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Declassified Case:
NW# 64284 Date:
05-13-2022

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, FAR EAST
and
EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY
(REAR)

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence
APO 343

DEC 19, 1955

SUBJECT: Summary and Analysis of Army Covert Evasion and Escape Operations
in Korea (S)

TO: Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C.
ATTN: Plans Branch, Collection Division

CLASSIFICATION APPROVED:
EJA
General E1168

1. References:

a. Radio, ACofS, G2, Department of the Army, DA 988746,
dated 19 September 1955.

b. Interim Radio to G2, Department of the Army, ACofS,
G2, AFPE/GA, FM 913308, dated 18 October 1955.

c. G2, AFPE/GA (Rear) Letter, dated 25 October 1955, sub-
ject: "Information Regarding AFPE/Eighth Army Evasion and Escape
Activities (U)".

2. In compliance with paragraph three (3) of reference 1a,
above, a documented summary and analysis of Evasion and Escape
experience factors in operations of elements coordinated by CCRAK
and CCRAFE is attached as Inclosure One (1).

3. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

1 Inclosure
Staff Study, Subject
as Above

H J VANDER BRIDE
Brigadier General, United States Army
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

0637

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NW#: 64284

DocId: 23419

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SUBJECT: Summary and Analysis of Army Covert Evasion and Escape Operations in Korea (S)

- (2) Army Crash and Rescue Group (ACAR), 8112th AU. US personnel and operational assets from the 8007th AU were phased into this unit which was organized on 1 October 1953. The name, ACAR, was purely for cover and had no relationship with the mission of the unit. Due to United Nations - Communist negotiations for exchange of PsW the mission of this unit was changed from that of establishing contact with PsW to that of collecting information on Communist POW camps, collecting information of PsW and their location, establishing safe lanes in North Korea and establishing an Evasion and Escape stay-behind capability in the area which could be over-run by the enemy in the event of renewed hostilities. Although several successful missions into enemy territory were launched by this unit, the Evasion and Escape value of these missions was largely negative. By 16 November 1954, when CINCPAC relieved AFPE of the mission of conducting covert operations north of the Demilitarized Zone, the majority of this unit's indigenous agent assets were dropped as unreliable. The change in the AFPE mission together with a reduction in CCRAFE personnel spaces dictated that ACAR be discontinued on 20 December 1954 at which time the Evasion and Escape Stay-Behind mission was phased into the 8157th Army Unit. (Annex B).
- (3) Special Operations Detachment, 8157th Army Unit. In addition to the Evasion and Escape stay-behind mission, taken over from the 8112th Army Unit, this unit is charged with conducting experiments in Evasion and Escape tactics and techniques. A considerable effort toward revitalization of the Evasion and Escape stay-behind assets taken over from the 8112th Army Unit has been expended by this unit. Due to various factors, unreliability of indigenous personnel being the major one, the stay-behind net has been reorganized several times. At this writing a new training program has been initiated to train replacements for indigenous personnel who have become overtly associated within the Evasion and Escape net. This has been a continuing problem which has kept the potential value of this net below acceptable standards. The unit experimentation program has been aimed at determining the best methods of survival and techniques of evasion in Korea. Material produced as a result of this experimentation is currently being assembled for publication as an Information Bulletin. (Annex C).

4. DISCUSSION:

a. Recovery Command, 8007th Army Unit, Operations.

- (1) Two major factors affected the operations of this unit. They were:
- (a) The short period the unit was operational (9 months).
 - (b) The advent of the armistice on 27 July 1953 with its inherent restrictions.

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, FAR EAST
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Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence
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DEC 19, 1955

SUBJECT: Summary and Analysis of Army Covert Evasion and Escape Operations
in Korea (S)

TO: Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C.
ATTN: Plans Branch, Collection Division

CLASSIFICATION APPROVED:
Central Files

1. References:

- a. Radio, ACoFS, G2, Department of the Army, DA 988716, dated 19 September 1955.
- b. Interim Radio to G2, Department of the Army, ACoFS, G2, AFPE/BA, FM 913308, dated 18 October 1955.
- c. G2, AFPE/BA (Rear) Letter, dated 25 October 1955, subject: "Information Regarding AFPE/Eighth Army Evasion and Escape Activities (U)".

2. In compliance with paragraph three (3) of reference 1a, above, a documented summary and analysis of Evasion and Escape experience factors in operations of elements coordinated by CCRAK and CCRAFE is attached as Inclosure One (1).

3. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

1 Inclosure
Staff Study, Subject
as Above

H J VANDER BRIDE
Brigadier General, United States Army
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

0637

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NW#: 64284

DocId: 23419

~~SECRET~~Declassified Case: NW#
64284 Date: 05-13-2022

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: 15 December 1955
 SUBJECT: Summary and Analysis of Army Covert Evasion and Escape
 Operations in Korea (S)

1. References:

a. Ref la of basic letter requested information as follows:

(1) Data on organization and mission of AFFE/8A E&E unit, concept of current operations being conducted, progress of research and operations to date and nature and success of field coordination with British IS-9 (K) unit.

(2) Documented summary as outlined in para 2 of basic letter.

(3) Status of implementation of exchange of E&E information with British.

2. Action taken:

a. Ref lb of basic ltr forwarded reply to DA query given in la(3), above.

b. Ref lc of basic letter forwarded reply to DA query given in la(1), above.

c. Inst basic ltr forwards study, as indicated in para la(2), above, to G2, Department of the Army.

3. Coordination: a. Within G2: CCRAFE Ln Off (Lt Col Bogardus).

b. Within CCRAFE: Lt Col Haley, Maj Hart, Maj Guild, Capt Leonard and Capt Deasy.

c. Outside G2: None.

4. This is a completed action.

5. This is not a G2 highlight.

6. CofS approval not necessary.

7. APPROVED _____ CO, CCRAFE.

8. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

9. Classification approved _____.

10. Approved for release _____.

J. E. Hicks

Capt Hicks
 Action Officer 969-3243

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Central Files

64284 DocId:23419

Declassified Case: NW# 64284

Date: 05-13-2022

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HQ CCRAFE
8177th AU
APO 613
15 Dec 55

ANNEX C (Special Operations Detachment, 8157th Army Unit Activities) to Summary and Analysis of Army Covert Evasion and Escape Operations in Korea (S)

1. In the latter part of 1953, the 8112th Army Unit, Army Crash and Rescue Group, then engaged in other Evacuation and Escape and clandestine activities, was given the additional mission of organizing and maintaining a stay-behind capability in the retardation area (that area that might be overrun by the enemy in any future offensive) that could effectively exfiltrate and return to UN control captured or lost personnel and downed airmen. This additional mission was not accompanied by an augmentation in personnel, therefore it received only secondary attention. In December 1954 the 8112th Army Unit was discontinued and the stay behind mission was taken over by the 8157th Army Unit. (App 1). The latter unit was better organized to support stay-behind activities since it contained a Special Operations Section of eight (8) officers and twelve (12) enlisted men whose sole mission was the organization and operation of these activities. The Special Operations Section (later reorganized into a separate unit) took steps to reorganize the then existent stay-behind mechanism and experiment with new techniques on a full time basis. A close study of the location of assets (i.e., Korean Team Chiefs) disclosed that most were grouped in the larger cities such as SEOUL, CHUNCHON, HONCHON etc... This was hardly adequate to provide proper coverage across the peninsula; therefore, it was decided to discharge the old team chiefs and approach the problem in a manner more in keeping with experience gained in Korea. (App 2, 3 and 4). The new approach is described below:

2. ORGANIZATION. During the month of May 1955, the 8157th Army Unit began the implementation of its reorganization of the stay-behind mechanism in South Korea to conform to the requirements of the unit mission in providing the US Eighth Army with personnel evacuation support. The area from the DMZ to the SEOUL - INCHON Corridor and extending from the Yellow Sea to the Sea of Japan was divided into five (5) areas of approximately equal size. (App 5). An area command team consisting of one (1) US officer and one (1) US NCO was then assigned to each area and given the responsibility of organizing a stay-behind mechanism in their respective areas. It was determined from past experience in operations in the rugged terrain of South Korea that an evader should not be expected to walk more than five (5) miles in one (1) night in his "rat-line" journey from one safe-house or safe place to the next. Based on this concept, the planned organization of the stay-behind area provided a safehouse at five (5) mile intervals throughout the area of responsibility. To insure adequate supervision and security of this organization, the five stay-behind areas were further subdivided into units approximately ten (10) miles square with a safehouse at each (approximately) of the four corners and one in the center of the square. The safehouse at the center of the squares would be the site of potential cell leaders while the houses on the corners of each square would become his cell members. Security was to be maintained through a system of cut-outs. Only cell leaders were to be employed on a full time basis. They were to be given training in the proper methods and techniques of organizing a stay-behind mechanism and then in turn they would select and train the cell members of their respective squares as needed. These cell members were not to be hired on a permanent payroll, but paid only when actually used in training. The same criteria and precautions used in the selection of cell leaders would be employed in locating and hiring these cell members. (App 6).

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ANNEX C (Special Operations Detachment, 8157th Army Unit Activities) to Summary and Analysis of Army Covert Evacuation and Escape Operations in Korea (S)

3. PHASING OF OPERATIONS. To accomplish the stay-behind organization described above, operations were conducted in three (3) phases; the reconnaissance phase, the recruiting phase and the training phase. (App 6, 7 and 8).

a. The Reconnaissance Phase: This phase consisted of thorough studies of each area by map and by air and ground reconnaissance. During this phase the tentative sites for cell chiefs and cell members were located, and evasion routes in each area from the DMZ to both coasts and from the DMZ to the south were selected. Redoubt areas, resupply routes, cache sites, troop dispositions, status of civilian population, condition of roads and bridges, location of National Police stations, important government buildings, areas known to be pro-communist, areas wherein guerrillas were known to be operating and all obstacles that might hinder the success of the stay-behind mission were studied and recorded. (App 6, 7 and 8).

b. The Recruiting Phase: This phase was used to locate and hire the most capable and dependable indigenous personnel to fill the positions as cell chiefs in the stay-behind areas. The primary prerequisites for the cell chiefs, in addition to passing rigid security background investigations, were that they be long-time residents in the area in which they were to be assigned and mentally and physically willing and able to perform the work. Every attempt was made to select cell chiefs that were beyond draft age, had no children, and whose homes were located in isolated areas. (App 5 and 6).

c. The Training Phase:

(1) Initial Schooling. The training phase of the stay-behind organization was begun by conducting schools for the indigenous cell chiefs in the proper methods and techniques to be employed in conducting stay-behind operations. The schools included instructions in Security, Net and Cell Organization, Recruiting of Agents, Methods of Contact, Map Reading, Cover Stories, Food Procurement and Preparation, Sanitation and First Aid, and Enemy Interrogation Methods. For experimental reasons to determine which method would be the most effective and successful, two different systems of training were employed in these schools. In one system, the cell chiefs were trained on an individual basis, wherein they were not given an opportunity to become acquainted with one another. In the other system, the cell chiefs received training in groups of two and three wherein they were afforded the opportunity to know the cell chief adjacent to them in their same area. It was anticipated that in the first system more complicated planning and training would be necessary to accomplish contact between cell chiefs, however, security would be more readily assured, while in the second system operational contact could be made more easily at the expense of security. Cell chiefs of areas #1, #2, #3 and #4 received their initial schooling individually while area #5 cell chiefs were trained in groups of two and three. (App 6).

(2) Conduct of Schools. The individual training of cell chiefs was accomplished by the Area Command Teams in CP type tents in remote sites approximately ten miles from the cell chief's villages. The indigenous net chief (also translator-interpreter) conducted the instruction under the guidance of the Area Command Team US personnel. To insure maximum security during schools, the cell

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ANNEX C (Special Operations Detachment, 8157th Army Unit Activities) to Summary and Analysis of Army Covert Evasion and Escape Operations in Korea (S)

chiefs were picked up at pre-selected rendezvous at 0500 hours in the morning (a time in which there is little activity on the Korean countryside) and transported to the school site. The US personnel from the Area Command Teams removed all insignia of organization and rank and other markings that might reveal the true identity of the individual or unit. Inquisitive natives were told these personnel represented the 1st Helicopter Company locating potential helicopter-ambulance evacuation sites. The 1st Helicopter Company bumper markings used on the vehicles added support to this cover story.

- (3) **Field Training.** During normal training periods, the cell chiefs of all areas are engaged in a minimum of two training problems of approximately three days and three nights duration each month. In these problems, the cell chief carries out his US Area Commander's plans for setting up and operating evacuation routes. In addition, the cell chief is charged with the responsibility of security within the evacuation route and the overall conduct of evaders and cell members. He coordinates the meeting times and places and insures that no cell member is afforded the opportunity of becoming acquainted with another cell member.
4. **INCENTIVES.** In order to stimulate the desire of the indigenous personnel in the stay-behind mechanism to assist in the evacuation of US personnel from enemy occupied areas to friendly territory, payment of bonuses ranging from \$100 to \$500 per individual evacuated are planned. The rate of payment would vary depending upon the risk involved and the importance of the individual being evacuated.
5. **CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.** The operational control of the stay-behind areas has been planned to revolve around two concepts.
- a. Concept 1 assumes that volunteer US stay-behind personnel will be made available to establish operational control of the stay-behind areas. In this event, these US personnel will be dispatched into the stay-behind areas and continue operational control from those areas. The decision to leave US personnel in the stay-behind areas during wartime will depend upon the tactical situation which exists at the time.
- b. Concept 2 is based on the assumption that volunteer US personnel will not be available to operate stay-behind areas during wartime. In this event, stay-behind areas will be operated by US team commanders from the Headquarters Section within friendly territory utilizing available communications between the stay-behind areas and the Headquarters Section.
6. **OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES.** Upon receipt of a warning that the stay-behind area is being overrun by an aggressor, or that the stay-behind area is being threatened by such action, CO, 8157th AU will implement his plan to move designated US and/or indigenous operational personnel into the assigned areas of operation. Upon arrival in the stay-behind areas, the net chiefs on order of the US team commanders will effect immediate contact with their assigned sub-area cell chiefs, according to plans. Radio contact with Hq 8157th AU of the conditions that prevail within the stay-behind area, and on the basis of that information and as required, an aerial supply delivery to the net chief or team commander is effected. This delivery will consist of supplies and equipment previously crated in cache kits which include food, barter items, clothing and weapons with ammunition.

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ANNEX C (Special Operations Detachment, 8157th Army Unit Activities) to Summary and Analysis of Army Covert Evasion and Escape Operations in Korea (S)

- a. When cache kits are received at the stay-behind area the team commander or net chief makes provision for caching the kits in previously selected sites. He effects distribution of such equipment and supplies to the cell chiefs as required for the accomplishment of the mission.
- b. After the stay-behind operations commence, the net chief concerned instructs his cell chiefs to be on the alert for UN (US) escapees or evaders and to take guarded action to contact such personnel. UN (US) escapees and evaders are then taken into protective custody by the evasion and escape cells and further protected from Communist capture. Cell chiefs notify the net chief in each instance of the name, rank and serial number of UN (US) personnel recovered by the evasion and escape network. This information is passed in turn to CO, 8157th AU and to CO, CCRAFE as quickly as possible. Positive identification of the evaders or escapees by higher headquarters will be made in each case, where possible, before exfiltration of the subject is started.
- c. CO, 8157th AU, upon receipt of evasion and escape information from the net chiefs or team commanders coordinates with Eighth Army (Fwd) for air and naval support as required for exfiltration or pick-up of recovered UN personnel. Details of such coordination are passed as required to the net chiefs or team commanders concerned in the form of pick-up points, times of recovery, naval or AF equipment being used, recognition signals in effect, alternate pick-up points, etc. The net chief or team commander effects the exfiltration on the basis of information received. In the absence of communication with CO, 8157th AU, the net chief or team commander takes the initiative and notifies his higher headquarters of action taken whenever communications are re-established.

7. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN STAY-BEHIND ACTIVITIES. A discussion of these problems and the solutions applied follows:

- a. Sparsity of Population. During the recruiting phase of the stay-behind organization, considerable difficulty was experienced in locating suitable indigenous personnel for employment in Area #4. The ROKA combat divisions had cleared the northern portion of that area of all civilian personnel during the Korean War and the southern portion of the area is entirely too mountainous and rocky to make settlement of the area attractive to rice farmers, resulting in a wide gap in the stay-behind mechanism created by the sparsity of population throughout the area. In order to bridge the gap in Area #4, "rat-lines" in areas #3 and #5 were expanded to pass through Area #4. When civilians are permitted to move back into the northern portion of Area #4, recruiting of cell chiefs will commence in that area. (App 7 and 8).
- b. Changing Troop Dispositions. The changing disposition of combat troops throughout the stay-behind area of responsibility poses a periodic necessity for alterations in the stay-behind mechanism. For example, in the month of July 1955, the movement of the newly activated 50th ROK Reserve Infantry Division into positions North-West of the HWACHON Reservoir was accompanied by the blocking off of all main arteries into the area thereby making contact with the cell chief of this area extremely difficult. This problem was relieved by the hiring of a cut-out, living just outside of the boundaries established by the ROKA division, for making contacts within that area. (App 8).

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ANNEX C (Special Operations Detachment, 8157th Army Unit Activities) to Summary and Analysis of Army Covert Evasion and Escape Operations in Korea (S)

- c. North Korean Guerrilla Activities. The presence of guerrillas and reported North Korean Agents in certain localities also has had an effect on this unit's stay-behind operations. In all cases the action necessitated by these activities was of a temporary nature, but nevertheless represented problems which at the time required alterations in planning and training. Guerrillas in South Korea are fanatical individuals whose sole purpose is to steal, sabotage and murder. They too are evaders, and by the nature of their predicament, must work the same type of terrain that stay-behind personnel utilize. Because of these facts, training problems in areas wherein guerrillas are known to be operating are postponed until the area has been cleared.
- d. ROK National Police and ROKA CIC. An ever present problem in establishing an underground organization in South Korea is the avoidance of ROK National Police and ROKA CIC. This problem is particularly acute in areas that are well known as North Korean infiltration routes where CI surveillance is accentuated. The ROK National Police have, on a few occasions, arrested stay-behind indigenous cell chiefs engaged in establishing cells and rat-lines. In two instances where this unit was unsuccessful in obtaining immediate release of these apprehended personnel, various methods of interrogation were employed by the National Police to obtain information concerning the cell chief's missions. In each case the cell chief disclosed all the knowledge he possessed concerning his mission. These incidents vividly illustrated the necessity of continuing the established practice of organizing and training the stay-behind personnel on a need-to-know basis wherein the compromising of any one individual would be restricted to that individual's knowledge of the work, and not reveal information on the efforts of other individuals or the overall stay-behind mission of this unit. (App 7).
- e. US Counterintelligence. US CIC personnel have been encountered on occasion while stay-behind US personnel were engaged in coastal pick-up and Han River Crossing training problems. Both areas are well known areas for NK agent infiltration and are therefore heavily guarded and under constant CI surveillance. The ROKA and ROK Marine patrols assigned guard missions in these areas cooperate fully with the American CIC and are prompt to inform the CIC of any incidents involving US or other caucasian personnel. In early Summer, during an Area Command Team #1 river crossing exercise on the Han river, two US "evader" personnel were apprehended by a guard force composed of ROK National Police and ROK Marines. In as much as caucasians were involved, the American CIC was notified, and their representatives promptly arrived on the scene. The CIC spent several hours in individual interrogations in an attempt to learn of this unit's mission, but to no avail. The main lesson learned through this experience was that the need existed for an identification card to be carried by US personnel, that the CIC would honor, that would assure stay-behind US personnel of more freedom of action in their duties. Such a pass was developed and, although the CIC has not been encountered with any frequency, the few occasions on which contact has been made, the presentation of the pass has been sufficient identification to enable the user to continue on his mission without delay. (App 7).

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ANNEX C (Special Operations Detachment, 8157th Army Unit Activities) to Summary and Analysis of Army Covert Evasion and Escape Operations in Korea (S)

8. PRESENT STATUS OF TRAINING. As of the first of October 1955, all cell chiefs in the stay-behind mechanism have received training in at least one training problem each in their respective areas, wherein the cell chief has organized and conducted "evader personnel" over an evacuation rat-line using personally selected cell members as assistants. Currently a "model evacuation route" is being utilized in the SEOUL-INCHON area to give cell chiefs additional training in the methods and techniques of evacuation route organization and operation. (App 10).

9. COMMENTS IN SUMMARY:

a. As of this date it is believed a US Army Evasion and Escape stay-behind potential, composed of US and non-US personnel undergoing continuous training in the organization and conduct of cells and evacuation routes, is in being south of the DMZ in Korea. The indigenous cell chiefs of all areas have a minimum of four cell members each under their control available for employment on short notice. For the following reasons it cannot be pre-determined how effectively the stay-behind indigenous personnel would perform their assigned missions in the event of hostilities:

- (1) If the occupying power in the stay-behind area were to clear the area of all civilians, the services of the stay-behind personnel presently living in the area would be rendered practically useless.
- (2) Though selected non-US personnel have volunteered to stay behind, there is no guarantee that these personnel would remain in the area, even if permitted to do so by the occupying power.
- (3) In any event, it may be assumed that if even a small percentage of these indigenous personnel were to remain in the stay-behind area during hostilities, the potential for later expansion to complete area coverage would exist.

10. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

10 Appendixes: Special Operations Detachment, 8157th AU
Monthly Command Reports

- 1 - January 1955
- 2 - February 1955
- 3 - March 1955
- 4 - April 1955
- 5 - May 1955
- 6 - June 1955
- 7 - July 1955
- 8 - August 1955
- 9 - September 1955
- 10 - October 1955

(Above Appendixes omitted)

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Annex B - Army Crash and Rescue Group, 8112th AU Activities (Cont'd)

- (2) Again, indigenous personnel were not always reliable; therefore the capability of the evasion and escape net, since it depended upon the honesty and patriotism of indigenes, could never be determined.
- (3) Communication to remote stay behind areas always presented a problem which appeared insoluble in many instances. This problem was the result of a combination of factors commonly inherent in operations involving communications.
- (h) Portions of the "rat-line" were sometimes compromised due to the vigilance of South Korean Police and other South Korean security organizations in catching our indigenous operational personnel and extracting statements from them concerning their activities. This problem was unavoidable so long as indigenous personnel were used. A few US operational personnel have also been picked up but released without divulging information; however the presence of our personnel in these remote stay behind areas has cast suspicion on the whole operation. It was considered that bringing the South Korean Police into the picture would be tantamount to "blowing" the entire operation.
- (5) Stay behind practice operations under peace-time conditions frequently encountered problems which completely stopped evacuation measures being executed. These encounters may be used as true indicators of the problems to be incurred during wartime operations. (App 2 through 8)

15 Appendixes: — ACAR, 8112th AU Monthly Command Reports

1. - October 1953
2. - November 1953
3. - December 1953
4. - January 1954
5. - February 1954
6. - March 1954
7. - April 1954
8. - May 1954
9. - June 1954
10. - July 1954
11. - August 1954
12. - September 1954
13. - October 1954
14. - November 1954
15. - December 1954

(Above Appendixes omitted)

~~REGRADE DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED~~

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Annex B - Army Crash and Rescue Group, 8112th AU Activities (Cont'd)

Northern China to establish Evasion & Escape net assets in that area. The day before the operation was launched the indigenous net chief was arrested by the Korean National Police on charges of subversion. His arrest led to the arrest of all net members of the Chinese "SAIL-PAN" net. Charges proved to be unfounded; however the South Korean Police had obtained too much information so the net and operation were abandoned. (App 8)

- g. During the months of July and August 1954 increased enemy security, in the form of fast, well armed naval patrol craft and heavier enemy shore patrols was observed on the Southwest Coast of North Korea in the ONGJIN area. This added security provided further deterrents to agent operations in this area. (App 10-11)
- h. This unit, over a period of fourteen months during which it was engaged in covert Evasion & Escape operations in North Korea submitted twenty-two intelligence information reports of varying degrees of credibility. Due to the factors brought out above it is unknown how many actual infiltrations and exfiltrations were effected in arriving at these results. At least two agents exfiltrated from North Korea in August 1954 were known to be doubled (App 11). Although all recorded assets of the 8112th Army Unit were carefully reviewed in November 1954 to determine retainability as clandestine assets it was determined that all should be dropped as completely unreliable; this was effected without further delay shortly before this unit was discontinued.
5. Stay Behind Operations. During the month of March 1954, six (6) "Stay Behind" areas were established immediately to the south of the DMZ and extended to cover the area from the east coast to the west coast extending southward for a distance of approximately 70 miles. The concept of the Stay Behind play involved the training and establishment of indigenous net personnel who would become active in the event this area was over-run upon resumption of hostilities. Extensive development of these Stay Behind areas was not possible until approximately August 1954 due to the requirements for gathering PW information and positive intelligence.
- a. With the primary mission of establishing the six stay behind areas as defined above, one US officer, one enlisted US Korean interpreter and two indigenous radio operators were assigned to each of the designated areas. These teams had the mission to establish indigenous contracts in each area with the final goal of organizing a complete "rat-line" across each area to be linked with the adjoining areas or an escape area near the ocean. Each U. S. Army team at initiation of hostilities was to be air-dropped or tracked into previously selected bases of operation within the six (6) areas. Communication between US stay behind teams would be established with 8112th Army Unit headquarters and operations to evacuate UN evaders and/or escapers as they were contacted would commence.
- b. Problems of this organization included:
- (1) Procurement of qualified US Officers and EM to volunteer, as required, for the stay behind mission. Stay behind areas were frequently organized and operated by US personnel who had not volunteered for the hazardous stay behind task. This was unrealistic since volunteers would be required for entry into the areas after hostilities had commenced. This meant that if US personnel did volunteer they would be entering a relatively strange area where the utmost terrain familiarity was an absolute necessity if the task of movement and evacuation was to be attempted.

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Annex B - Army Crash and Rescue Group, 8112th AU Activities (Cont'd)

the east coast. The operational techniques and methods employed by these bases were similar; therefore, the following discussion applies to all operations. No attempt was made by the operating unit to compartment its operations as separate projects, rather, the operations were a series of agent penetration missions.

- b. Agents were recruited on the basis of their previous contact with intelligence activities, familiarity with certain areas in North Korea, their past contacts with 8112th AU agents and/or their contacts with natives living in North Korea. The selected agents were given little or no training and sent on a mission into North Korea. Normally the agent was directed to go to the area of his acquaintance in North Korea, establish contact with a friend and attempt to procure the friend's house as a safe house, a "rat-line" house or a point for the collection and pick-up of intelligence information of any nature to include POW information. A few missions were launched to accomplish only one task although this was not the rule because of prohibitive agent cost.
- c. Agents were all launched by an indigenous net chief on each coast who also served as a "cut-out" between the agent and U. S. Army (8112th AU) personnel. This left room for the faking of operations and other illicit operational methods aimed at enriching each net chief involved. Each of these two net chiefs was later discovered to be engaged in smuggling and each, to some extent, practiced chicanery in submitting operational reports and collecting payment for missions not actually carried out. These practices were possible because of the restriction preventing US/UN personnel from entering international waters of North Korea and/or proceeding north of the DZ off the east coast of Korea. Another contributive restriction was the "plausible denial" clause which required that US personnel have no direct contact with non-US agent personnel.
- d. Checks on this illicit type of activity by U. S. personnel were difficult due to the same restrictions which allowed this activity to exist. Net Chiefs could fake operations that were productive or non-productive as they willed. Apparently, intelligence information was collected through occasional actual operations in sufficient quantities to allay the suspicions of US personnel. The failure of an agent to return from a mission to collect specific information could always be accredited to the security system in North Korea, agent defection, failure to make pick-up due to rough weather or a score of other unknown factors. The net result of the deviations practiced by the indigenous net chiefs was that the majority of assets established by the 8112th AU are classified as "paper assets" and were therefore non-existent and any information gained through these "paper assets" could be presumed false. (App 1 through 15)
- e. Persistent rumors and reports coming from North Korea, concerning the location of UN POW, led to the launching of missions to confirm the authenticity of these reports. The most important of these was the KOKSAN (CU 2412) Mine report that UN POW were working in the mine. Agents sent to this area returned with a report which was given a great deal of credibility, indicating that UN POW were not working in the KOKSAN area. (App 2)
- f. Prior to May 1954, the 8112th AU had recruited and trained Chinese native to Korea for an operation into the SHANTUNG Peninsula of

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HQ CCRAFE
 8177th AU
 APO 613
 15 Dec 55

Annex B (Army Crash and Rescue Group, 8112th Army Unit Activities) to
 Summary and Analysis of Army Covert Evasion and Escape Operations
 in Korea.

1. The following is a summary of the Evasion and Escape activities of the 8112th Army Unit in Korea from 1 October 1953 through 20 December 1954. During this period the 8112th Army Unit attempted to establish "rat-lines" in North Korea for the movement of UN personnel in the event of the renewal of hostilities or to evacuate prisoners who may not have been repatriated during "Big Switch". However, it is noted that the major efforts of the 8112th Army Unit was aimed at gathering positive intelligence through the infiltration of agents into North Korea.
2. The primary mission of the 8112th Army Unit was to obtain information concerning United Nations prisoners of war not repatriated by the Communist Forces. Secondary missions were to establish Escape and Evasion routes and mechanisms for recovery of United Nations personnel not returned by POW exchange, to collect information on the enemy, and to establish an Evasion and Escape stay behind capability in areas directly south of the DMZ. The concept of 8112th Army Unit operations in North Korea visualized the establishment of E & E nets closely paralleling the east and west coasts of North Korea (a continuation of the 8007th AU mission) for the evacuation of any UN prisoners not repatriated during "Big Switch".
3. The following factors had a decided influence on the operations of this unit:
 - a. US Project Officers were restricted from direct contact with agent personnel; therefore, satisfactory training, briefing, debriefing and control could not be effected.
 - b. Restrictions preventing US personnel in waters North of the DMZ precluded necessary agent direction and supervision into operational areas; such direction is necessary to ensure against fake missions by indigenous agent handlers.
 - c. Small craft available for over-water operations against North Korea were slow speed, short range types precluding extended operation in Communist controlled waters.
 - d. Effective screening of indigenous personnel prior to employment was not always complete and often resulted in poor agent selection.
- h. The intelligence collection and covert Evasion and Escape activities of this unit were in a constant state of flux while in the course of development due mainly to the unreliability of non-US agents. This situation was partially resolved on 16 November 1954 when CCRAFE relieved AFFB of the responsibility for conducting covert operations except for the establishment of a stay behind capability South of the DMZ in Korea. The results of 8112th Army Unit operations against North Korea and the problems encountered during these operations were as follows:
 - a. These tasks were attempted by launching agents from the island of PAENGYONGDO (XC 4601) on the west coast and SOKCHORI (DT 6428) on

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Annex A (Recovery Command, 8007th AU Activities(to Summary and Analysis of Army Covert B & E Opns in Korea (S) (cont'd)

10. "FABIUS" was the code name for the plan for the reorganization and subsequent operations of the 8007th Army Unit under the cover name; "Army Crash and Rescue Group", 8112th Army Unit. "FABIUS" was implemented during August and September 1953. (App 6, 7 and 8)
11. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

8. Appendixes: Recovery Command, 8007th AU
Monthly Command Reports

- 1 - February 1953
- 2 - March 1953
- 3 - April 1953
- 4 - May 1953
- 5 - June 1953
- 6 - July 1953
- 7 - August 1953
- 8 - September 1953

