X
6. D/Congressional Support		X
7. Admin		
8. Constituent Inquiries Officer		
9. FOIA Officer		
10. SECURITY		
11. SPECIAL ASSISTANT		X
12. DD/ICID		X

SUSPENSE

31 Dec 91
Date

Action Officer:

[Redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Remarks:

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

18 Dec 91
Name/Date

FORM 4422
EDITION DATE 6-91

000094

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	D/ICS		X		
4	DDA				
5	DDI				
6	DDO		X		
7	DDP&C				
8	DDS&T				
9	IG				
10	COMPT				
11	D/OCA	X			
12	GC				
13	Chm/NIC				
14	D/PAO				
15	DD/SA/OCA		X		
16	LEG/OCA		X		
17	C/PCS/DO		X		
18					
19					
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22					
SUSPENSE		31 Dec 91			
		Date			

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Remarks D/OCA will respond in consultation with the DO. Please provide ES with a drop copy of the response.

ER 91-4126

Executive Secretary
17 Dec 91

Date

3637 (10-81)

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~~S E C R E T~~

SPOT REPORT

4 NOVEMBER 1992

UPDATE ON COMMITTEE REQUEST FOR NATIONAL WARNING FILES

Further to our Spot Report on 3 November, on 5 November NIO Officer for Warning Charlie Allen chaired a meeting with OCA and EA/ICOG to discuss the request from the Senate Select Committee for POW-MIA Affairs for access to information held in a vast array of Warning Center files. Mr. Allen described the joint nature of the Warning Center files (which are administered jointly for the DCI, but not as a purely CIA activity), the extreme sensitivity of many of the files, the fact that many of the items belong to other Government agencies, and the fact that the files contain no separate repository of POW-MIA information such as the Committee is seeking.

In short, Mr. Allen is most reluctant to afford the Committee untrammelled access to information contained in the Warning Center files. He proposed that the Warning Center chief and an NIO Warning Officer physically review the file holdings at the Joint Warning Center at the Pentagon, to ensure themselves that they are not holding any POW information of value to the Committee. By early next week we will have the results of their search. Unless the search develops something of specific value to the Committee, we plan to respond to the Committee to the effect that we have thoroughly reviewed our Warning files, but that our search has failed to uncover the type of information they are seeking.

The other part of the requirement, for all intelligence reports on American military prisoners held during the Korean War and all Cold War incidents, is being pursued through IMS and OIR, but neither element was especially hopeful about locating comprehensive reporting on those topics at this late date.

 (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct~~S E C R E T~~

000096

~~SECRET~~

EA/ICOG Spot Report - 4 November 1992

On 4 November Major General Loeffke, Chief of the Army's Task Force Russia, made an introductory visit to ICOG with his deputy, Col. Herrington, and a Russian analyst. CE Division POW referent [redacted] participated in the meeting. We (b)(3) CIAAct briefed the general on who does what here with regard to POW/MIA issues. Gen. Loeffke expressed complete satisfaction with the support he has received to date from CIA, and said he had no problems. C/ICOG pledged our continuing assistance via the ICOGPOW Branch and CE Division. The visitors reiterated the need to deliver requested information directly to them rather than via DIA, for greater efficiency; we promised to do so. (The DIA Chief of Staff has confirmed this arrangement via memorandum.) The general asked if we had any information supporting the sometimes heard allegation that American POW's were moved to the Soviet Union during the Korean War. We said we do not. [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(6)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] On reading the report, Gen. Loeffke was satisfied that he could testify accurately to the Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs concerning his knowledge of it. [redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct promised to pass on immediately any additional pertinent information which we receive. The DO's working relationship with Task Force Russia is functioning smoothly.

(b)(3) CIAAct

Following this meeting, [redacted] told us that DC/CE had asked her to draft a memorandum recommending that an Agency-wide entity be established to handle the proliferation of POW-MIA questions which both EA and CE are constantly being asked to handle.

~~SECRET~~

000097

~~S E C R E T~~

Other: We researched a number of items in response to requests made by the three DIA (PW-MIA) visitors of last week, and have prepared some replies for them. We also responded to several specific requests from the DoD CDO to declassify certain items; from DIA (PW-MIA) to review an FOIA request involving the Nhommarath detention facility and a new DIA study on American POW's in Laos; and to other requests from the DASD, the U.S.-Russian Joint Task Force, and the State Department. And the beat goes on.

Since three of our contract employees area away teaching our Branch has fluctuated in strength from two to four people over the past two weeks.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

~~S E C R E T~~

000098

~~S E C R E T~~

ICOGPOW Weekly Highlights - 5 November 1992

Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs: On 30 October two Committee investigators visited Headquarters to examine numerous intelligence reports and other documents we had located and assembled at their request, concerning several cases centering on Laos. The investigators' perusal of the documents led to their raising a number of further questions, which we have since been researching. They expressed their appreciation for our thoroughness and responsiveness.

On 30 October we received three additional requests from the Committee, all of which we researched and answered on 2 November. On 2 November we received another Committee request, this one an ambitious, sweeping requirement for access to numerous sensitive National Warning Center files, as well as for all intelligence reports on U.S. military POW's from the Korean and Cold wars. The NIO Warning Office is physically checking its file holdings, preparatory to our replying to the first part of the requirement. We have asked OIR and IMS to search for the intelligence reports, but neither was especially hopeful about being about to locate Cold War reports catalogued as such, or the quite dated Korean War reports.

For the third time, the Committee is asking the Director for full access to our [redacted] thick volumes of [redacted] (b)(1) operational files. The matter is now being discussed at (b)(3) NatSecAct Directorate level. We prepared written reasons why we should not allow this, as well as proposed positions should the DCI decide to permit such access. The Committee will present its final report (reportedly in conflicting majority and minority versions) by 17 December, and expire on 2 January 1993. DIA expects the Committee will call for an investigation of DIA by the next Congress.