(Above Appendixes omitted)

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Annex A (Recovery Command, 8007th AU Activities) to Summary and Analysis of Army Covert E & E Opns in Korea (S) (cont'd)

Pyongyang and Chonju areas. Assets were established in these areas; however, the value and reliability of the net was never put to test by the exfiltration of POW. (App 4, 5 and 6)

6. OPERATION "BLACK VELVET" - was initiated on 28 April 53. This operation was evolved to establish safe houses, a radio base, and to provide all available information on POW in the HDERYANG, NORTH KOREA area. The "BLACK VELVET" team parachuted into the HDERYANG area of North Korea on 28 June 1953. No radio contact was established with this team. (App 4, 5 and 6)
7. OPERATION "BROKEN WING" - was initiated to establish an E&E net for the evacuation of UN personnel on the west coast of North Korea. The four (4) teams organized for this operation were employed as follows:
 - a. Broken-Wing #1 - air dropped into the SINULJU area on 28 Jun 53, effected initial radio contact on 16 July. This team remained in steady contact until Sep 53 when a resupply effort failed. As radio contact ceased subsequent to the failure of this resupply effort compromise of the team was suspected. (app 6, 7)
 - b. Broken-Wing #2 - sent for dispatch to Island Detachment #1, this team displayed unsatisfactory performance in dispatch, was returned to Seoul for debriefing and was subsequently disbanded.
 - c. Broken-Wing #3 - was water infiltrated into the HAEJU area on 28 June 1953. No radio contact was ever established. This mission was presumed lost. (App 6)
 - d. Broken-Wing #4 - parachuted into the TOKCHON area on 28 June 1953. No radio contact was ever established. This mission was presumed lost. (App 5 and 6)
8. As of the end of June, Recovery Command had parachuted six (6) teams into North Korea. Of these teams, only one (SIDECAR, See para 2) had reported or returned. It was felt, by the personnel of Recovery Command, that a major discrepancy lay in the communications phase of operation. It was also thought that, whereas operational difficulties might in certain measures be responsible for lack of field contact, communications training (two months) and station monitoring time (ten minutes) was totally inadequate. (App 5)
9. Contact with POW Camp #2, Branch #1, YALU Camp complex, was successfully accomplished by I.S.9 (K), the British E&E element in Korea, and POW were awaiting orders to effect or cancel a planned prison break. Special leaflets, containing a pre-arranged code message ordering cancellation of the planned escape, were drawn and printed by I.S.9 (K). The drop mission was flown by B-26 which attempted the drop on prime target and three other camps provided as deception targets. Mission completed 26 July 1953. Later reports from operation "BIG SWITCH" indicated leaflets missed prime target; however, the local population retrieved the leaflets and sold them to the POW, so the operation was successful. (App 6 and 7)

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HQ CCRAPE
 8177th AU
 APO 613
 15 Dec 55

Annex A (Recovery Command, 8007th Army Unit Activities) to Summary and
 Analysis of Army Covert Evasion and Escape Operations in Korea (S)

1. Evasion and Escape operations, conducted by this unit from its activation on 1 January 1953 until it was discontinued on 30 September 1953, are best summarized as groping in nature. The organization of the unit and its subsequent activities were not based on any established Evasion and Escape procedures but rather on experimentation. It would appear that planning was skeletal in nature and that recruitment and training of agents suffered from lack of guidance. These factors were mirrored in the low level of success achieved in the following operations.
2. OPERATION "LANCE" - was initiated 12 Feb 53 to conduct operations in the vicinity of the YALU POW Camp complex to effect the penetration of those camps for the purpose of establishing secure and continuous communication with the POW and where possible effect escape and evacuation of POW to the coast. Three "LANCE" teams were originally given intensive training prior to launching. "LANCE" teams #1 and #3 were parachuted into the YALU POW complex on 28 May 1953 to establish bases of operation. No radio contact was established with either team. This resulted in the decision to cease implementation attempts of Operation "LANCE" until "BIG SWITCH" results were analyzed. During the final briefing of "LANCE" team #2, internal dissension became apparent culminating in the team leader losing control. To further complicate this situation certain members of the team displayed a hostile and undisciplined attitude. At this point it was felt necessary, both as a security measure to protect the over-all mission, and to eliminate the possibility of causing reprisals within the POW Camps, to conceal infiltration of this team. This operation appears to have been feasible but too hastily planned and executed. (App 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6)
3. OPERATION "SIDECAR" - was initiated to supply sorely needed intelligence information concerning the enemy's handling of captured personnel, through agent penetration of the North Korean Home Ministry, POW Division. This plan was approved by CG, CCRAK and a selected agent placed in training. This agent was dispatched on 2 May 1953 returned through the lines to the 8007th Army Unit on 12 June 1953 and was subsequently returned by air 26 July 1953 to activate a net. Radio contact was never established with this agent who was not heard from again. (App 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6)
4. The first indication that Evasion chains within North Korean territory had been contemplated is delineated in a letter dated 18 Mar 53 from the 8007th AU to the Commanding Officer, CCRAK. This letter outlined a general plan to establish required Evasion and Escape chains in North Korea to recover and return to friendly territory USAF personnel forced down in North Korean territory. (App 2)
5. OPERATION "STINGER" - was initiated 28 April 1953. This plan was evolved to establish marine lanes of infiltration and exfiltration and to provide maximum assistance to escaping and evading personnel in the Chinnampo,

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SUBJECT: Summary and Analysis of Army Covert Evasion and Escape Operations in Korea (S)

- (2) The satisfactory establishment of this Evasion and Escape net remains contingent upon the efficiency and character of the indigenous personnel required to function as net chiefs and cell leaders. These personnel do not always meet the desired standards since they must be selected from the population in each stay-behind area to avoid suspicion by the enemy should these areas actually become operational.
- (3) The almost constant efforts of the ROKA police and ROKA intelligence agencies to penetrate US intelligence units has also caused operational difficulties and the compromise of Evasion and Escape net assets through the seizure and interrogation of indigenous net personnel by South Korean police and certain intelligence agencies.
- (4) In the final analysis, the effectiveness of the present Evasion and Escape Stay-Behind effort cannot be accurately judged due to the nature of its "wartime only" requirement. The 8157th AU has conducted no Evasion and Escape operations behind the enemy lines.

5. CONCLUSIONS:

- a. Army efforts during hostilities in Korea to establish physical contact with and/or evacuate POW from POW camps in North Korea were not successful.
 - b. The lack of experienced UN/US personnel was a hindrance to the planning, training and execution of covert evasion and escape operations in Korea.
 - c. The utilization of indigenous operational personnel presents a difficult problem which can be partially alleviated through careful agent selectivity and extensive training.
 - d. Evasion and Escape operational costs in Korea have been high with questionable results.
 - e. Non-US agent operations conducted under the direct control of US agent handlers produced better results and information of greater reliability than operations conducted through indigenous cut-outs.
6. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

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- 3 Annexes: A - Recovery Command, 8007th Army Unit Activities.
B - Army Crash and Rescue Group, 8112th Army Unit Activities.
C - Special Operations Detachment, 8157th Army Unit Activities.

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SUBJECT: Summary and Analysis of Army Covert Evasion and Escape Operations in Korea (S)

- (2) From the activation date of this unit to 31 October 1954, there were nineteen (19) separate teams launched into the East Coast of Korea. The number of individuals in each team is not recorded; however, two agents were frequently infiltrated together. Of the teams launched only four (4) agents returned with reports. The four reports appeared to have been "padded" and were similar in many respects to previously submitted reports. Fifteen (15) of the nineteen missions presumably launched did not return. Three (3) of the fifteen were believed captured and twelve (12) were unaccounted for. This trend led to a check which revealed that the indigenous net chief was faking missions and collecting money for missions which were never launched. These fake missions, until detected, presented a distorted statistical picture which reflected that operations for this period produced an average of one (1) report for each thirty-seven (37) days or approximately 1 report for each five (5) missions. There is no information currently available to indicate the value of these reports.
- (3) Operations launched into the West Coast of North Korea were primarily aimed at the establishment of an Evasion and Escape net to parallel the West Coast. The heaviest concentration of agent activity in this area was in the HAEJU-ONGJIN peninsula complex in North Korea. This concentration was the result of the limited range and speed of the unit small boats operating from Paengyong-do Island.
- (a) The use of an indigenous net chief had an adverse effect on the operations launched into the western coastal areas of North Korea. This net chief diverted agents and other assets to smuggling operations and neglected the assigned mission. He was discovered and subsequently dismissed. This led to the collapse of the entire operation and the loss of many assets. After this collapse the modus operandi was changed to decentralize net control and compartmentation of agent teams was effected where possible.
- (b) Boat maintenance problems and lack of suitable boats were a constant deterrent to agent operations. Low speed craft caused crews to be reluctant in attempting long infiltration missions and once the boat was out of sight on a mission, Caucasian personnel had no means of checking on the infiltration or exfiltration attempt.
- (4) 8112th Army Unit records reflect a total of 108 missions launched into North Korea over a period of fourteen (14) months with a total "take" of twenty-two (22) information reports. Some of these missions were aimed at the establishment of new Evasion and Escape cells; however, the absence of some intelligence information "take" during these missions is unaccountable. This, then, is indicative, once again, of the low caliber and state of training of the non-US agents.
- c. Special Operations Detachment (SOD), 8157th Army Unit Operations:
- (1) This unit has the primary mission of establishing a covert Evasion and Escape net to extend across Korea paralleling the DMZ and covering an area to a depth of approximately 70 miles south of that line.

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SUBJECT: Summary and Analysis of Army Covert Evasion and Escape Operations in Korea (S)

- (2) Specific operations conducted by the 8007th Army Unit show a marked lack of success throughout. As of the end of hostilities, the Recovery Command had air-dropped six (6) operational radio teams into North Korea. These teams had been launched to contact and exfiltrate PsW from YALU POW camps, gather information on PsW, and to establish Evasion and Escape nets along the west coast of North Korea. Of this number only one (1) team established radio contact but was later lost when resupply could not be effected. An agent who reported that he had successfully penetrated the NK Home Ministry, POW Division, was exfiltrated and then relaunched into North Korea with a radio operator to exploit this contact. This was the last heard from this agent and no record exists of any information he might have brought out when first exfiltrated. The lack of success in these missions had a decided influence over the future operations of the unit in that they brought out the need for more selectivity in recruitment of agents and the requirement for better, more intensive agent training.
- (3) The results of the 8007th Army Unit operations were strongly influenced by the fact that this unit was in existence for a shorter period than is usually accorded for the establishment and unit training of this type organization. Prior to the Armistice, agents were accorded hasty training and operations were hastily planned and executed; therefore, little operational experience was gained. US personnel assigned to the Recovery Command had negligible Evasion and Escape experience or training and were in many respects functioning on an experimental basis. From records available it would appear that the failures experienced by this unit were directly attributable to these factors. As a whole the experiences of this unit are too inconclusive to be utilized as guides to any future Evasion and Escape effort in an active theater of war.

b. Army Crash and Rescue Group (ACAR), 8112th Army Unit Operations:

- (1) Four major factors affected the operations of this unit. They were:
- (a) The armistice in Korea and the restrictions inherent to the armistice.
 - (b) Operational restrictions imposed by CINCPAC as a result of the armistice which included:
 - 1. UN/US personnel would not enter the international waters of North Korea nor proceed north of the 38th Parallel off the West Coast of Korea nor proceed North of the DMZ off the East Coast of Korea.
 - 2. The policy of "plausible denial" which required that no US personnel have direct contact with non-US agent personnel.
 - (c) Increase in security measures in the interior of North Korea subsequent to the armistice.
 - (d) The lack of suitable boats for operations of this type.

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Declassified Case: NW# 64284
 Date: 05-13-2022

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Relief from Responsibility for Covert
 Evasion and Escape Activities (U)
 G2

NOV. 1955
 Maj Hiner/jp/969-3243

(S)

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1. PROBLEM. To relieve G2, AFPE/8A (CCRAFE, 8177th AU) of the responsibility for covert Evasion and Escape (E&E).

2. FACTS.

a. The requirement for the conduct of covert evasion and escape training and operations in the FEC was established by DA Msg 90511 dated 28 Dec 51. This requirement was passed to CORAK, predecessor of CCRAFE, for implementation. On 20 Oct 54, CINCPAC Msg C-69974 relieved AFPE of responsibility for "covert operations" except for establishing a stay-behind capability in South Korea. This covert E&E mission is currently being conducted by CCRAFE.

b. Since the cessation of hostilities in the Korean conflict, an average of fourteen (14) officers and thirty-four (34) enlisted men have been continually engaged in the establishment of a covert E&E capability in Korea. At present eight (8) officers and fourteen (14) enlisted men are engaged in establishing a covert E&E stay-behind mechanism in South Korea and conducting experiments relative to evasion, escape and survival in Korea.

c. During the period since the cessation of hostilities in Korea, approximately \$267,000.00 in appropriated funds has been expended in attempting to establish an efficient covert E&E capability in Korea.

d. During FY 55 and 56, troop ceilings have been considerably reduced within G2, AFPE/8A (Rear) without a comparable reduction of mission.

3. DISCUSSION.

a. Since the inception of positive E&E activities within this theater in 1951 there has been a large expenditure in manpower, materiel and money which has produced a minimum in positive results. The end of hostilities in Korea in 1953 wrought a change in E&E requirements from that of POW recovery to that of clandestine collection of E&E information, establishing a covert E&E stay-behind capability in South Korea and conducting experiments in the techniques of evasion, escape and survival in Korea.

b. Maintenance of a covert E&E capability by CINCPAC is a requirement in time of war; however, this headquarters (G2 included) has long since been forced to dissolve those activities whose sole justification for existence is that they will be necessary during hostilities. With the continued reduction in funds and manpower, the maintenance of a covert E&E mechanism falls into the category of a desirable rather than an essential activity. Should hostilities become imminent a covert E&E mechanism could be re-activated.

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Central Files
 CLASSIFICATION APPROVED:

NW#: 64284

DocId: 23420

Declassified Case: NW# 64284
Date: 05-13-2022

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CFPP 350.05

Relief from Responsibility for Covert
Evasion and Escape Activities (U)

G2, AFPE/BA (Rear)

CO, CCRAFE

8. NOV. 1955
Maj Miner/jp/969-3249

(S)

1. Reference: Verbal Directive of G2, AFPE/BA (Rear) to CO, CCRAFE, concerning relief of CCRAFE from covert E&E activities.

2. In compliance with reference above the attached D/F from G2, AFPE/ Eighth Army (Rear) to CofS, AFPE/BA (Rear) has been prepared to outline cogent reasons why G2, AFPE/BA (Rear) (CCRAFE) should be relieved of responsibility for covert E&E activities.

3. In the discussion of these cogent reasons, the following points are emphasized:

a. In spite of the reductions in manpower and funds sustained by G2 during FY 55 and FY 56, a large amount of manpower and funds have been and are being expended on the AFPE/BA covert E&E activity.

b. These expenditures in effect are made at the expense of the clandestine intelligence collection effort, the heart of the overall intelligence mission.

c. Large amounts of funds and manpower are currently being expended for E&E research and development which logically should be done in COMUS in consonance with the policy of economy of force.

4. Recommend approval and dispatch of attached D/F to CofS, AFPE/BA (Rear).

5. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

1 Incl

D/F to CofS, AFPE/BA (Rear)

J. B. STANLEY, COL, INF
Commanding 969-3166

CLASSIFICATION APPROVED:

Central File

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~~SECRET~~Declassified Case: NW# 64284
Date: 05-13-2022

SUBJECT: Relief from Responsibility for Covert Evasion and Escape Activities (U)

TO: Cofs

FROM: G2

DATE:

8 NOV 1955

COMMENT NO. 1 (S)

Maj Miner/jp/969-3243

c. Continued research and experimentation by CCRAFE relative to E&E techniques and procedures in this theater are questionable both from the standpoint of economy and practicality. Large amounts of funds and manpower are currently being expended for E&E research and development, which logically should be done in the CONUS in consonance with the policy of economy of force.

d. The maintenance of a covert E&E mechanism is primarily a wartime requirement, whereas the importance of clandestine intelligence collection increases daily. The latter is the most important single means under army control of giving early warning of enemy attack. As such, it is the heart of the intelligence mission and should receive priority in every respect.