The Committee will depose former Czech defector Sejna this week, and he may be called to testify in an open Committee hearing on 11 November. [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(6)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Task Force Russia: On 4 November Major General Loeffke, his deputy, and an analyst from Task Force Russia paid an introductory visit to ICOG. The general said he is very pleased with the cooperation and support he is receiving from CIA (ICOG and CE Division). We pledged to continue to assist them. We discussed some specific cases of interest to the Task Force.

~~S E C R E T~~

000099

(Written for
C/EA)~~S E C R E T~~

4 November 1992

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

I. Reasons Not to Permit Senate Committee Staffers to Review Our [redacted] Operational Files

--They are full of "sources and methods"-type data;

--It sets a dangerous and irreversible precedent for the Agency and this Directorate to do so. Any Congressional Committee will henceforth demand the same kind of access.

--Committee members' threats of inevitable criticism of the Agency should not deter us from maintaining our standards of protecting sources and methods, or scare us into throwing away 45 years of strict and uncompromising standards for protecting DO documents;

--We can assure them that the FI contained in the files has already been extracted and declassified for the Library of Congress, and that the operational information in the files was pursued insofar as possible at the time, and will not now produce any new or different information;

--Some documents in the files came from other Government agencies (i.e., we are not authorized to pass them);

--Some items, such as memoranda from former NSC POW specialist Richard Childress, were clearly intended as privacy items between the Executive Branch and this Agency;

--Their search will inevitably lead to requests for other operational traffic and other files (e.g., on agents mentioned in these generic files), [redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted] Where would the (b)(1) search end? (b)(3) NatSecAct

--The Committee has a demonstrated propensity to leak sensitive data to the Washington Times [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

--The fact that a sane investigator like Art Grant does the review does not prevent the information from getting into the hands of the more extreme investigators on the Committee staff, who are prone to leak it or lie about it;

--The Director has twice denied the Committee full access to the files. Why should he roll over now, just because it is their third try? The entire Agency is counting on the Director to hold his ground. Why? Because he is right.

II. If we Lose, our position should be:

--All of the declassifiable FI in the files has already been extracted and declassified, for passage to the Library of Congress via the DoD POW-MIA Central Documentation Office. (Some of the documents are still being processed prior to

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(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

passage, but the extraction and declassification steps have been done.) We have done this in response to the Executive Order. These amount to over 200 documents. Some (possibly 30) others were denied because of their sensitivity, [redacted] or gory descriptions of the deaths of servicemen which we did not want their next of kin to see. In other words, we are not holding back any factual information on POW-MIA matters. Would they be satisfied with seeing these items? (I doubt it. Unfortunately, it is not this information they are after, but the operational traffic, which seems to tantalize them.)

There is some misunderstanding on the part of Committee investigators Taylor and McCreary as to what the files contain in terms of operational (b)(1) information. They have seen examples of our [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] reports to run down the initial intelligence reports on [redacted] and seem to think that the files contain many other like items; i.e., that every intel report we received launched a major effort to corroborate it. Some did, and some didn't. The files contain many dead ends. Some efforts ended with no explanation, and we are unable to learn the reasons now. Vientiane Station, the source of some of the information of greatest interest to the investigators, no longer exists. This information cannot be pursued any farther at this late date. The information we acquired was pursued as far as possible, within the capabilities of the Stations, at that time. Our experience in trying to locate refugee sources of reports 20 and more years old (as one example) is that it is nearly always an impossible task. In other words, we see their search as rather quixotic and impractical, an academic exercise at best, and enormously time-consuming. If we are to open up the operational files, the Committee investigator must understand this, and not task us with a hundred new requests which will be impossible to satisfy these many years later [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

-If we lose, we must establish precise guidelines as to just how far the Committee's researches can take them. For example, will we put a time limit on it? We are dealing with an unlimited number of possibilities with regard to the questions they can raise after reviewing [redacted] thick files. Are we to accept tasking of this magnitude? It won't lead anywhere anyway. At the minimum, we would have to discuss the terms of the agreement before just rolling over and letting them task us ad infinitum. (The workload this might entail could be [redacted] (b)(1) enormous.) (b)(3) NatSecAct

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000101

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 3306-92

17 November 1992

Ms. Frances Zwenig
Staff Director
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Ms. Zwenig:

We are sending as an enclosure to this letter a memorandum classified SECRET which responds in detail to the Committee's questions about [redacted] statements on POWs. (b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] recollection of information he supplied in the past is not supported by the record. While we ask that the details of the debriefing remain classified, the substance of the report is that at no time before 1992 did [redacted] provide information to this Agency on POWs in or from Korea or Indochina. (b)(3) NatSecAct

Let me know if I may be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

[redacted signature]

(b)(6)

John L. Breckenridge
Deputy Director for Senate Affairs

Enclosure

Downgrade to UNCLASSIFIED
When Separated From Enclosure

[redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~

000102

OCA 3306-92

SUBJECT: Letter to Frances Zwenig, POW/MIA Affairs Cmte
re [redacted] Debriefing Statements

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] (17 Nov 92)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

Distribution:

- Original - Addressee (w/encl)
- 1 - C/EA/ICOG (w/o encl)
- 1 - C/ORMS [redacted] (w/o encl)
- 1 - OCA Records (w/encl)
- 1 - POW/MIA Subject File (w/encl)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

000104

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

000105

~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

SUBJECT: Information for Passage to the Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs Regarding [redacted] Information about POWs (b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM:	(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)	EXTENSION	DATE SENT	REQUEST NUMBER
			5 Nov 92	0025/293-92

	TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1.	DC/ORMS [redacted]	5	[initials]		[Large redacted area]
2.	DC/ORMS (b)(3) CIAAct	5 NOV	1992		
3.	C/ORMS	6 NOV	1992		
4.	SA/DDO		6/11		
5.	ADDO		11.6		
6.	DDO			✓	
7.	OCA/Senate			(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)	
8.				(b)(1)	
9.				(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5)	
10.					
11.					
12.					

SUSPENSE DATE: [redacted]

RETURN TO: [redacted]

To [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
[redacted] [redacted] info (b)(3) CIAAct
[redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

FORM 8-87 4283

~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

000106

~~SECRET (When Filled In)~~

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

SUBJECT: Responses to 20 October Requests from Senate Select Committee for POW/MIA Affair (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)

FROM: C/EA/ICOG (b)(3) CIAAct	EXTENSION	DATE SENT 24 Nov 92	REQUEST NUMBER DDO 0025/309-92
---	------------------	-------------------------------	--

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		

1.	(b)(3) CIAAct		11/25		(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)
2.	Chief, FA (b)(3) CIAAct				
3.	C/ORMS		30/11/92		
4.	DC/ORMS		01 DEC 1992		
5.	C/ORMS		01 DEC 1992		
6.	SA/DDO		2/12		
7.	ADDO (b)(3) CIAAct		12.3		
8.	DDO			✓	
9.	O/OCA/S		03 DEC 1992		
10.	(b)(3) CIAAct				
11.					
12.					

SUSPENSE DATE:

RETURN TO: (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

FORM 9-87 4283

~~SECRET (When Filled In)~~

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

000107

~~S E C R E T~~

23 November 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Breckenridge
Chief, Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

VIA: Office of the Deputy Director of Operations

FROM:



(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

SUBJECT: Responses to 20 October Requests
from Senate Select Committee for
POW/MIA Affairs

REFERENCE: Committee letter of 20 October 1992

1. The following are our responses to the two separate requests made in the Committee's letter of 20 October 1992.

2. With regard to information contained in the classified files of the National Warning Staff (NWS) and the Office of the NIO for Warning which might be of value to the Committee, a thorough review of all NWS and NIO/Warning classified files was undertaken. On 7 November two NWS officers examined the contents of NWS classified files. All the files were inventoried and searched. Other files of potential interest were also searched for possible POW-MIA information, such as files on Vietnam, China and Korea. On 20 November one of the two officers completed a search of a file drawer that had been overlooked during the first search.

3. On 12 November an NWS officer requested an inventory of all NWS and NIO/Warning archived materials. Two officers examined the entire archive file and determined that two files, one identified as Vietnam and one as Korea, might hold information of interest to the Committee. Both files were received on 13 November, and each document in them was examined by both officers. However, neither file contained any information within the scope of the reference request.

4. The NWS files contained several documents, both classified intelligence disseminations and open press reports, which related to POW-MIA issues. These were closely examined. Both of the CIA-originated classified reports had already been disseminated among the intelligence community

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some time ago. [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] an October 1991 report on normalization of relations with Vietnam.

5. The search did not turn up any separate files specific to POW-MIA issues, nor were any independent research papers on the POW-MIA topic located in the files.

6. As a result of this exhaustive search, the Office of the NIO for Warning is satisfied that the NWS and NIO/Warning files do not contain any documents which would be of value to the Committee as stated in its request.

7. With regard to the second part of the 20 October request, for CIA intelligence disseminations pertaining to American POW's held during the Korean and Cold Wars, we initiated an automated search for documents in those categories. This revealed a number of documents, many of which had originated with other U.S. Government agencies. Once we obtain the CIA documents from our archives, we will forward them to you. In the meantime, we have located four CIA reports from 1954 and 1955 which pertain to American POW's in North Korea, Russia and China, which are attached. We are also passing copies of these reports to Task Force Russia.

[redacted]

Attachments: Four reports

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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~~SECRET NOFORN~~

22 November 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Review of National Warning Staff and NIO/Warning files and Archived Materials

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

1. On 7 November 1992, National Warning Staff (NWS) members [redacted] inventoried the contents of NWS classified files. The search was systematic and thorough; all file drawers were searched, an inventory was developed, and all materials that were either loose or in unmarked files were individually examined. Additionally, any files that indicated any potential for interest, such as all files on Vietnam, China, and Korea, were individually searched for possible information. On 20 November, [redacted] informed [redacted] that one additional file drawer was unintentionally overlooked. [redacted] completed a search of the remaining files on that same day.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

2. [redacted] requested an inventory of all NWS and NIO/Warning archived materials from [redacted] of the DDI Registry on 12 November. [redacted] examined the entire archive file list and determined that two files, one identified as Vietnam and the other as Korea, could potentially hold information relevant to a Congressional request. Both files arrived at CIA Headquarters on 13 November and each document was examined by both [redacted]. Neither file contained information within the scope of the inquiry.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

3. Within the NWS files there were several documents, clandestine reports and open press reports, that were identified as relating to POW/MIA issues. A file was developed and forwarded to [redacted] DO/EA. There were no specific files located in the search that related to POW/MIA issues, nor were there any independent research papers on the topic in the files.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

4. [redacted] is writing a formal response to the Congressional inquiry for the Office of Congressional Affairs, CIA. He is planning to draw on information provided in this memorandum for the record.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

000110

JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS,
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J. WILLIAM CODINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

October 20, 1992

Mr. John Breckenridge
Office of Congressional Affairs
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Breckenridge:

The Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs requests the Central Intelligence Agency provide to the Committee the files of the National Indications Center and of its successor organization, the Strategic Warning Staff, that cover the period 1948 through 1975. These files contain information relating to the losses of U.S. military personnel during the major crises and conflicts of the post-war period. This material is required to support a forthcoming hearing by this Committee.