4. CONCLUSION. Because of the continued reduction in funds and manpower within this theater, it is inadvisable to continue to maintain a covert E&E mechanism at the expense of the clandestine intelligence collection effort.

5. ACTION RECOMMENDED.

a. Attached draft letter be approved for dispatch to CINCPAC.

b. If request to relieve AFPE/8A of all covert E&E activities is approved by CINCPAC, that CCRAFE be relieved of this mission. Further that the personnel spaces now utilized for covert E&E activities be retained by G2 for utilization in positive intelligence activities.

6. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

1 Incl

Draft Ltr, AFPE/8A to CINCPAC

H J VANDER HEIDE, Brig Gen, USA
A C of S, G-2 3-1903~~SECRET~~

NW#: 64284

DocId:23420

~~SECRET~~Declassified Case: NW# 64284
Date: 05-13-2022

HEADQUARTERS
 UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, FAR EAST
 and
 EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY
 (RRAR)
 APO 343

SUBJECT: Relief from Responsibility for Covert Evasion
 and Escape Activities (U)

TO: Commander In Chief
 Far East
 APO 500

1. References:

- a. DA Message 90511, dated 21 December 1951 (TS)
- b. CINGFE Message C-69974, dated 20 October 1954 (TS)

2. The requirement for the conduct of covert evasion and escape training and operations in the Far East Command was established on 28 December 1951 by reference 1a, above. This requirement was passed to CCRAK, predecessor of CCRAFE, for implementation. On 29 December 1954, reference 1b, above, relieved this headquarters of responsibility for "covert operations" except for establishing a stay-behind capability in South Korea.

3. While it is recognized that a covert evasion and escape capability is necessary in time of war, it is felt that the covert evasion and escape activities presently being conducted by Army Forces in this theater are not justified for the following reasons:

- a. Currently, eight (8) officers and fourteen (14) enlisted men are engaged in covert evasion and escape activities in Korea.

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CLASSIFICATION APPROVED:

Central Files

NW#: 64284

DocId: 23421

~~SECRET~~Declassified Case: NW# 64284
Date: 05-13-2022

SUBJECT: Relief from Responsibility for Covert Evasion
and Escape Activities (U)

b. Since cessation of hostilities in Korea:

- (1) An average of fourteen (14) officers and thirty-four (34) enlistedmen have been engaged in covert evasion and escape activities in Korea.
- (2) Approximately \$267,000.00 in intelligence and other appropriated funds have been expended by the covert evasion and escape effort.
- (3) Army Forces in this theater have sustained drastic reductions in both troop ceilings and appropriated funds.
- (4) Clandestine collection of intelligence has supplanted overt and covert means of positive intelligence collection in Korea.

4. Clandestine collection of intelligence information, the most important single means, under army control, of gaining early warning of enemy attack, must be pursued vigorously and with all available means. The diversion of intelligence personnel and funds to covert evasion and escape activities is not in keeping with this philosophy. Therefore, and in keeping with the reasons outlined in paragraph 3, above, personnel and funds currently being channeled into covert evasion and escape activities must be diverted to further support the clandestine collection mission.

5. It is therefore recommended that AFPE/Eighth Army be relieved of responsibility for the conduct of all covert evasion and escape activities.

6. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

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NW#: 64284

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Declassified Case: NW# 64284
Date: 05-13-2022

MEMO FOR RECORD: 8 November 1955

1. References:
 - a. DA Msg 90511.
 - b. CINCPAC Msg C-69974.
2. Action Required: Dispatch of request for relief from responsibility for covert E&E activities.
3. Action Taken: Instant D/F with inclosure (draft ltr to CINCPAC) ~~are~~^{is} self-explanatory.
4. Coordination: J2, FEC (Col Iseman, SPB, 265-2630) and J3, FEC (Cdr Carroll and Lt Col Stuntz, P&P, 265-2680).
5. Copies furnished: G2 File and CCRAFE.
6. This is an initial action.
7. This is a G2 highlight.
8. CofS Approval is necessary.
9. Approved: *[Signature]* CO, CCRAFE.
10. Regraded to UNCLASSIFIED when separated from classified inclosures.
11. Classification Approved: *[Signature]*

[Signature]
Maj Miner
Action Officer 969-3243

RECEIVED
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SECURITY
DIVISION

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NW#: 64284

DocId: 23421

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (If any)

DISPOSITION FORM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FILE NO. FF-3-000571 (C)

SUBJECT KIM, Denny C (U)

TO AC of S, G2
AFFE/8A (Rear), APO 343
ATTN: Chief, Scty Gp
PS Branch

FROM Hq, 3d Opr Gp (8242)
APO 613

DATE 11 July 1956 COMMENT NO. 1 (C)
Lt Hood/lcm/969-3539

1. On 3 July 1956, during a routine liaison visit to the Three Sisters Bar, 873-banchi, 2-chome, Ikebukuro-machi, Toshima-ku, Tokyo-to, two representatives of this organization reported the following incident:

a. Two men, who appeared to be Japanese, entered the bar and one of these men began talking in English to one of the individuals mentioned above. This individual identified himself as Denny C. Kim, a Department of the Army Civilian. Kim stated he was employed by Army Command Reconnaissance Activities Far East, APO 613, and showed the representatives of this organization, a Department of the Army Civilian Identification Card, which indicated that the card had been issued to a Denny C. Kim, United States citizen employee of ACRAFE. Kim was intoxicated and talked freely about intelligence activities in the Far East. Kim stated that he had just returned from Okinawa where he had been working on a project for ACRAFE, relating that he had done similar work in Korea and Formosa. When questioned by the representatives of this organization, as to what ACRAFE actually was, Kim said that it was part of the 8242 AU, which also included such units as the CIC, Security Group,

b. Kim identified his companion as James Norita, a Japanese citizen. Kim became intoxicated to the point where he could not talk coherently and Norita finally persuaded him to leave the bar.

2. Files of this headquarters contain no information pertinent to the two individuals mentioned above.

3. Forwarded for your information and any action deemed necessary.

4. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

5. Attention is invited to paragraph 43, SR 380-320-10.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

FOIA(b)(1) ARMY

W. D. Neal Jr.

W. D. NEAL JR
Maj OrdC
S2

Declassified Case: NW# 64284
Date: 05-13-2022

11373

D FORM 96
1 FEB 50

REPLACES NME FORM 96, 1 OCT 48, WHICH MAY BE USED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

61-225-Army-AG Admin Cen-Japan-LMM

NW#: 64284

DocId: 32093965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Declassified Case: NW# 64284
Date: 05-13-2022

HEADQUARTERS

ARMY COMMAND RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES FAR EAST (8177)
APO 613

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interrogation of KIM, Chong Chin (aka KIM, Denny C.)

1. On 13 July 1956, Capt Quentin Scott-Smith, SFC Joseph W. Young, and Agent Savage of 3d Cpus Gp proceeded to Yokota Air base to meet with Mr. Kenny, OSI investigator, reference a Korean National who was apprehended with false identification while making PX purchases at the air base.

2. Mr. Kenny informed us of the following facts in his briefing:

A KIM, Chong Chin, using a false ID Card, had been observed by an OSI Agent making excessive purchases of golf clubs in the Yokota PX on 12 July 1956. Upon questioning by the agent, he broke down, and told the following story:

He was a Korean National, who had been flown by Air Force plane from Korea to Japan in 1950. He was a member of the ROK PIO, and his orders were issued by FEAF PIO. On arrival in Tokyo, Japan, he reported to a Dr. Han, and was put to work in the Psychological Warfare Unit in Tokyo. He returned to Korea on an indeterminate date, and went to work for a positive intelligence collection agency called FEC/ID(K), 8240th AU. He returned to Japan in 1954 aboard a U. S. Air Force plane. He had engaged as an employee in a firm called the International Commercial Company Limited, and later became a partner in the Pusan Company, Ltd., which catered to Korean ships landing at Kobe, Japan.

3. The papers found in KIM's pockets and wallet were examined. His identification card, which was an obvious forgery when compared to an original, was made out in the name of KIM, Denny C. This was the same individual on whom this unit had received a report from CIC, via Security Group, for talking too much in a bar on the night of 3 July 1956. He also had a small pad, on which was written the names and telephone numbers of several people. One of these was the number of Lt Col YEUN, and another was the number of Major SCOTT, given as 969-3444 (the number of the CCRAFE S2).

4. Mr. Kenny then took us to the Tachikawa Police Station, where an interrogation of the subject was commenced. The following information was elicited:

On the subject of his statements of the night of 3 July 1956, KIM stated at first that he was too drunk to remember. When told of some of his statements made on that evening, he said that he was probably just trying to act like a Nisei boy, and impress people with his own importance. He said that his trip to Okinawa was a fantasy, and that he hadn't been in Korea since 1954. He also stated that his companion on that night was not James NORITA, but Steve YORITA, aka KANEDA, aka KIM. When he was asked about the Lt Col Yeun listed in his notes, he quickly corrected the statement

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He asserted that he had left the employ of the 8240th AV in 1954, when it dissolved, and first said that he had come to Japan on a flight by an Air Force plane "which was used by the Army". He claimed he became friends with the pilot of this plane, and was flown to Japan in late 1954 without any documents of any kind. When pressed on this matter, he admitted he had paid the pilot, Captain "Posey", \$100 in MPC to take him. A little later, he said he was going to come clean, and said that he sailed from a small port between Masan and Pusan, and landed in Wakayama. He was documented as a crew member, and just didn't bother to go back with the boat. He said that he paid 300,000 Won as passage for himself and two (2) friends, and further, that he had gotten between two hundred and three hundred thousand Yen on the blackmarket in Korea, which he was also carrying. He claimed to have saved this much money from a salary of 30,000 Won per month (at current rate of exchange - 600-1). KIM claims to have been rooming in Shinjuku since April 1956. He was approached by KANEDA several times to do blackmarket purchasing, but refused, preferring to seek "honest" employment. He finally gave in to KANEDA's offer, and on 2 July 1956, KANEDA took his picture and his fingerprints, and presented him with an FEC Form 378. This ID card was supposed to be in KANEDA's possession except when KIM was making purchases for KANEDA. KANEDA was to put up all the money involved, and furnish ration books.

When it was pointed out to KIM that he had the ID card in his possession on 3 July 1956, he changed his story to say that he gave it back to KANEDA on 4 July 1956, and didn't get it back until 12 or 13 July 1956, when he purchased a movie projector (Kodak Brownie) in the Hardy Barracks PX.

5. It was finally decided to polygraph KIM. A check with Tachikawa OSI revealed that, after a long interrogation, the adrenalin content of the blood tended to make a polygraph test inaccurate. Therefore, Mr. Kemy requested the return of ACRAFE and CIC personnel on 16 July for the purpose of composing questions to be asked of subject.

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05-13-2022HEADQUARTERS
ARMY COMMAND RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES FAR EAST (8177)
APO 613

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Polygraphing and reinterrogation of KIM, Chong'Chin.

1. Reference undated Memo for Record, subject: Interrogation of KIM, Chong Chin (aka KIM, Denny C.).

2. On 17 July 1956, KIM Chong Chin was examined under polygraph and interrogated by CWO Edward Spohn, Military Police Laboratory and Records Facility, Camp Fuchinobe.

3. The following chronology of KIM's activities was disclosed:

Jan 51 - Dec 51: Worked in Tokyo for ROKA PIO, attached to U.S. Army Psywar.

Dec 51 - Oct 52: Interpreter for TLO team working in 2d Inf Div area (FEC/LD), 8240th AU).

Oct 52 - Aug 53: Interpreter for Col KYE, In Chu, ROKA, attached to FEC/LD (K).

Aug 53 - Mar 54: Interpreter for Lt Col Minnick and Major Scott, FEC/LD (K).

Mar 54 - Mar 54: Illegally entered Japan aboard fishing merchant vessel, as crew member, landing at Wakayama City.

Mar 54 - Mar 55: Worked as clerk-bookkeeper for textiles wholesaler in Kobe.

Mar 55 - : Called Maj Scott, and met him more than once at Nikkatsu Hotel, Tokyo. Maj Scott advised him to return to Korea and go to work for HAN; In Chun (who is not an Unreliable Source).

Apr 55 - Dec 55: Stayed with a friend, Timothy J. NAM KUNG (aka NAM KUNG, Yo Suk) in Tokyo.

Dec 55 - Apr 56: Returned to Kobe and lent money to Pusan Co, Ltd, living on earnings.

Apr 56 - date : Returned to Tokyo and approached Lt. Comdr YON, Chong for work. Waited for results of YON's efforts in his behalf, and finally agreed to blackmarket operations proposed by KANEDA.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. Mr Spohn stated that it was his opinion, based on polygraph examination, that KIM had nothing to do with intelligence activities since 1954, although it did appear that he had more to do with black market activities than he had admitted.

5. In view of the above, it is recommended that ACRAFE discontinue any further activities in connection with this incident.

Francis B. Mercier
FRANCIS B. MERCIER

Major Inf
Registration & Control Officer

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MPL&R-D-8156
Exhibits A

PROPERTY OF U.S. GOVT.



U.S. FORCES, JAPAN
(在日米軍)
IDENTIFICATION CARD
(身分証明書)

Name (姓名) Denny C. Kim
Nationality (国籍) American
Employer or Dependency
(雇主又は所属) P.W.D.
Employer FEC
Signature (署名) [Signature]
Date Issued 6 Aug, 53
(発行日)

FEC FORM 378 JAN 53 27147-FEC P&PC-5/51-135M

MPL&R-D-8156
Exhibits B-3

ANNUAL RATION BOOK
JAPAN CENTRAL EXCHANGE

Date Issued 25 Feb. 56.

Name Denny C. Kim
Age 28 ASN/ID 12526 (CIV) Sex M
Orgn. C.E.R.A.F.E. APO 613
Signature Issuing Officer [Signature]
Loss of this book will be reported to unit C.O.
FEC FORM 446 (Rev) 44 No. 103863

MPL&R-D-8156
Exhibits B-1

ANNUAL RATION BOOK
JAPAN CENTRAL EXCHANGE

Date Issued _____

Name _____
Age _____ ASN/ID _____ Sex _____
Orgn. _____
Signature Issuing Officer [Signature]
Loss of this book will be reported to unit C.O.
FEC FORM 446 (Rev) No. 403092

MPL&R-D-8156
Exhibits B-2

ANNUAL RATION BOOK
JAPAN CENTRAL EXCHANGE

Date Issued 25 Feb. 56.