These files are in the archives of the Central Intelligence Agency, filed variously. Some are listed under the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence; some are under the Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board, and some are logged under the National Intelligence Council. In addition, one five-drawer file cabinet located in the National Warning Staff contains a large number of post-war crisis management files that are related to the investigations of the Committee.

A large amount of this information can be declassified.


Ms. Linda Whitlow, Secretary for the National Intelligence Officer for Warning and the National Warning Staff, located in Room 1C925, The Pentagon, has a complete file of all materials archived by the National Indications Center and the Strategic Warning Staff. Please provide a copy of this master list to the Committee by 30 October.


*— MASTER LIST
SUMM.*

000111

Mr. Breckenridge
Page Two

Additionally, as a part of this request, please provide copies of any and all intelligence reports issued by your organization that relate to or discuss the fate of U.S. military personnel captured during the Korean War and captured during the various crises during the cold war, after World War II.

Sincerely, 



J. William Codinha
Chief Counsel

(b)(6)

JWC/kb/wl

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REPORT
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REPORT
2

000121

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as amended. The transmission or revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.

INFORMATION REPORT

~~SECRET~~

COUNTRY	USSR (Far East)	REPORT NO.	(b)(3) NatSecAct
SUBJECT	Exploitation of Prisoners-of-War of the Soviets	DATE DISTR.	24 March 1954
DATE OF INFO.	[Redacted]	NO. OF PAGES	1
PLACE ACQUIRED	[Redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1)	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
		REFERENCES	

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
 THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
 (FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE:

[Redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

1. [Redacted] the Soviet Intelligence Service is exploiting United Nations, particularly US, PWs in China and North Korea. He believes that some PWs listed as missing were in fact turned over to the Soviets by the Chinese and North Koreans. These PWs will be screened by the Soviets, and those eventually selected will be trained to be illegal residents either in the US or in other countries where they can live as Americans.
2. Some selected PW personnel will also be used in propaganda work, especially as radio announcers because there is a shortage of that type of personnel.
3. Those PWs who are found to be unsuitable will never be released because they will have learned too much about Soviet PW handling techniques. Use will also be made of the identities and biographies of dead PWs in preparing legends of new Soviet agents.

REPORT
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133109

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 INFORMATION REPORT

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~SECRET~~

COUNTRY	USSR/Communist China	REPORT NO.	(b)(3) NatSecAct
SUBJECT	Probable Communist Course of Action Regarding American Prisoners in Communist China	DATE DISTR.	20 December 1954
		NO. OF PAGES	2
DATE OF INFO.	12 December 1954	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
		REFERENCES	

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
 THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
 (FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

PD-32C

1. The future handling of the 13 American prisoners by Peiping, and, therefore, Moscow, will be based on a fairly simple strategy. The surfacing of the 13 men by Peiping has been designed thus far, in source's opinion, to arouse the anger of the American public, whose only recourse under the present circumstances is to appeal to the UN.
2. The Communist leaders in Peiping, undoubtedly in direct consultation with Moscow, calculated that the US would have sufficient strength at the UN to succeed in having the UN take up the US plea for UN good offices to intercede with the Chinese Communists. Such intercession would be welcomed by both Peiping and Moscow because it is, in effect, a de facto recognition of Communist China by the US. After the first UN approaches have been spurned, Communist China's Foreign Office will accept overtures for negotiations.
3. The Chinese Communists will thereupon show their "humaneness" by releasing at least the airmen, who have already been "proved" to be spies of the "warmongering American imperialists", and let them return home, possibly even in time for Christmas.
4. The cumulative result of this will be favorable world opinion for the Chinese Communists, who will be credited only with what is normally expected of a free-

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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world state, and a stronger de facto recognition of the Chinese Communist Government which has the power, independence, and sovereignty to prosecute illegal violators of its borders.

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REPORT
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COUNTRY	USSR	REPORT NO.	(b)(3) NatSecAct
SUBJECT	RIS Interrogation and Indoctrination of PWs	DATE DISTR.	19 August 1955
DATE OF INFO	(b)(3) NatSecAct	NO. OF PAGES	2
		REQUIREMENT NO.	(b)(3) NatSecAct
		REFERENCES	

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE:

1. The Soviets have no special PW interrogation centers. It is much simpler to send an interrogator to a PW camp than it is to transfer a PW to another interrogation site, which requires planning and transportation for the prisoner and his escort. If the prisoner is someone of importance, he is brought to Moscow and placed in either the Butyrskiy prison or Lefortovo prison during interrogation. PWs selected as agent prospects are also transferred to a prison in Moscow and are housed in comfortable accommodations after recruitment.

2. Not every PW is subjected to detailed interrogation; the prisoner's importance is the determining factor. Among those considered important and subjected to detailed interrogation were German intelligence personnel, SS officers, and Germans who had held important civilian jobs in Germany.

3. (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
However, rumors circulating among MVD circles indicated that conditions were fairly decent and perhaps better than in prisons for Soviet citizens. The PWs did not gain weight in Soviet camps, but they did stay alive.

4. Interrogators were given no special training, but before being assigned to an interrogation they were instructed on the information required.

5. (b)(3) NatSecAct
Soviet interrogation techniques other than the planting of informers in prison cells. From an informer the prisoner's true identity can be learned and his importance established.

~~SECRET~~

4. 2

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6. All PWs are subjected to indoctrination in Communism. Committees for a free Germany were set up among the German PWs; periodic lectures on Communism and discussions on the differences between Nazism and Leninism are also given. During interrogations, PWs are always subjected to preachings about Communism. Source could not say whether the results of these indoctrinations are successful.

000128

Approved for Release: 2021/09/16 C06444587
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	D/ICS		X		
4	DDA				
5	DDI				
6	DDO		X		
7	DDP&C				
8	DDS&T				
9	IG				
10	COMPT				
11	D/OCA	X			
12	GC				
13	Chm/NIC				
14	D/PAO				
15	DD/SA/OCA		X		
16	LEG/OCA		X		(b)(3) CIAAct
17	C/PCS/DO		X		(b)(6)
18					
19					
20					(b)(3) CIAAct
21					(b)(6)
22					

LOOSE
18 DEC 1991

SUSPENSE 31 Dec 91
 Date

Remarks D/OCA will respond in consultation with the DO. Please provide ES with a drop copy of the response.

ER 91-4126

Executive Secretary
17 Dec 91
 Date

3637 (10-81)

Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Secretariat

17 Dec 71

D/OCA:

Stan -
Another fax that ^{we} will
process as an original for
time-savings. Please advise
as to how you will respond.

Gyllis

JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS,
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 J. WILLIAM CODINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

December 12, 1991

The Honorable Robert Gates
 Director
 Central Intelligence Agency
 Washington DC 20505

Dear Mr. Gates:

Reports continue to surface that Soviet officials have admittedly participated in the interrogation of American POWs after 1973. Most recently, former Soviet KGB and military personnel, interviewed by the Australian "60 Minutes" program, described interrogations and live sightings of American POWs as late as 1978. Among these sources is Oleg Kalugin, a retired general in the KGB, who reportedly said he personally headed an interrogation team in Vietnam in 1975-78, that interrogated Americans.

The Committee recognizes the inherent difficulties in pursuing these matters, given the current state of disarray in the former Soviet Union. However, these difficulties should not deter this government from undertaking a quick and active investigation of these reports. We urge you to take advantage of the apparent Soviet willingness to discuss these matters openly with the western press, and dedicate intelligence resources to follow these important leads.


In particular, the opportunity may exist to establish an ongoing dialogue with Soviet intelligence services on the issue of American POW/MIAs, not only those lost in Southeast Asia but those unaccounted for in Korea and World War II. Likewise, the Committee encourages you to ascertain if other former Warsaw Pact countries may also be willing to cooperate in this regard.

Your efforts in this regard are greatly appreciated, and we ask that you keep us posted as to developments.

Sincerely,



Bob Smith
 Vice Chairman



John F. Kerry
 Chairman

JFK/kb

000131

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA FILE: SSPDW
RECEIPT #: _____

OCA 5081-91
24 DEC 1991

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

We are in receipt of your letters dated December 12, 1991 and December 13, 1991 to Director Gates. We are in discussion with Committee staff relative to a response, which will be forthcoming shortly.

A copy of this letter is also being provided to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

/s/ Stanley M. Moskowitz

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

000133

OCA 5081-91

SUBJECT: Interim Response to Sen Simon re illegal arms shipments to South Africa

OCA/Senate [redacted] ds/37292 (23 Dec 91)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

1 - ES

1 - D/OCA

1 - OCA Records (ER 4126-91 and ER 4127-91)

1 - [redacted] Chrono

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 5081-91/1
24 DEC 1991

The Honorable Bob Smith
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

We are in receipt of your letters dated December 12, 1991 and December 13, 1991 to Director Gates. We are in discussion with Committee staff relative to a response, which will be forthcoming shortly.



A copy of this letter is also being provided to Chairman Kerry.

Sincerely,

/s/ Stanley M. Moskowitz

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

000135

TO : D/OCA		CONTROL # OCA 5081-91	DATE OF REQUEST 23 Dec 91
FROM : DD/SA 		SUSPENSE DATE	
SUBJECT : Interim Response to Sen Kerry re POW/MIA			
NOTES			
COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices)			
NAME		OFFICE	DATE
NAME		OFFICE	DATE
NAME		OFFICE	DATE
NAME		OFFICE	DATE
ACTION REQUIRED BY D/OCA			
<p>For your signature </p>			

12/10/91 10:00
JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS,
Chairman
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, SOUTH DAKOTA
HARRY REID, NEVADA
CHARLES S. ROBB, VIRGINIA
J. ROBERT KERREY, NEBRASKA
HERBERT H. KOHL, WISCONSIN

BOB SMITH, NEW HAMPSHIRE,
Vice Chairman
JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA
MARK BROWN, COLORADO
MUCK GRASSLEY, IOWA
NANCY LONDON KASSERBAUM, KANSAS
JESSE HELMS, NORTH CAROLINA

FRANCES A. ZWENIG, STAFF DIRECTOR
ALAN C. PTAK, DEPUTY STAFF DIRECTOR
J. WILLIAM CODINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

December 13, 1991

The Honorable Robert Gates
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Director Gates:

As you are well aware, there have been numerous reports recently concerning the possible interrogation of American POWs by Soviet intelligence officers during the Vietnam War as well as the possible transfer of POWs to the Soviet Union during both the Korean and Vietnam Wars.


Although the Committee realizes that the investigation of these reports is ongoing, we would nevertheless appreciate receiving as soon as possible whatever documentation of these reports of a Soviet connection exists, including the recent debriefing of former KGB General Oleg Kalugin by the Defense Attache's Office of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and the 1955 document labeled "Re U.S. POWs in USSR." which National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft withheld this year from public release.

Please contact Frances Zwenig, Staff Director of the Select Committee, if you have any questions.