Name Denny C. Kim
Age 28 ASN/ID CIV 12526 Sex M
Orgn. C.E.R.A.F.E. APO 613
Signature Issuing Officer [Signature]
Loss of this book will be reported to unit C.O.
FEC FORM 446 (Rev) No. 103120

MPL&R-D-8156-ExD

IDENTIFICATION CARD

NAME Denny C. Kim
STREET Combiner Command Re.
CITY Army Far East
STATE Washington TEL. NO. _____
• IN CASE OF ACCIDENT OR SERIOUS ILLNESS PLEASE NOTIFY
NAME Trinity J. Hankung
ADDRESS Room 610 Nak Kato Bldg.
TEL 27-78076

Declassified Case: NW# 64284
Date: 05-13-2022

NW#: 64284 DocId: 32093965

Declassified Case: NW# 64284 Date: 5-16-2022

本籍 韓國 釜山道 靑邱 邑 新里 三四

住居 東京 都 新宿区 若松町 三番地 三木 金 高 五 五

職業 無職

金 鐘 辰

右の者に対する 昭和四十四年三月十日生(三十二年)

昭和三十一年二月十三日 川 警察署において

本職はあらかじめ被疑者に対し自己の意思に反して供述をする必要がない旨を告げて取り調べたところ被疑者は任意左のとおり供述した

一 出生地は

本籍で生まれました

二 位記、勳章、年金は

ありません

三 前科は

ありません。昭和二十二年一月二十日に韓国から従軍記者として羽田に乘り時旅券のことで蒲田警察署で調べを受けました。他にありません

四 学歴は

京塚専大を卒業しました (国立京塚大学工科卒業)

五 家族状況は

両親は亡くなりました。現在弟 金鐘 泰 三四 才 (DocID: 320999) を卒業して中軍。通訳

NW#: 64284

金田の人の金田の人の合：おーじ
金田の人の金田の人の合：おーじ
この二つの部分を照らす

その二つは半数材料はやるからと頼まれおーじが、その時
は赤くおーじの二つを照らす
その二つは五日の午後二時頃同一場所の金田の人の
送事をする二つを照らす
その二つは五日の約束の時間に行くと頼まれおーじを
受けおーじ

その二つは五日の約束の時間に行くと頼まれおーじを
受けおーじ
身分証明書の一事の父であるから金田の人の海軍を
しわがらす、その二つ

六月五日に約束を二つ受けおーじが適道にも
二つを照らす、その二つは五日の約束の時間に行くと頼まれおーじを
受けおーじ

警 視 庁

末に適道に二つを照らす、その二つは五日の約束の時間に行くと頼まれおーじを
受けおーじ
身分証明書の一事の父であるから金田の人の海軍を
しわがらす、その二つ

その二つは五日の約束の時間に行くと頼まれおーじを
受けおーじ
身分証明書の一事の父であるから金田の人の海軍を
しわがらす、その二つ

その二つは五日の約束の時間に行くと頼まれおーじを
受けおーじ
身分証明書の一事の父であるから金田の人の海軍を
しわがらす、その二つ

その二つは五日の約束の時間に行くと頼まれおーじを
受けおーじ
身分証明書の一事の父であるから金田の人の海軍を
しわがらす、その二つ

その二つは五日の約束の時間に行くと頼まれおーじを
受けおーじ
身分証明書の一事の父であるから金田の人の海軍を
しわがらす、その二つ

NW# 54284

DocId: 32093905

DEPOSITION (Certified copy)

NAME: KIM Chong Chin (金鐘震)

DATE OF BIRTH: 10 Mar 1929 (Age: 27)

PERMANENT ADDRESS: KOREA, HWANGHAE Do, CHAEYONG Up, ILSIN-ni, 34

PRESENT ADDRESS: TOKYO To, SHINJUKU Ku, WAKAMATSU Cho, 21 Banchi, c/o KIM Hyong O (金亨五), alias MIKI (三木)

OCCUPATION: None

The above-named individual was investigated on 13 Jul 56 at the Tachikawa Police Station in regard to suspected violation of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law and suspected violation of the Customs Law and the Alien Registration Law. The undersigned police officer notified the said individual beforehand that he was not required to make any statement against his will but the said individual nevertheless voluntarily made the following statement:

1. Place of birth: I was born at my permanent address.
2. Title, decoration and pension: None.
3. Previous offense: None. I was investigated at the Kamata Police Station with regard to my passport when I arrived at HANEDA from KOREA on 26 Jan 1951 as a war correspondent. There is nothing else to mention that is pertinent.
4. Educational background: I was graduated from Seoul Imperial University. (graduated from the engineering school of Seoul National University).
5. Family condition: Both my parents are dead. At present, I have only a younger brother, KIM Chong Nim (金鐘稟), age 24, who was graduated from Seoul University and is serving as an interpreter of the US Forces.
6. Property and income: I have no property. My monthly income is 20,000 Yen, which is the amount that I receive as a percentage of the income from the import-export business I formerly operated in TOKYO with my friend(s).
7. Brief personal history: After graduating from Seoul University, I worked for the Psychological Warfare Section, Far East Command Headquarters in JAPAN; as a war correspondent attached to Troop Information and Education of the ROK Forces. I arrived at HANEDA from KOREA by airplane on 26 Jan 1951, and worked at Meiji Building for about a year as a liaison official of the Sungni Ilbo (勝利日報) (Victory Daily). I left this position in November 1951 and became an interpreter and assistant administrator under Col KYE (桂) of the 8242d Unit at the Liaison office in KOREA of the Far East Command Headquarters in JAPAN. I held this position for about a year and a half till September 1953 when the war ended. Then, I started business with my friend(s), working at

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DEPOSITION (cont'd)

KOKUSAI TSUSHO KABUSHIKI KAISHA (International Trade Co., Ltd.) in Kishimoto Building, MARUNOUCHI till the summer of 1954. I later operated a ship-chandlery named FUZAN SHOKAI (Pusan Company) at MOTO Machi, KOBE, together with my friend(s). As the business did not go well, I returned to TOKYO in May of this year, planning to do some business with my friend(s) who had formerly worked at KOKUSAI TSUSHO KABUSHIKI KAISHA.

8. I will now tell about my arrest yesterday while buying a set of golf clubs with American MPC's at Yokota Base PX by using my forged identification card. About the 25th or 26th of last month, I met a Korean acquaintance by the name of KANEDA (金田) at the coffee shop EWAN (A-1), SHINJUKU asked a favor of me, saying, "As you can enter a base PX, purchase a set of golf clubs for me. I will give you a commission." Then I asked for time to think the matter over and promised to meet him again at the same place about 1400 hours on the 27th to give him my reply. On the 27th, I went there at the appointed hour and agreed to comply with his request.

9. Though I accepted his request that day, KANEDA had to prepare an identification card and the MPC's necessary to make the purchase. I thus promised on 27 June to make the purchase for him, but as a photograph was necessary, too, I had my bust photograph taken in the basement of the Odeon Theater, SHINJUKU, with a camera which KANEDA had brought. It was used on the identification card that was forged. This took place toward the end of the month.

10. I received the identification card and MPC's at the coffee-shop EWAN (A-1), SHINJUKU, about 1400 hours on 10 July. KANEDA asked me to go to the PX and buy a suitable set of golf clubs "a set of golf clubs with a good resale value". The amount of MPC's handed to me then was 160 dollars. He told me to make the purchase on the 12th.

11. I bought the article at the Yokota Base PX about 1430 hours yesterday. I was arrested by an investigator of the US Forces when I had just bought the article and paid for it. I bought this set of golf clubs for 152 dollars. I turned the remaining 12 dollars over to the US Forces investigator.

12. Items seized by the US Forces Investigator are:

- (1) 12 dollars in MPC's.
- (2) A set of golf clubs.
- (3) An identification card.
- (4) A sales ticket.

13. I was aware that my act was illegal. But I wanted money and I was complying with someone's request. This is why I committed an act that I knew to be illegal.

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DEPOSITION (cont'd)

14. I will not state the reason why I did not have an alien registration certificate in my possession when I was arrested yesterday. As I have mentioned already, I travelled by plane when I came to JAPAN from KOREA as a war correspondent. At that time, I thought that an alien registration certificate was unnecessary because of my work, which was connected with the military forces. After I quit working for the military forces, I realized the need for registering as an alien and intended to take steps for registration in JAPAN by having my military supervisor certify that I had not entered the country illegally. Since, however, this supervisor had been transferred elsewhere and could not be contacted, I could not make headway in the procedures. These procedures have finally been put off till the present time. Therefore, I have never obtained an alien registration certificate. I wish to take this opportunity to have everything cleared up as I want to reside in JAPAN. My statement above is true and correct. I beseech your leniency.

Deponent: KIM Chong Chin

The foregoing transcription was read to the deponent who found it to be true and correct and whereupon affixed his hand thereto. Same day as above.

ITO Shunichi (伊藤俊一)

Police constable, Judicial Police Officer,
Tachikawa Police Station.

The above is a certified copy. Same day as above.

MORI Masaji (森正治) (Seal)

Police constable, Judicial Police Officer,
Tachikawa Police Station.

Declassified Case: NW# 64284
Date: 05-13-2022

(Classification)

TRANSLATION COVER SHEET

DOC NR: 91454

666

	ACTION	DATE
Translated by	Uncl C	24 Jul 56
Checked by	KIM	24 Jul 56
Approved by	KIM	24 Jul 56
Edited by	<i>[Signature]</i>	26 Jul 56

HEADQUARTERS
500TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP
APO 613

Requesting Agency: S-3 500th MIG

Date Received by this Headquarters: 17 Jul 56

Description of Contents: Full translation of a certified copy of deposition by KIM Chung Chin.

~~Portions of this report considered to be pertinent have been translated in full while those portions considered to be of lesser importance have been summarized. A full translation of summarized portions will be made if requested by interested agency.~~

(NOTE: Symbol * indicates exact Romaji transliteration of original Kana.)

(Classification)

500 MIG Form 143
29 Aug 55

TRANSLATION WORK SHEET	PAGE N.	REPORT NR. 91454
Deposition (certified copy)		
Name: KIM Chang Chin (金鐘震)		
Date of birth: 10 Mar 29 (Age: 27)		
Permanent address: KOREA, HWANGHAE DO,		
CHAERYONG Up, ILSIN-mi, 34		
Present address: TOKYO Jo, SHINJUKU Ku,		
WAKAMATSU Cho, 21 Banchi,		
c/o KIM Hyong O (金亨五), alias		
MIKI (三木)		
Occupation: None		

2 500 MIG FORM 30 NOV 55 154

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The above-named individual
was investigated on 13 Jul 56 at
Tachikawa Police Station
in regard to suspected violation of
the Foreign Exchange and
Foreign Trade Control Law and
suspected violation of the Customs
Law and the Alien Registration
Law, and the undersigned
police officer notified the said
individual beforehand that

TRANSLATION WORK SHEET

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he was not required to make any statement against his will - but the said individual nevertheless voluntarily made the following statement.

1. Place of birth: I was born at my permanent address.

2. Title, decoration and pension: None.

3. Previous offense: None.

~~He said nothing except that~~

500 MIG FORM 30 NOV 55 154

H O

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Date: 05-13-2022

I was investigated at ^{the} Kamata

Police Station ^{with regard} ~~relatives~~

~~the~~ ^{my} to passport when I arrived

at HANEDA from KOREA on 26 Jan 51

as a war correspondent. There

^{to mention}
is nothing else that is

pertinent.

4. Educational background:

I was graduated from Seoul

Imperial University (Graduated

from the engineering school

I have no property. My monthly income is 20,000 yen, which is the amount that I receive as a percentage of ... the income from the import-export business I formerly operated in TOKYO with my friend(s).

7. Brief personal history:

After graduating from Seoul University, I worked for the Psychological Warfare Section, Far East Command Headquarters in JAPAN,

TRANSLATION WORK SHEET

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of Seoul National University.)

5. Family condition: Both
 my parents are dead, at
 present, I have only a younger
 brother, KIM Chong Nim (金鐘霖),
 age 24, who was graduated from
 Seoul University and is serving
 as an interpreter of the US
 Forces.

6. Property and income:

6 500 MIG FORM 30 NOV 55 154

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as a war correspondent

... Troop Information and Education

attached to ~~the Chonghaun~~

~~Kuk (국군) (the Republic of Korea)~~

~~Bureau of Intelligence) of~~

of the ROK Forces. I arrived

at HANEDA from ~~the REPUBLIC OF~~

KOREA by airplane on 26 Jan 51,

and worked at Meiji Building

for about a year as a liaison

official of the *Sungni Ilbo*

(勝利日報) (Victory Daily). I

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left this position in November
1951 and became an interpreter
and assistant administrator
under Col K^YE (桂) of the 8242d
Unit at the liaison office
in KOREA of the Far East
Command Headquarters in JAPAN.

I held this position for about
a year and a half till
September 1953 when the
war ended. Then, I started

well, ~~it~~ I returned to

TOKYO in May of this year, planning

to do some business with

my friend(s) who had formerly

worked at KOKUSAI TSUSHO KABUSHIKI KAISHA.

8. I will now ^{talk} ~~state~~ ^{my} about ~~what~~

~~case~~ ~~was~~ ~~arrested~~

while yesterday when buying a set of golf

American

clubs with MPC's at Yokota Base PX

by using my forged identification

card.

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business with my friend(s),

working at KOKUSAI TSUSHO

KABUSHIKI KAISHA (International

Trade Co., Ltd.) in Kishimoto

Building, MARUNOUCHI, till the

summer of 1954. ~~Then~~
later

I operated a ship-chandlery ~~firm~~

named FUZAN SHOKAI (Pusan

Company) at MOTO Machi, KOBE,

together with my friend(s). As

the business did not go

the matter over and promised to meet
 him again at the same place
 about 1400 hours on the 27th
 to give him my reply.

On the 27th, I went there
 at the appointed hour and agreed
 to comply with
~~accepted~~ his request;

9. Though I accepted his
 request that day, ~~the~~ KANEIDA
 had to prepare an identification
 card and MPC's necessary to

TRANSLATION WORK SHEET	PAGE NO.	REPORT NR. 91454
About the 25th or 26th of		
last month, I met of Korean		
acquaintance by the name of		
KANEDA (金田) at ^{the} coffee shop		
EWAN* (A-1), SHINJUKU, when he		
asked a favor of me, saying, "As you		
can enter a base PX, purchase		
a set of golf clubs from		
there for me. I will give		
you a commission." Then		
I asked for us time to think		

2500 MIG FORM 30 NOV 55 154

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that was forged. This took place
toward the end of the month

10. I received the

identification card and MPC's

at ^(A-1) ~~the~~ coffee-shop EWAN*, SHINJUKU,

about 1400 hours on 10 July.

KANEDA asked me to go to the PX

and buy a suitable set of

golf clubs ~~as~~ "a set of golf
with ~~has~~ good resale values."

~~clubs ~~can be resold with ample~~~~

~~for sale~~ The amount of

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TRANSLATION WORK SHEET	PAGE NO.	REPORT NR. 91454
make the purchase.		
I thus was promised		
on 27 June to make the		
purchase for him, but as a		
photograph was necessary, too,		
I had my best photograph		
taken in the basement of the		
Odeon Theater, SHINJUKU, with a		
the camera which KANEDA had		
brought. It was graph		
used on the identification card		

14500 MIG FORM 30 NOV 55 154

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I turned the remaining 12
 over
 dollars to the US Forces
 investigator.

12. Items seized by the
 US Forces investigator are:

(1) 12 dollars in MPC's.

(2) A set of golf clubs.

(3) An identification card.

(4) A sales ticket.

13. I was aware that my
 act was illegal. But ~~as I was~~

TRANSLATION WORK SHEET

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91454

MPC's handed to me then was
160 dollars. He told me to
make the purchase on the 12th.

11. I bought the article
at the Yokota Base PX about
1430 hours yesterday.

I was arrested by an investigator
~~officer~~ of the US Forces when
I had just bought the article
and paid for it. I bought this
set of golf clubs for 152 dollars.

16 500 MIG FORM 30 NOV 55 154

16

Declassified Case: NW# 64284
Date: 05-13-2022

came to JAPAN from KOREA

as a war correspondent, and

At that time, I thought that

an alien registration certificate

was unnecessary because of my

work, which was connected

with the military forces. After I

~~After I had ceased to work~~
quit working for

~~with~~ the military forces, I realized

~~felt~~ the need for registering

as an alien and intended to

TRANSLATION WORK SHEET

PAGE NO.

REPORT NO.

91454

true and correct. I beseech
your leniency.

deponent: KIM Chang Chin

The foregoing transcription
was read to the deponent
who found it to be true
and correct and whereupon
affixed his hand thereto.

Same day as above

ITO Shunichi (伊藤後一)

Police constable,

22 500 MIG 30 FORM NOV 55 154

22

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Date: 05-13-2022

TRANSLATION WORK SHEET

PAGE NO.