Sincerely,



Bob Smith
Vice Chairman



John F. Kerry
Chairman

SSACHUSETTS,

BOB SMITH, NEW HAMPSHIRE,

Approved for Release: 2021/09/16 C06471810

ASCHLE, SOUTH DAKOTA
NEVADA
S. ROBB, VIRGINIA
ROBERT KERREY, NEBRASKA
HERBERT H. KOHL, WISCONSIN

Vice Chairman
JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA
HANK BROWN, COLORADO
CHUCK GRASSLEY, IOWA
NANCY LINDON KASSEBAUM, KANSAS
JESSE HELMS, NORTH CAROLINA

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

FRANCES A. ZWENIG, STAFF DIRECTOR
ALAN C. PTAK, DEPUTY STAFF DIRECTOR
J. WILLIAM COONINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL

December 12, 1991

The Honorable Robert Gates
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington DC 20505

Dear Mr. Gates:

Reports continue to surface that Soviet officials have admittedly participated in the interrogation of American POWs after 1973. Most recently, former Soviet KGB and military personnel, interviewed by the Australian "60 Minutes" program, described interrogations and live sightings of American POWs as late as 1978. Among these sources is Oleg Kalugin, a retired general in the KGB, who reportedly said he personally headed an interrogation team in Vietnam in 1975-78, that interrogated Americans.

The Committee recognizes the inherent difficulties in pursuing these matters, given the current state of disarray in the former Soviet Union. However, these difficulties should not deter this government from undertaking a quick and active investigation of these reports. We urge you to take advantage of the apparent Soviet willingness to discuss these matters openly with the western press, and dedicate intelligence resources to follow these important leads.


In particular, the opportunity may exist to establish an ongoing dialogue with Soviet intelligence services on the issue of American POW/MIAs, not only those lost in Southeast Asia but those unaccounted for in Korea and World War II. Likewise, the Committee encourages you to ascertain if other former Warsaw Pact countries may also be willing to cooperate in this regard.

Your efforts in this regard are greatly appreciated, and we ask that you keep us posted as to developments.

Sincerely,



Bob Smith
Vice Chairman



John F. Kerry
Chairman

JFK/kb

~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency

OCA FILE: SSPOW
RECEIPT #: _____

S

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 5098-91

27 DEC 1991

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to your letter of December 12, 1991, concerning the possibility of US POWs/MIAs in the USSR, let me assure you that the Agency is actively pursuing this issue. A senior officer of the Interpublic Security Service (ISS), the successor organization to the former KGB Second Chief Directorate, advised the Agency on 3 December that the ISS had undertaken "an exhaustive search of available information and resources, and had come up with no indication of such presence in the USSR past or present." On 6 December the ISS passed us a written "official" response. Following is a translation of that response:

"At our request, an investigation was conducted in Kazakhstan concerning the supposed presence of an American military pilot in the village of Saryshagan, Dzhezkazgan Oblast, as presented in the newspaper 'Kommersant' (no. 42, dated 4 November 1991). The pilot was reportedly taken prisoner during the period of war in Indochina.

As a result of the investigation, which included questioning long-time residents, no information was obtained about the presence in that region at any time of an American pilot.

On our part, we also do not have any information about American military personnel located on the territory of the USSR who were missing in action during the course of military activities in Indochina."

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~

000139

~~SECRET~~

The Honorable John F. Kerry

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Regarding alleged statements by retired KGB General Oleg Kalugin, reported by Australian television, that he had been involved in the interrogation of Americans in Vietnam during the 1975-1978 period, we have tasked [redacted] to ask the ISS and the Russian Republic Federal Security Service to confirm the remarks attributed to Kalugin and provide details. [redacted] was also been directed to seek guidance from those services as to how a similar inquiry can be put to the military intelligence service, the GRU.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

The [redacted] have been asked for any information they may have on Soviet and/or East European incarceration or interrogation of POWs/MIAs from World War II, the Korean War, or the Vietnam War.

We will keep the Committee advised of any additional information that results from our discussions with the Russian and East European Services.

A copy of this letter is also being provided to Vice Chairman Smith.

Sincerely,

[redacted signature box]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

~~SECRET~~

000140

OCA Records

3

OCA FILE: SSPOW
RECEIPT #: _____

OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS

Routing Slip

	ACTION	INFO
1. D/OCA		X
2. DD/OCA		
3. D/Legislation		X
4. D/Senate Liaison	X	
5. D/House Liaison		X
6. D/Congressional Support		X
7. Admin		
8. Constituent Inquiries Officer		
9. FOIA Officer		
10. SECURITY		
11. SPECIAL ASSISTANT		X
12. DD/ICID		X

SUSPENSE

31 Dec 91
Date

Action Officer:	<input type="text"/>	(b)(3) CIAAct
Remarks:		(b)(6)

GP 18 Dec 91
Name/Date

FORM 4422
EDITION DATE 6-91

000141

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP**

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	D/ICS		X		
4	DDA				
5	DDI				
6	DDO		X		
7	DDP&C				
8	DDS&T				
9	IG				
10	COMPT				
11	D/OCA	X			
12	GC				
13	Chm/NIC				
14	D/PAO				(b)(3) CIAAct
15	DD/SA/OCA		X		(b)(6)
16	LEG/OCA		X		
17	C/PCS/DO		X		
18					
19					
20					
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		31 Dec 91			
		Date			

Remarks D/OCA will respond in consultation with the DO. Please provide ES with a drop copy of the response.

ER 91-4126

Executive Secretary
17 Dec 91

Date

3637 (10-81)

Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Secretariat

17 Dec 71

D/OCA:

Stan -
Another fax that ^{we} will
process as an original for
time-savings. Please advise
as to how you will respond.

Styllis

000143

JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS,
Chairman
 THOMAS A. DASCHLE, SOUTH DAKOTA
 HARRY REID, NEVADA
 CHARLES S. ROBB, VIRGINIA
 J. ROBERT KERREY, NEBRASKA
 HERBERT H. KOHL, WISCONSIN

BOB SMITH, NEW HAMPSHIRE,
Vice Chairman
 JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA
 HANK BROWN, COLORADO
 CHUCK GRASSLEY, IOWA
 NANCY LONDON KASGEBaum, KANSAS
 JESSE HELMS, NORTH CAROLINA

FRANCES A. ZWENIG, STAFF DIRECTOR
 ALAN C. PTAK, DEPUTY STAFF DIRECTOR
 J. WILLIAM CODINHA, GENERAL COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6500

December 12, 1991

The Honorable Robert Gates
 Director
 Central Intelligence Agency
 Washington DC 20505

Dear Mr. Gates:

Reports continue to surface that Soviet officials have admittedly participated in the interrogation of American POWs after 1973. Most recently, former Soviet KGB and military personnel, interviewed by the Australian "60 Minutes" program, described interrogations and live sightings of American POWs as late as 1978. Among these sources is Oleg Kalugin, a retired general in the KGB, who reportedly said he personally headed an interrogation team in Vietnam in 1975-78, that interrogated Americans.

The Committee recognizes the inherent difficulties in pursuing these matters, given the current state of disarray in the former Soviet Union. However, these difficulties should not deter this government from undertaking a quick and active investigation of these reports. We urge you to take advantage of the apparent Soviet willingness to discuss these matters openly with the western press, and dedicate intelligence resources to follow these important leads.


In particular, the opportunity may exist to establish an ongoing dialogue with Soviet intelligence services on the issue of American POW/MIAs, not only those lost in Southeast Asia but those unaccounted for in Korea and World War II. Likewise, the Committee encourages you to ascertain if other former Warsaw Pact countries may also be willing to cooperate in this regard.

Your efforts in this regard are greatly appreciated, and we ask that you keep us posted as to developments.

Sincerely,



Bob Smith
 Vice Chairman



John F. Kerry
 Chairman

JFK/kb

Approved for Release: 2021/09/16 C06471815

John F. Kerry, Massachusetts, Chairman
Bob Smith, New Hampshire, Vice Chairman

Select Committee on

POW / MIA Affairs

Tom Daschle, South Dakota
Harry Reid, Nevada
Charles Robb, Virginia
Bob Kerrey, Nebraska
Herb Kohl, Wisconsin

John McCain, Arizona
Hank Brown, Colorado
Charles Grassley, Iowa
Nancy Landon Kassebaum, Kansas
Jesse Helms, North Carolina

Frances A. Zwenig, Staff Director
Alan C. Plak, Deputy Staff Director
J. William Codinha, General Counsel

United States Senate Washington, DC 20510-6500 (202) 224-2306

FAX COVER SHEET

File

TO:

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

FROM: FRANCES ZWENIG

DATE: 12.12.91

TOTAL PAGES: 2 (including cover sheet)

=====

000145

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

SUBJECT: Response to 12 December 1991 Letter from Senators Kerry and Smith for Information Concerning U.S. POWs/MIAs in the Former USSR

FROM: C/ORMS/CCA 6U02 NHB	(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)	EXTENSION 75319	DATE SENT 24 Dec. 1991	REQUEST NUMBER DD/O 0025/138-91
--	-------------------------	---------------------------	-------------------------------------	---

	TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1.	DC/ORMS			JP	This revised at the request of Paul Stombaugh.
2.	C/ORMS			✓	
3.	SA/DDO 7E26 OHB		12-24	MS	
4.	ADDO				
5.	DDO			✓	
6.	(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)				
7.	[] C/OCA/S 7B00 OHB				
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					

SUSPENSE DATE: []

RETURN TO: []

FORM 8-87 4283

SECRET (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

CL BY 080456
DECL OADR
DTY MIS-2-82
000146

~~SECRET~~

DD/O 0025/138-91

24 December 1991

Letter to Sen Kerry + Smith

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Chief, Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

VIA:

Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

FROM:

Chief, Congressional and Covert Action Oversight
Group
Operations and Resource Management Staff

SUBJECT:

Information Concerning U.S. POWs/MIAs in the
Former USSR

REFERENCE:

Letter of 12 December 1991 from Senators John
Kerry and Bob Smith of the Select Committee on
POW/MIA Affairs to the DCI

*Let me assure you that
The Agency is actively
Reviewing the
ISS info*

*Now Letter of 12 December
The possibility of*

1. In response to an inquiry concerning U.S. POWs/MIAs in the USSR, a senior officer of the Interpublic Security Service (ISS), the successor organization to the former KGB Second Chief Directorate, advised the Agency on 3 December that the ISS had undertaken "an exhaustive search of available information and resources, and had come up with no indication of such presence in the USSR past or present." On 6 December the ISS passed us a written "official" response. Following is a translation of that response:

"At our request, an investigation was conducted in Kazakhstan concerning the supposed presence of an American military pilot in the village of Saryshagan, Dzhezkazgan Oblast, as presented in the newspaper 'Kommersant' (no. 42, dated 4 November 1991). The pilot was reportedly taken prisoner during the period of war in Indochina.

"As a result of the investigation, which included questioning long-time residents, no information was obtained about the presence in that region at any time of an American pilot.

[Redacted box]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~


000147

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Information Concerning U.S. POWs/MIAs in the Former USSR

"On our part, we also do not have any information about American military personnel located on the territory of the USSR who were missing in action during the course of military activities in Indochina."

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct



4. We will keep the Committee advised of any additional information that results from our discovery with the ~~to~~ Russian and East European sources.