REPORT NR.

91454

MPC's handed to me when was
160 dollars. He told me to
make the purchase on the 12th.

11. I bought the article
at the Yokota Base PX about
1430 hours yesterday.

I was arrested by an investigator
~~officer~~ of the US Forces when
I had just bought the article
and paid for it. I bought this
set of golf clubs for 152 dollars.

16 500 MIG FORM 154
30 NOV 55

16

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TRANSLATION WORK SHEET	PAGE NO.	REPORT NR. 91454
I wanted		
money for money and that I was		
complying with the Director's		
that been requesting of someone		
This is why		
I committed the ^{an} act which		
I knew was ^{to be} illegal		
the reason why		
14. I will now state about ^{the} fact		
that was the fact		
that I did not have an		
alien registration certificate		
in my possession		
when I was arrested yesterday.		
As I have mentioned already,		
I travelled by plane when I		

500 MIG FORM 30 NOV 55 154

18

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the procedures, ^{These procedures} ~~which~~ have
 finally been put off till
 the present time.

Therefore, I have never
 obtained an alien registration
 certificate.

I wish to take this
 opportunity to ^{have everything cleared up} ~~settle everything~~
 as I want to ^{reside} ~~stay long~~ in
 JAPAN, ~~in the future~~.

My above statement is

51c

TRANSLATION WORK SHEET

PAGE NO.

REPORT NR.

91454

take steps for registration

in JAPAN by having my military

supervisor certify that I

had not entered the country

~~I was not an illegal~~

illegally. Since, however, this

supervisor ~~is~~ had been

transferred elsewhere and could

~~in the absence of the person~~

~~who had supervised me at the~~

not be contacted. headway

~~time~~ I could not make in

20500 MIG FORM 154
30 NOV 55

20

Declassified Case: NW# 64284
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Judicial police officer,

Tachikawa Police Station

The above is a certified

copy.


Same day as above.

MORI Masaji (森正治) (seal)

Police constable,

Judicial police officer,

Tachikawa Police Station



Declassified Case: NW# 64284
Date: 05-13-2022

Declassified Case: NW# 64284 Date: 05-13-2022

A16-2/2-6-57

J

FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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COUNTRY	Rumania	REPORT NO.	[REDACTED]
SUBJECT	Prisons in Rumania	DATE DISTR.	15 July 1955
DATE OF INFO.	[REDACTED]	NO. OF PAGES	12
PLACE ACQUIRED	[REDACTED]	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
DATE ACQUIRED	[REDACTED]	REFERENCES	

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE:

[REDACTED]

The Ministry of the Interior Building

1. Newly arrested political prisoners are detained and interrogated in the cellar of the right wing of the Ministry of the Interior. When first brought into the Ministry and when taken to interrogations, prisoners are made to wear dark glasses. They are interrogated immediately before coming into contact with other prisoners.
2. In the cellar there are twenty 2.5 by 4 meter cells, twenty larger cells measuring 3.5 by 4.5 meters, and some small solitary cells for recalcitrant prisoners. In 1951 there were 100 prisoners held on political charges in the cellar of the Ministry building. There was no contact between the cells.
3. Five prison guards patrolled the corridor in seven hour shifts. Their rotation was supervised by a warrant officer or a second lieutenant. The patrol force consisted of one duty officer, with the remainder all army corporals or sergeants in Securitate uniforms.
4. Interrogations were conducted for several hours, day or night, over a several month period on the fourth floor of the Ministry building. Each prisoner had two interrogators who were dressed either in mufti or Securitate uniforms. In 1951 many confessions were extorted by force. Frequently prisoners were left alone for long periods of time prior to reinterrogation or transfer to other prisons.
5. The diet consisted of 300 grams of bread, a kind of porridge (terci, made of rice) and tea for breakfast, and soup and either potatoes or cabbage for lunch and dinner.
6. Letters and visitors were prohibited.

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(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#")

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The Malmaison Prison

7. The Malmaison prison is located on the Calea Plevnei, about two kilometers from the Bucharest side of the Podul Isvor bridge. The prison consists of two buildings, of which the second was completed in the fall of 1951. Opposite the prison there are apartment buildings and a photography shop, while on either side there are cottages and military barracks.
8. The older prison building, which faces Calea Plevnei, is a single storied edifice about 60 meters long. It has two rows of cells, numbered 1 - 49. Each cell accommodates two inmates in an area five meters square.
9. The second building, consisting of a half-basement and an upper story, houses 40 cells. The interrogation rooms, which are situated on the upper story, have double doors and are completely sound-proof.
10. In the older building two sentries patrolled the hall, while sentries were stationed at each end of the corridor. The sentry schedule was identical with that in the Ministry of Interior building. Guards always went in twos, unarmed, to cells to speak with or escort prisoners.
11. An electric light was kept on all night in the cells. After reveille at 6 a.m., prisoners were forbidden to sit or lay on their beds. They were escorted individually to the washrooms so that they never encountered other prisoners. The diet was identical with that in the Ministry building.
12. The cell doors of the new building were made of light, thin wood with simple locks that could have easily been broken. Above the doors there were large windows covered with chicken wire.
13. The inmates under guard were permitted to take short walks individually in the courtyard.
14. During 1952 all the Malmaison prisoners were held on political charges and were either undergoing interrogation or awaiting trial, although some had been tried in absentia. The original interrogators continued to examine the prisoners at Malmaison. No cases of torture were known in 1952.

The Jilava Prison

15. The prison near Jilava consists of an old round fort, called Reduite, and two one-story brick buildings. There are also two separate courtyards, containing a kitchen and some small sheds, which are surrounded by wooden fences.
16. During the winter of 1952-53 there were approximately 2,000 political prisoners at Jilava. Although some of them were war criminals, most of them were held there without trial or had been tried in absentia.
17. The two buildings had a total capacity of 640 inmates, with 20 in each of 32 cells. The cells, which measured approximately 5 by 5 meters, had two rows of double decker beds, a small water bucket, a washstand and a waste basket. The inmates under guard were taken for individual walks in the courtyard once a week or fortnight.
18. Guards counted the number of prisoners in each cell between six and seven a.m., while night counts were made between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m. Privileged

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prisoners brought the meals to the cells, without seeing the occupants.

19. Prison guards, who worked in two shifts, belonged to the Militia prior to January 1953, at which time they were made corporals in the Securitate.

The Ghencea Prison

20. The Ghencea prison, or Penitenciarul Rahovei, is about three kilometers from Bucharest on the Alexandria road past the Calea Rahovei. Ten large barracks, accommodating 200 to 250 men each, and six to eight barracks for women constitute the prison compound, which is surrounded by a wooden fence with observation towers. The administration barracks are located in a barbed wire enclosure outside the fence.
21. In 1953 Ghencea was extremely crowded, mostly with common criminals and undesirable elements. From March 1953 political prisoners held there were transferred elsewhere.
22. The meager diet of the Ghencea inmates consisted of 250 grams of bread, some coffee, soup and a small quantity of corn daily.

Capul Midia Labor Camp

23. In 1952-1953 Capul Midia labor camp was crowded with political prisoners working on the Danube-Black Sea canal. During this winter many prisoners died as a result of malnutrition, overwork and poor living conditions.
24. Lt. Major Liviu Borcea, a sadist who beat prisoners, directed the camp. Prisoners who worked on the canal project were treated in an especially sadistic manner until an early 1953 investigation of the situation entailed the dismissal of several guards and commandants.
25. In April 1953, all foreigners, numbering about 50, working on the canal were required to register and were subsequently transferred to Margineni prison. Among the seven or eight foreign nationals held at Capul Midia were the following:
- a. Ulmeanu (fnu) was a Yugoslav from the Banat who had worked for the Rumanians during the war, and had become an army officer and a Party member.
 - b. Liubomir Grigorovici was serving a two-year extended sentence for not having denounced his father, the head of the Yugoslav colony in Bucharest.
 - c. Nicola Medici, an official of the Yugoslav Legation in Bucharest, was promised that if he gave information on others he would be released. An informer for the camp authorities, he was nevertheless, serving a three year extended sentence.
 - d. Serbu (fnu) was a former legionnaire who had escaped to Poland in 1944 and received Polish citizenship. He was subsequently extradited and served a five year administrative sentence. He escaped from Margineni.

Margineni Prison

26. The Margineni prison, located about twenty kilometers west of Floesti, is about two kilometers from the railroad station of Ion Luca Caragiale (Margineni). The prison compound comprises a number of buildings and sheds

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Date: 05-13-2022~~SECRET~~
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housing the carpentry shops and timber storage areas. It is surrounded by a brick wall about 2.5 meters high, topped with barbed wire and with observation towers situated every 30 or 40 meters. There is a searchlight in each tower, and the tower sentries are armed with rifles or submachine guns.

27. Superficial searches were effected daily in the cells, usually after the prisoners had left for work.
28. Although cigarettes, fish, fruits and some clothing were available at free market prices in the canteen, inmates on good behavior could also receive monthly gift parcels to a five kilogram maximum weight and parcels brought by relatives on their monthly visits. Prisoners were separated from visitors by a guard.
29. With the exception of the aged, the sick and the privileged, most of the prisoners worked in the various carpentry shops, which during 1953 produced thousands of ammunition boxes, green ammunition cupboards and various pieces of furniture. Inmates helped to transfer the products to trucks for transport to the Margineni railroad station. Inmates who fulfilled their norms received an average monthly wage of 400 lei, of which from fifteen to thirty percent was deposited to a savings account for payment upon their release.
30. In 1953 there were approximately 1,200 to 1,300 prisoners at Margineni, who, with the exception of 200 to 250 foreign prisoners, were Rumanian political offenders. Of the foreign prisoners, fifty were held in isolated cells serving long sentences, and 100 to 150 were in communal cells and worked in the carpentry shops. Some 50 of them were housed with the criminals until 1953 when they were segregated.
31. The following are the legends for the attached sketches of the detention rooms in the Ministry of the Interior, and Malmaison, Jilava and Margineni prisons:

a. Sketch No. 1: The detention rooms in the building of the Ministry of the Interior.

1. Str. Academiei
2. Corridors
3. Prisoners' cells
4. Prisoners' cells
5. Washrooms.
6. Toilets
7. Hall
8. Offices
9. Elevator
10. Showers
11. Staircase

The Ministry building

12. Str. Academiei
13. Detention rooms: (figures 1 - 11)
14. Open area
15. Str. Wilson

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Prisoners' cells (figure 3 above)

16. Bed
17. Table and chairs
18. Cell door

Prisoners' cells (figure 4 above)

19. Beds
20. Table and chairs
21. Washroom and toilets
22. Cell door

b. Sketch No. 2: The Malmaison Prison

1. Villa, with castle-like towers
2. Direction of Isvor bridge
3. Galea Flevnei
4. Apartment houses
5. Photography shop
6. Entrance to prison
7. Entrance gate to courtyard

Prison building "A" (facing the street):

8. Showers
9. Toilets
10. Corridors
11. Exit to courtyard
12. Prison cells
13. Offices
14. Exits to courtyard
15. Courtyard

Prison building "B"

16. Prison cells
17. Corridors
18. Showers and toilets
19. Staircase
20. Staircase and offices
21. Military barracks

c. Sketch No. 3: The Jilava Prison

1. Cell No. 32 (for women)
2. Cell No. 31 (for women)
3. Cell No. 30 (for women)
4. Cells for male prisoners
5. Closed corridor
6. Corridor
7. Entrance to prison buildings
8. Enclosed prisoners' courtyard
9. Kitchen and services
10. The "Reduite" fort (prisoners' cells)
11. Showers

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d. Sketch No. 4: The Margineni Prison

1. Road to Margineni railroad station
2. Main entrance to prison area
3. Prison administration building
4. Timber storage shed
5. Guard post
6. Entrance to inner prison area
7. Workshops for wood polishing
8. Visitor's room
9. Packing and dispatch department
10. Workshops for wood polishing
11. Shops for tinsmith and production of wooden barrels
12. Shops for tinsmith and production of wooden barrels
13. Prison courtyard
14. Carpentry shops
15. Prison building
16. Inner courtyard for political prisoners
17. Mechanics' shops
18. Mechanics' shops
19. Carpentry shops (production of glues)
20. Toilets
21. Storage area for semi-finished carpentry products
22. Bakery
23. Carpentry shops where political prisoners work
24. Carpentry shop
25. Carpentry shop
- 26, 27, and 28. Main production halls of the carpentry section
29. Outer courtyard, with sheds and open-air timber storage.

e. Sketch No. 5: The Margineni Prison

Ground floor

1. Hall
2. Entrance gate
3. Staircase
4. Cells of political prisoners
5. Corridors
6. Kitchen exit
7. Kitchen
8. Mess hall
9. Isolation cell
10. Washrooms and dispensary
11. Washrooms and dispensary
12. Washrooms and dispensary
13. Prisoners' cells
14. Toilets
15. Prisoners' cells
16. Prisoners' cells

First floor


17. Cell No. 8
18. Cell No. 7
19. Cell No. 6
20. Cell No. 5
21. Staircase
22. Cell No. 11
23. Cell No. 4
24. Cell No. 3
25. Cell No. 2
26. Cell No. 1

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Sketch No. 1: Detention rooms in the building of the Ministry of the Interior




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Sketch No. 2: The Malmaison Prison



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
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Sketch No. 4: The Margineni Prison




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Sketch No. 3: The Jilava Prison



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
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Sketch No. 5: The Margineni Prison

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


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COUNTRY	Bulgaria	REPORT NO.	[REDACTED]
SUBJECT	The Central Prison in Sofia	DATE DISTR.	28 March 1955
DATE OF INFO.	[REDACTED]	NO. OF PAGES	2
PLACE ACQUIRED	[REDACTED]	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
DATE ACQUIRED		REFERENCES	

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE:

[REDACTED]

1. The Central Prison in Sofia is divided into ten wards, eight in the main building and two in a nearby former church. [REDACTED] there were approximately 2,500 inmates, the very great majority of them imprisoned for such offenses as embezzlement, bribery, forgery, and fraud.
2. Each ward, with the exception of Ward 2, has from 200 to 300 inmates, who are kept in 2 x 4 meter cells. Ward 2, reserved for new arrivals, consists of only one large cell. Prisoners, particularly political prisoners, receive beds in some wards, while the remaining wards have two-tiered, wooden bunks which afford each inmate approximately 60 centimeters of space. However, inmates of Ward 2 must sleep on the floor.
3. Prisoners are taken out for two walks daily, from 10:00 to 11:30 a.m. and from 3:00 to 4:30 p.m. Behavior of the guards is not considered objectionable, and no cases of physical pressure are known.
4. Food is not sufficient. Men receive a bean soup twice daily, about 100 grams of meat three times a week, 40 grams of marmelade weekly, and 40 grams of cottage cheese every two weeks.
5. Prisoners who are permitted to work receive such privileges as larger food rations, payment for output exceeding the norm, and reduction of the prison sentence by three days for every two days' work. The norm for a working prisoner is 25 percent higher than that for a free worker. A non-working prisoner is allowed to receive up to three kilograms of foodstuffs and three kilograms of fruit monthly from the outside, and a working prisoner is allowed to receive up to 10 kilograms of foodstuffs per month.
6. [REDACTED] the authorities began to send prisoners for work in industrial plants. Camps are being built near the plants, and the number of inmates in the Central Prison is decreasing.

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
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All the camps [redacted] in the fifth area had log cabin buildings. They had been used previously as slave-labor camps, and all were in very poor condition when my battalion, No 25, arrived. Mud had fallen out of the chinks, and the first winter [redacted] there (1945-1946) [redacted] spare time was spent filling the holes and plastering the inside of the buildings. This clean-up and repair work was compulsory but we were not allowed to do it during our regular work day. The prisoners were glad to do this work in their spare time, however, which was only at night, because it made the buildings so much warmer and easier to keep clean. The second year (1946) [redacted] ordered to plaster the outside of the log cabins and to calcimine them white, which gave the appearance of white stucco buildings. Because of the great length of the winter, the white buildings were well camouflaged most of the year. By the end of 1946 most of the renovation of the camps was completed.