ACCORDING TO WEBSTER, INQUIRY IS THE PREFERRED SPELLING. SUGGEST CHANMAKE SEVERAL EDITORIAL CHANGES TO CLEAN UP OBSCURE WORDING IN PAA'S 2-3.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

~~SECRET~~

000148

~~S E C R E T~~

SUBJECT: Information Concerning U.S. POWs/MIAs in the Former
USSR

DO/ORMS/CCA sc/x75324

(24 December 1991)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Distribution:

- Original - C/OCA/Senate
- 1 - ORMS/CCA/Senate
- 1 - POW/MIA soft file

~~S E C R E T~~

000149

~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 5098-91/1

27 DEC 1991

The Honorable Bob Smith
 Vice Chairman
 Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs
 United States Senate
 Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

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(b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~

000150

~~SECRET~~

The Honorable Bob Smith

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Regarding alleged statements by retired KGB General Oleg Kalugin, reported by Australian television, that he had been involved in the interrogation of Americans in Vietnam during the 1975-1978 period, we have tasked [redacted] to ask the ISS and the Russian Republic Federal Security Service to confirm the remarks attributed to Kalugin and provide details. [redacted] has also been directed to seek guidance from those services as to how a similar inquiry can be put to the military intelligence service, the GRU.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] have been asked for any information they may have on Soviet and/or East European incarceration or interrogation of POWs/MIAs from World War II, the Korean War, or the Vietnam War.

We will keep the Committee advised of any additional information that results from our discussions with the Russian [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

A copy of this letter is also being provided to Chairman Kerry.

Sincerely,



for Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

~~SECRET~~

000151

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Letters to Senators Kerry and Smith re POWs/MIAs
in the USSR

OCA/Senate, [redacted]; jmk/37292 (26 December 1991)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

Distribution (OCA 5098-91):

Original - Addressee

1 - DCI

1 - DDCI

1 - ES

1 - ER (ER 91-4126)

1 - D/OCA

1 - OCA Records

1 - [redacted] Chron

(b)(3) CIAAct

1 - Subject File

(b)(6)

~~SECRET~~

000152

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Letters to Senator Kerry and Senator Smith
re US POWs/MIAs in the USSR

FROM: Stanley M. Moskowitz Director of Congressional Affairs	EXTENSION 37605	NO. OCA 5098-91
		DATE 26 December 1991

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. Executive Registry	26 DEC 1991		<i>[Signature]</i>	This has been coordinated with DO/C/ORMS and SA/DDO.
2.				
3. Deputy Director of Central Intelligence		12/27	<i>[Signature]</i>	
4.				
5. Director of Central Intelligence				
6.				
7. Director of Congressional Affairs				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

Signed [Signature]



Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 98-0134/1
24 July 1998

The Honorable Jesse A. Helms
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-3301

Dear Senator Helms:

(b)(6) This is in response to a 7 May 1998 inquiry sent to the (b)(6)
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) via facsimile by
(b)(6) of your staff. (b)(6) attached copies of
two letters from (b)(6) one of your constituents.

(b)(6) (b)(6) wrote to you (as well as to the Department of
Defense, Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Office (DPMO)), with
respect to the recovery of the remains of (b)(6)
Norman A. Schwartz, and Robert C. Snoddy, both of whom were
killed on 29 November 1952 when the plane they were flying
crashed in Kirin Province, located in eastern Manchuria, China.

The CIA is very sympathetic to (b)(6) request, and (b)(6)
would like to assist his efforts in any appropriate way. The
Agency is, nevertheless, not itself in a position to induce the
government of the People's Republic of China to cooperate in
locating and recovering Korean War era remains. We are hopeful
that redoubled US diplomatic efforts to ascertain the precise
fate of Messrs. Schwartz and Snoddy will eventually bear fruit.

To that end, we have worked with DPMO in seeking any
information China may have concerning the remains of
Messrs. Schwartz and Snoddy. I am enclosing a copy of a
19 June 1998 DPMO cable soliciting American Embassy, Beijing,
intervention with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on a
range of Korean War POW/MIA issues, including that concerning
Messrs. Schwartz and Snoddy. We very much hope that the State
Department's diplomatic efforts will enable the eventual
recovery of their remains. Meanwhile, you--(b)(6)
may rest assured that the CIA does not forget those who have made
the ultimate sacrifice in its service.

000154

The Honorable Jesse A. Helms

While the necessary US diplomatic efforts are in process, we are ready to assist in any way possible.

Sincerely,

A rectangular box with a black border, used to redact the signature of John H. Moseman.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

John H. Moseman
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

~~SECRET~~

7 February 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[Redacted]

Chief, Senate Liaison Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

VIA:

Office of the Deputy Director for Operations

FROM:

[Redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

SUBJECT:

Request for CIA Reporting Pertaining to Soviet
or Chinese Contact with American POWs

REFERENCE:

Letter of 22 January 1992 from Senators Kerry
and Smith of the Select Committee on POW/MIA
Affairs to the DCI

1. This is in reply to the letter of 22 January 1992 which requested intelligence information, assessments or monographs pertaining to Soviet or Chinese contact with American POWs or the movement of these POWs to the Soviet Union or China.

2. As previously reported to the Committee, an Agency officer captured during the Tet offensive in January 1968 and released in March 1973 said he was interrogated by a man he presumed was a Soviet. A copy of the relevant transcript of our debriefing of the officer on this subject is available for review at CIA Headquarters by appropriately cleared and designated Committee personnel.

3. The Deputy Director for Operations and Senator Kerry also met privately for a discussion on this subject.

4. In regard to the possible movement of American POWs in Indochina to the Soviet Union, we have been able to identify one report that falls into this category. We also located the requested [Redacted] report. These reports are available for review by appropriately cleared and designated Committee personnel.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[Redacted]

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct


~~SECRET~~

000156

~~S E C R E T~~

SUBJECT: Request for CIA Reporting Pertaining to Soviet
or Chinese Contact with American POW's

5. We have been unable to identify any intelligence assessments/monographs, NID reports, or intelligence briefings relating to Soviet or Chinese contact with American POW's during the Indochina War. We are continuing our search and will advise the Committee if we are able to locate any such material.



(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

~~S E C R E T~~

000157