The first camp [redacted] was No 5/101 (October 1945) located at Dohf /Dofu - Japanese phonetic spelling [redacted]

[redacted] it was obvious that the camp had been recently occupied as there was fresh garbage and other evidence on the premises. [redacted] extremely crowded and in early 1946 an additional 200 PW's were brought in making [redacted] quarters almost unbearable. [redacted] this was only temporary and after approximately 30 days [redacted] moved to another camp approximately one mile west. This camp, No 5/111, [redacted] accommodated a few more but it was still very much overcrowded. After just completing the renovation of camp 5/101, [redacted] had to start renovation of camp 5/111, which was even in worse condition. [redacted] camp 5/101 was to be used as a technical school for the maintenance and operation of motors and vehicles. Vehicles and other equipment were being moved into the camp and the corridor between the two wire fences was being used as a run-way for testing vehicles. [redacted] this technical school was training Soviet "heavy" convicts (long-time hardened criminals).

[redacted] (This camp was located five miles north of camp 5/101. It was the same size and the same structure as the others. In the vicinity of this camp was a large "Sovkhoz", a government-owned farm. Approximately 300 prisoners [redacted] worked on this farm. These prisoners most willing to accept Communism were those chosen to work on the farm. Many of the prisoners said they would accept Communism in order to work there as farm work was much more pleasant than railroading and logging.

[redacted] camp 5/202 situated near Hormoli (Khurmuli). While on the move to Hormoli [redacted] there were five or six camps between 5/102 and 5/202, which were all similar to the others [redacted] seen. The buildings at camp 5/202 were slightly smaller than those at the other camps, but 200 men still occupied each building. The camp was on the northern outskirts of Hormoli and was well secluded in the foothills of the mountains. Hormoli is situated in the foothills of a mountain range which extended north of the city. Because the hills serve as an excellent camouflage, the food distribution center at Dohf, as well as the NKVD headquarters, were moved to Hormoli.

The BAM/Raikal-Amur Magistral Railroad ran northwest from Hormoli to Gorin. Along this route [redacted] camps every 10 or 12 miles. My camp number at Gorin was 5/402. Approximately 12 miles northwest of Gorin was another camp, near the little town of Ebarin, which was numbered 5/407. [redacted]

[redacted] only a short distance away the

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FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECURITY INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECURITY INFORMATION

FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(f)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods CIA

Railroad turned due west toward Lake Balkal to tie in with the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

2.

At each camp, two squads of soldiers, totalling about 30 men, one officer, sometimes two, and two to four non-commissioned officers were detailed as guards. They were armed with rifles and fixed bayonets. When we moved from a camp, riflemen were at the head and rear of the column, and the guards on the sides of the columns carried Burp guns. The Soviet officer in charge of the camp lived nearby. After the first year, some of these officers were replaced by civilians. In 1946, [redacted] these officers received their orders daily, and [redacted] they knew no more about future plans than the daily orders disclosed. These daily orders were placed in a metal tube and dropped from a plane.

[redacted] a political agent was attached to the camp. [redacted] these agents were from Moscow and the agent was usually a Soviet officer. He was greatly respected and feared by all the security personnel.

3.

Even though a battalion of one thousand men was assigned to each camp, the approximate capacity of all the camps was 300. They were, of course, always overcrowded, which resulted in a great deal of discomfort for the prisoners. Occasionally, additional small groups were sent to a camp, but this was usually only temporary. Also, deaths resulting from freezing, malnutrition, and a lack of medical care sometimes brought the number of prisoners down to the usual size group.

4.

Water supply was the greatest problem, particularly during the winter months. The water was hauled in by hand and in the winter it was necessary to chop through several feet of ice.

[redacted] would go many months without a bath and during the winter [redacted] never get enough water for laundry purposes.

One "doctor" was assigned to each camp. Some were good, but some were very incompetent and brutal. About one-half of the "doctors" were Soviet women. These women were often merciless and treated the prisoners more severely than did the men "doctors." In 1948 medical attention improved considerably. More "doctors" were assigned to each camp, and they seemed to be better qualified.

Sanitation was appalling, particularly the first winter (1945 and 1946). This was by far the worst winter for the prisoners, [redacted] did not have adequate clothing. No clothes were issued to [redacted] whatsoever; [redacted] only the garments [redacted] possessed when captured. Also, there was a shortage of food the first winter, as much of the food assigned to the prisoners was stolen by the Soviet guards. They divided it between themselves and Soviet civilians inasmuch as they did not have enough food for themselves. The standard ration consisted of 350 grams of black bread, 400 grams of cereal, 25 grams of fish, 12 grams of sugar, 300 grams of vegetable (almost always potatoes) and five grams of oil. This ration never varied throughout my entire five years imprisonment. [redacted] rarely received any sugar and did not always receive the oil. About three times a year meat was given in place of fish. Until the last couple of years, [redacted] never received the full ration of the other items, and only occasionally did we receive full quantities in the last two years. The food also improved somewhat in quality.

Declassified Case: NW# 64284 Date: 05-16-2022

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FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(f)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods CIA

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The first six to ten months of my imprisonment, the prisoners were treated very cruelly; but in mid-1946 there was a slight change for the better, and by 1947 there was quite a definite change. The food improved, somewhat better clothing was provided, and recreation was introduced. There was a great deal of discrimination shown between those who accepted Communism and those who remained reactionists, however. A limited number of musical instruments were available, and costumes and other paraphernalia was furnished, sparingly, for plays and shows. The camp political agent supervised the entertainment given by the prisoners. These improvements were, of course, well synchronized with the political indoctrination program.

- end -

FOIA(b)(1) CIA
FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods CIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECURITY INFORMATION

Declassified Case: NW= 64284 Date: 05-16-2011

FOIA(b)(1)
FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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~~SECRET~~
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY	Bulgaria	REPORT NO.	[REDACTED]
SUBJECT	The Central Prison in Sofia	DATE DISTR.	28 March 1955
DATE OF INFO.	[REDACTED]	NO. OF PAGES	2
PLACE ACQUIRED	[REDACTED]	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
DATE ACQUIRED		REFERENCES	

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE:

[REDACTED]

1. The Central Prison in Sofia is divided into ten wards, eight in the main building and two in a nearby former church. [REDACTED] there were approximately 2,500 inmates, the very great majority of them imprisoned for such offenses as embezzlement, bribery, forgery, and fraud.
2. Each ward, with the exception of Ward 2, has from 200 to 300 inmates, who are kept in 2 x 4 meter cells. Ward 2, reserved for new arrivals, consists of only one large cell. Prisoners, particularly political prisoners, receive beds in some wards, while the remaining wards have two-tiered, wooden bunks which afford each inmate approximately 60 centimeters of space. However, inmates of Ward 2 must sleep on the floor.
3. Prisoners are taken out for two walks daily, from 10:00 to 11:30 a.m. and from 3:00 to 4:30 p.m. Behavior of the guards is not considered objectionable, and no cases of physical pressure are known.
4. Food is not sufficient. Men receive a bean soup twice daily, about 100 grams of meat three times a week, 40 grams of marmelade weekly, and 40 grams of cottage cheese every two weeks.
5. Prisoners who are permitted to work receive such privileges as larger food rations, payment for output exceeding the norm, and reduction of the prison sentence by three days for every two days' work. The norm for a working prisoner is 25 percent higher than that for a free worker. A non-working prisoner is allowed to receive up to three kilograms of foodstuffs and three kilograms of fruit monthly from the outside, and a working prisoner is allowed to receive up to 10 kilograms of foodstuffs per month.
6. [REDACTED] the authorities began to send prisoners for work in industrial plants. Camps are being built near the plants, and the number of inmates in the Central Prison is decreasing.

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods


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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

Declassified Case: NW# 64284
Date: 05-13-2012

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NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL
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FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods

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Declassified Case: NW# 64284 Date: 05-16-2022

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

[Redacted]

File A/6-2/26.279

JOURNAL NO. # 3014 II

REPORT NO. [Redacted]

COUNTRY USSR

SUBJECT Evacuation of CP and Prison Records from the Kaliningrad Oblast to Moscow

PLACE ACQUIRED (BY SOURCE) [Redacted]

DATE ACQUIRED (BY SOURCE) [Redacted]

DATE (OF INFO.) [Redacted]

RESPONSIVE TO	
1	2
CD NO.	
OO/C NO.	
ORG NO.	
OAS NO.	
OCI NO.	

DATE DISTR. 31 Mar 1953

NO. OF PAGES 1

NO. OF ENCLS.

SUPP. TO REPORT NO.

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE [Redacted]

1. "Two high Communist Party officials, who arrived in Kaliningrad (Koenigsberg) at the end of December 1952 from Moscow have been engaged since early January 1953 in selecting and sending to Moscow various important documents and archives pertaining to activities in the Kaliningrad Oblast. The orders for this operation were top secret, but since the work of the two officials affected not only head offices of the Party in Kaliningrad, but also branch offices in Sovetsk (Tilsit), Chernyakhovsk (Insterburg) and Baltiisk (Pillau), the whole story soon blew open. As of early February it was known and commented upon throughout the Kaliningrad Oblast as an unusual measure.
2. "Prison archives from the central MVD prison in Kaliningrad and from district (Rayon) prisons, are all being evacuated to Moscow. They pertain to the years 1945-1952 and contain data on the mass deportations of Germans from this part of East Prussia and the resettlement of Russians in the present Kaliningrad Oblast.
3. "Old German documents pertaining to statistics and mortgages are also being evacuated to Moscow."

- end -

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RETURN ON REPORT DESTRUCTION NO.
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FEB 1952 31-4AA

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SECURITY INFORMATION

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

CD NO.

DATE DISTR. 17 Feb 1953

NO. OF PAGES 2

NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

COUNTRY

Bulgaria

SUBJECT

1. The Plovdiv Departmental Prison
2. The Pazardzhik Prison

DATE OF INFO.

Prior to May 1952

PLACE ACQUIRED

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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SOURCE

[REDACTED]

The Plovdiv Departmental Prison

1. In January 1952 there were approximately 700 political prisoners in the Plovdiv Departmental Prison. At the same time there were also approximately 400 criminal prisoners.
2. As of January 1952 a certain First Lieutenant Boyadzhiev, age 40, and a certain First Lieutenant "Bai Kiro", age 45, were the assistant directors of the prison.
3. The following men were inmates of the political section of the Plovdiv Departmental Prison in January 1952, and were transferred to the Pazardzhik Prison in May 1952:
 - a. Emin Karayabukov, age 50, from Mogilitsa, Smolyan Okoliya; he was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for anti-Communist activity;
 - b. Psycho Slavov Peychev, age 36, from Varna Okoliya; a State Security employee before September 1944, he was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment for anti-Communist activity; he should be released during the autumn of 1952 (sic);
 - c. ex-lieutenant Colonel Stefan Georgiev Stefanov, age 48, from Kazanluk; he was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1946 for anti-Communist activities; and
 - d. Petko Tavelkov Toshev, age 45, from Podgore, Vidin Okoliya; a forest guard who was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment for anti-Communist activity.

Declassified Case: NW# 64284 Date: 05-16-2022

CLASSIFICATION

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Declassified Case: NW# 64284
Date: 05-16-2012

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-2-



The Pazardzhik Prison

4. There were approximately 900 prisoners in the Pazardzhik Prison in May 1952. The prison is two kilometers north of Pazardzhik. It is a 2-story building approximately 65 by 15 meters and has a single-story wing which is approximately 35 by 20 meters.
5. The following men were inmates of the Pazardzhik political prison in May 1952:
 - a. Nayden Fortunov, age 47, from Mrachenik, Karlovo Okoliya; a farmer who was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment;
 - b. Georgi Gavazov, a partisan who is kept in solitary confinement ("Zad Zavesata", Behind the Curtain); and
 - c. Lieutenant Colonel Kostov, age 52, from the Botevgrad area, the former commanding officer of troops in Ruse who was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment in 1945.

FOIA(b)(1) CIA

FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods CIA

~~SECRET~~

Declassified Case: NW# 64284 Date: 05-16-2022

CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/SECURITY INFORMATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. [Redacted]

COUNTRY: China

CD NO.

DATE DISTR. 19 Feb 53

SUBJECT: Communist Prison Conditions

PLEASE RETURN
To OP 322H1

NO. OF PAGES 2

PLACE ACQUIRED

File 916-2/52.27

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE [Redacted]

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SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

DATE OF INFORMATION [Redacted]

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE [Redacted]

1. "More than a year ago the [Redacted] priest applied for an exit visa and obtained it. He set out from his mission to come to Hong Kong. All went well until he came to Shanghai. He was carrying some personal letters which he insisted on carrying with him. When these were examined in Shanghai it was found that he had made some anti-Communist annotations on the margins of the letters so he was detained, put into prison and has remained in prison ever since. He was detained in the first prison, which was a comparatively mild one, for about a month. Then he was changed to another prison, known as the 'Loo-Ka-Wei' where the regime was pretty tough. After a few months he became so ill that he had to be removed to a hospital and remained there from two to three months. When the Communists considered that he was well enough he was transferred back to Loo-Ka-Wei prison again. In all he spent 13-1/2 months in prison. He was released, or rather formally expelled, on 15 Dec 52 and got to Hong Kong some days later. Perhaps the Communists released him because they feared he would die on their hands. He is suffering from a large running abscess stretching from his ear to his chin, which is supposed to be infected glands.
2. [Redacted] during his stay in Loo-Ka-Wei prison, the Communists decided to remove him to still another prison. This was in [Redacted]. He was put on a truck with a number of other prisoners, and on the journey from Loo-Ka-Wei prison to this new one he discovered that a priest of our order was on the truck. They were able to mutter only a few words to each other, but they gave each other absolution and he gathered from what our man said that he had been all along in the Loo-Ka-Wei prison. When they arrived they were separated again, but they spent only one night in this prison and were taken away next day to another prison, known as the 'Chi-Lan-Chiao, Ren Men Faw-Yuen-Chin-Yeu'. It is a big improvement on the first prison, Loo-Ka-Wei, in which our priest was incarcerated.

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State	X	Navy	X	Dept	X	DISTRIBUTION													
Army	X	Air	X	FBI	X														

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In it there was a group of from 10 to 20 confined in one room. They had to sit on the floor all day and meditate. The food was bad and insufficient and very few vegetables. No talking was allowed. If anyone was found talking he was severely punished. In spite of this, our priest succeeded in instructing and baptizing two fellow prisoners. In the present prison each prisoner has his own cell, and it seems that he can do much as he pleases in his cell. They have also regular exercise, under supervision. During these exercises both priests were able to see each other often. They were not allowed to speak, of course, but they were able to pass letters (already prepared) to each other without attracting the notice of the guards. In this way they kept in constant touch with each other. There was also a trusty there who helped them to exchange letters on a number of occasions. In all, from 15 to 20 letters were received by each. Naturally they had not much news to communicate and so they often resorted to writing some of the Breviary hymns, especially when entrusting the letter to the 'trusty'. In one of our priests' last letters he wrote the Legion hymn with the remark, 'You see, they have not yet converted me.'

- 3. [redacted] father was not tortured in any of the prisons and [redacted] as far as he could gather [redacted] he was not tortured either. [redacted] no one was tortured in the Chi-Lan-Chiao prison. In the Loo-Ka-Wei prison they brought our priest to judgement and tried to force a confession of guilt from him a number of times, but not in the Chi-Lan-Chiao. [redacted] the food in the Chi-Lan-Chiao is quite good, with sufficient bread, a good supply of rice and vegetables, and a little meat and eggs twice a week. [redacted] our man seems to be in the best of spirits. He is not fat, but neither is he very thin. He always looks cheerful and happy and continues the work of the Apostolate. He is at present writing short copies of the Gospel story and distributing them amongst the other prisoners, some Catholic Chinese, some Japanese and some Philipinos. He does feel the cold though. He asked permission to write to one of our missionary priests still in Shanghai for clothes on several occasions, but was refused. However, shortly before the [redacted] priest was expelled, our man did receive permission to write, but whether the letter reached its addressee or not we do not know. Suddenly at midday [redacted] the guards came in and ordered [redacted] to get ready, that he had been expelled from China. He had seen our man that morning as usual at exercise and he feels that the fact that our priest has been removed to a better prison indicates that the worst is over and that he may be released soon. But, of course, we cannot be sure that that conclusion is correct."

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FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods CIA

end

They have both been in that prison ever since.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Declassified Case: NW# 64284
Date: 05-16-2022

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

CD NO. [REDACTED]

COUNTRY USSR

DATE DISTR. 4 MAR 1953

SUBJECT Slaves Labor and Prisoner of War Camps in the Artemovsk Area

NO. OF PAGES 2

PLACE ACQUIRED [REDACTED]

PLEASE RETURN
To OP 322H1

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE [REDACTED]

File A/6-2/26.279

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

DATE OF INFORMATION [REDACTED]

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SOURCE [REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED] USSR Camp 1004 [REDACTED] was located 20 miles south of Artemovsk, a town south of Kharkov. Camp 1004 held approximately 12 hundred ethnic Germans, about 500 men and 700 women, from Hungary, Yugoslavia and Rumania. In November 1949 all of these individuals were released. [REDACTED] Grotzwohl, the premier of East Germany, had petitioned Stalin to free Germans held by Soviet authorities for their return to East Germany.
2. In addition [REDACTED] there were three other slave labor camps in the vicinity. Our actual location was in the town of Uzna (phonetic) [REDACTED] A prisoner of war camp for Japanese soldiers was located [REDACTED] This camp was occupied by Japanese for about six months during the winter of 1946 - 1947, [REDACTED] there were about 600 Japanese confined there in one large building. [REDACTED] the Japanese were working in a central warehouse located at Tschasovyar, a town eight miles away. I do not know where the Japanese were sent from this camp when it was closed.
3. In addition to our camp and the Japanese camp there were also a German prisoner of war camp and a camp for ethnic Germans from the Transylvania district of Rumania. [REDACTED] there were 12 hundred prisoners of war in the German camp, all former soldiers, and about 900 civilians, men, women and children, in the Rumanian camp. The German prisoners of war left their camp around September 1949 and, [REDACTED] were returned to East Germany. The Rumanians were returned to East Germany along with the people from our camp in November 1949 and both the German prisoner of war and the Rumanian camps were then closed.
4. Our food was based principally on borsch and black bread which contained a considerable amount of sawdust. On rare occasions [REDACTED] some food from the US although very little was ever distributed. This food included oleomargarine, lard, powdered eggs, powdered milk, flour and peanut butter. The Soviet citizens were able to buy food in stores in the nearby villages, including US food. All food was rationed and one was required to have a ration card.

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ARMY	X	State	EV	X	FBI	X			

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5. During the time [redacted] the people [redacted] worked principally in clay quarries while the Rumanians were employed at brick factories (zavods) in making bricks. The name of our particular clay quarry was "Red October". Other quarries in the vicinity were known as "Yugostal", Ljevanovski and one other, [redacted] where prisoners of war were employed. The clay was loaded onto open top railroad wagons and shipped to smelter ovens and [redacted] the clay contained a certain amount of iron and aluminum.
6. The railroad tracks from the quarries were wide gauge and the wagons appeared similar to US gondola cars. Large, coal-burning, steam locomotives were used to haul these trains. There were a number of trucks in and around the quarries which were similar to the two and one-half ton trucks [redacted] the US Army use. [redacted] one personal auto in the whole time I was in the camp. It was a car of Soviet make and was used by Paul Mihailovitch Kitorov, the quarry director.
7. Coal mines were located about 30 miles from our camp. [redacted] near Stalino. [redacted] mostly women were employed in the mines and that they had to climb down either 165 or 265 steps on ladders to where they worked. [redacted] the mines were frequently flooded.
8. All of the camps had guards. [redacted] consisted of three large barrack buildings, one for men and two for women. Very seldom were any escapes made or attempted. [redacted] one case [redacted] in which two youths [redacted] had sold their clothes from home for money and then bribed a truck driver [redacted] they had successfully escaped to Rumania.
9. [redacted] The older people who had lived under the Czars and had known private ownership of land and churches were very unhappy under the Communist regime. Some expressed hope that the US would come and release them. A number of the free Soviet workers had been sent to our area without their families. One older man [redacted] had his family at Sevastopol and he received leave once a year to visit them.
10. The Soviet quarry workers resided at Tschasovyar in long two-story buildings. The first floor contained the common kitchen for all residents, a dining hall and a store. The residents lived on the second floor with from eight to 10 boys per room while the same number of girls would live in other rooms. The young girls were taught and worked at all types of trades, such as electricians, welders, etcetera. One girl [redacted] was an engineer on one of the small quarry locomotives. There were numerous female guards everywhere protecting supplies, coal dumps and store rooms. These guards did not wear any one type of uniform but were trained together in marching and drilling.
11. [redacted] an attempt was made to teach us Soviet history and indoctrinate us in Communism although none of the inmates were interested. We did not encounter any anti-US propaganda [redacted] We had no newspapers and the only radio was one in the town square of Uzna which had a loud speaker on a pole giving forth propaganda constantly.

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FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods CIA~~CONFIDENTIAL/SECURITY INFORMATION~~

Declassified Case: NW-64284 Date:
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FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods CIA

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- neatly raked so that any footprints would show up if these strips were walked on. There were towers on the corners with guards in them at all times. These guards were armed with rifles and submachine guns. Floodlights were kept on all night and spotlights were available on each tower if needed. The guards, all MVD men, kept a group of bloodhounds handy, but these were never used. These security precautions were never tested, however, as no escapes were attempted [redacted]
5. The treatment of German prisoners deteriorated soon after World War II when the Soviet Army troops were replaced as guards by MVD men. At all camps the MVD guards, who were rumored to have had some "special training," would yell [redacted] constantly and push, kick or hit [redacted] when [redacted] compliance was not satisfactory.
 6. While I was at Minsk there was some beating of prisoners going on and some of the Wehrmacht officers organized their groups for a hunger strike. This strike was surprisingly successful. It seems that it was necessary for the camp commandant to report the strike. High ranking political officials came to the camp and asked our officer spokesman about the trouble. After evidence of the beatings was shown the officials left and soon the beatings stopped altogether. The success of the strike may have been due to the fact that repatriation was under way at the time, although the high officials at Minsk actually did seem interested in keeping up the appearance that we were well cared for.
 7. One time in the Fall of 1949 a high official of some health and sanitation office was making an inspection trip. For his benefit [redacted] issued clean white bed sheets. These were put on our beds for the inspection and a half hour later [redacted] had to turn them back to the guards. Another such instance occurred in the mess hall when the German colonel, who was go-between for the Soviet guards and the prisoners, was singled out to pose for a brief sequence for a propaganda moving picture. In this shot he was seated at a table with a tray of food in front of him. The meal was a complete feast compared to our usual diet. He had a full course meal with two chops of meat on the plate. He was allowed to take one bite of the meat while the picture was being taken and the tray was immediately snatched away from him.
 8. The worst problem of the POW in the USSR was getting enough food. This, of course, was also true for Soviet civilians during the post-World War II period. Many prisoners died, directly or indirectly, of starvation and nutritional diseases were common. The mainstay [redacted] was cabbage soup, which was received twice a day along with 600 grams of "heavy bread." No fats were included in the diet.
 9. The saving factor was the fact that each prisoner was rationed 15 grams of tobacco and 200 grams of soap per week. It was significant that few prisoners were ever seen smoking. The tobacco could be better bartered for food. The barter trade in soap and cigarettes remained good. [redacted] Medicines of all kinds were also prime media of exchange when available. In each camp in Minsk captured German doctors were assigned to care for the prisoners. Their activities were directed by one Soviet doctor at each camp and he was in charge of disbursing all drugs and medicines used by the German doctors. Naturally, the German doctors obtained as much as possible and some of the medicines were "saved" and discretely entered into the barter trade. During the years 1946 and 1947 in the cities, and later in the rural areas, absolutely anything could be bartered with the Soviet civilians. The extent of their poverty cannot be exaggerated. Clothing was at a premium and all parts of our uniforms were good barter items.
 10. Political indoctrination of POW's gradually tapered off after 1947, probably due to poor results. During 1946 and 1947 weekly meetings were held in the camp. Political officers would tell of the glowing success of the Soviet Union and the invincibility of the Soviet Army. Holidays were also frequent and these days were given over to parades, propaganda movies and more meetings. Hardly any of the German POW's were won over although there was the usual small percentage who turned informer in order to gain small privileges or extra rations. Typical of these were the members of the anti-Fascist committees. These were formed soon after the war with innocent enough aims for the preservation of peace. Soon, however, their real purposes became known. They were set up to get the members of the "committee" to inform on their fellow prisoners who had been in the SS, or Abwehr, or who had been very ardent Nazis. These groups became quite unpopular after 1947 as their members were pressurized by fellow prisoners.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY USSR (Zakarpatskaya Oblast)
SUBJECT Crime in Zakarpatskaya Oblast

REPORT NO. [Redacted]
DATE DISTR. 1 Febr. 1954
NO. OF PAGES 4
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DATE OF INFO. [Redacted]
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THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE:

[Redacted Source Information]

2. Carpathian Oblast should read Zakarpatskaya Oblast throughout the report.

[Redacted Source Information]

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REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

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DATE DISTR. 18 Dec. 1953

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SOURCE

[REDACTED]

1. Before World War II, under Czechoslovak rule, there was no prison in Mukachevo. People from the Mukachevo region who had been sentenced to prison terms were sent to prison in Uzhgorod [N 48-38, E 22-197]; they were few. When Soviet succeeded Czechoslovak control of the area, the number of persons sentenced to prison terms in the Mukachevo region increased to such an extent that there was a need to set up a special prison in Mukachevo. For this purpose the old Czechoslovak Army barracks on the western outskirts of the city was taken over as a prison able to accommodate 5,000 people. This prison was used not only for the Mukachevo Rayon but also for some adjoining rayons. From 1945 on there were always an average of 4,000 convicts in this prison, of whom at any one time at least 1,000 were from the Mukachevo region.
2. It would be wrong to assume that crime in the Carpatho-Ukraine had increased with the establishment of the Soviet regime. On the contrary, [REDACTED] the number of murders and robberies considerably decreased under the new order. This was not because of any merit of the Communist system, but rather as a result of the new economic and security conditions created in the country:
 - a. Before World War II the standard of living in the Carpatho-Ukraine had been very high. There had been many national and local holidays, harvest festivities, etc., where people used to drink a great deal of homemade plum brandy and start fights in which quite often some people were killed;
 - b. The police force under Czechoslovak rule was very small. There were practically no guards keeping watch over warehouses, large stores, or industrial enterprises. Recently the militia had been large and strong, and practically all warehouses, government stores, offices, plants, and factories were guarded either by armed militia or civilian guards. As a result of this fact, it had

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become quite difficult to carry out a robbery and the number of robberies had considerably diminished.

3. Although [redacted] the number of murders committed under the influence of liquor had decreased, [redacted] until 1948-1949 there were quite a number of political killings in the Carpatho-Ukraine. Usually the perpetrators of these crimes were never discovered, and the blame was placed on Ukrainian nationalist partisans. [redacted] a case in 1947 when a high Soviet functionary was attacked and killed at night on his way to L'vov by car through the Carpathian Mountains. The same year the president of the rayon soviet in Irshava (30 km. southeast of Mukachevo) was killed in a restaurant in the daytime. A number of killings took place in villages during the collectivization campaign.
4. Incidents of theft and pickpocketing had skyrocketed compared to former times. The standard of living in the country had become very low [redacted] and this had led some people who would never before have thought of violating the law to commit some petty crime.
5. The Soviet system brought with it new types of crime hitherto unheard of in the Carpatho-Ukraine. They were:
 - a. Misappropriation and mismanagement of state property;
 - b. Political crimes; and
 - c. Speculation and black marketing [redacted]

Within these three categories of law violations fell about 90% of the sentences handed down by the courts in the Carpatho-Ukraine from 1945 to 1952.

6. The vast Soviet administrative system required a large number of state officials whose only qualifications, at least initially, were political reliability and proletarian ancestors. Entrusted with government funds and property, these people were very often guilty of mismanagement and even outright misappropriation of funds and property. Low-ranking Soviet employees and workers especially had no regard for government property. To them the term "government property" meant "nobody's property". "If I don't take it, somebody else will", was the reasoning one frequently heard. According to Soviet law, mismanagement and misappropriation of state property was punishable by up to 10 years in a corrective labor camp. Connected with sabotage, the same crimes were punishable with sentences of up to 25 years.
7. There were many political crimes of all types in the Carpatho-Ukraine, [redacted] break them down into four main groups:
 - a. Political crimes having to do with individuals' former activity during the Czechoslovak rule or during World War II;
 - b. Objection to and open criticism of the regime;
 - c. Lagging in production and failure to meet production plans, with no criminal intent;
 - d. Economic and industrial sabotage.
8. Criticism of the regime, which was quite widespread, when testified to by witnesses in court, brought sentences of up to 10 years in a corrective labor camp. Anti-state activity proved by compromising material found in a defendant's possession was punishable by sentences of up to 25 years. Most often, however, these crimes were

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reported by denouncers who were MGB or MVD agents or activists who, of course, did not appear in court to testify. In such cases, when the defendant did not plead guilty, he was detained in prison while investigation continued. Investigation included searches of the defendant's office and apartment; if nothing incriminating was discovered, evidence was usually planted anyway, and the person was sentenced for "its having been discovered in his possession". In order to give more credence to the results of such searches, normally carried out by the militia, local authorities such as the kolkhozy president would be invited to accompany the search party. In the presence of these neutral people, the compromising material was just as easily planted, and often the neutrals were even led to discover it.

9. Absenteeism, lagging in production, and failure to meet production and work norms, when not connected with sabotage, was punishable by several years of corrective labor camp. Here, of course, just as everywhere, the political standing and activity of the individual concerned played a predominant part in the severity of the sentence, which in the case of a reliable Party member, might be completely waived.
10. The most nebulous crime (dealt with in the most arbitrary way) was that of economic and industrial sabotage. Breakdown of a machine or of a truck, an accident, or even a mishap due to natural causes could be construed at any time by the courts as sabotage and be punished by up to 20 years of corrective labor camp. All political crimes, in addition to sentences of imprisonment, resulted in the confiscation of the defendant's property.
11. The low standard of living and variations in prices from market to market led many people to indulge in speculation and black marketing. Because of the risks, less lucrative projects were not undertaken; the punishment for black market activity or speculation was up to seven years in corrective labor camp.
12. Inmates of the Mukachevo prison were those who were either transient inmates or who had been sentenced to up to three years of corrective labor camp. They worked under guard during the daytime in various industrial enterprises in and around Mukachevo, and in the evening they were brought back to prison. [REDACTED]
13. Out of 1,000 convicts from the Mukachevo region in the prison, [REDACTED] that they could be grouped by their crimes as follows:
 - a. Premeditated murder - 2 or 3
 - b. Unpremeditated murder - 5
 - c. Armed robbery - 10
 - d. Theft and pickpocketing - 100
 - e. Misappropriation - 500
 - f. Speculation and black marketing - 200
 - g. Political crimes of all types - 200
14. There was no corrective labor camp in the territory of the Carpathian Oblast. Usually prisoners with sentences of more than three years were sent either to the eastern Ukraine or to Siberia.

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